THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Thomas Aquinas on the Sense Appetite as Participating in Reason

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Department of Medieval and Byzantine Studies
School of Arts and Sciences
Of The Catholic University of America
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

©
Copyright
All Rights Reserved
By Nicholas Kahm

Washington D.C.

2014
For Aquinas and Aristotle, moral virtue and vice, and also continence and incontinence, concern the manner in which the sense appetites (the seat of the passions or emotions) participate in reason. This dissertation examines exactly how this participation works in Aquinas’s thought.

The first chapter examines how reason and the sense appetites are parts of the soul and the manner in which the soul can be spoken of as a whole composed of parts. The second chapter investigates how these parts can be ordered or disordered and the manner in which moral virtue is an ordering of the parts of the soul. The third chapter examines the metaphysical status of these parts of the soul and their habits and it also examines Aquinas’s doctrine of participation. The fourth and fifth chapters examine Aquinas’s doctrine of how the sense appetites participate in reason in his early texts (1251-1259) and his late texts (1268-1274) respectively and charts development in Aquinas’s thought. The sixth chapter discusses Aquinas’s mature thinking in light of the current scholarship on this topic. The conclusion explains exactly what kind of participation Aquinas has in mind when he says that the sense appetites participate in reason.
This dissertation by Nicholas Kahm fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Medieval and Byzantine Studies approved by John F. Wippel, Ph.D., as Director, and by Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D., and William Mattison III, Ph.D., as Readers.

__________________________________________
John F. Wippel, Ph.D., Director

__________________________________________
Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D., Reader

__________________________________________
William Mattison III, Ph.D., Reader
# CONTENTS

**Introduction** ........................................................................................................................................... 1

**Chapter I: The Soul as a Potential Whole** ............................................................................................... 10

1. Precision and Aristotle’s Tripartite Division of the Soul in EN I.13 ....................................................... 10
2. Fragmentation of the Soul into Parts ....................................................................................................... 15
   A. Parts of the Soul ................................................................................................................................. 15
   B. Soul qua *Simplex*: The Unicity of Substantial Form ....................................................................... 17
   C. Soul qua *multiplex*: The Soul Must Have Parts ........................................................................... 22
   D. The Distinction Between the Soul and its Powers ........................................................................... 29
3. The Unification of the Parts of the Soul ................................................................................................. 36
   A. The Distinction Between Soul as Form (*forma*) and Soul as Mover (*motor*) ............................. 38
   B. Souls ................................................................................................................................................ 44
   C. The Soul as a Potential Whole ......................................................................................................... 50
4. Conclusion: Wholes and Parts Revisited .............................................................................................. 62

**Chapter II: The Inner Cathedral: Order and Disorder** .......................................................................... 68

1. Introduction to the Parts of the Potential Whole ................................................................................... 68
2. Man’s Divided Nature ........................................................................................................................... 76
3. In what way is virtue according to nature? ........................................................................................... 86
4. Natural and Supernatural: A Framework ............................................................................................. 102
5. Pre- and Postlapsarian Powers ........................................................................................................... 110

**Chapter III: Accidents and Participation** ............................................................................................. 121

1. Habits as Modes of Existing .................................................................................................................. 121
   A. The Genus Quality ........................................................................................................................... 124
      1. The 4th Species of Quality ............................................................................................................ 126
      2. The 3rd Species of Quality .......................................................................................................... 128
      3. The 2nd Species of Quality .......................................................................................................... 135
      4. The 1st Species of Quality ............................................................................................................ 138
   B. Aristotle’s Influence on Aquinas’s Fourfold Division of Quality .................................................... 150
2. Charity and The Increase and Decrease of Accidents ......................................................................... 156
   A. The Created Nature of Charity ......................................................................................................... 156
   B. Intension and Remission .................................................................................................................. 160
3. Participation: A Brief Introduction ...................................................................................................... 167
Chapter IV: The Sense Appetites as Participating in Reason (1251-1259) ..........177

1. *The Commentary on The Sentences* .................................................................178
   A. Will and Intellect ...................................................................................181
   B. Sense .......................................................................................................189
   C. Moral Virtue ..............................................................................................193
   D. Mode and Exemplarity ..........................................................................198
   E. What Moral Virtue Does To The Sense Appetites ................................205
   F. Summary ..................................................................................................213
2. *De veritate* ....................................................................................................214
   A. Will and Intellect ...................................................................................214
   B. Virtue, Sense, and Sensuality .................................................................219
   C. Summary ..................................................................................................233

Chapter V: The Sense Appetites as Participating in Reason (1268-1273) ..........235

1. Will and Intellect ............................................................................................235
   A. Consent ....................................................................................................245
2. Participation in Reason ................................................................................252
3. Command .....................................................................................................260
4. What Moral Virtue Does To The Sense Appetites .......................................267
5. Beyond Docility and Lowering Vehemence: Inclination and Connaturality ....279
6. Summary ......................................................................................................284

Chapter VI: Passions, Habits, and Choice ........................................................286

1. Choice and Habituation – The Medieval Problem .........................................286
2. Temperance and the Question of Virtuous Antecedent Passion ..................290
3. Jensen’s Objection .......................................................................................293
4. Habits in Thomistic Scholarship ..................................................................306
5. Courage: A Test Case ..................................................................................309
6. Qualis unusquisque est, Talis etiam finis videtur ei: Virtuous Affectivity .......316
7. Conclusion of Chapter ..................................................................................325

Conclusion .......................................................................................................329
Bibliography .....................................................................................................344
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Compendium theologiae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Summa contra gentiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Summa theologiae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDC</td>
<td>Quaestio disputata de caritate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDVC</td>
<td>Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDV</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de veritate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDA</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de anima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDM</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de malo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDP</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de potentia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QSC</td>
<td>Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De ente.</td>
<td>De ente et essentia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De princ.</td>
<td>De principiis naturae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De unit. int.</td>
<td>De unitate intellectus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De virt.</td>
<td>Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In I Cor.</td>
<td>Super primam epistolam ad Corinthios lectura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In De an.</td>
<td>Sentencia libri De anima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In De div. nom.</td>
<td>In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In De mem.</td>
<td>Sentencia libri De memoria et reminiscencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In De sensu.</td>
<td>Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Eph.</td>
<td>Super epistolam ad Ephesios lectura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Ethic.</td>
<td>Sententia libri Ethicorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Ioan.</td>
<td>Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Met.</td>
<td>In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Meteor.</td>
<td>Expositio in libros Meteorologicorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Periern.</td>
<td>Expositio libri Perymenias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Phys.</td>
<td>In VIII libros Physicorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Ps.</td>
<td>In Psalmos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Post. an.</td>
<td>Expositio libri Posteriorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Rom.</td>
<td>Super Epistolam ad Romanos lectura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Sent.</td>
<td>Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quodl.</td>
<td>Quodlibeta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De ebd.</td>
<td>Super Boetii De ebdomadibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Trin.</td>
<td>Super Boetii De Trinitate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De caus.</td>
<td>Super Librum de causis expositio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Editions


Marietti Opera omnia. Turin/Rome: Marietti (dates vary).
Introduction

This dissertation examines Aquinas’s views on how the sense appetites (the seat of the emotions or passions) can participate in reason. The basic question is quite simple: in what way can the emotions be rational? Or, in what sense can reason permeate emotion?

Practically all Thomists who touch on the subject of the relation between reason and emotion mention the importance of the sense appetites’ participation in reason, but almost none of them offer any detail about what this participation entails.¹ I hope to add some precision to this important aspect of Aquinas’s thought.

There is one common thread running through the literature. Although the lack of detail often makes it impossible to say what most Thomists think this participation entails, they are at least usually agreed about what it is not: it is not Kantian, nor is it Cartesian. Let me explain.

Descartes’ rejection of Aristotelian hylomorphism and formal causality is crucial. According to Descartes, the soul is not related to the body as form, but as an efficient cause, i.e., the human soul is a “pilot soul” of sorts, a ghost in the machine. This is then loosely joined to a common understanding of Kant. In the history of moral philosophy, Aristotle and Kant are usually placed at opposite ends of a spectrum. For Aristotle the emotions can participate in

¹ The literature that touches on the relation between reason and will is quite vast, since the topic is related to Aquinas’s epistemology, anthropology, and virtue ethics. There have recently, however, been three recent monographs on Aquinas’s views on the passions: Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009]; Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009]; Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011]. Of these three Cates has the clearest account of what it means to say that the sense appetites participate in reason, see pp. 214-5, 220 and 221. There is one is a small dissertation by Josef Jacob entitled Passiones: Ihr Wesen und ihre Anteilnahme an der Vernunft nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin (Vienna, Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1958); however, it has no discussion of participation and the secondary litterature on participation, and there are no details on what exactly this participation does to the passions. My interpretation of the topic differs significantly from Jacob’s, which relies almost exclusively on the cogitative power, which I shall discuss in chapters 4 through 6.
According to *The Metaphysics of Morals*, the only intrinsically good thing is the good will; the inclinations or passions are directed towards happiness (the fulfillment of inclination or passion), which ultimately has nothing to do with goodness, e.g., “Making a man happy is quite different from making him good . . .” For Kant, what is moral is restricted to the voluntary, and thus to the will. Universal volitions of duty (i.e., following the categorical imperative) impose themselves over and against our natural and contingent sensitive natures. In other words, we have a kind of Cartesian “ghost in the machine” or a “pilot soul” where the will is the domineering (or at least it ought to be) pilot.

Whatever Aquinas may mean by saying that the sense appetites participate in reason, it is apparently not that, i.e., a pilot soul dominating sensitive nature by way of efficient causality, for any ethical theory that grants the soul too much of a role as the efficient cause of the sensitive parts seems to imply this non-hylomorphic Cartesian-Kantian pilot soul. And thus they claim that

---

2 This reading of Kant, however, is no longer tenable. In the last ten years, Kantians have drastically changed our understanding of Kantian virtue ethics: now it is commonly accepted that reason can and should shape our sensible nature. See Anne Margaret Baxley, “Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence?” *The Review of Metaphysics*, 56.3 (2003):559-86. Ibid, *Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy* [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2010]. See Michael Rohlf “Emotion and Evil in Kant” *The Review of Metaphysics* (Forthcoming) for a discussion of the most recent literature.


4 Ibid., 46. The most famous example is the following: “To be beneficent where one can is a duty; and besides, there are a good many souls so sympathetically attuned that, even without any other motive of vanity or of self-serving advantage, they find an inner enjoyment in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others, in so far as this is their work. But I claim that in the case of an action like this, however dutiful and however amiable that action may be, it has no true moral worth. Rather, it is on a par with [actions proceeding from] other inclinations—for example, the inclination to honor, which, if it does by a stroke of luck hit upon that which is indeed generally benefactory [gemeinnützig] and dutiful, and consequently honorable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for the maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of such actions not from inclination but from duty.” Translated by Jeffrey Edwards in “Self-Love, Anthropology, And Universal Benevolence in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 53.4 (2000):891. For a discussion of this text see this article.

5 This common interpretation of Descartes is too simplistic: e.g., see Descartes *Discourses VI*, AT 59.
Scotus and the other medieval voluntarists were riding an express train headed straight for modernity. Aquinas, however, was not on this train, nor was he quasi-modern.

Servais Pinkaers, who has inspired many Thomists, is a strong advocate of this meta-narrative of the history of moral philosophy, and even if some scholars have not been directly influenced by Pinkaers, they nevertheless tend to share his basic meta-narrative. These scholars speak of “Aquinas’s remarkably positive assessment of passion...” and they are full of the language of the harmony, intelligence, and basic goodness of the emotions, which is a direct result of Aquinas’s Aristotelian hylomorphism. In other words, because of the natural hylomorphic unity, there is a kind of mirrored natural unity between reason and the passions which mutually and synergistically reinforce each other in a kind of hylomorphic manner. They are correct, in a certain sense, for Aquinas’s account of the passions of the soul involves an extraordinarily complex full-bodied and interesting mixture of the rational, irrational, natural and material all acting together. It does, in a way, mirror and reflect man’s hylomorphic body-soul or matter-form union. The very best depiction of this, in my opinion, is found in a very clear article by Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens entitled Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions.

---


7 Lombardo, Logic of Desire, 112. See also Ibid., 116: Aquinas’s “extraordinary trust in the passions,” and his “profoundly positive evaluation of emotion” (272) and that “Aquinas trusts the fundamental orientation of the passions” (100), etc. For more examples of similar positions see the citations in the previous note.

However, I object to the transposition of this “hylomorphic understanding” (if one may say such a thing) of the passions onto particular accounts of morality (in particular, the avoidance of anything remotely resembling “dualism.”) And by dualism is here meant any account of moral virtue that grants too much control to reason over and above emotion. For Aquinas, at least, it is obviously not the case that because the soul is the form of the body that it cannot also be an efficient cause of its motion. In fact, it is because the soul is the form of the body that it can efficiently and freely move it. There is strong textual evidence in Aquinas to show that the soul does efficiently move the body and the sense appetites: this is indeed part of what Aquinas has in mind when he says that the sense appetites participate in reason, as we shall see.

Aquinas says over and over again that the sense appetites only participate in reason to the extent that they obey reason’s command. We will investigate this in great detail in the last three chapters, but this implies, and here I have been influenced by Bonnie Kent, that there is a kind of conscious self, so to speak, which can command or not command the lower parts of the soul and the body. In other words, I experience a passion, but I then either freely accept or reject and then

---

9 Bonnie Kent, “Losable Virtue: Aquinas on Character and Will,” in *Aquinas and the Nichomachean Ethics*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013], 108-9: “Aristotle highlights the role of desire or choice only in discussing the exercise of rational capacities. The individual must choose whether to exercise them, and if so, for what purpose (*Met. 9.5.1047b31–1048a16*). The choice is external to the capacity. Thus it is no evidence against someone’s possession of a skill that she chooses to take a break from exercising it or sometimes uses it to produce the opposite of its characteristic result. Aristotle denies that the same holds for moral virtues, partly because there are no breaks from the moral life and partly because moral virtues are one-sided, with choice built into them. Since virtues are by their very nature stable, active dispositions to make good choices, it is evidence against someone’s possession of a virtue that she fails to choose correctly or, worse, chooses badly (*EN 6.5.1140b22–24*). For Aristotle the virtuous person’s constellation of dispositions constitute the self. There is no independent “I” capable of choosing. For Aquinas there is indeed an independent “I.” By their very nature, all dispositions are principally related to the will. We use the disposition or not, as we will (*ST 1–2.50.5 resp.*). Although people may be strongly inclined to act in accordance with their dispositions, they are never determined to act in accordance with them.”
I command these lower powers and their virtues or vices. There is a kind of “pilot” in Aquinas, but it is not exactly the soul itself. Furthermore, there is nothing particularly modern about the “pilot” problem, as Plato and the Stoics illustrate. Moreover, granting the medieval debates about the unicity or plurality of substantial forms, it would seem that practically everyone medieval but Aquinas would be modern. I would rather think of this as a perennial philosophical problem. On the one hand, we seem to be mostly what is conscious, rational, and free; on the other hand, we are substantial matter-form composites. Aquinas has a very interesting philosophical account of how these two come together. In this case, he seems to me to have figured out how to have and eat his cake without contradiction.

If I am right about this, it takes the pressure off certain more “dualistic passages” in Aquinas. For example, Aquinas often explains how the soul rules the passion politically rather than despotically.10 Most Thomists take this to mean that reason ought to respect the passions’ own inherent goodness and autonomy which are naturally ordered to virtue.11 But in every single one of those passages Aquinas is very explicit that their autonomy is problematic: they are rebellious (rebellans)12 and at times fight back (repugnat)13 with some contradiction (cum aliqua

---

10 The passage is originally from Aristotle’s Politics 1.5, 1254b1-5. For Aquinas See ST I, 81.3 ad 2 [St. Paul, 391]; ST I-II, 9.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 601]; ST I-II, 17.7 [St. Paul, 630]; ST I-II, 56.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 781]; ST I-II 58.2 [St. Paul, 790]; De virt. 1.4 [Marietti, 717]; De virt. 1.4 ad 11 [719]; QDM 3.9 ad 14 [Leon.23.88.323-28]; In X Ethic. 10 [Leon.47/2.583.22-31].

11 Lombardo is a strong proponent of this position, see Logic of Desire, 112: “... Aquinas’s remarkably positive assessment of passion qua passion as something intrinsically ordered toward flourishing, and therefore virtue.” Uffenheimer-Lippens, in Rationalized Passion (the whole article is concerned with explaining the political nature of the passions) is more tempered than Lombardo, but she nevertheless argues that the political way of understanding the passions is paradigmatic. See also Gondreau, “Passions and the Moral Life,” 422-24.

12 De virt. 4 ad 8 [Marietti, 719]: “in inferioribus animae virtutibus aliquid sit rationi rebellans, dum inferioris vires animae propios motus habent.

13 De virt. 4 [Marietti, 717]: “Appetitus autem inferior habet proprium inclinationem ex natura sua, unde non obedit superior appetitui ad nutum, sed interdum repugnat. . . .
contradictione)\textsuperscript{14} and can resist reason (\textit{habet facultatem resistendi in aliquo imperio domini}).\textsuperscript{15}

The purpose of moral virtue is to diminish this resistance and rebellion as much as possible.\textsuperscript{16}

The goal is for reason and will to become despotic, and for the passions to become slavish so that reason and will can rule. Aquinas’ texts are full of language of this sort. But because such texts seem too dualistic, they are downplayed. What is offered instead is a distortion of Aquinas’s position as if he espouses a kind of mutual respect for differing spheres of autonomy and thinks that the person is perfected by becoming more democratic and less autocratic. But this is to overlook Aquinas’s basic point that there are higher and lower parts of the soul and that the higher (reason and will) should rule the lower (the sense appetites and their passions) and that these lower powers are problematic after man’s fall.\textsuperscript{17} It is undoubtedly true that Aquinas also says that the sense appetites \textit{naturally} can obey reason,\textsuperscript{18} but this must be reconciled with passages in which Aquinas says that they \textit{naturally} often do not.\textsuperscript{19} Both claims, properly

\textsuperscript{14} ST I-II 58.2 [St. Paul, 790].

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{De virt.} 4 [Marietti, 717].

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{De virt.} 4 ad 7 [Marietti, 718]: “\ldots tota rebellio irascibilis et concupiscibilis ad rationem tolli non potest per virtutem; \ldots Nihilominus tamen per virtutem minuitur illa rebellio.”

\textsuperscript{17} One could turn the hylomorphic argument the other way around, away from the political or democratic metaphor. In Aquinas’s original account of hylomorphism (this is where he differs from Aristotle), the soul is not a material form but informs matter and transcends it. One could argue that because the immaterial soul clearly transcends the material body, it follows that the higher should clearly rule and transcend the lower. In any case, Aquinas nowhere makes such an argument, but it could be made. My point is simply that the connection between hylomorphism and ethics is not as obvious as it may seem. By ethics I here mean how moral virtue works; for other questions, such as abortion and hylomorphism, the person’s ontological unity are central.

\textsuperscript{18} E.g, \textit{De virt.} 8 [Marietti, 728]: “Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis naturaliter sunt obaudibles rationi; \ldots .”

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example QDM 16.2 [Leon.23.288.230-237]: “Vnde relinquitur cui cumque inest naturalis inclinatio ad malum simpliciter, quod hoc sit compositum ex duabus naturis, quorum inferior habet inclinationem ad bonum aliquod particulare conveniens inferiori nature et repugnans nature superiori secundum quam attenditur bonum simpliciter, sicut in homine est inclinationi naturalis ad id quod est conveniens carnali sensui contra bonum rationis.” QDA 8 ad 7: [Leon 24/1.71.401-02] “\ldots pugna que est in homine ex contrariis concupiscentiis etiam ex necessitate materiae provenit. Necesse enim fuit, si homo haberet sensum [the body of this article explains that man must have sense because phantasms are required for man’s intellect], quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum sequeretur concupiscentia delectabilium, que plerumque repugnat ratioci.”
understood, are true. Moreover, to argue that reason and will should rule the passions despotically does not in any way exclude the hylomorphic nature of the passions, nor does it exclude granting passions a positive role in the moral life. Passions may still be characterized as complex bodily-rational accidents and thus somehow quasi-hylomorphic, whether or not the person has political or despotic control over them. There is simply no connection between the degree or kind of control reason has or should have over them and Aquinas’s metaphysics of hylomorphism.

Also, what is completely absent from the secondary literature is any discussion of participation itself. Aquinas is quite clear that there are three kinds of participation, and there has been excellent scholarly literature on this from the perspective of metaphysics. There is none from the perspective of ethics. There is, however, some literature on the manner in which reason participates in eternal law, most notably the work by Martin Rhonhiemer, John Rzhia, et al. While that is undoubtedly very important, this dissertation, however, focuses on how the sense appetites and their passions participate in reason, which is not the same topic. I propose that Aquinas has a precise meaning of participation in mind, that he develops his thinking on this matter, and that in his mature texts efficient causality becomes increasingly important; but this

——


does not in any way contradict the demands of his hylomorphic metaphysics, nor does it preclude a positive role for the emotions in the moral life. I have made many broad claims here, but the truth is in the details, which I hope to bring out in the course of this dissertation.

The phrase “to participate in reason” comes from Aristotle’s *Ethics* I.13, in which Aristotle claims that the sensitive part of the soul participates in another, namely, reason. The first chapter examines Aquinas’s views on what exactly these parts are and what kind of a whole these parts comprise. I examine the important and completely neglected distinction between the soul as form (which has no parts) and the soul as mover (which is composed of parts). Because Thomistic ethicists only focus on the soul as form, they miss a crucial anthropological prerequisite distinction. Among other things, this distinction removes the objection that any understanding of Aquinas’s ethics that may seem to grant the soul a strong role as an efficient cause of the body or of a passion implies a rejection of Aristotelian hylomorphism.

Chapter two examines the manner in which these parts, or powers of the soul, are ordered to one another. I also examine the manner in which these powers are naturally disordered. In the case of the sense appetites, Aquinas claims that it is natural that they obey reason, but it is also natural for them not to obey reason. That is, in one way the disorder of the parts of the soul is natural, in another way the order that virtue imposes on these parts is natural. The naturalness of the disorder is contextualized in light (or darkness) of man’s fall.

Chapter three examines some requisite nuts and bolts for the remainder of the dissertation. I examine the metaphysical status and categorization of these parts and their habits. I also introduce Aquinas’s account of participation and its three-fold division.
The next two chapters examine Aquinas’s thinking on how the sense appetites participate in reason. Chapter four examines the texts from 1251-1259, and chapter five examines those from 1268-1274. Dividing the texts in this manner enabled me to chart some development in Aquinas’s thought.

Chapter six places Aquinas’ thinking on how the sense appetites participates in reason in the context of the medieval discussion as well as in the contemporary Thomistic discussion about the precise nature and role of moral virtue vis-à-vis passion.

The conclusion revisits the discoveries made in the 4th and 5th chapters and pinpoints, with Aquinas’s development in doctrine in mind, the exact kind of participation in reason Aquinas means when he says that the sense appetites participate in reason.
Chapter I: The Soul as a Potential Whole

1. Precision and Aristotle’s Tripartate Division of the Soul in EN I.13.

The true student of politics, Aristotle argues, must study virtue above all else. This is because this student desires to make laws which form virtuous citizens; moreover, since the operation of virtue, or human happiness, is an operation of the human soul, he must know a thing or two about the soul.¹

According to Aristotle, this student must know that one part of the soul is rational and that another is irrational.² Moreover, this student must also know that the irrational is further subdivided into two parts: “For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it.”³ This phrase “shares” in reason was rendered as participare ratione (to participate in reason) in Aquinas’s Latin text of these passages.

Moral virtue, as distinguished from intellectual virtue, concerns the appetitive or desiring part.⁴ Thus grasping moral virtue requires a recognition of something in the soul which can obey and listen to reason but at times “fights against and resists” it. It seems obvious enough that anyone can recognize this “part” of the soul:

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul [the “appetitive” part mentioned above]—one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the reason of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has reason, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another natural element beside reason,

² Ibid., I.13.1102a25-27 [Barnes, 1741].
³ Ibid., I.13.1102b29-1103a10 [Barnes, 1742].
⁴ Ibid., I.13.1103a4-8 [Barnes, 1742].
which fights against and resists it. For exactly as paralyzed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so it is with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something beside reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in reason, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys reason—and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as reason.\footnote{Nic.I.13.1102b13-28 [Barnes, 1741-42].}

Moral virtue, most generally, concerns the ordering of the appetitive to the rational part of the soul,\footnote{Aristotle also entertains dividing the rational part somewhat differently, Nic.I.13.1103a1-3 [Barnes, 1741-42]: “And if this element [appetitive] also must be said to have reason, that which has reason also will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and other having a tendency to obey as one does one’s father.” This alternate division rests on Aristotle’s claim that one could name the appetitive part in question rational, and thus the rational part itself would be divided in two. This passage in Greek is quite tricky, and Aristotle is playing on the different ways one can take logon exein, i.e., to have reason. It can be taken in three ways: 1) to have reason, 2) to obey and follow reason, and 3) to originate a reason. For a discussion of this see note a. in the Greek text in the Loeb edition of this work, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1934), 66. The appetitive part obviously cannot fall under the third alternative, but it can certainly be conceived to fall under the first two. For if under ‘rational’ is included that which is capable of being persuaded or influenced by reason (and in this way it could also be said to have logos), then one can call the appetitive power rational. In other words, it is possible to take the appetitive part as either rational or irrational depending on how strict one wants to be with the term ‘rational.’ Aristotle’s tripartate division can be divided in two ways: either one can have two rational parts and one irrational part, or one can have two irrational parts and one rational part. In a certain sense it makes no difference if one wants to name this middle part irrational (since it is not reason, but granted that it is not vegetative) or rational (but by participation). That seems to be Aristotle’s point. See Bonnie Kent, \textit{Virtues of The Will} (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 204-205.} more specifically, how the appetitive part listens to, obeys, or shares in reason. In Aquinas’s Latin version of these texts, the phrase “shares in reason” is rendered “participates” in reason (\textit{participare ratione}).\footnote{Aquinas’s Latin text of the first book of Aristotle’s \textit{Nichomachean Ethics} came from a version of Grosseteste’s translation of it. For Grosseteste’s translation see \textit{Aristoteles Latinus} v. 26, f. 1, ed. R. A. Gauthier (E. J. Brill: Leiden and Brussels, 1974). For this passage see pp. 161-62. Grosseteste is simply translating the Greek \textit{μετέχω} as the Latin \textit{participo}, see the entry in index of Greek-Latin terms on p.716. The version of this text that Aquinas used was reconstituted and published in the Leonine (v. 48) edition of Aquinas’s commentary on the \textit{Nichomachean Ethics}.} Aquinas regularly used this phrase, to participate in reason
(participare rationem), to explain how the appetitive part is or ought to be related to reason. Understanding Aquinas on this point will be the subject matter of this dissertation.

A natural starting point of this inquiry would be to examine exactly what Aristotle or Aquinas meant by a “part” of the soul. But notice that Aristotle warns his audience that in what sense these parts (vegetative, appetitive, and rational) are distinct, whether they are actually separable or only separable in thought, “does not concern us.” That is more precision than is necessary. In his commentary on the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aquinas notes that the end of practical science is not only knowledge but action. More specifically, it is knowledge for the

---

8 This is not necessarily the same tripartite division as the soul’s tripartite division into vegetative, sensitive, and rational; more specifically, the appetitive part ought not to be equated with the sensitive part. See Aristotle’s discussion in *De anima* III 432a17-432b9, esp. 432b5-7 [trans. J. A. Smith, Barnes, 687]: “It is absurd to break up the last-mentioned faculty [appetitive]: for wish is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational; and if the soul is tripartate appetite will be found in all three parts.” In Aquinas’s commentary on this passage (III *De anima* 432a17-432b9) he refers back to the exact passage we are discussing in *Nic* I.13: *In De an.* III.14 [Leon 24.1.239.50-58]: “... alii uero distinguunt uires animae per rationem habentem et irrationalem, set hec quidem divisio, licet secundum aliquem modum comprehendat omnes anime partes, non tamen est propria divisio parcium anime secundum quod sunt anime partes, sed forte solum secundum quod sunt in anima rationem habente et sic utitur ea Aristoteles in primo Ethicorum.” In other words, Aquinas thinks that proper division of the soul into its parts (as it is done in the *de anima*) is not identical to this threefold division according to rational, rational by participation (or irrational but less irrational than the vegetative part) and the properly irrational (vegetative). They are not contradictory, but they are different ways of dividing the soul. For a helpful discussion of this tripartite division in *Nic*.I.13 and a discussion and rejection of a possible misreading (dividing appetite into sense appetite and rational appetite) see Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 204-206.

9 *Nic*.1102a29-32 [Barnes, 1741].

10 Ibid., 1102b24-25[Barnes, 1742].

11 *In I Ethic.* 3 [Leon.47/1.12.144-48].
sake of action. To bring up excessive details about the parts of the soul would a waste of time and energy which ought rather to be focused on acts and virtue.

Anyone who has casually glanced at Aquinas’s ethical writings, however, will notice that he seems to ignore Aristotle’s statement about the kind of precision necessary. Aquinas offers a helpful distinction in ST I q. 14, a. 16 which accounts for his kind of precision:

Some knowledge is only speculative, some is only practical, but some knowledge is in a certain respect speculative and in a certain respect practical. It must be known on the following evidence that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways. First, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the one knowing, as is man’s knowledge of natural or divine things. Second, with respect to the mode of knowing, as for example if a builder would consider a house by defining, dividing, and considering its universal predicates. This indeed is to consider operable things in a speculative way and not insofar as they are operable: for something is operable through the application of form to matter, and not through the resolution of composed things into their universal formal principles. Third, with respect to the end: for the practical intellect differs from the speculative by its end, as Aristotle says in book three of the De anima (433a14).

For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of operation; the end, however, of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Whence, if some builder were to consider how some house could come to be, not ordering it to the end of operation, but only in order to know, there will be, with respect to the end, speculative consideration, nevertheless of something operable. – Knowledge therefore which is speculative by reason of the thing known is only speculative. But what is speculative either according to mode or according to end, is in a

---

12 Aquinas notes that it is necessary to know that concupiscence is curbed by abstinence, but it is not necessary to know why. For as long as someone thinks that it possible to change his destructive inclinations, he may try to, but if he does not think that this is possible, he will be less willing to make the effort. Armed with this knowledge, the lawmaker may prohibit certain activities and promote others with the express intent of ridding his citizens of certain habits which may be destructive to the common good and themselves. Thus it is necessary to know that this is the case (quia), but it is not necessary to know why (propter quid) this is the case. Propter quid knowledge of such things is reserved for the speculative sciences, see In Ethic. I, 4 [Leon. 47/1.15.141-50].

13 In I Ethic.11[Leon. 47/1.39.86-95]: “Et secundum hunc modum faciendum est in aliis scientiis operativis, ut non sequatur hoc inconveniens ut in scientia operativa fiant plures sermones ad opera non pertinentes illis sermonibus qui sunt circa opera, puta, si in hac scientia morali aliquis vellet pertractare omnia quae pertinent ad rationem et alias partes animae, oporteret plura de hoc dicere quam de ipsis operibus. Est enim in unaquaque scientia vitiosum ut homo multum immoretur in his quae sunt extra scientiam.”
certain respect speculative and in a certain respect practical. But when it is ordered to the end of operation, it is simply practical.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus, in the case of ethics, what is known does not compel it to be practical. Moral matters may be considered speculatively, as a house builder may consider universal truths about houses, that is, it is possible to consider universal truths about operable things, that is, things that can be made or done. Any object viewed speculatively, of course, has no limit to the amount of precision required, provided the details help one better understand the subject matter at hand.

One may thus distinguish between ethical knowledge which is truly practical, since it is for the sake of making men virtuous, and knowledge of human ethics which is speculative, since it seeks to satisfy our natural desire to know what virtue is by understanding the principles and causes of virtue simply for its own sake. The latter, although it must be presented quite differently than the former, need not and does not positively exclude it.

This dissertation will look closely at the precisions involved in Aquinas’s account of moral virtue’s placement within Aristotle’s tripartate division of the soul in *Nic.* I.13, i.e., into the rational, the appetitive and the vegetative. Since this dissertation is not strictly practical, it can ignore Aristotle’s warning concerning the requisite precision.15

2. Fragmentation of the Soul into Parts.

A. Parts of the Soul

Aquinas, is quite adamant that perfect knowledge about virtue requires knowledge about the powers of the soul.16 Aquinas often mentions the powers of the soul as its parts, e.g., reason, will, the internal and external sense powers, etc,17 but along with the powers he also mentions the supreme, active, contemplative,18 rational, sensitive,19 vegetative,20 interior,21 opiniative,22 apprehensive, appetitive parts,23 etc. Clearly these are not parts in the exact same way. For example, the sense power of sight cannot be a part of the soul in the same way that the sensitive part is a part of the soul.

---

15 It is not as if Aquinas simply decided to proceed differently than Aristotle. Aquinas was, of course, part of an academic or scholastic milieu which asked particular questions in highly detailed ways. He does, however, give a very good non-historical reason why he proceeds with the kind of detail that he does. Nor am I willing to say that the *Nichomachean Ethics* is simply a practical work.

16 *In I de an.* 11 [leon. 45/1.55.122-24]: “Si vero attendatur quantum ad moralem, non possimus perfecte ad scientiam moralem pervenire, nisi sciamus potentias animae.”

17 *In II De an.* 5 [leon.45/1.87.3-8]: “... non autem habet aliter anima partes nisi secundum quod eius potentie partes eius dicuntur. . . unde determinare de partibus anime est determinare de singulis potenciis eius.”

18 *In I Sent.* 3.4.1.ad 6 [Mand.114]: “. . . voluntas non tantum se habet ad partem activam, sed etiam ad contemplativam: unde pertinet ad supremam partem animae.”

19 SCG. 3.120 [Leon.manulis, 371]: “ . . . anima nutritiva vel sensitiva: quia harum partium animae . . .”

20 *De unit. intell.* c.1 [leon.43.292.116-118]: “anima determinatur – sicut per suas partes – vegetativio, sensitiuo, intellectiuo, motu . . .”

21 ST I-II, 80. [St. Paul, 899]: “ . . . interior pars animae . . .”

22 ST I-II, 57.4 ad 2 [St. Paul, 786]: “ . . . est in opiniativa parte animae . . .”

23 ST I-II, 22.2 arg.1 [St. Pail, 657]: “Sed pars appetiva est magis activa quam pars apprehensiva.”
In what way can the soul have parts? And what kind of parts are they? Or to phrase the question slightly differently, what kind of a whole do these parts comprise? Is a soul the kind of thing which is composed of diverse parts?

At times Thomas seems to deny that the soul has parts, for he insists that the soul, as the form of the body, is simple (simpexus) in its essence.\textsuperscript{24} There is not more soul in the hand than in the power of sight, i.e., the soul as immaterial is neither here nor there, it is the simple form of the whole body. But if it is the case that the soul is essentially simple, how then can it also be the kind of thing that is composed of parts?

Aristotle raised this question at the very beginning of his \textit{De anima}:

We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and whether it is everywhere homogenous or not; and if not homogenous, whether its various forms are different specifically or generically. . . . Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts? It is also a difficult problem to decide which of these parts are in nature distinct from one another.\textsuperscript{25}

He returned to this question in the \textit{De anima} again and again.\textsuperscript{26} Whether or not Aristotle ultimately succeeded in distinguishing between the soul [or souls] and its parts is still disputed.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} QDA.9.ad14 [leon.24.1.85.483]: “anima sit forma simplex secundum essentiam . . .”; QDA.8.ad14 [leon.24.1.73.459-463]; QDA.10.ad17 [leon.24.1.94.401].

\textsuperscript{25} Aristotle, \textit{De anima} I.1.402b1-13, trans. J. A. Smith in Barnes, 641-42.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.I.411b5-13 [Barnes, 655]; II.413b14-29 [Barnes 658]; III.432a15-b9 [Barnes, 687]. Cf. 

\textit{Nichomachean Ethics} I.13.1102a26-32 and 1102b24-25 [Barnes, 1741-42].

But it is quite clear, as his repeated return to the question shows, that he considered it to be a very important question to ask. Let us consider Aquinas’s solution to this problem.

**B. Soul qua Simplex: The Unicity of Substantial Form**

Since Aquinas’s positive explanations of what these parts are presupposes knowledge of what they are not, let us begin by looking at Aquinas’s important elimination of the possibility that these parts could be substantial forms. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Aquinas argued there could only be one substantial form in any given substance.

What is at stake in the various positions one might take on the unicity of substantial form is the role of the substantial form itself. For Aquinas, the substantial form is what makes the being actually exist as this particular substance and as this kind of substance. Substance does not exist prior to generation and posterior to corruption: generation and corruption account for the coming to be and destruction of the whole substance. Also, as the substantial form of the body, the soul as act immediately informs prime matter, i.e., body. Because prime matter or pure

---


29 R. Zavalloni argued, in *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (Louvain, 1951), 261-66, that early in Thomas’ career he was hesitant on this position and argued for a form of corporeity. For a refutation of this see Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 327-351.

potency cannot exist apart from substantial form there is nothing which is prior to generation or posterior to corruption. Accidental form, on the other hand, presupposes an actually existing subject or substance. Accidental being (esse) is to be in some substance (inesse); it is a modification of or a qualification of an already existing substance (which has esse), e.g., a person (a substance) is cold (an accident).

From this perspective, to posit a multiplicity of substantial forms necessarily implies a confusion the substantial and the accidental orders. For example, if one posited two substantial forms in a man, e.g., animal and rational, then either that man would not be one man but two men (since substantial form is what makes a substance to be one, as will be explained shortly) or one of these forms would have to be an accident and the other would have be a substance – but that is impossible, since man substantially is an animal: man is not accidentally animal. Another alternative is to suppose that generation unfolds according to a process of adding substantial forms: first the animal is generated and then an additional substantial form of rational is added to generate man. But Aquinas insists that in any such series the last added form must really be an accidental form which comes to and inheres in a preexisting substance, namely, animal. In other words, any articulation of a process of a later addition of a substantial form to an already existing subject cannot be substantial generation but is in fact an accidental change of some preexisting substance. It is only prime matter, not a substance, which is the potency principle in generation.
According to Aquinas it is the same substantial form that makes the substance to exist and makes it to be one. What is here presupposed is the convertibility of one and being.\textsuperscript{31} For this we can briefly turn to Thomas’s famous discussion of the transcendentals in *De veritate*, q.1, a.1. In considering how one can predicate something of being which is not included in the meaning (*ratio*) of being itself, he notes that one way is according to what he calls the general modes of being which follow upon each being in itself. One of these general modes is the term one. The term one is primarily negative and denotes being as undivided. The name one signifies nothing else than undivided being (*ens indivisum*),\textsuperscript{32} that is, a being as not divided from itself. To put this in other words, if there were a plurality of substantial forms in any particular being, that being would not, according to Thomas, be an undivided being; rather it would be divided. It is the substantial form which makes a being to be one in the unqualified sense (*simpliciter*).

But how exactly does this work? Is it not the case that God as creator makes beings to be by granting *esse*, that is, is it not God who makes all beings be *simpliciter* and makes them to be one? How is it that we seem to be granting God’s role to the substantial form? In order to understand in what sense a human being ultimately is one and in order to answer this question we must broaden our perspective to include not only Thomas’s account of matter-form composition, but also his thinking on essence-*esse* composition.


\textsuperscript{32} *DV*.1.1[Leon.22/1.5:124-142]: “Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens, et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se, alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad alium. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. . . . negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute est indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum.”
Aquinas gives a succinct account of this in the first article of his Disputed Question *De spiritualibus creaturis*:

It is clear that the first being, namely, God, is an infinite act having in himself the whole fullness of existing which is not contracted to some generic or specific nature. Thus it is necessary that his *esse* is not an *esse* that is, as it were, instilled in some nature which is not its own *esse*, since then it would be limited to that nature. Thus we say that God is his own *esse*, and this cannot be said of anything else. For as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses – for if there were a whiteness separate from any subject or recipient, it could only be one – so it is impossible that there be more than one *ipsum esse subsistens*. Everything that is after the first being, since it is not its own *esse*, has an *esse* received in something, by which the *esse* is limited. And thus in every created thing, the nature of the thing which participates in *esse* is other than the participated *esse* itself. And since each thing participates by assimilation in the first act insofar as it has *esse*, it is necessary that the participated *esse* in each thing is related to the nature that participates in it as act to potency.\(^{33}\)

Thus in every being, with one possible exception, there is a real distinction and composition between essence and *esse*. Thomas emphasizes that the correlation between essence and *esse* is one of potency to act. Essence as potency receives and limits *esse* which is its act. But how then can this same essence, which is related to *esse* as potency, in turn give *esse* to the body, i.e. be correlated as act to the body qua potency? Thomas immediately proceeds to discuss this.

\(^{33}\) QSC.1[Leon.24/2.13:363-14:385]: “Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est, est actus infinitus utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei; unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum alicui nature que non sit suum esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam naturam: unde dicimus quod Deus est ipsum suum esse. Hoc autem non potest dici de aliquo alio: sicut enim impossibile est intelligere quod sint plures albedines separate — set si esset albedo separata ab omni subjecto et recipiente, esset una tantum —, ita impossibile est quod sit ipsum esse subsistens nisi unum tantum. Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur: et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que participat esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quolibet res participet per assimilacionem primum actum in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquaque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum sicut actus ad potentiam.” For a discussion of this text see Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 118.
Therefore, in the nature of corporeal things matter does not participate per se in esse, but through form: for form coming to matter makes it to actually exist (ipsam esse actu) as the soul (does) to the body. Thus in composite things we can consider a twofold act and a twofold potency: first, matter is as potency with respect to form, and form is its act. Second, nature as constituted by matter and form is as potency with respect to its esse insofar as it receives it.  

Thus the solution is quite simple: essence receives esse and in turn grants it or communicates it to the body. It should be noted that essence is not the same as soul. Essence includes both matter and form, but the human soul does not include matter at all for soul is understood in contrast to matter. In the case of a human being, the esse which is of the whole composite, however, is also of the soul itself, and the soul communicates that esse in which it subsists to corporeal matter. Thus anything is one insofar as it has esse.

In conclusion, from the perspective of any corporeal being’s ontological unity we have four distinct principles: essence, esse, matter and form. None of these can be called a part of the soul. In order for matter to be called a part of the soul, it would have to be included within the

---

34 Ibid., lines 386-395: “In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se participat ipsum esse, set per formam : forma enim adveniens materie facit ipsam esse actu sicut anima corpori. Vnde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum et duplicem potentiam : nam primo quidem materia est ut potestia respectu forme, et forma est actus eius ; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma est ut potestia respectu ipsius esse in quantum est susceptiva eius.”

35 DEE.2[Leon.43.38-57]: “nomen essentie in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. . . . Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae composite non est tantum forme nec tantum materie, sed ipsius compositi ; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur : unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens non tantum sit forma, neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa.”


ratio of soul itself which, of course, it is not. As far as we know, we have no reason at this point to think of the soul as having parts. What we do know from this quick overview of Aquinas’s position on the unicity of substantial form is that, if the soul has parts, these parts cannot be other substantial forms: for the soul informs prime matter directly without any mediate forms. In terms of a being’s ontological unity, there are no parts to the soul. What is required are the being’s intrinsic principles – essence and esse, and for corporeal beings, also matter and form. That the soul is the form of the body, and that there is only one substantial form in any finite being, and that its being and its oneness are convertible offers no help in dividing the soul into parts. In this sense the soul itself is simple, as Aquinas puts it, and if we wish to posit parts at the very least we know something about what those parts are not.

C. Soul qua multiplex: The Soul Must Have Parts.

This metaphysical perspective is in a certain sense static. With the above mentioned principles we can account for a being’s existence, but we cannot say anything about what that being does. But Aquinas claims that each thing is for the sake of its operation.\(^{38}\) Or, as he puts it, esse is proportioned to operation; it is granted according to the mode which befits the being’s operation, for each being operates insofar as it is a being.\(^{39}\) Perhaps a better way of putting it is

\(^{38}\) ST I-II 3.2 [St. Paul, 569]: “. . . res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem, . . .” QDV 9 [Marietti, 731]: “omnis res est propter suam operationem; . . .” The end is the causa causarum, of course, e.g. In II Sent 9.1.1 ad 1 [Mand.2.226].

\(^{39}\) See, for example, QDA.9[Leon.24/1.82.278-80]: “anima singulis earum dat esse substantiale secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsorum”; QSC. 2[Leon.24/2.29.300-303]: “Et quia esse rei proportionatur eius operationi . . . cum unumquodque operetur secundum quod est ens, . . .”; QDA.10 ad 2[Leon.24/1.92.287-89]: “forma dat esse et speciem materie secundum quod congruit sue operationi.”; In II de an.[leon.45/1.88.50-54]: “Cum igitur unicuique comperat propria operatio secundum quod habet esse, eo quod unumquodque operatur in quantum est ens, oportet operationes anime considerare secundum esse quod inventur in viventibus.” SCG III, c. 13 [Leon.manualis.365]: “Omnis enim res propter suam operationem esse videtur : operatio enim est ultima perfectio rei.”
this: if we ask why any particular being has this kind of existence rather than that kind of existence, one answer Aquinas gives, in the line of final causality, is that the being exists in this way so that it can operate in this way.\(^{40}\) In a certain sense, operation is essential to the soul; in a certain sense, however, it is not.

If we ask the very general philosophical question: what is soul? The most common way to begin to answer the question is by making a distinction: animate beings are distinct from inanimate beings. A one-year-old child, for example, does this naturally. He takes far more interest and delight in the living animate thing that visibly moves itself, e.g., an insect, than in an inanimate thing which does not, say, the dirt on which the insect is crawling.\(^{41}\) This is the distinction between what has a nature and what does not according to Aristotle’s definition of nature as that which has its own internal principle of motion and rest.\(^{42}\) A living being, according to Aquinas, is precisely that which moves itself.\(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) His first answer to this is because the being has this kind of essence rather than any other. And in the order of discovery, one can reason from its distinctive kind of operation to its distinctive kind of essence. Aquinas, as the texts in the previous notes show, will answer the question in both ways: it acts like this because it exists in this way (because its essence has determined or limited its esse), or he answers that it exists in this way so that it can operate in this way – this latter answer being in the line of final causality. These are in no way mutually exclusive answers but rather appeals to different kinds of causes to answer the question.

\(^{41}\) ST.I.78.1 [St.Paul,369]: “quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio, huiusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco; hoc enim commune omnibus operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo mover seipsum.”

\(^{42}\) For Aristotle’s definition of nature in Book II of the Physics see 192b14. See Aquinas’ agreement with this definition in In octo libros physicorum Aristotelis expositio II.c.2.n.145(Marietti: Turin and Rome, 1965),74 and In De An.II.c.2 [Leon.45/1.75.78-80]. More generally, nature is simply the intrinsic principle of motion or operation, cf. ST I 29.1 ad 4 [St. Paul, 150]. See also ST I q. 115, a.2 [St. Paul, 534] and ST III, q.2, a.1[St. Paul, 1871-2].

\(^{43}\) ST I.18 [St. Paul, 99]: “Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima (431a6). Ut sic viventia dicitur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquum motum vel operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam similitudinem.”
But if we want to grasp more firmly what exactly this internal principle of motion or operation is, which Aristotle has called nature or soul, we immediately run into some aporias. To say that the soul has an internal principle of motion amounts to saying that the soul moves itself. But if it moves itself, it appears that there are two parts, one which moves and another which is moved. Notice that as soon as we speak of motion, we must posit parts. But which part is soul? If it is the moving part, then how can the soul be said to move itself? If it is the moved part, then what causes the motion? Can the living soul be both?

Let us look at his commentary on Aristotle’s discussion of this problem in *De anima* I.3.405b31f.:

All philosophers who recognized soul from observing motion held this common principle, namely, that everything which moves, is moved. Thus because it is natural for the soul to move, they believed that it was also connatural to it that it be moved; and that is that which the soul has from its own substance. That is why

---

44 This discussion will be restricted to the metaphysical and more general understanding of motion as the act of potency insofar as it is potency, rather than the understanding of motion from physics, e.g., everything in motion is divisible. The problem with arguments from physics is that one always has to ask whether or not they apply to the human soul. The study of the soul insofar as it is immaterial belongs partly to metaphysics, whose subject matter is, in John Wippel’s terms, negatively or neutrally immaterial being [*Metaphysical Thought*, 9-10], and partly to physics see *In I de an. 2* [leon.45/2.9.22-45;161-243;262-4], since it is the form of the body as well as the cause of many material powers and operations. I am leaning on the arguments from act and potency in general, because they cover all of man’s operations as well as man’s embodied or disembodied states. Arguments from physics cannot adequately deal with the soul’s immaterial powers and operations. Cf. *Sentencia De sensu*.intro.[Leon.45/2.73-79] “Maxima enim eius concretio est in anima, summa autem eius abstractio est in substanciis separatis; et ideo preter librum De anima Aristotiles non fecit librum de intellectu et intelligibili (vel, si fecisset, non pertineret ad scienciam naturalem, sed magis ad metaphysicam, cuius est considerare de substanciis separatis).” For a fuller discussion of whether or not the study of the soul ultimately belongs to metaphysics or physics see John F. X. Knasas, “Aquinas on the Cognitive Soul: Metaphysics, Physics, or Both?,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 72 (1998): 501-27.

45 In *VII Phys.*[Marietti.535.n.1023]: “Et primo dicit de iis quae moventur a seipsis (sicut sunt animalia, quae movent seipsis), quod moventur secundum naturam. Quod probat per hoc quod moventur a principio intrinsecos: illa autem dicimus a natura moveri, quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Unde manifestum est quod motus animalis, quo movet seipsis, si comparetur ad totum animal, est naturalis: quia est ab anima, quae est natura et forma animalis.”
those philosophers placed motion in its definition, saying that the soul moves itself.\footnote{In I De an.c.6 [Leon.45/1.28.57-65]: “Omnes autem philosophi qui venerunt in cognitionem anime ex motu, hoc principium habebant commune, scilicet quod omne quod movet, movetur ; unde quia naturale est anime quod moveret, credebant quod eidem sit connaturale quod moveretur et hoc habere animam ex substancia sua ; unde et ponebant in eius definitione motum, dicentes animam esse quid movens se ipsum.”}

For Aquinas this is not quite right, or perhaps it is better to say that it is not quite precise enough. Aquinas would never deny, in a general way that, say, an animal moves itself and truly exercises its own agency, for that is what it means to be alive. But positing agency does not commit one to the position that motion or operation is of the essence of any substance. First, Thomas says, Aristotle disproved the claim that everything which moves is moved by proving the existence of the unmoved mover in book VIII of the \textit{Physics}. Further, Aquinas notes, there is a very brief way to disprove it:\footnote{In I De an.c.6 [Leon.45/1.28.69-73].} .

\begin{quote}
. . . if something moves and is moved, it is obvious that insofar as it moves it is in act, and insofar as it is moved it is in potency. But then the same thing in the same respect would be both in act and in potency which is unacceptable (\textit{inconveniens}). . . . In something which moves itself there are two things: one moving and another moved. It is impossible that the one moving is itself moved per se.\footnote{Ibid.,[Leon.45/1.28.74-78 et 92-94]: “. . . si aliquid movet et movetur, constat quod secundum quod movet est in actu, secundum quod movetur est in potencia, et sic idem et secundum idem esset in actu et potencia, quod est inconveniens. . . . In movente enim se ipsum duo sunt, unum movens et alium motum, et impossibile est quod illud quod est movens moveatur per se.”}
\end{quote}

In other words, when it is said that a nature is that which has its own internal principle of motion, it cannot mean that the nature itself qua itself moves itself qua itself. In his commentary on book VIII of Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} he explains that a hot thing cannot heat as a whole, for “if the whole were to move itself as whole, it follows that the same thing insofar as it is the same thing at the same time is hot and not hot; since insofar as it is moving it will be actually hot, and
insofar as it is moved it will be potentially hot. If a finite being moves itself per se, in the sense that it moves itself by itself as whole, then it must be the case the substance is either prior to itself, or we would have to claim that it was in both act and potency at the same time in the same respect which, of course, is impossible. In other words, it is impossible for the soul to be the per se cause of its own motion.

Thomas then says something quite interesting: we arrive at an understanding of per se motion by negating per accidens motion. It may be helpful, then, to consider what exactly we are negating. He gives an overview of this in his commentary on Book VIII of Aristotle’s Physics. Concerning moving and mobile things, he notes, some move or are moved per accidens, and some are moved per se. Here, he says, Aristotle takes per accidens broadly insofar as it also means what is according to a part. Then he subdivides moving and being moved per accidens.

First, things are said to move per accidens whenever they are said to move because they are in some movers, as when it is said that a musical man heals because there is music in one who heals, and likewise things are said to be moved per accidens because the things which are moved are in things that are moved, either as what is located and moved in a place, as we say this person is moved because he is in a moving ship, or as an accident is in a subject, a we say white is moved because a body is moved. There is, however, another way to say that

---

49 In VIII Phys. lect. 7 [Marietti.553.n.1053]: “Si ergo totum moveat se totum, sequitur quod idem secundum idem simul est calidum et non calidum; quia inquantum est movens erit actu calidum, inquantum est motum erit calidum in potentia.”

50 Aristotle casts this problem in another light in De anima I.3.406b12-14[Barnes, 648]: “if the soul moves itself, it must be the mover itself that is moved, so that it follows that if movement is in every case a displacement of that which is in movement, in that respect in which it is said to be moved, the movement of the soul must be a departure from its essential nature, at least if its self-movement is essential to it, not incidental.” Aquinas in commenting on this passage explains that if it is claimed that the soul moves itself, it is apparent that it is moved according to its own substance. But everything which is moved leaves or becomes different than that from which it was moved. For example, if something is moved [i.e., increased or decreased] by some quantity, it has left and become different from that original quantity. Thus if the soul is moved from its own substance by its own self, as they say, it becomes different and leaves its own substance, and the motion will be the cause of its own corruption, In De an.1.c.6 [Leon 45/1.31.255-64].

51 Text in following note.
something moves or is moved *per accidens*, since it moves or is moved according to a part (*secundum partem*), as a person is said to strike or be struck, since his hand is struck or strikes. Something is said to move or be moved *per se*, however, through negation of the aforementioned kinds of *per accidens* motion.\(^{52}\)

All three kinds of *per accidens* motions are applicable to natures. But when it is said that a nature moves itself, this is obviously not to be understood in the sense in which a man moves because he is on a moving ship or in the sense that the accidental whiteness moves. What is meant is that natures must move by means of their parts.

*Per se* motion,\(^{53}\) grasped by negating the kinds of motion that we know, is in a certain sense unintelligible, for it seems to be in act and in potency at the same time and in the same respect.\(^{54}\) In the familiar natural motion of a living being, the mover must be distinct from the

---

\(^{52}\) *In Physic.* VIII.c.7[Marietti.535.n.1022]: “Primo quidem dicuntur movere per accidens, quaecumque movere dicuntur ex eo quod insunt aliquibus moventibus; sicut cum dicitur musicum sanare, quia is cui inest musicum, sanat: et similiter dicuntur moveri per accidens, ex eo quod insunt iis quae moventur, vel sicut locatum in loco, prout dicimus hominem moveri quia navis movetur in qua est; vel sicut accidens in subjecto, prout dicimus album moveri quia corpus movetur. Alio modo dicuntur aliqua movere vel moveri per accidens, quia movent aut moventur secundum partem; sicut homo dicitur percute aut percuti, quia manus percititur aut percutit. Per se autem dicuntur moveri aut movere, per remotionem duorum praedictorum: quia scilicet nec dicuntur movere aut moveri ex eo quod sunt in alius quae movent aut moveantur; neque ex eo quod aliqua pars ipsorum moveat aut moveatur.”

\(^{53}\) It might be helpful, at this point, to note that *per se* motion, is a somewhat flexible term. There is *per se* motion in the strong sense, as a whole cannot move itself as whole. But there is another kind of *per se* motion in the sense that an action is proper to a specific nature, e.g., reasoning and willing are *per se* actions of man. *In VIII Physic.* c.7[Marietti.535.n.1023]: “Et primo dicit de iis quae moventur a seipsis (sicut sunt animalia, quae movent seipsa), quod moventur secundum naturam. Quod probat per hoc quod moventur a principio intrinseco: illa autem dicimus a natura moveri, quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Unde manifestum est quod motus animalis, quo movet seipsum, si comparetur ad totum animal, est naturalis: quia est ab anima, quae est natura et forma animalis.” Also along this line of thinking is Thomas’s claim that *per se* actions only come from beings which *per se* subsist, see SCG II.51 [Leon.manusalis.144] – by this he has in mind an immaterial mode of existing (and its consequent actions), and the contrary, *per accidens* implies a material mode of existing (and its consequent actions). Thus Thomas at times affirms that man acts in a *per se* manner and at times denies it. When he affirms this it is usually to signify man’s immortal soul and its immaterial operations. When he denies it, it is according to the strong sense of *per se* self-motion.

\(^{54}\) The reasoning laid out in these arguments is essentially identical to the argument from motion for God’s existence in ST I, q. 2, a. 3.
moved, thus there must be division and parts.\textsuperscript{55} Wherever there is finite self motion or operation, be it on a physical or metaphysical plane, there must be parts.\textsuperscript{56}

But what about the soul itself, does this mean that it must have parts? In our discussion of it as the form of the body, we had no way to divide it into parts. For the soul as a whole completely informs prime matter, and prime matter is not a part of the soul. As the form of the body it is simple. But as a nature, i.e., a principle of motion which moves itself in a \textit{per accidens} manner, it must have parts.\textsuperscript{57} This was garnered from strictly metaphysical arguments based on act and potency.\textsuperscript{58} Aquinas was very careful to make this distinction between these two ways of viewing the soul: the soul qua form (\textit{forma}) is simple (\textit{simplex}), but the soul qua mover (\textit{motor})

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{In VIII Physic.} c.7[Marietti.537.n.1028]: “Quia movens ad motum se habet, sicut agens ad patiens: cum autem agens sit contrarium patienti, necesse est quod dividatur id quod est aptum natum agere, ab eo quod est aptum natum pati.”

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{In VIII Physic.} c.10[Marietti.553.n.1051]: “Si ergo sit aliquid quod moveat seipsum, erit in eo accipere totum et partem: sed totum non poterit movere seipsum totum (quod est \textit{penitus movere ipsum seipsum}).” Here Aquinas is discussing physical motion, but it is equally applicable to his general metaphysical understanding of motion. It transposes onto the metaphysical plane in exactly the way the \textit{prima via} moves. Cf., Ibíd., [Marietti.553.n.1052]: “Moventis seipsum simul et semel est unus motus numero: si igitur hoc modo aliquid moveat seipsum quod totum moveat totum, sequetur quod unum et idem erit movens et motum secundum unum et eundem motum, sive sit loci mutatio sive alteratio. Et hoc videtur inconveniens: quia movens et motum habent oppositionem ad invicem; opposita autem non possunt inesse eidem secundum idem. Non est ergo possibile quod secundum eundem motum sit aliquid idem movens et motum. Cum enim aliquid simul movet et movetur, alius est motus secundum quem movet, et alius secundum quem movetur; sicut cum baculus motus a manu movet lapidem, alius numero est motus baculi et motus lapidis. Sic ergo sequitur ulterius quod aliquid docebit et docebitur simul secundum unum et eundem scibile; et similiter quod aliquid sanabit et sanabitur secundum unam et eandem numero sanitatem.” The example of teaching and knowledge clearly raises this beyond the physical to the metaphysical. For teaching and learning come about by means of the intellect which is a completely immaterial power – thus the reasoning cannot simply be limited to material being. Thomas had already used this argument in SCG I.13 in his second argument from motion for the existence of an unmoved mover.[Leon.\textit{Manualis}, 13]: “Sed, hoc dato, iterum . . .”

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{In II De an.} c.1[Leon.45/2.73.380-392]: “Et hoc est etiam quod hic dicit quod, cum unum et ens \textit{multipliciter dicatur}, scilicet de ente in potencia et de ente in actu, id \textit{quod proprie est} ens et unum, est actus : nam sicut ens in potencia non est ens simpliciter set secundum quid ; sic enim dicitur aliquis unum sicut et ens. Et ideo sicut corpus habet esse per animam sicut per formam, ita et unitur anime immediate inquantum anima est forma corporis ; set in quantum est motor, nihil prohibet aliquid esse medium, prout una pars movetur ab anima, medianti alia.”

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{In VIII Physic.} c.10[Marietti.553.n.1053]: “Si igitur totum moveat se secundum totum, sequitur quod idem sit simul actu et potentia; quod est impossible. Ex hoc igitur concludit principale intentum, quod moventis seipsum una pars movet et alia movetur.” See SCG I.13, referred to in n.54, for the same.
is manifold (*multiplex*). While scholarship has been much more interested in the soul as form of matter (and yet as a principle of subsisting) than as mover, I hope to bring out some of this neglected and important aspect of Thomas’ thought.\(^{59}\) We may at this point conclude that for Aquinas in some way there must be parts to the soul and that they are not other substantial forms.

**D. The Distinction Between the Soul and its Powers.**

Rather than ask the question of whether or not the soul has parts, the Scholastics asked the question in a slightly different fashion: Whether or not the powers of the soul are the same thing as its essence.\(^{60}\) I shall focus on my favorite of Aquinas’ full and mature answers to this question, namely, article 11 of his disputed questions *De spiritualibus creaturis* (1267-68).\(^{61}\)

Aquinas begins the article by noting a common but incorrect opinion.

---

59 Most Thomistic scholarship on the soul revolves around two questions. 1) In what way the soul is a principle of subsisting and existing and, closely connected, whether or not the separated soul is a person. 2) In what way is Aquinas to be contrasted to Descartes and whether or not he can be placed in some kind of modern category, e.g., non-reductive materialism. Much of this large body of literature is very good, but none of it focuses on or even brings out this distinction. There is a disproportion between the amount that Thomas wrote on this topic and the paucity of literature. This distinction will also become important in the last chapter, because many Thomists will argue that certain ways of thinking about Thomas’ ethics are implicitly Cartesian or Kantian, in the sense that certain ethical positions [usually positions which are deemed to be too intellectual or voluntaristic in some sense] deny man’s hylomorphic unity. For the most part I think such criticisms are misguided, but that this distinction between the soul as *forma* and the soul as *motor* does help us draw the lines between the two roles of the soul.

60 In fact, they had another way of getting at the question of whether or not the soul had parts, namely, whether or not the whole soul was in each part of the body. See for example QSC a. 4. We will discuss some of these texts after this section.

Some people think that the powers of the soul are nothing else than the soul’s essence, thus the same essence of the soul, insofar as it is the principle of sensitive operations is called sense, but insofar as it is the principle of intellectual operation it is called intellect, etc. Avicenna noted that these people seem especially to have been moved by the simplicity of the soul, as though this simplicity would not permit so much diversity as appears in the powers of the soul.62

It is worth noting Thomas’s approving highlight of Avicenna’s opinion that the problem seems to be a misguided emphasis on the simplicity of the soul. Another way of putting this is that there really is no difference between the soul qua form and the soul qua mover. For if the soul acts directly without parts, there is no need to speak of parts of the soul or to emphasize its manifold (multiplex) nature. Thus we may speak of things like sense and intellect, but those are really just naming the soul as it is immediately operative. To use the given example, a person does not really think with his intellect, he really thinks with his soul. There are no parts (like intellect or sense) in any real way; these are simply helpful ways of articulating the simple soul in its capacity for its manifold operations.

First indeed since it is impossible that the very essence of any created substance is the same as its own operative power. For it is manifest that diverse acts come from diverse principles. This is because act is always proportioned to that whose act it is. As esse itself is the certain actuality of an essence, so operari is the actuality of an operative potency or power. Each of them is in act in this way: essence according to esse, power according to operari. But since in no creature is its own operari its own esse, for that is only true of God, it follows that the

---

Aquinas claims that the intellect is the form of the body, he does not mean the intellective soul, but the intellective power. Although I will not engage his argument directly, it should be clear from the later section on ‘souls’ why I agree with Bazán that Aquinas means the intellective soul.

operative power of no creature is its essence. Only in God is essence the same as operative power.\textsuperscript{63}

It is assumed that only in God is esse the same as operari, and thus in contrast, in all created beings there is a real distinction between esse and operari. If one grants such a distinction in creatures, the potency which is ordered to operari cannot be identical with the potency which is ordered to esse. If we ask why this is so, a number of arguments could be given.

First, it is obvious from introspection that there is a real distinction between esse and operari in us. Take thinking for example. It is an action, and it is obviously not the same as existing. A person can stop thinking without ceasing to exist.\textsuperscript{64}

What about God?\textsuperscript{65} We have no such recourse to introspection there. We have, however, already been reasoning along the lines of the first half of the first proof for God’s existence in ST I, q. 2, a. 3.\textsuperscript{66} If we grant the second half of the argument, i.e., the denial of the possibility of an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[63] Ibid., [Leon24/2.118.200-14]: Primo quidem quia impossibile est quod alicuius substantie create sua essentia sit sua potentia operativa. Manifestum est enim quod diversi actus diversorum sunt ; semper vero enim actus proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Sicut autem ipsum esse est actualitas quedam essentie, ita operari est actualitas operative potentie seu virtutis : secundum enim hoc utrumque eorum est in actu, essentia quidem secundum esse, potentia vero secundum operari. Vnde cum in nulla creatura suum operari sit suum esse, set hoc sit proprium solius Dei, sequitur quod nullius creature operativa potentia sit eius essentia ; set solius Dei proprium est ut sua essentia sit sua potentia.”
\item[64] Cf. ST I 77.1 [St. Paul, 363], “Invenitur autem habens anima non semper esse in actu operum vitae.”
\item[65] In every single discussion of this distinction between the soul and its powers Aquinas explicitly contrasts God and man, and it is clearly central to the text we are discussing.
\item[66] The first half of the argument is a defense of the axiom that everything (other than God) which is moved is moved by another because nothing can reduce itself from potency to act. Of course, since everything which moves is moved by other, nothing created can be immediately per se operative – so there must be a real distinction between the soul and its powers since the potency for esse and the potency for operari have to be really different. For Wippel’s comments on this real distinction see Metaphysical Thought, 288. I am intentionally staying away from the argument in QDA 12 because I’m not fully persuaded that it works. I’m uncomfortable with the claim that when an accident is produced, the proximate principle for that accident must be another accident, [Leon.24/1.109.152-163]: “Quando igitur id quod agitur non pertinet ad esse substantiale rei, impossile est quod principium quo agitur sit aliquid de essentia rei.” See King, Cathedral, 265 and Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 285-288. Künzle, Verhältnis,
infinite regress in *per se* ordered efficient causes, we can accept that God, as the uncaused cause, is pure act.\(^{67}\) From this Thomas argues to divine simplicity by negating any possible composition in God. For all composition implies imperfection and consequently potency of some sort.\(^{68}\) But God is pure act, so any composition must be denied. If *esse* and *operari* were really distinct in God, they would have to enter into some kind of composition; but that would force one to attribute some potency to God. Thus they are not really distinct in God.

What about the principles of *esse* and *operari*? Since *esse* and *operari* are not distinct in God one could hardly argue that they both require distinct principles. But what about creatures? What Thomas said in this passage is that diverse acts come from diverse principles since an act is always proportioned to its principle. Thomas simply says that this is “manifest.” If we grant this, then since it has already been proven that *esse* and *operari* are really distinct, they must have really distinct principles.

This is not so complex. A human obviously has the capacity to think actually even if she is not actually thinking. In other words, humans have a potency which may or may not be actualized. Furthermore, because humans cannot be immediately operative but must act by

---

\(^{67}\) I will not discuss the issue of divine uniqueness, I will simply assume it. For a fuller discussion of that see Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 485-97.

\(^{68}\) For example, as we saw in QSC a. 1, the highest level of composition, essence and esse, is a composition of potency and act.
means of powers, it does follow that there must be some proportion between the part or power and its action.

But let us return to the beginning of the article to consider what it means to say that essence is identical to operative power. Those who claim that the soul is immediately operative, are saying that the soul operates without parts, and thus operates in a per se manner. As Avicenna noted, these thinkers were overly impressed by the simplicity of the soul, and Aquinas adds that they ultimately wound up applying a characteristic to the soul which is applicable only to God himself.

Here we must remember Aquinas’ claim that one only has knowledge of *per se* motion in the strong sense by negating *per accidens* motion.⁶⁹ To say that God acts in a *per se* manner is simply to deny that he acts by means of his parts. In other words, the kind of operation in a being which is not composed of act and potency is going to be radically different from the kind of operation in a creature which is so composed. What it means to operate in a *per se* fashion is a purely negative concept for us. To say that something is immediately operative, as God, in this *per se* way is in a real sense unimaginable in any of the ways in which we are familiar with motion and act, for one is immediately confronted with the question of how something can reduce itself from potency to act.

In all of Thomas’s arguments for the distinction between the soul and its powers, he contrasts the way in which God is immediately operative with the way in which all finite beings operate by means of parts. By negating God’s mode of simple and immediate operation in

---

⁶⁹ See n. 51.
creatures, it is evident that man, by contrast, operates in a complex and mediate way (by means of powers). The powers of the soul, then, are the means by which humans are able to operate according to their own finite natures. These are the parts of the soul according to which the soul, qua mover, is operative.\(^70\)

Aquinas continues his argument in QSC 11, but he now restricts it to apply in particular to the human soul. Let us look at the third argument,

Third, the same is apparent from the order of the powers of the soul and their relation to one other. For it is found that one power moves another, as reason moves the irascible and concupiscible powers, and intellect moves the will. This would not be possible if all the powers were the very essence of the soul, since the same thing in the same respect does not move itself, as Aristotle proved. It follows therefore that the powers of the soul are not its very essence.\(^71\)

This argument assumes that the powers move one another. In anger, as Thomas sees it, a perceived injustice (in the intellect) will often cause (or move) a kind of bodily desire in the irascible power for revenge. At the very least one can distinguish between thinking about the injustice and recognizing the concomitant boiling of the blood, as Thomas (following Aristotle) describes the passion of anger. Without the perceived injustice, the somatic passion would not occur. If it were the case that there were no powers, but the soul was immediately operative, then

---

\(^70\) Before moving on to Thomas’ second argument I would like to note a recent objection to Thomas’ psychology. Peter King has argued that Thomas’ faculty psychology (i.e., psychology of powers) is not sufficiently rooted in his metaphysics to be able to withstand the philosophical objections which have been leveled against it in the wake of Descartes: King, *Cathedral*, 273. I shall simply note that King has not discussed any of the abovementioned arguments from the broad concept of motion, i.e., Aquinas’ strongest arguments for the necessity of positing powers of the soul which are rooted in his metaphysics of act and potency. I think these arguments are by far the strongest way to argue for faculty psychology. Of course, there is plenty of room to argue about the merits of dividing the powers or faculties exactly as Aquinas does.

\(^71\) Ibid., [Leon.24/2.118:229-119:238]: “Tertio apparit idem ex ordine potentiarum animae et habitudine earum ad invicem : inventur enim quod una aliam movet, sicut ratio irascibilem et concupiscibilem et intellectus voluntatem ; quod esse non posset si omnes potentie essent ipsa anime essentia, quia idem secundum idem non movet seipsum, ut probat Philosophus. Relinquitur ergo quod potentie anime non sunt ipsa eius essentia.”
the soul would be both moving (intellect) and moved (irascible powers) according to the same respect. There would be no difference between cause (perceived injustice) and effect (somatic passion). In other words, that would force us to posit the kind of *per se* self-motion that we recently excluded from all finite beings for the reason that something cannot be in act and in potency at the same time and in the same respect.

In the second half of this text, QSC.11, Thomas gives an account of what these powers are. For Aquinas being is divided between substance and the nine accidents, between what does not exist in another and what does exist in another.\(^{72}\) Granting this division, because a power of the soul is not the essence of the soul or another substance, it can only be an accident.\(^{73}\) More specifically, he notes that it is in the second species of quality.\(^{74}\) Thus, from a metaphysical perspective in which being is divided between substance and accidents, a power of the soul is an accident: the kind of being it has is *inesse*.\(^{75}\)

---

\(^{72}\) Most broadly this distinction can be articulated like this: “Within the finite beings we experience, there is need to distinguish between that which makes each of them a being, a center of existence in itself, and other aspects present within such beings which does not exist in themselves but only in something else,” Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 198; for a full treatment of the substance-accident division of being see chapters VII “Substance-Accident Composition” and VIII “Substance, Accidents and *Esse.*” in *Metaphysical Thought*, 197-295. See Gregory Doolan “Aquinas and the Categories as Parts of Being,” in *The Metaphysics of Aquinas: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives* (Fordham University Press: Fordham NY, Forthcoming).

\(^{73}\) Ibid., [Leon.24/2.119.243-58]: “Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod accidens a philosophis dupliciter accipitur : uno modo secundum quod condividitur substantie et continet sub se novem rerum genera. Sic autem accipiendo accidens positio est impossibilis : non enim inter substantiam et accidens potest esse aliquid medium, cum substantia et accidens dividant ens per affirmationem et negationem, cum proprium substantie sit non esse in subiecto, accidentis vero sit in subiecto esse. Vnde si potentie anime non sunt ipsa essentia anime – et manifestum est quod non sunt alie substantie – , sequitur quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta: sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis, quae dicitur potentia vel impotentia naturalis.”

\(^{74}\) We shall discuss the division of the accident quality in chapter 3.

\(^{75}\) However, this position was by no means common in Aquinas’ time. Albert was the first person to forcefully argue that the powers of the soul were predicamental accidents (this is how Künzle presents it, 157-158). But many masters denied this claim. Bonaventure (see Künzle, 127ff.) for example, agreed that the powers were not
But he also notes that the powers of the soul can be considered as properties of the soul and in this manner they signify an accidental relation of the predicate to its subject. The accidental predicate signifies the subject as it is caused by it, in the manner in which they naturally and inseparably follow from the essential principles of the species. Properties are neither the essence, nor part of the essence, but nor are they common accidents in the sense that they may happen (accidit) to an individual substance or a person, in the way that someone might become cold or happen to be in London. It is quite similar to our English use of the word property, which we use to describe what kind of a thing we mean to signify.

3. The Unification of the Parts of the Soul

But if we return to our original question about parts of the soul, how is it that powers (accidents) are ‘parts’ the soul (substance)? Can an accident be part of a substance? Aquinas replies to this question by arguing that the powers of the soul are called its parts, not as parts of identical with essence. He agrees that the soul cannot be immediately operative, Bonaventure, I Sent. d. 3 p. 2 a.1 q. 3, ad.3 [Quaracchi.1.86-87] (note the similarity to Thomas’s ST I, q. 77 a. 1.), but the parts which one is then forced to posit are not accidents, Bonaventure, I Sent. d. 3 p. 2 a.1 q. 3, ad.6 [Quaracchi.1.87] but are in the category of substance by reduction, Bonaventure, Ibid., ad.3 [Quaracchi.1.86]. This line of thinking would ultimately lead to the development of Henry of Ghent’s intentional distinction and Scotus’s famous formal distinction. These thinkers saw a need for a distinction that was weaker than a real distinction but stronger than a distinction which was merely rational. Aquinas was willing to admit that the powers were predicable substantial properties, but he insisted that they were nevertheless predicamental accidents, (for this see QSC 11 [Leon.24/2.119-120.239-90]) that is, they were really distinct. Because the soul is the substantial form of prime matter, the potency principle in the genus substance is limited to matter. Powers had to be excluded from substance, and thus they also had another mode of existing, namely, inesse. Bonaventure’s metaphysics of substance, however, is far more accommodating to the inclusion of other forms. For the soul itself directly informs spiritual matter, and there are a multiplicity of forms included in substance before it is united to the form of the body. All of these forms are included in the genus substance. The powers, according to Bonaventure, are essential because the subject cannot be thought to have perfect esse without them, see I Sent. d. 3 p. 2 a.1 q. 3, ad.1et 2 [Quaracchi.1.86]. Although it seems that Aquinas never directly challenged Bonaventure’s position, (See Bazán’s note in Aquinas’s QDA [leon.24/1.108. n.119]) it is not hard to see that it would conflict with his philosophy of prime matter and the unicity of substantial form.

76 See QSC 11 [leon.24/2.119-20.258-290], and ibid ad 5 [p. 121, lines 350-356], and ST I 77.1 ad 5 [St. Paul, 363].
77 For more on this see pp. 33-35 and 38-39.
78 QSC.11 arg. 19 [Leon.24/2.117.173-177].
the essence of the soul, but of its total power (*totalis virtutis eius*), as if it were said that the power of the bailiff is part of the total power of the royal court. When Aquinas calls the powers parts of the soul, he does not mean that these are parts of the soul itself. In other words, the word soul is used in a different sense than it is used when the essence of the soul is distinguished from its powers, that is, when substance is divided from accidents. Here the soul includes accidents and is not divided from them. The whole soul here signifies the soul’s total power. The image is that of the an entire court in which the power of all of its various members add up to some kind of total force. But what kind of a whole is this?

There are three kind of wholes: the universal whole which is present to each part according to its whole essence and power. This kind of whole is properly predicated of its parts, as when it is said that ‘man is animal.’ Another whole is an integral whole, which is not present to any part of it, neither according to the whole essence, nor according to its whole power. This whole can in no way be predicated of its part: one would be forced to say something like ‘the wall is the house.’ The third whole is the potential whole, *totum potentiale*, which is a medium between these two. For it is present to its own part according to its whole essence, but not according to its whole power. Thus it is predicated in a middle way, sometimes of its parts, but not properly. In this way it is sometimes said that the soul is its own powers, or conversely.80

---

79 QSC.11 ad 19[Leon.24/2.123.462-465]: “Potentie anime dicuntur partes, non essentie anime, set totalis virtutis eius, sicut si diceretur quod potentia balliui est pars totius potestatis regie.”

80 QSC.11 ad 2[Leon.24/2.120.317-32]: “. . . sciendum est triplex esse totum : unum universale, quod adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem : unde proprie praedicatur de suis partibus, ut cum dicitur ‘ homo est animal ’. Aliud vero est totum integrale, quod non adest alicui suae parti, neque secundum totam essentiam neque secundum totam suam virtutem : et ideo nullo modo praedicatur de parte, ut dicatur ‘ paries est domus ’. Tertium est totum potentiale, quod est medium inter hec duo : adest enim sue parti secundum totam suam essentiam, set non secundum totam suam virtutem ; unde medio modo se habet in praedicando : praedicatur enim quandoque de partibus, set non proprie. Et hoc modo quandoque dicitur quod anima est sue potentie vel e converso.”

The parallel passages to this text are *In I Sent*.1.3.4.2 ad 1; *Lectura Romana* 3.3.4 ad 1 (see chapter 3 n. 133 concerning the authenticity of this text) ; ST I.77.1 ad 1. But there are many other passages which discuss the *totum*

In general, there are two main groups of texts which treat the potential whole. There are texts concerning the division of the virtues into wholes and parts, and then there are texts focusing on the soul as a potential whole. These latter are then subdivided into two groups of texts. The first group of these texts, one of which we have just seen, concern the predication of the soul for its power or powers. The second group of texts focus’ on the relation between the soul and the body. We shall now turn to these latter texts.
Here is a preliminary answer to the question of what kind of a whole is the soul and its powers: it is a potential whole (\textit{totum potentiale}).\textsuperscript{81} We shall return to this passage shortly.

\textbf{A. The Distinction Between Soul as Form (\textit{forma}) and Soul as Mover (\textit{motor})}

In order to grasp in what sense the soul as a potential whole has parts, we must examine the distinction between the soul as form (\textit{forma}) and the soul as mover (\textit{motor}). For the soul qua mover corresponds to the potential whole. This distinction between form and mover almost always occurs in the context where Thomas is discussing whether or not the soul is immediately or mediately united to the body which, in turn, is connected to the problem of the unicity of substantial form.\textsuperscript{82} As Aquinas presents this material, first one has to understand that there is only one substantial form in one substance and that the soul is immediately united to prime matter; consequently one may consider in what sense the soul is a mover and has potential parts:\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{quote}
if it is the case that the rational soul is united to the body only as mover (\textit{motor}) by virtual contact,\textsuperscript{84} as some have said, then there is no problem in holding that
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{81} The English translation makes it sound like a potential whole is a whole which is not quite a whole – a kind of deficient whole of sorts. I hope it will become evident that that is not what Aquinas meant.

\textsuperscript{82} Thus QSC 3 is presupposed for QSC 4, and QDA 9 is presupposed for QDA10, and ST I.76, aa. 1,3,4,6,7, are presupposed for a. 8. He opens QDA 10 and QSC 4 by noting that the truth of these questions depend on the previous ones. I intend to follow that order. On the question of the soul’s mediate or immediate union to the body see Kevin White, “Aquinas on the Immediacy of the Union of Soul and Body,” in \textit{Studies in Thomistic Theology}, ed. Paul Lockey [Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1996], 209-280.

\textsuperscript{83} I shall focus on two parallel texts, namely, question 9 of his disputed questions \textit{De anima}, and article 3 of his disputed questions \textit{De spiritualibus creaturis}. Because both texts were written at more or less the same time, and because they emphasize different and useful aspects of Aquinas’ solution, I shall freely use both. Aquinas’ parallel texts in the \textit{Summa} (scattered through \textit{Prima pars}, qq. 75-77) do not in any way contradict these texts, but since the topic is scattered across several shorter articles in the \textit{Summa}, I find these two texts both clearer and easier to work with. The length of these passages and their focus allows Thomas to explore the issue with a depth and precision which is not present, at least in the same way, in the \textit{Summa}. That being said, I will bring in passages from the Summa and other texts when I think they add to or clarify some relevant particular point.

\textsuperscript{84}On virtual contact see ST I.75.1 arg. 3 [St. Paul.343]: “Praeterea, moventis ad motum oportet esse aliquem contactum. Contactus autem non est nisi corporum. Cum igitur anima moveat corpus, videtur quod anima sit corpus.” Ibid., ad 3 [St.Paul.344]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod est duplex contactus, \textit{quantitatis} et \textit{virtutis}. Primo
there are many intermediaries between the soul and body, and even more so between the soul and prime matter. But if it is held that the soul is united to the body as a form, then it is necessary to say that the soul is united to it immediately. For every form, whether substantial or accidental, is united to matter or to the subject. For every thing is one according to this, namely, according to which it is being. Each thing, however, is a being in act through its form, whether according to substantial esse or according to accidental esse. Thus every form is an act, and consequently the reason for the unity by which something is one. As one should not say that there is some other medium by which matter has existence through its own form, so it cannot be said that there is some other medium uniting form to matter or its subject. Insofar as the soul is the form of the body there cannot be some other intermediary between soul and body. But insofar as it is mover (motor) one may posit there many intermediaries: for it is obvious that the soul through the heart moves the other members of the body, and it also moves the body through its spirit.\(^{85}\)

Depending on how soul is understood, whether as form or as motor, a different answer will be given to the question of whether or not there are intermediate forms between it and the body. In the soul’s capacity as a mover, Aquinas notes, it is obvious that there are such intermediate forms, for the soul moves the heart, which in turn moves the other organs, etc. In

modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus.”

This had been discussed in the previous article in QSC.2 [leon.24/2.26: 244-27:256]: “Vt enim Gregorius Nixenus narrat, Plato posuit substantialiam intellectivam, quae dicitur anima, uniri corpori per quendam spiritualem contactum, quod quidem intelligitur secundum quod movens vel agens tangit motum aut passum, etiam si sit incorporeum; ex qua ratione dicit Aristoteles in I De generatione quod quidam tangunt et non tanguntur, quia agunt et non patiuntur. Vnde dicebat Plato, ut dictus Gregorius refert, quod homo non est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore set est anima utens corpore, ut intelligatur esse in corpore quodammodo sicut nauta in navi . . .” Gregorius Nixenus was in fact Nemesius Emensus. See comments in QSC.3 [Leon.24/2.26]. Thomas’ fullest account of virtual contact is in SCG II, c. 56.

\(^{85}\) QDSC.3 [Leon.24/2.38-39.224-48] “. . . si enim anima rationalis unitur corpori solum per contactum virtualem ut motor, ut aliqui posuerunt, nichil prohibebat dicere quod sunt multa media inter animam et corpus, et magis inter animam et materiam primam. Si uero ponatur anima uniri corpori ut forma, necesse est dicere quod uniatur ei immediate; omnis enim forma, siue substantialis siue accidentalis, unitur materie uel subiecto: unumquodque enim secundum hoc est unum secundum quod est ens. Est autem unumquodque ens actus per formam, siue secundum esse substantiali siue secundum esse accidentale: unde omnis forma est actus, et per consequens est ratio unitatis qua alicui est unum. Sicut igitur non est dicere quod sit aliquod aliud medium quo materia habeat esse per suam formam, ita non potest dici quod sit aliquod aliud medium uniens formam materie uel subiecto; secundum igitur quod anima est forma corporis non potest esse alicui medium inter animam et corpus, secundum vero quod est motor sic nihil prohibet ponere ibi multa media: manifeste enim anima per cor movet alia membra, et etiam per spiritum movet corpus.” For a discussion of this article see White, *Immediacy*, 230-238.
the soul’s capacity as a form, however, there are no such mediating forms. Any attempt to introduce such intermediating forms robs the substance of its unity. This is because between movers and moved there is no real reason to posit unity. It is only because the soul is the form of the body that it’s substantial unity is safeguarded and may be defended philosophically.

QDA 9 offers some helpful clarifications about how the soul as form is related to the soul as motor. Following upon his arguments that the soul is immediately united to the body as form, Aquinas is anxious to avoid restricting our understanding of the soul to its role of informing the body.

since it is the same form which grants esse to matter which is also the principle of action, and because each thing acts insofar as it actually is, the soul, as is true of any other form, must also be a principle of operation. It must be noted that, because operation comes from something that actually exists, in accord with the level (gradus) of forms in their perfection of existing is their grade in power of operation. And so insofar as some form enjoys greater perfection in granting esse, to that degree does the form have a greater power in acting.

---

86 SCG.II.56 [leon.manualis.151]: “. . . substantia intellectualis potest corpori uniri per contactum virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum, non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiendo: quod non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nec esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter.”

87 In general, the soul has three broad roles: 1) as the form of the body, 2) as motor, and 3) as a principle of subsisting. I have not spoken about the soul’s third role, that of subsisting. Often when Thomas says that the soul subsists per se he is referring to its immaterial operations. He usually reasons in the following way: a thing can only act insofar as it is; one can infer that the soul is immaterial from the nature of the intellect’s and the will’s operations; because it is immaterial it must survive the loss of the body – hence it subsists per se. See SCG. II, c. 51 for a good summary of what is means for a form to subsist. N.B., here per se agere means that it acts in accordance with its immaterial nature, not that it can be immediately operative. Be that as it may, the question of the unicity of the substantial form is not the same as the question of its mode of subsisting.

88 QDA.9[Leon.24/1.81.246-256]: “Sed quia eadem forma que dat esse materie est etiam operationis principium, eo quod unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu, necesse est quod anima, sicut et quilibet alia forma, sit etiam operationis principium. Set considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu. Et ideo quanto aliquam forma est maioris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam est maioris virtutis in operando.” For a discussion of QDA 9 see White, Immediacy, 244-256.
Thomas here is at pains to note that it is the same soul which moves and which informs the body. He clarifies this in his reply to the second objection of this article. There he notes that although “the soul is a form insofar as it is act and likewise insofar as it is a mover, and thus it is according to the same thing that it is form and that it is mover, but nevertheless its effect insofar as it is form and insofar as it is mover differ.”\textsuperscript{89} The effect of the soul as form is substance with its inseparable accidents and the effect of the soul as mover is operation.

I wish to draw attention to Aquinas’s point that the *actus essendi*, the kind of existence that the soul communicates to the body, corresponds to or is proportionate to the composite’s power of action or operation.\textsuperscript{90} This is rooted in the principle that each thing acts according to the way that it actually is. In other words, in order for a soul to perform the operation of galloping, for example, the soul must communicate to matter the *esse* of horse, that is, the soul must make the horse exist as a horse, which includes the power to operate befitting to a horse. It is the same soul that makes a horse exist as a horse (*forma*) which also makes the horse gallop (*motor*).

Following his account of this proportion between *esse* and operation, he notes that there is a corresponding degree of complexity:\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{89} QDA.9.ad2[Leon.24/1.83.324-330]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod licet anima sit forma in quantum est actus et similiter in quantum est motor, et ita secundum idem sit forma et motor, tamen alius est effectus eius secundum quod est forma, et alius secundum quod est motor. Et propter hoc locum habet distinctio.” See also QSC 3 ad. 7 [Leon.24/2.45.500-502]: “. . . sicut enim eadem est secundum substantiam anima, que est motor et forma, set differt ratione, . . .”

\textsuperscript{90} QDA 10, ad 2 [Leon.24/1.92.287-89]: “forma dat esse et speciem materie secundum quod congruit sue operationi.” QDA 9 [Leon.24/1.82.278-80]: “et anima singulis earum dat esse substantiale secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsarum.”

\textsuperscript{91} This only holds for the genus of material beings. Prime matter is the simplest. Elements are less simple, then mixed bodies, etc. The more simple a being, the more imperfect since it is closer to prime matter. Thus perfection and multiplicity go hand in hand. This is not the case in immaterial beings. There God is most simple and perfect, and all others are characterized by multiplicity and to that extent imperfection. See *QDA* 7 [Leon.24/1.59.277-311].
Whence more perfect forms have more operations which are more diverse than less perfect forms. Consequently, a diversity of accidents suffices for the diversity of operations in less perfect things, but in more perfect things there is further required a diversity of parts and so much the more so as the form will be more perfect. For we see that diverse operations belong to fire according to diverse accidents, such as to be borne upwards according to lightness, to heat according to heat, etc. But each of these operations belongs to fire according to some part of it. But in animate bodies, which have more noble forms, diverse parts are assigned for diverse operations, as in plants the operations of the roots, the stem, and its branches are diverse. And so, to the extent to which ensouled bodies are more perfect, to that extent will be found, because of that greater perfection, a greater diversity of parts. Thus, since the rational soul is the most perfect of all material forms, in a human there will be found the greatest distinction of parts on account of its diverse operations. The soul grants substantial esse to each of them according to that mode which is fitting for the operation of these parts. A sign of this is that once the soul is gone neither flesh nor eye remains except equivocally.

Building on the proportion between the perfection of existing and the power of operation, this passage adds that there is a corresponding complexity and multiplicity. Humans, as the highest material beings, are the most complex beings – their complex bodily and spiritual operations require an extraordinary diversity of parts or powers. For example, a plant, in contrast

---

92 Even the forms of elements are not immediately operative: STI.67.3[St. Paul.320]: “. . . sicut calor est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem ignis . . .”

93 QDA.9[Leon.24/1.81.256-282]: “Vnde forme perfectiores habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam forme minus perfecte. Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium ; in rebus autem magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium, et tanto magis quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Videmus enim quod igni conveniunt diverse operationes secundum diversa accidentia, sicut ferri sursum secundum leuitatem, calefacere secundum calorem, et sic de alis ; set tamen quelibet harum operationum competit igni secundum quamlibet partem eius. In corporibus uero animatis, que nobiliores formas habent, diversis operationibus deputantur diverse partes : sicut in plantis alia est operatio radicis, et stipitis et ramorum. Et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri maiorem diversitatem in partibus. Vnde, cum anima rationalis sit perfectissima formarum naturalium, in homine inuenitur maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes ; et anima singulis earum dat esse substantiale secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsorum ; cuius signum est quod, remota anima, non remainet neque caro neque oculus nisi equivoco.” See also QDA 9 ad. 14 [Leon.24/1.85.482-494].

94 Although the proportion between increasing perfection and complexity is only applicable to material beings, it does not follow that when the soul as mover is said to be multiplex that these multiple parts have to be material parts. Esse is proportioned to operari, and man’s proper operations primarily come from his immaterial powers, intellect and will. It is, however, true that insofar as man moves his body, this has to come about by some sort of material parts at some point in the chain of command.
to a human being, has far less parts corresponding to its far simpler operations. Aquinas concludes the article by emphasizing the distinction between soul as form and soul as mover:

But since it is necessary that the order of instruments be according to the order of operations, and of these diverse operations which are from the soul one naturally precedes another, it is necessary that one part of the body is moved by another to its own operation. Thus between the soul and the whole body, insofar as it is mover and the principle of operation, there is a medium; by some mediating first part it moves the other parts to their own operations: thus by the mediating heart it moves the other members to vital operations. But insofar as it grants esse to the body, it immediately grants substantial and specific esse to all the parts of the body. And this is what many say, namely, that the soul is united to the body as form without medium, but as a mover though a medium.\(^\text{95}\)

It seems clear enough, then, that the powers of the soul are the soul’s parts insofar as the soul is a mover, and that the soul has no parts insofar as it is a form.\(^\text{96}\) I would like to note that when Aquinas speaks of the soul as the mover, this is not to be restricted to bodily motion, nor is it to be restricted to the motive power, a particular power of the soul by means of which, for example, a person wills the hand to move.\(^\text{97}\) The rational soul as the principle of operations includes completely immaterial motions (volition and intellection) as well as bodily motions.

---

\(^{95}\) QDA.9[Leon.24/1.82.283-298]: “Sed cum oporteat ordinem instrumentorum esse secundum ordinem operationum, diuersarum autem operationum que sunt ab anima una naturaliter precedit aliam, necessarium est quod una pars corporis moueatur per aliam ad suam operationem. Sic ergo inter animam, secundum quod est motor et principium operationum, et totum corpus cadit aliquid medium, quia mediante aliqua prima parte mouet alias partes ad suas operationes: sicut mediante corde mouet alia membra ad uitales operationes. Et secundum quod dat esse corpori, immediate dat esse substantiale et specificum omnibus partibus corporis. Et hoc est quod a multis dicitur quod anima unitur corpori ut forma sine medio, ut motor autem per medium.” The Leonine editors do not specify who these others are who hold this same position.

\(^{96}\) Here is a helpful summarizing passage: QDA.9.ad14[Leon.24/1.85.482-494]: “... licet anima sit forma simplex secundum essentiam, est tamen multiplex urtute secundum quod est principium diversarum operationum. Et quia forma perficit materiam non solum quantum ad esse, set etiam ad operandum, ideo oportet quod, licet anima sit una forma, partes corporis diuersimode perficientur ab ipsa, et unaquaeque secundum quod competit eius operationi. Et secundum hoc etiam oportet esse ordinem in partibus secundum ordinem operationum, ut dictum est. Set iste ordo est secundum operationem corporis ad animam ut est motor.”

\(^{97}\) Concerning this power see ST I, q. 78.1 [St. Paul, 370]; see also QDA 13 [Leon.24/1.119-120.346-53]
(digestion, imagination, etc.) As motor, the soul is the principle of any reduction of potency to act, the exception of course, being its granting of esse to matter and to its powers.

It should also be noted that when we say that the soul qua motor has parts, we do not want to say, for example, that the soul sees or that the eye sees. Neither of these is true, strictly speaking. It is the person or agent that sees. This is because of the metaphysical point that actions are of the supposit or person, if one asks how someone sees, it is by means of parts.

B. Souls

At times, however, Thomas seems to speak as if man is composed of multiple souls, e.g., the rational soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul. What kinds of parts are these? Are they distinct from the soul’s powers and from the soul’s essence? In QSC.3 he makes it very clear that it is by the same rational soul that he is both animal and man, there is no other supperadded sensitive soul which makes man animal. He notes that in the powers of the soul it is true that the higher a power is, the more things it contains in itself in a unified and simple fashion. For example, the common sense extends to all that has been apprehended by the exterior senses. It is similar in the case of substantial forms, for the higher forms contain the lower, and the more perfect form can do through one principle whatever the less perfect form can do through diverse principles, and even more. For example, a form of an inanimate body grants to matter both esse and corporeal esse; the form of a plant grants these and also life (vivere); the

---

98 See, for example, QSC.3 ad 4 [Leon 24/2.45.464-476]; QDA.9 ad 6 [Leon.24.1.83:363-84:397]; In II De an. 1 [Leon.45/1.70.177-181].
100 For example see QSC.4 [Leon.24/2.52.187]: “omnis actus sit in eo cuius est actus, . . .”; ST I.76.8 [St. Paul, 361], etc.
sensitive soul grants these and also sensible esse; the rational soul grants all of these and also rational esse. \(^{101}\)

We see here that Aquinas holds that all of these diverse ‘souls’ are virtually contained in the human soul. The human soul in a unified fashion virtually contains whatever the lower forms have and more. He refers to Aristotle’s somewhat obscure example of the relation between geometrical forms: the sensitive soul is in the rational soul as the tetragon is in the pentagon. There are not two souls, and they do not differ essentially.\(^{102}\)

What is operative here is Thomas’s view on the unicity of substantiantial form. Granting that the operations of the intellect are strictly immaterial, if it were the case that the intellective soul were really distinct from the sensitive soul, there would be no need for the intellective soul to be the form of the body—the sensitive soul (whose operations are material) could perform that function. In fact, the intellective soul could be a separate substance.

---

\(^{101}\) QSC.3.[Leon.24/2.44.393-412]: “Sic ergo dicimus quod in hoc homine non est alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis, et quod per eam homo non solum est homo, set animal et uiuum et corpus et substantia et ens. Quod quidem sic considerari potest. Forma enim est similitudo agentis in materia ; in virtutibus autem activis et operativis hoc inventur quod, quanto aliqua uirtus est altior tanto in se plura comprehendit non composite set unite, sicut secundum unam uirtutem sensus communis se extendit ad omnia sensibilia, que secundum diversas potentias sensus proprii apprehendunt. Perfectioris autem agentis est inducere perfectiorem formam ; unde perfectior forma facit per unum omnia que inferiores forme faciunt per diversa, et adhuc amplius : puta si forma corporis inanimati dat materie esse et esse corpus, forma plante dabit ei et hoc et insuper vivere, anima vero sensitiva et hoc <et> insuper sensibile esse, anima vero rationalis et hoc et insuper rationale esse.”

\(^{102}\) QSC.3.[Leon.24/2.44.412-434]: “Sic enim inueniuntur differre forme rerum naturalium secundum perfectum et magis perfectum, ut patet intuenti in omnibus generibus et speciebus rerum naturalium ; propter quod species rerum comparantur numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphisice, quorum species per additionem et subtractionem unitatis uariantur. Vnde etiam Aristotiles in II De anima dicit quod ‘vegetatium est in sensitivo’ et sensitium in intellectuio ‘ sicut trigonum in tetragono ’ et tetragonom in pentagono : pentagonum enim virtute continet tetragonum ; habet enim hoc et adhuc amplius , non quod seorsum pentagono sit id quod est tetragoni et id quod est pentagoni proprium tanquam due figure. Sic etiam anima intellectuia uirtute continet sensitium, quia habet hoc et adhuc amplius, non tamen ita quod sint due anime ; si autem diceretur quod anima intellectuia differret per essentiam a sensitiva in homine, non posset assignari ratio unionis anime intellectuie ad corpus, cum nulla operatio propia anime intellectuie sit per organum corporale.”
Thomas often speaks of these souls as parts of the soul. One would expect these parts to be parts of a universal whole, that is, subjective parts. This is the kind of whole, as briefly mentioned, which is present to each part according to its whole essence and power, as the genus animal is present to man or horse, and thus it is properly predicated of its different species or parts. Aquinas, however, says that sometimes these souls signify the powers of the soul rather than the essence of the soul itself. In fact, he never calls these souls subjective parts. These souls are always potential parts of the soul. But why? Hasn’t he just shown that these “souls” are in fact one and the very same soul? For if these “souls” mean powers, then it would appear that they cannot be predicated of one another, that is, while it seems that one is permitted to say that the rational soul is virtually a sensitive soul, it would seem that one cannot say that the intellect or will is the soul. Aquinas’s proofs for the real distinction between the soul and its powers would seem to forbid such predication. Aquinas admits that this is a somewhat abusive form of predication; however, not only does he tolerate and permit it, but he at times uses it

103 STI.77.1.ad1[St.Paul.363]: “Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo: et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur.”

104 QDA.19.ad 5[Leon24/1.166.259-271]: “Ad quintum dicendum quod sensus dicitur dupliciter. Vno modo ipsa anima sensitiua, que est huismodi potentiarum principium ; et sic per sensum animal est animal sicut per propriam formam : hoc enim modo a sensu ‘sensible ‘ sumitur, prout est differentia constitutiuia animalis. Alio modo dicitur sensus ipsa potentia sensitiua, que cum sit proprietas naturalis, ut dictum est, non est constitutiuia speciei, set consequens speciem. Hoc igitur modo sensus non manet in anima separata ; set sensus primo modo dictus manet, nam in homine est eadem essentia anime sensibilis et rationalis.”

105 STII-II.48.1[St.Paul.1301]: “Respondeo dicendum quod triplex est pars: scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subjectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitiuum sunt partes animae.”

In de an.Ic.1[Leon.45/1.7.231-246]: “Consequenter cum dicit: Amplius autem, tangit difficultates que emergunt circa potencias anime. In anima enim sunt partes potentialaes, scilicet intellectuum, sensitiuum, vegetatium ; est ergo questio utrum hee sint diversae anime sicut Platonici uolebant, aut sint partes potentialaes anime ; et si sint partes potentialaes, queritur etiam utrum primo debeamus querere potencias quam actus ipsarum, ut intelligere aut intellectuum, et sentire, quod est actus, aut sensitiuum, quod est potencia. Et similiter in aliis potenciis et actibus. Et si primo debemus querere actus quam potencias, adhuc erit questio utrum sint prius querenda obiecta horum actuum quam potencie, ut puta prius debet quaerere sensibile quam sensitiium aut intelligibile quam intellectium.”
himself. Let us consider De veritate q. 10, a. 1 in which he seeks to explain this peculiar usage:

Because the essences of things are unknown to us, but their powers are known to us through their acts, we frequently use the name of powers or potencies to designate essences. But since nothing is made known except from what is proper to it, it is necessary that when some essence is signified by its own power, that is be signified by a power proper to itself.107

Because human beings do not have direct access to the essences of material beings, they must take the essential differences from the properties or powers of the soul.108 It is assumed that one can know something about essence by reasoning to its powers from its operations.109 Thomas’s claim here is that if one is going to name the soul from its powers, one had better choose the right one, that is, the one that tells us the most about the soul. Thomas explains why it is possible to predicate the soul of a power and which one to choose:

in powers this is commonly found, that what can do more can do less, but not conversely, as “he who can carry a thousand pounds can carry one hundred,” as Aristotle said in the first book of his De caelo. And so, if some thing ought to be

---

106 ST I. 76.1 [St. Paul, 351]: “Hoc ergo pricipium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis.”
107 De ver. 10.1[Leon.22.1.296-97.107-11]: “Quia vero rerum essentiae sunt nobis ignotae, virtutes autem earum innotescunt nobis per actus, utimur frequenter nominibus virtutum vel potentiarum ad essentias designandas. Sed quia nihil notificatur nisi ex hoc quod est sibi proprium, oportet quod, cum aliqua essentia designatur per suam potentiam, quod designetur per potentiam sibi propriam.”
108 STI.77.1.ad7[St. Paul.363-64]: “Ad septimum dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentissimis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium poni.” Note the qualification interdum: this order seems to admit of exception. See ST I, 85.1 [St. Paul, 416]: “Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capi perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quiditetem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam.”
109 The provenance of this line of thinking is Aristotelian. See Aristotle’s De anima I.402b22-25, trans. J. A. Smith in Barnes, 642: “the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by acquaintance with its properties: for, when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most favourable position to say something worth saying about the essential nature of that subject.” See also Richard W. Field, “St. Thomas Aquinas on Properties and the Powers of the Soul,” Laval théologique et philosophique 40 (1984): 203-215.
designated through its own power, it is necessary that it be designated by the ultimate of its own power. But the soul of plants has only the lowest level among powers of the soul; thus from this power it is named the nutritive or vegetative soul. But the soul of an animal reaches a higher level, namely, sense. That is why it is called the sensitive soul or sometimes even sense. But the human soul attains to the highest level among the powers of the soul and is named from this. Thus it is called the intellective soul and sometimes also intellect, and in like fashion mind insofar as from that soul such a power naturally flows, which is proper to it before other souls.  

It is because the powers or properties flow from the essence of the soul that it is possible to reason from effect to cause and signify the essential differences of souls. Awareness of this causal relationship is crucial for any human knowledge of soul. And because the higher power can do, in a sense, what the lower power can do and more, the soul may be named by its highest power. For example, if one wanted to describe a very fast car, one would describe how fast it was by the fact that it has the power to accelerate from zero to sixty miles per hour in three seconds. It would not be incorrect to say that it has the power to accelerate from zero to sixty in seven seconds, but that would not properly describe the car.

---


111 The one ‘natural’ exception being the separated soul’s infused knowledge which may be called natural according to the separated state. See QDM 5.3 [Leon.23.136.84-85]: “. . . qualis debetur anime separate secundum suam naturam, . . .” See also John F. Wippel, ”Thomas Aquinas on the Separated Soul's Natural Knowledge,” in Thomas Aquinas, In Approaches to Truth, ed. J. McEvoy and M. Dunne (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002), 114-40, esp. pp. 132-34.
When Thomas names the soul the intellective soul, he names it from the perspective that it is the kind of soul from which flow intellect and will. When he names it the sensitive soul, he names it insofar as it is the kind of soul from which sensitive powers naturally flow. Because these “souls” always signify the soul insofar as it causes certain kinds of powers and because the existence of the higher implies the existence of all the lower powers, the part can be used to substitute for the whole, and in this way the whole may be denominated or named by the part. Thus one can say that the intellect is the form of the body, meaning thereby the intellective soul.

It is the causal relation between the soul and its powers which permits some flexibility in predication. At times he emphasizes the soul itself, albeit understood as the principle of certain kinds of powers. At other times he emphasizes the powers themselves and speaks of souls as if they were a kind of cluster of powers. Either way, Aquinas’s ‘souls’ can never fully prescind from the powers of the soul, i.e., from the soul qua motor or as a potential whole.

C. The Soul as a Potential Whole

Let us now return, as promised, to our initial text on the potential whole, QSC 11 ad 2. In general, a whole can be predicated of its part according to the way that the whole is present to its part. In a universal whole, the whole can be predicated of its parts according to its whole essence and whole power because the whole is present to its parts according to its whole essence and

---

112 QDP 3.11, ad 2 [Marietti, 75].
113 STI.79.1ad1[St. Paul.375]: ”Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva: denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principaloris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute; sic dicitur in I de Anima, quod intellectus est substantia guaedam. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia. See notes, 105, 109, and, 108.
power. In a potential whole, however, the whole is predicated of its parts according to its whole essence, but not according to its whole power because the whole is present to its parts according to essence, but not according to its whole power.\textsuperscript{114}

Immediately one wonders what Thomas means by distinguishing between how one predicates the essence of a whole of its part from how one predicates the power of a whole of its part, and what kind of corresponding presence this entails.\textsuperscript{115} Since he offers the same examples in most of the texts, it will be worth examining them. Concerning the universal whole and its parts, which are called subjective parts, he notes that the whole is predicated of the part as animal is predicated of man. As we have seen, it is the same soul which is both man and animal.\textsuperscript{116} Thus the whole is predicated of the part according to its essential content because the whole is the part.

It is more difficult, however, to understand what Aquinas means by saying that this whole is also predicated of the part according to its full power (\textit{virtus}). What does he here mean by power? In ST III.90.3 Aquinas notes that “the whole power of the whole is present, simultaneously and equally, to each particular subjective part, in the way in which the whole power of animal, insofar as it is animal, is preserved in each species of animal, which

\textsuperscript{114} See n. 79.

\textsuperscript{115} This distinction seems to come from Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima} III, 9.432b1-4 [Barnes, 678]: “Further the imaginative, which is, in its being, different from all, while it is very hard to say with which of the others it is the same or not the same, supposing we determine to posit separate parts in the soul; and lastly the appetitive, which would seem to be \textit{distinct both in definition and in power} from all hitherto enumerated.” Emphasis is mine.

\textsuperscript{116} This mode of predication accords with the first mode of \textit{per se} predication, that is, when the predicate is included in the definition of the subject. \textit{See In de an.} [45/1.124.42-56]: ”\textit{Per se autem dupliciter dicitur. Vno enim modo dicitur propositio per se cuius praedicatum cadit in definitione subiecti, sicut ista : Homo est animal ; animal enim cadit in definitione hominis ; et quia id quod est in definitione alicuius est aliquo modo causa eius, in his que sic per se dicuntur, praedicatum est causa subiecti. Alio modo dicitur propositio per se, cuius e contrario subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, sicut si dicitur : Nasus est simus, vel : Numerus est par ; simum enim nichil aliud est quam nasus curvus, et par nichil aliud est quam numerus medietatem habens ; et in istis subiectum est causa praedicati.” See also \textit{In post. an.}1.10 [Leon.1/2.39.25-67].
simultaneously and equally divide animal." As I take it, the entire force (virtus) of the whole intelligible content is present to each of its parts in an undiminished fashion. The distinction between predicking the universal whole of its parts according to essence versus predicking it according to power seems to me to be mostly one of emphasis.

This distinction, however, concerning the potential whole, is quite different. Thomas’ favorite examples of potential parts are the powers of the soul or the ‘souls.’ According to Thomas the potential whole is present to its parts according to its complete essence, but not according to its complete power. Let us begin by asking how the whole is present to its parts according to essence.

117 ST III.90.3 [St.Paul.2372]: “Quia partibus subjectivis singulis adest tota virtus totius, et simul, et eequaliter: sicut tota virtus animalis, inquantum est animal, salvatur in qualibet specie animalis, quae simul et eequaliter dividunt animal.”

118 In the abovementioned case the distinction between its wholes and parts is clearly a logical distinction, but it need not be so: QSC.4 [Leon.24/2.52.227-234]: “Secunda autem totalitas [universal] attenditur secundum perfectionem essentie, cui totalitati etiam respondent partes essentie, phisice quidem in compositis materia et forma, logice vero genus et differentia ; que quidem perfectio in formis accidentalibus recipit magis et minus, non autem in substantialibus.” It should be remembered that genus is taken from matter and species is taken from form; thus there is a reason for uniting logical and physical wholes and all of these passages are concerned with in what sense one can speak of wholes and parts when discussing the soul which is also the form of the body. In an interesting passage, ST II-II.120.2 [St. Paul, 1571] he notes that being itself is a universal whole insofar as it is divided by substance and accidents. In the case of being, ens, it is predicated according to the prior and posterior, prius et posterius, but the whole is nevertheless essentially predicated of each part. I take this to mean that ens is essentially predicated of each part, i.e., being on a predicamental level is divided between substance and accident – each part is essentially a being, even if they are predicated per prius of substance and per posterius of accident, that is, analogically. If being were a potential whole, one could not fully predicate being of its part, neither of substance or accident.

119 In the classification of the virtues into their parts, e.g., subjective, potential, and integral parts one cannot, in the same sense, claim that the parts are ontologically distinct. That is beyond the scope of this project.

120 QDA.12ad15 [Leon.24/1.112.321-325]: “. . . potentie anime non sunt partes essentiales anime, quasi constituentes essentiam eius, sed partes potentiales, quia virtus anime distinguetur per huiusmodi potentias.” QDA.19.ad4 [Leon.24.1.166.254-258]: “. . . potentie anime non sunt partes essentiales vel integrales, set potentiales ; ita tamen quod quedam earum insunt anime secundum se, quedam vero composito.” SCG.4.36 [Leon.manulis.490]: “Adhuc. Voluntas est una pars potentialis animae humanae, sicut et intellectus.”

121 STII-II.48 [St.Paul.1301]: “Respondeo dicendum quod triplex est pars: scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subjectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae.”
He usually puts it this way: the whole is present to its potential parts according to its whole essence as the whole soul is present to its powers.\(^{122}\) He adds to this by saying that the essence of the soul is present to its powers as their origin, since the powers flow from the essence.\(^{123}\) Thus it is the manner in which the soul is present to its powers that shows us the relationship between the potential whole and its potential parts. Since the powers of the soul are potential parts, in this case, the relation between the soul and its powers not only is as, but in fact is that of a potential whole and its parts.

If we should choose to predicate the potential whole of its potential part, we would be predicating according to what Aristotle calls the second mode of per se predication in which the subject is included in the definition of the predicate.\(^{124}\) If we say man is intellect,\(^{125}\) it is clear that person is necessarily included in the definition of intellect, for the accident must include the subject in its definition as its cause.\(^{126}\) This follows because the subject serves as the receiving principle which grants being to the accident, but in the case of inseparable accidents which follow upon the species (i.e., the powers of the soul), the subject is also included in the definition

---

\(^{122}\) STIII.90.3 [St.Paul.2372]: “Et ideo alii dixerunt quod sunt partes potentiales. - Sed nec hoc iterum esse potest. Quia singulis partibus potentialibus adest totum secundum totam essentiam, sicut tota essentia animae adest cuilibet eius potentiae.” In Sent.4.16.1.1 qe.3 [Moos.4.774]: “Et ideo alii dicunt, quod sunt partes potentiales. Sed hoc iterum non potest esse, quia in partibus potentialibus totum adest secundum essentiae suae rationem cuilibet complectae parti, sicut essentia animae cuilibet potentiae.” Note the similarity! Should the first text be part of the Supplementum? Torrell notes, on p. 147 in Person and Work, that Thomas arrived at q.90, a.4 before he ceased writing!

\(^{123}\) In Sent.1.3.4.2 ad 1 [Mand.1.116-17]: “... cum dicitur: Tres potentiae sunt una mens, non est praedicatio essentialis, sed totius potestativi de suis partibus... in qua, secundum id quod est essentia, non includuntur potentiae, nisi sicut in origine, eo quod ab essentia oriuntur potentiae, in quibus attenditur imago.”

\(^{124}\) See text cited in n.111 for the distinction between the second and first mode of per se predication.

\(^{125}\) For example see QDA.12.ad13[Leon.24.1.111.310-14]: “... homo dicitur intellectus esse quia intellectus est id quod est potius in homine, sicut cuiitas dicitur esse rector civitatis. Non autem hoc dictum est eo quod essentia anime sit ipsa potentia intellectus.”

\(^{126}\) In II de an. [45/1.124.56]: “... in istis subiectum est causa praedicati.” See n.124.
of the accident as its active and efficient cause.\footnote{127} This second mode of \textit{per se} predication is rooted in the necessary causal connection between the soul and its powers or properties,\footnote{128} for the powers of the soul have a permanent cause in their subject,\footnote{129} that is, they are caused by its substantial form. This guarantees that as long as the subject exists, the powers do so as well. That is why they are said to be inseparable from the subject – for they are ultimately caused by the same cause which causes the soul itself.\footnote{130}

As we saw in \textit{De veritate} q. 10, a. 1 above, according to our mode of cognition we name the soul from its powers. According to the order of nature, however, the soul causes the powers. Because every agent produces something like itself, and because the soul produces the powers, there is some kind of likeness between the soul and its powers. There must be. For it is possible to reason from an effect to its cause, the soul. Reason of course is not present in the same way in the power of the soul named reason as it is in the soul itself, but it is present in the soul itself as

\footnote{127} \textit{Sup. Boet. De Trin.} 5.4 ad 4 [Leon.50.156.277-86]: “... quia figura et omnia accidentia consequuntur substantiam sicut causam, et ideo subjectum se habet ad accidentia non solum ut potencia passiva, set etiam quodammodo ut potentia activa. . . .” For a helpful discussion of all of Thomas’s texts on how the soul causes its powers see Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 266-275.

\footnote{128} \textit{In I post.an.} 14 [Leon.1/2.53-54.14-46]: “Dicit igitur primo quod \textit{demonstrativa scientia} non potest esse \textit{accidentium} quod non sunt \textit{per se}, sicut \textit{determinatum est \textit{per se} \textit{superius}, scilicet quod accidens \textit{per se} est} in cuius definitione ponitur subjectum, sicut par aut impar est \textit{per se} accidens numeri; album autem animalis non est \textit{per se} accidens, quia animal non ponitur in eius definitione. Quod autem de huiusmodi accidentibus quod non sunt per se, non possit esse demonstratio, sic probat: \textit{accidens} quod non est \textit{per se} \textit{contingit non inesse} (de hoc enim accidente loquimur); si ergo demonstratio fieret de accidente quod non est per se, sequetur quod conclusio demonstrationis non esset necessaria, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est.

Quod autem accidens quod non est \textit{per se}, non necessario insit, ex hoc potest haberi: Si enim aliquod accidens ex necessitate et semper insit subiecto, oportet quod causam habeat in subiecto, quae posita, non possit accidens non esse. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: uno modo quando ex principiis speciei accidens causatur, et tale accidens dicitur per se passio vel proprium; alio modo quando accidens causatur ex principiis individui, et hoc est accidens inseparabile. Omne autem accidens quod causatur ex principiis subjecti, si debat definiri, oportet quod subiectum ponatur in sua definitione: nam umumquodque definitur ex propriis principiis; et sic oportet omne accidens quod ex necessitate inest subiecto, esse accidens per se. Illa ergo quae non sunt per se, non ex necessitate insunt.”

\footnote{129} QDA.12 ad 7 [Leon.24/1.111.265-287].

\footnote{130} See Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 275.
an effect is present in its cause. Thus we learn of man’s essential differences from his accidental powers, e.g., man is rational. This is the manner in which the soul is present to its powers, as its receiving cause but more importantly as its active cause.\footnote{This cannot be limited to the subject’s receiving causality, for a subject equally receives, say, the power of the intellect as it does the accident of being in a place. From the first kind of accident it is possible to deduce far more about man’s essence than the latter. When we say man is rational from that fact that he has reason, it is the necessary causal connection between the soul and its powers which adds over and above whatever knowledge can be garnered from receiving causality. The second mode of per se predication is only applicable to properties; it cannot be predicated only in terms of receiving causality. In fact, what distinguishes properties from all other accidents and allows for this mode of predication is precisely their unique causal status as ‘flowing from’ or as being actively and absolutely necessarily caused by the soul. That is, it is because a human soul is the kind of thing which always necessarily produces the power of reason that we can call it the rational soul – that is how we name the kind of thing it is.} As he says in QDA 10, ad 10, “a power of the soul is rooted in the essence, thus wherever there is some power of the soul, there is the essence of the soul.”\footnote{QDA10 ad 10[Leon.24/4.93.335-37]: “... potentia anime radicatur in essentia ; et ideo ubicunque est aliqua potentia anime, ibi est essentia anime.”}

Let us turn to the second half of the statement, namely, that the potential whole is \textit{not} present to its potential part according to its complete power, and thus the whole cannot be properly predicated of its part.\footnote{See, n. 79.} In an early text, \textit{In II Sent.} 2.9.1.3 ad 1, however, he notes that the potential whole is present according to essence to each part, but according to complete power it \textit{is} in the supreme part, since always the superior power has in itself more completely what the inferior power has.\footnote{In II Sent. 9.1.3ad1 [Mand.2.237]: “... sed totum potentiale adest quidem secundum essentiam cuilibet parti, sed secundum completam virtutem est in parte suprema, quia semper superior potentia habet in se completius ea quae sunt inferioris.” In IV Sent. 38.1.2.qc.2 [Busa.1.611]: “divisio totius potestativi in partes suas, cujus perfecta virtus est in una suarum partium; in alis autem quaedam ipsius participatio, sicut anima dividitur in rationalem, sensibilem, et vegetabilem.” Cf. \textit{Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram} 1.1 [Leon.28.8.52-59]: “Et est sciendum quod prophetia saluat in istis tribus sicut totum potentiale in suis partibus, cuius natura est quod secundum perfectam suam virtutem est in uno, et in alis quaedam participatio et quidam modus illius ; sicut est in anima quod ejus tota...} Aquinas early texts affirm that the whole power is present in the highest potential part, but this is denied in the latter texts. Why?
Here I ought to mention something about Thomas’ context. For Bonaventure, who denied that the powers are ontologically distinct from the soul, the question never arose about what kind of a whole these ontologically distinct parts comprise.\textsuperscript{135} Pius Kunzle, has convincingly shown that Albert was the first medieval thinker to firmly hold to the position that the powers of the soul are predicamental accidents.\textsuperscript{136} Furthermore, Odon Lottin pointed out that there was very little use of the potential whole prior to Albert: it was Albert who more or less invented the concept.\textsuperscript{137} I would like to suggest that as soon as powers of the soul were understood to be predicamental accidents which had an accidental being distinct from their subject’s substantial being, the problem of the soul’s parts, as Aristotle raised it in the \textit{De anima}, took on a new dimension. Albert’s solution, passed on to his student Thomas, was the potential whole. Broadly speaking, I think Dom Lottin was right to say that to a large extent Aquinas

\begin{quote}
\textbf{55}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{uirtus saluatur perfecte in anima rationali, et sensibilis non habet perfectam anime virtutem, et adhuc minus anima vegetabilis . . .”}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{135} Bonaventure, \textit{In I Sent.} d. 3 p. 2 a.1 q. 3, ad.1et 2 [Quaracchi.t.1.p.86]: “Quarto modo dicitur essentiale, sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae animae, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale ; tamen non transit in aliud genus : ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Bonaventure, \textit{In I Sent.} d. 3 p. 2 a.1 q. 3, ad.6 [Quaracchi.t.1.p.87]: “. . . potentiae animae non sunt accidentales.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Bonaventure is interesting because he does not think the soul is immediately operative, \textit{In I Sent.} d. 8 p. 2 q. 2 [Quarrachi.t.1.p.168], but he is nevertheless not willing to make the powers ontologically distinct. See d’ Eysden, Fidèle, “La distinction de la substance et de ses puissances d’opération d’après saint Bonaventure,” \textit{Etudes Franciscaines} II (1951): 5-23, 147-71. See d’ Eysden’s point, on p. 169, that habits, for Bonaventure, also have the same ontological status as powers and the soul, he cites \textit{In I Sent.} 3.2.2 ad 2 [Quaracchi.t.1.p.92].
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{136} Pius Künzle, \textit{Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen: Problemgeschichte Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin} (Freiburg, 1956), 154-58. For most of the schoolmen, the categories were understood to be not only logical but also ontological. For Thomas, see \textit{De ver.} q.1, a.1, in which he says that they are \textit{modi essendi}.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
adopted the solution of Albert on this problem, namely, to distinguish between the soul as static and the soul as dynamic.\textsuperscript{138} The former excludes the powers, the latter includes them.

A quick look at Albert’s position manifests his obvious influence on Thomas:

It must be said that according to Boethius there is a certain potential whole, and that is in a certain way a medium between a universal whole and an integral whole. For the universal whole is in each of its part, and is predicated of it, as Aristotle proves in Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, that what is *per essentiam* is the same for the universal and for the particular. The integral whole, however, is not in any of its parts, nor is it predicated of them. But the potential whole is in each part, although not equally powerfully (*aequipotenter*), but in the first part according to less [power], in the second more powerfully and in the ultimate according to the whole power (*secundum totum posse*).\textsuperscript{139}

Although Albert does not explicitly distinguish between presence and predication according to essence and according to power, he does distinguish between some intelligible content that is completely present to each part of the whole, and the fact that the whole power is not present to all parts; but that there is a hierarchy of more or less power in individual parts with the whole power only being present to the ultimate part. Thomas’s use of the distinction between

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 500: “L’âme, répond le saint Docteur[Albert], peut être envisagée sous deux aspects: dans son être statique, en sa perfection absolue, et dans son être dynamique, comme principe d’opération. Au premier point de vue, l’âme est distincte de ses facultés: celles-ci découlent de l’âme et en reçoivent leur perfection. Au second point de vue, l’âme est un tout potentiel qui se parfait dans ses facultés elles-mêmes,” and on p. 501: “Quant à saint Thomas d’Aquin, il reprend la solution de son maître Albert, non toutefois sans la dégager davantage des formules franciscaines: les facultés sont des propriétés qui découlent de l’essence même de l’âme considérée comme un tout potentiel.” It is not quite right to label *esse* as static, since it is the act of all acts, and the perfection of all perfections, but there is nevertheless something true to the contrast between static and dynamic. Albeit in a somewhat different context, Wippel makes the same distinction in “Metaphysical Foundations for Christian Humanism in Thomas Aquinas,” *Doctor Communis* fasc.1-2 (2004), 124-42.

predicating *per essentiam* and *per virtutem* adds a little precision to Albert, but it doesn’t change much—they are more or less, at least according to Aquinas’s early texts, saying the same thing.

While there can be no doubt of the Albertian provenance of the potential whole, I think it worth asking how Albertian Thomas’ use of it ultimately was. I will mention a few reasons for thinking that Aquinas did not simply adopt Albert’s position. First, for Thomas the potential whole concerns the soul as *motor* in contradistinction to the soul as *forma*. This distinction is collapsed or at least it is very different in Albert’s thought. Albert, unlike Thomas, was unwilling to make the soul the form of matter, for like many of his contemporaries he thought that such a position would force the soul to be a material form. Albert’s solution to the problem was to lean on Avicenna’s two-fold way of viewing the soul, on the one hand in itself, and on the other hand insofar as it is the *motor* and act of the body.\(^\text{140}\) The reason he binds the soul as *motor* of the body to the soul as act of the body is because he understood the soul to be united to the body by means of its powers.\(^\text{141}\) But for Thomas, as we have seen, the soul is immediately united to prime matter. For Albert, unlike Thomas, the potential whole not only has to account for the soul’s

---


\(^\text{141}\) Albert, *De anima* III tr. 2 c.12 [Borg. v.7/1 p.193, l.41-49]: “*Licet autem sic dicamus intellectum esse separatum, tamen anima est coniuncta per alias virtutes suas, quae sint naturales sibi, in quantum est perfectio corporis, et ideo licet intellectus secundum se sit separatus, tamen intellectus est potentia coniuncti, quoniam est potestas animae, quae secundum potentias quasdam coniungitur corpori.*” See Bazán’s comments in the notes of QDA 9 [Leon.24/1.74].
motion, but also, in a certain sense, for its union with the body. Second, Aquinas wrestled with this issue of the potential whole. A comparison of early and late texts show that Thomas’s position did not stabilize until later in his career. This suggests that he was not quite satisfied with whatever he may have received from Albert. For example, in his earlier texts, in accord with Albert, the entire power of the potential whole is present in the soul’s highest power. In the latter parallel passages, however, he drops this claim and says that that the power of the potential whole is not present to its parts according to its whole power.

It seems to me that Albert and Thomas were trying to give an account of how the powers of the soul are like their cause and related to their cause, the soul itself. This is partly a question about how to interpret Aristotle’s passage about the virtual possession of souls as geometrical

---

142 For Albert what accounts for the soul’s substantial being is that the soul itself is composed of *quod est* and *quo est* (neither of which is matter, but the former acting like spiritual matter), in other words the soul is a substance. This makes it difficult for Albert to explain how the body has anything to do with the soul’s subsisting. The soul, however, does have a natural affinity for the body. But this is mostly in the manner in which a sailor needs a ship. Albert wants to say something like this: A sailor can, of course, exist without his ship, but he is nevertheless a sailor, so he must have a ship (a body). The soul’s role of granting being to the body is subsumed under its role as *motor*. By far the best treatment of this is by Steven Baldner in “St. Albert the Great on the Union,” 103-120. Baldner argues that Albert held to this position throughout the course of his career. See also Pegis’s treatment of Albert for a helpful collection of the important texts, *The Problem of the Soul*, 77-121. See also Dales, *The Problem*, 89-98; and Künzle, *Das Verhältnis*, 149, ff. For Thomas the soul as *forma* and the soul as *motor* are two different ways of viewing the same principle; if anything, the emphasis is the opposite in Thomas, for him the soul as form seems predominant. For Albert the soul is only united to the body because the soul is the mover of the body.

143 For examples of his mature position see ST I, 77.1 ad 1(1267-68) [St. Paul, 363]; QSC 11 ad 2 (1267-1268) [Leon 24/2.120:312-121:332]; and if you are persuaded of its authenticity, the *Lectura Romana* 3.3.4 ad 1(1265-66) [Boyle ed.120.37-40]. Aquinas’s earliest text *In I Sent*. 3.4.2 ad 1 (1252-56) [Mand. 116-17] is interesting because rather than predicating a whole of its part according to essence and/or power, the division is between predicating by the presence of the whole to its part according to *esse* and according to power. The language of essence and power normalizes by *In II Sent*. 9.1.3 ad 1(1252-1256) [Mand. 237], but there he notes that the whole is present to the highest part according to complete power and essence, but he later drops the claim that the potential whole is present to its highest part, as we have discussed. At the very least it is clear that Aquinas wrestled with this issue, and it cannot be said that he simply took whatever Albert gave him. But the later texts, some of which we have been examining, show that Aquinas firmly settled on an answer. See also notes 147 and 151 for evidence that it took Thomas some time to settle his position.

144 QSC 11, ad 2 [Leon. 24/2.120.326-29]: “Tertium est totum potentiale, quod est medium inter hec duo : adest enim sue parti secundum totam suam essentiam, set non secundum totam suam virtutem ; . . . :"
forms. Let us turn away from Albert.\textsuperscript{145} For Aquinas the virtual possessions of these forms is understood in terms of the soul itself, as the rational soul virtually contains the sensitive and vegetative soul. But because these souls can never completely prescind from the powers of the soul, it is also a question of how the higher powers virtually contain the lower.

For example, the highest power, reason itself by itself, does not possess the power to cause someone to do something. If a man is to act, he must also use a host of other internal and external sense powers and bodily organs etc. to choose and perform this action here and now.\textsuperscript{146} Each power has a limited sphere of operation. Although a lower power may derive its power of causing from the higher power, it is certainly not the case that the highest power formally has the power to do whatever the lower powers can do. This hierarchical complex of diverse powers is not united in the highest power, but in the soul itself as the mover, the principle of operation of the whole person.

The consideration of the soul as a potential whole is one in which one sees that the soul has various powers which operate in unison to perform highly complex operations in an

\textsuperscript{145} For Albert, all of the powers flow from the soul itself, and thus all of the powers are somehow contained in the highest power because the soul is united to the body via powers. Specifically the soul is united to the body in the heart. See De prin. mot. 2.11 [ed. Colon. 12:72.69-77]; this text with helpful discussion is in Baldner “St. Albert the Great on the Union of the Human Soul and Body,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1996):112. Virtual possession, as Albert interprets the geometrical forms of the De anima II, ought to be understood primarily in terms of powers, not in terms of ‘souls.’ For a discussion of this see Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg, “The Priority of Soul as Form and Its Proximity to the First Mover: Some Aspects of Albert’s Psychology in the First Two Books of His Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima,” in Albert The Great: Commemorative Essays ed. Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. Shahan [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980], 60. See also S. Baldner, “Is St. Albert the Great a Dualist on Human Nature?” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 67 (1993): 219-229.

\textsuperscript{146} See for example QDA.9 ad 6 [Leon.24.1.83:363-84:397]. At the very least the will is required, say, if I simply will to think about something. But for any other action a great number of powers are required.
integrated manner. It is a kind of sum total of what the soul can do\textsuperscript{147} and in which there is no need to force the highest power to have or do whatever the lower powers have or can do\textsuperscript{148}—that is reserved for the soul itself. Nevertheless, the soul moves one part by means of another, and it often moves the lower by means of the higher. Each power plays its proper role in the whole power of the creature. In a late passage in his commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{De sensu} (1268-1270), Aquinas gives a clear account of this; notice the hierarchy, order, and mutually exclusive but complementary operative roles of the soul’s parts.\textsuperscript{149}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{In de an.} 1.14 [Leon.45/1.67-69] “. . . anima enim est quoddam totum potenciale et pars accipitur ibi potencialis respectu tocius potestatiui.”
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{148} The highest power in some way controls the lower powers but not in such a way that it does not need the lower powers for its own operation, cf. QDA 13 ad. 9 [Leon.24/1.121.426-31]. That potential whole is not fully present in any of its parts see QSC 11.ad 2 [Leon.24/2.120.326-29]: “Tertium est totum potentiale, quod est medium inter hac duo : adest enim sue parti secundum totam suam essentiam, set non secundum totam suam virtutem . . .”; QDA 10 [Leon.24/1.91-92.249-52]: “Si autem accipiatur totalitas quantum ad uirtutem et potestatem, sic non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, nec etiam tota in toto, si loquamur de anima hominis.” Concerning this last passage, since we know that the potential whole is present to its parts according to its complete essence, if it were also present according to its complete power, then it could be completely predicated of the whole. Since, as he says in this passage, it cannot, it follows that the whole power is not communicated to any parts of the potential whole.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{149} There are some texts in which Thomas describes the relation between the potential whole and its parts in terms of participation. His accounts of this participation generally fit his earlier view of one part of the potential whole as completely possessing its full power. It is the other powers which then participate in this complete and perfect power. \textit{In IV sent.}24.2.1.qc.1 ad 2. [Busa.1.573]: “sed totius potestativi; cujus haec est natura quod totum secundum completam rationem est in uno, in aliis autem est aliqua participatio ipsius.” See also, \textit{In IV Sent.}4.38.1.2 qc. 2 [Busa.1.611]: “est divisio totius potestativi in partes suas, cujus perfecta virtus est in una suarum partium; in aliis autem quaedam ipsius participatio, sicut anima dividitur in rationalem, sensibilem, et vegetabilem.” There are a fair number of early texts in which he notes that the relation between the potential whole and its parts is one of participation. \textit{In III sent.}33.3.1 qc. 1; \textit{In III sent.} 33.3.2 qc. 1[Moos, 1081]; \textit{In III sent.} 33.3.3 qc. 1[Moos, 1087]; \textit{In IV sent.} 4.2.1 qc.1 ad 2 [Moos, 168]; \textit{Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram} 1.1. [Leon.28.8.52-59]; etc. But I have only found one later passage, QDV 1.12 ad 27 [Marietti, 747] (from 1271-1272) where Thomas espouses this relation of participation. . . aliae virtutes adiunctae vel secundariae ponuntur partes cardinalium, non integrales vel subjectivae, cum habeat materiam determinatam et actum proprium; sed quasi partes potentiales, in quantum particulariter participant, et deficitierent medium quod principaliter et perfectius convenit virtuti cardinals.” In this later passage he is making the point that the cardinal virtues are virtues in a complete and perfect way, but the potential parts of virtue participate in that perfection deficiently. Despite the different context (the classification of the virtues), this passage does not commit him to holding that the highest part completely contains the power of the whole, but nor does it positively exclude it. All that it requires is that what principally and more perfectly belongs to one, is deficiently had by another, in a participative manner. That is in accord with Thomas’ later thinking on the potential whole, and his general thinking on participation as outlined in the \textit{de hebdomadibus} c.2 in which Aquinas gives the general description of participation: “When something receives in a particular fashion what pertains universally to another, it is said to participate in that” \textit{Sup. Boet. De ebd.} 2[Leon.50.271:71-73]. For one can have a
wherever there are diverse ordered powers, the inferior power is related to the superior power in the manner of an instrument because the superior moves the inferior. For action is attributed to the principal agent through the instrument, as we say that the builder cuts with the saw. It is in this way that Aristotle says here that the common sense senses through sight and hearing, and the other proper senses, which are diverse potential parts of the soul, but they are not parts of some continuum.\footnote{In I De Sensu.18 [Leon.45/1.89.130-40]: “Considerandum autem est hic quod ubicunque sint diverse potentie ordinate inferior potencia comparatur ad superiorem per modum instrumenti, eo quod superior movet inferiorem, actio autem attribuitur principali agenti per instrumentum, sicut dicimus quod artifex secat per serram. Et per hunc modum Philosophus hic dicit quod sensus communis sentit per visum et per auditum et alios sensus proprios, qui sunt diverse partes potenciales anime, non autem diverse partes sunt alicuius continui . . .”}

It is in this way that the powers of the soul mirror the soul itself. The potential whole names the soul’s complete power, which is composed of a group of powers, but an ordered group. Thomas will at times refer to it as the order of the powers of the soul (\textit{ordo potentiarum}).

Nature or life understood as ordered and acting for the sake of an end, but not immediately operative, must be composed of a complicated ordered group of really distinct powers. It is this ordered hierarchy of material and immaterial powers, ordered in the sense of operating in unison, with each power playing its part for the sake of the person’s end, which Thomas calls the potential whole. As he notes in QDA 13, ad. 7

\begin{quote}
every soul has some particular end, as the human soul has the intelligible good. But it has other ends ordered to this ultimate end as the sensible is ordered to the intelligible. And since the soul is ordered to its objects through its powers, it follows that also the sensitive power in man is for the sake of the intellective, and so on for the others.\footnote{QDA 13ad 7 [Leon.24/1.121.407-414]: “. . . anima habet aliquem precipuum finem, sicut anima humana, bonum intelligibile ; habet autem et alios fines ordinatos ad hunc ultimum finem, sicut quod sensibile ordinatur ad intelligibile. Et quia anima ordinatur ad sua obiecta per potentias, sequitur quod etiam potentia sensitiva sit in homine propter intellectivam, et sic de alis.” I am not going to discuss the order of generation of the souls or the soul’s powers (as one can arise from another).}
\end{quote}

\footnote{Nature or life understood as ordered and acting for the sake of an end, but not immediately operative, must be composed of a complicated ordered group of really distinct powers. It is this ordered hierarchy of material and immaterial powers, ordered in the sense of operating in unison, with each power playing its part for the sake of the person’s end, which Thomas calls the potential whole. As he notes in QDA 13, ad. 7}
The natural order of the powers of the soul\footnote{ST 77.4 [St.Paul.365]: “Respondeo dicendum quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera: tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem objectorum. Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo, \textit{secundum naturae ordinem}, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur. Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae.” [my emphasis]} is the soul’s ordination to its end via its parts. Perhaps one should put it this way. On the one hand, one could rank all being according to materiality and immateriality and, more generally, of various degrees of act and potency. Because \textit{esse} is act, this is also understood in terms of various degrees of \textit{esse}. This is usually imagined in a rather vertical fashion with humans \textit{above} irrational animals but \textit{below} angels. The teleological order, however, is imagined in a rather horizontal sense – this is always done for the sake of that, e.g., I am driving for the sake of getting over \textit{there}. While this is a helpful way of thinking, I wish to emphasize its unhelpfulness as well. Being is not vertical nor is teleology horizontal. The imagination must here be repressed. It is because a human is a particular kind of being, that he can and must act for the sake of a particular kind of end. Aquinas’s distinction between the soul as a \textit{form} and the soul as a \textit{motor} allows one to keep the two perspectives related and distinct, but ultimately both are united in one being which is ranked in an ascending order of being according to varying degrees of \textit{esse}.

4. Conclusion: Wholes and Parts Revisited

I would like to conclude by mentioning an important series of mature texts which discuss the soul as a potential whole or mover, ST. I 76.8, QSC 4, and QDA 10. These texts presuppose, summarize and discuss most of what we have already covered in this chapter. What is at stake in
them is the following. As the form of the body, the soul cannot be said to be here or there within an individual body, for then it would not be the form of the body but the form of part of the body. As the form of the body the soul is as indivisible as it is immaterial. However, in another sense the soul is divisible, for there is clearly a hierarchy of parts ranked in terms of materiality and immateriality. There is somehow “more” soul in intellection than in digestion. But what does “more” mean in such a statement? If there is “more soul” in certain parts of the soul than others, then it appears that the soul cannot be the form of the body, for soul would somehow be more in a more spiritual part, say sight, than in an utterly material part, say digestion. That is, it appears that there is more soul in my eye (the bodily organ of the power of sight) than in my intestine (the bodily organ of the power of digestion). Thus on the one hand the soul is fully and in the same way present to all of its parts, but on the other hand the soul seems unequally and hierarchically distributed to its various parts.153

153 Albert denies that the soul is as a whole in the whole body, since for him the soul is united to the body by means of powers somehow through the organ of the heart. See the following interesting passage De anima. 2.1.7 [Ed. Colon.7/1:75.34-49]: “… dicimus, quoniam sicut anima est una et habet partes virtuales, ita corpus est unum et habet partes organicas, quae omnes continuationem habent ad unam, quae est cor. Et tunc dicendum, quod anima est in corde et inde influit potestates suas in totum corpus; et sic non est in toto tota, quod in qualibet parte sit tota, sed quod in qualibet parte est secundum aliquam suarum potestiarum; et si quae partes similares sunt in complexione et composizione, in illis est per similares potentiae et operationes. Et licet essentia eius adsit cuilibet virtuti ipsius, non tamen virtute separata separatur necessario essentia eius, quia virtus illa affixa est illi organo et non essentiae animae, sed potius illa est in corde, quod est organum essentiae animae deputatum.” See Baldner “St. Albert the Great on the Union,” 113. In other words, the soul is distributed throughout the body by means of power, because the potential whole, the soul qua motor, accounts for the soul’s union to the body in Albert. This is not the case at all in Aquinas. Aquinas explains the role of the soul as mover without having to account for the soul’s union to the body. He was, of course, familiar with Albert’s opinion, and made it quite clear, as his discussion of these texts point out that the soul can act both as form of the body and as a principle of its own operations by means of its powers. In other words, he keeps the roles distinct, but the principle (the soul) the same. One wonders if his lack of mentioning the potential whole as a whole in his first treatment of this problem in SCG 2.72 [I have not found any earlier treatments] manifests a desire to distance himself from his teacher. On the other hand, one could read into the text in SCG that he has simply subsumed the role as mover under the role as form. In any case, Aquinas seemed to have struggled a little with the potential whole before he determined exactly how to make it his own.
This is the tension between the soul’s role in the Aristotelian hylomorphic union and the soul’s parts, as Aristotle divides and outlines them in his *De anima*. Thomas’s answer, as we have seen, is the potential whole. It is interesting, and perhaps surprising, that Aquinas says that this is also Aristotle’s own personal solution to the problem. At the very least it is a plausible and defensible interpretation of Aristotle.

Aquinas’s answer in this set of texts is to outline three kinds of wholes and parts: of quantity, essence, and of power. The human soul, of course, cannot be divisible by a whole of quantity, which is material. As a whole of essence, however, it is completely in each part. Since the soul according to its own essence is the form of the body, it is in each part of the body and in the whole body. But as the potential whole, the human soul, is not entirely in each part of the

---

154 *In I De an.* 14 [Leon. 45/1.65.63-75].
155 These texts are not exactly parallel to the texts we were previously focusing on. I might say they are parallel *secundum quid*, for the threefold division of wholes (he tends to use the word *totalitas* in these texts and *totum* in the texts we have been focusing on) is not identical. In the texts on the threefold wholes, the occasion for the discussion is usually how the soul is predicated of a part, and the corresponding threefold division of wholes is universal, potential and integral. But in these texts the occasion for the discussion is quite different; they are seeking to grasp how the soul is in the whole body and in each part. Here he jettisons the integral whole as simply obviously wrong (see the mention of *domus* in ST I, 76.8 [St. Paul, 361] QDA 10 [Leon.24/1.90.154-56]) since then the soul would be simply an aggregate of bodily parts (I suspect that this is a quite popular current opinion). He replaces the integral whole with the whole of quantity, since one might wonder whether the soul is dimensively extended in the body. In the discussion of predicating the whole of its part, he is speaking of immaterial parts (with the exception of memory) so there is no real reason to consider the per accidens whole of quantity. But it seems to me that the first whole, the universal whole or the whole of essence, is the same, since he includes matter and form and genus and species, see ST I.76.8 [St. Paul, 361]: “Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes rationis et essentiae; sicut definitum in partes definitionis, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam.” If one wants to insist these are distinct, since it is true that he never speaks of the universal whole as including matter and form (he never denies it), but he only uses genus and species as his examples, I will not object. But it makes sense to me that they are the same if one considers that genus and species, for Aquinas, are taken from matter and form. Given the context of the questions which consider how the soul is in the whole body, it is not surprising that the emphasis is on how the soul uniformly informs the whole body, i.e., matter and form, nor is it surprising that the emphasis in the other texts is on the relation between genus and species. Be that as it may, I am primarily interested in the potential whole, and I have no doubt that he is speaking of that in all of these texts. Also, it should be noted that both groups of texts are quite similar in that both exclude per accidens wholes, whether it be an integral whole, a whole of quantity or even a whole of place, but both texts affirm that the only per se wholes are the universal whole/totality of essence and the potential whole. For per se and per accidens totality see ST I 76.8 [St. Paul. 361].
body nor is it in the whole body. This is because the human soul exceeds the capacity of the body, and there remains in it the power for certain non-bodily operations, namely, of intellect and will.\textsuperscript{156}

This general point is crucial for Aquinas understanding of the soul. Considering the soul as form, we can account for the person’s existence, his being one person and his bodily nature. But such a perspective falls short of many of the most important and distinctive aspects of human nature, in particular, that it is rational and capable of immaterial operations. It is only from the perspective of the soul as mover or as a potential whole that one can judge that a rational soul is not a material form, or as Aquinas says, it is not completely immersed or immersed in matter. Both perspectives are crucial and complement one another. There is no contradiction that one principle (\textit{anima}) has two different effects (by serving as \textit{forma et motor}).\textsuperscript{157} Without the soul as a form, a person has no ontological \textit{gravitas} or unity,\textsuperscript{158} but without the soul as motor one cannot ultimately grasp the distinct and dignified characteristics of man and ultimately Thomas’s unique account of the relation between man’s body and soul, namely that it is immediately and intimately united to the body, but nevertheless is not completely immersed and immersed in it.

The primary focus of ethics is not going to be on the soul as form, but on the soul as motor, or as the potential whole.\textsuperscript{159} Of course, the soul as form is presupposed for the soul as

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{156} QDA 10 [Leon.24/1.92.252-258]
\textsuperscript{157} See n. 88.
\textsuperscript{158} QDA 9 ad 3 [Leon.24/1.83.331-32]: “... ex motore ex mobili non fit unum per se in quantum huismodi...”
\textsuperscript{159} The entire concern of ethics is man and his actions towards his end or his failure to achieve it; and that is why its main focus has to be on the potential whole or man as \textit{motor}. As Aquinas notes in his famous prologue to
\end{flushright}
mover, but it is nevertheless somewhat peripheral to ethics.\textsuperscript{160} In this chapter we have discussed the soul as a potential whole from the perspective of the soul as a mostly active principle of operation, a group of operative powers. The Latin \textit{potentia} can, of course, be translated by the more active \textit{power} or the more passive \textit{potency} – both refer to the same metaphysical reality. From the more passive perspective, however, one considers how potency is ordered to act. One sees that that the potential whole is another way of viewing the person or substance as ordered to its actualization through its potency, that is, it is potentially actualized. This must be the case, for only God as perfectly actual has his end, all others do not but are ordered to their actualization or end through potency. Man is ordered to his end or actualization through potency, specifically, through the powers of the soul.\textsuperscript{161} Virtue is precisely such an actualization, a becoming of what man ought to be, and one can only say what something ought to be if it can be that – in this case the predication of possibility is very literally predicated on metaphysical potency.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{160} Because scholarship has been so focused on the soul as form and neglected the soul as motor, there have often been hasty judgments that this or that ethical position violates Aquinas’s philosophy of soul. For instance, more voluntaristic accounts of Aquinas have been criticized as denying Aquinas’s adoption of hylomorphism and falling into Cartesian dualism. See Pinkaers, \textit{Pinkaers Reader}, 284, who completely missed this distinction and who argues that an account of the soul as mover is not in Aquinas. But the focus ought to be on the soul as motor, on Aquinas’s account of the powers themselves and how they are arranged as an ordered series operating together with the soul, and from that perspective it is difficult to make the case that this or that ethical position is “more hylomorphic” than another. It is worthwhile considering precisely which of man’s operations are immaterial, which are not and which are somewhat in between, but no matter how one draws those lines, they do not call into doubt Aquinas’s hylomorphism. A strict materialist would run into problems, of course, but that is not Thomism.

\textsuperscript{161} To put it most simply, QDV 9 [Marietti, 731]: “omnis res est propter suam operationem, . . .” and humans are ordered to operation through potency.

\textsuperscript{162} Excluding absolute contradictions (that something cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same respect), we predicate possibility according to the passive and active \textit{potentiae}. \textit{In I Sent. 42.2.3} [Mand.994]:

the \textit{prima secundae}, the focus is going to be on man as he himself is the \textit{suorum operum principium}. Considering the soul as motor is the consideration of the soul as it is the “\textit{operationis principium}.” QDA 9 [Leon.24/1.81-82,247,250 and 288].
It is to this more passive sense of the potential whole that we now turn in the following chapter. For this is the context in which the tripartate division of the soul is set, and in which Aquinas will argue that the middle part of the soul can participate in reason. Man’s nature or soul is potentially ordered to this kind of participation or actualization through its inseparable potencies or properties. This is why Aquinas says that moral virtues are according to nature. Let us now turn to this topic.

“possibile potest dici secundum potentiam activam et passivam.” For some later texts supporting this position see DP 1.3 [Marietti, 14]; DP 3.14 co [Marietti, 80]; and DP 3.15 ad 11[Marietti, 85].
Chapter II: The Inner Cathedral: Order and Disorder

1. Introduction to the Parts of the Potential Whole.

Let us begin this second chapter with a tour of the inner cathedral, i.e., of Aquinas’s faculty psychology.¹ The powers of the soul are potentiae. In the Latin it is much more obvious that these potencies are understood in contradistinction to actualities. That is, the powers of the soul map nicely onto Thomas’ metaphysical distinction between act and potency, namely between what exists (act) and what can exist but does not (potency).²

The reason that powers are not called, say, actualities but are rather relegated to the realm of potentiality is because they are not always actual. This is quite obvious. I am not always thinking although I clearly have the potential or the power to do so. The act of thinking is the act of the potentia, that is, it is the actualization of my potential to think. But the primary metaphysical distinction between act and potency is not the sole explanatory principle of why a power of the soul is called a potentia.

There is another meaning of potentia which is not necessarily the correlative of act. For example, potentia is one of the names of God, and God, of course, is pure act. It appears that this other understanding of potentia came first in the order of discovery. In Book I of his commentary on the Sentences Thomas notes that the name potentia was first taken to signify the power (potestatem) of man, as we say that some men are powerful.³ Potentia was thus first used to

---

¹ This is Peter King’s phrase used to describe medieval faculty psychology, “Inner Cathedral,” 253-274.
³ In I Sent. 42.1.1 [Mand. 983]: “Responeo dicendum, quod nomen potentiae primo impositum fuit ad significandum potestatem hominis, prout dicimus aliquos homines esse potentes, ut Avicenna dicit, tract. IV
signify man’s power to act, his agency or principle of acting. Thus in its most general sense potentia signifies a principle of some sort, and principle qua principle is not the kind of thing which is necessarily understood to be ordered to potency.

For the most part, these are two different ways of thinking about the same thing: on the one hand as potency as ordered to act, and on the other hand as a principle or agent of action. But potentia (understood as agent) has limits to how potential (understood as distinct from act) it may be. In other words, pure potentia (understood as distinct from act) is in a way not compatible with pure potentia (understood as principle or agent). For if it is purely passive, it appears that it is not really an agent.

Aquinas resolved this tension by distinguishing between different kinds of principles or potentiae: between active and passive ones. Thus prime matter is a purely passive principle of a substance, and God is a purely active principle of creation. It makes sense that pure actuality is completely active and pure potentiality is completely passive, but it would be misleading to simply identify passivity with potentiality and activity with actuality. For the most part, these two different intelligibilities align, but sometimes they do not.

\[\text{Metaph., cap. II, et deinde etiam translatum fuit ad res naturales.}\]
\[\text{For a discussion of this text see Pasnau, Human Nature, 147.}\]
\[\text{It is worth noting that just as Thomas had said that the word potentia was first taken from human power, so Aquinas notes that the word actus was first taken from operation. See QDP I.1[Marietti, 9]: “nomen actus primo fuit attributum operationi. . .” and In Met. IX.1.n. 1769 [Marietti, 424].}\]
\[\text{Ibid., ad. 2: “potentia primo imposita est ad significandum principium actionis.”}\]
\[\text{See ST I, q. 33, a. 1 and especially ad 1[St. Paul, 167].}\]
\[\text{For example, the nutritive powers are active and the possible intellect is passive; it is not the case that the nutritive powers are higher than the possible intellect on the hierarchy (according to act and potency) of being since they are more material and thus less subsistent.}\]
The basic definitions of the two general kinds of principles can be stated simply: An active power is a principle of motion in another insofar as it is other; a passive power is a principle by which something is moved by another insofar as it is other. One sees in his clarification of Aristotle’s apparently redundant formulation of other qua other, that he is very much concerned with the case of natural agents which cause self-motion, that is the soul and its parts. There is no reason to rehearse the arguments from chapter 1 on why an agent cannot be immediately operative, but it is evident enough that in living agents there must be something which moves and something that is moved, and hence some kind of division between active and passive principles. This division between active and passive principles or powers is the first and most general division of the powers of the soul.

The powers are then further specified according to their acts, which in turn are specified according to their objects. This is quite simple: diverse acts require diverse principles or

---

8 I am here taking motion broadly to include any kind of reduction of potency to act. For Aquinas on the distinction between active and passive power see also ST I, q. 25.1 [St. Paul, 134], SCG II, 7 [leon.manualis.97], and QDP I, q. 1[Marietti, 9].

9 In his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX, Aquinas more fully describes active and passive powers as follows (his concern with self motion is quite apparent): In Met. IX.1.n. 1776 [Cathala. 425]: “Et hoc est principium activum, quod est principium transmutationis in alio inquantum est aliud. Et hoc dicit, quia possibile est quod principium activum simul sit in ipso mobili vel passo, sicut cum aliquid movet seipsum; non tamen secundum idem est movens et motum, agens et patiens. Et ideo dicitur quod principium quod dicitur potentia activa, est principium transmutationis in alio inquantum est aliud; quia etsi contingat principium activum esse in eodem cum passo, non tamen secundum quod est idem, sed secundum quod est aliud.” For a discussion of this passage in relation to Aristotle’s text see James E. Royce, “St. Thomas and the Definition of Active Potency,” The New Scholasticism 34 (1960): 431-37. See also McLaughlin, Act, 217. On passive potency see the following text: In Met. IX.1.n. 1777 [Marietti, 425]: “Et quod ad illud principium quod dicitur potentia activa, reductur aliae potentiae, manifestum est. Nam alio modo dicitur potentia passiva, quae est principium quo [text: quod] aliquid moveatur ab alio, inquantum est aliud. Et hoc dicit, quia etsi idem patiatur a seipso, non tamen secundum idem, sed secundum aliud. Hae autem potentia reductur ad primam potentiam activam, quia passio ab agente causatur. Et propter hoc etiam potentia passiva reductur ad activam.”
powers. Since potency is only intelligible by reference to act, one can only know what a power is by what it does. And we only know what the power does by the object of its action.

Thus the specification of a power is tightly bound to the specification of its action, which in turn, is specified according to the ratio of its objects.

An object is related to the act of a passive power as its principle and moving cause, but the object is related to the active power as its term and end. It is from these two kinds of objects (moving cause or end) that actions are first specified. This is intuitive. We have some powers which actively do things or tend towards an end, and some powers which undergo or “suffer” passively, and their objects will correspondingly be the cause that actualized them.

Let us consider Aquinas’s division of the powers in ST I 78.1. Aquinas specifies the powers by beginning with the three “souls” and their corresponding acts. The rational soul, acting by means of immaterial powers, causes immaterial actions. The vegetative soul, acting by means of corporeal qualities, causes material actions. The sensitive soul must use these material qualities, but its actions are not completely reducible to material causes.

---

10 QDA 13 [Leon. 24.1.118.281-283].
11 In de anima 3.8 [Leon.45.1.240.124-125].
12 ST I, 77.3 [St. Paul, 364-65]: “Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, sicut augmentativa virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti.”
13 QDA 13 [Leon.24/1.115.166-176]. In this text he roots this classificatory schema in the fact that an agent acts to induce its likeness in another. In other words, there will be a likeness between cause and effect, since the active principle always causes its likeness in the passive principle. That is why it is possible to reason from objects and ends to their respective active or passive principles.
14 For a somewhat different presentation of the division of the powers of the soul along the lines of act and potency see Pasnau, Human Nature, 145-49.
15 ST I, 78.1 [St. Paul, 369]: “... diversae animae distinguuuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio animae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis: tota enim natura corporalis subijacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut materia et instrumentum. Est ergo quaedam operatio animae, quae intantum excidit naturam corpoream,
He then divides the powers into genera by focusing on the universality (or lack thereof) of their objects. The object of the vegetative powers is not universal, namely, the very body of the composite in which they inhere, e.g., nutrition, generation, and growth. The sense powers, however, are ordered to a more universal object, namely, sensible body in general and not simply the body of the composite. Here we have the five external senses and the four internal senses. If, however, the object is not only sensible being but universally all being, then one has the rational powers, i.e., intellect and will. Thus the second and third genera of powers transcend the composite and are concerned with external objects.  

He then subdivides the rational and sensitive powers (the 2nd and 3rd genera) according to the manner in which they relate to their external objects. The agent can be joined or related to the external object in two ways. In one way the object is present to the soul by way of likeness. And here there are two kinds of apprehensive powers, namely, sensitive, with respect to sensible body, and intellect, with respect to the most common object, universal being. The other way that

quod neque etiam exercetur per organum corporale. Et talis est operatio animae rationalis – Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corporam qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis: quia etsi calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates corporeae requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. – Infima autem operationem animae est, quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae: quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio, huiusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco; hoc enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis est operatio animae vegetabilis, digestio enim, et ea quae consequuntur, fit instrumentaliter per actionem caloris, ut dicitur in II de anima.” Cf. Aristotle De anima II, c. 4 (416b25).

16 ST I 78.1 [St. Paul, 369-70]: “Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum objecta. Quanto enim potestia est altior, tanto respicit universalius objectum, ut supra dictum est. Objectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine potest considerari. Alicuius enim potentiae animae objectum est solum corpus animae unitum. Et hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum: non enim vegetativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. – Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit universalius objectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens.”
the soul can be joined to an external object is as the soul inclines and tends towards the exterior thing. There are two kinds of these powers. One kind is the appetitive powers by which the soul desires and seeks an external thing as an end. The other, however, is the motive power by which the soul is moved according to place. In this way the soul is related to an exterior thing as to the term of its operation and motion.\(^\text{17}\)

It is possible, in a rough way, to neatly divide the powers. The appetitive powers are actively related to their ends, and the apprehensive powers are passively related to their objects. Broadly speaking this is correct, but there is a way in which the apprehensive powers actively move the appetitive powers and a way in which the appetitive powers are passively moved by the apprehensive powers.\(^\text{18}\) In other words, what appears to be a passive power (e.g., intellect) is partly active and what appears to be an active power (e.g., will) is also partly passive.\(^\text{19}\) This, in broad brushstrokes, is the soul as a potential whole.

Since the whole purpose of the potential whole is operation, let us now consider how it operates. The soul, qua mover or as potential whole, moves by means of cognition and appetite;

\(^\text{17}\) We shall develop the precise nature of the relation between cognition and appetite in chapter 4. ST I, q. 78.1 [St. Paul, 370]: “Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. – Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo coniungi suo objecto circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est objectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum, respectu objecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, respectu objecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. – Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem, sunt duo genera potentiarum animae, unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; alius autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne animal movetur.” For more on the motive power see n. 22.

\(^\text{18}\) See, for example, De ver. 25.1 [Leon.22/3.728.114-29]: “Motus enim appetitivae partis ex apprehensione quodam modo oritur, quia omnis operatio passivi ab activo originem sumit: appetitus autem potentia passiva est, quia movetur ab appetibili quod est movens non motum, ut dicitur in III De anima. . .”

\(^\text{19}\) DM 6 [Leon.23.148.307-331]. We shall investigate this in more detail shortly.
in man, the soul moves by means of intellect and will. When the intellection part, reason and will, moves the body, it can only do so by means of the sensitive part, the internal and external sense powers, for reason apprehends what is universal, but motion concerns what is particular. In the particular case of locomotion, the soul moves the body by means of the motive power, which in turn is moved by reason’s command.

However, it is not the case that the sensible soul in man is identical to the sensible soul in animals, as if man were just an advanced animal but with two additional complex powers, reason and will, sprinkled on top. The sensitive soul in a human is more excellent than the sensitive soul in an irrational animal because a human’s sensitive soul is the rational soul. Aquinas notes that the sensitive soul in animals and man are not even in the same genus, since genus and species are taken from the composite, i.e., matter and form. If they were in the same genus, this would be so only logically speaking. If we ask how this is so, he gives us an answer:

The sensible soul in man is not an irrational soul, but it is simultaneously a sensible and a rational soul. But it is true that certain powers of the sensitive soul are indeed irrational according to themselves, but they participate in reason insofar as they obey reason. The powers of the vegetative soul, however, are completely irrational because they do not obey reason, as is apparent from the Philosopher in book I of the Ethics.

---

20 QSC 3 ad 4 [Leon.24/2.45.464-476].
21 QDA 9 ad 6 [Leon.24/1.83-83.368-91].
22 See ST I-II 76.2 ad 2. The motive power only moves by way reason and will’s command, see QDV 25.4 [Leon.22/3.737.74-76]: “ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis.” See also SCG 3.10 [Leon.manualis.236.In actionibus]: “… vis motiva, qua moventur membra ad exequendum imperium voluntatis.” This is not the case in animals, where the motive power is moved directly by the sense appetites, see ST I-II, 75.3 arg. 3 and ad 3, and QDV 22.3.
23 QDA 11, ad 12 [Leon.24/1.103.348-351]: “anima sensibilis est nobilior in homine quam in alis animalibus quia in homine non tantum est sensibilis, set etiam rationalis.” DP 3.11 ad 1 [Marietti, 74]; ST I, 76.5 [St. Paul, 358]: “Anima autem intellectiva habet completissime virtutem sentitivam: quia quod est in inferioris preexistit perfectus in superiori . . .”
24 QDA 1, ad. 14 [Leon.24/1.103.358-365].
25 QDA 11, ad 15 [Leon.24/1.103.366-74]: “. . . anima sensibilis in homine non est anima irrationalis, set
The sensitive powers are then irrational according to themselves, but since the sensitive soul from which they flow is the rational soul, they are not completely so because they can and are meant to participate in reason. Aquinas, following Aristotle, apparently wants to characterize some of the sense powers as partially rational and partially irrational. As rooted in the soul’s essence, the rational soul, the sense powers ought to participate in reason; however, as sensitive powers they are nevertheless somehow irrational.

Arguing along the same lines in QDV 8, he notes that the sense appetites are naturally obedient to reason and thus naturally receptive of virtue by which they are perfected to follow a good of reason. In the following article Aquinas explains, rather mechanically and somewhat simplistically, how the sense appetites participate in reason. One sees the natural aptitude to virtue, he says, from the order of the powers of the soul. In the intellect there is the quasi-passive possible intellect which is actualized by the agent intellect. The actualized intellect in turn moves the will, for the understood good is the end which moves the will. The will, which has been moved by reason in turn naturally, moves the sensitive appetite, which in turn naturally obeys reason. Virtue in the appetitive part, he says a little later, if rightly considered is nothing else...

---

26 QDV I. 8 [Marietti, 728]: “Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis naturaliter sunt obaudibiles rationi: unde naturaliter sunt susceptivae virtus, quae in eis perficitur, secundum quod disponuntur ad bonum rationis sequendum.” He is speaking of the same thing, see QDV I. 10 ad 11[Marietti, 737]; ” . . . irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis sic accipiunt nomen rationis vel rationalis, in quantum participant aliquid rationis, in quantum obedientiui.”

27 QDV I.9 [Marietti, 731]: “aptitudo naturalis ad virtutem quam habet homo, est secundum principia activa et passiva; quod quidem ex ipso ordine potentiarum apparat. Nam in parte intellectiva est principium quasi passivum intellectus possibilis, qui reductitur in suam perfectionem per intellectum agentem. Intellectus autem in actu movet...”
than a disposition or a form, sealed or signed and impressed (sigillata et impressa) on the appetitive power by reason.\textsuperscript{28}

Although this is highly simplified, I wish to emphasize that man’s aptitude to virtue is intelligible from the perspective of the rational soul qua motor, i.e., the potential whole which includes all of the powers operating together in unison as rooted in the soul. It is from this perspective that virtue is natural to man and it is according to his nature. Moral virtue is only natural when it is grasped that the sensitive soul is identical with the rational soul. When the sensitive powers are grasped by themselves, however, Aquinas seems to want to say that they are rather irrational. But there should be nothing too surprising about their natural irrationality, of course, for they are not, strictly speaking, rational powers.

\section*{2. Man’s Divided Nature}

Let us take a step back and consider how the sense appetites may be both irrational and rational, since this is a large part of the reason why humans need moral virtues at all. Aquinas opens his disputed questions \textit{De virtutibus in communi} with some prefatory remarks explaining that virtue is a perfection of a power. He then moves on to explaining which kinds of powers can be perfected by habits and which cannot; the crucial point is the manner in which a power is a principle of an act. Powers are constituted in three ways: active, passive, and partly active and partly passive.\textsuperscript{29} If a power is completely active (e.g., the agent intellect), or completely passive.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., “Unde, si recte consideretur, virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud quam quaedam dispositio, sive forma, sigillata et impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione.”

\textsuperscript{29}QDV 1 [Marietti, 708-709]: “Secundum autem diversam conditionem potentialium, diversus est modus complexionis ipsius. Est enim \textit{aliqua} potestas tantum agens; \textit{aliqua} tantum acta vel mota; \textit{alia} vero agens et acta.”}
(e.g. an external sense) then it cannot be perfected by a habit. In the case of a completely active power, the power itself is already complete and does not need an additional habit to be perfected or fully actualized. In fact, the virtue of such a power is the power itself. Nor can a completely passive power have such a perfection because such a power completely receives its perfection from its corresponding active power. Its perfection is utterly dependant on the active cause and as soon as that cause ceases to cause its perfection vanishes. In other words, it doesn’t make sense to speak of a perfection of a completely passive or a completely active power since they both always do exactly what they are supposed to do.

He says that those powers which are partly active and partly passive (agentes et actae), are moved by their active causes but (in the case of humans) they are not determined by those causes to one (ad unum). They are moved movers, but not deterministically. These powers are perfected by a superimposed habit, but by this habit the power is not compelled to one (ad unum), since then the power would not be in control of its own acts (domina sui actus).

Aquinas does not mean to say that the power itself completely controls its own act (although it

---

30 Ibid., “Potentia igitur quae est tantum agens, non indiget, ad hoc quod sit principium actus, aliquo inducto; unde virtus talis potentiae nihil est aliud quam ipsa potentia. Talis autem potentia est divina, intellectus agens, et potentiae naturales; unde harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt aliqui habitus, sed ipsae potentiae in seipsis completae.”

31 Ibid., “Illae vero potentiae sunt tantum actae quae non agunt nisi ab aliis motae; nec est in eis agere vel non agere, sed secundum impetum virtutis moventis moventis agunt; et tales sunt vires sensitivae secundum se consideratae; unde in III Ethic. [comm. 8] dicitur, quod sensus nullius actus est principium: et hae potentiae perficiuntur ad suos actus per aliquid superinductum; quod tamen non inest eis sicut aliqua forma manens in subiecto, sed solum per modum passionis, sicut species in pupilla. Unde nec harum potentiarum virtutes sunt habitus, sed magis ipsae potentiae, secundum quod sunt actu passae a suis activis.”

32 Ibid., “Potentiae vero illae sunt agentes et actae quae ita moventur a suis activis, quod tamen per eas non determinantur ad unum; sed in eis est agere, sicut vires aliquo modo rationales; et hae potentiae compleuntur ad agendum per aliquid superinductum, quod non est in eis per modum passionis tantum, sed per modum formae quiescentis, et manentis in subiecto; ita tamen quod per eas non de necessitate potentia ad unum cogatur; quia sic potentia non esset domina sui actus.” See chapter three for the difference between a transient passion and a relatively permanent habit.
does so to a certain extent), for he notes that the virtues of these powers are habits to the extent that someone can act when he wills to do so and humans only have control (\textit{dominum}) of their actions to the extent that they have free decision.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus it is not only because of the fact that some powers have an active and a passive element that perfecting habits are possible; it is also because these powers are in rational agents that one can speak of such perfections at all.\textsuperscript{34} Consider the case of non-rational animals: their sense appetites are partly active and partly passive, but they have no need for habits. In some sense an animal’s sense appetite is more perfect than man’s since it always does what it is supposed to do, that is, it impels the animal towards a particular perceived object as suitable (\textit{conveniens}) to its animal nature. More complex animals (excluding humans) have an estimative power which instinctually judges what is good or bad for them\textsuperscript{35} -- a kind of instinctual cognition which their sense appetites always immediately and naturally follow.\textsuperscript{36} Aquinas notes that

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., “Harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt ipsae potentiae; neque passiones, sicut est in sensitivis potentis; neque qualitates de necessitate agentes, sicut sunt qualitates rerum naturalium; sed sunt habitus, secundum quos potest quis agere cum voluerit ut dicit Commentator in III de anima [comm. 18]. Et Augustinus in Lib. de Bono Coniugali [cap. XXI] dicit, quod habitus est quo quis agit, cum tempus affuerit.” For Augustine’s text see \textit{De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate} ed. and trans. by P.G. Walsh (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), 45. See also \textit{In II Sent.} 25.1 [Mand.645] he says that humans have \textit{dominium} over their acts because they have free decision: “…haec est differentia in agentibus, quae quaedam determinant sibi finem et actum in finem illum, quaedam vero non: nec aliquod agens finem sibi praestitueret potest nisi rationem finis cognoscat et ordinem ejus quod est ad finem ipsum, quod solum in habentibus intellectum est; et inde est quod judicium de actione propria est solum in habentibus intellectum, quasi in potestate eorum constitutum sit eligere hanc actionem vel illam; unde et dominum sui actus habere dicuntur.”

\textsuperscript{34} See ST I-II, 51.3 [St. Paul, 764].

\textsuperscript{35} The estimative power in higher animals accounts for their relatively complex judgements, its judgements are too complex to be accounted for by the external senses. For texts on the estimative power see ST I, q. 78, a. 4 [St. Paul, 374]; De ver. 1. 11 [Leon.22/1.34.98-104]; \textit{In II de an}, 13 [Leon.45.122.200-222]. We shall discuss its human version, the cogitative power, later.

\textsuperscript{36} There is, of course, no such thing as an incontinent animal. ST I 83.1 [St. Paul, 390]: “appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus sicut ovis, timens lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet.”
animals can have this kind of instinctual judgment about what is truly good and bad for them because of the weakness of their active principle, that is, their soul. Because material forms (i.e., souls) have material goods, they can have instinctual judgments about particular goods, e.g., wolves are always evil for sheep. The goods which their sense appetites are naturally attracted to or repelled by are really what is good or bad for the animal qua animal. It is not the same in the case of man whose soul is the form of the body, but is nevertheless not a material form, that is, man’s soul is not completely immersed in matter. Although the sense appetite orders man to what is good for his animal nature, it is impossible that there be a determinate inclination to particular good things which are in fact good for man qua man. Man’s good would consist in particular material things if he were a material form, but he is not.

Because man’s bodily goods are ordered to the good of his soul, his bodily determination of their goodness or badness, that is, his sense appetite’s natural determination is necessarily always insufficient and incomplete. Any material good must always be placed in the

---

37 QDV 1.6 [Marietti, 722]: “Sed quia aliquod bonum apprehensum oportet esse objectum appetitus animalis et rationalis; ubi ergo istud bonum uniformiter se habet, potest esse inclinatio naturalis in appetitu, et iudicium naturale in vi cognitiva, sicut accidit in brutis. Cum enim sint paucarum operationum propter debilitatem principii activi quod ad paucam se extendit; est in omnibus unius speciei bonum uniformiter se habens. Unde per appetitum naturalem inclinationem habent in id, et per vim cognitivam naturale iudicium habent de illo proprio bono uniformiter se habente. Et ex hoc naturali iudicio et naturali appetitu provenit quod omnis hirundo uniformiter facit nidum, et quod omnis aranea uniformiter facit telam; et sic est in omnibus aliis brutis considerare. Homo autem est multarum operationum et diversarum; et hoc propter nobilitatem sui principii activi, scilicet animae, cuius virtus ad infinita quodammodo se extendit. Et ideo non sufficeret homini naturalis appetitus boni, nec naturale iudicium ad recte agendum, nisi amplius determinetur et perficiatur. Per naturalem siquidem appetitum homo inclinatur ad appetendum proprium bonum; sed cum hoc multipliciter varietur, et in multis bonum hominis consistat; non potuit homini inesse naturalis appetitus huius boni determinati, secundum conditiones omnes quae requiruntur ad hoc quod sit ei bonum; cum hoc multipliciter varietur secundum diversas conditiones personarum et temporum et locorum, et huiusmodi.”

38 ST I-II 2.5 [St. Paul, 565]: “non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore: et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat.”
extraordinarily complex and often messy circumstances of human actions, and in that context only reason informed by prudence is able to order material goods to the good of the soul.

Man’s sense appetites are, however, in some way rational, *aliquo modo rationales*, as we discussed, because they can participate in or obey reason. Thus there are two ways of construing what the sense appetites naturally do. On the one hand, they are naturally drawn towards particular objects as sensible goods. On the other hand, man’s sense appetite may *naturally* obey man’s reason and will in spite of its normal natural inclination towards some particular good. Man is naturally divided in a way that animals are not. Consider how QDV4 brings out man’s divided nature to argue for the need for perfecting habits in the sense appetites:

\[
\ldots \text{any act of which man is master} (\textit{dominus}) \text{ is properly a human act; not, however, those of which man is not master} (\textit{dominus}), \text{ although they happen in man, as to digest, and to grow, and other things of this sort. Therefore in that which is the principle of such action of which man is master} (\textit{dominus}), \text{ it is possible to place human virtue.}
\]

Nevertheless it must be known that there is a threefold principle of this sort of act. *One* as first mover and commanding: it is by this that man is master

---

39 ST I-II, q. 50, a. 3, ad 1 [St. Paul, 758]: “Sed vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediant rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. Dicitur.” And I-II, q. 56 a. 4 co [St. Paul, 780]: he notes the sense appetites “possunt considerari inquantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire.” There are many passages which say the same, we shall see them in chapter 4.

40 See ST I-II.31.1 [St. Paul, 686]. The sense appetites are drawn to real goods, but not in a moral sense, ST.I-II.34.1 [St. Paul, 700-01]. For example, our sense appetites are naturally drawn to sexual pleasures for the good of generating children, but they offer no help in choosing morally good spouses.

41 QDM 4.2. ad1 [Leon.23.111.316-323]: “... aliquid potest esse naturale homini dupliciter : uno modo in quantum est animal, et sic naturale est ei quod concupiscibilis feratur in delectabile secundum sensum communiter loquendo ; alio modo in quantum est homo, id est animal rationale, et sic naturale est ei quod concupiscibilis feratur in delectabile sensus secundum ordinem rationis. Concupiscencia ergo, per quam prona est vis concupiscibilis ut feratur in delectabile sensus praeter ordinem rationis, est contra naturam hominis in quantum est homo, et ita pertinet ad peccatum originale.”In II Sent. 30.1.1 ad 4 [Mandonnet.2.768]: “... vis concupiscibilis naturale habet hoc ut in delectabile secundum sensum tendat ; sed secundum quod est vis concupiscibilis humana, habet ulterior ut tendat in suum objectum secundum regimen rationis; et ideo quod in suum objectum tendat irrefrenate, hoc non est naturale sibi inquantum est humana, sed magis contra naturam ejus inquantum hujusmodi.” See also ST I-II, 50.3 ad 1 [St. Paul, 758].
(dominus) of his own act, and this is reason and will. Another is a moved mover, such as the sense appetite, which is also moved by the superior appetite insofar as it also obeys it, and then in turn it moves the exterior members through its own command. Third, however, is what is only moved, namely, the exterior member.

When, however, both, namely the exterior member and the inferior appetite are moved by the superior part of the soul, they are moved in different ways. For according to the order of nature the exterior member on command obeys the commanding superior without any resistance, unless there is some impediment, as is apparent with a hand or a foot. But the inferior appetite has its own inclination from its own nature, whence it does not follow the superior appetite on command, but sometimes it resists (repugnat, literally ‘fights back’).

Whence Aristotle says in his Politics [I.3] that the soul dominates the body by a despotic rule, as a master (dominus) dominates (dominatur) his slave, who does not have the capacity of resisting some command of his lord. But reason dominates the inferior parts of the soul by a regal and political rule, that is, as kings and princes of states lord over (dominatur) free men, who have the right and power to resist (facultatem repugnandi) with respect to some precepts of a king or a prince.

Therefore in the exterior member there is no need of something perfective of the human act, except its natural disposition, by which it is naturally moved by reason. But in the inferior appetite, which can resist reason, it is necessary that there is something by which it follows an operation which reason commands without resistance (repugnantia) . . . .

Thus when it is necessary that the act of a man is concerned with things which are objects of the sense appetite, it is required for the goodness of the act that there be some disposition or perfection in the sense appetite by which it easily obeys reason. And this we call virtue.42

QDV 4 [Marietti, 717-718]: “Quilibet igitur actus cuius homo dominus est, est proprie actus humanus; non autem illi quorum homo non est dominus, licet in homine fiat, ut digerere, et augeri, et alia huiusmodi. In eo igitur quod est principium talis actus cuius homo dominus est, potest poni virtus humana. Sciendum tamen est, quod huiusmodi actus contingit esse triplex principium. Unum sicut primum movens et imperans, per hoc quod homo sui actus sit dominus; et hoc est ratio vel voluntas. Aliud est movens motum, sicut appetitus sensibilis, qui etiam movetur ab appetitus superiori in quantum ei obedit, et tunc iterum movet membra exteriora per sui imperium. Tertium autem est quod est motum tantum, scilicet membrum exteriur. Cum autem utrumque, et appetitus inferior a superiori parte animae moveantur; tamen aliter, et aliter. Nam membra exteriur ad nutum obedit superiori imperanti absque ulla repugnancia secundum naturae ordinem, nisi sit impedimentum aliquod; ut patet in manu et pede. Appetitus autem inferior habet propriam inclinationem ex natura sua, unde non obedit superiori appetitui ad nutum, sed interdum repugnat; unde Aristoteles dicit in Politica sua [lib. I, cap. III], quod anima dominatur corpori dispotico principatu, sicut dominus servo, qui non habet facultatem resistendi in aliquo imperio domini; ratio vero dominatur inferioribus animae partibus regali et politico principatu, id est sicut reges et principes civitatum dominantur liberi, qui habent ius et facultatem repugnandi quantum ad aliqua praecipua regis vel principis. In membro igitur exteriori non est necessarium aliquid perfectivum actus humani, nisi naturalis eius dispositio, per quam natum est moveri a ratione; sed in appetitu inferiori, qui ratione repugnare potest, est
Thomas here speaks of the sense appetite as passive or as a moved mover in two ways: 1) insofar as it is moved by the sensible good apprehended by the external senses (or imagination we might add),\footnote{ST I 80.2 [St. Paul,388]. In both cases, 1 and 2, the sense appetite is moved via the internal sense powers.} and 2) insofar as it is moved by the command of reason. As it is moved by the command of reason it can be ordered to diverse things and in this respect it can have habits by which it is disposed in a good or bad way.\footnote{ST I-II 50.3 [St. Paul, 758]: “Respondeo dicendum quod vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo, secundum quod operandur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, secundum quod operandur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operandur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura. Et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu naturae operandunt. – Secundum vero quod operandur ex imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.” Cf. QDV 20.2 [Leon.22/3.576.122-3]. See also note 30 and QDV 1.4 ad 6 [Marietti, 718]. In these passages the phrase to operate by instinct of nature “ex instinctu naturae” is used to signify the determinate mode of natural operation exactly as it is contrasted with free operation, see the De veritate passage cited above. The instinctus naturae describes the manner in which a human sensitive appetite can be directly moved by external sensitive powers that operate (ST I-II 50.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 758]) “secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos.” Cf. In 1 Sent. 39.2.2 [Mand.932]: “. . . modus providentiae extendit se etiam usque ad bruta animalia, quae potius aguntur instinctu naturae quam electione voluntatis.” This is not exactly the same as God’s efficietly moving the cogitative power in irrational animals or the will in man, which is also described as a motion caused by an instinctu naturae. God’s efficietly moving the will ex instinctu naturae does not take away from the free nature of the action. We shall discuss this in more detail in the in chapters 4 and 5.} Except for the per accidens concordance of 1 and 2,\footnote{I am here speaking of antecedent passions which are prior to reason’s command. Consequent passions are, by definition, commanded, or at the very least consented to. There appear to be two ways that antecedent passions can align with the consequent command of reason. Either this happens by chance, or it appears to happen because reason has commanded the object to be presented to the sense appetite, e.g., I choose to imagine something attractive, or I place the attractive object, say something good to eat, before my senses. But in this latter case, the passions are not, in fact antecedent, but are consequent to and elicited by the command of reason, for the command is temporally prior to the passion. It is always per accidens to the sense appetite whether or not it is in line with reason. On its own the sense appetitive seeks its own pleasurable particular bodily good; it is accidental to its own natural appetite whether or not any appetitive motion is moral. See, for example, the following passage: DM 2.4 [Leon 23.40.196-220]: “. . . actus cuiuslibet potentiae specificatur secundum id quod per se pertinet ad illam potentiam, non autem secundum id quod pertinet ad eam solum per accidens. Si ergo objecta humanorum actuum necessarium aliquid quo operationem quam ratio imperat, absque repugnantia sequatur. . . . Quando igitur oportet operationem hominis esse circa ea quae sunt objecta sensibilis appetitus, requiritur ad bonitatem operationis quod sit in appetitu sensibili aliqua dispositio, vel perfectio, per quam appetitus praedictus de facili obedient rationi; et hanc virtutem vocamus.”} either it is drawn towards what reason commands, or it is drawn towards the sensible object.
Moral virtue, in this passage, is a kind of obedience or docility on the part of the sense appetites, the ability to always be moved by reason without resistance and pain.\textsuperscript{46} It seems that the purpose of virtue is to make the person more able to do as he freely chooses, and to make the sense appetites more slavish and less able to fight back, \textit{repugnare}, against man’s free decision about what is best. The perfection of the sense appetites is precisely to become obedient to reason without pain, resistance, and repugnance.

Moral virtue strives to overcome a kind of natural evil:

Thus it follows that there is in each thing a natural inclination to evil in the unqualified sense, because it is composed of two natures of which the inferior has an inclination to some particular good suitable to that inferior nature and repugnant to the superior nature insofar as it seeks the unqualified good, as in man there is a natural inclination to that which is suitable to the carnal sense against the good of reason.\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{DM 16.2 [Leon.23.288.230-237]: “Vnde relinquitur cuicumque inest naturalis inclinatio ad malum simpliciter, quod hoc sit compositum ex duabus naturis, quorum inferior habet inclinationem ad bonum aliquod particulare conveniens inferiori nature et repugnans nature superiori secundum quam attenditur bonum simpliciter, sicut in homine est inclinationis naturalis ad id quod est conveniens carnali sensui contra bonum rationis.” ST I-II, 71.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 850]. In the QDM 16.2 above, Aquinas had earlier distinguished between what is evil \textit{simpliciter} and what is evil \textit{secundum quid}. The former is always evil, say homicide; the latter can be good but simultaneously evil for another, as a wolf is good in itself but an evil for a sheep. In our case he is discussing something which is evil in itself, \textit{in se} or \textit{simpliciter}. One kind of such evil is a natural inclination to evil. Unlike humans, intellectual substances (angels) cannot have a natural inclination to evil, since their intellectual nature naturally inclines to something like itself, and thus their natural inclination is to what is immaterial and good in an unqualified sense. Man as rational has a similar natural appetite to what is immaterial and good in an unqualified sense, but as bodily he also has a natural appetite to what is delectable according to his senses, which is always for some particular and not unqualified good, (see lines 170-230). In itself there is nothing evil about the inclination following the sense appetites, but when the person is considered as a whole, then there is an intrinsic tension between the rational\textsuperscript{47}\textsuperscript{46}\textsuperscript{45}}
It is important to point out that there is a sense in which these two appetites are somehow essentially contrary to one another.\(^{48}\) The lower appetite, as pulling man towards some particular good, always threatens to draw him away from the universal good.\(^{49}\) On its own, because of its partly material nature, the sense appetite has a kind of resistance or repugnance to the immaterial reason and will\(^{50}\) – for it is always naturally pushing towards what it wants irrespective of reason’s consideration. The harmonizing of these two appetites is not a question of giving each equal reign, as in a democracy; it is rather the control of the one over the other.\(^{51}\) It is simultaneously a repression of a kind of natural evil and the perfection of a kind of natural good, i.e., the classical idea of letting the higher part of the soul govern the lower.

\(^{48}\) Virtue can diminish but not remove this contrarieness, QDV 1.4. ad 7 [Marietti, 718]: “tota rebellio irascibilis et concupiscibilis ad rationem tolli non potest per virtutem; cum ex ipsa sui natura irascibilis et concupiscibilis in id quod est bonum secundum sensum, quandoque ratione repugnet; licet hoc possit fieri divina virtute, quae potens est etiam naturas immutare. Nihilominus tamen per virtutem minuit illa rebellio, in quantum praedictae vires assueficiunt ut ratione subdantur; ut sic ex extrinseco habeant id quod ad virtutem pertinet, scilicet ex dominio rationis super eas; ex seipsis autem retineant aliquid de motibus proprii, qui quandoque sunt contrarii rationi.”

\(^{49}\) Sin, in one sense, is the turn from the immutable good to the mutable good. The sense appetites always draw us towards the mutable goods. Reason and will are naturally drawn to the immutable good. That is the basic tension. Because man only has one soul, his attention can only be focused in one way at any particular instant. The sense appetites always draw man’s attention towards some particular sensible good in the process of deliberation. This doesn’t, of course constitute sin, since sin must be chosen, but this natural attraction to the sensible is always a little dangerous unless it is regulated by reason. This is especially true if the attraction is strong, for it will distort the relative importance of the object being considered. Sensible motions or passions which are away from particular sensible goods are not exceptions: the irascible appetite is the *propugnatrix et defensatrix*, (ST I 82.2 [St. Paul, 390]) of the good of the concupiscible appetite, and even hatred in the concupiscible appetite is ultimately rooted in a love of some good. This follows from Aquinas’s thought that all of the passions are rooted in and derived from love, but sensible love for bodily goods.

\(^{50}\) QDA 8 ad 7: [Leon 24/1.71.401-02] “... pugna que est in homine ex contrariis concupiscientis etiam ex necessitate materiae provenit. Necessae enim futi, si homo haberet sensum [the body of this article explains that man must have sense because phantasms are required for man’s intellect], quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum sequeretur concupiscientia delectabilium, que plerumque repugnat rationi.”

\(^{51}\) *In II Sent.* 24.3.2 [Mand. 620]. See how sensuality diminishes man’s *dominium*. 
A vicious agent that habitually follows his passions has forfeited his humanity by reversing this order. He has chosen to act according to material necessity – for sensible objects determine his passions which in turn in a habitual manner determine his volitions.\textsuperscript{52} When that happens God governs him exactly like a brute (an animal), i.e., through heavenly bodies, which are material causes.\textsuperscript{53} The immaterial nature of the will requires God’s immediate causality, but the vicious have anchored their wills to material necessity. Sin allows the sense appetites to operate naturally according to material necessity, but from the perspective of their ability to obey reason they are depressed, i.e., drawn or dragged down to the flesh; on the other hand, when the sense appetites are perfected by virtues they are elevated, in a way, from this material necessity.\textsuperscript{54} The wise rule the stars, Aquinas says, but fools are ruled by them.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} In II Sent. 39.2.2 [Mandonnet, 993]. See also QDV 1.4 ad 1 [Marietti, 718]: “actus virtutis consistit in hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequuntur rationem, ita actus peccati consistit in hoc quod ratio trahitur ad sequendum inclinationem irascibilis et concupiscibilis.

\textsuperscript{53} Aquinas thinks that for the most part Astrologers can predict vicious and incontinent action because such agents are ruled by material necessity in accordance with the material heavenly bodies. He generally places this in the context of predicting wars, i.e., predictions of large numbers of people who for the most part act, he thinks, according to their passions and not reason. Because humans are free these predictions are severely lacking in particular cases. It would seem that a materialistic science of behavior which was sophisticated enough, say neuroscience in a hundred years (or perhaps a few hundred years), would be able to have quite a lot of predictive success among large populations. However, such science must always be blind to virtuous activity because it is necessarily free and thus not determined by prior internal and external materialistic causes. See ST I 115.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 536]; ST I-II, 9.5 ad 3 [St. Paul, 603]; De ver. 5.10 ad 7 [Leon.22/2.171.241-53], De sortibus, c. 4 [Leon.43.233-34.124-154].

\textsuperscript{54} QDV 1.4 ad 4 [Marietti, 718]: “… in formis invenitur quidam gradus. Sunt enim quaedam formae et virtutes totaliter ad materiam depressae, quarum omnis actio materialis est; ut patet in formis elementarius. Intellectus vero est totaliter a materia liber; unde et eius operatio est absque corporis communione. Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis medio modo se habent. Quod enim organo corporali utantur, ostendit corporalis transmutatio, quae earum actibus adiungitur; quod iterum sint aliquo modo a materia elevatae, ostenditur per hoc quod per imperium movetur et quod obediunt rationi. Et sic in eis est virtus, id est in quantum elevatae sunt a materia, et rationi obediunt.” On sin see DM 4.3 [Leon.23.111.265-274]: esp., “inferiores uires que erigi debebant ad rationem, depresse sunt ad inferiorea.” The full text is in n.234. See also In II Sent. 24.3.2 [Mand.621]: “sensualitas, ut supra dictum est, nominat partem sensitivam secundum quod magis ad carnem depressa est, prout non sequitur in operando imperium voluntatis, sed movetur proprio motu; . . .” The emphasis is mine.

\textsuperscript{55} In II Sent. 25.1.2 ad 5 [Mand. 650-51]. He means the heavenly bodies.
The vicious agent has chosen to act as a material form; he really thinks that he is his
sensitive nature – that is precisely what perverted self-love is. The virtuous agent, however,
does his best to live according to the demands of his rational human nature. For virtue, according
to Aquinas, is the good which is according to his form.

3. In what way is virtue according to nature?

But what does it mean to live according to one’s form? Sin (peccatum), for example, is
nothing else than a failure to achieve what is according to one’s nature. In its broadest sense

---

56 ST II-II, 25.7 [St. Paul 1203]: “. . . non omnes aestimant se esse id quod sunt. Principale enim in homine est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura sensitiva et corporalis: quorum primum apostolus nominat interiorem hominem, secundum exteriorum, ut patet II ad Cor. 4. Boni autem aestimant principale in seipsis rationalem naturam, sive interiorem hominem: unde secundum hoc aestimant se esse quod sunt. Mali autem aestimant principale in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporalem, scilicet exteriorium hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt id quod seipsos esse reputant. Boni autem, vere cognoscentes seipsos, vere seipsos diligunt.” See also ST I-II, 71.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 850].

57 ST I-II, 18.5 [St. Paul, 635-6]: “bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem. Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei praeter ordinem suae formae.” In II Ethic 2 [Leon.47.80.41-49]: Et dicit quod hoc debet supponi tamquam quiddam commune circa qualitatem operationum causantium virtutem, quod scilicet sint secundum rationem rectam. Cuius ratio est quia bonum ciuslibet rei est in hoc quod sua operatio sit conveniens suae formae; propria autem forma hominis est secundum quam est animal rationale; unde oportet quod operatio hominis sit bona ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam, perversitas enim rationis repugnat naturae rationis.” Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 [St. Paul, 850]: “Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, . . . vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. . . . considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam hominis inquantum est homo. Unde virtus humana, quae hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi: vitium autem intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem rationis.” In II Ethic 5 [Leon.47.91.128-133]: “Habitus enim est dispositio quaedam determinans potentiam per comparisonem ad aliquid, quae quidem determinatio, si sit secundum quod convenit naturae rei, erit habitus bonus disponens ad hoc quod aliquid fiat bene, aliquin erit habitus malus et secundum ipsum aliquid fieri male.” ST I-II, 50.2 ad 1 [St. Paul, 757]: “. . . essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis [habitus] disponitur.”

58 ST I-II 109.8 [St. Paul, 1057]: “. . . quia peccare nihil aliud est quam recedere ab eo quod est secundum naturam” and ST I-II 109.2 ad 2 [St. Paul 1052]: “. . . peccare nihil aliud est quam deficiere a bono quod convenit aliqui secundum suam naturam.” The classical Aristotelian definition of peccatum is to miss the mark as when an archer fails to hit the bull’s-eye. This is different from the more general malum which simply denotes privation (as
(when nature is divided from art), it is the very “inclination of nature itself” which provides the mark that is missed in a peccatum.\(^59\) Is it this same inclination of nature which drives the manner in which virtue is according to nature?

Does he mean natural inclination or appetite in a broad sense, or in some more restricted sense? It would seem that the phrase “according to nature” and the “inclination of nature itself” mean the same thing. For instance, in ST I-II, 49.2, he says that a habit is according to nature, and here he seems to be using it in a broad sense as essence.\(^60\) But in other places he seems to mean something more restricted. For example, says that human acts which are according to nature are those which are according to reason, man’s highest part; indeed the phrase secundum naturam and secundum rationem are often interchangeable for Aquinas.\(^61\) Moreover, Thomas often says that virtue is according to the natural inclination of the rational appetite itself, that is, the will.\(^62\) Which one is it? And to significantly complicate matters, what about the infused

---

\(^59\) DM 2.1 [Leon. 23.29.175-187]: “. . . peccatum enim, ut Philosophus dicit in II Phisicorum, contingit et in his quae sunt secundum naturam et in his quae sunt secundum artem, quando non consequitur finem natura vel ars propter quem operatur. Quod autem finem non consequatur operans per artem vel per naturam, contingit ex hoc quod declinatur a mensura vel regula debite operationis; quod quidem in naturalibus est ipsa naturae inclinatio consequens aliquam formam, in artificialibus uero est ipsa regula artis. Sic ergo in peccato duo possunt attendi, scilicet recessus a regula vel a mensura, et recessus a fine.” See also DM 2.4 [Leon 23.39.117-162].

\(^60\) ST I-II, 49.2 [St. Paul, 753], e.g., “Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni: quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.”

\(^61\) DM 14.2 ad 8 [Leon.23.262.217-219]: “. . . ratio est hominis natura: unde quidquid est contra rationem, est contra hominis naturam.” ST I-II, 54.3 [St. Paul, 773]: “Et hoc modo distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus: nam habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non convenientem naturae. Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem: actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur.”

\(^62\) CT I, c.122 [Leon.42.126.1-2,9-18]: “Non eodem autem modo omnis pena est contra voluntatem. . . Quandoque vero pena contrariatur voluntati secundum naturam ipsius potentiae. Voluntas enim naturaliter ordinatur ad bonum. Vnde si aliquis privetur virtute, quandoque quidem non est contra actualem voluntatem eius, quia forte
virtues? Are they also according to nature, are they not rather beyond (super) nature? This last question especially complicates matters, for we must ask about nature in the broadest sense, as nature is contrasted with the supernatural.

One way of approaching this is to consider that Aquinas speaks of the principles (semina) of virtue, which are in reason and will. These principles are the natural inclination of the will and the habitual knowledge of the first principles of practical reason, synderesis, which are rendered actually intelligible to the possible intellect by the agent intellect. One good way to account for Aquinas’s claims that virtue is both according to will and according to reason, is simply to trace the will’s natural volitions to reason’s naturally known first principles as illumined by the agent intellect. Thus, as Aquinas does in QDV 9, it is the agent intellect which is the first principle of motion in the case of virtue: the agent intellect moves the possible intellect by impressing intelligible content on it and as actualized the possible intellect then

88
moves the will which then moves the sense appetites.\textsuperscript{67} Do this enough times and a habit of virtue will be formed. Because we may predicate the whole of its highest part, reason, the phrases \textit{according to nature} and \textit{according to reason} may be substituted for one another. And since will always follows intellect, as rational appetite, we could further substitute the phrase \textit{according to will} with \textit{according to reason}.\textsuperscript{68} This, of course, is not speaking properly or strictly, but it is well within Aquinas’s usage.\textsuperscript{69} And thus we may have answered how virtue is according to nature, reason, and will. There is undoubtedly much truth to this account.

Such an account would undoubtedly please Thomists of a more intellectualist bent, but is the natural inclination of the will ultimately reducible to synderesis? I wish to momentarily focus on the “naturalness,” if one may say such a thing, of the natural inclination of the will – the other \textit{semen} of virtue. Let us consider the following two texts which discuss the will as nature, i.e., the will’s natural inclination towards its end. It should be noted that the will’s natural willing of the end is distinct from the will’s willing of the means (choice, \textit{electio}) to this end – we are not here discussing free decision, but the will’s natural volition of the end prior to free decision. It is from this natural volition that the will sets in motion the process of deliberation which ultimately results in a free decision. In any case, the first text below traces the cause of the natural

\textsuperscript{67} See text in n. 27. It would have been helpful if Aquinas had said more on exactly how the agent intellect moves the possible intellect which moves the sense appetites, but he does not offer too much detail here. The agent intellect, which is always actual, renders the potentially intelligible actually intelligible. But what is the cause of its rendering this actually intelligible rather than that actually intelligible? He does not, in the \textit{De virtutibus}, appeal to the will, since it is rather the intellect that moves the will. Nor can he appeal the the possible intellect, which he has just explained is a quasi-passive power.

\textsuperscript{68} This possible way of taking the phrase “according to reason,” which is admittedly somewhat intellectualist, fits better with his earlier texts. We will examine this in greater detail in the fourth chapter.

\textsuperscript{69} See QSC.11 ad 2 [Leon.24/2.120.317-32], full text in chapter 1, n. 80.
inclination of the will to God, while the second traces the same natural inclination to man’s
determination to one in those things toward which it
is naturally moved, as every man naturally wills to exist, to live, and happiness. 
These are the things to which naturally the creature is first moved either to be
understood or to be willed since natural action is always presupposed for other
actions. And so if the angel would have sinned in the first instant of his creation,
this would seem to be attributed to his nature and thus it would also somehow be
referred to the Author of nature.\footnote{DM 16.4 ad 5 [Leon.23.300.401-410]: “. . . uoluntas rationalis creaturae determinata est ad unum in que
naturaliter mouetur, sicut omnis homo naturaliter uult esse et uiuere et beatitudinem ; et ista sunt ad que primo
mouetur naturaliter creatura uel intelligenda vel uolenda, quia semper actio naturalis praesupponitur aliis actionibus :
et ideo si Angelus in primo instanti sue creationis peccasset, uidetur hoc competere sue nature et ita alqualiter
referretur ad auctorem nature.”}

Will is divided against nature as one cause against another. For some things come
about naturally and some come about voluntarily. However, there is another mode
of causing which is proper to the will which is mistress of its own act (\textit{domina sui
actus}) beyond the mode which is in accord with nature, which is determined to
one. But since the will is grounded in some nature (\textit{voluntas in aliqua natura
fundatur}), it is necessary that the motion proper to nature, with respect to
something, is participated in the will. Just as what belongs to a prior cause is
participated in by a posterior cause. For in each and every thing, the act of
existing itself (\textit{esse}), which is from nature, is prior to volition (\textit{velle}), which is
from the will, and thus it is that the will naturally wills something.\footnote{ST I-II, 10.1 ad 1 [St. Paul, 605]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam,
sicut una causa contra aliam: quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus
causandi propius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad
unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua natura fundatur, nescesse est quod motus propius naturae, quantum ad aliquid,
participetur in voluntate: sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re
ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid
vult.”}

In the latter passage we see that the will naturally wills something because it is rooted in
man’s nature, or his essence, which is determined to one, \textit{ad unum}; in the former passage we see
that this determination of nature, in turn, is caused by God. Aquinas thus traces the natural and
necessary aspects of man’s volitions straight back to the cause of the inseparable power of the
will itself: the essence of man’s soul and to its esse, which is immediately and always created by God. Thus the natural appetite of the will is rooted in man’s nature and caused by God. I wish to point out that the “naturalness” of the of the natural appetite of the will can be accounted for in two ways. 1) as following upon what is naturally cognized as good, and 2) as following from nature as essence and ultimately also from God’s causality. In other words, the natural appetite of the will comes from two directions, or kinds of causes as it were, from the intellect on the one hand and from nature and God on the other.

I would like to add two points to this. 1) For Thomas, it is axiomatic that wherever there is form, there is inclination following upon that form. Thus, 2) the powers of the soul, which are accidental forms, have their own “natures” and thus have their own natural appetites. This is how the will has its own natural appetite, and one way to account for its naturalness is by tracing it back to the agent’s nature, as we just saw. But then we must also ask whether (granting

---

72 If one objects that the two texts above are not explicit enough one can find confirmation in the following text: ST I.60.1 et ad 3 [St. Paul, 283]: “... necesse est in Angelis ponere dilectionem naturalarem. Ad cius evidentiam, considerandum est quod semper prius salvatur in posteriori. Natura autem prior est quam intellectus: quia natura cuiuscumque rei est essentia eius. Unde id quod est naturae, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum. Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae tamen inclinationio diversimode inventur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali inventur inclinationio naturalis secundum voluntatem; in natura autem sensitiva, secundum appetitum sensitivum, in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum solum ordinem naturae in aliquid. Unde cum Angelus sit natura intellectualis, oportet quod in voluntate eius sit naturalis dilectio. [ad 3] ... sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera ita dilection naturalis semper est recta, cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinationio naturae indita ab auctore naturae. Dicere ergo quod inclinationio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare auctori naturae.” Cf. De ver. 22.5 [Leon.22/3.624.190-4]: “Et ideo sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum.”

73 These are not mutually exclusive. We will see in chapter 4 how Thomas will account for these different kinds of causality in free decision.

74 ST I 80.1 [St. Paul, 387]: “quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinationio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile.” See also In de an. II.5 [leon.24/1.88.107-109]: “... ex unaquaque autem forma sequitur aliqua inclinationio et ex inclinatione operatio, ...”

75 ST I 80.1 ad 3[St. Paul, 388]; I 78.1 ad 3[St. Paul, 370]; ST I-II.30.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 683]; De ver. 25.2 ad 8 [Leon.22/3.239-42].
1) there is also an inclination which follows upon man’s nature itself, that is, upon man’s substantial form.\textsuperscript{76} Jorge Laporta says yes, and Lawrence Feingold says no; Aquinas’s texts are very tricky.\textsuperscript{77}

In the case of man’s natural appetite, Feingold argues that whenever Thomas divides appetite into rational, sensitive, and natural, either he is positively excluding a natural appetite following man’s nature itself and limiting it to beings which lack cognition\textsuperscript{78} or he is restricting its meaning to the nature of the powers of the soul.\textsuperscript{79} It must be granted to Feingold that there are texts that Laporta cites which upon closer inspection seem to support Feingold’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{80}

In these texts Thomas is emphasizing that the natural appetite which follows upon material forms is strictly proportionate and determined to material goods, i.e., natural is here used in the sense of

\textsuperscript{76} In de an. II.5 [leon.24/1.88.107-109, 114-117]: “. . . ex unaquaque autem forma sequitur aliqua inclinatio et ex inclinatione operatio, . . . sicut inclinatio consequens formam naturalem dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex appetitu autem sequitur operatio, . . .”

\textsuperscript{77} I spent a few days doing nothing but reading through all of the texts that Jorge Laporta cites in the first chapter of his book \textit{La Destinée de la nature humaine selon Thomas d’Aquin} (Paris: 1965), 23-46, in which he seeks to establish a simple innate unconscious metaphysical natural appetite in all beings. He cites a great number of texts, but very little of each of them, and often when I would spend some time with a text it did not seem to me to support the exact point he argued that it did. See also Laporta, “Pour trouver le sens exact Des Terms Appetitus Naturalis, Desiderium Naturale, Amor Naturalis, etc. chez Thomas D’Aquin,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-âge (1973): 66-71. Lawrence Feingold, \textit{The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters} (Florida: Ave Maria Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{78} Feingold, \textit{Natural Desire}, 12-13

\textsuperscript{79} Feingold’s theological concern is to exclude nature itself from having a natural appetite for the beatific vision because he thinks that any such connection robs grace of its gratuitous character. Thus he relegates it to the will, and pushes it further away from nature (out towards the intellect away from nature as essence) by offering a rather intellectualist account of Aquinas’s theory of volition, i.e., by sharply contrasting the “mutually exclusive”(Feingold, \textit{Natural Desire}, 15) “elicited” vs. “innate” acts of the will. The emphasis on elicitation cuts off nature from any role in the natural volition for the beatific vision by only looking towards the intellect’s role.

\textsuperscript{80} In II Sent. 24.3.1 [Mand.617]; De ver. 22.3 ad 2 et ad 3 [Leon.22/3.619.104-132] ; De Ver.23.1 [Leon.22/3.653.135-61]; De ver. 25.1 [Leon.22/3.729.131-158]; SCG 2.55 \textit{Praeterea Impossibile est} [Leon.manualis.149]; SCG, 3.23 \textit{Non tamen} [Leon.manualis.249]; ST I 19.1 [St. Paul, 103]; ST I 59.1 [St. Paul, 280]; ST I 81.2 [St. Paul, 390]; \textit{In I Ethic}.1 [Leon.47/1.5.165-83].
material. Since man is not a material form, this sense of natural appetite must be positively excluded. Furthermore, there are texts (which Laporta cites) in which Aquinas seems to say that man’s natural appetite is the natural appetite of the will itself.

There are quite a few ambiguous passages, and I do not have the space here to adequately argue about the details of this massive set of texts. But there are texts (which I have included in the following footnote), most of which concern divine providence, in which Thomas states that natural appetite follows upon all things, that is, on all natures or substances. Thus we may

---

81 The reason these texts are so hard to pin down is because of the way that Thomas often distinguishes between the three kinds of appetite, natural, sensitive and rational. When he draws the line between natural and rational appetite, for example, he contrasts the natural and material appetite of a rock with the immaterial rational appetite of man. The example of the rock makes the distinction quite clear, but what less clear is the exact scope of natural appetite. For the difference between material and immaterial is not the same as the difference between being moved by one’s own cognition and being moved by God’s cognition (by natural appetite). Animals have material forms, but they are nevertheless, in a real way, moved by the object of their own cognition and simultaneously by their natural appetite. It is true that material beings are never freely moved by their own cognition, since that requires reason, but it is less clear, what exactly the role of natural appetite is in rational and irrational animals.

82 E.g., ST I-II, 17.6 [St. Paul, 629].

83 In II Sent. 39.2.2.2 [Mand.994]; De ver., 22.5 [Leon.22/3.174-93]; SCG, 1.72 Amplius. Illud [Leon.manuatis.69]; SCG.3.26 Cum enim [Leon.manuatis.254]; DP 7.10 ad 6 [Marietti.211]; ST I 41.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 201]; ST I 60.1 et ad 2 et ad 3 et 60.2 [St. Paul, 283-84]; ST I-II 1.5 [St. Paul, 560]; ST I-II 10.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 605]; ST I-II 16.4 [St. Paul, 628]; De caritate 1 [Marietti.755]; QDV 1.5 et ad 2 [Marietti.720-21]; DM 3.1 [Leon.23.67.150-54]; DM 3.3 [Leon.23.73.221-33]; DM, 6 [Leon.23.148.269-96]; In Metaph. 5.6 [Marietti, p.226, n.829]; Ethic. 1.2 [Leon.47/1.7-8.20-52].

84 One could hardly interpret these passages to be referring to the will – he is clearly speaking about nature as the substantial form of each thing making it to be a particular kind of being. The italics in the following texts are mine. In III Sent., 27.1.2 [Moos. 861]: “Sic ergo dupliciter aliquid tendit in finem. Uno modo directum in finem a seipso, quod est tantum in cognoscente finem et rationem finis. Alio modo directum ab alio ; et hoc modo omnia secundum suam naturam tendunt in fines proprios et naturales, directa a sapientia instituente naturam. . Omne autem quod est a Deo, accipit aliquam naturam qua in finem suum ultimum ordinetur. . . dicendum est de amore, qui est terminatio appetitivi motus ; quia amor naturalis est in omnibus potentitis et omnibus rebus.” I-II 27.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 673]: “ . . . amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra dictum est.” In IV Sent., 49.1.3 qc. 1 [Busa,1.681]: “Sed hoc distat in motibus naturalibus et violentis; quod in motibus violentis impressio relicta a primo motore in secundis motoribus est praeter naturam eorum; et ideo operatio consequens ex tali impressione est eis difficilis et laboriosa: sed in motibus naturalibus impressio relicta a primo motore in secundis motoribus, est eis causa naturalis; et ideo operatio hanc impressionem consequens est conveniens et suavis; et ideo dicitur Sap. 8, quia “ Deus omnia suaviter disponit: ’quia unaquaque res ex natura sibi divinitus indita tendit in id ad quod per divinam providentiam ordinatur secundum exigentiam impressionis receptae.” Et quia omnia procedunt a Deo inquantum bonus est, ut
conclude, contra Feingold, that natural appetite which follows upon nature need not be restricted to material beings, and nor need it be restricted to material actions.\textsuperscript{85}

But the more difficult question is whether or how this natural appetite in humans ought to be distinguished from the natural inclination of the will itself. Aquinas’s texts generally proceed like this: there is natural inclination following on form, different kinds of forms have different kinds of inclinations, the inclination which follows man’s form is will.\textsuperscript{86}

dicit Augustinus, et Dionysius; ideo omnia creatae secundum impressionem a creatore receptam inclinantur in bonum appetendum secundum suum modum.” This following text is not on providence, but it makes the same point: \textit{Super II Cor. 5.2.} [Marietti, 477]: “Cuius ratio est, quia \textit{quamlibet naturam} consequitur appetitus conveniens fini suae naturae, sicut grave naturaliter tendit deorsum, et appetit ibi quiescere.” \textit{De ver. 22.1} [Leon.22/3.613-4.191-207]: “Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam ad aliquid petere, quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum. Unde cum \textit{omnia} sint ordinata et directa a Deo in bonum, et hoc modo quod unicumque insit principium per quod ipsummet tendit in bonum quasi petens ipsum bonum, oportet dicere quod omnia naturaliter bonum appetant. Si enim essent omnia inclinata in bonum sine hoc quod haberent in se aliquod inclinationis principium, posse dici duxa in bonum sed non appetentia bonum; sed ratione inditi principii dicuntur omnia appetere bonum quasi sponte tendentia in bonum; propter quod etiam dicitur Sap. VII quod divina sapientia “disponit omnia suaviter,” quia unumquodque ex suo motu tendit in id in quo est divinitus ordinatum.” I-II 55.4 ad 6 [St. Paul, 778]: “Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus: ipse enim operatur \textit{in omni voluntate et natura}.”

The emphasis is mine.

\textsuperscript{85} The following is also a strong text which distinguishes between the inclination of man’s nature and the will: ST I-II, 85.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 916]: “... natura, etsi sit prior quam voluntaria actio, tamen habet inclinationem ad quandam voluntarium actionem. Unde ipsa natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae actionis, sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur ad terminum.” And see ST I-II, 85.2 [St. Paul, 917].

\textsuperscript{86} ST I 80.1 [St. Paul, 387-8]: “... quod necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod \textit{quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinationi}: sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participat, altiori modo inventitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, inventur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur inclinationi, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic \textit{determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalen}[i.e., substantial form], quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum: in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquat, in quo omnia praexistent, sicut Dionysius dicit. Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclination supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinationi pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinationer ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam.” Here is a text on angels from DM 16.5 [Leon.23.304.233-238]: “Nam unicumque naturaliter conuenit unus finis, quem naturali
Does this mean that there is no natural appetite following upon man’s nature, which is
distinct from the natural appetite of the will or even the sense appetite? Wherever there is a
rational soul, there will always be a will inseparably flowing from it. One could, of course, say
the same about all of the powers of the soul since they are all inseparable accidents, but only the
will could be man’s natural appetite because it alone is naturally ordered to the good of the
whole person and the good of all of the other powers.  

However, appetite is a principle of operation, and the soul, it should not be forgotten, is a
form that is a principle of operation. Furthermore, because the soul is a real *per se* first
(although not proximate) principle of operation that is prior to the powers, it must have its own
end and action that is not caused by the natural inclination of the powers or from their cognition
since these are “posterior” to the soul in the causal chain.

---

necessitate appetit, quia natura semper tendit ad unum; set quia ad unum finem multa possunt ordinari, appetitus
intellectualis vel rationalis nature potest tendere in diversa, eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem.” See also ST I 60.1 et ad
2 [St. Paul, 283], text in n. 69 above; SCG, 1.72 *amplius* [Leon. manualis.69]; SCG.3.26 Cum enim
[Leon. manualis.254]; I-II 1.5 [St. Paul, 560]; DM 6 [Leon.23.148.269-84]; De caritate 1 [Marietti.755]; *In Metaph.*
5.6 [Marietti, p.226, n.829]. See also *In III Sent.* 27.1.2 [Mand. 861-862, esp.n.43], see partial citation in n.80, this
text was cited by Laporta to support his opinion; also notice in ibid., ad. 1 the reference to angels – there is natural
appetite and voluntary appetite in angels, “inquantum determinatur a Deo ad aliquid volendum naturaliter; . . .”

87 ST I-II, 10.1 [St. Paul, 605]: “Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit . . .
et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per voluntatem appetimus
solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum
hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt alii potentiis:
ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respicunt consistentiam
naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona.”

88 ST I 77.1 ad 4 [St. Paul, 363]: “. . . hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a
forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed not proximum.”

89 DM 4.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 117.135-143]: “. . . essentia anime comparatur ad potentias sicut forma
substantialis ad proprietates consequentes, puta forma ignis ad calidum; calor autem non agit nisi in virtute forme
essentialis ignis, alioquin non ageret ad formam substantialiam. Vnde forma substantialis est primum principium
actionis. Et sic etiam essentia anime est per prius principium actionis quam potentia.”
However, here we must recall from the first chapter that no living soul can be immediately operative. In other words, there is no operation of the soul without a distinct power, and there is no operation of a power without the soul. This means that man’s nature only operates by means of the powers, and the natural appetites of the powers only operate by means of man’s nature—they are distinguishable in thought and really distinct; but inseparable in reality.  

As he puts it in ST 10.1 ad 1, the natural motion of the will participates in the motion of nature, since the will is founded (fundatur) in nature and is posterior to it. The soul causes the powers and their natures, or natural inclinations. But also, when Aquinas says that the soul, and not the powers of the soul, is the first principle of operation, he means that the soul itself causes the operations of the powers of the soul through the natural inclinations of each power.  

Although the soul itself is the primary cause of the will’s volitions, one would never be able to experience or notice, at least in properly human acts, the difference between the natural

---

90 Note that the following passage is not restricted to the sense appetites. ST I-II, 41.3 [St. Paul, 728]: “...aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quod totum perficitur a natura, absque aliqua operatione apprehensivae virtutis; sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. – Alio modo dicitur motus naturalis, ad quern natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per apprehensionem: quia, sicut supra dictum est [see I-II, 10.1 & I-II, 17.9 ad 2], motus cognitivae et appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturalam, sicut in principium primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis, ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales.”

91 In I Phys.15 [Marietti.68, n.138]: “Nihil est igitur alius appetitus naturalis quam ordinatio aliquorum secundum propriam naturam in suum finem. Non solum autem aliquid ens in actu per virtutem activam ordinatur in suum finem, sed etiam materia secundum quod est in potentia; nam forma est finis materiae.” I emphasised that natural appetite of a substantial form must always be by means of a power. Consider also the following interesting text in which he explains that natural appetite is parcelled into the irascible and the concupiscible; and he also notes that natural appetite is related to operation which must be by means of its powers. De ver. 25.2 [Leon.22/3.732.97-110]: “Invenitur autem appetitus naturalis ad duo tendere, secundum duplicem operationem rei naturalis: una quarum est per quam res naturalis nititur acquirere id quod est conservativum suae naturae, sicut grave movetur deorsum et ibi conservetur; alia est per quam res naturalis sua contraria destruit per qualitatem activam; et hoc quidem necessarium est corruptibili qui nisi haberet virtutem qua suum contrarium vincere ab eo corrumperetur. Sic ergo appetitus naturalis ad duo tendit, scilicet ad consequendum id quod est congruum et amicum naturae, et ad habendum quandam victoriam super illud quod est ei adversum. . .”
inclination of the will and the soul itself; for the soul cannot tend towards its end without the
will’s volition and the will cannot and does not will its natural end without the soul as first cause,
that is, both require one another in their simultaneous inclination to the same end.⁹² Any human
action is the action of the person which includes the simultaneous synergistic causality of both
soul and power, or we should more accurately say, soul and powers.

Although Aquinas often, in later texts, speaks of God as moving the will directly,⁹³ it
must be supposed that he does this through the soul itself – otherwise Aquinas could not also say
that the soul itself is the first principle of operation prior to the powers of the soul and that every
operation of the soul is through its powers.⁹⁴ Since, as God causes the soul which in turn causes
its powers, so God moves the soul through its powers. As we discussed in the first chapter, the

---

⁹² These are an ordered series of causes, which means that the first is present in the second. Thus the natural
appetite of the soul is present in the natural appetite of the will, cf. De ver. 22. 5 [Leon.22.625.151-159, 174-183,
190-203]: “. . . necessitas naturalis inclinationis, sicut dicimus Deum de necessitate vivere, et tali necessitate voluntas
aliquid de necessitate vult. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod in rebus ordinatis oportet primum includi in
secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi competit secundum propriam rationem sed etiam quod
competit secundum rationem primi; . . . Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt ut etiam ipsa voluntas
quaedam natura sit, quia omne quod in rebus invenitur natura quaedam dictur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire
non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae ut a Deo sit
ordinatum in bonum naturaliter appetens illud, unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus boni sibi
convenientis; . . . Et ideo sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur est
aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium
eorum quae sunt ad finem, cum quae sunt propter finem non appetantur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo id quod voluntas
de necessitate vult, quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso
includuntur, ut esse, cognitio veritatis, et aliqua huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali
inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque omni necessitate.”

⁹³ See, for example, De malo. 6 [Leon.23.149:381-391, 407-417]. Cf. De malo 16.8 [Leon.23.321.235-238];
ST I-II, 9.4; ST I-II, 17.5 ad 3. For a discussion of God’s moving of the will see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical
Thought, 449-453 and Brian J. Shanley, “Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas,” American Catholic
St. Thomas Aquinas,” in Human and Divine Agency: Anglican, Catholic, and Lutheran Perspectives, ed. F. M.
McLain and W. M. Richardsom (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999): 41-47. For a helpful discussion of
the importance of this point in Aquinas’s theory of volition see Tobias Hoffmann, “Aquinas and Intellectual

⁹⁴ And ST I-II 55.4 [St. Paul, 778]: “omnis operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam.”
living soul or potential whole always moves by means of parts, and there is no reason to suppose that God would circumvent the natural order He Himself instituted.

But, nevertheless, is there such a thing as a simple natural unconscious metaphysical appetite following upon the human soul? It seems to me that if there were such a thing Aquinas would have treated it in his extraordinarily full treatments of the human soul in his disputed questions *De anima* (1265-66) and *De spiritualibus creaturis* (1267-68) and his treatment of the human soul in the *prima pars* of the *Summa* (1266-68). But one seeks in vain for unequivocal statements affirming such an appetite. I think there are good reasons why.

Appetite is a stretching out towards or a desire for something; moreover, it must be a desire for something not had. In the broadest terms Aquinas says, “act is in a certain way in potency . . . since for each thing existing in potency, insofar as it is this kind of a thing, there is in it appetite for its own act . . .”

95 He will go so far as saying that matter (which is utterly passive potency) inclines to and even seeks (*appetitum*) form.96 But he will also speak of the appetite of highly active potency, e.g., the will. The general point is that potency somehow seeks and tends towards actualization, an actualization not presently had, whether this seeking or tending be in an active or a passive way. All potency is ordered to a particular kind of actualization, and we may call this natural order of potency to some kind of actualization appetite.

95 ST I-II, 27.1 [St. Paul, 673]: “similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris . . . ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et in quaedam inclinatione, illud quod aliud habet in actu, . . Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum, nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus . . Quia unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, inest appetitus sui actus, et in eius consecutione delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens.”

*In de an.* III [Leon.45/1.203.131-34]: “omne enim quod est in potentia ad aliquid et receptuum eius caret eo ad quod est in potencia et cuius est receptivus.”

96 ST I-II, 59.2 [St. Paul, 280-1]; *De ver.* 22.1 [Leon.22/3.614.247-69].
Thus, in order to find the natural appetite of the soul, we must find how it is naturally in potency. If I may recap a little, form grants esse to the body. In this respect the soul is in act and the body as prime matter is in potency to the soul as its substantial form. But form grants esse to the body for the sake of action (operari), and in this respect the soul is in potency, with respect to its operations. I mean that the soul grants the kind of being which is able to (is in potency to) act. Since a soul can only act by means of powers, the soul is in potency to act through its powers. Simply put, it is in potency by its potencies to other acts (operations).

And, as we have seen, more complex souls (at least of souls that inform bodies) have more complex and diverse powers. In the case of the human soul, it is united to the body for the sake of its highest operation, intellegere. The complex of diverse powers (soul qua motor) are ordered to one another for the sake of an end, namely, intellegere. This end, then, can be said to be the

---

97 See, for example, QDA.9 [Leon.24/1.82.278-80]: “anima singulis earum dat esse substantialie secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsorum”; QSC. 2 [Leon.24/2.29.300-303]: “Et quia esse rei proportionatur eius operationi . . . cum unumquodque operetur secundum quod est ens, . . .”; QDA.10 ad 2 [Leon.24/1.92.287-89]: “forma dat esse et speciem materie secundum quod congruit sue operationi.” SCG IIII, c. 13 [Leon.manualis.365]: “Omnis enim res propter suam operationem esse videtur : operatio enim est ultima perfectio rei.” These texts are cited above in chapter I, n. 38.

98 See ST I 77 [St. Paul, 363]: “Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed secundum suam potentiam.”

99 QDA 8 ad 15 [Leon.24/1.73.468-74]: “Set anima unitur corpori propter intelligere, quod est propria et principalis eius operatio. Et ideo requiritur quod corpus unitum anime rationali sit optime dispositum ad servendum anime in hiis que sunt necessaria ad intelligendum, et quod de agilitate et de aliis huiusmodi habeat quantum talis dispositio patitur.”

100 QDA 13 ad 7 [Leon.24/1.121.408-18]: “anima habet aliquem precipuum finem, sicut anima humana, bonum intelligibile ; habet autem et alios fines ordinatos ad hunc ultimum finem, sicut quod sensibile ordinatur ad intelligibile. Et quia anima ordinatur ad sua obiecta per potentias, sequitur quod etiam potentia sensitiva sit in homine propter intellectivam, et sic de alis. Sic igitur secundum rationem finis oritur una potentia anime ex alia per comparationem ad obiecta ; unde potentias anime disinguini per originem et obiecta non est contrarium.”

QDA 10 ad 17 [Leon.24/1.94.400-413]: “anima, quamvis sit una et simplex in essentia, habet tamen virtutem ad diversas operations. Et quia naturaliter dat esse et speciem suo perfectibili in quantum est forma corporis secundum essentiam, ea autem quae sunt naturaliter sunt propter finem, oportet quod anima constituat in corpore diversitatetm partium, prout congruit diversis operationibus. Et verum est quod propter huiusmodi
end of its nature qua principle of operation. It is a bit like a carpenter. A carpenter needs a particular set of tools to operate. Without them he cannot be a carpenter. He cannot act without them, nor can they act without him. It is the same with the soul; in order to reach its end, it needs particular powers, they cannot act without the soul just as the soul cannot act without its powers.

Since potency and appetite are coextensive, one can simply consider that there are two kinds of potencies involving the soul: 1) prime matter, which it actualizes, and 2) the powers of the soul corresponding to 1) first act (esse substantiale) and 2) second act (operari). It is true that matter seeks form, but in such a case matter seeks to exist under substantial form – this could hardly be characterized as the natural appetite of nature itself for something not possessed. Qua form, the soul is in act. But insofar as it is ordered to its end, intellegere, it is so ordered as motor, as a whole composed of parts. The soul is so ordered by inseparable accidents added to the soul. In other words, the soul’s natural appetite for its end is multiplex, it is not simplex. The soul is in potency to its end; it naturally seeks its end through the manner in which it is naturally in potency, that is, through its powers.

---

101 See ST I, 59 [St. Paul. 280-281]: “. . . natura vel essentia alicuius rei intra ipsam rem comprehenditur: quidquid ergo se extendit ad id quod est extra rem, non est rei essentia. Unde videmus in corporibus naturalibus, quod inclinatio quae est ad esse rei, non est per aliquid superadditum essentiae; sed per materiam, quae appetit esse antequam illud habeat, et per formam, quae tenet rem in esse postquam fuerit. Sed inclinatio ad aliquid extrinsecum, est per aliquid superadditum: . . .” Cf. Aristotle’s Physics I, c. 9 (129a19-24).

102 Thus Aquinas’s famous distinction in ST I, 5 ad 1 [St. Paul, 24], to the effect that good secundum quid and substantial being are convertible, but not good simpliciter and substantial being, for the unqualified good requires accidental being. In other words, the unqualified good for man, which must include the soul qua form and mover must include accidental perfections because the soul qua mover necessarily includes accidents (its parts) which can and thus ought themselves to be perfected by habit and operation or action.

103 QDA 12 ad.11[Leon.24/1.111.300-305]: “ipsa anima est in potentia ad ipsas formas intelligibiles. Set ista potentia non est essentia anime, sicut nec potentia ad statuam que est in ere est essentia eris. Esse enim actu et potentia non sunt de essentia rei quando actus non est essentialis.” QDA 12 ad 12 [Leon.24/1.111.306-309]:
This complex of material and immaterial parts works together in unity (or at times disorder) towards one end. Hence, I do not think there is such a thing as a natural simple metaphysical appetite following from man’s essence. What is simple is the manner in which the soul informs the body and the end towards which the soul, via its parts, is ordered. What naturally flows from the soul as it is ordered to its end is complex. The soul is immediately ordered to its simple end in an extraordinarily complex fashion. Rather than seeking for a simple appetite, the answer lies in grasping that one person, considered as an agent, is a complex of material and immaterial parts ordered towards a simple end. Hence our focus will be on grasping how these parts are ordered to one another and how they can operate in harmony or cacophony, or how one part can be said to naturally participate in another.

Here we should note that God constitutes the soul as form and the soul as mover or potential whole through his divine idea. A divine idea exemplates and causes a particular essence (including matter and form) and its inseparable accidents, i.e., the whole substance including its powers. From another way of considering it, God’s divine idea of a person is one particular

---

“materia prima est in potentia ad actum substantialem qui est forma; et ideo ipsa potentia est ipsa essentia eius.”

QDA 12 ad 10 [Leon.24/1.111.295-299] “anima est principium operandi, set primum, non proximum. Operantur enim potentiae uirtute anime, sicut et qualitates elementorum in uiritute formarum substantialium.”

104 De ver. 3.7 [Leon.22/1.114.66-87]: “Quaedam enim sunt accidentia propria ex principii subiecti causata, quae secundum esse nunquam a suis subjectis separantur, et huiusmodi una operatione in esse producuntur cum suo subjecto: unde cum idea propris loquendo sit forma rei operabilis inquantum huiusmodi, non erit talium accidentium idea distincta sed subiecti cum omnibus accidentibus eius erit una idea, sicut aedificator unam formam habet de domo et omnibus quae domui accident in quantum huiusmodi, per quam domum cum omnibus talibus suis accidentibus simul in esse producit, cuiusmodi accidentis est quadratura ipsius et alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt accidentia quae non sequuntur inseparabiliter suum subjectum nec ex eius principii dependent, et talia producuntur in esse alia operatione praeter operationem qua producitur subiectum, sicut non ex hoc ipso quod homo fit homo sequitur quod sit grammaticus sed per aliquam aliam operationem: et talium accidentium est idea in Deo distincta ab idea subiecti, . . .”
way that God knows Himself to be able to be participated in.\textsuperscript{105} It is as a living, free, and operating being, that is, as the principle of his own actions (\textit{suorum operum principium}), that man imitates and participates in God who is his exemplar,\textsuperscript{106} and it is as a mover that man is the principle of his own actions (\textit{principium operationis}).\textsuperscript{107} In other words, an important part of man’s likeness to God is man considered as mover, that is, the manner in which man moves himself by means of intellect and will.

\section*{4. Natural and Supernatural: A Framework}

God’s divine idea of a person, however, is fixed and does not alter; furthermore, a person does not participate in his or her divine idea, that is, he does not become more or less like his divine idea.\textsuperscript{108} This means that man’s nature and his inseparable powers and their natural

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{105} ST I, 15.2 [St. Paul, 87-8]: “Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam huius creaturae.”

\textsuperscript{106} ST I-II prologus [St. Paul, 556]: “Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur \textit{intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestatitum}; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.”

\textsuperscript{107} QDA 9 [Leon.24/1.82.289]. See also ibid., ad 14 [lines 483-494].

\textsuperscript{108} Socrates does not participate in his divine idea, for he is always actually Socrates. If one held that the relation between a divine idea and a person was one of participation one would have to say that Socrates could be more or less like Socrates, or worse, that he could be more or less Socrates. But Gregory Doolan has shown that Aquinas never speaks \textit{ex professo} of a substance as participating in its divine idea; furthermore, he has sufficiently shown why it is impossible, according to Aquinas’s thought, that they do so. Doolan gives a number of carefully reasoned and well researched arguments; I defer to his monograph and will mention one. There is an exact similarity (this is not a matter of more or less) between a created essence and its divine idea, these differ not in formality (\textit{ratio}), but in only their mode of being (\textit{esse}). \textit{De potentia}, q. 7 a. 1 ad 8, and a. 7, ad 6. [N.B. a distinction in these passages: creatures do participate in the divine nature, but not in the divine ideas.] Doolan notes, “hence, Socrates cannot be more or less similar to the divine idea of Socrates: either he is like it or he is not; he is Socrates or he is not. In short he enjoys a perfect likeness to his divine idea.” Doolan, \textit{Divine Ideas}, 230. I cannot canvass all of Doolan’s arguments. But it is well worth reading Chapters 5 & 6 of Doolan’s book. Thus there is a separate divine
appetites are permanently fixed.\textsuperscript{109} From the perspective of God His immutability insures that a divine idea will not alter;\textsuperscript{110} from a natural perspective, Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s observation that the alteration of substantial form is its destruction. Original justice and grace as accidents\textsuperscript{111} cannot alter nature itself and its natural inclination,\textsuperscript{112} nor can original sin remove it. Grace and sin may perfect or obstruct nature, but they cannot alter it without destroying man.

\textsuperscript{109} In II Sent. 5.1.2 ad 4 [Mandonnet, 147]: “... assimilatio divina est finis uniuscujusque creaturae secundum modum sibi a Creatore praefixum; unde sine deordinatione non potest esse quod appetitus tendat in divinam assimilacionem ultra terminum naturae suae a Deo statum.” Note that the natural appetite of the powers of the soul are as fixed as the substantial form itself. The powers of the soul and their natural appetites pertain to the second species, powers and \textit{impotentiae}. As inseparably flowing from man's essence, as fixed in God's divine idea, they themselves are neither altered or increased by grace. We shall say more about the division of quality in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{110} See SCG I, c. 82 and 83 [Leon.manualis.76-77].


\textsuperscript{112} See ST I-II, 85.1 and 2 [St. Paul, 916-917]. See also \textit{De caritate} 1.1.ad16 [Marietti, 757]: “... quod per caritatem creatam elevatur anima supra posse naturae, ut \textit{perfectius ordinetur ad finem, quam habeat facultas naturae; sed tamem non sic ordinatur ad consequendum Deum perfecte, sicut ipse perfecte se fruitur. Et hoc contingit ex hoc quod nihil creatum sit Deo proportionatum.” Emphasis is mine.
To say that grace perfects nature is thus, in a sense, to say that it is according to nature. A great part of the dignity of man’s nature lies in the fact that naturally it has capacity for grace, naturaliter anima est gratiae capax. Aquinas, in fact, goes so far as saying the whole good of nature lies precisely in its ability or aptitude for grace.

If, however, the whole good of nature lies in grace, what then is meant by supernatural? Is this not to make the supernatural rather natural? To the inevitable chagrin of some Thomists, I would like to use a helpful and famous distinction from Scotus:

For a capacity to receive may be compared to the act which it receives or to the agent from which it receives [this act]. Viewed in the first way, this potentiality is either natural or violent or neither natural nor violent. It is called natural, if it is naturally inclined towards the form it receives. It is violent, if what it suffers is against its natural inclination. It is neither the one nor the other, if it is inclined neither to the form which it receives not to its opposite. Now from this viewpoint, there is no supernaturality.

But when the recipient is compared to the agent from which it receives the form, then there is naturalness if the recipient is referred to an agent which is naturally ordained to impress such a form in such a recipient. Supernaturalness is had, however, when the recipient is referred to an agent which does not impress this form upon this recipient naturally.

---

113 ST III 9.2 ad 3 [St. Paul. 1920]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod visio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis: inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad eam pervenire non potest. Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius: inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius, prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est.”

114 ST I-II, 113.10 [St. Paul, 1079].


116 Oxon. Prol. q. 1, Assisi ms 137, f. 2rb trans. by Alan Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural, pp. 286-289, the latin text is in n. 15: “Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, primo distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicatur supernaturale. Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad agentem a quo recipit. Primo modo ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra. Naturalis dicitur, si naturaliter inclinetur; violenta, si sit contra naturalem inclinationem passio; neutra, si neque inclinetur naturaliter ad istam formam quam recipit, neque ad oppositam. In hac autem comparatione nulla est supernaturalitas. Sed comparando receptivum ad agens a quo recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod natum est
There are great differences, of course, between Scotus and Aquinas. And this distinction does not exist as such in Aquinas’s texts. If it did there would be no need to use Scotus’s version of it. However, I hold that Aquinas agrees with it, or at least it explains what Aquinas is doing but has not articulated. What Aquinas does say is that we can take the term natural in two senses, as a passive principle and as an active principle.\(^{117}\) In the case of our active principle, Aquinas regularly explains that what is beyond the power of our active potencies is supernatural.\(^{118}\) However, in the case of the passive principles he notes that “the fact that God operates in all things according to their mode, does not exclude the fact that God does certain things which nature itself cannot do, but from this it follows that God does nothing contrary to what is according to nature.”\(^{119}\) In other words, what is according to man’s nature in that he can receive it and what is beyond the powers of his active faculties are not mutually exclusive.\(^{120}\) Thus Aquinas says that man is naturally inclined to something which he cannot attain by way of his

naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo; supernaturalitas autem quando comparatur ad agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum. . .”

\(^{117}\) ST I-II, 6.5 [St. Paul, 591]: “Dicitur autem aliquid naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est a natura sicut a principio activo, sicut calefacere est naturale igni. Alio modo, secundum principium passivum, quia scilicet est in natura inclinatio ad recipiendum actionem a principio extrinseco, sicut motus caelei dicitur esse naturalis, propter aptitudinem naturalem caelestis corporis ad talem motum, licet movens sit voluntarium.”

\(^{118}\) QDV qq. 8, 9, & 10 are fine examples of this [Marietti, 725-738].

\(^{119}\) ST I-II, 51.4 ad 2 [St. Paul, 764]: “Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod naturae convenit.”

\(^{120}\) QDV 9 [Marietti, 731]: “Dum enim aliquis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad perfectionem aliquam; si haec aptitudo sit secundum principium passivum tantum, potest eam acquirere; sed non ex actu proprio, sed ex actione aliquius exterioris naturalis agentis; sicut aer recipit lumen a sole. Si vero habeat aptitudinem naturalem ad perfectionem aliquam secundum activum principium et passivum simul; tunc per actum proprium potest ad illam pervenire.” As this passage shows, what is beyond the active power of an agent and simultaneously according to nature is not necessarily supernatural.
own powers, or he will say that the beatific vision is both according to man’s nature and supernatural.\(^{121}\)

These are not contradictions, provided one keeps in mind that one can use natural in a passive and active sense. In the passive sense one can lean on Aquinas’s axiom that everything which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. In general, whatever is received is either according to or against the natural inclination of the receiver, e.g., according to or against a particular kind of receptive potency.\(^ {122}\) When Thomas says that grace perfects nature, this means that nature is the kind of thing which can receive and be perfected by grace.\(^{123}\)

\(^{121}\) **ST III 9.2 ad 3** [St. Paul, 1920]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod visio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis: inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad eam pervenire non potest. Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius: inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius, prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est.” See also **ST I 12.1**, [St. Paul, 49-50]. And **Super De Trinitate**, 6.4 ad 5 [leol.50.171.193-196]: “quamvis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter illum consequi set solum per gratiam ; et hoc est propter eminentiam illius finis.”

\(^{122}\) Thus when something is against an interior natural inclination there is violence: **ST I-II 6.4 ad 2** [St. Paul, 591]: Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper est motus violentus, quando passivum immutatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra interiorem inclinationem passivi. Alioquin omnes alterationes et generationes simplicium corporum essent innaturales et violentae. Sunt autem naturales, propter naturalem aptitudinem interiorem materiae vel subiecti ad talem dispositionem. Et similiter quando voluntas movetur ab appetibili secundum propriam inclinationem, non est motus violentus, sed voluntarius.” But when something is according to an interior natural inclination there is perfection, or perhaps a better way of putting it is that perfection is according to one’s form (which has its concomitant inclinations as we have been discussing): Aquinas brings this out clearly in this passage in which he is comparing alteration and perfection: **In VII Physic.** 5 [Marietti, n.916, p.470]: “Ridiculum enim est dicere quod homo vel domus vel quidquid aliud, alteretur ex hoc ipso quod accipit finem sua perfectionis: puta si domus perficitur per hoc quod tegitur, vel per hoc quod lateribus ornatur aut cooperitur, ridiculum est dicere quod domus alteretur, quando cooperetur aut lateratur. Est etiam manifestum quod alteratio non est eorum quae fiunt, inquantum fiunt; sed unumquodque perficitur et fit, inquantum accipit formam propriam et figuram.” Whether or not one wants to hold on to Scotus’s idea of neutral reception does not seem to me to make much of a difference. There is the interesting case of non-natural passions in **ST I-II, 30.3** [St. Paul, 684], and some receptions of form are per accidens, e.g., is it per accidens to sight whether or not one sees the color green or red, but whether or not that is the same as a neutral reception I am not sure – for our purposes it does not make much difference whether or not one accepts that part of Scotus’ distinction.

\(^{123}\) **Super De Trinitate**, q. 2 a. 3: [Leon.50.98.114-116]: “... dona gratiarum hoc modo nature adduntur, quod eam non tollunt set magis perficiunt; ...” Wolter, **Duns Scotus**, 288 and n. 16 writes that, “In order to perfect the recipient, as the very term perficere implies, there must be some element of incompleteness in that which is perfected. For to perfect is merely to “carry through,” as it were, what was begun but left uncompleted. This incompleteness, obviously, is intimately bound up with the very nature of the recipient, and hence, whatever is
But we may distinguish between receiving and perfecting, for perfecting adds something over and above simply passively receiving grace; it implies that nature is the kind of a thing which is perfected, albeit passively, precisely by grace. In other words the soul is in potency towards grace, and it is perfected by it.\textsuperscript{124} If the soul is perfected by grace, this also implies that the soul is somehow imperfect without it, thus grace is, in this sense, according to nature.

The distinction between the natural and supernatural, however, is primarily one of a relation to the agent (the soul as an active principle). To say that the real significance of the supernatural is what is supernatural \textit{in itself} is to destroy the very meaning of the word – it is inherently a relative term.\textsuperscript{125} The word signifies something which is beyond (\textit{super}) nature (\textit{natura}); that is, it is beyond the power of the agent. Correlatively, it must be noted that the term supernatural is inherently limited; it is not meant to and nor does it need to convey all of the splendors and majestic transcendence of grace and our participation in the divine life of the Trinity. There are many other ways of doing that.

Scotus’ articulation of the distinction is helpful because it allows us to see how Aquinas can go back and forth between the naturalness of grace (in the passive sense that our nature is perfected by it, e.g., the \textit{whole} good of \textit{nature} lies in grace) and the supernaturalness of grace (it capable of being perfected is said to have a natural inclination towards that which perfects it. . . . Scotus’ concession to the Aristotelian-minded philosophers is a recognition of their clear insight into the implications of a metaphysics of act and potency. A necessary prerequisite for receiving any perfection, be it natural or supernatural, accidental or substantial, is that the recipient have the capacity to receive it. No amount of miracles of supernatural additions can supply this basic want. To argue that the recipient must be conditioned by a habit for the reception of something supernatural does not obviate the difficulty, since the recipient must be capable of receiving the habits which itself is something supernatural.”

\textsuperscript{124} I do not want to discuss the massive subject of obediential potency here. But I can breifly say that if by obediential potency one means the soul itself exactly as nature is in potency to grace, I accept, but if one wants to consider obediential potency like some accidental holding tank that can receive grace at a safe distance from man’s nature, then I have objections.

\textsuperscript{125} Feingold, \textit{Natural Desire}, 54.
is utterly beyond the range of our active powers). There is no contradiction between these two different ways of considering nature’s relation to grace.126

We can now answer our question about infused virtues. Can the infused virtues be according to nature? My answer is yes: in the same way that grace is according to nature and perfects it, so do the infused virtues. For grace is the cause of the infused virtues: “As the powers of the soul flow from its essence, which are the principles of its operations, so also from grace flow the virtues in the powers of the soul, through which the powers are moved to their acts.”127

As the powers are the inseparable properties of the soul, so are the infused virtues the inseparable properties of grace: thus if grace perfects nature, so do the infused virtues perfect nature’s powers or properties. The infused virtues are according to nature as perfections of powers, but supernatural in the sense of being beyond the active power of the agent.128

---

126 Perhaps the most obvious example of a natural desire for the supernatural is the natural desire for bodily immortality. From the immaterial nature of the soul’s operations Aquinas philosophically argues to its immaterial nature. As we have also seen, body, as tending to contraries naturally tends to its destruction. Man’s soul does not have sufficient power to stave off the body’s march towards death. Yet, as the form of the body, the whole person naturally fears death, the destruction of the whole substance. For we not only desire that the soul survive the body, but we naturally desire that our whole persons (body and soul) not die. All humans naturally desire bodily immortality, but are utterly incapable of fulfilling this desire. It is only grace which can fulfill the natural desire for bodily immortality. Death is both natural (to the body) and unnatural (to the soul). Grace is both natural (in accordance with the natural appetite of the soul) and supernatural (utterly beyond the capacity of the powers of the soul itself). DM 5.5 [Leon.23.142.258-270]: “Sic igitur mors et corruptio naturalis est homini secundum necessitatem materie, set secundum rationem forme esset ei conveniens immortalitas. Ad quam tamen prestandam nature principia non sufficiunt ; sed aptitudo quaedam naturalis ad eam convenit homini secundum animam, complementum autem eius est ex supernaturali virtute. Sicut Philosophus dicit in II Ethicorum [Ethic.II.1.1103a24-26] quod habemus aptitudinem ad virtutes morales ex natura, set perficiuntur in nobis per consuetudinem. Et in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis, mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam.”

127 ST I-II, 110.4 ad. 4 [St. Paul, 1063]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ab essentia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus. Et secundum hoc gratia comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens ad motum, quae est comparatio sessoris ad equum, non autem sicut accidens ad subiectum.” Cf. ST I-II, 110.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 1062].

128 For an example of how charity is according to nature see ST II-II, 34.5 ad 1: [St. Paul, 1251]: “sicut dicitur in VII Physic., virtus uniusculisque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene disposita secundum suam naturam. Et ideo in virtutibus oportet esse primum et principale quod est primum et principale in ordine naturali. Et propter hoc
There has recently been a great effort on the part of scholars to explain exactly how the acquired and infused virtues are related to one another. Thanks largely to the work of Angela Knobel, what is perhaps now clearer than anything else is how they are not related, or at least that they are not related in the way that Thomists have tried to relate them. Saying that the infused virtues are according to nature does nothing whatsoever to solve this problem. We can point out that both sets of virtues, acquired and the infused, can be said to be according to nature in the sense that they both perfect and inhere in the same natural powers. However, because the problem of the acquired and infused virtues is a form of the problem of the relationship between nature and grace, I think there are limits to the kind of line which can be drawn between

caritas ponitur principalissima virtutum.” See Ibid., resp. But, of course, it is utterly beyond our active powers, see ST II-II, 23.2 [St. Paul, 1183]: “Manifestum est autem quod actus caritatis excedit naturam potentiae voluntatis,” or ST I-II, 61.1 [St. Paul, 802]: “… virtutes theologicas sunt supra hominem, … unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanae, sed super-humanae, vel divinae.” Also see In II Sent. 38.2 [Mandonnet, 971]: “Unde et finis rationalis naturae, per quem ordinatur in finem proprium, est perfecta operatio, quae est propria naturae illi. Sed perfectio operationis in tribus consistit, scilicet in objecto, habitu, et delectatione. … Ipsa autem operatio perfecta beatitudo est, objectum autem altissimum Deus est, habitus autem perfectissimus charitas est, delectatio autem purissima est spiritualis delectatio. …” Cf. ST I-II 51.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 762].

The infused virtues are both according to nature and according to the divine nature. They are according to the divine nature in the sense that through them we are conformed to God, but they are according to nature in the manner in which our nature is created as the kind of nature which can participate in the life of the Trinity.


130 ST I-II, 55.4 [St. Paul, 777] notes that the infused and acquired virtues have a common definition, and by implication the general understanding of virtues that has been developed from I-II qq. 49 to 56 is applicable, except where obviously specified as one or the other, to both the infused and the acquired virtues.
them. I do not think it is possible to delineate and exactly demark how nature operates within
grace, or grace within nature. Christ is, after all, the exemplar of human life; it is central to the
Christian life to respect the mysterious integrity of the divine and human simultaneously
operating in one person, or as J. P. Torrell aptly put it, the “‘Chalcedonian status’ of grace in
nature.”

It seems to me that one ought to distinguish between the acquired and infused virtues,
strive to articulate as clearly as possible their differences and similarities, while also recognizing
that the precise relation between then must always remain mysterious and beyond our grasp.

**E. Pre- and Postlapsarian Powers**

It is thus to the subject of concupiscence that we finally turn, for this is utterly crucial for
understanding the moral virtues. In Eden man’s natural powers were insufficient in the sense that
he could only attain his ultimate end from God’s liberality; Created in grace, however, he was
freely given that which he naturally lacked; in other words, grace completes or adds what nature
naturally lacks. In a rather peculiar fashion, Aquinas considers nature within this graced state –
this is what Aquinas means by integral nature, that is, nature in its full or whole integrity but in
abstraction from grace.

---

131 Torrell, *Nature and Grace*, 172. Of course, as Torrell himself notes, one wouldn’t want to push this
analogy too far.
132 This was suggested to me in conversation by Robert Sokolowski.
133 *De ver. 14.10 ad 2* [Leon.22/2.467.221-8]: “. . . ab ipsa prima institutione natura humana est ordinata in
finem beatiunitinis, non quasi in finem debitum homini secundum naturam eius sed ex sola divina liberalitate; et ideo
non oportet quod principia naturae sufficient ad finem illum consequendum nisi fuerint adiuta donis superadditis ex
134 SCG 4.52 [Leon.manualis.508.non enim]: “. . . sic natura humana fuit instituta in sui primordio quod
inferiores vires perfecte rationi subierentur, ratio Deo, et animae corpus, Deo per gratiam supplente id quod ad hoc
derat per naturam.”
135 Torrell cites the following passage: “‘Man in the state of integral nature could do the good connatural to
him in virtue of his own nature, without the addition of a gratuitous gift, but not without the help of God moving
him’ (ST I-II 109.3). The conclusion follows of necessity: the state of integral nature designates the state of Adam
natural (for otherwise it would have remained after the fall), but then affirms that it is not only according to nature, but also according to the supernatural gift of God, (non solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae). He is, of course, here denying that the state is natural in the sense that man is the active cause of it, but he is nevertheless affirming that it is according to man’s nature. It is apparently only in the context of grace that we see how nature (even as agent) is supposed to fully thrive:

Man’s nature can be considered in two ways. In one way, in its integrity as it was in the first parent before sin. In another way, insofar as it is corrupted in us after the sin of the first parent. According to both states, however, human nature needs divine help, as the first mover, to do and to will any good, as was said. But in the state of integral nature, with respect to the sufficiency of his operative power, man could by means of his own powers will and do the good proportionate to his nature, which is the good of acquired virtue, not, however, the exceeding good, which is the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature man even

before the fall, hence in possession of the privileges with which God endowed him at the moment of his creation, but abstracting from sanctifying grace.” Torrell, Nature and Grace, 171. The emphasis is Torrell’s. The remainder of the passage is remarkable and worth citing: “If we remember that these privileges were precisely dependant on grace, this distinction may seem byzantine; for the state of integral nature and the state of innocence (or of original justice) were identical in one and the same concrete reality lived by the person of the first parents. This cannot be gainsaid, but we should not forget that this one and only reality can be considered under different aspects; we would manifest an uncultured spirit if we limited ourselves to one. As we have just seen in regard to the pura naturalia, the labor of setting forth what integral nature is responds above all to a twofold intention. On the one hand, it concerns making clear the distinction between nature and grace: for grace to remain grace, it is important that it not be due to nature; in this way Thomas preserves the divine freedom. On the other hand, it is about preserving the autonomy of the natural order; grace does not enter into the definition of nature.[In the footnote Torrell mentions the accidental nature of Grace]. This means that nature remains with its own characteristics, even if in concrete reality there are no separated “natural” acts any more than there is an integral nature apart from the state of innocence. We could characterize this by speaking of the “Chalcedonian status” of grace in nature: the natural element and the divine element are united without confusion, but also without separation, in the unique living reality of the graced being,” 171-2. DM 4.2 [leon.23.113.102-03]: “Rectitudo enim gratiae non est sine rectitudine naturae.” I think the coming together of the natural and supernatural is essentially mysterious, as is the coming together of Christ’s humanity and his divinity (there are, of course, enormous differences here), but I will not push hard on trying to exactly delineate their various and respective zones of operation.

136 ST I-II 95.1 [St. Paul. 959]: “Manifestum est autem quod illa subjectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis: alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde manifestum est quod et illa prima subjectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae: non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa.”
falls short of what he can do according to his own nature, so that he cannot fulfill the whole good of this sort through his own natural powers.\textsuperscript{137}

Most generally, Aquinas says that what is characteristic of this state is the body’s total subjection to and lack of interference with the soul.\textsuperscript{138} Metaphysically viewed, original justice is an accident (to the specific nature) which inheres directly in the essence of the soul.\textsuperscript{139} Thus it manifests itself in the soul’s two roles, as form and as mover. Qua form, integral justice enabled the soul to overcome the body’s natural march towards death.\textsuperscript{140} Qua mover, reason was perfectly subject to God, and the inferior powers were perfectly subject to reason.\textsuperscript{141} Consider this description of nature in Eden:

Man was constituted in his own condition by God in such a way that his body would be entirely subject to the soul; and again, among the parts of the soul the lower powers would be subject to reason without any repugnance, and man’s reason would be subject to God. Yet because the body was totally subject to the soul, it came to pass that no passion could happen in the body which would resist the dominion of the soul over the body; whence there was neither death nor sickness in man. But from the subjection of the inferior powers to reason there was in man a complete tranquility of mind because human reason was not perturbed by any inordinate passion. From the fact that the will of man was

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{137} ST I-II 109.2 [St. Paul, 1052]: “... natura hominis dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo, in sui integritate, sicut fuit in primo parente ante peccatum; alio modo, secundum quod est corrupta in nobis post peccatum primi parentis. Secundum autem utrumque statum, natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel volendum quodcumque bonum, sicut primo movente, ut dictum est. Sed in statu naturae integrae, quantum ad sufficientiam operativae virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae: non autem bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu naturae corruptae etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia.”

\textsuperscript{138} ST I, 94.2 [St. Paul, 458]: “Sed huius vitae integritatem habebat, inquantum corpus erat totaliter anmae subditum, in nullo ipsam impediens.”

\textsuperscript{139} See n. 111.

\textsuperscript{140} ST I, 97.1 [St. Paul, 467], DM 4.8 [leon.23.127.189-196]. The body, as composed of contraries tends towards its dissolution or de-composition; for more details see DM 5.5 [leon.23.141-142.157-270].

\textsuperscript{141} ST 95.1[St. Paul, 461]: “... ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. 7 [30]: Deus fecit hominem rectum. Erat enim haece rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subjectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae: quando enim ratio manebat Deo subjecta, inferiora ei subdebatur.”
\end{flushright}
subject to God, man referred all things to God as to the ultimate end, in which his justice and innocence consisted. The last of these three was the cause of the others; for the cause of this was not from the nature of the body, if its components are considered, that there was no place for dissolution or passion repugnant to life, since it would be composed of contrary elements. Likewise, it was not from the nature of the soul that the sensible powers were subject to reason without repugnance, since the sensible powers are naturally moved to those things which are delightful according to the senses, which are often repugnant to right reason. Therefore, it came from a superior power, namely, that of God, who just as he joined the rational soul to the body, transcending all proportion of body and of bodily powers (sense powers are powers of this sort), so he granted power to the rational soul so that beyond the condition of the body it could restrain it and the sensible powers, insofar as it was fitting for a rational soul.\footnote{CT I, c 186 [leon.42.153-54.1-35] “. . . homo in sui conditione taliter institutus fuit a Deo ut corpus omnino esset anime subjiciendum ; rursusque inter partes animae inferiores vires rationis absque repugnantia subjicerentur, et ipsa ratio hominis esset Deo subjicienda. Ex hoc autem quod corpus erat anime totaliter subjiciendum, contingebat quod nulla passio in corpore posset accidere quae dominio animae super corpus repugnaret, unde nec mors nec infirmitas in homine locum habebat. Ex subiectione vero inferiorum virium ad rationem erat in homine omnimoda mentis tranquillitas, quia ratio humana nullis inordinatis passionibus turbabatur. Ex hoc vero quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subiecta, homo referebat omnia in Deum sicut in ultimum finem, in quo eius iustitia et innocentia consistebat. Horum autem trium ultimum erat causa aliorum : non enim hoc erat ex natura corporis, si eius componentia considerentur, quod in eo dissoluto sive quaecumque passio vite repugnans locum non haberet, cum esset ex contrariis elementis compositum. Similiter etiam non erat ex natura anime quod vires sensibiles absque repugnantia rationi subjicerentur, cum vires sensibiles naturaliter moverentur in ea quae sunt detestabillas secundum sensum, que multociens recte rationi repugnabat. Erat igitur hoc ex virtute superiori, scilicet Dei, qui sicut animam rationabili et corpori coniunxerat, omnem proportionem corporis et corporearum virtutum cuiusmodi sunt sensibiles transcendentem, ita dedit anime rationali virtutem ut supra conditionem corporis ipsum contineret posset et vires sensibles, secundum quod rationali anime competebat.”}

Notice that the purpose of the sense appetites’ subjection to reason is negative: they are not to \textit{impede} reason from its journey to and contemplation of God.\footnote{See also \textit{In II Sent.} 30.1.1[Mandonnet.2.767]: “. . . ea quae sunt ad finem, disponuntur secundum necessitatem finis, . . . Finis autem ad quem homo ordinatus est, est ultra facultatem naturae creatae, scilicet beatitudine, quae in visione Dei consistit ; soli enim Deo hoc connaturale est, . . . Unde oportuit naturam humanam taliter instituui ut non solum haberet illud quod sibi ex principiis naturalibus debebat, sed etiam aliquid ultra, per quod facile in fines perveniret. Et quia ultimo fini amore inhaerere non poterat, nec ad ipsum tenendum pervenire nisi per supremam partem suam, quae est mens et intellectus, seu ratio, in qua imago Dei insignita est ; ideo, ut illa pars libere in Deum tenderet, subjectae sunt sibi vires inferiores, ut nihil in eis accidere posset quod mentem retinere et impedire ab itinere in Deum ; pari ratione corpus hoc modo dispositum est ut nulla passio in eo accidere posset per quam mentis contemplationem impediretur. Et quia haec omnia ex ordine ad finem, ut dictum est, homini inerat ; ideo factura deordinatione a fine per peccatum haec omnia in natura humana esse desiere, et relictus est homo in illis tantum bonis quae eum ex naturalibus principiis consequuntur.” Cf. QDV 5 ad 8 [Marietti, 721]: “. . . ad}
appetites do not behave as free men who have the power to resist, rather they are always well
behaved, docile, and utterly obedient. Adam and Even thus in some way had all the virtues,
whose purpose, Aquinas states, is to subject reason to God and the lower powers to reason. Aquinas grants that Adam and Eve have passions which do not imply any imperfection (e.g.,
delight, but not fear), but what is truly extraordinary about Eden is the supernatural peace
(omnimoda mentis tranquillitas) experienced by Adam and Eve in their wills. For Aquinas,
peace is naturally desired by all human beings. True peace, however, can only be of the true
and highest good, in which nothing further remains to be desired. This peace, in which all our
appetites (including the sense appetites) are satisfied and rest can only be granted as a gift of
grace. Adam and Eve did not experience the beatific vision, of course, but they knew and
felicitatem quaedam praexiguntur sicut dispositiones, sicuti actus virtutum moralium, per quos removentur
impedimenta felicitatis; scilicet inquietudo mentis a passionibus, et ab exterioribus perturbationibus."
144 ST I 95.3 [St. Paul, 462]: “... homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. Et hoc ex
dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo
subiecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio
ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus
agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet.”
145 ST I, 95.2 [St. Paul, 462].
146 ST II-II, 29.2 [St. Paul, 1225]: “... necesse est quod omne appetens appetat pacem: inquantum scilicet
omne appetens appetit tranquille et sine impedimento pervenire ad id quod appetit, in quo consistit ratio pacis.”
147 ST II-II, 29.3 [St. Paul, 1225]: “... pax consistit in quietatione et unione appetitus; sicut autem appetitus
potest esse vel boni simpliciter vel boni apparentis, ita etiam et pac potest esse et vera et apparente: vera quidem
pax non potest esse nisi circa appetitum veri boni; quia omne malum, etsi secundum aliquid appareat bonum, unde ex
aliqua parte appetitum quietet, habet tamen multos defectus, ex quibus appetitus remanet inquietus et perturbatus.
Unde pac vera non potest esse nisi in bonis et bonorum. Pac autem quae malorum est, est pac apparens et non vera.”
And Ibid., ad 4: “... vera pac non sit nisi de bono, sicut dupliciter habetur verum bonum, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte,
ita est duplex pac vera. Una quidem perfecta quae consistit in perfecta fruitione summi boni, per quam omnes
appetitus uniuertur quietati in uno. Et hic est ultimus finis creaturae rationalis: secundum illud Psalm. [ps. 147,
3]: Qui possit fines tuos pacem. – Alia vero est pac imperfecta, quae habetur in hoc mundo. Quia etsi principalis
animae motus quiescat in Deo, sunt tamen aliqua repugnantia et intus et extra quae perturbant hanc pacem.”
148 ST II-II, 29.3 [St. Paul, 1226]: “... de ratione pacis; ... secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum
in unum; ... unionem efficit caritas; ... secundum quod Deus diligitur ex toto corde, ut scilicet omnia referamus in
ipsum, et sic omnes appetitus nostri in unum feruntur.” And Ibid., ad 1: “... sine gratia gratum faciente non potest
esse vera pac, sed solum apparentes.” For the distinction between what is often called sanctifying grace (gratia
loved God with a desirable peace which is not possible for postlapsarian man; the powers of Adam’s and Eve’s souls operated together in harmony and delight without conflict.

The fall destroyed this harmony and left its parts in a mess;\textsuperscript{149} the natural order of the powers of the soul was undone (\textit{per deordinationem potentiarum}).\textsuperscript{150} Original sin is precisely a destruction of an internal harmony,\textsuperscript{151} a motion away from an internal unity and equilibrium, where virtues are connected, to a disordered multitude.\textsuperscript{152} Man was at peace, now he is torn asunder in different directions. Nature left to itself (\textit{sibi relinquitur} DM 5.1 and ST I-II, 87.7) is disordered.\textsuperscript{153}

Because Adam turned from the unchangeable good, he lost the gift of original justice, indeed from this he was inordinately turned to the changeable good and the inferior powers which should have been drawn towards and elevated by (\textit{erigi}) reason, were turned downward to inferior things. . . the superior part of the soul lacks its fitting order to God, which was through original justice, and the inferior

\textit{gratum faciente}) and actual grace (\textit{gratiam gratum facientem}) see ST I-II, 111.1 [St. Paul, 1063-64]. Sanctifying grace joins man to God and justifies him through the habit of grace, but by actual grace God may move someone to some supernatural act without sanctifying or justifying him (i.e., without the habit of grace being in him), that is, through sanctifying grace we may merit our actions, but through actual grace one man may help another to God without meriting that good (since one may be simply moved by God in a supernatural way). See also ST I-II, 111.5 (St. Paul, 1067).

\textsuperscript{149} In the soul’s role as form, without supernatural assistance, it no longer has the power to overcome death.

\textsuperscript{150} ST I-II 85.5 [St. Paul, 919].

\textsuperscript{151} ST I-II, 82.1 [St. Paul, 906]: “peccatum originale est . . . quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae: sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale \textit{luoguor naturae} dicitur.” The reference is to Peter Lombard’s \textit{Sentences} II, 30, c. 8 in \textit{Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi Sententiae In IV Libris Distinctae} [Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Grottaferrata, 1971], p. 500, l. 5.

\textsuperscript{152} ST I-II, 73.1 [St.Paul, 862]: “Huiusmodi autem bona in quae tendit intentio peccantis a ratione recedens, sunt diversa, nullam connexionem habentia ad invicem: immo etiam interd um sunt contraria. Cum igitur vitia et peccata speciem habeant secundum illud ad quod convertuntur, manifestum est quod, secundum illud quod perficit speciem peccatorum, nullam connexionem habent peccata ad invicem. Non enim peccatum committitur in accedendo a multitutdine ad unitatem, sicut accidit in virtutibus quae sunt connexae: sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitutinem.”

\textsuperscript{153} ST I-I, 82.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 906]: “originale [peccatum] . . . est inordininata dispositio ipsius naturae.”
powers are no longer subject to reason, but are turned to inferior things according to their own motions.\textsuperscript{154}

The cause of this disorder is something like the removal of the cornerstone of a bridge.\textsuperscript{155}

Original justice was a chain or a fetter (vinculum) holding the sense appetites in check.\textsuperscript{156}

Concupiscence or the \textit{fomes} of sin is the name of the inordination caused by its removal.\textsuperscript{157} In DM 4.2 ad 4, he explains that concupiscence was held in place by original justice as a bit restrains a horse from galloping. But once the rein was broken, the horse was no longer restrained by the bit, and the rider no longer had control of the horse which then galloped forth at full speed.\textsuperscript{158} This analogy may make it seem that grace is not perfecting nature, but rather

\textsuperscript{154} DM 4.3 [Leon.23.111.265-274]: “Ex hoc autem quod auersus fuit ab incommutabili bono, donum originalis iustitiae amisit, ex hoc uero quod conuersus est inordinate ad commutabile bonum, inferiores uires que erigi debebant ad rationem, depressae sunt ad inferiorea. . . et superior pars animae caret debito ordine ad Deum, qui erat per originalem iustitiam, et inferiores uires non subduntur rationi, set ad inferiorea convertuntur secundum proprium impetum,. . .” See \textit{In II Sent.} 30.1.3 ad 2 [Mandonnet, 775]: “ipsa habilitas quae relinquitur in inferioribus viribus ad inordinate concupiscendum, ex hoc quod ab appetitu subtrahitur retinaculum rationis, quo detinebatur ne effrenete posset in sua objecta tendere.”

\textsuperscript{155} ST I-II. 82.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 906]: “per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae, quae prohibat inordinatos motus.” \textit{In II Sent.} 32.1.3 [Mandonnet, 831]: “subtrahatur rectitudo illa quae omnes vires animae in unum continebat, . . .”

\textsuperscript{156} ST I-II 82.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 908]: “. . . soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaqueaque vis animae tendit in suum proprium motum.” See also Ibid., ad 3; \textit{In II Sent.} 32.2.1: [Mandonnet, 833-4].

\textsuperscript{157} ST III, 15.2 [St. Paul, 1943]: “Ad rationem autem formitis pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus in id quod est contra rationem.” For concupiscence see ST I-II, 85.3 [St. Paul, 918].

\textsuperscript{158} DM 4.2 ad 4 [Leon.23.112.343-55]: “. . . concupiscentia secundum quod pertinet ad originale peccatum non est concupiscentia actualis set habitualis. Set intelligendum est quod ex habitu efficimur habiles ad aliquid. Dupliciter autem aliqoud agens potest esse habile ad aliquid agendum : uno modo ex aliqua forma inclinante ad hoc, sicut corpus grave ex forma sua quam habet a generante inclinatur deorsum, alio modo ex subtractione eius quod impediebat, sicut vinum effunditur fractis circulis qui effusionem impediebat, et equeus concitatus praeceptanter uadit rupto freno quo retinebatur. Sic ergo concupiscentia habitualis potest dici dupliciter : uno modo aliqua dispositio vel habitus inclinans ad concupiscendum, sicut si in aliquo ex frequenti actuali concupiscentia causaretur concupiscentia habitus, et sic concupiscentia non dicitur esse originale peccatum ; alio modo potest intelligi habitualis concupiscentia ipsa pronitas vel habilitas ad concupiscendum, que est ex hoc quod uis concupiscibilis non perfecte subditur rationi, sublato freno originalis iustitie : et hoc modo peccatum originale materialiter loquendo est habitualis concupiscentia.” Note the habitual character of original sin; original sin is a habit, as is grace, but they are not virtues or vices.
violently restraining it. But according to Aquinas, man was created to be in a state of original justice, that is, with grace.

It was not, however, God’s intention that man be so disordered. Thomas explains it in the following way: someone who makes a saw chooses steel because it has the right material qualities for cutting. Man, in the same way, has a body for the sake of his intellect which requires phantasms to operate. Although steel rusts, the fact that it rusts was not intended by the maker. By the same token, although material bodies, which are composed of contraries, naturally tend to dissolution and death, that was not the intent of our maker who made our souls immortal. However, created in grace, God gratuitously gave man the supernatural power to overcome these natural bodily imperfections. Provided that we not sin, he would forever gratuitously grant them.

Furthermore, this image of the rider restraining his horse might seem to commit Thomas to a dualistic view of human nature, that is, as being composed of two essentially conflicted natures? Metaphysically the answer is no, and we have seen why Thomas is firmly wed to the unicity of substantial form.

De ver. 14.10 ad 2 [leon.22/2.467.221-228] “ab ipsa prima institutione natura humana est ordinata in finem beatitudinis, non quasi in finem debitum homini secundum naturam eius, sed ex sola divina liberalitate; et ideo non oportet quod principia naturae sufficiant ad finem illum consequendum nisi fuerint adiuta donis superadditis ex divina liberalitate.”

ST I-II, 85.6 [St. Paul, 920]. One might wonder why God chose to make man with bodies at all. This is, of course, an unanswerable question. But in his description of the universe, which as a whole is the most perfect representation of God, he notes that man is an integral part. In other words, on the supposition that God willed to create the universe, included in the intelligibility of the universe is that there are completely immaterial beings, beings with immaterial souls but material bodies, and beings which are completely material, i.e., there is a kind of hierarchy which includes man. Of course, God was free to will otherwise, but this kind of thinking does add a reason for (but not a cause of) God’s choice to create a universe which necessarily includes man which is the kind of thing that has a corruptible body and an immortal soul. Cf. SCG I, 86 & 87. On the important distinction between reason (ratio) and a cause see Wippel’s chapter 4 (p. 100-106) in “The Ultimate Why Question: Why Is There Anything Rather Than Nothing.” Ed. J. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011).
In Eden, the rectitude of the will\textsuperscript{162} was the cause of the rectitude of the passions; these two were related as form and matter: for by will man is immediately ordered to his end, and his sense appetites receive this order from the will, as Aristotle pointed out in EN I.13, insofar as the sense appetites obey or listen to reason (\textit{aliqualiter rationi obaudibles}).\textsuperscript{163} Because the sense appetites naturally ought to receive their order from the will, when unfettered from the will (by the will’s own disordered turn from God), the disorder of the sense appetites (inordinate turn towards created goods) necessarily also follows.\textsuperscript{164} A turn away from God must always be a turn towards something else. This necessarily follows since whatever we will we will for the sake of something we deem good (\textit{sub ratione boni}). The aversion from the immutable and

\textsuperscript{162} Aquinas defines the rectitude of the will as the will’s fitting order to its ultimate end, ST I-II, 4.4 and ST I-II, 5.7. This is not simply the natural inclination of the will, although he does in CT 1.122 speak of the natural inclination of the will as the \textit{naturalem rectitudinem voluntatis}. See ST I-II, 104.4 ad 2 and SCG 3.127 \textit{Item. Delectus peccati} and SCG 4.92 \textit{Bonum, inquantum.}

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{In II Sent.} 30.1.3 ad 4 [Mandonnet, 775]: “. . . peccatum contingit in his quae ad finem ordinata sunt, secundum quod a suo fine deficiunt ; et ideo in partibus animae in illis praecepe est peccatum hominis secundum quas homo ordinatur in finem ; et quia appetitus est tendens in finem, ideo in appetitu praecepe peccatum consistit. Ad finem autem hominis ordinatur appetitus rationis, qui est voluntas, immediate ; appetitus autem sensibiles mediate, inquantum scilicet ordinem finis ex voluntate rationis recipiunt, propter quod dicuntur aliqualiter rationi abaudibiles [Parma has obaudibiles], ut Philosophus dicit in fine 1 Ethic. Cap. XVIII [sic.]; et ideo defectus ordinis in appetitu voluntatis est formale et completivum originalis peccati, quod est privatio rectitudinis voluntatis, quae inerat secundum originalem justitiam ; defectus autem ordinis in appetitu inferiori, est materialiter in peccato se habens : et hoc est concupiscencia, ut dictum est ; et ideo nullus alius defectus naturae ex parte rationis nec ex parte sensibils partis originale peccatum dicitur, nisi concupiscencia sicut materiale, et privatio originalis justitiae sicut formale.”

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{In II Sent.} 30.1.3 [Mandonnet, 774]: “Illa autem pars quae per se nata est conjungi fini est ipsa voluntas, quae habet ordinem finis omnibus aliis partibus imponere ; et ideo destitutio ipsius voluntatis ab illa rectitudine ad finem quam habuit in institutione naturae, in peccato originali formale est : et hoc est privatio originalis justitiae. Vires autem appetitus sensibiles sunt natae recipere ordinem ad finem ab ipsa voluntate, secundum quod sibi subjectae sunt ; et ideo subtractio illius vinculi quo quodammodo sub potestate voluntatis rectae detinebantur, materiale in peccato est. Ex hac autem subtractione sequitur quod unaquaque vis in suum objectum inordinate tendat, concupiscendo illud ; et ideo concupiscencia qua habiles sumus ad male concupiscendum, peccatum originale dicitur, quasi materiale in peccato originali existens.”
conversion to the commutable are related as matter and form, and they cannot in any meaningful way be separated.\textsuperscript{165}

What was lost in original sin, bodily immortality, obedient sense appetites, knowledge, and the rectitude of the will was only partially restored by grace. Only rectitude of the will was reinstated. Death, ignorance, and disordered powers are now permanent aspects of earthly life.\textsuperscript{166} The flesh will always rebel against the spirit (\textit{rebellio carnis ad spiritum}), and perfect liberty (\textit{perfecta libertas}) will not be restored until the next life.\textsuperscript{167} There is now material necessity to the internal fight (\textit{pugna}) between contrary desires\textsuperscript{168} – we cannot help but experience them. Through grace we are given rectitude of will, but our sense appetites lag behind, often being stubbornly recalcitrant. Rectitude of will and rectitude of sense appetite are no longer related as matter and form; however, rectitude in the sense appetites is not possible without rectitude of will. Moral virtue, whatever it may be, cannot eliminate this rebellion of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{165} ST I-II, 82.3 [St. Paul, 907]: “Tota autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subiecta. Quae quidem subiectio primo et principaliter erat per voluntatem, cuius est movere omnes alias partes in finem, ut supra dictum est (I-II, 9.1). Unde ex aversione voluntatis a Deo, consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae virtutibus. Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali: omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animae s se habet in peccato originali sicut quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile: quae quidem inordinatio communis nomine potest dici concupiscencia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscencia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.”

\textsuperscript{166} In II Sent., 32.1.1 ad 1 [Mandonnet, 825]: “. . . in originali justitia erat aliquid quasi formale, scilicet ipsa rectitudo voluntatis, et secundum hoc sibi opponitur culpae deformitas. Erat in ea etiam aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet ordo rectitudinis impressus in inferioribus viribus; et quantum ad hoc opponitur sibi concupiscencia et fomes. Quamvis ergo non restituatur originalis justitia quantum ad id quod materiale in ipsa erat, restituitur tamen quantum ad rectitudinem voluntatis, . . .”

\textsuperscript{167} See Ibid., article 2 [Mandonnet, 828].

\textsuperscript{168} QDA 8 ad 7 [Leon.24/1.71.401-410]: “. . . pugna que est in homine ex contrariis concupiscentiiis etiam ex necessitate materie provenit. Necesse enim fuit, si homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum consequetetur concupiscencia delectabilium, que plerumque repugnat rationi. Set contra hoc etiam homini datum fuit remedium per gratiam in statu innocentie, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo contra rationem moverentur; set hoc homo perdidit per peccatum.” See also QDA 8 [Leon.24/1.69.304-313].
\end{footnotesize}
disordered passions. If it did, it could eliminate original sin; but it is nonetheless a partial and incomplete restoration of what was lost.

Original sin threw a wrench into the well made cogs of the potential whole\(^{169}\): “Original sin infects diverse parts of the soul insofar as they are parts of one whole, just as original justice kept together all the parts in one.”\(^{170}\) The soul which was once a peaceful autocracy has as a result of original sin become a noisy and often tumultuous democracy with each constituent asking to have his or her wish become law. Moral virtue, however, is an attempt, as much as is possible, to reestablish peace and quiet and to enable the soul’s natural leaders to rule.\(^{171}\) The stronger the moral virtues in any person, the weaker the \textit{fomes} becomes.\(^{172}\) Moral virtue can never completely eliminate contrariness and disorder from the sense powers, as it cannot eliminate original sin, but it can make them a little more obedient than they otherwise would be. In other words, it can help them to participate in reason.

\(^{169}\) ST I-II, 85.1 [St. Paul, 916]: “Sed quantum ad inordinationem agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum, sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensitivum, et appetitus sensitivus inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc causatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium subiectum; sed secundum quod objectum agit in potentiam, et una potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.”

\(^{170}\) ST I-II, 82.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 907]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animae, secundum quod sunt partes unius totius, sicut et iustitia originalis continebat omnes animae partes in unum.” See chapter one for a discussion of the soul as composed of parts or powers.

\(^{171}\) ST I-II 77.3 [St. Paul, 887]: “Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae.” And ST I-II, 55.2 [St. Paul, 776]: “. . . virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima: secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliquid litter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.”

\(^{172}\) ST III 15.2 [St. Paul, 1943]: “Virtus autem moralis quae est in irrationali parte animae, eam facit rationi esse subiectam, et tanto magis quanto perfectior fuerit virtus: sicut temperantia concupiscibilem, et fortitudo et mansuetudo irascibilem, ut in Secunda Parte dictum est. Ad rationem autem fomitis pertinet inordinatio sensualis appetitus in id quod est contra rationem. Sic igitur patet quod, quanto virtus fuerit magis in aliquo perfecta, tanto magis debilitatur in eo vis fomitis.”
Chapter III. Accidents and Participation

Not only is a habit an accident, but also it is a particular kind of accident, a quality. Section 1 will first examine Aquinas’s reason for placing a habit where he does in the categorical schema. It will also consider Aquinas’s division of the genus quality. Moreover, within this schema Section 2 will discuss the manner in which these particular kinds of accidents can increase and decrease. Aquinas describes this increase and decrease as a participation. Section 3 will introduce Thomas’s thinking on participation to the degree necessary for our subject matter and discuss what kind of participation Thomas has in mind when he says that qualities increase and decrease and when he says that the sense appetites and the moral virtues participate in reason.

1. Habits as Modes of Existing.

In article 2 of question 49 of the Prima secundae of his Summa theologiae Thomas offers his most metaphysical account of what a habit is: he articulates what it means for a habit to be in the first species of the predicament quality. The question, even for Aquinas’s metaphysically laden ethics, is extraordinarily metaphysical. Article 2 (and question 49 taken as a whole) comprises an interesting coming together of two different lines of thinking. On the one hand, Thomas is metaphysically categorizing human beings according to various modes of existing (modi essendi) whereby being is divided into substance and the nine accidents. On the other hand, he is categorizing humans according to ethics, an approach that is ultimately teleological. In speaking of a predicamental accident like quality we are speaking in accord with a division of being whereby we predicate being of an accident by reason of its reference to substance. But when we speak of that same quality as a virtue, we speak of it with reference to that entire
substantial being’s end or perfection, not only as an accidental mode of existing. Let us consider how these two lines of thinking come together.

Thomas follows Aristotle in categorizing everything according to the manner in which we predicate. Aristotle never completely made clear the connection between these different kinds of predication and his highly developed metaphysics. Aquinas, however, took up the task of metaphysically grounding the predicaments. For Aquinas, modes of predication follow modes of existing.\(^1\) Aquinas, of course, does not think that all speech simply signifies truth. Following Aristotle, he argues that the modes of signification do not immediately signify the modes of existence of things except by a mediate mode of understanding, for words are likeness of what is understood, and what is understood is a likeness of things.\(^2\) Therefore it is possible for us by carefully (being mindful of the mistakes we make) investigating human speech and thought to uncover the most elemental modes of existing.

Thus, in however many ways being is predicated, in so may ways is esse said to be: this is why the modes of existing are called predicaments.\(^3\) Of these modes of predication some signify what something is, that is, substance; others signify how much it is, that is, quantity;

\(^1\) In V Met. 9 [Marietti, p.238, n.890]: “Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia quoties ens dicitur, id est quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, id est tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicum modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis.”

\(^2\) In VII Met. 1 [Marietti, p.317, n.1253]: “Licet modus significandi vocum non consequatur immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante modo intelligendi; quia intellectus sunt similitudines rerum, voces autem intellectuum, ut dicitur in primo Perihermenias.” See Aristotle’s De Interpretatione I, 14a3-9 [Barnes, p. 25]. Cf also Aquinas’s commentary on this text in Expositio libri periermenias I.2 [Leon.1/1.9-13].

\(^3\) See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 211. For a full treatment of this whole topic and a discussion of Aquinas’s derivation of the predicaments see Wippel’s Metaphysical Thought, 208-228.
others signify how it is, that is quality; etc.\(^4\) Concerning quality, Aquinas follows Aristotle’s basic division in *Categories* 8 into four species each of which is subdivided further: \(^5\) the first species includes habits and dispositions, the second includes natural capacities or incapacities, the third includes sensible quality and passion, and the fourth includes form and figure. \(^6\) We will discuss these four species and their subdivisions in greater detail below.

As Aquinas sees it, these predicametal categories are not primarily logical; they are determinate modes of existence founded on the existence of things. \(^7\) But what does Thomas mean by a mode of existing? Why does he rely so heavily on the term *modus*? Furthermore, this question is heightened for us because Thomas states in ST I-II, q. 49, a. 2, that a habit is also a *modus* and offers “determination” as a synonym for “mode.” \(^8\) This is important because habits somehow “determine” their powers. \(^9\)

John Tomarchio argues that *modus* is always tied to Thomas’s metaphysics of *esse*. Tomarchio emphasizes this point by translating *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 6, ad 5 as follows:

“Whenever there is something received, it is necessary that there be a mode, because the________

\(^4\) See n.1.
\(^6\) Aristotle, *Categories* 8, 4b20-6a10 [Barnes, 8-10].
\(^7\) *De Ver.* 21.1 [Leon.22/3.593.135-36]: “… determinatum modum essendi qui fundatur in ipsa existentia rel”
\(^9\) See ST I-II, 49.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 756]; ST I-II 50.5 ad 1[St. Paul, 760]; ST I-II 53.2 ad 1[St. Paul, 770]
received is limited according to the receiver; and thus since both the accidental and the essential existence of a creature is received, mode is found not only in accidents but also in substances.”

Tomarchio comments on this text as follows: “Note that in considering a perfection as received, one is ipso facto considering it according to a distinct individual existence and not abstractly, as one does when considering the ratio of the perfection in itself. The notion of the mode of perfection, nature, essence, or form enters in with the consideration of its relation to existence.”

Tomarchio’s formulation clarifies the existential nature of the term modus. Thus the word modus, at least in this context, simultaneously connotes both formal determining aspects and strong existential aspects. These two aspects cannot be separated from each other in re: this mode of existence is formally different from that mode of existence. Any predicament, as it exists in a being, is a way in which that being either has a certain kind of being (accidental being or inesse) or the way in which a being is a certain kind of being (substantial being, esse).

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I wish to point out that for Aquinas virtue (or vice) is a real thing (a res, which is convertible with ens) that has its own ontological weight irrespective of whatever someone might think it is. It is a determinate mode of existence that qualifies a person as a certain kind of a person, i.e., a virtuous or vicious one.

**A. The Genus Quality**

---

10 Tomarchio, *Modes*, 592.
11 Ibid., 593.
12 But only God is his esse; all finite beings have esse (or participate in it) since, as caused by God, they cannot be their esse.
In a helpful passage in his *De ente et essentia* 6, Thomas explains how one takes genus, difference, and species in accidents. Genus is first taken from the mode of existing insofar as being (*ens*) is said in different ways of the ten predicaments. But the differences are taken from the diversity of the principles that cause the mode of existing. In other words, the difference is taken from the principle or cause that determines the specific mode of existing. However, sometimes the proper principles or causes of accidents are unknown to us, and in such a case we may take the differences from their effects.

Aquinas begins his own division of the genus quality in ST I-II 49.2 by noting that measure precedes mode, and mode implies a determination according to some measure. Although mode and determination are somewhat synonymous, the term mode has a stronger existential aspect whereas the emphasis of the term determination is more formal. Thomas notes that “just as that according to which the potency of matter is determined according to *esse substantiale* is called quality, which is a *differentia* of substance, so that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental *esse* is called accidental quality, which

---

13 *De ente*. c.6 [Leon.43.381.132-38]: “. . . genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius dicitur de decem generibus praeidiamentorum, sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantie et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantie, et sic de alii, secundum Philosophum in IX Metaphisice. Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. ” N.B.Ibid, lines 156-59: “Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus. . .”

14 See the previous note.

15 See texts in n. 8. However, at times he uses determination as a verb in the sense that a measure determines a mode, see ST I-II 49.2 [St. Paul, 753]. I take this to be referring to the terminus of the measure’s causal role as principle in the sense that the determining action (whatever it may be) is named by its effect or terminus, that is, a particular determined mode of existing.
is also a certain *differentia*.”\(^\text{16}\) Thus, the key lies with the measure since it is the determining principle or cause of the mode of existing.\(^\text{17}\)

In the case of quality, the mode or determination of the subject according to accidental *esse* can be taken according three measures: when quantity is the measure, we have the fourth species (form and figure, *forma* and *figura*). When action and passion (which follow upon the principles of nature: matter and form) are the measure, then we have the second (capacity and incapacity, *potentia* and *impotentia*) and third species of quality (passion and sensible qualities, *passio* and *qualitas sensibilis* or *passibilis*). When nature is the measure, then we have the first species of quality (habits and dispositions, *habitus et dispositio*).\(^\text{18}\) One immediately wonders in what way quantity, action and passion, and nature serve as distinct measures or principles. Let us work backwards from the fourth to the first species.

1. The 4\(^{th}\) Species of Quality

The fourth species of quality is divided into two kinds, figure and form. Figure is the termination of dimensive quantity or it is simply quality concerning quantity.\(^\text{19}\) Among all

\(^\text{16}\) ST I-II 49.2 [St. Paul. 753]: “Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad litteram [lib. 4, cap. 3 (PL 34, 299)], quem mensura praefigit: unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys [1020a33].”

\(^\text{17}\) See De ente. c.6 in n.6 above.

\(^\text{18}\) ST I-II, 49.2 [St. Paul, 753]: “Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem.”

accidents (in material beings) quantity is nearest to substantial form, thus among all four qualities, figure, which is the termination of quantity, is the closest to substantial form. This is presumably because substantial form directly informs matter, upon which quantity follows, and figure is the termination, or we might say the “shape” of that quantity. This is why Aquinas says that among all the qualities figure most follows and demonstrates the species of material things. In fact, he says that there is no more certain judgment of the diversity of species of plants and animals than that which is taken from the diversity of figures.\(^{20}\)

The other kind of the fourth species of quality, form, is the form of an artificial thing. Since art imitates nature, and an artificial thing is a certain image of a natural thing, the forms of artificial things are figures, or something like them. However, forms of things made by man are

\(^{20}\) *In VII Physic.* 5 [Marietti, p. 470, n. 917]: “Ad evidentiam autem harum rationum considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figureae maxime consequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori judicio diversitas specierum diiudicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum. Et hoc ideo, qua sicut quantitas propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae. Unde sicut posuerunt aliqui dimensiones esse substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuras esse substantiales formas. Et ex hoc contingit quod imago, qua est expressa rei representaatio, secundum figuram potissime attentatur, magis quam secundum colore vel aliiquid aliud. Et quia ars est imitatrix naturae, et artificialium est quaedam rei naturalis imago, formae artificialium sunt figureae vel aliquid propinquum. Et ideo propter similitudinem huiusmodi formarum et figurarum ad formas substantiales, dicit philosophus quod secundum secundum accesionem formae et figurae non est alteratio, sed perfectio. Et exinde etiam est quod materia de huiusmodi non praedicatur nisi denominative, sic etiam est in substantiis naturalibus: non enim dicimus hominem terram, sed terrenum.” In ST I-II 52.1 [St. Paul, 766] he also makes the point that form and figure are nearest to substance. *In VII Physic.* 5 [Marietti, p. 470, n. 915]: “Ubi considerandum est quod forma et figura in hoc ab invicem differunt, quod figura importat terminationem quantitatis; est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur: forma vero dicitur, quae dat esse specificum artificiato; formae enim artificiatorium sunt accidentia. Dicit ergo quod illud ex quo fit forma statuae, non dicimus formam; ideo statuae non praedicatur de statuae in principali et recto; et similiter est in figura pyramidis vel lecti: sed in talibus materia praedicatur denominative; dicimus enim triangulum aeneum aut cerereum aut lignum, et simile est in aliis.” For the reference to dimensive quantity see also IV Sent 4.1.1 [Moos.149]. See also ST I 78.3 ad 2 [St. Paul, 372]; ST III, q. 63.2 ad 1[St. Paul, 2179]; ST III 45.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 2086]; *In V Met.* 16 [Marietti, p.263, n.992]; *In VII Phys.* 5 [Marietti, p.469-70, n.914 et n.917]. Some of these texts are in n.19 above. Concerning the quality form, it is worth pointing out that it is not the exemplar form of the thing made, see *In 4 Sent.* 1.1.1 qc.3, ad 2 [Moos.14].
not substantial forms, i.e. they are not united hylomorphically to matter. The form of a statue does not inform matter, even though we might think and speak of the form of the statue and the matter as the stone. Artificial forms are accidental forms, which themselves inhere in other substances. A human may shape or “form” some matter in some fashion; a sculptor may shape marble thereby changing the outlines of the block’s dimensive quantity, but the underlying substance remains the same.

Although this division of the fourth species is not articulated as such by Aristotle in the Categories, there is certainly a kind of rough precedent for it in Bk. VII, chapter 3, of his Physics, 245b5-246a19 and 246b15. It is not far fetched to claim that Aquinas’s division of the fourth species of quality is an interpretation and perhaps even a clarification of Aristotle himself. To put it in the terms of De ente. 6, The cause of the fourth species is quantity, and the cause that subdivides the species is the cause of that particular dimensive quantity, whether it follows the quantity of a natural substantial form or whether it follows the quantity of an artificially made thing.

2. The 3rd Species of Quality

The division of the third species into sensible quality and passion (passio and qualitas sensibilis or passibilis) is more difficult because Aquinas, following Aristotle, sometimes uses

---

21 See the previous note.
22 Even though a house, for example, is not a substance, we nevertheless speak as if it is see In 4 Sent. 3.1.1 qc. 1 ad 3 [Moos.113]: “Sicut autem artificialia non ponuntur in genere ex forma simpliciter, sed ex materia – non enim dicimus quod domus sit in genere qualitatis nisi inquantum artificiale figuratum, sed dicitur esse in genere substantiae – . . .”
23 Joseph Owens denies that there is any significance to the distinction between form and figure, which “lacks sanction in traditional usage,” Christian Metaphysics, 177. This may be so in the context of a more general Christian metaphysics, as understood by Owens, but I think Aquinas’s distinction is quite straightforward and makes good sense.
these terms synonymously but sometimes he does not. There are two main Aristotelian passages that influenced Aquinas’s thinking on this: the discussion of quality in *Categories* 8 and the discussion of alteration in *Physics* VII, 2 & 3. Alteration is simply a change (*mutatio*) in a quality of the third species, which is sensible quality.\(^{24}\) It is important to note that for Aquinas alteration itself is not a quality, but it is in the category passion,\(^{25}\) but these are closely bound together for the alteration and the altered qualities happen simultaneously.\(^{26}\) Let us begin by assuming and noting a few main points from Aristotle’s treatment in the *Physics*, namely, that “everything which undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes” (245b3) and that alteration only occurs “in sensible things and in the sensitive part of the soul”(248a7-8), and thus it always partly material. Moreover, sensation itself always involves alteration.\(^{27}\)


Moreover, alteration usually involves a motion from contraries, i.e., from white to black, and becoming black is the expulsion of the contrary whiteness, see QDV 26.1 [Leon.22/3.747.164-185:202-205]: See also ibid. lines 202-205: But the intension and remission of qualities, e.g., becoming whiter or hotter is also a kind of alteration: I Sent. 37.4.3 [Mand. 888]; SCG 2.19 [Leon.manualis.104.*Amplius*].

\(^{25}\) See the distinction between *passio*, which is its own predicament, and *passio* as included within the predicament quality: *In V Met.* 20 [Marietti, nn.1065-66, p.278]: “Uno modo [passio] dicitur qualitas, secundum quam fit alteratio, sicut album et nigrum et huiusmodi. Et haec est tertia species qualitatis. Probatum enim est in septimo Physicorum, quod in sola tertia specie qualitatis potest esse alteratio. Secundus modus est, secundum quod huiusmodi actiones qualitatis et alterationis, quae fiunt secundum eas, dicuntur passiones; et sic passio est unum praedicamentum, ut calefieri et infrigidari et huiusmodi.” Alteration is only in the third species of quality in the sense that the alteration from white to black is the destruction of one quality and generation of another quality; the qualities themseleves are the terms of the motion of alteration, but the alteration itself is in the predicament passion.

\(^{26}\) *In VII Phys*. 4 [Marietti, n.909, p. 465]: “In omnibus enim quae alterantur, manifestum est quod simul sunt ultimum alters et primum alteratum.”

\(^{27}\) *In VII Phys*.4 [Marietti, n.910, p.466]: “... sensus sentiendo patiuntur: actiones enim sensuum, ut auditio et visio, sunt quidam motus per corpus cum aliqua sensus passione. Non enim sensus habent aliquam actionem, nisi per organum corporeum: corpori autem convenit moveri et alterari.”

This does not mean that these sensitive actualizations or motions are completely material. Aquinas explicitly denies this. In ST I 78.3 he says that sense is a passive power which is changed by exterior sensibles in two ways, by a natural *immutatio* according to *esse naturale*, as heat in the one heated, and by a spiritual *immutatio* according to *esse spirituale*, as color is recived in the eye without itself being colored. In Ibid., ad 1 he notes that not
altered (244b7-245a3), say from white to black, but such alterations of sensible qualities are nevertheless concerned with what can be sensed even if they are not actually sensed. Such sensible qualities can be described as passiones of sensible bodies in the way in which we might call them properties, since they manifest the differences between (or properties of) sensible things qua sensible, e.g., this differs from that since this is hot and that is cold, etc.28

These sensible properties, of course, always point back to the senses, which can sense them.29 And thus we can speak of the other and more common use of the term passio, for alteration necessarily involves a kind of passivity because what is altered is passively moved by another sensible quality.30 In both of these senses (passio as a property of sensible body and passio as the passive reception of alteration, and more particularly, as the external senses are

---

28 Ibid., “Dicuntur autem passiones sensibilium corporum, quia sensibilia corpora secundum huiusmodi differunt; inquantum scilicet unus est calidum et aliud frigidum, unum grave et aliud leve, et sic de aliis.”

29 ST I, 77.3 [St. Paul, 365]: “Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorum, sonum et huysmodi: et ideo alia potencia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et alia soni, scilicet auditus.”

30 In I de generatione 3.8 [Leon.3.293]: “. . . formae autem quae sunt per se sensu perceptibiles, sunt qualitates tertiae speciei, quae ob id dicuntur passibiles, quia sensibus ingerunt passiones, ut dicitur in Praedicamentis.” ST I 78.3 ad 1 [St. Paul, 372]: “. . . non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit alteratio. Et ideo solae huysmodi qualitates sunt objecta sensuum: quia, ut dicitur in VII Physic.[244b12], secundum eadem alteratur sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata.” But it is important to note that sensation is not itself alteration, even if alteration always accompanies it: QDV 26.3 ad 11 [Leon.22/3.758.413-421]: “Unde quamvis vis apprehensiva sensitiva immutetur simul cum organo corporali, non tamen est ibi passio proprie loquendo, quia in operatione sensus non transmutatur organum corporale per se loquendo nisi spirituali immutatione, secundum quod species sensibilium recipiuntur in organis sentiendi sine materia, ut dicitur in II De anima [424a17].”
passively affected by these sensible qualities) can be used to describe sensible quality, and thus Aquinas often uses the terms passion (*passio*) and sensible quality interchangeably.\(^{31}\)

Aristotle, however, makes a different distinction between the two in the *Categories* 8, and there is some evidence to suggest that Aquinas himself also subscribes to this other distinction. Aristotle states that sensible (or affective) qualities are “called affective not because the things that posses them have themselves been somehow affected. . . but it is because each of the qualities mentioned is productive of an affection of the senses that they are called affective qualities.”\(^{32}\) In this manner paleness affects sight, hotness affects touch, sweetness affects taste, etc. However, in the case of passions or affections, the sensible qualities “themselves have been brought about by an affection. That many changes of color do come about through affection is clear: when ashamed one goes red, when frightened one turns pale, and so on.”\(^{33}\) And “a man who reddens through shame is not called ruddy, . . . ; rather he is said to have been affected somehow.”\(^{34}\) Thus Aristotle divides the genus quality between sensible qualities and passions, e.g., shame, anger, etc. The difference between the two is causal, the first affects the senses

---

\(^{31}\) For example, Aristotle calls whiteness and heat a passion (*passio*) in Aquinas’s Latin rendering of Aristotle’s text: *Phys.* IV.14 [Marietti, 214]) in the *Physics*, 210b25-26, 224b11-15, which he had explicitly called a sensible quality in the *Categories* 8. Aquinas is quite aware that Aristotle sometimes these terms, passion and sensible quality, interchangeably and he himself rarely forces the distinction when commenting on Aristotle. *In VII Physic.* 8 [Marietti, p.488, n. 952]: “Sed si passio, idest passibilis qualitas, . . .” *In De sensu* tract. 1.14 [Leon.45/2.79.165-6] “. . . passiones, id est sensibiles qualitates . . .” *In I De generatione*, 5.11 [Leon.3.303]: “. . . passiones, idest passibiles qualitates,” and Ibid lect. 2. For more of the same see also *In III Physic.* 6; *In V Physic.* 1; *In V Physic.* 6; *In VII Physic.* 7; *In VIII Physic.* 15; *In VIII Physic.* 16. And sometimes, when not commenting on Aristotle, he also uses *passio* to describe sensible qualities, referring to the passive nature of the external sensation. 3 Sent. 14.1.1 sol. 2 [Mand. 435-6]: “. . . per modum passionis, dum scilicet potentia passiva est in transmutari: . . . Sed quia sensus non sentit nisi apud praesentiam sensibilis, ideo ad ejus operationem perfectam sufficit impressio sui activi per modum passionis tantum.”

\(^{32}\) Aristotle, *Categories* 8, 9a34-9b7 [Barnes, 15].

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 9b11-15.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 9b30-1.
directly, the second is a passion or affection that causes a sensible quality, e.g., the passion
shame causes one to become red. The passions are so-called because the subject is “affected
somehow,” e.g., affected by shame, i.e., the subject suffers the passion of shame and turns red.

I would like to point out that nowhere does Aquinas explicitly say that what he calls a
passion, specifically a motion of the sense appetite, say shame, is itself a quality of the third
species. Such passions are highly complex and often involve both material and immaterial
aspects. However, since there is alteration only in the third species of quality, and since such
passions are always accompanied by alteration, for there are no such passions without
alterations in the sense appetite’s organ, we might reduce them to this third species. Aristotle,
at least, certainly includes them in the third species of quality. Aquinas seems to read this
distinction in the Categories as primarily causal, either sensible qualities affect the external
senses, or sensible qualities are caused by passions. In other words, either redness affects and
causes the alteration in the senses, or the passion causes the redness. Of course, the redness of a
blushing face is a sensible quality, strictly speaking. But Aquinas nevertheless makes the

35 Ibid, 9b1, 9b31, and 10a9.
36 My guess is that just as alterations are strictly speaking in the genus action, so passions would be in the
genus passion. But I have not found any conclusive passages.
37 In VII Phys. 6 [Marietti, p. 474, n. 921]: “Passiones autem, cum sint in appetitu sensitivo, secundum eas
contingit alteratio.” See the entirety of n. 921. See also QDV 26.1 [Leon.22/3.747.173-5:183-6]; QDV 26.2
[22/3.752.105-7]; QDV 26.3 ad 12 [22/3.758.429-33].
38 QDV 26.1 [Leon.22/3.748.265-66]: “. . . actus sensitivarum potentiarum esse non possunt nisi
mediantibus organis corporaliibus; . . .”
39 Aristotle, Categories 8, 9b26-32 [Barnes, 15].
40 In VII Phys. 4 [Marietti, n.910, p.466]: “Et similiter etiam sunt alia sub sensu cadunt, sicut calor et
frigus, et lenitas et asperitas, quae etiam tactu comprehenduntur. Huiusmodi enim sunt quaedam passiones sub
genere qualitatis contentae: et dicuntur passiones, quia passionem ingerunt sensibus, vel quia ab alquiibus
passionibus causantur, ut in praedicamentis dicitur.” 4 Sent 4.1.1 [Moos.150]: “Sed hoc iterum non potest stare,
quia, sicut probat philosophus in 7 Physic.; tertia species qualitatis non est nisi in sensibili parte animae. Character
autem a nullo ponitur in hac parte animae, sed in intellectiva. Et praeterea illae qualitates semper habent ordinem ad
aliquam transmutationem corporalem, vel quam inferunt, vel a qua causantur.”
distinction between alterations concerning the passions of the sense appetite and alterations concerning the apprehensive sense powers.\(^{41}\) In fact, in one passage Aquinas explicitly says that the passion of redness as caused by shame is *not* a sensible quality.\(^{42}\)

Thus I think it fair to say that Aquinas accepts a version of the distinction between sensible qualities and passions in the *Categories*, even if he does not always make the distinction.\(^{43}\) It seems to me that the easiest way to make this distinction is simply to distinguish between the powers/organs that these qualities affect, i.e., passions affect and alter the organ of the sense appetites and sensible qualities affect and alter the organ of the apprehensive sense powers. Another way to make the distinction, perhaps, is to focus on their differing causes. In q. 26 of the *De veritate* Aquinas explains that passions of the sense appetite are always caused by the soul as mover, rather than by the soul as form.\(^{44}\) This means that such passions and their

---

\(^{41}\) ST I-II 52.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 767]: “... alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae speciei. ... Et similiiter, facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, ...”

\(^{42}\) QDV 20.2 [Leon.22/3.575.104-11]: Per modum passionis quando receptum non immanet recipienti, neque efficitur qualitas eius sed quasi quodam contactu ab aliquo agente immutatur et subito transit, sicut dicit philosophus in Praedicamentis [9a4] ruborem passionem et non passibilem qualitatem quando quis propter verecundiam in ruborem subito immutatur.” That *passibilem qualitatem* means sensible quality see ST I 77.3.

\(^{43}\) In the *Categories* 8 Aristotle also adds that sensible qualities are more permanent, e.g., skin hue, or as someone is irascible or bad tempered – this answers the question of how such a person is somehow qualified, e.g., a ruddy, irascible, or ill-tempered person. But passions are short-lived and easily disperse. For example, we do not say that someone who turns red is ruddy, or someone in a bad temper is ill-tempered, or that someone when angry is an irascible person, but that they are somehow affected. See *Categories* 8 9a20-10a10 [Barnes, 15-6]. This distinction also holds quite well since the passions of the sense appetite are necessarily short lived, see QDV 20.2 (in the previous note). But this distinction does not map perfectly onto the distinction between the passions of the sense appetite vs. the sensible or affective qualities, since heat (a sensible quality), for example, can be quite short lived. Furthermore, I doubt whether Aquinas would wish to call being ill-tempered a sensible quality. Aquinas rather speaks of those kinds of temperaments as dispositions, which belong to the first species, e.g., being naturally disposed (by a bodily disposition) to temperance or courage, etc., see ST I-II 63.1[St. Paul, 810] and *De virtutibus* 8 ad 10 [Marietti, 728-729]. Likewise, color or skin hue, e.g., being ruddy, would rather belong the the dispositions of the body as they are related to the soul; see the discussion of beauty in n. 82 below.

\(^{44}\) QDV 26.2 [Leon.22/3.752.77-80:88-101]: “Unitur autem corpori dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, in quantum dat esse corpori, vivificans ipsum; allo modo ut motor, in quantum per corpus suas operationes exercet. ... Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidens: uno modo ita quod passio incipiatur a corpore et
bodily alterations are always somehow internally caused by soul and its powers, but sensible qualities are external causes that affect the external senses and their organs.\textsuperscript{45} In other words, the cause of a material quality accompanying a passion is the soul as mover, but the cause of the material quality accompanying external sensation is an external sensible quality. Be that as it may, it is often difficult to know when he is distinguishing between passion and sensible quality and when he is not.\textsuperscript{46}

To put it in terms of \textit{De ente}. 6, the cause of the third species is a passive receiving or material principle of material and sensible alteration.\textsuperscript{47} The difference that subdivides this third species (when Aquinas distinguishes between them) is the particular power of the soul (and its organ) in which the accidental quality inheres and in which the alteration occurs, namely, the

\begin{quote}
QDV 26.3 [Leon.22/3.204-221]:
"Passio vero animalis, cum per eam ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adiungitur, et cuius est corpus transmutare; et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quia ex apprehensione sensitiva quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva quae est immediatum movens. Unde secundum modum operationis eius statim disponit organum corporale, scilicet cor unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur: unde in ira fervet, et in timore quodammodo frigescit et constringitur. Et sic in appetitiva sensitiva sola, animalis passio proprie invenitur."
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{45} Of course, the passions are also partially caused by external sources, e.g., external sensation, the heavenly bodies, etc., but they always also require the other powers as co-causes, e.g., fear requires the apprehension of something frightening, anger the apprehension of a perceived injustice, etc. We will discuss this in far greater detail in the the last three chapters. External sensation, however, is directly caused by the external sensible qualities.

\textsuperscript{46} See for example, 3 Sent. 14.1.1 sol 2 [Mand. 345]: “sicut etiam philosophus in praedicamentis distinguitor passio, et passibilem qualitatem.” The remainder of this passage makes one think that he is using these terms synonymously. See also ST III 63.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 2179]: “. . . in tertia specie qualitatis non sunt nisi sensibles passiones, vel sensibles qualitates.” And see the texts listed above in n. 31.

\textsuperscript{47} QDV 26.1 [Leon.22/3.747.158-63]: “Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicuius quocumque modo; et hoc sequendo significationem vocabuli: nam passio dicitur a patin Graece, quod est recipere.”
3. The 2nd Species of Quality

The second species of quality is divided into *potentia* and *impotentia naturalis*, which can be translated as capacity and incapacity or power and defective power. These qualify a subject in the sense that by means of them something is said to be able to do something or not to do something. And, of course, it is by means of these qualities that a substance can do something or not. These powers are all the powers of the soul, including vegetative, sensitive and rational powers. As we discussed in chapter one, essence is not the immediate principle of operation, but the powers of the soul, or *potentias naturales*, are the immediate principles of operation.

These powers are caused by the essential principles of the species, that is, they “flow” from and...
are inseparably caused by the soul, as we discussed in the first chapter. And thus, in the language of ST I-I 49.2, the determining measure of the second species is action which follows the principles of nature, since nature only causes action by means of these powers.

A defective power is simply a power that is defective or deprived, for example, blindness or a weak power of reason. The word natural here is important, because it implies not just any lack of power, but a lack of or deficiency in the powers that such and such a nature ought to have. Thus, although one might call, say the inability to look at the sun or the inability

---

53 QSC 11[Leon.24/2.120.272-7]: “causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei.” ST III 63.4 ad 2 [St. Paul, 2181]: “... essentia animae est subiectum potentiae naturalis, quae ex principiis essentiae procedit.” In VII Physic. 5 [Marietti, p.470, n.914]: “Ex quo etiam patet quare non facit mentionem de secunda specie qualitatis, quae est potentia vel impotentia naturalis. Manifestum est enim quod potentia vel impotentia naturalis non accipitur aut removetur nisi transmutata natura, quod fit per alterationem.” ST I-II 75.2 ad 1 [St. Paul, 879]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod est intrinsecum sicut potentia naturalis, semper inest, id autem quod est intrinsecum sicut actus interior appetitivae vel apprehensivae virtutis, non semper inest.” ST III 1.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 1867]: “... duplex capacitas attendi potest in humana natura. Una quidem secundum ordinem potentiae naturalis. Quae a Deo semper impletur, qui dat unicumque rei secundum suam capacitatem naturalem.”

54 In V Met. 14 [Marietti, p. 258, n.967]: “... impotentia est privatio potentiae. QDP 1.1 ad 17 [Marietti, p. 10]: “... potentiae dicitur esse contraria privatio, scilicet impotentia.” In V Met. 14 [Marietti, 256, n. 957]: “Et hoc ideo, quia posse pati aliquem defectum quandoque attribuitur impotentiae; et posse non pati idem, attribuitur potentiae, ...”

55 QDP 1.3 ad 2 [Marietti, p. 15]: “... propter defectum potentiae naturalis, ut caecum, ...” In II Met.5 [Marietti, p.93, n.334]: “Uno modo propter impotentiam complectendi: habent enim debilem rationem, unde non sufficiunt ad considerandum ordinem complexionis priorum et posteriorum.”

56 In V Met. 14 [Marietti, p. 258, n.967]: “Dicit ergo primo, quod impotentia est privatio potentiae. Ad rationem autem privationis duo requiruntur; quorum primum est remotio habitus oppositi. Id autem, quod opponit impotentiae, est potentia. Unde, cum potentia sit quoddam pricipium, impotentia erit sublatio quaedam talis principii, qualis dicta est esse potentia. Secundum quod requiritur, est quod privatio proprie dicta sit circa determinatum subiectum et determinatum tempus. Improprae autem sumitur absque determinatione subjecti et temporis. Non enim caecum proprie dicitur nisi quod est aptum natum habere visum, et quando est natum habere visum. In V Met. 14 [Marietti, 1887, n.960]: “... potestates dicitur omnes habitus sive formae vel dispositiones, quibus aliqua dicuntur vel reduntur omnino impassibilia, vel immobilia, aut non de facili mobilia in peius. Quod enim in peius mutentur, sicut quod frangantur, vel curventur, vel conterantur, vel qualitercumque corrupuntur, non inest corporibus per aliquam potentiam, sed magis per impotentiam et defectum alcuus principii, quod corrupi resistere non potest. Nuncquam enim corruptiur aliquid nisi propter victoriam corruptentis supra ipsum. Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate propriae virtutis.” Emphasis is mine.
to see in darkness an *impotentia*, one could not call it an *impotentia naturalis*, since humans are not naturally capable of either.\(^5^7\)

It seems to me that Aristotle’s influence here is somewhat tenuous. Aquinas has clearly attached the second species of quality onto his own faculty psychology. Aristotle does divide the second species of quality into natural capacity and incapacity, but the examples he uses do not quite fit with Aquinas’s account of this species. For example, Aristotle says that a boxer and a runner have natural capacities for boxing and running.\(^5^8\) It seems to me that Aquinas would rather categorize these as bodily dispositions, which are included in the first species of quality.\(^5^9\) Moreover, Aristotle also includes health and sickness and hardness and softness as natural capacities and incapacities. Aquinas explicitly categorizes the former pair as dispositions\(^6^0\) and the latter as sensible qualities.\(^6^1\) Aquinas nevertheless grants that these two may be considered as belonging to the second species, for when something is corrupted because of a defective natural principle, it lacks the natural power to resist, and thus is called an *impotentia*. In this sense softness or sickness may be characterized as an *impotentia naturalis*. And because the capacity

---

\(^{57}\) *In II De an.* 21[Leon.45/1.156-7.121-35] “... visus enim cognoscit visibile et invisibile, ut supra dictum est; invisibile enim est tenebra, de qua visus iudicat, et similiter illud quod est valde splendidum, ut sol, dicitur invisibile, set alio modo quam tenebra (nam tenebra dicitur invisibile propter defectum luminis, splendidum autem propter superhabundanciam <luminis> corrumpentis sensum); et similiter auditus est audibilis, scilicet soni, et non audibilis, scilicet silentii, quod est privatio soni; et etiam non audibilis est soni male audibilis, qui vel propter sui excellenciam corrumpit sensum vel propter sui parvitatem non sufficienter sensum inmutat. Et sic etiam est in omnibus que dicuntur secundum potenciam et impotenciam: ...”

\(^{58}\) For Aristotle’s discussion of the second species of quality see *Categories* 8, 9a14-27.

\(^{59}\) See his use of *macies* *In VII Phys.* 4 [Marietti, p.471, n. 918] and *macies* and *fortitudo* in *ST I-II 54.1* [St. Paul, 771].

\(^{60}\) *ST I-II 49.2* ad 3 [St. Paul, 753]. Aristotle himself also listed health as included in the first species of quality, *Categories* 8, 8b37.

\(^{61}\) *In VII Physic.* 4 [Marietti, p. 465, n. 910].
to resist such corruption is a kind of power, hardness and health may be characterized as *potentia naturalis* since they both have a natural power to resist corruption.\(^6^2\)

4. The 1\(^{st}\) Species of Quality

Generically, the first species of quality is a disposition.\(^6^3\) Paraphrasing Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* V, Aquinas notes that disposition signifies order, and more specifically, he says that a disposition is “nothing else than an order of parts in that which has parts.”\(^6^4\) Aquinas specifies this further and says that every such disposition is said to be toward something (*ad aliquid*) and thus it involves a relation, although it itself is not a relation.\(^6^5\) It is a certain way of being related (*modus se habendi*), either in oneself or to something else.\(^6^6\)

\(^6^2\) *In V Met.* 14 [Marietti, p.257, n. 960] text in n. 56 above. “... potestates dicuntur omnes habitus sive formae vel dispositiones, quibus aliqua dicuntur vel redduntur omnino impassibilia, vel immobilia, aut non de facili mobilia in peius. Quod enim in peius mutentur, sicut quod frangantur, vel curventur, vel conterantur, vel qualitercumque corrumputantur, non inest corporibus per aliquam potentiam, sed magis per impotentiam et defectum alicius principii, quod corrumpenti resistere non potest. Nunquam enim corrumpitur aliquid nisi propter victoriam corrumpentis supra ipsum. Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate propriae virtutis. Illis vero, quae non possunt tales defectus pati, “aut vix aut paulatim,” idest tarde vel modicum patiuntur, accidit eis propter potentiam, et in eo quod habent “aliquo modo posse,” idest cum quadam perfectione, ut non superentur a contrariis. Et per hunc modum dicitur in praedicamentis, quod durum vel sanativum significat potentiam naturalem non patiendi a corrumpentibus. Molle autem et aegrotativum impotentiam.” 3 Sent. 16.1.2 ad 5 [Moos. 513-4]: “... corpore Christi fuit secundum quid potentior clavus et lancea: inquantum scilicet clavus fuit durus, quod pertinet ad potentiam naturalem; et caro Christi mollis, quod pertinet ad naturalem impotentiam, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Cf. 2 Sent.19.1.4 ad 3 [Mand. 492-3].

\(^6^3\) *I-II* 49.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 754]: “Dispositio ... est genus habitus, nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione habitus; ...”

\(^6^4\) *In V Metaph.* 20 [Marietti, p. 277, n. 1058]: “... ponit rationem communem huius nominis dispositio, dicens, quod dispositio nihil est aliud quam ordo partium in habente partes.” Ibid, n.1061: “... hoc nomen dispositio, ordinem significet.” See also ST I-II 49.1 ad 3[St. Paul, 754].

\(^6^5\) *In VII Phys.* 5 [Marietti, p.470, n. 918]: “Omnis autem virtus et malitia dicuntur ad aliquid.” Ibid. p. 471, n. 918: “Dicuntur ergo huiusmodi dispositiones per relationem ad debitum opus, quod est optimum rei. ... Non autem est hic intelligendum quod huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid sint; quia sic non essent in genere qualitatis, sed relationis: sed quia eorum ratio ex aliua relatione dependet.”

\(^6^6\) ST I-II 49.1[St. Paul, 752]: “Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est: de quo Philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum est quod habitus est qualitas.”
Moreover, such dispositions are to “what is perfect in its own nature in relation to what is best, that is, the end, which is operation.” Likewise, in ST I-II 49.2 he says that a quality of the first species, in contrast to the other three, is according to nature (secundum naturam) and included in the understanding of nature is the end (the rationem finis). The first species is thus inherently teleological and is ordered to the end of nature. Because it is so related to the end of nature, whether or not it attains or falls short of its end, goodness or badness can be predicated of it. Because the other three species have no such teleological ordering, they cannot be said to be good or bad in this way.

In his commentary on the Metaphysics, Aquinas notes that a quality of the first species is a disposition according to which one is disposed well or poorly either with respect to oneself or with respect to something else, as by the disposition health one is well disposed to oneself and by the disposition robust, one is well disposed to doing something. Not only is this first species of quality concerned with the disposition of the whole (as the material dispositions of health or robustness are dispositions of the whole body), but it also includes the dispositions of the

---

67 *In VII Phys. 5* [Marietti, p.471, n. 918]: “dispositiones eius quod est perfectum in sua natura per comparationem ad optimum, idest ad finem, qui est operatio.”

68 ST I-II 49.2 [St. Paul, 753].

69 ST I-II, q. 49.2 [St. Paul, 753]: “Non autem consideratur in his [the second and third species of quality] aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem – Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, . . . ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; . . . Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. . . Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.” And ad 1: “. . . dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis.”

70 ST I-II 49.2 ad 1[St. Paul, 753]: “. . . dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis.”
whole’s parts, as the good dispositions of the parts of animals are parts for the sake of the whole animal, likewise are the virtues good dispositions of the parts of the soul, e.g., as temperance in the concupiscible appetite, courage in the irascible appetite and prudence in reason.\textsuperscript{71} A disposition is thus an order of that which has parts to the whole of which the part is a part. Nature taken in different senses can be considered as a universal whole composed of subjective parts (form and matter), an integral whole composed of integral parts (the various different bodily parts of the animal) and a potential whole composed of potential parts (as the soul is a whole composed of powers).\textsuperscript{72} Qualities of the first species are always dispositive perfections of these parts to the whole of which they are a part, that is, to nature.

This is not the perfection that necessarily follows upon creation, i.e., a being’s first perfection, but the perfection that a creature may or may not attain, i.e., its second perfection. In other words, it is a dispositive perfection or actualization that a creature is naturally in potency towards but may not actually posses. Furthermore this perfection can only be in a potency that

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{In V Metaph.} 20 [Marietti, p.277, n.1064]: “Secundo modo dicitur habitus dispositio, secundum quam aliquid disponitur bene et male; sicut sanitate aliquid disponitur bene, aegritudine male. Utroque autem, scilicet aegritudine et sanitate, aliquid disponitur bene vel male dupliciter; scilicet aut secundum se aut per respectum ad aliquid. Sicut sanum est quod est bene dispositum secundum se; robustum autem quod est bene dispositum ad aegritudinem. Et ideo sanitas est habitus quidam, quia est talis dispositio quals dicta est. – Et non solum habitus dicitur dispositio totius, sed etiam dispositio partis, quae est pars dispositionis totius; sicuti bonae dispositiones partium animalis, sunt partes bonae habitudinis in toto animali. Et virtutes etiam partium animae, sunt quidam habitus; sicut temperantia concupiscibilis, et fortitudo irascibilis, et prudentia rationalis.”

\textsuperscript{72} See the discussion of habits in angels in ST I-II 50.6 [St. Paul, 761], esp. ST I-II 50.6 ad 3 [St. Paul, 761]: “... in angeli non sunt partes essentiae: sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.” Here he clearly means potential parts of the potential whole. For Aquinas’s division between different kinds of whole and parts see Chapter 1, n. 80.
can be actualized in many different ways, in other words, in a potency that can be disposed either according to nature or contrary to it.³³

More specifically, this perfection concerns a dispositive actualization of two kinds of potency: 1) as the body is in potency to the soul, or 2) as the being is in potency towards operation through its powers. Thus Aquinas distinguishes between two ways of taking “according to nature”: as either 1) according to form (ad formam) or 2) according to operation (ad operationem).³⁴ The former may be subsumed under the latter, since the perfections of the body are ordered to the soul, which is itself is ordered to operation.³⁵

³³ ST I-II 49.4 [St. Paul, 755]: “habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indiget disponi ad alterum, tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Unde si aliquid sit cuius natura non sit composita ex potentia et actu, et cuius substantia sit su operatio, et ipsum sit proprius seipsum; ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet, sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, utam quod non sit in potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet: quia tale subiectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad talem actu. Unde si corpus caeleste sit compositum ex materia et forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in primo dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad formam; aut etiam ad operationem, qua natura caelestis corporis non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum.”

³⁴ ST I-II, q. 50.1[St. Paul, 756]: “habitus est quaedam dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, vel ad operationem.” And ST I-II, q. 50.2 [St. Paul, 757]: “habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad operationem.” ST I-II 54.2 [St. Paul, 772]: “Habitus autem importat ordinem ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata: scilicet ad naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam.” This distinction is ubiquitous in ST I-II qq. 49-66.

³⁵ The objector notes that all being, qua being (transcendentally) is good. He wonders why, since our natures are then good, that there is a need for some additional form to make us good. Here is Aquinas’s response: I-II 49.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 755]: “… per formam perfectur natura rei: sed oportet quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subiectum aliqua dispositione. – Ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterior ad operationem, quae vel est finis, vel via in finem. Et si quidem habeat forma determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia dispositio requiritur ad operationem praeter ipsum formam. Si autem sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima; oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per alios habitus.” See also ST I-II 49.3 [St. Paul, 754]: “Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod conventit vel non conventit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterior etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem.” See also I-II 49.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 755].
What is common to the first species, then, is that it is according to nature (*secundum
naturam*). The primary way that Aquinas divides this species is into dispositions that are ordered
to form and dispositions that are ordered to operation. Dispositions towards form (*ad formam*)
are called dispositions and dispositions towards operation (*ad operationem*) are called habits.
Habits and dispositions may be distinguished both by their respective potency, which they
perfect, and by their respective causes.

Let us first consider dispositions towards form (*ad formam*). Qualities of the first species
which are according to form are in the body as it is related to the soul, e.g., health and beauty.\(^{76}\)
Since a habit or a disposition can only be in a potency which can be disposed in different ways, it
is impossible for there to be a disposition in the rational soul as it is ordered to the body. This is
because the soul, as the form of the body, is already perfectly actualizing the body – there is no
potency for a perfecting disposition.\(^{77}\) The body, however, being inherently potential and
composed of contrary elements is always unstable; that is why there is room for perfecting
dispositions in the body. Furthermore, such dispositions do not have stable causes.\(^{78}\)

---

\(^{76}\) ST I-II, q. 50.1 [St. Paul, 756]: “Si vero loquamur de dispositione subjecti ad formam, sic habitualis
dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subjectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et
pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia
causae eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt.

\(^{77}\) ST I-II, 50.2 [St. Paul, 757]: “Si ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic
non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae
naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per ordinem ad animam,
quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus.”

\(^{78}\) ST I-II, q. 49.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 754]. Cf. text above in n.76.
Health, for instance, is a certain proportion of humors, heat, and coldness, which is according to nature.  

There is no reason to insist on the details of medieval medicine, but the general point is still correct. Health involves a proportion of material parts to one another. When someone is sick, for example, it is fair to say that something material and internal is somehow out of proportion; it is disordered. Beauty (\emph{pulchritudo}) is also included in this species, but as the proper figure of the body and the proportion and color of the members of the body.  

He even considers strength and weakness to belong to this species of quality, as a kind of fitting commensuration of nerves, flesh, and bones.  

These are all material dispositions of the body and

---

79 The humors are the four fluids of the body. QDV 27.1 ad 4 [Leon.22/3.791.190-3]: “... sanitas est quaedam qualitas corporalis ex humoribus adaequatis causata, ponitur enim in prima specie qualitatis, ...” QDVC 3 [Marietti, 823]: “Et similiter inveniuntur quaedam qualitates quae sunt dispositiones in ordine ad aliquid; sicut sanitas est quaedam commensuratio humorum in ordine ad naturam animalis, quod dicitur sanum: et ideo aliquid gradus commensurationis humorum in leone est sanitas, qui in homine esset infirmitas.” In II Physic. 4 [Marietti, p. 87, n. 170]: “... sicut medicus cognoscit sanatum quod est in homine et in leone, et el aliae causae sanitatis, sunt causa sanitatis, quae est in animali, ...” QDV 11.2 [Leon.22/2.353.78-82]: “... sicut motus causat sanitatem aut aliqua medicina calida in qua calor invenitur vel actualiter vel virtualiter, calor autem non est tota sanitas sed est pars sanatis.”

80 ST I-II 49.2 ad 1 [St. Paul, 753-4]: “... dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo et naturam, quae est finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quo est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde et ipsae figuras et passibles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones: nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanatum.”

81 ST I-II 54.1 [St. Paul, 771]: “... habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alciuis in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. Et de illis quidem habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod possunt plures esse in uno subiecto: eo quod unius subjecti possunt diversimode.
its parts as they are ordered to the soul, and they all have changeable and corruptible material causes. Although they concern the relation of the body to the soul, Aquinas insists, as we noted, that they concern the manner in which the soul is ordered to operation. Closely related to these dispositions are the natural dispositions of the organs of the sensitive powers, e.g., the manner in which some have a natural \textit{inchoatio} to virtue, e.g. a natural mildness that may help someone be temperate.

\begin{quote}
partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus dicuntur. Sicut, si accipientur humani corporis partes humores, prout disponentur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel dispositio sanitatis; si vero accipientur partes similis ut nervi et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est fortitudo aut macies: si vero accipientur membra, ut manus et pes et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo.” See also \textit{In X Ethic.} 3 [Leon.47/2.559.46-55]. In \textit{II Ethic.} 7 [Leon.47/1.98.12-21], \textit{De regno} 1.3 [Leon.42.452.47-50], and QDM 8.4 [Leon.23.206.55-8] he also discusses beauty’s opposite, \textit{turpitudo}. Pulchritudo always has some pleasing relation to the apprehensive power, ST I-II 27.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 672], in our case sight. But Aquinas does distinguish between spiritual and sensible beauty, ST I-II 27.2 [St. Paul, 673]. Thus we may distinguish between spiritual beauty apprehended by the intellect and sensible beauty apprehended by sight (and presumably the internal senses). For example see ST II-II 145.2 [St. Paul, 1647]: . . . “pulchritudo corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra corporis bene proportionata, cum quadam debiti coloris claritate. Et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis, sive actio eius, sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualia rationis claritatem.”

\textit{82} ST I-II 49.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 754] and ST I-II 50.1 [St. Paul, 756].

\textit{83} ST I-II 49.3 ad 3 [St. Paul,755]: “. . . sanitas dicitur habitus, vel habitualis dispositio, in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est. Inquantum tamen natura est principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum.” \textit{In VII Phys.} 5 [Marietti, 471, n. 918]: “Habitus qui sunt in prima specie qualitatis, etiam corporei, sunt quaedam virtutes et malitiae. Virtus enim universaliter cuiuslibet rei est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit: unde virtus corporis dicitur, secundum quam bene se habet et bene operatur, ut sanitas; e contrario autem est de malitia, ut de aegritudine. Omnis autem virtus et malitia dicuntur ad aliquid. Et hoc manifestat per exempla. Sanitas enim, quae est quaedam virtus corporis, est quaedam commensuratio calidorum et frigidorum; et dico hanc commensurationem fieri, secundum debitam proportionem eorum quae sunt infra, idest humorum ex quibus componitur corpus, ad invicem et ad continens, idest ad totum corpus. Aliqua enim contempitatio humorum est sanitas in leone, quae non esset sanitas in homine, sed eius extinctio; quia eam humana natura ferre non posset. . . . Similiter pulchritudo et macies dicuntur ad aliquid (et sumitur macies pro dispositione, qua aliquis est expeditus ad motum et actionem). Huiusmodi enim sunt quaedam dispositiones eius quod est perfectum in sua natura per comparationem ad optimum, idest ad finem, qui est operatio.”

\textit{84} ST I-II 51.1 [St. Paul, 762]: “Secundum vero naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum inchoationem naturalis inquantum unus homo, \textit{ex dispositione organis} est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtibus sensitivis. . . Sed ex parte corporis, secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria corporis complexione ad castitatem et mansuetudinem, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi.” ST I-II 63.1 [St. Paul, 810]: “. . . secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quaedam virtutes: prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam
Because one of the distinguishing marks of habits is that they have immutable or permanent causes and these dispositions have changeable causes, they are not truly habits and they do not perfectly have the nature of habits, although he often calls them habits. Aquinas says that these dispositions are as habits (ut habitus), and at times he rather refers to them as habitual dispositions (habituales dispositiones).

Habits proper, as we noted, concern the manner in which the soul is ordered to operation or action. Thus Aquinas contrasts dispositions that are in the body with habits that are in the soul. However, as we already noted, habits can only be in a potency that can be determined in different ways. Since the soul itself as form is always actual it cannot be in the soul as it informs the body, and thus Aquinas denies that habits inhere in the essence of the soul. But as we discussed in chapter 1, the soul is in potency to operation through its potencies. Thus habits are

---

85 ST I-II 50.1 [St. Paul, 756]: “Si vero loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subjectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum: quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt.”

86 See, for example, ST I-II, 49.1 [St. Paul, 752]; In VI Ethic. 10 [Leon.47/2.371.131]. 3 Sent. 23.1.1 [Moos, p.699, n. 25].

87 ST I-II 50.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 757].

88 ST I-II 49.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 755]; ST I-II 50.1 [St. Paul, 756]

89 Grace is the only exception. It is important to note that grace is not immediately ordered to operation, but to esse spirituale. See QDV 27.2 ad 7 [Leon.22/3.795.192-202]; ST I-II 110.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 1062] and 2 Sent. 26.1.4 ad 1[Mand. 678]: “. . . gratia ad genus qualitatis reductur, et ad primam speciem qualitatis; nec proprie tamen naturam habitus habet, cum non immediate ad actum ordinet; sed est velut habitudo quaedam, sicut sanitas se habet ad corpus.” Cf. chapter 2, nn. 111 and 135.

90 ST I-II 50.2 [St. Paul 757-8]: “. . . habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad
in the soul, but only understood as the soul is a potential whole composed of powers and
ordered to operation.  

One way to grasp this is to contrast habits with powers, and to consider why habits are in
the first species and powers are in the second. Natural powers or potencies are also ordered to a
kind of natural perfection, namely, their actualization, e.g., thus will is ordered to willing and the
intellect to understanding, etc. Furthermore, the powers of the soul are the parts of the potential
whole. Is not the actualization of such a part ordered to the whole of which it is a part? The
answer is no, powers are ordered to or inclined to their own actualization, but they are not
ordered to the end of nature, that is, the end of human life. An example may be helpful: the
intellect may be actualized by understanding the quiddity of a dog, but such an actualization is
neither according to nor opposed to the end of human life. Even if someone understands the

---

91 ST I-II 49.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 75]: “Si ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad natu
ram, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur: quia ipsa anima est forma comple
tiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per odin
umer ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse par
ticeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae divinae: sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essen
tiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicitur. Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.” ST I-II 49.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 75]: “Si autem sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima; oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos habitus.” ST I-II 50.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 757]: “Qualitates autem animae dicuntur simpliciter habitus.”

92 ST I-II 50.2 [St. Paul, 757]: “Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima: inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.” See n. 72 in this chapter.

93 ST I-II 50.5 ad 1 [St. Paul, 760]: “Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanae vitae, quod vis appetitiva inclinetur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod non inclinatur ex natura potentiae, . . .” On the connection between vita and nature as a potential whole see chapter 1, Section 3.
good, that actualization is not necessarily ordered to the end of human nature since the incontinent or vicious can understand the good.  

What is required for the existence of a habit is an indeterminate but determinable potency. But this potential indeterminacy is not a property of the nature of a power or potency itself. Let us consider the sense appetites. It is true that the sense appetites have something indeterminate with respect to their objects, as it is possible to be attracted to this or that, but this is not the kind of potential indeterminacy that is related to the end of nature. In one manner, the sense appetites can be considered as they operate in a deterministic fashion *ad unum*. When a certain sensible object is perceived and presented to the sense appetite, the sense appetite is either naturally attracted to it or it is not. It is only when the sense appetites are considered in the context of the whole of which they are a part, that is, the rational soul as a potential whole, which includes reason and will, that there is a determinable potency that can be said to be according to nature or contrary to nature. This is why the very *ratio* of habit necessarily includes will and reason, which is the principle of the soul’s rational acts. Any act of a habit of the soul proceeds from synderesis and the natural inclination of the will. In fact, it must be commanded, and thus a habit of the soul necessarily includes reason and will in its definition as its cause. Habits cannot

---

94 We will have much more to say about this in chapters 4 and 5.
95 ST I-II 50.3 [St. Paul, 758]: “... vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura. Et ideo sicut in potentissimis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ita etiam nec in potentissiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu naturae operantur. – Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.” See also Ibid. ad 2.
96 See previous note.
97 ST I-II.50.5 [St. Paul, 760]: “Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est. See also ST I-II 50.3 ad 2 [St. Paul, 758]; ST I-II 50.1 ad 1 [St. Paul, 756-7]. We will have more to say about this in the last three chapters.
be severed from free decision, for without free choice man’s potency is determined by
nature. That is, when goodness and badness are predicated of operative habits, this is only
intelligible in reference to the whole soul, including all its powers, as they are ordered to nature’s
end. There is no such reference to the end of nature in the powers of the soul;\textsuperscript{98} thus habits are in
the first species, and powers are in the second. The natural powers, as inseparably “flowing”
from the essence of the soul and intrinsically ordered to operation are, of course, closer to nature
as a principle of operation than the third and fourth species, and thus they fall within the second
species.

Thus the habits of the soul, which are ordered to operations, perfect and determine the
powers of the soul according to nature. The nature (\textit{ratio}) of these virtues includes reason and
will. Their immutable principles or seeds are the natural inclination of the will and synderesis.\textsuperscript{99}
Thus the proper division between virtues and dispositions is as follows: dispositions are
dispositions of the body as it is related to the soul that have mutable causes; habits are
dispositions of the soul, which inhere in the powers of the soul, as it is ordered to operation that
have immutable causes. When Aquinas says that a disposition cannot become a habit he is

\textsuperscript{98} Synderesis is not an exception since it is a habit. The only exception is the natural inclination of the will
as the will naturally inclines to the good of virtue, the good of all of the other powers and the good of the whole
person, ST I-II 10.1 [St. Paul, 615]. However, this natural inclination is determined \textit{ad unum} and operates by way of
an \textit{instinctus naturae}. We will discuss this in detail in the last three chapters.

\textsuperscript{99} ST I-II, 63. 1 [St. Paul, 810]: “Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione homini insunt
naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia
intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est
secundum rationem.” ST I-II 51.1 [St. Paul, 762].
distinguishing between them in this way. One has mutable causes, the other has immutable causes, and thus they are different species of the genus disposition.

However, Aquinas also grants that there is another proper way to make the distinction between habits and dispositions. Within these two species, one may further divide each between what is perfect and what is imperfect, or what is perfectly in it (perfecte inest) and thus cannot be easily lost, and what is imperfectly in it (imperfecte inest) and thus can be easily lost. This is a reference to the intension and remission of accidental forms, which we shall discuss in the immediately following section. But the point is that one way that we may speak of the perfection or imperfection of accidents (the esse of which is inesse) is as the degree to which they inhere in a subject. That is, any given accidental form may be more or less firmly entrenched in the subject, or one can say that the accident is more or less perfectly in the subject. Thus we may

100 ST I-II 49.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 754]; QDM 7.3 ad 4 [Leon.23.168.243-51] and ad 11 [Ibid. lines 292-5]; QDM 7.2 ad 4 [Leon.23.164.265-9]; De virt. 1.1 ad 9 [Marietti, 710].

101 ST I-II 49.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 754]: “Et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi contra habitum, dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie: ut scilicet dispositio dicatur, retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facile amittitur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili amittatur. Et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir. — Alio modo possunt distinguui sicut diversae species unius generis subalterni: ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae speciei, quibus convenit secundum suam propriam rationem ut de facili amiantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, . . . Et secundum hoc dispositio non fit habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum intentioni Aristotelis.” 4 Sent. 4.1.1 [Moos.150]: “dispositio nihil aliud est quam quidam habitus incompletus.” Cf. QDM 7.6 ad 5 [Leon.23.175.117-120]. However, it is important to note that the division between perfect and imperfect also applies to the distinction between habits of the soul and habits of the body, habits of the soul are inherently more perfect than habits of the body, see QDM 7.3 ad 4 [Leon.23.168.243-50]: “. . . dispositio comparatur ad habitum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Set hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo quod perfectum et imperfectum sint in eadem specie, et sic dispositio fit habitus; alio modo sic quod perfectum et imperfectum sint in diversis speciebus, et sic dispositio nunquam fit illud ad quod disponit: . . .”

102 QDM 7.2 ad 4 [Leon.23.164.273.6]: “. . . quod aliquis habitus fiat de facili mobilis potest contingere dupliciter: uno quidem modo per se, quia scilicet non habet ita perfectum esse in subiecto.” Emphasis is mine. He clarifies a few lines later [287-8] that this has to do with the disposition’s “radicationem in subiecto.” Cf. ST II-II 24.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 1191]. For another text tying this manner of distinguishing habits from dispositions by the degree inesse see. ST I-II 54.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 774]: “. . . successio in generatione habitus non contingit ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem: sed ex eo quod subjectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile mobilem;
say that any given subject has more or less temperance as temperance inheres more or less firmly in the soul. According to this way of making the division, habits have firm inesse and are thus immobile, and dispositions have weak inesse and thus are easily removable. According to this division the same disposition can become a habit.¹⁰³

Thus there is a tremendous amount of flexibility in Aquinas’s usage of the term habit and disposition and it can be difficult to know which way he is using the terms. Moreover, at times he seems to use the terms interchangeably and imprecisely.¹⁰⁴ But the two ways of making the division make sense: 1) between dispositions of the body as it is ordered to the soul with mutable causes, and habits of the soul as ordered to operation with immutable causes, and furthermore within this division 2) we may speak of any given disposition or habit as a habit if it has firm inesse, or we may call it a disposition if it has weak inesse. Thus health is a disposition, since it is a bodily disposition ordered to the soul, but we may speak of it as a habit if it is firmly entrenched in a subject. And in the process of acquiring virtue, a novice may have the habit of temperance, but if he is bordering on continence, we may call that habit a disposition, since metaphysically it has weak inesse.

B. Aristotle’s Influence on Aquinas’s Fourfold Division of Quality

et ex eo quod primo imperfecte incipit esse in subiecto, et paulatim perfectur.” See the texts in next section on intension and remission.

¹⁰³ QDM 7.2 ad 4 [Leon.23.164.265-71]: “. . . difficile mobile non est differentia constitutiva habitus. Nec enim dispositio et habitus sunt diversae species, alioquin non posset una et eadem qualitas que prius fuit disposition postea fieri habitus. Set facile mobile et difficile mobile se habent sicut perfectum et imperfectum circa eamdem rem.” For an argument suggesting that the mature Aquinas thought that a disposition could not become a habit see Mckay Knoble, “Pagan Virtues,” 347. To that I would note that this De malo text is a late text: Torrell dates it to roughly 1270, which is contemporaneous to the parallel passage in ST I-II 49.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 754].

¹⁰⁴ E.g., QDM 7.3 ad 11[Leon.23.168.292-4]: “egritudo sicut et sanitas non est actus set dispositio vel habitus, . . .”
This, then, is how Aquinas divides the genus of quality. Moreover, as we have seen Aquinas does offer a reason for the division based on their causes. The first species is caused by nature as a final cause, the second is caused by the soul, which efficiently causes the powers of the soul and their actions, the third is caused by a receptive/material bodily cause of alteration, and the fourth is caused by quantity, which follows upon substantial or artificial form. Moreover, Aquinas does claim that these four species are comprehensive, that is, these four kinds of quality account for all of the various ways in which we say that some substance is qualified.

Some scholars have vehemently complained that Aristotle never explained how he divided the genus quality in the *Categories*. Whatever may be the merits of this criticism, I would like to suggest that Aquinas’ hierarchical ordering of the species, from first to fourth, is inspired by Aristotle’s very brief discussion of quality in book 5 of his *Metaphysics*.

Aristotle’s text distinguishes between two broad ways of taking quality: on the one hand as a difference of substance (as abstracted from motion), and on the other hand of things in motion qua in motion. When Aquinas comments on this passage he notes that concerning the

---

105 4 Sent. 1.1 [Moos.149]: “omnes (the species of quality) reducuntur ad has species: quod patet ex hoc quod nulla alia species inveniri adhuc potuit.”

106 “He [Aristotle] gives no special argument to show that [habits and dispositions] are qualities. Nor does he give any criterion for deciding that a given quality is or is not a [habit-or-disposition]; why, for example, should affective qualities be treated as a class quite distinct from [habits and dispositions]?” John Ackrill, *Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); and “‘I shall largely dispense with questions like… the rationale (if there be one) for comprehending into a single category the monstrous motley horde yelept Quality…” Montgomery Furth, *Substance, Form and Psyche: an Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). These texts are cited in Paul Studtmann’s *The Foundations of Aristotle’s Categorical Scheme* (Milwaukee: Visions, 2008) 9 and 103.

107 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Ross, book 5.1020b14-25, [Barnes, p.1611-12.]: “Quality, then, seems to have practically two meanings, and one of these is the more proper. The primary quality is the differentia of substance, and of this the quality in numbers is a part; for it is a differentia of substances, but either not of things in motion or not of them qua in motion. Secondly, there are the modification of things in motion qua in motion, and the differentiae of movements. Excellence and badness fall among these modifications; for they indicate differentiae
first sense of quality if we ask what kind (quale) of an animal is man, we can say he is biped, etc. This is not discussed in Aristotle’s *Categories*, says Aquinas, because this sense of quality is not contained under the predicament quality,\(^{108}\) however, the fourth species of quality reduces to this sense of quality.\(^{109}\) The shape or figure of something, say cubed, is obviously not a consideration of it as in motion.\(^{110}\) Moreover, Aquinas notes that Aristotle does not discuss the second species of motion here in the *Metaphysics* since he deals with it in his treatment of act and potency.\(^{111}\)

The first and third species of quality, however, reduce to the other sense of quality, that is, to things in motion as in motion.\(^{112}\) We may infer that the second species does so as well, since powers or *impotentia* are inherently ordered to operation (or its lack thereof). The third species of quality, whether it be passion or sensible quality always involve motion, in particular,

---

\(^{108}\) *In V Met.* 16 [Marietti, p.264, n. 1000].


\(^{110}\) *De virt.* 1.1 [Marietti, 709]: ”...figura non dicit ordinem ad actum in se est.”

\(^{111}\) Ibid. n. 995. Aristotle takes this up in book 9 of the *Metaphysics*. To see Aquinas’s discussion of the powers of the soul in his commentary on book 9 see *In IX met.* nn.1776-7, 1779-83, 1787, 1792, 1818, 1820, 1828-29, 1857-58, 1861-65, 1881, etc.

\(^{112}\) *In V Met.* 16 [Marietti, pp.263-4, nn.998-9].
alteration. Habits and dispositions imply being moved well or badly, for “good and bad indicate quality especially in living things, and among these especially in those which have choice.”

Aquinas says that Aristotle reduces quality to these two broad principles, that is, the kinds of quality are either reduced to the soul as form or the soul as mover. This broad division forms a kind of spectrum, where on the one extreme one considers substantial form in complete abstraction from motion and on the opposite extreme are qualities concerned with beings that most of all move themselves. It is only in the latter case that one fully can speak of good and bad (in the non-transcendental sense).

Concerning Aristotle’s broad reduction, Aquinas comments that the good has the ratio of an end and things with choice act for the sake of an end. But all animate things, nevertheless, act for the sake of an end, whether this is by means of rational appetite, animal appetite, or natural appetite alone. Aquinas thus takes Aristotle to be tying the division of quality on the one end

---

113 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 120b24-25 [Barnes, 1612].
114 *In V Met.* 16 [Marietti, p. 263, n. 996]: “Redeit quator positos modos ad duos; . . .” Note that Aristotle himself is not reducting the four species of quality to two, but it is a reduction of four ways of taking quality (1020a33-1020b12) to two broad ways of taking quality (1020b13-25), which are 1) the differences of substances or 2) of things in motion as in motion. Aquinas however, in his commentary on this text, reduces the four species of quality to these two broad ways of taking quality.
115 For texts that explicitly say that the transcendental good and the moral good are not the same see I-II 55.4 ad 2 [St. Paul, 777] and QDM 2.5 ad 2 [Leon.23.44.201-214].
to teleology, which is the fulfillment or actualization of some nature.\textsuperscript{117} We can thus speak of the goodness or badness of animate things insofar as they attain their end (or actualization) or as they fall short of it. Thus Aquinas’s insistence that nature must be the first principle of the division of the genus quality is quite Aristotelian, although many of the details, as we have seen, are his own.\textsuperscript{118}

Although each of the ten predicaments or categories is its own distinct mode of existing, one might ask about each species and subspecies of quality. In what way are they distinct? For example, Aquinas (following Aristotle) sometimes says that heat may be considered to be in the first and third species\textsuperscript{119} and sometimes he says that figure is in the first species.\textsuperscript{120} In other quae sunt in finem ipsum. Et ideo sicut seipsa movent ad finem, ita etiam ad appetendum finem, vel ea quae sunt propter finem, ex quo est in eis electio libera.”

\textsuperscript{117} E.g., from this particular commentary see \textit{In IX Met.} [Marietti, p.438, n.1833]: “natura est causa per se, . . .” and \textit{In IX Met.} [Marietti, p. 447, n. 1857]: “omne quod fit vadens ad finem, vadit ad quoddam principium. Nam finis cuius causa fit aliquid, est quoddam principium. Est enim prius in intentione agentis, quia eius causa fit generatio. Sed actus est finis potentiae: ergo actus prior potentia, et principium quoddam eius.” And Ibid., n.1861: “Operatio autem est actus quidam. Propter quod, nomen actus dicitur ab operatione, ut supra dictum est. Et inde derivatum est ad formam, quae dicitur endelechia sive perfectio.”

\textsuperscript{118} This insistence that nature is first is in his response to Simplicius, whom Aquinas criticises for organizing the four species according to the following general differentiae: qualities of the last three species are natural and always present, but qualities of the first species are adventitious because they are produced from without and can be lost. Of these, habits and dispositions can be lost with ease or difficulty. Thomas counters that this cannot be right for there are many adventitious qualities in the third and fourth species and many qualities that are natural in the first species of quality. But more importantly, and more generally, Aquinas says that what is more natural must be prior in any order of species. Simplicius, according to Thomas, had gotten the ordering principle backwards see ST I-II, q. 49, a. 2, [St. Paul,753]. For Moerbeke’s translation of Simplicius’s Greek text see \textit{Commentaire Sur Les Categories D’Aristotele: Traductione De Guillaum De Moerbeke}, edited by A. Pattin (Brill, 1975), t.2, p. 313-14, lines, 78-96. For more clarifications of this by Simplicius see also ibid, p. 309, lines, 86-96; p. 313, lines, 91-96; p. 352, lines, 00-5, p. 361, lines, 62-74 and lines 83-84; p. 362, lines 89-90; etc.

\textsuperscript{119} Aristotle placed heat in the first and third category, \textit{Categories} [Barnes, 14-15]; for his placement of it in the first species see VIII.8b35-38, for his placement of it in the third species see VIII.9a30-31 and 9b2.

\textsuperscript{120} I-II 49.2 ad 1[St. Paul, 753]: “. . . dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquid disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquid disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde et ipsae figureae et passibles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones: nam figura, prout convenit
words, the same numerical quality may be in different species of quality. Because the
division of the genus quality is through its principles, and since there can simultaneously be
multiple principles or causes operating in different respects, we may classify a quality in a
species according to the cause being considered. Thus we may consider heat to be in the first
species, since it can be viewed as a *causa transmutable*, of sickness or health, which is either
good or bad for the subject,\textsuperscript{121} or we may simply consider it as a sensible quality. Any particular
quality has its own mode of existing as a quality, but it is distinguished from the other qualities
by reference to a real cause.

We might also ask about the nature of the distinction between something and its privation
in the first two species of quality, whether this be the distinction between *potentia* and *impotentia
naturalis* or between virtue and vice, health and sickness, beauty and disfiguration, etc. Evil is
not complete non-being, of course, but a privation of what something should have. This privation
is enough to distinguish it from the lack of privation. Concerning dispositions, the privative and
perfect remain in the same species, i.e., dispositions of the body and habits of the soul (this is not
the division by way of *inessus*). In the second species of quality, in which the perfect and
privative subdivide the species, the deficiency can be caused by a deficient internal principle

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{121} I-II 52.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 767]: “... alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae speciei. In
qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio per posterius: facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et
frigidum, sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum.” I-II 50.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 757]: “Aristoteles autem
ponit calorem in tertia. ... Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, commensuratio ipsarum
qualitatum passibilium secundum convenientiam ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis: et ideo, facta alteratione
circa ipsas qualitates passibles, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, fit ex consequenti alteratio
secundum aegritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio secundum huiusmodi habitus et
dispositiones.” See ST I-II, 12.3 ad 2 [St. Paul, 612].
\end{flushleft}
(e.g., from some problem in generation) or from some other external agent. Since such causes are often not known, we usually take the difference from the effect of this deficiency or lack thereof, e.g., someone can or cannot do something, i.e., someone has the power or potency to do this or that.

2. Charity and The Increase and Decrease of Accidents
A. The Created Nature of Charity.

In Book I, distinction 17, chapter 1, of his *Sentences*, Peter Lombard argues that charity is the Holy Spirit: “The Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son by which they love each other and us. It must be added to this that the very same Holy Spirit is the love of charity by which we love God and neighbor.” Granted that God is completely unchanging, the challenge for Peter Lombard was to explain how it is that some people have more charity than others, and furthermore, how it is possible that within the same person, charity can increase or decrease at different points in that person’s life. He raises this problem in chapter 5 of this same distinction and answers as follows: “the Holy Spirit is given to man, and, once given, is given more fully, that is, is increased, and is had to a greater or lesser degree, and yet remains unchangeable.”

Most of the thirteenth-century masters, however, rejected the Lombard’s claim that man’s charity is the Holy Spirit, and consequently they rejected his interpretation on the increase and

---

122 See 2 Sent. 20.2.1 ad 2 [Mand. 510-511]; on the three causes of *impotentia* here mentioned, the first and the third are relevant.
124 Peter Lombard in Silano, 93; Grottaferrata, 147, lines 1-3: “Sic igitur Spiritus Sanctus homini datur, et datus amplius datur, id est augetur, et magis ac minus habetur, et tamen immutabilis exsistit.”
decrease of charity. Albert the Great, for example, begins his commentary on this *quaestio difficilis* by asking whether charity is the Holy Spirit or some created habitual gift, and then proceeds to discuss whether and how charity increases and decreases.

While Aquinas’s early commentary on the Sentences focuses first and foremost on the problem of the kind of metaphysical union between God and man that would have to result from such a conception of charity, in his later texts Aquinas rather focuses almost exclusively on the voluntary nature of the charitable act itself. The question is this: can the will be directly moved

---

125 For example Albert said, “a Magistro dicitur quod non essentialiter augetur sed nobis vel in nobis. *Omnes autem moderni fere dicunt contrarium.*” The emphasis is mine. D. Alberti Magni *Comenentarii in I Sententiarum* [ed. Borgnet, v. 25, Paris, 1893], 481.

126 Ibid., 481.


128 Aquinas begins his commentary on this passage in *In I Sent.* 1.17.1.1 [Mand. 393-94], by noting that since everything which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver, charity as received in a created human must also be created. But there is another serious problem with the Lombard’s position that the Holy Spirit directly moves free decision. For if that is true, then one who has charity also has the Holy Spirit. If one actually has the unchanging Holy Spirit and if the actions are still one’s own [which they must be], that is, from one’s own person or supposit, then one has to grant that the divine nature has hypostatically united to that person. Charitable actions would come from two natures united in one person, and thus anyone with charity would be God incarnate. But if one denies this and says that the Holy Spirit moves free decision as he moves all things, then one cannot claim that the action is perfect. For Aquinas notes that the perfections of contingent operations follow the conditions of their proximate causes, not their first cause. And in order for the action to be perfect, the will must be perfected. For an act from a power can only be perfected if that power itself is perfected by a habit.

These arguments concerning the problems about the kind of union between the Holy Spirit and man are later abandoned. Bonaventure brings up the same problem of how the Holy Spirit is to be united to the soul in his commentary on this passage: [Quarrachi, vol. 1, p. 294.]. It seems to me that the later Aquinas would deny that, because the will is moved by the Holy Spirit qua Charity and the will moves itself, that the human must be hypostatically united to God – provided that one not claim that it was one’s own Charity: it is the nature of merit which is nevertheless putting the pressure on this early passage. The later Aquinas seems more comfortable with God and man simultaneously exercising efficient causality in the will. Furthermore, Christ had the virtue of charity [e.g., ST III.48.2 ad 2, St. Paul, 2107]: in other words, even granting the hypostatic union, there is nevertheless a need for a created habit. For Christ’s human will still needed the habitual gift of charity, since qua human it was not sufficient to love God as Triune. Thus the emphasis on the later passages is on the nature of merit as voluntary and simultaneously supernatural (infused) rather than on the problems of uniting these two causes in the same person.
by the Holy Spirit or does it need some habit to perfect it?129 The will is, after all, free and nevertheless it is always moved by God, so why is there any need to posit a habit? God is already operating in man and man is already co-operating with God without any habit.

Let us consider Aquinas’s answer to this in the first article of the disputed questions De Caritate (1271-1272).130 Aquinas brings up the example of a rock. A rock is naturally and intrinsically inclined downwards. We may throw a rock upwards, but this is contrary to its inclination, i.e., it is violent to its nature. If God made a rock that was naturally inclined upwards, it would not be a rock – it would be something else. Likewise humans are naturally inclined to their end through their wills, an intrinsic principle; man’s natural inclination to his ultimate end is the principle and root of free decision, for humans freely will this or that for the sake of a naturally willed end. Now, acts that exceed the whole capacity of man’s nature cannot be willed voluntarily, i.e., if they are beyond the ken of the will’s natural inclination to its ultimate end, man simply does not have the capacity or power to will them. If the cause of this volition is external, then the action cannot be attributed to the will itself or to the person, but to the external agent – i.e. then the action would not be internal and free. Thus, in order for the action to remain free, the will must be given its own principle by means of which it can will its supernatural end.131 In other words, the Holy Spirit could move my will immediately but such an action

---

129 This is the question of II-II, 23.2[St. Paul, 1183] and De caritate 1.1[Marietti, 755-56].
130 This is the date cited in Torrell. It has, however, been disputed by Michael Sherwin in By Knowledge and Love, 199-200, n. 192. Jeffrey Hause and Claudia Eisen Murphy argue against Sherwin in their commentary and translation of this text, Aquinas: Disputed Questions on Virtue [Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2010], 324-5, n. 2.
131 De caritate 1.1 [Marietti, 755-56]: “Sed haec opinio omnino stare non potest. Sicut enim naturales actiones et motus a quodam principio intrinseco procedunt, quod est natura; ita et actiones voluntariae oportet quod a principio intrinseco procedant. Nam sicut inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus appetitus naturalis nominatur, ita in rationalibus inclinatio apprehensionem intellectus sequens, actus voluntatis est. Possibile autem est quod res
would not be meritorious because it would not be my action but it would only be the action of the Holy Spirit. For example, a person who can only lift 100lbs may be helped by another to lift 120lbs, but in that case one could not say that he had lifted 120lbs. In the case of charity one is given, by another, the capacity to lift the heavier weight, that is, to will a higher end, so that one can be said to have done it oneself. God moves as a primary cause in either case (with or without charity). What is important is the manner in which the human exercises secondary causality, i.e., with a superadded habit or without, as meritorious or not.  

Thus rather than interfering with the will’s voluntary nature, as one might suppose, it is precisely to safeguard man’s free decision that the habit of charity must be placed in the will. The will’s nature as a power is limited, and to love God as triune is beyond its natural power. God could not, according to Aquinas, cause an act of charity without the created habit of charity.

naturalis ab aliquo exteriori agente ad aliquid moveatur non a principio intrinseco, puta cum lapis proicitur sursum. Sed quod talis motus vel actio non a principio intrinseco procedens, naturalis sit, hoc omnino est impossibile, quia in se contradictiorum implicat. Unde, cum contradictoria esse simul non subsit divinae potentiae; nec hoc a Deo fieri potest, ut motus lapidis sursum, qui non est a principio intrinseco, sit ei naturalis. Potest quidem lapidi dare virtutem, ex qua sicut ex principio extrinseco sursum naturaliter moveatur; non autem ut motus iste sit ei naturalis, nisi ei alia natura detur. Et similiter non potest hoc divinitus fieri ut aliquis motus hominis vel interior vel exterior qui sit a principio extrinseco, sit voluntarius; unde omnes actus voluntatis reducuntur, sicut in primam radicem, in id quod homo naturaliter vult, quod est ultimus finis. Quae enim sunt ad finem, propter finem volumus. Actus igitur qui excedit totam facultatem naturae humanae, non potest esse homini voluntarius, nisi superaddatur naturae humanae aliquid intrinseceum voluntatem perficiens, ut talis actus a principio intrinseco proveniat. Si igitur actus caritatis in homine non ex aliquo habitu interiori procedat naturali potentiæ superaddito, sed ex motione spiritus sancti, sequetur alterum duorum: vel quod actus caritatis non sit voluntarius; quod est impossibile, quia hoc ipsum diligere est quodam velle; aut quod non excedit facultatem naturae, et hoc est haereticum. Hoc igitur remoto, sequetur primo quidem, quod actus caritatis sit actus voluntatis; secundo, dato quod actus voluntatis possit esse totaliter ab extrinseco, sicut actus manus vel pedis, sequetur etiam, si actus caritatis est solum a principio exteriori movente, quod non sit meritorius. Omne enim agens quod non agit secundum formam propriam, sed solum secundum quod est motum ab altero, est agens instrumentaliter tantum; sicut securis agit prout est mota ab artifice. Sic igitur si anima non agit actum caritatis per aliquam formam propriam, sed solum secundum quod est mota ab exteriori agente, scilicet spiritu sancto; sequetur quod ad hunc actum se habeat sicut instrumentum tantum. Non ergo in homine est hunc actum agere vel non agere; et ita non poterit esse meritorius. Haec enim solum meritoria sunt quae in nobis aliquo modo sunt; et sic totaliter tollitur meritum humanum, cum dilectio sit radix merendi.”

132 For the connection to merit see the text in the previous note.
If He did, the act would not be voluntary; it would be neither meritorious nor charitable. The only way that man can cooperate with God in charity is if he can will it himself, and the only way he can will it himself is if God strengthens the power of the will by granting it a new created habit, a new principle by which it can so act. To say that the Holy Spirit directly moves the will without a habit is to destroy the free nature of supernatural love, and by implication it is to destroy the possibility of such love.

2. The Intension and Remission of Accidental Forms.133

Having abandoned the Lombard’s position on the nature of charity, the masters avoided the particular problems of accounting for God’s increase and decrease in a person. But they inherited a whole new set of problems. On its most basic level the problem is this: how can one say that an accidental quality increases? For the word increase signifies quantity, but we are discussing quality. For example, when skin becomes more tan as it is exposed to the sun, or when water becomes hotter on the stove, we have used or implied the word more, which signifies bulk or quantity, although we do not really mean quantity. By more we mean to signify something about the quality of the tan or the heat itself and we borrow quantitative terms to signify qualitative characteristics. But we do not want to say that the quality changes in such a

133 Aquinas’s fullest treatments of this topic are in In I Sent. 17.2 [Mand. 409-427]; QDV 11 [Marietti, 790]; ST I-II, q.q.52-53 [St. Paul, 765-71]; ST II-II, 24. a.4-7 and 10 [St. Paul, 1190-83 and 1195]. The texts in the Summa are clearly later, for Aquinas heavily uses Simplicius’ commentary on the categories which Aquinas received in 1266-67. But its absence in QDV makes me wonder about the late dating of that text. There is a parallel passage in I Sent. 17, q.2 in the Lectura Romana, [ed. Boyle, 195-201] if one accepts that it is authentic. See Torrell’s doubts about this in Person and Work, 46-7, 160, 412. But I find its discussion of fervor to be unusual in 17.2.1 [Boyle.195.28-41], which is not in the other parallel texts and furthermore, his claim in I.17.1., that we have a kind of intuitive or natural knowledge of God as creator I find highly suspect [Boyle.191.22-26]: “Est autem trip lex cognitio Dei. Una est qua cognoscitur in suis effectibus tantum, prout si in quantum cognoscit quis ens vel aliquid creatum, habet aliqualem cognitionem Dei creantis et creantis ipsum. Et haec inest omnibus hominibus naturaliter et a principio.”
way that it becomes another quality, e.g., red to purple. Thus there needs to be some kind of an explanation that accounts for the “increase” of a quality without its simultaneously morphing into another quality; for then it would not be an increase but rather the destruction of the previous quality.\textsuperscript{134}

Aquinas denies that the increase of a disposition is an alteration. His arguments are directed against the kind of alteration that is a motion from one contrary to another, e.g., from white to black, for the alteration of sensible material qualities is the destruction of one and the generation of another. Virtue is a perfection which is according to nature and as such its coming to be does not entail a simultaneous destruction of a contrary quality. Furthermore, since alteration itself is material and sensible, it only concerns the sensitive part of the soul: there is no alteration in the immaterial intellect and will. Dispositions of the body or habits of the sense appetites, however, may come to be or be accompanied by alterations. But because all dispositions are founded on a relation, in which there is no motion (in the strict sense of material

motion), properly speaking the coming to be or passing away of dispositions of any sort, and their increase or decrease, is not an alteration.\textsuperscript{136}

Nor is the augmentation of a disposition an increase in corporeal quantity. Aquinas does, however, distinguish between dimensive quantity (which is increased by adding parts to parts) and virtual quantity.\textsuperscript{137} Virtual quantity, unlike dimensive quantity, is not restricted to material

\textsuperscript{135} In V Phys. 3 [Marietti, pp. 329-30, n. 666-7] he argues that there is no motion in the category relation. For more on relation. See also In V Met. 17 [Marietti, p.266-269, n.1001-32]. Aquinas does not develop in more detail the exact kind of relation he means, although it may be possible to infer it on philosophical grounds. See also In V Phys. 3 [Marietti, n.661] where he finds Aristotle saying that \textit{motus} is only found in three predicaments: substance, quality and place. Aquinas does grant, that the intension and remission of sensible qualities is a kind of alteration, and these alterations may, in turn, be the cause of dispositions, e.g., health. But he seems to suggest that because habits and dispositions are founded on relation there is no alteration in habits and dispositions. See nn. 24-25 above.

\textsuperscript{136} In VII Phys.5 [Marietti, p.469-71, n.913-918], he argues that there is no alteration in the dispositions of the body. In the following \textit{lectio} 6 [Marietti, pp.473-6, n.919-27] he argues that there is no alteration in the dispositions of the soul. However, he does not take up intension and remission in these passages.

\textsuperscript{137} For a short presentation of Aquinas’s view on virtual quantity, see Anne Ashley Davenport’s \textit{Measure of a Different Greatness: The Intensive Infinite 1250-1650} [New York: Brill, 1999], pp. 60-63. Besides this context, Thomas, and Bonaventure for that matter [See Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, Quarrachi, tom. 4, p.770 and Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis, q. 4, a. 1, Quarrachi, tom. 5, p. 80], use virtual quantity to describe God’s infinity. The thrust of Davenport’s argument is that this is a peculiar medieval conception of God that was drummed up in response to the Cathar heresy (1\textsuperscript{st} two chapters). If we follow Aquinas’ argument in \textit{Summa contra gentiles} I, c. 43, we can see the merit of this line of thinking. Thomas notes that we attribute infinity to God, but infinity refers to quantity and there are two kinds of quantity, according to multitude and continuous quantity. But God cannot be infinite in either of these ways, for if we attribute an infinity of multitude to God then one has implied that God has parts and hence composition. Nor can we attribute infinity according to continuous quantity to God, for then we imply infinite extension; but being incorporeal, God cannot extend infinitely in this way. Thus God is infinite according to a spiritual magnitude, \textit{secundum spiritualem magnitudinem}. Also see the discussion in ST I, 7.1-2 [St. Paul, 31-3]. A little further on in the argument, Aquinas cites the much used passage from Augustine’s \textit{De Trin.}, 6, c. 8: “in those things which are not great in bulk, \textit{mole}, to be greater is the same as to be better.”[ Cf. Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 17, q. 1 (Quarrachi, t. 4, p. 308).] I do not doubt the usefulness of such a concept of God’s infinity to argue against a Manichean cosmology in which God cannot be infinite. Scholars have also pointed out, for example, that the notion of transcendental goodness was also worked out as a response to the Cathars: for if one concedes that everything which is is good, then one must posit that evil, its opposite, is non-being. See Jan A. Arsten’s discussion of Philip the Chancellor’s \textit{Summa de bono in Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas} (Leiden-New York-Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1996), 25-40. Be that as it may, such a heresy may indeed have been a kind reason for formulating such positions more distinctly than they had been formulated in the past, but one could also point out that most clarifications of Catholic doctrine, which have been cemented in councils, were articulated in response to this or that heresy whenever they arose in history. There can be little doubt that understanding God’s infinity as precisely as possible was simply part of the theological discourse of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century and had its own theological interest, import, and momentum regardless of how the discussion may have
forms. He notes, for example, we cannot understand God because of the excess of God’s virtual quantity, which is disproportionate to the power of our intellects, just as we cannot see the sun because of the excess of its brightness. In another use Aquinas explains that angels can move corporeal things by means of virtual quantity. Virtual quantity is the amount of power (we might say) that follows from a form. Virtual quantity is bound to perfection, and as such is rooted in a specific form and its consequent actions. Charity has such virtual quantity and its increase may be described as a quantitative increase in such terms.

originated in time. I wish to note this interesting possible historical origin, but avoid reducing the development of the notion of spiritual magnitude or virtual quantity to a bludgeoning weapon against heretics. I think Davenport’s depiction of Aquinas as an intellectual pitbull goes too far. Furthermore, John Tomarchio criticises Davenport for reducing “Aquinas’s concept of divine infinity to a fideistic doctrine of divine incomprehensibility.” Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Concept of Infinity” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2002): 163. Tomarchio’s article, which brings out the fullness and complexity of Aquinas’s understanding of divine infinity, stands in stark contrast to Davenport’s rather emaciated presentation of it.

More specifically, they can be in a place by means of virtual quantity. ST I.52.1 [St. Paul, 255]; Quodl.1.I.3.1[Leon.25/1.181.23-39].

ST I.42.1 ad 1[St. Paul, 205]: “ . . . duplex est quantitas. Una scilicet quae dicitur quantitas molis, vel quantitas dimensiva, quae in solis rebus corporalibus est: unde in divinis personis locum non habet. Sed alia est quantitas virtutis, quae attenditur secundum perfectionem alicuius naturae vel formae: quae quidem quantitas designatur secundum quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus calidum, inquantum est perfectius vel minus perfectum in caliditate. Huismodi autem quantitas virtualis attenditur primo quidem in radice, idest in ipsa perfectione formae vel naturae: et sic dicitur magnitudo spiritualis, sicut dicitur magnus calor propter suam intensionem et perfectionem. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin.[cap. 8, PL.42.929], quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse: nam melius dicitur quod perfectius est. Secundo autem attenditur quantitas virtualis in effectibus formae. Primus autem effectus formae est esse: nam omnis res habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem effectus est operatio: nam omne agens agit per suam formam. Attenditur igitur quantitas virtualis et secundum esse, et secundum operationem: secundum esse quidem, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt maioris durationis; secundum operationem vero, inquantum ea quae sunt perfectioris naturae, sunt magis potentia ad agendum.”

De ver. 29.3 [Leon.22/3.855.140-78]: “Est autem duplex quantitas, scilicet dimensiva, quae secundum extensionem consideratur, et virtualis, quae attenditur secundum intensionem; virtus enim rei est ipsius perfectio secundum illud philosophi in VII Physicorum ‹ Unumquodque perfectum est quando attingit propriae virtutì ›; et sic quantitas virtualis uniuscuiusque formae attenditur secundum modum suae perfectionis. Ultraque autem quantitas per multa diversificatur; nam sub quantitate dimensiva continetur longitudo, latitudo, et profundum, et numerus in potentia; quantitas autem virtualis in tot distinguitur quo sunt naturae vel formae, quaram perfectionis modus totam mensuram quantitatis facit. Contingit autem id quod est secundum unam quantitatem finitum, esse secundum aliam
These two terms dovetail. Charity’s description as a quantitative increase or as a qualitative intensification amount to the same thing; in either case, an increase or decrease in formal perfection is signified. A passage from Augustine’s *De trinitate* VI was commonly cited: “in these things which are not great in bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better.” This augmentation or intensification or remission connotes an increase or decrease in perfection, that is, a becoming better or a becoming worse. The Latin word used was *intendere*, which echoes Aristotle’s famous ὀρέγονται of the opening of his *Metaphysics*, to stretch out towards, evoking the teleological thrust of appetitive motion. Thomas at times will use the almost redundant Latin phrase *attenditur secundum intensionem*. Aristotle’s understanding of form as *dynamis* and *energeia* (rather than *kinesis*) as intrinsically ordered towards its operation or perfection is at
work here. When one says that such an accidental form increases (of the 1st species of quality), it means that the subject participates more in that form and the form is more able to perform its proper activity with more power and actuality. When charity increases, one loves God more intensely, more easily and with more delight. One can translate *intensio* as the English intensity, provided that this not is restricted to (as it often is in English) intense emotional experiences.

Unlike some accidents, appetitive habits are only increased or perfected in one way; this is according to its participation in its subject. In a very pithy passage Thomas summarizes how this works:

Some said that charity does not increase according to its own essence, but only insofar as it is rooted in the subject, or according to fervor. But they did not know what they were saying. For since charity is an accident, its esse is inesse; whence for it to increase according to essence is nothing else than for it to be more in the subject (*magis inesse subiecto*), which is for it to be more rooted in the subject. Likewise also it is essentially a virtue ordered to act, whence it is the same thing for it to increase according to essence and for it to have the power to produce an act of more fervent love.

---

148 QDV 1.11. [Marietti, 739]: “Nihil enim est aliud qualitatem aliquam augeri, quam subiectum magis participare qualitatem; non enim est aliquod esse qualitatis nisi quod habet in subie. Ex hoc autem ipso quod subiectum magis participat qualitatem, vehementius operatur; quia unumquodque agit in quantum est actu; unde quod magis est reductum in actum, perfectius agit.”

149 Intellectual virtues are increased and perfected in two ways, for one can learn new things which were previously not included in the habit. This is not true of the moral virtues, which are always related to everything which fall under their purview. We shall return to this in chapter 5.

150 ST II-II 24.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 1191]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dixerunt caritatem non augeri secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum radicationem in subiecto, vel secundum fervorem. Sed hi propriam vocem ignoraverunt. Cum enim sit accidens, eius esse est inesse: unde nihil est aliud ipsam secundum essentiam augeri quam eam magis inesse subiecto, quod est eam magis radicari in subiecto. Similiter etiam ipsa essentialiter est virtus ordinata ad actum: unde idem est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam et ipsam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum.”
Thus the intensification or increase of accidental forms is the same as the subject’s participation in that form and the subject’s increased efficiency for action. Since the kind of existence that an accident has is *inesse*, its essential increase and perfection is simply for it to be more in the subject, to have more *inesse*. To have more charity is to have one’s habit more firmly rooted in the person. Its quantitative or qualitative aspects, if one may say such a thing, are completely dependent on the degree to which the accident inheres in the subject, for it cannot exist or operate apart from the subject.

Thus someone with temperance can have it more fully insofar as such a person participates in temperance more fully, i.e., they can act better, more temperately, with greater ease and pleasure. But before treating the causes of this intensification or participation, I shall introduce participation itself. For it is important, at this point, to distinguish between the different kinds of participations at stake. On the one hand the subject essentially participates in the moral virtues, but on the other hand, the moral virtues essentially are participations in reason. In order

---

151 ST II-II, 24.5 [St. Paul, 1191]: “Sic ergo caritas augetur solum per hoc quod subiectum magis ac magis participat caritatem: idest secundum quod magis reductur in actum illius et magis subditur illi. Hic enim est modus augmenti proprius cuiuslibet formae quae intenditur: eo quod esse huiusmodi formae totaliter consistit in eo quod inhaeret susceptibili. Et ideo, cum magnitudo rei consequitur esse ipsius, formam esse maiorem hoc est eam magis inesse susceptibili: non autem aliam formam advenire. Hoc enim esset si forma haberet aliquamquantitatem ex seipsa, non per comparationem ad subiectum.”

152 Here I agree with Wippel and Maier that this is how one ought to take essential increase in *In I Sent.* 17.2.1 [Mand.1.411]; Wippel, *Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension and Remission*, 318-19; Maier, *Intensiven Grösse*, 24-25 and 27, n.10. I would like to note that Brown, who has argued for a real distinction between accidental esse and accidental quiddity (this is the thesis of the whole book, but for an explicit statement see Brown, *Accidental Being*, 281) apparently thinks that in the intensification of accidental forms, there is an increase in *inesse* but not in the really distinct quiddity of the accidental form itself, Brown, *Accidental Being*, 177-188, see comments on 180 and 185. Interestingly, this is exactly Giles of Rome’s position. For Giles’ position see Wippel, *Intension*, 321-22. While there is undoubtedly something to be said for such a philosophical position, I accept Wippel’s criticism of Brown’s interpretation of a real distinction between accidental *esse* and accidental quiddity, Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 262-65.
to clearly distinguish these different senses of participation, if indeed they are different, a
general introduction to the different kinds of participation is now necessary.


There can be no doubt that participation is first and foremost a metaphysical doctrine. Its
importance can hardly be exaggerated. It is Aquinas’s ultimate answer to the Parmenedian riddle
of how being can be both one and many in the context of created and uncreated being; is it is his
reconciliation of Platonic participation with Aristotle’s division of being into act and potency.
Participation is the causal undergirding of Aquinas’s analogical predication of being and of the
divine names. There is much good scholarship on this topic, notably by Wippel, Montagnes and
Fabro, and quite a few good summaries of the topic, and there is no need for us to replicate what
has already been done.153 However, I shall take from the scholarship on participation (most

---

153 The best treatment is Wippel’s chapter III “Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many” in
Metaphysical Thought, pp. 94-132. To get the sense of the grandeur of its scope within its Parmenedian context one
ought to read the section on participation in the entirety of part 1: “Aquinas and the Problem of the One and the
Many in the Order of Being” pp. 65-197. Wippel has been influenced by Cornelio Fabro and Bernard Montagnes’s
excellent book The Doctrine of Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas, [Marquette University Press:
Milwaukee, 2004]. Montagnes, was in turn, influenced by Cornelio Fabro. For a summary of Fabro’s thinking on
participation see “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy,” Review of Metaphysics 27 (1974), 449-
491. See also Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d’Aquin [Louvain, 1961]. For a recent dissertation on Fabro
see Jason A. Mitchell, Being and Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection according to
greatly (concerning the role of essence with respect to esse) with Louis B. Geiger, La participatione dans la
philosophie de s. Thomas d’Aquin [Paris: Librairie Philosphique J. Vrin, 1953] who has influenced Rudi A. te
Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas [New York: E.J. Brill, 1989]. See Wippel’s effective
response to Geiger and te Velde in Metaphysical Thought, 128-130. For an excellent and very clear overview of
participation and a summary of the scholarship see Doolan, Divine Ideas, 192-212. See also John Rziha, Perfecting
Human Actions: St. Thomas on Human Participation in Eternal Law [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2009] – the first chapter is a summary on participation and its scholarship. There is a summary of the
dispute between Fabro and Geiger in Helen John James, The Thomist Spectrum [New York: Fordham University
Press, 1966]. For some discussions of the Platonic and Neoplatonic provenance of participation see W. Norris
Association 26 (1952) 147-57; Robert J. Henle, Thomas and Platonism [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956]; Arthur
Little, Platonic Heritage [Dublin: Golden Eagle Books, 1949].
notably from Montagnes and Wippel) their general conclusions and comments about the
nature of participation as I deem it is helpful for understanding how the sense appetites
participate in reason, and as we have been discussing, how a subject participates in an accident.
For the sake of clarity, I shall stay close to Thomas’s own terminology.\footnote{154}

The best place to start is Aquinas’s commentary on Boethius’ \textit{de hebdomadibus}, c.2
(1271-72).\footnote{155} It is the only place in his corpus where he lays out an account of participation
(\textit{rationem participationis}).\footnote{156} Although the passage is explicitly concerned with participation in
\textit{esse}, the passage is also useful for its general comments on participation and his classification of
participation into three modes or kinds.

He introduces the \textit{rationem participationis}, with an etymological play. To participate is,
in a sense, to take a part (\textit{Est autem participare quasi partem capere}).\footnote{157} He then clarifies what
he means: “And so when something receives in a particular way that which pertains to another
universally, it is said to participate in that. . . .”\footnote{158} From this general definition one can readily

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{154} I shall neither use Geiger’s terminology of participation by similitude or composition, nor shall I use
Fabro’s language of predicamental or transcendental participation. As Wippel has noted, these divisions of
participation are not Thomas’s own terms (\textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 127), but more importantly, I do not think they
would be particularly helpful for our investigation.
\footnote{155} See [Leon.50.263-64].
\footnote{156} Ibid., [Leon.50.271.70].
\footnote{157} The whole text is cited below in note 159.
\footnote{158} Wippel aptly puts this in other words: “In other words, when we find a quality of perfection possessed
by a given subject in only partial rather than in total fashion, such a subject is said to participate in that perfection. If
in fact other subjects also share in that same perfection, it is because each of them only participates in it. None is
identical with it. Thus, appeal to a participation structure is also a way of accounting for the fact that a given kind of
characteristic or perfection can be shared in by many different subject, or of addressing oneself to the problem of the
One and the Many.” Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 96-97. For similar general descriptions see \textit{In Metaph.} I.10
[Marietti, p. 46, n. 154]: “Quod enim totaliter est aliquid, non participat illud, sed est per essentiam idem illi. Quod vero non
totaliter est aliquid habens aliquid alium adiunctum, proprie participare dicitur. Sicut si calor esset calor per
se existens, non diceretur participare calorem, quia nihil esset in eo nisi calor. Ignis vero quia est aliquid alium quam
calor, dicitur participare calorem.” \textit{In De caelo} 2.18 [Marietti, p.233, n. 643] “. . . dicit autem \textit{participat}, propter
grasp how vast the application of participation can be. He then proceeds to offer three such ways or modes of participation: 1) as man is said to participate in animal because he does not have the ratio of animal according to its complete universality. For the same reason Socrates participates in man. 2) Likewise a subject participates in an accident and matter participates in form, since substantial or accidental form, which when considered by itself is common, is determined to this or that subject. 3) An effect is said to participate in its own cause, especially when it is not adequate or equal to the power of its own cause, for example, as air participates in the light of the sun because it does not receive it according to the same brightness which is in the sun. 159

The intension and remission of accidental forms is obviously the second kind of participation. Before we finish our discussion of how a substance participates in an accident, I would like to briefly mention the first and third kinds or modes of participation. For we will have to determine which kind of participation is at stake when Thomas says that the sense appetites participate in reason.

_________________________

159 De ebd. 2 [Leon.50.271.69-85]: “Qua quidem differencia sumitur secundum rationem participationis. Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communidadem ; et eadem ratione Sortes participat hominem. Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidentem et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, que de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel ad illud subiectum. Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat virtutem sue cause, puta si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in ea claritate qua est in sole.”
In the first kind of participation an individual shares in the intelligible content of a species, and the species shares in the intelligible content of a genus. In Wippel’s helpful rephrasing:

In each of these examples we are dealing with a less extended intelligibility which is said to share in a more universal or more extended intelligible content. Since in each of these instances we are dealing with the fact that one intelligible content shares in another without exhausting it, we may describe it as a case of participation; but since we are only dealing with intelligible contents, the participation is logical or intentional, not real or ontological.\footnote{Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 97. For some parallel passages, discussion, and scholarship on this first mode of participation see Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 97, n. 9. For an interpretation which ties this first mode of participation to analogy of being see Fabro, \textit{Intensive Hermeneutics}, 484-86.}

In this first case, the kind of form communicated is univocal; that is, when animal is predicated of horse and cow the word animal is the same in name and definition or intelligible content.\footnote{See \textit{In Metaph.} 4.1 [Marietti, p. 151, n.535].} This is not the case in the third mode of participation, that of equivocal causality.\footnote{On equivocal causality see SCG I.29 [Leon.manualis.30-31]; \textit{De ver.} 10.13 ad 3 [Leon.22/2.343.158-170]; DP 7.5 [Marietti, 198]; ST I, 4.2 [St. Paul. 22]. See Fabro, \textit{Participation et Causalité}, 338ff; Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical}, 517-18; Doolan, \textit{Divine Ideas}, 175.} According to this third mode of participation, in which the effect virtually exists in its cause but in a more eminent way, there is a likeness between cause and effect, but not so much likeness as to be univocal; nor is there so much unlikeness as to be equivocal, that is accidentally sharing the same name.\footnote{The example Aquinas uses is the star \textit{canis} major and Latin word for dog, \textit{canis}. These two accidentally share the exact same name but there is no real likeness between in intelligible content or definition, hence they are only equivocally alike. \textit{In Metaph.} 4.1 [Marietti, p.151, n.535]; \textit{De princ.} 6 [Leon.43.46.29]. See, however, what Fabro describes as predicamental-univocal participation which I discuss on p. 299 of the conclusion.} The kind of likeness at stake in the third kind of participation is analogical likeness, where the intelligible content is “partially diverse and partially not diverse;” or as Aquinas puts it, these contents are diverse insofar as they have diverse relations, but they are not
diverse insofar as these diverse relations are referred to one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{164} Thus secondary analogates are always related to one prime analogate.\textsuperscript{165} And this prime analogate is not merely one in intelligible content, but it actually exists as a real equivocal efficient cause of the secondary analogates.

The analogical likeness between equivocal effects and their causes is rooted in Thomas’s axiom that every agent produces something like itself, \textit{omne agens agit sibi simile}.\textsuperscript{166} Thus there is a real likeness between effect and its cause, at least enough so that effect and cause may share the same name, provided one is mindful of negating univocal significance to both terms. This analogical predication according to the third mode of participation is usually expressed according to the language of \textit{per prius} and \textit{per posterius}: something is predicated of its cause \textit{per prius} and predicated of its effect \textit{per posterius}.\textsuperscript{167} In most general terms, this is one of the ways that Aquinas says that something can share in particular what belongs to something else universally; something can share in an intelligible content without being forced to predicate univocal likeness while simultaneously avoiding having to say that the likeness is simply logical.

When it is said, however, that a subject participates in an accident (2\textsuperscript{nd} kind of participation), it is said univocally. Thus when a painting and a human participate in whiteness, it


\textsuperscript{165} \textit{IV Met.} 1 [Marietti, p.151, n.536].

\textsuperscript{166} See Wippel’s “Thomas Aquinas on Our Knowledge of God and the Axiom that Every Agent Produces Something Like Itself,” in \textit{Metaphysical Themes II}, 152-172. Wippel shows that at times Thomas takes this principle as self-evident, but at times he tries to prove it, although Wippel questions whether or not Thomas was philosophically successful in doing so. Wippel suggests, however, that the axiom can be defended on Thomistic philosophical grounds by reasoning from God’s perfection and on the theological grounds that man is created in the image and likeness of God.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{ST I.13.6} [St. Paul, 65]. Sometimes, however, Aquinas expresses this as more or less: \textit{In VII Met.} 4 [Marietti, p. 331, n. 1336]; and \textit{In II Sent.} 3.1.5 [Mand. 100] For a discussion of the \textit{per prius, per posterius} couplet see Montagnes, \textit{Analogy} 44-45. See Fabro, \textit{Intensive Hermeneutics}, 485.
is the exact same color that is meant in both predications. The intelligible contents of both are identical. Univocity even holds in the case of intension and remission of accidents.168 When it is said that something is whiter, the exact same intelligible content is signified as when it is less white.169 Montagnes has noted that predication of more or less in accidental forms does not translate into analogical predication of per prius and per posterius.170

Another significant difference between the manner in which a subject participates in an accident (2nd kind) and the participation of an equivocal cause in its effect (3rd kind) is that in the 3rd kind the cause exists independently and separately from the effect that participates in it. This is not the case in the 2nd kind of participation in which the participated perfection only exists in the subject. Accidental esse is inesse; it can never exist apart from its subject. There is no such thing as a whiteness separate from any white thing.171 When it is said that a subject participates in whiteness, this means that a particular accidental form (which could never subsist on its own) inheres in a particular subject. If the subject is whiter this is because the subject participates more in that particular accidental form which inheres more fully or deeply in the subject.

Another characteristic of the second mode of participation is that it involves composition. All real participation (as opposed to logical participation) involves some sort of composition. For

168 Montagnes, Analogy, 30-31.
169 QSC 8 ad 8 [Leon.24/2.84.401-406]: “. . . magis et minus dupliciter accipitur: uno modo secundum duersum modum participationis unius et eiusdem forme, sicut magis album dicitur magis clarum quam minus album; et sic magis et minus non diversificant speciem.” De ente 6 [Leon.43.379.115-121]. “Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales quia sunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem, que non diversificant speciem; gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album in participatingo eiusdem rationis albedinem.”
170 Montagnes, Analogy, 31.
171 Furthermore (to add matter and form, the other part of the second mode of participation), prime matter cannot exist without form.
Aquinas says that in every case of predication of real participation there must be some existing thing in addition to what is participated.\textsuperscript{172} According to the second mode of participation Aquinas tells us that a subject is presupposed for an accident.\textsuperscript{173} This subject enters into a real ontological composition with the accident, that is, a non-substantial \textit{esse aliquid} of some sort. In this case, the subject is the potency principle, and the accident is the act principle. For the accidental form determines some potency to this or that kind of accidental being,\textsuperscript{174} for example, being white or being virtuous.

If the second mode signifies composition while implying an efficient cause of that composition, the third mode signifies an efficient cause of that composition while implying some composition resulting from the efficient cause. The emphasis of the third mode of participation is first and foremost on causality, specifically, equivocal efficient causality; but composition is necessarily implied if the participated and efficiently caused perfection is to belong to the one participating.\textsuperscript{175} The second mode of participation, on the other hand, names formal causality, substantial and accidental, but it does not signify what causes the substantial or accidental form itself. In the case of substance participating in an accident, participation tells us of composition, degrees of inherence, and its mode of existing (\textit{inesse}); but it does not, as does the third mode of participation, name or even point to the cause of the accidental composition or its intensification.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Quodlibet} 2.2.1 [Leon 25/2.214.44-46]: “Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicatur de altero per participationem, oportet ibi aliquid esse preter id quod participatur, . . .”

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{De ebdomadibus} 2. See also te Velde’s discussion of this mode of participation in, \textit{Participation and Substantiality}, 36-40. It is a good summary of many of the essential points.

\textsuperscript{174} In the line of existence, the soul is the act principle and an accident is the potency principle, for accidental being participates in being through substance’s causing the accidental being. That is, being is predicated per prius and of substance and per posterius of accidents. But this is not what he has in mind in the second kind of participation.

\textsuperscript{175} See, for example, QSC.1[Leon.24/2.13:363-14:385], in chapter 1 n.32 above.
There obviously must be such a cause. We know that the cause is not a Platonic separate version of the participated form. Furthermore, we know that the accidental form itself cannot be the cause, since it cannot reduce itself from potency to act, and if it could it would have to be separate.

In particular, we can say that a person has temperance and can have it to a greater or lesser extent, and we know that there is no Platonic form of temperance that causes that particular temperance. In this way we could say that a temperate person (substance) participates in temperance (an accident). Aquinas tells us, however, that temperance itself is a participation in reason. This claim cannot be understood according to the second mode of participation. For temperance cannot enter into composition with reason, since temperance is not a substance. Although one accident may inhere in a subject via another accident, it is obviously nonsense to say that reason inheres in a person by way of temperance. Temperance, of course, inheres in the sense appetite.

Thus we can safely say that the sense appetite’s participation in reason should not be understood to mean the second mode of participation. The obvious conclusion would be to say that it is according to the third mode that the sense appetites participate in reason. For Aquinas says over and over again that the sense appetites participate in reason insofar as they obey the command of reason. We might intuitively guess that the command of reason is an equivocal efficient cause.

---

176 One accident may inhere in a subject by way of another. The example Aquinas usually uses is of whiteness (quality) inhering in the surface (quantity) of a substance. *In III Sent.* 33.2.4 sol.1 [Moos.1062].
Although it is highly unlikely, perhaps, we have still not ruled out the possibility that he means it as the first kind of participation, that is, a kind of logical participation. But there is a still more important interpretation and serious objection. Perhaps Aquinas doesn’t mean participation here in any particularly specific way at all. Aristotle’s text was simply translated into Latin as *participans quidem aliqualiter, racione.* When one reads enough of Aquinas’s treatments of this topic one cannot help but notice that these exact words were permanently burned into Aquinas’s memory, like a song or rhyme memorized in one’s youth. The phrase (*participat aliqualiter rationem*) immediately rolls right off his tongue (or pen, or his scribe’s quill) verbatim as soon as the question of moral virtue arises in early, middle and late texts. Perhaps we are being misled by the accidental use of the same word, participation, in both his metaphysics and ethics. Perhaps one is better off abandoning the superficial similarity by translating the phrase *participat aliqualiter rationem* as “somehow shares in reason;” we ought perhaps even to emphasize the vagueness of the adverb (*aliqualiter*), which was permanently attached to the phrase. The sense appetites *somehow* share in reason – leave it at that. At least

---


178 In II Sent. 41.2.2 ad 2; In III Sent. 27.2.3 ad 5; In III Sent. 33.1.1 qc. 2; In III Sent. 33.1.2 qc. 3 ad 3; In III Sent. 33.2.4 qc. 2 ad 2; In III Sent. 33.2.4 qc. 3 ad 1; In III Sent. 33.3.1 qc. 2 ad 3; QDV 14.4; QDV 15.4 ad 6; QDV 25.5 ad 4; QSC 9; ST I, 57.4 ad 3; ST I-II 24.1 ad 2; ST I-II, 58.2; I-II 68.3; ST II-II 156.4; DM 7.1 ad 14; etc.
then we will not be tempted to overcomplicate and overburden his ethics, i.e., we will not be using the wrong kind of precision for the subject matter at hand.

In order to answer these questions, we must delve into the texts themselves to see if we can find sufficient support for one kind of participation rather than another, or whether we ought to conclude that Aquinas simply means participation in some generic sense, and that he was really only using it because the very important Aristotelian phrase was permanently burned into his memory. Of course, the permanence of the phrase does not necessarily exclude the possibility that he may also have had in mind one or another kind of participation. We must also consider the possibility that Thomas’s thinking on the topic matured in the course of his roughly twenty year career. Let us turn to the next chapter and consider the textual evidence.
Chapter IV: The Sense Appetites as Participating in Reason (1251-1259)

In order to trace the development in Aquinas’s thought, the next two chapters will follow the chronological sequence of Aquinas’s ethical writings. This chapter outlines Aquinas’s thought in Paris in the 1250s as he was teaching and composing his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences from 1251-56 and then later as a Regent Master in theology when he disputed a series of questions known as the De veritate from 1256-59. He does not write too much on ethics until his return to Paris in 1268. The following chapter traces his thought through the latter period, 1268 until his death in 1274, which is marked by a large quantity of ethical writings. The second part of the Summa (1268-72) towers above them all and will necessarily consume the great bulk of our attention, but the De malo (1266-72) and De virtutibus in communi (1271-1272) have quite a few important texts, as does his commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics (1271-72).¹ These mature texts, written so close together (and the precise chronology of these texts is often not known), do not reveal much development of thought, or at least none that I have found significant. Thus I shall treat Thomas’s mature thought as a block and attempt to present it as clearly as possible.

I began my research by generating a massive chronological list of Aquinas’s ex professo treatments of this topic. It is impossible, however, simply to march through these texts in strict chronological order: there are too many of them and they are in too many diverse contexts to

¹ I will only use this text sparingly, since I do not want to get too sidetracked on the question of whether or not Thomas is writing with a view to expounding Aristotle’s views or his own personal positions. I will note the parallel passages in my footnotes, and I will only turn to this work when it adds something that is not present in the other texts. In such cases I will try to address the difficult question of whether or not Aquinas is speaking in his own voice. For a helpful discussion of how to read Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle see Wippel’s “Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics” in Metaphysical Themes II, 240-272. For the most comprehensive philosophical treatment of this work see James Doig, Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics: A Historical Perspective (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001). For an excellent discussion, summary, and current bibliography about the various interpretations of this text see the introduction to “Aquinas and the Nichomachean Ethics,” ed. Hoffmann, Müller, and Perkams, pp.1-13.
simply them line up – not to mention that such a chapter would be completely unreadable.

Rather, I will present the fruit of my research by using the most important and representative passages to depict three synoptic overviews of his teachings, namely, his position in the *Sentences*, his views in the *De veritate*, and his more mature teaching in the later texts. Because I will follow the texts closely, this chapter will appear be somewhat out of balance as each section mirrors the strengths, idiosyncrasies, and particular emphases of each set of texts. Although there will necessarily be some overlap between these sections, my intention is to bring out the similarities and differences between texts and to chart development in Aquinas’s thought where possible.

These chapters are not primarily focused on addressing the scholarship on our topic and the interpretative differences among contemporary Thomists. In fact, there is no literature comparing early and late texts on our topic; the debates simply concern Aquinas’s mature views. The last chapter will be devoted to engaging the scholarship on this topic. Chapters IV and V will add to contemporary scholarship not only on Aquinas’s views on how the sense appetites participate in reason but also some important clarifications on how Aquinas’s thinking on moral virtue progressed.

1. *The Commentary on The Sentences (1251-56)*

Aquinas clearly accepts Aristotle’s broad tripartite division of the soul in the *Sentences*. One part of the soul is essentially rational and another part (the sensitive part) is rational by

---

2 As his thought matures and the quantity and detail of his treatment of our topic increases there are later texts for which there are no simply no earlier parallel discussions. This adds a bit to the asymmetrical treatment.
participation; however, the vegetative part does not participate in reason. Aquinas does not speak of all of the powers of the sensitive part as participating in reason, but only of the concupiscible and the irascible powers. Thus two parts of the tripartite division seem quite clear: the vegetative part, which in no way participates in reason, and the sensitive part (the concupiscible and irascible powers), which participate in reason.

Aquinas does say, however, that universally all appetite participates in reason. Since the will is an appetite, it too somehow participates in reason. In this context Aquinas has in mind the moral virtue of justice, which is a virtue of the will. To fit justice into Aristotle’s tripartite division of the soul in which moral virtue must be ‘placed’ in the middle part, Aquinas allows for there to be a way in which the will can habitually participate in reason through the moral virtue of justice. Thus, in the context of justice, the will participates in reason, but in the context of the moral virtues of temperance and courage, the will is essentially in the rational part.

---

3 In III Sent. 1.3 [Moos.707]: “Cum autem homo ex hoc sit homo quod habet rationem et intellectum, illae potentiae humanae sunt quae aliqualiter rationales sunt, vel per essentiam, sicut quae sunt in parte intellectiva, vel per participationem, sicut quae in parte sensitiva sunt rationi obedientes.”

4 In II Sent. 25.1.3 ad 3 [Mand.652-53]: “... homo ex hoc dicitur homo quod rationem habet; unde illi tantum actus dicitur actus humani qui sunt virium rationalium vel per essentiam, vel per participationem. Virtutes autem nutritivae partis nullo modo rationem participunt, ut in 1 Ethic., cap. ult., dicitur; unde earum actus operationes humanae non dicitur.” See also In III Sent. 33.2.4 sol.2 [Moos.1063].

5 See, for example, In III Sent. 33.1.2 sol.3 [Moos.1030]: “... virtutes infusedae et acquisitae non sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili nisi secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem; et ex hac parte non habent dependentiam ab organo corporali, sed continentur sub mente, sicut et sub ratione, inquantum ipsam participat.” In II Sent. 41.2.2 ad 2 [Mand.1043]: “... virtus non est in concupiscibili nisi secundum quod aliqualiter participat rationem, inquantum est rationi obediens;...” In fact, Aquinas claims that reason, since it needs phantasms participates in the other sense powers In III Sent. 33.2.4 sol. 2 ad 6 [Moos.1064].

6 In III Sent. 33.2.4 sol. 3 ad 1 [Moos.1065]: “... rationale per participationem non solum dicitur irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sed universaliter appetitus, ut ibidem dicit.”

7 Ibid., “Et ideo voluntas quamvis per essentiam sit in parte intellectiva, tamen quantum ad actum aliqualiter ratione participat, ...”

8 Ibid. (ad 2) “rationale comprehendit non solum rationem cognitivam, sed etiam voluntatem; et sic justitia est in rationali sicut in subjecto.” In III Sent. 33.2.1 sol. 3 ad 2 [Moos.1048]: “ratio quandoque comprehendit duas potentias, scilicet vim cognitivam in qua est prudentia, et vim affectivam quae voluntas dicitur in qua est justitia...”
Since our topic concerns the sense appetites and their moral virtues or perfections, it is worth noting that the very word *moral* implies a necessary relation to the will. In fact, it is really only the acts of the will that are moral per se; all other acts are moral per accidens.\(^9\) It is choice (*electio*) that is the principle of virtue, and thus virtue can only be in choice or in those acts that are commanded by choice.\(^10\) Thus acts of moral virtue involving the sense appetites are only moral as they are related to or commanded by the will.

But what is moral is also, of course, necessarily related to reason. In explaining Augustine’s view that virtue is a good quality of the mind, Aquinas says that even if some virtue inheres in some power which is not the mind, nevertheless as a subject is posited in the definition of an accident so is the mind (*mens*) posited as the subject of moral virtue, for moral virtue is not virtue except insofar as it participates in mind or reason. Thus reason is the subject of virtue whether essentially or by participation.\(^11\)

\(^9\) *In II Sent.* 42.1.1 [Mand.1053]: “... actus non ponitur in genere moris nisi propter voluntatem, scilicet secundum quod est a voluntate elicitus vel imperatus; et ideo secundum unitatem voluntatis est sumendum judicium de unitate ejus quod in genere moris dicitur.” And *In II Sent.* 24.3.2 [Mand.621]: “Nullus autem motus ponitur in genere moris nisi habita comparatione ad voluntatem, quae principium est moralium, ... comple tum dominum habet in illis actibus qui ex imperio voluntatis procedunt; et hi sunt actus deliberationem sequentes, quod rationi adscribuntur.” *In II Sent.* 40.1.1 [Mand.1011]: “actus sunt in genere moris ex hoc quod sunt voluntarii; ... ipsi actus voluntatis qui per se et immediate ad voluntatem pertinente, per se in genere moris sunt; unde simpliciter specie dividuntur interniores actus voluntatis per bonum et malum, sicut per differentias essentiales: actus autem imperati a voluntate, elici per alias potentias, pertinent ad genus moris per accidens, secundum scilicet quod sunt a voluntate imperati;”

\(^10\) *In II Sent.* 24.3.2 [Mand.621]: “electio est principale in virtute, ... unde oportet omnem actum virtutis ex electione procedere, ... virtus non potest esse nisi in illis actibus qui ex imperio voluntatis procedunt, quamvis etiam sensitivarum partium: ... .” He even goes so far as saying that acts which are commanded by the will are not moral in their species, but only in their use as they are commanded by the will: *In III Sent.* 23.1.4 sol. 2 [Moos.713-14]: “Alii vero actus sunt a parte appetitiva non elici, sed imperati sicut ambulare, considerare et hujusmodi; et isti non sunt morales quantum ad speciem suam, sed solum quantum ad usum eorum, prout imperantur a voluntate.”

\(^11\) *In II Sent.* 27.1.2 ad 3 [Mand.299]: “... in definitione accidentis non debet ponii subjectum ejus. Quamvis autem contingat virtutem in aliqua potentia ut in subiecto esse quae essentia...
Furthermore, in the context of discussing Christ’s two wills, Aquinas says that sense appetite can be called will by participation, for insofar as it obeys reason (he cites EN I.13) it participates in reason and in that manner it also somehow participates in the freedom of the will. Thus when Aquinas says that the sense appetites participate in reason he also means that they participate, as he here says, in the freedom of the will.

Thus our study, which focuses on the manner in which the sense appetites participate in reason in the thought of Thomas Aquinas must not only consider the sense appetites and reason, but also the will and free decision, which involves both, reason and will. Since the sense appetites do not have their perfections except insofar as they participate in the perfection of a higher power, our investigation must examine exactly what participates in what, and also what he means by participation. In the next section of this chapter I will first outline the most relevant parts of the soul: will, reason, the sense appetites, and some of the other internal sense powers as he presents them in the Sentences, and then I will discuss how Aquinas understands that the sense appetites can participate in reason in this text.

A. Will and Intellect

*Ethicorum*, cap. ult., dicit quod rationale est subjectum virtutis, vel rationale essentialiter, vel rationale per participationem.”

12 *In III Sent.* 17.1 sol. 2 [Moos.531]: “Tamen in homine potest etiam dici voluntas appetitus sensibilis, inquantum est obediens rationi, ut dicitur in 1 Eth.; et ideo participat aliquid libertatem voluntatis, sicut et rectitudinem rationis, ut possit dici voluntas participative, sicut et dictur rationes per participationem.” See also *In III Sent.* 17.1 sol. 2 ad 3 [Moos.532]: “voluntas per essentiam, est in ratione per essentiam; et voluntas participative, est in ratione per participationem.”

13 *In III Sent.* 27.3.4 [Moos.889].

14 The discussion of the internal sense powers in this sections will serve as a kind of introduction to this topic and I will not emphasize them too much later.
We have seen Aquinas lump will and reason together under the name reason and we have seen that this couplet is related to moral virtue in some crucial way. Let us break apart the couplet and examine each part to see what role it plays in moral virtue.

In the Sentences, in general, the will simply follows intellect; the operation of the will begins wherever the intellect leaves off. The will is an appetite and appetite is a passive power: it is a moved mover. In fact, he goes so far as calling the act of the will the motion of reason (motus rationis). Or, as he says, the will follows reason, and the process of the will is proportioned to the process of the intellect.

Aquinas divides the will in two: will as nature and will as reason. This division of the will is not a division of the will into two powers. In fact, the division is entirely accidental to the will itself, that is, it is completely dependent on and posterior to the act of reason, which he also divides in two. Thus the twofold acts of the will simply follow the twofold acts of reason.

---

15 In III Sent. 27.3.2 [Moos.895]: “Unde cum ad intellectum affectus sequatur, ubi terminatur operatio intellectus ibi incipit operatio affectus sivi voluntatis.” Moos points out that this text is only included in one manuscript. It will be interesting to see whether or not the Leonine editors ultimately keep it.

16 In III Sent. 27.1.1 [Mand.854]: “Appetitus autem est virtus passiva. Unde in III De anima, dicit philosophus, quod appetibile movet sicut movens non motum, appetitus autem sicut movens motum. In III Sent. 27.1.1 ad 6 [Moos.858]: “Ad sextum dicendum, quod appetitus, ut dictum est, movet motum.” See Chapter 5, n. 16 for a further discussion and some secondary literature on this point.

17 In II Sent. 24.3.1 [Mand.617]: “Appetitus autem rationalis est qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis, et hic dicitur motus rationis, qui est actus voluntatis.”

18 In III Sent. 17.2.sol.1 [Moos.536-537]: “. . . cum voluntas sequatur rationem, processus voluntatis proporcionatur processui rationis.”

19 In II Sent. 39.2.2 ad 2 [Mand.994]: “. . . voluntas ut deliberata et ut natura non differunt secundum essentiam potentiae: quia naturale et deliberatorium non sunt differentiae voluntatis secundum se, sed secundum quod sequitur judicium rationis: quia in ratione est aliquid naturaliter cognitum quasi principium indemonstrabile in operabilia, quod se habet per modum finis, quia in operabilia finis habet locum principii, ut in VI Ethicorum, cap. 11, dicitur. Unde illud quod finis est hominis est naturaliter in ratione cognitum esse bonum et appetendum, et voluntas consequens istam cognitionem dicitur voluntas ut natura. Aliquid vero est cognition in ratione per inquisitionem ita in operativis sicut in speculativis; et utroboque, scilicet tam in speculativis quam in operativis, contingit inquireret rationem errare; unde voluntas quae tales cognitiones rationis sequitur, deliberata dicitur, et in bonum et malum tendere potest, sed non ab eodem inclinante, ut dictum est.” In III Sent. 17.1 sol. 3 ad 1
These two acts of reason, although at first they might seem to be, are not the two acts of the intellect, i.e., 1) abstraction (dematerialization) and understanding of a quiddity and 2) judgment which often involves a returning to phantasms and forming propositions. The two acts of reason at stake here are two kinds of the latter, i.e., of judgment, which concern the forming of propositions and their truth.

In judgments concerning individual material beings, the intellect judges the truth of a proposition by returning to the phantasms (which includes materially conditioned singulars) and somehow knows a quiddity as it exists in matter. Aquinas uses the famous word *adequatio* between the intellect and thing to explain truth, i.e., an equaling, comparing, checking or

---

[Moos.532-533]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod *thelesis* secundum Damascenum est voluntas naturalis, quae scilicet in modum naturae movetur in aliquud secundum bonitatem absolutam in ipso consideratam; *bulesis* autem est appetitus rationalis qui movetur in aliquid bonum ex ordine alterius. Et haec duo alis nominibus a Magistro dicuntur voluntas ut ratione et voluntas ut natura: secundum quae tamen non diversificatur potentia voluntatis, quia ipsa diversitas est ex eo quod movemur (one manuscript says movetur) in aliquid sine collusione vel cum collusione. Conferre autem non est per se voluntatis, sed rationis. Unde illa divisio voluntatis non est per essentialia ipsius, sed per accidentalia. Et propter hoc non sunt diversae potentiae, sed una differens secundum respectum ipsius ad apprehensionem praecedentem, quae potest esse cum collusione vel sine collusione.” Aquinas’s texts on Christ’s two wills, of which this is one, are particularly helpful. The two wills refers to Christ’s famous statement in the garden of Gethsemane, “Not My will, but Thine, be done.” Christ’s paradoxical willing against his own will prompted speculation on what exactly these two volitions were. For a book which is invaluable for its trove of historical information on the medieval discussion of the two wills see Corey L. Barnes, *Christ’s Two Wills in Scholastic Thought: The Christology of Aquinas and Its Historical Context.* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012). For his discussion of these passages in the *Sentences* see 132-153. Although I quibble, Barnes cites Aquinas’s distinction between the will as potency and the will as act as a major development in Aquinas’s thought from the *Sentences* to the *Tertia pars* (Barnes, 139,148,158 and 161), but I would like to point out that the distinction is also present in the *Sentences*, just not in the passage on Christology, see *In II Sent.* 2.39.1.1 [Mand.985].

In II Sent. 24.3.1 [Mand.617]: “Appetitus autem rationalis est qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis, et hic dicitur motus rationis, qui est actus voluntatis. Sed rationis apprehensio dupliciter esse potest. Una simplex et absoluta, quando scilicet statim sine discussione apprehensum dijudicat, et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas quae dicitur non deliberata. Alia est inquisitiva, quando scilicet ratiocinando, bonum vel malum, conveniens vel nocivum investigat, et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas deliberata.”

For the twofold operation of the intellect see *In I Sent.* 19.5.1 ad 7 [Mand.489] and *In I Sent.* 38.1.3 [Mand.903]. See also the relatively early (1257-58) but very developed *In De trin.* 5.3 [Leon.50.146-49].
verifying – it is by returning to a phantasm that the intellect judges that this or that is true.22

But in the case of practical (or logical) reasoning there is no phantasm by which the intellect can check or verify that something is or is not true. Rather than checking the validity of its thinking against apprehended sensible forms, it reduces them (or brings them back) to what Aquinas describes as naturally or habitually known first principles – in the case of speculative matters (and hence in the theoretical sciences) this is called understanding (\textit{intellectus}), but in our case, that of practical reasoning, it is called synderesis.23 This habit of first principles is in some way illumined by the agent intellect.24 These infallible and general habitual principles are always present and always murmuring at evil and enjoining towards good.25

He describes the first kind of judgment as a simple and absolute (\textit{simplex et absulta}) apprehension that judges without discursión; he describes the second kind of judgment as an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[22] See \textit{In De trin.} 6.3 [Leon.50, pp.159-160] for the difference between logic, mathematics, and physics with respect to the terminus of their distinctive kinds of judgements.
\item[23] \textit{In II Sent.} 39.3.1 [Mand.996]: “Oportet ergo quod in anima rationali, quae angelo in ordine creaturarum configuratur, sit aliqua participatio intellectualis virtutis, secundum quam aliquam veritatem sine inquisitione apprehendat, sicut apprehenduntur prima principia naturaliter cognita tam in speculativis quam etiam in operativis ; unde et talis virtus intellectus vocatur, secundum quod est in speculativis, quae etiam secundum quod in operativis est synderesis dicitur ; . . .”
\item[24] \textit{In II Sent.} 24.2.4 [Mand.610]: “ratio practica ab aliquibus principiis per se notis deducatur ut quod est malum non esse faciendum, praecptis Dei obediendum fore, et sic de aliiis : et horum quidem habitus est synderesis. Unde dico quod synderesis a ratione practica distinguitur non quidem per substantiam potentiae, sed per habitum, qui est quodammodo innatus menti nostrae ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, . . .” Note that in the practical syllogism, Ibid., [Mand.613]: “synderesis in hoc syllogismo majorem ministrat, . . .”
\item[25] \textit{In II Sent.} 39.3.1 [Mand.997]: “Sicut autem non contigit in speculativis intellectum errare circa cognitionem primorum principiorum, quin semper repugnet omni ei quod contra principia dicitur, ita etiam non contingit errare in practicis in principiis primis ; et propter hoc dicitur quod haec superior rationis scintilla, quae synderesis est, extingui non potest, sed semper repugnat omni ei quod contra principia naturaliter sibi indita est.” And Ibid., ad 1: “. . . non dicit quod synderesis praecipitatur, sed quod conscientia praecipitatur, quae est conclusio, ut supra dictum est ; et est in ea virtus synderesis, sicut virtus principiorum in conclusione.” \textit{In II Sent.} 39.3.2 [Mand.999]: “. . . prima principia quibus ratio dirigitur in agendis sunt per se nota ; et circa ea non contingit errare, sicut nec contingit errare ipsum demonstratram circa principia prima. Haec autem principia agendorum naturaliter cognita ad synderesim pertinent, sicut Deo esse obediendum, et similia.” On conscience see the previous article, the remainder of this article, and the following one. It is synderesis that remains in the damned, which always murmurs against their will; \textit{In II Sent.} 39.3.1 ad 5 [Mand.998].\end{footnotes}
inquisitive consideration of good and bad, and suitable or harmful. A non-deliberative volition follows the former and a deliberative volition follows the latter. Examples of what is grasped by this first kind of absolute and simple cognition are knowledge, virtue, health, happiness, and death. What is characteristic of these simple and absolute judgments is the non-discursive or natural grasp of the goodness or badness of whatever is being understood. For example, when one thinks of happiness one immediately grasps that it is good and when one thinks of death one immediately grasps that it is evil. No one really needs to think about whether or not happiness is good or death is evil, for their attractiveness or repulsiveness are intuitively grasped without discursion.

Because this first kind of simple cognition reduces to synderesis the volition that follows it (will as nature) is characterized as natural as it follows the naturally known first principles of the mind. When the intellect considers these first principles it cannot but assent to them. When reason presents something to the will, grasped as good in light of these principles, the will naturally follows suit. For example, as soon as one considers health, one wishes for it.

---

26 *In II Sent.* 24.3.1 [Mand.617]. Text above in n. 20.
27 *In I Sent.* 48.1.4 [Mand.1089]: “Est et quaedam voluntas in nobis spiritualis naturalis qua appetimus id quod secundum se bonum est homini, inquantum est homo; et hoc sequitur apprehensionem rationis, prout est aliquid absolute considerans: sicut vult homo scientiam, virtutem, sanitatem et hujusmodi.” Death is the example often given in the Christological context.

28 See n. 23 above.
29 *In II Sent.* 39.2.2 [Mand.993]: “...voluntas autem rationalis, prout est natura hominis, sive prout consequitur natuoram apprehensionem universalium principiorum juris, est quae in bonum inclinat.”.

30 *In II Sent.* 25.1.2 [Mand.649]: “Cujus ratio est, quia objectum intellectus est verum, objectum autem voluntatis est bonum. Invenitur autem aliquod verum in quo nulla falsitatis apparentia admisceri potest, ut patet in dignitatibus; unde intellectus non potest subterfugere quin illis assentiat. Similiter etiam invenitur aliquod falsum quod nullam veri apparentiam habet, ut patet in oppositis dignitatum; unde illi nullatenus intellectus assentire potest.”
Whether or not health is actually willed as the end of some particular action depends on deliberation.\(^{31}\)

But if humans necessarily will things like happiness, following the intellect’s necessary assenting to first principles, how are humans free? Freedom for Aquinas is primarily a question about choice (electio) and Aquinas accounts for free choice by distinguishing between the compulsion of a power by way of a subject and its’ compulsion by way of an object. A power may be compelled by its subject if it is bound to a material organ, but because the will is immaterial it cannot be so compelled. Or a power may not be compelled by way of its subject because it is not attached to an organ, but by its object, as the intellect is compelled by the force of a demonstration.\(^{32}\) The will is indeed compelled along the line of object concerning volitions

---

\(^{31}\) For more details on this see *In III Sent.* 17.2 sol. 1 [Moos.536-37]: “cum voluntas sequatur rationem, processus voluntatis proportionatur processui rationis. Ratio autem habet aliquod principium per se notum, ad quod resolvendo [cf. text cited in n.22 above] reduct ut illud cujus cognitionem quaerit; et quando ad illud reducere potuerit, habet certitudinem de re et sententia quod ita est. Sed antequam ad illud principium reducere possit, movetur aliquibus verisimilitudinibus; et si quidem illis detineatur tamquam certis, decipitur et errat quandoque; si autem illis non detineatur, tunc habet opinionem unius partis cum formidine alterius. Finis autem, ut dicit Philosophus, VII Eth.(115a16), se habet in voluntariis sicut principium in speculativis. Unde quando voluntas reduct aliq undis consiliabile in finem in quo totaliter quiescit, sententialiter acceptat illud; si autem reducat in finem in quo non totaliter quiescit, trepidat inter utrumque. Sed si consideretur hoc quod est ad finem sine ordine ad finem, movetur voluntas in ipsum secundum bonitatem vel malitiam quam absolute in eo inveniet. Sed quia voluntas non sittit in motu quem habet circa hujusmodi, cum non feratur in ipsum sicut in finem; ideo non sententiat finaliter secundum praedictum motum suum de illo, quoqueque finem in quem illud ordinat, non consideret; unde voluntas non simpliciter vult illud, sed vellet, si nil inveniretur repugnans. Voluntas autem ut natura movetur in aliquid absolute, ut dictum est (art. praeeced.sor.3). Unde si per rationem non ordinetur in aliquid aliiud acceptabit illud absolute, et erit illius tamquam finis; si autem ordinet in finem, non acceptabit aliquid absolute circa hoc, quoqueque perveniat ad considerationem finis quod facit voluntas ut ratio. Patet igitur quod \(^{voluntas ut natura}\) imperfecte vult aliquid, et sub conditione, nisi feratur in ipsum sicut in finem; ideo non quae ordinantur ad finem, habet \(^{voluntas ut ratio}\) ultimum judicium et perfectum.”

\(^{32}\) *In II Sent.* 25.1.2 [Mand.649]: “in partibus animae quaedam sunt quae compelli possunt: sed dupliciter. Quaedam enim compelluntur ex subiecto, sicut illae vires quae sunt organis affixae: cum enim sine organis operationes habere non possint, compulsis organis, ipsae virtutes prohibentur vel compelluntur, earum acutis violenter extortis. Quaedam vero sunt quae quidem subjecto non compelluntur, quia organis affixae non sunt; compelluntur tamen objecto, sicut intellectus: ipse enim non est actus alicujus partis corporis, ut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, et tamen demonstrationis vi cogitum. Voluntas autem neque subjecto cogit potest, cum non sit organo
following the intellect’s natural and simple judgment of what is good. When the will presents something to the intellect which cannot be considered bad or harmful in some way, e.g., happiness, the will cannot but will that object. In this sense we are not free. However, nothing that can be chosen here is so good that it cannot be considered bad in some way, and nothing is so bad that it cannot be considered good in some way.\textsuperscript{33} We can think about things that we cannot help but will, e.g., health and happiness, but they are not what are chosen even if they may serve as the ends of choice. Thus, in this life, we make free choices.

More broadly, to understand the rational appetite in the \textit{Sentences} one looks to reason: it is reason that accounts for the will’s volitions, both as nature and as reason. Moreover, all of the natural aspects of volition are traced to reason’s natural understanding of first principles. There is nothing in the \textit{Sentences} that would lead one to believe that the will has some kind of spontaneity or control over and above reason’s considerations and judgments. And although Aquinas never denies it, it is worth noting that nowhere in the \textit{Sentences} does Thomas affirm (as he strongly

\textsuperscript{33} In II Sent. 25.1.2 [Mand.649]: “Similiter etiam si proponatur voluntati aliquod bonum quod completam boni rationem habeat, ut ultimus finis, propter quem omnia appetuntur, non potest voluntas hoc non velle ; unde nullus non potest non velle esse felix, aut velle esse miser. In his autem quae ad finem ultimum ordinantur, nihil inventur adeo malum quin aliquod bonum admixtum habeat, nec aliquod adeo bonum quod in omnibus sufficiat : unde quantumcumque ostendatur bonum vel malum, semper potest adhaerere et fugere in contrarium, ratione alterius quod in ipso est, ex quo accipitur, si malum est simpliciter, ut apparens bonum, et si bonum est simpliciter, ut apparens malum ; et inde est quod in omnibus quae sub electione cadunt, voluntas libera manet, in hoc solo determinationem habens quod felicitatem naturaliter appetit, et non determinate in hoc vel illo.” For another text on the two acts of the will and reason see \textit{In II Sent.} 38.1.4 [Mand.976-77].
does in later texts) that the will moves the intellect. The motion is quite unidirectional from intellect to will. Aquinas does seem anxious in the *Sentences*, however, to avoid the charges of intellectual determinism. It is the will, he exclaims, that is “most free,” but he nevertheless always traces the will’s freedom back to the fact that it follows reason. This is not exactly the case in his later texts, as we shall see. There is no question but that free decision requires reason in both early and late texts, but his thinking on will matures and it affects his thinking on moral virtue.

To return to our initial question, since moral virtue is necessarily tied to the will, which itself follows reason, when it is said that the sense appetites are virtuous insofar as they participate in reason and obey the command of the will, there is no real need to distinguish between what comes from the will or what comes from reason, since the will simply follows reason. Let us now turn to the sense appetites.

---

35 *In II Sent.* 39.1.2 ad 3 [Mand.986]: “voluntas liberrima est.” *In II Sent.* 41.2.1 [Mand.1040]: “Et quia potentia secundum quam nostrorum actuum domini sumus, est voluntas.” *In II Sent.* 39.1.2 [Mand.988]: “Ratio enim culpae in actu deformi est ex hoc quod procedit ab eo qui habet dominium sui actus. Hoc autem est in homine secundum illam potentiam quae ad plura se habet, nec ad aliquod eorum determinatur nisi ex seipsa : quod tantum voluntati convenit; . . .” And see this interesting passage: *In III Sent.* II.2.4. sol. 4 [Moos.1066]: “Sed quia naturalis inclinatio ad finem aliquem est ex praestituente naturam, qui talem ordinem naturae tribuit; ideo naturalis inclinatio voluntatis ad finem non est ex ratione, nisi forte secundum naturalem communicantiam, qua fit ut appetitus rationis conjunctus naturaliter tendat ad conformentum se rationi sicut regule; et ex hoc est quod voluntas est naturaliter inclinata ad finem, qui naturaliter rationi est indivita. Unde cum negotiatio de his quae sunt ad finem, praesupponat naturalem cognitionem finis, quae sequitur naturalem inclinationem voluntatis in finem.” This is as far as I have found Aquinas separating the intellect from the will, but he nevertheless traces the will’s natural inclination back to synderesis: the “presupposed natural cognition” is synderesis.
36 *In II Sent.* 7.1.1[Mand.181]: “Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem : et haec non eliguntur nisi secundum regulam finis quae est in aestimatione.” See *In III Sent.* II.2.4. sol. 4 [Moos.1066] in the previous note.
37 A search with the *Index Thomisticus* of the *Sentences* reveals that Aquinas used the phrases ‘command of will’ and ‘command of reason’ interchangeably. See n. 73 in the following chapter.
B. Sense

In this section I will introduce some more detail about the inner senses.\textsuperscript{38} Because I have not found any doctrinal shift here, this section will also serve as an introduction to the remaining sections.

As we discussed in chapter two, rational appetite follows the cognition of reason and sense appetite follows the cognition of sensation. The external senses perceive sensible qualities. When someone smells and sees a peach, there is an internal sense power, the common sense, which unifies the two sensible qualities, smell and color, as belonging to one peach. The external senses and the common sense are crucial in grasping the material object, i.e., the peach itself, but we still do not know what accounts for the formal aspect under which it is sought, i.e., why the object is grasped as attractive or repulsive.

As the will does not move towards anything unless it is apprehended under the intelligibility of the good (\textit{sub ratione boni}), neither does the sense appetite move towards anything unless it is apprehended as suitable or unsuitable (\textit{sub ratione convenientis vel inconvenientis}).\textsuperscript{39} This apprehension of suitability or lack thereof is the formal object of the passion. In II Sent. 24.2.1 he offers two possible origins for its apprehension.

The power that apprehends suitability seems to be (\textit{videtur}) the aestimative power. This is the power by which a sheep flees a wolf and follows its mother. The aestimative power is related

\textsuperscript{38} For good background on this in Avicenna, Averroes, Albert and Aquinas see Carla Di Martino, \textit{Ratio Particularis Doctrines Des Sens Internes D'Avicenne à Thomas D'Aquin} [Sorbonne: Vrin, 2008].

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{In II Sent. 24.2.1 [Mand.601-602]}: “Sicut autem est in intelligibilius, quod illud quod est apprehensum, non movet voluntatem nisi apprehendatur sub ratione boni vel mali, propter quod intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de mutando et fugiendo, ut in III De Anima dicitur, ita etiam est in parte sensitiva, quod apprehensio sensibilis non causat motum aliquem, nisi apprehendatur sub ratione convenientis vel inconvenientis; . . .”
to the sense appetite as the practical intellect is related to the will.\textsuperscript{40} Here the aestimative power seems to be accounting for the whole formal object of the passion,\textsuperscript{41} but another immediately following analogy qualifies the role of the aestimative power: the sense appetite is to the internal and external senses as will is to intellect.\textsuperscript{42} Here Aquinas seems to grant that the other internal and external senses can also play a role in determining the apprehension of suitability.\textsuperscript{43}

This suitability (\textit{conveniens... aut ratio suae convenientiae}) which moves sense appetite is either apprehended by sense, as are delectable things according to singular senses; or it is not apprehended by sense, as the enmity of wolf, which the sheep perceives neither by seeing or hearing, but only by estimation.\textsuperscript{44} Thus the formal object of a passion may either be determined by the external senses themselves or by the aestimative power, or perhaps by some combination.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. [Mand.602]: “Vis autem apprehendens hujusmodi rationes convenientis et non convenientis, videtur virtus aestimativa, per quam agnus fugit lupum et sequitur matrem; quae hoc modo se habet ad appetitum partis sensibilis, sicut se habet intellectus practicus ad appetitum voluntatis; . . .”

\textsuperscript{41} For another, perhaps stronger (notice the \textit{movens}) restatement of the analogy see \textit{In II Sent.} 24.2.1 ad 2 [Mand.603]: “vires apprehensivae sensitivae pertinent ad sensualitatem, licet secundum quemdam ordinem: quia aestimativa proprie se habet ad eam sicut ratio practica ad liberum arbitrium, quae etiam est movens; . . .” but in the remainder of this passage he also allows imagination and the other powers to play a role, albeit more remote.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{In II Sent.} 24.2.1 [Mand.601-602]: “hoc modo se habeat sensualitas ad partem sensitivam, sicut se habet voluntas et liberum arbitrium ad partem intellectivam.” He had explained these terms a few lines above: “. . . sensibilitas enim omnes vires sensitivae partis comprehendit, tam apprehensivas de foris, quam apprehensivas de intus, quam etiam appetitivas ; sensualitas autem magis proprie illam tantum partem nominat per quam movetur animal in aliquod appetendum vel fugiendum.” Note the distinction he makes between \textit{sensualitas} and \textit{sensibilitas}, cf. Klubertanz, \textit{The Discursive Power}, 154.

\textsuperscript{43} For a somewhat later passage [1265-68] explicitly saying this see \textit{In III de an.} 11 [Leon.45/1.256.226-228]: “Et ideo, nisi animal haberet sensum tactus per quem discerneret conveniencia a corruptuius, non posset haec fugere et illa accipere.” He says the same about taste, ibid lines 232-236.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. “Hoc autem conveniens quod sensualitatem movet, aut ratio suae convenientiae, aut est apprehensa a sensu, sicut sunt delectabilia secundum singulos sensus, quae animalia persequantur: aut est non apprehensa a sensu; sicut inimicitiam lupi neque videndo neque audiendo ovis percipit, sed aestimando tantum: et ideo motus sensualitatis in duo tendit: in ea scilicet quae secundum exteriores sensus delectabilia sunt, et hoc est quod dicitur, quod ex sensualitate est motus qui intenditur in corporis sensus; aut ad ea quae nociva vel convenientia corpori
Aquinas posits the aestimative power in animals to account for those complex apprehensions (e.g., something harmful, *nocivum*) that cannot be fully accounted for by their external senses powers. When a sheep senses a wolf, it also immediately senses danger. The apprehension of danger cannot be explained, according to Aquinas, by the external senses, but is caused by a certain natural instinct. Aquinas seems to restrict the use of the aestimative power to relatively complex apprehensions. For example, I do not think he would want to say that an animal needs the aestimative power to judge that this food is appetible – he seems to allow for such cognition below the level of the aestimative power. There is a limit to the apprehension of the other sense powers; the aestimative power accounts for what goes beyond this limit. One would have wanted Aquinas to say more about exactly where to draw this line, or even about how the lower sense powers judge something as suitable.

The aestimative power in humans, however, is quite different than it is in animals. It has various names: cогitative power, passive intellect, and particular reason. In man it does not operate by a natural instinct, but rather is bound to reason and operates through it. This internal sense power in humans operates as a kind of bridge between thought and sense, between the universal and the particular. There is no need to rely on instinct, since the aestimative power

---

45 Previous note.

46 In II Sent. 2.2 [Mand. 605]: “... nullus appetitus movetur in suum objectum nisi fiat apprehensio alicuius sub ratione boni vel mali, convenientis vel nocivi. Hanc autem rationem convenientis et boni aliter homo percipit, aliter brutum: brutum enim non conferendo, sed quodam naturali instinctu sibi conveniens vel nocivum, cognoscit; homo autem per investigationem quamdam et collationem hujusmodi rationes considerat; et ideo vis illa per quam in hujusmodi rationum cognitionem venit consequenter ratio dicitur, quae investigativa est et deductiva unius in alterum.” That this is indeed referring to the cogitative power see In II Sent. 2.1 ad 3 [Mand. 603]: “unde et quaedam pars sensitiva, scilicet cogitatione, alio nomine ratio dicitur, propter confinium ejus ad rationem.”
along with reason performs some kind of a comparison (collatio) of intentions, by which the person determines that this or that is dangerous or harmful.\(^{47}\) A sheep perceives a wolf, apprehends danger and runs. Man, however, perceives the same wolf, but first apprehends that it is a wolf, then judges that it is dangerous, and then runs. Humans apprehend suitability or harm by way of a kind of collation with the intellect, i.e., the universal quiddity of the wolf is involved, with a whole series of judgments that involve returning to phantasms – the cogitative power is involved in this process of practical reasoning.\(^{48}\) This process involves complex interactions between material and immaterial powers, but again, here it seems to me that Aquinas simply did not say enough for us to say exactly how this collatio works. Nevertheless, we can say that the formal object of certain passions may be taken directly from the senses or it may come from the cogitative power, and thus be somewhat rational, or it may involve some kind of combination of both.

To complicate matters slightly, Aquinas suggests that passion may also follow upon imagination.\(^{49}\) The imagination is the power that stores in a phantasm what has been sensed by the external senses and organized by the common sense. We may as well add the memorative power, which recognizes as past what has been stored in a phantasm and recognized as helpful or harmful by the aestimative or cogitative power; for I may think of a snake or a worm-filled-apple

\(^{47}\) *In II Sent.* 25.1.2 [Mand.647]: “... animalia non apprehendunt rationem convenientis per collationem, sed per quendam naturalem instinctum ; et ideo animalia habent aestimationem, sed non cognitionem.”

\(^{48}\) The cogitative power itself does not grasp universals; it shares in intellect because it compares particular intentions. See Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power*, Chapter VI, esp. p. 175.

\(^{49}\) *In II Sent.* 24.3.2 [Mand.617]: “Appetitus sensitivus est qui ex praecedenti imaginatione vel sensu consequitus, et hic vocatur motus sensualitatis.” And for his use of the word motion here note what he says a few lines above, “in partibus animae motus proprie dictur inclinatio ad aliquid . . .” A passion is always an inclination/motion of the sense appetite to something.
and experience fear or disgust without the material object actually being present. Thus all of
the internal sense powers may play some part in the determination of the formal object of a
passion.

From the moral point of view, what is important is the degree to which these responses or
emotions are voluntary. For choice, as we discussed, is primary in virtue, and all acts of virtue
proceed from choice. Depending on a passion’s causes, it may or may not be voluntary.
Sensuality (sensualitas) names the sense appetites as they are more turned downward toward the
flesh (ad carnem depressa est) and as they are moved by their own motions, but not as they obey
the command of the will. As attached to a material organ, the sense appetite are compelled to
some act by a change in the organ. He speaks of motions that are not caused by imagination
(which is open to the influence of the will and cogitative power), but by natural active qualities.
These motions are not caused by the command of the will, but since the will can impede or not
impede them they are in a certain way subject to the will.

C. Moral Virtue

50 See In II Sent. 24.3.2 [Mand.620]: “Nullus autem motus ponitur in genere moris nisi habita comparatione
ad voluntatem, quae principium est moralium, ut ex VI Metaph. text. 5, patet; et ideo ibi incipit genus moris ubi
primo dominium voluntatis inventur. Habet autem voluntas in quibusdam dominium completum, in quibusdam vero
incompletum. Completum dominium habet in illis actibus qui ex imperio voluntatis procedunt; et hi sunt actus
deliberationem sequentes, qui rationi adscribuntur.”
51 In II Sent. 24.3.2 ad. 3 [Mand.621]: “… sed sensualitas, ut supra dictum est, nominat partem sensitivam
secundum quod magis ad carnem depressa est, prout non sequitur in operando imperium voluntatis, sed movetur
 proprio motu;…”
52 In II Sent. 39.1.2 [Mand.989]: “… potentiae enim organis affixae coguntur ad aliquem actum per
immutationem organorum, sine quibus in actum exire non possunt; intellectus autem, quamvis sit potentia non
affixa organo, tamen cogitur ad aliquid ex ratione vel arguento,…” See also In IV Sent. 4.49.3.1 sol. 1.
53 See In II Sent. 24.3.2 [Mand.620]: “naturales diximus, qui imaginationem non sequuntur, sed solum
naturalium qualitatum actionem, … Completum dominium habet in illis actibus qui ex imperio voluntatis procedunt
; et hi sunt actus deliberationem sequentes, qui rationi adscribuntur. Sed incompletum dominium habet in illis
actibus qui non per imperium rationis procedunt, sed tamen voluntas eos impedire poterat, ut sic quodammodo
voluntati subjaceant, quantum ad hoc quod est impediri, vel non impediri.”
If we ask what virtue is Aquinas suggests that there are many definitions; this is because definitions must include all of a thing’s causes and in this case there are too many causes to neatly bundle them up in one simple definition.\(^{54}\) This is significant because it highlights the complexity of virtue – there are multiple simultaneously operative causes, all of which must be taken into account if one is to grasp what (which is what a definition signifies) virtue is.

Moral virtue is bound to appetite, and appetite is an inclination towards something.\(^{55}\) In some respects appetite is naturally right, as with respect to an ultimate end, for example, as everyone desires happiness, but in respect to other things the rightness (\textit{rectitudo}) of the appetite is “caused by reason, insofar as appetite in some way participates in reason, as Aristotle said.”\(^{56}\) And so one may ask: where does the rightness (or \textit{rectitudo}) of appetite come from, and is it always (as it seems from this passage) from reason?

In all things that have a rule and measure, Thomas says, their goodness consists in conformity to that rule or measure, and badness consists in a turning away from it; divine

\(^{54}\) \textit{In II Sent.} 27.1.2 [Mand.700]: “. . . si accipiatur definitio rei quae complectitur totum esse rei, secundum quod ex omnibus causis constituitur, quae est perfecta definitio, tunc unius rei non potest esse nisi una definitio. Dicta autem definitio virtutis complectitur omnes causas ejus, ut dictum est ; inveniuntur autem et aliae quae aliquas harum exprimunt, sicut illa Philosophi, \textit{II Ethic.}, c.VI : “Habitus electivus in medietate consistens,” etc., quae exprimit formalia virtutis et actum ejus ; et illa quae est in \textit{VII Phys.}, “dispositio perfecti ad optimum,” exprimit ordinem ad finem : et diversae descriptiones diversas conditiones virtutis exprimunt ; et sic non est inconveniens, si de virtute plures definitiones dantur.”

\(^{55}\) For the claim that appetite is an inclination see \textit{In III Sent.} 27.1.2 [Moos.861]: “. . . appetitum naturalem qui nihil aliud est quam inclinatio rei in finem suum naturalem qui est ex directione instituentis naturam, et iterum appetitum voluntarium qui est inclinatio cognoscentis finem et ordinem in finem illum. . . .” For the claim that appetite is an inclination towards something see \textit{In III Sent.} 26.1.5 ad 4 [Moos.830-31]: “. . . intellectiva apprehensio est secundum motum a rebus in animam. . . . Operatio autem appetitus est secundum motum ab anima in res.” N.B. \textit{In II Sent.} 24.2.1 ad 5 [Mand.604]: “. . . appetitus est nomen potentiae et nomen actus: unde non est inconveniens quod ex appetitu potentiae procedat appetitus actus.”

\(^{56}\) \textit{In III Sent.} 33.1.1 [Moos.1020-21]: “Appetitus autem respectu alicujus est rectus naturaliter, sicut respectu finis ultimi, prout quilibet naturaliter vult esse felix ; sed respectu aliorum rectitudo appetitus ex ratione causatur, secundum quod appetitus al duphater ratione participat, ut dicitur in \textit{II Eth.}.” He means \textit{I Eth.}
wisdom, however, is the first measure and rule of all things.⁵⁷ Some powers are limited to
determined actions or passions and as such are conformed to their rule as ordered by divine
wisdom and therefore of their very nature can sufficiently have rectitude and goodness.⁵⁸ But
higher and more universal powers (such as those which are rational) are not limited to some one
object or mode of operation (*modum operandi*) since they can have their rectitude according to
diverse objects and in diverse ways. Thus these powers do not naturally have this rectitude, but
they must receive it from elsewhere.⁵⁹ This perfection is received in the manner of an inhering
quality so that the rectitude of the rule is caused in the regulated power.⁶⁰ Because of this
inhering quality the power does what is right or suitable to its form with ease and pleasure. When
this quality is imperfect it is called a disposition, but when it is perfected it is called a habit, and
we may also then call it a second nature since it inclines to one (*ad unum inclinant*).⁶¹

---

⁵⁷ *In III Sent. 23.1.1 [Moos.697]*: “... in omnibus quae habent regulam et mensuram, eorum bonitas et
rectitudo consistit in conformitate ad suam regulam vel mensuram; malitia autem, secundum quod ab ea discordant.
Prima autem mensura et regula omnium est divina Sapientia. Unde bonitas et rectitudo sive veritas(or virtus)
uniuscujusque consistit secundum quod attingit ad hoc quod ex sapientia divina ordinatur, ...”

⁵⁸ *In III Sent. 23.1.1 [Moos.697]*: “Sunt autem quaedam potentiae limitatae ad determinatas actiones vel
passiones; et secundum quod illas implent, regulae suae conformantur, quia per divinam sapientiam ad talia sunt
ordinatae. Et quia naturae inclinatio semper est ad unum, ideo tales potentiae ex ipsa natura potentiae rectitudinem
sufficierent habere possunt et bonitatem; ...”

⁵⁹ *In III Sent. 23.1.1 [Moos.697-98]*: “Potentiae vero altiiores et universaliares, cujusmodi sunt rationales
potentiae, non sunt limitatae ad aliquid unum vel objectum vel modum operandi; quia secundum diversa et
diversimode rectitudinem habere possunt. Et ideo ex natura potentiae non potuerunt determinari ad rectum et bonum
ipsarum; sed oportet quod rectificentur, rectitudinem a sua regula recipientes.”

⁶⁰ Powers are not perfected simply by being acted on (*per modum passionis*), see *In III Sent. 23. 1.1
[Moos.698]*.

⁶¹ *In III Sent. 23.1.1 [Moos.698-99]*: “Oportet ergo ut alio modo recipiatur, scilicet per modum qualitatis
inhaerentis, scilicet ut rectitudo regulae efficiatur forma potentiae regulatae; sic enim faciliter et delectabiliter quod
rectum est operabitur, sicut id quod est conveniens suae formae. Et haec quidem qualitas sive forma, dum adhuc est
imperfecta, dispositio dicitur; cum autem jam consummata est et quasi in naturam versa, habitus nominatur, qui, ut
ex II Eth. (1105b25) et V Meta. (1022b10) accipitur, est secundum quem nos habemus ad aliquid bene vel male.”
Aquinas then excludes the possibility of perfecting habits for certain powers since they are already naturally determined *ad unum*: the apprehensive sense powers are already perfect in their operation, as is the will by way of its object (the ultimate end), and so is the agent intellect by its own determinate action. Moreover, there cannot be a habit in God, since he is the first rule unruled by another. God is essentially good; he is not good by participation of rectitude from another. But the possible intellect, which is indeterminate even as prime matter is, needs habits by which it can participate in the rectitude of its own rule. These may be natural, as those that are immediately illuminated by the light of the agent intellect, i.e., the first principles (which are understood only by the possible intellect). Or they may be acquired, as are those that are educed from these first principles, or they may be infused, as those that participate in the first rule concerning things that exceed the agent intellect. It is the same in the will, with respect to things to which it is not determined by nature and in the irascible and concupiscible appetites: with respect to what is not determined by nature, habits are needed that participate in

---

62 Ibid., “Patet ergo quod potentiae naturales, quia sunt ex seipsis determinatae ad unum, habitibus non indigent. Similiter etiam nec apprehensivae sensitivae, quia habent determinatum modum operandi, a quo non deficiunt nisi per potentiae defectum. Similiter etiam nec voluntas humana, secundum quod est naturaliter determinata ad ultimum finem, et ad bonum, secundum quod est objectum ejus. Similiter etiam nec intellectus agens, qui habet determinatam actionem, scilicet facere intelligibilia in actu ; sicut lux facere visibilia in actu.”

63 Ibid., “Similiter etiam nec in ipso Deo est aliquis habitus, cum ipse sit prima regula ab alio non regulata: unde essentialiter bonus est, et non per participationem rectitudinis ab alio; nec malum in ipso incidere potest.”

64 Ibid., “Sed intellectus possibilis qui de se est indeterminatus, sicut materia prima, habitu indiget, quo participet rectitudinem suae regulae : et naturali quantum ad ea quae ex naturali lumine intellectus agentis qui est ejus regula, statim determinantur, sicut sunt principia prima ; et acquisito, quantum ad ea quae ex his principiis educi possunt ; et infuso, quo participat rectitudinem primae regulae in his quae intellectum agentem excedunt.”
the rectitude of reason, which is their rule, or participate in the rectitude of the first measure in those matters exceeding human nature, i.e., the infused virtues.\(^6\)

This passage makes it quite clear that in the *Sentences* when Aquinas says that the sense appetites participate in reason he really means the power of reason itself. The first principle in the acquired moral virtues is the agent intellect, by whose illuminating power the possible intellect understands, and from this are “educed” (*educi*) the virtues for the will and sense appetites. The scope of the agent intellect is the line by which Aquinas distinguishes between the acquired and the infused virtues. If the action falls under the power or purview of the abstracting power of the agent intellect, then we are in the realm of acquired intellectual and moral virtues. If, however, the action requires cognition that is beyond the range of the agent intellect, then we are in the realm of the infused virtues.

It is reason that ultimately causes the form that is received in the sense appetites. We can see this if we consider his argument against what he considers to be Avicenna’s view that virtue comes from the *dator formarum*, i.e., a separate substance. Man’s actions, according to this line of thought, merely dispose him to receive virtues from this separate substance. Aquinas replies that

This position, however, destroys a natural power (*virtus*), which is in each natural principle to producing like itself, insofar as the matter on which it acts is receptive of its own similitude. Which indeed is necessary from this that everything which acts, acts from this that it is in act. Whence it is necessary that anything which is something in act, in some way can be the active cause of that. And so every natural principle naturally introduces its own similitude through its own act. Since

\(^6\) Ibid., “Similiter etiam in voluntate quantum ad illa ad quae ex natura non determinatur, et in irascibili et in concupiscibili, indigemus habitibus, secundum quod participant rectitudinem rationis, quae est eorum regula, vel rectitudinem primae mensurae in his quae humanam naturam excedunt, quantum ad habitus infusos.”
therefore the principles of the sciences and virtues are naturally placed in us, as was said, it is necessary that through actions proceeding from those principles, the habits of virtues and sciences are completed.  

It is thus from the naturally known first principles of the intellect and the actions proceeding from the understanding of these principles that the moral virtues are acquired.

Aquinas is critical of Avicenna’s position because it seems to deny that humans are the active principle of their own virtue. This active principle, according to Aquinas, is the agent intellect, which is always fully in act and by which the content of the naturally known first principles is illumined. Reasoning from his two axioms that every agent produces something like itself and that every agent acts insofar as it is in act, he explains that the virtues are caused by reason as it is actual and a likeness is communicated when this act actualizes something in potency, i.e., the power in need of being perfected by, or participating in, reason.

D. Mode and Exemplarity

In order to further hone in on this causality and communication of similitude let us consider an important passage that discusses prudence. The rectitude of appetite is caused by

---

66 In III Sent. 1.2 sol. 2 [Moos.1028-1029]: “Quidam philosophi quos sequitur Avicenna, posuerunt omnes formas esse a datore, et quod agens naturale non facit nisi dispositionem ad formas illas. Et similiter etiam dicit Avicenna quod scientia et virtus sunt a datore, et per studium et exercitium disponitur anima ad recipiendum influxum dictorum habituum. Haec autem posito tollit naturalem virtutem quae inept cuilibet principio naturali ad faciendum sibi simile, secundum quod materia in quam agit est receptiva suae similitudinis. Quod quidem necessarium est ex hoc quod omne quod agit, agit ex hoc quod est in actu. Unde oportet quod omne quod est in actu aliquid, aliquo modo possit esse activum illius. Et ideo omne naturale principium natum est inducere suam similitudinem per actum suum. Cum igitur principia scientiarum et virtutum sint naturaliter nobis indita, ut dictum est, oportet quod per actiones ex illis principiis prodeuntes, virtutum et scientiarum habitus compleantur.”

67 See text in previous note and In III Sent. 1.2. sol. 2 ad 2 [Moos.1029]: “. . . in operibus animae est quidam gradus, secundum quod una potentia alteri subjacet. Et in eadem potentia est inveniri superius et inferius, secundum quod ad diversa objecta comparatur. Inferius autem natum est recipere a superiori ; et ideo per operationes egredientes a ratione naturali et voluntate, in quibus praexistent seminaria virtutum, acquiritur habitus in irascibili et concupiscibili; . . .” Remember that the natural will here follows the intellect, as we discussed and that the distinction between natural and rational movements is accidental to the will itself and is dependant on the two kinds of acts of the intellect. See the above section on intellect and will.
reason and the moral virtues make the sense appetites right, but reason itself is made right by prudence (the virtue of deliberation). Because right reason (prudence) is required for moral virtue, when the sense appetites participate in reason in the moral virtues this means they are participating in reason informed by the habit of prudence. Prudence rules the moral virtues in the sense appetites and they participate in prudence as they participate in reason. Here is the passage I wish to highlight:

For an inferior power does not have the perfection of virtue except insofar as it participates in the perfection of a superior power; as a habit which is in the irascible appetite does not have the nature (rationem) of virtue, as is said in VI Eth. 1144b1, except insofar as it receives understanding and discretion from reason, which prudence perfects, and according to this prudence posits form and mode in all of the other moral virtues.

This last line illustrates what I consider to be most peculiar of Aquinas’s account of virtue in the Sentences: when the moral virtues, temperance and fortitude, are said to participate in reason Aquinas explains it in terms of form and mode. The kind of formal causality he means is exemplar causality.

---

68 See also In III Sent. 33.1.1 sol.2 [Moos.1020-21] “Appetitus autem respectu alicujus est rectus naturaliter, sicut respectu finis ultimi, prout quilibet naturaliter vult esse felix ; sed respectu aliorum rectitudo appetitus ex ratione causatur, secundum quod appetitus aliquam rationem participat, ut in II Eth. dicitur. Et quia prudentia facit rationem rectam, ideo praeter prudentiam requiruntur aliae virtutes morales quae faciunt appetitum rectum in his in quibus naturaliter rectus non est. Et quia bonum rationis non eodem modo invenitur in ipsa ratione et in his qua rectitudinem rationis participative habent ; . . .”

69 In III Sent. 33.3.1 sol. 2 ad 3 [Moos. 1075]: “. . . prudentia regulat omnes alias virtutes, ideo omnes participant aliquam prudentiae ; sicut irascibilis et concupiscibilis participant aliquam rationem. Unde illud quod ad alias virtutes pertinet participative, cautio scilicet, ad prudentiam pertinet essentialiter.”

70 In III Sent. 27.2.4 sol. 3 [Moos.889]: “Inferior enim potentia non habet perfectionem virtutis nisi secundum quod participat perfectionem potentiae superioris; sicut habitus qui est in irascibili, non habet rationem virtutis, ut dicitur in VI Eth. 1144b1, nisi inquantum intellectum recipit et discretionem a ratione quam perficit prudentia ; et secundum hoc prudentia ponit formam et modum in omnibus alis virtutibus moralibus.”

71 That exemplarity is indeed a kind of formal cause see the section “Exemplarism and the Four Causes” in Doolan, Divine Ideas, 33-43.
There are two kinds of exemplar forms. One according to whose representation something comes to be, and for this similitude alone is required, as we say that true things are the exemplar forms of their depictions. In another way an exemplar form is said to be that according to whose similitude something comes to be and through participation in it has *esse*, as the divine goodness is the exemplar form of every goodness, and divine wisdom of every wisdom. And such an exemplar form need not be one in species with its effects, since those participating do not always participate through the mode of the participated. And in this way prudence is the form of the other moral virtues, insofar as a certain sealed or stamped (*sigillatus*) order of prudence in the lower powers grants to habits, which are there, the intelligibility of virtue (*rationem virtutis*).\(^7^2\)

The exemplar causality between reason and the sense appetites is explained by way of analogy to the manner in which God is the exemplar cause of *esse*, goodness, and wisdom. This requires a little explanation. Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of exemplarity in the *Sentences* and in later texts. An idea is an exemplar cause of its effect. For example, a carpenter has an idea for a cabinet that he builds, or God has a divine idea for a person whom He creates. This is not, however, the kind of exemplarity Thomas has in mind in the case of reason and the moral virtues. Here he means a kind of exemplar causality that is rather explained by way of analogy to nature in the way that man generates man, that is, man produces a form that is similar to himself. In a similar way, God as *ipsum esse* produces *esse*, or God as good produces things

---

\(^7^2\) *In III Sent. 27.2.4 sol. 3 ad 1* [Moos.889-90]: “. . . forma exemplaris est duplex. Una ad cujus repraesentationem aliquid fit, et ad hanc non exigitur nisi similitudo tantum ; sicut dicimus res veras picturarum esse formas exemplares. Allo modo dicitur forma exemplaris ad cujus similitudinem aliquid fit et per cujus participationem esse habet; sicut divina bonitas est forma exemplaris omnis bonitatis, et divina sapientia omnis sapientiae. Et talis forma exemplaris non oportet quod sit unius speciei cum causatis ; quia participantia non semper participant per modum participati. Et hoc modo prudentia est forma aliarum virtutum moralium, inquantum sigillatus ordo quidam prudentiae in inferioribus viribus dat habitibus qui ibi sunt, rationem virtutis.”

He only uses this interesting word *sigillatio* (the sealing of wax) like this in two other places, QDV 24.4 ad 9 [Leon.22/3.692.257-60]: “. . . quod id quod est superioris potentiae, scilicet rationis, eis imprimatur, et ipsa sigillatio rationis in inferioribus viribus formaliter perficit virtutes morales.” *De virt.* 9 [Marietti, 732] “Unde, si recte consideretur, virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud quam quaedam dispositio, sive forma, sigillata et impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione.”
that are good. Thomas is not emphasizing the exact formal likeness between God’s divine idea and its created effect, but rather the communication of a diminished likeness from the cause’s nature (God’s nature) and its effect (a creature), and as he also puts it, analogically.\textsuperscript{73}

There are, however, two different ways that causes can be like to their effects. 1) They may be univocally like one another, as a human generates a human or heat causes heat, that is, both the causes and effect can be said to be exactly like one another, at least insofar as they are both human or both heat. This must be denied of God since there is no univocal formal communication between God and creatures.\textsuperscript{74} In a similar but different way, participations in reason, the moral virtues, do not have the full nature of the power of reason itself. Thus 2) there

\textsuperscript{73}In I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 4 [Mand.493]: “. . . exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter. Vel quantum ad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideas est exemplar intellectus divinus omnium quae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiatorum. Vel quantum ad id quod est in natura sua, sicut ratione suae bonitatis qua est bonus, est exemplar omnis bonitatis; et similiter est de veritate.” See ibid., ad 1 (p.492) where he explicitly refers to this as analogical. In I Sent. 2.1.2 [Mand.62-3]: “Respondeo dicendum, quod quidquid est entitatis et bonitatis in creaturis, totum est a Creatore : imperfectio autem non est ab ipso, sed accidit ex parte creaturarum, inquantum sunt ex nihilo. Quod autem est causa alicujus, habet illud excellentius et nobilius. Unde oportet quod omnes nobilitates omnium creaturarum inveniantur in Deo nobilissimo modo et sine aliqua imperfectione : et ideo quae in creaturis sunt diversa, in Deo propter summam simplicitatem sunt unum. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod in Deo est sapientia, bonitas et hujusmodi, quorum quodlibet est ipsa divina essentia, et ita omnia sunt unum re. Et quia unumquodque eorum est in Deo secundum sui verissimam rationem, et ratio sapientiae non est ratio bonitatis, inquantum hujusmodi, reliquinquit quod sunt diversa ratione, non tantum ex parte ipsius ratiocintantis, sed ex proprietate ipsius rei : et inde est quod ipse non est causa rerum omnino aequivoca, cum secundum formam suam producit effectus similes, non univoce, sed analogice ; sicut a sua sapientia derivatur omnis sapientia, et ita de aliis attributis, secundum doctrinam Dionysii, De div. nom., cap. VII, col. 866, . I. Unde ipse est exemplaris forma rerum, non tantum quantum ad ea quae sunt in sapientia sua, scilicet secundum rationes ideales, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt in natura sua, scilicet attributa.”

\textsuperscript{74}In I Sent. 8.1.2 [Mand.198]: “Respondeo, sicut dicit Bernardus, Serm. IV super Cant., Deus est esse omnium non essentiale, sed causale. Quod sic patet. Invenimus enim tres modos causae agentis. Scilicet causam aequivoce agentem, et hoc est quando effectus non convenit cum causa nec nomine nec ratione: sicut sol facit calorem qui non est calidus. Item causam univoce agentem, quando effectus convenit in nomine et ratione cum causa, sicut homo generat hominem et calor facit calorem. Neutro istorum modorum Deus agit. Non univoce, quia nihil univoce convenit cum ipso. Non aequivoce, cum effectus et causa aliquo modo conveniant in nomine et ratione secundum prius et posterius; sicut Deus sua sapientia facit nos sapientes, ita tamen quod sapientia nostra semper deficit a ratione sapientiae suae, sicut accidens a ratione entis, secundum quod est in substantia.” This, of course, is an analogical likeness.
are non-univocal causes, which are equivocally like their effects.\textsuperscript{75} In this case the form exists in the cause in a more eminent way than it does in its effect.\textsuperscript{76} Thus God and created beings are good, but goodness exists in God supereminentemente. Aquinas, however, further distinguishes between two kinds of equivocal causes. The communicated form may exist in the cause according to the same form or not according to the same form. In the latter case the cause has the form virtually, that is, in its power (\textit{virtus}). For example, the sun, which is not hot (to use his outdated medieval example) causes heat; the sun is not formally hot itself but it has the power to cause the form heat.\textsuperscript{77} This is not the kind of causality he means in our case. God truly is \textit{esse}, good and wise, and he communicates these in causing creatures, albeit in a diminished fashion. In a similar way the sense appetites participate in reason. Reason, of course, is the very form of reason, and it communicates this form, albeit in a diminished fashion, to the sense appetites in the form of the moral virtues.

There is a likeness between sense appetite and reason, indeed a formal exemplar likeness, an impression of reason, but not the exact same form. What is clear from this passage is that when Aquinas says that the moral virtues participate in reason he has in mind formal causality,

\textsuperscript{75} Previously we had discussed things which are equivocally predicated of one another, as a dog and a star. In such a case there is no real likeness at all – they just accidentally happen to share the same name. This is not the case with what is called “equivocal causality.” See the text in the previous note.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{In II Sent.} 14.1.2 ad 3 [Mand.351]: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod quando materia est proportionata ad recipiendam actionem secundum virtutem agentis, tunc agens facit sibi simile in specie, et dicitur agens univocum ; quando autem materia non est proportionata ad recipiendam actionem secundum virtutem agentis, servatur quidem aliqua similitudo effectus ad agentem, secundum quod dicit Dionysius, in II cap. \textit{De div. nomin.}, quod habent causatum causarum contingentes imagines : et tamen non oportet codem modo inveniri aliquid in causa quo est in effectu, sed eminentiori : et ita etiam calor aliquo modo est in sole, non quidem denominans ipsum, ut dicitur calidus formaliter, sed effective secundum virtutem calefaciendi, quae in eo est.” \textit{In II Sent.} 15.1.2 ad 4 [Mand. 372]: Ad quartum dicendum, quod similia sunt quae in eadem forma communicant ; sed contingit quod illam formam non uniformiter participant quaedam ; quia quod est in uno deficienter, in altero est eminentius : . . .”

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{In II Sent.} 14.1.2 ad 3 [Mand.351]; \textit{In I Sent.} 2.1.2 [Mand.62-3]; \textit{In I Sent.} 8.1.2 [Mand.198]. These texts are in footnotes in the last two pages.
specifically the kind of analogical/equivocal-exemplar causality in which the cause possesses the form that it communicates to its effect. The way he sometimes puts it is that there is a formal likeness, but a difference according to mode.

But what does he mean by using the term mode so frequently in the Sentences? And what is its connection to formal causality? For example, he says that “reason posits mode in all the powers which are under it,” and he says that the “inferior powers participate in the perfections of the superior powers according to their own mode.” I take this to be a variation of his axiom that everything which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. For he does say that the participations are determined in the ones participating by the capacities and natures of the ones participating. The lower powers have or receive a form from a higher power, as they are able to receive them. In other words, it depends on the nature of the potency, insofar as this kind of potency can receive a form and be actualized in some particular manner or mode:

And so each virtue which is in an inferior power has a certain form which is a virtue from participation in the perfection of a superior power; but it has the form, which is this virtue, from the nature of its own power through the determination to its proper object, and each virtue posits this form and mode which it has with respect to (circam) its own act, and again, that form and mode from a higher power.

---

78 In III Sent. 27.2.4 sol. 3 ad 2 [Moos.890]: “. . . inferiores vires non perficiuntur perfectione virtutis, nisi per participationem perfectionis a superioribus. Cum autem superiora sint formalia respectu inferiorum quasi perfectiora, quod participatur a superioribus in inferioribus formale est. Unde ad perfectionem virtutis in aliqua potentia tot formae exiguntur quot superiora sunt respectu illius potentiae. Sicut ratio superior est quam concupiscibilis quasi ordinans ipsam. Et ideo prudentia quae est perfectio rationis, est forma temperantiae quae est virtus concupiscibilis.”

79 In III Sent. 27.2.4 sol. 3 ad 3 [Moos.890]: “. . . ratio imponit modum omnibus viribus quae sunt sub ipsa, . . .” He also mentions will here in the context of discussing charity.

80 In III Sent. 27.2.4 sol. 3 ad 5 [Moos.891]: “. . . inferiora participant perfectiones superiorum secundum modum suum; . . .”

81 Ibid., “et ideo participationes determinantur in participantibus ex capacitate et natura participantium.”
power; thus temperance in its own act posits its proper mode and that of prudence, charity and grace.\textsuperscript{82}

It is clear enough that a virtue has something from its natural power, i.e., determination to its proper object), but it also has something from its participation in a higher power, i.e., a form or mode concerning this relation to its proper object, which the virtue adds over and above the natural relation to this object. The English translation of \textit{modus} as ‘way’ is perfectly suitable. One could say that virtue adds a way of being related to the object, a kind of \textit{modus operandi}.

For example, the sense appetites are naturally related to pleasurable objects, but when a virtuous habit is added to the sense appetites, they are related to a pleasurable object in a different way. Aquinas does not seem to want to distinguish between form (\textit{forma}) and way (\textit{modus}); it seems to me that what the form does as a formal cause in the sense appetites is to change the way that the sense appetites operate. I offer this as an interpretation of how to take Aquinas’s peculiar use of the term \textit{modus}, but it still seems to me to be somewhat obscure, and I will not insist on this interpretation especially since he later abandons, as we will see, this peculiar way of describing the moral virtues.

However we might interpret Aquinas’s use of \textit{modus} here, we may still ask exactly in what way (\textit{modus}) the sense appetites of the virtuous operate. This discussion so far has been highly abstract. We have discussed exemplar causality, form, mode etc., let us now turn to examine this participation more concretely.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., “Et ideo unaquaque virtus quae est in inferiori potentia habet quamdam formam quae est virtus, ex participacione perfectionis superioris potentiae ; sed formam quae est haec virtus habet ex natura propriae potentiae per determinationem ad proprium objectum; et hanc formam et modum ponit unaquaque virtus circa suum actum, et iterum illam formam vel modum quem habet ex superiori ; sic temperantia in actu suo ponit modum proprium et prudentiae et caritatis et gratiae.”
E. What Moral Virtue Does to The Sense Appetites.

Aquinas grants a few different roles to moral virtue. One is facility. A power, he says, is a principle of simply acting, but a habit is a principle of acting quickly and with ease. This certainly counts as a way of operating. Aquinas also notes that all moral virtues are distinguished by their end; virtues are according to their end and vices fall short of it. The proximate good to which the moral virtues are ordered is the good of reason, but since the good of reason is not found in the same way in all moral matters there are specifically different kinds of moral virtue.

What is of reason and intellect is not participated in the same way in the matters of all moral virtues, since the medium of reason is rightly found in diverse matters in diverse ways. And so such diversity of matter causes diversity of form and species; as also happens in natural things, when diverse matters are not proportionate to receiving the form of one kind (*rationis*).

Note again the language of formal causality and the likeness to the reception of form in matter. But also notice that what moral virtues receive is the mean as determined by reason. It is the role of deliberation and of prudence to determine the mean, i.e., to find what is right in moral

---

83 In III Sent. 33.1.1 [Moos.1019]: “Potentia enim est principium agendi absolute, sed habitus est principium agendi prompte et faciliter; et ideo objectum secundum illam rationem qua se habet ad actum simpliciter respondet potentiae, sed secundum quod se habet ad facilitatem actus respondet habitui.”

84 In III Sent. 33.1.1 [Moos.1019]: “Et ideo secundum relationem ad finem omnes Morales habitus distinguentur, ex quo prima sumpta est differentia boni et mali; quia bonum importat finem, ut dicitur in X Meta., malum autem deordinationem a fine. Et secundum hoc virtutes a vitii distinguentur. Et in virtutibus uti invenitur diversa ratio boni sunt diversae virtutes secundum speciem. Bonum autem ad quod humanae virtutes proxime ordinantur, est bonum rationis, contra quam esse est malum hominis, ut dicit Dionysius in Lib. de Divin. Nom. Et quia non in omnibus materiis moralibus eodem modo invenitur rationis bonum, ut patet; ideo oportet diversas virtutes Morales esse specie differentes.”

85 In III Sent. 33.1.1 ad 2 [Moos.1020]: “. . . quod est rationis et intellectus non eodem modo participatur in materiis omnium moralium virtutum, cum in diversis materiis diversimode medium rationis recte inveniatur. Et ideo talis materiæ diversitas diversitatem formæ et specie causat; sicut etiam accidit in naturalibus, quando diversae materiæ non sunt proportionatae ad reciprociendum formam unius rationis.”
actions which necessarily concern contingents, and it is the role of moral virtue to participate in reason by receiving this mean.

In a helpful passage Aquinas outlines three ways that the sense appetites participate in reason. Moral virtues are diversified from a good of reason, which consists essentially (essentialiter) in the judgment of reason which belongs to prudence; but in these matters that are disposed by reason, by participation (participative), they pertain to moral virtues. Reason disposes or orders these moral matters, passions and actions, in three ways. First by ordering the passions themselves through actions according to themselves insofar as reason reduces them to a medium according to a certain measure; and so it is said to posit a mode in them, since mode implies measure. Second by ordering the subject to the very actions and passions ordered in the first way, namely, so that a man might firmly inhere in these things which reason orders. Third, in a relation to something external to which our acts need to be proportioned, whether this is the end, or some other man, or something extrinsic; and according to this, rectitude or equality is caused in virtue.

Although there is a general way in which all three are applicable to all of the moral virtues, the entire force (intensio) of reason and virtue is to make up for nature’s shortcomings and thus each virtue corresponds to one of these roles: 1) to temperance, 2) to courage, and 3) to justice. Temperance, he says, whose matter is connatural bodily pleasures, is concerned with the

---

86 In III Sent. 33.1.1 ad 3 [Moos.1020] “... quod in omnibus moralibus invenitur una ratio veri, quod est verum contingens in hominis actione consistens; et ideo ad unum actum cognoscitivum pertinent.” See nn.67-68.

87 In III Sent. 33.1.1 sol 3 [Moos.1021-22]: “... habitus virtutum moralium ex bono rationis diversificantur: quod quidem in ipso rationis judicio essentialiter consistit, quod ad prudentiam pertinet; in his vero quae per rationem disponuntur, participative, quod ad Morales virtutes spectat. Moralem autem materiam, idest actus et passiones humanas, ratio quantum ad tria ordinat sive disponit.”

88 In III Sent. 33.1.1 sol 3 [Moos.1022]: “Primo ordinando ipsas passiones per actiones secundum se, prout eas ad medium reducit secundum quamdam commensurationem; et sic dicitur modum in eis ponere, quia modus mensurationem importat. Secundo ordinando subjectum ad ipsas actiones et passiones primo modo ordinatas, ut sicilicet homo firmiter inhaeret his quae ratio ordinavit. Tertio in ordine ad aliquod extra, ad quod oportet actus nostros proportionari, sive sit finis sive alius homo sive quidquid extrinsecum; et secundum hoc causatur rectitudo vel aequalitas in virtute.”
most difficult business of keeping the mode (\textit{difficillimum est modum tenere}), this is why temperance particularly concerns mode.\textsuperscript{89} Here he seems suggest that the word \textit{temperantia} is taken from the verb \textit{temperare}. Although I don’t want to compare with later texts yet, since we have not gotten to them, I would like to point out one difference from a passage that we examined in chapter 3, ST I-II, 49.2, in which he discusses mode (\textit{modus}) and measure with respect to habits. In that passage Aquinas does not mean it to signify a \textit{way} that the power operates in which the habit inheres, but rather its \textit{modus essendi}, i.e., the way it has existence as a predicamental accident. In any case, here in the \textit{Sentences} fortitude concerns firmly holding onto what reason has ordained in the most difficult matters, namely the fear of death, and justice concerns rightness in one’s dealings with others.\textsuperscript{90} Since nature fails in these three respects (in holding onto mode, or moderation, in firmness in holding onto mode, and in one’s dealings with others and external things), we need moral virtues that are participations in reason.

Let us consider what this ‘having of mode’ (\textit{modum tenere}) might mean, since it is common to both temperance and courage, which inhere in the sense appetites. He often describes this mode as facility. At times he seems to mean a kind of general facility of action in moral matters, but at times he seems to mean that the sense appetites easily \textit{obey} reason. In this sense reason is not dragged around by passion because virtues of the sense appetites repress vehement passions, which leaves reason unperturbed and also enables the sense appetites to more easily

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{In III Sent.} 33.1.1 sol 3 [Moos.1022]: “Unde tota intensio rationis et virtutis ad hoc fertur ubi natura deficit. Sicut patet quod delectationes corporales sunt nobis connaturales, et ideo in his difficillimum est modum tenere; et propter hoc virtus quae est circa eas, scilicet temperantia, praecipue modum sibi adscribit, unde et nomen accepit.”

\textsuperscript{90} See n. 89 above.
obey reason’s command.\textsuperscript{91} This makes the moral virtues, in a sense, utterly passive – their role is to lower the force of passion so that reason’s command is more easily obeyed. And the person needs these habits so that his choices can be executed without trouble and difficulty from the passions.\textsuperscript{92}

But this is only part of the story of moral virtue according to Aquinas. For the moral virtues in the sense appetite incline towards virtuous action – there is a forward thrust of sorts towards acting virtuously. Thus there is a twofold role of the moral virtues, 1) a kind of passive obedience to reason, and 2) a kind of active inclination towards virtuous acts. Let us consider this latter aspect.

Virtue, Thomas says citing Cicero “moves in the mode of nature, namely, through a certain inclination of affect (\textit{incinationem affectus}),”\textsuperscript{93} in other words, it is a kind of appetitive motion (in contrast to an apprehensive motion). Another way he puts this is to say that habits

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{In III Sent. 33.2.4 sol 2. [Mand 1063]: “Principium autem humani operis est omnis potentia in qua aliquid rationis invenitur, a qua homo habet quod homo sit. Unde cum in irascibili et concupiscibili quae sunt partes sensibilis appetitus, sit aliquid rationis participative, inquantum rationi obedire possunt — quod non est de potentii nutritivae partis — oportet quod in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes sicut in subjecto, quibus efficitur ut facile rationi obediant illae potentiae in quibus sunt: quod quidem contingit inquantum passiones reprimuntur ut non rationem perturbent. Unde in illo qui passiones vehementiores patitur, sed non deducitur, est quidem habitus in ratione qui tenet eam ne deducatur, non autem in viribus illis in quibus sunt passiones; sicut patet in continente. Et ideo continens seu abstinens, non est perfecte virtuosus, sed temperatus vel mitis, in quo non solum superior pars est perfecta ut deduci non possit, sed etiam inferior moderata ut passiones vehementes non insurgant. Et ideo in quacunque potentia est passio circa quam est virtus aliqua, illa potentia est subjectum illius virtutis; sicut concupiscibilis, temperantiae; fortitudinis autem et mansuetudinis, irascibilis.}

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{In III Sent. 23.1.1 ad 3 [Mand.700]. “... quamvis producere talum actum (i.e. an act with ease) sit in potestate voluntatis, tamen non est in voluntate tantum, sed etiam in inferioribus viribus, ex quibus potest accidere repugnania et difficultas; et ideo indigemus habitibus, quibus omnis difficultas tollatur.}

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{In III Sent. 33.2.4 [Moos.1068]: “Virtus enim, ut dicit Tullius (II De Invent., c. 53), movet in modum naturae, scilicet per quandom inclinationem affectus.”}
incline to doing something \((\text{inclinare ad agendum aliquid})\).\(^94\) We are inclined and impelled by habits, but we are not compelled by them. This distinction is important for it means that free decision is not nullified by habits; however, since habits draw or impel agents to choose certain things over others there is a kind of quasi-diminished freedom, at least in those with vices. He calls lack of vice freedom from impulsion or dispositions.\(^95\)

But to what exactly is the habit inclined and how did the habit become so inclined? The answer to the first question is quite simple, almost too simple. The virtuous habit is inclined to virtuous acts:

However, in the act of virtue not only should the substance of the act itself be considered, but also the mode of acting \((\text{modus agendi})\): for not he who acts chastely in any way is chaste, but he who acts with ease and delight, as is stated in book I, c. 13 of the Ethics. Delight, however, is caused by suitableness \((\text{convenientia})\), as also in sensibles it is obvious that the conjunction of the suitable thing with the one to whom it is suitable produces delight. Therefore it is necessary that the act of virtue proceed from a power adapted and assimilated to this act. The rational power, however, does not have this from itself, since it is indeterminately related to many \((\text{ad utrumlibet})\). It is therefore necessary that something be superadded to the power, as its perfection, through which it produces such an act, from wherever it is caused: and this we say is a habit of virtue; and so the Philosopher in II Ethics says that a sign of a generated habit must be that delight be taken in its act. Hence it is also that a power perfected by a habit of virtue tends to a similar act through the mode of a certain nature: on

\(^94\) \textit{In II Sent. 25.1.2 [Mand.649-50]} Quamvis autem cogi non possit, nihilominus tamen potest inclinari ad agendum aliquid per aliquas dispositiones et habitus ex quibus pronior efficitur ad eligendum alteram paratem."

\(^95\) \textit{In II Sent. 25.1.4 [Mand.654]}: ". . . liberum arbitrium dicitur ex eo quod cogi non potest. Coactio autem, ut prius dictum est, est duplex: una compellens, et alia inducens vel impellens. Hoc autem est naturale et essentiale libero arbitrio ut sufficienter non cogatur coactione compellente, et hoc sequitur ipsum in quolibet statu ; unde non augetur talis libertas nec diminuitur per se, sed per accidentem tantum. . . . Libertas autem illa quae est ab impellentibus et disponentibus in unam partem, augetur et minuitur, et acquiritur et amittitur, secundum quod illa disponentia augmentur et minuuntur, et acquiruntur vel amintuntur ; unde libertas talis per se etiam augetur et minuittur in homine secundum diversos status.” Ibid., ad 1: “. . . libertas a necessitate est quae consequitur naturam potentiae; et ideo per actus et habitus non variatur; sed libertas a disponentibus, sequitur habitum et actum; et ideo secundum diversitatem actuum et habituum variatur.” See also \textit{In II Sent. 25.1.5 [Mand.656]}: “ Si autem dicatur libertas per remotionem impellentis seu impedientis, . . . quia hoc quod impellit liberum arbitrium aut impedit, vel facit hoc per se, sicut habitus et dispositiones, quae fiunt in ipsa anima, et sic est libertas a peccato: . . .” See also \textit{In II Sent. 27.1.1.ad 3.}
account of which Cicero says (prooem. Rhet.) that virtue is a habit in the mode of nature, in agreement with reason. As gravity tends downwards, so does chastity produce chaste deeds.\(^{96}\)

In this passage we see that the sense appetites become conformed or likened to the virtuous act. Because pleasure is caused by likeness, the habituated power takes delight in its act, and this pleasure undoubtedly adds to the act’s ease. This likening of the power to the virtuous act is also described as making the act connatural to the power,\(^{97}\) that is, the habit is a second nature, which is acting quite naturally according to itself. Whereas the power is indeterminately related to virtuous acts, the habit is determinately related to virtuous ones. Aquinas pushes this quite far in the Sentences; he goes so far as saying that chastity acts like the force of gravity pulling downwards, and the will perfected by justice acts like fire, naturally rising upwards.\(^{98}\)

This likening of virtue to natural causality in the particular sense of non-rational actions is risky...

\(^{96}\) In II Sent 27.1.1 [Mand.695]: “In actu autem virtutis non solum consideratur substantia ipsius actus, sed etiam modus agendi: non enim qui caste operatur quocumque modo castus est, sed qui faciliter et delectabiliter, ut ex 1 Ethic., cap XIII habetur. Delectatio autem ex convenientia causatur, sicut et in sensibilibus patet quod conjunctio convenientis cum convenienti facit delectationem. Oportet ergo quod actus virtutis procedat a potentia adaptata et assimilata ad hunc actum. Hoc autem potentia rationalis non habet ex seipsa, cum sit ad utrumlibet. Oportet ergo aliquid potentiae superaddi, ut perfectionem ejus, per quod talem actum educat, undecumque causetur: et hoc dicimus esse habitum virtutis; et ideo dicit philosophus in II Ethic., ubi supra, quod signum generati habitus oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem. Hinc etiam est quod potentia perfecta per habitum virtutis tendit in actum consimilem per modum cujusdam naturae: propter quod dicit Tullius, in prooem Rhet., quod virtus est habitus, modo naturae, rationis consentaneus; sicut enim gravitas deorsum tendit, ita castitas casta operatur.”

\(^{97}\) In IV Sent. 49.3.2: “Non autem omnis operatio est delectationis causa, sed illa quae est ab habitu procedens, et non impedita; bonum enim conjunctum non delectat nisi inquantum est conveniens. Operatio autem efficitur nobis conveniens, et quasi connaturalis, per habitum; quia habitus inclinat in actum per modum naturae, ut Tullius dicit de virtute; et ideo dicitur in 2 Ethic. quod delectatio in opere facta est signum habitus inherentis.”

\(^{98}\) See n. 94, and In I Sent. 39.2.2 ad 4 [Mand. 934-35]: “... ipsa natura humana in se considerata aequaliter se habet indifferenter ad omnia vel intelligenda vel facienda; et quia malum contingit multifariam secundum Dionysium, IV cap. De div. nomin., et bonum uno modo; ideo ut in pluribus flecitur in malum. Sic enim considerata natura humana, nondum est ut agens perfectum, nisi respectu naturalium operationum; sed tunc est agens perfectum quantum ad omnes suas operationes, quando jam perfecta est perfectionibus secundis, quae sunt virtutes; et ideo quando determinatur per perfectionem secundam vel infusam vel acquisitam, tunc determinatur ad unum, vel ad quod tendat ut in majori parte, sicut in statu viae, vel ut semper, sicut in statu patriae. Et ideo Tullius comparat virtutem naturae, dicens quod est habitus voluntarius in modum naturae rationis consentaneus; et ideo voluntas perfecta virtute justitiae se habet ad opera justa, sicut ignis ad motum sursum.”
because it seems to put pressure on the voluntary nature of moral virtue. Aquinas is emphasizing that moral virtue has a kind of natural gravity by which it tends or draws one to acts of virtue in a rather deterministic way or mode. But the sense appetites, of course, may act deterministically without determining choice.

The habit’s power of ordering the passions means that the passions follow the inclination of the habit. For example, because of the inclination of his habit an intemperate person will judge incorrectly, namely, that “to delight in a woman,” is a per se good, and “because of the inclination of the habit and the impetus of passion the murmur of synderesis is not perceived by the mind because the soul is, as it were, inebriated by passion.” For “according to that which is from habit, the end seems to someone to be such as that person is; for example, to him who has the habit of voluptuousness or intemperance, sexual pleasures will seem to be the best, which is according with his own habit.” In the case of the intemperate person, the habit and the passion drag him in tandem in the same direction.

---

99 *In II Sent. 39.3.1 ad 4 [Mand.998]: “. . . propter inclinationem habitus contrarii deficit malus de finis judicio. Judicat enim hoc esse tamquam per se bonum, ut cum muliere delectetur; et ideo propter inclinationem habitus et impetum passionis non percipitur mente synderesis murmur, quia anima est quasi inebriata passione.” Notice that the inclination of a passion is not the inclination of a habit.

100 *In II Sent. 25.1.1 ad 5 [Mand.646-47]: “. . . secundum illam quae est ex habitu, videtur aliqui finis talis qualis est ipse ; verbi gratia, ei qui habet habitum luxuriae, videtur optimum delectable venereum, quod est secundum simitudinem sui habitus.”

101 Indeed in vice the form of the habit enables the agent to perform bad actions without any shame or regret, and because of the vice, which is like to vicious acts, the agent takes pleasure in his own vicious acts. This is why Aquinas says that a just person cannot instantaneously become unjust, for he would be tormented by the murmur of synderesis – at least for a while, until his habit managed to obscure and utterly obstruct it. *In II Sent. 25.1.4 [Mand.655]: “quamvis quilibet per se possit in malum, non tamen potest quilibet eodem modo malum facere sicut ille qui habet habitum malitiae : unuiquie enim habenti habitum est delectabilis operatio quae est secundum habitum illum ; et ideo illi qui habent habitus corruptos, opera abominabilia delectabiliter et sine abominatione exercent ; et ideo libere illud facere dicuntur, inquantum per habitum corruptum reprimitur contradictio rationis, ratione obtenebrata : quod non potest esse in illis qui talibus habitibus carent ; et ideo dicit Philosophus, in V Ethicor., cap. XIII, quod justus non potest statim facere opera injustitiae, sicut injustus facit.”
But toward what is the inclination of temperance drawn? In the case of vice one can be directed toward rather concrete objects, e.g., sexual pleasures, etc. But temperance is much more complex. The temperate person neither simply rejects nor desires all naturally pleasurable objects, but he must find the mean which is in accord with prudence in each contingent situation, taking into account all of the complex and particular circumstances. In the case of moral virtue, it is reason perfected by prudence that determines or prescribes the means of the moral virtues. Thus prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue because a definition, as mentioned, must include its causes. Prudence is the exemplar cause of virtue, and this causality is then articulated in the language of participation:

When some things are distinguished from one another, with each equally receiving a predication of something common, then one is not included in the definition of another; but when the common term is predicated of them per prius and per posterius, then the first is included in the definition of the others, as substance is included in the definition of accidents. This is why prudence is included in the definition of the other virtues, in which the good of reason is found per prius and the intelligibility of virtue (ratio virtutis) per consequens; since what is essentially (per essentiam) is prior to what is by participation (per participationem).

102 See n. 58, In III Sent. 27.2.4 [Moos.887]: “. . . ratio recta, quae ad prudentia pertinent, ponitur in definitione virtutis, . . .”

103 See n. 75.

104 In III Sent. 33.1.1 sol.2 ad 1 [Moos.1021]: “. . . quando aliqua condividuntur, aequaliter recipientia communis praedicationem, tunc unum non ponitur in definitione alterius; sed quando commune praedicatur de eis per prius et posterius, tunc primum ponitur in definitione aliorum, sicut substantia in definitione accidentium. Et propter hoc prudentia ponitur in definitione aliarum virtutum, in qua per prius bonum rationis, et per consequens ratio virtutis invenitur; quia prius est quod est per essentiam quam quod est per participationem.” Thomas uses this language of per prius and per posterius in dividing analogical predicates: In III Sent. 33.2.1 sol. 1 ad 2 [Moos.1046]: “. . . ea quae dividunt aliquod commune univocum, simul sunt quantum ad intentionem generis, quamvis unum possit esse causa alterius quantum ad esse, sicut motus localis est causa aliorum motuum contra quos dividitur. Sed ea quae dividunt aliquod commune analogum se habent secundum prius et posterius, etiam quantum ad intentionem communis quod dividitur, sicut patet de substantia et accidente. Unde ex hoc quod una virtus condividitur alteri, non oportet quod una non sit altera principalior.” This last claim is worth emphasizing, namely that because one virtue is divided from another it does not follow that one is not more principal than another.
Virtue, he says, is an inclination, and every inclination requires some cognition by which it is ordered and inclined. But if moral virtue is inclined to something by prudence, to what can this be if prudence must always be free to hit the moving contingent target? Whereas the end of vice is intelligible: say, to take delight in a woman; the end of temperance, the temperate act itself, is somewhat more obscure. How is the habit inclined to this act by prudence? We will return to this in the following chapter.

**F. Summary**

Aquinas’s account of reason and will in the *Sentences* gives primacy of place to reason. The sense appetites participate in reason according to exemplar analogical causality in which reason formally possesses that which it communicates to the sense appetites. It is important to point out that such causality also implies efficient causality since an exemplar cause cannot cause anything unless there is an efficient cause that actually causes the effect. The emphasis, however, is nevertheless on the formal nature of exemplarity, which is consistent with his metaphysics of participation as he writes the *Sentences*. The sense appetites receive this exemplar causality and this reception causes mode in the sense appetite. This mode then seems

---

105 *In III Sent.* 33.2.4 [Moos.1068-69]: “Virtus enim, ut dicit Tullius (II De Invent., c. 53), movet in modum naturae, scilicet per quamdam inclinationem affectus. Omnis autem naturae inclinatione praexigit aliquam cognitionem quae et finem praestituit et in finem inclinet et ea quibus ad finem pervenitur provideat : haec enim sine cognitione fieri non possunt. Propter quod etiam a Philosophis dicitur opus naturae esse opus intelligentiae ; alias ea quae natura fiunt, a casu acciderent.”

106 See *In I Sent.* 19.5.2 [Mand.492-93]. There he refers to God as the efficient-exemplar cause (principio effectivo exemplari) of the esse, the truth, and the goodness of all else, see also ibid., ad 2 and ad 3.

107 See Montagnes, *Analogy*, 34-39. We will discuss this further in Chapter 5 and in the Conclusion.

108 The modal nature of the virtues is particularly interesting and it should also be noted that his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Sentences* are also explained in the language of modes. On the gifts see *In III Sent.* 34.1.1 [Moos.1114] and Ibid, ad 5, and see article 2 [Moos.1117-21] and article 3 [Moos.1123]. It seems to me that some thinkers trying to grasp what Aquinas says about the gifts in the second part of the *Summa*, turned to the *Sentences* to find some help, and were mistakenly drawn to explain the latter in the modal language of the former.
to describe the *way* in which the sense appetites operate. The way the virtues act in the sense appetites is by lowering the vehemence of passion, by rendering them docile to reason, and by granting a connatural inclination towards the virtuous act. Let us now turn to the *De veritate* and see how he tinkers with the details.

2. *De veritate* (1256-59)

For our purposes, the salient feature of the disputed questions *De veritate* is Aquinas’s enormous discussion of volition (qq. 21-24 discuss volition in some detail) and his more developed account (one full question, q.26) of the passions, and another on sensuality (q.25). The *De veritate*, however, does not have any questions or articles directly on moral virtue, but it nevertheless has enough material hidden in various places to let us offer a rather complete account of his views. This section will try to mirror the last; hence we will begin with reason and will before moving to the sense appetites and discussing how they may participate in the former.

A. Will and Intellect

The relation between will and reason in the *De veritate* is quite similar to that of the *Sentences*. Aquinas here also divides reason between reason as nature and reason as reason. The former concerns reason’s relation to what it naturally knows; the latter concerns reason insofar as it compares.\(^{109}\) The will, in turn, follows the twofold kinds of judgment.\(^{110}\) The will as nature

---

\(^{109}\) QDV 26.9 [Leon.22/3.781.211-218]: “Alio modo potest intelligi praedicta distinctio, ut dicamus rationem ut naturam intelligi secundum quod ratio comparatur ad ea quae naturaliter cognoscit vel appetit; rationem vero ut rationem, secundum quod per quamdam collationem ordinatur ad aliquid cognoscendum vel appetendum, eo quod rationis est proprium conferre.” Cf. ibid. ad 4 [Leon.22/3.782.306-309]: “ratio ut ratio non nominat aliquam potentiam distinctam a ratione ut natura est, sed nominat quendam modum considerandi ipsam potentiam.”

\(^{110}\) For a discussion including the relevant literature see Angela McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy,” Ph.D. dissertation (University of Notre Dame: Indiana, 2004), 42-51. Aquinas drops this modal language in his later texts.
naturally follows the first kind of cognition, and will as reason follows reason’s indeterminate consideration. The first kind of judgment is absolute or universal and pertains to synderesis, and the second kind of judgment concerns particular actions that pertain to choice.

In general, the apprehended good moves appetite. The intellect directs and rules the will, and it does so by “showing” the will what it should seek. This showing is crucial, for the will cannot will anything without the intellect “showing” it what to will. The simple and absolute judgment provides the end that spurs the remainder of volition. A person, for example, by a simple judgment recognizes that health is good, and thus wills health. From this simple willing of health, a person then wills to deliberate about how to attain health. She then chooses

110 QDV 22.12 [Leon.22/3.645.196-207]: “Cum enim voluntas moveatur in suum objectum sibi propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversimode sibi proponitur. Unde cum ratio proponit sibi aliquid ut absolute bonum, voluntas movetur in illud absolute, et hoc est velle; cum autem proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni ad quod alia ordinatur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud cum quodam ordine, qui inventur in actu voluntatis non secundum proprium naturam sed secundum exigentiam rationis, . . .” See also ibid. lines 177-189. These last lines cited are interesting because Aquinas discusses the will’s natural tending to its own object apart from any discussion of cognition. But the remainder of the passage shows that he means that this natural motion of the will is precisely to follow the intellect’s cognition, that is, the first kind of judgement we have been discussing. For further support of this point see QDV 24.1 ad. 20 [Leon.22/3.684.557-67].

111 QDV 22.5 ad s.c. 5 [Leon 22/3.626.357-63]: “. . . dicendum quod voluntas in quantum est rationalis ad opposita se habet; hoc est enim considerare ipsam secundum hoc quod est ei proprium; sed prout est natura quaedam nihil prohibet eam determinari ad unum.”

112 QDV 16.2 ad 15 [Leon.22/2.507.430-434]: “. . . iudicium est duplex, scilicet in universali, et hoc pertinet ad synderesim, et in particulari operabili et est hoc iudicium electionis, et hoc pertinet ad liberum arbitrium, unde non sequitur quod sint idem.”

113 QDV 22.4 [Leon.22/3.619.96-98]: “Ipsum enim bonum apprehendum est movens appetitum secundum Philosophum in III De anima [c. 15, 433b11].”

114 QDV 32.6 [Leon.22/3.667.59-62]: “Voluntas autem non habet rationem primae regulae, sed est regula regulata; dirigitur enim per rationem et intellectum . . .”

115 QDV 22.11 ad 5 [Leon.22/3.640.226-29]: “. . . intellectus regit voluntatem non quasi inclinans eam in id in quod tendit, sed sicut ostendens ei quo tendere debeat; . . .”
the best way to achieve that end (health) here and now. Thus what is chosen (freely) is for the sake of what is naturally (not-freely) understood to be naturally good.\textsuperscript{116} The intellect by itself is indeterminately related to good and bad, but by the habit of synderesis it is determined as a nature to one, namely, to the good.\textsuperscript{117} It is thus that the intellect provides or "shows" the end to the will.\textsuperscript{118} In the \textit{De veritate}, the intellect moves the will in the line of final causality by “showing” or “presenting” the end, but the will moves the intellect in the line of efficient causality.\textsuperscript{119} Granting this, one immediately wonders how to avoid the

\textsuperscript{116} QDV 23.4 [Leon.22/3.662.159-175]: “Sciendum est igitur quod cuiuslibet voluntatis est duplex volitum: unum quidem principale et aliud quasi secundarium. Principale quidem volitum est in quod voluntas fertur secundum suam naturam, eo quod et ipsa voluntas natura quaedam est et naturalem ordinem ad aliquid habet; hoc autem est quod naturaliter voluntas vult, sicut humana voluntas naturaliter appetit beatitudinem, et respectu huius volitii voluntas necessitatatem habet cum in ipsum tendat per modum naturae; non enim potest homo velle non esse beatus, aut esse miser. Secundaria vero volita sunt quae ad hoc principale volitum ordinatur sicut in finem. Et ad haec duo volita hoc modo se habet voluntas diversimode, sicut intellectus ad principia quae naturaliter novit, et ad conclusiones quas ex eis elicet.” QDV 22.5 [Leon.22/3.624.193-201]: “In appetibilitibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem, cum quae sunt propter finem non appetentur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo id quod voluntas de necessitate vult, quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut esse, cognitio veritatis, et aliqua huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali inclinatione sed propria dispositione absque omni necessitate.”

\textsuperscript{117} QDV 16.3 ad 4 [Leon.22/2.509.132-137]: “potentia rationalis quae de se se habet ad opposita, per habitum quandoque determinatur ad unum, et maxime si sit habitus completus; synderesis autem non nominat potentiam rationalem absolute sed perfectam per habitum certissimum.” On its inclination to the good see QDV 16.1 ad 7 [Leon.22/2.505.316-18]: “... synderesis ex habitu aliquo naturali habet quod semper ad bonum inclinet.” And see QDV 16.1 ad 11 [Leon.22/2.506.357-61].

\textsuperscript{118} QDV 22.12 [Leon.22/3.642.67-79]: “Ratio autem agendi est forma agentis per quam agit; unde oportet quod insit agenti ad hoc quod agat. Non autem inest secundum esse naturae perfectum, quia hoc habito quiescit motus; sed inest agenti per modum intentionis, nam finis est prior in intentione sed posterior in esse, et ideo finis praexsistit in movente propriamente secundum intellectum, cuius est recipere aliquid per modum intentionis et non secundum esse naturae. Unde intellectus movet voluntatem per modum quo finis movetur, in quantum scilicet praeprecipit rationem finis et eam voluntati proponit.”

\textsuperscript{119} See the entirety of QDV 22.12 [Leon.22/2.642.56-117]. For the same view see SCG 1.72 [Leon.manualis.70]: “... intellectus, non secundum modum causae efficientis et moventis, sed secundum modum causae finalis, moveat voluntatem, proponendo sibi suum objectum, quod est finis. Primo igitur moventi convenit maxime habere voluntatem.” SCG 3.26 [Leon.manualis.256]: “... intellectus autem voluntatem per modum quo finis movet, nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis; agens autem est posterior in movendo quam finis, nam agens non movet nisi propter finem.”
problem of circularity, for the will efficiently moves the intellect, which in turn moves the will by presenting to the will what it should efficiently will.\footnote{217}

Aquinas answers that the infinite regress stops “the in natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its own act.”\footnote{218} He could either mean the natural appetite of the will (as he does in later texts) or he could mean the natural inclination of the intellect. As far as I can tell, in the De veritate Aquinas does not specify which he means. I am inclined towards the latter interpretation. Aquinas is quite explicit in the De veritate that every power of the soul is a nature and is inclined to something by a natural appetite.\footnote{219} This means that the intellect has its own natural appetite. Furthermore, he says that the natural habit of synderesis and reason always “incline to the good.”\footnote{220} Since he does say that the apprehended good \textit{moves} the will,\footnote{221} I see no reason why we cannot trace the regress back to the intellect as first in the series of movers.\footnote{222}

\footnote{120}{See QDV 22.12 obj. 2 [Leon.22/3.641.8-18].}
\footnote{121}{QDV 22.12 ad 2 [Leon.22/3.642.127-130]: “Ad secundum dicendum quod non est procedere in infinitum; statur enim in appetitu naturali quo inclinatur intellectus in suum actum.” For the secondary literature related to this see Chapter 5, n.15.}
\footnote{122}{QDV 25.2 ad 8 [Leon.22.3.734.237-244]: “... sed concupiscere appetitu naturali pertinet ad quamlibet potentiam; nam quaelibet potentia animae natura quaedam est et naturaliter in aliquid inclinatur; ...”}
\footnote{123}{QDV 16.1 ad 7 [Leon.22/2.505.312-17]: “... synderesis ex habitu aliquo naturali habet quod semper ad bonum inclinet.”}
\footnote{124}{QDV 22.3 [Leon.22/3.619.96-98] (cited above): “... bonum apprehensum est movens appetitum ...” QDV 22.12 [Leon.22/3.645.196-207] (cited above): “Cum enim voluntas moveatur in suum objectum sibi propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversimode sibi proponitur. Unde cum ratio proponit sibi aliquid ut absolute bonum, voluntas movetur in illud absolute, et hoc est velle; cum autem proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud cum quodam ordine, qui inventitur in actu voluntatis non secundum propriam naturam sed secundum exigentiam rationis, ...”}
\footnote{125}{On God and the will see QDV 22.8 [Leon.22/3.631.67-73], on God and the agent intellect and synderesis see QDV 16.3 [Leon.22/3.510.54-56]. Neither of these texts (nor QDP 3.7, for that matter) speak of God’s moving of the will with respect to intellect or his actualizing the agent intellect with respect to will – neither settles the problem of the infinite regress. I am not firmly committed to this interpretation that I have laid out, but in light of the Sentences, where reason seems to be the first mover, I think these texts can at least be read as consistent with the texts of the Sentences. They are, of course, chronologically closer to them. But I nevertheless grant that they can be interpreted along the lines of the later texts in which God directly moves the will. I am more committed to the change from the Sentences to the later texts than from the De veritate to the later texts.}
Also, it should be pointed out that in the *De veritate* man is free because of cognition and reason. His explanation of freedom is primarily that man *knows* the end and can *consider* what can be ordered to this end, and further, that man can judge or consider his own judgments. In either case, the cause of freedom in the *De veritate* is first and foremost cognition and its indetermination. The distinction between the two kinds of volitions, i.e., between willing the end absolutely and the means to this end is, as in the *Sentences*, entirely dependent on the operation of reason and is accidental to the will itself. The root of all freedom is reason (*totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta*), and as such it should not be too surprising that the first principle of motion is intellect.

Moreover, the end is the cause of causes (*causa causarum*), and it is the final cause that is ultimately the cause of efficient causality and not the other way around. Even if they are...

---

126 QDV 22.4 [Leon.620.22/3.94-98]: “Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in finem, non potest contingere nisi cognoscat finem, et habitudinem finis in ea quae sunt ad finem: quod est tantum rations.” On judging one’s own judgements see QDV 24.1[Leon.22/3.681.286-93].

127 QDV 24.3 [Leon.22/3.685.69-72]: “. . . tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sibi per vim cognitivam proponitur.”

128 QDV 24.6 [Leon.22/3.695.77-83]: “Nec haec differentia qua finis appetitur absolute, id autem quod est ad finem in ordine ad alterum, potest appetitivarum potentiariarum distinctionem inducere; nam ordinatio unius ad alterum inest appetitui non per se, sed per alius scilicet per rationem, cuius est ordinare et conferre; . . .”

129 QDV 24.2 [Leon.22/3.685-86.92-101]: “Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare; de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate possumus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis quae super actum suum reflectitur, et quae cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat et per quas iudicat; unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituata. Unde secundum quod aliud se habet ad rationem sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium.”

130 QDV 28.7 [Leon.22/3.840.150-160]: “Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid altero esse prius et posterius secundum diversum genus causae. Sed tamen illud simpliciter est prius dicendum ordine naturae quod est prius secundum genus illius causae quae est prior in ratione causalitatis; sicut finis, qui dicitur causa causarum quia a causa finali omnes aliae causae recipiunt quod sint causae; quia efficiens non agit nisi propter finem, et ex actione efficientis forma perficit materiam, et materia sustinet formam.”
mutually reinforcing causes, which they undoubtedly are,\textsuperscript{131} one is primary. Efficient causality without final causality would be utterly unintelligible and arbitrary for there would be no reason why something efficiently caused this rather than that; in other words, it would not be efficient causality. This is why I think it is fair to say that the buck ultimately stops with the intellect, for the intellect is responsible for the end. This is also why it is highly significant that Aquinas later shifts the \textit{causa causarum} from intellect to will.\textsuperscript{132} We will have more to say on this in the next chapter.

\textbf{B. Virtue, Sense, and Sensuality.}

Aquinas’s account of the sense appetites is rather similar to the account in the commentary on \textit{The Sentences}, but the entire discussion is framed, as the title of q. 25 suggests, around sensuality, \textit{De sensualitate}. This is helpful because sensuality names the sense appetites precisely insofar as they do \textit{not} participate in reason; it names these powers according to their natural inclination, which is contrary to reason.\textsuperscript{133} The forces at work are stark: sensuality always

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{131} QDV 24.6 ad 5 [Leon.22/3.696.135-140]: “...voluntas quodam modo movet rationem imperando actum eius, et ratio movet voluntatem proponendo ei objectum suum, quod est finis; et inde est quod utraque potentia potest aliqualiter per aliam informari.”

\textsuperscript{132} I grant that it is possible to interpret the \textit{De veritate} as closer to the \textit{Summa} and the \textit{De malo} than to the \textit{Sentences}, but I have tried to present a case that the \textit{De veritate} is quite similar to the \textit{Sentences}. It seems to me that it should be held as an open question whether or not the \textit{De veritate} essentially contains Aquinas’s mature thinking on volition with only slight terminological differences. See secondary literature in Chapter 5, n. 15.

\textsuperscript{133} QDV 25.5 [Leon.22/3.740.164-17]: “...virtus moralis est in viribus sensualitatis, idest in irascibili et concupiscibili, ut patet per Philosophum in III Ethicorum [c.19 1117b23], ubi dicit quod temperantia et fortitudo sunt irrationabilium partium. Sed quia sensualitas nominat has vires quantum ad inclinationem naturalem sensui, quae est in contrarium rationi, et non secundum quod participant rationem, ideo magis proprie dicitur quod vitium sit in sensualitate et virtus in irascibili et concupiscibili: ...” QDV 25.4 [Leon.22/3.737.82-85] and ibid ad 2 [lines.94-96]: “sensualitas quantum est de se, repugnant rationi; tamen ratio potest eam reprimere, ...”
\end{flushright}
inclines to evil (*ex corruptione fomitis*); synderesis always inclines to good.\textsuperscript{134} The *fomes* or sensuality is part of the inheritance of original sin and moral virtue seeks to repair some of this damage,\textsuperscript{135} even if it can never be fully repaired.\textsuperscript{136}

Article 4 of question 25 asks whether sensuality obeys reason. As the first two objections he cites two of St. Paul’s famous passages: “Not what I will, this I do; but the evil I hate, that I do” and “I see another law in my members fighting against (*repugnantem*) the law of my mind,”\textsuperscript{137} Thus the sense appetites do not obey reason. These objections pit Aristotle against St. Paul.\textsuperscript{138}

The sense appetites, he says, are subject to reason in three ways. The first is from the side of reason itself. For reason can consider something under diverse aspects, for example, as pleasurable or repugnant. In this way reason opposes sensuality by means of imagining things as

\textsuperscript{134} QDV 16.1 ad 7 [Leon.22/2.505.313-317]: “... dicendum quod hoc quod sensualitas inclinat semper ad malum habet ex corruptione fomitis, quae quidem corruptio inest ei per modum cuiusdam habitus: et sic etiam synderesis ex habitu aliquo naturali habet quod semper ad bonum inclinet.”

\textsuperscript{135} See previous two notes, as well as the end of chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{136} QDV 25.7 [Leon.22/3.743.54-60]: “... sensualitas in hac vita curari non potest nisi per miraculum; cuius ratio est quia id quod est naturale non potest permutari nisi a virtute supernaturali. Huiusmodi autem corruptio qua partes animae dicuntur corruptae, sequitur quodammodo inclinationem naturae.”

\textsuperscript{137} QDV 25.4 obj. 1 et 2 [Leon.22/3.736.1-10]: “Quarto quaeritur utrum sensualitas obediat rationi. Et videtur quod non: Rom. VII [19] dicitur “Non enim quod volo hoc facio; sed quod odi malum illud facio”: hoc enim dicitur, ut quaedam glossa exponit, propter motus sensualitatis; ergo sensualitas voluntati et rationi non obedit.” Obj 2: “Praeterea, ibidem dicitur “Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnamentem legi mentis meae” etc.: haec autem lex est concupiscencia; ergo repugnat legi mentis, id est rationi, et ita non obedit ei.”

\textsuperscript{138} His *sed contra* interestingly lists not only Aristotle, but now also includes Damascene and Nemesius as his authorities for the claim that the sense appetites somehow participate in reason and thus that the motion of sensuality is in the power of reason. QDV 25.4 *sed contra* [Leon.22/3.736.30-35]: “Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis participant aliqualiter rationem, quae sunt partes sensualitatis; ergo et motus sensualitatis est in potestate rationis. Hoc idem habetur ex dictis Philosophi in I Ethicorum et ex Gregorio Nysseno.” For a helpful discussion of these historical sources see Vernon Bourke, “Human Tendencies, Will and Freedom,” in *L’homme et son destin, d’après les penseurs du Moyen Age*, [Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1960] 76-79. For a new edition of Nemesius’s text (mistakenly know by Gregory Nyssa by Aquinas) see *De Natura Hominis: Traduction De Burgundio De Pise*, ed. G. Verbeke and J.R. Moncho [Leiden: Brill, 1975]. The text here refered to is in c.16, p. 95, lines 40-67.
pleasurable or painful depending on how it seems to reason. This is what Aristotle meant when he said that reason persuades “to the best” in EN I.13.\textsuperscript{139} Thus we see here the important role of the internal sense power imagination, which stores and puts together sensible images in different combinations. In a few other places Aquinas offers us a helpful example of how this works:

\[
\ldots\text{ that which is understood by the intellect universally, is formed in the imagination particularly, and thus the inferior appetite is moved, as when the understanding of a believer intellectually grasps future punishments and forms phantasms of them by imagining burning fire and gnawing worms and other things of this sort, from which the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite.}\textsuperscript{140}
\]

Thus reason controls the imagination, which in turn can alter the passion. In other words, whenever you are in the throes of some temptation (and grant intellectually the existence of eternal punishment), just imagine gnawing worms and burning fire and perhaps you will be less inclined towards whatever seems so attractive. There is undoubtedly something true about this. It is worth noting that most of what we loosely call “thinking” in fact occurs with phantasms and involves imagination – for the most part the very act of thinking will shape and alter our passions. Reason can oppose sensuality by considering and imagining something from a different

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{139} QDV 25.4. [Ibid. 22/3.737.52-62]: “Subduntur autem appetitivae inferiores, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, rationi tripliciter: primo quidem ex parte ipsius rationis: cum enim eadem res sub diversis conditionibus considerari possit et delectabilis et horribilis reddi, ratio opponit sensualitati mediante imaginatione rem aliquam sub ratione delectabilis vel tristabilis secundum quod ei videtur, et sic sensualitas movetur ad gaudium vel tristitiam; et ideo dici Philosophus in I Ethicorum [1102b15] quod ratio persuadet “ad optima.”}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{140} QDV 26.3 ad. 13 [Leon.22/3.758-59.444-51]: “in quantum id quod intelligitur universaliter per intellectum, formatur in imaginative particulariter, et sic movetur inferior appetitus; sicut cum intellectus credentis accipit intelligibiliter futuras poenas, et earum phantasmata format imaginando ignem urentem et vermem rodentem et alia huiusmodi, ex quo sequitur passio timoris in appetitu sensitivo.” See also QDV 26.6 ad 13 [Leon.22/3.770.366-72].}
perspective. This is one of the ways that our sense appetites are said to participate in reason. Aquinas will not modify his position on this point.

The second way that sensuality obeys reason is from the side of the will. Thomas says that the will moves the lower powers by overflowing (reundat) upon them. He explains that in powers ordered and connected to one another, they are related so that an intense motion in one of them, especially in a superior power overflows to a lower power. When the motion of the will intends towards something chosen, the motion of the sense powers, by way of a kind of overflow, follows suit.\(^\text{141}\)

The third way that sense appetites are subject to reason is from the side of the motive power executing the act. The motive power does not move the members except at the command of reason, no matter what motion may happen to be in the lower powers. Thus reason prevents or represses (reprimit) the sense appetites so that they do not proceed to an exterior act.\(^\text{142}\) In other words here we have a case where it seems that reason and will have not succeeded in altering the passions in the sense appetites—perhaps they are too powerful. Someone experiencing a strong passion for something can simply turn and walk in the other direction, that is, reason can simply (but not easily) command one’s bodily members to do something else. In such a case one simply

\(^{141}\) QDV 25.4 [Leon.22/3.737.62-72]: “Secundo ex parte voluntatis: in viribus enim ordinatis ad invicem et connexis ita se habet quod motus intensus in una earum, et praecipue in superiori, redundat in aliam; unde cum motus voluntatis per electionem intendentur circa aliquid, etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequitur motum voluntatis; unde dicitur in III De anima [2, 434a13] quod appetitus movet appetitum, superior scilicet inferiorem, sicut sphaera sphaeram in corporibus caelestibus.” See also the entirety of QDV 26.3 ad 13 and 26.6 ad 13 partially cited in the previous note.

\(^{142}\) QDV 25.4 [Leon.22/3.737.72-80]: “Tertio ex parte motivae exequentis; sicut enim in exercitu progressi ad bellum pendet ex imperio ducis, ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis, qualscumque motus fiat in inferioribus viribus. Unde ratio irascibilem et concupiscibilem reprimit, ne in actum exterioriorem procedant; . . .” For another use of this reprimere see ibid ad 2.
overrides and bypasses the sense appetites altogether. This seems to be what he means by preventing or repressing one’s passions.\textsuperscript{143} A passion may be powerful, but it does not last long, and not long after moving away, the vehemence of a passion will die down.

In sum, there are three ways that the sense appetites are subject to, or participate in, reason. The last option simply bypasses the sense appetites altogether and thus reason is able to frustrate or repress its passions. But in the first two reason seems to have a direct role in shaping them, either by way of the imagination or by way of an overflow of the will’s intensity.

Here we should perhaps say something about the \textit{De veritate}’s somewhat peculiar account of the passions. A passion involves a bodily alteration. As the soul is united to the body in two ways, as form and as mover, so there are two corresponding ways that the soul can experience this alteration. Either the soul is affected because the body or its organs are directly altered; this is called a corporeal passion (\textit{passio corporalis}) or the soul experiences the passions because the soul as mover of the body causes the alteration itself. These latter are called animate passions (\textit{passio animalis}).\textsuperscript{144} It is interesting that Aquinas does not mention this distinction in

\textsuperscript{143} cf. QDV 25.4 ad 2{[ibid., lines 94-96]}: “. . . sensualitas, quantum est de se, repugnat rationi; tamen ratio potest eam reprimere, . . .”
\textsuperscript{144} QDV 26.2 {[Leon.22/3.752.70-107]}: “. . . quod per se patitur passione propria accepta corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens. Unitur autem corpori dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, in quantum dat esse corpori vivificans ipsum; alio modo ut motor, in quantum per corpus suas operationes exercet. Et utroque modo anima patitur per accidentes, sed diversimode; nam id quod est compositum ex materia et forma, sicut agit ratione formae, ita patitur ratione materiae, et ideo passio incipit a materia, et quodammodo per accidentes pertinet ad formam; sed passio patientis derivatur ab agente, eo quod passio est effectus actionis. Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidentes: uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in anima secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma, et haec est quaedam passio corporalis; sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod incipiat ab anima, in quantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus, et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore et alii huiusmodi, nam huiusmodi peraguntur per apprehensionem et appetitum animae, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio; . . .”
his massive treatment of the passions in the *prima secundae*, although he will once refer to it in his Christology, for much of Christ’s passion can be described as a *passio corporalis*.\(^{145}\)

Be that as it may, since what is moral is voluntary we might be tempted to equate the moral realm with animate passions (since they must come from the soul as agent) and the involuntary realm with corporeal passions (since they happen to the body). But that is too simple. One of the great virtues of the *De veritate* is that Aquinas precisely delineates how passions are and are not moral and voluntary.

In a discussion on the meritorious nature of the passions, in q.26 a.6, he explains three ways that passions are related to the will. The first way is as the object of the will, and in such a case passions are meritorious because they are willed or loved. It is not the passion that causes the merit per se, but the will of that passion.\(^{146}\) It would have been helpful if he had filled this out a bit, but he seems to mean that we can think about a passion and will it. He does not return to this in latter texts.

In the second way, passion is a principle of volition; in the third way, it is the effect of volition.\(^{147}\) A passion can be a principle of volition by exciting or inclining the will, and this can happen either *per se* or *per accidens: per se*, when the passion inclines the will to what is similar to itself, for example, when the passion of concupiscence inclines the will to consent to an

---

See also QDV 26.3 [Leon.22/3.755-56.169-230], QDV 26.9 [Leon.22/3.779-80.94-133] and QDV 26.1 [Leon.22/3.749.312-28].


\(^{146}\) QDV 26.6 [Leon.22/3.769.198-203]: “Habet autem se passio ad voluntatem tripliciter: uno modo ut voluntatis objectum, et sic passiones dicuntur esse meritoriae in quantum sunt volitae vel amatae; id enim quo per se meremur, secundum hoc non erit ipsa passio sed passionis voluntas.” See also ibid lines 224-231. There he notes that passions as the object of the will are meritorious just as gold can be meritorious as an object of the will. For another reference to this see ibid, ad 7 lines 291-297.

\(^{147}\) QDV 26.2 [Leon.22/3.769.224-27].
attractive object; *per accidens*, when the passion inclines the will to what is contrary to itself, for example, when the passion of concupiscence in a chaste person causes the will to resist that passion. ¹⁴⁸

The third way outlining the relation between will and passion is as an effect of the will. This is, as we discussed above, through the *redundantia* of the will. Thomas gives the example of feeling shame. ¹⁴⁹ Fear in the will of moral depravity redounds into the sense appetites. Blushing is the somatic effect of this overflow.

Although passion may be either a principle or an effect of the volition, it is nevertheless first and foremost volition that is meritorious, in particular, free decision. In the following article, a. 7, he explains that passions can be related to the free decision in two ways, as preceding or as consequent. Passions are preceding when they impel the will to choose something; they are consequent to the will as they redound from it, or even insofar as the will “arouses and brings about these passions of its own accord,”¹⁵⁰ that is, according to the first way mentioned above (as an object of the will).¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ QDV 26.2 [Leon.22/3.768.203-214].
¹⁴⁹ QDV 26.2 [Leon.22/3.769.217-224]: “Tertio modo e converso, quando ex voluntate passio excitatur, secundum quod motus superioris appetitus redundat in inferiorem; sicut cum quis per voluntatem detestatur peccati turpitudinem, ex hoc ipso inferior appetitus ad verecundiam afficitur; et sic verecundia dicitur esse vel laudabilis vel meritoria, ratione voluntatis causantis.”
¹⁵⁰ QDV 26.7 [Leon.22/3.773.103-111]: “passiones animae in duplici ordine se possunt habere ad voluntatem: vel ut praece dentes, vel ut consequentes: ut praece dentes quidem, in quantum passiones impellunt voluntatem ad aliquid volendum; ut consequentes vero, prout ex ipsa vehementia voluntatis per quamdam redundantiam commovetur inferior appetitus secundum has passiones, vel etiam in quantum ipsa voluntas has passiones procurat sponte et excitat.”
¹⁵¹ See n. 146 above.
Preceding passions diminish the meritorious nature of human acts because acts are praiseworthy as they are ordered by reason (not by passion) to the good.\textsuperscript{152} Consequent passions, however, do not diminish the meritorious nature of the acts, but rather add to their praiseworthiness, since they have been moderated by the judgment of reason. One cannot help but wonder about the consequent passions of vicious or incontinent agents, but Aquinas here only seems to be thinking of good choices. The more general and important point is that preceding passions are always dangerous because they distort the discretion of reason,\textsuperscript{153} that is, they distort deliberation, which should judge things to be as they are and not on the basis of the impulsion of the sense appetites. Thus sensuality is always naturally opposed to reason, for it distorts reason’s deliberation.

This is why Aquinas insists that one of the roles of moral virtue is to lower the vehemence of preceding passions. Even the virtuous have passions, good and bad ones, foreseen and unforeseen, but they are weak (\textit{debiles}). Moral virtue restrains (\textit{refrenare}) the inferior powers,\textsuperscript{154} by lowering the vehemence of preceding passions. This is why sinners are “followers

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, lines 114-16.
\textsuperscript{153} QDV 26.7 [Leon.22/3.773.112-120]: “Secundum igitur quod sunt praecedentes voluntatem, sic diminuunt de ratione laudabilis, quia laudabilis est actus voluntatis secundum quod est per rationem ordinatus in bonum secundum debitam mensuram et modum. Qui quidem modus et mensura non servatur nisi cum actio ex discretione fit; quae quidem discretio non servatur cum homo ex impetu passionis ad aliquid volendum etiamsi sit bonum, provocatur . . .”
\textsuperscript{154} QDV 26.8 [Leon.22/3.776.146-165]: “. . . in hominibus in statu viae, si sunt peccatores, sunt passiones et respectu boni et respectu mali, quandoque quidem non solum praesivae sed subitae et intensae et frequenter etiam perfectae; unde dicuntur “passionum sectatores” in I Ethicorum. In iustis vero nunquam sunt perfectae, quia ratio in eis nunquam deductitur a passionibus; sunt tamen vehementes in imperfectis, sed in perfectis sunt debiles, inferioribus viribus per habitum virtutum moralium refrenatis; habent tamen passiones non solum praesivae, sed subitas; et non solum respectu boni, sed respectu mali. In beatis vero et in homine in primo statu et in Christo secundum statum infirmitas huiusmodi passiones nunquam sunt subitae: eo quod propter perfectam obiedentiam in eis inferiorum virtut ad superiores nullus motus exurgt in appetitu inferiori nisi secundum dictamen rationis; . . . .” Aquinas explains a few lines later (175-77) that in Eden there was nothing which could be apprehended as
of passion” as Aristotle said (EN I, 3 1095a4), but the just are never led by passions.\textsuperscript{155}

Perhaps the best passage discussing the role of passion, moral virtue, and judgment is hidden away in a discussion on whether free decision in the damned can be immutably fixed in evil, q. 24 a. 10. In the case of humans, he notes, since their natural appetite is for the good, no one sins except because of some species of an apparent good. For example, the fornicator knows in general that fornication is bad, but he nevertheless does it because he deems it to be good for him right now.\textsuperscript{156} Thus one must find some kind of cause for the appearance (\textit{species}) which makes this \textit{particular} action seem to be good and choice worthy.

The first cause is the impetus of passion that cuts off the judgment of reason from judging in particular what it holds in a universal habit. Thus through concupiscence or anger the agent follows the inclination of passion and consents to what the passion inclines towards as if that were a per se good.\textsuperscript{157} But Aquinas insists that a person is not determined by passion to choose this because he has right understanding of the end, and since he is so disposed towards the end, he can resist the impetus of the passion.\textsuperscript{158} In other words, because an agent knows universally or

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{155} See previous note. QDV 25.7 ad 4 [Leon.22/3.744.91-94]: “temperatus, secundum philosophum, non caret omnino concupiscentiis, sed concupiscentiis vehementibus, quales possunt inesse continenti.”

\textsuperscript{156} QDV 24.10 [Leon.22/3.706.232-39]: “Cum autem naturaliter insit cuilibet creaturae appetitus boni, nullus ad peccandum inducitur nisi sub aliqua specie apparentis boni: quamvis enim fornicator in universali sciat fornicationem esse malum, tamen cum in fornicationem consentit, aestimat fornicationem esse sibi bonum ut nunc ad agendum.”

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid. lines, 240-246: “Quorum primum est ipse impetus passionis, puta concupiscentiae vel irae, per quam intercipientur iudicium rationis, ne actu iudicet in particuli quod in universali habitu tenet, sed sequatur passionis inclinationem, ut consentiat in illud in quod passio tendit quasi per se bonum.” That even the fornicator seek a per see good albeit according to sense see QDV 22.1 ad 6 [Leon.22/3.615.286-292].

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. lines, 264-77: “Contra primum igitur horum liberum arbitrium remedium habet quod possit peccatum deserere: ille enim in quo est impetus passionis habet rectam existimationem de fine, qui est quasi}
habitually (by means of synderesis) that fornication is wrong, it is possible to recognize that this particular act is an act of fornication and thus resist the temptation to fornicate. Aquinas wants to emphasize that because we have such universal knowledge, it is at least possible to avoid acting according to passion’s particular thrust.

In another passage he clarifies that passion only moves the will from the side of an object, i.e., as what is presented to the will by the intellect. For the object of the will is an apprehended good, but because actions concern particulars, a good apprehended by universal reason does not move except by means of particular apprehension. And it is in the realm of particular apprehension that the passions wreak havoc. Sometimes a passion is so strong that it completely binds the apprehension of particulars and the will is moved to what the particular apprehension presents and sets aside or simply misses that good which universal reason presents. The passions seem to consume the acts of the inferior powers so that they cannot

principium in operabilibus, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethicorum [1140b16]. Unde sicut homo per veram existimationem quam habet de principio potest a se repellere si quos errores circa conclusiones patitur, ita per hoc quod recte circa finem disponitur, potest a se repellere omnem impetum passionum; unde dicit philosophus in VII Ethicorum [1150b30] quod incontinentis qui propter passionem peccat est poenitus et sanabilis.”

159 QDV 22.9 ad 6 [Leon.22/3.634.184-209]: “. . . illud quod est inferius voluntate, ut corpus vel appetitus sensibilis, non immutat voluntatem quasi directe in voluntatem agendo, sed solum ex parte obiecti. Obiectum enim voluntatis est bonum apprehensum; sed bonum apprehensum a ratione universali non movet nisi mediante apprehensione particulari, ut dicitur in III De anima [434a16], eo quod actus sunt in particularibus. Ex ipsa autem passione appetitus sensitivi, cuius causa potest esse interdum complexio corporis vel quaecumque impressio corporalis ex hoc quod appetitus ille utitur organo, impeditur et interdum totaliter ligatur ipsa particularis apprehensio, ut id quo ratio superior dictat in universali non applicetur actu ad hoc particular. Et sic voluntas in appetendo movetur ad illud bonum quod sibi nuntiat apprehensio particularis, praetermissa illo bono quod nuntiat ratio universalis. Et per hunc modum huiusmodi passiones voluntatem inclinant non tamen de necessitate immanent, quia in potestate voluntatis est huissumodis comprimere, ut usus rationis non impediatur, . . .”

160 QDV 24.1 [Leon.22/3.700.117-127]: “Sed ex aliquo extrinseco ratio deficit, cum propter vires inferiores quae intense moventur in aliquid, intercipitur actus rationis, ut non limpidate et firmamente suum iudicium de bono voluntati proponat; sicut cum aliquis habens rectam existimationem de castitate servanda, per concupiscentiis delectabilis appetit contrarium castitati, propter hoc quod iudicium rationis aliquam partem concupiscencia ligatur, ut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic.”
play the role they ought to play in deliberation. These kinds of acts are crucial to practical reasoning and without them a person cannot make a rational and levelheaded decision. For example, a person undergoing powerful anger is probably incapable of considering mitigating circumstances, which may diminish that anger. A person with moral virtue, however, could do so since the anger would not be vehement.

The second cause of the appearance (species) that makes something appear good is the inclination of a habit. For a habit is a kind of nature for the one possessing it; according to Aristotle custom is a second nature, and according to Cicero virtue consents to reason (consentit rationi) as a nature. The habit of vice inclines as a kind of nature to what is suitable or fitting to itself (sibi conveniens), and thus to the one who has the habit of voluptuousness, the good seems to be that which agrees with that habit (luxuriae convenit) and is as it were connatural to it. That is why Aristotle said “as each person is, so does the end appear to him,” qualis unusquisque est talis et finis videtur et.\(^{161}\)

Free choice is not compelled by a habit because no matter how corrupt any particular power is, there will remain some rectitude in another power by which the person can consider and do what is contrary to the power corrupted by habit. For example, someone whose

\(^{161}\) QDV 24.10 [Leon.22.3.706.246-58]: “Secundum est inclinatio habitus, qui quidem cum sit quasi quaedam natura habentis, ut Philosophus dicit in libro De memoria et reminiscencia [452a27] quod consuetudo est altera natura, et Tullius in Rhetoricis [De inventione, II.53] quod virtus consentit rationi in modum naturae, et pari ratione vitii habitus quasi natura quaedam inclinat in id quod est sibi conveniens, unde fit ut habenti habitum luxuriae bonum videatur illud quod luxuriae convenit, quasi sibi connaturale, et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethicorum [1114a32], quod “qualis unusquisque est talis et finis videtur et.” Cf. QDV 5.1 [Leon.22/1.139.137-147.
concupiscible appetite is corrupted by voluptuousness may be incited by the irascible appetite to doing some arduous good opposed to this soft vice.\textsuperscript{162}

Thus we see that both habit and a passion can make things seem to be otherwise than they are in particular and this obstructs and deflects synderesis which always inclines to the good but in a general and universal way.\textsuperscript{163} We have seen that part of what it means to participate in reason is simply to allow reason to deliberate properly and this requires that there not be any vehement passions. Of course, after one has concluded deliberating, one may increase one’s passions, say to add ease, pleasure, anger, or whatever is appropriate to aid in the action.

The third cause of this appearance (\textit{species}) is a false judgment of reason about some particular thing one might choose. This can happen either from passion or the inclination of habit, i.e., the first two just discussed; or, again, from an ignorance of a universal precept, e.g., that fornication is not a sin.\textsuperscript{164} But it is always possible to avoid this error, says Thomas, since a person grasps this rationally, that is, by way of deliberation (\textit{per viam inquisitionis et...})

\textsuperscript{162} QDV 24.10 [Leon.22/3.706.277-290]: “Similiter etiam et habet remedium contra inclinationem habitus: nullus enim habitus omnes potentias animae corrumpit, et ita cum una potentia est corrupta per habitum, ex hoc quod remanet aliquid rectitudinis in alis potentis homo inducitur ad meditandum et agendum ea quae sunt contraria illi habitui; sicut si aliquid habet concupiscibilem per habitum luxuriae corruptam, ex ipsa irascibili incitatur ad aliquid arduum aggregiendum cuius exercitatio mollitiem luxuriae tollit; sicut dicit philosophus in Praedicamentis [Leonine editors suggest Phys. VII, 6, 248b27], quod pravus ad meliores exercitationes deductus proficiat, ut melior sit.”

\textsuperscript{163} See also QDV 16.3 ad 1 [Leon.22/2.510-11.79-82]: “...ratio errat propter hoc quod absorbetur ab aliqua passione vel deprimitur ab aliquo habitu, ut lumen synderesis non sequatur in eligendo.” And also QDV 16.3 [Leon.22/2.510.65-73]: “...actus synderesis ad contrarium deflectatur, et sic impossibile est in universali iudicium synderesis extinguit; in particulari autem operabili extinguitur quandocumque peccatur in eligendo, vis enim concupiscentiae aut alterius passionis ita rationem absorbet ut in eligendo universale synderesis iudicium ad particularum actum non applicetur.”

\textsuperscript{164} QDV 24.10 [Leon.22/3.706.258-63]: “Tertium vero est falsa aestimatio rationis in particulari eligibili, quae quidem provenit vel ex altero praedictorum, scilicet impetu passionis aut inclinatione habitus, vel iterum ex ignorantia universali, sicut cum quis est in hoc errore quod fornicatio non sit peccatum.”
collationis), and thus it is possible to think contrary thoughts and not sin. In other words, the non-deterministic nature of reason’s deliberation means that we can always consider something from a contrary perspective and thus we are not bound to choose according to a false consideration of reason.

In q. 24, a. 12 Thomas distinguishes between the role of a passion and a habit prior to choice. Both can be prior to choice and both can incite someone towards sin. He makes Aristotle’s point that courage is seen more clearly when a person is fearless and unperturbed by sudden threats than by foreseen threats. The more an action follows from preparation, the less it follows from habit. For when something is known beforehand, someone may choose it without a habit simply by thinking; but things that happen suddenly occur only according to habit. This does not mean, however, that an action that is by habit is altogether without deliberation, since virtue is a habit of choice (habitus electivus), but it means that the person who has the habit already somehow has the determined end of his choice. Thus whenever something happens which is suitable to that end (conveniens illi fini), it is immediately chosen, unless it is impeded by some better and more attentive deliberation.  

---

165 Ibid., p. 707, lines 290-96: “Contra tertium etiam remedium habet quia homo illud quod accipit, quasi rationabiliter accipit, id est per viam inquisitionis et collationis; unde quando ratio in aliquo errat, ex quocumque error ille contingat, potest tolli per contrarias ratiocinationes; et inde est quod homo a peccato potest tolli et desistere.”

166 QDV 24.12 [Leon.22/3.716.335-51]: “Alio modo contingit aliquid in nobis quasi repente ex inclinatione habitus; ut enim dicit Philosophus in III Ethicorum [1117a17] “Fortioris est in repentinis timoribus impavidum et imperturbatum esse quam in praemanifestis.” Ab habitu enim est magis operatio quanto minus est ex praeparatione; praemaniesta enim, id est praecognita, aliquis praeelegit ex ratione et cogitatione etiam sine habitu, sed repentina sunt secundum habitum. Nec hoc est intelligendum quod operatio secundum habitum virtutis possit esse omnino absque deliberatione, cum virtus sit habitus electivus, sed quia habenti habitum iam est in eius electione finis determinatus; unde quandocunque aliquid occurrit conveniens illi fini, statim eligitur, nisi ex aliqua attentiori et maiori deliberatione impediatur.”
This is very interesting because the habit of moral virtue already somehow has the end of choice present in it. Aquinas will clarify this later in the *Summa*, and we will take it up then again. But the passage almost makes it seem that in the case of a sudden threat the courageous man acts by habit apart from deliberation. The problem with such a view, of course, is that it makes the sense appetites essentially rational and not rational by participation. But the sense power’s role in choice and deliberation need not be limited to what the sense powers themselves can do, for habits can transcend their powers.

Along these lines, in q. 24, a. 4 ad 9 he explains that there are two reasons that powers need habits. Either it is because the operation of a power exceeds the power of that potency (*vim potentiae*), or because the operation exceeds the power of the whole nature. The latter kind of operation is supernatural and requires the habit of grace. The former kind of operations are not beyond the power of human nature, but only of a particular power or potency. These perfections, namely the acquired virtues, do not exceed human nature, but they exceed the power of the sense appetites. “Thus it is necessary that that which belongs to the superior power, namely reason, is impressed in them and that the very stamp of reason (*sigillatio rationis*) formally perfects the moral virtues in the lower powers.”

167 QV 24.4 ad 9 [Leon.22/3.691.236-260]: “... duplici ratione aliquia potentia habitu indiget: primo quidem quia operatio quae est per potentiam educenda excedit vim potentiae, quamvis non excedat vim totius naturae humanae; alio modo quia totius naturae vim excedit, et hoc secundo modo habitibus indigent omnes animae potentiae, quibus actus meritorii eliciuntur, sive sint affectivae sive intellectivae, quia in huiusmodi actus non possunt nisi habitus gratiae superaddantur. ... appetitivae inferiores, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, habitibus indigent, unde perficiuntur virtutibus moralibus; quod enim actus eorum moderati sint, non excedit naturam humanam sed excedit vim dictarum potentiarum; unde oportet quod id quod est superioris potentiae, scilicet rationis, eis imprimatur, et ipsa sigillatio rationis in inferioribus viribus formaliter perficit virtutes Morales.”
C. Summary

Note that as in the commentary on the *Sentences* the emphasis in the *De veritate* is on the power of *reason*. But unlike the *Sentences*, there is hardly any discussion of moral virtue as a mode.\(^{168}\) Sensuality names the sense powers as they are naturally, that is, as they do not participate in reason and are contrary to reason. The details of this account add much to the *Sentences*. Here he begins to discuss how the will moves the intellect with his famous exercise/specification distinction. The distinction between antecedent and consequent passions helps us to see how passion is related to merit and morality, and it also enables us to explain with more precision what exactly Aquinas thinks moral virtue does to passion. Vehement antecedent passions are contrary to reason because they obscure deliberation. Moral virtue lowers the vehemence of antecedent passion so that reason informed by prudence may properly do its work. After the judgment of reason has run its course, consequent passions may follow reason’s determination and make the execution prompt, pleasurable, and passionate (whatever passion may be appropriate).\(^{169}\) Moral virtue thus both “orders and represses” passion, as he puts it.\(^{170}\)

\(^{168}\) What little discussion there is in QDV 26.7 resp. et ad 2 [Leon.22/3. 773-4] means rather that that someone without virtue may do some good act, but he does not do it in the way that a virtuous agent does. But then again, he did not say too much about moral virtue in the *De veritate*.

\(^{169}\) See for example, QDV 26.7 [Leon.22/3.774.193-200]: “. . . passio electionem praeventiens impedit actum virtutis, in quantum impedit iudicium rationis quod necessarium est in eligendo; postquam vero puro iudicio rationis iam electio est perfecta, passio sequens plus prodest quam noceat, quia etsi in aliquo turbet iudicium rationis, facit tamen ad promptitudinem executionis.”

\(^{170}\) QDV 25.7 ad 2 [Leon.22/3.744]: “. . . irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt rationi in quantum motus earum vel ordinantur vel comprimuntur per rationem, non tamen ita quod totaliter inclinatio earum tollatur.” The following is a helpful summarizing passage: QDV 14.4 [Leon.22/2.450.128-48]: “Scendium tamen quod non est in intellectu speculativo absolute sed secundum quod subdendum quod participat aliquid rationem. Cum enim ad bonitatem actus alciuius potentiae requiratur quod illa potentia subdatur alciui potentiae superiori sequendo eius imperium, non solum requiritur quod potentia superior tantum sit perfecta ad hoc quod recte imperet vel dirigat, sed etiam inferior ad hoc quod prompte obediat; unde ille qui habet rationem rectam sed concupiscibilem indomitam non habet temperantiae virtutem quia
infestatur passionibus quamvis non deducatur, et sic non facit actum virtutis faciliter et delectabiliter, quod exigitur ad virtutem, sed oportet ad hoc quod temperantia insit quod ipsamet concupiscibilis sit per habitum perfecta ut sine aliqua difficultate voluntati subdatur, et secundum hoc habitus temperantiae dicitur esse in concupiscibili; . . . ”
Chapter V: The Sense Appetites as Participating in Reason (1268-1273)

After having considered Aquinas’s position on our topic in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (1251-56) and the De veritate from (1256-59), we will now consider his thought from the later period, primarily in the second part of the Summa (1268-72), the De malo (1266-72), and De virtutibus in communi (1271-1272).

A. Will and Intellect

As the rational appetite, the will always follows reason. Everything willed is first understood, but it is crucial to appreciate the precise nature of this following. Aquinas explains this by noting that a power can be moved in two ways. It can either be moved on the part of the subject or on the part of the object. On the part of the subject, an agent can exercise the power of sight by opening and closing his eyes, for example. On the part of the object, however, the thing seen specifies or determines the form of the object, e.g., one sees something black or white.\(^1\) It is in this latter way, on the part of the object, that everything willed is first understood.

Reason is the first principle of choice by way of specifying the formal content of the object of the will; however, the will is the first principle not only in the line of efficient causality, but also in the line of final causality.\(^2\) Thus reason and will move each other along different but mutually reinforcing causal lines: reason moves the will by presenting the formal content of volition, but the will simultaneously moves reason in the line of efficient and final causality.

\(^1\) QDM 6 [leon.23.148:308-319]: “Secundo considerandum est quod potentia aliqua dupliciter movetur: uno modo ex parte subiecti, alio modo ex parte objecti. Ex parte subiecti quidem, sicut visus per immutationem dispositionis organi movetur ad clarius vel minus clare videndum; ex parte vero objecti sicut visus nunc videt album, nunc videt nigrum. Et prima quidem immutatio pertinet ad ipsum exercitium actus, ut scilicet agatur vel non agatur aut melius vel debilius agatur; secunda vero immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus, nam actus specificatur per obiectum.” Cf. ST I-II 9.1[St. Paul, 600].

\(^2\) QDM 6 [leon.23.148:326-331]: “Si autem consideremus obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, inveniemus quod obiectum intellectus est primum et precipuum in genere cause formalis, est enim eius obiectum ens et verum; set obiectum voluntatis est primum et precipuum in genere causae finalis, nam eius obiectum est bonum, . . .” Cf. ST I-II 9.3 resp. et ad 3.
In the case of specification (the intellect’s role in specifying the object willed), the object understood that moves the will is the good apprehended as suitable (bonum conveniens apprehensum). If the intellect proposes something to the will, which is good, but not suitable (for that person), then that object will not necessarily move the will. Because deliberation and choice only concern particulars, the good apprehended must also be good and suitable in particular (not only universally good). If, however, the intellect understands something as good and suitable in every possible way that it can consider the object, then the will is necessarily moved in the line of specification, although it is still free in the line of exercise since it may simply not will this good. If, however, the object is not good in every possible way that it can be considered, then the will will not necessarily be moved by it in the order of specification, for one could always consider the object in some less favorable light, which would make it less worthy of choice. As far as I understand this, the only possible particular object of choice that is so good that it cannot be considered bad or deficient in some way is the beatific vision of God himself, and since this is not something we can choose in this life, human choice is always free along the lines of

---

3 QDM 6 [leon.23.149-50:418-449]: “Si autem consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte obiecti determinantis actum voluntatis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum est quod obiectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum. Vnde si aliquod bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in ratione boni, non autem in ratione convenientis, non movebit voluntatem. Cum autem consilia et electiones sint circa particularia, quorum est actus, requiritur quod id quod apprehenditur ut bonum et conveniens, apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in particulari et non in universaliter tantum. Si igitur apprehendatur aliquid ut bonum conveniens secundum omnia particularia que considerari possunt, ex necessitate movebit voluntatem, et propter hoc homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem, que, secundum Boetium est “status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus.” Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad determinationem actus, quia non potest velle oppositum, non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non velle tunc cogitare de beatitudine, quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus et voluntatis particulares sunt. Si autem sit tale bonum quod non inveniatur esse bonum secundum omnia particularia que considerari possunt, non ex necessitate movebit, etiam quantum ad determinationem actus: poterit enim aliquis velle eius oppositum, etiam de eo cogitans, quia forte est bonum vel conveniens secundum aliquod alium particularia consideratum; sicut quod est bonum sanitati non est bonum delectationi, et sic de aliis.” See ST I-II 10.2 [St. Paul, 606].
specification. In simpler terms, the understanding of something that can be chosen never compels choice. Of course, what is presupposed here is that the will can and does efficiently will and move the intellect to consider an object from different perspectives.4

This brings us to the will’s role in efficient and final causality. Aquinas argues that because the end pertains to the will, it moves all other things that are for the sake of the end; in this way the will moves itself and all of the other powers.5 For example, the will moves the intellect to think.6 Concerned to show that the motion of the will does not violate the act/potency axiom (that everything which is moved is moved by another), Aquinas explains that when it is said that the will moves itself, this does not mean that the will is in potency and act (at the same time and in the same respect).7 He offers a concrete example. From the desire for health, the will begins to deliberate about how best to attain health. When the person has concluded that he ought to take medicine, he then wills to take medicine. The problem of the infinite regress arises at the level of deliberation. If the will wills the intellect to deliberate, does the will to deliberate require a prior deliberation of the intellect? In other words, if one must deliberate in order to will

4 QDM 6, see the texts in the following and in the previous note, and Ibid. ad 15 [p.152, lines 604-19]: “... illa causa que facit voluntatem aliquid velle [i.e., the object from reason], non oportet quod ex necessitate hoc faciat, quia potest per ipsam voluntatem impedimentum praestari, vel movendo tale considerationem que inducit eum ad volendum, vel considerando oppositum, scilicet quod hoc quod proponitur ut bonum secundum aliquid non est bonum.” Cf. ST I-II 9.1 [St. Paul, 600].
5 QDM 6 [Leon.23.343-52]: “Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex volunate. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem, sicut militaris movet frenorum factricem ad operandum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet se ipsum et omnes alias potencias.” Cf. ST I-II 9.1 [St. Paul, 600].
6 See the previous note.
7 QDM 6 [Leon.23.149:360-365]: “Quantum ergo ad exercitium actus, primo quidem manifestum est quod voluntas movetur a seipsa: sicut enim movet alias potentias, ita et se ipsam movet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod voluntas secundum idem sit in potentia et in actu.” Cf. ST I-II 9.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 602].
to deliberate, we are trapped in an infinite series where the will moves the intellect which in
turn moves the will, *ad infinitum*.  

Aquinas’s solution to this problem is that in the line of exercise or efficient causality the will is first moved efficiently by an exterior (i.e., not the intellect) impulse or instinct (*instinctus*) from God. Thus God moves the will by an instinct, which is the same as saying that the will is naturally moved to will health – that is the first moment of volition along the lines of exercise and finality. This reduction of the will from potency to act or whether or not the will actually wills is reduced to God and nature, as we discussed in chapter 2 section 3. This first motion of the will, which is natural and caused by God, is not present in his earlier texts. His first explicit statement of God’s role here is in SCG 3 (1263-65). The subject/object distinction in the...
Sentences is different: in that text the question of how the subject moves is strictly a question of materiality or immateriality – efficient and final causality are not brought up.

If granting efficient causality to the will is a development on Thomas’s part, what is also new is that he places final causality on the side of the will rather than the intellect, which he had done in the De veritate. One might ask whether there is any real difference between granting the will causal efficacy in the realm of final causality and granting reason causal efficacy in the line of formal causality. Is it not the intellect, which understands health to be good (in the light of its naturally known first principles of practical reasoning), that in fact “presents” or gives the final cause to the will? Is it not precisely the exact same “form” or idea that reason grasps as...
good that becomes the end of the will? This is clearly the teaching of the De veritate. But how are these latter texts different?\textsuperscript{15}

The object of the will is the good apprehended as suitable, that is, as it is apprehended by reason as suitable or good.\textsuperscript{16} Such apprehensive causality, we might say, provides the formal content of volition, but neither the efficient nor the final causality for it. Although the will is a moved mover, moved by the understood object, Aquinas nevertheless insists that the will is an active rather than a passive power.\textsuperscript{17}

For Aquinas, there is no such thing as efficient causality without final causality, for without a final cause there is no way to explain why this rather than that was efficiently caused, that is, without an intention or a final cause, efficient causality would be entirely arbitrary or per


\textsuperscript{16} See for example ST I.82.2 ad 1 [St. Paul, 393]; ST I-II 8.1 [St. Paul, 598] and ST I-II 9.1–2[600-601]; QDM 6 [Leon.23.149.418-21]; etc.

\textsuperscript{17} The will is an active principle; ST I-II 10.4 [St. Paul, 607]; QDM 6 [Leon.23.148.272-74]. It was very important for Aquinas to distance himself from the position that the will was simply a moved mover (QDM 6 arg.7), as it appears to be in Aristotle’s de anima. For then sin is simply an intellectual mistake. Most recently he has been accused of holding this by Thomas Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 199-200. Of course, he was accused of this a few years after his death as well. See Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” The Modern Schoolman 72(1995): 255-61; Kent, Virtues of the Will, 110-129. The will is a moved mover along two different lines. On the one had the will is moved by the object apprehended as good and on the other hand the will is moved directly by God/nature as the unmoved mover. These two kinds of passivity are not the same, since reason’s apprehension of health as good does not always move us to will to deliberate.
accidens. Thus if God is truly the first efficient cause of a volition then He must also provide the final cause.

I would like to make the simple and related point that not all of the will’s volitions are free, but some are natural. Let us consider why he calls them natural. The general rule is quite simple: natural motion is per se, that is, it is not by chance but by some intention, and thus it is intelligible since it comes from some intellect. If an agent’s own intellect cannot account for the intelligibility of the motion, it must come from another intellect. For Aquinas, the fact that natural things lacking cognition act for the sake of an end (always or for the most part) implies that they do not act by chance but by some intention or intelligence. This intentionality or natural inclination comes from the first cause of that nature, namely, God, who efficiently impresses this order or inclination upon it (in the manner of a natural appetite that follows such a

---

18 ST I-II 1.2 [St. Paul, 557]: “Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam, nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente: nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis aget hoc quam illud: ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquod certum, quod habet rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.” Cf. SCG III.2 [Leon. manualis.228]: “Item. Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. Quod autem indifferenteret se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam alium: unde a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus nisi per aliquum determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur esset quod aget. Omne igitur agens tendit ad aliquem determinatum effectum, quod dicitur finis eius.” For a helpful discussion of the need for final causality see also De princ. 3 [Leon.43.41:120-42:41]. Of course, it is presupposed that “… natura est causa agens per se, …” In IX Metaph. 6 [Marietti, n.1833, p.440]. Also see Klubertanz, “St. Thomas’ treatment of the Axiom omne agens agit propter finem” in An Etienne Gilson Tribute ed. C.J. O’ Neill (Milwaukee: 1959), 101-17.

19 This does not mean that there are no created final causes. All final causes qua created are caused by God in some way, but these are directly caused by God in a different way than the others. See QDP 3.7. X [this is new].

20 ST I-II 13.3 [St. Paul, 615] and ibid. ad 1; ST I-II 14.2 [St. Paul, 619].

21 This is Thomas’s fifth way of ST I.2.3 [St. Paul, 14]. There is a more developed version of this argument in De ver. 5.2 [Leon. 22/1.143:120-144:184]. For a discussion of the latter text see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 410-413, and for the former see 480-485. See also SCG II, 63 [Leon. manualis.296] (the fourth argument).
Thus irrational animals can act in rational or prudent ways because God efficiently causes their natures and natural inclinations by which they act for the sake of a final cause. Thus the end for the sake of which they act is caused by God’s intelligence and will, and natural motions are not rational in the sense that they need to be traced back to the created agent’s own reason. Man is free because choice always requires his own cognition, but it does not follow that the entirety of man’s choice or volition must be fully explained by his own cognition. Some of man’s volitions, according to Aquinas, are natural in the sense that they are not causally reducible to his own cognitions.

Because efficient causality without final causality would be arbitrary, volitions that are traced to God as the first efficient cause must have some kind of finality or intentionality that is also ultimately caused by God. In other words, these natural or instinctual volitions carry an intelligible content that has not been provided by the reason of the individual acting person. Thus it seems to me that one could call this first natural motion or efficient cause of the will instinctual rather than intellectual (granting that one is mindful of the dissanalogy). This motion is

---

22 ST I-II 27.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 673]: “... amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra dictum est.” In I Physic. 15 [Marietti, p.68, n.138]: “Sciendum est enim quod omne quod appetit aliquum, vel cognoscit ipsum et se ordinat in illud; vel tendit in ipsum ex ordinatione et directione alicuius cognoscentis, sicut sagitta tendit in determinatum signum ex directione et ordinacione sagittantis. Nihil est igitur alius appetitus naturalis quam ordinatio alicuorum secundum propriam naturam in suum finem.” At times he traces the cause of the natural inclination back to the cause of generation, but if one follows the causal chain backwards up through the heavenly bodies the cause of generation is ultimately reduced back to God. As secondary causes, of course, one can attribute the cause of the inclination to the causa generans. For more texts on God as the cause of natural appetite see ST I, 60.1 ad 3[St. Paul. 283]; I-II 26.1 [St. Paul, 670]; In I Ethic.1[Leon.47.5.165-173]; In I Ethic. 2 [Leon.47.8.44-47].

23 ST I-II 13.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 615].

24 For a discussion of this dissanalogy see n. 12 above. That this movement is caused by an instinctus see I-II, 9.4 [St. Paul, 602]: “Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsam ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret, ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in
analogous to the manner in which animals cannot give a reason for their intentional and intelligible action, but it occurs on a spiritual plane.

It should be no surprise that the intellect understands everything to be good which the will naturally wills as good.\textsuperscript{25} God, of course, is the author of both the will’s nature and is the first cause of its instinctual movements and synderesis, and so it would be unthinkable that there be any contradiction between the two. Furthermore the priority of this natural inclining need not be temporally prior; the priority concerns the kind of causality. Thus there are texts in Thomas which he describes the apprehension of reason as being temporally first,\textsuperscript{26} but this does not preclude that God by a natural priority along the lines of final and efficient causality moves the will towards what was apprehended as good.

Since the \textit{causa causarum} is the final cause, and in particular the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause’s action, to claim that the intellect’s formal causality provides the final causality is to place final causality on the side of intellect, as it was in the \textit{De veritate}.

Moreover, if one says that the intellect provides the final cause and if the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause’s action, then the intellect is ultimately the cause of the efficient cause of the will as well. That is, in the exercise-specification distinction, the intellect’s specification ultimately causes the will’s excercise. But in the later texts Aquinas does not grant

\[\textit{quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae."} \textit{ST I-II 9.5 ad 2 [St. Paul, 603]; ST I-II 17.5 ad 3 [St. Paul, 629]; ST I-II 6.1 ad 2 [St. Paul, 589]. On his use of this in animals see I-II 12.5 and ad 3 [St. Paul, 613]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem, quod est proprie intendentis, sed concupiscientia finem naturali instinctu, moventur ad finem quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur naturaliter.”}

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{I-II 94.2 [St. Paul, 955]: “. . . omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona . . .” For a full length article on this passage see Steven Brock, “Natural Inclination and The Intelligibility of the Good in Thomistic Natural Law,” \textit{Vera Lex} vi, nos. 1–2 (2005): 57–78.}

\textsuperscript{26} For example, \textit{ST I-II 15.1 [St. Paul, 623].}
this, since by squarely placing final causality in the will and by saying that the will is efficiently moved by an external source, he has cut off reason from causing the will’s exercise and from providing the final causality in free decision. Thus the exercise-specification distinction is somewhat different in the *De veritate* than it is in the later texts.

The way I understand this distinction in the later texts is as follows: reason is ultimately responsible for specifying the object willed, i.e., *what* is willed, but the will (not the intellect) is ultimately responsible for the end or *why* it is willed. For example, I choose to take medicine (*what* I will, which I have deliberated about) because I will health (*why* I will it, the end of choice).27 If someone asks why I wish to be healthy, I can answer because I understand health to be good, and this is undoubtedly true; without some knowledge of the end we cannot be said to cause our own actions.28 But there is also something more natural and instinctual about my attraction to health and happiness than simply intellectual understanding. There are many things that we understand to be good, but not all of them start the process of deliberation (in other words, not all understood goods reduce deliberation from potency to act). Moreover, sometimes the same understood good (e.g., health) begins deliberation and sometimes it does not. The answer or cause, according to Aquinas, is not to be found in understanding or reason, but in the

---

27 See ST I-II 9 ad 3 [St. Paul, 604]. Here it is argued that God moves the will universally to the good and through reason man determines himself to will this or that particular good. Ultimately, the question *why* can always be answered because it is good. But the will does not only naturally will the good in general, but also certain less universal goods without which this general good cannot be had e.g., happiness, health, existence, life etc. See ST I-II 10.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 606] and see St I-II 10.1 [St. Paul, 605] and ST I-II 13.6 ad 1 [St. Paul, 617]. These things, e.g., health are still rather universal. No one can simply choose health, we still have to deliberate about how to obtain health. In any case, the end of the will is not the transcendental good which is convertible with all being, rather it is the general good for the person which necessarily includes happiness, wisdom, health, life, etc.

28 ST I-II 6.1 and article 2 [St. Paul, 588-89].
will and, in particular, God’s efficiently moving it by way of *instinctus*. Thus, compared to the *Sentences*, the will has a certain spontaneity or increased causal role *vis–à–vis* the intellect. In the *Sentences* the will’s natural volitions are entirely accidental to the will itself and reducible to reason. In the *Summa* and the *De malo* the will’s natural volitions are grounded in the will’s rootedness in man’s nature and are not simply traceable to reason.

Concerning our topic, Aquinas is quite clear that the sense appetites participate in reason insofar as they obey reason’s command. Aquinas is also quite clear in that even if command is an act of reason, it is nevertheless not fully reducible to reason: “Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded, which is subject to reason. The first act of the will, however, is not from the ordering of reason, but from the instinct of nature or of a superior cause.”

Thus when we say that the sense appetites participate in reason, we must grant that the will has something to contribute to this command that is not simply caused by reason.

A. Consent

Granting the medieval faculty psychology (we have examined Aquinas’s position in Chapters 1 and 2) it was hotly disputed in the high middle ages whether one ought to give primacy of place to reason (the intellectualist position) or to will (the voluntarist position) in

---

29 I-II 9.4 [St. Paul, 602]. In the case in which reason’s deliberation discovers that a naturally willed end cannot be obtained, say one wills health but one discovers that one has a rapidly deteriorating terminal disease, in such a case reason is the cause of one ceasing to will the end, or more precisely, of ceasing to find a means to that end. ST I-II 13.5 St. Paul, 616. But the first cause of willing health was nevertheless God and nature.

30 In ST I-II 10.1 ad 1 [St. Paul, 605] he clearly roots these natural volitions in man’s nature.

31 I-II 17.5 ad 3 [St. Paul, 629]: “... imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in infinitum procedatur.”
accounting for free human actions. Tobias Hoffmann argues for a somewhat voluntaristic (relative to more intellectualistic leaning Thomists) reading of Aquinas based on God’s direct moving of the will; Bonnie Kent, however, also argues for a similar position based on Aquinas’s theory of consent. I think both pieces of evidence are quite strong. Consent is an act of the will. At times in the *Sentences* he almost seems to attribute consent to reason, but at times he attributes it to the will; in the *Sentences*, however, there is nothing of the will’s spontaneity with respect to reason, which is manifest in his later treatment of consent.

In order to begin discussing consent, we should distinguish it from choice. First one wills the end, say health, which is general and universal, and then one deliberates about the best way to attain that health in the concrete particular circumstances. After having considered the best possible way to become healthy here and now, one then chooses to do this particular thing that one has deliberated about. Choice is always about a particular means to some end, but not about the end itself. But before one chooses to do this particular action one consents to it. Consent is thus distinguishable from choice and is causally between deliberation and choice, even if they happen simultaneously. Choice and consent are thus both at the level of particular contingents

---


34 ST I-II 15.1; ad 3 [St. Paul, 622]

35 See *In II Sent.* 24.3.1 and especially ad 5 [Mand. 617-619]; *In II Sent.* 39.1.1 ad 3 [Mand. 986]; *In II Sent.* 2.39.1.2 [Mand. 988-89]; *In III Sent.* 17.1.2 sol. 3 ad 4 [Moos, 540]; *In III Sent.* 17.1.3 sol. 4 [Moos, 545-46]; *In III Sent.* 23.2.2 sol. 1 ad 1 [Moos, 726].

36 ST I-II, 15.3, ad 3[St. Paul, 623]: “... post consensum, adhuc remanet electio.”

37 ST I-II, 15.3 ad 3[St. Paul, 623]: “Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placent ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.”
that can actually be done by us, e.g., how I might, in these particular circumstances, become healthy.

In ST I-II, q. 15 consent is an act of the will. Consent does not concern the willing of the end, but rather the willing of means to the end. It is the “application” of the “appetitive motion” to the determination of what has been deliberated, and it is in man’s power to “apply or not to apply to this or that.” It is the deliberation of reason that determines a means to an end. We may call this means to an end the practical judgment of reason. But in order for a person to actually choose a practical judgment, the will must consent to it. And this consent is not determined by that very deliberation, for when it is uncertain whether or not the practical reason has reasoned correctly from its first principles, it is not the judgment of reason which has the final say, but it is the will which has the final say (finalis sententia) in consent.

---

38 ST I-II, 15.3 [St. Paul, 623].
39 ST I-II, 15.3 [St. Paul, 623]: “... consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliud praexistent in potestate applicantis. In ordine autem agibilium, primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Appetitus autem in ultimum finem tendit naturaliter: unde et applicatio motus appetitivi in finem apprehensum, non habet rationem consensus, sed simplicis voluntatis. De his autem quae sunt post ultimum finem, inquantum sunt ad finem, sub consilio cadunt: et sic potest esse de eis consensus, inquantum motus appetitivus applicatur ad id quod ex consilio iudicatum est. Motus vero appetitivus in finem, non applicatur consilio: sed magis consilium ipsi, quia consilium praesupponit appetitum finis. Sed appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, praesupponit determinationem consili. Et ideo applicatio appetitivi motus ad determinationem consili, proprie est consensus. Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem.”
40 ST I-I 15.2 [St. Paul, 622]: “Unde brutum animal appetit quidem, sed non applicat appetitivum motum ad aliquid. Et propter hoc non proprius dicitur consentire, sed solum rationalis natura, quae habet in potestate sua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non applicare ad hoc vel ad illud.”
41 In De veritate the practical judgement is emphasized, but in the later texts, ST I-II and QDM, deliberation is emphasized. Some hold that this amounts to a significant change in position, but I am not persuaded since what is chosen out of the process of deliberation is precisely a practical judgement of the intellect. See David Gallagher, “Free Choice and Free Judgement in Thomas Aquinas,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76 (1994): 268-269 and n. 57.
42 ST I-II, 15.4 [St. Paul, 623]: “Manifestum est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare: quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas, quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem. Et ideo quandiu incertum est an secundum
Bonnie Kent has rephrased this in a helpful way: “The will cannot specify or determine the judgment, but it can at least veto various means presented by the intellect as suitable to the end.”\textsuperscript{43} I would add that not only does it have this veto power, but consent also has an affirmative role. We might say that the will approves of the practical judgment when it consents to it. This “approval” is not the sole cause of choice, but there is certainly no choice without it. Aquinas explains this “approval” or “veto” by noting that the act of consent involves the will being pleased (\textit{placet}) or not pleased (\textit{non placet}) with the practical judgment of reason.\textsuperscript{44} It involves a certain “taking pleasure for itself in that” (\textit{complacet sibi in ea}).\textsuperscript{45}

Now pleasure involves the presence of a connatural good,\textsuperscript{46} and each thing has a kind of connaturality to what is suitable according to its nature.\textsuperscript{47} Aquinas notes that the fact that something seems suitable and good (\textit{bonum et conveniens}) depends on two things, namely, the

\textit{rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae. Finalis autem sententia de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum pertinet ad rationem superiorem: secundum tamen quod in ratione voluntas includitur, sicut supra dictum est.”}\textsuperscript{43} Kent, \textit{Virtues of the Will}, 120.

\textit{ST I-II, 15.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 623]: “. . . electio addit supra consensus quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeelegitur, et ideo post consensus, adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet \textit{placet}, in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae \textit{placent}, praeaccipimus unum eligendo. Sed si inventiatur unum solum quod \textit{placet}, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod \textit{placet} ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae \textit{non placet}.” Emphasis is mine.}\textsuperscript{44} I-II, 15.1 [St. Paul, 622].

\textit{I-II, 31.1 [St. Paul, 686]: “. . . causa delectionis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni.” This is also applicable to \textit{complacentia}: see ST I-II, 26.4 [St. Paul, 672]: “. . . amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum.” For more on this see also ST I-II 26.1 et 2 [St. Paul, 697-70]; ST I-II 11.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 608]. For Aquinas’s on pleasure see ST I-II qq. 31-34, and for a definition see ST I-II 31.1. For Aquinas, pleasure presupposes the presence of a connatural good and the sensation of this presence. Although Aquinas’s treatment of pleasure in the \textit{prima secundae} is primarily concerned with pleasure as a passion, he is explicit that there is also pleasure in the will, see I-II, 31.4.}\textsuperscript{45} I-II, 26.1 ad 3 [St. Paul, 670]: “. . . unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.”
condition of what is proposed and that to which it is proposed.\textsuperscript{48} This means that the intellect’s proposal of the suitable good (in some particular practical judgment) has to fit, so to speak, the condition, nature, natural appetite, or potency of the will.\textsuperscript{49} If it does, then the will takes delight in it, for likeness causes love and pleasure,\textsuperscript{50} and it consents.\textsuperscript{51} If it does not, then the will vetoes.

Please allow me to offer an experiential explanation of this. After our deliberation has reached its term and has proposed this particular thing which should be done, we are either somehow attracted to this or somehow not. When we are attracted to the conclusion of our deliberation, we have a \textit{reason} for the attraction, namely, the practical judgment itself. This is why choice is rational, for one can always point to the practical judgment that has been chosen. But when we are not attracted to the practical judgment, we have no such reason to point to.\textsuperscript{52} Rather we have a sense (we are displeased with it) that something is not quite right, and rather than choose that practical judgment we will to reconsider in the hope of coming up with a better

\textsuperscript{48} I-II 9.2 [St. Paul, 601]: “Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.”

\textsuperscript{49} See for example I-II 6.7 ad 1 [St. Paul, 593]: “Malum autem secundum se contrariatur voluntati, sed bonum est voluntati consonum.” See also ST I-II 6.4 obj. 2 et ad 2 [St. Paul, 590-591].

\textsuperscript{50} I-II 27.3 [St. Paul 673-4] and I-II 32.7 [St. Paul 695-96].

\textsuperscript{51} This does not mean that the person chooses what the will consents too, since one can consent to multiple practical judgements simultaneously. See ST I-II 15.3 ad 3.

\textsuperscript{52} This cannot be traced to another better reason, since this would already be included in the practical judgement. That is, if there were some other known (or habitually known) reason, then the intellect would not present that particular practical judgement as something to will – the person would still be deliberating towards the best practical judgement that he can. See also Hoffmann, \textit{Angelis Sin}, 149: “The passage from inactivity to activity of the will requires an antecedent cause, a reason that makes the will want to start to consider a certain object. Yet when the object is already habitually present in one’s intellect, the focus on one rather than another characteristic of the object does not seem to require an antecedent cause in addition to the object that receives special attention. Indeed Thomas nowhere posits a chain of motives to consider a specific aspect of an object. The efficacy of a specific motive is in fact not to be traced to ever more specific reasons, but rather to the inclination of the will to the ultimate end.” See also up to p. 151.
plan of action. We reject the proposal and go back to the drawing board, so to speak. When we do not consent, we will to redeliberate; when we consent, we will to follow whatever reason has determined, and then we choose it. The rejection of a practical judgment is not a choice, so it need not be rational in the same way that choices are, but the will to reconsider nevertheless forces us to ask how a non-rational power (as will is distinct from reason) can “veto” or “approve” a practical judgment of reason. Does this not compel us to paradoxically make the will the ultimate judging power?

In a way yes, and in a way no. It does not because free human actions are always chosen, and choice always follows the practical judgment of reason which judges that something is suitable and good. But if the will is understood to be an entirely blank slate that only follows the dictates of reason, and if reason, which sometimes makes mistakes, is determined by the way things appear, then human choices are determined by the appearances of things, just as sense appetite is determined by sense cognition. This kind of intellectual determinism would destroy moral responsibility and true freedom. What is required, as has been persuasively argued by David Gallagher and Tobias Hoffmann, is that humans have control over the way things appear, and this control must be reduced to the will as its cause; as Hoffmann rightly points out this makes human freedom somewhat irrational. But what is also added by consent is that the will

---

53 Gallagher, “Free Choice,” 247–77, esp. p.277. ST I-II, 74.1 arg 2 and ad 2 [St. Paul 870]: This objection notes that the will wills the good or the apparent good. There is no sin in willing the good, but nor is there in willing the apparent good, since the defect is in the apprehensive powers not in the will. In other words, we are not responsible for how things appear to us. In his response he simply notes that the defect of the apprehensive power is subject to the will, i.e., the will has control over how things appear to it – and this is why we are responsible when we choose something which seems good to us even when it is not. Hoffmann rightly notes that the advantage of delegating this role to the will is that it safeguards human freedom from intellectual determinism; the disadvantage is that it renders choice somewhat irrational. Hoffmann, Angelic Sin, 152-53: “In short: Aquinas’s account of free
seems to have some sense of when practical reasoning derails, for in the case of a faulty practical judgment it is somehow the responsibility of the will not to consent to a bad idea. Again, the will cannot come up with a practical judgment or a reason for the rejection itself, but it somehow affectively “judges” or discriminates between practical judgments by way or being “pleased” or “displeased” with whatever reason has determined.54

My goal here is simply to point out that in Aquinas’s later texts the will looms larger – it is more muscular and spontaneous. Unlike the earlier texts, Aquinas is quite clear that command includes not only the intelligible content provided by reason but also that which comes from God’s natural moving of the will as the First Cause; in other words, the will does not simply follow the intelligible content of reason. God and nature provide some of it. It is important to point out that this does not destroy human freedom, for as Thomas says, God moves created agents in accord with their nature, and hence moves free agents to act freely.55 Beyond God’s moving of the will directly, consent, which is also not fully reducible to reason is involved in decision is not determinist. This is at the same time a fortunate and a troubling result. If the good or evil choice of the angels had not depended on them, it would be hard to see how they could have earned eternal satisfaction or eternal frustration from something that did not lie in their power to do or to avoid. On the other hand, the contingent aspect of their choice poses a challenge with regard to its rationality. Angelic choice, and acts of free decision in general, seem to be rational up to a point, but not intelligible through and through. . . Even if Thomas is free from the charge of intellectual determinism, matters are far from being solved. Contingent choices can be described, but not fully explained. At most it is possible to say post eventum that one person acted for this reason and another for that reason. Any attempt to give an a priori account of an individual act of free decision is destined to fail. Hence the decision of the good angels cannot be fully illuminated any more than the evil decision of the demons: even with regard to the good angels it cannot be said in the last analysis why they acted for an adequate reason; only in retrospect can it be said that they did so. To say that it is because of their will that good or bad angels decided the way they did surely means to indicate a cause, but not a reason why some chose in one way and others in a different way. The fact that natural inclination decreases the probability of sinning does not help to explain the individual choice. In the last analysis, the dilemma to reconcile the non-deterministic and the rational character of free decision remains unsolved.”

54 Although I do not have space to pursue this here, it seems to me that the will’s affective natural inclination has its own intelligible content (since it naturally inclines to something) that somehow “discriminates” by way of likeness or unlikeness in this non discursive manner.

55 QDM 6 [Leon.23.149.407-418]. See also SCG III.70.
reason’s command of the lower powers, for there is no choice without consent and there is no command without choice.⁵⁶ Thus when the sense appetites are said to participate in reason insofar as they obey reason’s command in the later texts, the formal exemplar causality of the Sentences in which reason communicates its form to the sense appetites will not sit quite as easily.

2. Participation in Reason

In the later texts, the use of the phrase “to participate in reason” within the tripartite division of the soul is quite similar to the earlier texts.⁵⁷ Most generally all appetite is said to obey reason and to participate in reason.⁵⁸ There are four subjects of the cardinal virtues, namely, what is essentially rational, which prudence perfects, and what is rational by participation, which is divided into three: 1) the will, which is the subject of justice, 2) the concupiscible appetite, which is the subject of temperance, and 3) the irascible appetite, which is the subject of courage.⁵⁹ Thus the three powers of the soul that can participate in reason are the will and the irascible and sensitive appetites.

⁵⁶ ST I-II, 17.3 ad 1.
⁵⁷ See chapter 4, nn, 3-8. Perhaps the most unusual use is in ST I-II, 17.6 ad 2 in which he speaks of reason as participating in itself, as its cognition of conclusions participates in its cognition of principles because of the diversity of its objects [St. Paul, 630].
⁵⁸ ST I-II 56.6 ad 2 [St. Paul, 782]: “. . . rationale per participationem non solum est irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed omnino, id est universaliter, appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic (1102b30). Sub appetitivo autem comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate, erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.” See also ST II-II, 58.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 1334]: “rationale per participationem non solum est irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sed omnino appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic., quia omnis appetitus obedit rationi. Sub appetitivo autem comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo voluntas potest esse subiectum virtutis moralis.”
⁵⁹ ST I-II, 61.2 [St. Paul, 802]: “Quadruplex enim invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur; scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.” See also I-II, 59.4 ad 2 [St. Paul, 796].
When he speaks of moral virtue generally, including justice, courage, and temperance, he sometimes emphasizes that appetitive powers participate in the apprehensive power of reason itself. But when he is discussing the sense appetites in particular, will is generally included in reason. In one passage he notes that sense appetite can have virtue and vice “insofar as they participate in will and reason.” In another passage he explains that the passions can be moral “insofar as they participate in something of the voluntary and of the judgment of reason.” We have seen passages like this in the Sentences.

Although his use of the phrase *participare rationem* is quite stable when compared to earlier texts, his explanation of the kind of causality evolves somewhat. As we saw in the Sentences, he argued that the sense appetites participate in reason by way of exemplar causality, but his description of it in ST I-II 60.1 is somewhat different:

Moral virtues are certain habits of the appetitive part. Habits, however, differ in species according to specific differences of objects, as was said above. The

---

60 ST I-II 66.1 [St. Paul, 821]: “... causa et radix humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem, praeferetur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem.”; I-II 63.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 811]: “... naturalis rectitudo rationis est nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem.” See also ST I-II 58.2 [St. Paul, 790], and In II Ethic. 1 [Leon.47.77.98-114]. See also the previous note.

61 ST III 18.2 [St. Paul, 1964]: “Sciemus autem quod sensuality, sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedire rationi, dicitur rationale per participationem, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Et quia voluntas est in ratione, ut dictum est, pari ratione potest dici quod sensuality sit voluntas per participationem.” As far as I can tell he only calls sensuality will by participation in his Christology; see also ST III, 18.5 [St. Paul, 1966]. For the point that will is in reason (not as inhering) also see ST III 18.2 ad 1 [St. Paul, 1964]: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de voluntate essentialiter dicta, quae non est nisi in parte intellectiva. Sed voluntas participative dicta potest esse in parte sensitiva, inquantum obedit rationi” and ibid. ad 3.

62 ST I-II. 74.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 871]: “... bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem sicut per se obiecta ipsius; sed alias potentiae habent aliquod determinatum bonum et malum, ratione cuius potest in eis esse et virtus et vitium et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et ratione.”

63 ST I-II, 24.4 [St. Paul, 665]: “... secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis.”

64 See chapter 4, n. 12.

65 See chapter 4, section D.
species, however, of the appetible object, as of anything, is taken according to the specific form, which is from the agent. But it must be considered that the matter of a recipient is related to an agent in two ways. For sometimes the patient receives the form of the agent according to the same intelligible content (*rationem*) as it is in the agent, as is in all univocal agents. And so it is necessary that if the agent is one in species, the matter receives the form of one species, as from fire there is generated univocally only something existing in the species of fire. But sometimes matter receives form from an agent not according to the same intelligible content as is in the agent, as is obvious in non-univocal generating agents, as an animal is generated by the sun. And then the forms received in matter from the same agent are not of one species, but they are diversified according to a diverse proportion of matter to receiving the influx of the agent, as we see that from one action of the sun, through putrefaction, animals of diverse species are generated, according to a diverse proportion of matter. It is manifest, however, that in moral things reason is involved as commanding and as moving; but the appetitive power is as commanded and moved. Appetite, however, does not receive the impression of reason, as if, univocally, since it does not come to be rational essentially (*per essentiam*) but by participation (*per participationem*), as is said in I *Ethic*. Whence appetible things are constituted according to the motion of reason in diverse species, insofar as they are related to reason in diverse ways. And so it follows that moral virtues are diverse in species, and not only one.

As in the Commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas explains that the sense appetites’ participation in reason must be understood in the context of univocal, analogical, and equivocal likeness. He explicitly here rejects univocal predication of reason to the sense appetites, and also

---

66 ST I-II 60.1[St. Paul, 797]: “... virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente; sicut est in omnibus agentibus univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod materia recipiat formam unius speciei: sicut ab igne non generatur univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis.— Aliquando vero materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente: sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei, sed diversificantur secundum diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis: sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum, secundum diversam proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce: quia non fit ratione per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I *Ethic*. Unde appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituantur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum.”
by implication equivocal predication. The intelligible content of reason as it is predicated of
the sense appetites is neither identical (univocal) to reason itself, but nor is it so foreign that it
shares no intelligible likeness (equivocal) as canis can signify dog or a constellation. There is
enough likeness, enough to merit predication by participation. The only alternative left is
analogical likeness. Although he does not explicitly mention it here, he does so in I-II 61.1 ad 1:

When a univocal genus is divided in its own species, then the parts of the division
are equally related according to the intelligible content of the genus; . . . But when
there is a division of something analogous, which is predicated of many according
to the prior and posterior (secundum prius et posterius), then nothing prohibits
one from being more principal than another, even according to a common
meaning (rationem), as a substance is more principally said to be a being than an
accident. And such is the division of the virtues into the diverse genera of virtues,
that the good of reason is not found in all virtues according to the same order. 67

Although this statement concerns the division of the virtues, Thomas clearly holds that
the ground for this division, which is an analogical predication of reason, is the rectitude of
appetite (rectitudinem appetitus) (I-II 61.1), or the manner in which appetite receives the
impression of reason (appetitus recipit impressionem rationis) (I-II 60.1). 68 In other words, the
predication of reason of the sense appetites is analogical, and conversely, the participation of
reason by the sense appetites is analogical.

The emphasis here is not on exemplar causality, as it was in the commentary on the
Sentences, but rather on agent or efficient causality. In ST I-II 60.1 he explains that the agent

67 I-II 61.1 ad 1[St. Paul, 802]: “. . . quando genus univocum dividi tur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis
ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei, una species sit principalior et perfectior
alia, sicut homo alis animalibus. Sed quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et
posterius; tunc nihil prohibit unum esse principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem; sicut substantia
principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum
rationis non secundum eundem ordinem inventur in omnibus.”

68 Text in n. 58.
cause (*agens*) is reason as commanding and moving and the receiving or patient cause is appetite as commanded and moved (*ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota*). It is the “motion of reason” which causes the participation by appetite in reason, and reason, as we discussed, only commands or moves by way of will. This is why the very meaning (*ratio*) of habits includes an order to the will,⁶⁹ that is, these participations are essentially related to the command of reason, which necessarily also includes the will.

Although he does not bring up the so-called transcendentals as he did in the commentary on the *Sentences*, the example of generation and the sun is enough to conclude that he means equivocal efficient causality, the basis for the third kind of participation outlined in *In De ebdomadibus* c.2.⁷⁰ Concerning these three kinds of participation, this one cannot be the first kind, logical participation, since he clearly points to a cause (reason’s command) and its distinct participated effect in the sense appetites (moral virtue). Nor can it be either of the second kinds of participation, since cause and effect do not enter into hylomorphic composition of matter and form and nor do they enter into accidental composition as substance and accident. Rather we clearly have a relation between an agent or efficient analogical cause and its effect, as the sun causes quite diverse effects which are consequently analogically like their cause, the sun.

Unlike the commentary on the *Sentences*, however, Aquinas here no longer uses the language of exemplarity, but rather speaks of the agent cause. The danger with exemplarity, as Fabro and Montagnes have pointed out, is that it tends towards univocity; this is connected with

---

⁶⁹ ST I-II 50.5 [St. Paul, 760]: “Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus appareat quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.” See also ST I-II 56.3 [St. Paul, 779]: “Subiectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate.”

⁷⁰ See text in Chapter 3, n. 159.
a particular thorny set of problems at the level of the analogy of being and predication of the divine names. But what difference does it make in this psychological context? Perhaps, he is simply using it here because he had worked it out in his more important metaphysics.

But I also think the shift aligns quite well with the shift in his understanding of volition, which I have outlined above. In the case of a more intellectualist account of volition, the will directly communicates reason’s formal content to the sense appetite; hence the emphasis is on form and exemplarity. But the emphasis of the later texts is on command, a kind of efficient causality, which emphasizes the communication of both reason and will’s simultaneous act to the sense appetite. Reason and will move and the sense appetites are moved. Here the great role of virtue seems to be *obedience* to the command or motion of reason.

On the other hand, we should not exaggerate this difference. Exemplar causality in the *Sentences* also implies efficient causality. Moreover, equivocal efficient causality necessarily

---

71 Montagnes describes the general problem this way: “There [in the *Sentences*] Thomas accepts the same formalist conception according to which the principal relation of being to God is that of immitation, but he grasps the danger that it presents: more or less to confuse the creature with the creator and to succumb to the univocity to which our conceptual process inclines us. There is only one means to eliminate this danger: to accentuate the distance, to deny all direct likeness, to refuse every sort of determinate relation. At what price, then, does one safeguard the divine transcendence? By radically separating beings from God, by accentuating the distance to the point of rupture, by running the risk of equivocity and agnosticism. Neither theologically nor philosophically is this a satisfactory solution: it annihilates our knowledge of God; it eliminates the unity of being. The cause of this is the underlying metaphysics which inspires this solution. To escape the impasse, one had to conceive being no longer as form but as act, and causality no longer as the likeness of the copy to the model but as the dependence of one being on another being which produces it. Now this is exactly what efficient causality implies: exercised by a being in act, it makes a new being exist in act, which being is not confounded with the first, since the effect and the cause each exist on its own account, but which communicates with it in the act, since the act of the agent becomes that of the patient. Thus it is by a veritable commnication of being that God produces creatures and creative causality establishes between beings and God the indispensable bond of participation so that there might be an analogy of relation between them.” Montagnes, *Analogy*, 78. Cf. Fabro, *Participation et Causalite*, 525, cited in Montagnes, *Analogy*, 43.

72 *In I Sent.*, 38.1.1 [Mand.899]. Furthermore, Aquinas does speak of the exemplar causality of the divine nature in later texts. ST I 47.1 ad 2; Cf. QDP 3.4. ad 9: Quodlibet IV, q. 1.
also involves communication of formal content, otherwise there would be no analogical likeness between cause and effect. Montagnes suggests that this formal communication arises out of Aquinas’ axiom that “every agent produces something like itself,” which in turn is grounded in the more fundamental axiom that “every agent acts insofar as it is in act.” Montagnes describes the shift in Aquinas’s thought this way:

In short, the primacy of act and the priority of efficient causality go hand in hand. Exemplarity does not disappear; it is subordinated to efficiency. In sum, participation is presented as the communication of act to a subject in potency. The act is communicated by a productive causality that assimilates the effect to the agent.

In summary, in the works of Thomas two different orientations can be found as emphasis is accorded to exemplarity or to efficiency. They are characterized by the greater or lesser importance that they accord to the two aspects of causality, but they are not mutually exclusive and it would be inaccurate to claim that Thomas had first chosen exemplarity and rejected efficiency and then taken up efficiency and abandoned exemplarity. Nevertheless, though he never separated

---

73 Montagnes cites the following texts which I have highlighted, but I have included more of them because both of them connect this causality to equivocal and efficient causality using the example of the sun, which is used in the passage we are examining above. Here are the passages: QDP 7.5 [Marietti, 198]: “Cum omne agens agat in quantum actu est, et per consequens agat aliqualiter simile, oportet formam facti aliquo modo esse in agente: diversimode tamen: quia quando effectus adaequat virtutem agentis, oportet quod secundum eamdem rationem sit illa forma in faciente et in facto; tunc enim faciens et factum coincidunt in idem specie, quod contingit in omnibus univocis: homo enim generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Quando vero effectus non adaequat virtutem agentis, forma non est secundum eamdem rationem in agente et facto, sed in agente eminentiis; secundum enim quod est in agente habet agens virtutem ad producendum effectum. Unde si tota virtus agentis non exprimitur in facto, relinquitur quod modus quo forma est in agente excedit modum quo est in facto. Et hoc videmus in omnibus agentibus aequivocis, sicut cum sol generat ignem.” SCG 1.29 [Leon.manus.31]: “Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eius in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa exceedente inventur quidem alicuius, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoce dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde oportet quod calor a sole generatus alicuius similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istic inferioribus causatur; ratione cuius sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis alicuius dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole inventur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul.”

74 Montagnes, Analogy, 40.
the two causalities, one has to recognize that he first puts the notion of form in the foreground and that later the notion of act becomes fundamental.\textsuperscript{75}

The shift in emphasis between the early and late texts on our subject also tracks this shift from formal to efficient causality. The emphasis on exemplarity is more congruent with his earlier intellectualistic account of volition, and his latter more muscular account of volition is congruent with an emphasis on an efficient causality, but which nevertheless also communicates some formal content. The later formulation of agent causality is much more suited to including will and intellect together in one cause, especially if it be granted that the power of reason is not the sole cause of command. The formal language of exemplarity leans too heavily towards the power of reason, but it is quite suited to his position in the \textit{Sentences}. For if our free choices and commands are fully caused by reason, then it makes sense that the effects of reason’s command would emphasize formality. But if our free choices and commands are only partly caused by our reason, and the will is granted some spontaneity apart from reason, then the switch to communication of the act of reason and will together along the lines of efficient causality makes more sense.

Aquinas’s account of participation of the sense appetites in reason thus develops and tracks the changes in his account of participation in \textit{esse}, at least if we consider the \textit{Sentences} and the \textit{Summa}.\textsuperscript{76} But rather than speak of it in this somewhat abstract manner, let us turn and consider the details of how exactly it works.

\textsuperscript{75} Montagnes, \textit{Analogy}, 43. Slightly emmended.

\textsuperscript{76} For more details on Aquinas’s metaphysical shift see Montagnes, \textit{Analogy}, chapters 1 and 2. Concerning moral virtue, there is no need to account for something like \textit{De veritate} 2.11, i.e., the disputes about the analogy of proportion and the analogy of proportionality. The development in Aquinas thinking on participation of the sense
Aquinas tells us that the sense appetites participate in reason insofar as they obey reason’s command.\textsuperscript{77} Sometimes he speaks quite generally and simply says that the sense appetites participate in reason insofar as they are \textit{obedient} to reason,\textsuperscript{78} but this is obedience to the command of reason: “reason is as commanding and moving, the sense appetites are commanded and moved.”\textsuperscript{79}

Thus let us consider command which, it is worth pointing out, is utterly absent from Aristotle. Most broadly Aquinas distinguishes between acts, which are immediately elicited by the will, and acts by which the will commands other powers to their acts.\textsuperscript{80} We are primarily concerned with the latter. Elicited acts, however, are acts of the will that are not necessarily appetites in reason is a much simpler story to tell than that of his metaphysics. For a recent challenge to Montagnes’s account of Aquinas’s progression, especially concerning the \textit{De veritate}, see Steven Long’s \textit{Analogia Entis} (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2012). But Long does not offer nearly the same wealth of detailed textual support as Montagnes, nor does he offer a historically based interpretation of analogy in Aquinas.

\textsuperscript{77} See for example, DM 8.3 ad 18 [Leon.23.205.350-55]: “Set quia per uirtutem moralem magis directe perficitur uis appetitiua quam ipsa ratio, ideo melius est dicendum secundum Aristotelem quod uirtutes morales sunt in ui appetitiua, que est rationalis per participationem in quantum movetur per imperium rationis.”; ST I 57.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 273]: “. . . secundum quod moventur a voluntate et ratione: quia etiam inferior pars animae participat alicuius rationem, sicut obediens imperanti, ut dicitur in I Ethic.” and ST I-II, 68.3 [St. Paul, 835]: “. . . virtutes morales perficient vim appetitivam secundum quod participat alicuius rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri per imperium rationis.”; \textit{In I Ethic.} 20 [Leon.47.72.126].

\textsuperscript{78} ST I-II 56.4 [St. Paul, 780]: “Alio modo [the sense appetites] possunt considerari inquantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire.” See also ST I 79.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 376]; ST I-II 26.1[St. Paul, 672]; ST I-II 56.4 ad 1[St. Paul, 781]; ST I-II 58.2 [St. Paul, 790]; ST II-II 58.4 ad 3[St. Paul, 1334]; ST III 18.2[St. Paul, 1964]; ST III.18. 2 ad 1[St. Paul, 1964]; ST III, 19.2[St. Paul, 1970] \textit{In I Ethic.} 20 [Leon.47.72. see lines 126, 140-146, 171-77]; \textit{In II Ethic.} 1[Leon.47.77.107-109]; and also cf. QDA 11 ad 15[Leon.24/1.103.366-74].

\textsuperscript{79} ST I-II 60.1 [St. Paul, 797]: “Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitia est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce: quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.”

\textsuperscript{80} ST I-II q. 6 \textit{prooemium} [St. Paul, 588]: “secundo, de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi ab ipsa voluntate eliciti, ut immediate ipsius voluntatis existentes: tertio, de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quae a voluntate imperati, qui sunt ipsius voluntatis intermedius aliis potentiis.” See also ST I-II 6.4 [St. Paul, 590]: duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eiusmod immediate, velut ab ipsa eliciti, scilicet velle; alius autem est actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potestia exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur mediante potentia motiva.”
related to other powers. Here we may speak of the natural willing of the ends, intention, choice, and consent. The commanded acts of the will, however, follow upon choice as the will moves the whole person through his powers to execute what he has chosen to do. Aquinas uses the phrase command of the will and command of reason interchangeably. Most precisely, however, Aquinas argues that command is an act of reason since command involves ordering and advocating or announcing (*intimando vel denuntiando*), but it nevertheless presupposes the will’s act in the order of exercise and finality which we have already discussed and thus we may trace the first cause of the motion back through choice and ultimately to God. To summarize, after a person has made a choice, the person must will the action and this means willing that the powers of the soul act – that is what command is.

---

81 To be exact, a search with the online *Index Thomisticus* shows that he used some version of the phrase *imperium voluntatis* 83 times in 71 different places and he used some version of the phrase *imperium rationis* 85 times in 64 places.

82 ST I-II 17.1[St. Paul, 626-27]: “Respondeo dicendum quod imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu voluntatis. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, quia actus voluntatis et rationis supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult ratiocinari; contingit actum voluntatis praeveniri ab actu rationis, et e converso. Et quia virtus prioris actus remanet in actu sequenti, contingit quandoque quod est aliquid actus voluntatis, secundum quod manet virtute in ipso aliquid de actu rationis, ut dictum est de usu et de electione; et e converso aliquid est actu rationis, secundum quod virtute manet in ipso aliquid de actu voluntatis. Imperare autem est quidem essentialiter actus rationis: imperans enim ordinat eum cui imperat, ad aliquid agendum, intimando vel denuntiando; sic autem ordinare per modum cuiusdam intimationis, est rationis. Sed ratio potest aliquid intimare vel denuntiare dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute: quae quidem intimatio exprimitur per verbum indicativi modi; sicut si aliquid aliquid dicat, *Hoc est tibi faciendum*. Aliquando autem ratio intimat aliquid alii, movendo ipsum ad hoc: et talis intimatio exprimitur per verbum imperativi modi; puta cum alii dicitur, *Fac hoc*. Primum autem movens non moveat nisi in virtute primi moventis, sequitur quod hoc ipsum quod ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis. Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actu rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.”

83 Thus the first cause of motion in the line of efficient and final causality is traced back to God, from the “instinct of nature,” as we have discussed: ST I-II, 17.6 ad 3 [St. Paul, 629]: “cum imperium sit actu rationis, ille actus imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in infinitum procedatur.”
When Aquinas says that reason commands and the sense appetites are commanded, he does not mean that reason commands the sense appetites directly. I should clarify this. He does not mean that we can immediately command our sense appetites to feel something. For example, if I am experiencing some uncomfortable emotion, I cannot simply will it to go away as I can will my hand to move however I please. Command, as the execution of what has been deliberated upon, is generally about particular actions that are to be done. We almost never try to change our emotions directly. Usually, when we are affected by some passion the struggle is not directly with the passion itself, but rather whether or not we succumb to the object of the passion. For example, when faced with a freshly baked plate of cookies that should not be eaten, one does not command the desire for the cookies to go away; rather one commands oneself not to eat the cookies.

There are three main passages in Aquinas’s corpus that discuss how the sense appetites are subject to reason: QDV 25.4, ST I 81.3, and ST I-II 17.7. QDV 25.4, which we have already examined, argues that the sense appetites are subject to reason in three ways: 1) on behalf of reason as it controls the imagination and thus how things appear attractive or repulsive; 2) on behalf of the will as the intensity of the will’s motion redounds upon the sense appetite; and 3) on behalf of the motive power, which follows the command of reason despite whatever passions there may be. In ST I, 81.3, he drops 2 (the redounding of the will) and rather presents the will’s role with respect to the sense appetite as executing the motive power. On the side of the intellect, reason is now presented as moving the cogitative power rather than the imagination.

84 For the text and discussion see chapter 4, around nn.138-140.
Whereas in QDV 25.4 reason controlled the sense appetites by directing the imagination to imagine objects differently and thus make them appear attractive or repulsive, in ST I, 81.3 reason’s role rather is to supply the universal premise in the practical syllogism, enabling one to move from universal principles to particular actions – and in this the cogitative power somehow plays a role.\textsuperscript{85}

But in ST I-II 17.7 he does not distinguish between what comes from will and what comes from reason, nor is there there any mention of redounding or the motive power. Reason now commands the sense appetite through imagination (he reverts back to the imagination from the cogitative power). Some think that this latter passage (ST I-II 17.7) simply follows from the earlier passages (QDV 25.4 and ST I 81.3),\textsuperscript{86} as if there is no significant difference between the two, but I am not sure.

The role of reason is significantly different in the two prior passages. In the \textit{De veritate} it is that of deliberation, i.e., of imagining something from different perspectives. Deliberation is always and only about particulars that can be done by us, and particulars are almost always considered with the imagination. When we deliberate about eating a ripe apple it is not surprising if our imagining it causes us to desire it. If we wish to change this emotional response to disgust we can simply command ourselves to imagine a worm in the apple. The role of reason in the

\textsuperscript{85} I am not going to make too much of the cogitative power because Aquinas himself said rather little about it, at least with respect to our topic. See Cates, \textit{Emotions}, 116. For the passages in the \textit{Summa} on the \textit{vis aestimativa}: ST I 81.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 393]; ST I-II 6.2 [St. Paul, 589] on the \textit{vis cogitativa}: ST I 78.4 [St. Paul, 373-74]; ST 81.3 [St. Paul, 390-91]; on the \textit{intellectus passivus}: ST I 79.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 367], on the \textit{ratio particularis}: ST I 20.1 ad 1 [St. Paul, 113]; ST I 78.4 [St. Paul, 373-74]; ST I 79.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 367]; ST I 81.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 393]; ST I-II 30.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 684-685]; ST I-I 51.3 [St. Paul, 763]. For more passages and the secondary litterature see chapter 6 nn.56-57.

Summa, however, is to provide the universal first principles from which our practical reasoning proceeds or to which it is reduced. Here the desire for my neighbor’s delectable apple is tempered by my universal knowledge that I should not steal. Of course, these two accounts of reason’s role in controlling the sense appetites are in no way incompatible, and both require the use of the internal sense powers, but they are quite different.

If one considers the role of the will, it appears that it has dropped out altogether by the time of ST I-II 17.7. First the will’s role consisted in redounding on the sense appetites (QDV 25.4), then in executing the motive power (ST I, 81.3), but finally it is not mentioned at all (ST I-II, 17.1), and all that is apparently left is reason’s role via the imagination or cogitative power. Perhaps the will’s redounding is too indirect and vague. And perhaps moving the motive power is not really moving the sense appetites at all, for in such a case a person moves themselves to do something despite whatever may be happening in their sense appetites. So perhaps he means to drop the will from the equation.

I think that the context in the questions on human volition and acts (ST I-II qq.6-21) strongly implies that will is already included in any command of the sense appetites. For this article comes on the heels of his explanation that command is an act of reason which necessarily also involves an act of the will. Thus this discussion on command must also include will.

There is also ample textual evidence to show that Aquinas was still firmly committed to the will’s redounding or overflowing into the sense appetites. For example, later in the Prima

---

87 For various formulations that synderis provides see In II Sent. 24.2, a.3 & 4; In II Sent. 39.3.2; QDV 16.1, ad 9.
88 ST I-II 24 3 ad 1 [St. Paul, 664]; ST I-II 30.1 ad 1[St. Paul, 683]; ST I-II 31.5 [St. Paul, 689]; ST I-II 38.4 ad 3 [St. Paul, 718]; ST I-II 59.5 [St. Paul, 796]; ST I-II 61.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 804]; ST I-II 77.6 [St. Paul,
Secundae he says that any intense volition will necessarily redound in the sense appetite.\textsuperscript{89}

And this brings us to the role of the will in moving the external motive power. There is a way in which we have control over our sense appetites because we can move our motive power, which moves our muscles to do things without or even despite our passions. In other words, if I am experiencing an obviously inordinate passion for something, getting up and walking away will often do much good. If the object was before me, now it no longer is. Moreover, even if the object was not right before me but only imagined, now I have an entirely new set of sensory inputs, which are affecting my sense appetites. This is one of the ways that we repress (reprimere) our emotions, as he often puts it. But any such action against some passion requires a great effort of command and thus it will also directly redound upon the sense appetites. Thus the action of commanding oneself to turn away affects the sense appetites in two ways: 1) by offering new sensory inputs to the sense appetites, and 2) by the will’s redounding to the lower sense powers.

But if one actually performs such an action, one must have chosen this action, and this presupposes deliberation, which includes both considering the first principles of practical reasoning and thinking about some appetible thing from different perspectives, i.e., one is using both imagination and the cogitative power.\textsuperscript{90} In any such action, we are in fact, affecting the

\textsuperscript{89} ST I-II 77.6 [St. Paul, 889]: “Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores: non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitivo.”

\textsuperscript{90} The application of universal principles to particular cases involves the cogitative power, but intellectual awareness of something as individual need not.
sense appetites along many different causal lines: 1) new sensory inputs, 2) redounding, 3) imagination, and 4) cogitation.

Moreover, reason can only move the imagination and the cogitative power because it wills to, for it is only through the will that the other powers of the soul are moved.\textsuperscript{91} In other words the acts that Thomas attributes to reason are imbued with will and the acts that Thomas attributes to will are imbued with reason. Since he has already explained that both reason and will are included in command in ST I-II 17.1, I prefer the formulation in ST I-II, 17.7, which does not distinguish between the role of reason or will, but rather emphasizes the connection between freedom and immateriality.\textsuperscript{92}

Command affects the sense appetite in the four ways just mentioned: 1) redounding, 2) new external sense inputs, 3) via the imagination and 4) via the cogitative power. Any particular commands can have some of these and not others, or more of one and less of others. For example, sometimes when angry, the consideration of mitigating circumstances can quiet the anger, but sometimes it is best to go for a short walk. It entirely depends on the circumstances and the judgment of prudence.

\textsuperscript{91} See, for example, QDM 6 [Leon.23.149.349-52].

\textsuperscript{92} The whole article works on the distinction between materiality and immateriality. What is immaterial is in our control, while what is material is not strictly in our control. The sense appetites, as powers of the soul are in our control, but as they are affixed to a material organ they are not in our control. Thus will and intellect are completely in our control, the sense appetites are not completely in our control, and the more material vegetative powers are utterly out of our control. It offers a principle for control and lack of control, for freedom and the lack thereof, but within the sense powers there is tremendous difference in the degree of control. The motive power is almost completely in our control, so long as we are not injured.
When reason has successfully commanded the sense appetite, the motion of the sense appetite accompanies or follows reason.\(^{93}\) When reason has not successfully commanded the sense appetite, that sense appetite does not accompany reason, but pulls in a contrary direction. A great role, perhaps the great role, of courage and temperance is thus simply to render the sense appetites obedient or docile to reason’s command so that it follows along with reason’s command.

4. What Moral Virtue Does To The Sense Appetites

In a certain sense this is all quite simple: either I can do what I want or my passions make it very difficult, if not impossible, for me to do so. The sense appetites can be considered insofar as they follow their own natural inclinations or they may be considered insofar as they obey reason’s command, that is, insofar as they participate in reason.\(^{94}\) Moral virtue makes the sense appetites docile and obedient to the command of reason\(^{95}\) and thus it helps us to do what we will. But how exactly does moral virtue do this?

\(^{93}\) ST I-II 30.1 ad 1 [St. Paul, 683]: “... appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscientia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam: vel propter intentionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem...”

\(^{94}\) ST I-II 56.4 [St. Paul, 780]: “Alio modo [the sense appetites] possunt considerari inquantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire.” ST I 79.2 ad 2 [St. Paul, 376]: “... appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi.”; ST I-II 26.1 [St. Paul, 669]: “Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis: qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit racioni.”; ST III 18.2 [St. Paul, 1964]: “Sciendum est autem quod sensualitas, sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedire rationi, dicitur ratione per participationem: ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic.”; ibid. ad 1: “Sed voluntas participativa dicta potest esse in parte sensitiva, inquantum obedit racioni.” (see discussion on parallel use in Sentences; In I Ethic. 20 [Leon.47/1.72. see lines 126, 140-146, 171-77]; In II Ethic. 1[Leon.47/1.77.107-109]; and cf. the slightly earlier (1266-67) QDA 11 ad 15[Leon.24/1.103.366-74].

\(^{95}\) ST I-II 56.4 ad 1 [St. Paul, 781]: “... irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis. Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.” ST I-II 67.1 ad
In order to address this, I would like to start with the general point that there is no distinctly human goodness without free choice, for human actions can be neither meritorious nor culpable if compelled. In one passage Aquinas points out that what is voluntary is deeply internal to the agent, but passions are external, that is, they are exterior principles of human actions, and thus are neither meritorious nor blameworthy. In fact, they diminish the voluntariness of an action and thus make it less praiseworthy or blameworthy. The strength of a passion thus diminishes the praise or blame owed to an action, but to the extent that they have been freely chosen and commanded, however, some passions are in our control and thus meritorious. Thus passions that are consequent to free choice augment the praiseworthiness or blame for an action. For we freely choose to act in accordance with them, and we may incite or repress them as we see fit. In sum, antecedent passions diminish and consequent passions increase the merit or culpability of human actions.

3 [St. Paul, 827]: “Unde et poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili temperantia: inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad obediendum rationi.”

96 DM 3.11 ad 3 [Leon.23.90.62-73]: “Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione peccati est quod sit voluntarium. Voluntarium autem dicitur cuius principium est in ipso agente. Et ideo, quanto principium interius magis augetur, tanto et peccatum fit gravius; quanto autem principium exterius magis augetur, tanto peccatum fit levius. Passio autem est principium extrinsecum voluntatis, motus autem voluntatis est principium intrinsecum. Et ideo, quanto motus voluntatis fuerit fortior ad peccandum, tanto peccatum est maius; set quanto passio fuerit fortior impellens ad peccandum, tanto peccatum fit minus.”

97 I-II 74.6 [St. Paul, 873]: “Et ideo quando deficit ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in ratione, . . . Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum dupliciter. Uno modo, quando imperat illicititas passiones: sicut quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum irae vel concupiscientiae. Alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis motum: sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et ipsum non expellit.” See also the texts in the following note.

98 The following are a good summarizing passages: ST I-II 77.6 ad 2 [St. Paul, 889]: “. . . bona passio consequens iudicium rationis, augmentat meritum. Si autem praecedat, ut scilicet hom magis ex passione quam ex iudicio rationis moveatur ad bene agendum, talis passio diminuit bonitatem et laudem actus.” ST I-II 77.6[St. Paul, 889]: “. . . peccatum essentieliter consistit in actu liberis arbitrii, quod est faculata voluntatis et rationis (Peter Lombard, II Sent. 2.14.cap. 3) Passio autem est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus
It would seem that antecedent passions are morally neutral, since their effect can be equally for good or bad, but if anything at all, antecedent passions are troublesome because they obstruct free decision, a crucial human good. Passions cloud and bind the judgment of reason. Without passion a person can judge more clearly and with greater perspicacity. But why such a negative view on the passions?

Thomas offers a few reasons. First, he explains that passions distract from the higher operations of the soul. The intensity of a passion in the sense appetite detracts the other powers from their operations. Because our powers are rooted in one soul, and because the soul’s concentration or attention applies each power to its own act, when someone is concentrating on the act of one power, the attention granted to another power is necessarily diminished and at

sensitivi trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores: non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praecedit actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non ex impulsu passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens. Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit voluntarium. Passio autem consequens non diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget: vel potius est signum magnitudinii eius, inquantum scilicet demonstrat intensionem voluntatis ad actum peccati. Et sic verum est quod quanto aliquis maiori libidoe vel concupiscientia peccat, tanto magis peccat.”

DM 3.11[Leon.23.90.28-59]: “Dicendum, quod peccare ex infirmitate est peccare ex passione, ut dictum est. Passio autem appetitus sensitius dupliciter se habet ad motum voluntas: uno modo ut precedens, alio modo ut consequens. Vt precedens quidem, sicut cum propter passionem inclinatu voluntas ad aliquid volendum: et sic passio diminuit rationem meriti et rationem demeriti, quia meritum et demeritum in electione consistit ex ratione praecedente, passio autem obnubilat uel etiam ligat iudicium rationis. Quanto autem iudicium rationis fuerit purius, tanto electio est perspicacior ad merendum uel demerendum. Vnde qui inducitur ad benefaciendum ex iudicio rationis, laudabilius operatur quam qui inducitur ad hoc idem ex sola animi passione: hic enim interdum errare potest indebite miserendo. Et similiiter ille qui inducitur ad peccandum ex deliberacione rationis, magis peccat quam ille qui inducitur ad peccandum ex sola animi passione. Vt consequens autem consideratur passio quando ex forti motu voluntas commouetur appetitus inferior ad passionem. Et sic passio addit ad meritum uel demeritum, quia est signum passio quod motus voluntatis sit fortior. Et hoc modo uerum est quod ille qui cum maiori compassione facit eleemosinam, magis meretur, et qui cum maiori libidoe facit peccatum, magis peccat, quia hoc est signum quod motus voluntatis sit fortior. Set hoc non est ex passione benefacere uel peccare, set potius pati ex electione boni uel mali.” ST I-II 59.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 794]: “... passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adivat ad exequendum imperium rationis.”
times utterly impeded. He offers the helpful example of someone listening intensely who does not notice another person passing by.\textsuperscript{100} It is the vehemence of the passion that has this effect; it has nothing to do with the object of the passion.

Vehement passions also clog up the normal operations of the imagination and cogitative powers which are crucial for deliberation. He notes that lovers have a very difficult time turning their imagination towards something else.\textsuperscript{101} This will, of course, cause great trouble in deliberation, which must be able to consider and imagine a particular object from different perspectives. Presumably reason will request a phantasm that will not be produced by the imagination.\textsuperscript{102} In other words, reason will not be able to consider its object in a free and disinterested manner since it cannot conjure up the right phantasm at will.

\textsuperscript{100} DM 3.9 [Leon.23.86-87.180-192]: “Manifestum est enim quod quandocumque una potentia intenditur in suo actu, alia potestia uel impeditur uel totaliter auertitur a suo actu: sicut cum aliquis intentus est ad aliquem audiendum, non percipit hominem pertranseuntem. Et hoc ideo contigit, quia omnes potentiae radicantur in una anima, cuius intentio applicat unamquamque potentiam ad suum actu: et ita, cum aliquis fuerit fortiter intentus circa actum unius potentiae, minuitur eius intentio circa actum alterius. Sic igitur, cum fuerit concupiscentia fortis, aut ira aut aliquid huiausmodi, impeditur homo a consideratione scientiae.” ST I-II 33.3[St. Paul, 699]: “Primo quidem, ratione distractionis. Quia, sicut iam dictum est, ad ea in quibus delectamur, multum attendimus: cum autem attento fortiter inhaeserit aliqui rei, debilitatur circa alias res, vel totaliter ab eis revocatur. Et secundum hoc, si delectatio corporalis fuerit magna, vel totaliter impediet usum rationis, ad se intentionem animi attrahendo; vel multum impediet.” The internal reference is too I-II 4.1 ad 3[St. Paul, 575], which makes the same point. See also ST I-II, 77.1 [St. Paul, 885] which applies this line of thinking to the will: “passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediat. Tum quia omnis virtus ad plura dispersa fit minor: unde et contrario, quando intenditur circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispersi. Tum quia in operibus animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehemens applicatur ad unum, non potest alteri vehemens attendere. Et secundum hunc modum, per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod remittatur, vel totaliter impediat motus proprius appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas.”

\textsuperscript{101} ST I-II, 77.1[St. Paul, 885].

\textsuperscript{102} This is Baker’s idea, Passions, 118, and I have not found Aquinas saying it, but it seems correct. See Baker, Passions, 118, “But in the grip of a passion which has transfixed the imagination and the estimative sense exclusively upon the delectable object, the contrary phantasm needed by the intellect to actualize the habitual knowledge, by which the sensible object would be judged in a rational way, cannot be produced.”
The other great effect of passion is that it makes things seem to be other than they truly are. My desire for this cookie makes it seem to be better than the piece of broccoli next to it. Here there is a conflict or contrariness between the “seeming” of the sense appetite, and the “seeming” of reason, between my attraction to the cookie and my knowledge that I ought rather to eat something healthy. These two “seemings” or appearances cause the powers of the soul to move contrary to one another, one towards the broccoli and the other towards the cookie. Aquinas often speaks of this as the “contrariness” of passions. Because reason cannot simultaneously choose both, and because choice always follows the practical judgment of reason, at the very moment that I choose to eat the cookie, my reason’s judgment is in accord with that passion. In this way passion moves the will, namely, insofar as it affects the object that reason

103 ST I-II 44.2 [St. Paul, 736]: “Alio modo dicitur aliquis consiliativus, a facultate bene consiliandi. Et sic nec timor, nec aliqua passio consiliativos facit. Quia homini affecto secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel maius vel minus quam sit secundum rei veritatem: sicut amanti videntur ea quae amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timet, terribilia. Et sic ex defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.”

104 ST I-II, 10.3 ad 2 [St. Paul, 607]: “cum in homine duae sint naturae, intellectualis scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliquais uniformiter secundum totam animam: quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva totaliter subicitur rationi, sicut contingit in virtuosis; vel e converso ratio totaliter absorbetur a passione, sicut accidit in amentibus. Sed aliquando, et si ratio obnubiletur a passione, remanet tamen aliquid rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc potest aliquid vel totaliter passionem repellere; vel saltem se tenere ne passionem sequatur. In tali enim dispositione, quia homo secundum partes animae diversimode disponitur, aliud ei videtur secundum rationem, et aliud secundum passionem.”

105 ST I-II, 9.2 ad 3 [St. Paul, 601]: “. . . sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit.(1254b5), ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarum movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.”

106 DM 3.9 [Leon.23.87.193-207]: “Secundo considerandum est quod passiones anime cum sint in appetitu sensitiuo, sunt circa particularia: concupiscit enim homo hanc delectationem, sicut et sentit hoc dulce. Scientia autem est in universali; et tamen universalis scientia non est principium aliquius actus nisi secundum quod applicatur ad particulare: quia actus circa particularia sunt. Quando igitur passio est fortis circa aliquod particular, repellit contrarium motum scientiae circa idem particular, non solum distrahendo a consideratione scientiae, ut supra dictum est, set etiam corrupiendo per viam contrarietatis. Et sic ille qui in forti passione est constitutus, etsi consideret aliquo modo in universali, in particulari tamen impeditur eius consideration.” See also ST I-II 33.3[St. Paul, 699]: ST I-II 77.2 [St. Paul, 886].
presents to the will.\textsuperscript{107} And lastly, if the passion is vehement enough, its corporeal aspect can utterly bind free decision and render the act involuntary.\textsuperscript{108} I would like to point out that this way that passion “binds” is not simply black or white, free or not, it seems to be a question of degrees.\textsuperscript{109} In other words, the material aspect of the passion seems to diminish freedom in proportion to the degree of its vehemence.\textsuperscript{110}

Thus we can note four ways that passion harms reason’s judgment: 1) by distracting the soul’s attention away from reason and will; 2) by clogging imagination and cogitation which is crucial to reason’s deliberation; 3) by making things seem to be otherwise than they are, and 4) very powerful bodily dispositions can bind reason altogether, but less powerful dispositions can

\textsuperscript{107} ST I-II 9.2 [St. Paul, 601]: “Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti, sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto. Et per hunc modum, ex parte obiecti, appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.” ST I-II 10.3 [St. Paul, 606]: “. . . passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliquid movet per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret.”

\textsuperscript{108} DM 3.9 [Leon.23.87.193-207]: “Tertio considerandum est quod ex aliqua corporali transmutatione ligatur usus rationis, ut uel totaliter nihil consideret uel quod non libere considerare possit, sicut patet in dormientibus et freneticis. Per passiones autem fit aliqua immutatio circa corpus, ita quod interdum aliqui propter iram uel concupiscientiam uel aliquam huiusmodi passionem in insaniam inciderunt. Et ideo, quando huiusmodi passiones sunt fortes, per ipsam transmutationem corporale ligant quodammodo rationem ut liberum iudicium de particularibus agendis non habeat.” See also ST I-II 33.3[St. Paul, 699].

\textsuperscript{109} ST I-II 10.3 [St. Paul, 607]: “. . . passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliquid movet per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum, quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret. Huiusmodi autem immutatio hominis per passionem duobus modis contingit. Uno modo, sic quod totaliter ratio ligatur, ita quod homo usum rationis non habet: sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementem iram vel concupiscientiam furiosi vel amentes fiunt, sicut et propter aliquam aliam perturbationem corporalem; huiusmodi enim passiones non sine corporali transmutatione accidunt. Et de talibus eadem est ratio sicut et de animalibus brutis, quae ex necessitate sequuntur impetum passionis: in his enim non est aliquid rationis motus, et per consequens nec voluntatis. Aliquando autem ratio non totaliter absorbetur a passione, sed remanet quantum ad aliquid iudicium rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc remanet aliquid de motu voluntatis. Inquantum ergo ratio manet libera et passione non subjecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat. Et sic aut motus voluntatis non est in homine, sed sola passio dominatur: aut, si motus voluntatis sit, non ex necessitate sequitur passionem.”

\textsuperscript{110} Cf. I-II, 17.7 [St. Paul, 630], mentioned above. There he says that we have control over powers to the degree that they are inmaterial, or not affixed to material organs.
also diminish freedom to a certain extent. Since the root of human goodness is free decision, one can see the troublesome nature of passion and the reason why Aquinas is at times willing to speak of passion as naturally contrary to reason.\textsuperscript{111} From a theological perspective, this natural disorder is part of the punishment of original sin, as we discussed in chapter 2. And as we also mentioned, moral virtue cannot remove this problem altogether, for original sin is permanent, but it can mitigate its effects to a limited extent.

Reason (including will) has some power over the sense appetite (in the other four ways mentioned above), and the sense appetites have some power over reason (in the four ways just mentioned). There is a kind of cycle here that can easily become vicious: passion affects deliberation, which affects command, which affects passion, ad infinitum. The more vehement the passions, the more pressure they put on reason, and the less reason is able to judge clearly and control that passion. One can see how this often spirals out of control in a kind of snowball effect. There is a kind of gravity to the passions drawing us away from reason towards evil. For our purposes, since Aquinas says that the sense appetites participate in reason insofar as they obey its command, this can be understood in two ways: 1) either at the moment when the continent agent manages to make the right choice despite his contrary passions, or 2) with

\textsuperscript{111} Richard Baker notes that the chief kind of ignorance which passion causes is the “ignorance which results from not \textit{actually} considering what should be considered in the deliberation proceeding a moral choice.” Baker, \textit{Passions}, 114. Failure to pay attention to what one should have at the moment of choice is the cause (or, more precisely, the non-cause) of sin. For two very good discussions of non-consideration as a cause of sin see Hoffmann, \textit{Angelic Sin},122-153; and Matthews S. Grant, “God, The Sinner, and The Act of Sin” \textit{Thomist} 73 (2009): 455-96. It is not difficult to see that force of passions make us prone to not consider something as one should (whether by distraction, by causing a false “seeming” or by clogging the internal senses) and thus they are a cause of defective practical judgements. Baker notes, ibid., “The ignorance arising from a passion, therefore, is the temporary ignorance existing here and now which the reason suffers because of the fact that the passion has distracted it from the consideration of everything else except the object of the passion. We might say that that the net result of the various influences which a passion exerts on the reason is that the latter does not actually consider the good points of that which is contrary to the passion.”
reference to the habitual way in which the virtuous agent easily controls his sense appetites. The difference between the two, if we focus on the sense appetites, is that the sense appetites in the virtuous agent have become habitually docile and obedient. In particular, this means that her antecedent passions are not very vehement. It should be recalled that Aquinas has argued that passions are neither morally good nor bad prior to choice, but vehement antecedent passions are inherently disordered because they obstruct lucid thinking required for free decision and they make it very difficult for reason to command the sense appetites, i.e., they make good consequent passions very difficult. Thus the only kind of good passions are consequent passions, and it is only possible to have these kinds of passions habitually if one’s antecedent passions are mild.

The lowering of the intensity of antecedent passions has very powerful effects: it leaves reason clear-sighted, enables commands to be followed promptly, and allows for the proper emotional response to follow effortlessly. None of these things is possible with strong antecedent passions.

In this cycle in which reason affects passion and passion affects reason, participation in reason concerns the motion from reason to passion. In the following passage Aquinas is asking whether the sense appetites are the subject of virtue.

The irascible and concupiscible can be considered in two ways. In one way according to themselves, insofar as they are parts of the sensitive appetite. And in this way it does not belong to them to be the subject of virtue. In another way they can be considered insofar as they participate in reason, because they naturally

---

And so the irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of human virtue, for thus it is the principle of human acts, insofar as it participates in reason. And in these powers it is necessary to posit virtues. For it is evident that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible appetites. For an act which progresses from one power insofar as it is moved by another cannot be perfect unless each power is well disposed to the act, as the act of a craftsman cannot be suitable unless both the craftsman and also the tool itself are well disposed to act. Therefore in these things concerning which the irascible and concupiscible powers operate insofar as they are moved by reason, it is necessary that there be some habit perfecting them to act well, not only in reason, but also in the irascible and concupiscible powers. And because the good disposition of a power moved by a mover is attained according to its conformity to the moving power, therefore the virtue, which is in the irascible and concupiscible, is nothing else than a certain habitual conformity of those powers to reason.\textsuperscript{113}

This passage brings out the passive nature of the kind of participation at stake when Aquinas says that the sense appetites participate in reason. They participate in reason by the virtue or disposition by which the sense appetites are well disposed to being moved by reason. This is, as we previously discussed, making the sense appetites a little more like slaves, making them more subject to reason. He describes this as habitual conformity (\textit{habitualis conformitas}) of the sense appetites to reason.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{113} ST I-II, 56.4 [St. Paul, 780]: “... irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum sunt partes appetitus sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competet eis quod sint subiectum virtutis. – Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participat rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae: sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat rationem. Et in his potentiis nescesse est ponere virtutes. Quod enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet. Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit bene disposita ad actum: sicut actus artificis non potest esse congruus, nisi et artifex sit bene dispositus ad agendum, et etiam ipsum instrumentum. In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, nescesse est ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili. Et quia bona dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.”

\textsuperscript{114} For another important passage which says the same see ST I-II 58.2 [St. Paul, 790]: “Respondeo dicendum quod omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est: et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum invenientur, quodammodo rationi obediunt; diversimode tamen. Nam quaedam rationi obediunt omnino ad
In the *prima pars*, Aquinas had said that anything that is participated in is related to the participant as its act. In this case the sense appetites participate in reason insofar as they are moved or actualized by reason, hence they are in potency to the act they receive from the command of reason. The more they are habitually disposed or conformed to be so moved or actualized, the better or more virtuous they are. This happens as we have seen, not by making the sense appetites essentially rational, i.e., by making the sense appetites judge and decide what should and should not be sought in this particular circumstance (the proper role of deliberation...
and prudence), but rather by lowering the vehemence of the antecedent passions and thereby letting reason informed by prudence operate with clear vision and swift execution. In fact, any virtuous act, which involves the sense appetites participating in reason, must include the full and complete operation of reason and will. There is no need to make the sense appetites take over the role of reason and will.

This is evident in two very important articles, ST III, 19.1 and 19.2, on the unity and plurality of operations in Christ. In ST III 19.1 he explains that,

... the action of that which is moved by another is twofold: one indeed which it has according to its own form; another, however, which it has insofar as it is moved by another. As the operation of an axe according to its form is to cut; however, insofar as it is moved by the artisan, its operation is to make a bench. Therefore the operation which belongs to something according to its own form is its own, and it does not pertain to the mover except insofar as it uses a thing of this sort for its own operation: thus to heat is the proper operation of fire, but not of the blacksmith, except insofar as he uses fire to heat iron. But that operation which pertains to a thing as moved by another, is not another operation beyond the operation of the one moving it: as in the case of making a bench, the operation of cutting is not an operation of the axe separate from the operation of the artisan. And so, wherever a mover and moved have diverse forms or operative powers, there it is necessary that there is some proper operation of the mover, and another proper operation of the moved, although what is moved participates in the operation of the mover, and the mover uses the operation of what is moved, and so each acts in communion with the other.\footnote{ST III, 19.1 [St. Paul, 1968]: “Quia actio eius quod movetur ab altero, est duplex: una quidem quam habet secundum propiam formam; alia autem quam habet secundum quod movetur ab alio. Sicut securis operatio secundum propiam formam est incisio: secundum autem quod movetur ab artifice, operatio eius est facere scamnum. Operatio igitur quae est alicuius rei secundum suam formam, est propria eius; nec pertinet ad moventem, nisi secundum quod utitur huiusmodi re ad suam operationem: sicut calefacere est propria operatio ignis; non autem fabri, nisi quatenus utitur igne ad calefaciendum ferrum. Sed illa operatio quae est rei solum secundum quod movetur ab alio, non est alia praeter operationem moventis ipsum: sicut facere scamnum non est seorsum operatio securis ab operatione artificis. Et ideo, ubicumque movens et motum habent diversas formas seu virtutes operativas, ibi oportet quod sit alia propria operatio moventis, et alia propria operatio moti, licet motum participet operationem moventis, et movens utatur operatione moti, et sic utrumque agit cum communione alterius.”}
In the next article (III 19.2) he explicitly connects this framework to the manner in which the sense appetites participate in reason:

Since man is that which he is according to reason, that operation is said to be human in the unqualified sense which proceeds from reason through will, which is the appetite of reason. If, however, there is some operation in man which does not proceed from reason and will, it is not a human operation in the absolute sense, but it is suitable to man according to some part of human nature: sometimes indeed according to the very nature of a corporeal element, as to be borne downwards; sometimes according to the power of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished and to grow; but sometimes according to the sensitive part, as to see and to hear, to imagine and to remember, to desire and to be angry. Among these operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive soul are somehow obedient to reason (aliqualiter obedientes rationi): and so they are somehow rational and human, insofar as they obey reason, as is apparent from the Philosopher in I Ethic. But the operations that follow the vegetative soul, or also the nature of elemental body, are not subject to reason: whence in no way are they rational, nor are they human in the absolute sense, but only according to a part of human nature. It was said above [in ST III, 19.1 translated above] that when an inferior agent acts through its own form, then the operation of the inferior agent is other than the operation of the superior agent; but when the inferior agent does not act except as it is moved by the superior agent, then the operation of the superior agent and the inferior are one and the same. So therefore in each pure man [that is, not Christ] the operation of the elements and of the vegetative soul are different from the operation of the will, which is properly human. Likewise also the operation of the sensitive soul with respect to that which is not moved by reason; but with respect to that which is moved by reason, the operation of the sensitive and rational part is one and the same. There is one operation of the rational soul itself, if we attend to the principle itself of operation, which is reason and will. They are diversified, however, with respect to diverse objects; . . .

117 ST III, 19.2 [St. Paul, 1970]: “. . . quia homo est id quod est secundum rationem, illa operatio dicitur esse simpliciter humana quae a ratione procedit per voluntatem, quae est rationis appetitus. Si qua autem operatio est in homine quae non procedit a ratione et voluntate, non est simpliciter operatio humana, sed convenit homini secundum aliquam partem humanae naturae: quandoque quidem secundum ipsum naturam elementi corporalis, sicut ferri deorsum; quandoque vero secundum virtutem animae vegetabilis, sicut nutriti et augeri; quandoque vero secundum partem sensitivam, sicut videre et audire, imaginari et memorari, concupiscere et irascri. Inter quas operationes est differentia. Nam operationes animae sensitivae sunt aliqualiter obedientes rationi: et ideo sunt aliqualiter rationales et humanae, inquantum scilicet obediunt rationi, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Operationes vero quae sequuntur animam vegetabilem, vel etiam naturam elementalis corporis, non subiciuntur rationi: unde nullo modo sunt rationales, nec humanae simpliciter, sed solum secundum partem humanae naturae. Dictum est autem supra [article 1] quod quando agens inferius agit per propriam formam, tunc est alia operatio inferioris agentis et superioris: quando vero agens inferius non agit nisi secundum quod est motum a superiori
The sense appetites only participate in reason to the extent that reason is actually actualizing them. Reason is the cause or the act, which is received in the potency of the sense appetites. The act of the sense appetites can be somewhat (*aliqualiter*) rational when reason is causing or commanding them to be so – in this sense they participate in reason. But it is as the artisan uses fire to make the sword. By no means can he make a sword without fire, nor can fire make the sword without the artisan – both are required. Here cause and command are identical. Command and being commanded are a necessary part of any action of moral virtue. In fact, Thomas explains that in any act of moral virtue, the act of prudence and the act of the moral virtue operate together as form and matter,¹¹⁸ that is, they are inextricable and moral virtue is unintelligible without both. The very virtue of being commanded needs the very virtue of command, namely, prudence.¹¹⁹ This is why Aquinas will say that we only use our habits when we *will* to do so.¹²⁰ There cannot be an act of moral virtue without the prudential free choice that actualizes the moral virtues.

5. Beyond Docility and Lowering Vehemence: Inclination and Connaturality

---

¹¹⁸ For this hylomorphic description of prudence and moral virtue, where prudence is referred to as form and moral virtue as matter, see ST I-II, 66.2.

¹¹⁹ ST II-I, 47.8 [St. Paul, 1295].

¹²⁰ DM 6 [Leon.23.149.352-54]; ST I-II, 71.4 [St. Paul, 851]. Bonnie Kent has pointed out that although Aquinas attributes this to Averroes, it is not in Averroes, or at least not in this way. Averroes (*Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima* 3.18, ed. Crawford, 439) is discussing intellect and Aristotle’s claim that the agent intellect is a *hexit* (*De an.* 430a14-17). See Kent, *Losable Virtue*, 107-8.
I do not wish to make the sense appetites entirely passive and to remove their own nature as principles of virtuous action. I have emphasized their passive nature because the passages on how they participate in reason do so. The manner in which the sense appetites participate in reason primarily concerns how the sense appetites as the potency principles are actualized by reason as cause. But Aquinas by no means wishes to remove the sense appetites’ own more active contribution to the virtuous action. As we saw in ST III 19.1 above, the blacksmith uses the nature of fire and its property of heating in order to heat the iron, and he cannot make a sword without the nature of fire. It is the same with the act of the sense appetites in acts of moral virtue. The sense appetites’ subjection to reason, their docility, does not rob them of their own proper acts but rather, by following the command of reason they exercise their own acts,\textsuperscript{121} as the artisan uses the saw to cut in order to make the bench.

But Aquinas grants the moral virtues a rather active role in addition to the crucial task of making the sense appetites docile. Virtuous habits are forms, and as forms they incline towards something. Inhering in appetitive powers, they are appetites of sorts, and appetitive inclinations always requires cognition, whether natural/divine or human.\textsuperscript{122} Because man is not naturally born with these habits but must acquire them, they are traced back to our own cognition.\textsuperscript{123} Virtuous habits are caused by virtuous acts, and in the case of the sense appetites, virtuous habits are caused by reason’s repeated commanding of the sense appetites, which produces an \textit{impressio} or

\textsuperscript{121} ST I-II, 59.5 [St. Paul, 796]: “Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subjecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent: sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.”
\textsuperscript{122} See chapter 2 for a discussion of this.
\textsuperscript{123} Our cognition includes the natural appetite of the will and the naturally known first practical and speculative principles, so our cognition and volition, as discussed above is also partially traced back to God’s cognition. Also, they can only be traced back to our own cognition in the case of the acquired virtues.
conformitas of reason upon the sense appetites, as discussed. The commanded virtuous act which caused the virtue in the first place is the same kind of act to which the virtue inclines as a “second nature.” This means that the virtuous agent, unlike the continent agent, has the advantage of having a kind of habitual inclination towards the virtuous act. The virtuous act has become, as we saw in the Sentences, “connatural” to the agent.

The term “connatural” seems to be taken from Aristotle’s statement in EN 6.1147a18: “youths beginning to learn prate doctrine but do not really know what they are talking about, for doctrine must become connatural to be known and this takes time.” Aquinas comments on this text by noting that in order for knowledge to become connatural, people need much time to repeatedly consider something before it is strengthened and perfectly impressed upon their minds, “and so it is also with the incontinent; for even if he says ‘it is not good for me now to pursue such a delectable thing,’ nevertheless he does not so feel it in his heart (sentit in corde).” The continent and incontinent may reason correctly, but they do not have habits that incline towards these acts. In other words, they know what they ought to do, but they are simply not so inclined.

---

124 The word comes from Grosseteste’s translation of EN 7.3.1147a22. See Hoffmann, Prudence and Practical Principles.
125 In VII Ethic.3[Leon.47/2.392.204-220]: “Secundum exemplum est de pueris quando primo addiscunt, qui coniungunt sermones quos ore proferunt, sed nondum eos sciunt, ita scilicet quod mente intelligent; ad hoc enim requiritur quod illa quae homo audit fiant ei quasi connaturalia propter perfectam impressionem ipsorum intellectui, ad quod homo indiget tempore in quo intellectus per multiplices meditaciones firmetur in eo quod accipit. Et ita est etiam de incontinente; etsi enim dicat: “Non est mihi bonum nunc persequi tale delectabile” tamen non ita sentit in corde; unde sic existimandum est quod incontinentes dicant huiusmodi verba quasi simulantes, quia scilicet alius sentiunt corde et alius proferunt ore.” This text is cited in Tobias Hoffmann’s excellent article “Prudence and Practical Principles,” Aquinas and the Nichomachean Ethics, 177.
This inclination is sometimes described as the end or principle or prudence. In some texts moral virtue provides the ends that prudence reasons towards, but in other texts reason provides the ends that prudence reasons towards. In ST I-II 58.5, Thomas clarifies or distinguishes between two principles or ends: particular principles (moral virtues) and universal principles (synderesis). He notes that the universal principles are not sufficient by themselves for us to reason about particulars because sometimes our universal understanding is corrupted in particular by some passion. For example, to someone overcome by desire, the object lusted for trumps the universal judgment of reason. We might conclude that what is needed then is simply docile sense appetites, lowering antecedent passions allowing reason to judge clearly. While this is undoubtedly important, Aquinas goes further and says that the moral virtues perfect man so that “it comes to be in a certain way connatural to man that he rightly judge about the end.” He adds the Aristotelian dictum “of whatever kind each man is, so seems the end to him.” Thus moral virtue not only removes the obscuring effect of vehement passions, which

---

126 In ST I-II 56.4 ad 4 [St. Paul, 781] he speaks of the moral virtues role in providing the end as the “intentio finis,” (the same is in In VI Ethic. 10 [Leon.47/2.373.153]) and in ST I-II 65.1 [St. Paul, 817] he speaks of the “inclinatio in debitum finem.”

127 ST I-II 66 ad 3 [St. Paul, 824]: “. . . . prudentia non solum dirigat virtutes morales in eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem.” Cf. ST II-II 47.6. text in following footnote.

128 ST I-II 58.5 [St. Paul, 792]: “prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones. Recta autem ratio praexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrupitur in particulari per aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscientia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis.”

129 ST I-II 58.5 continued [St. Paul, 792]: “Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per alios habitus secundum quos fiat
makes things seem much more attractive than they usually are, but it also grants a different
“seeming,” an appetitive connatural inclination towards the virtuous act. In other words, moral
virtue not only makes the sense appetites more docile and passive, but it actively inclines an
agent towards an act of virtue.

Aquinas speaks of this connatural or appetitive inclining\(^{130}\) of moral virtue as a kind of
judgment, not a judgment of reason, but an appetitive “judgment” by inclination or
connatural.\(^ {131}\) It is instinctual or intuitive and it is grasped somewhat like the manner in which
our intellects assent to first principles\(^ {132}\) - there is nothing discursive about it. This connatural
inclination to virtue exists prior to choice and independently of any particular choices,\(^ {133}\) but it is

\[^{130}\text{That this judgement by connaturality is in fact an appetitive inclining see the use of affectus in In De}
\div. nom. 2.4. [Marietti, 59]: Tertius modus habendi est, quod doctus est ista quae dixit ex quodam inspiratione
diviniore, quam communiter fit multis, non solum discens, sed et patiens divina, idest non solum divinorum
scientiam in intellectu accipiens, sed etiam diligendo, eis unitus est per affectum. Passio enim magis ad appetitum
quam ad cognitionem pertinere videtur, quia cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis et non
secundum modum rerum cognitarum, sed appetitus movet ad res, secundum modum quo in seipsis sunt, et sic ad
ipsas res, quodammodo afficitur. Sicut autem aliquis virtuosus, ex habitu virtutis de his quae ad virtutem illum pertinent, ita qui afficitur ad divina, accipit divinitus rectum iudicium de rebus divinis.” See Hoffmann on this in “Prudence and Practical Principles,” forthcoming.\]

\[^{131}\text{ST I, 6 ad 3 [St. Paul, 7]: “... cum iudicium ad sapientem pertinet, secundum duplicem modum
iudicandi, dupliciter sapientia accipitur. Contingit enim aliquem iudicare, uno modo per modum inclinationis: sicut
qui habet habitum virtutis, recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclinatur:
unde et in X Ethic. (1176a17) dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula actuum humanorum. Alio modo, per
modum cognitionis: sicut aliquis instructus in scientia morali, posset iudicare de actibus virtutis, etiam si virtutem
non haberet.”}\]

\[^{132}\text{II-II 2.3 ad 2 [St. Paul 1102]: “... sicut homo per naturale lumen intellectus assentit principis, ita homo
virtuosus per habitum virtutis habet rectum iudicium de his quae convenient virtuti illi.”}\]

\[^{133}\text{II-II 45.2 [St. Paul, 1285]: “Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo, secundum
perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum. Sicut
de his quae ad castitatem pertinent per rationem inquisitionem recte iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem: sed per
quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa recte iudicat de eis ille qui habet habitum castitatis.” Jacques Maritain has
emphasized this theme of knowledge by connaturality in The Range of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1952), 22-29.}\]
not, it must be stressed, a virtuous antecedent passion.\textsuperscript{134} We shall have more to say on this in the last chapter.

6. Summary

Moral virtue’s antecedent connatural inclinations are indeed habitual remnants of prior causal actions, of prior participations in reason, but Aquinas seems to want to limit the use of the phrase participating in reason to the present causal action of command and the sense appetites’ reception of this act, whether in the continent agent or in the virtuous agent. Although the inclining role of moral virtue is an important aspect of Aquinas’s theory of moral virtue, he does not describe it as participating in reason. As we have seen, Aquinas uses that phrase when he is directly considering the sense appetites relation to reason’s command. Since participation involves causality and some communication of formality, reason as act commands and actualizes the sense appetites as potency, and moral virtue makes this happen with ease.\textsuperscript{135} In this context participation describes the relation of command and commanded, rather than the earlier emphasis in the \textit{Sentences} on communication of form by way of exemplar causality. We should not, however, exaggerate this shift of emphasis, for formal communication and efficient causality are present in both early and late texts. Nevertheless, this shift from exemplar causality to efficient causality also traces his granting the will some spontaneity apart from the intellect. One does detect, in the later texts, that the will plays a somewhat larger role on moral virtue.

\textsuperscript{134} We shall discuss this in light of the secondary literature in chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{135} Note the general rule in ST I, 75.5 ad 4 [St. Paul. 347]: “. . . omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius.”
When reason commands and the sense appetites are commanded, whether this happen habitually or not, then the sense appetites participate in reason because they are actualized by reason and will. This stems from Aquinas’s mature belief that only the good will makes us unqualifiedly good. If moral virtues are always good, this is because their act always includes the causality of will.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{In Ethic.} 3.6 [Leon.47/1.136.40-59]: “Huius autem differentiae ratio est quia bonus vel malus dicitur aliquis non secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum, ut habetur in IX Metaphysicae, id est non ex hoc quod est potens bene operari, sed ex hoc quod bene operatur; ex hoc autem quod homo est perfectus secundum intellectum fit homo potens bene operari, non autem bene operans, sicut ille qui habet habitum grammaticae ex hoc ipso est potens loqui congrue, sed ad hoc quod congrue loquatur requiritur quod hoc velit quia habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator III De anima, unde patet quod bona voluntas facit hominem bene operari secundum quacumque potentiam vel habitum ratione obedientem; et ideo aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus homo ex hoc quod habet bonam voluntatem, ex hoc autem quod habet bonum intellectum non dicitur bonus homo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus vel bonus musicus; et ideo, quia electio pertinet ad voluntatem, opinio autem ad intellectum, ex electione dicimur boni vel mali, non autem ex opinione.” QDM 1.5 [Leon.23.24.191-211]: “Manifestum est autem quod in habentibus voluntatem per actum voluntatis quilibet potestina et habitus in bonum actum reducitur: . . . Non enim ex hoc ipso quod aliquis habet habitum grammatico loquitur aut bene loquitur: potest enim habens habitum non uti habitu aut contra habitum agere, sicut cum grammaticus scienter soloeesium facit; set tunc recte operatur secundum artem, quando vult. Et ideo homo qui habet bonam voluntatem dicitur simpliciter bonus homo, quasi per actum bone voluntatis omnibus que habet bene utatur, ex hoc vero quod habet habitum grammaticae, non dicitur bonus homo set bonus grammaticus; et similiter est de malo.”
Chapter VI: Passions, Habits, and Choice.

1. Choice and Habituation – The Medieval Problem

Bonnie Kent depicts the High Medieval debate on moral virtue in this way: all the master’s generally agreed that actions are good and meritorious because they are free, but they often disagreed on how to incorporate two Aristotelian elements of moral virtue into their particular accounts of freedom. On the one hand Aristotle emphasizes that a habit is a *habitus electivus* (VI.1106b36), that is, it is always bound to choice; but on the other hand habits, as second natures, act in a natural and deterministic way. These two elements, *prima facie*, seem to be intrinsically in conflict, for if the *habitus electivus* compels an agent to act deterministically, then virtue or vice destroys the voluntary act itself and hence the meritorious or blameworthy nature of virtue or vice.¹

Granting the medieval faculty psychology (we have examined Aquinas’s views in chapters 1 & 2), there were two broad explanations of moral virtue corresponding to one’s views on the relation between intellect and will. For those who offered a voluntaristic account of the will’s freedom over and against reason, the role of moral virtue was to help the will accord with reason’s dictates in spite of contrary passions. The business of moral virtue was first and foremost about making good choices. The main concern of the voluntarists, and a very important one, was to safeguard the free nature of virtuous acts. Although they had many good arguments for positing all of the moral virtues in the will, their main line of thought seems to have been this:

---

¹ Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 226.
only the will is free, as a *habitus electivus* free choice is an essential part of moral virtue, and thus moral virtues are in the will.²

If, however, one takes the will in an intellectualist sense, then the role of the virtues will be concomitantly altered and placed in the sense appetites. Consider Godfrey of Fontaines, who held that the will is efficiently moved by the intellect (in Thomistic terms, both in the line of specification and of exercise).³ As he saw it, because the will is the kind of thing that is determined by the intellect, there is no need for a virtue to help it do what it already naturally does. Godfrey thus argued that *all* of the moral virtues are in the sense appetites.⁴ He notes that the inferior appetite naturally should obey the superior appetite, but this does not always happen because the intellect is sometimes enticed by the sense appetites. The problem, as he saw it, is not between intellect and will, but between flesh and spirit, i.e., between the sense appetite and the intellect/will.⁵ In other words, for Godfrey the moral virtues exist in the sense appetites to modify the passions before they can obstruct reason and will.

Both sides agree that the moral virtues were concerned with not letting passion hinder the right use of reason and will, but the voluntarists placed their efficacy in the will (emphasizing

---

⁴ *Quodlibet* XIV.3, ed. *Philosophes Belges* V, 343: “Est ergo iustitia et omnis virtus moralis ponenda in appetitu sensitivo.”
⁵ Ibid., 342: “Sed quia in homine isti duo appetitus sunt coniuncti et inferior natus est oboedire superiori, non tamen prompte propter hoc quod frequenter alliciendo trahit contra illud quod apprehenditur a ratione per aliquid apprehensum a sensu et icto est ibi repugnantia non voluntatis ad intellectum, sed carnis, id est carnis affectionis appetitus sensitivi ad spiritum quae non contingit ex parte appetitus rationalis, sed ipsius appetitus sensitivi.”
their voluntary nature), whereas the intellectualists placed their efficacy in the sense appetites (emphasizing their role as a second nature in moderating passion). For the intellectualists the first role of moral virtue is to order passion. For the voluntarists the first role of moral virtue is good choice. For Aquinas the moral virtues are in the sense appetites and thus they moderate passions, but since they are only used when willed they are also strictly voluntary.

What I find unique about Aquinas’s view is that his position seems to be able to accommodate the important concerns of both the intellectualists and the voluntarists. He seems to be able to both have and eat his cake – on the one hand, accounting for the free nature of moral virtue, and on the other hand, accounting for how moral virtues order the passions, which is precisely what the voluntarists neglect. What distinguishes his position from the others is that his “psychological division of labor,” to use Kent’s phrase, neither has to grant excessively heavy roles to intellect, will, or the sense appetites. Scotus’s will, for example, has to do all of the heavy lifting: it must account for both the free and virtuous nature of human acts.

In Aquinas, however, moral virtue plays a smaller role. As we discussed, when considering habits and their role vis-à-vis the human soul, we are considering the soul not as form but as mover, in the way in which the soul is composed of parts. Moral virtue helps to make the parts of the potential whole work together more seamlessly. I think Aquinas would argue that the intellectualist and the voluntarist positions are both distortions of the psychological division of labor. Because the sense appetites are only virtuous to the extent that they participate in reason or are commanded by reason, in any particular virtuous act one has the full force of reason, will,

---

and sense appetites simultaneously operating along different causal lines. Reason and will actualize the potency and virtues of the sense appetites. This is precisely what it means for the sense appetites to operate as they ought.

Scotus’s position that the will was always free to choose against the practical judgment of reason severed the connection between the virtues and the parts of the soul. Because prudence is in the intellect, Scotus correctly saw that it is quite possible (although highly unlikely) to have prudence without the moral virtues in the will. For Aquinas, however, since choice always follows the practical judgment of reason and moral virtue is bound to choice, moral virtue is inseparably bound to prudence, the habit of good choice. This is not to say that for Aquinas the free agent always chooses according to prudence. It should be recalled that Aquinas holds that we are always free to act against our habits. But Aquinas does hold that any act of moral virtue is always according to the judgment of prudence. This is because any act of temperance is necessarily bound to prudence via command, for the habit of temperance is only actualized by the prudential judgment and command of reason.

However, there are some contemporary Thomists who imply that this is not the case, namely, that it is possible to have virtuous passions prior to prudential judgment. They claim that the emotions may participate in reason prior to reason’s command. In order to clarify this let us take a look at the problem of the so-called virtuous antecedent passions and the scholarly debates surrounding this issue. If these Thomists are right, this poses a problem for my thesis.

2. Temperance and the Question of Virtuous Antecedent Passion

The debate concerns whether or not there is such a thing as a virtuous antecedent passion. It strikes at the very heart of the role of moral virtue. Advocates of the existence of these kinds of passions argue that the virtuous habituation of the sense appetites makes them feel the right passions concerning the right objects spontaneously. By spontaneously they mean apart from (or antecedent to) reason’s command. In other words, like any other habit, once the emotional faculty (the sense appetites) has been properly habituated by many commands over a long period of time they will by themselves be automatically or spontaneously attracted to the right things at the right time in the right way prior to reason’s command. They argue that having good emotional responses prior to prudence’s deliberation and choice is an essential aspect of moral virtue. The temperate agent, for example, simply has the right spontaneous emotional responses before she has to think about them.\(^8\)

However, Giuseppe Butera has powerfully challenged this. Butera argues against this position for four main reasons. First, he points out that Aquinas nowhere in his corpus says there are virtuous antecedent passions. Second, since Aquinas argues that antecedent passion decreases merit (by obscuring practical reason)\(^9\) whereas virtue increases merit, it is contradictory to hold that there is a passion that is both antecedent and virtuous; for it would simultaneously increase


and decrease merit. Third, virtuous antecedent passions would displace the role of prudence. If there were passions which were reliably good prior to the command of reason, it would mean that the sense appetites could judge exactly what and to what degree some particular thing was worth pursuing, in other words, they would determine the mean, which is the precise role of prudence. Fourth, the goal of temperance is despotic or slavish control of the sense appetites, i.e., no antecedent passions at all (even thought this is unattainable). Along these lines, Butera also points out that in Christ, Adam, and Mary, who were free from the *fomes peccati*, there were no antecedent passions at all. Their sense appetites were only moved by reason’s command, that is, despotically. Granting these four reasons, which all have strong textual support, Butera concludes that there is no such thing, at least in Aquinas, as virtuous antecedent passions. 

But Butera nevertheless grants that those Thomists who argue for virtuous antecedent passions are right about moral virtue – just not about Aquinas. He argues that Aquinas’s account is deficient, since experience teaches us that virtuous antecedent passions are “an essential feature of the moral life.” Because Aquinas does not take seriously man’s affective spontaneity, Butera criticizes Aquinas for not going far enough in explaining the difference between

---


continence and temperance.\textsuperscript{12} Let us consider the experiential evidence Butera presents to manifest the deficiency:

For the virtuous person does not first stop to deliberate whether he should run over to the old man who has just slipped on a patch of ice, but appears to act without prior deliberation. Neither does he appear to choose his passion, commanding himself to feel pity on the old man. He seems to be acting from a disposition that requires no mediation by reason.\textsuperscript{13}

I bring this up because this kind of objection is often raised. It seems to me that Aquinas could easily account for this experience without leaning on virtuous antecedent passions. As far as I can tell, in such a situation reason would immediately and simply grasp what the agent must do and command would follow swiftly (unless the agent was perverted by some vice). Deliberation is only slow and time-consuming in those situations when it is not exactly clear what one ought to do; but for the most part reason judges and chooses quite quickly (often too quickly!), and in this kind of situation there is no need stop and deliberate about how best to help the old man. It is immediately obvious: apprehension, deliberate choice, and command are practically instantaneous. Thus I see no reason why the speed of the action means that it is caused by passion rather than reason’s command. From my own experience, since experiences are often brought up on this point, I immediately understand that I should help the fallen man. The emotional response seems to me to come a little more slowly, although not much. In this particular case, however, it seems to me that appealing to common experience is inherently

\textsuperscript{12} Butera, \textit{Aquinas’s Theory of Temperance}, 160.
\textsuperscript{13} Butera, dissertation, 347-48.
problematic since virtue is by definition uncommon. If something is true according to common experience we may immediately disqualify it as evidence for virtue.

Aquinas’s reasons for rejecting virtuous antecedent passions are quite persuasive. As far as I see it, for someone to say that there are virtuous antecedent passions implies that the sense appetites are essentially rational rather than rational by participation. The benefit of simply saying that temperance lowers the vehemence of antecedent passion is that the virtuous sense appetites do not need to discriminate between complicated contingents which reason may or may not judge to be good for the person. Lowering the vehemence of every antecedent passion requires no discrimination. It makes no rational kinds of judgments of any sort. Rather it lets prudence and the judgment of reason properly perform their task and it furthermore enables the sense appetites to follow whatever reason has chosen.

3. Jensen’s Objection

In an excellent article, “Virtuous Deliberation and The Passions,” Steven Jensen both defends and criticizes Butera’s thesis. Surprisingly, this is the only author who treats Butera’s argument directly. Jensen defends Butera’s claim that virtuous passions only follow reason’s

---

14 Steven Jensen also makes this point about appealing to common experience; see “Virtuous Deliberation and The Passions,” forthcoming in The Thomist. Unfortunately, the pagination for this article has not yet been set, so I cannot offer paginated references. I would also like to add that the command of the emotions, as discussed in the last chapter, is never direct (as the example implies); but in cases when one commands oneself to explicitly feel some particular emotion, it is always indirect. When Aquinas speaks of doing this, it is not in these kinds of immediate situations. But rather, for example, in the midst of temptation one can command oneself to consider hellfire or the Queen of England. It is always a command to think of something else or to move away, knowing full well that the emotions are short lived and will alter.

judgment, that is, there are no spontaneous virtuous passions, but he nevertheless argues that “virtuous deliberations are not always dry deliberations,” meaning that passions can somehow antecedently assist us in deliberating about what ought to be done. Virtuous deliberation, he argues, is not simply without passion, that is, it is not completely “dry.”

First, Jensen argues that the words antecedent and consequent should not be understood primarily in a temporal sense, but in a causal sense. Antecedent means that which causes the passion, and consequent means that which is caused by the passion. Once this distinction is made, it is possible for there to be passions temporally prior to the judgment of reason that do not have a causal influence and thus are not strictly antecedent. These are called propassions, which are temporally prior but without any causal influence. Furthermore, Jensen argues that choice is

---


---

16 He cites QDV 26. 7; QDM 3.11 and I-II, 77. 6. Lombardo also criticizes Butera for taking antecedent and consequent temporally, see *Logic of Desire*, 186, n. 208, and p. 110. But Lombardo does not argue for a causal role, he argues instead that “antecedent passions primarily implies dissonance with the will’s preexisting inclinations and affections,” ibid., 110. For Lombardo an antecedent passion is simply a disordered spontaneous passion, see p. 211. Titus also criticizes the view that the term antecedent is temporal, see “Passions in Christ,” 74-78. Both Titus and Lombardo hold the view that antecedent passions are only concerned with illicit objects. But Aquinas is quite clear that we have antecedent passions for both bad and good objects. For examples of antecedent passions towards good objects see QDM 3.1 [Leon.23.90.41-47] and I-II 77.6 ad 2 [St. Paul, 889].

17 He cites the following persuasive text, QDV 26.7[Leon.22/3.773.102-111]: “. . . passiones animae in duplici ordine se possunt habere ad voluntatem, vel ut praecedentes ipsam vel ut consequentes: ut praecedentes quidem in quantum passiones voluntatem impellunt ad aliquid volendum, ut consequentes vero prout ex ipsa vehementia voluntatis per qudamdam redundantium commovetur inferior appetitus secundum has passiones, vel etiam in quantum ipsa voluntas has passiones procurat sponte et excitat.” He also cites QDM 3.11 and ST I-II 77.6. Jensen seems to have been influenced by Claudia Eisen Murphy who also offers a causal account of antecedent and consequent passions, see “Responsibility for Our Emotions,” 182-84, 190.
not the pivot around which the terms antecedent and consequent turns, but they pivot around
the kind of judgment of reason (volition follows cognition/judgment\textsuperscript{18}) that will as nature
follows. Jensen takes the will as nature to follow upon reason’s judgments about anything
considered in itself, by which he means apart from any consideration of the end. Thus in
deliberation one may consider bitter medicine (apart from the health [the end] which it may
cause), and this consideration will cause revulsion in the will and a corresponding passion in the
sense appetites. Passions can only follow the will as nature and not the will as reason since
passions cannot be concerned with the ultimate end.\textsuperscript{19}

This move enables Jensen to say that passions may positively assist us in deliberation
prior to choice, since antecedent/propassion and consequent may refer to a judgment within
deliberation that focuses “our attention upon the important features of actions.” Thus my prior
judgment will cause an emotion that will help my posterior deliberation focus on some important
aspect of something. Butera is right to insist that only virtuous passions are consequent, but if we
jettison choice as the pivot around which antecedent and consequent turn and rather expand the
notion of judgment to include judgments within deliberation, then we can have judgments within
deliberation that cause consequent passions (which may be good) that positively assist

\textsuperscript{18} I bring this up because there are texts in which Aquinas suggests that antecedent and consequent are
relative to volition. See. QDV 26.7 cited in the previous note; DM 3.11; ST I-II, 77.6. Jensen then notes that volition
always follows cognition and thus it is really cognition or judgment that is important.

\textsuperscript{19} This is because the sense appetite cannot seek such a thing. He cites In III Sent 17.1.2 sol. 1, but we
could also add the following text: QDM 7.1[Leon.23.159.321-27]. On the will as nature Jensen says, “The will as
natural, on the other hand, follows upon the judgment of reason – judgment taken in the broader sense – concerning
an object considered in itself, without including its relation to the ultimate end. It considers, for instance, the taking
of bitter medicine in itself, without any consideration of how this action is ordered to health or to the ultimate end.” I
disagree with the characterization of the will as natural, for which see my discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 below.
deliberation and choice prior to the choice itself. Jensen refrains from calling these virtuous passions, but they are nevertheless something like good passions prior to choice.

Although I think it is a promising philosophical thesis in its own right, I am not convinced that the thesis is as compatible with Aquinas’s thought as Jensen suggests. Jensen is quite straightforward that Aquinas does not put it like this, but he argues that it is a logical extension of Aquinas’s thought. To which I will reply as follows: first, to sever the will as nature from the end of choice is to overlook a central role of this kind of volition, which is precisely to provide the ends of choice. For my part, I am unwilling to bind passion to either volition, since both can cause passions by redundantia, if the volition is powerful. But I would suggest that most passions rather follow upon the will as reason, which is not directly concerned with the end in itself, but the particular means to that end. Since the will as reason follows thinking about particulars, it is inherently involved with the internal senses, which can directly cause passions along the ways that we discussed in the previous chapter.

But more importantly, Jensen’s wish to unhinge the terms antecedent and consequent from choice and rather tie them to any judgment within deliberation seems problematic to me. Antecedent passion decreases merit, which is rooted in choice, and choice is the principle of

\[\text{20} \] Furthermore, if passion only follows upon this kind of consideration, then there could be no passion following upon electio, which is precisely an act of the will as reason. See ST III 18.4[St. Paul, 1965]: “electio autem est idem quod voluntas ut ratio, et est proprius actus liberi arbitrii, . . .” If there is no passion following upon choice then the whole point of increased responsibility for the consequent passions is lost, since we are not free concerning will as nature.

\[\text{21} \] ST I-II 77.6 [St. Paul, 889]: “Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores: non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitivo.” For a passage explicitly connecting redundantia to electio see QDV 25.4 [Leon.22/3.727.62-72].

\[\text{22} \] QDV 26.7 ad 1[Leon.22/3.774.157-67]: “. . . perfecta ratio laudabilis et vituperabilis consistit in
the goodness and badness of human actions. This is why the terms antecedent and consequent pivot around choice, *electio* or *liberum arbitrium* (which are the same). The whole point of the distinction (between antecedent and consequent) is to explain how passions are related to merit. To remove choice as the pivot is to take away the grounds for discussing merit. When these passions go before and cause choice, their causal role detracts from the free nature of the decision and thus take away some of the blame or praise owed to the act. When the passions are caused by our free choices, then they reflect our free choice and rather magnify the praise or blame owed to the act. Deliberations, however, are neither good nor bad, but only choices are good or bad. If Jensen is right that antecedent and consequent can be about any judgment in deliberation, since Aquinas insists that these passions decrease and increase merit respectively, one could increase or decrease merit prior to choice, which is impossible. Humans are neither good nor bad based on their deliberations, but on their choices. In any case, Aquinas often uses the exact words *electio* and *liberum arbitrium,* and when he does not use them, I hold that he means them.

---

\[23\] See texts in chapter 5, n. 128.

\[24\] ST I-II 77.6 [St. Paul, 889]: “Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Passio autem est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores: non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitiivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praeceedit actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non ex impulso passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens. Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit voluntarium. – Passio autem consequens non diminuit
Jensen is absolutely right, however, to emphasize that antecedent and consequent must involve causality of some sort, but I nevertheless also hold that the temporal distinction pivoting around choice, *electio*, still holds. Choices happen at a point in time\textsuperscript{26} and it follows that passions that exert a causal influence on choice must thus also temporally precede that choice, and passions that are caused by choice must also be temporally posterior to choice.\textsuperscript{27} We can

\hspace{1cm}

\footnotesize

\(^{25}\) In *IV Sent.* 50.2.4 qc. 2: “Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod misericordia vel compassio potest inveniri in aliquo dupliciter: uno modo per modum passionis; alio modo per modum *electionis*. In beatis autem non erit aliqua passio in parte inferiori, nisi consequens *electionem* rationis; unde non erit in eis compassio vel misericordia, nisi secundum rationis *electionem*. Hoc autem modo *ex electione* misericordia vel compassio nascitur, prout scilicet aliquis vult malum alterius repelli; unde in illis *qua non volumus secundum judicium rationis repelli*, . . .” Emphases are mine, but see the next few lines of this text as well. In this text, for example, he clearly means *electio*, and this is what he means by the phrase *qua non volumus secundum judicium rationis repelli*, even though he does not use the word *electio*. Jensen argues that because Aquinas uses the phrase judgment of reason in different ways (he cites ST I-II, 15.4; I-II, 14.1; II-II, 47.8; QDV 17.1 ad 4) all of these passages on antecedent and consequent passions are ambiguous. It is true that Aquinas will use the phrase to mean different things in different contexts, but I think it is very clear that in this context (and the parallel texts) he means choice, both since he often expressly uses the word *electio*, and since he sometimes uses the phrase to mean choice (e.g., this passage) and since the argument about merit only makes sense because he mean choice. Thus I don’t think Aquinas is particularly ambiguous. It seems to me that Jensen is rather criticizing Aquinas’s account of choice and all its various “moments” as too rigid and fixed, especially the difference between deliberation, choice, and execution. For another example where he is clearly using *iudicium rationis* to mean the act of *liberum arbitrium*, see ST I-II 77.6 ad 2 [St. Paul, 889], and its clarification in ST I-II 77.6 [St. Paul, 889]; see also QDM 3.11[Leon.23.90.28-59]. N.B. Aquinas’s use of *electionis* in I-II 24.3 ad 1, refers to deliberately and self-consciously choosing to feel a particular emotion; both this and the *redundantia* there mentioned are consequent to free choice, see I-II, 77.6.

\(^{26}\) The best discription of this is in the questions about whether angels sinned in the first instant of their creation. Granting that Angelic time is different, there is nevertheless a real temporal before and after in their choice, see QDM 16.4 [Leon.23.298-300.343-45]. The point is that choice happens in an instant. Before we have not sinned and afterwards we have, but we are not culpable until that very temporal instant.

\(^{27}\) See for example, QDV 26.7 ad 3 [Leon.22/3.774.193-200]: “Et inde est quod passio *electionem praeveniens* impedit actum virtutis, in quantum impedit iudicium rationis quod necessarium est in eligendo; *postquam* vero pufo iudicio rationis iam *electio est perfecta*, passio *sequens* plus prodest quam noceat, quia etsi in aliquo turbet rationis iudicium, facit tamen ad promptitudinem executionis.” Emphases are mine. See also, for example, QDM 12.1 [Leon.23.235-36.206-219]: “… *ira et alie huiusmodi passiones dupliciter se possunt habere ad iudicium rationis*: uno modo antecedenter, et sic necesse est ut semper *ira* et omnis huiusmodi passio iudicium rationis impediat, quia anima maxime iudicare potest ueritatem in tranquillitate quadam mentis; unde Philosophus etiam dicit quod in quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens. Alio modo potest se habere *ira* ad iudicium rationis ut
make the distinction like this. Concerning passions that are temporally prior to choice, we
can distinguish between antecedent passions, which detrimentally affect choice, and propassions,
which do not detrimentally affect choice. Every consequent passion, however, is temporally
posterior to choice and caused by it.

Let us introduce Aquinas’s distinction between perfect and imperfect passion. Perfect
passion has four characteristics; 1) it comes from some external source (not the will), 2) it is
quite vehement, 3) it affects man’s highest part, reason, and not only the sense appetite, and 4) it
affects reason adversely. The full ratio of passion means suffering something external,
something relatively powerful, and something that truly affects us all the way to our highest part,
and it is something that cannot be easily ignored. It is felt and we are moved by it, that is, it drags
our reason down towards it. The causal chain must at least partially have its origin from outside
of the person, rooted in some external object or event beyond one’s control. Nor are mild
passions perfect, since we are not really suffering them. A perfect passion affects our reason
quite vehemently and thus adversely destroys its equanimity. Furthermore, commanded

28 The best passage on perfect passion is QDV 26.8 [Leon.22/3.775-776.93-145], but see also ST III 15.4
[St. Paul, 1944]; 15.6 ad 1 [St. Paul,1946]; 15.7 ad 1 [St. Paul, 1947]; 46.7 ad 3 [St. Paul, 2096].
29 This vocabulary of “yanking” and “dragging,” as a way of translating trahere comes from Kevin White,
"The Passions of the Soul (IaIIae, qq.22-48),” in Essays in the Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Ed. by S. Pope
30 In III Sent. 15.2.3 sol. 3 expos. [Moos.504-05]: “Et dicendum quod passio importat immutationem
patientis. Non autem dicitur aliquis immutari simpliciter, quando id quod est principale in ipso immutatum
permanet. Et ideo simpliciter loquendo, quando ratio non immutatur a sui aequalitate vel aequitate, non dicitur
passio, sed propassio, quasi imperfecta passio. Et hoc modo fuit in Christo. Et ideo dicendum ad primum quod
propassio proprae loquendo, est immutatio inferioris partis tantum; et ideo quando talis immutatio in nobis accidunt,
non praeceditur a ratione, ideo Glossa [L. 114, 94] secundum statum potentiarum in nobis loquens, dicit
propassionem subitum motum. In Christo autem alter fuit, ut ex dictis patet. Nec tamen est verum quod omnis
passions are not fully passions since we are “suffering” something from ourselves, but
perfect passions requires some external source. This last point is important because it means that
consequent passions are not perfect passions. An antecedent passion is a perfect passion; it is
most truly and fully what a passion is.

Aquinas distinguishes these perfect passions from imperfect passions or propassions that
do not meet these criteria but are also temporally prior to choice. The reason for the distinction is
to explain how Christ could suffer passions that in no way incline him to sinning mortally or
venially. How can Christ be fully human and suffer passion if it is the case that passions as a
result of original sin and by their very ratio incline reason away from good judgment? The
answer is that Christ does not have perfect passions but imperfect passions, i.e., propassions,
whose defining characteristic is that they do not adversely affect reason, but remain inchoate in
the sense appetites.31

Not only did Christ have propassions, but also Adam, Eve, Mary, and even the virtuous
have them.32 Jensen concludes that because Christ’s propassions were vehement, it follows that
the propassions of the virtuous may also be vehement. However, Jensen notes that a propassion

\[
\text{subitus motus sensualitatis sit peccatum veniale; sed tunc tantum quando est in illicitum tendens: quod in Christo
nullatenus fuit. Ad secundum dicendum quod dicitur non esse passio quia non est perfecta passio, quamvis sit de
genere passionis; sicut ea quae parva sunt, quasi pro nihilo reputantur; sicut dicit Damascenus, “passio proprie est,
quando habet aliquam magnitudinem perceptibilem.”}
\]

31 See QDV 26.8 [Leon.22/3.776.131-38]: “Tunc autem totaliter homo per huiusmodi affectus transmutatur
quando non solum sistunt in appetitu inferiori, sed trahunt ad se etiam superiorem; quando vero in solo appetitu
inferiori sunt, tunc homo immutatur eis quasi secundum partem, unde sic dicuntur propassiones, primo autem modo
passiones.” ST III 15.4 [1944]: “Quia in nobis quandoque huiusmodi motus non sistunt in appetitu sensitivo, sed
trahunt rationem. Quod in Christo non fuit: quia motus naturaliter humanae carni convenientes sic ex eius
dispositione in appetitu sensitivo manebant quod ratio ex his nullo modo impediebatur facere quae conveniebant. . . .
ut passio perfecta intelligatur quando animo, idest rationi, dominatur; propassio autem, quando est inchoata in
appetitu sensitivo, sed ulterius non se extendit.” On the historical predecessors of propassion see Gondreau, The
Passions of Christ’s Soul, 67-70 and 366-372.

32 See QDV 26.8 [Leon.22/3.776].
does not adversely affect reason either on the strength of the higher powers or on account of a passion’s low vehemence. I would argue that, being untouched by original sin and full of grace, and experiencing the beatific vision, the strength of His higher powers can suffer far more vehement passions that do not disturb or affect His reason. Furthermore, the antecedent/consequent distinction is not exactly the same for Christ as it is for us. Christ chose to suffer these passions in choosing to assume human nature and its defects (in which the passions are included) in order to suffer for man’s redemption. In this sense, there is no such thing as an unforeseen passion for Christ, and I would argue that all of his passions are quasi consequent and thus somewhat different than ours. It seems to me to be somewhat like a courageous man who is fully aware of what terrible pains and sorrows are coming, but who nevertheless chooses to suffer them. Christ’s propassions are nevertheless temporally prior to his free choices, but they do not have the detrimental effects of perfect passions.

---

33 CT I.232 [Leon.42.181.26-30]: “Iam enim supra dictum est quod anima Christi perfecta Dei visione fruebatur. Superior igitur ratio animae Christi, que rebus eternis contemplandis et consulendis inheret, nichil habebat adversum aut repugnans ex quo aliqua nocuenti passio in ea locum haberet.” To see that the higher powers in Christ were not affected by the lower, see ST III, 46.7 & 8 [St. Paul, 2096-97]. This kind of passage would make one wonder if propassions were at all applicable to virtuous humans, were it not for the fact that Aquinas explicitly says that they are in other passages.

34 Super Mt. [rep. Leodegarii Bissuntini], cap. 26 l. 5. “Ideo notandum quod quandoque tristitia accidit secundum passionem, aliquando secundum propassionem. Secundum passionem, quando aliquid patitur et immutatur: sed quando patitur, et non immutatur, tunc habet passionem. Sed quandoque huiusmodi sunt in nobis, ita quod ratio immutatur, et tunc passiones sunt complectae: quando autem ratio non immutatur, tunc est propassio. Sed in Christo numquam fuit ratio immutata; ideo fuit propassio, et non passio. Unde signanter dicit Evangelista coepit tristari. Item dicit Augustinus quod nos habemus tristitiam ut contractam, Christus autem ut assumptam: illud enim contrahitur quod nascendo per originem habetur, sed Christus assumpsit naturam nostram ut voluit; ideo non fuit necessitas quod passibilitatem acciperet, ut tristitiam, sed a voluntate.” See also ST III 15.4 [St. Paul, 1944] and ad 1: “anima Christi poterat quidem resistere passionibus, ut non ei supervenirent: praeertim virtute divina. Sed propria voluntate se passionibus subieciabat, tam corporalibus quam animalibus.” Among defects that Christ did not assume, however, was the pronitas ad malum, see ST III 14.4 [St. Paul, 1941], i.e., he did not assume the fomes peccati III 15.2 [St. Paul, 1943]. Perfect passion is precisely part of the fomes. Thus there is no possibility for perfect passion in prelapsarian man. For a discussion of Christ’s coassumed defects see Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 166-176.
The propassions of Adam, Eve and Mary are also substantially different than the propassions of the virtuous. Untouched by original sin, their reason was supernaturally united to God, by whose power the sense appetites were despotically controlled. Because of the graced power of their reason and will there was no possibility of the inferior dragging around the superior. Moreover, many passions that commonly have this effect, e.g., fear and anger were simply absent in paradise. Mary is an interesting case, since Aquinas both wants to grant her the inheritance of original sin (so that she can be saved by Christ) but also free her from the fomes, which inseparably follow upon original sin. What Aquinas does in her case is argue that grace completely and utterly binds her sense appetites so that she simply does not feel them (non sensit) and with the help of divine providence God insures that nothing illicit draws her (analogous to the manner in which there simply are no evils in Eden).

For the remainder of us humans, grace does not take away the fomes, the inherited disorder. Grace grants the person the power to overcome this internal disorder, but it does not remove it. Venial sins are simply a permanent part of the postlapsarian condition. For us, vehement passions temporally prior to choice are inherently disordered, since reason cannot think clearly about what should be done when they are present. A permanent legacy of original sin is the loss of original justice by which reason controls the sense appetites. Now that we have lost this despotic control, the stronger or louder the passion, the more troublesome it is and the more it will disturb reason. There is no question of simply being rid of illicit objects through

---

35 ST I 95.2 [St. Paul, 462]; QDV 26.8[Leon.22/3.775-777.86-185]
36 CT 224 [Leon.42.175-76.48-97]. See esp lines 55-62: “Et quia veniale peccatum interdum ex surreptione contingit, ex hoc scilicet quod aliquis inordinatus concupiscientiae motus insurgit, aut alterius passionis, praeveniens rationem, ratione cus primi motus dicuntur esse peccata, consequens est, quia beata Virgo Maria nunquam venialiiter peccavit, quod inordinatos passionum motus non sensorit.”
paradise or providence. What is left, however, is some tinkering with passion’s vehemence.

The propassions of the virtuous are mild because the habits of moral virtue restrain them, and because they are mild they do not affect reason adversely.  

Concerning passions prior to choice Aquinas only distinguishes between those that adversely affect reason and those that do not. Some may wish that Aquinas had included a category for passions that positively affect reason prior to choice. He seems to think this is impossible, for he claims that even if one happens to have a “good” passion prior to choice, this will be by chance. He offers the classic example (now thanks to Kant) of beneficence. If someone would unthinkingly act on the passion of doing good to another, this action will be imprudent, and perhaps even detrimental to the recipient, since he has not properly thought through what he is doing. A great part of passion is precisely that it comes from without, e.g., the person who arouses pity, the perceived injustice, the threat of impending death, and the plate of freshly baked cookies, etc. To these external things and events must always be added the workings of the inner senses, which may form the passions in all sorts of interesting and complex ways. All of this happens rather automatically and unconsciously. And each passion makes a claim on human actions: eat cookies, flee death, seek revenge, give money, etc. It may be that

---

37 QDV 26.8 [Leon.22/3.776.146-59]: “Sciendum est ergo quod in hominibus in statu viae, si sunt peccatores, sunt passiones respectu boni et respectu mali, quandoque quidem non solum praecavisae sed etiam subitae et intensae et frequenter etiam perfectae; unde dicuntur “passionum sectatores” in I Ethicorum. In iustis vero nunquam sunt perfectae, quia ratio in eis nunquam deducitur a passionibus; sunt tamen vehementes in imperfectis, sed in perfectis sunt debiles, inferioribus viribus per habitum virtutum moralium refrenatis; habent tamen passiones non solum praecavisae sed etiam subitas, et non solum respectu boni sed etiam respectu mali.”

38 QDV 26.7 [Leon.22/3.773.112-24]: “Secundum igitur quod [passiones] sunt praecedentes voluntatem, sic diminuunt de ratione laudabilis, quia laudabilis est actus voluntatis secundum quod est per rationem ordinatus in bonum secundum debitam mensuram et modum. Qui quidem modus et mensura non servatur nisi cum actio ex discretione fit; quae quidem discretio non servatur cum homo ex impetu passionis ad aliquid volendum etiamsi sit bonum, provocatur, sed erit circa modum actionis secundum quod impetus passionis est Magnus vel parvus; et sic non nisi a casu continget quod debita mensura servetur.”
one ought to do what the passion advocates, but chances are that it won’t, and one cannot
know unless one thinks about it: the ways to go wrong are infinite; the ways to go right are very
few and require prudence. Choice is from within, passions are from without; a right passion
prior to choice is ultimately by chance since these external causes are beyond us and happen
(accedit) to us or are accidental (accidentalis). Despite all our own contributions to the formal
object of the passion via the inner senses, there is nevertheless a real way in which passions are
external material causes that pass though us as we suffer the world through them.

I have only found two examples in Aquinas’ massive oeuvre that speak of some kind of
good passions prior to choice: moderate pain can help to focus our attention on removing the
cause of that pain, and fear may cause us to deliberate with a little more attention. In both
cases Aquinas is very clear that these passions are not vehement. There is a direct proportion
between the vehemence of a passion and its power to adversely affect reason. However, this

39 ST I-II 77.6 [St. Paul, 889]: Actus enim intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis
existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid
agunt, non ex impulso passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens.” QDV 28.8 [Leon.22/3.776.114-124]:
“Secundo per hoc quod passio totaliter est ab extrinseco vel est ab aliquo principio intrinseco; magis salvatur ratio
passionis quando est ab extrinseco quam quando est ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco quidem est quando passio subito
concitatur ex occursu alicuius convenientis vel nocivi, ab intrinseco autem quando ex ipsa voluntate passiones istae
causantur per modum qui est dictus; et tunc non sunt subitae cum sequantur iudicium rationis.” QDM 3.13 ad 5
[Leon.23.95.153-160]: Impulsio que est ex passione diminuit peccatum, quia est quasi ex exteriori. Impulsio autem
quae est ex voluntate, auget peccatum: . . .”
40 I-II 37.1 ad 1 [St. Paul, 714].
41 I-II 44.4 [St. Paul, 731].
42 Titus, Passions in Christ, 76, on the other hand, implies that the term “antecedent passion” only refers to
a passion that alone caused the act of the person. He seems to take antecedent as all or nothing. If passion is the sole
cause of the act, then it is an antecedent passion and detrimental, but if it does not then it is neither antecedent nor
detrimental. Perhaps Titus is taking this from an example in QDM 3.11[Leon.23.90.41-43] in which Aquinas
compares someone who acts only from passion with someone who only acts from reason. In this case it is of course
ture that the one is worse than the other, but it does not follow that antecedent passion only refers to the extreme
case. If a passion were truly the sole cause of the act, then the act would not be voluntary at all, and thus the story of
antecedent passion would simply be one of very violent passion, see ST I-II, 6.7 ad 3 [St. Paul, 593] and ST I-II10.3
[St. Paul, 606-607](but also note Aquinas’s claim that sometimes reason is not totally absorbed or bound by passion,
does not mean that a mild passion cannot affect reason *at all*, just not so much that reason has a hard time considering other alternatives. So long as they are mild and do not distort reason or excessively draw the will, they may certainly be granted the role of adding a partial, but secondary, causal role in deliberation.

This leads to Jenson’s more general point, namely, that dispassionate deliberation is dry and cold, and that according to Butera’s thesis the “virtuous person feels no passions or emotions prior to deliberation.” But virtuous deliberation is not completely without passion, just not passion that obscures clear-sighted deliberation, draws reason towards what it wants, and causes internal struggle. Mild passions are still passions. Moreover, Aquinas gives a tremendous role to the will in deliberation, which as an appetite is quite moved, for it is attracted, repulsed, hopeful, it takes pleasure, etc., in its own way. I mean to say that I think it unfair to call virtuous deliberation “dry” simply because one is not granting perfect passion a causal role. Of course, since most of us are not virtuous, our own deliberations are rather “wet” and often a bit too passionate. But it seems to me that virtuous deliberations should rather be considered to be peaceful, serene, and in a certain sense passionate, referring to the analogous way that one can

---

43 One might object that vehement consequent passions equally distort reason, so any vehement passion is bad. Aquinas notes that it is impossible to consider spiritual goods during procreation and that it is quite rational to at times choose to lose control of reason. If it were not, he humorously notes, sleeping would be a sin. ST II-II 153.2 [St. Paul, 1675-76].
call the will’s motions passions, but also referring to our experience of real but mild passions.
I don’t think that such a virtuous person would consider his deliberations to be dry and sterile.
Whenever I have had moments of calm deliberation, I am always grateful for them; they seem 
more lucid and they are even at times pleasant in a way that more “wet” deliberations are not.

The general point is that the higher powers of the soul should rule the lower. In virtuous 
human beings this happens rather peacefully and despotically; most of us, however, are more like 
democracies, where all sorts of differing constituents with relatively equal power are loudly 
arguing with one another and claiming their right to decide the course of events. This analogy is 
repugnant to our modern sensibilities, of course, but we must put our correct political 
sensibilities aside to grasp the point. Either the higher rules the lower with pleasure and ease or it 
often painfully struggles with it. For my part, I long for peace and quiet.

4. Habits in Thomistic Scholarship

There has been some interesting research on the manner in which habits perfect the 
powers, which has trickled outwards though the scholarship, primarily the work of Servais 
Pinkaers and Vernon Bourke. Pinkaers, in an article entitled “Virtue is Not a Habit,” has argued 
that a virtue is not a habit as a common rote habit; rather virtue is something altogether different. 
Thus we should not translate it as habit but should leave it untranslated as *habitus*, which

---

44 Part of the analogy is also that the sense appetites have a motion and cauality of their own. We have discussed this in chapter 4. But this is not diminished or taken away when the higher powers become more despotic, and the lower participates in or obeys the higher. What happens in the despotic case is that the sense appetites act according to their own causal efficacy on the comand of reason, rather than simply as a response to external sensibles and/or vice. The sense appetites acts according to their full integrity as sense appetites in either case. But the latter more despotic alternative is even better, since then it acts according to its nature, i.e., as it should participate in reason as prelapsarian man was created.
signifies that virtue is dynamic. However, I must confess that I do not quite understand exactly what this means. Sometimes it seems to mean that a habit has its own inner dynamic spontaneity, which apparently operates on its own. To say that the habits are only actualized when willed is to reject the all-important Aristotelian hylomorphism and to fall into an unbridgeable Cartesian dualism. The sense appetites are the place where the material and immaterial meet and above all these habits are dynamic participations in reason. I fully support the view that Aquinas’s hylomorphism is unique and interesting, but one moves far too quickly when claiming that certain interpretations of Aquinas’s ethics are incompatible with his hylomorphism.

There is another interesting and oft-cited source for this kind of dynamic language. Vernon Bourke characterizes a habit as a “metaphysical perfectant,” and by this he means to


46 Pinkaer’s does this in the Pinkaers Reader, 278-82. For other authors who hold the same position see Romanus Cessario’s statement that Aquinas’s moral realism “rejects all forms of anthropological dualism, an aspect that Simon Harak is also at pains to substantiate” in The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991) 65. And see Simon Harak, Virtuous Passions, 7-19, but also the remainder of the book. Gondreau, “Passions and the Moral Life,” 422-26; Tom Ryan, “Aquinas’ Integrated View of Emotions, Morality and the Person,” Pacifica 14 (2001), 55-70. Aquinas never jumps from his hylomorphism to some particular ethical postions. The following is the closest that I have seen Aquinas doing some such thing: QDM 12.1[Leon.23.235.195-205]: “Sic ergo, quia natura hominis composita est ex anima et corpore et ex natura intellectiva et sensitiva, ad bonum hominis pertinet quod secundum se totum virtuti subdatur, scilicet et secundum partem intellectivam et secundum partem sensitivam et secundum corpus; et ideo ad virtutem hominis requiritur ut appetitus debite vindicte non solum sit in parte rationali anime set etiam sit in parte sensitiva et in ipso corpore, et ipsum corpus moveatur ad serviendum virtuti.” This argument does not commit one to any more or less voluntaristic, dualistic, hylomorphic, or Cartesian understanding of moral virtue. It is perfectly compatible with the position that virtuous emotions are in the lower parts as commanded by the higher parts. But usually Aquinas moves in the other direction, i.e., from human acts to hylomorphism, e.g., because the soul’s highest operations are immaterial, it cannot be the case that the soul is completely material form, etc. – but such arguments and statements are far from being ethical positions.

47 Vernon J. Bourke, “Habitus as a Perfectant of Potency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Ph.D. dissertation, (University of Toronto, Toronto, 1938); and for a far more expanded treatment of the same topic see his
emphasize the manner in which a habit perfects a power: it is not completely in potency (since it is actually a quality), but nor is it completely in act (since it is in potency to operation), hence the term “perfectant,” not quite perfect but becoming so, not quite potency and not quite act—according to him this is a kind of “metaphysical scandal.” Bourke uses the English word dynamic to mean Aristotle’s Greek dynamis, in the sense of being in potency to or ordered to operation. Thomists often cite Bourke’s later article in support of the view that a habitus is dynamic; however, in his almost never cited and very good dissertation he suggests that a habit’s dynamic character as a “perfectant” lies not only in its order to operation but also in the causality of the will. Hence, he seems to mean by this word something quite different from what those who cite him suppose he does.

Bernard Ryosuke Inagaki, however, in an also oft-cited article on habits criticizes Thomists (and Bourke) for neglecting Thomas’s most significant and original claim, namely, that virtue is according to nature; indeed, “the uniqueness of Aquinas’s position can hardly be overemphasized.” The problem with Inagaki’s article is that his conception of nature is unclear.


48 Bourke, “Habitus as a Perfectant,” 104.

49 Bourke, The Role of Habitus., 104. Although I do not think this is so very scandalous, since habits are passive and active in different respects, he is absolutely right to point out that virtues are metaphysical perfections of the powers of the soul with active and passive elements.

50 Bourke, Habitus as Perfectant, 25, and 65-66.

51 Bernard Ryosuke Inagaki, “Habitus and Natura in Aquinas,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 166-7. Inagaki cites the following passage on p.168: ST I-II 49.3 : “. . . non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed respiciat naturam.” However, I must confess that I do not understand all of Inagaki’s article, and much of what I understand I am unwilling to embrace. For example, I do not agree with his thesis that habit is the best way to arrive at an understanding of nature (that no quidditative knowledge comes from knowledge of the acts of the soul, but it does come through knowledge of habits, 161-62). It is unclear to me what exactly he ultimately thinks nature is. For Inagaki’s debt to and abandonment of Bourke see n.3 on p. 159.
But if Bourke may perhaps be criticized for neglecting the role of nature in habits, I think it worth pointing out that Inagaki has neglected the role of the powers of the soul in his study. To examine the role of habits in nature without emphasizing the powers of the soul is surely to overlook the crucial sense of nature as a principle of motion ordered to operation. Conversely, a habit’s role as a metaphysical perfectant, to use Bourke’s terminology, is only fully intelligible in light of nature as potential whole, i.e., a rational nature as a living principle of operation. The perfection of the parts (the powers) is only intelligible in light of the whole of which they are the parts. For example, the perfection of the sense appetites is only intelligible in light of its natural and at times conflicted relation to reason and will. If one tries to examine moral virtues as simply metaphysical perfections, as Bourke often does, much of the sense of perfection is lost.\textsuperscript{52} There is no good way to consider the perfection of a moral virtue in abstraction from the other powers of the soul – it is always necessarily bound to reason and will, man’s bodily nature, and his concupiscence.

5. Courage: A Test Case

\textsuperscript{52} Perhaps Bourke’s emphasis on the intellectual virtues enabled him to prescind a little too much from the whole of which the intellectual virtues are parts. In ST I-II, 56.3 [St. Paul, 779-80] and QDV 7 [Marietti, 724-5] Aquinas argues that properly speaking it is the moral virtues which are habits and virtues; this is because it is through the appetitive powers that we are ordered to the good (and virtue makes man good) and through the will that we are ordered to the human good. Virtues are thus in the will or in a power moved by the will. Even though the habit of knowledge makes someone potentially knowing, one is only actually knowing when one \textit{wills} to know. Intellectual virtues are only actually virtues insofar as they are related to the will. In any case, it seems to me that this is a bit of a problem for Bourke: he is offering an account of what a habit of virtue essentially is by focusing on what is not most essentially a habit of virtue (the intellectual virtues). This is not to say that the intellectual virtues are not in a certain respect higher than the moral virtues, but this is not insofar as they are virtuous habits. If one wants to know what a virtuous habit essentially is, one is better off studying moral virtues and focusing on the role of the appetitive powers and on how all of the powers are ordered to one another. Thus I hope that this study may serve as a compliment to Bourke’s, which I like very much despite these criticisms.
This dissertation has for the most part used temperance when discussing how the sense appetites participate in reason. This is partially because temperance is far less complex than courage and partly because the original passage from EN I, 13, clearly concerns temperance, as the example of incontinence shows. For the most part, however, I have been discussing moral virtue in general, but I wish to consider briefly the specific virtue of courage to bring out some of the central points of this study.

Concerning the question of the virtuous antecedent passions, it is hard to imagine what these would look like in the case of courage. The reason that this is so difficult is because the object of the irascible appetite is far more complex than that of the concupiscible appetite. In the case of temperance one could conceive of material objects, e.g., food, drink and sex. And as we discussed in chapter 4, the concupiscible appetite seems to be able to be moved apart from the higher internal senses, the cogitative and memorative power. It seems to be able to be moved directly by the external senses, common sense and the imagination. But this is not the case with the more complex irascible appetite whose motion or passion always presupposes the cogitative power. Thus the passions of the irascible appetite are always somewhat rational.

---
53 See chapt. 4, n.27.
54 Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions,” Review Of Metaphysics 56 [2003]: 540-41 and Mark Drost “Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Emotions,” International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991): 449-460. Both argue that the cogitative power must be involved in every emotion, specifying the formality under which the material object of the passion is desired, hated, feared etc. However, I don’t think Aquinas says enough to draw such a conclusion. He only argues for the estimative power in animals to account for their more complex operations, for the lesser ones there seems to be no need for it. It seems to me that it is the same for man. Does the human desire to mate really require the cogitative power? Irrational animals apparently have no need for their parallel aestimative power in such cases, why should we? What about food? However, Aquinas is very clear that the cogitative power is needed in all irascible emotions. His emphasis for cogitation in the more complex irascible passions seems to me to cast doubt on whether cogitation is necessary for all concupiscible passions. However Drost is good at explaining that a passion not only directs one to a material object, but a formality under which that material object is desired or
As I discussed in chapter 4, I am agnostic when it comes to drawing the line between reason and the cogitative power. I have read all of the texts that I have been able to find and it at least seems clear to me that the cogitative power is necessarily required in any practical reasoning about particulars if it involves applying a general principle to an individual case; but it is not clear to me where the one begins and the other leaves off, or exactly what differing roles these two mutually reinforcing powers and causes each contribute. Nevertheless, the point I wished to make is that the object of the irascible appetite’s passion, the difficult good in the hated. Drost argues that this formality must always come from the cogitative power, but I am not so sure. If he is right, it follows that all human passions are somewhat rational. I am willing to say this for the irascible passions, but I am not sure about the passions of the concupiscible appetite. Josef Jacob in *Passiones: Ihr Wesen und ihre Anteilnahme an der Vernunft nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Vienna, Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1958), argues that the way to grasp the manner in which the sense appetites participate in reason is entirely reducible to the question of how the cogitative power works, see pp. 82-87.

55 I have examined these passages. For the *vis aestimativa*: In II Sent. 20.2.2 ad5; III.17.1.1; III.35.1.2; IV.49.2.2; QDV 1.11; 15.1; 18.7.ad 7; 24.2; 25.2; SCG II.47, 48, 60; In VI Ethic 7; 9; De sensu et sensato 1; De memoria et reminiscencia 2; ST I 81.2 ad 2; I-II 6.2; 77.1. For the *vis cogitativa*: In III Sent. 26.1.2; IV.49.2.2; QDV 1.11; 10.5; 15.1 ad 9; SCG II.60; 73; 76; ST I.78.4; 81.3; In De an. II.13; QDA13. For the intellectus passivus: In IV Sent. 50.1.1.ad 3; SCG II.60; 73; ST I.79.2 ad 2; QDA 13; QSC 9; In I Meta. 10, n.13; In De an. III. 4; ST I.79.2 ad 2; In I Phys. 2.6. For the ratio particularis: In II Sent. 24.2.1 ad 3; In IV Sent. 50.1.1 ad 3; QDV 2.6; 10.5; 14.1 ad 9; 15.1; SCG II.60; In VI Ethic 7; 9; In De an. III.10; ST I.20.1 ad 1; 78.4; 79.2 ad 2; 81.2 ad 3; I-II.30.3 ad 3; 51.3. I am grateful to Daniel De Haan for providing me with this helpful list.

future, involves judgments about difficulty, goodness, and futurity. Although the goodness can perhaps come directly from the sense appetite (although it need not), the judgment of difficulty at least cannot, since there must be some sort of comparison between my own power and the power of whatever difficulty is between me and the good object that I seek. If I judge that it will be hard to overcome the difficulty (it is more powerful than me), my emotion will tend towards fear. If I judge that I can overcome it (it is less powerful than me), my emotion will tend towards daring. Moreover, to add another layer of complexity to the judgment, it is about a future good, not a present one, and futurity apparently cannot be grasped by sense alone but requires reason.\(^57\) Animals, we could say, have proper “virtuous” antecedent passions since they are moved by instinct to fearing what they should apart from cognition:\(^58\) they experience the right fear without judging. Aquinas expressly denies this kind of instinct for man, who through the cogitative power, via reason, must judge that this or that is a difficulty to be overcome in the future. This means that all fearing and daring is already informed by reason to a considerable extent. Thus the irascible appetite, he says, more than the concupiscible appetite, participates in reason.\(^59\)

Irascible passions are always, to some extent, informed by reason. Their intentional content has clearly been informed by some considerations within deliberation, but they are

\(^{57}\) Sense does not apprehend futurity, but animals do so by instinct, I-II 41.1 ad 1 and ad 3 [St. Paul, 727]. Cf. *In III Sent.* 26.1.1 ad 4. However, it is possible that an animal, in relying on the memory of a past reward, may repeat an action in the hope of a future reward.

\(^{58}\) Of course they are not virtuous because they are not free, since they do not have reason and will. But they experience something like what many proponents of Aquinas’s views on virtue would say humans experience.

\(^{59}\) QDV 25.6 [Leon.22/3.742.94-95]: “... irascibilis sit magis rationi propinqua, quasi aliquid rationis in suo motu participans...” See also ad 2 and 3 esp. lines 121-126: “... irascibilis movetur quasi deliberando et conferendo vindictam intentam ad injuriam receptam, quasi syllogizans, ut dicitur in VII Ethicorum; sed concupiscibilis, ad solam apprehensionem delectabilis movetur ad fruitionem delectabilis, ...”
neither good nor bad, as deliberation itself is not, until the moment of choice. For example, my deliberating about the consequences of telling an ugly truth, say being thrown in jail, may make me fear; on the other hand, my considering that others have done similar actions and have not suffered such consequences may make me feel more daring. When we consider these things with practical reason we are using the cogitative power and imagination and forming phantasms of these possible alternatives, e.g., me in jail, and the emotion of fear follows from such imaginations. One has a hard time considering whether or not one ought to tell some particular truth if one is preoccupied with imagining oneself in jail, and it is not hard to see which conclusion the emotion is dragging deliberation towards. A virtuous person will also imagine himself in jail, in considering possible effects of various choices he can make, and this will be repugnant to him and cause him some fear, but he easily turns his thinking to different aspects of the problem and can objectively judge and choose as he ought. Aquinas’s point seems to be this: the choice whether or not to tell the truth should not be caused by emotions, but by clear thinking, and that is why it is so important that such passions not be vehement.

The point of courage is to help the courageous man be and act according to reason. And he specifies that what is at stake is precisely helping the will accord with reason. “It belongs to

---

60 People who fall from fear of hights while walking the plank, Aquinas notes, fall because of their imagination of themselves falling. They would have no problem walking the same plank on the ground. ST I-II 44.4 ad 2 [St. Paul, 737].
62 Ibid., “Dupliciter autem impeditur voluntas humana ne rectitudinem rationis sequatur. Uno modo, per hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad aliud quam rectitudo rationis requirit: et hoc impedimentum tollit virtus
the virtue of courage to remove the impediment by which the will is dragged away from following reason,” and this impediment is precisely fear. But this does not mean that courage is a virtue of the will. The main job of the habit of courage in the irascible appetite is to restrain fear and to moderate daring, but more so with repressing fear since fear is by far the greater impediment drawing the will away from reason. Thus the first and most important role of courage is repressing fear, i.e., lowering the vehemence of this tremendously powerful passion.

This lowering of vehemence enables the virtuous person to deliberate and choose clearly.

In the virtuous person, the sense appetite informed by virtues simply has weak passions (propassions) prior to reason’s command. The virtue holds the emotions in check and waits for temperantiae. Alio modo, per hoc quod voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, propter aliquid difficile quod incumbit. Et ad hoc impedimentum tollendum requiritur fortitudo mentis, qua scilicet huiusmodi difficultatibus resistat: sicut et homo per fortitudinem corporalem impedimenta corporalia superet et repellit. Unde manifestum est quod fortitudo est virtus, inquantum facit hominem secundum rationem esse.”

One might think so from reading Patrick Clark’s article “Is Martyrdom Virtuous?: An Occasion for Rethinking the Relation of Christ and Virtue in Aquinas,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, 30, 1 (2010):141-160. Clark does not once mention the irascible appetite in this article on courage but speaks of it as a “progressive habituation of the will,” 146.

There are those who are naturally prone to daring, but they are exceptions, and in those individuals courage will lower the vehemence of daring.

QDV 26.8 [Leon.22/3.776.138-159]: “Quarto per hoc quod transmutatio est remissa vel intensa: remissae enim transmutationes minus proprie passiones vocantur; unde Damascenus dicit in III libro ‘Non omnes motus passivi passio vocantur sed qui sunt vehementiores et in sensum procedentes; qui enim sunt parvi et insensibles, nondum passiones sunt.’ Sciendum est ergo quod in hominibus in statu viae, si sunt peccatores, sunt passiones et respectu boni et respectu mali, quandoque quidem non solum praevisae sed subitae et intensae et frequenter et perfectae; unde dicitur “passionum sectatores” in I Ethicorum. In iustis vero nunquam sunt perfectae, quia ratio in eis nunquam deductur a passionibus; sunt tamen vehementes in imperfectis, sed in perfectis sunt debiles,
the command of reason. Reason moves the sense appetite and the consequent passions then cooperate with and enable the person to more promptly execute his act. Fear is an antecedent or perfect passion when it is temporally prior to choice and vehement, since it has the effect of pulling the will from the judgment of reason. Fear is a propassion when it is mild and temporally prior to choice and thus does not adversely affect reason, i.e., pull the will away from reason.

Moral virtue renders passions prior to choice mild; it makes them propassions rather than antecedent or perfect passions. But in rendering the passions mild it apparently also simultaneously renders the sense appetites obedient to the command of reason. Although Aquinas does not put it this way, this seems somewhat obvious, since it is going to be much more difficult to alter a sense appetite with a vehement passion than one with a mild passion, that is, an antecedent passion will not be able to participate in reason if it is very vehement. Thus temporally prior to choice the courageous man will have mild passions and posterior to it he will have the right passions. He will fear what he ought as he ought and be daring in the right way towards the right thing, with the right vehemence, however the prudential judgment deems it necessary given the circumstances at hand.

This is part of the story of moral virtue, as we have discussed. However, the habit in an appetitive way also inclines to an action like the one that caused it. Thus the courageous habit is caused (acquired) by courageous acts and it appetitively inclines back to those same acts. Or as

in inferioribus viribus per habitum virtutum moralium refrenatis; habent tamen passiones non solum praevisas sed subitas, et non solum respectu boni sed respectu mali.”

68 ST II-II, 123.10 [St. Paul, 1586]: “. . . appetitus sensitivus movetur per imperium rationis ad hoc quod cooperetur ad promptius agendum, idcirco ponebant et iram et alias passiones animae assumendas esse a virtuosis, moderatas secundum imperium rationis.” He is here discussing the difference between the perepatetics and stoics, but there is nothing to suggest that this is not his position since he clearly agrees with the peripatetic formulation.
Thomas puts it, the proximate end of the courageous person is to express a likeness of his habit in act; he intends to act according to what is suitable (*secundum convenientiam*) to his habit.\footnote{ST II-II, 123.7 [St. Paul, 1584]: “Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est finis: scilicet proximus, et ultimus. Finis autem proximus unusquisque agentis est ut similitudinem suae formae in alterum inducat: sicut finis ignis calefacientis est ut inducat similitudinem sui caloris in patiente, et finis aedificatoris est ut inducat similitudinem suae artis in materia. Quodcumque autem bonum ex hoc sequitur, si sit intentum, potest dici finis remotus agentis. Sicut autem in factibilibus materia exterior disponitur per artem, ita etiam in agibilibus per prudentiam disponitur actus humani. Sic ergo dicendum est quod fortis sicut finem proximum intendit ut similitudinem sui habitus exprimat in actu: intendit enim agere secundum convenientiam sui habitus. Finis autem remotus est beatitudo, vel Deus.” See also I-II 7.3 ad 3 [St. Paul,596]: “Non enim finis qui dat speciem actus, est circumstantia; sed aliquis finis adiunctus. Sicut quod fortis fortiter agat propter bonum fortitudinis, non est circumstantia; sed si fortiter agat propter liberationem civitatis, vel populi Christiani, vel aliquid huiusmodi.” cf. QDV5.1[Leon.22/1.139.136-147]: “Sed finis agibilium praeexistit in nobis dupliciter: scilicet per cognitionem naturalem de fine hominis, quae quidem naturalis cognitio ad intellectum pertinet, secundum Philosophum in VI Ethicorum[1143a35], qui est principiorum operabilium sicut et speculabilium; principia autem operabilium sunt fines, ut in eodem libro dicitur; *alio modo quantum ad affectionem, et sic fines agibilium sunt in nobis per virtutes morales*, per quas homo afficitur ad iustae vivendum vel fortiter vel temperate, quod est quasi finis proximus agibilium.” Emphasis is mine.} Since the attainment of what is suitable to something causes pleasure, when the courageous person acts courageously he takes pleasure in that. The problem with courage, however, is that courageous actions usually involve a fair amount of pain, and this pain tends to drown out the pleasure that connaturally accompanies the act.\footnote{ST II-II, 123.8 [St. Paul,1584-85] and In *Ethic.*III.18 [Leon.47/1.177.55-59]: “... cum fortitudo sit in sustinendo tristia, videtur quidem fortis habere aliquam delectationem ex consecutione finis propter quem fortiter agit, sed ista delectatio evanescent, idest debiliter sentitur, propter circumstantes tristitias, ...”}

6. *Qualis unusquisque est, Talis etiam finis videtur ei: Virtuous Affectivity.*

In order to discuss this manner in which the virtuous habit inclines towards the virtuous act, I would like to place it in the context of Aquinas’s use of Aristotle’s famous statement, which we have already seen a few times, “however each man is, such seems the end to him” from EN III.13, 1114a32-b1. By the first part of the phrase, “however each man is,” Aquinas means however each man is disposed, and in particular, however each man’s appetite is...
disposed. Since appetite is ordered to something as an end, the dispositional cause disposes
the appetite to some end rather than another, and thus the disposition is like to the thing to which
it is now disposed. But it is worth pointing out that this “seeming” is not essentially
cognitional, even though it must ultimately be caused by cognition of some sort. Being
attracted to something does make that thing seem to us to be good, regardless of whether or not it
is good. Thomas uses this particular statement to explain four different appetitive seemings: 1)
will, 2) habits, 3) passions, and 4) bodily dispositions. Our concern is primarily with # 2, but I
would like to briefly say something about the others. Passion is perhaps the most obvious one;
those freshly baked cookies that we know we should not eat seem very attractive to us. It is not
simply the smell, or the look, or our knowledge that they will taste delicious that does this; it is
rather the fact that we are being drawn or yanked towards them with a kind of momentum that
makes them seem so good. In any passion there can be many co-causes of a disposition, as we

71 In Ethic. III.13 [Leon.47/1.156.18-20]: “. . . sed qualis est unusquisque, talis finis videtur ei: id est tale
aliquid videtur ei appetendum quasi bonum et finis; . . . ” This is in an articulation of an argument, which he
refutes, but he does not refute this point, and he later in the same lectio affirmis it, see Ibid, lines 59-73. QDM 2.3 ad
9 [Leon.23.37.165-173]: “. . . qualis enim est unusquisque, talis et finis videtur ei,” ut dicitur III Ethicorum
(1114a32-b1): experimento enim cognoscimus quod aliter videtur nobis bonum aliud vel malum circa ea quae
amamus et ea quae odimus. Et ideo cum aliquis est inordinate affectus ad aliud, impeditur iudicium intellectus in
particulari eligibili ex inordinata affectione.”
72 ST I-II 88.3 [St. Paul, 931]: “. . . disponens est quodammodo causa. . . . Est enim causa quaedam movens
directe ad effectum: sicut calidum calefacit. . . . et sic disponit ad actum similem secundum speciem. . . . nam
unicuique habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum habitum.”
73 Thomas Ryan, in “Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connatural Knowledge of Affects,” Theological Studies
The Review of Metaphysics 58 (2004): 61–79, both claim that this connaturality is a kind of cognition. What is often
referred to as connatural knowledge, I put squarely on the side of appetite. When Aquinas discusses it in cognitive
terms it is always qualified, it is quasi knowing or like knowing. For another discussion see Tobias Hoffmann,
74 ST I-II 9.2 [St. Paul, 601] “. . . id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem
per modum objecti. Quod autem aliud videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione
eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque
extremorum dependent. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliud ut
have discussed, the object itself, the inner and outer senses, and intellect and will. The will’s movements, like the sense appetites, are appetitive inclinations that can also be described as a kind of seeming. In the will this disposition can refer to the intellect’s formal presentation of the object to the will, or the will’s natural disposition to its end. In either case it refers to the forming of the will, or the disposing of it, to desiring or being repulsed by this or that. The bodily dispositions are quite straightforward. For example, to a sick person something may taste repulsive which would have tasted good when healthy – the difference is a bodily dispositional alteration, which makes things seem to be different.

---

conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic, qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti, sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto. Et per hunc modum, ex parte objecti, appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem."

In V Heb. 2 [Marietti, p. 394, n. 273]: “Unusquisque enim secundum quod est dispositus, sic iudicat; sicut iratus aliter iudicat durante passione, et aliter ipsa cessante. Et similiter incontinentis aliter iudicat aliquid esse bonum tempore passionis, aliter post. Et ideo dicit philosophus, quod unusquisque qualis est, talis sibi finis videtur.” See ST I-II 10.3 ad 2. Aquinas argues that passions, in general, make things seem otherwise than that really are, ST I-II, 44.2 [St. Paul, 736]: “Quia homini affecto secundum aliquam passionem, videtur aliquid vel maius vel minus quam sit secundum rei veritatem: sicut amanti videntur ea quae amat, meliora; et timenti, ea quae timet, terribiliora. Et sic ex defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.” But in Virtuous Deliberation Jensen asks “Why could not a person’s fear make him evaluate the danger just as it should be evaluated, especially if that fear is consequent upon a judgment of reason?” Thus one would have rational passions which would influence one’s deliberation antecedently. I would respond that choices are about particular things to be done by us. First I choose x then I choose y: these are two different choices. It is not at all true that a good passion consequent to x will also be good for choice y, since they are different choices about different things. The mean in fear concerned with choice x will not necessarily be the same mean in fear concerned with choice y.

---

75 SCG 4.95 [Leon.manualis.565]: “Et hoc quidem sequitur in universali naturam rationalem, ut beatitudinem appetat: sed quod hoc vel illud sub ratione beatitudinis et ultimi finis desideret, ex aliqua speciali dispositione naturae contingit; unde Philosophus dicit quod qualis unusquisque est talis et finis videtur ei. Si igitur dispositio illa per quam aliquid desideratur ab aliquo ut ultimus finis, ab eo removeri non possit, non poterit immutari voluntas eius quantum ad desiderium finis illius.” QDM 2.3 ad 9[Leon.23.37.156-176] See also QDM 6 [Leon.23.150.461-72].

76 See ST I-II 9.2 in n.75 above. ST I 83.1 ad 5 [St. Paul, 397]: “Ad quintum dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex: una naturalis, et alia superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa partem intellectivam; vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliquis qualitate naturali quae attendit secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus naturalis est, et non subiacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supradictis patet. Ex parte vero corporis et
Habits have this same effect; they make things seem to be good. As appetitive inclinations ordered to ends, they make the ends seem to be such by inclining to such ends. There is no real difference between the final causality of appetitive motion and the “seeming”; they are two different ways of describing the exact same thing. This is why he sometimes speaks of this appetitive inclination as a kind of knowledge (sometimes connatural knowledge) of the end.  

virtutum corpori annexarum, potest esse homo aliquais naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione corporearum causarum, quae non possunt in intellectivam partem imprimere, eo quod non est alicuius corporis actus. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis videtur ei: quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes subiaceant iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut dictum est. Unde per hoc libertati arbitrii non praeiudicatur. Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, secundum quae aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alium. Tamen istae etiam inclinationes subiaceant iudicio rationis. Et huiusmodi etiam qualitates ei subiaceant, inquantum in nobis est tales qualitates acquirere, vel causaliter vel dispositiva, vel a nobis excludere.” Notice how his position has slightly shifted, in the Summa the corporeal disposition makes the end seem such, not so in this earlier passage: In II Sent. 25.1.1 ad 5 [Mand.646-47]: “. . . qualitas alicujus est duplex: quaedam ex habitu, et quaedam ex naturali complexione; et secundum illam quae est ex habitu, videtur aliqui finis talis qualis est ipse; verbi gratia, ei qui habet habitum luxuriae, videtur optimum delectabile venereum, quod est secundum similitudinem sui habitus. Sed ejus quod est tales esse vel non tales, est in potestate nostra: quia vel opera causant habitum, sicut in acquisitis, vel saltum sunt dispositiones ad habitum, sicut in infusis. Qualitas autem quae est ex naturali complexione, non est ad hoc quod faciat videri esse finem huismodi, sed est sicut disposition ad illud: sicut patet in illis qui ex naturali complexione ad luxuriam proni sunt, quod non omnes delectabile venereum prosequuntur, licet eos ad hoc quodammodo naturalis complexio inclinet.

77 QDC.12 [Marietti, 787]: “Ubi considerandum est, quod habitus virtutis inclinat hominem ad recte agendum, secundum quod per ipsam homo habet rectam a estimationem de fine; quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei. Sicut enim gustus iudicat de sapore, secundum quod est affectus aliqua bona vel mala dispositione, ita id quod est conveniens homini secundum habituale dispositionem sibi inhaerentem, bonam vel malam, aestimatur ab eo ut bonum; quod autem ab hoc discordat, aestimatur ut malum et repugnans; unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. cap. II, 14, quod animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus Dei. Contingit tamen quandoque, quod id quod videtur alicui secundum inclinationem habitus, non videatur ei secundum aliquid aliud; sicut luxurioso secundum inclinationem proprii habitus videtur bonum delectatio carnis, sed secundum rationis deliberationem, vel auctoritatem Scripturae, videtur ei contrarium; et ideo habens habitum luxuriae, ex hac aestimatione contra habitum quandoque agit, et similiter habens habitum virtutis quandoque agit contra inclinationem proprii habitus; quia aliquid ei aliter videtur secundum aliqua alium modum, puta per passionem, vel alicuam seductionem. QDVC 2 [Marietti, 819]: “De fine autem habet aliquis rectam exstimationem per habitum virtutis moralis; quia, ut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic. qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei; sicut virtuoso videtur appetibile, ut finis, bonum quod est secundum virtutem; et vitioso illud quod pertinet ad illud vitium; et est simile de gustu infecto et sano.”
For example, the act of fortitude is connatural to the “exigency” of the habit of fortitude, it
is suitable (conveniens) to the habit, and thus it seems good to the one who has the virtue since
he is drawn towards it or inclined to it.

The seeming of a habit is simply not the same as the seeming of a passion: Aquinas
clearly distinguishes between them. My solution to the problem of the virtuous antecedent
passions is simply to reject them altogether, but to grant the existence of antecedent virtuous
affectivity.

Moral virtues can only be used for the good. This means that a moral virtue cannot be
actualized or used by a bad command or an imprudent reason. If someone virtuous made an
imprudent choice, that is, did not use his prudence in deliberation, he could not use his virtue of

---

78 In VIII Rom., 1 [Marietti, p.112, n. 616]: “Et horum ratio est, quia, sicut philosophus dicit in III Ethic.,
qualis est unusquisque, talis finis videtur ei. Unde ille cuius est animus informatus per habitum bonum vel malum,
existimat de fine secundum exigentiam illius habitus.”

79 QDV 24.10 [Leon.22/3.706.246-258]: “Secundum est inclinatio habitus, qui quidem cum sit quasi
quaedam natura habentis, sicut Philosophus dici in libro De memoria et reminiscetia (De mem. 6 452a 27) quod
consuetudo est altera natura, et Tullius in Rhetoricis (De inventione II, C. 53) quod virtus consentit rationi in modum
naturae, pari ratione vitii habitus quasi natura quaedam inclinat in id quod est sibi conveniens, unde fit ut habenti
habitum luxuriae bonum videatur illud quod luxuriae convenit, quasi sibi connaturale, et hoc est quod Philosophus
dicit in III Ethicorum, quod "qualis unusquisque est talis et finis videtur ei."

80 Notice that one of the ways that one knows that one has a habit is if one perceives that one has the
inclination to the proper act: In III Sent. 23.1.2 [Moos.702]: “. . . sed ille qui habet habitum, . . . cognoscit se habere
habitum, inquantum percipit inclinationem sui ad actum, secundum quam se habet aliquafier ad actum illum. Et hoc
quidem cognoscit homo per modum reflexionis, inquantum scilicet cognoscit se operari quae operatur.”

81 Note the continuation of the passage cited in the note above (QDV 24.10): “Tertium vero est falsa
aestimatio rationis in particulari eligibili: quae quidem provenit vel ex altero praelictorem, scilicet impetu passionis,
aut inclinatione habitus.” See also the next few lines. See also QDC 12 cited above where he is quite clear that these
are two different seemings. DM 6 [Leon.23.150.461-481]; Cf. QDM 7.5 ad 7 [Leon.23.173.242-245]. SCG 4.95
[Leon.manualis.565]: “Et hoc quidem sequitur in universali naturam rationalem, ut beataaltudinem appetat: sed quod
hoc vel illud sub ratione beatitudinis et ultimi finis desideret, ex alia speciali dispositione naturae contingit; unde
Philosophus dicit quod unusquisque est talis et finis videtur ei. . . . Quod enim aliquid appetatur a nobis ut
ultimus finis, contingit quandoque ex eo quod sic disponimur aliqua passione, quae cito transit: unde et desiderium
finis de facili removetur, ut in continentibus apparat. Quandoque autem disponimur ad desiderium aliusuis finis boni
vel mali per aliquem habitum: et ista dispositio non de facili tollitur, unde et tale desiderium finis fortius manet, ut in
temperatis apparat; et tamen dispositio habitus in hac vita aufferi potest.” Cf. In Ethic 3.13 [Leon.47/1.156-57.54-
78], and cf. In Ethic 3.13 [Leon.47/1.155.114a32 and 114b3] and Ibid., lines 120-129.
temperance to carry out his imprudent command. The virtue in the sense appetite ‘distinguishes’ between prudent and imprudent choices. But such language makes the virtuous sense appetites seem essentially rational, as if they had a little homunculus distinguishing between reason’s good and bad choices. This is not how it works. Rather, moral virtue is precisely the kind of potency that is only actualized by prudential commands. It is a particular kind of potency caused by and ordered to a particular kind of actualization, one that is always good. It has only been caused by prudence and it can only be actualized by prudence, and as potency ordered to actualization it “seeks” or “inclines towards” the command of prudence, or its actualization. Thus moral virtue orders passion both by lowering its vehemence, thereby rendering the sense appetites docile, and by inclining towards prudence’s command.

The inclination of the virtuous sense appetites is not outwards toward this or that particular good, since only the prudential judgment of reason determines the mean concerning these things. It is rather upwards and inwards towards the command of reason. Temperance and courage, unlike justice, are first and foremost concerned with perfecting the agent; they order the agent to himself, as he ought to be ordered. As an impression caused by reason’s command, which inclines back towards its like, moral virtue can discriminate (in an appetitive way) between the motions of the sense appetites that are caused by reason and those that are not, the one actualizes it and the other does not. Their role is to tighten the ship. They help the parts of

---

82 The virtues of the sense appetite order a person towards himself, ST I-II 72.4 [St. Paul, 857]
83 In fact, an imprudent choice pains the virtuous sense appetites, since it is contrary to the habit – this is why someone with virtue cannot act viciously even when he chooses to do something evil. Cf. In II Sent. 25.1.4 [Mand.655]: “quamvis quilibet per se possit in malum, non tamen potest quilibet eodem modo malum facere sicut ille qui habet habitum malitiae : unicuique enim habenti habitum est delectabilis operatio quae est secundum habitum illum ; et ideo illi qui habent habitus corruptos, opera abominabilia delectabiliter et sine abominatione
the potential whole to operate in a more seamless harmony, drawing them a little nearer to their original prelapsarian state, as the parts are drawn together in a more unified operation.

Vice, however, does not have this same unifying and harmonizing role. As the turn from the immutable to the mutable, evil in general and vice in particular can be an inclination towards particular material objects, say, sex or alcohol. It is precisely the blanket acceptance that some material thing or kind of material thing is always good that is evil. There is no need for prudence in vice because there is no need to judge whether this or that particular thing or kind of thing is good for the person, since the person always habitually judges that it is. In vice the inclination of the habit and the antecedent passions can line up with far greater force and ferocity than it can in virtue. There is simply no need to lower the antecedent passions to be able to prudentially judge what is good.84

Let me offer a concrete example. Imagine that a temperate man has just walked into a room where a freshly baked plate of cookies and a vegetable platter is set before him. He would undoubtedly delight in the smell of the cookies, but not in such a way as to blind him to the benefits of the vegetables. His sense appetites would be attracted to the cookies, and probably neutral with respect to the vegetables. The virtue in his sense appetites lowers the vehemence of his passion enabling him to deliberate about whether to eat a cookie or a carrot. The intemperate man, however, whose habitual inclination is towards what is sweet, doesn’t flinch – he follows

---

84 Sometimes the objection is raised that the vicious can have tremendous control over their passions. That is undoubtedly true, but the particular vice in such a case would not be intemperance, but perhaps, for example, injustice.
his passion and goes straight for the cookies. The continent and incontinent have strong passions for the cookies and thus are having a difficult time thinking clearly about the benefits of eating vegetables, but they are trying. The habit of temperance in the temperate man is not inclining towards either of these two alternatives, but it is seeking or inclining towards the mean prudentially commanded. It is waiting for the person to make up his mind (of course, this wouldn’t take long), and wants and seeks (appetit) the virtuous act, which must be commanded. It takes some delight in receiving this prudential command whenever it is given, whether the agent choses to eat a cookie or a carrot. The point I wish to make is that the virtuous person is simply inclined to doing whatever he thinks is good. The habit of temperance inclines towards a temperate act, which is precisely a prudentially commanded act. The intemperate person is simply inclined to sweets. The continent and incontinent are not so inclined in either way, but because they have vehement passions they are being drawn towards the sweets and thus are having a difficult time thinking clearly about what they should do.

But it is perhaps not quite right to say that the sense appetites of the virtuous incline to the prudential command of reason, although Thomas does put it that way. What he says is that they incline to the virtuous act. Virtuous acts, however, must always be freely chosen, and if reason is to move the lower powers, this only happens by way of command – so it is the same. If one breaks down the parts of the soul into their various precise roles, as Aquinas does, then the inclination of moral virtue is towards command. Fortitude, for example, is precisely concerned

---

85 Cf. In III Sent. 23.1.4 sol. 2 ad 4 [Moos.714] : “prudentia determinat medium per modum dirigentis et ostendentis; sed virtus moralis per modum exequentis et inclinantis in medium.”

86 Ibid.
with finding the mean in fear and daring. When Aquinas says that the habit of courage inclines to the courageous act itself, this must refer to an act in which the mean has been found in fear and daring, and that can only be an act commanded by prudence. It certainly helps to be inclined toward this and not pulled away from it by strong passions.

Aquinas speaks of this technically as “that the proximate and proper end is that the likeness of the habit exists in act.” Thus one can say that the courageous person intends the very courageous act itself. One can also say that a habit seeks to do something like itself. Of course, the cause (courageous act) is like its effect (the virtue of courage), which effect seeks to cause similar courageous acts. Or we can say that to the courageous man, courage seems good since he is so disposed according to his habit. Or we can say that he seeks to act in a manner that is connatural to his habit, that is, courageously, etc. Or that he ‘judges’ courage to be good according to his habit. It is all the same. Thus I affirm the existence of a kind of “virtuous

---

87 In Ethic III.15 [Leon.47/1.165.95-118]: “Et dicit quod finis cuiuslibet operationis virtuosae est secundum convenientiam proprii habitus; movet enim habitus ex consuetudine causatus per modum naturae eo quod consuetudo est sicut quaedam natura, sicut dicitur in libro De memoria (452a27-28). Finis autem ultimus agentis naturalis operantis est bonum universi, quod est bonum perfectum, sed finis proximus est ut similitudinem suam in alium imprimat, sicut finis calidi est ut per suam actionem calidum faciat. Similiter autem et finis virtutis operantis ultimus quidem est felicitas, quae est bonum perfectum, ut in I habitum est (1107b2), sed finis proximus et proprius est ut similitudine habitus existat in actu. Et hoc est quod dicit quod bonum quod intendit fortis est fortitudo, non quidem habitus fortitudinis qui iam praexistit, sed similitude ipsius in actu, et hoc etiam est finis, quia unumquodque quod est propter finem determinatur in propria ratione secundum proprium finem quia ex fine sumitur ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem; et ideo finis fortitudinis est aliud ad rationem fortitudinis pertinentis. Sicigitur fortis sustinet et operatur gratia boni et hoc est inquantum intendit operari ea quae sunt secundum fortitudinem.” That this is indeed Aquinas’s thought and not simply an exposition of Aristotle see ST II-II 123.7 [St. Paul, 1584].

88 See both texts in the previous note.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 see texts in n.78 and 82 above.

92 see text in n. 80 above.

93 QDM 7.5 ad 7 [Leon.23.173.235-45]: “. . . tam continens quam incontinens habet rationem rectam ad minus in universali, quia et incontinens iudicat esse malum per rationem rectam acceptare delectionem inhonestam licet ab hac consideratione universali deficiat propter passionem. Non tamen sequitur propter hoc quod ciuslibet
antecedent” affectivity as an essential feature of moral virtue, since this affectivity simply follows upon the existence of the virtue, but I avoid the particular set of problems rightly associated with virtuous antecedent passions.

7. Conclusion of Chapter

There are some scholars who resist making the sense appetites’ perfection consist in obedience, since this seems to destroy the sense appetites’ own causality. But it is hard to gainsay the textual evidence in Aquinas in support of this. To emphasize the despotic control of reason over the emotions is not to take away from the sense appetites’ own causal role. This would follow if the sense appetites were really free, i.e., fully rational beings, but they are not and their virtue lies precisely in being made docile and subject to reason’s command, that is to say, in participating in reason. Consider the following passage, which describes the moral virtues in reference to the gifts of the Holy Spirit:

The gifts are certain perfections of man, by which man is disposed to this, namely, that he follows well the instinct of the Holy Spirit. It is manifest, however, from what has already been said, that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power insofar as it somehow participates in reason (participat aliqualiter rationem), insofar as it naturally is moved by the command of reason. In this way the gifts of the Holy Spirit are related to man in comparison to the Holy Spirit, as the moral virtues are related to the appetitive power in comparison

peccatoris ratio in universali laudetur, quia intemperatus etiam extra passionem existens iudicat ut bonum delectatione inhonesta uti, tamquam perversa ratione utens.”

94 Although we have seen many such passages see, for example, QDV 14.4 [Leon.22/2.450.128-48]:
“Sciendum tamen quod non est in intellectu speculativo absolute sed secundum quod subditur imperio voluntatis, sicut etiam et temperantia est in concupiscibili secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem. Cum enim ad bonitatem actus alicuius potentiae requiratur quod illa potentia subdatur alicui potentiae superiori sequendo eius imperium, non solum requisitum quod potentia superior tantum sit perfecta ad hoc quod recte imperet vel dirigat, sed etiam inferior ad hoc quod prompte obediat; unde ille qui habet rationem rectam sed concupiscibilem indomitam non habet temperantiae virtutem quia infestatur passionibus quamvis non deducatur, et sic non facit actum virtutis faciliter et delectabiliter, quod exigitur ad virtutem, sed oportet ad hoc quod temperamentia insit quod ipsamet concupiscibilis sit per habitum perfecta ut sine aliqua difficultate voluntati subjurator, et secundum hoc habitus temperantiae dicitur esse in concupiscibili; . . .”
to reason. Moral virtues, however, are certain habits by which the appetitive powers are disposed to promptly obey reason. Whence also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are certain habits by which man is perfected to promptly obey the Holy Spirit.  

Clearly it is natural for the sense appetites’ potency to obey reason, and moral virtue perfects this. The whole point of the gifts as habits in the powers of the soul is to make man able to follow the promptings of the Holy Spirit. Just as a gift could never be actualized without the Holy Spirit’s actual instinctual movement neither could a moral virtue be actualized without reason’s actual command or motion. These are their perfections, not their destructions. To say that virtues are commanded is not to take away from their causal role or that of the sense appetites. In fact, they act as efficient causes of action, but secondary ones in an ordered series of per se causes. They are “naturally” the kinds of things that can and ought to obey or be commanded by reason. 

I would like to end this chapter by returning to my initial discussion of the intellectualists and the voluntarists. Aquinas’s theory can accommodate the intellectualists who argue that the moral virtues are in the sense appetites and order the passions. They do this by lowering

---

95 ST I-II 68.3 [St. Paul, 835]: “... dona sunt quaedam perfectiones hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod participat aliquid rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona Spiritus Sancti se habent ad hominem in comparatione ad Spiritum Sanctum, sicut virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona Spiritus Sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad prompte obediendum Spiritui Sancto.” Cf. I-II 68.4 [St. Paul, 836]: “dona sunt quidam habitus proficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires appetitivae ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori potentia.”

96 ST I-II, 71.3 ad 3 [St. Paul, 851]: “... habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis; sed actus est causa habitus in genere causae finalis, secundum quam consideratur ratio boni et mali. Et ideo in bonitate et malitia actus praeeminet habitui.”
vehemence and by rendering the sense appetites obedient to reason. In this way moral virtue helps man’s bodily nature act in accord with his spiritual and rational nature.

But his account can also accommodate the voluntarist concern with the will and choice, for every act of moral virtue is strictly commanded by reason and will. As a *habitus electivus* it is only actualized by its cause, the command of reason, which follows free decision.  

It seems that the *ratio* of a habitus qua second nature conflicts with the *ratio* of a habitus qua *habitus electivus*, since choice must be indeterministic and a habit deterministically as a second nature inclines to one thing, namely, virtue. Even granting the affective inclining and the lowered vehemence temporally prior to choice, these are not of themselves strictly speaking good, since for Aquinas the virtuous agent can act against his virtue, that is, he can choose to ignore it. The action of a person with the habit of temperance (with its antecedent help) who acts against it is far worse than the action of a person who does the same but as goaded on by antecedent passion. Lowering passion enables clear consideration, and the inclination makes the virtuous choice attractive. Neither is strictly speaking morally good until choice, but they certainly make the good choice easier and more likely. Nevertheless moral virtue does antecedently help the will accord with the practical judgment of reason, both by lowering the

---

97 *In II Sent. 24.3.2 ad 3 [Mand., 621]: “. . . electio est principale in virtute ut Philosophus in III Ethic., cap. IV dicit; unde oportet omnem actum virtutis ex electione procedere: propter quod etiam virtutis habitus electivus dicitur in II Ethic. cap. VI, vel VII in antiq.; et ideo virtus non potest esse nisi in illis actibus qui ex imperio voluntatis procedunt, quamvis etiam sint sensitivarum partium: propter quod in irascibili et concupiscibili ponimus esse virtutem; . . .” ST I-II 59.1 [St. Paul, 793]: “Motus autem virtutis est e converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur, in II Ethic. (1106b36) quod est *habitus electivus in mediate consitens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit.*”

98 Habits incline towards their objects even when they are not actually in use, albeit in a far lower and lesser way than when they are used, see, for example, DM 7.1 ad 4 [Leon.23.159.391-395]. See also ibid ad 9 [p.160, lines 427-32].
vehemence of passion and by inclining towards virtue and thus making it “seem” good. I fully embrace the view that moral virtue offers antecedent affective support, but I reject the existence of spontaneous antecedent passion in Aquinas’s account.
Conclusion

To conclude this dissertation, I will return to the topic of participation and draw together the findings from chapters 4 and 5 concerning the manner in which the sense appetites participate in reason.

As discussed in chapter 3, in c. 2 of the *In De hebdomadibus* Aquinas begins his discussion of participation by noting that to participate is, in a way, to take a part (*quasi partem capere*); it is to receive in a particular fashion what pertains to another universally. He then outlines three kinds of participation: 1) what may be called logical participation as an individual participates in a species or as a species participates in its genus, 2) as matter participates in form and substance participates in an accident, and 3) that based on efficient causality, especially as an effect participates in a higher level cause.¹

One way of having in particular what belongs to another universally according to the first kind of participation is the manner in which we might say that the idea of this man participates in the idea of animal, for a man is an animal, or the idea of a species such as man participates in a genus (animal). Since there is no separate form of animality which causes all animals to be animals, we are speaking of a logical participation of one less extended idea or concept in another that is more extended. Because this involves the relationship between ideas or concepts rather than between really distinct things or principles of being it is called logical participation.

When we say, however, that the sense appetites participate in reason, we signify really distinct forms, which we established in our discussion of the distinction between the soul and its

---

¹ *De ebd.* 2 [leon.50.271.69-85]. Text in chapter 3, n. 160. For a fuller discussion of this see chapter 3, C.
powers in chapter 1. Because the powers of reason and will are really distinct from the sense appetites, this is obviously not a case of the first kind of participation, i.e., logical participation.

Concerning the second mode of participation there is a real distinction and composition between participant and what is participated, whether between matter and form or between substance and accident. But sense appetites and reason enter into no such composition, neither as substance participates in an accidental form nor as matter participates in substantial form. Thus, by a process of elimination we can see that a sense appetite can participate in reason only according to the third mode of participation, namely that of an effect participating in an equivocal efficient cause.

Before saying anything positive about this kind of participation, I wish to mention briefly Fabro’s division of participation, and the place of the sense appetite’s participation in reason within it. Fabro distinguishes between transcendental and predicamental participation. By predicamental participation Fabro means the communication of a univocal formality wherein the participated perfection does not exist separately in itself apart from the participant(s). By transcendental participation he means the analogical communication of a formality where the participated perfection does exist separately, as in the case of esse, in God himself. Broadly speaking, Fabro is interested in understanding Thomas’s unique reconciliation of Platonic

---

2 See Chapter 1, C, 3.
4 For a definition of predicamental univocal participation see the following sentence: “All the participants have in themselves, the same formality, according to all its essential content, and the participated does not exist in itself, but only in the participants (Aristotelian moment of Thomistic participation).” In La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo san Tommaso d’Aquino, Opere Complete 3, Editrice del Verbo Incarnato, Segni 2005, 305. Translated with some adjustments by Mitchell, in Being and Participation, 168. Mitchell cites the incorrect page number in referring back to Fabro’s text.
5 For a definition of transcendental analogical participation see the following text: “The participants only have in themselves a ‘degraded similitude’ of the participated which subsists in itself, outside of these, either as a property of a superior subsistant, or, without anything else, as a pure and subsistent formality in the full possession of itself” (Platonic moment of Thomistic participation.) Ibid. with some adjustments.
vertical participation (i.e., transcendental) with the more horizontal Aristotelian immanence
of forms (i.e., predicamental). For Fabro the first and second kinds of participation in the In de
ebd. 2 are predicamental participations. The third kind of participation seems to be divided into
predicamental-univocal participation, i.e., fieri, and transcendental-analogical participation, i.e.
God’s creating esse.

Fabro himself suggests that the case of the sense appetites participating in reason is
“closely connected with the predicamental order.” I have shown, however, that this kind of
participation clearly involves an analogical communication of formality. But according to
Fabro’s general division, a predicamental-analogical participation should be impossible, since
predicamental participation is always univocal. Furthermore, this case of the sense appetites
participating in reason cannot be grasped as transcendental participation, at least not in the way
Fabro understands such participation as immediately related to the divine. In other words, our

---

6 Fabro, Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d’Aquin [Louvain, 1961], 320, 335. All vertical
transcendental participation is tied to esse (in which similitude is analogically communicated between God and
creation) and all predicamental participation is tied to essence (from the immanence or energeia of Aristotelian
form). He seems to be taking this distinction from an important text: Quodlibet II.2.1 [Leon.25/2.214-15].
7 Fabro, Intensive Hermeneutics, 472, 481-82.
8 This is how Mitchell (461) takes the division, and it seems to have textual warrant in Fabro, see Intensive
Hermeneutics, 474. Aquinas himself says that the third kind of participation happens especially (praecipue) when
the effect does not equal the power of its cause, which suggests that there are cases in which the effect does equal
the power of its cause (text in Chapter 3, n. 159). Generation would be such a case in which the cause does equal the
power of its effect and in which effect and cause are univocally like one another, as man generates man. On this see
CT II, c. 9 [Leon.42.201.145-154] in which Aquinas clarifies that a son does not participate in his father, but that in
generation the father induces the son to participate in the essence of the species, i.e., man. This text is cited in Fabro,
La Nozione, 306.
9 Fabro, Intensive Hermeneutics, 478.
10 In Intensive Hermeneutic, 477-80, and in “Elementi per una dottrina tomistica della partecipazione” in his
collection of articles entitled Esegesi tomistica (Rome: Libreria editrice della Pontificia Universita Lateranense,
1969), 421-48, esp. pp. 440-442. Fabro seems to connect this case of participation to the so-called principle of
contiguity or continuity. I say that he seems to connect it, since in the Intensive Hermeneutic, p. 478 he notes that it is
“closely connected” with the predicamental order (in Elementi, 441 he notes that it is “quasi di ordine
predicamentale”), and concerning the sensitive appetites participating in reason he notes his explanation “may
explain” (ibid., 478) why the sense appetites participate in reason. I bring these qualifications up because I think we
can fairly read Fabro as leaving this somewhat open. In any case, the reasoning he lays out follows the Pseudo-
Dionysian understanding that the lower participates in the higher by a kind of affinity or contiguity QDV 16.1
conclusion, if it is correct, may pose a kind of exception to Fabro’s division between predicamental and transcendental participation. I will leave this as an open question. As Wippel has observed, this distinction between predicamental and transcendental participation is not Aquinas’s own but Fabro’s; thus I will simply follow Aquinas’s threefold division.

Perhaps the best discussion of this third kind of participation is in Bernard Montagnes’ monograph *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*. Montagnes praises Fabro for his groundbreaking work in uncovering the metaphysical underpinning of participation and analogy, but he also criticizes Fabro for not taking into account the manner in which Aquinas developed his thinking on this point.¹¹

Let us briefly consider Aquinas’s development in thinking on the third kind of participation at the level of God and creation. One of the characteristics of this kind of participation is that it involves analogical predication. The first two kinds of participation, as Fabro points out, involve the predication of univocal formalities.¹² When we predicate animal of a man and a donkey, we mean animal in the exact same way, i.e., univocally.¹³ When we say that a substance participates in whiteness, or even when we speak of more of less whiteness, (i.e., the

---

¹² Fabro, *Intensive Hermeneutics*, 471-472 and 481-482 and 484: “Predicamental participation is therefore, strictly speaking, confined to univocity.”
¹³ De princip. 6 [Leon.43.46:27-29].
intension and remission of accidental forms) we are predicating that formality of a subject univocally, for it is one and same meaning (*ratio*) of whiteness that we mean.\(^\text{14}\)

What is distinct about this third kind of participation, however, is that it involves a communication of a formality that is not exactly the same (unvocal) but nor is it entirely different (equivocal). As Aquinas puts it, something is predicated analogically when it is applied to things which have different intelligible contents (*rationes*), (or which are partly the same and partly different), but these *rationes* are ordered to one and the same thing.\(^\text{15}\) This one and the same thing, in turn, is the cause of these secondary analogates. These secondary analogates are like the prime analogate because they are effects that are like their cause (the prime analogate). This is how we say that an effect (a secondary analogate) participates in its cause (the prime analogate).\(^\text{16}\)

Montagnes shows how Aquinas’s thinking on the third kind of participation evolves in the context of the relation between divine and created being.\(^\text{17}\) In the *Sentences*, it is clear that

\(^{14}\) *De ente*, 5 [Leon.43.379.113-120]. See Montagnes, *Analogy*, 30-31.

\(^{15}\) *De princip.* 6 [Leon.43.46.33-35]: Analogice dicitur predicari quod predicatur de pluribus quorun rationes diverse sunt, sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem, . . .” *In IV Metaph.*, c. 2 [Marietti, p. 151, n. 535]: “Sed scieendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove.–Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali.–Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, . . .” For a comparison of these texts see Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 81-82.

\(^{16}\) See Montagnes, p. 40. The relation of causality undergirding participation and analogical predication is apparent when one considers that participating and participant are related as act and potency (ST I, 75.5 ad 4; SCG II, 54), that is, causally: SCG II, 15 [Leon.13.295]: “Quod per essentiam dicitur, est causa omnium quae per participationem dicuntur.”

\(^{17}\) See Montagnes, pp.34-43, I have cited some of the texts below, but see his footnotes for a more comprehensive list. At the level of analogy of being on the transcendental plane, Aquinas’s thinking developed in a non-linear threefold manner, corresponding to three sets of text, his commentary on the *Sentences*, his *De veritate*, and his mature position beginning from the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Although I will only outline the first and last of these three, the middle position is crucial, since it explains his unhappiness with his first solution in the *Sentences*, and his recognition that his somewhat formalist early conception of being or “formalist ontology” as Montagnes calls it (p.74-5) tended towards univocity. This he rejects in the *De veritate* with his famous analogy of *proportionalitas*, of q. 2, a. 11. As I skip this middle step in Aquinas’s development in my very brief sketch, it may
likeness is said of two things which possess the same form. In the case of analogy, however, the form is in one fully (per essentiam) and in another according to participation (per participationem) by some imitation and diminished likeness. Created being is an imperfect and inadequate imitation or representation of its divine exemplar, God, Who is the exemplar form that created beings imitate by participation (omne ens, quantumcumque imperfectum, a primo ente exemplariter deducitur).

God is an exemplar cause in two ways: 1) according to his nature and 2) according to his ideas. These two kinds of exemplarism correspond to two kinds of equivocal causes, 1) as the effect is formally present in its cause and 2) as the effect is virtually present in its cause. According to 1) the form by which the agent acts is communicated to its effect, which then resembles its cause by an intrinsic formal participation, e.g., because God is good we are good, because God is wise we are wise, etc. Thus the effect is present formaliter in God. In the case of 2) the effect is only present effective secundum virtutem in the cause, because the cause has the power to produce an effect which is not formally present in the cause, e.g. the sun which is not
hot produces heat.\textsuperscript{21} The sun has the power to produce heat, but heat is not a formal attribute of the sun. In this manner God creates beings through his divine ideas, which include, essence, form, matter, separable and inseparable accidents, among other things.\textsuperscript{22} The predominant language of this third kind of participation in Aquinas’s commentary on the Sentences is that of formal likeness, in particular, a diminished formal likeness explained in the language of exemplar causality. Montagnes points out that this implies a somewhat “formalist ontology,”\textsuperscript{23} and a “formalistic conception of causality and being.”\textsuperscript{24}

In the latter texts, however, the emphasis is on act and potency and reduction of potency to act by way of efficient causality. The participated perfection is related to the participant as act to potency.\textsuperscript{25} In the case of God and the analogy of being, the emphasis is now on esse as act, and ipsum esse per se subsistens acts insofar as it is pure act and brings new beings into existence. “In sum, participation is presented as the communication of act to a subject in potency. The act is communicated by a productive causality that assimilates the effect to the agent.”\textsuperscript{26}

According to Montagnes, the crucial shift “is the substitution of the notion of act for that of form.”\textsuperscript{27} As he puts it, “Causality is presented as the communication of a form, whereas

\textsuperscript{21} In II Sent. 14.1.2 ad 3 [Mand.351]; In II Sent. 14.1.2 ad 3 [Mand.351]: “... et tamen non oportet eodem modo inveniri aliquid in causa quo est in effectu, sed eminentiori: et ita etiam calor aliquo modo est in sole, non quidem denominans ipsum, ut dicatur calidus formaliter, sed effective secundum virtutem calefaciendi, quae in eo est.” In I Sent. 2.1.2 [Mand.62-3]; In I Sent. 8.1.2 [Mand.198].

\textsuperscript{22} For the distinction between the two kinds of exemplarity see In I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 4 [Mand.493]; In I Sent. 2.1.2 [Mand.62-3]. These texts are in chapter 4, n. 72. See also Doolan, Divine Ideas, 77 ff. As a somewhat distracting aside, I was surprised to find that Aquinas held that some separable accidents are included in the divine idea of a substance; n.b. time in the following passage: In I Sent. 38.1.3 ad 1 but he denies that they are included in his De veritate 3.7.

\textsuperscript{23} Montagnes, 74.

\textsuperscript{24} Montagnes, 79.

\textsuperscript{25} ST I q. 75 a. 5 ad 4[St. Paul. 347]: “omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius.” SCG II. 54 [Leon.13.391]: “Omne participans aliquid comparatur ad ipsum quod participatur ut potentia ad actum: per id enim quod participatur fit participans actu tale.”

\textsuperscript{26} Montagnes, 40.

\textsuperscript{27} Montagnes, 80.
subsequently it is that of an act. According to the first perspective, the agent acts in virtue of its form, and causality consists in imprinting its likeness; according to the second, the agent acts in as much as it is in act and does so in order to bring a new being into existence. Correlatively, the perfection received by the effect is limited either owing to its imperfect likeness or as an act received by a potency.”

The problem with the earlier and more formalist account is that it tends towards univocity, since it is the same form that is possessed in a diminished fashion per participationem. Granting the formal nature of exemplar causality, it is as if our minds gravitate towards imagining this participation using the example of the form of whiteness, e.g., something participates in whiteness as it is more or less perfectly white. But such participation is nevertheless univocal.

Concerning the nature of this development, Montagnes warns against both exaggerating and downplaying its significance. Exemplarism in the Commentary on the Sentences involves efficient causality since an exemplar cause cannot cause anything unless an agent also efficiently causes it, and Aquinas certainly does not abandon these two forms of divine exemplarism in his late texts. But the emphasis in the early texts is first and foremost on a formal communication (with efficient causality implied), but in the later texts the emphasis is on efficient causality (with formal communication implied).

Equivocal causality and Participation in Reason.

28 Montagnes, 42.
29 Montagnes, 76.
Since the kind of participation at stake when Aquinas says the sense appetites participate in reason is the third kind, it is not surprising that we have found Aquinas explaining this participation in the early texts in terms of exemplar causality and in the late texts in terms of efficient causality.

In the commentary on the *Sentences*, the sense appetites participate in reason (their exemplar cause) through the moral virtues; in fact, the moral virtues themselves are, as it were, participations in reason. Moreover their exemplar cause is not only reason itself, but reason informed by prudence. Aquinas is explicit that the kind of exemplarism is that of nature, i.e., as the effect is formally present in its cause and as the form by which the agent acts is communicated to its effect, which then resembles its cause by an intrinsic formal participation. This participating form, either temperance or fortitude, is in fact a diminished likeness of reason (informed by prudence) impressed upon the sense appetites. This participating form then causes a mode (*modus*) which can be understood either as a way of operating (facility, lowered vehemence of passion, obedience, connaturality) or as the formal receiving of the habit in the sense appetites along the lines of the axiom that everything that is received is received according to the mode (*modus*) of the receiver.\(^{30}\)

The emphasis in exemplar causality, as the name exemplar signifies, is clearly formal. However, one wonders what exactly this natural exemplarism is meant to explain. It is tempting to grasp this likeness as the exemplarism of ideas, since our ideas are obviously from reason, and reason does exercise such exemplarism when making external things, e.g., building houses. But it is not as if an agent thinks of moral virtue and tries to make himself virtuous in the manner in which a man builds a house: that is clearly not what Thomas means since the natural

\(^{30}\) Chapter 4, A, 4.
exemplarism named is explicitly contrasted with exemplarism of ideas. Rather by placing this exemplarism on a natural level it seems to suggest that the sense appetites are deficient likenesses of reason itself. But if the participated effect exists formally in the cause, what exactly is the formal similarity between the two forms (moral virtues and reason informed by prudence)? Should one explain this similarity in terms of the decreased vehemence of passion, or of the increased pleasure, or of the facility of action, or of the connatural inclination? Are these quasi-rational actions of a quasi-rational form?

In the later texts, however, the emphasis of Thomas’s appeal to participation is rather on efficient causality. What is now emphasized is that the sense appetites participate in reason by the act of *command*, and the sense appetites participate as they *obey* this command. Participation is now cast in the language of act/potency and movers/moved. Participated and participant are related as act and potency, as moving and moved. Unlike the earlier exemplarism, which implies that sense appetites (via moral virtue) themselves formally possess reason in some diminished fashion, now all that is required is that the sense appetites receive the act of reason from reason itself. When the sense appetites are actually being commanded, they participate. When they are not actually being commanded, then they do not. This is helpful because it allows one to explain how the continent agent’s sense appetite may also be said to participate occasionally in reason. Likewise, habits of the sense appetite, temperance and fortitude, are only actualized when we will to use them. That is, although they exist as accidents when they are not being used, they do not participate in reason as “first acts” but only as “second acts,” i.e., as actually actualized by
reason. Moral virtues are a particular kind of potency that can only be actualized by a particular cause, namely, reason’s command.\textsuperscript{31}

When it is said that the sense appetites participate in reason, this means that they quite literally “have reason,” albeit in a partial manner through receiving reason’s actual causality in commanding. Thus, as the passages in the \textit{tertia pars} show, these are not two acts, namely first the command of reason and then that of sense appetites, but one act of sense appetite qua actualized as commanded and moved by reason.\textsuperscript{32} The habit of moral virtue helps this act to come about habitually by lowering the vehemence of antecedent passion and by causing facility and delight in action.\textsuperscript{33} It is true that the habit connaturally inclines towards this act, for this inclination follows upon the habit’s first act as an accidental quality, but Aquinas does not describe this inclination as a participation in reason, since the unactualized habit is not actually participating in reason’s command. It is only inclining towards it.\textsuperscript{34}

It is worth pointing out that in equivocal causality (of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} kind of participation) one may distinguish between analogical formal communication and efficient causality even if these are not separable in reality. There is no question but that in the line of efficient causality it is the will that is causally efficacious. This is true of early and late texts. But in the Commentary on the \textit{Sentences} and in the \textit{De veritate}, it is reason that provides both the formal content and the end of volition, i.e., what (the object) is willed and why (the final cause) it is willed. That is, all of the formal intelligible content comes from reason, and the will simply executes whatever that may be along the lines of efficient causality. Thus we can think of the will in the early texts as a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Chapter 5, B-D.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Chapter 5, nn. 108 and 109.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Chapter 5, D.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Chapter 5, E and Chapter 6, F.
\end{itemize}
bridge between reason and moral virtues, over which reason must pass to cause its likeness (the moral virtues) in the sense appetites. The caused habit or moral virtue is simply a likeness of reason itself, its natural exemplar cause.\footnote{Chapter 4, A, 1 and Chapter 4, B, 1.}

In the late texts, however, reason no longer has a monopoly on formal content, but the will, in fact, provides some of it; this is evident from our discussion of the will’s natural inclination, God’s \textit{instinctus}, and consent. There is thus a significant change here. Command, which presupposes choice, is no longer reducible to reason as it was the in Commentary on the \textit{Sentences}. When it is said that the sense appetites participate in reason, here it no longer means the power of reason itself, but rather the rational part of the soul, i.e., reason and will acting together in unison along different causal lines, neither reducible to the other. The act of command in both the Commentary on the \textit{Sentences} and the later texts, includes reason and will, but in the late texts the will contributes substantially more (by way of \textit{instinctus}, consent, and final causality in choice) to the choice itself and thus makes its own contribution to command that far surpasses what Aquinas grants to the will in the Commentary on the \textit{Sentences}. This means that the intelligible content analogically communicated to the sense appetites in command is no longer solely the domain of reason, but includes some content also provided by the will. With Aquinas’s later strengthening of the role of the will, free choices are no longer causally reducible to reason as they were in the early texts, and participation is no longer grasped as a likeness between two forms, e.g., between reason and moral virtue, but rather as the actualization of the sense appetites by reason’s and will’s \textit{act} of command.\footnote{Chapter 5, A.}
In order to distinguish efficient causality from formal communication, we must thus try to pick apart command. Command, as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5, is highly complex. Whether or not this act affects the sense appetites by redounding, by causing new external sense inputs, through the imagination or through the cogitative power in a certain sense makes no difference. Prior to this one must grasp that what is commanded is first of all chosen, since command is the execution of choice vis-à-vis the lower powers of the soul. Distinguishing the efficient cause from its formal content must thus occur at a prior and higher level in the causal chain, namely, that of choice.  

Reason and will are now, in a different way, understood as included in reason (taken more broadly as the rational part of the soul) as co-causes in reason’s act of choice and command. Efficient causality, and this can only be grasped as per se efficient causality, is now a better way of understanding the causal foundation of this relation of participation between the sense appetites and reason. By definition all per se efficient causes are intelligible. When we speak of the formal content of an efficient cause, we do not mean a formal cause as one of the four Aristotelian causes. What is meant is the formal content of the final cause, namely, the “that for the sake of which,” the *causa causarum*, which is the reason for the efficient cause. Without such a cause, according to Aquinas, an efficient cause is not an efficient cause, but only a *per accidens* efficient cause. Efficient causes always convey and are bound to intelligible content. In the case of free decisions, this intelligible content is partly provided by reason (what is willed, the object) and partly provided by the will (the end of volition). However, in a series of per se efficient causes, the lower movers need not themselves be able to account for the intelligibility of their action, e.g., a saw cannot say what it is making or why it is making it – but the action itself

---

37 Chapter 5, C.
is, nevertheless, perfectly intelligible. In the case of free human action, it seems, we are
partly like saws, on the one hand efficiently moved by God’s instinctus, but on the other hand we
simultaneously have reasons for choosing what we do. Both our own reasons and God’s
efficiently moving us are included in free choice and command – thus the action is partly
intelligible and partly unintelligible to us. While God’s efficiently moving our wills is
unintelligible to us, it is not unintelligible in se, since it is caused by God’s reason and will.

Granting this, we cannot really say that our own reason is the exemplar cause that is
participated in since the participated form is no longer simply a deficient imitation of reason
itself, understood as some sort of formal lessening. Rather once one takes the strengthened will
into consideration and all that it brings into the picture, efficiency has far superior explanatory
power. Efficiency can explain both what moves and what is moved (act and potency, participated
and participant), but also the conveying of an intelligible content which need not and cannot be
fully reduced to the agent’s own reason and which must remain partially obscure to us as caused
by God’s reason. It is this rational act that is participated in by the sense appetites.

There is much opposition to explaining the relation of participation between the sense
appetites and reason in terms of efficient causality since it seems inevitably to lead to a Cartesian
understanding where the only relation between soul and body is that of an efficient cause. But
once one introduces the distinction between the soul as a mover (motor) and the soul as form
(forma), one sees that this account of how the parts of the soul are related to one another, and in
our case how some of these parts are related to others by way of efficient causality, in no way
contradicts or conflicts with the manner in which the soul is the form (forma) of the body.

To what degree one should emphasize Aquinas’s development on how the sense appetites
participates in reason, I am unwilling to say. On the one hand, one can find many of the elements
of his later thought scattered here and there in his earlier works, and on the other hand exemplarity is undoubtedly part of his later thinking on participation as well. Be that as it may, his shift of emphasis from exemplarity to efficiency in this particular context seems fully warranted by an abundance of texts. He does not return to explaining the participatory relation between reason and the sense appetites in the language of exemplarity, but he does speak of a moral virtue in the sense appetites as a “habitual conformity” of those powers to reason, understood as a disposition (or habit) of a potency towards what actualizes or moves it.\(^{38}\) Moreover this shift of emphasis aligns perfectly with the shift from Thomas’s exemplarist and quasi-formalist ontology in his earlier texts to his later emphasis on \textit{esse as actus} and efficient causality in his account of creation, as Montagnes has pointed out. On the ethical plane, his earlier accounts of free decision shifts from being somewhat intellectualist to being somewhat more voluntarist, and this aligns with his shift in reason’s relation to the sense appetites along the lines of exemplarism and then in terms of efficient causality. To be clear, I would never go so far to claim that Aquinas went from being an intellectualist to being a voluntarist, as others have done.\(^{39}\) It is rather a question of degrees, and of explaining exactly what causal roles reason and will each bring to choice, and then exactly how the execution of this choice is participated in by the sense appetites. Aquinas is quite clear, as he states over and over again in his later texts, that the sense appetites only participate in reason to the degree that they obey reason’s command.

\(^{38}\) He does discuss the habitual conformity of the sense appetites to reason as caused by reason’s command: ST I-II 56.4 [St. Paul, 780]: “Et quia bona dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quasi habitus conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.” Cf. ST I-II, 61, 5.

\(^{39}\) I.e. Lottin, See chapter 5, n. 15, for the litterature and a discussion of this debate.
Bibliography


355


