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Thomas Aquinas’ Exposition of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Developments in His Thought and Rival Interpretations

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Despite the renewed interest in the moral theology of St. Thomas since the time of Leo XIII, little attention has been paid to the topic of the gifts of the Holy Spirit among moral theologians, which is puzzling considering St. Thomas viewed the gifts as necessary for the moral life. Among the few scholars who discuss the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a considerable disagreement has emerged regarding how to understand St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate an account of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit through an examination of the development of his doctrine of the gifts within his writings as a way to decide between the differing accounts.

First, this study surveys the historical development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to show the scriptural foundations of the gifts, an emerging understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in the writings of the Church Fathers, and the efforts of systematizing the virtues and gifts in the writings of the Scholastic authors prior to St. Thomas. Second, this study presents the two differing accounts for understanding St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit with attention to the specific areas of disagreement between these rival accounts. Third, this study examines the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the
gifts of the Holy Spirit. This close textual study reveals how St. Thomas, for most of his work, consistently held one view of the gifts, but in his later work, wrote a different account of the gifts. Fourth, this dissertation concludes by focusing on the areas of development in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts with specific attention on the use of the term *instinctus* and by adjudicating the areas of disagreement between the rival accounts.

__________________________________________
William C. Mattison III, Ph.D., Director

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Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D., Reader

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To Katherine, my wife
For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God. For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a spirit of adoption. When we cry, “Abba! Father!” it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ.…

—St. Paul, Letter to the Romans
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Introduction

St. Thomas Aquinas, in the *Summa Theologiae, Prima-secundae*, question sixty-eight, takes up the question of the meaning of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and of the gifts’ relationship to the infused virtues (cardinal and theological) in human action. In recent theological scholarship, the nature of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and their relationship to the infused virtues in the moral life have been taken seriously by only a few scholars, which is a significant omission especially in light of St. Thomas’ own position on these gifts as being necessary for salvation.¹ Among those who explore the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a considerable disagreement exists concerning how St. Thomas explains the nature and role of the gifts and their relationship to the infused virtues.

There are two differing schools of thought concerning the role of the gifts vis-à-vis the infused virtues. In the first, which is labeled here the Standard Two Modes account given its clear dominance within Thomist circles, the authors argue for two modes of action in man toward his supernatural end: one human and one above/beyond the human. In the human mode, the human person with the infused virtues acts without the gifts of the Holy Spirit toward his supernatural end. In the above/beyond the human mode (*supra humanum modum*), the human person with gifts of the Holy Spirit acts

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toward his supernatural end. The major proponents of the Standard Two Modes account are Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and Romanus Cessario.

In the second, which I label the Rival Two Modes account, the authors argue that there are two modes of human action, like the Standard Two Modes account, but describes these two modes differently. For the Rival Two Modes account, the first mode consists of the human person with the acquired virtues acting toward his connatural end. The second mode entails the human person with the infused virtues and gifts acting toward his supernatural end. Thus, the infused virtues do not operate without the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Recent proponents of this school are Servais Pinckaers and Angela McKay (now Knobel).

Both of the above accounts employ similar language concerning the infused virtues and gifts, and both argue that they are faithfully following St. Thomas’ position regarding the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The differences in these two accounts can be traced, in part, to how these scholars approach St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his earlier work the *Scriptum super Sententiiis* and its use in developing St. Thomas’ understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa theologiae*. Cajetan in his commentary on the *Summa theologiae* q. 68, a. 1 explicitly refers to Thomas’ earlier doctrine of the gifts found in the *Scriptum*. John of St. Thomas uses this text in his treatise on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Cursus Theologicus*. Garrigou-Lagrange and Cessario both explicitly refer to John of St. Thomas and follow his treatise on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Pinckaers and McKay, on the other hand, do not read the *Summa* with a prior commitment to Thomas’ claims in the *Scriptum* but
rather read Thomas’ teaching in the *Summa* on its own, despite any tensions with Thomas’ earlier claims in the *Scriptum*. In light of the renewed interest in Thomist virtue ethics, the two differing accounts deserve a closer examination in order to see which account more closely resembles Thomas’ own understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify an account of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit through an examination of the development of his doctrine of the gifts within his writings as a way to adjudicate between the differing aforementioned accounts.

This project unfolds in four chapters. In Chapter 1, I focus on the historical development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit prior to St. Thomas in three parts. First, I develop a description of the scriptural foundations of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Old and New Testaments, particularly with the texts of Isaiah 11:2-3 establishing the qualities of the spirit and Revelation 1 connecting the number *seven* with spirits. Second, I show how the early Church Fathers develop an understanding of the Holy Spirit as a guide in Christian lives and with attention to the use of Isaiah 11:2-3 in these developments. In particular, Augustine and Gregory the Great serve as important authorities for later medieval reflection on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Third, I detail the theological development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the scholastic period prior to St. Thomas. In particular, the scholastic writers present attempts at understanding how the gifts of the Holy Spirit fit into the moral life as well as how to describe the gifts using such terms as receptivity and *habitus*, among others. These three parts help illuminate how the writers of the Christian tradition prior to St. Thomas advance the doctrine of the
gifts of the Holy Spirit that set the stage for St. Thomas’ unique contribution to understanding the gifts in his writings.

In Chapter 2, I detail the Standard Two Modes and Rival Two Modes accounts. In the first part of chapter 2, I evaluate the writings of John of Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and Romanus Cessario to express the traditional Thomist account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The authors of the Standard Two Modes account explain that St. Thomas’ understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit involves a two-mode distinction that explains how the human person achieves meritorious works: the first mode, the human mode, concerns the human person and the infused virtues under the rule of human reason; the second mode, the above/beyond the human mode (*supra humanum modum*), concerns the Holy Spirit in the gifts moving the human person under the rule of divine reason. In both modes, the human person is capable of achieving meritorious acts, but in the second mode, the above/beyond the human mode, the human person accomplishes such meritorious acts with facility and perfection that he could not accomplish solely with the infused virtues under human reason.

The second part of chapter 2 describes a more recent view of St. Thomas' teaching on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which I call the Rival Two Modes account. Servais Pinckaers and Angela McKay are among the scholars who articulate this account. These scholars argue, similarly to the Standard Two Modes account, that there are two modes of human action. The first mode of human action is the human person acting with the acquired virtues under the rule of reason toward his connatural end. The second mode of human action is the human person acting with the infused virtues and gifts together under
the rule of divine reason toward his supernatural end. The authors of the Rival Two Modes hold that to place the gifts of the Holy Spirit in a separate mode, as a higher mode than the infused virtues as the Standard Two Modes account does, misses the importance of the gifts as being always necessary for the human person acting toward his supernatural end. In evaluating these two accounts of the gifts, I note four areas of disagreement, which I will adjudicate in chapter 4.

In Chapter 3, I give an account of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and specify the areas of development in St. Thomas account chronologically starting with his earliest work on the gifts in the Super Isaiam commentary, then in his Scriptum super Sententiiis, and next in his commentary Super Galatas. In these three earlier works, St. Thomas develops an account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that speaks of two modes of human action toward one’s supernatural end that closely reflects the account of the Standard Two Modes. I conclude the chapter with an analysis of his doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa theologiae, which is St. Thomas’ most mature treatment of the gifts. I assert that St. Thomas advances his doctrine of the gifts in six different areas from his treatment of the gifts in Super Isaiam, Scriptum super Sententiiis, and Super Galatas to the Summa theologiae. It is his treatment of the gifts in the Summa theologiae that more closely resembles the account of the Rival Two Modes.

In Chapter 4, I focus on various points of development in St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts. First, I argue that St. Thomas’ use of the term *instinctus* with the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa theologiae significantly alters his doctrine concerning the gifts and is key to understanding how St. Thomas develops his doctrine of the gifts. Second, I contend that St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts of the Holy Spirit undergoes further
development from his earlier works to his more mature work, the *Summa theologiae*. To underscore this development, I examine five further developments (mentioned in Chapter Three) where St. Thomas advances his account of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae* from previous accounts. Third, I examine the four areas of dispute between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts and determine that the Rival Two Modes account provides a more attentive read of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by focusing on his later, more mature work that takes into consideration how St. Thomas develops his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Chapter 1

Historical Development of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit Prior to St. Thomas Aquinas

In order to understand St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, one must understand three things: 1) the scriptural foundations for the gifts of the Holy Spirit; 2) how the Church Fathers developed a theology of the Holy Spirit and its relation to the gifts of the Holy Spirit; and 3) how scholastic theologians prior to St. Thomas dealt with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The task in this chapter is not to discuss every scriptural text or theologian that wrote on the gifts of the Holy Spirit prior to St. Thomas. That task would be several monographs by themselves, and such tasks have been handled well by other scholars.¹

My task in this chapter is threefold: 1) to develop an account of the scriptural foundations for the gifts of the Holy Spirit that involves the use of Isaiah 11:2-3 as the primary text for the qualities that became synonymous with the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the importance of Revelation 1:4-5 for connecting the number *seven* for spirits; 2) to elaborate how the early Church Fathers develop their understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit as guide in the lives of Christians and in particular through references to the text of Isaiah 11:2-3; and 3) to document the theological development on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in three varying views in the scholastic period prior to St. Thomas with specific connections to St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts. These three tasks serve to show how writers in the Christian tradition develop the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit who serve as precursors to St. Thomas’ treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which I describe in chapter three. As I discuss in chapter three, St. Thomas shows his awareness of the differing opinions concerning the nature and role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Scriptum super Sententias* and in the *Summa theologiae* and indeed builds on some of these theories to create his own innovative approach to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his work.

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Part I. Foundations in Sacred Scripture

When one examines the Old and New Testaments, one finds key Old and New Testament texts that serve as the basis for a doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Church Fathers and later scholastic theologians. In the Old Testament, the key text to examine is Isaiah 11:2-3; in the New Testament, the Book of Revelation and its mentioning of seven spirits are integral to future discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Also in the New Testament are other texts that refer to the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of believers and in particular regarding baptism that provide additional biblical texts for reflection in the early Church.\(^2\) There are two goals in this section. First I use modern scholarship, both biblical and historical, to help develop an account of the scriptural foundations for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This is done to illuminate those key texts that help establish the list of qualities of the spirit and the numbering of the spirits. Second, I show, using modern scholarship, that there is a significant warrant in scripture itself for the writers of the Christian tradition to account for the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The principal text of the Old Testament that serves as a basis for the gifts of the Holy Spirit is Isaiah 11:2-3.\(^3\) This is the text that the early Church Fathers use to develop

\(^2\) It is no surprise when in the early Church, certain Fathers connect the work of the Spirit in baptism to the baptism of Jesus with a reference to Isaiah 11:2-3. I speak more of this toward the end of this section.

an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Its use is not without some difficulty, as I discuss further along. The historical context in this section of Isaiah is “Isaiah’s involvement in the crisis of the Syro-Ephraimite war (734 BCE).” The section of Isaiah 11 that serves as the biblical text for the gifts of the Holy Spirit occurs as one of “two poems about the future kingdom of peace and justice.” Isaiah 11:2-3 reads as follows: “2 The spirit of the LORD shall rest on him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and fear of the LORD. 3 His delight shall be in the fear of the LORD.” The word “spirit” is translated from the Greek word *pneuma* or from the Hebrew word *ruach*, which means “breath, air, wind, or soul.” In


5 Blenkinsopp, 976. This is a point that is debated among the scholars of the Old Testament. See Wonsuk Ma, *Until the Spirit Comes: the Spirit of God in the Book of Isaiah* (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 33-7. This debate does not have any great significance on the analysis of Isaiah 11 for an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. I am referencing one scholar’s viewpoint to help illuminate an understanding of the text.

6 Is 11:2-3. NRSV. It is important to note that while I am using a modern critical English translation of the text in this historical section, in chapter three, I discuss the Vulgate edition that St. Thomas uses and how that particular translation bears upon his work since the Vulgate relies upon the Septuagint (LXX) and not the Hebrew. I discuss verse three in the following examination of the verses. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Gardeil, “Dons du Saint-Esprit,” 1750-1.

the Old Testament, the word *rûach* appears 378 times and of those 378 times, it appears fifty times in Isaiah.\(^8\)

The passage from Isaiah 11 speaks of a future ruler of Israel who will be given spiritual endowments. And this new ruler will be in the line of King David.\(^9\) The “spirit of the LORD” is a familiar Old Testament motif, and it displays God’s role in providing the necessary endowments for the ruler to lead as God calls him to lead.\(^10\) One difference in this motif in the Isaiah passage is that the Spirit of the LORD rests upon “the future David, as though he were to be its permanent abode” as opposed to the Spirit of the LORD more commonly “coming upon” or “falling upon” other individuals.\(^11\)

Determining the exact meaning of these spiritual endowments proves difficult since the six Hebrew terms used have different nuances and connotations from their

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\(^8\) Congar, 3, 7.

\(^9\) Is 11:1 “A shoot will come from the stump of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots.” See also 1 Sm 16:11-13 and 2 Sm 7:1-16 for ties to the story of David and future leaders in David’s lineage. See also Mi 5:1ff for another prediction about a future ruler. For more about this prediction of a future ruler for Israel and similar predictions in the ancient world, see Hans Wildberger, *Isaiah 1-12: A Commentary*, trans. Thomas H. Trapp (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 463-4. For a perspective that disagrees with Wildberger’s comment that this is about a future event, see Watts, *Isaiah 1-33*, 208-9. Instead Watts proposes that this prophecy concerns the status of the Davidic kingship, which is reduced amid division of the kingdom and the recent rule of a vassal.

\(^10\) See Nm 11:17, 25, 26; Dt 34:10; 1 Sm 10:6; 1 Sm 16:13, 23, 18:10, 19:9.

English equivalents. However, it is useful to offer some basic understanding of these endowments in the context of their Hebrew meaning as a way to show the connection between the tradition of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and scripture. “The first pair of terms [wisdom and understanding] seem to designate the deeper intellectual qualities of a good ruler.” The term “wisdom”, hochmah, O’Connor notes, is “rich in religious connotation” so it is difficult to determine exactly what it refers to in this context. The term “understanding”, binah, often appears as a synonym of wisdom. Wildberger writes that wisdom may refer to that which “can handle problems of daily living” whereas understanding may refer to those “intellectual abilities which are necessary for one to see beyond the details of a particular situation, make an appropriate assessment, and come to conclusions about necessary decisions.”

The second pair of terms, counsel and might, concern more practical qualities that a ruler needs. “Counsel”, hetsah, “is a quality of mind enabling him [a ruler] to concoct


13 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 84. See similar usage in Dt 1:13 and 1 Kgs 3:12, 5:9.

14 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 84. Joseph Jensen writes that “[i]t can be argued that, for Isaiah, true wisdom resides in Yahweh alone and that it comes to humans only by his gift, as here it comes to the messianic king through Yahweh’s spirit. The wisdom tradition, which, especially in its origins, was empirically oriented, came to the position that true wisdom came from God (Prov 8:10; 9:11; Sir 1:1, 5-7), and in this pilgrimage Isaiah seems to have played an important role.” Joseph Jensen, O.S.B., Isaiah 1-39, 152.

15 Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12, 472.

a plan by which to achieve his purpose,” and “might” (or power or strength as it could be translated), *g’burah*, “is here chiefly a moral quality but also connotes a physical strength that a ruler may need to use in order to execute his plans accordingly.” The third pair of words has primarily a religious meaning. “Knowledge”, *dahath*, “may be taken as knowledge of God, i.e., that which arises from a faithful meditation on God’s word and from a life in accord with his will.” “Fear of the LORD”, *yirath Yahweh*, involves the proper reverence for God, otherwise known as piety. Wildberger comments that this pair “is the decisive terminology” for Isaiah since “both words are central concepts for describing the Yahweh faith.”

So far I have examined six spiritual endowments in pairs. Writers on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Christian tradition following on this passage take verse three as the seventh spiritual endowment; it is a repetition of the sixth spiritual endowment – fear of the LORD. O’Connor notes that in verse three, the term translated as “delight” is *herich*, a hiphil form of the same root (*ruach*) from which the Hebrew word for spirit (*ruach*) derives. Hence there is a very close parallel between this and the preceding line…. In Hebrew parallelism is more noticeable, leading some critics to reject the second line as a dittograph of the first. The majority retains it, however, and following them, one may

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17 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 84. Wildberger makes note that these qualities are connected with a king’s military prowess but not only there since these qualities also have “civil applications.” See Wildberger, *Isaiah 1-12*, 472.

18 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 84. Watts, in *Isaiah 1-33*, 210, notes that “the fear of YHWH” is a complex phrase, despite being so common in the OT. The complexity begins with the old question of whether it is a subjective or objective genitive. Does the fear come from YHWH, or is it directed toward YHWH? Hebrew does not distinguish the two. Probably overtones of both should be heard in the phrase.”

suppose that the second line [verse three] is a conscious variation on the theme of the first [the last part of the third pair of verse two].

In the Septuagint text of Isaiah, in the last pair of verse two, “fear of the LORD” becomes “piety” (εὐσεβεία) while verse three remains “fear of the LORD.” This change in the Septuagint text, which serves as the basis for the Old Testament in the Vulgate Bible that those in the Latin-Western Christian Church would use, provides the grounds for seven spiritual endowments. Does the repetition of “fear of the LORD” and what appear to be six spiritual endowments in this text of Isaiah render future reflection on the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit as contrived? The Thomist scholar Edward O’Connor does not think so.

In support of his argument, O’Connor points to three features that help support the possibility of seven spiritual endowments. First, O’Connor argues that the list in Isaiah 11:2-3 “by its length and style, suggests the idea of a certain plentitude, which is one of the chief meanings attributed to the number seven by the [early Church] Fathers.”

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20 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 85. Wildberger thinks that this verse is a dittograph but then goes onto say that this gloss “underscores once again the great importance attached to fear of God.” See Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12, 473.

21 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 85. O’Connor speculates that the Septuagint may have revised verse 2 to avoid repetition.

22 Watts in his commentary on Isaiah notes that “The phrase here [in verse 3] echoes v.2 and implies that the spirit’s work in the king brings genuine devotion, a real ... “delight,” to his worship and service, or that such devotion is the Spirit’s delight.” Watts, Isaiah 1-33, 210.

23 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 85. Jean-Pierre Ruiz, footnote regarding 1:4-8 of Revelation in The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 3rd ed., edited by Michael D. Coogan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 422 (NT) notes that the number seven is the number “of completion [of a ritual in Lv 4, 6; of divine punishment in Lv 26, 27-28] or wholeness” and it is also “the most important symbolic number in [the Book of]
while the actual list of Isaiah 11:2-3 may not list seven endowments, it gives the impression, due to the way it is written, that there is an abundance of spiritual endowments which would match up with the Church Fathers readily identifying this list with seven spiritual endowments.

Second, O’Connor notes that the phrase “fear of the LORD” actually in Hebrew had a much richer connotation than the English rendering would suggest. “One might suggest that the fundamental and all-pervasive character of fear of Yahweh may be the reason why it is reiterated with special emphasis at the end of this list of the attributes, as if to say, ‘Fear of Yahweh pervades every breath that he draws.’”

Thus O’Connor argues that the combination of “fear of the LORD” and “piety” help provide a richer connotation that underlies what the Hebrew phrase “yirath Yahweh” means.

Third, O’Connor also makes the case that one should not take the six spiritual endowments as six separate and distinct features. Rather, these terms overlap and in some cases could be used synonymously. "Thus we read in Hosea 14, 9, Whoever is wise, let him understand these things; whoever is discerning, let him know them. After declaring that God alone knows the place of wisdom and understanding, Job 28, 28 turns to man and says, Fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is

Revelation” which is the locus for reflection about the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit for the early Church Fathers.

24 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 85. Wildberger is of a similar opinion concerning this passage’s reference to the Messiah. See Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12, 473.

25 As I noted earlier, Jensen makes this same point concerning the overlap of the spiritual endowments. See Jensen, Isaiah 1-39, 132.
In the passage from Job, the writer of Job uses two terms synonymously as in the case of “fear of the Lord” is “wisdom” even though they clearly have different nuances as shown earlier in this section. Thus one could say that these Old Testament passages, as well as others, point to how these six spiritual endowments are similar to each other and at times synonymous in character. In the end, O’Connor argues that “it does not seem to be the purpose of this text to give a complete list of the workings of the Holy Spirit, or of any definite category of them, but to depict the salient characteristics of the messianic king (as he will eventually be called) to be imparted to him by the Spirit.” These are the spiritual endowments that the Church Fathers turn to when trying to specify the role of the Holy Spirit.

The New Testament writers begin to consider the role of the Holy Spirit in the moral life, explicitly and implicitly. While no single text lists the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the early Church Fathers do draw upon certain texts that serve as the basis for their reflection. The author of the Book of Revelation mentioning seven spirits in various passages becomes a focal text for connecting the number seven with spirits in the early

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26 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 85.

27 O’Connor, Appendix 1, 86. See Jer 23:5-6 for a comparable text of spiritual attributes of a leader in the Davidic line. Wildberger also writes that the “concept that every human being will participate in the gift of the Spirit appears at a relatively late time: Ez 11:19; 36:26ff; cf also the theme of the outpouring of the Spirit: Is 32:15, 61:1; Jl 3:1ff, and cf. Ps. 51:12; Zec 12:10, 13:2. As O’Connor later states in relation to the Book of Revelation in the New Testament, “the text of Isaiah made it possible to concretize the spirits which the Apocalypse presents abstractly.” I examine the role the texts of Revelation play in the development of the role of the Holy Spirit in the next section of this chapter.

Church. In chapter 1 of Revelation, one reads: “Grace to you and peace from him who is and who was and who is to come, and from the seven spirits who are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ…” As commentators note, the reference to “seven spirits” may be a reference to Isaiah 11:2-3 or to the seven angels of God in Tobit 12:15 and 1 Enoch 20:1-8.

Chapter 3 of Revelation, in a passage that refers to Jesus Christ, reads: “…These are the words of him who has the seven spirits of God and the seven stars.” Further in

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31 Jean-Pierre Ruiz, footnote regarding 1:4-8 of Revelation in The New Oxford Annotated Bible 3rd ed., edited by Michael D. Coogan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 422 (NT). See also Gardeil, “Dons du Saint-Esprit,” 1751. Gardeil is of the opinion that the references to the seven spirits and angels are no doubt references to the Book of Tobit and 1 Enoch. He basis his opinion upon the work of W. Bousset, Die Offenbarung Johnnis (Goettingue, 1896), 215 and also J. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinité (Paris, 1910), 373, 507-10. But in the end, Gardeil cautions against a literal reading of the text and leaves open other ways to interpret the text; he also notes that the texts of Revelation do provide the Church Fathers with an impetus for codifying the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. J. Massyngberde Ford in Revelation, Yale Anchor Bible 38, ed. William Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 377, commenting on the different interpretations notes that if the “spirits” reference “angels” in reference to Tb 12:15 and 1 Enoch 20:1-8, then it would be a rare case in OT and NT scripture in which angels are referred to as spirits. Regarding the second option, that the spirits refer to Is 11:2-3 and the Holy Spirit, Ford notes, “This interpretation fits better with the seven spirits in the throne visions of Rv 4:5, 5:6 (collated with Zec 3:9, 4:10).” Ford also offers a third possible interpretation in which the seven spirits concern seven blessings found in a Qumran scroll. For a lengthy defense of the view that the seven spirits are angels, see Aune, Revelation 1-5, 34-5. For a more general discussion of “spirit” in Revelation, see Aune, Revelation 1-5, 36.

32 Rv 3:1.
chapter 4, in describing a throne in heaven, it reads, “Coming from the throne are flashes of lightning, and rumblings, and peals of thunder, and in front of the throne burn seven flaming torches, which are the seven spirits of God…”\textsuperscript{33} Then in chapter 5, again within the context of a description of the heavenly scene, it reads, “Then I saw between the throne and the four living creatures and among the elders a Lamb standing as if it had been slaughtered, having seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of God sent out into all the earth.”\textsuperscript{34} The text from Revelation 5 bears an interesting connection to Isaiah 11. Revelation 5:5 speaks of the root of David, and as Harrington notes, “John’s text not only echoes Zech 4:10 but recalls Isa 11:2- the sevenfold Spirit of The Lord resting on the root of Jesse.”\textsuperscript{35}

While these particular texts of Revelation do not denote any particular qualities or endowments with the “seven spirits,” the Book of Revelation connects “the number seven with the Spirit’s activity.”\textsuperscript{36} This is an important feature in understanding why the number “seven” becomes connected with the work of the Holy Spirit. Just as the text from Isaiah solidified the qualities that the Holy Spirit imparts, the writer of the Book of Revelation contributes the number of “spirits” that brings these two facets from Isaiah and Revelation together in the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. In addition, these elements together help build the scriptural warrant for the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

\textsuperscript{33} Rv 4:5.
\textsuperscript{34} Rv 5:6.
\textsuperscript{36} O’Connor, Appendix I, 86.
No other texts in the New Testament serve as such a basis for the gifts as the texts from Revelation. But that does not mean the early Church Fathers do not draw upon other texts that concern the work of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament. For example, in Pauline literature, there are the references to spiritual gifts, which later will be called *gratia gratis data.* For St. Thomas Aquinas, these are different spiritual gifts than the gifts of the Holy Spirit; but for some early Church Fathers, these spiritual gifts, as mentioned in 1 Corinthians 12, are viewed as rival alternatives for the gifts of the Holy Spirit as mentioned in Isaiah 11. They are alternatives in the sense that some early Church Fathers view St. Paul’s writing as specifically attributing certain gifts to the work of the Holy Spirit. This mentioning of other gifts of the Spirit provides a context for these early Church Fathers to use this list as gifts of the Spirit. Besides spiritual gifts that appear as alternatives in the Church Fathers’ writings, the New Testament writings detail the activity of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification and adoption of believers into the life of God.

37 See 1 Cor 12 and St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111.

38 Gardeil, “*Dons du Saint-Esprit,***” 1752. “Parmi ces effets nous devons signaler comme offrant de nombreux contacts avec les dons du Saint-Esprit, les dons spirituels, plus tard distingués à part sous le nom de graces *gratis datae*, dont certaines caractéristiques analogues à celles des dons: *sermo sapientiae, scientiae, operatio virtutum, discretio spirituum*, ont souvent été employées par les Pères en concurrence avec les esprits énumérés par Isaié, pour développer la doctrine des dons proprement dits.” Emphasis in the original.

39 The first passage is John 3:1-21, which details a conversation between Nicodemus and Jesus. In reply to Nicodemus’ confusion concerning being reborn, Jesus responds: “Very truly, I tell you, no one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and Spirit. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit…. The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the
The New Testament offers a fertile ground for a rich theology of the Holy Spirit that begins to bear fruit in the Church Fathers. As Gardeil summarizes:

All evidence of the New Testament shows that there exists, from the first appearance of Christianity, a very affirming doctrine concerning the normal, continuous, and effective influence of the Holy Spirit on the just souls, concerning the gift that the Holy Spirit makes them of himself, its lights, its help in the fight against evil, to promote their supernatural sanctification and to ensure their salvation.⁴⁰

The gifts of the Holy Spirit, then, provide a way for the early Church Fathers to specify the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of believers in different ways; these different ways, of course, are based upon the scriptural foundations which they can refer to, especially the text of Isaiah 11:2-3 which solidifies the list of qualities associated with the spirit and the Book of Revelation which solidifies the number *seven* in conjunction with Spirit. (Jn 3:5-6, 8. In addition to the baptism required of Christians, the baptism of Jesus also is significant because it concerns the bestowing of the Spirit on Jesus. See Jn 1:29-34. Cf. Lk 3:21-22). The passage is in reference to the baptism that believers must undergo in order to be acceptable in the kingdom of God.

A second important passage is in Paul’s Letter to the Romans chapter 8. Paul speaks about living according to the Spirit as opposed to living according to the flesh. Paul says: “[Y]ou are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness…. So then, brothers and sisters, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh— for if you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the Spirit you will put to death the deeds of the body, you will live. For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God (Rom 8:9-10, 12-14. Cf. Gal 5:16-26). As Congar notes, “[b]y faith and baptism, the believer begins a life in and through the Spirit, serving ‘in the life of the Spirit’…. The Spirit who made the humanity of Jesus … a completed humanity of the Son of God … does the same with us, who are of the flesh from the moment of our birth and makes us of sons of God…” (Congar, 31).

spirits. In addition, the scriptural texts of Isaiah and Revelation help provide significant warrant for the development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as a topic of theological reflection in the early Church. In particular, Isaiah 11:2-3 proves valuable for seeing how St. Thomas understands the gifts of the Holy Spirit in consonance with the scriptural roots of the gifts.

Part II. The Church Fathers

The Church Fathers provide the first theological writings concerning the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of Christians and help develop the notion of the Holy Spirit in the gifts. In the Church Fathers two important ideas concerning the Holy Spirit are developed: 1) the role of the Holy Spirit as aiding human action and 2) the stabilization of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. I proceed through the Church Fathers in the following manner: 1) I examine prominent early Church Fathers who develop the role of the Holy Spirit, as one who aids the lives of Christians including some references to the list of Isaiah; 2) I consider key texts from Augustine and Gregory the Great as significant figures in the development of the role of the Holy Spirit especially when it comes to the sevenfold association with the action of the Holy Spirit and as key authorities for future Middle Age writers; 3) I offer a brief consideration of the term “gift” as it relates to the Holy Spirit in the Church Father period since this term has not always been connected with the sevenfold “spirits” as taken from the texts of Isaiah and Revelation. These three sections pave the way for understanding the more refined and detailed theological consideration of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Middle Ages.
Part II, A. Early Church Fathers

There are numerous Church Fathers in the first few centuries of Christianity that develop an understanding of the Holy Spirit in the lives of Christians and the church. Of these Church Fathers, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Origen are four notable Church Fathers for their contributions to a developing understanding of the Holy Spirit as one who aids human persons towards perfection in the Christian life. In some instances these Church Fathers develop this role of the Holy Spirit as prompting human action in connection with Isaiah 11:2-3.

Justin Martyr represents one of the first early Church Fathers who speaks about the role of the Holy Spirit in aiding the human person and connecting this aid with a partial list of the spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3. In his work, Dialogue with Trypho, in the first few chapters, Justin recounts his conversation with a stranger that leads to Justin’s conversion to the Christian faith. When Justin remarks that, according to Plato, God can only be apprehended by the mind, the stranger replies: “Is there then … such and so great power in our mind? Or can a man not perceive by sense sooner? Will the mind of man

see God at any time, if it is uninstructed by the Holy Spirit?"\(^{42}\) And towards the end of Justin’s encounter with the stranger, the stranger reveals that it was the Holy Spirit who filled the prophets with the truth about God and encourages Justin to pray for the wisdom and light that comes from God.\(^{43}\) Swete notes that this encounter with the stranger no doubt informs Justin’s understanding of baptism and the role of the Holy Spirit as instructor and revealer to new believers.\(^{44}\) When it comes to describing baptism and the role of the Holy Spirit, Justin connects the role of the Holy Spirit to a partial list of the spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3: “And this washing is called illumination, because they who learn these things are illuminated in their understandings.”\(^{45}\) Baptism illuminates the mind with the knowledge of God. And this turning to God opens one up to the gifts that God gives to his believers.

Therefore, just as God did not inflict His anger on account of those seven thousand men, even so He has now neither yet inflicted judgment, nor does inflict it, knowing that daily some [of you] are becoming disciples in the name of Christ, and quitting the path of error; who are also receiving gifts, each as he is worthy, illumined through the name of this Christ. For one receives the spirit of understanding, another of counsel, another of strength, another of healing, another of foreknowledge, another of teaching, and another of the fear of God.\(^{46}\)


\(^{43}\) Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 7, 198.


\(^{46}\) Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 39, 214.
The Holy Spirit, as the illuminator of the human mind, provides the necessary spirits (gifts) that help the human person live as a disciple of Christ. And as Labourdette notes, this list is not identical to Isaiah 11:2-3 but certainly borrows from it.47 So Justin Martyr’s writings on the Holy Spirit and baptism develop the role of the Holy Spirit as aiding the human person in the Christian life through various spirits and/or gifts.

In the writings of Tertullian, one begins to see a more developed notion of the Holy Spirit in the lives of Christians in regards to the perfection that the Holy Spirit imparts to believers. Tertullian writes, in *On the Veiling of Virgins*, “…the reason why the Lord sent the Paraclete was, that, since human mediocrity was unable to take in all things at once, discipline should, little by little, be directed, and ordained, and carried on to perfection, by that Vicar of the Lord, the Holy Spirit.”48 Tertullian notes the inability of humanity to do as it should, so the Holy Spirit aids humanity towards perfection. Further, he notes with more clarity that the “administrative office” of the Holy Spirit concerns:

the direction of discipline, the revelation of the Scriptures, the reformation of the intellect, the advancement toward the “better things…. Righteousness—for the God of righteousness and of creation is the same—was first in a rudimentary state, having a natural fear of God: from that stage it advanced, through the Law and the Prophets, to infancy; from that stage it passed, through the Gospel, to the fervor of youth: now, through the Paraclete, it is settling into maturity.49

47 Labourdette, “*Dons du Saint-Esprit,*” 1580. The text also seems to borrow from 1 Cor 12: 8-11 when it mentions healing and foreknowledge.

This last quote of Tertullian’s is quite interesting. Tertullian not only lays out the exact role of the Holy Spirit in the lives of Christians, that is directing humanity towards perfection, but also shows how the Holy Spirit has a fundamental role in the righteousness of Christian believers, and this new role for the Holy Spirit is the maturity of God’s salvific role in humanity.

One of the first early Church Fathers ever to offer a systematic presentation of the Christian faith is Irenaeus. Irenaeus echoes Tertullian when he writes “The Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied, and the fathers learned the things of God, and the righteous were led forth into the way of righteousness; and who in the end of the times was poured out in a new way upon mankind in all the earth, renewing man unto God.”

And then he echoes Justin when he states concerning baptism that

God the Father bestowing on us regeneration through His Son by the Holy Spirit. For as many as carry (in them) the Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son; and the Son brings them to the Father; and the Father causes them to possess incorruption. Without the Spirit it is not possible to behold the Word of God, nor without the Son can any draw near to the Father for the knowledge of the Father is the Son and the knowledge of the Son of God is through the Holy Spirit; and, according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Son ministers and the Spirit to whomsoever the Father wills and as He wills.

For Christian believers to come to knowledge of God the Father, one must gain such knowledge in Jesus Christ, the Son and Word of God, through the Holy Spirit. Irenaeus

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51 Irenaeus, The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 7, 3.
discusses the basic orientation of the Christian life towards God, and it is through Jesus Christ and by the Holy Spirit that Christians are reborn in baptism and thereby possess incorruption. For Irenaeus, it is the role of the Holy Spirit to bring the Christian believers closer to God. In other writings, Irenaeus refers to the Holy Spirit as “the ladder of ascent to God.” As Swete notes, the Holy Spirit “prepares man for the Son, who leads him to the Father.” In a way, Irenaeus represents a synthesis and development of his predecessors’ teaching on the Holy Spirit going back to Ignatius of Antioch.

Irenaeus also represents the first early Church Father who directly connects the spirit of God in Isaiah 11:2 to Jesus Christ. In a discussion of the effects of baptism upon Jesus, Irenaeus writes, “that the Spirit of God as a dove descended upon Him; this Spirit, of whom it was declared by Isaiah, ‘And the Spirit of God shall rest upon Him,’…. It is this same Spirit that is poured out upon believers in baptism. Irenaeus writes:

… the Spirit of God, who descended upon the Lord, should be diffused throughout all the earth, “the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and piety, the spirit of the fear of God.” This Spirit, again, He did confer upon the Church, sending throughout all the world the Comforter from heaven, from whence also the Lord tells us that the devil, like lightning, was cast down. Wherefore we have need of the dew of God, that we be not consumed by fire, nor be rendered unfruitful, and that where we have an accuser there we may have also an Advocate, the Lord commending to the Holy Spirit His own man, who had fallen among thieves, whom He Himself compassionated, and

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bound up his wounds, giving two royal *denaria*; so that we, receiving by the Spirit the image and superscription of the Father and the Son, might cause the *denarium* entrusted to us to be fruitful, counting out the increase [thereof] to the Lord."\(^{56}\)

Irenaeus connects all seven spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3 to the work of the Holy Spirit in the baptism of Christ and subsequently to all baptized Christians.\(^{57}\) This is how the faithful ascend to God through the Advocate, the Holy Spirit. Irenaeus, then, represents an early Church Father who has connected the seven spirits as translated in the Septuagint version of Isaiah with the work of the Spirit in the baptism of Jesus and then in the lives of believers.

Another early Church Father who makes a similar connection of the seven spirits of Isaiah 11 to the Holy Spirit is Origen. In his homilies on Leviticus and Numbers, Origen specifically makes mention of “the Spirit of God” and its “sevenfold virtue.”\(^{58}\) This is in the context of the Spirit of God resting on Jesus Christ as a prophet unlike other prophets, and in Jesus, he has the fullness of the sevenfold virtue in the Spirit of God. In


\(^{57}\) See Labourdette, “*Dons du Saint-Esprit*,” 1582.

\(^{58}\) Origen, “Homily VI,” in *Homilies on Numbers* in the *Ancient Christian Texts*, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, ed. Christopher A Hall (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2009), 22, 3 (page number then homily text reference). See also “Homily 8,” in Origen, *Homilies on Leviticus 1-16*, trans. Gary Wayne Barkley in The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation vol. 83, ed. Thomas P. Halton, et. al. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 175, 14. “Moreover, ‘the priest sprinkles some of the oil before the Lord seven times.’ For after all these rites which were celebrated for purification, after he was converted and reconciled to God, after the sacrifice of offerings, the order was that he call the sevenfold virtue of the Holy Spirit upon him…. The quotation is taken from Lev. 14:16, and it is in the context a priestly rite of purification for someone with leprosy.
his commentary on the gospel of Matthew, Origen makes reference to John the Baptist as being filled with multiple spirits.

[And that John “was filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother’s womb,” and separately, “came before Christ in the spirit and power of Elijah.” For it is possible for several spirits not only worse, but also better, to be in the same man.... But if, in order that the Saviour may impart to us of “the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and reverence,” he was filled also with the spirit of the fear of the Lord; it is possible also that these several good spirits may be conceived as being in the same person.59

In his homilies on Numbers and Leviticus as well as in his commentary on Matthew, Origen provides a connection between the Holy Spirit to the spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3 and also refers them to virtues.

In other works, Origen also develops a rich Trinitarian theology and elaborates on the Holy Spirit and the sanctification of believers. In De Principiis, Origen writes:

God the Father bestows upon all, existence; and participation in Christ, in respect of His being the word of reason, renders them rational beings. From which it follows that they are deserving either of praise or blame, because capable of virtue and vice. On this account, therefore, is the grace of the Holy Ghost present, that those beings which are not holy in their essence may be rendered holy by participating in it. Seeing, then, that firstly, they derive their existence from God the Father; secondly, their rational nature from the Word; thirdly, their holiness from the Holy Spirit,—those who have been previously sanctified by the Holy Spirit are again made capable of receiving Christ, in respect that He is the righteousness of God; and those who have earned advancement to this grade by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit, will nevertheless obtain the gift of wisdom according to the power and working of the Spirit of God.60


In this passage, Origen connects the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to humanity in that it is through the Father that the human person exists, and it is through the Son that the human person is a rational being, and it is through the Spirit that the human person becomes holy. Origen further stresses that the Holy Spirit pours out various gifts for the progress of believers in sanctification such that “he may make so great an advance in holiness and purity, that the nature which he received from God may become such as is worthy of Him who gave it to be pure and perfect, so that the being which exists may be as worthy as He who called it into existence.”61 Of course the consummation of this perfection will not come about in this life but only in the next but the process of and progress in sanctification begins in this life and most especially through the Holy Spirit.

It is in the works of Justin, Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Origen that the role of the Holy Spirit becomes closely associated with the passage from Isaiah 11, particularly in relation to the baptism of Jesus. Even more so, a theology of the Holy Spirit develops that underscores the role of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification of believers, first in baptism, and throughout believers’ lives towards the final consummation of perfection with God in heaven. Again, in this role of aiding the human person in the Christian life the Holy Spirit is associated with Isaiah 11 and the role of “spirits” in the lives of Christians.

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61 Origen, De Principiis, Book I, 3, 8, 244.
Part II, B. Augustine and Gregory the Great

Toward the end of the early Church, two significant theologians, Augustine and Gregory the Great, continue the development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by furthering the role of the Spirit as one who aids the Christian life and by further specifying the role of the spirits/gifts. Augustine’s theology of the Holy Spirit specifies the terms “love” and “gift” in particular to name the Holy Spirit; in addition, Augustine develops the role of the Holy Spirit as sanctifier of the Christian life and in particular with connection to the list from Isaiah 11:2-3; finally Augustine importantly develops a connection between the spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3 with the Beatitudes and petitions of the Our Father prayer. In a similar manner, Gregory the Great develops a theology of the Holy Spirit involving the sevenfold work of the Holy Spirit as remedies for vices and as ways to understand the working of grace. Both Augustine’s and Gregory the Great’s treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit become the two main competing accounts for the gifts in the Middle Ages.  

Augustine’s contributions are twofold for St. Thomas. First, Augustine provides a theology of the Holy Spirit that gives such names as love and gift to the Holy Spirit. Second, Augustine speaks of the spirits of Isaiah in connection with the sanctification of believers. In one of his earlier works, Augustine notes that the Holy Spirit is rightly called the “Gift of God.” Augustine affirms this title of the Holy Spirit in *On the

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62 To provide just two examples of their later influence, Anselm of Laon utilizes Augustine’s schema of virtues, gifts, and beatitudes while Hugh of St. Victor follows Gregory the Great’s understanding of the gifts as remedies for vices.

Trinity, his mature treatment on the Trinity, when he says “For the Spirit is a gift eternally, but a thing that has been given in time.” Additionally, for Augustine, it is on account of the Holy Spirit as love that one can understand the Holy Spirit as gift.

Augustine says that

There is no gift of God more excellent than this. It alone distinguishes the sons of the eternal kingdom and the sons of eternal perdition. Other gifts, too, are given by the Holy Spirit; but without love they profit nothing. Unless, therefore, the Holy Spirit is so far imparted to each, as to make him one who loves God and his neighbor, he is not removed from the left hand to the right. Nor is the Spirit specially called the Gift, unless on account of love.

Augustine’s efforts at explaining the role of the Holy Spirit as love and gift proves formative for future generations who turn to Augustine’s account of the Trinity.

A second important contribution of St. Augustine lies in his treatment of the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of Christians. As Swete notes, Augustine “sees, more clearly perhaps than any Latin theologian before his time had seen, how entirely the life of the soul depends upon the work of the Spirit of Christ for knowledge, and yet more for love.” In De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae, Augustine writes, “It is through love, then,


that we become conformed to God…. And this is done by the Holy Spirit. ‘For hope,’ he says, ‘does not confound us; for the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which is given to us.’”

It is also in this second contribution of Augustine that one sees his development of the role of the Holy Spirit in light of Isaiah 11: 2-3. Augustine, in one of his letters discussing what man has vis-à-vis God, says

"For, what has he that he has not received? And if he has received it, why does he glory as if he had not received it? Just as a man would not have wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear of God unless, according to the Prophet’s words, he had received “the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, of counsel and of fortitude, of knowledge and of godliness, and of fear of God,’ and just as he would not have power and love and sobriety, except by receiving the Spirit of whom the Apostle speaks…."

Augustine makes the point that the human person only shares in wisdom, understanding, etc. because of the Holy Spirit in him as the “spirits” of Isaiah 11:2-3. It is the Holy Spirit that helps “men to believe, but after His indwelling He helps them as believers.”

As a means to develop further the the role of the Holy Spirit in the lives of Christians, Augustine “ingeniously correlated the seven operationes of the Holy Spirit

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with the Beatitudes” of the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew’s Gospel. In his

*Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount*, Augustine begins with a reflection on

the different beatitudes. Having reviewed the beatitudes, Augustine writes:

It seems to me, therefore, that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirit,
of which Isaias speaks, coincides with these stages and maxims. However,
the order is different. In Isaias, the enumeration begins from the higher,
while here it begins from the lower; in the former, it starts from wisdom
and ends at the fear of God. But, ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom.’ Therefore, if we ascend step by step, as it were, while we
enumerate, the first grade is love of God; the second is piety, the third is
knowledge; the fourth is fortitude; the fifth is counsel; the sixth is
understanding; the seventh is wisdom.

Augustine is attempting to reconcile the ordering of the sevenfold operation of the Spirit
in Isaiah 11:2-3 with the Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount.

Isaiah 11:2-3 begins with what Augustine interprets as the highest of the
operations, wisdom, and ends with fear of the Lord. The Beatitudes begin with “poor in
spirit” and end with “peacemakers”. Augustine then proceeds to go through each of the
sevenfold operations of the Spirit and identify them with the seven Beatitudes. For
example, “The fear of God corresponds to the humble, of whom it is here said, ‘Blessed

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70 Edward O’Connor, C.S.C., Appendix II: The Fathers of the Church to *Summa theologicae* vol. 24 by St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 91. As O’Connor notes, this is not without some difficulty since Augustine has to reduce the Beatitudes to seven by “treating the eighth…as merely a confirmation of the others.”

are the poor in spirit,’ i.e. those not puffed up, not proud: to whom the apostle says, ‘Be not high-minded, but fear;’ i.e. be not lifted up.’

Later on in the second part of his *Sermon on the Mount*, Augustine relates both the seven operations of the Holy Spirit and the seven beatitudes to the seven petitions of the Our Father. As Augustine notes:

The sevenfold number of these petitions also seems to me to correspond to that sevenfold number out of which the whole sermon before us has had its rise. For if it is the fear of God through which the poor in spirit are blessed, inasmuch as theirs is the kingdom of heaven; let us ask that the name of God may be hallowed among men through that “fear which is clean, enduring for ever.”

In this passage, Augustine connects the operation of the Holy Spirit, “fear of God” with the “poor in spirit” of the Beatitudes, with the opening petition of the Our Father, asking God’s name be made holy. O’Connor argues that Augustine’s use of the operations of the Holy Spirit from Isaiah 11 in the context of the Beatitudes and the Our Father petitions presents two different issues: 1) On the one hand, Augustine’s use of this schema seems contrived since the meanings of the various terms, whether from Isaiah 11 or the Sermon on the Mount, are “stretched, narrowed, or pulled away from their natural sense in order to be made to fit to one another”; 2) on the other hand, “there is a realistic spiritual wisdom in this passage which caused it to be greatly appreciated by subsequent generations.” Indeed this spiritual wisdom is commented upon and used in the Middle

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73 Saint Augustine, *Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount*, II, 11. For a extended discussion of Saint Augustine’s *Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon*, see de Bliq, “*Pour l’historie de la theologie des dons avant saint Thomas,”* 121-5.
Ages and by St. Thomas in addition to Augustine’s rich theology of the Holy Spirit that he develops over the course of his writings.

Gregory the Great is another Church Father that deserves mention because of his formative influence on future generations of theologians on the topic of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, especially with regard to Gregory’s understanding of the gifts as remedies for vices. There are two significant instances in which Gregory the Great discusses Isaiah 11:2-3. The first occurs in his *Morals on the Book of Job* and later in a homily on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. In these texts, Gregory the Great provide future theologians a source for how to understand these spirits in Isaiah 11 since he reads these texts allegorically.

The passage that Gregory the Great uses for his reflection in the Book of Job is Job 1:18-19: “While he [the servant] was still speaking, another came and said, ‘Your sons and daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brother’s house, and suddenly a great wind came across the desert, struck the four corners of the house, and it fell on the young people and they are dead….’”

In the *Morals on the Book of Job*, Gregory writes:

Now it is within these *four corners of the house* that the sons are feasting, because it is within the depths of the mind, which is carried up to the topmost height of perfection in these four virtues especially, that the others like a kind of offspring of the heart take their food together. For the gift of the Spirit, which, in the mind It works on, forms first of all Prudence [*prudentiam*], Temperance [*temperantiam*], Fortitude [*fortitudinem*], Justice [*iustitiam*], in order that the same mind may be perfectly fashioned

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74 O’Connor, Appendix II, 92. Saint Augustine has other passages in which he discusses the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirit. See Gardeil, “*Dons du Saint-Esprit*,” 1763-4 for more examples.

75 Jb 1:18-19.
to resist every species of assault, doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues, so as against folly to bestow Wisdom [sapientiam], against dullness, Understanding [intellectum], against rashness, Counsel [consilium], against fear [timorem], Fortitude [fortitudinem], against ignorance, Knowledge [scientiam], against hardness of heart, Piety [pietatem], against pride, Fear [timorem].

The four corners of the house represent the four classical virtues: prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. These four classical virtues are the basis for a virtuous life. They provide the safe-haven for the development of other virtues, which are wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear. These seven virtues help protect against temptations of folly, dullness, rashness, fear, ignorance, hardness of heart, and pride. This emphasizes the role of the spirits of Isaiah as virtues in the fight against sin.

A second text that Gregory the Great uses allegorically to reflect on the meaning of the text is Ezekiel 40:22: “Its [the temple’s] windows, its vestibule, its palm trees were

76 Saint Gregory the Great, *Morals on the Book of Job* Book II, xlix, trans. Members of the English Church, in Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, Anterior to the Division of the East and West (London: J.G.F., and J. Rivington, 1844), 119. I have modified the translation slightly to be consistent in its use of Latin terms. See also *Morals on Book of Job* Book 1, xxvii where Gregory introduces the connection of the seven sons with the sevenfold virtues.

O’Connor explains that text of Gregory the Great in Book II, xlix is cited “by most of the scholastics, including Thomas…” See O’Connor, Appendix II, 93.

77 As O’Connor notes, these virtues were not yet named “cardinal” virtues. See O’Connor, Appendix II, 93. Additionally, faith, hope and love were not yet conceived of as virtues.

78 Note that in this text Gregory does not call these seven steps as gifts. Instead he calls them virtues. I speak more about the term “gift” as it applies to the spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3 in the next section. But it deserves to be said that some in the Middle Ages follow Gregory in calling these seven manifestations as virtues. The next section of this chapter explores that topic.

of the same size as those of the gate that face toward the east. Seven steps led up to it; and its vestibule was on the inside.”

This passage from Ezekiel is amidst the blueprint of the new temple that God is promising Israel. It is relayed as a vision to Ezekiel. On this passage, Gregory the Great reflects that

by the seven steps to the gate, it is ascended because through the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit our approach to the heavenly life is opened. That the sevenfold grace of Isaiah in our very head, or in his body, which we are, enumerating he says, “it shall rest upon him the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of piety, and he will delight in the fear of the Lord (Is. 11. 2)…”

The seven steps leading to the temple, for Gregory the Great, are the seven graces that are ways to understand the grace of the Holy Spirit working in the lives of Christians.

Gregory the Great then goes on in the next section to work out the order of ascension on the steps. And for those moving from earthly to heavenly things, one begins with fear, then piety, knowledge, fortitude, counsel, understanding, and finally wisdom. Citing

80 Ez 40:22.


82 Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem Prophetam II, 7, 320-1: “Quos gradus, de coelestibus loquens, descendendo magis quam ascendendo numeravit, videlicet sapientiam, intellectum, consilium, fortitudinem, scientiam, pietatem, timorem, et cum scriptum sit: Initium sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. IX, 10), constat procul dubio quia a timore ad sapientiam ascendentur, non autem a sapientia ad timorem reditur, quia nimirum perfectam habet sapientia charitatem. Et scriptum est: Perfecta charitas foras mittit timorem (I Joan. IV, 18). Propheta ergo, quia de coelestibus ad ima loquebatur,
Proverbs, Gregory the Great reminds his listeners “the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord.”83 While the second allegorical reading of Gregory the Great’s provides an interesting view of the role of the Holy Spirit, it is the first allegorical reading from the passage on Job that the scholastics focus on. As O’Connor states, “this text would compete with that of Augustine for the role of decisive influence on the scholastic conception of the Gifts” since Augustine provides one way to understand the sevenfold spirits of Isaiah 11:2-3 and Gregory provides another way to understand them as virtues.84 In addition to these contributions of competing accounts of reading Isaiah 11:2-3, Augustine’s theology of the Holy Spirit proves significant for future development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit since he connects the titles of “love” and “gift” to the Holy Spirit and continues to deepen the role of the Holy Spirit as sanctifier of the lives of Christians.

But before I proceed to the final section on the term “gift”, it is helpful to note the progress that has been made concerning the understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in the Church Fathers. From the earliest writings after the New Testament, one begins to see a developing picture of the influence of the Holy Spirit in the moral life. The Holy Spirit, as love and gift, becomes the director of the Christian life in that the Spirit aids the Christians through the gift of grace and the spirits of wisdom, understanding, fortitude,

coept magis a sapientia, et descendit ad timorem. Sed nos qui a terrenis ad coelestia tendimus, eosdem gradus ascendendo enumeremus, ut a timore ad sapientiam pervenire valeamus. In mente etenim nostra primus ascensionis gradus est timor Domini; secundus, pietas; tertius, scientia; quartus, fortitudo; quintus, consilium; sextus, intellectus; septimus, sapientia.” Emphasis in the original.

83 Prov. 9:10.

84 O’Connor, Appendix II, 93-4.
piety, fear of the Lord, counsel, and knowledge. These gifts, operations, or virtues become ways to understand what kind of aid the Holy Spirit gives to Christians that begins in baptism and reaches its consummation in the eternal life in heaven with God. These manifestations of the Spirit become associated with the Beatitudes through Augustine; and in Gregory the Great, these spiritual manifestations are seen as virtues that aid against temptations. All of these rich understandings of the ways of the Holy Spirit in the moral life find a deeper, systematic presentation in the Scholastic theologians.

Part II, C. The Term “Gift”

One may have noticed that the terminology of “gift” in regards to list from Isaiah 11 has not emerged clearly from the Church Fathers. There have been references to operations, spirits, virtues, and graces; with Augustine, one clearly sees him giving the role of “Gift” to the Holy Spirit in his Trinitarian theology, and Gregory the Great spoke of the gifts of sevenfold virtues or graces, but the connection between the term “gift” and the list of spirits in Isaiah 11:2-3 did not congeal during the early Church.\(^8^5\) The standard

\(^8^5\) Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315 – ca. 367) in his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew seems to be the first to use the term “gifts” to refer to the sevenfold spirits of Isaiah. Remarking on the number of loaves and the fish prior to the multiplication of the loaves and fish to feed the crowd who had been following Jesus, Hilary writes, “The seven loaves are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. And the indefinite fish are the diverse charisms (See Mt 15:34-39; Hilary of Poitiers, *Commentarius in Evangelium Matthaei*, 15, 10 in *Sancti Hilarii, Pictaviensis Episcopi, Opera Omnia* 1, in Patrologia Latina 9, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne (Paris, 1844), 1006: “Panes septem Spiritus sancti septem dona. Pisces indefiniti, diversa charismata.” Hilary is in some sense calling both of these gifts but using two distinct terms in doing so.). Hilary then goes on to contrast the sevenfold gifts of Isaiah 11:2-3 in reference to the diverse charisms in 1 Corinthians 12:7-10.
designation of the term “gifts” with the text of Isaiah 11:2-3 appears to have been work of the Carolingian writers of the ninth century. de Bliq argues that it is in the writings of the Venerable Bede where the designation of “gifts” become standard for endowments listed in Isaiah 11:2-3. According to de Bliq, the usage of “gifts” according to Bede are attested in the works of Rabanus Maurus, Amalarius of Metz, Haymon of Halberstadt, and Paschasius Radbertus, who are all contemporaries in the ninth century. How does the usage of “gifts” then become central in later scholastic thought? de Bliq argues that it is due to Paschasius Radbertus and his work on the Gospel of Matthew that is taken up in the *Glossa ordinaria*. The *Glossa ordinaria* juxtaposes Paschasius’ terminology of the “gifts” of the Holy Spirit with that of the Church Fathers. That the terminology of “gift” becomes part of the *Glossa ordinaria* is significant since “[t]he Gloss came to exert a tremendous influence on both literature and theology through the Middle Ages.”

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86 O’Connor, Appendix 2, 94.


88 O’Connor, Appendix 2, 94. See also de Bliq, “*Pour l’histoire de la theologie des dons avant saint Thomas*,” 160-1.

89 de Bliq, “*Pour l’histoire de la théologie des dons avant saint Thomas*,” 161. de Bliq in footnote 158 details this connection with the ties to the original sources.

The contributions of the Church Fathers are significant for the development of the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. First, these Fathers developed the role of the Holy Spirit as an aid to Christians and found the list of Isaiah 11:2-3 as a way to describe that role. Second, in the writings of Augustine and Gregory the Great, two competing accounts emerge concerning the sevenfold list of Isaiah 11:2-3 that become authoritative sources for medieval theologians concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Third, the Church Fathers began to designate the sevenfold list of Isaiah with the term “gift” but the term gift did not become the standard designation until much later in the ninth century. Without the linking of Isaiah 11:2-3 to the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church Fathers and the explaining of the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of Christ and in believers, the topic of the gifts of the Holy Spirit may have remained connected solely with 1 Corinthians 12. Fortunately, these early Christian writers probed the depths of scripture and richly left behind work that fosters the development of the role of the Holy Spirit in the Middle Ages and the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Part III. Scholastic Thought prior to St. Thomas

The beginning of the twelfth century marks a turning point in the theology of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. As O’Connor relates, this is in part due to the systematization of theology that is beginning in the twelfth century. There also is a growing interest in the gifts of the Holy Spirit outside of theology.\footnote{Edward D. O’Connor, C.S.C., Appendix 3: Scholastic Thought Before St. Thomas to Summa Theologiae vol. 24 by St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 99. O’Connor goes onto to mention examples in art, e.g. the Tree of Jesse with seven doves circling Jesus, and literary works such as sermons that captured...} With the rise of systematic attempts at...
explaining the mysteries of the faith, theologians began trying to understand the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, especially whether they are virtues and if not, what is their relation to the virtues.  

"For the early scholastics, the virtues were exemplified chiefly by those praised by Jesus in the Beatitudes: poverty in spirit, meekness, etc." Yet this association did not last very long. The classical understanding of virtue with the four principal virtues became the “more satisfactory framework” for the scholastic theologians. In addition to the recognition of the four principal virtues, faith, hope, and charity began to be recognized as virtues as well during this same time period. So the twelfth century represents the time in which these scholastic theologians work out different understandings of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Following the work of the Thomist scholar Edward O’Connor, I show that the scholastic period provides three different understandings of the gifts of the Holy Spirit: 1) the gifts precede the virtues; 2) the gifts are identical to the virtues; 3) the gifts are subsequent to the virtues. At various

upon the seven gifts and its connection to other sevens, e.g. the sacraments, days of creation, etc.

92 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 100. “This was to be expected, since the Gifts are obviously related to the virtues. It should be born in mind, moreover, that virtue was another topic of major interest to the 12th century theologians.”

93 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 100.

94 Ibid.

95 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 100. “…for they [faith, hope, and charity] are not presented as such [virtues] in Scripture, and had not been so treated, excepted occasionally and unconsciously, prior to the twelfth century.”

96 Lottin describes the twelfth century as a period of trial and error concerning the doctrine of the gifts. See Odon Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles III II-I (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1949), 330.
points within these three ways of understanding the gifts, I point to developments that foreshadow St. Thomas’ own understanding of the gifts, which ultimately follows the third understanding, that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues.

**Part III, A. The Gifts Precede the Virtues**

This first approach argues that the gifts precede the virtues, that is, they act as some sort of preparation for the Christian life but are not the higher or highest summit of the Christian life. The three scholastic theologians who exemplify the first approach are Anselm of Laon, Hugh of St. Victor, and the anonymous author of the *Summa sententiarum*. Following Augustine, Anselm of Laon says, “[b]y prayer we obtain the Gifts; by the Gifts we keep the commandments; from the keeping of the commandments, the Beatitudes follow.” This schema of Anselm of Laon suggests an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that function as the equivalent of grace. As O’Connor notes, “Anselm seems to be using this to give a deeper significance to the rhetorical device by which Augustine correlated the Gifts with the Beatitudes and the *Our Father*."

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97 Lottin attributes the *Summa sententiarum* to Othon de Lucques but recent scholarship has not attributed this text to one particular author.

98 *Glossa Ordinaria*, on Matthew 6:8. Cf. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles* VI (Gembloux: Duculot, 1959-60), 474. O’Connor notes that this passage is not in the *Patrologia Latina* 114, 100ff. Also the term “Beatitude” should be understood in the context as mentioned in the previous paragraph, that is, the Beatitudes were thought of as those virtues praised by Jesus in scripture.

99 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 101. O’Connor continues that Anselm’s use of the term *gift* seems to be the driving force behind the synthesis and not the scriptural or patristic reflection that exists prior to him.
Anselm’s approach could be summed up as first prayer, then the gifts, next the keeping of the commandments, and finally the Beatitudes.

Another approach similar to Anselm of Laon is Hugh of St. Victor in *De sacramentis*. Influenced by Gregory the Great, Hugh argues that the gifts precede and lead to the virtues but not because the gifts act as the seeds of the virtues; instead, the gifts act as remedies for vices that pave the way for the virtues. “Man lying in sin is sick; the vices are his wounds; God is the physician; the Gifts of the Holy Spirit are remedies; the virtues are health; the Beatitudes joy. For it is by the Gifts of the Holy Spirit that vices are healed; the healing of vices is the panoply of virtues; one who is healed works; he who works is rewarded.”

Hugh of St. Victor’s approach is first the vices of mankind, then the gifts as remedies, next the virtues provide health, and finally the Beatitudes give joy.

In his small work on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Hugh does not change his view of the gifts but only expands upon the sickness of the human soul due to sin and how the gifts act as medicines. “Each vice has its medicine; seven vices, seven spirits. What are the seven spirits? Seven gifts of the Spirit: the Gifts are spirits and the spirits are Gifts. Hence one Spirit is seven spirits, because given in seven ways, and in seven inspirations.

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Seven inspirations and one Spirit; one medicine heals seven illnesses.”

Hugh of St. Victor modifies Anselm of Laon’s schema of prayer, gifts, commandments, and beatitudes by dropping the commandments and including the work of the virtues as well as dropping prayer and focusing on vices; so Hugh of St. Victor’s schema reflects vices, gifts, virtues, and beatitudes.

The anonymous author of the *Summa sententiarum* further modifies Anselm’s schema of prayer, gifts, commandments, and beatitudes. In the *Summa sententiarum*, after a discussion of the seven vices and how they affect the human person, the author points to the virtues and gifts working against the vices that wound the human person. Explaining how to understand the virtues and gifts, he writes,

Between the gifts and virtues there is a difference that the gifts are first movements of the heart, as it were, certain seeds of virtue sown upon the soil of our heart. The virtues are like the plants that rise out of them. The effects of the gifts truly are certain habits of the established good. And they are called the seven gifts of the Spirit. When in Revelation, John saw the seven spirits running before the throne (Rev. 1). They are called spirits, that is aspirantes or inspirations that precede the virtues; and they are simply gifts and not merits; the virtues are both gifts and merits. In the gifts, God works without us; in the virtues, he works with us. Out of fear, which is the beginning of wisdom (Psal. 110), humility is born; out of the...

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102 I reverse the chronology that O’Connor uses in this section because scholars of medieval thought argue that the author of the *Summa sententiarum* is influenced by Hugh of St. Victor and subsequently this work appears after *De sacramentis*. See Martha Colish, *Peter Lombard* vol. 1 (New York: Brill, 1994), 63.
spirit of piety meekness is born; and thus for each thing they are numbered there: Blessed are the poor in spirit (Matt. 5), etc.\textsuperscript{103}

The author of the \textit{Summa sententiarum} follows Hugh of St. Victor’s treatment of the gifts and virtues. The gifts and virtues are situated in the context of the vices of humanity and act against them. But instead of the gifts as being simply remedies for the vices, the gifts act as seeds of virtues for the flowering of the virtues. Also, in a similar manner, the gifts are spirits, which inspire the human person without any effort on his part and thus are not merits. But the virtues are where God works with the human person. Thus the virtues are rightly called both gifts and merits. Interestingly, O’Connor speculates that understanding the gifts this way in the \textit{Summa sententiarum} makes them not as “qualities produced by the Holy Spirit, but as the very action of the Holy Spirit.”\textsuperscript{104} To represent the \textit{Summa sententiarum} in a similar way to Anselm of Laon’s and Hugh of St. Victor’s treatment,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The text to the \textit{Summa sententiarum} can be found as attributed to Hugh of St. Victor in the Patrologia Latina. See Hugh of St. Victor, \textit{Summa sententiarum}, in \textit{Hugonis de S. Victore, Canonici Regularis S. Victoris Parisiensis, Opera Omnia} 2, in Patrologia Latina 176, edited by Jacques-Paul Migne (Paris, 1854), 114-115: “Inter dona autem et virtutes haec est differentia quod dona sunt primi motus in corde, quasi quaedam semina virtutum jactata super terram cordis nostri; virtutes quasi seges quae ex ipsis consurgunt. Sunt enim effectus donorum habitus quidam confirmati jam boni. Et dicuntur septem dona Spiritus. Unde in Apocalypsi: Vidit Joannes septem spiritus discurrentes ante thronum Dei (Apoc. I). Spiritus dicuntur, id est aspirantes vel aspirationes quae praecedunt virtutes; et sunt dona solummodo et non merita. Virtutes sunt et dona et merita. In illis operatur Deus sine nobis; in istis operatur nobiscum. Ex timore, qui est initium sapientiae (Psal. CX), nascitur humilitas; ex spiritu pietatis mansuetudo nascitur; [Col.0115A] et ita per singula quae numerantur ibi: Beati pauperes spiritu (Matth. V), etc.” My own translation. I have left the word \textit{aspirantes} untranslated because there is not an easily available equivalent in English to denote the plurality of the spirits inspiring.

To anticipate the next chapter on St. Thomas, I think the author of the \textit{Summa sententiarum} gets remarkably close to things St. Thomas argues for in the \textit{Summa theologiae} but of course with clarifications. Identifying the gifts as spirits, denoting God working in us in the gifts, etc. are such things one finds in St. Thomas.

\item O’Connor, Appendix 3, 101.
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one could say that first there are the vices of mankind, then the gifts act as seeds of virtue upon which the virtues grow. And out of the virtues comes the Beatitudes.

All three of these approaches follow similar lines that denote the precedence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the moral life. Additionally, all three of these authors follow the two main figures from the early Church tradition, St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great by connecting the gifts to the Beatitudes and displaying some concern for how the gifts dispel vices. One can see the influence that Augustine and Gregory have given to these much later scholastic theologians by their efforts to better understand the nature of the gifts of the Holy Spirit using the categories of their authorities but expanding and going beyond what Augustine or Gregory had done in their own work.

Part III, B. The Gifts Are Identical to the Virtues

The second approach of scholastic thought as to the gifts and virtues prior to St. Thomas argues that the gifts are identical to the virtues. Peter Lombard in his Sentences represents this approach.¹⁰⁵ Peter situates the discussion of the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the person of Christ. Christ represents the exemplar of virtue and thus “it is in emulating Christ’s perfect humility that we render ourselves fit for salvation; it is in attempting to reciprocate God’s charity that our hearts are raised to the love of God and neighbor that saves; and it is faith in the efficacy of Christ’s death on the cross that tears us away from the sins standing in the way of virtue.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Alan of Lille also argues that the gifts are virtues. See Odon Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles III-I (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont Cesar, 1949), 334-6.
In identifying the gifts with the virtues, Peter relies upon a passage from St. Ambrose that identifies the seven spirits of Revelation with the virtues. Peter quotes Ambrose as saying: “The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem, is not washed by the current of any earthly stream of river; but from the fountain of life proceeds the Holy Spirit, of which we are satiated in a small draught, in those heavenly spirits it seems to flow more abundant, blazing with the full motion of the seven spiritual virtues.”

Peter’s position then follows upon Ambrose’s description of the seven spirits as virtues: “Here it is expressly taught that the seven gifts are virtues and sanctifications of the minds of the faithful…” Peter’s position flows from his understanding of Christ as exemplar of virtue and denotes how Christians can participate in the seven gifts/virtues of the Holy Spirit. In the end, Peter argues that there are no distinctions between the virtues and gifts, and thus they are identical.

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107 Ambrose, *De spiritu sancto libri tres*, I, 16, in *Sancti Ambroii, Mediolanensis Episcopi, Opera Omnia* 2, in Patrologia Latina 16, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (Paris, 1845), 740. “Civitas Dei illa Hierusalem coelestis, non meatu alicujus fluvii terrestris abluuitur; sed ex vitae fonte procedens Spiritus sancti, cujus nos brevi satiamur haustu, in illis coelestibus spiritibus redundantius videtur effluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens meatu.” My own translation. For a brief summary of Peter Lombard’s view of the virtues and gifts, see Philipp W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 139-43. In this excellent summary, Rosemann notes the Christological nature of Peter’s position as well as Peter’s understanding of charity as grace. For a more extensive summary, see Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard* vol. 1 (New York: Brill, 1994): 507-10.

108 Peter Lombard, *The Sentences* vol. 3, trans. Giulio Silano (Ontario: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 137, d. 34, 2. O’Connor seems skeptical of this reliance on Ambrose and offers another suggestion. He argues, briefly, that Peter’s position reflects an understanding of each gift and how these are reflected already in virtues. See O’Connor, Appendix 3, 102.
Part III, C. The Gifts Are Subsequent to the Virtues

The third view in scholastic thought regarding the gifts and virtues before St. Thomas argues that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues. And within this view, there are two main positions that explain how the gifts are subsequent to the virtues. I treat each of these positions in its own section to help retain clarity regarding each position. The first of these positions (according to Stephen Langton, Philipp the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure) argues that the gifts act as remedies for sin/vice in the human person for the exercise of the virtues. Of the four authors I examine in this section, all argue for this position in different ways. The second position (of William of Auxerre) argues that while the gifts are virtues, they are subsequent to the virtues and ultimately are the cardinal virtues in an advanced degree of purity.

Finally, a key element to consider as I go through these various positions on the gifts as subsequent to the virtues is the notion that the gifts do offer something distinct for the moral life of Christians as opposed to simply being relegated to just a virtue or as preparation for the moral life. The various authors I consider take different vantage points to this key element and that is what makes their positions vary. Nonetheless, St. Thomas

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109 See Peter Lombard, *The Sentences* vol. 3, 137-8, d. 34, 3.

110 Two other medieval theologians follow Peter Lombard’s position. Peter of Poitiers categorizes virtues in three ways: 1) four cardinal virtues, 2) three theological virtues, and 3) seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (Lottin, *P et M* III, II-I, 332). Alan of Lille too characterizes the gifts as virtues but he regards them as virtues in conjunction with the other virtues which are the seven beatitudes (Lottin, *P et M* III, II-I, 333-4); this is a rejection of both Peter Lombard’s and Peter of Poitiers’ positions and a return to an earlier scholastic conception of the beatitudes as virtues.
is cognizant of these various views when he turns to write the *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

**Part III, C, i. Position 1 - The Gifts Are Subsequent to the Virtues**

One of the first scholastic theologians who proposes an understanding that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues is Stephen Langton. Langton argues that “[i]n reality, the gifts naturally come after the virtues, because they are effects or quasi-effects of virtue; I do not say that the effect is the exercise [of the virtues], but the effect is a habit.”¹¹¹ This passage is notable in two respects. First, Langton articulates the position that the gifts come after the virtues; Second, Langton also refers to the gifts as *habitus*.¹¹² Langton goes on to remark that the seven gifts enumerated by Isaiah are not virtues and “thus in a special way they are called gifts, because, since they are the effects of virtue, it can seem to some that they are from free will as the exercise of virtue, thus they would not be pure gift.”¹¹³ These early understandings of the gifts as subsequent to the virtues and as *habitus* begin to allude to the mature position that appears in St. Thomas.

¹¹¹ O’Connor, Appendix 3, 102. For the text, see Odon Lottin, “*Textes inédits relatifs aux dons du saint-Esprit*,” *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 1 (1929): 64. “immo dona naturaliter sunt posteriorea virtutibus, quia sunt effectus vel quasi effectus virtutum; non dico effectus id est usus, set effectus id est habitus.” My own translation.

Philipp the Chancellor in his work *Summa de bono* makes use of the work of Langton as well as the typical categories of the virtues, gifts, and the beatitudes that can be found in earlier Medieval theologians. Using the categories of virtue, gift, and beatitude, Philip describes three kinds of acts as follows:

“Now there are three states of acts: some acts are to be called primary, some intermediate, some ultimate and most perfect. First are the acts of virtue, because a virtue is a habit which first elevates potency. The consequent and intermediate acts are acts of the gifts, because the gifts are given in help to the virtues. However, consequent and ultimate and most perfect acts are acts of the beatitudes.”

For Philip, a gift is a “free bestowal out of the first superadded grace above the grace of virtue for consequent acts.” For example, belief is the primary act of the virtue of faith; the intermediate act is to be able to understand and savor the truth believed which are the gifts of understanding and wisdom; the ultimate and most perfect act is for the pure of heart, the seventh beatitude, to see God as best as possible in this life with the notion that...

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113 Lottin, “*Textes inédits relatifs aux dons du saint-Esprit,*” 64. “Dicimus ergo quod illa septem dona que enumerat Ysaias non sunt virtutes; et ideo specialiter dicuntur dona, quia cum sint effectus virtutum, posset aliqui videri quod essent ex libero arbitrio sicut usus virtutum et ita non essent pure dona.” My own translation.


one will see God more clearly in the next life.\textsuperscript{116} What exactly does the act of the gift contribute?

Philip holds that the gifts serve two functions. First, the gifts are “remedies to the corruption resulting from sin, which impedes the practice of virtue.”\textsuperscript{117} This follows the view of St. Gregory the Great who viewed the gifts as remedy for vices. Second, Philip argues that “the gifts are more for suffering (\textit{patiendum}), from suffering as a quality (\textit{a passione qualitate}), than for acting. For fearing means suffering as a quality, though acting is through a mode, and it is the work of piety, that is to say of the other, mercifully to co-suffer and of fortitude, to suffer things terrible to sustain; and to know what is meant by taste or understanding, which is called “suffering” according to the philosopher, and in what way this is suffering.”\textsuperscript{118} As O’Connor notes, “the principal effect of the

\textsuperscript{116} Philip Cancellarii Parisiensis, \textit{Summa de bono}, q. 1, 1109 “Primus actus rationabilis in finem est credere; secundus est intelligere cum sapore; tertius munditia cordis plena ad videndum deum, sicut possibile est in via: hoc enim, scilicet videre Deum immediate, coniunctum est cum plena munditia in patria.” O’Connor makes an interesting note regarding Philip’s position in this text. “Curiously, this position [of Philip] is in one sense a return to that of Anselm of Laon, in spite of its appearance to the contrary. When Anselm said that the Gifts were inferior to the virtues, the virtues he had in mind were those given in the Beatitudes. Philip, in declaring the Beatitudes to be superior to the Gifts, is putting the two in the same relationship as did Anselm. The difference between them lies in this, that Philip distinguishes virtues from Beatitudes, making the former inferior to the Gifts, and the latter superior. Anselm made no such distinction.” O’Connor, Appendix 3, 103.

\textsuperscript{117} O’Connor, Appendix 3, 103-4. “Ad id quod obicitur quod tam virtutues quam dona sunt ad resistendum et ad operandum et ita videtur in hoc non distinguui, concedendum est quod virtutes sunt ad resistendum \textit{/ temptationibus et pronitatibus, et dona similiter; et hec et illa ad operandum.” Philip Cancellarii Parisiensis, \textit{Summa de bono}, q. 1, 1109.

\textsuperscript{118} See Philip Cancellarii Parisiensis, \textit{Summa de bono}, q. 1, 1110: “…dona sunt plus ad patiendum, a passione qualitate, quam ad agendum. Timere enim passionem qualitatem dicit, licet per modum agere; et pietatis opus, scilicet compati alterius miserie;
Gifts [according to Philip], in which their proper activity consists, is to rectify man in the things he has to endure or suffer, whereas the virtues are the source of right action."\(^{119}\)

So not only do the gifts help virtuous action by limiting the affects of sin, the gifts also help with the passions.\(^{120}\)

What exactly do the passions mean in this context? As Lottin writes, “Don’t the gifts pertain to the passions? Understand the last word, passivity, in the broadest sense. Philip regards it as such. The gifts reside in either the cognitive faculties or the affective powers. Not only is affectivity a passion but also knowledge in the words of Aristotle, is a passivity vis-à-vis the object known.”\(^{121}\)

Philip develops an understanding of the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the human person as gifts that are concerned with passivity in the affective and cognitive powers of the human person and that act as...

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\(^{119}\) O’Connor, Appendix 3, 104. O’Connor continues: “Philip argues that in Christ, who is our exemplar, the Gifts were ordained to aid in his nobles act, that of the Redemption, which was achieved by suffering. …the proper effect of the Gifts is to conform us to Christ, whereas the proper role of the (moral) virtues is to rectify us according to the demands of human nature.

\(^{120}\) I am speaking more broadly here of “passions” as connected to “suffering” in Philip’s quotation. St. Thomas, in \textit{ST} I-II, q. 22, a. 1 and in q. 35-39 speaks of sorrow/pain in a similar sense.

\(^{121}\) Odon Lottin, \textit{Psychologie et Morale aux XII\textsuperscript{e} et XIII\textsuperscript{e} Siècles} III-I (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont Cesar, 1949), 361. “Les dons ne se rapporteraient-ils pas aux passions? Entendez ce dernier mot au sens large passivité. Philippe estime qu’il en est ainsi. Les dons résident soit dans les facultés cognitives, soit dans les puissances affectives. Or, non seulement l'affection est une passion, mais à son tour, la connaissance selon le mot d'Aristote, est une passivité vis-à-vis de l'object connu.” Lottin is connecting Philip’s notion of suffering to the passions in general.
remedies to those corruptions that prevent the exercise of virtue.\footnote{122} Two features of Philip’s account find expression in St. Thomas’ own work. First, St. Thomas recognizes the affective and cognitive dimension of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. And second, St. Thomas argues that the gifts help the virtues but does not follow the way Philip understands the help given by the gifts to the virtues.

\footnote{122} William of Auvergne holds a similar position to Philip that “the Gifts have to do with passio and endurance, whereas the virtues are principles of action” (O’Connor, Appendix 3, 105). As such, the gifts are “principles of passivity” making one able to receive divine grace (See Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles III-I, 356-7). In De virtutibus, he writes: “[s]ometimes, it seems to us that the gifts consist more in receiving than in an outflow or emanation” and thus they are “receptive aptitudes from the fountain of grace which flow and descend into the human soul” (William of Auvergne, De virtutibus, II in Opera Omnia (Venetis: 1591), 138 quoted in footnote 1 in Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles III-I, 357. “Aliquando visum est nobis illa dona magis in recipiendo consistere quam in effluendo seu emanando…hoc est aptitudines receptionem a fonte gratiae in mentem humanum descendentum ac defluentem.” My own translation.). The notion of receptivity that William of Auvergne speaks of foreshadows a key notion in St. Thomas’ understanding of the gifts in the Summa theologiae (O’Connor, “Appendix 3,” 105). Later in De virtutibus, William of Auvergne also makes the argument that the seven gifts combat seven vices/evils: childishness, brutishness, crisis and danger, continuous blows of wars and spiritual struggles, falsity, profanity, and foolish security. These vices/evils “amazingly and miserably subvert and defile human life” [William of Auvergne, On the Virtues, II trans. Roland J. Teske, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009), 173-90]. He spends a significant portion of the end of chapter two detailing how each gift of the Holy Spirit combats one of these particular vices/evils.

But in later years, William of Auvergne rejects his earlier doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in favor of an interpretation that is similar to Peter Lombard’s, which argues that there is no real distinction between the virtues and gifts. Lottin argues that this change is due to a “reaction against all metaphysical entities in the questions concerning the faculties of the soul and synderesis,” and William of Auvergne goes on to elaborate that the distinction between the virtues and gifts is purely a difference in name and quite extrinsic to the matters themselves (Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles III-I, 357. “…dans sa réaction contre toutes les entités métaphysiques…dans les questions des facultés de l’âme et de la syndérèse,” and “l’évêque de Paris nie dorénavant toute distinction réelle entre les vertus et les dons: si une chose est << donnée >> c’est là une dénomination purement verbale et tout extrinsèque à la chose elle-même: aussi prévient-il son disciple contre ces distinctions qui sont affaires de pure logique.”).
The second and important scholastic writer that follows Philip the Chancellor’s position is Albert the Great. As a teacher of St. Thomas, Albert has considerable influence on the work of his most famous disciple, and indeed, St. Thomas follows Albert early on in his work but as St. Thomas’ teaching matures, he ultimately distances himself from some of the key facets of Albert’s teaching on the gifts.

In article one, distinction thirty-four of his Commentarii in tertium librum sententiarum, Albert, following Gregory the Great, begins by noting that the opinion of Gregory the Great saying that the gifts are given to help the virtues (adiutorium virtutes).123 Then he notes the two ways that the virtues need help. “One consists in the indisposition of the subject, and this is overcome by the development of virtue itself, and requires nothing else.”124 The first way virtue needs help is that the human person does not fully possess the virtues, and only by developing the virtues does the person overcome its lack in himself. Albert argues that this can be done without any other assistance but the virtue itself. The second way concerns an “impediment intrinsic to the virtues themselves, at least in some cases.” The example Albert cites is the virtue of faith and its imperfection and how that imperfection is overcome through a gift of the Holy Spirit.

123 Albert the Great, Commentarii in terium librum sententiarum, d. 34, a. 1 in Opera Omnia, ed. Augusti Borgnet (Paris: Ludovicum Vives, 1894), 619. However, Albert does not hold with those who follow Gregory the Great that the gifts are given to help combat defects in the human person due to sin. See the response to the first objection.

124 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 107. See Albert the Great, Commentarii in terium librum sententiarum, d. 34, a. 1, 619: “Et ad hoc intelligendum, notandum quod quoddam impedimentum est virtutis ad actum proprium; et hoc non habet nisi per accidens ex aliqua dispositione subiecti sui; et hoc ipsa virtus convalescens in usu operis per se excludit.”
The defects of virtue that Albert points out and the example Albert uses are accordingly the same way St. Thomas describes the defects of virtue in the *Sententiae*; subsequently, this is how the Standard Two Modes account understands St. Thomas’ own understanding of the virtues in relation to the gifts.

In the reply to the first objection, Albert further clarifies his understanding of the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. “The virtues will be the first perfection of the powers of the soul” of the human person, and “the gift since it may have been followed to a perfection according to higher act of a certain virtue, is not a virtue but a discrete habit from the virtue.” So for Albert, the virtues concern a first order of perfection for human acts while the gifts concern a higher order of perfection for human acts, all the while maintaining that the gifts are not virtues but habits that assist the virtues. And so the gifts are superior to the virtues only insofar, according to Lottin commenting on Albert’s theory of the gifts, as it is God himself who intervenes. This feature of

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125 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 107. See Albert the Great, *Commentarii in terium librum sententiarum*, d. 34, a. 1, 619: “Aliud autem impedimentum est potentiae ex imperfectione habitus, quod est quasi e contrario primo impedimento, sicut potentia nostri intellectus est in verum primum, et ad hoc non perficit virtus nisi imperfecte, scilicet in speculo et aenigmate, et ideo evacuabitur; et ideo indiget potentia alio habitu altius juvante in illud, et ex parte illa tamquam secunda perfectio, et altius infunditur donum.”

126 Albert the Great, *Commentarii in terium librum sententiarum*, d. 34, a. 1, ad. 1, 619: “Stricte tunc virtus erit prima perfectio virium animae ad actus vitae ordinatae ad finem... et hoc modo donum cum sit secunda perfectio ad altiorem actum quarumdam virtutum, non est virtus, sed discretus habitus a virtute.” In d. 34, a. 2, Albert discusses the third and fourth orders of perfection, that is, the beatitudes and fruits respectively.

127 Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles* III-I, 399. “Si les dons sont supérieurs aux vertus, c'est que, d'après Albert, Dieu lui-même y intervient.” In d. 34, a. 2, Albert specifically notes how the virtue of charity is the highest of perfections and consequently needs no higher perfection.
Albert’s account, that the gifts concern higher, perfect acts, is similar to how St. Thomas characterizes the gifts vis-à-vis the virtues in the Sententiis and how the Standard Two Modes account characterizes St. Thomas’ own account in chapter two.

The last notable aspect of Albert’s understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit concerns his appeal to divine inspiration. In the reply to distinction thirty-four, article two, Albert gives the example of prudence and how it is elevated by the gifts of knowledge and counsel. “To prudence, however, which is suitable practical knowledge, two gifts respond to it. For it is civil prudence making use of reason for natural and human law, but it is not elevated to that which is divinely inspired unless through the gift of the Holy Spirit.” The gifts of knowledge and counsel help elevate the virtue of prudence. “The former relates to matters obligatory for everyone; the latter to matters

\[128\] This is a notable aspect of Albert’s work because St. Thomas adopts the language of divine inspiration/instinct in his mature work the Summa theologiae but such language is absent in his earlier work the Scriptum super sententiis. Whether or not Albert’s position influenced St. Thomas is not really known. O’Connor is inclined to argue, albeit not extensively, that this notion of divine inspiration suggested here may have been an influence on the work of St. Thomas. See O’Connor, Appendix 3, 108. I agree with O’Connor that it is possible that St. Thomas draws upon the work of his teacher but even O’Connor seems to undercut his own suggestion when he writes that “[i]t must be stressed, however, that Albert does not present divine inspiration as the universal and distinctive characteristic of the Gifts, but appeals to it only in some particular cases” whereas St. Thomas treats divine inspiration/instinct as a universal trait of the Gifts. Also note that St. Thomas uses the term “instinctus” to speak of divine inspiration. This is not a term Albert uses in his work.

\[129\] Albert the Great, Commentarii in terium librum sententiarum, d. 34, a. 2, 621: “Prudentiae autem quae est cognitio practica, respondent dona duo. Est enim prudentia civilis utens rationibus iuris naturalis et humani, sed non atollitur ad illas quae divinitus inspirantur, nisi per donum Spiritus sancti. Illae autem quae inspirantur, certissimae sunt.”
which are simply counsels." This distinction between the virtues and gifts in Albert 
relegates the gifts to a different and higher level that does not concern everyone; one 
should ask as to what kinds of purposes these gifts are necessary for the Christian life? 
St. Albert builds upon the earlier tradition and expands it concerning the virtues and gifts. 
The gifts aid the removal of impediments in the virtues themselves through God’s 
intervention in the gifts. That God intervenes in the gifts goes together well with his 
notion of divine inspiration that happens in particular cases in which the gifts help elevate 
the virtues.

The next significant scholastic theologian to hold the position that the gifts are 
subsequent to the virtues is St. Bonaventure. Bonaventure is a contemporary scholastic 
theologian of St. Thomas that prominently adopts the view that Philip the Chancellor first 
expounds. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Bonaventure, like Philip and Albert 
before him, acknowledges the disordered human nature due to sin and the need for its 
healing. The gifts are habits that help repair and heal the disorderliness in the human 
person. And by helping and repairing the disorderliness in the human person, the gifts

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130 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 108. See also Albert the Great, *Commentarii in terium 
librum sententiarum*, d. 34, a. 2, 621: “Et hoc contingit dupliciter: vel secundum ea ad 
quae tenentur omnes, et sic exaltatur ad donum scientiae; vel secundum ea quae non 
omnes obligant et sic exaltatur in dono consilio.”

131 “It is Bonaventure (1221-1274) who gave the richest and most coherent 
presentation of this school of thought. The most pacific of theologians, he had an 
extraordinary capacity for reconciling divergent views, and while his doctrine is neither 
profound nor very original, it is the best synthesis of the scholastic thought on the Gifts 
prior to Thomas.” O’Connor, Appendix 3, 104. Others who adopted Philip’s view are 
Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Odo Rignaud.

132 Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum magistri petri 
lombardi*, III, 34, I, I, 3 in *Opera Omnia* vol. 3, ed. R. P. Bernardini and Portu Romatino
help expedite the virtues. “The habits of the virtues are contrary to the very disorders of sins, but the gifts are contrary to the very results of them, so that through the virtues they are driven out by a spear, and through the gifts they are driven out by an injury.…”\(^{133}\) So while the virtues directly oppose sin, the gifts heal the consequences of sin in the human person.

In considering the healing effects of the gifts, Bonaventure explains that the gifts have a function of expediting virtue:

> “Now the rectifying habits are rightly called virtues, because a virtue by reason of its name affirms, that to be lead, it lifts up and invigorates. The expediting habits are rightly called gifts, because they name a certain further abundance of goodness to act, and through this they attest more to divine liberality; and because of this it is rightly assessed the name of gift.”\(^{134}\)

This function of expediting the virtues is “the key notion in his [Bonaventure’s] definition of the Gifts.”\(^{135}\) Indeed both Lottin and O’Connor note that Bonaventure’s

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\(^{133}\) Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum magistri petri lombardi*, III, 34, I, I, 1. My own translation. “…habitus virtutum sunt contra ipsos morbos peccatorum, sed dona sunt contra sequelas ipsorum, ita quod per virtutes expelluntur tela, et per dona expelluntur vulnera.…”

\(^{134}\) Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum magistri petri lombardi*, III, 34, I, I, 1. My own translation. “Nam habitus rectificantes recte dicuntur virtutes, pro eo quod virtus de ratione sui nominis dicit, quod ad agendum erigit et vigorat. Habitus vero expedientes recte dicuntur dona, pro eo quod dicunt quandam ulteriorum abundantiam bonitatis ad agendum, ac per hoc magis attestantur divinae liberalitati; et propter hoc recte censentur nomine doni.”

\(^{135}\) O’Connor, Appendix 3, 104. In footnote 20, O’Connor speculates that this emphasis on expediting the virtues is due to the influence of Albert the Great and says that Bonaventure “fails to deal adequately with the objection that to expedite the virtuous act is the function of virtue itself.”
analysis of the virtues and gifts leaves the impression that the gifts concern “a more
divine mode of activity than the virtues.”

But Bonaventure does not seem to affirm this explicitly but only implicitly with his comments concerning the divine aid the gifts bring in expediting the work of the virtues. The implicit affirmation of a divine mode of activity is similar to the explicit formulation of a divine mode of the gifts one finds in St. Thomas treatment of the gifts in the Sententiae. Ultimately, Bonaventure holds that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues and mainly treats the gifts as remedies for sin. How that remediation takes place becomes expanded in the work of Bonaventure with his emphasis of the expediting of virtues.

In conclusion, this section seeks to delineate the position that argues that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues, and this position is argued in several different ways. The section starts with the first theologian, Stephen Langton, to articulate this position of the gifts as subsequent to the virtues, and his contribution of the gifts as habitus. Following from Langton, all the following thinkers, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure, build upon Langton’s initial contribution for the gifts as subsequent to the virtues and follow in a way Gregory the Great’s understanding of the gifts as aiding the virtues by removing sin/vice. In particular Albert the Great’s contributions to this view of the gifts is significant since he, as teacher of St. Thomas, expounds a few points regarding the gifts and virtues that St. Thomas himself articulates: that the virtues have a twofold defect – in the virtue itself and in the person where the virtue resides; that the gifts concern divine inspiration; and that the gifts concern higher, perfect acts than the.

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136 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 105. See also Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIe Siècles III-I, 405.
acts of virtue. All three of these features are prominent in St. Thomas’ own treatment of the gifts in the *Sententiiis*.

**Part III, C, ii. Position 2 - The Gifts Are Subsequent to the Virtues**

I now turn to the second position on the gifts as subsequent to the virtues in the work of William of Auxerre. According to O’Connor, William of Auxerre takes a compromise position between the views of Peter Lombard (the Gifts are nothing other than virtues) and Stephen Langton (the Gifts are subsequent to the virtues). Formally, he agrees with the former; but his interpretation makes him much more akin to the latter. He holds that the Gifts are simply the cardinal virtues in an advanced degree of purity.  

In his *solutio* to the question on whether the gifts are virtues, William of Auxerre affirms that the gifts are rational virtues. But in the reply to the second objection, he also affirms that the gifts as virtues are not the theological virtues nor are they the cardinal virtues. Yet they share the same essence with the cardinal virtues.

What is the difference, then, between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the cardinal virtues? According to William of Auxerre, they differ in cause, office, and status. They differ in cause because the “cardinal virtues move to act according to the rule derived from the natural law” but the “gifts move to act according to the rule of faith since they

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137 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 105-6.


139 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III-II, 30, 2. “[S]unt enim dona ab his virtutibus diversa, quia non sunt ille tres virtutes theologice, nec sunt ille quatuor cardinales secundum rationem, sunt tamen secundum essenciam eedem cum cardinalibus.”
are spiritual.”\textsuperscript{140} The cardinal virtues and gifts differ in office and status because “the cardinal virtues attend to exterior acts, following that through exterior acts they fight against vices; but also the gifts are called the highest degree of the same virtues following that they are in interior acts, by which now they are in the very act of overcoming.”\textsuperscript{141} So for William of Auxerre, the gifts are like the cardinal virtues, in essence, but differ in respect to its cause and rule, its office, and status.

William of Auxerre provides one further way to distinguish the gifts from the cardinal virtues. Following the teaching of Macrobius, William of Auxerre holds that the cardinal virtues are found in three states: 1) political, 2) purgative, and 3) complete purity.\textsuperscript{142} According to William:

Political virtues regulate external actions, purgative virtues regulate interior acts also, while the virtues of a completely purified soul are those of the perfect man. The Gifts … are simply the cardinal virtues in the purgative state, in which man has begun to sense something of the divine sweetness, and so begins to be drawn to the interior life.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{140} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa Aurea} III-II, 30, 3. “Causa, different, quia virtutes cardinales, ut dictum est, movent ad opera ex rationibus sumptis a iure naturali, dona vero ex rationibus fidei, quia spiritualis sunt.”

\textsuperscript{141} William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa Aurea} III-II, 30, 3. “Officio vero et statu different, quia virtutes cardinales attenduntur in exterioribus operibus, secundum quod per opera exteriora pugnant contra vicis; dona vero dicuntur eadem virtutes maxime secundum quod sunt in actibus interioribus, quibus iam sunt in ipso actu vincendi….”

\textsuperscript{142} O’Connor, Appendix 3, 106. For a discussion of Macrobius’ degrees (including a fourth degree, see Lottin, \textit{Psychologie et Morale aux XII\textsuperscript{e} et XIII\textsuperscript{e} Siècles} III-I, 346-8. For a recent discussion of the sources of Macrobius’ degrees and how they are adopted in the works of Bonaventure and Aquinas, see Joshua P. Hochschild, “Porphyry, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas: A Neoplatonic Hierarchy of Virtues and Two Christian Appropriations,” 245-259 in \textit{Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: In Islam, Judaism and Christianity}, ed. John Inglis (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002).

\textsuperscript{143} O’Connor, Appendix 3, 106. See William of Auxerre, \textit{Summa Aurea}, III-II,
O’Connor explains the difference between these two types of virtue by giving the example of how to treat another person. “For example, the virtue of prudence teaches us not to do to another what we do not want done to ourselves; but the Gift of Knowledge teaches us to refrain from harming another person because he is a son of God, our brother, and a co-heir of the Kingdom.”

So in the example of how to treat one’s neighbor, the gifts, according to William of Auxerre, make a person into a spiritual man by giving him the knowledge of who the other person is and how to treat him while the virtue of prudence, a political virtue, only sees the other person on a more basic level, similar to the Golden Rule.

The last, notable feature of William of Auxerre’s account is how the individual gifts relate to each other. William “proposes to classify them according to the distinction between the active and contemplative lives.” According to this schema, the five gifts,

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145 Furthermore, in holding that the Gifts are more advanced cardinal virtues, William of Auxerre also holds the view that the theological virtues are superior to the Gifts. Thus one needs to examine the cardinal virtues and how they are differentiated in order to understand how the Gifts act as advanced cardinal virtues. See William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III, 30, 4. In this section, William discusses why the theological virtues are superior to the gifts.

146 O’Connor, Appendix 3, 106-7. “This classification, which is implicit in the doctrine of Augustine, was first proposed by Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109). Like many others of his insights, it went unnoticed during the 12th century and was rediscovered in a great Anselmian revival that seems to have occurred in Paris during the 1220’s, possibly due to the influence of the Englishman, Alexander of Hales (c. 1170-1245). Thomas at first adopts this classification, and only at the end of his career abandon it.”
fear of the Lord, piety, fortitude, knowledge, and counsel, regulate the active life since they concerning doing good and avoiding evil. The last two gifts of wisdom and understanding regulate the contemplative life. These two gifts concern higher things of God.

The writings of William of Auxerre on the gifts of the Holy Spirit provide several key points that appear in the writings of St. Thomas. First, for St. Thomas, the gifts are compared to the cardinal virtues analogously but no more than that. Second, St. Thomas does adopt the active and contemplative lives distinction early in the *Scriptum super sententias* but does not employ that distinction in his later work when discussing the nature of the virtues and gifts. Third, St. Thomas also holds, with William of Auxerre, that the theological virtues have a priority over the gifts. These are relevant ideas concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit that serve as precursors to St. Thomas’ own understanding, which I discuss in the third chapter.

Part III, D. Conclusion

One can see the development of the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Medieval period prior to St. Thomas as an effort to clarify whether the gifts are virtues or not. And if gifts are not virtues, then what role do the gifts have in the lives of Christians? These questions are the ones left lingering after the writings of the Church Fathers in

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which two main figures, St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great leave behind two separate traditions concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and these two accounts act as alternatives in the Medieval scholastic theologians.

Subsequently, scholastic thought prior to St. Thomas proposes three different positions on the gifts of the Holy Spirit: 1) the gifts are prior to the virtues; 2) the gifts are identical to the virtues; and 3) the gifts are subsequent to the virtues. Holding the position that the gifts are prior to the virtues, Anselm of Laon, Hugh of St. Victor, and the anonymous author of the *Summa sententiarum* follow in similar ways St. Gregory the Great’s view that the gifts act as remedies for vices. Notable in the account of the *Summa sententiarum* is the calling of the gifts as inspirations and spirits, which foreshadow St. Thomas’ own treatment of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*. Espousing the view that the gifts are identical to the virtues, Peter Lombard follows an Ambrosian (and consequently an Augustinian) view of the gifts. Peter Lombard’s view finds it basis on an understanding of Christ as the exemplar of virtue.

And in the third position on the gifts, that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues, one finds two different variants of this third position. The first group of theologians who argue that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues are Stephen Langton, Philip the Chancellor, Albert, and Bonaventure. These theologians similarly (with some differences) view the gifts as remedies for sin/vices that help the human person live out the Christian life of virtue. Also, these theologians make specific contributions towards understanding St. Thomas’ account that I develop in chapter three. Stephen Langton notably calls the gifts *habitus*. Philip the Chancellor finds that the gifts concern the passions and have both affective and cognitive dimensions as remedies from the
corruption of sin. Albert the Great provides three important contributions: 1) locating a twofold defect of virtue that necessitates the need for the gifts; 2) designating the gifts as a higher perfection than the virtues; 3) terming the gifts as divine inspiration in the human person. Finally, Bonaventure implicitly affirms, no doubt following Albert’s position, that the gifts concern a divine mode of activity. One can find resonances of all of these above-mentioned contributions concerning the gifts in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as he develops it.

The other variant of this view, in the writings of William of Auxerre, that the gifts are subsequent to the virtues also make contributions towards St. Thomas’ own understanding of the gifts. William of Auxerre provides two important contributions to understanding St. Thomas’ position on the gifts. First, William locates the gifts of the Holy Spirit as cardinal virtues; St. Thomas does not adopt this view but does analogously develop his understanding of the gifts vis-à-vis the cardinal virtues in the Summa theologiae. Second, William discusses the gifts of the Holy Spirit in conjunction with the distinction between the active and contemplative lives. St. Thomas too uses these distinctions when describing the gifts in the Scriptum super sententias.

These specific contributions of theologians in the differing positions and accounts that I have noted find their fruition in the doctrine of St. Thomas’ gifts of the Holy Spirit to which I turn to in chapter three.

Part IV: Conclusion

In this chapter, as I stated earlier, my task is threefold. First, I want to identify the scriptural foundations for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This is a necessary task in order to
show the importance of Isaiah 11:2-3 as listing the qualities of the spirits and of Revelation 1 as helping connect the number seven with spirits. These connections help explain how Scripture itself provided the way for the unique doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that the writers of the Christian tradition recognize. Second I show how the early Church Fathers develop an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit with specific attention to how these Church Fathers focus on the role of the Holy Spirit as aiding in the lives of Christians and how these Church Fathers connect Isaiah 11:2-3 to the work of the Holy Spirit. Additionally, I focus on the accounts of Augustine and Gregory the Great as they serve as two important and differing authoritative accounts for the Middle Ages concerning the gifts. Also, I discuss how the term “gift” becomes definitively associated with the list of spirits in Isaiah 11:2-3 such that by the time the scholastic period begins, there is no debate as to the association of the term “gift” with the list from Isaiah 11:2-3.

The third task in this chapter is to document the theological development on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in three varying views in the scholastic period prior to St. Thomas with specific connections to St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts. The third variant of the position of the gifts as subsequent to the virtues proves most useful for understanding St. Thomas’ own doctrine of the gifts. For example, such notions as how the gifts aid the virtues, the receptivity and divine inspiration in the gifts, the affective and cognitive dimensions of the gifts, the divine mode of the gifts, the two-fold defect of the virtues that necessitates the gifts, the comparison of the gifts to the cardinal virtues, and the division of the gifts according to the active and contemplative lives find resonance in
certain ways in the work of St. Thomas both in his earlier work and in his later work on the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Having a grasp of the historical development of the gifts of the Holy Spirit prior to St. Thomas proves useful for the next two following chapters, in particular chapter three when I trace the development of St. Thomas’ thought on the gifts throughout his works. In the next chapter, chapter two, I focus on two rival interpretations of St. Thomas. The historical development that has occurred in this chapter serves as an introduction to how interpreters of St. Thomas view his understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Chapter 2

Rival Interpretations of St. Thomas' Doctrine of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

After having reviewed the development of the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit prior to St. Thomas Aquinas through some of the various positions previous theologians formulated in the Christian tradition to understand how these gifts work in the moral life, this chapter presents an understanding of two rival interpretations of St. Thomas' doctrine of the gifts. These two rival interpretations will set the stage for an analysis of St. Thomas' text in the next chapter.

In the first part of this chapter, I will analyze and synthesize the writings of John of Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and Romanus Cessario to formulate the traditional Thomist account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This is the presentation, which I will call the Standard Two Modes account, offered through the Thomist commentorial tradition and articulated by most Thomists as St. Thomas' own understanding of the gifts. This account argues that St. Thomas’ understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit proposes a two-mode distinction that explains how the human person achieves meritorious works: the first mode, the human mode, concerns the human person and the infused virtues under the rule of human reason; the second mode, the above/beyond the human mode, concerns the Holy Spirit moving the human person under the rule of divine reason. These two modes provide an account of how the human person achieves meritorious works.

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1 Note that the phrases “superhuman” or “divine” mode and “above/beyond the human mode” are the same translations of the Latin phrase “supra humanum modum” or its equivalents. I prefer to use the terminology of “above/beyond the human mode” to render the Latin more literally. At times, certain English translations I cite will use the phrase “superhuman” to render this Latin phrase.
person acts with the infused virtues on the one hand and how the Holy Spirit guides human persons to act with the gifts of the Holy Spirit on the other hand. Both modes provide ways to achieve meritorious acts, but the second mode as the above/beyond the human mode achieves such meritorious acts with ease and perfection that the infused virtues alone could not under human reason. Note that this position does not mean that the gifts do not need the virtues but the virtues need the gifts at times for the perfect acts that the Spirit moves the human person to do.

The second part of this chapter describes a more recent view of St. Thomas' teaching on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which I call the Rival Two Modes account. Central thinkers in this account are Servais Pinckaers and Angela McKay. These

2 Other scholars who hold a similar view are Bernard Lonergan, Eric Luijten, and Etienne Gilson, and Jan H. Walgrave. Despite the prominence of other figures, I will rely primarily on the work of Angela McKay. With the exception of McKay, the other scholars (Pinckaers, Lonergan, Luijten, Gilson) did not write any particular article, chapter, or book that focuses on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Rather, the topic of the gifts of the Holy Spirit appears as an ancillary topic to their main concerns. For example, in the work of Pinckaers, his larger concern is re-iterating the complete moral teaching of St. Thomas of the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, fruits connected to supernatural happiness. The gifts fit into this larger vision but he does not seem concerned with taking to task other interpretations. See Servais Pinckaers, “Dominican Moral Theology in the 20th Century,” trans. Mary Thomas Noble in the Pinckaers Reader, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 85-6: “I am convinced that the virtue-based moral system of St. Thomas has a future, if we know how to actualize it…. We need the teaching on the virtues and gifts, on the Evangelical Law and grace, if we are to restore to Catholic morality its spiritual richness and vitality, to the moral law its dynamic interiority, and to the action of the Holy Spirit its primacy – and all this within the framework of a vigorous systemization” (Emphasis added). In his earlier works, Bernard Lonergan mentions the gifts of the Holy Spirit as an example among larger issues of St. Thomas’ understanding of grace, the human will, and freedom. They are but brief allusions in the overall texts but Lonergan’s position is abundantly clear since he argues for a change in St. Thomas’ teaching on grace from his earlier work to later work that will be central in chapter three’s discussion of why St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts of the Holy Spirit changes. See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas in the Collected
scholars argue, against the Standard Two Modes account, that there are two modes of human action 1) the mode of human action in which the human person acts with the acquired virtues under the rule of reason, and 2) the mode of human action in which the human person acts with the infused virtues and gifts together under the rule of divine reason. This Rival Two Modes holds that to place the gifts of the Holy Spirit in a separate mode, as a higher mode than the infused virtues as the Standard Two Modes account does, misses the importance of the gifts in the moral life; that is, the gifts serve as a supplement for the virtues to rectify the deficiency of human reason so that the human person may properly act toward his supernatural end.

Before I turn to the two different accounts of St. Thomas’ understanding of the virtues and gifts, I aim to outline the areas of agreement and disagreement between these two accounts because there are areas in which both accounts agree on certain notions from St. Thomas and there are areas of severe disagreement on other notions in St. Thomas’ work. In general, both the Standard Two Modes account and the Rival Two


This lacuna in scholarship explaining the gifts of the Holy Spirit according to this more recent interpretation explains some of the merit for this dissertation.
Modes account agree on the following: 1) St. Thomas’ understanding of the human person’s two-fold happiness; 2) the definition of virtue; 3) the categories of acquired and infused virtue; 4) the deficiency of human reason for the supernatural life; 5) the insufficiency of the infused virtues; and 6) the gifts as habitus. Additionally, there are also significant disagreements between the Standard Two Modes and Rival accountS and these concern: 1) the distinction and definition of two modes of human action; 2) the rule/measure for the infused virtues; 3) why the infused virtues are insufficient and need prompting of gifts; 4) how often the gifts are needed; in other words, are the gifts operative in every act of infused virtue or are the gifts operative sporadically? The goal of this chapter is to identify and illuminate these points of agreement and disagreement in order to prepare the reader for the ensuing chapter on the texts of St. Thomas.

Part I. The Standard Two Modes Account

In reviewing the Thomistic literature of the past several centuries, one finds a common thread for understanding how that tradition has interpreted Thomas Aquinas on his doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. A reader of the tradition finds from such important commentators as John of Capreolus, Cajetan, and John of St. Thomas a reiteration of the same basic approach to St. Thomas’ understanding of the gifts. Indeed, the commentator tradition continued into the 20th century in the writings of Dominicans Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Romanus Cessario. In this discussion of the Standard Two Modes account, I do not aim to give a complete historical development of the account but rather explain some of its roots and articulate its position clearly so as to clarify future points of disagreement with the Rival account.
First, I articulate the basic position of the Standard Two Modes account and draw out its implications concerning human action while drawing upon five major Thomists: Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Garrigou-Lagrange, Cessario, and John of Capreolus. First, to understand the Standard Two Modes account, one must understand how Cajetan enumerates the three-fold movement of human action.

1. The first movement concerns the human mind under the guidance of "natural light and prudence."
2. The second movement concerns the human mind led by the "light of grace and faith."
3. The third movement concerns the human mind being "urged by the instinctu of the Holy Spirit." 3

The first movement relates to human or acquired moral virtue. This is a manner of acting consistent under the direction of human reason or acquired prudence. Every human

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3 Thomas de Vio Cajetan, *Commentarius* in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, vol. 6 in *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* (Rome: Typographia polygotta, 1891), 448. "Ad quorum etiam habere pleniorem intellectum, scito quod imaginamur quod in homine est triplex subordinatum movens ad actus bonos: scilicet mens humana praedita lumine naturali et prudentia; mens humana praedita lumine gratiae et fidei; et mens humana pulsata instinctu Spiritus Sancti."

Cajetan's influence upon the rest of the Thomist tradition cannot be overstated. It is his commentary on the *Summa theologiae* that the Leonine edition includes along with the text of St. Thomas' *Summa theologiae*. Cajetan's commentary follows very closely St. Thomas' argument concerning the gifts in the *Scriptum super sententis*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super sententis magistri petri lombardi*, ed. by R. P. Maria Fabianus Moos, O.P. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1947), III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1. To be referred to as *Sent.* in subsequent footnotes.

John of St. Thomas quotes Cajetan on this point as well. "Et hoc in sensu optime advertit Cajetanus super articulum primum hujus quæstionis LXVIII, esse in nobis triplex movens actus bonos...." John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus in summa theologicam d. Thomae*, vol. 6 (Paris: Ludovici Vives, 1885), q.70, d.18, a.2, n.30. To be referred to as *Cursus theologicus* in subsequent footnotes.
person has the potential for acting towards good acts in this first movement. The second movement involves the infusion of grace. With the infusion of grace, God endows the human person with the infused virtues, theological and moral. Any good acts guided by these virtues are directed through human reason endowed with grace and infused prudence. The third movement concerns the human person through grace under the direction of the instinct of the Holy Spirit. Through these additional graced habits given through the gifts, the Holy Spirit moves the human person toward good acts. These three levels represent three different kinds of good acts, from the lowest good act of acquired virtue to the highest good act through the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The Standard Two Modes account receives its name from focusing on (2) and (3) listed above. These modes are called the human mode (2) and above/beyond the human/divine mode (3). These modes differ due to the regulating principle or rule to which each movement conforms. Human reason, under the influence of infused prudence, guides the human mode of action or as John of St. Thomas describes it, “the result is human virtue regulated at the level of morality which parallels a humanly

\footnote{4 Among the rival interpretations, there is no dispute regarding the role of the first movement of acquired moral or human virtue at least as regards the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.}

\footnote{5 Cajetan, 448. "Et ad hoc ut vires animae obediant primo motori, ponuntur virtutes morales acquisitae, tendentes ad media et fines ad ipso motore praestitutos. Ad hoc autem ut eadem vires obediant secundo motori superiori, ponuntur virtutues morales infusae, tendentes ad media et fines ab illo motore praestitutos. Ad hoc autem quod non solum eadem, sed omnes vires animae obediant supremae motori, ponuntur dona, tendentia in fines proprios a tali motore ostensos."}

\footnote{6 See Thomas Aquinas, Sent. III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1. “Et secundum hoc dico, quod dona a virtutibus distinguuntur in hoc quod virtutes perficiunt ad actus modo humano, sed dona ultra humanum modum....” See Romanus Cessario in Christian Faith and the Theological Life (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 165-6.}
prudent manner of acting."7 As noted above, this is the situation in which the human person, possessing the infused virtues, acts accordingly under the guidance of human reason illuminated by grace.8 As Cessario describes it, "The infused virtues direct the Christian life according to a human mode."9

The infused virtues in the First Mode refer to both the theological virtues and the infused moral virtues. As Garrigou-Lagrange explains it: “[t]he theological virtues are infused virtues which have for their object God Himself, our supernatural last end.”10 These are habitus, which are infused by God that give the human person an orientation towards beatitude with God in heaven.11 In addition to the theological virtues, through

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8 It is helpful to note that “while traditional accounts of graced action (i.e. accounts of action at the level of infused virtue [like the Standard Two Modes account]) acknowledge that the infused virtues are measured by a different rule, they typically do not argue that this rule plays a vital role in the performance of graced action. Instead, they typically argue that in an act of infused virtue, reason (perfected by the theological virtues) arrives at the appropriate action, and the infused virtues allow man to act accordingly.” See Angela McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2004), 33-4 and 34n48.


grace, the human person receives the infused moral virtues. As Lagrange notes, “[t]he acquired moral virtues do not suffice in a Christian to make him will, as he ought, the supernatural means ordained to eternal life.”\textsuperscript{12} The acquired virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are not sufficient \textit{habit\textup{u}s} to help direct the human person toward his ultimate end – beatitude in heaven with God. Thus there is a need for new \textit{habit\textup{u}s}, which help the human person progress towards this ultimate end in God.

These new \textit{habit\textup{u}s} are the infused moral virtues which “provide a safer and surer performance of the same action, even though acquired and infused virtue produce the same action materially considered, to wit, to moderate impulse emotions or to bolster the contending emotions.”\textsuperscript{13} So by having the theological virtues, the human person receives a new orientation toward his ultimate end, God, and with the infused moral virtues, the human person receives \textit{habit\textup{u}s}, which help him act better concerning inner-worldly activities toward this new supernatural end. The human mode, thus, is the human person acting with human reason guided by infused prudence toward virtuous acts for the Christian life.

The second mode, the above/beyond the human/divine mode, is where the Holy Spirit guides the action of the human person. "If God moves the soul to follow a command and rule higher than that of prudence, a rule which is measured by the scope of

\begin{footnotes}


\item[13] Cessario, \textit{Introduction to Moral Theology}, 201. See Cessario’s account on 200-1, which explains some differences between the acquired moral virtues and infused moral virtues.
\end{footnotes}
the Holy Ghost alone, then other habits on a loftier moral plane than mere human
trade are demanded. These are called the gifts of the Holy Ghost."¹⁴ In this second
above/beyond the human/divine mode, the human person under the direction of the Holy
Spirit through the gifts is guided toward virtuous acts for the Christian life. It is
important to note that both modes are concerned with the human person's supernatural
end, beatitude in heaven with God, and both modes help the human person move toward
this end of beatitude with God. If both of these modes move man toward the same final
end, then why posit two separate modes?

In an often-quoted passage from the *Cursus Theologicus*, the Standard Two
Modes account relies upon a metaphor developed by John of St. Thomas to explain these
two modes.

> There is a decided difference in the pursuit of the divine ultimate when it
> is regulated by human zeal and industry, or even by the infused virtues,
> and when it is formed according to the rule and measure of the Holy
> Ghost. For example, although the forward progress of a ship may be the
> same, there is a vast difference in its being moved by the laborious rowing
> of oarsmen and its being moved by sails filled with a strong breeze.¹⁵

As the passage from John of St. Thomas denotes, the Standard Two Modes account has
viewed the two modes as two separate ways of reaching the same goal but under different
means. Cessario remarks that “the illustration employs the example of two categorical
causes, viz., oarsmen and wind, to explain two modes of a single divine activity in the

Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus* VI q. 70 d.18, a.2, n.28.

*Cursus Theologicus* VI q. 70 d.18, a. 2, n. 29. “Et sic diversam moralitatem ponit, et
diversam specificationem, diverso quippe modo ducimur ad finem divinum, et
supernaturalem ex regulatione formata nostro studio, et labore, etiam si virtus infusa sit,
vel formata, et fundata in regulatione, et mensuratione Spiritus sancti, sicut diverso modo
ducitur navis labere remigantium, vel a vento implente vela, licet ad eundem terminum
per undas tendat.” See also Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life*, 165.
person...the text does not envisage two competing causal agents, one from human agency and the other from divine."\textsuperscript{16} The Two Modes concern divine activity but under differing modes, and in each case, the mode determines the kind of divine activity that proceeds forth from the human person. With the infused virtue of prudence, the human person acts toward his supernatural end in the human mode; and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the human person acts towards his supernatural end in the above/beyond the human/divine mode.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Cessario, \textit{Introduction to Moral Theology}, 208.

\textsuperscript{17} An essential element of the authors of the Standard Two Modes Account’s reading of Saint Thomas Aquinas has been to interpret the \textit{Summa theologiae} and its exposition of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in continuity with his earlier \textit{Scriptum super Sententiae}. Indeed, the important language of “human” and “above/beyond the human” modes of action that is at the heart of how the authors of the Standard Two Modes account have understood St. Thomas is found in his \textit{Scriptum super sententiae, liber III}, d. 34, q. 1 in his treatment of the gifts and how they are to be distinguished from the virtues. An early example of this reading of St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts of the Holy Spirit occurs in the writings of John of Capreolus in his \textit{Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis} written in the early fifteenth century. [In the Translator's Introduction to \textit{On the Virtues}, White and Cessario allude to the fact that Capreolus is considered as "first of Thomists" for his defense of Saint Thomas and that later Thomists are indebted to his contributions. See John Capreolus, \textit{On the Virtues}, trans. Kevin White and Romanus Cessario, O.P. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2001), xxix-xxx. See also Pinckaer’s Forward that is included in this book for his discussion of Capreolus in defense of St. Thomas.]

In the \textit{Defensiones}, one will find Capreolus arguing against adversaries of St. Thomas and defending St. Thomas’ understanding of the gifts and virtues by frequent lengthy citations from the \textit{Summa theologiae} and the \textit{Super scriptum Sententiae} with references to the human and above/beyond the human modes of human acting. To give one example, in response to one of the arguments of Scotus, which called into question the need for the gifts, Capreolus states: “... we say that positing - but not conceding - that these two manners of acting, namely the human and the superhuman, are incompatible, it does not follow from this that the gift would remove every habit or act of virtue. For one who has both habits can use them individually, one without the other, especially since the habit of a gift causes a greater disposition to the passive movement caused by the Holy Spirit than to an active movement caused by oneself. Hence Saint Thomas, in ST II-II q. 52, a. 9, ad I, speaks as follows: ‘In the case of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the human
Beyond just being a helpful metaphor concerning the supernatural end that both modes concern, the imagery of John of St. Thomas further connotes that the gifts give the mind stands not as mover but rather as moved.’ Thus Saint Thomas. Thus it is clear that one can act in a human manner while applying the virtue and in a superhuman manner while being moved by the Holy Spirit, by Whom a power of soul is moved in such a way that the power itself also does something.”[John Capreolus, On the Virtues, trans. Kevin White and Romanus Cessario, O.P. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2001), 314-5. Liber III, distinction 34, article 3. Emphasis added.]

In this text, Capreolus defends the necessity of the gifts by using the writings of St. Thomas. And in doing so, Capreolus uses direct quotes from the Summa theologiae and references to the language of “human” and “superhuman” from St. Thomas’ Scriptum super sententiis to make his point. The use and co-existence of the writings of St. Thomas’ work on the gifts from his earlier to later writings continues in the Standard Account offered here. This continuity between the texts of the Scriptum super sententiis and the Summa theologiae provides the Standard Two Modes approach a way to understand the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as presented in the Summa theologiae: the human mode of action concerns the human person under the rule of reason with infused prudence moving to action; the superhuman (above/beyond the human) mode of action concerns the impulses of the Holy Spirit moving the human person to action.

Whether the language and/or content of the Standard Two Modes continue to exist in the Summa Theologiae is a question in dispute. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was an exchange between Joseph de Guibert and Garrigou-Lagrange. de Guibert argued that the Summa Theologiae presents a change in Aquinas’ position in which the language of “super-human” disappears, where previously Aquinas had used language denoting a super-human mode in relation to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his Scriptum super Sententiis. Thus de Guibert argued that language usage represents a substantive change in Aquinas’ understanding of the gifts and their relation to the virtues. See Joseph de Guibert, S.J., “Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d’agir ‘ultrahumain’ d’apres saint Thomas,” Revue d’Ascetique et de Mystique 3 (1922): 394-411. Garrigou-Lagrange countered that there is not only continuity between the two texts but also the same theory of the gifts in both texts, and the differences in terminology are due to different points of view. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., “Le mode supra-humain des dons du Saint Esprit,” Vie spirituelle 8 (1932): 124-136. According to O’Connor, Lottin and Labourdette also support Garrigou-Lagrange’s thesis concerning the continuity between the Scriptum super sententiis and the Summa Theologiae. See Edward D. O’Connor, C.S.C., “Appendix 4: The Evolution of St. Thomas’s Thought on the Gifts,” 110-130 in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae vol. 24 (Blackfriars). O’Connor accepts Garrigou-Lagrange’s position with some changes. “It would be going too far, however, to identify the theory of the commentary with that of the Summa as Garrigou-Lagrange seems to do. The latter work introduces a precision that represents an immense progress over the former, and perhaps even a rectification of it”(119). I will discuss this dispute in chapter 4 when I turn to the issue of development in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts and try to see how much change and rectification has occurred.
human person a facility towards his supernatural end that the infused virtues do not.

Cessario develops this point when he argues that “common experience supports” this distinction between the Two Modes.

As the evident contrasts in fervor among the members of the Church makes clear, each justified believer retains the capacity to direct the progress even of his or her supernatural life. In some persons, human reason remains the dominant directive rule or measure for the virtues, even for the infused moral and theological virtues. However in other persons, the Holy Spirit, like a prompter on a theatrical set, inspires a virtuous action in accord with a measure that surpasses that of human reason. A good example may be found in the different ways that people devote themselves to prayer: some fulfill what is required by the commandments, whereas others are prompted to give themselves over with great intensity and for longer periods to the practice of divine communication. No human explanation explains fully why one person prays more than another. The only answer lies in the divine beneficence and the inscrutable designs of divine providence.\(^{18}\)

Cessario’s example shows the distinction that exists between the Two Modes. The human person acts differently depending on the mode guiding one’s actions. In the example of prayer, both modes are working towards the practice of divine communication. In the first mode, under the guidance of human reason with the help of the infused virtues, the human person fulfills the basic requirements towards the supernatural end of communication with the divine. In the second mode, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the human person more intensely lives the practice of divine communication. Thus, prayer comes more easily to the person under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. To underscore this facility, it is important to examine the two modes with another example that illustrates the difference between these modes.

An often-quoted example in Thomas Aquinas’ *Scriptum super sententiis* highlights the differences between the two modes quite well. It concerns the difference between the theological virtue of faith and the gift of understanding.\(^{19}\) Garrigou-Lagrange, commenting on this virtue and gift, remarks that “while faith adheres simply to revealed truths, the gift of understanding makes us scrutinize their depths…”\(^{20}\) Each mode presents a different approach to understanding the truth about God. As Cessario puts it in the context of the Eucharist as the body and blood of Christ, “[s]ince the virtue of faith is constituted by its lack of evidence, the believer must still gaze on the Eucharist with the eyes of faith.”\(^{21}\) In the first mode, the theological virtue of faith leaves the believer unable to comprehend with his own eyes the truth behind the Eucharist as Christ’s own body and blood and thereby the believer must consent by faith to the mystery of the Eucharist as Christ’s body and blood.

With the gift of understanding, on the other hand, the believer does not struggle with such shortcomings concerning the mystery of the Eucharist, and subsequently the gift of understanding even increases the shortcomings of the virtue of faith in a way.

…because the gift allows the believer to perceive more clearly the distance between the hidden reality and the truth-bearing statement that manifests it, the gift actually heightens the suspense of faith’s inevidence. The gift accomplishes this goal, even as it bolsters the believer to adhere with greater precision and clarity to the truth that is believed. Understanding helps the Christian grasp the true dimensions of the

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\(^{19}\) See Thomas Aquinas, *Sent*. III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1. I will focus on this text, among others, in the next chapter when I examine the texts of St. Thomas.


mysteries, so that the “substance of things hoped for” emerges from the shadow of appearances.\textsuperscript{22}

As Cessario and Garrigou-Lagrange have discussed, the theological virtue of faith and indeed the other infused virtues have an incompleteness that the gifts in a way supplement. With the virtue of faith in the context of the Eucharist, one lives by consent to a mystery not fully seen, a “shadow” in Cessario’s words. But with the gift of understanding, one understands better the hidden dimension, the “substance,” of the mystery. And yet this revelation of “substance” illuminates further the virtue of faith’s inability to grasp these mysteries, an inability that only passes away in the afterlife when the virtue of faith passes away and when one is united to God.

Describing the virtue of faith in relation to the gift of understanding makes the virtue of faith seem lacking in the human person. Garrigou-Lagrange goes so far as to say that “…St. Thomas notes that even the infused virtues, both theological and moral, which are adapted to the human mode of our faculties, leave us in a state of inferiority in regard to our supernatural end which should be known in a more lively, more penetrating, more delightful manner, and toward which we ought to advance with greater ardor.”\textsuperscript{23}

Where does this inferiority lie? Is it in the infused virtues? Or in the human person? John of St. Thomas notes that “…the Holy Doctor [Thomas Aquinas] discerns a twofold defect in virtue, one on the part of the one having the virtue, the other, on the part of the

\textsuperscript{22} Cessario, \textit{Christian Faith and the Theological Life}, 173.

\textsuperscript{23} Garrigou-Lagrange, \textit{The Three Ages of the Interior Life} vol. 1, 74. Emphasis added.
virtue itself.” The answers to both of the above questions seem to be yes – the inferiority lies in the human person and in the virtue.

John of St. Thomas continues discussing the first defect by saying that “[a]s regards the one having the virtue, the defect is not essential. It arises from his indisposition and imperfect participation in the habit. This defect is removed through an intensification or growth of the virtue.” John of St. Thomas notes that one does not possess the virtue perfectly when first infused and thus growth in virtue is necessary if the human person wants to rectify the defect. So the first defect of virtue concerns the human person not fully possessing the virtue.

The second defect of virtue concerns the virtue properly speaking. John of St. Thomas points out that:

\[ \text{In the virtue itself, however, the defect is intrinsic, since such a habit has an imperfection annexed to it. Faith, for example, is of its very nature imperfect, inscrutable, and obscure…. This defect is removed by a further perfection, which is called a gift, because it exceeds the ordinary manner of human operation. In this case it is the gift of understanding.} \]

For John of St. Thomas, the human person who has the virtue of faith possesses an incomplete virtue since the human person with the virtue of faith does not have the certitude of having seen and understood the mysteries of faith but yet must give assent to the mysteries of faith, like in the Eucharist. It is not surprising then for John of St. Thomas to describe this human mode of acting as the human person walking according to

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25 Ibid.
his own industry and zeal in ordinary virtue.\textsuperscript{26} If deficiencies remain both on the part of the human person and in the virtue itself, then something more is needed to bring the human person to the supernatural destiny that God has called him to dwell in the afterlife. John of St. Thomas says, “...a special help is needed in men when the inherent principles and virtues are not sufficient for the accomplishment of that higher sphere of activity which is made possible by the elevation of the gifts.”\textsuperscript{27} And this special assistance needed by man resides in the motion of the Holy Spirit in the gifts.

In the second mode, man is “perfected by an exterior principle and power both moving and adding a spirit, a new and higher force, a more sublime rule of action.... These spirits, vital and divine, are given by God, so that the human heart is compliant with the movements of the Holy Ghost in that higher sphere of action to which it is directed and elevated by God.”\textsuperscript{28} The metaphor of the ship with oars and sails used by John of St. Thomas is quite fitting since his metaphor described the gifts as the breeze blowing the sails of a ship – the breeze being the Holy Spirit moving the ship accordingly. The gifts “come from the outside through the inspiration of God, moving the soul to that higher manner [mode] of acting in which the ordinary virtues of mere

\textsuperscript{26} John of St. Thomas, \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 30. no. 8. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 8.

\textsuperscript{27} John of St. Thomas, \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 35. no. 15. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 15.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
human nature are insufficient. By such an inspiration and an opening of the heart, the Holy Ghost renders men readily movable for higher accomplishments.”

In the Second Mode, the human person accomplishes a divine level of action towards his supernatural end. And yet this mode of action also has certain facility that enables the human person to move closer to his supernatural end: “…those who are moved by the wings of an eagle are swept along in the breath of a strong wind. Without labor, they run in the way of God.”

One should not be misled to understand that the gifts supersede the virtues but rather they are part of the totality of the Christian life of virtue. John of St. Thomas describes the interconnectedness of the gifts and virtues in the following way: “These gifts adorn and gild the virtues, making them more resplendent. This adornment comes about by extending the virtues to things which through themselves they could not attain.” And the example John of St. Thomas refers to is the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding. He says, “[s]olitary and naked faith, for example, leaves the soul in obscurity,” and “[t]hose contemplatives who desire to penetrate the mysteries of faith


31 Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology*, 206: “In other terms, the gifts round out the exercise of the moral and theological virtues in the daily experiences of the Christian life, making the moral agent more and more amenable to learn and to receive moral truth.”

need to use the gift of understanding.”

Further on, John of St. Thomas remarks, “[h]eld captive by the bonds of faith, the soul remains in darkness. The flame of love, however, can benefit the soul in this regard, for love makes things clear. From love proceed the gifts of understanding, of wisdom, and of knowledge. They break through the mist of faith, thereby opening the heavens.”

The example of faith and its ineffectiveness for the Christian life becomes more apparent when contrasted against the gifts, and in particular the gift of understanding. The example of the virtue of faith manifestly shows the need for the gifts and how these gifts rectify what is lacking in the human person and his possession of the virtues.

The gifts then “complete and perfect the virtuous life” and thus “…represent seven distinct ways in which the individual believer receives divine impulses or movements that assist him or her to perform specific kinds of virtuous activity.”

Having clarified the nature of the two modes, more needs to be said about the exact nature of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as divine impulses/movements in the human person. John of St. Thomas, in the Cursus theologicus, begins his treatment of Aquinas’ gifts of the Holy Spirit with a discussion of the scriptural foundations for the gifts. This follows

33 John of St. Thomas, The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 32. no. 12. John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 12.


35 Cessario, Introduction to Moral Theology, 206.

closely Thomas' own treatment beginning in question sixty-eight of the *Summa theologiae* I-II, when Thomas calls the gifts "spirits". Using the passage of John 3:8 as his starting point, John of St. Thomas reflects on the multidimensional progress the gifts as "spirits" work in the human person. He characterizes the work of the gifts as threefold:

1) an interior disposition, 2) an exterior communication, and 3) the hidden motion of God.\(^{37}\)

The gifts first of all act as *habitus* that remove confusion and impediments to a life in the Spirit.\(^{38}\) The gifts impact the interiority of the human person. These gifts- *habitus* are “permanent spiritual endowments” and as such “shape the moral character of the Christian in determined ways.”\(^{39}\) As with the infused virtues, these gifts are infused as *habitus* in the human person when the person receives grace through the sacrament of baptism or if he happens to be in a state of mortal sin, he receives these gifts again in the sacrament of reconciliation. Furthermore, “the gifts perfect Christian freedom inasmuch as it accompanies the achieving of excellence in human behavior.”\(^{40}\) The gifts of the


\(^{40}\) Cessario, *Introduction to Moral Theology*, 211.
Holy Spirit help perfect the human person’s freedom because he ultimately moves toward his final end in God by doing good acts through God’s grace and assistance.\textsuperscript{41} With these gifts, the human person is capable of acting in a truly free manner that exceeds \textit{ordinary human standards}. The gifts allow the human person to act in a \textit{superhuman manner}, and thus, the human person is no longer guided solely by his reason elevated with grace but is lead by the Spirit. “Thus we see that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not acts, or actual motions, or passing helps of grace, but rather qualities or permanent infused dispositions (\textit{habitus}), which render a man promptly docile to divine inspiration.”\textsuperscript{42} The gifts of the Holy Spirits, as habits then, are accordingly associated with sanctifying or habitual grace.\textsuperscript{43}

Secondly, as John of St. Thomas has noted, the gifts move man in such a way that "all sensible and exterior actions, especially his conversations, are from the Spirit."\textsuperscript{44} The gifts, as interior dispositions, elevate the exterior actions of the human person, and make

\textsuperscript{41} According to John of St. Thomas, “…there would be a great loss in merit if the Spirit determined the will and worked in it by violence rather than by breathing and actuating its inclination…. Thus, those who are conducted by the Spirit are moved not as slaves but as free men, willingly and voluntarily, since the principles, which move them, though derived from the Spirit, are inherent in their very souls. They are impelled to operations which by their character and measure exceed all ordinary human standards.” \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 28. no. 5. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 5.

\textsuperscript{42} Garrigou-Lagrange, \textit{The Three Ages of the Interior Life} vol. 1, 74.

\textsuperscript{43} Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, \textit{Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St. Thomas, Ia Iae, q. 109-114}, trans. The Dominican Nuns of Corpus Christi Monastery (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1952), 150, 153. Sanctifying grace is the kind of grace that makes one pleasing to God and “is primarily ordained to the salvation of the recipient, whom it justifies.” [152].

\textsuperscript{44} John of St. Thomas, \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 29. no. 6. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 6.
these actions befitting the dignity of the human person in the life of grace. Cessario remarks that the gifts “ensure that each virtuous action of the believer [according to the second mode, the super-human mode] conforms perfectly to the will of God.”\textsuperscript{45} The gifts thus make the Spirit visible in the lives of Christians. “The Spirit comes not only as Comforter but also Guide. The invisible action of the Holy Spirit makes itself visible in the good works of the saints, and assures that the divine plan for salvation of the world continues to be realized fully in the lives of those redeemed by Christ.”\textsuperscript{46} And this visible work of the Spirit provides assurance of the continuing work of Christ’s redemption through the Spirit. According to John of St. Thomas, following Cajetan, a noteworthy way to see the life of the Spirit in a human person is the way that person speaks the truth. “…the control of the external senses, especially speech – is frequently indicative of a spiritual man….”\textsuperscript{47} So the life of the Spirit pervades the whole human person, both interiorly as permanent dispositions and exteriorly as visible actions and speech that manifest the work of the Spirit in the world. But how does Spirit work behind the scenes in the human person so as not to do violence to his will but also to aid him towards doing the will of God? This points to a third way the Spirit works as noted by John of St. Thomas.

\textsuperscript{45} Cessario, \textit{Introduction to Moral Theology}, 211.

\textsuperscript{46} Cessario, \textit{Introduction to Moral Theology}, 212.

\textsuperscript{47} John of St. Thomas, \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 29. no. 6. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 6.
As John of St. Thomas noted earlier, thirdly, the gifts are like the wings of an eagle that are swept up in the "breath of a strong wind." This is another metaphor that plays upon the work of the Spirit as a guiding wind similar to the boat metaphor. “And you do not know whence he comes nor whither he goes. This describes the profundity of the interior motion and direction of the Spirit. For the soul does not know the origin of the motion, its procedure, nor its end. The Spirit, on the otherhand, knows thoroughly the inmost thoughts and secrets of the soul.” There is a hiddenness and gratuity to the work of the Spirit through the gifts in the human person. Commenting on the work of the Spirit as “breathe,” Garrigou-Lagrange alludes to a saying from Jesus in the Gospel of John: “The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes; so it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit.”

Garrigou-Lagrange, commenting on this quote from John, notes “[W]e do not really know where precisely the wind that blows was formed, or how far it will make itself felt. In the same way, we do not know where precisely a divine inspiration begins, or to what degree of perfection it would lead us if we were wholly faithful to it.”

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hiddenness of the Spirit in the gifts helps convey how the gifts are not vital to every act directed toward the human person’s beatitude with God in heaven. If that were the case, then John of St. Thomas’ metaphor about the wind blowing the sails of a boat and the oarsmen rowing the boat towards the same goal makes no sense. There have to be two distinct modes of human activity. This makes sense when one realizes what kind of grace the Standard Two Modes account identifies with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The acts of the gifts of the Holy Spirit are characterized as operative actual grace as distinct from the habitual/sanctifying grace that characterizes the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits.\(^\text{52}\) This characterization of the exercise of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as operative actual grace means that they can be seen as “special help” or “special inspiration” and that it is a certain motion of the soul.\(^\text{53}\)

Yet, the gifts, as habits, are necessary for salvation because they aid the human person in being receptive to the hidden motion of the Spirit towards those acts of the gifts, which would be difficult for the human person to do according to the human mode.

As Cessario notes:

> In order wholly to appreciate the role of the gifts, we must recall that no adequate proportion exists between human nature and the goal of beatific fellowship with God…. To put it differently, we cannot take heaven for granted, as if a life of communication with the Blessed Trinity were something akin to us as eating, drinking, or playing.\(^\text{54}\)

\(^{51}\) Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life* vol. 1, 72. “By this passive docility, the gifts help us to produce those excellent works known as the beatitudes. From this point of view, the saints are like great sailing vessels which, under full sail, properly catch the impelling force of the wind.”

\(^{52}\) Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 163.

Thus, when the motion of the Holy Spirit moves the human person to right action, then the mind tends “heavenward by a straight course and a direct route without error and evasions.”\footnote{Cessario, \textit{Introduction to Moral Theology}, 209.} This puts the human person on the higher mode – the above/beyond the human mode – that leads him to do higher and more perfect acts directed toward heaven. John of St. Thomas says, “Adorned by the Holy Ghost with the gifts, the human heart may be raised to an even loftier plane [than the virtues]. It may then be regulated not according to the constricted and impoverished standards of human reason, but according to the full scope of the Holy Ghost.”\footnote{John of St. Thomas, \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 36. no. 16. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.1, n. 16.} This explanation of John of St. Thomas is an effort in some respect to explain why the gifts are necessary for salvation and why the infused virtues are limited in scope. Without this difference in the work of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused virtues, then these two sets of \textit{habitus} would seem be the same, or indistinct. Indeed, as John of St. Thomas says:

\begin{quote}
All these gifts serve the virtues. They assist them by preparing for acts of virtue, not by arousing the theological virtues to an essentially more perfect act. No works of faith and charity are so perfect that they cannot in essence be accomplished by those virtues. But the object can be dealt with more perfectly when the virtues are assisted by the gifts. For the virtues are not sufficient to dispose and prepare themselves with respect to that object.\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{quote}

\footnote{John of St. Thomas, \textit{The Gifts of the Holy Ghost}, 68. no. 55. John of St. Thomas, \textit{Cursus theologicus} vol. 6, d.18, q.20, a.2, n. 57.}
The Standard Two Modes tradition, as found in the works of Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Cessario, presents a very detailed understanding of Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This account argues that the infused virtues and gifts are from the same divine activity towards the same ultimate end, beatitude in heaven with God. However, there are two modes of activity that concern beatitude. The infused virtues are governed by infused prudence, and the gifts are governed by the Holy Spirit. There are times where the infused virtues are sufficient for those acts proper to the human person’s supernatural end. However, when the infused virtues fail, due to the human person’s deficient reason, the gifts supplement and augment the virtues to those perfect acts that are proper to the human person’s supernatural end.

Having provided an account of the Standard Two Modes authors’ understanding of Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, I now proceed to discuss a more recent interpretation of Thomas and the gifts that seeks to differentiate itself from this Standard Two Modes account.

Part II: The Rival Two Modes Account

A more recent interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit has emerged over the past century. In particular, I focus on the work of Angela McKay and Servais Pinckaers.58 These scholars argue similarly that there are two

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modes of human action: the first mode is the human person under the rule of human reason with the acquired virtues; the second mode is the human person under the rule of divine reason with the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit. The authors who make up the Rival Two Modes account rely upon St. Thomas’ mature teaching in the *Summa theologica* as the way to account for the human person acting in these two modes. Ultimately, in the Rival Two Modes account, they argue that to separate two different graced modes, as the Standard Two Modes account does, would be to neglect how St. Thomas has underscored the importance of the gifts in the moral life as a remedy particularly for the deficiency of human reason in light of the human person’s supernatural end.

To arrive at an understanding of the Rival Two Modes account, I elaborate how this account understands the first mode which has the acquired virtues as the human means of acting and then how this account understands the second mode which has the infused virtues as the principles of action under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Central to understanding the two modes of the Rival Two Modes account is the detailing of the ends of these two kinds of virtues, along with the seeds and rules of these virtues. Only then am I able to show how the authors of the Rival Two Modes account understand the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as necessary for virtuous action.


59 Both the Standard and Rival Two Modes share the same elements regarding the Two Modes. The question comes down to where does one draw the line between the Two Modes.
In order to differentiate the Rival Two Modes account from the Two Modes account articulated earlier in this chapter, it would be helpful to discuss, following Cajetan’s schema, what the modes are for the Rival Two Modes account. If one was to borrow the terminology from Cajetan, the Rival Two Modes argues for two movements of human action in the human person, as opposed to three in the original schema from Cajetan:

(1) The first movement concerns the human mind under the guidance of "natural light and prudence."

(2) The second movement concerns the human mind lead by the "light of grace and faith" and “urged by the instinctu of the Holy Spirit.”

The (1) movement of human action is the human person acting with the acquired virtues under the rule of human reason. This mode concerns the human person not acting with the grace of baptism and the grace of other sacraments. The (2) movement of human action is the human person endowed with grace, the infused virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit under the rule of divine reason. This mode presumes that the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit are working together in the human person when the human person operates according to the rule of divine reason. In order to understand the difference between this rival account and the previous Two Modes account, it would be helpful to examine how this Rival Two Modes account explains these two modes with attention to the seeds of the virtues, the rules of the virtues, and the necessary habitus in each mode.
McKay begins her treatment of St. Thomas’ understanding of the acquired virtues, the first mode, with a discussion of the seeds of acquired virtue.60 For St. Thomas, the acquired virtues “grow out of man’s nature.”61 The human person’s nature provides the beginning for a virtuous life.62 What exactly then are the seeds of virtue? The seeds of virtue are “the general principles of thought and action that man possesses in virtue of his specific nature: the will’s appetite for the good of reason and the natural knowledge of first principles.”63 The seeds of virtue are part of the resources that the human person naturally has at his disposal towards the happiness proportionate to his nature. But the seeds of virtue are not sufficient for the human person to be virtuous;

60 She remarks that scholars have neglected the seeds of the virtues and in doing so have confused Aquinas’ understanding of the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit as well. See Angela McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2004), 17-8.


62 Servais Pinckaers, “Aquinas on Nature and the Supernatural,” trans. Mary Thomas Noble in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 362. “We can also say that the human person is moral ‘from birth,’ possessing within, by nature, the primitive criteria of morality and the seeds of the moral life, the semina virtutum. This holds true not only in the temporal sense of the day of birth, but also in a structural sense: at the origin of life of the mind and heart, there is within us a certain higher nature that inclines us to truth and goodness.”

they only provide a “rudimentary orientation to the good: they give him general principles of action.”

Knowing that the human person possesses the virtues inchoately with the seeds of virtue, how does one become virtuous? As McKay states, “…man is equipped with the natural light of reason. Thus through successive actions, based on reason’s formulation of specific dictates from more general ones, man acquires habits that dispose him to act in accord with the good of reason.” This does not mean that a human person simply must repeat the same act over and over again as if it was some “kind of psychological mechanism.” Virtue “is formed by the repetition of interior actions that insure excellence and progress in performance.” Acquiring virtue, in other words, concerns both an exteriorly good act and an interior disposition towards that good act. This is how the human person goes about acquiring the virtues.

Additionally, McKay’s aforementioned description of the development of the acquired virtues has introduced the important topic of the rule of the virtues, which for the acquired virtues, as the first mode, is the rule of human reason. Human reason is a natural resource the human person has at his use for the attainment of happiness proportionate to his end. Moreover, understanding that the acquired virtues are under the rule of human reason allows one to see that

64 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 22.


when a man learns, or acquires virtue, he – or more specifically, his reason – … is the primary cause of the acquisition…. The rule, [human] reason, is not merely an end goal, but is involved in the very acts through which the habits are formed. For it is right reason that the teacher must appeal to in leading the student along the appropriate path.67

Following the rule of reason, the human person becomes capable of achieving that happiness which is proportionate to his human nature. If this kind of happiness is the ultimate or final end for the human person, then there is no need for further virtues.

But the happiness proportionate to human nature is not the final end; rather God himself is the ultimate or final end for the human person and to attain this end, the human person needs the assistance of God.68 As McKay explains:

No matter how adept man becomes at acting in accord with the good of reason, he cannot render himself capable of acting in this more elevated way without divine assistance. For to act in accord with one’s true end is to act as an adopted son of God should act, and such actions exceed the capacity of human nature. What it means to become the adopted son of God, therefore, will turn on what it means to be made ‘worthy’ of the divine inheritance.69

If the human person’s true happiness lies in God alone, then the human person needs new *habitus* in order to help him become worthy of divine adoption.70 And these new *habitus*
are due to the infusion of grace that brings about a participation in God’s divinity.

“Grace allows us to know God in a new, more intimate way; so intimate in fact, that God is said to dwell in the souls of the justified by Grace.”⁷¹ Thus, the infusion of grace and the dwelling of God in the human person’s soul alter the nature of the human person.⁷²

Since the human person’s soul has been altered and indeed perfected by grace, the acquired virtues are no longer sufficient for the human person’s ultimate end.

As Pinckaers says, “[o]nly God himself, through the sheer gift of grace, can reveal himself to us and bring us to possess him. According to Scripture, this grace is the special work of the Holy Spirit.”⁷³ Human reason, then, becomes incapable of directing the human person to God since it is only God who can direct the human person to the ultimate end. Subsequently, since human reason no longer offers a fitting guide for the human person’s end (which now resides in God due to grace), the seeds of acquired

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emphasis on the necessary *habitus* required in the life of grace and thus this section needs to be explained in order to differentiate these two accounts.

⁷¹ McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 27. One should not take this to mean that God dwelling in the soul is perfect and complete when one experiences a conversion and/or becomes baptized.


virtue and the acquired virtues are not sufficient for the human person’s ultimate end in God.\textsuperscript{74}

Having understood the change in the human person’s soul and how this change has transcended human reason and its own resources toward the human person’s ultimate end, the human person needs additional resources. Since the human person has received an infusion of grace through the Holy Spirit, he needs additional principles, similar to his natural ones, to help him toward his supernatural end in God. McKay writes “[A]s the natural appetite for the good of reason and the natural knowledge of first principles order us to the good of reason, so do the theological virtues give man his first, incomplete, order to God. The theological virtues, then, are in a very real sense to be understood as the ‘seeds’ of virtue at the level of graced action.”\textsuperscript{75}

But, for St. Thomas, calling the theological virtues as “seeds” of virtue at the level of graced action does not mean that the theological virtues are not genuine virtues making them similar to the natural inclinations to virtue the human person has according to the first mode of acquired virtues. The theological virtues are full virtues and have specific acts associated with them.\textsuperscript{76} So if the theological virtues are the “seeds” of virtue for one’s supernatural happiness, what are the virtues equivalent to the acquired virtues for the graced life? “For if the general directions given by the seeds of acquired virtue are

\textsuperscript{74} If human reason is no longer fitting as a rule for human action with the acquired virtues, the Rival Two Modes account will argue, that it is even more unfitting for the infused virtues (theological and cardinal) to be under such a rule as the Standard Two Modes account argues for their movement (2) of human action.

\textsuperscript{75} McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 30-1.

\textsuperscript{76} McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 31.
rendered particular through the acquired virtues, it seems only reasonable that there be virtues at the level of graced action that renders the general directives of the theological virtues specific.”

For St. Thomas, the virtues that render the directions of the theological virtues specific in the graced life are the infused moral virtues. While not perfect parallels, these various sets of “seeds” of virtue and virtues help show how one’s supernatural happiness is in continuity with the happiness proportionate to the human person’s natural resources. Pinckaers draws out this same point in the following way:

...one needs to remember that the virtues form an organism whose head is constituted by the theological virtues. These animate and inspire the moral virtues from within, to such an extent that they transform the measure of the moral virtues. This leads St. Thomas to support the existence of infused moral virtues, needed to proportion the action of the Christian to the supernatural and theological end to which he is called.

Through the work of the Holy Spirit in grace, the human person has received a transformation towards a supernatural happiness that the theological virtues help orient him to with the assistance of the infused moral virtues.

But since these infused virtues have a supernatural end that the human person is not capable of reaching on his own, human reason as the rule and measure for the virtues

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77 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 31-2. See Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 127: “They [the theological virtues] governed all of Christian action and gave to the other virtues, working in harmony with them, an incomparable value, measure, dynamism and finality.”

78 Servais Pinckaers, “Sources of the Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas,” trans. Mary Thomas Noble in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 15. See “The Place of Philosophy in Moral Theology,” in the Pinckaers Reader, 67 which makes a similar point and draws out some of the changes the infused moral virtues will make in the graced life compared to the acquired virtues. See also Servais Pincakers, La vie selon l’Esprit: Essai de théologie spirituelle selon saint Paul et Saint Thomas d’Aquino (Luxembourg: Editions Saint-Paul, 1996), 204-5.
falls short and thus the human person needs a new rule to guide him. The new rule needed for the governance of the infused virtues is divine law or divine reason.\textsuperscript{79}

Because God has oriented the human person to a supernatural beatitude, it is divine reason that serves to direct the human person accordingly to this end in God. But, how does the human person have access to divine reason that allows him to act accordingly with the infused virtues? To answer this question, McKay states that “[a]s the acquired virtues allow man to walk as befits the light of reason, so do the infused virtues allow man to walk as befits the light of grace.”\textsuperscript{80} So how does the human person walk as “befits the light of grace”?

First, one must understand the acquired virtue parallel, as discussed earlier in this account, in order to understand the infused virtues. McKay states

\begin{quote}
The acquired virtues, says Aquinas, enable man to “walk in accordance with the natural light of reason.” Through the acquired virtues, man is able to (1) see which actions are in accord with reason and (2) act accordingly. This distinction will help us to better understand how the infused virtues help man in action. That is, it would seem that “walking as befits the light of grace” will entail that the individual in question is (1) able to see the world with an altered vision, in the light of grace, and (2) able to act in a manner befitting this altered vision.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{79} McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 33.

\textsuperscript{80} McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 33. This description by McKay of St. Thomas’ understanding of the acquired and infused virtues is central. It is here at this juncture where she takes issue with how the Standard Two Modes account defines movements of human action (2) and (3) and how their account has been inattentive to St. Thomas’ teaching on the rule governing the infused virtues. All the aforementioned material on the acquired virtues has been to develop the analogy the way St. Thomas does between the acquired and infused virtues and to point to this inconsistency in the Standard Two Modes account.

\textsuperscript{81} McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 34.
On the acquired level, the human person has the natural resources necessary to see which actions are in accordance with reason and to act accordingly. On the infused level, do the infused virtues provide the human person with an altered vision in the light of grace and an ability to act accordingly? According to McKay’s understanding of St. Thomas, the answer is yes and no. The answer is yes because through the infused virtues alter the human person’s direction towards God, and the answer is no because in the sense that the infused virtues do not perfectly unite the human person with God and “hence perfect man’s reason only in a imperfect and limited way.” According to McKay, for St. Thomas, reason even with the infused virtues cannot move the human person sufficiently to his ultimate end, and thus the human person needs the support of the Holy Spirit to prompt and move him.

How should one describe this insufficiency on the part of human reason? McKay says, “[i]t makes the most sense to characterize what is absent from the theological virtues as having to do with ‘seeing’. Man, it seems, has the ability as a stable disposition to act in a way befitting his status as an adopted son of God, and he has a general union with the divine nature, but he is not so perfected that he is able to ‘see’ clearly in the light of grace.” While the human person has the *habitus* in the infused virtues, these virtues...

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82 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 35.

83 It is this crucial point in the Rival Two Modes account that causes a deep separation of it from the Standard Two Modes account.

84 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 35-6. One should not take McKay to mean that the inability “to see” means a literal seeing, that is, that this inability limits the human person’s reason. The gifts then add an ability to grasp instinctually the right act in the moral life.
can only form reason imperfectly because they are not perfectly possessed by the human person.

Following St. Thomas, McKay gives two examples discussing the imperfect possession of the infused virtues and how this has ramifications for how the human person moves toward his ultimate end. The examples of St. Thomas compare the luminosity of the sun and moon and the art of medicine of a doctor and disciple. According to McKay, for St. Thomas, the sun and the doctor represent the human person’s ability to use his reason toward the end proportionate to his human nature. In the examples, the sun gives off its own luminosity, and the doctor knows how to practice medicine. This parallels how the human person has the capabilities and resources to act toward his connatural end with reason and the acquired virtues. But for the supernatural end, the human person does not have such ability even with the infused virtues. The human person with the infused virtues is comparable to the moon and the student in the examples used by St. Thomas. The moon is never able to give off its own luminosity and needs the sun, and the student is in the process of learning how to be a doctor and needs instruction.85 In both examples, there is an inherent need that must be filled in order to achieve one’s proper end. Ultimately, the human person with the infused virtues needs assistance to reason and will properly about his supernatural end in God.86

85 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 35.

86 McKay describes the effect of the gifts as follows: “As habitual dispositions, the gifts do not merely make it possible for man to receive the motion of the holy spirit: they give him an affective longing, as it were, for that motion…. To possess the gift of wisdom or understanding or any other gift is not to possess the mere potency to be moved by God, but to possess a habitual tending-towards, an affective inclination for that movement.” See McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 37-8. See also Francis
Since the human person who both imperfectly possesses the infused virtues and requires assistance toward his supernatural end needs something else to move him, that something else is the Holy Spirit through the gifts. As McKay explains, “[m]an, who has through the infused virtues the ability to act in a manner befitting an adopted son of God, and who has through the theological virtues an affective union with God, still sees [or grasps] ‘through a glass darkly,’ and must be guided in supernatural actions through the instinct or motion of the Holy Spirit.” What kind of grace(s) is/are the gifts of the Holy Spirit then?

Following the work of Joseph Wawrykow, McKay argues that the gifts are both actual operative and co-operative grace working in the human person. These terms are drawn from St. Thomas’ discussion of grace in *Summa theologiae* I-II question 111, article 2. Divine *auxilium* or actual grace concerns “God moving the human person to

Cunningham’s *The Indwelling of the Trinity* (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1955), 202-11. McKay relies upon Cunningham’s analysis for her point.

Gilson echoes this kind of analysis when he says that “[t]he Gift of Wisdom … does not add a superior reason to the natural superior reason, but it causes reason, in its investigation of the divine, to feel as if it were at home therein, instinctively sensing what is true long before grasping its demonstration.” See Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook (NY: Random House, 1956), 348. As McKay notes in fn 58 in reference to this passage of Gilson, “it is important, of course, that one not treat the gifts as purely intellectual perfections. The gifts are necessary because of the imperfections of reason, but what the gifts give us is not some purely rational knowledge. The knowledge received through the gifts is a knowledge rooted in love, and for this reason the gifts are said to grow out of charity.” See McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 39.

87 The human person needs assistance in these two ways: 1) because he does not possess the infused virtues perfectly because they are not “natural” to him in the same way the acquired virtues can be; and 2) because the supernatural end is beyond human nature and capacities and thus the need for the various forms of grace working in the human person.

supernatural acts.” And this *auxilium* is divided into two kinds of grace: operative and cooperative. “Considered as ‘operative,’ the divine *auxilium* moves the will to the willing of the end in every good act. As ‘cooperative,’ *auxilium* strengthens and confirms the human person in the correct choice of the means leading to the end and the execution of the act…” As McKay explains, “…[T]he *auxilium* of God does not merely sustain man in the doing of good acts that he has already chosen, but even takes an active causal role in the choice itself. Through operative grace, God actually moves the will to will the end. Then, through cooperative grace, God confirms and sustains the actual willing of the end.” McKay further remarks “For if in every meritorious act it is God’s grace which not only sustains our willing but presents the good to the will in the first place, then it makes sense to say that the operative principle of acts in the nature habituated by grace is the divine light of God.” This understanding of the gifts as both operative and cooperative actual grace underscore the abiding presence the gifts have in the moral life. Speaking about the unique role the gifts of the Holy Spirit have as central to the moral life, Pinckaers notes:

…”St. Thomas links the virtues with the gifts of the Holy Spirit which thus enter the organism of the virtues in order to perfect them. The gifts are an integral part of Thomas’ moral teaching, in accordance with the definition

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89 Joseph Wawrykow, *God’s Grace & Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 172n53. For Warwykow’s extended discussion on divine *auxilium* or actual grace, see 170-77.

90 Wawrykow, 177.

91 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 44. See also 44n68. While not using the term “actual grace,” McKay makes references to God’s *auxilium* which is one of the terms the tradition uses for what later will become actual grace.

92 McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues…,” 45.
of the New Law as the grace of the Spirit, and are necessary for all Christians. They add a receptivity to the virtues, a docility to spiritual impulses. In this way the Holy Spirit’s action, like the virtues, can affect all that the Christian does. Morality truly becomes “life in the Holy Spirit,” as the Catechism calls it (n. 1699).  

What Pinckaers says is vitally important to understand how the Rival Two Modes account views the role of the gifts. The Rival Two Modes account argues that St. Thomas understands the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the following way: “(1) every act of infused virtue involves the simultaneous operation of the corresponding gift, and (2) that the motion of the Holy Spirit is operative in every act of infused virtue.” This seems to speak to the concern of Pinckaers that the gifts are an integral part of the moral life. Pinckaers, in his most detailed discussion of the interplay between the gifts and virtues, notes that “[t]he coordination between gifts and virtues – understood as vital and dynamic principles – is important for our study. It shows that this spiritual instinct formed in us by the gifts does not act in a sporadic way, through sudden inspirations, but in a constant way, supporting the enduring patience required by the practice and progress of virtues.”


95 Servais Pinckaers, “Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit,” in the Pinckaers Reader, 391. “La coordination entre les dons et les vertus – comme des principes vitaux et dynamiques, - est important pour notre sujet. Elle nous indique que cet instinct spirituel que forment en nous les dons, n’agit pas d’une façon intermittente, par des inspirations subites, mais d’une manière constante, soutenant la longue patience que requièrent l’exercice et le progress des vertus.” Emphasis added.
The gifts are not for certain times but for all moments of the moral life oriented toward one’s supernatural beatitude.

Thus, the Rival Two Modes account presents an account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in which the gifts play a continuous role in the moral life along with the infused virtues. Having understood how St. Thomas separates the life of acquired virtue from the life of infused virtue with a discussion of the ends, seeds, and rules of virtues, the authors of the Rival Two Modes account argue that the gifts aid the infused virtues; consequently, the human person who possesses the infused virtues and gifts can “see” as an adopted child of God and act accordingly. This “seeing” through the motion of the Holy Spirit made possible through the gifts overcomes the limitations of human reason elevated with the infused virtues. Because the gifts are habitus and described as instinctus, they enable the human person to long for the motion of the Spirit within him as well as make him receptive to that motion that leads to the fitting conduct that is worthy of beatitude with God in heaven.

Part III. Conclusion

Having discussed the two rival interpretations of St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, it is helpful to recall the various areas of agreement between these two accounts. The common areas of agreement concern: 1) St. Thomas’ understanding of the human person’s two-fold happiness; 2) the definition of virtue; 3) the categories of acquired and infused virtue; 4) the deficiency of human reason for the supernatural life; 5) the insufficiency of the infused virtues; and 6) the gifts as habitus.
Even more important are the areas of disagreement between these two accounts. 1) how to distinguish the Two Modes; 2) the rule/measure for the infused virtues; 3) why the infused virtues are insufficient and need prompting of the gifts; 4) how often the gifts are needed, i.e. do the gifts operate with each act of infused virtue? In the following, I elaborate each of these disagreements as a way to prepare the next chapter’s examination of the texts of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The first major area of disagreement is how to distinguish the Two Modes. Recall Cajetan’s three levels of action: (1) The first movement concerns the human mind under the guidance of "natural light and prudence." (2) The second movement concerns the human mind lead by the "light of grace and faith." (3) The third movement concerns the human mind being "urged by the instinctus of the Holy Spirit."\(^{96}\) Beginning with the three levels of action that Cajetan sets up, how are the two modes to be distinguished? The Standard account argues that the first mode is the human person under human reason elevated by infused prudence acting with the infused virtues, which this account calls the human mode. The second mode is the human person acting under the movement of the Holy Spirit in the gifts, which is called the above/beyond the human mode. The Rival account argues that the first mode should be understood as the human person under human reason acting with the acquired virtues, and the second mode is the human person acting under the movement of the Holy Spirit in the gifts with the infused virtues.

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\(^{96}\) Thomas de Vio Cajetan, *Commentarius in Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae*, vol. 6 in *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.*, Rome: Typographia polygotta, 1891, 448.
The second major area of disagreement, related to the first, concerns the rule/measure for the infused virtues. The Standard account argues that the rule/measure for the infused virtues is human reason elevated by grace. This is a “humanly prudent manner of acting” as John of St. Thomas puts it. The Rival account contends that the rule/measure for the infused virtues is divine law or divine reason since the human person received, through grace, a supernatural end, and new seeds of virtue, that it stands to reason that the infused virtues follow some higher rule to guide the human person in conduct befitting the graced life.

The third major area of disagreement concerns the insufficiency of the infused virtues and thus the need for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The Standard account claims that the insufficiency of the infused virtues is twofold: 1) the human person does not have full possession of the infused virtues due to the human person’s disposition and imperfect participation in the infused habits; 2) there are defects in the infused virtues themselves. Due to both of these insufficiencies concerning the infused virtues, the Standard account argues for the gifts of the Holy Spirit as providing the special help needed for some supernatural activity directed towards God. The Rival account holds only the first reason mentioned above from the Standard account: the human person does not have full possession of the infused virtues due to the human person’s disposition and imperfect participation in the infused habits. Such a perfect possession does not occur until one reaches his supernatural end.

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The fourth subject of disagreement concerns how often does one need the gifts? Or do the gifts operate continuously with the infused virtues? With the Standard account, it becomes clear from the outset that there are two modes of human action that can be meritorious. The acts of the gifts then become an occasional or sporadic activity for those times when human action with the infused virtues is limited due to either of those insufficiencies, whether on the part of the person or the virtue. Additionally, these acts of the gifts are due to operative actual grace, which explains its occasional character.

For the Rival account, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are part and parcel with all of graced living, and the gifts act with each act of infused virtue. The Rival account reasons that, if God gives the human person grace with both the infused virtues and gifts, then these habits must work together in the moral life. Similarly, the acts of the gifts are brought about by divine auxilium or actual grace in a twofold manner: either operative actual grace or cooperative actual grace.

These subjects of disagreement about how to understand St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Spirit are helpful in the analysis of St. Thomas’ text in the next chapter. I examine the texts of St. Thomas starting with his earliest work in his commentary on Isaiah to his later work in the *Summa theologiae*. My hope is that through a thorough examination of the writings of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, I am able to show which account, the Standard Two Modes or the Rival Two Modes, best accords with St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts.
Chapter 3

St. Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

In the previous chapter, I examined the two rival interpretations of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and showed how these two interpretations have similarities and yet important dissimilarities that invite further inquiry as to which account is more in accord with the work of St. Thomas. The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and to specify the areas of development in St. Thomas account. In this chapter, I begin with his earliest treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Super Isaia commentary, then I examine St. Thomas’ Scriptum super Sententiiis which further develops his initial doctrine on the gifts; next, I consider his re-elaboration of his doctrine in his commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, and I conclude with an examination of his work on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa theologiae.

I contend that St. Thomas develops his doctrine of the gifts in six different areas. First, St. Thomas uses the term *instinctus*, which allows him to redefine the gifts, also called spirits, as habitus that make the human person amenable to the motion and prompting (*instinctus*) of the Holy Spirit thereby helping the motion of human reason. Second, St. Thomas designates the rule of the infused virtues as the rule of Divine Law or Divine Reason. Third, St. Thomas’ use of the language of the two modes all but disappears. Fourth, St. Thomas’ previously prominent example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding disappears. Fifth, because St. Thomas has redefined the gifts, the gifts now aid the three theological virtues, as opposed to only faith since the gifts
perfect the will as well as the intellect. Sixth, St. Thomas redefines the insufficiency of the infused virtues as concerning the imperfect possession of the virtues. These are the areas I focus on more specifically in chapter four with particular attention to the term *instinctus*.

Additionally, as I examine the various texts of St. Thomas on the gifts, it is important to be mindful of the areas of agreement and disagreement between these two rival interpretations of St. Thomas. As I stated in chapter two, both the Standard Two Modes account and the Rival Two Modes account agree on the following: 1) St. Thomas’ understanding of the human person’s two-fold happiness; 2) the definition of virtue; 3) the categories of acquired and infused virtue; 4) the deficiency of human reason for the supernatural life; 5) the insufficiency of the infused virtues; and 6) the gifts as *habitus*. Additionally, there are also significant disagreements between the Standard Two Modes and Rival accounts and these concern: 1) the distinction and definition of two modes of human action; 2) the rule/measure for the infused virtues; 3) why the infused virtues are insufficient and need prompting of gifts; 4) how often the gifts are needed or do the gifts operate with each act of infused virtue?

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1 In this chapter, I analyze the texts of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit as a way to sort through the disagreements between the two rival interpretations of St. Thomas. Those disagreements I focus on more closely in the following chapter.
The texts of St. Thomas that I examine are ordered as follows: 1) *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram*; 2) *Scriptum super sententiis*; 3) *Super Galatas*; 4) *Summa theologiae*.

Part I. *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram*

St. Thomas develops his earliest exposition on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his commentary on the book of the prophet Isaiah, *Super Isaiam*. Torrell notes that *Super Isaiam* seems to have been written over the years either of 1251-52 or 1252-53. As a biblical bachelor, St. Thomas would have been lecturing on texts from the Bible, and in these cases, he lectured on Jeremiah, Lamentations, and Isaiah during these time periods.

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2 I am following the chronology provided by Jean-Pierre Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, trans. Robert Royal, 2nd ed. (Washington: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 327-9. In addition, I am omitting an interesting reference to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus*. This writing is concurrent with the writing of the *Secunda secundae* of the *Summa theologiae* and dates to the end of St. Thomas’ second period in Paris, 1271-1272. (See Torrell, vol. 1, 336). In *De caritate* q. 1, a. 2, r. 17, St. Thomas argues for an understanding of the gifts that is quite similar to his earlier material from *Isaiam* to *Galatians*. “Ad decimum septimum dicendum, quod dona perficiunt virtutes elevando eas supra modum humanum, sicut donum intellectus virtutem fidei, et donum timoris virtutem temperantiae in recedendo a delectabilibus ultra humanum modum.” Yet recent scholarship has noted that the response to arguments 9 to 17 were written by Vicentius de Castronouo so they are not to be considered as part of Thomas’ writing on the gifts. See Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus – de caritate*, q. 1, a. 2 in the *Library of Latin Texts – Series A* (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2011), 760, co. 1 and Background to the Text.

3 Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, 328. The variance in dating comes from James Wieshepl’s chronological placement of these works in his time in Cologne (1251-52) and the Leonine editors placement of these works in his first year of teaching in Paris (1252-53). See Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, 28.
under the tutelage of St. Albert the Great. Following the Leonine editors, Torrell remarks that these early lectures on scripture are St. Thomas’ first theological works.

St. Thomas’ commentary on chapter eleven of Isaiah is where he treats the gifts of the Holy Spirit; in doing so, St. Thomas is following his predecessors in treating Isaiah 11:2-3 as the key text for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Additionally, St. Thomas uses different terminology to describe the gifts of the Holy Spirit apart from his predecessors, and in particular, Albert the Great. The format of the text follows a set pattern. St. Thomas quotes a verse or two and then explicates the verse(s). The Latin Vulgate text that Thomas uses as the basis for his reflection is as follows: “Et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini, spiritus sapientie et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientie et pietatis, et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini.”

St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in Super Isaiam contains five notable features: 1) a reliance on Gregory the Great’s understanding of the gifts as aid to the virtues; 2) a two mode explanation of the virtues and gifts; 3) a two-fold explanation of the imperfection of virtue; 4) a relational understanding of the gifts to the contemplative and active lives; and 5) a reliance on Augustine’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as gift and love. When St. Thomas begins explicating the meaning of this text, he discusses it in the context of the holiness of Jesus Christ. After having explicated the first part of verse two with

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4 Torrell, St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work vol. 1, 27.

5 Torrell, St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work vol. 1, 28.

6 Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram, vol. 28, Opera omnia iussu leonis xiii p.m., Editae, (Roma; Editori di San Tommaso, 1974), 79. To be referred to as Super Isaiam.
respect to Jesus Christ, St. Thomas then focuses his attention on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the second part of verse two and notes that it “is necessary to see five things about these gifts. First how they differ from the virtues, the beatitudes and fruits; second, their number; third, their order; fourth, how they exist in Christ; fifth, how they are attributed to the Holy Spirit.”

On the question of how the gifts differ from the virtues, St. Thomas follows St. Gregory the Great’s understanding of the gifts as aid to the virtues but describes them differently from his predecessor. “The gifts are given as a help to the virtues, which perfect the powers of the soul to acts proportionate to the human mode, such as faith which makes us see in a mirror and through mysteries.”

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7 Super Isaiam, 79.

8 See Super Isaiam, 79: “Et requiescet. Hic describit ipsum quantum ad sanctitatem, quantum ad tria: primo quantum ad habitus necessitates; secundo quantam ad rectitudinem operis: Non secundum visionem; tertio quantum ad effectum rectiudinis: Habitabit lupus” (Emphasis in the original). Then he elaborates on how Christ has the perfection of graces in three different respects. First, Christ possesses grace in its completeness since Jesus’ grace did not increase any; furthermore, Christ did not have original sin so was never “troubled by the war of the spirit and the flesh” [Benedict Ashley, ed., Thomas Aquinas: The Gifts of the Spirit, trans. Matthew Rzeczowski (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 87-8]. Second, Christ had the perfection of graces with respect to having all of the graces of personal sanctification and ministry. And third, Christ has all the graces in “their plentitude, since he not only had all graces but had them in fullness…” (Ashley, 88) Where noted, I have followed Ashley’s translation. Since his text is a partial translation, I have translated other passages.

9 Ashley, 88. I have altered Ashley’s translation briefly because it leaves out the virtues in St. Thomas’ text. “Ad evidentiam eorum que hic dicuntur, oportet videre quinque cierca hec dona: primo qualiter differant a virtutibus, beatitudinibus et fructibus, secundo de numero ipsorum, tertio de ordine ipsorum, quarto qualiter sint in Christo, quinto quomodo attribuuntur Spiritui Sancto.” See Super Isaiam, 79. Also note that I will only concern myself primarily with the first question, with brief attention to questions two and five.
with St. Gregory, St. Thomas notes that the gifts are aids to the virtues. The
difference that St. Thomas adds is that the virtues concern a human mode; such language
of “human mode” does not appear in Gregory the Great’s understanding of the gifts.

So in elaborating how the gifts aid the virtues, St. Thomas describes the role of
the virtues. The virtues concern acts that are proportionate to the human mode. St.
Thomas then further explains how the virtues operate in the human mode.

There is however a two-fold imperfection of virtue: one through an
accident, which is by not having the disposition, out of which
indisposition remains imperfection in the subject, and this defect is
removed through an increase in virtue; the other defect is per se from the
part of the habit itself, such as faith according to its definition is the
imperfect knowledge because of its mystery, and this defect is removed
through a higher habit, which is called a gift because as it were it exceeds
the human mode of operation, having been given by God; thus the gift of
understanding which makes by some transparent and clear mode those
things to be gazed upon which are of faith.¹¹

Thus the human person who possesses the virtues has two imperfections; one
imperfection is on the basis of not having the habit fully and thus can be overcome
through its increase. The second imperfection concerns the habit itself, and in these cases,
the defect cannot be overcome by itself but must be rectified by a higher habit, that is, a

¹⁰ *Super Isaiam*, 79. “…dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum quibus perficiuntur
potentie anime ad actus proportionatos secundum modum humano, sicut fides que facit
videre in speculo et enigmate.” My translation.

¹¹ *Super Isaiam*, 79. “Est autem duplex imperfection virtutis: una per accidens,
que est ex indispositione habentis, ex qua indispositione manet <imperfect> in subiecto,
et iste defectus tollitur per augmentum virtutis; alius defectus est per se ex parte ipsius
habitus, sicut fides secundum diffinitionem est cognitio imperfecta quia enigmatica, et
iste defectus tollitur per altiorem habitum, qui vocatur donum quia quasi excedit modum
humane operationis, a Deo datum: sicut donum intellectus, quod facit aliquot modo
limpide et clare inueri que sunt fidei.” My translation.
The gifts of the Holy Spirit, as higher habits, exceed the human mode of operation because they come from God. To display this difference between the virtues and gifts, St. Thomas discusses how the human person acts with the virtue of faith in contrast to how the human person acts with the gift of understanding.

With the theological virtue of faith, the human person comes to knowledge of God through a mirror and in mystery, and the knowledge imparted through this virtue is imperfect accordingly: “…such as faith according to its definition is the imperfect knowledge.” Thus the virtue of faith, for St. Thomas, has a defect in itself that is inherent to the nature of the virtue itself. This is in contrast to the gift of understanding. The gift of understanding is a higher mode of operation by God in the human person, which allows the human person to come to knowledge of the mysteries of faith in a clear and transparent manner: “…thus the gift of understanding which makes by some transparent and clear mode those things to be gazed upon which are of faith.” This process with the gift of understanding acts as an aid to the theological virtue of faith since the virtue of faith is lacking in itself. St. Thomas does not expound more deeply about the relationship between the virtues and gifts in this text, but St. Thomas does clearly note the human mode concerning the virtues, which is the first area of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts; he also discusses the two imperfections regarding the infused virtue of faith, which concerns the third area of disagreement.

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12 St. Thomas at this point has not adopted the language of above/beyond the human mode (supra humanum modum). Instead, he notes that the second mode “exceeds” the human mode.

13 Super Isaiam, 79: “…sicut fides secundum diffinitionem est cognitio imperfecta…."My translation.
between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts. There remain two questions that St. Thomas raises in the rest of this commentary that are pertinent for his understanding of the gifts.

The second of five questions that St. Thomas addresses for each gift concerns their number. In a very complicated schema, St. Thomas shows how the gifts can be taken in three ways: “the gifts are perfected either by the avoidance of evil, and this is fear; or through access to the good, and this is either according to the contemplative life or according to the active life.”14 St. Thomas shows how the different gifts fit into the different patterns of life, as seen in the distinction between the contemplative life and the active life.

If the gifts are taken according to the contemplative life, they can be taken either as to the contemplation of the goal of all things, and this is the gift of wisdom, which is knowledge of the highest causes, or as to contemplation of those things which are means to the goal, and this is understanding, which is of spiritual creatures and what pertains to them. If according to the active life, this either regards duties to which all are obliged, and this is carried out by the gift of piety (which is reverence toward those who by faith or example are witnesses of God) and is guided by the gift of knowledge; or it regards duties to which not all are obliged, and to this pertains the gift of fortitude (for exposure to difficulties) and is guided by the gift of counsel.15

14 *Super Isaiam*, 79-80: “…dona perficiunt aut per recessum a malo, et sic timor; aut per accesum ad bonum, et sic vel secundum vitam contemplativam vel secundum activam.” My translation.

15 Ashley, 89-90. I have altered Ashley’s translation to reflect the Latin text more closely where possible. *Super Isaiam*, 80: “Si secundum contemplativam, aut secundum contemplationem finis, et sic est sapientia que est de causis altissimis; aut de his que sunt ad finem, et sic est intellectus, sicut de substantiis creates spiritualibus et de his que ad eas pertinent. Si secundum activam, aut quantum ad ea ad que tenentur omnes, et sic exequens est pietas, que est benivolentia in eos qui fide vel imagine Dei sunt iuncti, dirigens scientia; aut di his ad que non tenentur omnes, et exequens est fortitude ut exponat se difficilibus, dirigens consilium.”
These distinctions of the contemplative life from the active life and their relation to the gifts becomes apparent in the development of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his next work, the *Scriptum super sententiis*.

In the fifth question that St. Thomas addresses concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit, he takes up how the gifts are to be attributed to the Holy Spirit.

…if these gifts are considered according to their specific essences, for example, knowledge precisely as knowledge, then those which perfect the intelligence should be appropriated to the Son, and those which pertain to the affective life, to the Holy Spirit, although all are gifts of the whole Trinity. If, however, they are considered generically as gifts, all are attributed to the Holy Spirit, who is the first gift, in whom all other gifts are given. Likewise, if they are also considered as to the principal motive for which they are given, this is love. For the goodness of God, as says [Pseudo-]Dionysius, is diffusive of all that is received from God in created beings, and this divine goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.16

In this fifth area concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit St. Thomas relates the gifts in three different ways. First, he considers the intellect’s perfection through the gifts and how this is appropriated to the Son, Jesus Christ. Then, he connects the will’s perfection and the affective life to the Holy Spirit. Of course, all gifts come through the Trinity. Second, he notes how in a more general way, the gifts are attributed to the Holy Spirit since the Holy Spirit is the first gift through whom all the seven gifts come. Third, St. Thomas relates the gifts of the Holy Spirit to God’s love which is the motive behind the gifts and thus the Holy Spirit appropriates the gifts through God’s divine goodness. Using the terminology of “gift” and “love” denotes St. Thomas’ reliance on the ways in

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In n15, St. Thomas already links the gift of fear to the avoidance of evil so he does not repeat that again here in this passage.

16 Ashley, 90-1. *Super Isaiam*, 80.
which St. Augustine develops his theology of the Holy Spirit with these titles. These comments of St. Thomas, near the end of his discussion of Isaiah 11:2-3, are insightful for the ways he understands the gifts following Augustine’s Trinitarian theology.

Having examined this first writing of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, it is important to take away the five notable things in the text. First, St. Thomas shows his reliance on Gregory the Great’s understanding of the gifts as aid to the virtues although he does not follow in necessarily the same way since St. Thomas invokes the human mode, which Gregory does not use when speaking of the virtues. Second, St. Thomas names the human mode as concerning the virtues and the mode exceeding the human mode as concerning the gifts. This points to the first significant disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts concerning what exactly are the two modes for St. Thomas. Third, St. Thomas in discussing the human mode focuses on the two defects of the infused virtues: the defect inherent in the virtue itself and the defect in the imperfect position of the virtue in the human person. This point concerns the third significant disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts on how St. Thomas articulates the defect in the virtues. Fourth, St. Thomas relates the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the contemplative and active lives as a way to understand the role of the gifts. Fifth and finally, St. Thomas shows his own dependence on the Trinitarian theology of St. Augustine in attributing the titles of “gift” and “love” to the Holy Spirit. These five features are significant areas in which St. Thomas develops his doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his earliest work on the gifts.
Part II. *Scriptum super Sententiis*

After his time in Cologne with St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas moved on to Paris in 1252 to begin his teaching as a bachelor “under the guidance of Master Elias Brunet de Bergerac,” who held the post left vacant by St. Albert. In addition to his teaching work, St. Thomas had to begin the second stage in his work to becoming a master in theology, which involved “commenting on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*…. According to an often-invoked parallel, the commentary on the *Sentences* was like the chef d’oeuvre that the apprentice was required to present in order to become a master artisan.”

The commentary that St. Thomas wrote concerning the *Sentences* was not a strict one. As Torrell explains:

> Materially, his commentary on each *distinctio* presents itself as a series – longer or shorter as the case requires – of questions that are themselves subdivided into articles and subarticles (*quaestiunculae*). The whole is framed by a *divisio textus* at the beginning, and an *expositio textus* at the end. Between these two markers, we can see the vestiges of the literal commentary, which was honored less and less.

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17 Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, 37.

18 Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, 39.

Torrell speculates that St. Thomas took probably four years to complete his five-thousand-page commentary on the *Sententiis*, from 1252-1255.\(^\text{20}\) There is no doubt that this work appears after his initial commentaries as a biblical bachelor, and thus the *Scriptum super Sententiis* is the next theological work after *Super Isaiam*.

There are four features to St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in the *Sententiis* that are most significant for this study. First, St. Thomas elaborates on the human mode of virtue that he first articulated in *Super Isaiam*. Second, he further clarifies what he means by a higher mode of the gifts of the Holy Spirit; in *Super Isaiam*, St. Thomas never explores the implications for this higher mode. Third, St. Thomas details the relation between the acquired and infused virtues with the various gifts under the contemplative and active life distinction. Fourth, when explaining the virtues and gifts under the contemplative and active life distinction, St. Thomas explains how the two modes have two different rules/measures. These four features concern issues of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts and issues of development of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

St. Thomas treats the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the same place that Peter Lombard does in the *Sententiis*. In Book III, distinction thirty-four, St. Thomas begins treating the nature of the gifts. In article one, St. Thomas asks whether the gifts are virtues. After dismissing several different accounts of the gifts, St. Thomas answers that “…the gifts are given for higher acts than the acts of virtues. And this opinion seems to be the true

\(^{20}\) Torrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, 45, 328.
one.”

And to distinguish those two kinds of acts, the acts of the gifts and the acts of the virtues, St. Thomas starts with a threefold analysis of human action. In the first way, the human acts are in reference to human reason. St. Thomas states:

In one way, by reason of the power eliciting or commanding the act, as the act of reason or of a power that obeys reason is called human, since a man is a man because he has reason, while to nourish himself and to see and such things are not acts of man insofar as he is man, but insofar as he is living or is an animal. And in this respect all habits perfecting man for acts that he does not have in common with beasts can be called human virtues.

Human virtue consists of those acts that are commanded by “the act of reason or a power that obeys reason” and insofar as the human person has habits that perfect him for acts that are only common to the human person qua human person (not qua animal), such habits are called human virtues.

In a second sense of understanding human acts, St. Thomas refers to the object or matter of the act.

In a second way an act is called human by reason of its matter or object, as those that have for their matter human passions or actions. For in this way moral virtues are properly called human virtues. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics X that the work of speculative virtue is more divine than...
human, since it has necessary and eternal things as its matter, but not human things.\textsuperscript{24} So in a second manner, St. Thomas speaks of human acts as those that have for their object the human passions or actions; thus the moral virtues are called human virtues.

Then St. Thomas delineates the third manner in which acts are called human by reason of its mode. “In a third way, an act is called human by reason of its mode, namely because in acts that are human in either the first or second way, also the human mode is kept.” In this third way, St. Thomas uses “mode” to distinguish human acts and then applies mode back to the first two ways of understanding human acts and by consequence human virtue. Thus, for St. Thomas, the human mode concerns those acts that have been commanded or elicited by human reason (either directly or indirectly) and those acts that have the matter or object that concern human passions or actions.

St. Thomas further elaborates the understanding of the human mode in the reply to the second objection, which raises the concern that the infused virtues, by their nature “grace-given goods,” are gifts.\textsuperscript{25} St. Thomas replies

To the second it should be said that even in the infused virtues the account of gift is not kept in every respect in which it is kept in the aforesaid gifts; for in the virtues, the mode of acting in the virtues is according to the human condition, although the substance of the habit is from the divine gift, and so a virtue can in a certain way be called a gift.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Sent. III d. 34, q. 1, a. 1. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 106.

\textsuperscript{25} Sent. III d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 104.

\textsuperscript{26} Sent. III d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, ro. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 106.
Notably in this reply, St. Thomas extends the human mode to the infused virtues because he notes a certain kind of virtue that is a divine gift (not acquired) and can thus be called gift; yet the mode of human action is “according to the human condition.”

Lest one thinks that maybe St. Thomas is speaking haphazardly about the infused virtues in the human mode, in distinction thirty-four, question one, article two, St. Thomas makes it clear that the virtues he is speaking of include both acquired and infused virtues. St. Thomas states that “[i]t should be said that as is evident from what has been said, there are three genera of virtues. For there are intellectual virtues, theological virtues, and moral virtues, and we find as common to all of them, that they perfect a man for their acts according to the human mode.”

Not all these virtues help direct the human person to the same end, but their commonality is that they perfect the human person for acting in the human mode. The aforementioned account of the human mode of action bolsters the way the Standard Two Modes account reads St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas is quite clear that the human mode of action concerns the acquired and infused virtues. This becomes even clearer below when St. Thomas charts the various intellectual, moral, and theological virtues in the contemplative and active life distinction and shows how the gifts are a higher mode of action compared to the human mode of the virtues.

Having noted that the virtues correspond to the human mode of action, St. Thomas then explains that the acts of the gifts of the Holy Spirit correspond to a different and higher mode than the virtues.

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But if one carries out human things in a way that is above the human mode (*supra humanum modum*), the act will be not simply human but in a certain way divine...I say that the gifts are distinguished from the virtues in this, that the virtues perfect one for acts in a human mode, but gifts perfect one for acts in beyond the human mode (*ultra humanum modum*).  

St. Thomas makes this distinction between acts of virtue and acts of the gifts upon a citation of Aristotle in which Aristotle defines heroic or divine virtue as “by the excellence of virtue man becomes as it were God” as opposed to virtue simply. Thus for St. Thomas, the gifts are distinguished from the virtues because the virtues concern the perfection of the human person in the human mode, and the gifts concern the perfection of the human person for acts that are above/beyond the human mode (*supra humanum modum*).

To help clarify this distinction between the virtues and gifts, St. Thomas uses the example of the theological virtue of faith and the gift of understanding. For the mode connatural to human nature is to perceive divine things only through the mirror of creatures and obscure likenesses, and the faith that is called a virtue perfects one to perceive divine things in this way. But the gift of understanding, as Gregory says, “enlightens the mind about the things heard, so that a man even in this life receives a foretaste of the future manifestation.”  

Reminiscent of his account of the theological virtue of faith and the gift of understanding in his commentary on Isaiah, St. Thomas explains that the human person with the virtue

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28 *Sent.* III d. 34, q. 1, a.1. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 106. See also *Sent.* III d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, ro. 1 and III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2.


of faith does not have direct access to divine things, and thus in the human mode, the human person accesses divine things through obscurity. But with the gift of understanding, the human person does have access to divine things that is a foretaste of what God will reveal in heaven. So far twice in the Thomistic corpus, St. Thomas uses the same example of the infused virtue of faith and the gift of understanding to explain the two-fold distinction between the human mode of action concerning the virtues and the beyond/above the human mode (\textit{supra humanum modum}) of action concerning the gifts. This, too, is a notable example of the Standard Two Modes account that helps explain their use of the human and beyond/above the human mode distinction regarding human action. Subsequently, these points figure into the first area of disagreement about how to understand St. Thomas’ discussion of two modes of human action.

In distinction thirty-four, question one, article two, St. Thomas continues his elaboration of the differences between the two modes by focusing upon the two things that pertain to human activity: contemplation and action. St. Thomas uses the divisions of contemplation and action to show how the virtues are proper to one mode, the human mode, and the gifts to a higher mode, the above/beyond the human mode (\textit{supra humanum modum}) of action. The explanation that unfolds in St. Thomas’ account thoroughly explains the role of the virtues and gifts in contemplation and action. Previously in \textit{Super Isaiam}, St. Thomas mentions a basic framework for explaining the gifts and virtues in contemplation and action without going into explicit detail as he does in the \textit{Sententiiis}.

Concerning human contemplation, St. Thomas discusses a two-fold division: the first way involves how “one proceeds to the knowledge of necessary and eternal things,
which pertains to discovery,” and the second way involves how “one orders things on the basis of first principles, which pertains to judgment.”\textsuperscript{31} The first way of human contemplation, according to St. Thomas, goes

(1) from sense to memory, (2) from memory to experience, and (3) from experience to first principles, which are known as soon as the terms are known. And understanding, which is the habit of principles, perfects this process. One proceeds further in the same way (4) by seeking conclusions on the basis of those principles. And another intellectual virtue, which is called science, perfects this process, with respect to the things that are subject to reason.\textsuperscript{32}

In this first way of contemplation, St. Thomas shows how the intellectual virtues of understanding and science both help perfect the process of knowledge towards the first principles of things and finding conclusions based on those first principles.

Further, St. Thomas remarks that “… faith, which is the seeing of divine things in a mirror and obscurity, perfects in the things that are above reason. But that the spiritual things be grasped in as it were naked truth is above the human mode [\textit{supra humanum modum}]. And this is accomplished by the gift of understanding, which enlightens the mind about the things heard through faith, as Gregory says.”\textsuperscript{33} So with the first way of contemplation, which concerns the senses, spiritual things are not accessible to the senses in the same way as other things that are sensible. Thus the human person is given the theological virtue of faith to see divine things, yet obscurely since the divine things are above reason. In order to grasp the divine things, the human person is given the gift of understanding, which allows him to grasp the divine things first heard through faith. Thus

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Sent.} III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 112.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Sent.} III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 109.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
the intellectual virtues of understanding and science and the theological virtue of faith concern the human mode; and the gift of understanding concerns the above/beyond the human mode (\textit{supra humanum modum}).\textsuperscript{34}

In the second way of contemplation that concerns judgment, “the human mode is that a man judges and orders concerning lower things on the basis of a simple seeing of the first principles and highest causes. And this is done by wisdom…”\textsuperscript{35} Here St. Thomas, in dealing with the second way of contemplation, focuses on the intellectual virtue of wisdom and its role in contemplation and in the judgment and ordering of lower things. But for the human person, who is called to share in the divine life of God, this mode is insufficient. As St. Thomas states, “…it is above the human mode [\textit{supra humanum modum}] for a man to be united to those highest causes, transformed into the likeness of them in the way in which ‘he [who] clings to God is one spirit [with him],’ as is said in 1 Cor 6:17, so that from his inmost being, as it were, he may judge and order other things, not only speculative things, but also human actions and passions. And this is done by the gift of wisdom.”\textsuperscript{36} St. Thomas is saying that the human person through the normal human mode of judgment is not capable of achieving the kind of contemplation befitting a

\textsuperscript{34} The aforementioned account of virtues and gift regarding the first way of contemplation helps explain how Cajetan in his commentary on the \textit{Summa theologiae} distinguishes two modes of human action with regard to three levels because St. Thomas here makes reference to the intellectual and moral virtues, the theological virtues, and the gifts which map well with Cajetan’s threefold levels of action. All of this, of course, serves as additional material to consider how St. Thomas understands the two modes of human action, which is the first disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes account.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Sent.} III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 109.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
person who is called to share God’s divine life so he needs the gift of wisdom to help him judge and order things properly, concerning not only speculative issues but concerning human action and passions. In this above/beyond the human mode, the gift of wisdom has an advantage over what the intellectual virtue of wisdom can achieve through human reason.

After discussing the two gifts associated with contemplation, St. Thomas focuses his attention on the divisions within human action that involve various virtues and gifts. Drawing parallels with his discussion on contemplation, St. Thomas states that “[t]wo things are also found on the part of action, namely to direct, which pertains to knowledge, and to carry out, which belongs to affection. Now just as in the knowledge of contemplation, so also in practical knowledge, which directs in moral activities, the twofold way of discovery and judgment is found.”

St. Thomas takes the activities of discovery and judgment and speaks of how the virtues and gifts accord with these kinds of activities in the human person.

In discovery, the human mode is to proceed by inquiring and conjecturing on the basis of the things that usually happen, since moral consideration is based on such things and regard such things, as the Philosopher says. This discovery in the human mode is accomplished by Categoria, which is good deliberation. But for a man to receive what he should do, as being instructed with certainty by the Holy Spirit, is above the human mode [supra humanum modum]. And the gift of counsel effects this.

St. Thomas in this instance contrasts the human virtue of Categoria or good deliberation as the human mode with the gift of counsel as the above/beyond the human mode. In the human mode, the human person has recourse only to considering how things have


38 Ibid.
happened and then proposing some course of action to undertake. But to act in a
divine way concerns receiving what one should do with certainty through the Holy Spirit
in the gift of counsel. Thus the gift of counsel provides the human person with what he
should do with assurance and certainty when deciding how to act well.

Then, St. Thomas examines the way of judgment and how the human mode and
the above/beyond the human mode vary based upon how the human person acts with the
requisite virtue or gift. He writes that:

…the human mode is for a man, on the basis of things that tend to happen
frequently, (1) to judge with probability about the things found by
deliberation, which is done by gnome and synesis, and further (2) to
impose the order of this judgment on inferiors, which is done by prudence,
which gives command. But for a man to perceive with certainty
concerning the things that ought to be done is above man. And this is done
by the gift of knowledge, which teaches us how to live one’s life “in the
midst of a crooked and perverse nation” (Phi 2:15); hence also its very
name conveys the notion of certainty.39

According to the human mode, once the human person has deliberated about how to act
or not act in a given situation, one must judge about those things deliberated with the
virtues of gnome and synesis and then to make a judgment and order what must be done
in that given situation with prudence. But according to the above/beyond the human
mode, one acts with the gift of knowledge that helps us act with a certainty that the
human mode does not give.

Once St. Thomas has discussed how the two modes work in the process of a
human action, he then broadens his inquiry into the active life to the effects of action with
others and within himself, i.e. the passions.

Now actions by which a man interacts with others are regulated according to the human mode in two ways: (1) either on the basis of him with whom one interacts, as when something is presented to him that is due to him, which justice does; (2) or on the basis of him who interacts with the other, inasmuch as his good shines out in such interaction. This later interaction is found either (2a) in a man’s giving what belongs to him, which liberality does in small affairs, and magnificence in the greatest gifts or expenses; or (2b) in his showing his own self to the other, either according to knowledge, so that he may be recognized such as he is by words and deeds, which the virtue called truthfulness by the Philosopher does, or according to affection, insofar as he makes himself pleasant to his companions either in games, which *eutrapelia* does, or in common life, which friendship does…. But for interaction in regard to all of the aforesaid things not to be regulated on the basis of the good of the one who interacts or the one with whom one interacts, [but on the basis of the divine good], and thus not limited to only granting so much to the other as is due him or as is beneficial for the one who gives, but as much as the divine good shines out in himself or in his neighbor is pleasing to God – this is above the human mode [*supra humanum modum*]. And this is done by the gift of *piety*.40

The virtues governing human interaction with others according to the human mode are justice, liberality, magnificence, truthfulness, and *eutrapelia*. These are according to the human mode because these virtues concern giving to the other on the basis of the good of the person giving or on the basis of the good of the person receiving. But when using divine goodness as the basis for how to give to others, this concerns the above/beyond the human mode, and thus it is done by the gift of piety.

Having outlined the two modes of human action concerning one’s interaction with others, St. Thomas then shows how the two modes are reflected in the irascible and concupiscible parts pertaining to the passions and draws specific reference to the measures of each mode that help reflect the kind of activity (whether virtue or gift) that is needed for the requisite directing of the passions. “Therefore in directing the passions of

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40 *Sent.* III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 110.
the irascible part, that which is good according to reason is taken as a measure or rule. 

For the passions of the irascible part can be led back to three things: (1) hope…. (2) Fear and daring…. (3) Anger….“41 Hope concerns the obtaining of a difficult good that is in accordance with the human person’s own strength and direction. The virtue of magnanimity aids the human person to do the difficult good in regards to great honors. “A certain unnamed” virtue aids the human person to do the difficult good in smaller honors.42 In regard to fear and daring, the virtue of fortitude aids the human person in dealing with a “threatening evil that is difficult to avoid.”43 And lastly, “[a]nger, which arises from a preceding injury, in which we are directed so that we do not rise up in vengeance beyond the quantity of the offense and the order of the law; mildness does this.”44 All of the above preceding virtues concerning the irascible part of the human person are virtues that are measured out according to human reason. The reference to the measure of human reason is important since St. Thomas affirms here that the virtues in the human mode are measured according to human reason. This concerns the second of the disagreements between the Standard and Rival Two Modes account on how one should understand the rules regarding the virtues and gifts.

In the very next section, St. Thomas explains the other measure for the gifts.

When things concern a higher measure, then this is above the human mode.

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41 *Sent.* III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 110.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.
But for a man to take a divine power as a measure in all of these things, so that (1) he reaches out to works of virtue that he knows his strength is not sufficient for, and (2) relying on the divine assistance, is not afraid of dangers that exceed his strength, and (3) not only does not seek vengeance for injuries inflicted upon him, but even glories in them, looking to the one who repays – this is above the human mode \([supra humanum modum]\). And all this is done by the gift of fortitude.\(^45\)

When having a higher measure, the human person has a higher course of action that is above the human mode. In the case of the gift of fortitude, the human person comes to rely on divine strength and not just his own; he also is not afraid of the dangers that he on his own strength is unable to take; and lastly he is willing to take on afflictions that he would otherwise not be able to on his own initiative. These differences, for St. Thomas, show how these two modes operate and how these differences are formed based upon the respective measure for each level of activity.

Finally, St. Thomas discusses the passions of the concupiscible part of the human person. These are concupiscence, love, and pleasure. In these passions, we are directed in the human mode to that which is good according to reason, so that a man has affection for temporal goods in proportion to his need for them; this is done by temperance, which regards the greatest pleasures and concupiscences, and by other virtues attached to temperance. But for a man to judge of all these things as on account of his reverence for the divine majesty is above the human mode \([supra humanum modum]\), and this is brought about by the gift of fear.\(^46\)

Again, St. Thomas follows the same method as in previous discussions of the virtues and gifts. He shows how the virtue of temperance and other virtues attached to temperance moderate his desires for pleasures according to need in the human mode. But when taking


\(^{46}\) Sent. III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 111.
into consideration one’s reverence for the divine and not one’s human needs, then pleasures are moderated on account of the gift of fear.

One may wonder what gifts St. Thomas aligns with the theological virtues of charity and hope. There are no gifts aligned with these two theological virtues.\textsuperscript{47} St. Thomas states that no such gifts correspond to charity and hope because “the will does not have of its nature an imperfect mode.”\textsuperscript{48} Thus, there can be no gift corresponding to hope and charity “that would act in a more perfect mode. For the imperfection that is in the act of hope is not due to the mode of the act, but is due to the distance of the object.”\textsuperscript{49} Thus the gift of understanding is necessary to augment and perfect the intellect.

It is only when one turns to distinction thirty-four, question one, article, 3 that St. Thomas clearly distinguishes what has been assumed for the past few articles regarding modes and measures for the virtues and gifts. This appears as the preface to a response regarding whether the gifts remain in the homeland.

It should be said that a mode is determined for each thing by its proper measure. Hence the mode of action is taken from that which is the measure and the rule of the action. And therefore, since the gifts are for acting above the human mode, it is necessary for the acts of the gifts to be measured by a higher rule than the rule of human virtue – the divinity itself partaken of by man in its own mode, so that now he may act not humanly, but as one who has been made God by participation, as is evident from what has been said. And thus all the gifts have a common measure of action.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} This becomes a point of development in St. Thomas’ later account of the virtues and gifts in the \textit{Summa theologiae} in which he aligns gifts with both the theological virtues of hope and charity.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Sent.} III d. 34, q. 1, a. 2. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 112.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Sent.} III d. 34, q. 1, a. 3. “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 114.
St. Thomas here explains how grace and its effects have changed the human person’s potential for action beyond human virtue under the rule of human reason; as a human person called to participation in the life of God, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are measured by a divine rule. Furthermore, this clarifies St. Thomas’ elaboration of the above/beyond the human mode, which entails a higher divine rule of action than human reason.

Previously regarding the active life, St. Thomas does not mention the rule for the higher mode of the gifts. Additionally, this explanation of the two rules, human reason concerning the human mode and divinity concerning the above/beyond the human mode, explains how the Standard Two Modes account can conclude that these are the two rules governing the two modes of human action.

After having understood the discussion of modes and measures/rules in St. Thomas’ treatment of the gifts, it is important to look at his article concerning whether the beatitudes correspond to the gifts. This is where St. Thomas finishes most of his treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtues and speaks of the differences of these modes regarding the beatitudes. In distinction thirty-four, question one, article four, St. Thomas argues that the “beatitudes are not habits that are distinct from the virtues and gifts, but are acts of virtues made perfect by the addition of the gifts, or rather acts of the gifts themselves.”⁵¹ So the beatitudes are simply acts of virtues with the gifts, or acts of the gifts themselves. What is not clear from this and from what has been said earlier, is

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⁵¹ *Sent. III d. 34, q. 1, a. 4.* “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 117. St. Thomas, further in the response, elaborates on three ways of perfection of virtue and the third way deals with the gifts, which can be called “perfect virtues…or also the virtues can be called perfect virtues when they are joined with the gifts, inasmuch as one habit is helped by the addition of another.”
how the gifts perfect the virtues. It seems at times that the acts of the gifts supersede
the acts of the virtues in different kinds of acts, and this is because of the different
measure of each set of acts. That is, the gifts seem to impart something special or unique
to the human person that the virtues cannot give and thus by the divine measure, the gifts
seem distinct from the virtues even though they deal with similar matters and most of the
virtues have gifts that are aligned with them.

Having explored the main texts of the *Scriptum super Sententiis* of St. Thomas,
there are several distinct lines of elaboration that have occurred from his previous work.
First, St. Thomas expounds his teaching on the human mode of action concerning the
human virtues, acquired and infused. He explains the categories of human action and
shows how the human mode concerns those acts elicited by human reason or by a power
under the guidance of reason and those acts that have for their object the human passions
or actions. Furthermore, as noted earlier, human virtue for St. Thomas refers to the
intellectual, moral, and theological virtues. So the human mode includes both acquired
and infused virtues. Second, having explained the human mode, St. Thomas explains the
above/beyond the human mode concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which concerns a
higher perfection than human virtue. The gifts, if called virtues, are the heroic or divine
virtues, using Aristotle’s terminology. Using the theological virtue of faith and the gift of
understanding, St. Thomas underscores the difference between these two modes of action.

Third, St. Thomas provides a detailed account of the theological, moral, and
intellectual virtues in the human mode and the gifts in the above/beyond the human mode
concerning both contemplation and action. This is an elaboration of St. Thomas’ work in
*Super Isaiam* that briefly catalogued the virtues and gifts under the headings of
contemplation and action. Fourth, while discussing the virtues and gifts under the headings of contemplation and action, St. Thomas clarifies the rules/measure regarding the human mode of action and the above/beyond the human mode of action. Human virtue, in the human mode, is under the rule of reason; the gifts, in the above/beyond the human mode, are under the rule of God.

Finally, St. Thomas' doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Scriptum super Sententiis* provides points of contact for the first two disagreements between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts detailed in chapter two. In particular, St. Thomas clarifies his understanding of the two modes arguing for a human mode of the virtues (intellectual, moral, and theological) and a beyond/higher than human mode of the gifts; and he details the rules/measures for the virtues, which is human reason, and for the gifts, which is God. In the next section, St. Thomas continues to use the distinctions between virtues and gifts that he outlined in his *Super Isaiam* and *Scriptum super Sententiis*.

**Part III. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Galatas lectura**

The exact dating of St. Thomas' commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians is not known. Scholars postulate that St. Thomas taught courses on St. Paul in two stages in three different times and places: the first stage took place possibly in Rome between 1265 and 1268; the second stage took place in Paris between 1268 and 1272, and finally in Naples between 1272 and 1273.\(^\text{52}\) Scholars propose, with uncertainty, that the majority of the Pauline commentaries took place during the Rome period from 1265 to 1268 because after this time period, St. Thomas produces an astonishing amount of work.

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\(^{52}\) Torrell, vol. 1, 328-9, 340.
and to presume that he commented on the majority of the Pauline corpus in addition to the other works produced would be “hardly plausible.” 53 The passage I focus on from the commentary on Galatians presents St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Spirit that is similar to the Sententiis commentary. It is an important text that shows continuity with St. Thomas’ earlier doctrine of the gifts in Super Isaiaam and Scriptum super Sententiis.

St. Thomas gets into a discussion of the virtues and gifts by way of commentary on the fruits of the Spirit in Galatians 5. St. Thomas states:

For God planted in human nature certain seeds, namely, a natural desire of good and knowledge, and He added gifts of grace: And therefore, because the works of the virtues are produced naturally from these, they are called “fruits,” but the works of the flesh are not. And for this reason, the Apostle says: “What fruit, therefore, had you then in those things of which you are now ashamed?” (Rom 6:21). It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that the works of the virtues are called fruits of the spirit, both because they have a sweetness and delight in themselves and because they are the last and congruous products of the gifts. The difference from one another of the gifts, beatitudes, virtues and fruits is taken in the following way. In a virtue can be considered the habit and the act. Now the habit of a virtue qualifies a person to act well. If it enables him to act well in a human mode, it is called a virtue. But if it qualifies one for acting well, above the human mode, it is called a gift. Hence the Philosopher, above the common virtues, puts certain heroic virtues: thus, to know the invisible things of God darkly is in keeping with the human mode, and such knowledge pertains to the virtue of faith; but to know the same things more penetratingly and above the human mode [supra modum humanum] pertains to the gift of understanding. But as to the act of a virtue, it is either perfective, and in this way is a beatitude; or it is a source of delight,

53 Torrell, vol., 1, 340. My theory of the development of St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts supports an earlier dating of the commentary on Galatians as opposed to this commentary being contemporaneous with the Summa theologiae. The Galatians commentary seems to be the middle point of his development concerning the gifts. He has not abandoned his earlier terminology concerning the gifts themselves but earlier in the commentary St. Thomas speaks of the instinctus of the Holy Spirit, which shows that his theology of the Holy Spirit has changed but such a change has not affected his doctrine of the gifts.
and in this way it is a fruit. Of these fruits it is said in the Apocalypse (22:2): “On both sides of the river was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits.”

In this passage, St. Thomas first outlines how God gave human nature both the natural seeds of the desire for good and knowledge and also the gift of grace. Now when the human person who possesses these seeds and grace does works of virtue, such works produce fruits of the spirit. Having understood how the fruits of the spirit come about, St. Thomas then distinguishes the categories at play here: the virtues, the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits.

To help clarify these four categories, St. Thomas affirms that a virtue can be either a habit or an act and that the habit of virtue perfects one for doing the good. And if the habit of a virtue allows one to act well in a human mode (operandum humano modo), then such a habit is called a virtue. If the habit of a virtue allows one to act well in a way above the human mode (operandum supra modum humanum) then such a habit is called a gift. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas calls the gifts heroic virtues (virtutes quasdam heroicas) as opposed to the level of common virtues (comones virtutes). To further illustrate this division between virtues and gifts, St. Thomas gives the example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding. The virtue of faith, in the human mode, concerns the human person knowing the things of God through mystery; the gift of understanding, in the above the human mode, concerns the human person knowing the

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things of God more clearly. The beatitudes then are the perfective acts of virtue; and
the fruits are the delightful acts of virtue.

The account of the virtues and gifts in this part of the commentary on the
Galatians is very reminiscent of his account of the virtues and gifts in the *Scriptum super
Sententias*. St. Thomas refers to the division between these two categories of virtues and
gifts with the terminology of human mode and above the human mode respectively.
These are the marks of the Standard Two Modes account presentation of St. Thomas’
teaching on the gifts. Additionally, the gifts are referred to as heroic virtues citing
Aristotle. Finally, St. Thomas invokes his familiar example of the virtue of faith in the
human mode and the gift of understanding in the superhuman mode. These main features
remain the same within this later presentation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by St.
Thomas some ten or so years after the *Scriptum super Sententias*. So far, all three texts
represent the same basic understanding of the gifts and the virtues. As I turn to the final
text of *Summa theologiae*, one must ask how much of this understanding of the gifts of
the Holy Spirit continues to be transmitted in St. Thomas’ most mature work.

Part IV. *Summa theologiae*

The *Summa theologiae* represents the “most widely used work by Thomas, and
without doubt the best known.”\(^{55}\) The impetus for St. Thomas’ *magnum opus* was due to
St. Thomas’ founding of a *studium* in Rome at the behest of the Dominican provincial
council in 1265. While taking up the task of teaching Peter Lombard’s *Libri quattuor
sententiarum*, scholars agree that St. Thomas seems to have decided around 1266 to

\(^{55}\) Torrell, vol. 1, 147.
abandon Lombard’s *Sentences* and to chart a new course of studies for his Dominican *studium*. “This is the genesis of the great *Summa theologiae*, designed to introduce beginners to theology in an orderly, intelligible, interesting way, avoiding the boring and labyrinthine procedures that were inevitable if theology had to be taught on the basis of set texts, with all the repetitions and inconsequentiaity this involved.”

The writing of the *Summa theologiae* takes place from 1266 onwards to 1273: the *Prima pars* 1266-68 in Rome; the *Prima secundae* 1271 in Paris; the *Secunda secundae* 1271-72 in Paris; and the *Tertia pars* winter of 1271-2 in Paris to December 6, 1273 in Naples.

St. Thomas treats the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa theologiae*. In the *Prima Secundae*, he focuses on a more general account of the gifts in connection with the virtues, beatitudes, and fruits. In the *Secunda Secundae*, he devotes attention to each specific gift within the context of the virtue it is aligned with as well as the specific beatitude and fruit. In the *Prima Secundae* section of the *Summa theologiae*, I follow the general outline of the text beginning with a general account of the virtues since there are disputes regarding the varying modes and rules of the virtues and gifts. Then I attend to St. Thomas’ general account of the gifts. My aim in this section is to present St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae* with attention to the virtues so as to devote special attention to those four areas of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts. These disagreements concern: 1) the two modes of human action; 2) the rule/measure for the infused virtues; 3) the insufficiency of the infused


57 Torrell, vol. 1, 333.
virtues and the need for the gifts; and 4) how often the gifts are needed. I begin with
St. Thomas’ doctrine of the virtues, both natural and supernatural. I then treat St. Thomas’
understanding of the two ends of the human person, the object of the virtues, and the
rules concerning the virtues. This initial treatment of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the virtues
serves as a way to understand St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts.

Part IV, A. The Virtues

St. Thomas accepts the definition of virtue as “a good quality of the mind by
which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us
without us.” He also refers to virtue as a “habit by which we work well.” Having

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58 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol. II, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Press, 1948), I-II, q. 55, a. 4, obj. 1. All English text citations are taken from edition and will be abbreviated ST in subsequent footnotes. All Latin citations of the Summa theologiae are taken from Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, in Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m. vol. 4-12 (Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1888-1906).

This definition can be applied to the infused in particular, and when the last clause is removed, it applies to the acquired virtues.

“Thomas wants his definition to cover both the human virtues acquired through our natural resources and the superhuman virtues Christians have through God’s grace.” Bonnie Kent, “Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49-70),” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 119.

59 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 56, a. 3. One should understand the word “habit” from the robust Latin term habitus, which is not easily translatable in English. As Pinckaers writes, “Habitus are like forces that link actions together, forming and coordinating them from within so as to improve them…What shall we call the skill acquired by an artisan or an artist, which makes them masters of their art? The ordinary term ‘habit’ is inadequate and misleading, because it designates a psychic mechanism that tends to diminish the human engagement that such work demands. It cannot signify an advance in perfection or in the power to create a work. Can we explain the masterly composition or performance of a musician by saying that he has a habit of playing the piano or violin? But this is precisely what a habitus is, the capacity of acting to perfection, of creating a new and excellent work. Virtuous habitus are thus defined as powers of
understood the basic principle of action, a virtue, it is important to recognize St. Thomas’ understanding of a two-fold happiness in the human person. In *Prima Secundae* question five, article five, St. Thomas contrasts two different kinds of happiness.  

First he states: “[i]mperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue in whose operation it consists.” And second he writes: “But man’s perfect Happiness … consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God’s Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature.” The human person’s perfect beatitude lies beyond his human nature and subsequently beyond human powers. This discussion of the two-fold happiness of the human person continues in question sixty-two when St. Thomas raises the question of whether there are any theological virtues.

Due to the human person’s two-fold happiness, there are two types of virtues: the natural virtues are natural principles that can direct the human person to his connatural end, and the supernatural virtues are supernatural principles that can direct the human

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61 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 5, a. 5.

62 Ibid.

person toward a supernatural end, which surpasses human nature. These natural virtues concern the acquired moral and intellectual virtues, which have for their object that which is comprehensible to reason. The supernatural virtues concern, in part, the infused theological virtues, which have for their object, God himself, who surpasses human reason alone. As St. Thomas states,

A habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Aquinas thus distinguishes between the infused virtues and natural virtues by reference to their respective ends and formal objects. These are not the only distinctions between these two kinds of virtues.

St. Thomas also maintains that there are differing rules for the two kinds of virtues, acquired and infused. St. Thomas says in question sixty-three article two that


65 The supernatural virtues also include the infused cardinal virtues.


67 The foundation for his view of the rules governing the virtues appears in articles three and four of question nineteen in the *Prima-secundae*. He states that “the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will’s object is proposed to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will…since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends…. Therefore, the goodness of the will depends on reason…” (*ST* I-II, q. 19, a. 3). St. Thomas argues in this
“man’s good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold…viz., human reason and Divine.” So far, St. Thomas mentions the two rules governing the human good.

Then he continues:

It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts; inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone.

St. Thomas here makes a distinction between two kinds of virtue: human [or natural] virtue and [supernatural] virtue not caused by human acts and the differing rules for these two kinds of virtue. The supernatural virtues direct the human person to the ultimate good, God himself, according to Divine Law or Divine Reason. The human/natural virtues direct the human person to the end that is connatural to him, in other words, the good article that human reason acts as the rule of the human will due to reason’s involvement in its apprehension of the good.

In the next article, St. Thomas points out that “it is from the eternal law which is the Divine Reason that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human will derives its goodness…. It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason; and when human reason fails we must have recourse to Eternal Reason”(ST I-II, q. 19, a. 4). St. Thomas reiterates his earlier point in the previous article concerning the rule of reason and the will. Then he explains how human reason participates in Divine Reason and subsequently the will depends upon Divine Reason more than human reason, most especially in those cases when human reason is incapable of apprehending the proper good of the human person.

68 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 63, a. 2.

69 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 63, a. 2.
according to the rule of reason. Additionally, the discussion of the rules of the natural and supernatural virtues serves as a way to adjudicate the disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes account regarding the rule of the infused virtues. To anticipate the discussion of that disagreement later in this chapter, it is helpful to reiterate here that St. Thomas, in the aforementioned articles, states that the rule of the natural/human virtues is the rule of human reason; and accordingly, the rule of the supernatural virtues is the rule of Divine Law (or Divine Reason).

A second important clarification regarding the supernatural virtues concerns the infused moral virtues. St. Thomas makes his argument concerning the question as to whether there are moral virtues in us by infusion. He writes:

\[ \text{Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us\ldots. Instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end\ldots. Therefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.} \]

\[ \text{Thomas Aquinas, } ST \text{ I-II, q. 63, a. 3.} \]

\[ \text{Thomas Aquinas, } ST \text{ I-II, q. 63, a. 2. “Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue [referring to the infused virtues] inserts the words, } which God works in us without us. \text{”} \]

\[ \text{In } ST \text{ I-II, q. 55, a. 4 ro. 6, St. Thomas anticipates the infused virtues in his more general discussion of the definition of virtue. “Infused virtue is caused is us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, } which God works in us without us. \text{ As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.”} \]

\[ \text{So far I have only discussed the theological virtues but in the following paragraphs, I explain the category of infused moral virtues, which are also supernatural virtues and thus follow the rule of Divine Law or Divine Reason.} \]

\[ \text{Thomas Aquinas, } ST \text{ I-II, q. 63, a. 3.} \]
St. Thomas begins with discussing how effects must be proportionate to their respective causes and principles and uses the example of the natural principles of knowledge and action “which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues.” These pre-existing principles in the human person act as the foundation in which the intellectual and moral virtues develop toward the human person’s connatural end.

Since the human person has received a new supernatural end who is God, he needs additional new principles to strive toward this end. These “seeds” are the theological virtues, which the human person receives by infusion of grace. Since the human person receives these new principles of [supernatural] virtue towards his supernatural end, he needs similar principles to the [natural] intellectual and moral virtues for his supernatural end. And thus there is a need for the infused moral virtues. St. Thomas reiterates this point when he states in the reply to the first objection of question sixty-three, article three: “Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.” And consequently in the reply to the second objection, St. Thomas further explains his points. “The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e., to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected


74 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 3, ro. 3. “The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.”

by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.” Thus St. Thomas speaks of the infused moral virtues as necessary for the human person’s supernatural end, God in conjunction with the theological virtues.

I have elaborated St. Thomas’ teaching on the virtues, which include the natural and supernatural virtues with specific attention to the two ends of the human person, the object of the virtues, and the rules of the aforementioned virtues. All of this serves as important background material for understanding how St. Thomas elaborates on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in connection with the infused virtues and drawing parallels with the acquired virtues.

Part IV, B. The Nature of the Gifts

St. Thomas begins in Prima secundae question sixty-eight, article one asking whether the gifts differ from the virtues. St. Thomas then begins outlining several different positions on how others have treated the relation between virtues and gifts. After dismissing these positions, St. Thomas states that to distinguish the gifts from the virtues, one must follow how Scripture speaks concerning the gifts. “[F]or we find there that the term employed is spirit rather than gift. For it is written (Isa. xi, 2,3): The spirit ... of wisdom and of understanding ... shall rest upon him, etc.” St. Thomas focuses on how the gifts are related in scripture and what that description from Scripture has to say about the nature of the gifts.

76 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 63, a. 3, ro. 2.

77 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 1. Emphasis in the original.
He continues:

[From which words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (Q. 9, AA, 4, 6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii. 8).]

So the seven gifts are in us by divine inspiration (ab inspiratione divina). But there is a paradox here since these gifts are in the human person yet “inspiration” signifies a certain motion (motionem) coming from outside the human person. St. Thomas explains this “inspiration” in the human person by focusing on the two principles of movement for the human person. The first is the intrinsic movement, which is reason and the second is the extrinsic movement, which is God. This is a key passage in St. Thomas’ account. It sets up the next claim concerning how God moves the human person to perfection.

St. Thomas then turns to give an account of motion and the proportionality involved in the mover and that which is moved:

Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be moved well by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master.  

St. Thomas here argues for three things: 1) the nature of the relationship between the mobile and the mover; 2) the nature of the mover’s motion in relation to the mobile; and 3) the nature of the perfection of the mover in relation to the perfection of the disposition

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78 Thomas Aquinas, *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 1.

79 Ibid.
in the mobile. St. Thomas’ example of the disciple and teacher helps illuminate these three things. First, the disciple, who is searching for knowledge, has a teacher who is imparting such knowledge. Second, the disciple needs to have a certain disposition in order to receive such knowledge from the teacher. And third, because of the profound nature of the teaching, the disciple needs to be more perfectly disposed to be able to receive it. After explaining these three facets in the example between the mover, the mobile, and the appropriate dispositions, St. Thomas applies these things to two sets of dispositions: human virtues and the gifts.

St. Thomas states:

Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amendable to Divine inspiration, according to Isa. 1. 5: The Lord ... hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back.80

St. Thomas posits two sets of dispositions. The human virtues help perfect the human person insofar as it is his nature to be moved by reason.81 In this case, the mover is human reason, the mobile is the human person, and the dispositions in question are the human virtues.

80 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

81 Following St. Thomas’ use of human virtues in connection with reason, I am concluding that human virtues in this instance refers to the acquired virtues. I do so based upon two references: 1) the reference to the rule of reason, which is connected to the acquired virtues; and 2) the reference to the two ends of the human person. See also William C. Mattison, III, “Thomas’ Categorization of Virtue: Historical Background and Contemporary Significance,” *The Thomist* 74 (2010), 217-221, esp. 221 when Mattison says St. Thomas ‘more commonly uses the terms’ human’ and ‘natural’ to refer to virtues directed to natural human happiness—which is in principle, accessible to unaided human capacities—as ultimate end.”
virtues. The gifts of the Holy Spirit help perfect the human person insofar as he is disposed to be moved by God. In this case the mover is God, the mobile is the human person, and the perfective dispositions are the gifts. In the first case, human reason is sufficient to move the human person as it is his nature to be moved by reason. In the second case, if God is the mover, then the human person needs a more perfect disposition to make the human person open to being disposed by God to be moved.

St. Thomas finds support for his view with both a passage from scripture (Isaiah 11:2-3) and a passage from Aristotle. He writes:

Even the Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., loc. cit.) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct [instinctum], there is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings [instinctum], since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue.  

82 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 1. St. Thomas is quoting what he knew as Aristotle’s de Bona Fortuna which is a selection from Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics VIII, 2, 1248a24-38. O’Connor, the translator of the Blackfriar’s edition of the Summa theologiae vol. 24 notes that this citation of de Bona Fortuna appears for the first time when St. Thomas “enunciates his doctrine on the divine prompting.” O’Connor also in his appendix on the de Bona Fortuna gives the passage that St. Thomas was using as a reference: “What we are looking for is this: What is the starting point of the movement in the soul? The answer is clear: just as in the universe so here, God moves everything. For the divine in us somehow moves everything. Moreover, the starting point of reasoning is not reasoning itself, but something superior to it. What then could be superior to both knowledge and intellect, but God? Not virtue, for virtue is an instrument of the intellect. Hence as I was saying above, those are called fortunate who succeed in whatever they undertake, without using reason. And it is no good for them to deliberate, for they have within themselves a kind of principle or starting point better than mind and deliberation. (On the other hand, those who have reason do not have this.) They have inspiration [instinctus divinus], but they are not capable of deliberation. For without using reason they attain even that which is characteristic of the prudent and wise – swift divination. Only we must not specify this as the divination of reason. Rather some attain this quick divination through experience, others by practice of observation, but these men by use of the divine.” O’Connor, 144-5. O’Connor is working from a Greek text of Aristotle. He speculates that St. Thomas probably had a Latin text that used the term “instinctus divinus” as noted earlier in the quotation. For a more detailed discussion of this text, see
Upon the authority of Aristotle, St. Thomas gives additional weight to his argument concerning the gifts being associated with divine instinct (instinctum divinum). The human person with the gifts is able to follow the inner prompting “interiorem instinctum” as opposed to counsel according to human reason. Thus the person with the gifts is able to perform higher acts than the acts of acquired virtue. This reiteration of the human person following the divine instinct (divinus instinctus) in the gifts continues in three of the four replies to the objections.

In article three of question sixty-eight, St. Thomas continues his teaching on the nature of the gifts by asking whether the gifts are habitus. In this article, St. Thomas

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I will focus on instinctus more in chapter 4.


85 See St. Thomas’ discussion of habitus in *ST* I-II, q. 49, which describes habitus as stable dispositions. Additionally, this is a new question not found in his previous works. One can say that St. Thomas assumes that the gifts are habitus in the *Scriptum*
draws upon the example of the moral virtues as *habitus* to underscore analogically the work of the gifts as *habitus*. He states that “[n]ow it is evident from what has been already said (Q. 56, A. 4; Q. 58, A. 2) that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural appetite to be moved by the command of reason.”86 This perfection of the appetite concerns not only the sensitive appetite but also the intellectual appetite, the will; as long as these appetites are brought under the direction and control of reason, these appetites are perfected by the moral virtues. Then how do the gifts compare analogically? St. Thomas writes:

Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey promptly the Holy Ghost.87

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86 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 3, See *ST* I-II, q. 59, a. 4 and q. 60, a. 1 for St. Thomas’ discussion of the moral virtues and the appetitive faculty.

87 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 3. “Hoc igitur modo dona Spiritus se habent ad hominem in comparatione ad Spiritum Sanctum sicut virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona Spiritus Sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad prompte obediendum Spiritui Sanctor.” I have modified the translation slightly to maintain the parallel in the language that St. Thomas is using.

Edward O’Connor, the translator of the Blackfriar’s translation of the *Summa theologiae* vol. 24, notes in Appendix IV, II, 123, that “…nothing like [this analogy] had occurred to any of his predecessors, despite the intense reflection on the nature of the
So for St. Thomas, the gifts as stable dispositions, *habitus*, perfect the human person by enabling him promptly to obey the Holy Spirit in a similar way to the moral virtues, as stable dispositions, *habitus*, that enable the human person promptly to obey reason.

In his reply to objections of question sixty-eight, article three, St. Thomas further clarifies the abiding nature of the gifts as dispositions in the human person. 88 Of the replies, the reply to objection two is the more interesting reply of St. Thomas since he tries to elucidate further the way in which the Holy Spirit perfects the human person. The objection notes that the human person as a kind of instrument should not be perfected by a *habitus* since a *habi tus* is for the principal agent to be perfected. St. Thomas responds: “This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself in so far as he has a free will. Therefore he needs a habit.” 89 St. Thomas turns this objection around to work for his conclusion. He argues that the human person is an instrument in the sense that the Holy Spirit moves him so that he can act accordingly with his free will. And for the Holy Spirit to move him accordingly, the human person needs a *habitus*.

virtues, and the comparison between Gifts and virtues, which had been going on for a good hundred years. The reason, no doubt, is that the analogy could hardly be drawn until the dependence of the Gifts on the prompting of the Holy Spirit was recognized.”

88 The replies to objections one and three concern the two kinds of gifts of the Holy Spirit: the gifts as *habitus* and the gifts as *gratia gratis datae*. Thus St. Thomas quotes Gregory the Great to support a distinction between these two kinds of gifts: the seven gifts are necessary for salvation and abide in the human person; the gratuitous graces do not abide in the human person and are not necessary for salvation. See Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ro 1 and ro 3.

89 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ro. 2.
So far this account of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa theologiae* is already importantly different from his previous account of the gifts as articulated in the three works previously examined. For instance, St. Thomas does not speak of the human mode or the above the human mode concerning the virtues or gifts\(^{90}\), and he makes an explicit argument for the gifts as *habitus*.

Additionally, the only reference to mode, so far, occurs in reply to objection two, when St. Thomas refers to the common/ordinary mode of virtue.\(^{91}\) But that is not a usage that has appeared in previous texts examined earlier in chapter three. One could argue that his distinction between the higher acts of the gifts and the acts according to human reason imply this language of modes. But that would be reading such language into the text. There are two levels of human action at play here and two distinct kinds of human acts without the recourse to the language of “modes” as typified in St. Thomas’ earlier account of the gifts.

One feature in the first article that does resonate with his earlier account is in the reply to objection one. St. Thomas recalls that “the Philosopher [Ethic. vii. 1] above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of heroic or *divine* virtue, in respect of which some men are called *divine*.\(^{92}\)” This particular mention of heroic or divine virtue finds


\(^{91}\) Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ro. 2. St. Thomas does not in the next few lines refer to a higher mode with the gifts.

\(^{92}\) Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ro. 1.
resonance with St. Thomas’ earlier statements in the *Sententiis* and *Galatians* that speaks of the gifts as divine virtues. So far, this is the one clear feature that is in consistent in St. Thomas’ account. How many more features of his earlier account remain is the question to examine as I continue into article two of question sixty-eight.

Part IV, C. The Necessity of the Gifts and the Perfection of Human Reason

St. Thomas in article two asks, “[w]hether the Gifts are necessary to man for salvation?” In his reply to this article, St. Thomas begins: “As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the divine instinct. Wherefore in those matters where the instinct of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting [instinctus] of the Holy Ghost, there is, in consequence, need for a gift.” First, notice again that St. Thomas continues his usage of the term “instinctus” and applies it to reason. In this passage, St. Thomas speaks of the two instincts in the human person: the instinct of reason, which is not sufficient in certain matters, and thus the prompting [instinctus] of the Holy Spirit is necessary. St. Thomas

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93 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2. O’Connor notes that this particular question is an original one; neither a predecessor nor a contemporary of St. Thomas nor even St. Thomas himself had articulated such a question concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit previously; yet O’Connor mentions that the position is already expressed in III *Sent.* d. 36, a. 3, ad. 4. See the Blackfriars *ST* vol. 24, 11, fn.a.

94 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2. “Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam hominis perfectiones quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur instinctum divinum. Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus rationis, sed est necessarius Spiritus Sancti instinctus, per consequens est necessarium donum.” I have modified the translation to keep the language consistent when referring to divine instinct (*instinctum divinum*) and its parallel in the instinct of reason (*instinctus rationis*). When referring to the *Spiritus Sancti instinctus*, I have decided to leave that as promptings of the Holy Spirit but will insert *instinctus* in brackets to denote the similar language that St. Thomas is using when speaking of various *instinctus*. 
spends the bulk of his reply in article two from here forward discussing human reason and the divine *instinctus*.

St. Thomas begins by speaking of human reason and its perfection:

> Now man’s reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 1). And, though the latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly.\(^95\)

A key to understanding this twofold perfection of human reason is to recall how St. Thomas addresses the natural and supernatural virtues back in question sixty-two, article one. There, St. Thomas explains the human person’s two-fold happiness: 1) a happiness proportionate to human nature which the human person is able to obtain by use of his reason; and 2) a happiness that surpasses human nature and which the human person obtains by God’s power through a participation in God. Since the second kind of happiness surpasses the human person’s natural capacities to obtain, the human person needs additional principles to be directed to this supernatural happiness. Such additional principles are the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.\(^96\)

So when St. Thomas speaks of God perfecting human reason in two ways, he is referring to the underlying two-fold happiness of the human person. In the first way, human reason being perfected by the natural light of reason concerns the human person’s

\(^95\) Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2. This is an important text for helping adjudicate the first disagreement about where to draw the line between the two modes for the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts and also the third disagreement about the insufficiency of the infused virtues.

\(^96\) Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 62, a. 1.
connatural happiness. And in the second way, the theological virtues perfect human reason in accordance with the human person’s supernatural happiness. Accordingly, the theological virtues perfecting human reason are greater than human reason itself because of the supernatural end of the theological virtues. Yet, the human person has complete possession of the natural perfection of human reason but only an imperfect possession of the perfection of human reason endowed with the theological virtues since we know and love God imperfectly (*imperfecte*). The perfect and imperfect possession of perfected human reason is the next point that St. Thomas discusses in order to clarify the necessity of the gifts.

He writes:

Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses the light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him.97

St. Thomas distinguishes how a something/someone that possesses perfectly a nature, form, or virtue is able to act in consonance with that particular nature, form, or power.98 And subsequently, if something/someone does not perfectly possess a nature, form, or virtue, then that thing/person is not able to act in consonance with that particular nature,

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97 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

98 Note St. Thomas has already taken into consideration God’s universal motion in moving all things. For St. Thomas’ treatment of God’s universal motion, see *ST* I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad. 3.
form, or virtue. St. Thomas uses two examples to help explicate these principles. The sun possesses light and is able to give it off unlike the moon, which does not possess light itself but must be illumined first in order to give light. Similarly, the doctor has perfect possession of the art of medicine and can dispense the art of medicine; the disciple however does not have perfect command of the art of medicine and thus needs instruction in order to practice medicine well.

Having distinguished between how one acts when one perfectly possesses a nature, form, or virtue as opposed to how one acts when one imperfectly possesses a nature, form, or virtue, St. Thomas now applies this to reason. He writes:

Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receives help in the shape of special promptings [per specialem instinctum] from God, this will be out of God’s superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. 99

This concerns St. Thomas’ first way that God perfects human reason. Thus the human person acting with the acquired virtues under the rule of human reason is able to act accordingly in those matters that are subject to human reason. St. Thomas posits the scenario that God may give the human person a special prompting (per specialem instinctum) that helps him make a judgment of reason in order to act well, and this is out of God’s superabounding goodness. Even philosophers agree with St. Thomas’ main point here about reason. Not everyone who possesses the acquired virtues also possesses

99 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2.
heroic or divine virtues.\textsuperscript{100} So St. Thomas speaks of the perfection of human reason through the natural light of reason towards the human person’s connatural happiness. This is the happiness that is proportionate to the human person’s nature and concerns the natural virtues, that is, the acquired virtues. This clarification is important in the next claim of St. Thomas.

St. Thomas then applies his previous distinction about the perfect and imperfect possession of nature, form, and virtue to the second way God perfects reason. He states:

\begin{quote}
But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason \textit{motio rationis} does not suffice, unless it receives in addition the prompting \textit{instinctus} or motion \textit{motio} of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 14, 17: \textit{Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God ... and if sons, heirs also; and Ps. cxlii. 10: Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land, because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.}\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

Note that St. Thomas in this passage is speaking of the human person’s supernatural happiness for which the theological virtues form the human person’s reason imperfectly. So the human person needs something else to move him to his supernatural end. St. Thomas affirms that the human person needs the prompting \textit{(instinctus)} and motion \textit{(motio)} of the Holy Spirit to direct sufficiently the motion of reason that leads the human person to his supernatural end. Thus St. Thomas says that the human person needs the gift of the Holy Spirit.

\textsuperscript{100} St. Thomas is referring to Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics} VII, 1 (1145a20).

\textsuperscript{101} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{ST} I-II, q. 68, a. 2.
In the reply to the objections of article two, St. Thomas gives some additional clarification regarding the gifts and the kinds of virtues he is discussing. In the reply to the first objection, St. Thomas affirms that the “The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kinds of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.” This is a notable passage whose meaning is difficult to ascertain. It is notable because for the first time, St. Thomas is referring to the modes of operation of the virtues and gifts and that the gifts move the human person by a higher principle. But what is unclear from the passage is what St. Thomas means by the “ordinary [or common] perfection of the virtues.”

102 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 1.

103 A search of the Index Thomisticus reveals that this particular phrase only appears three times in the works of St. Thomas: 1) Sent. III, d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 4; 2) ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2, obj. 1; 3) ST II-II, q. 153, a. 2, ro. 1 (While not pertinent for this discussion, I note that in the text from ST II-II, q. 153, a. 2, ro. 1, St. Thomas distinguishes between the ordinary degree of virtue and the perfect degree of virtue in regards to sin.). The text from the Sententiis is an interesting parallel to ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2 since in the Scriptum super Sententiis article, St. Thomas is asking whether the gifts are connected. And in the reply to the fourth objection, St. Thomas affirms that the perfections from the gifts are necessary for salvation. When turning to the fourth objection of that particular article, St. Thomas is trying to differentiate between 1) the perfection that is above the genus of virtue, 2) the ordinary perfection of virtue, and 3) the perfection in the genus of virtue.

The ordinary perfection of virtue seems to imply that one possesses the virtues but not perfectly. See Sent. III d. 36, a. 3. O’Connor, the translator of the volume on St. Thomas in the Blackfriar’s edition, is convinced that ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 1 shows “the conception of the Gifts as making man docile to the prompting of the Spirit, which Thomas proposes in the Summa, does not supplant, but interprets, the conception proposed in his commentary on the Sentences, according to which the Gifts are distinguished by their mode of operation.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologicae vol. 24 I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 1, 15ni. I am not as convinced as O’Connor in that regard.

So clearly there is a connection between this text from the Sententiis and the Summa theologicae. But the connection is minimal and does not provide any real sense of
In the reply to the second objection of question sixty-eight, article 2, St. Thomas further explains the necessity of the gifts. He states that “[b]y the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand always in need of being moved by the yet higher promptings [instinctu] of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.” This is a key explanation on St. Thomas’ part. So far he has elaborated the following: 1) whatever possesses a nature, form, or power imperfectly is not able to act by itself unless it is moved by something else; 2) the theological virtues only perfect the human person’s reason imperfectly and subsequently reason needs something else to move it; 3) thus the gifts of the Holy Spirit help direct the moving of the human person’s reason which has been elevated with the theological virtues. The reply to the second objection then further clarifies this motion of the Holy Spirit. It is the motion of which the human person is always in need to help him act toward his supernatural end. The claim of St. Thomas that the human person is always in need of the continuity between these two texts other than the notion that St. Thomas advances in the Sententias, which is that the gifts are necessary for salvation.

104 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 2. “…quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita perfitur homo in ordine ad ultimum findem, quin semper indigite moveri quodam superiori instinctu Spiritus Sancti, ratione jam dicta.” I adjusted the translation of the term “semper” to “always” in the quoted text to be more literal. Emphasis added.

“Even though, once we are initiated into the new life of freedom, we can, to a certain extent control our lives, we nevertheless stay in need of divine inspiration…. With respect to the domain of the supernatural, the motion of reason only suffice when it is being assisted by the instinct of the Holy Spirit. The gifts of the Holy Spirit make us receptive to this instinct….” Eric Luijten, Sacramental Forgiveness as a Gift of God: Thomas Aquinas on the Sacrament of Penance (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 73-4.

“Thus the gifts as perfections, which make us receptive to this instinct, are necessary and are in every act of this higher life.” Jan H. Walgrave, “Instinctus Spiritus Sancti: een Proeve tot Thomas-interpretatie,” in Selected Writings Thematische Geschriften: Thomas Aquinas, J.H. Newman, Theologia Fundamentalis, G. de Schrijver and J. Kelly (Leuven: University Press, 1982), 137. My translation.
help of the Holy Spirit in the gifts corresponds with the fourth area of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts that concerns how often the gifts are needed.

The reply to the third objection again reiterates the main points that St. Thomas has elaborated now with respect to the objection. He writes:

Whether we consider human reason as either perfected in its natural perfection or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings [instinctum], are said to be given as remedies to these defects.  

St. Thomas again reiterates how human reason, whether by natural perfection or perfected by the theological virtues, is not able to know all things. However, God who does know all things moves the human person through the prompting of the Holy Spirit and keeps the human person safe from defects like foolishness. This is why the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to the human person. Furthermore, this text serves to underscore how St. Thomas distinguishes the two modes of human action: one mode concerns natural perfection with the natural virtues; the other mode concerns a supernatural

105 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 3. “…quod rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque omnia possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia hujusmodi, de quibus ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus, cijus scientiae et potestati omnia subsunt, sua motione ab omnia stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine et duritia et ceteris hujusmodi, nosertos reddit. Et ideo dona Spiritus Sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, dicuntur contra hujusmodi defectus dari.” I have edited the translation slightly to make St. Thomas’ point clearer.

Note the reliance here on Gregory the Great’s position on the gifts with some clarification since the gifts refer to God’s motion protecting the human person from temptations.
perfection with the supernatural virtues. Having understood the nature of the gifts and the necessity of the gifts vis-à-vis human reason, St. Thomas now turns to treat the gifts in relation to the virtues and the various human faculties.

Part VI, D. The Gifts and their Relation to the Virtues and the Human Faculties

After having discussed the basic nature of the gifts in articles one and three and the necessity of the gifts for salvation in article two, St. Thomas then turns to the numbering of the gifts themselves and how they function within the human person in article four of question sixty-eight. For the purpose of this chapter, I focus on the more general material concerning the gifts found in this article. The specific look at each gift will come in the following chapter. The more general treatment of the gifts comes in the reply to the objections of article four.¹⁰⁶

St. Thomas hones his understanding of the gifts in his reply to the third objection which asks why some gifts are listed pertaining to the theological virtues. St. Thomas replies

¹⁰⁶ The first objection raises the question as to why none of the gifts correspond to art, the fifth intellectual virtue, when four of the gifts (wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel) concern the other intellectual virtues. St. Thomas replies that “the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life; whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi. 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of man, who are His organs when He moves them” (ST I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ro. 1). St. Thomas reiterates in his reply that the gifts perfect the human person for those matters that concern living well. And then he goes on to describe, metaphorically, how the Holy Spirit moves the human person as if he were the organs of the Holy Spirit. Thus the Holy Spirit is the true artisan.
The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman, unless there be contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope, and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.  

St. Thomas in this passage does two things. First, he shows how the Holy Spirit moves the human person, who is united to the Holy Spirit in the theological virtues. Thus the theological virtues act as the “roots” of the gifts. Second, by describing the rootedness of the gifts in the theological virtues, he can explain how the gifts concern the matters of the theological virtues in the human person. This is a reversal of his earlier thinking in the Sententiae, which argued that the gifts do not concern the virtues of hope and charity.

St. Thomas continues his inquiry into the gifts vis-à-vis the virtues in article eight of question sixty-eight when he asks whether the virtues have precedence over the gifts. It is in his reply to this question that St. Thomas fittingly encapsulates his own section on the virtues and gifts together by elaborating on the role of the virtues and gifts, and importantly how the gifts concern all the powers of the soul. He states:

As was shown above (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 62, A. 1), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man’s mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.

St. Thomas here describes three sets of virtues and the perfections they involve. The theological virtues unite the human person’s mind to God; the intellectual virtues perfect

\[107\] Thomas Aquinas, *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 4, ro. 3.

\[108\] Thomas Aquinas, *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 8.
human reason; the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so they obey reason.

The gifts dispose the human person’s powers of the soul to divine motion. This last point shows further development of St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae* from his account in the *Scriptum super Sententiae* since in that earlier text, St. Thomas argued that no gifts were needed to perfect the will.\(^{109}\)

\(^{109}\) Also, in article eight, St. Thomas develops an analogous way to understand the gifts and the theological virtues vis-à-vis the moral and intellectual virtues. He writes: “Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i. 12.) that *the seven sons*, i.e. the seven gifts, *never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all that they do be done in faith, hope, and charity*” (Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 8). The analogy St. Thomas develops is as follows: the intellectual virtues perfect reason, the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers to obey reason, and thus in a way the intellectual virtues regulate the moral virtues. So too then do the theological virtues join the human mind to God and the gifts perfect the powers of the soul. Consequently the theological virtues regulate the gifts. Thus, St. Thomas is making another argument for the rootedness of the gifts in the theological virtues.

So the theological virtues take precedence over the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But how do the gifts fare in comparison to the intellectual and moral virtues? St. Thomas explains that “[b]ut if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul’s powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the moral exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues” (Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 8). Here St. Thomas explains how the gifts take precedence over the intellectual and moral virtues because the gifts perfect the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit as the one who prompts; the intellectual and moral virtues perfect reason and the appetitive powers respectively in relation to reason. So the gifts would have a higher precedence over these virtues because of the Holy Spirit as prompter. St. Thomas then alludes to his argument from article two of question sixty-eight in which he notes for the human person to achieve a greater perfection, then one needs to be disposed to be moved by a higher mover.
The last area to explore concerning St. Thomas’ treatment of the gifts is how St. Thomas aligns the gifts with the various human faculties. If one recalls, in the *Sententiae*, St. Thomas aligned the gifts according to the two states of life, the contemplative and the active and then aligned particular gifts within each of those states. That particular usage of the contemplative and active lives does not make an appearance in any of the articles in which St. Thomas treats the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa theologiae*. St. Thomas does however continue to use similar distinctions of the gifts but under the headings of the faculties of the reason and appetite.

Under speculative reason, the gift of understanding deals with apprehension while the gift of wisdom concerns judgment; under practical reason, the gift of counsel concerns apprehending the truth and the gift of knowledge aids right judgment. Under the appetitive faculty, the gift of piety concerns the human person’s relations to others; the gift of fortitude deals with matters touching the human person against fear of danger and the gift of fear against concupiscence. Needless to say, these distinctions regarding reason and the appetite are very similar to the way St. Thomas distinguishes the gifts under the headings of the contemplative and active lives, but St. Thomas does not resort to using the two states of life that set up his discussion of how the gifts work in the human person.

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111 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 4.
So in question sixty-eight, St. Thomas, while relying upon previously developed topics such as the two-fold happiness of the human person, the rules of human action, the natural and supernatural virtues provides an account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that recognizes them as separate *habitus* from the virtues that make the human person amenable to the Divine motion of the Holy Spirit and are necessary for salvation. It is my contention that St. Thomas in the *Summa theologiae* develops a new account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and such a contention is based upon the disputed issues between the two rival accounts.

**Part V. Conclusion**

The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, it is to give an account of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Second, it is to specify the areas of development in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts. In his Commentary on Isaiah, his *Scriptum super Sententias*, and in his Commentary on Galatians, St. Thomas presents a similar account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. He does so principally by explaining that the human person with the virtues acts in a human mode, and the human person with the gifts acts in a beyond the human mode. Each mode is governed according to a different rule. For the human mode, the rule is human reason. For the beyond the human mode, it is God.

To illuminate these two modes, St. Thomas uses an example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding to contrast how these two modes operate. Additionally, St. Thomas contends that the gifts do not perfect the will but only the intellect. By limiting the role of the gifts, the virtues of charity and hope are not associated with any of the gifts. Finally, St. Thomas argues that the human person needs the gifts based upon a two-fold
imperfection regarding the infused virtues: 1) an imperfection in the virtue itself and
2) an imperfection in the person who has the virtue. These are consistent features of St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in his commentary on Isaiah, the *Scriptum super Sententiis*, and his commentary on Galatians.

Yet, when looking at his treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa theologiae*, St. Thomas presents a different doctrine of the gifts. He notably develops his teaching in six ways: 1) by using the term *instinctus*, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are redefined as *habitus* which make the human person amenable to the motion and prompting (*instinctus*) of the Holy Spirit; 2) the rule of the infused virtues is the rule of Divine Law or Divine Reason; 3) the language of the two modes all but disappears; 4) the previously prominent example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding disappears; 5) the gifts aid the three theological virtues, as opposed to only faith since the gifts perfect the will as well as the intellect; 6) the insufficiency of the infused virtues concerns the imperfect possession of the virtues. These developments aid St. Thomas in articulating a new account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that avoids certain language and notions from his previous work.

In the following chapter, I aim to examine this development of St. Thomas’ account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit with particular attention to the term *instinctus* as a way to underscore St. Thomas’ development of his doctrine of the gifts. Then I focus on 5 other developments in his doctrine of the gifts as a way to adjudicate the areas of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes account and to arrive at some conclusion regarding which account best accords with St. Thomas’ own treatment of the gifts in his mature work, the *Summa theologiae*. 
Chapter 4

The Development of St. Thomas’ Doctrine of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

In the previous chapter, I examined the texts of St. Thomas to develop an account of his doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit with attention devoted to some changes his doctrine of the gifts undergoes as well as attention to the areas of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts. In this chapter, I focus on those points of development in his teaching on the gifts that I noted as I established his doctrine of the gifts, and then assess the areas of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts in light of these developments. First, I contend that St. Thomas’ introduction of the term *instinctus* in his account of the gifts significantly alters his doctrine concerning the gifts. I illuminate this contention by discussing how important *instinctus* is for St. Thomas’ account of the gifts and provide some context for how this term appears in the writings of St. Thomas in general. Additionally, St. Thomas’ use of the term *instinctus*, as a way to underscore divine initiative in human action, helps one understand why St. Thomas develops his doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*.

Second, having determined the five additional areas of development in the previous chapter while surveying St. Thomas’ work on the gifts in chronological order, I now examine those five developments in more depth so as to prepare for the chapters final section on adjudicating the differences between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts. Third, I assess the four areas of dispute between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts and determine that the Rival Two Modes account provides a more attentive read of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by attending to his
later, more mature work. This argument highlights the areas of disagreement in which the authors of the Standard Two Modes account fail to consider the changes and developments that St. Thomas makes in his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his later work. This failure becomes exacerbated when the *Scriptum super Sententii*is serves as the guiding work of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. By reading the *Summa theologiae* in light of the *Scriptum super Sententi*is, the authors of the Standard Two Modes account fail to integrate the changes St. Thomas makes in his later work.

**Part I. Instinctus and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit**

Servais Pinckaers make the claim that “it seems that in his study of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas reaches the apex of his theological reflection and of his effort to account for the best of Christian experience in the light of scripture and tradition.”¹ One of the central features of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae* is his use of the term *instinctus* when speaking of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and this is the first notable development in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts. This development shows St. Thomas’ awareness of the tradition concerning the divine initiative in human action as well as a reconnection to the scriptural roots of the gifts since he does call the gifts “spirits” in reference to Isaiah 11:2-3. In order to underscore the significance of *instinctus* in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts, I examine his usage of *instinctus* in relation to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Then, I treat his usage of *instinctus* in other works that concern

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the issue of Semi-Pelagianism in conjunction with the issues of faith and grace.

Finally, I connect his parallel development of *instinctus* when dealing with faith and grace to his doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. I contend that by using the term *instinctus* St. Thomas significantly alters his doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae.*

The term “*instinctus*” first appears regarding the gifts in *Prima Secundae* question sixty-eight, article one, at the end of the response: “Even the Philosopher says in the chapter *On Good Fortune* (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct (*divinum instinctum*), there is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings (*interiorem instinctum*), since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason.”

There are three notable aspects in this claim.

First, St. Thomas speaks of an *instinctus*, which becomes the key term in his doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*. Second, he makes an argument about the motion of the *instinctus*. Third, he quotes Aristotle’s *On Good Fortune*. These three features help identify how different St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae* really is. As Max Seckler notes, in his groundbreaking study of the term *instinctus* in St. Thomas, “the instinct of the Holy Spirit denotes mainly the internal dwelling force [to move the human person] to external actions” and that this gives Thomas “a new formulation of the doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.”

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2 Recall from chapter 3, in *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 1, after discussing various opinions about the gifts, St. Thomas defines the gifts in regards to divine inspiration (*inspiratione divina*) but transitions to references to *instinctus* at the end of the response and onward in the remaining articles on the gifts.
According to the *Index Thomisticus*, St. Thomas refers to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit five times in articles in the *Scriptum super Sententiae*. Three of these instances are pertinent for this survey. The first instance occurs in the article asking whether counsel is a gift. In his reply, St. Thomas contrasts human counsel with the counsel from God. Since human counsel does not give certitude, the human person needs divine counsel to arrive at certitude of the things to be done (or not done) for a certain end.

Toward the end of the article, he writes “[a]nd therefore for this certainty it is necessary for the mind to be raised above the human mode by the impulse [*instinctus*] of the Holy Spirit, ‘for those who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God’ (Rom 8:14).” Notable in this instance is St. Thomas’ reference to “above the human mode” in conjunction with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.

The second and third instances concern the counsel and instinct of the Holy Spirit in the article asking whether lies are sins. In the first argument of article three, St. Thomas raises the objection that not all lies are sins since “[f]or no sin is done by the prompting [*instinctu*] of the Holy Spirit.” Then he refers to the example of Genesis 27 in

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4 The two other references concern the Eucharist and the priest celebrating the Eucharist. See *Sent.* IV d. 11, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3, co. and d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, co.


6 See *Sent.* III, d. 38 q. 1, a. 3, obj. 1 and ad. 1. I should also add that *instinctus* in other forms such as divine instinct or interior instinct do not make any appearances in St. Thomas treatment of the gifts in any works prior to the *Summa theologiae*. 
which Jacob, at the urging of his mother, lies to his father Isaac to obtain the firstborn blessing instead of his older brother Esau. The objection characterizes the lie of Jacob as being done due to the counsel of the Holy Spirit. In his reply to this first argument, St. Thomas notes that the example of Jacob is not a case of lying since God ordained this for Jacob, and accordingly the Holy Spirit guided Jacob “by understanding and instinct.” All three instances of the appearance of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit in the *Scriptum super Sententias* coalesce around the theme of counsel. It does not apply more broadly to any of the other gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The reference to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit does not appear again in connection with the gifts of the Holy Spirit until the *Summa theologiae Prima Secundae* question sixty-eight. In using the *Index Thomisticus* to search the terminology of the *Summa theologiae*, one finds that St. Thomas uses several different expressions with the

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7 *Sent.* III, d. 38 q. 1, a. 3, obj. 1. My own translation.

8 *Sent.* III, d. 38 q. 1, a. 3, ad. 1. My own translation.


10 In my review of the *Index Thomisticus*, I searched all the known works of St. Thomas for the term *instinctus* in its four Latin forms and reviewed 271 instances. Of these 271 instances, forty-nine concern the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit of which eight are found in the *Summa theologiae* concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

St. Thomas’ commentary on Isaiah does not have any references to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. His commentary on Galatians includes five mentions to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit but not in any context dealing with the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Additionally, St. Thomas most commonly uses *instinctus* in conjunction with “nature” or “natural.” I observed 93 such instances in his works. Besides *instinctus* in a general form (34 times), St. Thomas also uses *instinctus* with “God” or “divine” 24 times, “demonic,” “devil,” or “satan” 26 times, and “interior” 23 times.
term *instinctus* in relation to the gifts. In the specific articles concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Prima Secundae* question sixty-eight, St. Thomas uses the expression the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit six times\(^\text{11}\), the divine *instinctus* four times\(^\text{12}\), the *instinctus* of God twice\(^\text{13}\), interior *instinctus* once\(^\text{14}\), special *instinctus* once\(^\text{15}\), *instinctus* of reason once\(^\text{16}\), and *instinctus* (in a general way) once\(^\text{17}\) for a total of sixteen times.\(^\text{18}\)

In the *Summa theologiae*, St. Thomas uses the term *instinctus* to make the argument for God’s motion in the human person in the form of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as *habitus* that work in conjunction with the infused virtues towards one’s supernatural beatitude. “More precisely, the gift is a disposition to receive the action of the Holy Spirit, which penetrates to the very heart of our spirit, our freedom, and our virtues, in order to give us a superior impulse in the form of inspiration [*instinctus*].”\(^\text{19}\) In other

\(^{11}\) See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2 (twice); q. 68, a. 2, ad. 2; q. 68, a. 3; q. 68, a. 4; q. 68, a. 5.

\(^{12}\) See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1; q. 68, a. 1, ad. 2; q. 68, a. 1, ad. 4; q. 68, a. 2.

\(^{13}\) See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad. 3; q. 68, a. 4.

\(^{14}\) See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

\(^{15}\) See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ad. 3.

\(^{18}\) Walgrame notes that *instinctus* becomes the keyword in his definition of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*. See Walgrame, “*Instinctus Spiritus Sancti*...” 136. And it serves as “an important technical theological term meaning the highest and most intimate ways in which God moves the soul in the supernatural order...” Walgrame, “*Instinctus Spiritus Sancti*...” 140.
words the Spirit of God becomes a part of the human spirit, in the *habitus* of the gifts, so as to enable the human person to be prompted and moved accordingly to his supernatural end. Walgrave furthers this point by writing that “[t]he more perfect the work of the Holy Spirit [namely the inspiration (*instinctus*)], the more it is interiorized and the more our will and the Holy Spirit work together [with our virtues], as if they formed a common principle.”

This emphasis on the interiority and motion of the Holy Spirit in the gifts fits well with the already documented on-going development of St. Thomas’ teaching on faith and grace that are happening along similar lines that involve the term *instinctus*. In works

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These developments in St. Thomas’ teaching on grace, faith, and subsequently the gifts are due to his “increasing knowledge of the later works of Augustine, his more intensive study of the Bible and his discovery of Aristotle’s *Eudemian Ethics*” as well as his encounter of the Church’s condemnation of Semi-Pelagianism (Schillebeeckx, *Revelation and Theology*, 36).
dealing with grace and faith, St. Thomas begins speaking of God moving the person and employs Aristotle’s *On Good Fortune* as an authoritative text on the matter.

Subsequently, the development in St. Thomas’ doctrines of grace and faith is a comparable development to St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*.

Without being able to go into all the particulars of the development of grace and faith in

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St. Thomas knew of the *Eudemian Ethics* as the *Liber de bona fortuna*. The *Liber de bona fortuna* contained fragments of the *Eudemian Ethics*. See Sherwin, *By Knowledge & By Love*, 141.

Additionally, it is speculated that St. Thomas uncovered the condemnations of Semi-Pelagianism in the work the *Indiculus* of Pope Celestine. See Schillebeeckx, *Revelation and Theology*, 38. However, the *Indiculus* is misattributed to Pope Celestine. Modern scholarship has named Prosper of Aquitaine as the author of the *Indiculus*, and it can be found in Migne’s *Patrologia Latina* as *Liber cui titulus praeteritorum sedis apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates, de gratia dei et libero voluntatis arbitrio*. See Migne, *PL* 51: 205-12. For a discussion of the authorship of this text, see D. M. Cappuyns, “L’origine des capitula pseudo-Célestiniens contre le semipélagianisme,” *Revue Bénédictine* 41 (1929): 156-170 and further corroboration, see Arturo Elberti, *Prospero d’Aquitania: teologo e discepolo* (Rome: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1999), 67-71. Bouillard explains well how St. Thomas’ contemporaries were not aware of Semi-Pelagianism either. See Bouillard, *Conversion*, 92-102.

The official Church condemnation of Semi-Pelagianism occurs in the Second Council of Orange in the year 529. In the text of that council, the phrase most often cited when dealing with the role of the Holy Spirit in grace is *inspiratione(m) Spiritus Sancti*. See canons 5-7. For the whole text of the Second Council of Orange, see Henry Denzinger and Adolph Schönmetzer, S. J., “*Conc. Arausicanum* (Orange) II,” in *Enchiridion Symbolorum: Definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, editio XXXII* (Barcelona: Herder, 1963), 131-37. (I am referring to page numbers).

The question remains though as to how St. Thomas comes into contact with the term *instinctus*. Schillebeeckx explains this point by saying that “…it is a remarkable fact that the term *instinctus* played a part both in the Church’s condemnation of Semi-Pelagianism and in the Latin translation of the *Eudemian Ethics*. The word *instinctus* is the only connection that can be established between anti-Semi-Pelagianism and these *Ethics* of Aristotle. Just as the danger of Semi-Pelagianism was averted in the writings of the Church Fathers by an appeal to the *instinctus divinas*, so too did this same term play a similar part centuries later in the works of Aquinas”(Schillebeeckx, *Revelation and Theology*, 36-7). The first appearance of *instinctus* in connection with Semi-Pelagianism (St. Thomas refers to it as the view of the Pelagians) in the work of St. Thomas occurs in Book III of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* c. 149, 152, and 155 (questions concerning the role of grace and God’s activity).
St. Thomas, it is helpful to note the outlines of this development for the purposes of seeing how it is comparable to the development of the doctrine of the gifts in St. Thomas.

Michael Sherwin in his book *By Knowledge & By Love*, which focuses on the interaction of the will and intellect in human action, describes the situation dealing with grace and faith in the following passage:

> At issue for St. Thomas is the adequacy of describing the causality of grace in the act of faith merely in cognitive terms. As we have seen, in his earlier work, Thomas is content to describe the act of faith as caused by knowledge. A *cogitatio visio* or *bonum cogitum* moves the will to act. It moves the will to move the intellect to assent to the articles of faith. This description implies that, although the habitual cognitive motive of faith—in other words the *habitus fidei*—is divinely infused, the act of faith is essentially generated by the will’s own power. When, however, Aquinas begins to grasp that not only the habit of belief, but also the act of belief must be caused by God’s graced action, he develops an account of how grace in the gift of faith also elevates the will’s act.\(^{22}\)

Sherwin’s account notes that St. Thomas turns to *instinctus* to help denote God’s graced action in elevating the act of the will. “Thus, in describing what God gives us in the gift of faith, Aquinas, states that ‘included in this giving is not only the *habitus*, which is faith, but also the interior *instinctus* to believe.”\(^{23}\)

> But this *instinctus* to believe is part of a larger role of God’s action in grace in the lives of human person. In his conclusion on the evolution of St. Thomas’ theology of faith, Sherwin writes that “[t]he light of faith is fuller participation in the divine light, while the will’s motion in faith—the *instinctus fidei*—is a fuller participation in the divine *instinctus* that moves the will. These two principles work together to enable the agent to

\(^{22}\) Sherwin, *By Knowledge & By Love*, 139.

assent to the conceptual content of faith.”  

So for St. Thomas, in the habit of faith, there is a twofold *instinctus* at work. The first is the *instinctus fidei* which is God moving the will in faith. The second, of which the first is a part, is the divine *instinctus* which is God moving the will. By placing God’s movement of the will as primary to the habit of faith, St. Thomas is making central God’s activity in grace for the human life called to beatitude in heaven.

As Michael Lawler notes, St. Thomas uses his

...knowledge of Semipelagianism which produced in him a change of attitude towards preparation for grace. Now he emphasizes the divine initiative; to prepare himself for grace man must first have the help of grace. When it is a question of doing good, divine grace precedes rather than follows as merit, the movement of the free will. Our conversion to God is preceded by divine help which converts us. The *initium fidei* is from God, not man.  

St. Thomas, beginning in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book III, argues for the need for the divine initiative of grace to help prepare the human person to be justified in

24 Sherwin, *By Knowledge & By Love*, 145.


“Semi-Pelagianism is a doctrine concerning divine grace that while repudiating Pelagianism, nevertheless assigns a greater role to man's will than to God's grace in an individual's conversion to a religious way of life leading to salvation.” This gets specified in the works of Semi-Pelagians like John Cassian who hold that “[t]he beginning of faith or the impulse to do good sometimes comes from man's will, unaided by grace; for, in spite of original sin, the will is still capable of performing good and salutary acts. Supernatural grace is necessary for salvation, but no special help from God is needed to persevere to the end; a fixed number of the elect is contrary to the universal salvific will of God; infants who died without Baptism were punished because God foresaw what sins they would have committed if they had lived longer.” S. J. McKenna, "Semi-Pelagianism," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* 2nd ed., vol. 12 (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 899. *Gale Virtual Reference Library*, Web, 6 Mar. 2012. For the full article, see pages 899-901.
Additionally, he argues that once justified, the human person needs God’s grace as well to do good acts. This second point is further evidenced in St. Thomas’ later works with specific attention to the arguments concerning God moving the human person through grace. As Lawler notes:

In his *Commentarium in II Epistolam ad Corinthios*, after opposing the Semipelagian error to the doctrine of St. Paul, St. Thomas adds a *ratio accedens* which he attributes to the *Liber de Bona Fortuna*, but which is in reality a fragment of the *Eudemian Ethics*. Man does good because he has so decided; this decision is from a principle superior to him moving him to act; this principle is God. The same argument is repeated in the *Quodlibetum I* with greater precision. It is not enough that Providence provide for man exterior occasions of salvation, preaching, good example, illness, and the like; God must interiorly move him to accomplish good.

Already in his commentary on Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians and again in his *Quodlibetum I* St. Thomas speaks of the superior principle, God, moving the human person and cites Aristotle’s *On Good Fortune* as a source for this insight. Then in the *Summa theologiae* one finds St. Thomas making references to God’s motion and the

26 According to Torrell, following the work of Gauthier, the *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book III chapter 85 (and the following chapters in Book III) dates to the years 1263-64 since these involve the introduction of previously unknown works of Aristotle, such as the *Liber de bona fortuna* among others. For the more detailed account, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* vol. 1, revised ed., trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 102.

27 Lawler, 627-8. See Thomas Aquinas, *II ad Cor.*, c. 3, lect. 1; *Quod I*, q. 4, a. 2. “No one then can prepare himself for grace nor do anything good except through divine aid.” Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibetal Questions 1 and 2*, trans. Sandra Edwards (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 46, *Quodl*. 1, q. 4, a. 2.

instinctus in conjunction with the gifts of the Holy Spirit with reference to *On Good Fortune*.28

Thus one sees a parallel development in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the use of the *motio* and *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit in conjunction with the text from *On Good Fortune* that comes directly from his initial observations about Semi-Pelagianism and how God, through grace, moves the human person to receive the *habitus* of faith and that God, through grace, moves the human person to do the good. As St. Thomas notes in his commentary on Romans:

> “Those who are led by the Spirit” are led by him as by a guide or director. The Spirit does this to us by enlightening us interiorly about what we should do: “your good Spirit leads me in the right way” (Ps 142). Yet, since one who is led is not acting from himself, the spiritual person is not merely taught by the Holy Spirit what he should do, his heart is also moved by the Holy Spirit. Thus, this is principally how the phrase “those who are led by the Spirit” should be understood, because those who are said to be led are moved by some higher prompting (*superiori instinctus*).… Likewise, the spiritual person in a certain sense is not primarily inclined to act from the motion of his own will, but from the prompting (*instinctu*) of the Holy Spirit. Hence, Isaiah states that “It will come like a rushing river which the Spirit of the Lord drives on” (Is. 39.19), while Luke affirms that Christ was “led out into the desert by the Spirit” (Lk 4.1). This, however, does not mean that spiritual people no longer act from their own wills and from *liberum arbitrium*, because the very motion of the will and of *liberum arbitrium* is caused in them by the Holy Spirit, as St. Paul states, “God is the one who acts in us, both to will and to do” (Phil. 2.13).29

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28 After a review of the *Index Thomisticus*, in the *Summa theologiae* I note that St. Thomas uses variations of the terms *motio*, *moveo*, and *motus* seventy-seven times in the articles concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Prima-secundae and the Secunda-secundae alone. Yet, when one reviews the *Scriptum super Sententiis*, the variations of terms *moveo* and *motus* comprise eleven instances in articles concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit. And even in these eleven cases, nine of them concern the passion of fear properly speaking and not the gift of fear.

While this commentary text on Romans does not specifically address the gifts of the Holy Spirit, it does contain two notable features that pervade St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts. First, the Holy Spirit moves the human person as a guide or director, and second this is done through the higher prompting (instinctus) of the Holy Spirit.

These two features directly connect to St. Thomas’ discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in article one of question sixty-eight in Prima Secundae of the Summa theologiae. As Sherwin notes, St. Thomas “explains that in order for the Spirit to move us as a teacher and guide—in order for him to move us in a way that respects our liberum arbitrium—the Spirit instills within us certain dispositions that render us receptive to the Spirit’s action. These infused dispositions (habitus) are the gifts of the Holy Spirit.”

In the same way that St. Thomas’ doctrines concerning grace and faith changed with the introduction of condemnations of Semi-Pelagianism as well as the introduction of Aristotle’s On Good Fortune in other works, these same changes appear in St. Thomas’ later work regarding the way in which God moves the human person to do the good. God moves the human person, by a superior prompting (instinctus) of the Holy Spirit to do the good by way of the habitus that are the gifts of the Holy Spirit. As St. Thomas notes in his reply to the third objection in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 68, “[I]likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given

Sherwin in By Knowledge & By Love, 165. For a parallel discussion of the role of the Holy Spirit that involves the terminology of motion and instinctus, see St. Thomas’ Super Galatas, Ch. 5, lectures 4 and 5.

30 Sherwin, By Knowledge & By Love, 166.
by God in relation to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings (instinctus) of God.”  

This same theme of the motion of God in the instinctus of the Holy Spirit in the gifts that move the human person to his supernatural end continues in the second article of question 68 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa theologiae. As St. Thomas states:

But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting [instinctus] or motion [motio] of the Holy Ghost, according to Rm. 8:14,17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost.

St. Thomas adds then in his reply to the second objection of the same article that the human person always stands in need of being moved by the higher promptings (instinctus) of the Holy Spirit. The motion and prompting of the Holy Spirit is necessary because the motion of reason, while sufficient to direct the human person to his connatural end with the human virtues, is insufficient to direct the human person to his supernatural end. Thus, the human person needs higher perfections that help perfect reason sufficiently so that he may be moved accordingly to his supernatural end.

I contend that the term instinctus plays a significant role in the development of St. Thomas’ account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. I base this contention upon the documented development of St. Thomas’ thought on grace and faith when dealing with the Semi-Pelagian errors concerning grace that only appears in his later work. And when

31 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ro. 3.

32 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2.
he does take up Semi-Pelagianism, he does so invoking the term *instinctus* to explain the role of God’s motion in aiding the human person in justification and in doing good works once justified in God’s grace. Additionally, as an authority for this use of *instinctus*, St. Thomas relies upon Aristotle’s *On Good Fortune*.

That these same features of St. Thomas’ dealings with Semi-Pelagianism in his other works now appear in his *Summa theologiae* account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that concern the role of God’s motion in helping the human person to carry out the good strengthens the contention that St. Thomas’ significantly develops his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa theologiae*. It is also my contention that this development of *instinctus* in the *Summa theologiae* is responsible for the modification of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*. Lastly it is my contention that St. Thomas emphasizes God’s activity in the motion of the Holy Spirit in the permanent dispositions of the gifts that the human person always needs as a way to further his work against the discovered Semi-Pelagianism. This development of St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts is to resolve the concern that in his previous doctrine of the gifts, the human person could by use of the measure of human reason elevated by grace do human acts directed toward his supernatural end without the gifts of the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas rectifies this concern by describing the gifts as permanent *habitus* that make the human person amenable to God’s motion and prompting, which he constantly needs, so that together with the infused virtues, the human person may do the good that is directed to his supernatural end with God’s assistance and direction. These are the same concerns that St. Thomas has about God’s activity in the human person concerning the issues of faith and grace that now are extended to the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Part II. Five Further Developments of St. Thomas’ Doctrine of the Gifts

The previous section on St. Thomas’ use of *instinctus* serves as a preface for the way St. Thomas further develops his teaching on the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*. By using *instinctus* St. Thomas emphasizes the human person’s need for the gifts of the Holy Spirit in every act directed toward his supernatural end. With this new emphasis, St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae* changes to accommodate this key concept of understanding God’s motion and prompting. In order to serve the third section of this chapter in which I focus on the areas of disagreement between the Standard and Rival Two Modes accounts, I treat in this section the question of the development of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in light of the conceptual change of his understanding of God’s activity in human action in the term “*instinctus*”. The aim of this section is to show the ways in which St. Thomas develops his teaching on the gifts from his earlier works to his mature work, the *Summa theologiae*.

In addition to the first notable development and use of *instinctus* in the previous chapter, there are five additional areas in which St. Thomas develops his teaching on the gifts: 1) the rule of the infused virtues is the rule of Divine Law or Divine Reason; 2) the language of the two modes all but disappears; 3) the previously prominent example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding disappears; 4) the gifts aid the three theological virtues, as opposed to only faith since the gifts perfect the will as well as the intellect; 5) the insufficiency of the infused virtues concerns the imperfect possession of the virtues. In the following I examine each of these developments of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts. And toward the end of this section, I assess the contention as to how
much St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts has changed from his previous work and how much continuity exists between his earlier and later work.

The first development to consider concerns the rule governing the infused virtues. In the *Sententiiis*, St. Thomas argues that the rule governing the acquired and infused virtues is human reason, and the gifts are governed according to the rule of God himself.\(^{33}\) In *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 2, St. Thomas clearly affirms two rules for human action: the first rule is human reason that corresponds to human virtue; the second rule is Divine Law which concerns supernatural virtue.\(^{34}\) These two rules correspond perfectly to the two ends of the human person: the human person, under the rule of reason, can act with the natural virtues toward the happiness that is connatural to him; the human person, under the rule of Divine Law (Divine Reason), can act with the supernatural virtues toward his supernatural happiness. Nowhere in the *Summa theologiae* does St. Thomas claim that the supernatural virtues follow the rule of human reason. Instead, St. Thomas elaborates how the gifts as permanent dispositions make the human person amenable to the *motio* and *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit thereby enabling the infused virtues to be guided according to Divine Law or Divine Reason since it involves the promptings and motion of Holy Spirit. This is one way the usage of “*instinctus*” impacts further St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts.


\(^{34}\) Human virtue for St. Thomas often refers to natural virtue and the virtue produced in us by divine operation alone are the supernatural virtues.
The second development on the gifts corresponds to the language of “human mode” and “above/beyond the human mode” that is so prevalent in his earlier works. With the exception of one text, such language disappears in the *Summa theologiae*. The parallel texts of the *Scriptum super Sententiis* III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 and the *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1 contain one comparable sentence in the first sentence of the *Sententiis* reply and the last sentence of the *Summa theologiae* reply. Both texts are almost identical. The *Sententiis* says that the gifts are given for higher acts than the acts of virtues, while the *Summa theologiae* text says that the gifts perfect the human person for higher acts than the acts of virtues. One must ask the obvious question: is St. Thomas articulating the same understanding of the gifts in each of these replies?

As it turns out, that is not the case. While St. Thomas is making a point using similar language, it would be misreading the text to assume that these two replies make the same point regarding modes of human action. First, in the *Sententiis*, St. Thomas details the different levels of human action that lead him to identify two modes of action: 1) the virtues in the human mode and 2) the gifts in the above the human mode. Second, to give weight to his distinction of the gifts as being “divine virtues” he cites Aristotle’s *Ethics* as an example of how Aristotle divides virtue and calls certain virtues divine. Third, he elaborates this two modes distinction using the theological virtue of faith and the gift of understanding with an allusion to Gregory the Great discussing the gift of

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35 For a close analysis of key Latin texts from the *Scriptum super Sententiis* and *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas that comes to this same conclusion, see Joseph de Guibert, S.J., "*Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d’agir ‘ultrahumain’ d’après saint Thomas*," *Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique* 3 (1922): 394-411.
understanding. None of these three features to the Sententiis reply appear in the Summa theologiae reply.

Instead, as noted in the earlier section on instinctus, St. Thomas introduces several new features that have not appeared in any of his previous texts. First, he calls the gifts “spirits” as Scripture does. Second, he introduces his theory of divine inspiration/instinctus and movement/motion to explain the work of the gifts. Third, he makes specific reference to the human virtues “as it is man’s nature to be moved” according to human reason and thus the human person needs new, higher perfections to be moved by God. Third, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for St. Thomas, are now defined as those higher perfections that make the human person amenable to divine inspiration/prompting (instinctus). At this point, St. Thomas cites Aristotle’s On Good Fortune as the authority in helping show the role of divine instinct as motion for the human person. These four features to the Summa theologiae account do not show up in any form in the Sententiis.

Garrigou-Lagrange, a representative of the Standard Two Modes account, is of the opinion that the account of gifts in the Sententiis and the Summa are not different. 

36 The reference to the human virtues implies that St. Thomas is speaking of those virtues that concern the human person’s connatural end, which is accessible to human reason.

37 As a matter of fact, these four features of St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in the Summa theologiae do not appear in the Super Isaiam or Super Galatas commentaries.

38 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian Perfection and Contemplation: According to St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross, trans. M. Timothea Doyle, O.P. (Rockford, IL: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 2003), 276n20. “This doctrine of St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences does not differ in spite of what has been said, from that of the Summa, as can be seen from the text (Ia IIae) quoted at the
He stakes his claim on what he considers to be similar texts of St. Thomas from the 

*Sententiis* and the *Summa theologiae* that use the language of “mode.” Below, I have set 

these particular texts side-by-side for comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Sententiis</em> III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1.</th>
<th><em>ST</em> I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ad 1.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>And according to this, I say that the gifts are distinguished from the virtues in this, that the virtues perfect one for acts in a human mode, but gifts perfect one for acts in a mode beyond the human mode.</td>
<td>The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kinds of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the mode of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

beginning of this note, and from that indicated in the following note.” In this text, 

Garrigou-Lagrange is referring to Joseph de Guibert who argues that St. Thomas’s doctrine on the gifts undergoes significant development (Yet de Guibert does not belong in the Rival Two Modes account since while he argues for development on the part of St. Thomas, he still argues, like the Standard Two Modes account, that the human person does not need the gifts for every act of infused virtue. See Joseph de Guibert, S.J., *The Theology of the Spiritual Life*, trans. Paul Barrett (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953), 123.).


A central argument of both Labourdette’s and Garrigou-Lagrange’s account is that the *Sententiis* and *Summa theologiae* present similar accounts of the gifts on the basis of the axiom *modus a mensura causatur* which appears explicitly in the *Sententiis*. They use *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad. 3 and *Sent.* III, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, 3 as examples to argue that the measure of the gifts in both the *Sententiis* and the *Summa* is the divine prompting as articulated in the *Summa*. As O’Connor notes, the use of divine prompting does not appear in the text noted from the *Sententiis* or in other texts of the *Sententiis*. The rule, as noted earlier in this chapter, for the gifts is Divinity itself. Thus their central argument falls. For a fuller response, see O’Connor, Appendix 4, 119-20.

39 “On the Virtues and Gifts,” 106. Garrigou-Lagrange also notes another *Sententiis* text mentioned as well but I am unable to locate the exact text since it appears the citation is wrong. Furthermore, I have to forgo a second reference that Garrigou-Lagrange uses since he cites the text from the *Disputed Questions on Charity* that I mentioned very early in this chapter as one which recent scholarship has noted that is not an authentic text of St. Thomas.
What is critical in these two texts for Garrigou-Lagrange is the language of the *modum* that appears in describing the two kinds of perfection: of the virtues and of the gifts. Certainly in the *Sententiis* selection, St. Thomas is making a distinct contrast between two modes of human operation toward one’s supernatural end insofar as the infused virtues under the rule of reason act toward this end and the gifts under the rule of God himself act toward this same end. What is not clear, and this I noted in looking at q. 68, a. 2, ad 1 in the last chapter, is what St. Thomas means when he refers to the *communem perfectionem virtutum*.

When the authors of the Standard Two Modes account discuss this text, they assume automatically that St. Thomas here means the first of the two modes mentioned in the *Sententiis*, the human mode, which includes the infused virtues under the rule of human reason. From the main replies of articles one and two of question sixty-eight in the *Summa theologiae*, one cannot infer that St. Thomas is still operating under the same terminology as in the *Sententiis*. If anything, St. Thomas is contrasting the acquired virtues under the rule of human reason beside the infused virtues and gifts under the rule of divine reason. This appears more clearly in article two in which St. Thomas contrasts the two-fold perfection of reason. To recall one significant passage from that article: “But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason [*motio rationis*] does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting

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40 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ad. 1. I have modified the translation slightly to make the parallel in language more obvious in English.
While the theological virtues perfect human reason, that perfection is not sufficient for the human person to be ordered to his supernatural end. Thus he needs the gifts of the Holy Spirit (instinctus et motio) to move his reason toward this supernatural end.

This becomes even clearer when one recalls St. Thomas earlier in the same article saying that “[a]ccordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason.” Here St Thomas notes how both the connatural end of the human person and human reason fittingly direct the human person to this particular end. This understanding of the connatural end fits better with what St. Thomas calls the common perfection of the virtues noted earlier. Furthermore, there is no middle category between the rule of reason and the connatural end on the one hand and the rule of divine reason and the supernatural end on the other hand. He does not venture to describe the theological virtues under the rule of human reason enabling the human person toward his supernatural end as he did in the Sententiis. Instead it seems that if St. Thomas is discussing two modes, then the two modes are 1) the acquired virtues under the rule of human reason, and 2) the infused virtues and gifts under the rule of divine reason.

Additionally, as a third point of development in the Summa theologiae, St. Thomas discards the reference to the example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding which is the example that he alludes to on three separate occasions: his commentary on Isaiah, his commentary on the Sentences, and his commentary on

41 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

42 Ibid.
Galatians. This example is fundamental for St. Thomas in explaining the human mode and the above/beyond the human mode of action. I contend that St. Thomas drops the reference to this example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding in light of his development of the virtue of faith and grace, which involves an account of God moving the human will to the act of faith as noted in the first section of this chapter. This development is linked then with the concept of *instinctus* in St. Thomas’ mature theology of faith. That such an important example fails to appear in the *Summa theologiae* further denotes the development that St. Thomas makes regarding his doctrine of the gifts.

Furthermore, the fourth point of development in St. Thomas’ account of the gifts corresponds to how the gifts aid the theological virtues. In the *Sententiis*, St. Thomas argues that the gifts do not aid the virtues of charity and hope, only the virtue of faith. This argument depends upon the claim that the human will does not need the aid of the gifts. In the *Summa theologiae*, St. Thomas argues that the gifts aid all three theological virtues and aligns particular gifts with the virtues of faith, charity, and hope. Consequently, St. Thomas makes the claim that the gifts do perfect the human will. That the gifts, which make the human person amenable to the motion and prompting of the Holy Spirit, perfect the will clearly stands on the development of St. Thomas’ understanding of *instinctus* since section one noted earlier that God’s grace is necessary to move the will to the act of faith and that God’s grace is necessary to move the human person to the good. The gifts represent this second aspect, that God’s grace is necessary to move the human person to the good. This is another point in which St. Thomas reverses a previous position concerning the gifts that he elaborated in the *Sententiis* and
now presents a new position that encompasses the gifts aiding all three theological virtues.

Moreover, the fifth and last point of development in St. Thomas’ account of the gifts concerns the insufficiency of the infused virtues. In the Sententiiis, St. Thomas argues that the infused virtues have two defects: one defect inherent in the infused virtues and the other defect due to the imperfect possession of the infused virtues. In the Summa theologiae, St. Thomas refines this position. In his mature position, St. Thomas claims that the imperfection concerns the imperfect possession of the perfection of human reason endowed with the theological virtues since the human person knows and loves God imperfectly. In the end, St. Thomas focuses on the second defect noted in his earlier work and neglects to make a case for the first defect concerning the inherent defect of the infused virtues. Such a position makes sense when one realizes that St. Thomas does not refer to the virtue of faith and gift of understanding example that exemplified the imperfection of the infused virtues. Under his previous understanding, St. Thomas made the case that the virtue of faith had both defects which highlighted the “above the mode” activity of the gift of understanding.

Finally, as a rejoinder to the comments I have made so far in trying to identify the theory of the gifts in the Sentences as identifiable in the Summa theologiae, O’Connor notes in his “Appendix 4” on the development of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that

[it is evident that the two expositions [found in the Sententiiis and the Summa] are fundamentally compatible. The commentary contrasts the human principle of movement with one that is superhuman and in fact divine; the Summa contrasts a human principle of movement with one that is divine. The latter gives the ultimate grounds for the former. The earlier
approach was that of a moralist and psychologist, observing the contrast between the two ways of acting; the latter is that of a theologian and metaphysician, designating the ultimate source of these two ways.\textsuperscript{43}

The first part of O’Connor’s response makes sense IF St. Thomas is using the same categories to draw the lines between the two modes of human action, that is, the infused virtues under the rule of human reason and the gifts under the rule of God himself. But that does not seem to be the case since St. Thomas is contrasting the two different ends of the human person and the two different sets of virtues needed for those ends. The human person, working toward his connatural end under the rule of human reason, has the natural principles of knowledge and action, which act as the seeds of the acquired virtues, which are the necessary principles of movement toward good action. The human person, working toward his supernatural end under the rule of divine reason, has the infused theological virtues as the seeds of the infused moral virtues and needs the motion of the Holy Spirit in the gifts to be moved toward good action. So in a sense, I agree with O’Connor that there is some compatibility between these two accounts; the question then becomes how much St. Thomas develops his doctrine of the gifts between the Sententiis and the Summa theologiae.

Furthermore, suggesting that St. Thomas has approached these two kinds of texts, the Sententiis and the Summa theologiae, in different manners betrays the way in which St. Thomas sought to use the Summa theologiae as a teaching text in the very same manner that the Sententiis had been used as a teaching text. O’Connor even admits that “[i]t is clearly not enough…to explain the difference between the commentary on the Sentences and the Summa by saying that they teach the same doctrine from different

\textsuperscript{43} Edward D. O’Connor, C.S.C., Appendix 4, 119. Emphasis in the original.
ponts of view” and that “[i]t would be going too far, however, to identify the theory of the commentary with that of the Summa as Garrigou-Lagrange seems to do. The latter work introduces a precision that represents an immense progress over the former, and perhaps even a rectification of it.”

While not specifically aiming to validate the points I am making regarding the substantial differences between the account of the gifts in the Sententiis and the Summa theologiae, I think O’Connor is right to be open to the notion that the articulation of the doctrine of the gifts in the Summa represents “immense progress” and “perhaps even a rectification” of the doctrine of the gifts in the Sententiis. Once a reader follows the trajectory that St. Thomas develops regarding his doctrine of the gifts, as I have done so in the Summa theologiae section of chapter three, in the first section in this chapter on instinctus, and in this section noting the five additional developments of St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts, one should see that St. Thomas is working with a very different schema of the gifts than he has worked with in previous texts. Only a few years earlier, St. Thomas quite easily fit his older understanding of the gifts in his commentary on Galatians. What stopped him from doing that here in the Summa?

Part III. Evaluation of the Disputed Areas between the Rival Accounts

Having examined the issue of the development of the St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, I now return to the four areas of disagreement between the Standard Two Modes and Rival Two Modes account concerning the gifts in order to

44 O’Connor, “Appendix 4,” 123.

reach some conclusion regarding these two approaches to understanding St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts. Those four areas of dispute are as follows: 1) the distinction and definition of two modes of human action; 2) the rule/measure for the infused virtues; 3) why the infused virtues are insufficient and need prompting of gifts; 4) how often the gifts are needed or do the gifts operate with each act of infused virtue? When examining these areas of dispute, the issue of development is an important issue for several of the disputed areas between these two accounts of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts since it ultimately affects how the various authors take into consideration the terminology of St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts.

Part III, A. Two Modes

One of the key disputes between the two rival accounts concerns the language (and thereby a difference) of two modes when speaking about the virtues and gifts. Having examined four texts of St. Thomas that concern the gifts of the Holy Spirit, one can see how the authors of Standard Two Modes account appropriate their understanding of St. Thomas’ doctrine on the gifts. The authors of the Standard Two Modes account take the *Scriptum super Sententiiis* of St. Thomas as the basis for his doctrine of the gifts where he clearly establishes two modes of action and adds subsequent developments such as the divine prompting [*instinctus*] found in the *Summa theologiae* to clarify further how the gifts should be understood.

On the other hand, the authors of the Rival Two Modes account do not seem to give much if any consideration as to how St. Thomas formulates the doctrine of the gifts in the *Scriptum super Sententiiis*. Instead these authors focus more on St. Thomas’ later
formulations on the gifts and virtues whereby they argue that the two modes of action concern the acquired virtues under the rule of human reason on the one hand and the infused virtues and gifts under the rule of divine reason on the other hand. Additionally, the authors of this account focus on the use of *instinctus* as a key point in St. Thomas’ treatment of the gifts. In doing so, the authors of the Rival Two Modes develop an account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that takes into consideration the conceptual change that St. Thomas makes regarding the gifts. This conceptual change, involving the use of the term *instinctus*, helps account for the human person’s need always to be moved by God in the gifts so that the human person can act toward his supernatural end accordingly.

To help adjudicate this dispute, it is helpful to recall the three levels of human action that I outlined earlier in chapter two following Cajetan’s commentary on the *Summa theologiae*:

1. The first movement concerns the human mind under the guidance of "natural light and prudence."
2. The second movement concerns the human mind lead by the "light of grace and faith."
3. The third movement concerns the human mind being "urged by the *instinctu* of the Holy Spirit."

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Using these three kinds of movements, the question becomes: how does one draw the line between the movements to establish the two modes of human action? The authors of the Standard Two Modes account draw the line between (2) and (3) while the authors of the Rival Two modes account draw the line between movements (1) and (2). So where does St. Thomas draw the line between these movements?

To answer this question, it is important to recall how in *ST I-II*, q. 63, a. 2, St. Thomas affirms that there are two rules for human action: the rule of human reason which directs human virtue; the rule of Divine Law which directs supernatural virtue. Nowhere does St. Thomas mention in this or similar texts that the supernatural virtues enable the human person to strive toward his supernatural end under the rule of human reason. This kind of claim would contradict the two-fold ends of the human person that St. Thomas had established that helps categorize the natural virtues concerning the connatural end of the human person and the supernatural virtues concerning the supernatural end of the human person.

Also, in *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 1, St. Thomas makes a two-fold argument concerning these two modes. First, the human person with the aid of the human virtues is perfected in so far as it is his nature to be moved by reason AND that human reason is sufficient to move the human person accordingly. Second, the human person with the aid of the gifts is perfected in so far as he is disposed to be moved by God, AND this is the case because human reason is not sufficiently disposed to direct the human person to God unless he has additional dispositions that make him ready to be *moved* by God accordingly.

Furthermore, in *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 2, St. Thomas specifically draws out why the gifts are needed; it is because human reason is not sufficiently perfected by the
theological virtues and therefore needs the prompting (*instinctus*) and motion (*motio*) of the Holy Spirit in the gifts to enable him toward his supernatural end.47 How often are the gifts needed? I address this question below but suffice it to say that St. Thomas argues that the human person always needs the gifts in order to be perfected in respect of his supernatural end.48

Having briefly mentioned these three texts of St. Thomas, I contend that the Rival Two Modes account accurately describes how St. Thomas understands the two modes in the *Summa theologiae*. This is because the Rival Two Modes account best takes into consideration St. Thomas’ understanding of the two ends and the two rules of human action as well as the role of the gifts in the *Summa theologiae*. Following Cajetan’s distinctions from above, the line between the two modes exists between levels (1) and (2) for the reasons mentioned.

Part III, B. The Rule/Measure for the Infused Virtues

The second area of dispute regarding the Standard Two Modes and the Rival Two Modes accounts concerns the rule or measure for the infused virtues and the insufficiency of the infused virtues. In chapter 2, I explored the two different accounts on these issues. For the authors of the Standard Two Modes account, the rule or measure for the infused virtues is the rule of human reason elevated by grace (or infused prudence as they

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47 To avoid repetition, I only briefly address this argument here. In a sense, the response to the two modes question continues in the remaining three areas of dispute since all of these areas of dispute are connected to the question of how the two modes are distinguished in St. Thomas.

48 See *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ro. 2.
sometimes say). For the authors of the Rival Two Modes account, the rule or measure for the infused virtues is the rule of divine reason (or divine law). To help adjudicate this disagreement, it is again helpful to review some key texts of St. Thomas that involve this particular issue.

First, I quote two texts earlier in the *Summa theologiae* that lead into a discussion of the rule of the infused virtues. The first passage concerns the theological virtues.

> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts; inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone.49

St. Thomas, in this text, distinguishes between two kinds of virtues. First, the human person can acquire the human virtues ruled according to reason. Second, the human person cannot acquire the supernatural virtues, which are ruled according to divine law, but must be given to us by God.

The rule of human reason for the natural virtues gets again confirmed when St. Thomas treats the gifts and has to speak of the nature of human reason.

> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God’s superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues.50

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49 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 2.

50 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2.
For St. Thomas, human reason is in principle sufficient to direct the human person to his connatural end. However, when it comes to the human person’s supernatural end, human reason proves to be insufficient to direct him to such an end.

St. Thomas makes this point in two different passages. First he states that:

Now man’s reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 1). And, though the latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly.  

This passage speaks about the two different kinds of perfection of human reason and how the theological virtues perfect human reason to a higher perfection than human reason with its natural perfection, but the higher perfection of the theological virtues is possessed imperfectly.

St. Thomas then connects this imperfect possession of elevated reason to the necessity of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to help move the human person properly to his supernatural end. “But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost…” So in the *Summa theologiae*, St. Thomas presents two rules of human action: human reason and divine reason/divine law which concern the two modes of human action, human virtues toward one’s connatural end and supernatural virtues with the gifts toward one’s supernatural end. Nowhere does St. Thomas in the

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51 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

52 Ibid.
Summa theologiae make a case for the infused virtues to act under the rule of human reason. Certainly that is a position he held in the Sententias but one that does not appear in the Summa. Following the aforementioned texts and arguments, I argue that St. Thomas uses a different rule/measure for the infused virtues in the Summa theologiae.

Part III, C. The Insufficiency of the Infused Virtues

The third area of disagreement concerning the Standard Two Modes and Rival Two Modes accounts concerns how St. Thomas characterizes the insufficiency of the infused virtues. The authors of the Standard Two Modes account argue that there is a two-fold defect regarding infused virtues: 1) on the part of the person who does not have the habit perfectly; and 2) on the part of the virtue that has an intrinsic defect as in the case of the virtue of faith. The authors of the Rival Two Modes account argue that the insufficiency of the infused virtues lies squarely with the imperfect possession of the infused theological virtues that would otherwise have the human person know and love God perfectly.\(^{53}\) How does St. Thomas characterize the insufficiency of the infused virtues?

In Super Isaiam, St. Thomas clearly distinguishes two kinds of deficiencies in the infused virtues. He writes:

> There is however a two-fold imperfection of virtue: one through an accident, which is by not having the disposition, out of which indisposition remains imperfection in the subject, and this defect is removed through an increase in virtue; the other defect is per se from the

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\(^{53}\) When saying perfectly, I do not intend to mean that the infused theological virtues enable the human person to know and love God in complete perfection or comprehensively. It is important to note that regardless of whether it is one or two defects, the human person still needs the gifts.
part of the habit itself, such as faith according to its definition is the imperfect knowledge because of its mystery, and this defect is removed through a higher habit, which is called a gift because as it were it exceeds the human mode of operation, having been given by God; thus the gift of understanding which makes by some transparent and clear mode those things to be gazed upon which are of faith.54

St. Thomas describes a two-fold defect of virtue here: first the indisposition of virtue and second a virtue that has an inherent defect. And St. Thomas uses the example of the virtue of faith and its defect of the imperfect knowledge of God, which is rectified by the gift of understanding. So there is a two-fold defect of virtue outlined in Super Isaiam.

In the Summa theologiae, St. Thomas takes a different approach to the issue of what is lacking in virtue. The key texts occur in Prima Secundae question sixty-eight, article two. In this article, St. Thomas discusses the two kinds of perfection of human reason: a natural perfection and a supernatural perfection. He then distinguishes the two kinds of perfections based upon which is greater and which is more fully possessed. The human person can possess the natural perfection of reason more fully but it is not the greater of the two kinds. The human person can possess the supernatural perfection only imperfectly in this life, but it is the greater of the two kinds of perfection. The reasons for these distinctions are important. Because human reason is part of human nature, its perfection can be possessed more perfectly than a supernatural perfection that is given by God’s grace and directs us to love and know God. Yet, the natural perfection of reason

54 Super Isaiam, 79. “Est autem duplex imperfection virtutis: una per accidens, que est ex indispositione habentis, ex qua indispositione manet <imperfect> in subiecto, et iste defectus tollitur per augmentum virtutis; alius defectus est per se ex parte ipsius habitus, sicut fides secundum diffinitionem est cognitio imperfecta quia enigmatica, et iste defectus tollitur per altiorem habitum, qui vocatur donum quia quasi excedit modum humane operationis, a Deo datum: sicut donum intellectus, quod facit aliquot modo limpide et clare inueri que sunt fidei.” My translation.
only directs the human person to his connatural end whereas the supernatural perfection of reason is greater because it directs the human person to his supernatural end in God.

The distinction between the two kinds of perfections of reason is important because it serves as a way for St. Thomas to speak of the insufficiency of the infused virtues and the need for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus, St. Thomas states that “[b]ut in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost….”55 Because the infused theological virtues do not sufficiently inform human reason, the human person needs the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This is how St. Thomas’ characterizes the lacking in the infused virtues in the *Summa theologiae*.

It is without a doubt that St. Thomas in *Super Isaiam* ascribes two kinds of deficiencies regarding the infused virtues: one on the part of the human person who imperfectly possesses the infused virtues and another on the part of the infused virtues themselves, e.g. the virtue of faith. The above-cited texts from the *Summa* already get into the first kind of deficiency and confirm that St. Thomas still holds that the human person does not perfectly possess the infused virtues and thereby the infused virtues are characterized by an insufficiency. What is missing from St. Thomas’ account of the gifts in the *Summa* is the second deficiency inherent in the infused virtues. St. Thomas, while very apt to use the same example of the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding to display this inherent deficiency of the infused virtues in his commentary on *Isaiah*, his

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55 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2.
Sententiis, and his commentary on Galatians, does not quote or reference this particular example in the *Summa*. Neither in the *Prima Secundae* nor in the *Secunda Secundae* does St. Thomas make use of or reference his earlier example. So St. Thomas does not make a case for the inherent deficiency of the infused virtues in the *Summa theologiae*.

Having considered the insufficiency of the infused virtues in the *Summa*, I can now consider the need for the prompting of the gifts and the exact contribution of the gifts in the human person. The authors of the Standard Two Modes account argue that the gifts are for those times when the infused virtues leave the human person insufficient for his supernatural end in God. And the prompting [*instinctus*] of the gifts serves those times in which the Holy Spirit moves the human soul to a higher manner of acting than would have been possible with only the infused virtues. The gifts grant a certain facility to the human person in being moved assuredly in those times when the infused virtues prove insufficient for good action. As John of St. Thomas stated: “…those who are moved by the wings of an eagle are swept along in the breath of a strong wind. Without labor, they run in the way of God.”

The authors of the Rival Two Modes account argue, along the lines of the account drawn in the *Summa theologiae* section, and as noted above, that the need for the prompting [*instinctus*] of the gifts comes about due to human reason’s insufficiency in being able to direct the human person toward his supernatural end even with the infused theological virtues. Since the human person has been granted higher perfections, he needs

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to be moved always and accordingly to partake of those higher perfections (the infused theological virtues). Thus the human person needs the prompting of the Holy Spirit in the gifts. As Pinckaers notes, the gifts “add a receptivity to the virtues, a docility to spiritual impulses.” Based upon the foregoing review of texts and arguments from St. Thomas, I contend that the Rival Two Modes account represents better St. Thomas’ mature thought on the insufficiency of the infused virtues and subsequently the need for the gifts.

Part III, D. Occasional or Constant Operation of the Gifts?

Regarding the fourth and final area of disagreement, the authors of the Standard Two Modes account and the Rival Two Modes account answer this particular question about the occasional or constant operation of the gifts in different ways. Because of the way the authors of the Standard Two Modes account describe graced human action with a human mode and with an above the human mode, these authors fit the gifts of the Holy Spirit with the above the human mode and make it thereby an occasional operation in the human person’s life. The Rival Two Modes takes a different approach. This approach argues that the gifts are part of the graced moral life and that each act of infused virtue is accompanied with the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

In order to address this particular question, I again turn to the texts of St. Thomas as a way to render some opinion about this matter. Following what I quoted earlier, in ST I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ad. 2, St. Thomas replies, “[b]y the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand always in need of being moved

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57 Servais Pinckaers, “The Place of Philosophy in Moral Theology,” 68.
by the yet higher promptings [*instinctu*] of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already
given.”\(^{58}\) What does St. Thomas mean when he says that the human person stands always
in need of being moved by the higher promptings of the Holy Spirit?

To be able to give a more sufficient answer to this difficult text, I recapitulate the
main reply to this article, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, because it is in this text where St. Thomas
makes his argument for the constant activity of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas
begins the main reply with a contrasting of natural perfection with supernatural
perfection. In regards to natural perfection, human reason, since it is more perfectly
possessed, is capable of directing more perfectly towards man’s natural perfection. In
regards to supernatural perfection, the theological virtues, being imperfectly possessed,
cannot direct man to his supernatural perfection. St. Thomas then makes one further
distinction between these two perfections. Since man possesses human reason perfectly,
he can direct himself accordingly. But since man does not possess the theological virtues
perfectly, he cannot direct himself but must be moved by something else. St. Thomas at
this point is laying the groundwork for how the gifts of the Holy Spirit help the
theological virtues.

St. Thomas clearly makes the case that the theological virtues need to be moved
by something else. And that something else is the Holy Spirit through the gifts. As St.
Thomas states

> But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason
> moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by

\(^{58}\) Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ad. 2. “Ad secundum dicendum quod per
virtutes theologicas et morales non ita perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin
*semper* indigeat moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam dicta.” I
have modified the translation slightly. Emphasis added.
the theological virtues, the motion of reason \textit{[motio rationis]} does not suffice unless it receive in addition the prompting \textit{[instinctus]} or motion \textit{[motio]} of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 14, 17: \textit{Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God ... and if sons, heirs also}; and Ps. cxlii. 10: \textit{Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land}, because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.\textsuperscript{59}

For St. Thomas, human reason, even elevated with the infused theological virtues, needs additional habits to help it be directed toward the ultimate and supernatural end.

The examination of the main response of article two helps provide a better understanding of what is at stake in the reply to the second objection. In that reply, Thomas says, \textit{“by the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand always in need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.”}\textsuperscript{60} This reply taken together with the main body gives a clear argument of the deficiency of reason in light of the supernatural end. This is a deficiency that the infused virtues cannot rectify because even elevated human reason needs to be moved by something else because the infused theological virtues represent new seeds of virtues that are for higher perfections and since human reason is not able to direct the human person accordingly toward his supernatural end in God. And for Thomas, the motion that helps direct the human person is the Holy Spirit in the infused habits of the gifts. Based upon the texts analyzed, I argue that the

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\textsuperscript{59} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{ST} I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

\textsuperscript{60} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{ST} I-II, q. 68, a. 2, ad. 2. \textit{“Ad secundum dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin \textit{semper indiget} moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam dicta.”} Emphasis added. I have modified the translation slightly.
\end{flushright}
gifts of the Holy Spirit are a necessary part of every graced action since the need for
the motion of the Holy Spirit is constant as a way to address the insufficiency of human
reason vis-à-vis the human person’s supernatural end.

Part IV. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been three-fold. First, I focused on the term *instinctus*
and how this term shows a significant change in St. Thomas’ doctrine of the gifts.
Second, I examined the six areas of development of St. Thomas’ teaching on the gifts in
the *Summa theologiae* from his previous works on the gifts so as to illuminate the
changes that St. Thomas makes in his doctrine of the gifts in his mature work. Third, I
adjudicated the four areas of dispute between the Standard and Rival Two Modes
accounts and determined that the Rival Two Modes account best reflects St. Thomas’
own treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa theologiae*. This last point
deserves some final remarks.

Knowing that over seven hundred years of Thomist reflection has for the most
part consistently interpreted St. Thomas according the Standard Two Modes account, I
tread very hesitantly in denying the validity of the Standard Two Modes account. But I
contend that the texts of St. Thomas in the *Summa theologiae* warrant such a rejection for
the reasons cited above. As I said earlier, St. Thomas could have kept his account of the
gifts of the Holy Spirit as consistent as his previous works had done so prior to the
*Summa theologiae*. As the commentary on *Galatians* shows, he repeats almost verbatim
his understanding of the gifts as first outlined in his commentary on *Isaiah*. 
And yet, by the time he writes the Second Part of the *Summa theologiae*, St. Thomas had developed his doctrine on the gifts significantly so as to reject key elements of his earlier doctrine on the gifts and include one significant new feature among others, the terminology of *instinctus*. That this key term plays a role in the development in St. Thomas’ account of faith and grace and coincides with the development of his account of the gifts is not accidental. Rather, it appears as a deliberate effort on St. Thomas’ part on explaining how the Holy Spirit moves the human person to act by both illuminating his intellect and inclining his wills in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. And by using *instinctus* St. Thomas underscores God’s abiding presence in the Holy Spirit in guiding and directing the human person toward his supernatural happiness in God. As St. Paul says, “And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, ‘Abba! Father!’ So you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also an heir, through God.”[^61]

[^61]: Gal. 4:6-7.
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