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A Phenomenology of Having

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By

Yang Yu

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A Phenomenology of Having

Yang Yu, Ph.D.

Director: Robert Sokolowski, Ph.D.

The term *having* easily triggers associations of *possession*, particularly that of *material* possession, which can in turn connote *vulgarity*. This sequence of ideas is so natural that it could have been the inspiration for Gabriel Marcel's *Being and Having*, and Erich Fromm's *To Have or To Be*, two books that reprimand the attitude of having in various aspects of life.

In this dissertation, however, I attempt to reveal the philosophical significance of *having* by articulating a phenomenological understanding of it. Metaphysically speaking, I argue, *having* is no less important than *being*. Crucial to my argument are two distinctions: one between *having* and *possession*, and another between *having* and *being*.

The two distinctions are developed in two steps, the first being my critical evaluation of the being-having dichotomy set up by Gabriel Marcel in his *Being and Having*. Marcel misidentifies *having* with *possession*, and his negative attitude toward *having* results from that misidentification. While I disapprove Marcel's being-having dichotomy, I accept the two eidetic moments of having he discovers in his study of having (the tension between *within* and *without*, and the distinction between *the self* and *the other*) and employ them in my study of Husserl.
Turning to Edmund Husserl's *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations*, I show that the two eidetic moments of having are operative in Husserl's methods of phenomenological epoché and transcendental reduction, and for this reason the two methods are the transcendental ego's means to achieve its self-evidence, that is, its self-having. The transcendental ego's self-having is then shown to be constitutive of being, and it also serves as both the *archē* and the *telos* of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. I conclude that Husserl's phenomenology can rightly be called a phenomenology of having because its subject matter, methodology, and terminology all can be understood in terms of having.

I close the present dissertation by pointing out how a larger research project that aims at elucidating the topic of having in the history of philosophy (for example, in Plato and Aristotle's epistemology and metaphysics) can be carried out, and how this project could benefit greatly from Husserl's phenomenology.
This dissertation by Yang Yu fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by Robert Sokolowski, Ph.D., as Director, and by Holger Zaborowski, Ph.D., and John McCarthy, Ph.D., as Readers.

_______________________________________
Robert Sokolowski, Ph.D., Director

_______________________________________
Holger Zaborowski, Ph.D., Reader

_______________________________________
John McCarthy, Ph.D., Reader
To my parents
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To the extent that writing acknowledgements involves a "constitutive analysis" of one's own work, it can be likened to the performance of the phenomenological epoché. In other words, one needs to temporarily imagine away the help and support one has received from others; "suspending" one's own work in such imaginary manner, one is able to perceive clearly that one's "own" work is the result of co-constitution, and this perception immediately raises in oneself a keen awareness of the contingency and "pending" nature of what oneself has achieved. With this awareness, one now "thematically" recognizes the constitutive and indispensable roles played by others; one also realizes that their help and support, as a graceful "facticity," is also impenetrably mysterious. Such facticity is exactly what one does not dare to imagine away, let alone live without, in one's real life. Knowing this, one finds oneself in the grip of an overwhelming feeling of thankfulness—and this seems to be the existential moment that motivates acknowledgments. To be sure, one does not have to be a phenomenologist in order to write an acknowledgement. I do believe, however, that one certainly is transcendental, that is, one certainly has transcended oneself, the moment one becomes thankful.

I shall begin by expressing my immense gratitude to Fr. Kurt Pritzl, O.P. (1952-2011). It saddened all of us here in the School of Philosophy when Fr. Pritzl, a philosopher of great judgment and extraordinary personality, left us in February of this year. Fr. Pritzl, with the wisdom, generosity, and care that are characteristic of him, had in many ways helped me overcome a number of seemingly insoluble difficulties, academic and otherwise, that I had to
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I thank my brother Yuehai, who has in important ways helped me concentrate on my writing in the year of 2011, the most crucial year for the present dissertation.

It is phenomenologically verifiable that the most constitutive factor is sometimes also the most anonymous. The support from my wife, Zhihui Zhao, is of this kind. Her support, while being lived through by me continuously, always remains unthematic: even now I am unable to fully thematize the support she has been giving. Perhaps one reason is that she has
not just been *giving* support: she has been living supportingly with me along this much extended journey; she is my support.

Words fall apart when it comes to expressing my profound indebtedness to my parents, to whom I dedicate my dissertation.
INTRODUCTION

The term *having* easily triggers associations of *possession*, particularly that of *material* possession and property, which can in turn bring to one's mind the notion of *vulgarity*. This mental mechanism is so natural and popular that it could have been the inspiration for Gabriel Marcel's *Being and Having*, and Erich Fromm's *To Have or To Be*, two major books that harshly criticize having or the attitude of having in various aspects of life.

But we *have* more, much more than just material things. For example, we *have* our own lives, we *have* a common world, we *have* this or that kind of knowledge or virtue; moreover, we witness that things in the world are either wholes that *have* their own parts or parts *had* by their respective wholes, and that they each *have* or are *had* in their own ways. These important phenomena of having and these legitimate usages of the verb *to have* are surely familiar to us; should they all be conflated into one single category, namely, material possession? Or rather, should not we, as philosophers, respect the richness of the phenomena and make the necessary philosophical distinctions?

As a matter of fact, Aristotle is probably the first philosopher who has consciously exercised due respect for the phenomenon of having. He explicitly discusses the concept of *having* (*echein, hexis*) in his *Categories* and *Metaphysics*, and he there distinguishes no less than seven senses of the term, including the sense of *possession*. It is unfortunate, however, that in the history of philosophy *having* is, arguably, one of the most understudied among the
thirty entries treated by Aristotle in the Book V of *Metaphysics*, a fact that partly accounts for the bad name of having (as possession) in our time.

Yet the history of philosophy is also fortunate enough to "have" Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenology has important things to say about how the mind can have time, things, and ultimately the world, all by virtue of intentionality, or better, "intentional having." Even though Husserl himself never speaks of a phenomenology of having, it seems to me that, with the help of Husserlian phenomenology, we can fruitfully distinguish having from possession. And with this distinction we can achieve more than just to free "having" from a necessarily vulgar or low-minded connotation; more important, we can show that having is an essential word in our philosophical vocabulary, and that, metaphysically, having is no less (if not more) important than being.

Thus it becomes understandable why the present dissertation understands itself as primarily a phenomenological investigation of the concept of having. It begins with an analysis of Gabriel Marcel's phenomenological criticism of having, an analysis that catalyzes our articulation of a phenomenological understanding of having. Then, utilizing this understanding, we try to identify and comprehend Husserl's transcendental phenomenology itself as a phenomenology of having.

In Chapter 1 I examine the phenomenology of having presented by Gabriel Marcel in his book *Being and Having*. I focus on Marcel's discovery of the two eidetic moments of having: the tension between within and without, and the distinction between the self and the other. For Marcel, the two moments can be said to attest to the perverse nature of having, and they pave the way to the sublimation of having to being. I argue that Marcel wrongly reduces
having to a merely external relationship, i.e., possession, and because of his confusion of the two, his criticism of having should more properly be called a criticism of possession. I then endeavor to show that the rich sense of having can be appreciated only after we are able to distinguish having from possession, and only then, will we be able to see its philosophical usefulness and importance. I also anticipate a topic that will be treated in Chapters 3 and 4, namely, that having need not be sublimated into being; on the contrary, the sense of being can be clarified via having.

Chapter 2 offers mainly a transition from Marcel to Husserl. Three passages from Husserl's *Experience and Judgment, Ideas II*, and *Logical Investigations* will be sampled, and my aim is to present and analyze the having-being dichotomy that seems to be operative in these texts.

(1) I argue that the distinction between the "is"-judgment and the "has"-judgment made by Husserl in *Experience and Judgment* has the effect of showing that in both epistemology and ontology the language of having is indispensable.

(2) I explain why the distinction between "subjective being" and "subjective having" that Husserl makes in *Ideas II* signifies rather a technical and fluid differentiation inside the all-embracing transcendental subjectivity, which means that the Husserlian having-being distinction is not the Marcelian having-being dichotomy.

(3) I then turn to a passage from the Fifth Logical Investigation in which Husserl phenomenologically clarifies the sense of *experiencing* in terms of the ego's *having* of its experiences. I take this occasion to point out that, given Husserl's understanding of the nature of the ego in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, the having in question is but a
simple mereological relation and hence the ego that *has* the experiences is, strictly speaking, not a genuine *haver*. I also point out, however, that since Husserl's understanding of the nature of the ego has undergone some radical changes afterwards, the impact of these changes on Husserl's understanding of the way the ego *has* its experiences should be carefully assessed. This argument then leads us into Chapter 3, where the ego's having of its experiences will be carefully considered in our study of the phenomenological epoché and the transcendental reduction.

Chapter 3 employs the two eidetic moments of having discussed in Chapter 1 to study the phenomenological epoché and the transcendental reduction. To facilitate our study, I treat the particular epoché and the universal epoché separately. I show that in the particular epoché the tension between within and without is at work; that is to say, guided by the phenomenological interest in understanding, the performer of the particular epoché needs to purposely create a tension between the act on which the epoché is performed and the nexus of experiences in which the act is originally embedded, so that constitutive analysis of the original positing can be carried out. I then show that when we depart from the particular epoché and proceed to the universal epoché, there occurs also a transition from the within-without tension to the self-other distinction. The universal epoché results in the transcendental ego's radical self-having, on the basis of which the pre-epoché self-other distinction can be reinstalled and reinvestigated in a new light.

In the same chapter I also highlight that the universal epoché and the transcendental reduction should better be understood as the two different aspects of one unitary operation of the mind, that is, whereas the universal epoché focuses on the transcendental ego's self-
having, the transcendental reduction focuses on what is to be done after the self-having is secured. More specifically, the transcendental reduction is a reduction of being to having, namely, a reduction making manifest that all beings are intentionally achieved in and through the transcendental ego's self-having, and it calls for the most comprehensive constitutive intentional explications.

Chapter 3 is the longest chapter in the dissertation; the conclusions arrived at in it are important for and presupposed by the studies undertaken in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 I turn to the *Cartesian Meditations*, a book that in my view fairly represents Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a well unified whole. My purpose is to show that *evidence as having* provides us the key to understanding the transcendental philosophy presented in this mature yet "introductory" book by Husserl. I distinguish two versions of transcendental philosophy in the book: they both can be said to be the result of Husserl's hermeneutical appropriation of the Cartesian legacy, and they both can be expressed in the language of having.

(1) The first version results from Husserl's phenomenological and hermeneutical interpretation of Descartes' transcendental philosophy. It can be seen as a journey that travels from cognitive poverty (*having-nothing*) to an all-inclusive cognition (*having-all*), and in Husserl's opinion it is the "prototype" of transcendental philosophy.

(2) The second version is Husserl's portrait of his own transcendental phenomenology, which "overhauls" the traditional Cartesianism. I attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenology is a transcendental-philosophical enterprise whose telos, archē, and methodos can all be understood in terms of evidence (as having); that is to say, its telos and archē are the transcendental ego's *self-evidence* (i.e., the transcendental ego's *self-having*
resulted from the universal epoché and grasped in different degrees of adequacy), and evidence (i.e., intuition) itself also functions as the methodos of this enterprise.

Our study of these two versions of transcendental philosophy will help us understand more concretely why Husserl's transcendental phenomenology can be called a phenomenology of having; in a way, we also confirm Husserl's claims that the transcendental ego is for transcendental phenomenology "not only its initial but sole theme," and that he needs to "reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy," even though his transcendental phenomenology can be called a neo-Cartesianism.

To sum up, the present study phenomenologically explores the concept of having and employs this concept to shed light on phenomenology itself. It should be noted, however, that while I write this dissertation with a rather systematic goal in mind, only Marcel and Husserl are treated here. In my concluding words I point out that the philosophical significance of the present study of having could go beyond the discipline of phenomenology by serving as the preliminary work for a larger research project, one that aims at the elucidation of having in the history of philosophy. We mentioned earlier that Aristotle's treatment of having is a rather unique event in the history of philosophy; but there are indeed traces of the theme of having in other philosophers, say, Plato. Now, if the dissertation is able to show that having is a phenomenologically useful and important concept, it will also be justified in suggesting that the philosophical history of having is itself worth investigating; and Husserl's phenomenology of having, I believe, has its unique philosophical contributions to make in this larger research project.
CHAPTER 1

MARCEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF HAVING

Gabriel Marcel conceives of a phenomenology of having in his book *Being and Having*.¹ The book has two parts: the first part is entitled "Being and Having," and it is further composed of "A Metaphysical Diary" and "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having"; the second part is entitled "Faith and Reality," and it has three components: "Some Remarks on the Irreligion of Today," "Some Thoughts on Faith," and "Peter Wust on the Nature of Piety." Marcel's phenomenological analysis of having can be found mainly in the "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having" (hereafter referred to as "Outlines"), which also provides the textual basis for the present chapter.

As outlines, Marcel's discussions are in the main only sketchy. In his own words, he only gives us some "nuclear ideas" that may contain "a germ of a whole philosophy."² However, it is appropriate for us to start with them because, on the one hand, the problems inherent in our experience of having and possession are clearly presented therein, and, on the other hand, his diagnoses and evaluations of these problems represent our common understanding of and prejudice concerning having. In what follows, I will discuss the "Outlines," present and evaluate the core ideas of Marcel's phenomenology of having, and try

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² *BH*, 154.
to show the presuppositions and implications of these ideas. The goal of this chapter is to distinguish between the phenomenon of having and the phenomenon of possession, and to prepare the way for a Husserlian phenomenology of having in which the philosophical importance of having can be more adequately explored.

**Marcel's Understanding of Having**

It is helpful to clarify what Marcel means by *having* before we examine the details of his phenomenology (or phenomenological criticism) of having. He explains the meaning of this term through an analysis of the verb *to have*:

What we have obviously presents an appearance of externality to ourselves. But it is not an absolute externality. In principle, what we have are things (or what can be compared to things, precisely in so far as this comparison is possible). I can only have, in the strict sense of the word, something that possesses an existence that is, up to a certain point, independent of me. In other words, what I have is added to me; and the fact that it is possessed by me is added to the other properties, qualities, etc., belonging to the thing I have. I only have what I can in some manner and within certain limits dispose of; in other words, in so far as I can be considered as a force, a being endowed with powers. We can only transmit what we have.

In Marcel's explanation having is clearly understood by him as an *extrinsic* (though not absolutely *external*) relation between two "entities," namely, between me and what I have, or in general, between the have and the had. According to Marcel, "what I have is added to me," but this addition does not form an unbreakable unity because I, the haver, can always

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3 *BH*, 155, translation slightly modified.

4 Whenever possible, the first person singular narrative will be used to discuss the phenomenon of having. This is to reflect Marcel's insight that all statements of having are understandable only because they refer back to an "I have," or only because they are "founded" on such first person singular having experience. See *BH*, 159. This point will be treated below, pp. 33-35.
dispose of or transmit what I have. This disintegrable relation of having is also implied by what Marcel says about the nature of the had, namely, in principle, only things (chooses) can rightly said to be had. Since things are understood as things that possess independent existence, the separation of the things from the haver is always possible. In summary, for Marcel, having primarily means a coming-together of two mutually independent entities, and this coming-together is made possible and sustained by the "power" of the haver; since there is no intrinsic bond between the two entities, nothing can prevent this coming-together from falling apart again. In other words, having is a relation that is too fragile to be sustainable; later it will be seen that the fragile state of having plays an important role in Marcel's criticism of having.

Marcel's explanation sounds plain at first glance, but some obscurity in it becomes eye-catching when we read it closely. Special attention should be paid to Marcel's parenthetical remark in the passage quoted above regarding that which "can be compared" with things. In that remark Marcel emphasizes that, normally, what I have are things, but I can also have that which is not a thing in itself yet is nonetheless comparable with things. Strangely, his language about this comparability is in fact vacuous: it amounts to saying that that which is comparable with things is comparable precisely in so far as it is comparable. How can this remark be informative and illuminating? Where are we supposed to be led by this virtually tautological remark? Is this only an incidental ambiguity in Marcel's explanation of the sense of having? Or rather, is it the symptom of a fundamental defect in his understanding of having? By making the having of things the paradigm of having, is not the richness of the term "having" impoverished, and are not some genuine having-phenomena
lost from Marcel's sight? Later it will be shown that this ambiguity indeed undermines Marcel's otherwise ingenious distinction between *a feeling I am* and *a feeling I have*.

Also noteworthy is that in this explanation of the meaning of *to have* (*avoir*), Marcel uses the verb *to possess* (*posséder*) twice: things are said to *possess* existence and they are also said to be *possessed* by me. Throughout the "Outlines" Marcel does use these two verbs as interchangeable terms, and we will see in a moment that he subdivides having into two species—having-as-possession and having-as-implication—and claims that the former is more fundamental than the latter.\(^5\) It is true that having and possession are almost indistinguishable terms in most ordinary contexts; but light can be shed on the paradoxical nature of having as depicted in Marcel's "Outlines" only after having is distinguished from possession. Marcel's problem is that he understands having, a more intrinsic communion between the haver and the had, in terms of *possession*, a merely external relation between the possessor and the possessed. This misunderstanding accounts for his lack of appreciation of the significance of some genuine having-phenomena (for instance, the having of the body and the having of ideas). He claims that these genuine having-phenomena are indeed being-phenomena covered up, and corrupted by, the language of having; but he does not see that even being itself is a having-phenomenon, that is, being itself needs to be had.\(^6\) In what

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5 BH, 158.  
6 This is clear even in Marcel's own language, but he does not seem to be fully aware of this point. For example, he says that the things that I have *possess* independent existence; and later he also distinguishes *that which has more being* from *that which has less being*.

\(BH, 170\) Obviously there is a problem: if having needs to be sublimated into being (as Marcel claims), why then is being (or existence) said to be had (or possessed)? Moreover, if we stick to the strict sense of having stipulated by Marcel, namely, to have is to have things, shall we then say that being is a thing? This perplexing situation can be clarified only after the relation between having and Husserl's method of transcendental reduction is laid bare. See below, pp. 190-93, on how in Husserl's phenomenology the transcendental ego's self-having is shown to be constitutive of being.
follows, these points will be fully developed while the genuine sense of having is won back from its conflation with possession. The hostile opposition between being and having as conceived by Marcel will also vanish, or better, be elevated into a higher unity.

It might be asked that if Marcel's understanding of having is incorrect, or at least too narrow, how then should having be understood? To answer this question, let us turn to a remark made by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception.* In this book, Merleau-Ponty, among other things, attempts to overcome the traditional subject-object dichotomy by concrete phenomenological analysis of perception, the body, and the relation between the self and the world. In his treatment of the body, he devotes a section to the theme of "The Body as Expression, and Speech," and attempts to elucidate what it means for us to *have* language. He comments on the importance of this having, and discusses in a long footnote its relevance to Marcel's distinction between being and having. Since both the comment and footnote are pertinent to my argument, I reproduce them as follows:

Here [i.e., with respect to the phenomenon of the having of language] as everywhere, the relation of having, which can be seen in the very etymology of the word habit, is at first concealed by relations belonging to the domain of being, or, as we may equally say, by ontic relations obtaining within the world.

Immediately following this passage, Merleau-Ponty adds a long footnote:

This distinction of having and being does not coincide with M. G. Marcel's (*Être et Avoir*), although not incompatible with it. M. Marcel takes having in the weak sense which the word has when it designates a proprietary relationship (I have a house, I have a hat) and immediately takes being in the existential sense of belonging to . . . , or taking up (I am my body, I am my life). We prefer to take account of the usage


which gives to the term 'being' the weak sense of existence as a thing, or that of predication (the table is, or is big), and which reserves 'having' for the relation which the subject bears to the term into which it projects itself (I have an idea, I have a desire, I have fears). Hence our 'having' corresponds roughly to M. Marcel's being, and our being to his 'having'.

Merleau-Ponty's point is that in order to correctly understand the phenomenon of the having of language, we first of all should refrain from seeing it as an external relation (the so called "ontic relation") between humans as mere biological beings, on the one hand, and language as an independent natural fact governed by the laws of neurological mechanics, on the other. But, claims Merleau-Ponty, this would not be possible if we do not modify the sense of having; he thus distances himself from Marcel by proposing that here we should take having in its strong sense. That is, having should be understood as naming a relationship of mutual belonging and involvement rather than a mere proprietary relationship (namely, possession).

While Merleau-Ponty's making of the distinction between having and possession is an important step toward a correct understanding of having, from what he says in the footnote it is clear that his effort to rescue having is achieved at the expense of restricting the sense of being to mere ontic presence or predication: the sense of being-true, for example, is neglected and worse, obscured, by such talk. Consequently, the result of Merleau-Ponty's rescue is still an undesirable dichotomy of having and being, a dichotomy that mirrors, instead of overcoming, the one instituted by Marcel.

Following Merleau-Ponty's strategy, I shall also stipulate a sense of having that is different from Marcel's. But I will take a different approach to sort out the relationship between having and being. I suggest that having be understood in terms of the way in which

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consciousness (in the Husserlian sense) has its objects; in more technical terms, having can be seen as what Husserl calls the intentional correlation between the cogito and the cogitatum.¹⁰ The advantage of this understanding of having is that it allows us to treat the problem of having as a problem concerning intentional constitution. Moreover, since in Husserl's phenomenology being is regarded as a leading clue or an index pointing to transcendental system of evidence that calls for comprehensive constitutive analysis, the kinship between having and being is brought into view through the mediation of constitution.¹¹ The details of this kinship will be spelled out in what follows, and our sense of having will also establish and enrich itself gradually along the way.

The Structure of the "Outlines"

Marcel's "Outlines" was originally delivered as a lecture and the printed version reflects its spoken origin in its lack of clearly identified section headings or even sections.

¹⁰ Husserl ends §14 of his Cartesian Meditations by saying: "Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum." This bearing (tragen) illustrates the sense of having I am getting at.

See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 33 (§14); Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, 2nd edition, ed. S. Strasser, Husserliana 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963; reprinted in 1991), 72 (§14). The two books will hereafter be referred to as CM and Hua 1, respectively. Since Cairns' English translation is one of my primary texts, for convenience's sake, all references to it will be formatted as: CM, the page number(s) of Cairns' English translation, a slash, and the page number(s) that appears in the margins of Cairn's translation (which refers to Strasser's 1950 Husserliana edition), and in most cases, the section number will also be given. For example, the present reference can be written as "CM, 31-33/70-72 (§14)."

Strasser's 1963 Husserliana edition will be referred to as Hua 1, followed by its own page number(s), only when the German text is particularly important.

¹¹ See CM, §§21-29.
For convenience's sake I divide it into three parts, the summary of which is as follows.

In the first part, Marcel introduces us to the problem of having by considering two questions. The first question is about the possibility of identifying an experienced feeling. This leads Marcel to make the distinction between "a feeling I am" and "a feeling I have," a strategic distinction that enables him to systematize his criticism of having by setting up the having-being dichotomy. The second question he considers is about the phenomenon of the having of the body. If, as Marcel emphasizes, to have is always to have something of which I can have disposal, can I really claim that I have my body? Is my body a thing? Do I have the right to dispose of my body? From these questions, the paradoxicality inherent in the notion of the having of the body (or in Marcel's words, "the typical possession") is exposed.

In the second part, Marcel discusses the two essential moments of having, namely, *the tension between within and without* and *the distinction between the self and the other*. *The tension between within and without* is revealed in the example of secret-having: to have a secret means to harbor it within, yet the secret is always in danger of being discovered or betrayed, namely, being exposed to a without. This implies that the boundary between within and without is always blurred by the dialectical tension between them. *The distinction between the self and the other* is then revealed in the example of ideas-having or opinions-

\[12\] BH, 154-56.
\[13\] BH, 155.
\[14\] BH, 163.
\[15\] BH, 157-66.
\[16\] BH, 160.
having. Marcel claims that when the self displays its ideas or opinions, it also brings about a
process of self-alienation, namely, the self has to alienate itself as an other. The consequence of these two eidetic moments of having is then drawn out in the example of the
having of the body again: because of the dialectical nature of having, we are inevitably
enslaved by what we have if we stay in the having-attitude and confine ourselves to the realm
of having. The conclusion of this part is that having needs to be sublimated into being.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, Marcel in the third part manages to discover
the hidden work of the attitude of having in traditional disciplines such as epistemology,
metaphysics, ethics, and even theology. He attempts to show that in different degrees these
traditional disciplines have been implicitly formulated in the language of having, and in a
deeper sense, they are molded upon our erroneous understanding of phenomena such as the
having of the body and the having of one's own life. He argues that this is the cause of our
inability to make progress on philosophical issues such as knowledge and freedom.

I will follow this summary and examine the "Outlines" in more detail. Since Marcel's
"Outlines" (especially his discovery of the two eidetic structures of having) is a fascinating
mixture of penetrating insights and astounding prejudices, a sufficient commentary needs to
balance between appreciation and criticism. To achieve this balance, I will present Marcel's
thoughts "in themselves" before commenting on them, on the assumption that such a
separation, even if not entirely possible in the strict sense, can, within limits, still make a
legitimate dialectical contribution. Also, since the "Outlines" was originally delivered as a

17 BH, 161.
18 BH, 166-75.
lecture, some lacunae in the arguments are naturally to be expected, and I will attempt to fill in some of them when the continuity of Marcel's arguments demands it. In order to do this, at some point I will need to make references to his discussion of having in the other parts of the book. Finally, new ideas keep branching out in the course of Marcel's writing (or lecturing). While most of them are interesting in themselves and relevant to the main thread in varying degrees, it is not always possible to incorporate them into the present discussion. To keep my analysis manageable, I will pass over some of these "digressions" in silence.

**Marcel's Introduction to the Question of Having**

Marcel introduces the issue of having by considering two questions. The first is about the identifiability of a feeling and the second is about the having of the body.

"A Feeling I Have" and "a Feeling I Am"

It is in the question about the identifiability of a feeling where the Marcelian distinction between having and being is introduced. Marcel says that his interest in the problem of having was originally motivated by an apparently psychological question, namely, "Is it possible to identify a feeling which we experience for the first time?" 19 He says that this

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19 Cf. BH, 154. This translates "Est-il possible d'identifier un sentiment qu'on éprouve pour la première fois?" (Marcel, Être et Avoir, 224.) Katharine Farrer translates it as "Is it possible to identify a feeling which we have for the first time?" Although in this context the translation of éprouve as have has the merit of being natural English, it can be misleading because it overlooks the fact that the term have obtains important technical meaning in the text.
type of identification is not always easy to carry out, but making a distinction between "a feeling I have" and "a feeling I am" can be helpful.

Marcel explains the meaning of this distinction and the role it plays in identifying a feeling as follows:

I observed that an identification of this sort can be realized in proportion as the feeling can be compared with something I have, in the sense that I have a cold or the measles. In that case, it can be limited, defined and intellectualized. So far as this can be done, I can form some idea of it and compare it with the previous notion I may have had about this feeling in general. . . . On the other hand, . . . in proportion as my feeling cannot be isolated, and so distinguished, I am less sure of being able to recognize it.20

What Marcel says here is intelligible in the light of his definition of having. In other words, he believes that some feelings are comparable to the things I have, and these feelings can rightly be called the feelings that I have. Since having always implies possible separation of the had from the haver, therefore, once the separation is carried out, it creates a distance between two. This distance then enables the haver to limit, define, and intellectualize (namely, subsume it under a previously known concept) the had, and this is exactly what needs to be done when identifying a feeling. However, we are not always so lucky; sometimes, according to Marcel, this comparison or analogy between feelings and things does not hold at all—my whole being can be permeated by a feeling so completely (i.e., the feeling in question is "consubstantial with what I am")21 that it is impossible to set the feeling apart from myself. In such a case, the feeling in question should be called a feeling that I am. Marcel does not give examples to illustrate this second category of feelings, but he parenthetically mentions the

20 BH, 154.

21 BH, 154.
feeling of love, and seems to be suggest that love could be "a feeling I am." He remarks on the difficulty involved in identifying love by saying that it "may appear in such disconcerting shapes as to prevent those who feel it from suspecting its real nature."\(^{22}\)

Marcel tells us that this is one of the concrete questions from which his inquiry of having originated. Indeed, this introduction to the question of having and the distinction between having and being is straightforward and intelligible. It furthermore has the merit of reminding us of a very interesting phenomenon in our life, namely, the need to identify a feeling or an experience. This need arises in our life from time to time, and it is philosophically important because it has both an epistemic value and an existential function, namely, it helps us to understand the meaning of our own existence. For example, in the phenomenological tradition, the feeling of nostalgia is a feeling the identification of which is notoriously difficult. The description and identification of nostalgia are existentially important because, by disclosing the peculiar temporality involved in it, they help us to understand and enhance our sense of personal identity.\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\) Bh, 154. Although it sounds somewhat strange to call love a feeling, and although Marcel does not offer further explanation of his strange usage of the term feeling, the strangeness can be tolerated if we compare the Marcelian distinction between a feeling I have and a feeling I am with the Husserlian distinction between Gefühlsempfindung and Gefühlakt. To be sure, in the Logical Investigations, Husserl sets up the distinction between Gefühlsempfindung and Gefühlakt with an entirely different purpose, namely, to clearly demarcate the realm of intentional experiences, and in particular to resolve the dispute over the issue of whether or not there are non-intentional feelings. (See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay, ed. Dermot Moran [London: Routledge, 2001], 2:106-12. Hereafter cited as LI.) But extensionally speaking, a feeling I have roughly matches Gefühlsempfindung and a feeling I am roughly matches Gefühlakt. When Marcel mentions love in this context, he is obviously not referring to love as a feeling-sensation, but a feeling-act. The fact that the role played by "feeling" and "sensation" in English does not exactly reflect the role played by sentiment and sensation in French may also be a factor in the strangeness.

If Marcel's terminology is adopted, then at first glance nostalgia is admittedly "a feeling I am": when it occurs, the "poignancy" or "bitter sweetness" inherent in it permeates the whole person to such a degree that the person becomes "consubstantial" with the nostalgia. However, there is nothing unnatural or ungrammatical if, instead of saying *I am nostalgic*, say *I have nostalgia*. Taking this linguistic fact into consideration, it is legitimate to ask: Is the classification of nostalgia as "a feeling I am" at all correct? Should not nostalgia be classified as "a feeling I have"? It seems that the Marcelian criterion that is used for the classification needs to be reexamined.

According to Marcel, a feeling's identifiability is determined by its isolatability. A feeling I have allows identification better than a feeling I am because the former can be more easily "detached" or "isolated" from the one who experiences it. But how can we tell whether or not, and to what degree, a feeling is isolatable? Since the comparability between a feeling and a thing is the key to this question, what really should be asked is whether this comparability can be cashed into phenomenological intuition, so that the classification in question can be made. As was pointed out earlier, Marcel's language is extremely vague on exactly this point, i.e., the nature of this comparability in question. This problem is more acute now because, given that the comparability is in fact undefined, we can only appeal to Marcel's definition of having and take it seriously; but then we simply cannot classify any feeling as "a feeling I have." The reason is simple—no feeling can be external to (or

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24 Note also that etymologically speaking, "nostalgia" means a longing for home-returning that pains one. (*Oxford English Dictionary* [2nd ed., 1989], the entry "nostalgia"). Marcel would classify a (bodily) pain as "a feeling I have," perhaps because it can be located in the body; but in the case of a "spiritual pain" like nostalgia, the distinction between "a feeling I have" and "a feeling I am" is blurred.
independent of) the subject because a feeling is always a subjective process, be it a feeling of love (or nostalgia) or a feeling of cold (or pain).

It turns out that this Marcelian distinction between a feeling I have and a feeling I am is not so much an eidetic distinction read off from the "things themselves" as a conclusion of Marcel's semantic analysis of the concept of having. He does not phenomenologically spell out what is implicitly meant when statements like "I am nostalgic" and "I have nostalgia" are uttered, respectively. Instead, he only pursues this more or less deductive line of thought: if to have always means to have something capable of an independent existence, and if independence readily suggests isolatability, which in turn promises identifiability, then the task of identifying a feeling should welcome the distinction between what one has and what one has not.

Hence, we have to pronounce this Marcelian distinction "artificial" in a sense, even though it enables Marcel to make an impressive opening move by setting up the dichotomy between being and having. The artificiality existing in Marcel's introduction to the problem of having foretells the fate of his phenomenology of having, as will become clear later in our study.

**The Having of the Body**

The having of the body is the second question Marcel considers in his introduction. He asks whether or not there is anything in reality that cannot be transmitted by us.\(^{25}\) The

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\(^{25}\) See BH, 156.
logic behind this question is simple: for Marcel, "we can only transmit what we have"; hence, if we can find something that is supposedly had by us but cannot really be transmitted, then this something may serve as a good pointer to the paradoxical nature of having. To find out such a pointer, Marcel turns to the phenomenon of the having of the body:

I cannot . . . concentrate on what is properly called my body—as distinct from the body-as-object considered by physiologists—without coming once more upon this almost impenetrable notation of having. . . . [C]an I . . . say that my body is something which I have? In the first place, can my body as such be called a thing? If I treat it as a thing, what is this 'I' which so treats it? . . . [W]e end up with this formula: My body is (an object), I am—nothing.

Two points are made in this passage. First, Marcel explains the term my body through a distinction made between my body and the body considered by physiologists. This distinction is akin to the Husserlian distinction between the "lived body" (Leib) and the "physical body" (Körper), that is, the distinction between the body experienced by me from "within" and in which I "rule and govern," on the one hand, and the body perceived from "without" as a physical thing, which is also subject to phychophysical causality, on the other.

Phenomenology needs this distinction because it emancipates us from the derivative knowledge of the body obtained from a naturalistic view, and leads us to the primordial and original lived experience of the body. This distinction is an initial but necessary step to the fulfillment of the call "to the things themselves."

Once this distinction is set up, Marcel can question the appropriateness of calling this

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26 BH, 155.
27 BH, 156.
"lived body" my body. He observes that if the strict sense of having is in effect, that is, if it is accepted that only things can properly be had, then I cannot really say that I have my body because my body is not a thing, or at least its thinghood is imperfect. This is a legitimate point because it is inconceivable how my body and I could withstand the test of separation, a test that poses no problem at all to a really independent thing such as, say, my glasses.

Not only is the actual separation of my body from me inconceivable, it is already difficult enough to distinguish them conceptually in thought. As Marcel puts it, "If I treat it [my body] as a thing, what is this 'I' which so treats it?" He even coins the intriguing formulation "My body is (an object), I am—nothing" to make plain his view of this problematic distinction. The following two formulations from his "A Metaphysical Diary" (the part that precedes the "Outlines") highlight the problem from still different angles:

I am my body.29

Of this body, I can neither say that it is I, nor that it is not I, nor that it is for me (object). The opposition of subject and object is found to be transcended from the start.30

What the first quotation says is plain, and it clearly expresses Marcel's intention to understand the having of the body as a being-phenomenon. However, Marcel's considered view on the relation between my body and I is conveyed by the second quotation, that is, "Of this body, I can neither say that it is I, nor that it is not I, nor that it is for me (object)." This somewhat embarrassing statement bespeaks the uselessness of the traditional subject-object model in the problem of the having of the body, and this is why the Cartesian dualist solution

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29 BH, 12.

30 BH, 12.
to this problem is not mentioned by Marcel at all.\textsuperscript{31}

If I neither have my body in the strict sense of having, nor am my body without qualification, what can we say about this strange state-of-affairs? This question cannot be answered before the whole problematic of having is fully understood. Marcel will further explore the paradox of the having of the body in the second part of the "Outlines," and we shall also wait until then to further discuss this theme.\textsuperscript{32}

Marcel is also aware of the fact that the problem of the having of one's body is more than an issue of conceptual clarification; it bears on the ethical issue of the having of one's life. He draws our attention to this different dimension of the problem by considering a possible objection to his analysis: one may want to defend the legitimacy of the notion of the having of the body by pointing out the possibility of suicide. Since to commit suicide is in a sense to dispose of my own body, and since to have also implies to have something of which I have disposal, does not the extreme possibility of committing suicide confirm that the body is, after all, mine? Marcel responds to this objection by pointing out that once such a disposing of one's body is performed, it immediately results in, not the confirmation of the having of the body, but the absolute annihilation of this having, and this reveals the paradoxical nature of having once more:

My body is something of which I can only dispose, in the absolute sense of the term, by putting it into such a state that I shall no longer have any power to dispose of it. This absolute disposal [i.e., killing oneself] is therefore in reality a putting out of


\textsuperscript{32} See below, pp. 63-67.
Marcel points out further that the paradoxicality involved in committing suicide could also be examined through a comparison of people's different attitudes toward the alleged right to commit suicide:

Surely killing ourselves is disposing of our bodies (or lives) as though they are something we have, as though they are things. And surely this is an implicit admission that we belong to ourselves? . . . It is surely clear that the relation is quite a different thing for the man who refuses to kill himself: because he does not recognize a right to do so, since he does not belong to himself.\textsuperscript{34}

Obviously, if the statement \textit{I have my body} is denied of its validity, to say that \textit{I have my life} becomes equally problematic. According to Marcel, one's having of one's own life (i.e., the idea that \textit{my life belongs to me}) is the implicit presupposition inherent in modern ethical thinking. Therefore, if we can show the illegitimacy of this having, the way to a better ethics is also paved, an issue that Marcel will discuss in the third part of the “Outlines.”\textsuperscript{35}

To sum up, Marcel introduces the distinction between being and having through the distinction between a feeling I have and a feeling I am; he also briefly discusses the paradoxicality inherent in the notion of the having of the body. The goal of his introduction is to provide a cue for the formal entrance of his more extensive analysis of having; this goal is achieved.

\textsuperscript{33} BH, 82.

\textsuperscript{34} BH, 156.

\textsuperscript{35} See below, pp. 77-78.
Terminological and Methodological Preparation

The second part of Marcel's "Outlines" consists of detailed analyses of having, and the most important part of it is his discovery of the two eidetic moments in the structure of having, i.e., the tension between within and without and the distinction between the self and the other. He develops this part in four steps: he first provides some methodological and terminological preparation; the discovery of the two eidetic moments through carefully chosen examples is the second step; the third describes how having is destined to the fate of self-annihilation; Marcel concludes by showing through examples that having needs to be sublimated into being.

On Having in the History of Philosophy

Marcel begins with a brief comment on the inadequate attention the theme of having has received in the history of philosophy:

We should first notice that the philosophers seem to have always shown a sort of implicit mistrust towards the notion of having. . . . It almost looks as if the philosophers had on the whole turned away from having, as if it were an impure idea, essentially incapable of being made precise.36

While Marcel's remark is an accurate depiction of most philosophers, it is nonetheless not right to say that they had "on the whole turned away from having": Aristotle is an exception because both "to have" and "having" (echein and hexis) are clearly discussed his Categories

36 BH, 157.
Having said this, however, we have to admit that Aristotle's treatment of having is rather a unique event in the history of philosophy. In other words, having, as a philosophical issue, debuted quite abruptly on the stage of philosophy through Aristotle, almost without any obvious historical preparation (which is not the case for the issues of, for example, being and virtue); and after Aristotle, the philosophical interest in having among philosophers seems to have dwindled quite rapidly. Marcel gathers that it is the impurity and impreciseness inherent in the idea of having that have made having an understudied philosophical topic. So he tries to bring some precision to it through some methodological and terminological clarification.

**Methodological Comment on Phenomenology**

As the title of the "Outlines" tells us, the analysis of having Marcel offers here is meant to be read as phenomenological. Marcel explains his understanding of phenomenology in this way:

> It may be asked why . . . I have myself made use of the term phenomenology.

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37 See Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter 15, and *Metaphysics*, Book 5, chapters 20, 23. Also see *Metaphysics*, Book 5, chapter 22, on "privation (steresis)," i.e., having-not.

38 With help from Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott's *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), some invaluable clues are indeed found under the entry of *hexis*. For example, *hexis* makes a handful of appearances in Plato's writings that are really important, which suggest that it should be possible to establish (hermeneutically) certain relations between Plato and Aristotle's philosophical inquiry of having; but this is all that we have. On the other hand, the philosophical development of having after Aristotle is neither continuous nor sufficient. To be sure, in Aquinas we find some impressively insightful discussions of *habitus*, but in Aquinas having *qua* having is no longer an issue: the focus is shifted from having *qua* having to having as *habitus*, a moral or "existential" phenomenon. Habitus itself has again undergone a serious shrinkage of philosophical significance when it is primarily received as *habit* in modernity. On this point, see Yves Simon, *The Definition of Moral Virtue*, ed. Vukan Kuic (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), esp. chapter 3.
I reply that the non-psychological character of such an enquiry as this must be emphasized as strongly as possible; for it really concerns the content of the thoughts which it is trying to bring out, so that they may expand in the light of reflection.\textsuperscript{39}

Marcel's characterization of his inquiry as "non-psychological" reminds us of Husserl, who always distinguishes psychological analysis from phenomenological analysis. Moreover, although Marcel does not explain what he has in mind when he uses the phrase "the content of the thoughts (des contenus de pensée)," given his emphasis on the non-psychological character of his analysis, it is safe to assume that Marcel means to distinguish the content of the thoughts from the psychological make-up of thoughts; that is to say, we can safely assume that the style of Marcel's subsequent analysis is close to what Husserl calls noematic description, the descriptive interest of which is in the structure, modality, and style of the experienced as experienced, rather than in the experiencing itself.\textsuperscript{40} Since having is what concerns us here, the experienced and the experiencing should be understood as the had and the having, respectively.

In the "Outlines," this is the only place where Marcel directly talks about his understanding of phenomenology. Since one purpose of the present study is to examine Marcel's position from a Husserlian phenomenological perspective, it is helpful to press this methodological consideration further now. Another methodological clue can be found in

\textsuperscript{39} BH, 158.

\textsuperscript{40} On noematic description, see, for example, CM, §15. Of course, for Husserl, to understand noematic description and noetic description as two mutually independent and separable approaches is as absurd as to separate the cogito from the cogitatum. Although I do not want to bring up this point against Marcel here (because his intention is simply to emphasize the "objectivity" of his analysis), his words are nonetheless revealing: his understanding of phenomenology is, to some extent, infected by a certain one-sidedness.
Marcel's comment on Gunter Stern's doctoral dissertation *Über das Haben.* Marcel praises Stern for his sensitivity to the problem of the having of the body, but he disapproves of Stern's using of Husserl's methodology and terminology, and stresses that "we must take care not to have recourse to the language of German phenomenologists, which is so often untranslatable." Marcel's lack of enthusiasm for Husserl's phenomenology is palpable in his words. Moreover, this somewhat negative attitude is not incidental—about four decades later, in his reply to Paul Ricoeur's article "Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology," Marcel makes the following claim in a similar spirit:

I will begin by pointing out that I am barely acquainted with Husserl's philosophy. I remember reading the *Ideen* some months before the beginning of the First World War and not understanding a word of it. I had not yet read the *Logical Investigations*. Much later I listened to the first Cartesian Meditations, when Husserl himself came to deliver them at the Sorbonne. At first I found them interesting, then tiresome.

Without a doubt, Marcel finds Husserlian phenomenology unpalatable and is reluctant to admit that it had any influence upon him. If Marcel labels himself as doing a phenomenology quite different from Husserl's, what then is the difference between their phenomenologies? And what is the philosophical significance of their difference? These are some important questions that we cannot answer unless both phenomenologies of having are carefully studied.

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41 Gunter Stern, i.e., Günther Stern (also known under the pseudonym Günther Anders), Hannah Arendt's erstwhile husband, studied under both Heidegger and Husserl. His doctoral dissertation is entitled *Über das Haben: Sieben Kapitel zur Ontologie der Erkenntnis* (Bonn, F. Cohen, 1928).

42 *BH*, 158.


The Distinction between Having-as-Possession and Having-as-Implication

The next step Marcel takes is to address two terminological issues. The first is about the subdivision of having into two species, i.e., having-as-possession and having-as-implication; and the second is about the qui-qui correlation in having.

To explain what having-as-possession and having-as-implication are, Marcel says that he will "start with the clearest examples [of having] . . . where having is plainly in its strongest and most exact sense."45 He explains having-as-possession through a few having-statements from our everyday speech:

Having-as-possession can itself develop varieties that are very different, and arranged, as it were, in a hierarchy. But the possessive index [l'indice possessif] is as clearly marked when I say, 'I have a bicycle,' as it is when I assert, 'I have my own views on that,' or even when I say (and this takes us in a slightly different direction), 'I have time to do so-and-so.'46

For Marcel, the three having-statements mentioned in this passage all represent a kind of possession because the "possessive index" is clearly implied in them. Namely, each statement can be converted into a phrase that begins with the possessive pronoun my: my bicycle, my views, my time.

As regards having-as-possession, an important point is made: Marcel tells us that a hierarchical order of having-as-possession is involved here. Being a hierarchy implies that the manifold senses of having form a spectrum, ranging from the original to the analogous and the derivative. To determine what is involved in this hierarchy of senses, we need to see

45 BH, 158.
46 BH, 158.
in what respect these having-statements differ from one another.

(1) I have a bicycle.

(2) I have my own views on that.

(3) I have time to do so-and-so.

Formally speaking, these statements all begin with an "I have," and this means that the haver remains unchanged; therefore, the difference in their senses should be found in their material constituents, the had. Clearly then, that which is had is arranged in the order of its "tangibility." A bicycle is a material possession, the tangibility of which is beyond doubt; my views are not visible as a bicycle, but they are nonetheless "something" distinct (or at least capable of being made distinct); time is neither tangible nor visible, and to conceptualize what it is is notoriously difficult. Since Marcel understands having as the coming-together of two mutually independent "entities" that is sustained by the power of the haver, it is only natural for him to find the "strongest and most exact sense" of having in material having. For him, mental having (e.g., the having of an idea or a view) enjoys a less original sense, and temporal having, namely, the having of time, enjoys a still less original sense and needs a different treatment.

It is clear, then, that Marcel's hierarchy of having-as-possession in fact reflects different degrees of the tangibility of the had, and establishes material having as the

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47 Let us for the moment ignore the point that, as an indexical, the "I" can mean a different haver in different contexts. See below, pp. 33-34, for development of this point.

48 Marcel in this quotation does say that the having of time "takes us in a slightly different direction," but he never explains what this different direction is. John V. Vigorito in his "On Time in the Philosophy of Marcel" (in The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, 391-417) has shown that Marcel's view of time (or time consciousness) is quite similar to Husserl's. It is regrettable nonetheless that Marcel does not elaborate on the temporality of the experience of having.
paradigm of having. This paradigm makes sense whenever one fixes one's mind on the tangible and visible only. In what follows, we must carefully consider whether this paradigm really helps Marcel shed light on the phenomenon of having.

Having explained the subdivision of having-as-possession, Marcel turns to having-as-implication, the second of the two species of having identified by him. He illustrates it by examples like "Such-and-such a body has such-and-such a property," and "A certain geometrical figure has a certain property." These are statements about an *impersonal* thing's having of its own (essential or accidental) properties, i.e., properties that are either *implied* by the thing's nature, or sustained anyway by the thing itself. This type of having is important because epistemologically speaking, knowing a thing requires knowing the properties the thing has. This connection between having-as-implication and epistemology has its role to play in Marcel's later criticism of the traditional epistemology.  

The *Qui-Quid* Correlation

Once the distinction between having-as-possession and having-as-implication is made, Marcel can concentrate on having-as-possession, the more important species of having in his eyes, and make a further terminological clarification. He observes that:

In all having-as-possession there does seem to be a certain content. That is too definite a word. Call it a certain *quid* relating to a certain *quí* who is treated as a center of inherence or apprehension. I purposely abstain from the use of the word  

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49 *BH*, 160, 163.

50 See below, pp. 75-77.
subject, because of the special meanings, whether logical or epistemological, which it connotes.\footnote{BH, 158-9.}

In this passage, Marcel leads us into the inside of having-as-possession, and introduces new terms to name the two structural moments in it, namely, the *qui* and the *quid*.\footnote{Marcel does not explain how he comes up with this unusual combination of terms, and we can of course use the English "who" and "what" to substitute the Latin *qui* and *quid*. However, since the two terms are used quite frequently in the "Outlines," I will keep them in their original forms.} The purpose of these new terms is clearly explained: in order to transcend the "opposition of subject and object," it is desirable to keep the terminology redolent of this opposition at bay. Moreover, since having-as-possession always involves a *person*, or a *who*, as the haver, the term "qui" does a better job than "subject" in reminding us of this point. For this reason, although up to this point I have been using the somewhat awkward terms *the haver* and *the had* to name the two correlates in having, whenever possible I will adopt Marcel's terminology in the remainder of my exposition. Another pair of correlates, *the possessor* and *the possessed*, will be reserved to describe the phenomenon of possession.

But one may wonder, since the so-called qui-quid correlation seems to be so obvious as to be trivial, why should it be emphasized? To reply, we say: methodologically speaking, this correlation is important because it makes it clear that any concrete understanding of having must take this inherent two-sided correlation into account; and any study that focuses one-sidedly either on the qui or on the quid would be abstract and unacceptable. Moreover, since intentionality (i.e., intentional having, the essential feature of consciousness) manifests itself through the cogito-cogitatum correlation (i.e., the cogito's bearing of its cogitatum within itself), the common two-sided structure also intimates that a common two-sided
methodological approach would be feasible.

About the qui-quit correlation, Marcel adds the following observation:

[A]ny assertion about having seems to be somehow built on the model of a kind of prototypical statement, where the qui is no other than myself. It looks as if having is only felt in its full force, and given its full weight, when it is within "I have." If a 'you have' or a 'he has' is possible, it is only possible in virtue of a kind of transference, and such a transference cannot be made without losing something in the process.

This can be made somewhat clearer if we think of the relation which plainly joins possession to power, at any rate where the possession is actual and literal. Power is something which I experience by exercising it or by resisting it—after all, it comes to the same thing.  

The original sense of having is what occupies Marcel here. Since the manifold senses of having are hierarchical, it is natural for a phenomenology of having to study the original sense first, and then investigate the founding-founded relation between the original and its derivatives. As regards the original, Marcel claims that having is "felt in its full force, and given its full weight" in the so called "prototypical statement" of having; and a statement of having is prototypical when the qui is myself and having is expressed in the form of an "I have." In other words, he suggests that the ultimate source of the intelligibility of any having-statements must lie in the first person (i.e., original) experience of having. A "You have" or a "He has" is intelligible only when it is seen as founded on an "I have"; an exclusively second or third person usage of having would be inconceivable and unintelligible. Furthermore, Marcel points out that this founding-founded relation has its rationale in the experience of power: having is brought into reality, and sustained, through the qui's exercise of power; and one becomes acquainted with power only through one's first person experience of it (that is, through one's own effort to exercise or resist it); therefore, in order to make sense of the

53 BH, 159.
having-statements that are formulated in non-first person language, one has to seek intelligibility in one's first-person experience of having, which is in turn brought forth through one's first-person experience of power.

With respect to the foundational role played by the "I have," it should be noted that like a "You have" or a "He has," an "I have" is also an occasional expression that functions "indexically"; namely, the "I" that is picked out by an "I have" varies according to occasions. It follows that a having-statement begins with "I have" but is uttered by someone other than myself should be treated like a "He has" or "You have." For instance, I am able to understand what John Smith means when he says that "I have an idea about that" only on the basis of my own experience of what it is like for me to have an idea. This is the subtlety in Marcel's claim that in the prototypical statement of having, "the qui is no other than myself."\(^{54}\)

About this founding-founded relationship, Marcel continues to say that although a "You have" or a "He has" is understood on the basis of an "I have," such understanding necessarily undergoes certain modification, and loses its originality in this modificational process. This is why he says that "If a 'you have' or a 'he has' is possible, it is only possible in virtue of a kind of transference, and such a transference cannot be made without losing something in the process."\(^{55}\) From a phenomenological point of view, that which is lost in the analogical transference of sense is related to the original mode of givenness. I understand what it is like for you to have an idea, that is, I can see you as having an idea, on the basis of my own experience of having-an-idea; but I cannot experience your having-of-the-idea,

\(^{54}\) BH, 159.

\(^{55}\) BH, 159.
which is a really inherent constituent of your conscious life and can never be given to me in its originality.\footnote{This point can be compared to the phenomenon of \textit{appresentation} discussed by Husserl. For example, Husserl says, "properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same." (CM, 109/139) In other words, I can \textit{appresent} your having of ideas, but, in principle, I cannot originally experience your having of ideas. More detailed discussion of the peculiarity of \textit{appresentation} can be found in \textit{CM}, §§50-52.}

So far, Marcel has studied the original and derivative modes of having, but he seems to have forgotten the study of another correlate: should not the inquiry into the quid, i.e., the correlate of the qui, be carried out as well? The correlative inquiry is necessary because the \textit{prototypical} having-statements, i.e., the having-statements that begin with an "I have," are not of the same prototypicality or originality. "I have a world," "I have my life," and "I have a bicycle" represent different types of having because they are of different constitutive stories (i.e., they are established in different manners). They are also of different \textit{priorities} because, obviously, I cannot have a bicycle if I have not a world "in advance." A mere formal approach to the having-problematic is therefore inadequate, because it fails to see that it is the \textit{material} of having, namely, the quid, that distinguishes one "I have" from another. Hence, a two-sided study of the original sense of having is in order, and its task is to find out if there is an "I have" in which the \textit{quid is intrinsically} my own, so that this very "I have" is the most original.\footnote{To be sure, Marcel can have recourse to his definition of having: namely, he can point out that having is a relation that is \textit{anything but an intrinsic bond} between the qui and the quid, and hence, an "intrinsic having" is only an oxymoron. But it is exactly his understanding of having that the present dissertation wants to challenge.} This most original "I have" will be treated in my discussion of Husserl's phenomenology;\footnote{In Chapter 3 we will see that the transcendental ego's radical self-having (i.e., the transcendental ego's} for my present purpose, what we have done so far should be enough to
establish the importance of the quia-quo correlation for any inquiry into the phenomenon of having.

*Having Does Not Signify Spatial Containing*

To talk about having, it is almost impossible to not use such terms as "in" and "out" (as Marcel will do in a moment), but is the seemingly innocent spatial connotation of the terms really harmless? This is Marcel's next concern, and his answer is "No":

I should be told here that having is often apt to reduce itself to the fact of containing. But even if we admit that this is so, the important point must be made, that the containing itself cannot be defined in purely spatial terms. It seems to me to always to imply the idea of a potentiality. To contain is to enclose; but to enclose is to prevent, to resist, and to oppose the tendency of the content towards spreading, spilling out, and escaping.\(^{59}\)

Having is always accompanied by the connotation of spatial containing and being-in, with the added implication of keeping the content from escaping the predetermined space.\(^{60}\) This

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59 *BH, 159.*

60 Aristotle in his *Categories* and *Metaphysics* enumerates for us the many senses of "to have": (1) the having of a quality (for example, the having of a disposition, a virtue, or knowledge); (2) the having of a quantity; (3) the having (wearing) of apparel; (4) a whole's having of parts; (5) having as containing (e.g., a jar is said to have wine) or "being in something"; (6) having in the sense of acquiring and possessing; (7) a husband's having of his wife. See Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter 15, and *Metaphysics*, Book 5, chapter 23 (the sense of "being in something" is only explicitly mentioned in *Metaphysics* 1023a 25). According to Theodore Kisiel, the close relation between having and being-in that Aristotle identifies in the *Metaphysics* is also of interest to Heidegger's study of Aristotle's "ousiological ontology." See Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 253. "Having" also plays an important part in Kisiel's interpretation of Heidegger. Cf. below, footnote #78. Note: cross references to footnotes all refer to the footnotes in the same chapter, unless otherwise noted.
common understanding, however, can obscure the philosophical significance of having.\footnote{It should be noted that this is also the problem Heidegger struggles with in the *Being and Time*. Dasein is intrinsically Being-in-the-World (or, Having-the-World), and this Being-in cannot be interpreted as a spatial relation either. Heidegger says, "Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand. Nor does the term 'Being-in' mean a spatial 'in-one-another-ness' of things present-at-hand, any more than the word 'in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind." See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 79-80. Hereafter cited as *BT*.} To counter this common understanding, Marcel emphasizes the role played by power in having and relates having to the notion of *potentiality*. Instead of signifying a spatial and static proprietorship, for Marcel, having signifies a dynamic process that is closely coupled with some kind of "doing." This shift of meaning suggested by Marcel can be seen as parallel to Husserl's effort to distinguish intentional having from *reell* containing: when consciousness is said to *have* its object by virtue of intentionality, this having is a having achieved in and through intentional constitution; it should never be taken to mean a containing in the proper sense, or in a *reell* manner, with the connotation of a spatial enclosure.\footnote{See for example, *LI*, 2:84, 98, where Husserl criticizes the tendency to misunderstand intentionality as a psychologically real relation. More discussion of the relation of intentionality to having can be found in below, pp. 212-15.}

**The First Eidetic Moment:**

**The Tension between Within and Without**

After the methodological and terminological clarifications are made, in this section Marcel is able to discover two eidetic moments of having, namely, the tension between within and without, and the distinction between the self and the other. As we will see later in
our study, his discovery is the basis of his criticism of having.

An Analysis of the Verb "To Have"

Marcel begins by directing our attention to a linguistic feature of having. This linguistic analysis is the prelude to his discovery of the within-without tension:

It is significant that the relation embodied in having is, grammatically, found to be intransitive. The verb 'to have' is only used in the passive in exceptional and specialized ways. It is as though we saw passing before us a kind of irreversible progress from the qui towards the quid. . . . [T]he progress seems to be carried out by the qui itself: it seems to be within the qui. . . .

We can only express ourselves in terms of having when we are moving on a level where . . . the contrast between within and without retains a meaning.63

In this passage, Marcel observes that grammatically the verb "to have" is intransitive and he relates this allegedly intransitive character to "the contrast between within and without." According to him, the intransitive character of "to have" and the rareness of its passive usage indicate that "to have" is not only an "irreversible process from the qui towards the quid," but also a process that remains within the qui. But his argument is unsound for the following two reasons: 1) the premise is not true because, normally, "to have" is not classified as an intransitive verb, and 2) the reasoning is unclear, if not flawed, because if "to have" is an irreversible process" that emanates from the qui and arrives at the quid, how then can contradiction be avoided when it is also asserted that this process remains "within" the qui? Is "having" an arrow that strikes the target without leaving the bowstring?

In both French and English, the verbs "avoir" and "to have" are not intransitive: they

63 BH, 160.
can take a direct object, as in the three examples Marcel himself has given. Grammatically speaking, "avoir" and "to have" are classified as *stative* verbs. To be sure, "to have" is usually not used in the passive voice, but this linguistic feature has a different raison d'être than the one Marcel suggests.

Let us consider an example. Suppose a general in ancient time had conquered his enemies and turned the captives into his slaves; triumphantly, he claimed that "They are *had* by me." Although his use of the verb "to have" in the passive is unusual, it is nonetheless intelligible, because the power that was *exercised* by him was "remarkable," and it is exactly this power that the captives had literally *suffered* from. Is not the passive voice of a verb originally meant to express suffering and passion? And what is the source of the *patient's* passion and suffering if not the power exerted by the *agent*? The power in question has to be *literal* rather than *metaphorical* in order for a passive form to sound natural. When the quid is tangible, as is the case in material having, the power involved is either identical with or closely related to physical force, which stands for power in the literal sense; in contrast, one does not have to be muscular to *have* ideas and time, and the ideas and time that are had do not really "suffer" from the fact that they are *had* by someone. The "act" of having is not *intrusive* at all in the latter cases; this explains why the passive form of "to have" sounds unnatural more often in mental and temporal having: there is hardly any passivity to be expressed.

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64 Of course, they are also auxiliary verbs, but it seems to me that this grammatical phenomenon is not immediately relevant to our purpose.

65 In today's consumer society, most material possessions are established through purchase, an exchange of money for commodity. Although a purchase itself is normally an "effortless" process, our intention to emphasize our ownership is revealed in the term we coin, *purchasing power*. We are convinced that literal proprietorship requires literal power.
From an Aristotelian perspective, therefore, the forgoing analysis shows that mental having and material having (possession) belong to different efficient causes. This is why, even in the case of material having, the use of "being possessed" is preferred to the use of "being had": the former, as the passive form of a transitive verb, expresses passivity more aptly. Language itself, instead of conflating having and possession into one, subtly shows us the difference between them by instituting in us a "linguistic instinct," so that whenever genuine passivity is to be expressed we naturally use "to be possessed," rather than "to be had." This fact—that a better choice is available for us—partly accounts for Marcel's observation that "the verb 'to have' is only used in the passive in exceptional and specialized ways." In the present dissertation, however, "to have" will be used in the passive quite frequently, because it is the removal of certain harmful confusion that our "exceptional" usage is aimed at.

One who writes is more or less at the mercy of language and Marcel is no exception: in the French text of the "Outlines," he, too, is somehow compelled by the nuances between the two verbs "avoir" and "posséder" to opt for the passive form of "posséder" when he needs to express having in the passive. Unfortunately, his own linguistic practice does not make him suspect the inappropriateness of identifying having in the primary sense with material possession. Yet if having is nothing but possession, what is the point of his choice of words? Ironically, so it seems, his "instinctive" choice betrays rather than supports him: it implies that between having and possession there is some essentially irreconcilable difference.

So far, a beam of light is shed on the phenomenon that "the verb 'to have' is only used in the passive in exceptional and specialized ways." But the use of the verb "to have" in
mentally having and temporally having (the genuine birthplace of having) should be further examined. Let us recall the feeling of nostalgia from our earlier discussion: nostalgia seems to be both "a feeling I have" and "a feeling I am" because the statements "I have nostalgia" and "I am nostalgic" both sound legitimate. Nostalgia presents another problem for us now because it makes sense to say "Nostalgia has me"; this statement makes much better sense than "Nostalgia is had by me" or "Nostalgia is possessed by me" does. Does not this fact fly in the face of Marcel's claim that having is an irreversible process from the qui towards the quid? Having is reversible! In nostalgia, the having that obtains between the qui and the quid seems to be neither active nor passive; it is "middle voiced." This middle-voicedness reflects the mutual-belongingness of the qui and the quid, which strongly suggests that the language of having itself either already transcends or provides the resource to transcend "the opposition of subject and object." The value of Marcel's effort to overcome this opposition through his criticism of having has to be discounted, if not totally denied, because he fails to appreciate the middle-voicedness inherent in the relation of having.

66 See above, pp. 18-19.

67 Nostalgia is not the only example. In fact, this linguistic phenomenon is true to most "intense" emotions—for example, it is equally acceptable to say "Terror has me (in its grip)."

68 Herbert Weir Smyth explains the middle voice thus: "The middle voice shows that the action is performed with special reference to the subject: louomai. I wash myself." Also, "The middle represents the subject as doing something in which he is interested. He may do something to himself, for himself, or he may act with something belonging to himself." (Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges [New York: American Book Company, 1920], 390.) In our case, if nostalgia is used as a verb, to say "I nostalgia myself" would perhaps be as good as saying "I have nostalgia," "I am nostalgic," or "Nostalgia has me."

I want to express my gratitude to Theodore Kiesel for helping me to see the philosophical significance of the middle voice through his interpretation of Heidegger. For some valuable discussions on this topic, see Kiesel's Genesis, esp. 153, 301, and 366. A helpful study of both Kiesel and Gadamer's interpretations of Heidegger's take on the middle voice can be found in Philippe Eberhard's The Middle Voice in Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Basic Interpretation with Some Theological Implications (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), esp. 21-22 and 46-47.
We are thus led to a final consideration that is relevant to the rareness of the passive use of "to have": having seems to be an "immanent activity" that differs radically from transitive activity. To be fair to Marcel, he seems to be conveying this point when he says in the passage quoted above that the act of having "seems to be carried out by the qui itself: it seems to be within the qui"; but he does not spell out how the term within should be understood, and we have no clue to judge whether or not he is alluding to the notion of "immanent activity."

To sum up, our analysis of Marcel's argument has revealed that "to have" is rarely used in the passive form because 1) the power involved in some kinds of having (i.e., mental having and temporal having) is not power, or force, or strength, in the literal sense, and the quid does not literally suffer; 2) the relation between the qui and the quid are "middle voiced" in some kinds of having and should not be characterized by the normal subject-object or agent-patient categories; and 3) the activity of having can be interpreted as an immanent activity, and hence is different from transitive activities where the passive use is natural and normal. The three points highlight the peculiarity of the "act" of having and are indispensible for a correct understanding thereof.

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An Analysis of Secret-Having

To say that Marcel has misinterpreted the grammar of "to have" is not to underestimate the value of his discovery of the tension between within and without. The discovery is validly made through his analysis of secret-having:

Reflection will . . . bring before our eyes the existence of a kind of dialectic of internality. *To have* can certainly mean, and even chiefly mean, *to have for one's-self*, to keep for one's-self, to hide. The most interesting and typical example is *having a secret*. . . . This secret is only a secret because I keep it; but also and at the same time, it is only a secret because I could reveal it. The possibility of betrayal or discovery is inherent in it, and contributes to its definition as a secret. This is not a unique case; it can be verified whenever we are confronted with having in the strongest sense of the word.⁷⁰

In secret-having, a distinction between within and without and its dialectical feature present themselves to us. To say that "I have a secret" normally means that the secret, the quid, is hidden in me, and I will not let it out; the within-without distinction is established and is supposed to be maintained. However, the "possibility of betrayal and discovery" is always there threatening the effort of keeping this distinction undisturbed. More importantly, secret-having is by definition an attempt to confront such threats: in a world where there were only one who confides and one who listens, secret-having would be pointless exactly because there is no external threat. To put it another way, secret-having is essentially an act of embracing something (i.e., the quid) that by nature may escape from the embrace (through betrayal or discovery); the quid, by virtue of its peculiarity, therefore blurs the distinction between within and without and transforms it into a dialectical tension. This dialectical feature, as Marcel tells us, defines "having in the strongest sense of the word."

⁷⁰ BH, 160-61.
We have noted earlier that Marcel understands having as a fragile connection between
the qui and the quid; now, in the light of the just discovered tension between within and
without, the fragility of having is heightened. In Marcel's eyes, this heightened fragility is the
bane of having, and will finally lead having to its own annihilation.

The Second Eidetic Moment:
The Distinction between the Self and the Other

The Having of Ideas

The second eidetic moment of having that Marcel discovers is the distinction between
the self and the other. He starts with an analogy between mental having and material having:

The characteristic of a having is being displayable. There is a strict parallel between
having drawings by X in one's portfolios, which can be shown to this or that visitor,
and having ideas or opinion on this or that question.\(^7\)

We are told that "the characteristic of a having is being displayable," and this means that as it
is essential for my secret to be exposable, it is also essential for my ideas to be displayable.
This display, no matter public or private, needs a "visitor" (or "dative") to whom the display
occurs. For a material possession like drawings, it is not difficult for me to find an onlooker
or a spectator to "show off," but how about the ideas I have? Who is the "visitor" to my ideas?
Marcel's answer is as follows.

This act of displaying may take place or unfold before another or before one's-self.
The curious thing is that analysis will reveal to us that this difference is devoid of

\(^7\) BH 161, translation slightly modified.
meaning. In so far as I display my own views to myself, I myself become someone else. That, I suppose, is the metaphysical basis for the possibility of expression. I can only express myself in so far as I can become someone else to myself.

And now we see the transition takes place from the first formula [i.e., "we can only express ourselves in terms of having when we are moving on a level where the contrast between within and without retains a meaning"] to the second one: we can only express ourselves in terms of having, when we are moving on a level implying reference to another taken as another. There is no contradiction between this formula and my remarks just now on "I have." The statement "I have" can only be made over against another which is felt to be other.72

In this passage, Marcel opines on the so called "metaphysical basis for the possibility of expression," and claims that it is the distinction between the self and the other that serves as the basis. This is the case because "in so far as I display my own views to myself, I myself become someone else." In other words, either myself or an other can be the "visitor" to my ideas; but as the dative of this displaying, myself or the other should all be treated as the other. But why is the distinction between the self and the other necessary for expression (or in general, any display of having)? Is it a phenomenologically demonstrable claim?

Since to display, or to express, my own views or ideas to myself is what is normally called thinking, the "metaphysical basis for the possibility of expression," if it exists, is also the metaphysical basis of thinking. In thinking, a certain relationship between oneself and one's thoughts (or ideas) is established, but Marcel's perception of this relationship is misguided by the improper analogy of ideas-having to material-having (i.e., the having of drawings). The analogy does not necessarily cause a problem as long as one knows that it is a metaphorical way of speaking; unfortunately, Marcel overcharges the metaphor because the "solid" sense inherent in the example of drawings fits perfectly into his materialistic understanding of having. Let us now examine how Marcel misses the philosophical

72 BH, 161.
significance of his discovery because of his failure to see the essential difference between the two kinds of displaying.

Two Kinds of Displaying

To reveal Marcel's problem clearly, let us compare what he says about expression with what Plato says about thinking. In both the *Theaetetus* 189e and the *Sophist* 263e, Plato tells us that thinking is the soul's voiceless conversation with itself. This voiceless conversation is a displaying of one's views to oneself. Hence, the difference between Marcel and Plato (with regard to the essence of thinking) is in fact a difference between displaying to *oneself as another* and displaying to *oneself*. These two displayings may appear indistinguishable at first glance, but the existential status—namely, *real* being or *ideal* being—of that which is being displayed plays a decisive role here. If we are blind to this existential difference, our perception of the essence of thinking will be untrue. For instance, if we liken the displaying of a tangible and real thing to the displaying of one's thoughts, we may interpret the process of thinking thus: my thoughts and views are in a sense "something" ready-made and stored in my mind-closet, and thinking seems to involve more or less the following steps, namely, *locating* the views, *catching* the views "in hand," and *displaying* them to a visitor. If these are the steps that take place whenever I attempt to display my ideas, there can be no difference between displaying before an other and displaying before myself.

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because 1) my thoughts are treated as some independent (i.e., external and isolatable) objects without a first-person origin, and 2) I myself am treated as no less an "onlooker" of my thoughts than an other who does not author these thoughts at all.

Unfortunately, this is a distorted picture. Plato is far more perceptive on this issue when he describes what really happens in thinking as the soul's intimate conversation with itself, and this "intimacy" is phenomenologically valid. No doubt, when I converse with myself, I experience myself as saying something to "someone"; but it is too hasty to claim that this is to alienate myself as an other, or to suggest that this is the intrusion of an other into my conscious life. At any event, the full-fledged sense of the other (or alienness) does not have to be established in this scenario.\footnote{Husserl has a relevant observation on this issue: in CM, §34, Husserl describes in broad strokes how to intuit the *eidos ego* through phantasy-variations; he writes that in this procedure "I find only myself as if I were otherwise; I do not find others [Mich fingiere ich nur, als wäre ich anders, nicht fingiere ich Andere]."}

I mull over some thoughts, i.e., display my thoughts to myself in and through the process of constitution; displaying thoughts here means exactly constituting and having thoughts. Unlike material having, the having of ideas and the displaying of them (to oneself) are less two separate processes than one unified achievement effectuated "in one shot." Agent, patient, and dative, if still conceptually distinguishable, are really one and the same in this scenario, and the peculiarity of ideal (i.e., categorial) objectivities is responsible for this situation.\footnote{For Husserl, ideal objectivity differs from real objectivity in that, for the former, the original perception (i.e. evidential having) of it is at the same time also the original production (i.e., constitution) of it; receptivity and spontaneity are fused together; so to speak. See his Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), §63, which is entitled "Originally Productive Activity as the Giving of Logical Formations Themselves; the Sense of the Phrase, Their Production," esp. 168. Hereafter cited as FTL.} Furthermore, this is true no matter whether I am constituting a categorial
formation for the first time, or explicitly reactivating it (i.e., through re-living the elapsed original constituting experience) after I have already acquired it.\textsuperscript{76}

Marcel seems to have already anticipated the objection spelled out here because he stresses that "[t]here is no contradiction between this formula and my remarks just now on 'I have.' The statement 'I have' can only be made over against another which is felt to be other."\textsuperscript{77} Contradiction (or paradox) arises if one insists that the statement "I have" is the prototypical having-statement, and at the same time holds that no "I have" is possible if there is not an other: an awkward situation that resembles the classic chicken-and-egg dilemma. Marcel attempts to persuade us that there is no contradiction at all, but his words only paraphrase rather than solve or clarify the problem.

*Having and the Principle of Individuation*

Beneath Marcel's misinterpretation of the having of ideas, however, there lies a valuable insight, to which we now turn.

In thinking or ideas-having, a full-blown distinction between the self and the other is not established yet. But if we do not look for such a full-blown distinction, it seems that some preliminary differentiation between the self and non-self (i.e., the primitive form of the other)

\textsuperscript{76} Husserl also describes another relevant thinking-situation, namely, the possibility of "a one-rayed vague returning" (*FTL*, 117) to my earlier thoughts. Although Husserl calls the sedimented categorial formations as "habitual and intersubjective possessions (*Besitz*)," he uses the term *Besitz* (and also the term *Erwerb*) only metaphorically. In transcendentalese, it is unlikely that Husserl would liken the having of thoughts to some material possessions; see below, pp. 202-3, on Husserl usage of the language of possession.

\textsuperscript{77} BH, 161.
is indeed there. This differentiation can be understood better if we recall that having does not signify a spatial containing nor does the within-without distinction mean a spatial relationship. Naturally, we may ask: what else can these terms connote besides spatial relationship? The introduction of the differentiation between the self and non-self, then, helps us answer this question because it enables us to see having in a new light; that is to say, it makes it clear that the realm of having harbors in itself a principle of individuation, by virtue of which the self can be distinguished from the non-self. Once this individuating differentiation occurs, "within" and "without" acquire their sense respectively as that which belongs to the self and that which belongs not to the self. Together, the nascent differentiation and its accompanying sense of negation can function as 1) the basis of a complete individuation and 2) the forerunner of a fully fledged the other; they are also able to open up the possibility of a more complicated intersubjective space.

When Marcel speaks about the distinction between the self and the other, he is clearly getting at this important differentiation inside of having in general. However, as we have seen,

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78 It is interesting to note that for Aristotle, *ousia*, that is, *substance*, originally means the property one has. Since for Aristotle substance in its genuine sense is an *individual*, or *a this* (*tode ti*), it seems that Aristotle already saw the connection between having and the principle of individuation, namely, *who one is* is determined by *what one has* (but the connotation of material possession will need to be purged from the phrase "what one has"). On this issue, Heidegger also has a pertinent interpretation, which is recapitulated by Kisiel: "In Aristotle's naming of being itself, accordingly, the coined term *ousia* is still accompanied (especially in his *Ethics* and *Politics*) by its everyday sense of property, house-and-hold, real estate. Even in ordinary usage, the reference is to an entity which is 'there' in a distinctive way, namely, the entity which is there 'to begin with and for the most part' in life. Thus, even common usage has words which refer both to the being and (implicitly) to the how of its being, property and its being had or ownedness, household goods in their everyday familiarity, real estate in its underlying 'substantiality.'" (Kisiel, *Genesis*, 288) This principle of individuation can be applied to both having-as-possession and having-as-implication. See below, p. 85.

79 The issue of the differentiation between the self and non-self can be compared to Plato's discussion of "Not-Being" and "the Other." (*Sophist*, 257b1-259d8) For a clear discussion of this relation between "Not-Being" and "the Other," see Jacob Klein, *Plato's Trilogy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 57-60.
his insightful discovery is "spoiled" by his misanalogy of having to material possession because he interprets this differentiation as a fully fledged and rigid self-other distinction. However, in the present dissertation we will continue to use the phrase the distinction between the self and the other; it should not cause any confusion, given that its meaning has been clarified.

Let us sum up Marcel's work with respect to the two eidetic moments before moving on to his next topic. Marcel sheds light on having through his analysis of such mental havings as secret-having and ideas-having. Since he makes material possession the paradigm of having and uses this paradigm to understand mental having, his otherwise insightful discoveries of the within-without tension and the self-other distinction are misinterpreted to some extent. In his subsequent analysis of having, the serious consequences of his misinterpretation will be more clearly seen.

It should also be pointed out that when Marcel speaks about the relation between the two eidetic moments, he might seem to suggest that the self-other distinction is deeper and more original than the within-without tension. This, I think, is not the case. The two eidetic moments complement each other and should be taken as equiprimordial in the structure of having.

Finally, throughout the "Outlines," Marcel repeatedly emphasizes that the tension and

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80 Note that Marcel does say that "the statement 'I have' can only be made over against another which is felt to be other." (BH, 161) An other that is felt as other [sent comme autre] is perhaps not as rigid as an explicitly identified other. It is possible that, by saying this, Marcel is trying to "soften" the self-other distinction a bit, but no other effort is made by him to make this point clearer. See Marcel, Être et Avoir, 234.

81 See the quotation above on p. 45.
the distinction are necessary when we "express ourselves in terms of having." His hesitancy in attributing directly the tension and the distinction to having itself reveals that he tends to see them as features imposed on the state of affairs by the language of having, so that the overthrow of this "harmful" language can be justified. But after our analysis of his discoveries, it should be clear now that the tension and the distinction are indeed two eidetic moments of having itself, rather than mere byproducts of human language.

The Fate of Having

The necessary methodological preparation has been done, and the two essential moments of having have been discovered: now it becomes possible for Marcel to treat having with the precision it demands. His aim now is to show that having "has a tendency to destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by possessing." In his description, this self-destroying fate appears to be tragic because it originates from the self-affirming effort of having (i.e., having tends to emphasize its own importance), and is in a sense necessitated by the two eidetic moments inherent in having. We will see in a moment how the qui ardently hastens on a slippery slope, accelerating only to reach his own annihilation faster. To preserve the dramatic nature of Marcel's description, I shall refrain from interrupting his flow of thought, and postpone my commentary until he finishes.

Marcel begins by telling us that "we must return to having-as-possession in its strict

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82 BH, 161.

83 BH, 164.
sense," and by this he means returning to material having. The possession of a picture is chosen as the example. He describes this material possession within the conceptual frame he has established; yet a surprising comment is added after the description, saying that the description is only "superficial." It is necessary then to examine why Marcel changes his mind:

From one point of view we should say that this object [i.e., the picture] is exterior to its possessor. It is spatially distinct from him, and their destinies are also different. And yet this is only a superficial view. The stronger the emphasis placed on having and possession, the less permissible is it to harp upon this externality. It is absolutely certain that there is a link between the qui and the quid, and this link is not simply an external conjunction.85

The first two sentences of this passage confirm Marcel's understanding of having as an extrinsic and fragile connection between the qui and the quid: the picture and its possessor are of course two different entities of different "destinies," and they clearly fit into the Marcelian definition of having. But what does the remark "superficial" mean? What does Marcel mean by saying that the link between the qui and the quid is "not simply an external link"? The reason is, according to Marcel, that "the stronger the emphasis placed on having and possession, the less permissible is it to harp upon this externality." To put it differently, the more important the quid is to the qui, the less is the qui willing to tolerate the separation of the quid from him. The qui of such a changed attitude attempts to eliminate the distance between the quid and himself, but he does not realize that he thus destabilizes having and in effect alters its quality. Marcel describes the behavior of the qui of a different mentality in

84 BH, 161.
85 BH, 162.
dramatic language:

I [i.e., the qui] hug to myself this thing which may be torn from me, and I desperately try to incorporate it in myself, to form myself and it into a single and indissoluble complex. A desperate, hopeless struggle. ⁸⁶

Since the importance of the quid to the qui ignites the qui's desire to be united with the quid, this having can no longer be regarded as an external relationship. The formation of a "single and indissoluble complex" out of the qui and the quid is desperately wanted exactly because it can satisfy the qui's desire. This strong desire, however, is but a "hopeless struggle," Marcel warns us. It is hopeless because it reveals itself as covetousness, a degenerate form of having:

It is . . . very important to notice that having already exists, in a most profound sense, in desire or in covetousness. To desire is in a manner to have without having. That is why there is a kind of suffering or burning which is an essential part of desire. . . . There is also an absolute balance between covetousness and the pain I feel at the idea that I am going to lose what I have, what I thought I had, and what I have no longer. . . . [I]t seems . . . that having in some way depends upon time. ⁸⁷

When the qui desperately desires to secure what he has, the agony and pain that are characteristic of desire and covetousness also creep into his heart because he soon finds himself in a condition of degenerate having, i.e., "to have without having." Why then must the desire be such an agony? Why cannot the desire be fulfilled? Interestingly, Marcel points out that the source of the qui's agony is related to the temporality of having. In other words, the qui who desires to be united with the quid realizes that time is a threat to the qui-quad unity: this unity will of course disintegrate when the time comes—time takes away

⁸⁶ BH, 163.
⁸⁷ BH, 162.
everything. To counter the disuniting force imposed by time, the qui passionately wishes the permanence of both the qui and the quid so that a "single and indissoluble complex" may be secured once and for ever. This longing for permanence therefore signals the qui's will to transcend time. But sadly, this will cannot succeed; it is frustrated by some external threat:

There is certainly a two-fold permanency in having: there is the permanency of the qui, and the permanency of the quid. But this permanency is, of its very nature, threatened. It is willed, or at least wished, and it slips from our grasp. The threat is the hold exerted by the other qua other, the other which may be the world itself, and before which I so painfully feel that I am I.  

Here Marcel tells us that the qui's will to the permanence of having is ruined by the threat that comes from "the other qua other, the other which may be the world itself." Since the distinction between the self and the other is an eidetic moment of having, this threat cannot be eliminated. But what exactly has the other done to the qui-quid unity? What kind of threat is exerted on the unity by the world itself? The answer can be found in the nature of the quid:

[I]n so far as this quid is a thing, and consequently subject to the changes and chances proper to things, it may be lost or destroyed. So it becomes, or is in danger of becoming, the center of a kind of whirlpool of fears and anxieties, thus expressing exactly the tension which is an essential part of the order of having.

According to the self-other distinction, the qui who claims that he has the quid brings about the so-called self-alienation, and he alienates himself from the rest of the world. However, the quid is primarily a material thing, a worldly thing. As a thing, the quid still immerses itself in the inescapable Heraclitean flux, that is, the world of becoming, despite the fact that it belongs to the qui. Governed by the necessary law of worldly "generation and corruption,"

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88 BH, 162-63.

89 BH, 162.
the quid has an unavoidable prospect of loss and destruction. This prospect casts gloom on the qui’s will to permanence, and the qui who worries about the fate of the quid, which is deemed important by him, is therefore drawn into a "whirlpool of fears and anxieties."

So far, Marcel’s description manages to show that having is often accompanied by frustration or "unhappy consciousness." Yet his aim is still more radical: he wants to show that "having as such seems to have a tendency to destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by possessing, but which now absorbs the master who thought he controlled it." That is to say, Marcel wants to show that having ultimately leads itself to its own ruination. The climax of the drama therefore arrives: in order to prove that having is self-annihilating, Marcel takes up the issue of the having of the body again and draws our attention to the following paradox.

There is one particular thing which really stands first among them [i.e., the things I have], or which enjoys an absolute priority, in this respect, over them—my body. The tyranny it exercises over me depends . . . upon the attachment I have for it. But—and this is the most paradoxical feature of the situation—I seem, in the last resort, to be annihilating myself in this attachment, by sinking myself in this body to which I cling. It seems that my body literally devours me.

In the first part of the "Outlines" we have seen that Marcel throws doubt on the statement "I have my body" because the thinghood of my body is questionable and my body is not a thing that I can dispose of. In this passage Marcel describes the intensified paradoxicality of my body. My body seems to be the most important possession I can lay claim to; often it is

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90 BH, 164.

91 BH, 164.
deemed as identical with my life, and this is why it enjoys an "absolute priority."\(^{92}\) In a sense, this important and typical possession does satisfy my desire of being united with what I have: it indeed seems that I am entirely fused into my body (as is expressed by the Marcelian formulation "I am my body"). However, as Marcel reminds us, a "boomerang action"\(^ {93}\) is taking place—am I not in fact "devoured" by my body? Am I not a prisoner encased in my body, rather than the haver of it? Marcel even invokes the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the slave to strengthen this dramatic effect.\(^ {94}\) So the thesis is proved, that the more important a having is, the more inescapable is the fate of its self-annihilation. Having gives way to being.

**Our Evaluation**

It is our task now to find out why having appears so destructive in Marcel's eyes. As can be seen above, quite a few issues are going on in Marcel's description of having. In order to evaluate his position clearly and efficiently, we can break our discussion into three parts: 1) the distinction between having and possession; 2) a different fate of having; and 3) a different analysis of the having of the body.

\(^{92}\) The phrase "absolute priority" can also mean that "the body becomes indeed the quintessence of all property," meaning that the body, as the material basis of human labor, originally makes all private possessions possible through the exchange of labor for goods. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 112.

\(^{93}\) *BH*, 163.

\(^{94}\) *BH*, 164.
Marcel's description, though impressive, rests on a confused understanding of possession and having. A certain terminological rigor is therefore needed if we are to expose the confusion. The term possession will hereafter mean material having, and having intentional or mental having.95

There is a major difference between having and possession. From an Aristotelian perspective, this difference is about the different efficient causes and final causes of having and possession. We already saw how their efficient causes differ: possession is brought into existence by power in the literal sense, whereas having is made possible through power in the metaphorical sense. More importantly, they each steer themselves toward a different telos: for possessing, the telos is usually the possessor's consumption or manipulation of the possessed; for having, the telos is normally the mindfully entertaining, contemplating, and securing of the had. Whereas consumption and manipulation cannot do without the presence of the possessed, being mindful does not depend on the presence of the quid; for example, the quid can be had, i.e., minded, in its absence.

Once this difference is laid out, a serious problem in Marcel's way of deploying his arguments is immediately exposed. Marcel's analysis of having is characterized by a strange style—he constantly switches his focus between having and possession, two essentially

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95 Having and possessing overlap with each other in ordinary usage. Since this overlapping has caused confusion, and since the present dissertation endeavors to gradually establish having as an important term in transcendentalese, it is necessary to do certain "violence" to the overlapping usage. Hence, the aim of making the following distinction is not to describe having and possessing in their everyday usage, but to eliminate their overlapping as much as possible.
different phenomena, as if this switching made his arguments more cogent. For example, he begins by defining having as basically material possession, and establishes material possession as the paradigm of having. He then discovers the two eidetic moments in the analysis of two mental havings (i.e., secret-having and ideas-having), but the material paradigm is then employed to (mis)interpret the discovery. When it comes to describing the fate of having, his description is again based on a material possession (the possession of drawings), and the two eidetic moments discovered in mental havings are indiscriminately applied to that material possession. At the climax of his criticism of having, Marcel's focus drifts to the having of the body, a still different kind of having that is interpreted by him as the self-annihilation of having. And it can be shown that this pattern of switching focus continues into his subsequent analysis.

But the problem can be serious: if having and possession are essentially different phenomena, constantly switching focus may open the door for some unheeded fallacy of equivocation, and may therefore render the arguments based on it vulnerable. In fact, Marcel's analysis of having does suffer from such an equivocation. This is why it was pointed out earlier that Marcel's phenomenology of having is a fascinating mixture of penetrating insights and astounding prejudices\(^9\) when he simply describes phenomena, his descriptions are precise and insightful for the most part; but when it comes to interpreting these phenomena, his prejudice surfaces and distorts his perception. The culprit is the unheeded equivocation concerning having and possession.

\(^9\) See above, p. 15.
If we bear the difference between having and possession in mind and reexamine Marcel's position, we can see that although a material possession is indeed subject to the necessary law of "generation and corruption," the danger of the loss of the possessed does not originate from without. On the contrary, the "danger" arises teleologically from within: the possessed will be consumed after all, even though there is no outward threat. Possession typically results in depletion or emptiness that triggers a new round of accumulation and re-consumption. This is the dynamic in which a possessor typically finds himself engaged. Fear and anxiety normally do not arise if the possessor really understands what possession means.

To be sure, material possession has its own problem. Marcel is very perceptive in seeing the dynamic of possession, that is, the possessor has to busy himself with possession, consumption and re-accumulation, and the possessor's will to permanence is a way to cope with this problem. This will to permanence sometimes gravitates toward the human vice that is ordinarily called greed (or covetousness as Marcel calls it), the desire to always possess more, to over-possess, to trespass the private-public border. But it seems that Marcel once again fails to grasp a subtle difference between possession and having: we all know that greed is always accompanied by its characteristic over-possession, and that greed can be cured by justice; but we should also bear in mind that, as Plato teaches us, justice can be understood as "the having [hexis] and doing [praxis] of one's own." Although here we

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97 In the Republic, Plato contrasts injustice with justice and discusses their causes. The cause of injustice, according to him, is over-doing, over-reaching, and over-possessing (pleonkein, pleonexia), whereas the having and doing of one's own is equivalent to justice. Plato tells us that this "having and doing of one's own" is
cannot inquire into the exact meaning of Plato's definition of justice as having, we can at least tentatively say that the problem caused by possession could be solved by having. Unfortunately, this would be a nonsensical solution for Marcel, because he equates the two.

The situation, however, is totally different in regard to having. Let us return to secret-having as our example. It is essential to see that, no matter whether it is an issue of keeping one's own secret or keeping a secret for others, a secret is not to be let slip into the lifeless internality of forgetfulness. Otherwise, the secret-haver's state-of-mind will be indistinguishable from that of an ignorant "outsider." To confide a secret to someone is to put the secret under the listener's "custody," and the listener should share the burden of having a secret, rather than disposing of it or forgetting it. The burden of having a secret, either alone or jointly, is exactly to have it with a heightened awareness of both the secret itself and the danger of its being discovered or divulged (if the secret-having in question is not a childish thing). This heightened awareness shows that secret-having is not a narrow-minded attending to that which is held private, nor is it a mere private language game in the realm of sheer internality. Instead of being made fragile by the within-without tension, secret-having

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the cause of all other three virtues (i.e., wisdom, courage, and moderation) in the Kallipolis; he also suggests that if this "having and doing of one's own" happens internally, i.e., if it occurs in an individual's soul, it also makes the soul just. Since a just soul is a soul in which all of its three parts (i.e., reason, spirit, and appetites) are each "having and doing" their own, and since it also displays a perfect and harmonious order, justice can also be understood as a sort of psychological inner harmony.

Cf. Republic 344a, 359c, 433b-c, 433e-434a, 443c-e. The English text used by me is the translation by G. M. A. Grube, and revised by C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackette Publishing Company, 1992); the corresponding page numbers are 20, 35, 108-9, 119-20; see especially the translators' note #18 on page 20. Also see Gregory Vlastos's "Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic," The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 505-21.

98 It is also interesting to note that we sometimes call a secret an open secret. The convolution of individual and intersubjective intentionalities beneath this phenomenon makes this point even clearer. It should be emphasized, however, that an "open secret" should not be seen as a failed secret; it has its peculiar social/intersubjective function to fulfill.
shows its own excellence by transcending the tension, that is, by minding the within-without tension with a heightened tension-awareness.

But perhaps this subtle point cannot be appreciated by the mind-set that looks at secret-having through the conceptual lens that fit only "material possession." The reason is that the notion of "material possession" strongly connotes "private possession," the security of which would normally be guaranteed if the within-without tension and the intersubjective dimension do not exist at all. Now that we have shown that these two moments are all implied in any genuine secret-having, there is no wonder why Marcel is tempted to interpret these moments as the bane of having. In order to see clearly why Marcel's interpretation is problematic, let us say: from a phenomenological point of view, secret-having and knowledge-having are indeed very similar—as being disclosed is to secret, so is being imparted to knowledge; communicability and verifiability in the public domain is the hallmark of this kind of having. A secret that in principle is not discoverable is probably a Kantian "thing in itself" which in principle cannot be given to us: both would be phenomenological nonsense in Husserl's eyes. This is exactly the point that Marcel fails to pay attention to for he insists that the possibility of being discovered or divulged implies the failure of having.99

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99 Two points need to be made here. First, to say that "as being disclosed is to secret, so is being imparted to knowledge" does not mean to conflate secret-having with knowledge-having: the former endeavors to conceal, the latter reveals. But while a secret-haver promises that he will not betray the secret, he does not blindly wish that the secret will never be discovered. That which is had is something ideal, an immanent transcendency, and its possible manifestation in the intersubjective realm prevails over all sorts of voluntaristic subjectivism.

Second, it is helpful to distinguish between being discovered and being divulged because they are of different causes. Being divulged, that is, being divulged because of someone's betrayal, is indeed a failure of having if we understand confidentiality as a virtue, a hexas (or habitus). But in the "Outlines," Marcel is not interested in this sort of having (he may even deny that virtue is a kind of having according to his definition of
Our phenomenological interpretation of secret-having can be made still stronger if we examine the *temporality* of secret-having in terms of its qui-quid correlation.

For the quid, "being a secret" is essentially a *temporary predicate*. Normally, a state-of-affairs is a secret only for a limited period of time. An *eternal* secret, if exists, is perhaps beyond the reach of human efforts and names. When a secret expires or transpires, it becomes publicly accessible "information." In a time horizon that is comprehensive enough, a discovered or divulged secret is not different from a secret that expires in its natural course; in fact, they are numerically identical. Obviously, this is not the case in the consumption or dilapidation of the possessed: even though the possessed can be replaced, the replacement is at best a qualitatively similar, but numerically different, item.

For the qui, since secret-having obliges the secret-haver(s) to embrace the possibility of the secret's being discovered/divulged (which is a future possibility), this means that secret-having is not the establishment of a static proprietorship between the secret and the secret-haver(s). It is not an evanescent act that is "in force" only at the moment it is enacted; on the contrary, its vision extends forward, envisioning the adverse fate that may befall the secret in the future. "Existentially" speaking, therefore, to have a secret is to pledge one's loyalty to the secret "in spite of" the possibility of its being discovered or divulged. The one who has a secret should always accept that *as soon as* a secret is created, it is *at once* ready to be discovered; yet he promises to keep it, nevertheless. This *anticipatory* and *resolute* having). It is therefore enough for us to focus only on the second scenario, i.e., a secret's being discovered.

100 This understanding of secret-having is akin to Paul Tillich’s understanding of *courage*. Tillich writes in his *The Courage to Be* that "[c]ourage does not remove anxiety. Since anxiety is existential, it cannot be removed. But courage takes the anxiety of nonbeing into itself. Courage is self-affirmation 'in spite of,' namely in spite of nonbeing." (Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000], 66.) In other words, for
acceptance of future can be seen as a way of having time that is "not yet," and it is this acceptance that "swallows up" the fear and anxiety. Thus it become clear why it is improper to perceive time as a threat to secret-having—a secret would not be what it is without time; and in secret-having time can be transcended through the qui's having of time.

The Having of the Body Revisited

We now proceed to examine Marcel's thesis that the having of the body is self-annihilating. As we have seen, Marcel's argument is based on the "fact" that my body "devours" me. To understand his argument, it is crucial for us to identify the perspective from which this somewhat "tragic" fact is registered. In other words, we need to find out from which vantage point the state of affairs such as "I sink myself in my body" or "My body..."

Tillich, courage can take the anxiety of nonbeing into itself because it is able to "embrace" or "have" the possibility of nonbeing.

It should be noted that, ultimately, Tillich owes his insight to Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of death (i.e., Dasein's nonbeing). According to Heidegger, the existential interpretation of Dasein demands that Dasein be grasped as a whole; but death, as something always "not-yet" and "outstanding," seems to make an authentic and holistic grasp impossible. (BT, 276) However, since the primordial ontological basis for Dasein is temporality, and since temporality is intrinsically the unity of the three equiprimordial ecstasies, Dasein can be said to always already have its "not-yet." This is why Heidegger writes that "death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is." He also confirms this interpretation of the death of Dasein by a quote: "As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die." (BT, 289.)

In addition, what Heidegger says about anticipatory resoluteness becomes intelligible if the unity of the three ecstasies is taken into consideration: "Resoluteness does not just 'have' a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbors [birgt] in itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity." (BT, 353) In other words, Angst can be overcome because Dasein always already harbors or has its own death, which is a "future" event. These are the sources that I have absorbed in my understanding of secret-having.

One may still wants to object: even though a secret's being discovered or betrayed is different from a material possession's being lost or destroyed, the secret-haver's worry about the secret's being discovered is, nonetheless, quite similar to the possessor's anxiety concerning the loss of the possession. But this objection does not hold—the possessor worries about the loss of the possessed itself, whereas the secret-haver's is concerned about the effect entailed by the discovery of the secret. For example, a Jewish family will be found by the Nazi Gestapo.
devours me" can be observed. Who on earth is the Marcelian observer, the "I"? The paradox concerning the having of the body can be solved only through the disclosure of the identity of this observer.

Let us try to disclose the identity of the Marcelian observer by putting ourselves into his situation. The observer has a body, and he has the power over his body. He thinks that to have is in a sense to have the quid *within*, but this "within" always troubles him. What else can "within" mean if not *spatially* within? Yet it turns out that he himself is "within" the body! Be that as it may, he still has an ineffable feeling that he is *not* confined in the body: it just occurs to him that he can *somehow* transcend the body, i.e., it is open to him that somehow he can raise himself above both himself and the body. But he cannot explain what exactly this "raising above" means either. What can it mean if not transcending or overstepping? But how can he spatially transcend or overstep his own skin?

As we transport ourselves into the Marcelian observer's situation and look at things from there, it becomes clear that the nature of the "I" is indeed the origin of his puzzlement. It would be helpful if the Marcelian observer may ask himself questions such as "Who am I?" and "Is the 'I' who has the body the same 'I' that is devoured by the body?" To better understand this situation, let us spell out the three different ways in which the term "I" can be used.

First of all, the term "I" can be used by a person who is entirely absorbed in his biological life. He lives, moves, senses, and talks; when he refers to himself as "I," he means the bodily reality with which he coincides. He sees himself as a body alongside other worldly things that are spatially outside himself. Obviously, this person cannot be the Marcelian
observer because he is not troubled by the problem of transcendence at all; the sense of transcendence never arises in him. To be sure, one may object that the purely biological man described here is merely an abstraction because no one really lives in this condition. However, this usage of the term "I" is conceivable and its conceivability helps us set the following two usages in bolder relief.

The term "I" can be used in a second way by one who, in addition to living, walking, sensing, and talking, also wonders, thinks, and reflects. In his reflective life the sense of transcendence arises and fascinates him. He vaguely entertains the thought that "I am more than my body" and he sometimes attempts to clarify this fascinating thought. He may even begin to philosophize; however, since he does not distinguish between the mind and the brain, i.e., between philosophy and psychology, his thinking is unavoidably characterized by the tendency to naturalize both philosophy and his own transcendence. For example, he might attempt to understand his transcendence in terms of certain cerebral and/or neuronal activities. The more he thinks in this manner, the more perplexed he becomes.

Thirdly, the term "I" can be used by one who takes on the transcendental attitude and recognizes the three different senses of "I." Since he is clearly aware of the other two possibilities, this clear awareness elevates himself to a higher level. It also helps him avoid the fallacy of equivocation when he refers to himself as the "I." To put it differently, at this level the one who uses the term "I" is explicitly aware of his own "double life": he knows that the indexical "I" has both a transcendental referent (the transcendental I who has the body) and a mundane referent (the mundane I who either is the body or is in the body, and is constituted by the transcendental I as a real part of the real world).
Now that the three senses have been spelled out, it should become clear that the 
Marcelian observer is located at the second level: he may endeavor to escape from this level, 
but he does not have a clue. The observer sees himself as a psycho-physical reality in 
physical space; yet at the same time, by virtue of the anonymously constitutive 
transcendental life "in" him, he also has a vague glimpse of his own transcendence, namely, 
he is vaguely aware of the possibility that he can somehow transcend the psycho-physical 
soul and body. This vague glimpse is not knowledge, but it preconditions his puzzlement. 
Since he cannot explicitly grasps his "double life," his talk about himself is necessarily 
infected by the fallacy of equivocation. When it occurs to him that "the body that I have also 
devoirs me," this is indeed an frustrating and destructive experience. However, it is not that 
the notion of having is destructive; the destructive effect comes from the equivocation on "I" 
and the misunderstanding of having as a mere ontic relation.

In this analysis, there also crops up a striking similarity between the paradox of the 
having of the body and the problem of transcendence that besets the traditional theory of 
knowledge: the former concerns the possibility to have, or, to take in, and the latter concerns 
the possibility to know, or to reach out. The distinction between inside and outside is the 
stumbling block in both cases, and some of Husserl's most extraordinary insights can be 
drawn upon to help us achieve further clarification.

In fact, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, §§40-41, the strategy Husserl employs to 
debunk the pseudo question of "How can I get outside my island of consciousness?" is 
exactly to deprive the "natural man" or the man in the natural attitude the right to raise such 
questions. The natural man has no right to raise such transcendental questions because he
resides on the same level with *inside* and *outside*—the categories he employs to formulate his question. That is to say, they all are achievements brought about by the transcendental ego.\(^\text{102}\) Man *can* transcend this level, which is infected by all kinds of paradoxes, absurdities, and despairs, but he has not done so when he lets such questions entrap himself.

The striking similarity between the paradoxes concerning the having of the body and the possibility of knowledge therefore suggests that the problematic of having needs to be studied from a transcendental perspective.

**Sublimation of Having into Being**

Marcel is unaware of the problem in his criticism of having. For him, the fate of self-annihilation suggests that the sublimation of having into being is necessary. He claims that the sublimation can be achieved when the possessor is "more vitally and actively bound up with something serving as the immediate subject-matter of a personal creative act, a subject-matter perpetually renewed."\(^\text{103}\) Some concrete examples are provided to illustrate this point, namely, "the garden of the keen gardener, the farm of a farmer, the violin of a musician, or the laboratory of a scientist."\(^\text{104}\) In these cases, says Marcel, the possessor is less likely to be "devoured" by the possessed because "the duality of possessor and possessed is lost in a

\(^{102}\) See *CM*, 83/116 (§41): "We ask: Who then is the Ego who can rightly ask such 'transcendental' questions? As a natural man, can I rightly ask them? As a natural man, can I ask seriously and transcendentally how I get outside my island of consciousness and how what presents itself in my consciousness as a subjective evidence-process can acquire Objective significance?"

\(^{103}\) *BH*, 165.

\(^{104}\) *BH*, 165.
living reality.\textsuperscript{105} The disappearance of the duality indicates that having has been "sublimated and changed into being," adds Marcel.\textsuperscript{106} But, we know, a gardener is not his garden, neither is the musician his violin. How then should the nature of this magical sublimation be understood?

Marcel goes on to explain this sublimatory feat by "the most concrete illustration we can think of."\textsuperscript{107} At this junction, he switches his focus again: "the most concrete illustration" he employs is not a material possession, that is, the "having in its strict sense"; rather, he turns to the having of ideas and opinions. He tells us that an ideologist represents a victim of his having (i.e., his ideas) because "he is enslaved to a part of himself which has mortified"; in contrast, the thinking of a genuine thinker (or an artist) involves the sublimation of having to being because "[h]e lives in a continual state of creativity, and the whole of his thought is always being called in question from one minute to the next."\textsuperscript{108}

Clearly, Marcel still uses the model of material possession to understand the having of ideas: he claims that the way an ideologist treats his ideas is similar to the way one treats some material possessions of which one is proud.\textsuperscript{109} This is the reason why the ideas and the ideologist entangled in this possession-relationship are both condemned into a state of

\textsuperscript{105} BH, 166.

\textsuperscript{106} BH, 165.

\textsuperscript{107} BH, 166.

\textsuperscript{108} BH, 166.

\textsuperscript{109} BH, 166.
"inertia,\textsuperscript{110} a typical attribute of a material object. It is this state of inertia that petrifies the ideologist's thinking.

Things become interesting if we note that it is exactly Marcel's incorrect understanding of the essence of thinking that makes his judgment about the ideologist particularly incisive. This is because in the ideological way of thinking, a process of externalization, or, as Marcel calls it, \textit{fossilizing}, of the ideas is taking place. The ideologist is so infatuated by the ideality of the ideas or perhaps, by the awareness that they are "his" ideas, that he idolizes them instead of contemplating them and thinking them through; in his mind, the place of thinking is usurped by sloganeering.

But Marcel's criticism of the ideologist only shows that the attitude of possession is the cause of this perverse way of thinking; it does not show that having is incompatible with genuine thinking. In fact, we can show that having is the \textit{sine qua non} of genuine thinking. Marcel's own description of genuine thinking can serve as a pointer. He states that a genuine thinker "lives in a continual state of creativity, and the whole of his thought is always being called in question from one minute to the next." This is a good depiction of what happens in genuine thinking, but the creativity of genuine thinking cannot be equated with the divine creation \textit{ex nihilo}; as human creation, it is preconditioned by many factors. From a phenomenological perspective, thinking (i.e., the constituting and the having of ideas) is not a momentous act torn out of contexts; it necessarily occurs within a history and as a continuing synthesis. This means nothing but that one who thinks creatively has to engage

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{BH}, 166.
oneself in a two-sided "self-increasing logos"\textsuperscript{111} of having: on the noetic side, he immerses himself in the flux of his ever growing egoic \textit{habitualities}, and it is this flux that determines the \textit{quality}, \textit{style}, and \textit{efficiency} of his thinking (i.e., constituting); on the noematic side, the formation of ideas of a higher level is made possible on the \textit{sedimentation} of meanings acquired earlier, which is also an incessantly self-enriching process. Both habituality and sedimentation can be seen as potentialities (\textit{not} material \textit{inertia} in Marcel's sense) in one's conscious life. They are \textit{had} and not just \textit{possessed} by the Ego, and this is possible because of the peculiar structure of time consciousness.

To make this point concrete, Husserl's description of the peculiarity of phenomenological analysis can serve as an example. Husserl once makes an observation on the immense difficulties involved in the phenomenological investigation of the distinctions between internal imagining and external imagining. He issues a warning before the investigation starts:

\begin{quote}
For as easy as the analysis [of imagining] at first appears, the difficulties that subsequently come to light and gradually require many modifications in what we earlier accepted and many new distinctions in what we earlier took to be simple are just as great.

Indeed, this is universally the peculiarity of phenomenological analysis. Every step forward yields new points of view from which what we have already discovered appears in a new light, so that often enough what we were originally able to take as simple and undivided presents itself as complex and full of distinctions.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

This is a passage favored by students of Husserl because it felicitously expresses what happens in phenomenological thinking. It is quoted here because it also aptly describes the

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. Heraclitus's famous fragment: "The soul has a self-increasing logos." (DK 115)

essential role played by having (in the form of *habitualities* and *sedimentations*) in thinking: new distinctions become visible and new insights become possible because the earlier distinctions and insights (achieved either by myself or others) are appropriated; phenomenological thinking, in other words, has to proceed in the manner of constant recovery, recapitulation, and re-appropriation. This on-going re-appropriation can be described as a two-sided having that comprises both the noetic and the noematic.\(^{113}\)

Thus we can see that genuine thinking is in sharp contrast with the attitude of possession: it always depends on the having we just described,\(^{114}\) and it should always be on guard about the danger of lapsing into a "dead having" (i.e., when habituality idles and "rusts" due to the lack of reactivating exercises). If we are obliged to use the term "sublimation," what we need in genuine thinking is rather the sublimation of the attitude of possession into the attitude of having, and the ability to articulate this sublimation in an equally sublimated language, i.e., *transcendental*ese, *mundane*ese "sublimated."\(^{115}\)

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\(^{113}\) To be sure, this having is not to be confused with the external *possession* of some masterpieces of phenomenology, though documentation is certainly necessary. Husserl discusses the necessity of documentation in "The Origin of Geometry," in his *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 353-78.

\(^{114}\) Incidentally, this necessity of having also gives rationale to Husserl's famous zig-zag style of phenomenologizing. This style is not Husserl's idiosyncrasy; it is rather the demand of phenomenology. Phenomenological thinking is perhaps the form of thinking that demands the most explicit awareness of (the having of) its own history; were there not such a historical dimension, phenomenologizing would not fit the task of exploring transcendental subjectivity, the infinite yet self-contained work-field whose hidden richness only becomes prominent (and hence can be appreciated) through persistent, zig-zagging, and well habituated, cultivation.

\(^{115}\) The term "transcendental*ese" was originally introduced by Thomas Prufer to refer to the language we employ to describe our philosophical findings after we make the transcendental turn. In a sense, transcendental*ese is the foreign language *par excellence*: everyone (or every philosopher) has to learn it and gets accustomed to it by philosophizing from the transcendental perspective. See Robert Sokolowski, *Phenomenology of the Human Person* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 181-83, esp. 182n4.
Marcel's Criticism of Traditional Philosophy

In the last part of the "Outlines," Marcel criticizes traditional disciplines such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and even theology. He claims that these disciplines are all formulated in the language of having, which is ultimately the cause of our lack of real progress in these areas.

This part is almost of the same length as the second part, but I shall only highlight some ideas in it. Full exposition and detailed criticisms are unnecessary because Marcel's arguments (their merits and mistakes) should no longer pose a problem to our understanding, now that we have discussed at length his analysis of having.\(^{116}\)

In what follows, I will present Marcel's line of thinking in two steps: 1) I will explain his overall evaluation of the methodology of the traditional way of thinking and how he relates this methodology to the attitude of having; 2) I will briefly present and evaluate his criticism on traditional metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

The Subject-Object Model of Thinking and the Possession-Attitude

Marcel points out that the subject-object model of thinking has been the prevalent mode of thinking in traditional philosophy, and he argues that this mode of thinking and the

\(^{116}\) The third part of the "Outlines" also has an overtly theological tone to it. For example, Marcel employs the concepts of creation, love, charity, and worship, etc., to discuss the difference between being and having. I have to leave this dimension of Marcel's thought out due to the limited scope of the present dissertation.
attitude of having are two sides of a single coin. This is the case because the self in the attitude of having transforms itself into a subject that is cut off and isolated from its objects. Obviously, this argument is valid only on the basis of identifying having with possession: possession is the possession of an independent thing, and the possessor and the possessed are separable entities, each "bounded by its outlines." Marcel calls this isolated status of the self "self-specification." The self sees itself as a self-thing, and over against this self-thing, other things are treated as independent objects. In this attitude, therefore, a worldview that sees everything as "loose and separate" is generated; the subject-object dichotomy, as a thinking technique, is then created to assist our enterprise of knowing the world (and to some extent, this technique has been effective indeed).

In order to show the symptoms of this dichotomic mode of thinking, Marcel introduces a distinction between problem and mystery. He believes that the dichotomic mode of thinking gives rise to the so-called problem-solving attitude. In this attitude, claims Marcel, our task in life is to solve problems, namely, we, as disinterested thinking subjects, are

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117 BH, 168.

118 BH, 172.

119 This phrase is from Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, where he says: "All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected." David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 49. According to Marcel's interpretation, the entities in the world are also of no intrinsic connection with each other (i.e., they are loose and separate) when seen from the attitude of having/possession. Hence the similarity between Hume's analysis of custom/habit and Marcel's criticism of having is exposed: for Hume, causal relation is merely subjective and illusory because it is projected upon the events by our mental habits; similarly, for Marcel, the attitude of having only reflects our irrational desire to unavailingy establish some intrinsic bonds between us and the things we have.

The present dissertation attempts to show through Husserlian phenomenology, however, that habit and having in general have a sense that is much wider than what Hume and Marcel have conceived of. The attitude of having does not generate a "loose and separate" world picture, neither is there a "loose and separate" world to be mended by our habits.
"working upon [objective] data placed before us."\textsuperscript{120} In contrast, Marcel insists that the proper attitude is to see ourselves as \textit{involved} in some mysteries. He defines a mystery as "a problem which encroaches upon its own data and invades them, and so is transcended \textit{qua} problem."\textsuperscript{121}

These two attitudes are then contrasted by an analysis of how they differently deal with the phenomenon of evil. When evil is treated as a problem, i.e., when it is treated as some objective and independent data to be cognized, says Marcel, "it ceases to be evil \textit{suffered}, . . . [and this means that] it simply ceases to be evil."\textsuperscript{122} This is why the solution provided by traditional philosophy "often gives the impression of being a game, or a kind of intellectual sleight-of-hand. The more idealist the philosophy, the more strong the impression."\textsuperscript{123} In contrast, Marcel holds that "I only really grasp it as evil in proportion as it touches me; that is, where I am involved in it in the sense that one is involved in an affair [impliqué dans une affaire]."\textsuperscript{124} In this fundamental involvement, there is no place for the dichotomy between the allegedly mutually independent subject and object; but this fundamental involvement is entirely foreign to the attitude of having, Marcel claims.

To be fair to Marcel, we must acknowledge that his criticism of the so called problem-solving attitude is penetrating. This attitude is blameworthy because it fails to do justice to the "things themselves." If evil \textit{is} only when it is in the mode of "being suffered,"

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{120} BH, 171.
\item \textsuperscript{121} BH, 171.
\item \textsuperscript{122} BH, 172.
\item \textsuperscript{123} BH, 172.
\item \textsuperscript{124} BH, 172.
\end{enumerate}
then to treat it as some objective and independent datum is only to destroy it. However, the notion of involvement emphasized by Marcel is nothing but the phenomenological demand for the two-sidedness of philosophical inquiry, a demand that comes from the phenomenological insight that since the object to be cognized is always already caught up in the multiplicities of intentionalities that intend it (in actual and potential manners), an adequate cognition has to pursue the study of both. This demand of two-sidedness reflects exactly the mutual-belongingness of cogito and cogitatum, the intrinsic feature of intentional having. Hence, although Marcel is right in criticizing the dichotomic mode of thinking, he makes an unjustified move when he ascribes the failure of this mode of thinking and the problem-solving attitude to having. If this move is unjustified, then Marcel's belief that the attitude of having should be held responsible for the incompetence of the traditional disciplines is also unfounded.

Marcel's Criticism of Traditional Epistemology and Ethics

Marcel continues his more elevated attack on having. He first targets traditional metaphysics and the epistemology founded on it. He says that traditional metaphysics is based on the conviction that things are characterizable, that is, things are seen as "subjects possessing predicates or characteristics"¹²⁵ that are grasppable by us. We have seen that this type of possessing is called having-as-implication in Marcel's jargon.¹²⁶ Marcel writes that

¹²⁵ BH, 167.

¹²⁶ See above, pp. 29-31.
when a thing is said to have certain essential characteristics, the within-without tension and the self-other distinction are also imposed onto the thing in question. For example, when a triangle is said to have three sides, the within-without distinction and the self-other distinction are supposedly to be found. In Marcel's eyes, this is an "absolutely external proceeding" that only misleads us, because the real thing is substituted by a man-made model-thing, a "little abstract effigy." Moreover, from the fact that we enumerate the characteristics of a thing using the word "also (aussi)" (e.g., an object has the property A, but also has the properties B, C, etc.), it can also be seen that we implicitly reduce a thing into a mere juxtaposition or "collection of characteristics." This way of characterizing things, therefore, "gives us the least opportunity of reaching the heart of that reality which we are trying to characterize," because what it does is only to "let the essence of things go."\footnote{BH, 168.}

As we can see, the most serious problem Marcel sees in characterization is that, by virtue of the language of having, reality is reduced into a mere collection of characteristics and becomes a fake reality. This is why he suggests that we should not talk about the characteristics of things, and we should accept that reality is in a sense "uncharacterizable."\footnote{BH, 169.} This uncharacterizable reality, he adds, can be comprehended only through a certain immediate access (e.g., the Platonic dialectic, or something comparable to

\footnote{BH, 168-9.}\footnote{BH, 169. This is a surprising claim, but Marcel immediately adds that he does not mean to endorse any version of agnosticism. His point is that the traditional way to characterize reality is bound to fail, and we therefore need a new approach.}
But Marcel's argument is not well founded: if a thing and its properties are related as the whole and its parts, and if the whole evidently has its parts, why should the language of having be avoided if we want to give a truthful description? This is an issue that we will need to take up again later in our discussion of the relationship between the language of having and the logic of parts and wholes.\textsuperscript{132}

After having criticized the traditional epistemology, Marcel moves on to his next target, the traditional theory of ethics, and he directs our attention to the problem of freedom and autonomy. He claims that the notion of the having of one's life has made us unable to understand the true meaning of freedom. According to Marcel, most philosophers (for example, Kant) have equated freedom with autonomy, the most radical formulation of which is "I want to run my own life."\textsuperscript{133} Beneath this equation, says Marcel, there are two supporting beliefs, namely, the belief that I have my life, which entails the second belief that I should not accept any heteronomy. Together, these two beliefs advance the idea that I must administer my own life in the way I administer "a fortune or possession."\textsuperscript{134} Since the distinction between the self and the other is an essential moment in having, a paradoxical conclusion unavoidably follows: namely, I can be autonomous and free only when I alienate myself as an other and oversee my life as an other; but thus alienated and overseen, am I

\textsuperscript{131} Marcel only mentions the Platonic dialectic in passing, without developing this point in detail. Presumably, he is referring to Plato's Republic, Book 7, where dialectic is described as the science of true Being. But what about the Platonic anamnesis? Is not anamnesis a methodic exploration of one's memorial having, namely, an unfolding of that which is had in an implicit and apriori manner?

\textsuperscript{132} See below, pp. 81-86.

\textsuperscript{133} BH, 173.

\textsuperscript{134} BH, 173.
really free, or rather enslaved? Marcel points out that this idea of life-administration is paradoxical because it attempts to apply the category of having, which is essentially dichotomous, to the realm of Being, where any dichotomies, including the one of heteronomy and autonomy, are transcended.135

The problem is, however, why must the idea of having be incompatible with freedom? Why cannot the explicating and actualizing of the life-potentialities that one implicitly *has* be called freedom? It seems to me that Husserl's phenomenology has rich resources to constructively solve these difficulties, especially if we take into our consideration the fact that the late Husserl attempted to understand his transcendental phenomenology as a revival of the Monadology of Leibniz,136 whose thoughts could be interpreted as endorsing the compatibility between having and human freedom.137

To conclude our exposition of Marcel's criticism of traditional philosophy, let this point be made clear: the traditional disciplines criticized by Marcel are indeed problematic,

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135 See *BH*, 174.

136 See, for example, *CM*, 150/176 (§62).

137 The standard interpretation of Leibniz depicts him as a compatibilist who holds as true both determinism and human freedom. This is an instructive point because Leibniz's system exemplifies a way in which the compatibility between having and freedom can be worked out. There are two Leibnizian doctrines that can be interpreted as about having, i.e., his Monadology and his Predicate-in-subject principle. In Leibniz's philosophy, these two doctrines are the necessary logical consequences of God's creation and omniscience. Nevertheless, Leibniz holds that human beings are free, even though they already *have* all the true predicates *in* them "as soon as" they were created by God. It would be interesting to see how Marcel would have handled the problem of human freedom against the background of divine foreknowledge because he would probably call Leibniz's strategy an "intellectual sleight-of-hand."

and they indeed suffered from the dichotomic mode of thinking, which is especially true in modernity. But we should not forget that this incisive evaluation of the traditional disciplines was in fact achieved in the first half of the last century through the then flourishing phenomenological movement. It is correct to hold the attitude of possession responsible for the failure of these traditional disciplines, if the distinction between having and possession is made in the way suggested by the present dissertation; but the crucial point, then, is to see that it is one thing to criticize the subject-object dichotomy, and another thing to say that this dichotomy is engendered by having or the language of having.

Earlier it has been pointed out that having and the language of having already provide the resource to transcend the subject-object dichotomy that has beset traditional thinking.138 It is my hope that the following study of Husserl will make this point sharper and more concrete.

138 See above, p. 41.
CHAPTER 2

TRANSITION TO HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF HAVING

In the following chapters I will concentrate on Husserl and show that having is closely related to both the subject matter and the methodology of his phenomenology. This close relation justifies the claim that, to some extent, Husserl's phenomenology is a phenomenology of having.

My treatment of Husserl consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 analyzes three Husserlian passages in which Husserl deals with a having-being distinction. The analysis of these passages enables us to make the transition from Marcel to Husserl. Chapters 3 and 4 carry out more detailed and technical phenomenological explorations from the perspective of having: Chapter 3 offers an introduction to the methods of phenomenological epoché and transcendental reduction; Chapter 4 treats the phenomenology of having contained in the Cartesian Meditations by examining the themes of evidence and intentionality.

In the present chapter, I will consider three passages from the Experience and Judgment,\(^1\) the Second Book of the Ideas,\(^2\) and the Logical Investigations. A brief study of these passages should make our transition from Marcel to Husserl less abrupt. More

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specifically, the two passages from the *Experience and Judgment* and the Second Book of the *Ideas* show that Husserl employs a having-being distinction to illustrate the various aspects of the ontology of wholes and parts. And the passage from the *Logical Investigations* gives us an opportunity to see the evolution of Husserl's understanding of the manner in which the ego *has* its experiences; the ego's having of its experiences will then play a central role in Chapter 3 when we study the methods of phenomenological epoché and transcendental reduction.

**The "Is"-Judgment and the "Has"-Judgment**

In the previous chapter it was shown that the Marcelian having-being distinction is somewhat artificial. Interestingly, the distinction also seems to be present in some of Husserl's works. Let us clarify Husserl's view on this distinction before we move on.

The book *Experience and Judgment* has a subtitle—*Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*—that clearly expresses Husserl's interest in the genealogy of the fundamental forms of judgment. His genealogical study reveals that judgmental formations originate in the perceptual acts that thoughtfully disclose the features of certain objects; a well synthesized system of perceptual acts as such can be called *explication* (*Explikation*) because it aims at the unfolding of the objects' properties and it is regulated by the ego's interest to cognize. Different judgmental forms come into existence when different syntactic constructions are enacted to fit that which is achieved (i.e., "unfolded") in the course of explication; and the

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3 See above pp. 19-20.

4 See *EJ*, § 22.
genealogical stories of these forms are what Husserl wants to tell.

For us, the title of §52—"The 'Is'-Judgment and the 'Has'-Judgment"—is particularly of interest for the following reason: is Husserl here endorsing a distinction between being and having? If so, what is the relation between his distinction and the Marcelian one? These questions deserve a closer look.

Husserl in this section offers genealogical accounts for two forms of judgment: 1) S is p; 2) S has T. These two forms are generated when the objective determination explicated by the Ego in its thoughtful perceptions is a dependent determination and when it is an independent determination, respectively. If the objective determination being explicated is a dependent part (i.e., a moment) of the explicandum (i.e., the whole being explicated), then the judgmental form "S is p" will be generated (e.g., "The courthouse is magnificent"); if the objective determination being explicated is an independent part (i.e., a piece), then "S has T" will be generated (e.g., "The courthouse has an annex"). About the relationship between these two forms of judgment, Husserl writes that:

The has-judgment can never be transformed into an is-judgment without a complete modification of its sense. This is because an originally independent object, since it is an independent part of an original substrate, can never lose this independence and be changed into an object of determination. On the other hand, it is indeed quite possible . . . that . . . objects originally dependent, can be made independent. This is expressed in the predicative sphere by the fact that these objects can be substantified and then either enter as subjects into new judgments or assume other functional forms.6

In this passage Husserl tells us that the convertibility between "is"-statements and "has"-statements is asymmetrical because, logically speaking, to convert "The courthouse has an

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5 EJ, 221.

6 EJ, 221-22.
annex" into "The courthouse is annexed" is totally different an operation from converting "The courthouse is magnificent" into "The courthouse has magnificence" (or "The courthouse has being-magnificent"). The latter operation is named substantivation because the dependent part, "being magnificent," is substantified into "magnificence," an independent part in the resulting "has"-statement (i.e., "The courthouse has magnificence" or, on a higher level, "The magnificence of the courthouse symbolizes the power of justice").

The latter operation is named substantivation because the dependent part, "being magnificent," is substantified into "magnificence," an independent part in the resulting "has"-statement (i.e., "The courthouse has magnificence" or, on a higher level, "The magnificence of the courthouse symbolizes the power of justice").

The situation is different when we convert a "has"-statement into an "is"-statement. For example, we cannot say that "The courthouse is an annex" because the annex, as an independent part of the whole, cannot be predicated of the whole; nor is it identical with the whole itself.

Of course, we may change the original statement into "The courthouse is annexed" or "The courthouse is annex-having," but in Husserl's opinion this conversion involves a "complete modification" of the original "has"-statement. In other words, an annex, as an individual substance, cannot lose its independence and be simply transformed into a dependent attribute.

This point can probably be made more visible if we compare the statement "The courthouse is annexed" with "The courthouse is burned." These are two similarly constructed statements, but the grammatical similarity also covers up the fact that "being annexed" and "being burned," as two predicates, derive from radically different perceptual experiences (more precisely, different explicating processes). In reflection we should see that "being-

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7 It seems that this process of substantivation can be related to (but not identified with) the transformation of a many-rayed constitution to a one-rayed constitution (i.e., the so-called nominalization). To the best of my knowledge, Husserl does not explicitly talk about the "essential possibility" of transformation from a one-rayed act to a many-rayed act (but see FTL, 323), so perhaps the transformability between two kinds of constitution is also asymmetrical. See LI, 2:156, 160; Ideas I, 285/248.

8 This reminds us of the Aristotelian doctrine that a (first) substance cannot be used to predicate another substance.
"annexed" is not an original adjective, but "being-burned" is. Moreover, if we are asked to convert these two "is"-statements into their corresponding "has"-statements, it is very probable that we will intuitively adopt different strategies.  

This passage on "has"-statement and "is"-statement naturally brings up the question: does the substantiation that Husserl has in mind exemplify a change from being to having, a reversal of the Marcelian sublimation of having into being? It is tempting to give a quick and affirmative answer, but it is important to see that the state-of-affairs involved here is of a different order. The Marcelian sublimation of having into being is in fact the sublimation of having-as-possession into being; that is to say, the having in question harbors in itself a qui-quid correlation, and the qui is understood by Marcel as a person (as is clear from the example of ideas-having). In contrast, the change of being into having through the substantiation described by Husserl is a substantiation of a dependent part into an independent part, the parts here being the objective determinations (i.e., characteristics) of a thing. In the Marcelian jargon, therefore, Husserl here is dealing with a having-as-implication instead of a having-as-possession, and this is why we should hold off from celebrating a

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9 It should be noted that Husserl's purpose in discussing the conversion between the "is"-statement and the "has"-statement is not to change our ordinary way of speaking, but to reveal the ontology of wholes and parts captured in our language. Hence, although the change from an "is"-judgment to a "has"-judgment can always be done, Husserl reminds us that the resulting "has"-judgment has less originality. For example, a thoughtful judger can see that the judgment "The courthouse has magnificence" refers back to "The courthouse is magnificent," and will normally use the latter formulation. The latter formulation is more original because "magnificence" as a noun points back to its origin in adjectivity, and adjectivity is articulated more properly in an "is"-judgment.

Also, relying on our normal linguistic intuition, from "The courthouse is annexed" we go back to "The courthouse has an annex" rather than "The courthouse has annexed-ness"; and we will probably say "The courthouse has burnt-ness" if we have to use a "has"-statement. (Cf. EJ, 221-23; also see FTL, §82.)

10 See above, pp. 67-70.
Husserlian reversal of the Marcelian sublimation.  

However, the phenomenon of *substantivation* does relate to what Marcel has said about *characterization*. It appears that, contrary to Marcel's opinion that to say a thing *has* some characteristics is to willfully impose the within-without tension and the self-other distinction onto the thing,  

Husserl has shown that the language of having is perfectly suitable to things themselves because it is a faithful linguistic correlate of the ontology of wholes and parts that defines the true being of things. A whole *has* its dependent and independent parts, and this *having* needs to be disclosed and articulated by a mind that teleologically strives toward truth (as disclosure). The language of having captures truths concerning this sort of having; without this language, the differentiations between wholes and parts as such cannot be registered properly and the true being of things would then be "the night in which all cows are black" (Hegel) because they will then be totally featureless, uncharacterizable, and hence, unidentifiable.  

It should be clear now that Husserl's "has"-judgment and "is"-judgment do not correspond to the Marcelian having-being dichotomy. They are rather a technical differentiation set up by Husserl to clarify and facilitate our achievement of truth, and they are meaningful only against the larger picture of a whole's having of different kinds of parts. The possibility of *substantivation* not only shows that this differentiation is fluid, but also demonstrates that "has"-judgments have wider applications than have the "is"-judgments,  

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11 See above, pp. 29-31, on the distinction between *having-as-implication* and *having-as-possession*.  
12 See above, pp. 75-77.  
13 See above pp. 48-50, on how the principle of individuation is harbored in having.
because a dependent part of a whole is nonetheless a part that is had by the whole and can be described in a "has"-judgment on the basis of a correctly performed substantivation.

In the previous chapter we have followed Marcel's line of thought and examined with him the having of feelings, the having of ideas and secrets, and the having of the body. The just discussed passage from Husserl's Experience and Judgment enriches our sense of having by adding an important dimension to it, namely, a whole's having of its parts. This kind of having is absent from Marcel's discussions, but it is very important in Husserl's phenomenology. For instance, every particular cogito's intentional having of its cogitatum makes up an indissoluble and concrete whole, that is, the unique occurrence of a concrete experience, a single cogitatio; and every concrete cogitatio is in turn had by the ultimate whole, the "absolute concretion," namely, the transcendental subjectivity. The relation between these instances of having and the logic of wholes and parts in Husserl's phenomenology will be studied in more detail later.

14 This absence can perhaps be explained in this way: Marcel understands having as the coming together of two mutually independent entities, and this implies that the whole that comprises the two as its parts is a loosely pieced-together aggregate, and hence, is not an apparently interesting topic to explore.


16 In CM, 84/117, Husserl calls transcendental subjectivity the "absolute concretion." In the LI, absolute concretion is called absolute concretum, which is defined in the Third Investigation (i.e., where the theory of wholes and parts is explored) as "[a] concretum that itself is abstract in no direction." (LI, 2:29)
An Experience I Have vs. an Experience I Am?

Once we have broadened the notion of having to include the whole's having of its parts, we are also at a position to make sense of a passage from Husserl's *Ideas II*. One of Husserl's tasks in this book is to show that the Ego can explore itself from a "personalistic" view, and what is seen from this view is different from what is seen from a "naturalistic" view.\(^\text{17}\) Husserl shows that once the Ego in the "personalistic" attitude begins its reflective self-exploration, it immediately encounters the immense field of its own subjective being. In this context Husserl speaks about the having and being in the ego's subjectivity. He distinguishes between:

1. subjective being as the being and comportment of the Ego: the subject and its acts, or rather, its states; its activities and passivities, and
2. subjective being as being for the subject: what the Ego has, which consists of the material of sensation and the totality of Objects constituted for the subject in the course of its genesis.\(^\text{18}\)

More specifically, Husserl remarks that the data of sensation, that is, the materials of sensation mentioned above, are "'subjective,' but they are not states or acts of the Ego; rather, they are what is had by the Ego, the Ego's first 'subjective having' [subjektive Habe]."\(^\text{19}\)

\(^\text{17}\) The personalistic view is not the phenomenological attitude yet; in fact, personalistic view and naturalistic view are all possible views in the natural attitude. The difference between the two views is that the former makes no use of the concepts derived from natural sciences that physicalize all beings. For example, I am in the personalistic view if I say "I feel cold and shivering" or "I am hungry," but I would be in the naturalistic view if I say that "I have a body temperature of 103.5° F" or "I have a low blood sugar level." The former directly describes what is given in experience; the latter employs theoretical constructs to intellectualize experiences.

\(^\text{18}\) *Ideas II*, 226, translation slightly modified.

\(^\text{19}\) *Ideas II*, 226.
A having-being dichotomy within the ego's subjectivity unmistakably shows up here. However, if we bear the formal structure of parts and wholes in mind, we can see that this seeming dichotomy is again a technical (though important) differentiation "inside" a comprehensive whole, namely, the Ego's subjectivity. In fact, what Husserl does in this passage is not unlike Aristotle's effort of distinguishing between theorein and epistēmē\textsuperscript{20} if we interpret theorein as the active performance of knowing and theorizing, and interpret epistēmē as the habituality or conviction resulting from one's previously executed knowing and theorizing. To be sure, Husserl's distinction is more subtle; for him, the ego in its subjective life may (1) be executing and living through an act, or (2) have available to himself some "products" left behind (i.e., constituted) by some of his previously executed acts, or (3) have some most primitive "pregivenness," i.e., the material of sensation. He labels the first class "subjective being" and the latter two classes "subjective having." Beneath this differentiation is the undeniable fact that the Ego's acts, states, sensations, and the constituted Objects all are the parts had by a common whole, i.e., the entirety of the Ego's subjectively unified life. Husserl and Aristotle's distinctions both aim at elucidating the ego's different modes of life; they are qualitatively different from the Marcelian having-being dichotomy.

**Excursus: Reconsidering the Possibility of Identifying a Feeling**

The foregoing analyses of Husserl's position on the having-being distinction not only confirms the artificiality of the Marcelian dichotomy; it also reveals for us an inconsistency

\textsuperscript{20} De Anima, 412a22-30, 417a22-30.
lurking in Marcel's thoughts which he himself is not aware of. The original question Marcel wanted to answer was, "Is it possible to identify a feeling which we experience for the first time?" We have seen that Marcel's strategy in answering this question is to take the *isolatibility* of a feeling as the touchstone of its identifiability. But whence comes this idea, namely, that identifiability is based on isolatibility, which guarantees identifiability by generating some sort of real distance between the one who identifies and that which is to be identified?

The answer can be found in Marcel's criticism of traditional philosophy. In the third part of the "Outlines," Marcel distinguishes *problem* from *mystery*, and he criticizes traditional philosophers for their problem-solving attitude, namely, the fact that they always think that they are disinterestedly working upon some objective data placed before them. Marcel claims that this attitude is ultimately engendered by the subject-object dichotomy; but it seems that Marcel treats the identification of a feeling exactly as a *problem*, and for him a *feeling I have* is identifiable exactly because it can be turned into an "objective" datum placed in front of the one who wants to identify. In doing this, is not Marcel also doing injustice to the essence of the feeling? Is he not committing the same mistake committed by the traditional philosophers he criticized?

If this is indeed an inconsistency in Marcel's thought, then Marcel's position becomes somewhat awkward: the motive for his making of the having-being distinction is not only non-phenomenological, but also remotely, yet unequivocally, dependent on the subject-object dichotomy that he himself is so resolute to overcome.\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) Of course, this criticism of Marcel's position has to be qualified: when he introduces the problem of being and
However, Marcel's awkward situation does not mean that identifying a feeling is a pseudo-problem; it should be possible for phenomenology to meet this need without making use of any artificial presuppositions.

How then would Husserl have identified a feeling we experience for the first time? First of all, Husserl would have claimed that the question raised by Marcel hardly makes sense if taken literally. Marcel's question runs: "Is it possible to identify a feeling which we experience for the first time?" Since a feeling is a subjective process, the phrase "for the first time" renders the whole question illegitimate if this temporal qualification is to be taken strictly. Phenomenologically speaking, a subjective process of mine is not particularly of psychological or epistemological interest to me if it exists only once and to which I cannot "always go back again" in the later stages of my conscious life. Typically, the need for the identification of an immanent datum or a subjective process arises when this sort of "going back again" happens. Is this what Marcel means when he talks about the need of identifying a feeling? In any event, this is not clear from his words. However, since he admits that he is only giving us "a skeleton" of how this sort of identification can be performed, let us grant that he does mean something of that sort. So what would Husserl say about this kind of identification?

Presumably, Husserl would say that it is nothing but a matter of intentional analysis. The identification could be carried out by reflectively re-living the subject process in having through the phenomenon of the having of the body, there does not seem to be any inconsistency.

22 See _FTL_, 157, 285; and _CM_, 60/95 (§27).

23 _BH_, 155.
presentifications (such as recollections). In this reflective attitude, some noetic and/or noematic moments may become more prominent than others, and they begin to "affect" me by "claiming" my closer attention. At first, my attention may only "brush over" them passively, but it is also up to me at some point to turn toward them attentively and pursue the "hints" coming from the "eye-catching" prominence actively. I can also employ the method of free variation so that I can accentuate the prominent features in my phantasized experiences and explore to a fuller extent their interrelations. A successful identification could be achieved if in the end a harmonious synthesis between prepredicative quasi-intuition and signitive meaning-intention is achieved.24

This seemingly complicated process of identification is in fact a quite ubiquitous phenomenon in our daily lives. It is certainly going on when one searches for appropriate words to thoughtfully state an opinion, or to articulate an unusually significant situation, or to simply recognize a thing, except that in these daily scenarios we seldom have a thematic awareness of the identification we are after. But phenomenologically speaking, such daily tasks are demanding and sophisticated enough, as they all call for a "sublimation" of the prepredicative into the predicative.25

In the Husserlian solution described above, it can be seen that real isolatability and real distance are not needed for the purpose of identification. However, in order for presentification and synthesis to work, there has to be temporal distance between the original

24 To be sure, not every attempt at identifying can succeed, and the likelihood of success is by and large determined by phenomenologizer's habituations and sedimentations, which are the two phenomena of having we mentioned earlier in Chapter 1. See above, pp. 69-71.

25 Cf. CM, 11/52 (§4), where Husserl briefly addresses the problem of how predicative expression should fit pre-predicative evidence.
experience and the presentified (either recollected or phantasized) experience, namely, between the different experiences to be synthesized. This temporal distance, however, does not extend in the real or objective time measurable by physical timepieces; rather, it unfolds itself "inside" the realm of transcendental subjectivity. Inside this same transcendental subjectivity, furthermore, the Ego who identifies is in a sense "over and above" the experiences being synthesized and identified; this "over and above" is again a "distance" of a different sort. How should these claims be understood? What structure of transcendental subjectivity is implied by the genuine possibility of identifying a feeling? We will find the answers in Husserl's phenomenology of having.26

The Ego's Having of Its Experiences in the Fifth Logical Investigation

Having clarified the meaning of the having-being dichotomy that appears in two Husserlian passages, let us turn now to a passage in the Logical Investigations where Husserl directly speaks about the ego's having of experiences.

First of all, let it be noted that the presence of the theme of having in the Logical Investigations is beyond question. For instance, in the Third Investigation Husserl studies the various aspects concerning a whole's having of its parts: the having of independent parts is different from the having of dependent parts, the having of immediate parts is different from the having of mediate parts, and the having of nearer parts is different from the having of

26 Cf. below, pp. 185-88, on the structure of the universal epoché.
The theme of having also appears clearly in the Fifth Investigation, which is entitled "On Intentional Experiences and Their 'Contents.'" The author's task is clearly announced in this title, namely, to study intentional experiences and what these experiences have (i.e., their contents). For my present purpose, I would like to discuss the peculiar way in which Husserl, at this very early stage in his philosophical career, speaks about the phenomenological ego's having of its experiences.

Experiencing as Having

The primary task Husserl sets for himself in the Fifth Investigation is to prepare for an in-depth investigation of "the kind of experiences in which the supreme genus Meaning has its originative source." Since the experiences of meaning (i.e., the "originative source" of Meaning) are normally called "(intentional) acts," and since "(intentional) acts" in general are understood as "activities of consciousness," it is desirable to have the meaning of terms such as "consciousness" and "act" clarified before more advanced research can be carried out. The Fifth Investigation is indeed designed to provide such clarificatory analyses and discerning descriptions.

Husserl observes that although consciousness and experiences have long been studied by traditional psychology, the terms consciousness and experience were not used with the necessary scientific rigor. This explains why the first thing he attempts to do is to

27 See the Third Investigation, §§17-20 (LI, 2:28-34).

28 LI, 2:79.
disambiguate these terms. He lists three senses of the concept of consciousness in §1, namely, (1) consciousness as the totality and phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences, (2) consciousness as "inner perception," and (3) consciousness as "intentional experiences." The three senses are thoroughly discussed in Chapters 1 and 2; what interests us here is the first sense, which is Husserl's major concern in §§2-4. Besides the many important clarifications achieved here, his understanding of the nature of the phenomenological ego is also spelled out, a theme that is closely related to the present study.

Husserl begins by making a distinction that has long been blurred in traditional psychology, namely, the distinction between the *appearing* of an object and the object that *appears.* The former is a real (reell) content of consciousness, whereas the latter is an *improper* or *intentional* content of consciousness. Making this distinction allows us to see that, phenomenologically speaking, what can be experienced is the *appearing* of a thing, but not the thing that appears. This assertion has to do with the phenomenological sense of the verb *to experience,* which is discussed in the following passage:

If someone says he 'experienced' the wars of 1866 and 1870, then what he has been said to have 'experienced' in this sense, is a complex of outer events, and 'experiencing' consists here in perceptions, judgments and other acts, in which these events appear as objects. . . . Experiencing in the latter sense is quite different from experiencing in the former sense. To experience outer events meant to *have* certain acts of perception, of this or that type of knowledge, directed upon them. This 'having' (*Haben*) at once furnishes an instance of the quite different 'experiencing' in the sense of phenomenology.  

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29 For an example of those who confused the two, see Husserl's criticism of Locke, in the Second Investigation, §10 (*LI*, 1:252).

30 See *LI* 2:83-84. Husserl also expresses this distinction in this way: "As belonging in a conscious connection, the appearing of things is experienced by us, as belonging in the phenomenal world, things appear before us. The appearing of the things does not itself appear to us, we live through it."

31 *LI*, 2:84-85.
The different senses (i.e., the popular and the phenomenological) of the verb "to experience" are under discussion here. Husserl stresses that the experiencing ego, phenomenologically speaking, cannot be said to experience that which transcends the stream of consciousness, be it an outer event or a physical thing. That which appears cannot be had, or more precisely, cannot be had in one's consciousness in a really inherent manner, and hence cannot be experienced. The phrase "to experience an outer event" (as is often said in popular parlance), when translated into phenomenological terms, means to have acts, or appearings, that are themselves really inherent members of consciousness (but they target the outer event in question). To us, of particular interest here is Husserl's observation that the having of these acts exemplifies the phenomenological sense of experiencing. This having, Husserl continues, merely means that certain contents help to constitute a unity of consciousness, enter into the phenomenologically unified stream of consciousness of an empirical ego. This [ego] itself is a real whole, in reality made up of manifold parts, each of which may be said to be 'experienced'. It is in this sense that what the ego or consciousness experiences, are its experience: there is no difference between the experience or conscious content and the experience itself.\footnote{Husserl, 2:85.}

Clearly, the logic of wholes and parts is employed to clarify the sense of experiencing as having: the whole here being the phenomenological ego, and the parts are its manifold experiences. Since the parts are not only had but at the same time also experienced, the whole's having of its parts is at the same time a way of experiencing. To put it another way, the ego experiences nothing but the experiences it has as primary parts,\footnote{For the meaning and examples of terms such as primary part, secondary part, mediate part, and immediate part, see Husserl, 2:30-32.} hence its
experiencing is equivalent to a peculiar conscious having (more precisely, this experiencing as having is also the ego's self-experiencing and self-having). From this phenomenological equation of having with experiencing some thought-provoking implications follow.

_Problem concerning the "Haver"

The talk about the having of experiences seems to imply the existence of a "haver," i.e., the qui, or the owner, of these experiences. At first glance, the owner here is undoubtedly the phenomenological ego. Does not Husserl talk about the ego's experiences? Is not this possessive an undisputable indication of ownership? However, if we consider both the way Husserl characterizes this having and what he says about the nature of the ego, together with his rejection of Natorp's postulation of the "pure ego" or an "ego principle" in the first edition of the _Logical Investigations_, then we have to conclude that the owner of the having in question is, in a sense, absent. A closer look at Husserl's understanding of the nature of the ego may help us better understand this peculiar ownership (or the absence thereof).

Note that we are here dealing with the first sense of consciousness, namely, consciousness as the totality and phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences. In Husserl's eyes, consciousness in this sense is in fact the "phenomenological subsistence of the ego." That is to say, the phenomenological ego is for him just the "interconnected unity"

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34 _LI_, 2:91-93.

35 The title of Chapter 1 reads: "Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego and consciousness as inner perception."
of the manifold experiences, and is entirely reducible to the stream of consciousness. Although this stream of consciousness, or the manifold of experiences, is unified, no ego that resides over and above the experiences is required for this unifying synthesis.

Given this characterization of the ego, the having in question can be interpreted in two senses. In a weaker sense, the having in question signifies "the relation of a single experience to a complex of experiences." That is to say, this having is only a simple mereological relationship, not unlike the relationship between an extended physical aggregate and its constituents (even though the having here happens to be conscious). More particularly, since this simple mereological relation is not intentional at all, it does not even warrant Husserl's interest in the Fifth Investigation.

In a slightly stronger sense, this having can be interpreted as the Marcelian mode of being. Husserl says in the passage quoted above that "there is no difference between the experience or conscious content and the experience itself." In only a couple of pages he expresses this thought several times. For example, he also claims that "the relation in which

36 LI, 2:86.

37 LI, 2:86.

38 LI, 2:84. The following observation (in §12 of the Fifth Investigation) also expresses this relation of one experience to a complex of experiences: "The sentences 'The ego represents an object to itself,' 'The ego refers presentatively to an object,' 'The ego has something as an intentional object of its presentation' therefore mean the same as 'In the phenomenological ego, a concrete complex of experiences, a certain experience said, in virtue of its specific nature, to be a presentation of object X, is really [reell] present." LI, 2:101.

39 See esp. LI, 2:31 (§19 of the Third Investigation), on how Husserl characterizes an extended physical whole's having of its parts.

40 See above pp. 67-68.

41 LI, 2:85.
experiences are thought to stand to an experiencing consciousness (or to an experiencing 'phenomenological ego') points to no peculiar phenomenological situation." The title of §4 is yet another telling example: "The relation between experiencing consciousness and experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar type of relation." These claims all amount to expressing one point: the difference between the haver (the ego, the experiencing consciousness) and the had (the manifold experiences, the content of consciousness) collapses; the ego loses itself in the stream of consciousness and is the stream of consciousness. Consequently, the "having" of experiences should not be called a having at all, but better interpreted as the mode of being advocated by Marcel.

But by telling this story of having I do not mean to quibble that Husserl has misused the term having: things become more interesting if we take into consideration the fact that Husserl understood the nature of the pure ego differently at the time he composed the second edition of the Logical Investigations. His anti-Natorp position in the first edition is as impressive as the self-criticizing footnote that appears in the second. The pure ego is now "found," and it is understood by Husserl as a "transcendency within immanency" that not only lives in and through every conscious act but also transcends all the acts. Now that the

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42 *LI*, 2:84. Husserl's footnote deleted.

43 See *LI*, 2:91-93. Although it is not my task to examine in the dissertation the cause of Husserl's change of mind, it is worth mentioning that in the intervening years Husserl discovered absolute immanent time consciousness and developed the mature version of the method of transcendental reduction; both topics are related to Husserl's new understanding of the nature of the pure ego. On this point, see Brough's "Translator's Introduction" to Husserl's *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893-1917), trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). Brough (and Rudolf Boehm, the editor of Husserliana 10) proves that Husserl's notion of absolute time consciousness emerged during the same period (i.e., 1904-1909) when he came to a mature understanding of the method of transcendental reduction. This book will hereafter be referred to as PCIT.

44 In the *Ideas I* Husserl calls the "pure ego" a "transcendancy within immanency [Transzendent in der
pure ego is situated on a level that is "higher" than its experiences, and hence not entirely reducible to its experiences, it is no longer appropriate to characterize its "having" of experiences as a simple mereological relation. In fact, Husserl's later theory of the three-level structure of time consciousness supports this interpretation: since the ego's experiences (as immanent "objects") are unities intentionally and flowingly constituted inside the transcendental subjectivity, the transcendental ego can now be said to be the haver of its experiences by virtue of the double intentionality of the absolute time-constituting flow, especially through so-called vertical intentionality (Querintentionalität).45

So it is clear that Husserl's understanding of the ego's manner of having of its experiences has changed over time. This change prompts us to ask: does Husserl's changed understanding of the ego have any impact on the phenomenological studies carried out in the Logical Investigations? The answer is both a No and Yes. On the one hand, we have a definite "No" from Husserl himself. He says in the notes supplied in the second edition that

there are phenomenological problems that "can be systematically explored without taking up any stance on the ego-issue"; he even assures us that his earlier attitude against the pure ego "is irrelevant to the investigations of this volume." On the other hand, the practice of hermeneutics tells us that authors are not necessarily infallible when interpreting their own works. Hence it is not surprising if we find out that Husserl in fact underestimates the phenomenological significance of what his change of view can bring about. Given that his stance on the "ego-issue" in fact has dramatic effect on his understanding of the ego's manner of having of its experiences, it is philosophically safe for us to exercise caution in our study of any theme that is related to the ego's having of its experiences, especially if such theme is treated by Husserl in both the Logical Investigations and his late works. This caution is necessary and beneficial because if we base our understanding of such a theme solely on what Husserl says in the Logical Investigations, some defective understanding will almost unavoidably arise. As I see it, this is especially the case with respect to topics such as phenomenological reduction and self awareness. We will soon be able to see that Husserl's new view on the ego's having of its experiences in significant measure determines his methods of phenomenological epoché and transcendental reduction.

46 *LI*, 2:93.
CHAPTER 3

PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPOCHÉ AND TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION

In this chapter I explain the methods of *phenomenological epoché* (or *epoché* for short) and *transcendental reduction* from the perspective of having. Although the phenomenological operations named by these two terms are highly technical, understanding these operations does not presuppose too much phenomenology\(^1\) because their starting point, i.e., the natural attitude, is lived through by all and hence is familiar (unthetically, to be sure) as well as accessible to all. In addition, both the epoché and the reduction can be made more understandable if we employ the two eidetic moments of having to shed light on their structural features, namely, we will show that (1) the particular epoché, which deals with a particular intentional act, is characterized by the within-without tension and the awareness thereof; (2) the universal epoché and the transcendental reduction, which deal with the entire life of consciousness, are characterized by the self-other distinction.\(^2\)

The benefits of explaining the two concepts at this stage are also obvious. First of all, my interpretation of the *Cartesian Meditations* in Chapter 4 will begin with a reading of its Introduction and the last paragraph of its Conclusion. The concept of epoché is employed by Husserl in the last paragraph of the *Cartesian Meditations* and is the prerequisite for the understanding of the claims made in this dense text. Offering an explanation of this concept

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\(^{1}\) See below, footnote #16, for more discussion of this claim.

\(^{2}\) About these two eidetic moments, see above pp. 37-51.
here spares us the need to digress later and facilitates the subsequent exposition. Moreover, terms like "phenomenological epoché," "transcendental epoché," and "transcendental phenomenological reduction" appear very early in the *Cartesian Meditations* (i.e., in §8), but the way Husserl employs these terms may generate the impression that they all mean the same thing.³ Strictly speaking, however, the phenomenological epoché and the transcendental reduction emphasize *two different aspects of one unitary operation of the mind*, and the difference should be grasped. It is therefore wholesome for us to obtain a clear understanding of the two concepts and methods before we occupy ourselves with the details of the book.

Finally, treating the epoché and the reduction here also helps us to maintain a continuous train of thought: we will see that the method of transcendental reduction is a method that clarifies the sense of *being* in terms of the transcendental ego’s *having* of experiences, and hence it overcomes the Marcelian having-being dichotomy—a main theme treated in the previous two chapters.

The methods of phenomenological epoché and transcendental reduction were for the first time officially explained in some detail by Husserl in *Ideas I*. Hence a major part of my explanation of the two methods will be based on what Husserl says in this book, but I will

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³ This is an obscurity in Husserl’s terminology that has been often referred to and discussed by his commentators. Maurice Natanson's description of the problem is concise and worth quoting: "In the spectrum of meaning assigned to it, epoché signifies at one extreme a narrowly construed act of restraint and at the other extreme is almost synonymous with phenomenological reduction." In his *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks* (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1973), 77-78.

refer to his *Cartesian Meditations* and *Crisis* if necessary. Four stages can be identified in Husserl's explication of the epoché. (1) Before he introduces the method of epoché he begins by describing the so-called "natural attitude" and the "general positing" that characterizes this attitude.⁴ (2) Husserl then attempts to show the possibility of radically changing the natural attitude. The method of epoché is introduced for this purpose and Husserl emphasizes that the effect of the epoché is different from that of the Cartesian radical doubt (which results in universal negation), even though the Cartesian method is used to help define the epoché.⁵ (3) He then speaks about how, after the epoché is universally carried out and the "general positing" of the natural attitude is suspended, a new transcendental "region of being" can be revealed and acquired.⁶ (4) Finally, Husserl refines our understanding of the phenomenological epoché by elaborating on an important type of conscious operation, namely, neutralization, and he identifies the epoché as a special kind of neutrality modification.⁷ I will go over the four stages one by one, and I will bring in the two eidetic moments of having, namely, the within-without tension and the self-other distinction, to define the epoché and the transcendental reduction.

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⁵ *Ideas I*, §31.

⁶ *Ideas I*, §§32-33; also *CM*, §8.

The General Positing that Characterizes the Natural Attitude

To understand the epoché, we need to understand the natural attitude because it is the intrinsic function of the epoché as a method to help us leave the natural attitude and get used to the transcendental one. The natural attitude, according to Husserl, is the attitude we live through by default in our conscious waking life, and it is characterized by the phenomenon of the general positing (also called the "general thesis"), which is explained as follows:

The general positing . . . does not consist of a particular act, perchance an articulated judgment about existence. It is, after all, something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of the attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life. That which at any time is perceived, is clearly or obscurely presented . . . bears . . . the characteristic "there," "on hand"; and it is essentially possible to base on this characteristic an explicit (predicative) judgment of existence agreeing with it. If we state such a judgment, we nevertheless know that in it we have only made thematic and conceived as a predicate what already was somehow inherent, as unthematic, unthought, unpredicated, in the original experiencing or, correlative, in the experienced, as the characteristic of something "on hand" [Vorhanden].

This paragraph deals with two related features of the general positing: (1) the general positing is not an explicit act of believing or judging; but as a potential and inexplicit positing, the general positing can nonetheless be explicated predicatively and be articulated into an existential judgment. The importance of these two features for our understanding of the epoché can hardly be overemphasized, because they contain the two principles on which our study of the epoché is based: (1) the epoché as a method is related to an inexplicit positing; and (2) we should respect the difference between inexplicit positing and explicit

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8 Ideas I, 57-58/53; Hua 3/a, 62.

9 Note that "judging" here is used in its narrow sense, i.e., an explicit predicative judging. There is also a broadest sense of judging, which is equivalent to any positing, either predicative or prepredicative, of anything as existent. See CM, 11/52 (§4).
posing and treat them differently according to their essence.

To facilitate our understanding of the general positing, we shall in what follows distinguish between its local and global manifestations. The term "local manifestation" signifies the way the general positing shows itself in every single experience (the third and fourth sentences in the quoted passage are specifically about this manifestation), whereas "global manifestation" signifies the way the general positing manifests itself in our waking conscious life as a whole (this is what the second sentence speaks about). Husserl himself does not thematically make this distinction, but it is there in his text and it proves to be a useful one because

(1) it makes it understandable that the epoché can be performed on two levels, namely, either on the local level, i.e., on a single particular experience, or on the global level, i.e., on one's conscious life as a whole, which is the so-called universal epoché;¹⁰

(2) it enables us to see more clearly what exactly we are mentally doing when we exercise the particular epoché and when we exercise the universal epoché, respectively.

Let us confirm Husserl's descriptions on the local level first. On this level, the general positing shows itself as the "believing" character of every single experience¹¹ I undergo in my natural waking life. That is to say, as a matter of course, whenever I live through an everyday normal perceptual experience I also "believe" in the existence (more precisely, the

¹⁰ On the two levels of the epoché (or reduction), see Ideas I, §§31-33 and Crisis, §§39-41.

¹¹ Although perceiving, imagining, supposing, doubting, etc., all are possible modes of experience in our natural waking life, here I use the term experience to stand for the normal, undisturbed, and perceptual experience, which best illustrates the characteristic of the general positing.
being "on hand") of the object(s) perceived. For example, suppose I now notice that there is a small grayish object moving under the juniper tree in the backyard. A glimpse suffices to make me "believe" that a squirrel is there, even though the appearance of this grayish object is somewhat hazy in the dusk. Phenomenologically speaking, a squirrel as a being-on-hand is accepted by me in the mode of certainty.

To say that I accept with certainty the being of a squirrel does not mean that there was an explicitly articulated judgment, e.g., "This is a squirrel," accompanying my glimpse. My acceptance of (or my belief in) the being of the "squirrel" is not an independent act of judging or believing that is concurrent with or overlaid on my glimpse; rather, it may be defined as a *prepredicative sense* tacitly "implied" in the glimpse, or, as Husserl puts it, it is something "unthematic, unthought, unpredicated, in the original experiencing." An *unthought* prepredicative sense as such can, in principle, be unfolded (i.e., thought through) and pronounced predicatively as a judgment if I wish to do so, but it is wrong to say that a ready-made act of judging *was* there with my original glimpse.

A proper understanding of the difference between a predicative judgment and a prepredicative sense as such is important for our study of the epoché, so let us deepen our understanding by examining their different functions. A judgment like "It is a squirrel" may

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12 It is important to bear in mind a terminological subtlety in Husserl's text here, namely, "on hand" [*vorhanden*] is used by Husserl to characterize the noematic correlate of the *inexplicit* positing, i.e., the general positing. This subtlety in a sense is indirectly confirmed by McKenna's discussion of the distinction between "on hand" [*vorhanden*] and "actual" [*wirklich*] in the *Ideas I*, even though this distinction serves an entirely different purpose in McKenna's Husserl's *Introductions to Phenomenology,* see especially 33–45, where McKenna spells out the distinction and employs it to critically evaluate Husserl's thesis that consciousness constitutes the world.

13 The term *unthought* here should not be understood as something I am ignorant or unaware of; rather, it indicates a sense that does not take the form of thinking yet, i.e., a sense that is not explicitly and syntactically articulated.
become a member of a system of propositions, and can be logically manipulated in relation to other propositions. Namely, I can negate it, I can put it in conjunction or disjunction with other propositions, and I can make it the premise of some arguments and draw some conclusion from it. For instance, a conclusion about the climate and geographical features of the region can be drawn. Obviously, once the judgment is formed, all these logical operations can in principle be performed by me without the bodily presence of the "squirrel" in question.

But the believing character of my original glimpse, that is, the inexplicit belief in the on-handness of the squirrel, functions in a different style and makes different contributions to my conscious life. Among other things, it "suggests" to me, the perceiver, a system of possible experiences that all target the "squirrel." This "suggesting" is not an act, neither does it mean an "actual triggering" of the experiences in question; rather, by this term it is meant to say that the believing character of my perception of the grayish object either is, or opens up, my inexplicit awareness of possibilities such as: if I am to observe this "object" for a sufficiently long period of time, my expectation of a normal squirrel will gradually be fulfilled by its behavior; if I am to walk closer, then a squirrel will appear clearly to me; or if

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14 This suggesting is closely related to the phenomenon of appresentation in Husserl's phenomenology. The perception of the front side of a building presents its back side; but appresentation is possible because one perception refers to another possible perception about the same object. This interpretation of appresentation is an application of the principle of the two-sidedness of phenomenological inquiry. (On this principle, see CM, §17) Appresentation takes note of the noematic side of our conscious life, i.e., how the seen features present the unseen; in our analysis of the general positing, or the belief in being (Seinsglaube), it is suitable to take note of the noetic side. It may also be the case that the general positing is the condition of the possibility of appresentation in general: I have no motive to explicate what the seen features might present unless I somehow "believe" that an object whatsoever is itself there.

I like, I may also have someone else to confirm this state of affairs—"a squirrel is over there"—for me, etc. These possible acts are not had by me in a really inherent manner (that would mean that I carry them out actually, or in recollection, or in phantasy), but my awareness of the possibility of really having them, though inexplicit, is certainly more salient in my consciousness than my awareness of other related possibilities, say, the possibility of seeing a bewitched leopard's actually being under the juniper tree.  

To explicate the believing character in a two-sided manner, we say: subjectively speaking, my (inexplicit) awareness of these if-thens intimates that "I can" actually carry out this system of experiences; objectively speaking, these actualizable experiences can be harmoniously synthesized with respect to their identical objective core, i.e., the "squirrel" in our example—if the "squirrel" is really a squirrel. To put it differently, the inexplicit belief suggests to the believer a predelineated system of not only actualizable but also harmoniously synthesizable acts that is able to verify the actuality of the object in question and, if necessary, to transform the unthought belief into a predicatively articulated one. It is also evident that the inexplicit belief cannot function, or, at least, cannot function optimally, if the perceiver (or "believer") is removed from the specific perceptual situation in which the belief arises. Let us call this the situation-dependency feature of the inexplicit belief, and we will explore the feature in more detail later in our study of the epoché.

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15 This is also a phenomenological way to understand Hume's distinction between belief and fiction. Cf. Hume, *Enquiry*, Section V, Part II, para. 10-13, the difference between believing that one is hearing the voice of an acquainted person, and imagining that one is in an enchanted castle.

16 See below, pp. 129-31. It might be contended that, while this section is supposed to offer an introduction to the epoché, the present analysis of the believing character of a normal perceptual experience already utilizes too much phenomenology. For example, the phenomenological principle that an object is always an index of a correlative system of consciousness is presupposed. (For this principle, see *Crisis*, § 48; *CM*, §§21-22) Also, the
Let us turn to the "global" level now. The general positing manifests itself on this level as well, and one of its important features is described by Husserl in the passage just quoted: the "general positing" is "something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of the [natural] attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life." In other words, in my conscious waking life as a whole, the general positing shows itself as an uninterrupted and all-pervading belief in an all-embracing field of beings, i.e., the world. As long as I am wakeful, I simply have a world "out there," a world as the totality of all kinds of existent "things." This "belief" requires no active doing from my part; more specifically, it does not consist in a judgment like "I have a world" or "There is a world." This all-pervading belief, like the believing character that is found on the local level, should also be understood as the inexplicit awareness of a system of harmoniously synthesizable acts (to be sure, much richer and more complicated) that is actualizable by myself, including: my endless possibilities of moving spatially and temporally in the "world," and carrying out different types of acts to encounter, verify, and produce this or that sort of beings belonging to various ontological

phenomenological understanding of verification, actuality, harmony, synthesis is also at work here. (See CM, the Third Meditation, for Husserl's explanation of these terms).

On this seeming circularity, I make two suggestions: 1) This dissertation gives a teleological interpretation, rather than a chronological one, of Husserl's phenomenology of having, which means that we may have to use Husserl's later and more mature formulations to shed light on the earlier ones, a strategy that is found also in the late Husserl's self-interpretation. 2) This circularity, namely, that we need phenomenology to understand and do phenomenology, seems to be the "problem" inherent in any introduction to phenomenology in general (e.g., as a "beginning philosopher" Husserl attempts at the most profound philosophical problems), and introduction to the epoché in particular (e.g., in the Ideas I Husserl's description of the natural attitude is not done from within; and in the CM, while the epoché presented in §8 asks us to suspend the world's claim to being, we arrive at the full understanding of being and actuality as late as in the Third Meditation). It seems impossible to offer an introduction to the epoché free from any phenomenological motivations and interests.

regions, etc.

Besides these similarities, however, a notable difference can be observed between the local and global manifestations of the general positing: locally, I may turn certainty into probability or uncertainty here and there, I may even cancel or negate my belief in some beings (e.g., "It is not a squirrel, but a pigeon instead!"); but globally, as long as I am wakeful, my belief in this world holds steadfastly as always, never shaken by my awareness of these local disturbances. This difference also explains why the epoché performed on the global level (i.e., the universal epoché) cannot be the simple extension of the epoché performed on the local level (i.e., the particular epoché), a theme we will try to clarify later.

So far we have reflected in some detail on the manifestations of the general positing; our reflection shows that they are rather striking phenomena. On the local level, any single normal perceptual act alone has only a very limited constitutive effect. In our example, a glimpse only presents the silhouette of a grayish moving "object," yet the sense of a squirrel "in itself there" is produced and accepted. That is to say, what I accept as valid and real is more than what is perceptually presented to me. How is this possible? Moreover, why is a normal perceptual act in general always coated in this mood of believing? On the global level, the general positing appears to be an even more extraordinary phenomenon. Whenever I am awake, only a small portion of worldly "things" (or more precisely, certain profiles of these "things") are actually and directly present to my awareness, with some others lingering more or less on the indefinite fringe of my attention, and still others minded or mindable by me, potentially at most. Nonetheless, I feel with ineffable assurance that an all-embracing world

\[17\] Cf. Ideas I, 57/53.
is "out there," "in itself," independent of my subjective life.\textsuperscript{18}

Facing the extraordinariness of the general positing, one may see it as either some deeply rooted illusion in need of debunking or some wonderful achievement of consciousness in need of clarification. Husserl takes the latter path: among other things, the phenomenological epoché helps us to clarify and understand the general positing; but the clarification and understanding have to be achieved via a "detour," for the epoché is primarily designed as a means to suspend \textit{(aufheben)} the general positing. This is the theme that we shall examine next.

\textbf{The (Particular) Epoché}

In this section I discuss Husserl's introduction of the epoché in §31 of \textit{Ideas I}, and my discussion focuses on the epoché that is performed on a particular experience.\textsuperscript{19} (1) I will offer a straightforward textual analysis of Husserl's text. (2) I then focus on the text in which the effect of the epoché is explained by Husserl through a series of "parallel expressions" (namely, the original positing is said to be \textit{put out of action, parenthesized, disconnected}, and

\footnote{18}{In this reflection on the general positing and its extraordinariness, the problem of circularity we mentioned before arises again, namely, we need phenomenology to introduce readers to phenomenology. (See above, footnote #16.) For example, in order to appreciate the extraordinariness of achievement of the general positing, we need some phenomenological understanding of the limitedness of the constitutive effect of a single act, which presupposes the phenomenological notion of \textit{validity} and the constitutive function of consciousness. Cf. Ströker, \textit{Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology}, 62-63.}

\footnote{19}{I treat the particular epoché and the universal or total epoché separately because, it seems to me, while it is appropriate to say that the universal or total epoché and the transcendental reduction are two different aspects of one unitary mental operation, the particular epoché, as a mental operation, is not identical with the universal epoché and falls short of the level of transcendental reduction. The universal epoché will be discussed below, pp. 182-94.}
made no use of). I point out a way to understand these expressions in terms of having, or more specifically, in terms of the within-without tension, one of the eidetic moments of having that we elaborated in Chapter 1. (3) Finally, I engage in a conversation with J. N. Mohanty by considering a passage on the epoché from his recent book, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*. The purpose of this conversation is to highlight the usefulness of our interpretation of the epoché from the perspective of having.

*Husserl's Text*

When commenting on the epoché, Paul Ricoeur in his *A Key to Husserl's "Ideas I"* says that "Husserl's method of approach is to extract from methodical doubt, better known than epoché, the component which is exactly the epoché." This appears to be an exact depiction of what Husserl is doing in §31: the epoché, the phenomenon that is also called "parenthesizing" or "disconnection," is indeed seized upon in Husserl's analysis of doubt and the attempt to doubt; even though Husserl also suggests that it is possible to arrive at the epoché via different approaches.

Husserl starts §31 by saying that we now want to radically change (ändern) the natural attitude, and he wishes to show the essential possibility of doing so. Since the

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21 Ricoeur, *A Key to Husserl's "Ideas I,"* 89.

22 See *Ideas I*, 59/55.

23 Herbert Spiegelberg observes that "[o]ne of the odd features of this first presentation of the reduction [in the
general posting that characterizes the natural attitude is a potential and inexplicit positing, Husserl's task can be defined as to radically change such a positing.\textsuperscript{24} To tackle this task, Husserl observes that "[w]e can now proceed with the potential and inexplicit positing precisely as we can with the explicit judgment-positing."\textsuperscript{25} This statement likens the inexplicit positing to the explicit positing, and a methodological guidance to Husserl's search for the epoché is implied in it.

If we can proceed with the potential and inexplicit positing precisely as we can with the explicit judgment-positing, namely, if whatever works for the explicit judgment-positing also works for the potential and inexplicit positing, it then follows that: if there is a method that is able to radically change the explicit judgment-positings, then, in principle, on the basis of this method, a parallel method can be found or devised, which can be used to radically modify the potential and inexplicit positings in question.

This methodological guidance explains why Husserl turns to the phenomenon of the Cartesian attempt to doubt and believes that from it we may extract the method we need: (1) an explicit and predicative positing produces a judgment that can undergo different logical modifications; (2) among the many possible modifications that a judgment can undergo, negation stands out prominently because of the radical effect (i.e., the canceling effect) it

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\textit{Ideas I} was that it did not offer any clear reason why such a violent change of our natural attitude was to be required." In his "Is the Reduction Necessary for Phenomenology? Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies," 5. Only in retrospect can we see that for Husserl the purpose of this change of attitude is to understand the natural attitude.
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\textsuperscript{24} See above, p. 104; also cf. Elisabeth Ströker, \textit{Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology}, 61.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ideas I}, 58/53. This is a claim that Husserl does not prove. But what warrant does Husserl have in treating the two types of positing in a methodologically indifferent manner? Perhaps he takes the claim as self-evident; but it seems to me that the correctness of this claim is questionable. For one thing, the potential and inexplicit positing is more primitive than the explicit judgment-positing (their relation is analogous to that between the prepredicative and the predicative), and they function differently. See above, pp. 106-8, for their different functions; also cf. below, footnote \#28, for a related issue.
produces on the original thesis; (3) in Descartes a universal negation of one's former beliefs in entirety (as explicit posittings) is achieved by virtue of the method of the universal attempt to doubt, that is, the Cartesian method proves to be an effective way of changing the explicit posittings; (4) therefore, according to the methodological guidance formulated above, the Cartesian method can serve as a model that we may emulate when we deal with the potential and inexplicit positing in question, i.e., the general positing itself.

Turning to the phenomenon of the attempt to doubt, Husserl now observes that there is an element of position-suspension that, once teased out, can serve our purpose. This element is to be grasped in this manner:

It is clear that we cannot doubt a being and, in the same consciousness (with the form of unity belonging to the simultaneous) posit the substrate of this being, thus being conscious of the substrate as having the characteristic, "on hand" [vorhanden]. Equivalently expressed: The same material of being cannot be simultaneously doubted and held to be certain. In like manner, it is clear that the attempt to doubt anything intended to as something on hand [vorhanden] necessarily effects a certain suspension [Aufhebung] of positing and precisely this interests us.²⁶

We should read this passage closely, but let it first be noted that the passage discusses both doubt and the attempt to doubt: the first sentence is clearly about the act of doubt, and the principle of non-contradiction (or a variation thereof) is mentioned in this sentence; the second sentence paraphrases the principle; and in the third sentence Husserl turns to the attempt to doubt and finds there the so-called "suspension of positing" that interests him.²⁷

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²⁶ Ideas I, 58/54; Hua 3/a, 62-63. Kersten translates aufheben and Aufhebung as to annul and annulment, respectively. But the term to annul strongly connotes "to make something into nothing," and it is exactly Husserl's point that the epoché does not make the original positing into nothing (rather, the epoché is said to be able to retain the original positing). Gibson translates the two terms as to suspend and suspension, which is a more literal, and obviously also superior, translation. I will adopt Gibson's practice and modify Kersten's translation wherever applicable. The exact sense of suspension is discussed below, p. 143.

²⁷ Let us say a word about the difference between doubt and the attempt to doubt. To doubt is to actually stamp
The analysis of the act of *doubt* is supposed to shed light on the *attempt to doubt*, and Husserl's objective is to make intelligible the element of position-suspension that is contained in, or somehow conditioned by, the *attempt to doubt*.

In the analysis of *doubt*, Husserl states that when we doubt a being, we cannot simultaneously hold the *substrate* of this being as "on hand"; namely, doubt and certainty cannot coexist in one's mind with respect to one and the same thing. This seems to be an interesting appeal to the principle of non-contradiction.\(^{28}\) To illustrate Husserl's point by our

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\(^{28}\) I shall leave it an open question what exactly is the role played by Husserl's mentioning of the principle of non-contradiction twice in this specific context and, if he does intend to apply the principle here, whether or not it is a valid application. As far as my reading goes, I see that Marcus Brainard and Michael Sukale are the two phenomenologists who explicitly read this passage as Husserl's appeal to the principle of non-contradiction.

Brainard interprets Husserl's intention as *to set a limit to our perfect freedom to attempt to doubt*. He says: "We are not free to subject the thesis of or belief in the Being of whatever it is we are presently conscious of to any modification that effectively negates it, whether outright (as in negation) or potentially (as, for example, in presumption, undecidedness, or doubt), for such a modification would generate an inadmissible contradiction—as long as the fundamental belief has not been annulled, it remains the ground of every modified thesis." In other words, Brainard interprets Husserl as applying the principle of non-contradiction to the relation between the modality of the general thesis (the fundamental belief that is always unshakeable) and the effect of the attempt to doubt on every particular Being. See his *Belief and Its Neutralization: Husserl's System of Phenomenology in "Ideas I"* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 63.

Sukale goes farther: he claims that when we actually carry out the attempt to doubt as instructed by Husserl, we can see that the principle of non-contradiction renders Husserl's description of the epoché (as the *bracketing*) impossible or even "nonsensical." See the essay "World and Epoché in Husserl and Heidegger" in his *Comparative Studies in Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 101-120, esp. 110-11, and 111n35.

I disagree with both Brainard and Sukale's interpretations. The main reason that I think their interpretations are wrong is that they uncritically accept Husserl's appeal to the law of non-contradiction. For the time being, I wish to point out that Husserl's application of this law is questionable, because he seems to have applied it to two different levels of positing, namely, the *explicit* judgment-positing that posits "a being" and the *potential* and *inexplicit* positing that posits the *substrate* of this being. Husserl's questionable application of the law of non-contradiction seems to be the result of his also questionable claim that "we can . . . proceed with the potential and inexplicit positing precisely as we can with the explicit judgment-positing." (Also see above, footnote #25)

I believe that some in-depth investigation into the relation between predicative and prepredicative evidence is needed before we can say under what condition a *formal* contradiction may arise between an explicit position
previous example, it means: under the particular perceptual situation we described earlier, if I cast doubt on the judgment "A squirrel is over there," that is, if the explicit judgment-positing of a squirrel's being is doubted, then I cannot continue enjoying my potential belief in the on-handness of this squirrel, or, which is the same, I can no longer live in the inexplicit positing that posits the substrate of the squirrel. I have to give up or cancel my inexplicit belief in the on-handness of the squirrel in order for the doubt of its being to go through; otherwise, it may be inferred, I would in effect be enjoying a mental status analogous to holding both P and non-P in my mind simultaneously, that is, committing some sort of self-contradiction.

As was pointed out earlier, Husserl wants to find a method that is able to radically change the potential and inexplicit positing; the analysis of doubt draws the goal closer because, according to Husserl's interpretation, a canceling of the potential and inexplicit positing does happen in the act of doubt. Although this canceling is not the exact effect that Husserl is aiming at, at least an unfamiliar operation (i.e., the change of the potential and inexplicit positing) is brought into our view through the interpretation of a familiar phenomenon (i.e., the act of doubt).

The second sentence—"The same material of being cannot be simultaneously doubted and held to be certain"—only repeats the principle of non-contradiction. Then in the third

and an inexplicit one. Moreover, we need to consider: whether or not the epoché can still be called a free act if, to some extent, it is logically and really "entailed" or "caused."

Everything considered, however, I also believe that Husserl's introduction of the epoché in the Ideas I remains a successful one, despite the problematic nature of his application of the principle of non-contradiction in this specific context (§31). The reason is, as Husserl clearly states at the beginning of §31, he aims at showing the possibility of performing the epoché, and the many descriptions of the epoché he makes from different angles evidently show the possibility. Hopefully, the interpretation of the epoché in terms of having offered in this dissertation can help make this point clearer.

29 On the correlation between the inexplicit positing and on-handness, see above, footnote #12.
sentence Husserl says that, "in like manner," the phenomenon of position-suspension occurs when we attempt to doubt something that is posited as "on hand." It is tempting to understand the position-suspension that happens in the attempt to doubt in terms of the position-canceling that happens in doubt, but it is crucial to see that it is possible for the two to differ in an important way, a possibility without which the epoché would be impossible.

In order to show that this possibility can indeed be materialized, Husserl tries to explain the essential features of the positing-suspension: he first describes what the suspension does not do, and then describes what the suspension does achieve.

The suspension in question is not a transmutation of positing into counter positing, of position into negation; it is also not a transmutation into uncertain presumption, deeming possible, undecidedness, into a doubt. . . . We do not give up the positing we effected, we do not in any respect alter our conviction which remains in itself as it is as long as we do not introduce new judgment-motives.

This passage stresses that the suspension in question differs from negation because the former does not change the modality of the original positing. The default modality of the general positing may be characterized as believing and affirming, and the suspension leaves them intact. That is, "believing" and "affirming" are not turned into "uncertain presumption," "deeming possible," "undecidedness," or "doubt." For if they are, they will give rise to different existential judgments when they are explicitly and predicatively articulated, which

30 The term *vorhanden* is used here, and this confirms that the suspension of positing conditioned (or effected) by the attempt to doubt is the suspension of an *inexplicit* positing. See above, footnote #12.

31 It is only possible for the two effects to be different because, in the natural attitude, doubt and the attempt to doubt may both change, i.e., negate, the original doxic modality of their target-positings. After all, they are primarily some natural means to make doxic modifications. For example, in Descartes, doubt and the attempt to doubt are in fact indistinguishable, and they lead Descartes to a universal negation. It is because of our phenomenological interest in understanding that we can possibly perform the attempt to doubt in a different manner, and in doing so our performance has to be transcendentally remodeled or adjusted.

would require the introduction of new judgment-motives; but we do not introduce such motives as our interest is only to understand. Obviously, this "leaving intact" is the novel effect of the suspension, and its novelty distinguishes the suspension in question from negation (and all other possible doxic modifications in the natural attitude). Husserl spells out the peculiar effect of the suspension more:

With regard to any positing we can quite freely exercise this peculiar epoché, a certain refraining from judgment which is compatible with the unshaken conviction of truth, even with the unshakable conviction of evident truth.33

The claim Husserl makes in this passage, namely, that "an unshakable conviction" in the original positing may perfectly coexist with the suspension of the original positing, is surprising. For we know that negation always amounts to the actual denial or removal of the original thesis, which suggests that it is impossible for a negative modification (and, probably, any other doxic modification in the natural attitude) to coexist with the original positing. Now, if the suspension in question is able to coexist with the original positing, it is probably not a "natural" modification. In order to render this unnatural compatibility, or peculiar coexistence, more intelligible, Husserl describes, in somewhat figurative but still helpful language, what exactly is achieved by the suspension:

Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification: while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, "put it out of action," we "disconnect it," we "parenthesize it." It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, like the disconnected outside the connexional system. We can also say: The positing is a mental process, but we make

33 Ideas I, 59-60/55. It is noteworthy that Husserl in the so-called Copy D changes "refraining from judgment" [Urteilsenthaltung] to "refraining from belief" [Glaubensenthaltung]. Since "refraining from judgment" is the classical meaning of the epoché (according to the Greek skeptics), this change is remarkable because it stresses that (1) judgment and belief in this context are different types of posittings—the former is an explicit positing, whereas the latter is an inexplicit positing; and (2) the epoché is a means to suspend, i.e., to refrain from, an inexplicit positing, i.e., the general positing in question. (Ideas I, 59n24; Hua 3/b, 485.) Also see above footnotes #12,30.
"no use" of it. . . . [I]n the case of this expression and all parallel expressions it is a matter of indicative designations of a definite, specifically peculiar mode of consciousness which is added to the original positing simpliciter . . . and, likewise in a specifically peculiar manner, changes its value.  

Here the peculiar effect of the suspension is explained through metaphors such as putting out of action, disconnection, parenthesizing, and making no use of. Together, these metaphors convey an important message: the original positing is modified (because "a peculiar mode of consciousness" is added to it) but also retained (because "it is still there" and remains "what it is," that is, remains identical with itself) through the peculiar treatment of the epoché. The modifying and retaining effect appears to be the key to the understanding of the peculiar coexistence of the epoché with the original positing, but the effect is itself paradoxical: how can the original positing remains identical with itself while it is said to have been modified?  

In order to understand what exactly the modifying and retaining effect is and in what way it can be realized, it is desirable that Husserl's metaphors be explained in more literal and precise terms. So in what follows, we will focus on these metaphors and occupy

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34 Ideas I, 59/55; Hua 3/a, 63. Kersten translates "wie das Ausgeschaltete außerhalb des Zusammenhanges der Schaltung" as "like the excluded outside the context of inclusion," whereas Gibson translates it as "like the disconnected outside the connexional system." I follow Gibson's translation and modify Kersten's translation accordingly. (See below, footnote #66, for more discussion of the meaning and translation of ausschalten.)

35 The phrases Husserl employs to describe the effect of the suspension, namely, putting out of action, disconnection, parenthesizing, and making no use of, should be understood as "metaphors" because they normally are used to describe how we deal with tangible things, rather than with acts, beliefs, and positings.

Also to be noted is that in the last paragraph of §31 Husserl says that the metaphor of parenthesizing is more suitable to the sphere of objects, and the metaphor of putting out of action is more suitable to the sphere of acts. What he says is clearly meant to distinguish the noetic and noematic aspects of the performance of the epoché. In my interpretation of the epoché I will not take this distinction as a particular issue, because the apriori correlation, i.e., the noetic-noematic structure, is always presupposed and working in the background in my interpretation of the epoché.

36 It is noteworthy that in the Copy A Husserl inserted a marginal note here, modifying the phrase "which is added to the original positing simpliciter" to "which relates to the original positing." See Ideas I, 59n23; Hua 3/b, 484. I discuss the possible implication of this note in below, footnote #71.
ourselves with the task of explaining the possibility of simultaneously modifying and retaining an original positing, a seemingly impossible effect in the natural attitude.

From the Perspective of Having

So far we have been reading §31 of Ideas I literally. A tension between Descartes and Husserl is dramatically expressed in the text through Husserl's description of the peculiar effect of the position-suspension: on the one hand, Husserl needs to employ the Cartesian method as a "methodic expedient" in his discovery of the epoché; on the other hand, since the attempt to doubt in Descartes—still employed as a natural means to make doxic modification—leads to explicit negation, and since negation is exactly the effect that Husserl does not want, Husserl must spin off the undesirable Cartesian effect and show that it is indeed possible for the epoché as a novel operation to produce some novel (or, "unnatural") effects. We should bear this tension in mind as it is crucial to a correct understanding of the epoché.

In what follows the performance of the epoché and its effects will be closely examined. Husserl's metaphors in the passage just quoted will be taken as our clue and I will relate them to the phenomenon of having. I do this for three reasons. (1) Husserl believes that the epoché (as the phenomenon of parenthesizing or disconnection) is not restricted to the phenomenon of the attempt to doubt, and it may be grasped in combinations with other

37 Ideas I, 58/54.

38 See Ideas I, 59/55.
phenomena. If we can point out a different way to the epoché, for example, a way originating from the phenomenon of having, we surely understand the epoché better. (2) Some kinship between Husserl's metaphors and the within-without tension in the phenomenon of having can be clearly observed, which suggests the feasibility of identifying the epoché as a kind of mental having. And (3) the intelligibility of Husserl's metaphorical expressions, the performability of the mental operations denoted by his expressions, and the possibility of modifying yet retaining an original positing are, it seems to me, by no means self evident, a situation that also welcomes further elucidation. It is my hope that, by bringing in the theme of having, the metaphors will be rendered more intelligible, the performability of the epoché will be clearly seen, and we may understand the nature of the paradoxical effect of the epoché more precisely.

In addition, as will also be shown later, the perspective from having helps us to identify the essential peculiarity that distinguishes the epoché from the neutrality modification in general, namely, the thematic awareness of the within-without tension inherent in the epoché.40

McKenna's analysis of the epoché

Before delving into Husserl's metaphors, let us briefly turn to an in-depth analysis of the epoché offered by McKenna in his *Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology."*

39 See *Ideas I*, 59/55.

40 See below, pp. 166-82.
McKenna's analysis is instructive because, to some extent, our research shares some common interests with his. For example, McKenna characterizes the mental operation that is involved in the epoché as "neutralized reflection," namely, the neutralization of a reflective act.\textsuperscript{41} As will be seen in a moment, we also understand the mental operation of the epoché as a sort of reflection, only that we define the peculiarity of this reflective act in terms of the two eidetic moments of having, rather than the concept of \textit{neutralization}.\textsuperscript{42} Furthermore, McKenna arrives at his conclusion by focusing chiefly on the example of particular epoché, i.e., the epoché performed on a particular act. Needless to say, the particular epoché is also our interest at the current stage. Moreover, McKenna starts his analysis of the epoché as first of all an attempt to understand the essential difference between the epoché and the neutrality modification in general,\textsuperscript{43} and this difference is what we will study and explain later from the perspective of having.

McKenna explains the phenomenon of \textit{neutralized reflection} by contrasting it with the \textit{ordinary neutrality modification} (e.g., reading a novel, or "uncritically listening to a lecture") on the one hand, and with the \textit{ordinary non-neutral reflection} (most of our everyday reflections are non-neutral) on the other. (1) The \textit{neutralization} that is involved in the epoché is different from the ordinary neutrality modification because in the epoché the neutralization \textit{must} be brought out. The term "must" signifies a volitional element in the performance of the

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\textsuperscript{41} McKenna, \textit{Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology,"} ch. 5, esp. 149-57.

\textsuperscript{42} On identifying the epoché as a type of reflective act, see \textit{Ideas I}, 114/94-95, where Husserl himself suggests that when we exercise the epoché we are in fact carrying out a reflection. Also cf. Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," 115.

\textsuperscript{43} McKenna, \textit{Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology,"} 149.
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epoché, namely, whereas in the ordinary neutrality modification the neutrality comes about "naturally," the neutralization effected by the epoché must be consciously and methodically pursued. (2) As neutralized reflection, the epoché is first of all a reflection, but it differs from its non-neutral counterpart in that in it we purposely refrain from participating in the original positing of the act being reflected on. McKenna points out that this purposely "refraining from" is possible because the performance of the epoché is subject to the over-arching phenomenological attitude that is featured by "1) its profound respect for the evidence of perception, and 2) its interest in seeking the grounds of that evidence, of its validity, and of the natural acceptance of its validity in sources which do not presuppose any of these." In other words, the epoché-performer in the phenomenological attitude can, while fully acknowledging the evidence of an act, keep a distance from it (i.e., refrain from participating in its original positing), and hence better understand its grounds.

Clearly, by characterizing the epoché as "neutralized reflection" McKenna is able to show the performability of the epoché, namely, how the epoché can be obtained on the basis of a reflective act. But McKenna does not thematically treat the issues of the intelligibility of Husserl's metaphors and the possibility of modifying yet retaining the original positing through the epoché. The following interpretation of the epoché from the perspective of

44 McKenna, *Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology,"* 155.

45 To be sure, McKenna's analysis throws some light on how the original positing is "put out of action" and how the epoché-performer refrains from "making use of" the original positing, but he does not explain the metaphors of parenthesizing and disconnection.

46 This is of course not to deny that McKenna does see the difficulty of explaining the retaining of the original positing in the epoché. I think it is exactly because of his awareness of this difficulty that McKenna characterizes the epoché as the neutralization of the non-neutral reflection of the original act, rather than the neutralization of the original act itself. See his *Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology,"* 152.
having is to some extent offered as a confirmation and complement of McKenna's outstanding study.

The hint from the metaphors of parenthesizing and disconnection

The metaphors that particularly interest us are in Husserl’s claim that "It is still there, like the parenthesized \textit{in} the parentheses, like the disconnected \textit{outside} the connexional system." To be sure, we have two different metaphors here: that which is \textit{in} the parentheses is in the second metaphor \textit{outside} the connexional system; but a common sense of \textit{separation} is clearly conveyed by both metaphors. This sense of separation is the key to our understanding of the epoché from the perspective of having. Immediately, the terms "\textit{in}" and "\textit{outside}" remind us of the within-without tension in having. In our analysis of mental having

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The benefit of characterizing the epoché as the neutralization of the non-neutral reflection of the original act is that it allows the original act itself be retained in the moment of the non-neutral reflection, and this helps McKenna to explain the \textit{coexistence} of the epoché with the original positing—he can claim that the epoché-performer is able to refrain from participating in the original positing when he neutralizes the \textit{position-taking of the non-neutral reflection}, even though the original act and the original positing \textit{continue to be present to the epoché-performer} (because they are preserved in the moment of the non-neutral reflection). See his \textit{Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology,"} 154 and 156. Mary Jeanne Larrabee seems to have missed exactly this point when she says that "McKenna claims that the epoché neutralizes the \textit{position-taking of the reflecting act itself}. I would say that it neutralizes the \textit{position-taking of the reflected act}.” See her "The Noema in Husserl's Phenomenology," in \textit{Husserl Studies} 3 (1986): 229n18.

But Larrabee's criticism is not without a reason, for McKenna's account seems to have mistakenly identified the position-taking of the non-neutral reflection with the position-taking of the original act itself. The former posits the being of the original act that is being reflected upon (the \textit{seeing} of the "squirrel" in our example), whereas the latter normally posits the being of a non-mental entity (the \textit{squirrel} in our example). In other words, McKenna does not seem to be aware of the fact that neutralizing the \textit{position-taking of the non-neutral reflection} is not the same as refraining from participating in the original positing of the original act itself. We may also point out that, in fact, it is the essential difference between these two types of position-taking that enables Husserl in the \textit{Ideas I} to prove that physical things and conscious acts have essentially different manners of existence. See ibid., 219-20, and \textit{Ideas I}, 79/68 (§38).

Only after the modifying and retaining effect of the epoché is correctly understood will we be able to adjudicate between McKenna and Larrabee's accounts of the epoché. See below, pp. 139-40, esp. footnote #72.

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\footnote{See above, footnote #34, italics added.}
it was pointed out that although to have always connotes "to have something within," this connotation should not be interpreted as meaning that the haver attends exclusively to that which is held within. To have is to have something within while maintaining a heightened awareness of the within-without tension, an awareness that results from the haver's transcendental viewpoint, which here means nothing other than the haver's ability to seriously take note of both the within and the without. As the example of the having of a secret shows, a secret is no longer a secret if there is no tension between the within and without, and the genuine secret-haver needs to adopt an attitude that transcends both the within and the without, an attitude that manifests itself clearly in the secret-haver's resolution to have the secret in spite of the danger of being discovered or divulged.⁴⁸ Can we find a similar structural tension in the epoché?

The statement "It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, like the disconnected outside the connexional system" strongly suggests that the one who makes the statement is not attending exclusively to the it; i.e., he is aware of more than just the it. If one is able to say that "It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses," is not he also somehow aware of that which is outside the parentheses, or at least, that there is an outside? And this point is more clearly seen in the saying that "it is . . . like the disconnected outside the connexional system": in naming that which surrounds the disconnected as the "connexional system" the speaker is obviously aware of the disconnected as having been disconnected from (and placed outside) the "connexional system." Hence it becomes initially clear that Husserl's statement is a narration done from a "transcendental" viewpoint, a

⁴⁸ See above, pp. 60-63.
viewpoint that transcends, or over-sees, both the in and the out; and Husserl the narrator, who is also the performer of the epoché, sees and reports a within-without tension. This structural tension hints that the epoché we are trying to understand is probably a phenomenon of mental having. In order to confirm this hint, namely, in order to identify the performing of the epoché as a phenomenon of having, let us consider: if the performance of the epoché is a kind of having, what then is had within when the epoché is exercised? Moreover, if it really makes sense to talk about the within-without tension in the epoché, what then do the terms "within" and "without" refer to in the epoché?

To answer the question concerning what is had within when we perform the epoché, we need to determine the referent of the pronoun it in Husserl's statement "It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, like the disconnected outside the connexional system." From the context we can tell that the "it" unequivocally refers to the original positing, the "target" of the epoché. From the perspective of having, then, the original positing is what we come to have when we execute the epoché because it is within the parentheses (namely, it is the primary focus of our reflective attention). Since we have clarified that the original positing, as an inexplicit and potential positing, is not an act that subsists in itself but is a mode of consciousness that always parasites on the original act, it therefore follows that it is the original act itself that is had in the epoché. We can also say that if the epoché is a peculiar kind of reflection, then it is the original act itself that is being

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49 By saying that Husserl's narration is done from a transcendental viewpoint, or a viewpoint from above, I anticipate Husserl's usage of the term above (über) in Crisis, 150 and 152 (§§40-41), where he describes the transcendental attitude resulted from the epoché as above the entirety of mundane conscious life. See below, footnote #78.

50 See above, pp. 104-9.
reflected on in a peculiar manner by the epoché-performer.

Having confirmed that it is the original act that is had in the epoché, we now try to clarify the meaning of the within-without tension; namely, now that we know that the original act is within the parentheses or is disconnected from (and hence outside) the connexional system, our next task is to find out what is outside the parentheses, or, which is the same, what is inside the connexional system from which the original act is disconnected. The phrase "connexional system" is suggestive: returning to the squirrel example, we can see that the seeing of the squirrel, as the original act that occurs in my natural wakeful life, transpires within a nexus of experiences. In other words, when I see the squirrel, I am also (inattentively) aware of the juniper tree, the lawn, the fence, etc. (i.e., the awareness that is called by Husserl the "halo of background-intuitions"\(^{51}\)); I may also be inexplicitly aware of the time of the day, the season of the year, and the way I am now seated in my room. Moreover, my current conscious life as a whole is flowingly embedded in a still wider nexus of experiences, namely, it itself is only a conscious episode running its course in my all-embracing conscious life.\(^{52}\) Now the question is, when we perform the epoché, can the all-embracing nexus of experiences in which the seeing is originally embedded be the "connexional system" from which the seeing is disconnected? In what follows I will prove

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51 _Ideas I_, 70/62.

52 In the _Crisis_, Husserl describes the "mute" but constitutive nexus of experiences in our "natural, normal life" before he raises questions about the possibility of the "universal epoché": "[T]he particular object of our active consciousness, and correlative the active, conscious having of it, being directed toward it, and dealing with it—all this is forever surrounded by an atmosphere of mute, concealed, but cofunctioning validities, a vital horizon into which the active ego can also direct itself voluntarily, reactivating old acquisitions, consciously grasping new apperceptive ideas, transforming them into intuitions." _Crisis_, 149 (§40). Husserl's more technical term, _horizon_, has roughly the same meaning as does the phrase "nexus of experiences." The relevancy of this passage to our current inquiry will be more clearly seen in a moment, see below pp. 129-31.
that this is indeed the case.

Basically, my proof consists in showing that in order for the epoché to be able to achieve what it is expected to achieve, namely, to radically modify but also retain the original positing, and ultimately also to help us understand the general thesis, the epoché-performer's awareness of the tension between the original act and its original nexus of experiences (namely, the within-without tension that is characteristic of the epoché) is necessary. More precisely, I wish to show that performing the epoché on an act involves (1) reflectively focusing on the original act as if it is disconnected from (and placed outside) the nexus of experiences in which it was originally embedded, and (2) while so focusing on the act itself, one must maintain a heightened awareness of the within-without tension involved in the epoché, namely, one needs to maintain a heightened awareness of the disconnected act's having been disconnected (or parenthesized) from the original nexus of experiences. Whereas the first step enables us to thematically grasp the intrinsically limited constitutive power of the original act, the second step in effect brings the "imagined away" nexus of experiences back and thus allows the original positing be retained. Together, the two steps enable us to accomplish what the epoché is expected to accomplish: to radically modify but also retain the original positing, a peculiar effect that, paradoxically, illuminates the nature of the original positing (and ultimately of the natural attitude itself).

53 For convenience's sake, in my analysis I will primarily focus on the metaphor of disconnection, but what is said about disconnection applies, mutatis mutandis, to the metaphor of parenthesizing.
The world before the epoché

In order to understand the purpose of the operation of "disconnection," it is helpful to begin by examining the world before the epoché, that is, examining how things stand in their original pre-disconnection (or pre-epoché) status.

In our squirrel example it seems evident that some associative and apperceptive connections exist between my current seeing of the squirrel on the one hand, and some experiences inside the nexus on the other. The latter includes, among other things, my former identifications and perceptions (especially the harmoniously synthesized and fulfilled ones) of entities such as "squirrels" and "juniper trees," etc., and my former experiences of the similar perceptual circumstance (e.g., how my visual experience of the backyard feels like at dusk in early spring). Most of these associative and apperceptive connections are passive, meaning that I do not actively carry them out and in all likelihood I am unaware of most of them; yet they are constitutive, nonetheless, because they allow the so-called *analogizing transfer of sense* to happen. The most important transfers of sense are perhaps the transfers from the primal institutions of the senses of "squirrel" and "a visual perception at dusk in early spring" to my current seeing,\(^ {54}\) without which my inexplicit belief in a squirrel "in

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\(^ {54}\) See *CM*, §§37-39, 50-51, for the phenomena of apperceptive-analogizing transfer of sense, the primal institution of sense, and habituality. For example, Husserl says: "*Every* apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given beforehand . . . points back to a *primal instituting,* in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. . . . Thus *each everyday experience* involves an *analogizing transfer* of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense." Also see Victor Biceaga's *The Concept of Passivity in Husserl's Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), esp. ch. 4: "Passivity and Crisis." On the relation between the phenomenological reduction, the époché, and *habitus*, see Dorion Cairns, *Conversations*, 13 (Conversation #I) and 16 (Conversation #X). The phenomena described here can all be studied under the general title of *habituality*, that is, the *having* of one's (past) experiences.
itself" cannot arise.

Generally speaking, without the associative connections and the analogizing transfers of senses mentioned above, I would not be able to identify an object in a single seeing, not to mention to "believe" in a thing "in itself." Noematically, this means that the sense that is implicit in the act of seeing in question (or, which is the same, what is posited by the inexplicit belief inherent in the seeing) is dependent not only upon the presentational contents of the seeing itself, but more importantly also upon (1) the "historical" or "genealogical" position of this seeing in my conscious life\(^55\) and (2) the concurrent conscious events and background awareness that together define the type of perceptual situation in which the seeing occurs. It can be inferred, therefore, that a particular perceptual experience enjoys its believing character (i.e., the "local manifestation" of the general positing according to our terminology) exactly because it is such a perceptual experience that transpires at a specific time within a specific nexus of experiences, or in more technical terms, because it is such a perception to which there belongs a specific horizon.\(^56\)

Our reflection on the pre-disconnection world not only refines our talk about the "situation-dependency" of the inexplicit belief of a particular perceptual experience,\(^57\) but also sheds light on the performability of the epoché. We said earlier that we wish to show that

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\(^{55}\) For example, were this act to be transferred to my infancy, it would have been unable to posit what it posits now. Cf. CM, §§36 and 38.

\(^{56}\) Cf. Husserl's description in Crisis, §40: "[E]very straightforwardly performed validity in natural world-life always presupposes validities extending back, immediately or mediately, into a necessary subsoil of obscure but occasionally available reactivatable validities, all of which together, including the present acts, make up a single indivisible, interrelated complex of life." This passage tells us how the validity and the full objective sense of an act are codetermined by its horizon.

\(^{57}\) See above p. 108.
to perform the epoché on an act is to reflect on the act in the manner "as if it is disconnected from the nexus of experience"—now, in the light of our reflection, performing this as-if disconnection is no longer a vague notion.

The as-if disconnection

The as-if disconnection has two moments—the as-if and the disconnection—and we can treat them one at a time. At the present stage, we can ignore the qualifier "as-if" and take the disconnection in an unqualified sense. In other words, let us observe what can happen if the original act is turned into an absolutely disconnected act.

Intuitively, it is possible for me to "imagine away" the nexus of experience that originally surrounds the seeing, a mental exercise that falls under the general title of imaginative variation. In such imaginative variation I may presentify, in phantasy, the act of seeing in question as absolutely contextless and history-less.

Since the believing character of the original seeing is dependent upon its original nexus of experiences, and since the unqualified disconnection deprives the act of seeing of its

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58 See CM, §34 for Husserl's discussion of the method of imaginative or eidetic variation. For a lucid analysis of the method of imaginative variation, see Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, ch. 12, "Eidetic Intuition."

59 Hume has a thought-experiment that is very similar to the imagining of an absolutely contextless and history-less act described here. See his Enquiry, Section V, Part I, para. 3, where he describes a rationally mature but empirically uninitiated man (i.e., a person who is "endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection," but is "brought on a sudden into this world"). This man, according to Hume, is unable to produce the ideas of cause and effect when he is exposed to two events that are apparently conjoined, because (1) the ideas of cause and effect are the products of our mental habit or custom, which results from our past experiences; and (2) this fictional man, although in possession of "the strongest faculties of reason and reflection," has no such habit or past experiences with which he can consult.
original nexus, reflecting "in" this imaginary scenario, I should be able to see that the original positing (i.e., the believing character) of the original act necessarily disappears from the disconnected seeing. The disconnected seeing becomes incapable of constituting the sense of a "squirrel," not to mention the "in itself" of the squirrel.

Noematically speaking, this means that, through the unqualified disconnection, a squirrel "in itself" is modified into a mere squirrel-phenomenon "for me," the validity of which is *pending future verification (or falsification).* However, given that the act of seeing is presentified as contextless and history-less (i.e., no other acts "cohabit" with it "in" the presentification when the unqualified disconnection is carried out), neither verification nor falsification is possible, because no acts can possibly come into either the verifying or the falsifying synthesis with it. This impossibility of verification (or falsification) can therefore also be understood as an *indeterminate openness* to verification or falsification, or, to put it more precisely, the impossibility suggests that the absolutely disconnected and contextless

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60 Let it be stressed that the disconnected act of seeing should not be identified as the original seeing itself. In the Heraclitean flux of consciousness, every act is a unique event whose identity is determined by its *historical,* *genealogical,* and *contextual* position. To identify the abstractively disconnected act with the original act can lead us into grave misunderstanding of the purpose of the epoché. (Cf. Cairns, *Conversations,* 12 [Conversation #IX], where Fink defends Husserl's phenomenology against the false allegation that the phenomenological epoché is a set of analyses of "pseudo-acts" and "pseudo-world.") Having said this, however, we should also note that since the disconnected and contextless act of seeing can be seen as an abstract and essential moment (revealed by the operation of imaginative variation) "contained" in the original act of seeing, the limited constitutive power of the former can also, in a sense, be attributed to the latter. See below, pp. 133-34, 136-37.

61 Cf. *CM,* §8, where Husserl points out that by performing the epoché every being "in itself" is turned into a phenomenon "for me," i.e., a "phenomenon of being." Also cf. the following note inserted by Husserl in the so-called Copy A of the *Ideas I:* "with a single stroke we parentheses the realm of the in-itself and everything in itself." ["setzen wir in einem Schlage <das> Reich des Ansich und jedes Ansich in Klammern."] *Ideas I,* 61n29; *Hua* 3/b, 485.

act of seeing is indifferent to and compatible with any doxic modality:\textsuperscript{63} what modality it "takes on" depends on the specific nexus of experiences in which it is actually "embedded," for it is the nexus that determines the style of the synthesis that produces for the act its "fitting" doxic modality.

In order to make this somewhat abstract point clear, we can exercise some imaginative variations on our squirrel example: at the time of normal dusk, the seeing of that grayish object under the juniper tree harbors within the positing of a "squirrel" with the doxic modality of "certainty"; but it is perfectly conceivable that "uncertainty" can become the modality of the "same" act of seeing if, ceteris paribus, the seeing occurred on the rainy dark evening when I just moved to this area. The change from "certainty" to "uncertainty" is due to the changes in the experiential nexus that surrounds the act of seeing.

In sum, the unqualified disconnection in phantasy modifies the original seeing into an absolutely disconnected act of seeing. Since the latter can be regarded as an eidetic component of the former, the disconnection thus does allow us to see the intrinsic "pending validity" (or limited constitutive power) of the former. But it is also clear that the unqualified disconnection, by effecting such a radical change, fails to preserve the identity of the original act and lets go the situation-dependent original positing of the original act. Moreover, it does not really helps us understand better how the "local manifestation" of the general positing is

\textsuperscript{63} Neutrality can also be the name of this indifference to and compatibility with any doxic modality. In fact, this contextless and history-less act of seeing is comparable to the purely aesthetic consciousness of the "depicted" (or better, the "depicted," which translates das Abgebildete more naturally) of a picture discussed by Husserl in the last paragraph of Ideas I, §111. The purely aesthetic consciousness of the "depicted" is a neutrality modification of a normal perception because in this consciousness no "stamp of being or non-being, of being possible or being deemed likely" is imparted to the depictured. (Ideas I, 262/226.) It is perhaps for this reason that Husserl claims that there is certain kinship between the epoché and the neutrality modification, because the former contains a moment similar to the latter. See below, pp. 168-69 , for more analysis of the nature of the purely aesthetic consciousness of the "depicted."
possible. Hence, it fails to achieve what the epoché promises to achieve. We may tentatively conclude: the unqualified disconnection is not the method of epoché we are after; or at least, it cannot be the whole story about the epoché.

In view of the failure of the unqualified disconnection, let us take up the moment of "as-if." The term "as-if" indicates that the disconnection in question cannot be understood in an absolute sense.

Factually speaking, the original act cannot be disconnected from its original nexus of experience because its original being-situated-in-a-nexus-of-experiences is a fact that cannot be altered, namely, I cannot, for whatever purpose and by whatever means, actually go back in time to the original seeing itself and tear it out of its nexus. To be sure, this factual constraint seems to have been "overcome" in the imaginary scenario described above, but (1) the contextless and history-less act we presentify in the unqualified disconnection is not identical with the original act, and (2) this imaginary operation necessarily removes the original positing, which should be retained.

Hence the "as-if" also suggests that, if we want to achieve what the epoché is supposed to achieve, especially if we wish to retain the original positing of the act, the original act should not be unqualifiedly disconnected from its original nexus of experience.

To be sure, merely retaining the original positing of an act is not a difficult task in itself. From our analysis of the situation-dependency of the original positing it can be inferred that if we are able to retain the original experiential nexus of an act, then we should also be able to retain the original positing of the act. In fact, this type of retaining frequently happens in our everyday reflective recollections. In such natural reflections, we go through,
i.e., re-live, an original conscious complex, and we (passively and tacitly) identify the experience reflected upon as a former experience coming back. But the problem is that such ordinary recollection retains the original positing without effecting any modification, and like the unqualified disconnection discussed above, neither does the ordinary recollection help us better understand the "local manifestation" of the general positing.⁶⁴

So it seems that we have searched in vain for the epoché, the mental operation that is able to both modify and retain an original positing: the everyday reflective recollection retains without modifying, whereas the unqualified disconnection modifies without retaining. But can the performance of the epoché be fashioned on the basis of a combination of the two operations? Let us see.

The tension-awareness that characterizes the epoché

Let us "combine" the imagining away and the recollective restoration in the following manner.

We begin by temporarily "imagining away" the original nexus of experiences of an act.⁶⁵ Thisimagining-away enables us to thematically consider the validity of the original act.

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⁶⁵ Instead of imagining away the nexus of experiences, one may abstractly "single out" the act in reflection, i.e., abstractly disregarding its nexus of experiences. Since my aim is only to show a possible way of doing the epoché from the perspective of having, I will not treat this "singling out" here. Moreover, if we compare the two operations (i.e., the "imagining away" and the "singling out"), it can be seen that (1) as a mental operation, "imagining away the nexus" is intuitively easier to carry out, and (2) the awareness of the within-without tension is also indispensable in the operation of "abstactively disregarding the nexus", if the disregarding aims at revealing the intrinsically limited constitutive power of the original act.
and discover its intrinsic "pending" nature; but, then, this imagining-away must be followed by a restoration of the original nexus. The restoration functions like a recollection, and its purpose is to bring back the original nexus of experiences and ensures that the original act itself is being considered.

But merely performing the imagining-away and the restoration as such is not the epoché yet; our performance becomes the epoché when a heightened awareness of the tension between the original act and its original nexus (i.e., the within-without tension) is maintained throughout the performance. With this awareness,

(1) *when the original nexus is imagined away*, the disconnected act is identified as having been disconnected from its original nexus of experience; and

(2) *when the original nexus is restored*, the original act is identified as that which could have been disconnected from exactly this nexus of experiences.\(^{66}\)

Making these synthetic identifications means that, while the original act itself is held/had in my reflective gaze, I not only see the original seeing's intrinsic pending validity when I freely and purposefully interrupt the transfers of senses by the imaginary disconnection, I also

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\(^{66}\) Metaphorically speaking, when alternating the imagining away and the restoration, the original nexus of experiences is "switched" off and on. I believe this is the point Brainard is getting at when he insists that *ausschalten* should better be translated as "to switch off," rather than "to exclude." Brainard expresses a valuable insight when he says that if we were to accept the translation of "to exclude," we should bear in mind "both what is excluded thereby and from what"; an insight that akin to our emphasis of the tension-awareness in the epoché, namely: the disconnected act is identified as having been disconnected from its original nexus. See Brainard, *Belief and Its Neutralization*, 34n5 (underline is added by me); and 64n80.

Sukale speaks about how when we perform the epoché on an act we would need to "step inside the act" and then "step out of it" later. Technically speaking, the stepping inside and the stepping out are similar to the "restoration" and the "imaging away" in my account of epoché. But Sukale and I perform the two operations in opposite orders, and this opposition is fundamental: for Sukale, the aim of performing the epoché is to get rid of (that is, to imagine away) the horizon of the original act and render the original positum *irreal*; but this is exactly what the epoché does not do according to my understanding of the epoché. See Sukale, *World and Epoché in Husserl and Heidegger*, 113-17; also see below, 136-38.
appreciate the "local manifestation" of the general positing as the *extra achievement* resulting from the original seeing's factually being thus situated in a nexus of experiences. Unlike a skeptic who only sees the pending validity and would claim that this extra achievement of the original act is illusory, I now acknowledge its legitimacy because I see that the transfers of senses (and constitutive efficacy) between the original act and its original nexus in a way do legitimate the original positing.\(^{67}\) This acknowledgement is no longer the naïve acceptance I experience in my pre-epoché life, and it no longer entails my naïve participation in the original positing.

Thus, the imagining-away, the restoration, and the necessary tension-awareness together give us a fuller understanding of the original act itself: we see that, the original act, as an act that factually transpires in *that* specific nexus of experiences, is neither a *mere pretension* nor a *fully legitimate and self sufficient positing*; it is, rather paradoxically, both a *pretension to* (due to its intrinsic pending validity), and a *legitimate positing of* (due to its factually being embedded in that specific nexus), a being.\(^{68}\) In other words, the validities in our pre-philosophical life are not only *preserved* but also better *understood* by virtue of the epoché.

It should be noted that in most cases, the imagining-away and the restoration need to

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\(^{67}\) Fink says that, in performing the epoché, "the reflecting 'observer'... looks on the belief in the world in the actuality of its live performance without taking part in it." See his "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," 115, underline added. In our interpretation, to grasp the function of the anonymous transfers of senses is exactly to reflectively consider the original positing "in the actuality of its live performance."

\(^{68}\) Borrowing the formulation from McKenna, we can also say that this seemingly paradoxical conclusion is reached because of the over-arching phenomenological attitude we have been adopting. The phenomenological attitude allows us to acknowledge the validity of every act, on the one hand, and urges us to also examine the grounds of validities as such, on the other.
be alternated more than once so that we can study the original act more thoroughly; but the
restoration should always serve as the final phase of the epoché (to ensure that the original
act itself is being reflected upon). And although the imagining-away and the restoration (i.e.,
the "recollection") are independent acts in themselves, they lose their independency when
they "become" the epoché. The two "acts" become the two dependent moments of the unitary
performance of the epoché because they are regulated by the epoché-performer's
phenomenological interest in understanding and are also synthesized through the heightened
awareness of the within-without tension. To perform the epoché is not to externally string
together the two operations as some stand-alone acts; rather, the epoché is a unitary and
synthetic achievement realized in distinct steps or phases. Only in synthesis with other phases
is the methodological function of each phase manifest.

Recapitulation

Let us recapitulate the gist of our interpretation of the epoché by highlighting two
points.

(1) It is worth repeating that the epoché does not aim at exposing the original act as a
mere pretension.\(^69\) One can claim that the original act is a mere pretension only by identifying
the original act with the absolutely disconnected act and hence failing to do justice to the

\(^{69}\) See above, footnote #60. Also see the distinction between a claim and a mere claim reflected in McKenna’s
following statement: "The effect [of the epoché] is that the ontic character correlative to the positing of the act
reflected upon appears to the reflecting act as a claim, but not as a mere claim as in the case of a disbelieving
reflection." (McKenna, Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology," 153-54.)
transcendental value of the constitutive efficacy of the original experiential nexus. If we mistake this claim as the aim of the phenomenological epoché, we not only falsify Husserl's descriptions of the epoché, but also render the Husserlian phenomenology indistinguishable from a philosophy of the As-if, for instance, the Humean philosophy, for which the world is a pile of loose and separate things, and the mind a bundle of equally loose experiences (i.e., mere pretensions).  

(2) The Husserlian thesis that the epoché modifies and retains the original positing has been confirmed rather generally in our study so far. It is now fitting for us to state the meaning of this thesis more accurately.

We already explained the retaining effect of the epoché in our interpretation of the as-if disconnection, that is, because of the operation of restoration, the original act and its original nexus both remain identical before and after the as-if disconnection, and hence, evidently, the original positing gets retained in the epoché.

But is there still room left for the modifying effect, given that both the original act and its original nexus remain identical, that is, unchanged, in the epoché? Where, if not in the original act or the original positing, should the modification be located? The answer is: the modification occurs only in the epoché-performer's understanding in the sense that a new dimension accrues to his understanding of the original positing. That is to say, on the part

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70 Cf. above, Chapter 1, footnote #119.

71 In the original text of the Ideas I, when describing the effect of the epoché, Husserl's remarks that "a peculiar mode of consciousness" is added to the original positing, which seems to imply that it is the original positing itself that has undergone some modification (because of the addition). But in the Copy A Husserl inserted a marginal note, changing the phrase "which is added to the original positing simpliciter" to "which relates to the original positing." See Ideas I, 59, and 59n23; Hua 3/b, 484.

A minor change, no doubt, but it could be interpreted as an indicator of Husserl's attempt to refine his
of the époque-performer, a naïve believing absorption in the full validity of the act is modified into the understanding of the original act as both a pretension to and a legitimate positing of some being. Hence we should say that that which is modified by the époque is the phenomenologist himself, rather than the original positing itself. More radically speaking, the identity of the original positing is retained at the price of the simple identity of the ego, for the époque-performer has to undergo the process of ego-splitting that leads to a much more sophisticated identity-of-the-three-egos. We should bear this clarification in mind, as we will refer to it in our later treatment of Mohanty’s understanding of the époque.

expression of the effect of the époque: the peculiar mode of consciousness effected by the époque, instead of being added to the original positing, now only relates to it. In my opinion, this note inserted in Copy A is more accurate, and our interpretation of the époque’s modifying effect is in accord with it: the époque-performer’s changed understanding of the original act of course relates to its original positing, but this change takes place in the époque-performer, rather than in the original positing simpliciter.  

72 The two themes—the modifying and retaining effect of the époque and the ego-splitting that occurs in the époque—were already the stumbling blocks for Husserl’s contemporary critics. This explains why some most accurate descriptions of the ego-splitting that occurs in the époque were offered by Fink in his classical essay “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” an essay that received Husserl’s unequivocal and unreserved endorsement.

For example, in this essay Fink says that “[t]he reduction is not understood in its transcendental phenomenological meaning as long as one directly identifies the ego living within the belief in the world with the ego exercising the époque” (114), and “the phenomenological reduction is at bottom a transformation of the ‘self’; it transcends the pure and ‘indissoluble’ unity of the human ego, divides it [into a ‘triadic structure’ of the egos], and brings it together within a higher unity” (117). The works of the “three egos,” namely, that of the transcendental ego, the mundane ego, and the phenomenologizing ego, are captured in this fascinating picture: “[A]fter the époque is performed,[1] the transcendental ego who accepts the world does not suspend this belief in the world, but rather enacts it with greater intensity, thus [2] leaving the ego which is preoccupied with the world, the self-apperception ‘man,’ in acceptance, [3] the transcendental theoretical ‘onlooker’ renounces all sharing in the belief in the world, renounces all taking part and concurrence.” (116) For further discussion of the topic of “three egos,” see below pp. 154-57.

In the light of Fink’s descriptions, we can see that Maurice Natanson is right when he says that, with the performance of époque, the real world does not change in any way, but incorrect when he says that “neither does the phenomenologist undergo any transformation.” See Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 58.

Also important: locating the change brought about by the époque in the époque-performer himself enables us to dissolve the insuperable difficulties that McKenna and Larrabee each have to face in their own accounts of the époque. See above, footnote #46. If we compare McKenna and Larrabee’s rather technical discussions of the époque with Fink’s account of the époque, we seem to get this impression, that is, unfortunately, some fundamental insights achieved by the first generation phenomenologists have not been sufficiently reappropriated and utilized by us.
Other metaphors

In our interpretation of the epoché we have rendered intelligible the metaphors of *disconnection* and *parenthesizing*. Now we can also clarify the remaining two metaphors: according to Husserl's formulation, the original positing is also said to be "put out of work," and correlatively, we are said to "make no use of it." These two metaphors describe from another angle what occurs when the as-if disconnection is carried out. To understand them, it is important to know the *work* of the general positing and the *use* we can make of it.

Husserl succinctly describes the *work* and the *use* in question by saying that, in the natural attitude, we let "ourselves be induced, by motives implicit in them [i.e., the acts executed in the natural attitude], to effect ever new positings of something transcendent."\(^{73}\) Our previous analysis of the *function* of the inexplicit positing\(^ {74}\) can be employed here to illustrate what Husserl's description means. We have shown that the inexplicit positing inherent in an act suggests to me a potential system of experiences that is harmoniously synthesizable and actualizable by myself, and in my current conscious life the "saliency" (i.e., *prominence*) of my awareness of such possible actualization is palpably increased by it. This peculiarly salient awareness of possibility serves as the conscious foundation that allows further apperceptive and/or analogizing transfers of sense to happen, prompting me to install or accept, actively or passively, new positings and new senses. In the squirrel example this

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\(^{73}\) *Ideas I*, 113/94.

\(^{74}\) See above pp. 106-8.
means that, remaining in the natural attitude, I may inexplicitly posit and accept the existence of a nearby squirrel-den, and/or posit the non-existence of a snake-den in vicinity, etc., on the basis of my inexplicit belief in a squirrel's on-handness. Clearly, these new contributions made to my conscious life are the work of the original positing and the use I can make of it.

However, the work and use will come to a halt in the epoché because of the new dimension added to my understanding of the original act (and its positing). The knowledge that I obtain by performing the epoché, namely, that the original act is both a pretension to and a legitimate positing of an actuality, is "disenchancing," because it renders the original positing "powerless" for me. And this is to be understood in this way: the knowledge sets me free, releases me from the inducing "spell" of the original positing. Even though both the original act and its original nexus remain "there" in my mind, I can freely refrain from participating in the original positing. I "make no use of" it not because I have entirely forgotten it, but exactly because I fully comprehend it in its "live performance"; I am fully conscious of both its presence (here and now) and its possible absence (were it removed from its current nexus).

75 It should be stressed that these new positings are not the results of my carrying out logical inferences on the basis of my zoological knowledge of the squirrel and its natural predator. Like my original and inexplicit positing of the squirrel, these new positings are also the manifestation of the general thesis, i.e., they are also unthought, and they originate from my prepredicative acquaintance with, rather than my predicatively articulated knowledge of, the world.

76 See above footnote #67.

77 Cf. Husserl's description: "The positing is a mental process, but we make 'no use' of it, and this is not understood, naturally, as implying that we are deprived of it (as it would if we said of someone who was not conscious, that he made no use of a positing)." Ideas I, 59/54. Namely, our making no use of the original positing is not the result of our ignorance of it.

Note also: because of the possibility of equivocation (due to the ego-splitting effect), I italicize the pronouns I, me and my: do they all refer to the phenomenologizing ego? Or do some of them also refer to the transcendental ego and/or the mundane ego? The distinctions involved here need to be sorted out carefully. On the
Finally, our interpretation of the metaphors of disconnection and parenthesizing also points out a way to understand why the term *aufheben* is employed by Husserl, and in a way justifies Gibson's translation of it as "to suspend." In Husserl this key term is employed in a rather literal sense as *auf-heben*, because the act that is disconnected can also be seen as having been *lifted up* (of course, also in the manner of "as if") and "hung alone" above its original nexus, in the reflective atmosphere. Its own constitutive power can thus be individually "weighed," and its limitedness and the "pending" nature exposed. What we have so far said about the disconnection and parenthesizing as well as the indispensable awareness of the within-without tension, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to this metaphor of suspension.

Summary

It is time for us to sum up what we have achieved so far, and see whether or not we have fulfilled our goal, namely, showing the *intelligibility* of Husserl's metaphorical expressions, the *performability* of the mental operations denoted by his expressions, and the *possibility* of modifying yet retaining an original positing.

We begin by noting the kinship between the within-without tension that is discovered in having and Husserl's metaphorical description of the epoché. We then identify the epoché performed on a particular act as a reflective *having* of the act by showing that (1) to perform the epoché on an act does not mean to reflect exclusively on that act and (2) the reflection that is involved in the epoché must switch its focus between the within (i.e., the original act)
and the without (i.e., the original nexus of experience that surrounds it), i.e., between the part and the whole. This switching of focus is accompanied by the epoché-performer's "heightened awareness of the within-without tension." Since both the structural within-without tension and the awareness thereof are characteristic of having, performing the epoché can therefore be identified as a reflective having of the original act in question. Moreover, since the ego who performs the epoché can be seen as "above" the within-without tension, this viewpoint from above confirms that the epoché is a transcendental performance: it transcends mundane conscious life and the validities therein.79

We also explained how, after the epoché is described as the synthesized interplay of the imagining-away, the restoration, and the tension-awareness, the paradoxical effect of the epoché (i.e., the modifying and retaining of the original positing) should be understood. We especially emphasized that it is more appropriate to say that the modifying effect of the epoché happens in the epoché-performer's understanding of the original act.

Lastly, let us remind ourselves that the interpretive procedures we have carried out in

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78 Cf. Husserl's usage of the term above (über) in Crisis, §§40-41, esp. 150 and 152.

79 The term "transcendental" has been used quite frequently in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Now, as we call the epoché a "transcendental performance," a clear explanation of this term is in order.

(1) "Transcendental" can mean that which constitutes, has, and is responsible for the transcendent. This is the sense Husserl has in mind when, for example, he explicitly speaks about the transcendental-transcendent correlation in CM §11. Phrases such as "transcendental subjectivity" and "transcendental intersubjectivity" exemplify this sense as they connote that the subjectivity and intersubjectivity in question are responsible for the constitution of the transcendent world. We will say more about this sense when we discuss transcendental reduction, see below pp. 192-94.

(2) "Transcendental" can also signify the methodological, or more precisely, the reflective, stance one takes when one practices Husserlian phenomenology. The term is clearly used in this sense when Husserl in CM §15 contrasts transcendental reflection with natural reflection. "Transcendental reflection," as Husserl uses it here, signifies the reflection that is executed on a "new level," above the mundane experiences reflected upon. When we say that the epoché is a "transcendental performance," the term "transcendental" is used primarily in this second sense.

To be sure, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is so called because it investigates transcendental (sense 1) constitution by virtue of transcendental (sense 2) reflection.
this section can well be reversed in our actual phenomenologizing. To put it differently, with the interest in understanding the extraordinariness of the local manifestation of the general positing (an epistemic interest that is characteristic of phenomenology), we can begin by reflecting on the validity of any experience with an awareness of the within-without tension involved. We have shown that this reflective analysis can be done with the help of some imaginative variations (i.e., the as-if disconnection). In these reflections we do not just focus on the original act, but also give due consideration to its nexus; we carry out a polythetic reflection as we recognize a part-whole relationship with respect to the validity of the act's original positing. The awareness of the within-without tension enables us to thematically take into consideration the constitutive effects emanating from the nexus of experiences in which the act is originally embedded. As a result, we can compare what the act "itself" is able to constitute with what it is able to achieve as an act factually situated within a specific nexus of experiences. We can see that, when we do this, we are already performing the epoché on a single experience with respect to the validity of its positing, and the effect of our reflection comes to terms with Husserl's metaphorical descriptions of the epoché. What is more, this access to the epoché originating from the perspective of having is independent of the Cartesian influence. In other words, the act of doubt and the attempt to doubt, the mere "methodic expedient," as Husserl calls them, are shown to be indeed dispensable. Husserl's talk about the alternative approaches to the epoché gets confirmed.

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80 See above, pp. 110-11, for the extraordinariness of the general positing.
In this section I engage in a conversation with Mohanty, focusing on some remarks he makes on the epoché in his recent book *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*. Mohanty's understanding of the epoché's modifying and retaining effect will be discussed, and I also discuss the difficulty involved in expressing the effect of the epoché. Hopefully, this conversation with Mohanty will confirm the usefulness of our interpretation of the epoché from the perspective of having.

The paradox

Mohanty in his *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl* devotes four chapters to the *Ideas I*, and when commenting on the epoché, he writes:

There is also a seeming paradox with regard to the epoché as "neutralized" reflection. I not only neutralize the doxic modality of the act reflected upon, for example, a perceptual experience I have had, but it is also necessary that I retain in memory—and this is the positing element—the thetic element in the "unreduced" perception. I must be able to say that the being-in-itself of the perceived object has become—"now," after the epoché—a mere "presumptive actuality." Does epoché bring about this transformation, or was the naïve believed-in being always—even before epoché—merely presumptive, and now discovered to have been so?

Husserl has a remark to the effect that the reduction does not deny anything in the reduced, that everything remains where it belonged, only placed within brackets; the natural thesis qua thesis remains within brackets, not naively used for theoretical-cognitive purposes (although remaining effective for practical everyday purposes). The question that I have raised pertains to correctly and precisely understanding the relation between the pre-epoché and the post-epoché experience, which *Ideas I* does not explicitly thematize, let alone resolve.\(^{81}\)

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Mohanty directs our attention to a "seeming paradox" in Husserl's doctrine of the epoché, and he tells us that this paradox is about "the relation between the pre-epoché and the post-epoché experience." Before we examine the paradox in detail, let us say a word about the relevancy of Mohanty's text to our inquiry. First of all, like what we have been doing so far in our interpretation of the epoché, the question Mohanty is raising is also about the particular epoché, that is, the epoché performed on "a perceptual experience." Moreover, Mohanty understands the epoché as "neutralized reflection," a concept we have presented in our explanation of McKenna's analysis of the epoché and have assimilated in our study of the epoché. The two methodologically relevant points thus guarantee the comparability of Mohanty's understanding of the epoché to ours.

Mohanty emphasizes Husserl's opinion that "the reduction [here it means the epoché] does not deny anything in the reduced, that everything remains where it belonged," and he also speaks about the transformation that occurs in the epoché. Obviously, under Mohanty's consideration is Husserl's doctrine that the epoché modifies but also retains the original positing, a doctrine that we have clarified in our study of the particular epoché. Thus Mohanty's interest in "the relation between the pre-epoché and the post-epoché experience" can be translated into an interest in the identity of the act before and after the epoché. The identity becomes an issue because two apparent conflicting claims need to be reconciled: (1) there obviously takes place "in" the epoché some kind of transformation; but (2) the original positing remains what it is and "everything remains where it belonged" during and after the
epoché.\textsuperscript{82}

The identity question

Let us consider this question: Does the identity of the act survive the epoché? Clearly, the correct answer has to be a "Yes"—to answer "No" would contradict Husserl's emphasis that the original positing is retained (via the retaining of the original act) in the epoché. But then, an account of the transformation that does occur in the epoché must be given, namely, one needs to explain: how can the identity of the act survive the epoché while some transformation does happen in the epoché?

The account is already given in our interpretation of the epoché. We emphasized that the epoché-performer faces the same original act, the same original nexus, and the same original positing, before and after the epoché; and we explained that the transformation brought forth by the epoché resides in neither the original act nor its positing—the transformation happens only to the epoché-performer's understanding; more speculatively, we may even say that the epoché-performer himself has been "transformed" by the epoché.\textsuperscript{83}

What then is Mohanty's opinion on the survival of the identity of the act through the epoché? Mohanty does not explicitly voice his opinion here; yet, on the basis of his understanding of the modifying and retaining effect of the epoché, it can be inferred that he inclines to \textit{affirm} the identity of the act (notwithstanding the subtlety of his formulation). Let

\textsuperscript{82} See above, pp. 118-19.

\textsuperscript{83} Namely, the epoché-performer undergoes the ego splitting. See above, pp. 139-40, and footnote #72.
us spell out this inference by examining his understanding of the epoché's peculiar effect.

Regarding the modifying effect of the epoché, Mohanty says that as an epoché-performer "I must be able to say that the being-in-itself of the perceived object has become—'now,' after the epoché—a mere 'presumptive actuality.'” It is noteworthy that in his formulation Mohanty italicizes the term "become." His emphasis makes a good point as it reminds us that in the epoché we are not statically reflecting on an act itself; rather, we are evidencing a becoming, a dynamic process. To grasp a process or a becoming, we need to grasp a temporal structure of "from . . . to . . . ." The switching of focus involved in this grasping is analogous to the focus-switching we perform when we examine the original act with a heightened awareness of the within-without tension.

Having said this, however, we need to point out that the very wording of Mohanty's statement suggests that he takes the becoming in question as a transformational process undergone by that which is posited by the original act; namely, he seems to hold that the original positum is transformed from a being-in-itself to a mere presumptive actuality. This transformation threatens the identity of the original act because, needless to say, if the positum of the original act has been changed, then the original act itself (as the noetic correlate) must have also undergone a correlative change: from an act that posited a being-in-itself (or an actuality in the full sense) to an act that posits a "presumptive actuality." According to the clarification we made earlier, locating the transformational change in either the act or its positum does not seem to be a correct interpretation of Husserl's teaching on the

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84 Mohanty, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, 360.
epoché’s modifying and retaining effect. It follows that, if Mohanty does understand the transformation as a change undergone by either the original positum or the original positing, then he cannot at the same time affirm the identity of the act before and after the epoché.

But Mohanty immediately raises a disjunctively formulated question concerning the nature of the transformation, which suggests that he is probably aware of the problem of locating the modifying effect of the epoché in either the positum or the positing. His question runs: "[1] Does epoché bring about this transformation, or [2] was the naïve believed-in being always—even before epoché—merely presumptive, and now discovered to have been so?" The phrase "this transformation" in his question obviously refers to the becoming he describes in the previous statement, that is, it signifies the transformation of the original positum from a being-in-itself to a merely presumptive actuality. According to our interpretation, if the identity of the original act is to be retained in the epoché, the epoché must not effect this becoming or transformation. Therefore, the first disjunct of Mohanty’s question—"Does epoché bring about this transformation"?—has to be negated; otherwise, Husserl’s teaching on the epoché would be falsified. The very fact that Mohanty does formulate such a disjunctive question suggests that (admittedly, this is an educated guess of ours) his intention is probably to make room for a different thought, that is, he probably intends to negate the first disjunct and affirm the second. His intention can be seen more clearly if we examine the second disjunct of his question.

The second disjunct suggests that the naïve believed-in being was always—even before the epoché—merely presumptive, but is now, that is, after the epoché, discovered to

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85 See above, pp. 139-40.
have been so. In other words, affirming the second disjunct means to interpret the transformation that occurs in the epoché as a discovery of a "hidden" feature of the positum. Discovery is not as "hard" a change as transformation, and more importantly, the discovery is made by the epoché-performer and the awareness of this discovery resides in the epoché-performer's understanding. Hence, if by formulating the disjunctive question Mohanty does hint at his preference of the second disjunct over the first, he then implies that the original positum (and positing) itself undergoes no change, and the transformation that happens in the epoché should better be described as the epoché-performer's discovery of a previously hidden feature of the positum, or better, as an enlightenment undergone by the epoché-performer himself.

Thus interpreted, Mohanty can be seen as cautiously holding that (1) the identity of the act does survive the epoché, and (2) the modification effected by the epoché is a discovery made by the epoché-performer himself, which relates to the original act. This conclusion is compatible with Husserl's teaching that the original act itself should remain intact while some "change" does occur in the epoché; it also appears to be akin to our position, that is: the modifying effect occurs in the epoché-performer's understanding of the original act, rather than in the original act itself.86

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86 In our interpretation we arrived at the conclusion that performing the epoché reveals for us that the original act is both a pretension to and a legitimate positing of a being. But Mohanty claims that after the epoché we see the positum as merely presumptive actuality. In other words, for Mohanty, what the epoché reveals is that the original act is a mere claim, mere pretension; thus, the legitimate side of the original act is not explicitly acknowledged. (See above, pp. 146 and 149) I have criticized this position earlier, and I do not plan to engage in a polemic at this point as my purpose here is to understand. See below, pp. 164-66, for a relevant discussion of Mohanty's understanding of the retaining effect of the epoché.
Difficulties in expressing the effects of the epoché

Because of the unnatural performance of the epoché, whenever we attempt to describe the effects of the epoché or to understand such descriptions, our attempt is hedged about by some difficulties. In what follows I will show two of these difficulties by discussing an interesting remark made by Husserl. The first difficulty is related to the change of meaning that our language undergoes in the epoché, and the second, also deeper, difficulty is related to the splitting of the ego resulting from the epoché. I will also show how a proper understanding of these difficulties can help us avoid some possible misreading of both Mohanty's and our descriptions of the epoché.

Dorion Cairns reports in his Conversations with Husserl and Fink that Husserl once said that "when one has attained the phenomenological Einstellung, the phrase 'I was in the natural Einstellung' has a totally different sense than it would have were it possible to be said in the natural Einstellung." Presumably, were it possible for a man in the natural attitude to express the idea about himself being in the natural attitude, he should have formulated the phrase in the present tense, namely, "I am in the natural attitude," rather than "I was in the natural attitude." Why does Husserl think that the two statements have totally different senses? Do they not differ only in tense? What are the other differences, if any, between the two statements, one made before the epoché and another made after the epoché? In the analyses that follow, we will soon see that "I am in the natural attitude" is an incoherent statement, whereas "I was in the natural attitude" is made by the phenomenologizing ego who is himself.

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87 Cairns, Conversations, 44 (Conversation #XXVIII).
not the true subject of the statement.

From a linguistic point of view, the units that make up the two statements have different meanings before and after the epoché, and this partly explains why the statements themselves are different. For instance, strictly speaking, terms such as "natural attitude" and "transcendental attitude" belong to the vocabulary of transcendentalese, and make precise sense only for one who has made the transcendental turn. The six-word pre-epoché sentence "I am in the natural attitude," notwithstanding its grammatical correctness, involves a non-transcendental use of a transcendental term; hence, it does not have clear (transcendental) meaning even if it is, for whatever reason, uttered verbatim by one who is absorbed in the natural attitude.88

Moreover, the linguistic unit "I" deserves special consideration. Although the first

88 We can compare the Husserlian scenario in question—the man living in the natural attitude says that he is in the natural attitude—to the story told by Hilary Putnam in his article "Brains in a Vat." In this article Putnam attempts to prove that the supposition that we are brains in a vat (or in its classic formulation, that there is not an external world) is self-refuting. He bases his proof on a causal analysis of the way our language refers to things. Putnam argues that the brains that really reside in the vat cannot really say and mean that "We are brains in a vat"; even if, for whatever reason, they happen to utter the words "We are brains in a vat," this statement "means" something entirely different from what it means in the real world. This is because, to put it simply, that the referents (the meaning-bearers) of the Vat-English are radically different from the referents of the normal real English. For instance, the term "vat" cannot refer to the real vat if it is used by the brains in the vat because, in Putnam's opinion, there is no significant causal relation between the term "vat" in the Vat-English and the real vat.

It seems to me that Putnam's differentiation between the Vat-English and the real English is comparable to the phenomenological distinction between the so-called mundanese and transcendentalese; and I think Husserl would also agree that the man living in the natural attitude cannot really say and mean that "I am in the natural attitude." Still more interesting is the fact that Putnam calls his argument a transcendental argument (in the Kantian sense), and he also criticizes the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality, saying that it is useless in solving the problem of the existence of the external world. Putnam's criticism misfired, however, because (1) his understanding of the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality is seriously defective, if judged only from what he says in this specific article, and (2) the genuinely transcendental solution to, or rather, dissolution of, the problem of the existence of the external world was already offered by phenomenologists such as Husserl and Heidegger. Putnam's own solution is pseudo-transcendental because he relies on a causal analysis of the meaning of language, which is, by essence, a mundane (or empirical, as it is called in the analytic tradition) analysis in disguise. See Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 1-21, esp. 12-17.
person pronoun "I" belongs to both mundanese and transcendentalese, given that performing the phenomenological epoché splits the ego into a triadic structure, after the epoché the term "I" can possibly refer to different egos. The term I, therefore, becomes a possible source of equivocation, and may pose difficulties for both the expressing and understanding of the effects of the epoché. In other words, if "I was in the natural attitude" is uttered as a post-epoché statement, its meaning cannot be properly understood unless the referent(s) of the term "I" can be correctly determined, a task that we must cope with now by explaining the epoché's ego-splitting effect in greater detail.

As we pointed out in an earlier footnote, Fink claims that by performing the epoché the naïve pre-epoché unity of the human ego is divided into "three egos." For convenience's sake, let us reproduce Fink's words:

[After the epoché is performed], [1] the transcendental ego who accepts the world does not suspend this belief in the world, but rather enacts it with greater intensity, thus [2] leaving the ego which is preoccupied with the world, the self-apperception "man," in acceptance, [3] the transcendental theoretical "onlooker" renounces all sharing in the belief in the world, renounces all taking part and concurrence.

The three egos are the transcendental ego, the mundane ego, and the phenomenologizing ego.

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89 Husserl once remarks that "if this seems a contradiction: I-man perform epoché and am not I-man anymore but only the I-epoché-performing-transcendental-subject, then it is a contradiction in the mundane sense of the language, which must be so reduced via the transcendental epoché also that it loses this mundane sense and the contradiction with it." Here Husserl speaks about how "contradiction" arises because of the ego-splitting effect of the epoché, and how in principle the contradiction can be solved if we perform the reduction on the meaning of language. This observation is from Husserl's Ms B-I-5-V/20, and is quoted and translated by Bossert in his "The Sense of 'Epoché' and 'Reduction' in Husserl’s Philosophy,” 254n45. On Husserl and Fink's understanding of the transcendental ambivalence of language, see Ronald Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 476-81.

90 See above, footnote #72.

This triadic structure might seem excessive and "factitious," but we can make sense of it by taking the triad not as about three substances, or about three entities, not even about three persons, but as three modes of life that the transcendental ego (in the widest sense) can live in.

In other words, in the context of our discussion of the three egos resulted from the epoché, we should take the term "transcendental ego" in the triad in a narrower sense: we let it signify the optimal and preeminent mode of the transcendental ego, "the all-inclusive absolute ego" philosophically and fully awakened by virtue of the epoché. I believe this is also the sense Fink has in mind as he says that the transcendental ego after the performance of the epoché does its own work (i.e., world-constituting) with "greater intensity." This "greater intensity" comes from the transcendental ego's knowledge of his own transcendentality, a knowledge generated by the epoché, and which helps the transcendental ego do a better job in constituting. Once this narrower and preeminent sense of "transcendental ego" is accepted, the explanation of the other two egos becomes much easier.

For example, now we can see the mundane ego as resulting from the transcendental ego's (in the broadest sense) "mundanizing self-apperception," and see the phenomenologizing ego as the "disinterested onlooker" established by the transcendental ego in his practice of

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93 CM, §45. It seems to me that the three egos are, arguably, implicit in Husserl's discussion in §45.

94 Cf. CM, 99-100/130.

95 CM, 35/73 (§15).
phenomenology. Thus, the transcendental ego in the broadest sense can be said to be the "common denominator" of the three egos; and the transcendental ego taken in the preeminent sense is now set in sharper contrast with the other two derivative modes of life. We can still strengthen our position by dealing with two objections.

(1) It may be objected that the mundane ego and the transcendental ego (namely, the [1] and [2] in Fink's passage) are the same ego because there are insufficient grounds to distinguish between them. True, Husserl in the *Cartesian Meditations* does say that "as an Ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego." But this state-of-affairs, i.e., myself-being-always-a-transcendental-Ego is not manifest to the mundane ego, and this is why Husserl immediately adds that "but . . . I know about this [i.e., that "I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego"] only by executing phenomenological reduction." The philosophically wide awakened transcendental ego is certainly different from the transcendental ego for whom his own transcendentality remains anonymous. Moreover, if the transcendental ego in the preeminent mode says that "I have a world," he means and knows that the world is constituted in and correlated with his subjective life. In contrast, if the mundane ego is to say that "I have a world," he would mean the world that is "outside him," and he "has" it as an external possession. This is no doubt a sharp difference.

(2) One may also object to Fink's strong opposition between the transcendental ego and the phenomenologizing ego. Tobias Trappe, for example, holds this view. He contends that the transcendental ego already contains from the beginning a *reflective* moment, and that

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96 *CM*, 37/75.
the phenomenologizing ego is also in a sense constitutive (although not constitutive of the world), and this surely make the two egos akin to each other. This objection certainly contains a grain of truth, and in what follows, if we have to use the phrase "the transcendental-phenomenologizing ego," we do it exactly out of the consideration of this kinship and the fact that the phenomenologizing ego is certainly parasitical on the transcendental ego. However, in the context of our discussion, an important difference between the two can still be revealed if we "test" the phenomenologizing ego by the sentence "I have a world." Can he properly and meaningfully say this sentence? The answer should be a "No" because, as the "disinterested onlooker," the phenomenologizing ego is not even amongst the worldly things; he is so un-worldly that it is not appropriate for him to say "I have a world." His job is not to constitute or have the world, but to contemplate and witness the constitution and having.

If the statement "I have a world" can have different meanings from different ego-perspectives, the statements "I am in the natural attitude" and "I was in the natural attitude" can be expected to be in the same situation. On the basis of our explanation of the three egos resulted from the epoché, we can now examine the two statements by studying the states-of-affairs they each express.


Upon such examination, the pre-epoché statement "I am in the natural attitude" appears to be not only unclear, but also, at bottom, incoherent. It is incoherent because it cannot possibly be fulfilled in intuition, and this is ultimately due to the fact that the state-of-affairs expressed by the statement, that is, myself-being-in-the-natural-attitude, cannot manifest itself to any of the three egos in the mode of "here and now." Or, to put it differently, there does not seem to be a "dative of manifestation" to whom this state-of-affairs can manifest itself in the present tense and be registered from the first person perspective. This claim can be spelled out as follows.

(1) This state-of-affairs is not available to the mundane ego. For the mundane ego, the transcendental dimension of his life is anonymous, and even this anonymity is itself anonymous. What this deep anonymity means is that the mundane ego himself is unable to draw properly the distinction between the mundane and the transcendental, a distinction that is necessary if the state-of-affairs of myself-being-in-the-natural-attitude-here-and-now is to be registered properly. It follows that the state-of-affairs in question does not manifest itself to the mundane ego.

(2) Neither can the transcendental ego or the phenomenologizing ego register the state-of-affairs from the first person perspective in the mode of "here and now": the very talk about the transcendental ego (to be sure, in the narrower sense we explained above) or the phenomenologizing ego implies that the natural attitude has already been transcended.


100 This also explains the subjunctive mood of Husserl's statement, which begins with "were it possible."
through the performance of the epoché; these two egos are never in the natural attitude themselves.

In a word, the mundane ego *in himself* cannot grasp the natural attitude; and although the transcendental ego and the phenomenologizing ego are able to grasp it, they transcend it and are never *in* it. Hence we conclude that no ego can be the dative of manifestation of the state-of-affairs of myself-being-in-the-natural-attitude-*here-and-now*. Since no "I" can be the true subject of the statement "I *am* in the natural attitude," this statement makes no coherent sense at all, both before and after the epoché.

But what about the post-epoché statement "I *was* in the natural attitude," which is made by the phenomenologizing ego and is supposedly meaningful? To be sure, in this statement the state-of-affairs of myself-being-in-the-natural-attitude is expressed in the *past tense*: can a mere change of tense make an incoherent statement meaningful? If yes, how?

As we have pointed out, the transcendental ego and the phenomenologizing ego *never* enjoy the natural attitude and are *never* in it. Therefore, the "I" in "I *was* in the natural attitude" cannot refer to either of these two egos. If the statement "I *was* in the natural attitude" is indeed a meaningful one, the "I," the true subject of this statement, can only refer to the mundane ego, the only ego who was ever in the natural attitude. So the peculiarity of the statement "I *was* in the natural attitude" surfaces: he who makes this first-person statement (that is, the phenomenologizing ego) is not himself the true subject of the statement. How can such a first-person statement be made? And does it express a coherent thought?

We can make sense of this first-person statement by taking the phenomenologizing ego as reporting "on behalf of" the mundane ego, with whom he is, nonetheless, identical to
some extent. That is, we need to show that, whereas the mundane ego undergoes what he himself cannot describe, the phenomenologizing ego is able to describe in the first person language what he himself does not undergo; and because of the identity of the three egos and the "communication" among them, a genuine and intelligible first-person statement can still be made.

This rather speculative explanation can be phenomenologically confirmed if we examine the making of the post-epoché statement that "I was in the natural attitude." The very making of this statement by the phenomenologizing ego reveals a fascinating feature inside the ego's triadic structure. That is, the ego's pre-epoché life can be "recollected" (by the transcendental-phenomenologizing ego) with a certain modification; lacking a better name, let me call this modification the "retroactive effects" resulted from the ego's phenomenological practice.\textsuperscript{101} One's phenomenological practice certainly influences one's egoic conscious life in general and the recollection and observation of one's pre-epoché life in particular.\textsuperscript{102} With the retroactive effects, the transcendental-phenomenologizing ego seems to be able to "displace" himself into the recollected pre-epoché life, a "there and then" that he was factically never in, and he then reports, in transcendentalese, "his" pre-epoché

\textsuperscript{101} My use of the term "retroactive effects" is based on Husserl's description of the retroactive effects in our normal perceptual life, namely, a sequence of new perceptions that disappoint an anticipation I held earlier can affect the modality of this anticipation when it is recollected by me at a later time. See Husserl, \textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic}, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 66-72, 430.

\textsuperscript{102} This is why Husserl also says that "when one has once attained the phenomenological Einstellung, one can never fall back completely into the natural Einstellung," except "in phantasy." We can never completely return to the natural attitude because some undeletable changes have happened to our understanding; and even when we return to it in phantasy, such phantasy, it seems to me, is under the influence of the "retroactive effects" of one's already executed phenomenologizing. See Cairns, \textit{Conversations}, 44 (Conversation #XXVIII), 35 (Conversation #XXI).
life from "there." Undeniably, such reports made by the phenomenologizing ego have a mundane appearance because they are about the pre-epoché life and seem to have been mouthed by the mundane ego (the true subject of the statements). But as statements made by the "fully armed" phenomenologizing ego, they are in effect transcendental propositions. Such reports (i.e., the first person reports that are transcendental in essence but mundane in appearance\textsuperscript{103}) given by the phenomenologizing ego are the important achievement of the epoché, because they make our pre-epoché life understandable: our pre-epoché life is perfected by such understandableness, and such understandableness also ensures us that we have now taken an all-embracing hold of our own life.\textsuperscript{104} This is especially true for the post-epoché statement "I was in the natural attitude."

In phenomenology it is often said that only one who co-performs the epoché can

\textsuperscript{103} Husserl's descriptions of the natural attitude in the Ideas I all fall into this category. The "I," the true subject of Husserl's descriptions, is the mundane ego "in the eyes of," or, perceived by, the phenomenologizing ego. It is as if the phenomenological ego, as an onlooker, was there with the mundane ego before the transcendental turn is made, and now, after the transcendental turn, the phenomenologizing ego comes to the fore and reports a "previously" seen or witnessed state-of-affairs, namely, the mundane ego's being in the natural attitude, a state-of-affairs that is about the mundane ego but cannot be properly registered by the mundane ego himself.

\textsuperscript{104} It may be proposed that the phenomenologizing ego can say something like "He (that is, my mundane ego) was in the natural attitude" and avoid the quibbling inconvenience on which we have spent so much time. But since what is at issue here is the phenomenologizing ego's ultimate self-understanding, the first-person mode of speech is preferred, because the intelligibility it produces has no substitute. Note also that if the meaning of the proposed third-person statement is to be further questioned, then, as the parenthetical remark "(that is, my mundane ego)" shows, some sort of appeal to the first person vocabulary still needs to be made.

It is helpful to quote a theological observation Sokolowski makes when he discusses the first person speech of Jesus: "the Holy Trinity could not have been revealed in the third person. It could not have been revealed, say, through a prophet who spoke about the Trinity 'from outside.' The Holy Trinity could only have been revealed 'from within,' by a speaker who indicates the differentiations within the Trinity not only by what he says but also by his very act of speaking." In his "The Revelation of the Holy Trinity: A Study in Personal Pronouns," from Ethics and Theological Disclosures: The Thoughts of Robert Sokolowski, eds. Guy Mansini and Jame G. Hart (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 162-178. Although Sokolowski's observation is made in the context of another discipline, it is still pertinent to our study because of its phenomenological nature, and also because of the apparent analogy between the Holy Trinity and the triadic egoic structure engendered by the epoché. The Holy Trinity could not have been revealed in the third person, neither could the highest possible self-understanding be articulated in the third person.
understand the epoché. Our analysis of the mundane appearance and transcendental content of the post-epoché statements in a way gives rationale to such claim. The tension between a post-epoché statement's mundane appearance and transcendental content can be seen and fully appreciated only by one who co-performs the epoché and in the meantime recognizes the retroactive effects of the phenomenological practice.\footnote{This also suggests that, even if we have already made the transcendental turn, if we become unheedful of the retroactive effects of our phenomenological practice, we may treat a post-epoché statement as a normal first-person statement in which the speaker and the true subject of the statement coincide, and thus miss the transcendental significance of the post-epoché statements. Let us now apply this observation to Mohanty's and our description of the epoché.}

As we have shown, Mohanty, in the second disjunct of the question he raises, suggests that the naïve believed-in being \emph{was} always merely presumptive, but is now, that is, after the epoché, discovered to have been so.\footnote{The past tense of Mohanty's formulation suggests that it is a statement of a mundane appearance (that is, it is \emph{about} the pre-epoché life) and a transcendental content (it is made by one who has carried out the epoché); it should therefore be read in the way we indicated above, i.e., the retroactive effects of the epoché should be taken into consideration when we explicate his statement. But the past tense also makes Mohanty's formulation susceptible to a certain misreading. For instance, an unheedful reader may thoughtlessly make this inference: to say that the naïve believed-in being \emph{was}...}

\footnote{This also explains from another aspect why it is so difficult to write a "presuppositionless" introduction to phenomenology. See above, footnotes ##16, 18.}

\footnote{See above, p. 146.}
always merely presumptive implies that the state-of-affairs of the original act's being merely presumptive was there (before the epoché), and since the mundane ego was there too, it follows that the mundane ego could have been the dative of the manifestation of it. This inference is in fact a misreading because it amounts to saying that the mundane ego was potentially able to grasp a genuinely transcendental state-of-affairs, and hence the radical absence of transcendental insight in the natural attitude is mistaken for a phenomenon of mundane potentiality.\(^{107}\)

In the same vein, our description of the effect of the epoché can also be misread. We say that performing the epoché enables us to see that the original act is both a pretension and a legitimate positing of a being.\(^{108}\) Since the simple present tense is used in our description, our words can be interpreted as saying that the original act is always both a pretension and a legitimate positing of a being, even for the mundane ego living in the natural attitude. Obviously, the same kind of confusion is committed in this misreading, that is, it fails to do justice to the fact that the original act's being both a pretension and a legitimate positing of a being is a state-of-affairs that could not have been manifest to the mundane ego.\(^{109}\)

But we may wonder: who is to blame after all? Are not these post-epoché descriptions essentially confusing in themselves? Why do we not just get rid of them? Yet it seems to me

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\(^{107}\) That which is potential can be turned actual when more experiences flow in, e.g., the back of the house shows up as my perception of the house unfolds; but more experiences alone are not helpful in making present a transcendental insight that is radically absent—we need a new type of (reflective) experience instead. And the point is, this new type of experience is unavailable in the natural attitude.


\(^{109}\) To be sure, the simple present tense implies the expression of an eternal truth, and hence nothing prevents us from saying that it is always true that the original act is both a pretension and a legitimate positing of a being; but the eternity involved here can be fully explicated only when we take into account that time itself is also transcendentally "reconfigured" through the epoché. Unfortunately, we cannot pursue the theme of time further here.
that as long as we wish to describe our phenomenological findings, these "confusing" and paradoxical descriptions are unavoidable. *Transcendentalese*, the working language that phenomenology employs to express its findings, receives its meaning from mundanese, even though the mundane meaning is transcended in some way. For instance, without our familiarity with the first person mode of speech in mundanese, such mode of speech in transcendentalese would be unintelligible. This also means that transcendentalese is not artificially fabricated for Platonic ideal entities; it is exactly because of the tension between transcendentalese and mundanese that light can be shed on our mundane life through the *transcendental* descriptions. Moreover, the paradoxical and puzzling ego-splitting effect of the epoché is somehow retained and reflected in the tension between transcendentalese and mundanese. This tension, however, should not be perceived as a hindrance to our phenomenological explorations. It does not impede us from understanding the phenomenological statements; rather, it effectively reminds us of the irrevocable changes in ourselves engendered by the practice of phenomenologizing and invites us to understand with an entirely new habit of reading, and first of all, with patience.

Recollection as a stand-alone act?

So far we have commented on the complexity of Mohanty's understanding of the modifying effect of the epoché and the difficulties in expressing that effect. Let us also briefly comment on Mohanty's interpretation of the retaining effect of the epoché.

Mohanty explains the retaining effect of the epoché by saying that the original thetic
element (i.e., the original positing) is retained in a memory.\textsuperscript{110} The question that interests us is: whose memory is Mohanty talking about? That is, if the memory in question is expressed in a statement like "I remember the original positing," who then is the true subject of this statement? Obviously, the mundane ego does not enjoy such a memory because the thetic element or the validity of the original act could not have been thematic to the mundane ego: how can the mundane ego remember something he could not have been aware of?\textsuperscript{111} If Mohanty intends to ascribe that memory to the mundane ego, then he seems to be unheedful of the retroactive effects of the epoché, namely, ascribing to the mundane ego a memory that the latter could not have been able to enjoy, except in the phenomenologizing ego's phantasy.

So can the transcendental-phenomenologizing ego's memory be what Mohanty is talking about? This seems to be an incorrect interpretation of the epoché too. Remember that when interpreting the epoché as the synthetic achievement of the moments of the imagining away, the restoration, and the tension-awareness, we pointed out that although the restoration is comparable to a recollection, it is not a stand-alone act of recollection; it should more precisely be described as a dependent moment of the epoché because it is synthesized with the operation of imagining away through the awareness of the within-without tension. The retaining of the original positing is possible in the epoché not because after performing the epoché I then proceed to recollect some "past information"; rather, the moments of restoration and imagining-away are the part and parcel of the epoché, and they are executed

\textsuperscript{110} See the quotation above on p. 146.

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. above, pp. 158-59, the discussion of the incoherence of the statement "I am in the natural attitude."
in the living present as a synthetically unitary operation.\textsuperscript{112}

The epoché-performer comes to see the original positing of the original act while his performance of the epoché is underway; he does not carry out an independent act of recollection in addition to the performance of the epoché itself. This is why I think Mohanty's description is imprecise as he seems to suggest that such an independent act of recollection is required.\textsuperscript{113}

**The Epoché and the Neutrality Modification**\textsuperscript{114}

In this section let us deepen our understanding of the epoché by contrasting it with the phenomenon of the "neutrality modification." In the *Ideas I*, Husserl elaborates on the neutrality modification in §§109-114. Our study takes as our clue Husserl's remarks on the relation between the neutrality modification and the epoché: (1) In the original text of the *Ideas I* Husserl suggests that the epoché and the neutralization modification are two "closely akin" phenomena,\textsuperscript{115} but (2) he seems to have taken back this affirmation as he writes a "No"

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\textsuperscript{112} See above, pp. 135-38.

\textsuperscript{113} This also partly explains why in Mohanty's account of the epoché the legitimate side of the original act is not acknowledged—for Mohanty, that has to be done in a stand-alone act of recollection. Cf. above, footnote #86.

\textsuperscript{114} In the *Ideas I* Husserl's discussion of the neutrality modification comes quite late (in §§109-114), long after he has introduced the epoché. It seems to me that the discussion of the neutrality modification should more appropriately be located immediately after the introduction of the particular epoché so that the kinship between the particular epoché and the neutrality modification can be seen more easily. We will turn to the universal epoché after this comparison of the particular epoché with the neutrality modification.

\textsuperscript{115} In the *Ideas I* Husserl says that, when the neutrality modification is executed, the posited characteristic is rendered "powerless," which means that in the neutrality modification "everything has its modifying 'parentheses,' closely akin to that which we have spoken so much before, and which is so important for preparing the way to phenomenology." (*Ideas I*, 258-59/223, my italics.) The phrase "that which we have spoken so much
opposite the phrase "closely akin" in a note inserted later in the so-called Copy A.\textsuperscript{116}

This later inserted "No" is puzzling because, apparently, it negates the phrase "closely akin," and this negation can be interpreted in two ways: (1) it can mean that the epoché and the neutrality modification are not merely closely akin to each other, but are rather identical operations; or (2) it can mean that the two operations are not at all closely akin to each other, but are quite different operations.\textsuperscript{117} Of course, the two interpretations cannot both be true. In what follows it will be shown that the second is a more plausible interpretation.

My interpretation of Husserl's puzzling remarks takes three steps. (1) Restricting my discussion to the original text of the Ideas I, I relate Husserl's example of the purely aesthetic consciousness of the "depicted" to the performance of epoché. I will show that the latter does contain a moment comparable to the former, which is a phenomenon of the neutrality modification, and hence the view that the epoché and the neutrality modification are akin to each other is justifiable. (2) I then discuss McKenna's understanding of the difference between the epoché and the neutrality modification. McKenna says that the component of "refraining" is only found in the epoché and it is this component that distinguishes the epoché from the neutrality modification. In a way, what McKenna says is supported by Husserl's talk about the volitional element that is present in the epoché, but I will show that McKenna's

\textsuperscript{116} Ideas I, 258n22; Hua 3/b, 510.

\textsuperscript{117} Brainard in his Belief and Its Neutralization offers a helpful review and rather detailed criticism of different commentators' interpretations of this "No" inserted by Husserl, and he takes this occasion to emphasize the difference between the epoché and the neutrality modification. For Brainard, the difference consists in that the epoché only neutralizes the belief in the world, whereas the neutrality modification neutralizes every belief and validity. It is of course not wrong to emphasize this difference, but it seems to me that Brainard misses some more important differences. I spell out my understanding of the differences below on pp. 176-82. See Brainard, Belief and Its Neutralization, 160 and 160n90.
interpretation of the "refraining" as a definite act of "resisting" is problematic. (3) On the basis of the interpretation of the epoché we have developed earlier in this chapter, I then show that it is the presence of the within-without tension and the epoché-performer's heightened tension-awareness that distinguishes the epoché from the ordinary neutrality modification; the "refraining" is but a function of such tension and tension-awareness, rather than a definite act. I illustrate my point by contrasting the reading of a novel with the reading of a biography.

The Kinship between the Epoché and the Neutrality Modification

In our study of the particular epoché, we have seen that in the first phase of the performance of the epoché we obtain an absolutely contextless act by imagining away the nexus of experiences that surrounds the original act. Examining the so-obtained contextless act with the awareness of its having been disconnected from its original nexus allows us to reveal the intrinsic pending nature of the original act. It was pointed out earlier in a footnote that this absolutely contextless act is comparable to the neutralized consciousness that is discussed in Husserl's analysis of a typical visual experience of a picture, namely, the purely aesthetic consciousness of the "depicted."\(^{118}\) Let us spell this claim out in more detail now and show the kinship between the epoché and the neutrality modification.

According to Husserl, a typical visual perception of a picture has three "layers": (1) the normal seeing of the physical picture-thing, the physical bearer of the picture; (2) the

\(^{118}\) Cf. above, footnote #63.
seeing of the depictured realities, the "subject" of the picture; and (3) the seeing of the presentive picture itself. Husserl claims that the third layer, i.e., the seeing of the presentive picture itself is always a neutrality modification of a normal perception;\footnote{For more of Husserl's analysis of image-consciousness, see his Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, 23, 50, where he says that the "image object" (i.e., the picture itself) has no existence at all.} about the second layer he says that we can turn to the "depicted" in a purely aesthetic way, and this purely aesthetic appreciation of the "depicted" is also a neutralized consciousness because in it no "stamp of being or non-being, of being possible or being deemed likely" is imparted to the depicted.\footnote{Ideas I, 262/226.}

For instance, suppose we are standing in front of Michelangelo's "Conversion of Saul." It is possible (though admittedly hard) for one who sees the picture to turn only to the depictured as depictured, without relating the subject of the picture to either that dramatic biblical event or one's own spiritual life. That is to say, it is possible to carry out a seeing-consciousness in which no fusion of the "depicted realities" with the "real realities" happens. It is exactly because in such purely aesthetic regard of the depictured the "depicted realities" are kept isolated from the "real realities," the being or non-being of the depicted does not interest the viewer. We could therefore say that the "depicted" itself is "put out of action," that is, it is not allowed to induce the viewer to make new (real and practical) posittings. If we recall our earlier characterization of the epoché, we see that this effect is epoché-like: the depicted gets "suspended"; and correlative speaking, the purely aesthetic viewing of the picture becomes a consciousness of a snapshot-like contextless and history-less appearing of the depicted.
Hence it becomes initially clear that, in both the first phase of the epoché and the purely aesthetic regard of the depictured, the acts we enjoy can be called neutralized acts because they are acts disconnected from a wider context. We may therefore tentatively conclude that the epoché does appear to contain a moment similar to the neutrality modification; and a further textual support for this claim can be found in Husserl's more technical analysis of the neutrality modification.

The phenomena of the neutrality modification are ubiquitous in our everyday life. Besides the neutralized noeses that Husserl has identified in a typical visual perception of a picture, acts such as phantasy, merely thinking or conceiving of something, and reading novels can all be regarded as neutralized. The common feature of these acts is that in them "the posited characteristic has become powerless [kraftlos]." Corresponding to the lack of power of the posited there is also the lack of "seriousness" on the noetic side: "[a neutralized] believing is . . . no longer serious believing, [a neutralized] deeming likely is no longer serious deeming likely, [a neutralized] negating is no longer serious negating."\textsuperscript{122}

According to Husserl, such phenomenon of neutralization "is included in every abstaining-from-producing-something, putting-something-out-of-action, 'parenthesizing'-it, 'leaving-something-undecided.'"\textsuperscript{123} Here, among the four phenomena that are said to include in themselves the phenomenon of the neutrality modification are the phenomena named by

\textsuperscript{121} Phantasy can in general be characterized as a sort of neutrality modification, but according to Husserl, there is an essential difference: the former is reiterable, whereas the latter is not. See Ideas I, §112.

\textsuperscript{122} Ideas I, 258/223. Another way to say the neutralized noeses are not serious is to say that they are not subject to the "legitimation of reason." See below, pp. 179-80, for further discussion of this topic.

\textsuperscript{123} Ideas I, 257-58/222.
the phrases *putting-something-out-of-action* and *parenthesizing something*. Since these two phrases are also used by Husserl to characterize the performance of the epoché,\(^{124}\) we can infer that the phenomenon of the neutrality modification is indeed included in the performance of the epoché. Needless to say, *inclusion* as such signifies a sort of kinship.

*The Difference: The Volitional Element*

So far we have shown that the particular epoché and the neutrality modification are akin to each other because the former does include a moment comparable to the latter. But to say that one phenomenon includes another one does not mean that the two are identical; this is a point Husserl already clearly makes in the original text of the *Ideas I*. Having spoken of the four phenomena that include in themselves the neutrality modification, he immediately adds that these phenomena all connote an extra element of *volitional* or *voluntary doing*, which is *not* essential for the neutrality modification. He then uses the phenomenon of *leaving-something-undecided* (i.e., *Dahin-gestellt-sein-lassen*, one of the phenomena that are said to include the neutrality modification) to illustrate how this volitional element can be excluded in principle. The purpose of such exclusion is to obtain the neutrality-modification in its pure form, and the resulted phenomena are called by Husserl *having-an-"undecided"-something* [{"Dahingestellt"}-haben] and *having-something-"standing there"* [{"Dastehend"}-haben von etwas].\(^{125}\) It is interesting to see that these two phrases are formulated in the

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\(^{124}\) See above, pp. 118-19.

\(^{125}\) See *Ideas I*, 258-222-23; *Hua 3/a*, 248.
language of having; and although Husserl does not explain further the difference between leaving-something-undecided and having-something-standing-there, the "linguistic instinct" he demonstrates here is remarkable. The way he employs the term having harkens back to a point we made earlier in our study of the rareness of the passive form of the verb to have: exercising the "act" of having does not require the exertion of power in the literal sense, because the relation of having is itself a middle-voiced relationship that does not fall under the categories of either the active or the passive. If we are allowed to appeal to our grammatical intuition for the moment, we can also "feel" that leaving-something-undecided involves a voluntary application of power or an active disposal of something; whereas having-something-standing-there results in a neither active nor passive relation to the "something" there: the result is rather a middle-voiced non-intrusive minding of the thing there.126

We can express the point Husserl attempts to get across in a more rigorous manner. The neutralization in the epoché is the result of a voluntary, conscious, and methodic endeavor, whereas the effect of neutralization in everyday neutrality modification comes about "naturally," which means: in our everyday life, neutralization is not thematically set as the conscious goal of our volitional striving; instead of being willed or thematically pursued, the neutralization just occurs and is simply lived through; moreover, as a mental process transpiring in the natural attitude, its being a neutrality modification is a state-of-affairs anonymous to one who lives in the naturally neutralized act itself, and the anonymity only

126 On the middle-voiced "power" that is involved in having, see above, pp. 38-42.
gets lifted in our phenomenological investigation.

In order to more accurately understand the volitional element that makes the epoché different from the neutrality modification, we may now turn to the analysis McKenna offers in his book *Husserl’s "Introductions to Phenomenology."* McKenna formulates the difference between the epoché and the ordinary neutrality modification in this way: the ordinary neutralized consciousness is by essence non-producing and non-performing, but the neutralizing moment in the epoché amounts to a "performance" because the method of epoché, as "neutralized reflection," must realize neutralization. The emphasis put on the performing and the term "must" is in line with the volitional and voluntary element Husserl has talked about. McKenna then says that this performing component that distinguishes the epoché from the normal neutralization is what Husserl calls the "refraining," and he claims that the refraining is "an act of a subject who feels a pull toward something, and thus acknowledges its value, but precisely resists that pull." In other words, McKenna identifies the refraining as an act of resisting, and he identifies as the noematic correlate of this act of resisting the pull (toward participating in the positing of the original act). My concern is, however, that interpreting the refraining as an act of resisting unnecessarily increases the

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127 McKenna does not discuss the possible meaning of the "no" Husserl inserted later in the "Copy A"; but his analysis of the phrase "closely akin" is an effort to show the essential difference between the epoché and the neutrality modification.

128 Cf. *Ideas I*, 258/222, where Husserl says that neutralization does not "produce" anything; it is "the conscious counterpart of all producing [Leisten]."

129 McKenna, *Husserl’s "Introductions to Phenomenology,"* 149-50.

130 This formulation is from the entry "Epoché and Reduction" composed by McKenna in Lester Embree et al. ed. *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 179. In *Husserl’s "Introductions to Phenomenology"* McKenna also says that what the "reflective refraining" resists is "the 'pull' of the doxic positionality of straight-forward acts," but the formulation is not as clear.
number of acts and does not really render the moment of refraining more intelligible (how then should the act of *resisting* be described?).

Considering a phenomenon of refraining that happens in our everyday life might be helpful in illustrating my point. I would like to take smoking as our example, and also draw upon Aristotle's description of the moral characters of the virtuous and the continent to clarify some points. Is refraining from smoking a *definite act* itself? For an agent who possesses the virtue of temperance, "refraining" from smoking is a consequence that naturally follows his *knowledge* that smoking is harmful; the Socratic doctrine "knowledge is virtue" holds perfectly for such a virtuous agent. He is the one who does not experience inner struggles when choosing what is good and noble or turning away from what is bad and base (because of the harmony of his reason and appetite); no obvious refraining or resisting is inwardly observed in such an agent.

The phenomenon of refraining or resisting becomes visible in a continent type, and we may add, such refraining or resisting is characteristic of this moral character. The continent feels the pull, i.e., what is *for him* the pleasure of smoking, at the sight of cigarette (because of his bad appetite); he struggles but, thanks to his good reason, manages to resist it. It is important to see that, even in the case of a continent agent, the resisting of the pleasure is not a *definite act* in itself. Practically speaking, refraining from smoking, that is, *not* smoking,

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131 By considering such an example I do not mean to confuse the refraining in the epoché with some kind of ordinary refraining. As Fink points out, in his "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," that the epoché is not an ordinary ontic refraining. I take Fink as meaning that *the from which one refrains* is radically different in two situations: in the epoché one refrains from participating in the belief in being, whereas one refrains from some ontic "pulls" in the ordinary scenarios.

132 To be sure, the phenomenon of resisting is also observable in the incontinent type, but this type can be ignored in our study because the incontinent collapses rather than "passing the test."
is achievable in many ways, by positively doing many different things. For example, one can remind oneself that smoking is harmful; or remind oneself that one's promise/resolution to quit smoking has already been made; one can also physically or mentally distract oneself by doing something else (e.g., imagining oneself being in a healthier shape in the long run because of quitting smoking), etc. All these "acts" can help bring out the refraining; but none of these doings properly represents the refraining per se.

We may also observe that the refraining in most cases is itself not the end of our action: we refrain from doing X for the sake of achieving something better and nobler; we normally do not become happy and praiseworthy in an unqualified sense just because we are capable of refraining. This, in a sense, is another proof that the refraining is not itself a definite act.

McKenna's interpretation of the component of "refraining" in the epoché as an act of resisting thus seems to have been modeled on the psychology of the morally continent.\(^{133}\) In other words, his interpretation of the epoché is a rather existential one.\(^{134}\) While an existential interpretation is not necessarily wrong, it seems to me that it would be better to model on the virtuous rather than on the continent if we really wish to interpret the epoché existentially. Like the virtuous, the epoché-performing transcendental ego experiences no inner struggle or resisting, neither does he ever need to mentally "distract" himself to something else for the

\(^{133}\) McKenna correctly emphasizes that the epistemic refraining that characterizes the epoché is different from the psychological refraining experienced by us in ordinary life, but his talk about the resisting of the "pull" shows that his interpretation of the epistemic refraining is still based upon a psychological paradigm. See his Husserl's "Introductions to Phenomenology," 155-56.

\(^{134}\) Another example of too existential a reading of the epoché can be found in Ricoeur's A Key to Husserl's "Ideas I," 42-43. In my opinion, the existential reading of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology can be both helpful and misleading.
sake of performing the epoché. What the epoché-performing ego really does is to *purposely* and *volitionally* create the within-without tension by isolating in imagination the original act from its context. This volitional creation of the tension is the volitional element that makes the epoché different. Moreover, the vision of this volitionally created tension is itself "disenchanting," that is, this vision suffices to make the epoché-performer "refrain." The more clearly he sees the tension, the more able he will be to understand that the original act on which he performs the epoché is *both* a pretension to *and* a legitimate positing of a being. And we should note: it is this vision and the clear understanding that results from this vision, not the experience of refraining, that serve as the end of the epoché.

*The Heightened Tension-Awareness as the Essential Difference*

We can more convincingly show that the epoché should not be analyzed into a neutrality modification "bundled" with an *act* of refraining or resisting by some concrete examples. In what follows I will describe the reading of a novel, Hermann Hesse's *Gertrud,* and the reading of a biography, Maynard Solomon's *Mozart;* I also describe how the epoché can be applied to the latter. My aim is to show, on the basis of the foregoing analysis of the

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135 See above, pp. 136-37, 142.

136 See above, pp. 136-37.

epoché, that the "refraining" is rather the *function* of the characteristic within-without tension and the performer's thematic awareness of the tension; and the volitional element that distinguishes the epoché from the ordinary neutrality modification consists in the volitional creation of such tension and the voluntary maintenance of such a tension-awareness.

In my reading of Hesse's *Gertrude* I believe, for example, that Kuhn's music is beautiful and that Muoth commits suicide. The beauty of Kuhn's music and the death of Muoth are harmoniously verified *in* the novel, viz., in Hesse's masterful narration, and hence they *truly are* in the novel. But as long as I, as a rational reader, am aware (a marginal/habitual awareness suffices) of the fact that I am reading a novel, I do not bother to extend that verification into my everyday existence; that is to say, I won't seriously entertain a wish to actually buy a CD of Kuhn's operas or to visit Muoth's grave. Phenomenologically speaking, my belief in the beauty of Kuhn's music and Muoth's death can be called *neutralized* belief.

In contrast, the belief I hold in my reading of Maynard Solomon's *Mozart* is quite different. For example, I notice that the author of this biography has made some interesting remarks about Mozart's Clarinet Quintet K. 581 and the composer's grave. I may therefore naturally hold a belief in the beauty of the Quintet and the existence of the grave. Moreover, there is nothing irrational in this case if I want to verify the author's claims by myself, in reality; namely, I may entertain a wish to actually listen to the Quintet and to actually visit Mozart's grave. Obviously, my belief in the beauty of the Quintet in question and the existence of the composer's grave has a different quality: it is a robust and serious belief,
rather than a "powerless" and neutralized one.\textsuperscript{138}

To sum up: in reading a novel we have neutralized belief and in reading a biography we have unneutralized belief. The verificational processes corresponding to each belief also reflect the difference between the two beliefs, namely, I verify the former in the \textit{text} only, that is, in the novel itself, but I may extend my verification of the latter into the reality. This fact leads us to Husserl's claim that "\textit{genuinely} non-neutralized noeses are subject to the \textit{'legitimation of reason,'} whereas \textit{the question about reason and unreason makes no sense for the neutralized noeses.}"\textsuperscript{139}

For a certain set of mental processes to be subject to the legitimation of reason, the admittance of the mental processes in question into the all-embracing synthesis that is always going on in my wakeful conscious life, i.e., the birthplace of rationality, is required.\textsuperscript{140} As members in the all-embracing synthesis, if the mental processes in question are verified, i.e., harmoniously corroborated by other members, then they are called true, veridical, and rational; if they are falsified, i.e., revealed to be in disharmony or discordance with other previously verified members, they should then be marked (at least initially) false, illusory, or irrational.\textsuperscript{141} My belief in the beauty of Mozart's Clarinet Quintet K. 581 and the existence of his grave, as a \textit{non-neutralized} belief, represents a member that is admitted into my normal belief system. It is therefore subject to such verification and falsification, i.e., "legitimation,"

\textsuperscript{138} The reading of a biography has the "believing character" we described on pp. 106-8.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ideas I}, 259/223 (§110).

\textsuperscript{140} About this all-embracing synthesis, cf. the "universal constitutive synthesis" that embraces all objectivities and all modes of consciousness of these objectivities, mentioned by Husserl in \textit{CM}, 54/90 (§22).

\textsuperscript{141} Cf. \textit{CM}, 57/92 (§23): "Reason refers to possibilities of verification."
and this explains why I may go about seriously testing its validity in real life.

On the contrary, neutralized noeses are not subject to the legitimation of reason because they are not honored as the candidates for possible verification/falsification in the all-embracing synthesis. To be sure, this does not mean that neutralized noeses do not participate in verification or synthesis of any type. In our example of novel-reading, we see that the beauty of Kuhn's music and the death of Muoth do get verified, but not in the normal way, because the "scope" of the verification in question is diminished: the synthesis and verification related to the beliefs I hold are confined in the novel; the novel marks the boundary where real synthesis ends and "phantsical" (or "fictional") synthesis begins. The beliefs I hold in reading a fiction are not subject to the legitimation of reason because I know that I am not dealing with real person and real predicates. This knowledge is somewhat enigmatic, because it implies that, even in the natural attitude, I understand that being extends as far as harmony, i.e., harmonious verification, extends, and I know that the synthesis, verification, and harmony with a "shrunken" scope are not real synthesis, verification, and harmony at all. This enigmatic knowledge obviously accounts for the characteristic lack of seriousness of the naturally neutralized noeses. It should also be noted that in novel reading I do have a tension-awareness, that is, I am aware of the existence a within (the text itself) and a without (my real life), but neither the tension nor the tension-awareness is created by my active application of will. Furthermore, the only "use" I make of

142 To be sure, I am talking about a rather extreme case. There are admittedly many subtleties in the experience of novel-reading and there are indeed many ways in which a novel can influence our real life. It seems to me, however, these subtleties do not falsify my study here, because they represent intentionalities and habitualities of some mixed form, and can be made intelligible on the basis of the study offered here, supplemented by a general phenomenological study of the act of reading.
the tension and tension-awareness is practical (so that I do not trespass the boundary between
the within and the without lest I go delirious by mistaking fiction for life) rather than
theoretical, and I am concerned about the neutralized contents themselves, not about the
phenomenon of neutralization as such.

Now, as a student of phenomenology, if I wish to understand how my reading of
Solomon's Mozart is able to influence and enrich my rational life, one thing I can do is to
practice a phenomenology of reading, and more particularly, a phenomenology of the reading
of the genre of biography. Naturally, I will need to perform the epoché on my reading of this
book. Following our analysis of the particular epoché, in the first phase of the epoché I would
have to disconnect the reading in question from its original nexus of experiences. Inside the
nexus of experiences there are of course my previous experience of different literary genres
and my former knowledge of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart the composer; they should all be
"imagined away" for the moment so that all habitual and tacit transfers of senses are
interrupted. Once this step is done, my reading of Mozart would be like the reading of a
fiction about a fascinating man named Mozart who has accomplished many unbelievable
feats. But it is a fiction-reading experience like no other, because it is accompanied by my
heightened awareness of the within-without tension that is not found in its ordinary
counterparts: the tension is volitionally created for theoretical purpose, as is determined by
the logic of the epoché, and I examine this fiction-reading-like-reading-experience as having
been disconnected from its original context. Then, in the second phase of the epoché, I would
restore this disconnected reading to its original place in my conscious life. As we have shown

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143 This is similar to the purely aesthetic consciousness of the depictured we discussed earlier.
in our analysis of the particular epoché, performing the *disconnection* and *restoration* with a heightened awareness of the within-without tension helps us understand the grounds of the validity of biography reading.

Our examples thus allow us to talk more precisely about the differences between the ordinary neutrality modification and the epoché.

(1) The ordinary neutrality modification (e.g., phantasy, novel-reading) generates beliefs/experiences that are not subject to the full legitimation of reason, whereas it is exactly the primary interest of the epoché to target beliefs/experiences that are rationally justified, that is, acts subject to the legitimation of reason. This is why the performance of the epoché promotes rationality, but sheer phantasy itself is not concerned about making an immediate contribution to rationality.

(2) The within-without tension is present in both the neutrality modification and the epoché, but it comes into being in different ways, and serves different purposes. In the ordinary neutrality modification, the *within* and the *without* are two realms naturally separate from each other. I enter one (e.g., the "world" in the novel), and normally with a habitual/marginal awareness of myself being in a novel. With this awareness I normally won't mistake fiction as reality. On the contrary, in the epoché the within-without tension is purposely created and is maintained with methodological rigor. As we pointed out earlier, this tension awareness is crucial for our epistemic effort to understand the nature of the original act, that is, this "artificial" and volitional disconnection *must* be made in order to serve our theoretical interest. To sum up, and I think this is essential: we are unthematically aware of the within-without tension in the ordinary neutralization; but we have a heightened and
voluntarily maintained tension-awareness in the epoché.

(3) The status of the ego is also worth highlighting. In ordinary neutrality modification, the ego lives in the within, gets absorbed in the within, marginally knows that he is within (the novel) and that there is a without. The act of novel reading may become critical, but not transcendental, because the ego is not fully above the within-without tension. In the epoché, however, the ego consciously and voluntarily raises himself above the within-without tension and shifts his focus back and forth; it is a genuinely transcendental act.

Given the difference discussed above, it becomes understandable why the "No" is added by Husserl in the "Copy A." Perhaps, the more Husserl practiced the epoché, the more urgently he felt that the difference between the two phenomena should be emphasized rather than played down. Although in the operation of the epoché we, in a sense, utilize, refine, and sublimate a "skill" (i.e., the ordinary neutrality modification) we already have in the natural attitude, the epoché and the neutrality modification are nonetheless as sharply different as the natural is different from the transcendental.144

The Universal Epoché and the Transcendental Reduction

Having interpreted the particular epoché from the perspective of having, in this section I turn to the universal epoché. My presentation of the universal epoché, however, will not follow Husserl's procedure in the Ideas I, namely, I will not delve into Husserl's detailed

144 Thus I agree with Brainard's conclusion that the epoché and the neutrality modification "are separated literally toto coelo." See Brainard, Belief and Its Neutralization, 160 and 160n90; also see above footnote #117.
phenomenological analyses of the different modes of being that pertain to consciousness and physical things. Instead, my primary concern is to show, through a reading of Husserl's descriptions of the universal epoché, that the transition from the particular epoché to the universal epoché involves a transition from the within-without tension to the self-other distinction. Since the self-other distinction is another eidetic moment of having, the universal epoché can thus be identified as a kind of having, namely, the transcendental ego's radical self-having.

To confirm this claim, it will be necessary to go beyond the Ideas I and to make references to the descriptions Husserl offers in his late works. When I do this I will particularly focus on Husserl's descriptions of the universal epoché that clearly bring out its acquiring character. This acquiring is called in the Ideas I the acquiring of the region of the absolute being, and it is clear that (as we will see in a moment) this acquiring is also the acquiring (i.e., having) of the transcendental ego himself in entirety and purity.

I then attempt to explain that the universal epoché and the transcendental reduction are inseparably one unitary mental operation: they differ in that they each have a different

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145 I do not follow Husserl here because it seems to me that the universal epoché should be introduced immediately after the particular epoché; there is no need to digress here. Another reason I do not follow him is that his procedure in the Ideas I is, to some extent, confusing. After the introduction of the epoché in §31, in §32 he speaks about how the universality of the epoché should be restricted so that a region of new beings may survive the epoché; then in §§34-46 he studies the differences between immanent perception and transcendent perception in order to reveal that mental processes and physical things have different modes of being. Yet it is more accurate to call these analyses pre-epoché intentional analyses: they are obviously influenced by the Cartesian motive, namely, they aim at discovering a region of beings that is able to survive the radical doubt. But, at this stage, the epoché as a method should have already officially replaced the Cartesian method. These analyses in fact fall back to a level that is "below" the epoché. For criticisms of Husserl's approach in Ideas I, see Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," 121-22; Ricoeur, A Key to Husserl's "Ideas I," 38-39; Ströker, Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology, 59-62.

146 See below, pp. 189-91.
methodological focus.\textsuperscript{147} In other words, whereas the universal epoché as a method focuses on the *acquiring*, the transcendental reduction focuses on the concrete work to be done *after* the acquiring. More precisely, the transcendental reduction emphasizes the need to take up the most comprehensive *transcendental* constitutive analysis, through which, on the one hand, the clarifying of the being of the world in terms of having is made possible and, on the other hand, the transcendental ego's own being, viz., its radical *individuation*, is brought about and enhanced. Thus, by virtue of the transcendental reduction, being is shown to be reducible to the transcendental ego's having of experiences, and the having-being dichotomy discussed in the previous two chapters can be seen as solved in the performance of the transcendental reduction.

*From the Within-Without Tension to the Self-Other Distinction*

We have shown that the particular epoché is in essence a reflective act characterized by its peculiar within-without tension and the epoché-performer's awareness of the tension. In performing the particular epoché our interest lies in clarifying and understanding the validity of a particular act. Since our ultimate interest in performing the epoché is to understand the all-pervasive belief in being that characterizes the natural attitude, the

\textsuperscript{147} My position will be developed below on pp. 191-94. For the moment, I would like to point out that my position can be said to be a synthesis of Ströker and Bossert's opinions. Ströker says that the difference between the epoché and the reduction is "insubstantial," and therefore it should not be philosophically overestimated. Bossert claims that "epoché and reduction are not two separate stages of a larger operation but rather two aspects—distinct but not separable—of the same operation." See Ströker, *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology*, 60n34; Bossert, "The Sense of 'Epoché' and 'Reduction,'" 244.
particular epoché is no longer enough: it has to be universalized. In the universalized epoché, instead of parenthesizing one particular act and refraining from participating in the original positing of it, we practice the parenthesizing on all acts and refrain from participating in all the posittings. We thus enact an all-embracing reflection in which our conscious life is beheld in its entirety.

My aim is to show that the transition from the particular epoché to the universal epoché structurally corresponds to a transition from the within-without tension to the self-other distinction. I shall therefore focus on the structural difference between the two epochai, and this means to study the structural difference between two types of reflection. The structure of the all-embracing reflection that makes up the universal epoché is well described in the following two passages, one from the Ideas I and another from the Crisis.

In the phenomenological attitude in essential universality we prevent the effecting of all such cogitative posittings, i.e., we "parenthesize" the posittings effected; for our new inquiries we do not "participate in these posittings." Instead of living in them, instead of effecting them, we effect acts of reflection directed to them, and we seize upon them themselves as the absolute being which they are. We are now living completely in such acts of the second degree, acts the datum of which is the infinite field of absolute mental processes — the fundamental field of phenomenology.

An attitude is arrived at which is above the pregivenness of the validity of the world, above the infinite complex whereby, in concealment, the world's validities are always founded on other validities, above the whole manifold but synthetically unified flow in which the world has and forever attains anew its content of meaning and its ontic validity. In other words, we thus have an attitude above the universal conscious life (both individual-subjective and intersubjective) through which the world is "there" for those naively absorbed in ongoing life, as unquestionably present, as the universe of what is there, as the field of all acquired and newly established life-interests.

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148 On the need to universalize the epoché, see Ideas I, §32; Crisis, §40.

149 Ideas I, 114/94-95.

150 Crisis, 150 (§40).
Although these two passages were written more than twenty years apart from each other, they describe the performance of the universal epoché in a very similar fashion. Both of them are quoted because they explain each other and, together, they shed light on the structural feature of the universal epoché. Husserl in the first passage describes the acts of reflection (the part and parcel of the universal epoché) as acts of "the second degree," and he claims that such reflective acts take as their datum "the infinite field of absolute mental processes." The structural feature of the universal epoché is expressed by the phrase "the second degree," and an explanation of this phrase can be found in the second passage where Husserl says that in order to effect a total change of the natural attitude, that is, in order to carry out the universal epoché, we need to raise ourselves above the universal conscious life and the validities therein. "The universal conscious life" mentioned in the second paragraph is synonymous to "the infinite field of absolute mental processes" mentioned in the first paragraph, and to raise oneself above this infinite field is to perform reflections on a higher order, that is, to carry out reflections on "the second degree." To be sure, neither "above" nor "the second degree" signifies a spatially elevated position; they both refer to the transcendental viewpoint, from which we are able to take the entire natural conscious life as the datum of our contemplation.\footnote{Also cf. Crisis, 206 (§58), where Husserl describes the transcendental attitude as "a way of lifting myself above all world-apperceptions and my human self-apperception, purely for the purpose of studying the transcendental accomplishment in and through which I 'have' the world." (My italics)} The structure of the universal epoché is thus laid bare.

We can now compare the structural feature of the universal epoché with that of the particular epoché. We have seen that the particular epoché is also a \textit{transcendental}
performance in which the epoché-performer (1) is *above* the particular act and the nexus of experiences in which this very act is embedded, so that (2) he becomes aware of the within-without tension therein and can then study the grounds of the validity of the original act. When the operations of *imaging-away* and *restoration* are carried out, the epoché-performer always keeps the original act as the primary focus, and the particular act in question is said to be that which is *had within*. The structural feature of the universal epoché we described above, however, does not seem to fit into our description of the particular epoché, even though the ego who performs the universal epoché also reflects from *above* (that is, both epochai are *transcendental* operation). For the ego is now *above* his natural conscious life as *a whole* and reflects on it as *a whole*, and this implies that the structural within-without tension is no longer present, because the entire conscious life, which includes all possible acts and all possible nexuses of experiences (with their correlative validity-products), is now *within* the all-embracing reflective gaze. To put it differently, there does not seem to be a more comprehensive "*without*" that is able to enclose this *within*, or at least, to be in contrast with this *within.*\(^{152}\) The universal epoché thus loses the characteristic tension and the related tension-awareness; moreover, without the necessary *without*, the first phase of the epoché—viz., the "imaging away," as we have identified in the particular epoché—cannot be performed.

The above consideration suggests that the universal epoché is not a simple extension

\(^{152}\) *We deal with the wakeful* conscious life when we investigate the natural attitude. It is therefore possible to take the non-wakeful conscious life as that which is *without* and still maintain a within-without tension. For instance, we can carry out phenomenological investigations into dreams and even dreamless sleep and find out how they contribute to the validities of the wakeful life. But it should be noted that the boundary between the wakeful and the non-wakeful is a peculiar one, as it seems that it can only be approached from "one side," i.e., from the wakeful side. I will not pursue this topic here.
of the particular epoché. Yet, even though the universal epoché no longer embraces the characteristic within-without tension, we can show that it is still a logical development of the particular epoché. We may imagine that, in the course of the universalization of the epoché, the within undergoes such a process of amplification\(^{153}\) that it becomes virtually infinite, that is, the epoché performer's reflection finally arrives at a within that is "without a without."\(^{154}\)

It is the arrival at this virtually infinite within that has caused the disappearance of the within-without tension. The following two passages from the *Cartesian Meditations* tell us that this virtually infinite within is the ego's own conscious life as a whole.

The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend [fasse] myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me.\(^{155}\)

[W]hat I . . . acquire [was mir zueigen wird] by it [i.e., performing the universal epoché] is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of "phenomena" in the . . . phenomenological sense.\(^{156}\)

Husserl in these two passages clearly understands the achievement of the universal epoché as the grasping and acquiring of the ego's pure conscious life; we can also say that it results in

\(^{153}\) To say that the within undergoes a "process" of amplification does not necessarily mean that the epoché-performer has to go through a continuous, piecemeal way of amplifying his reflective gaze. In fact, this amplification can be achieved "in one leap."

\(^{154}\) Cf. *FTL*, 250, where Husserl says that "neither a world nor any other existent of any conceivable sort comes 'from outdoors' into my ego, my life of consciousness. Everything outside is what it is in this inside, and gets its true-being from the givings of it itself, and from the verifications, within this inside." "Everything outside is what it is in this inside"—this statement can be said to be Husserl's transcendental idealism in a nutshell. But only when the transcendental ego's life becomes "without a without," everything objective/outside can be what it is in this virtually infinite subjective within. In other words, when the epoché is universalized, there is neither subjective without nor objective without; every without is now understood as having been constituted within, that is, constituted within the transcendental life of consciousness as a mode of immanent being or immanent sense.

\(^{155}\) *CM*, 21 (§8).

\(^{156}\) *CM*, 20-21.
the transcendental ego's radical self-having. This achievement is especially clear in the second passage where the phrase *mir zueigen werden* is used. Literally meaning "to become one's own" or "to enown,"\(^{157}\) the German phrase *mir zueigen werden* vividly brings out the point that, by virtue of the epoché, the ego in its transcendental reflections comes to a radical self discovery, that is, a radical self-having, accompanied by the enhanced awareness of its *ownership* of its experiences.\(^{158}\) Since this radical self-having is also the ego's radical individuation, the essence of the ego's own being is also realized through its self-having.\(^{159}\)

We may wonder, however: if the ego's radical self-having is identified as "without a without," does not this radical self-having also eliminate other egos, which certainly connote a *without*? If this is the case, it seems that the universal epoché, the performance that leads to the ego's radical self-having, not only cancels the within-without tension, but also pushes us into solipsism by annihilating the *self-other distinction*. It then follows that the universal epoché should no longer be interpreted in terms of having, exactly because the two eidetic moments of having—the within-without tension and the self-other distinction—are all

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\(^{158}\) This awareness also distinguishes the transcendental reduction from the method of phenomenological reduction conceived by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*. See above pp. 96-100, on how Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* understands the ego's manner of *having* its experiences; also cf. Quentin Smith, "Husserl's Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction in the *Logical Investigations*," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 39 (1979): 433-37.

\(^{159}\) See above, pp. 48-50, on having and the principle of individuation.
"destroyed" by it.

This worry, however, is unfounded, because the distinction between the self and the other gets renewed and reinstalled in the universal epoché. In other words, although the other is for transcendental phenomenology no longer the traditional problem concerning the existence of the other's mind, it becomes a transcendental problematic after the performance of the universal epoché: it is recognized as a sense to be explicated inside the transcendental ego's self-having, the infinite within. With respect to the explication of the sense of the other, Husserl in the Fifth Meditation gives us a methodological guideline:

> Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me—in respect of its "what" and its "it exists and actually is"—is a sense in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered for me in consequence of my life's constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification."\(^{160}\)

That is to say, the being (the "it exists and actually is") of the other is still fully acknowledged after the universal epoché, only that it is now regarded as clarifiable in the transcendental ego's radical self-having.\(^{161}\) This is why it is appropriate to say that the self-other distinction is renewed and reinstalled in a clarified form.

Given that the performance of the universal epoché keeps the self-other distinction and enhances the transcendental ego's ownership of his conscious life, the universal epoché,

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\(^{160}\) *CM*, 91/123.

\(^{161}\) That the traditional self-other distinction is reinstalled and reformulated after the performance of the universal epoché can also be illustrated by the following example. Still in the Fifth Meditation, in order to show how in principle a common Objective world is possible, Husserl talks about the question of "how to identify a Nature constituted in me with a Nature constituted by someone else"; he then reformulates the question "with the necessary precision" as "how to identify a Nature constituted in me with one constituted in me as a Nature constituted by someone else." (*CM*, 126/155, underline added.) The underlined text reveals the gist of Husserl's reformulation: as transcendental phenomenologists, our task is to recognize "what is constituted in me as nevertheless other than me." (Ibid.)
like the particular epoché, can also be understood in terms of having.

*The Transcendental Reduction: from Being to Having*

In addition to the affirmation that the epoché leads to the transcendental ego's radical self-having, another important message is conveyed by the two passages we just quoted. Namely, we are told that the pure egoic life arrived at through the epoché is *constitutive* of the world. To say that I, by virtue of the epoché, recognize that in and by my infinite subjective life (which is acquired through the epoché) "the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me,"\(^{162}\) is to assert that my radical self-having is the origin of the constitution of the world. So we get this formula: my radical self-having is world-constituting, and since to constitute the world is to *have* the world, my radical self-having is at the same time my having of the world.\(^{163}\) A new task is intimated by this formula, namely, it is the task of the transcendental reduction to spell out this formula by virtue of comprehensive and detailed analyses and descriptions.

As was anticipated earlier, in this section we shall discuss the difference between the universal epoché and the transcendental reduction. Let us turn to a pertinent comment Elisabeth Ströker makes in her *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology*:

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\(^{162}\) *CM*, 21 (§8).

\(^{163}\) For example, Husserl says that "*Die Welt ist konstituiert, da das Ego welthabendes ist.*" In Eugen Fink, *VI. Cartesianaische Meditation, Teil 1: Die Idee einer transzendenten Methodenlehre*, ed. Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl, and Guy Van Kerckhoven, Husserliana Dokumente, Vol. 2/a (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 135. The idea that "to constitute is to *have*" (i.e., to "contain") is also expressed in *Ideas I*, 113/94, where he says that "the whole of absolute being . . . contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies." Also see above, footnote #151, the quote from the *Crisis*. 
The difference in meaning between "transcendental reduction" and "epoché" has repeatedly been the object of overly exact debates. . . . Since the difference in the matter itself is insubstantial, it should not be philosophically overestimated. The distinction may be properly restored by seeing in the transcendental reduction the measure that leads to the attitude of the epoché.\textsuperscript{164}

Ströker's position is unequivocally expressed in this passage. Although I do not see "in the transcendental reduction the measure that leads to the attitude of the epoché" as Ströker sees it,\textsuperscript{165} I do agree that there is no need to overemphasize the difference between the two methods. As I see it, the universal epoché and the transcendental reduction are inseparably one unitary mental operation: their operations and functions interpenetrate and they differ only in that they each have a different methodological focus. To express the difference differently, the epoché discovers the transcendental ego, and the reduction answers the question of "what can I do with the transcendental ego philosophically?"\textsuperscript{166} by actual work.

We already see that the methodological focus of the universal epoché is mainly on the acquiring of the transcendental domain (i.e., the transcendental ego's self-having); in order to show that the transcendental reduction focuses more on the concrete work to be done after the acquiring has been secured, let us use the term "transcendental" to guide our exposition.

For Husserl, the transcendental is called transcendental because it primarily means that which constitutes, has, and hence is responsible for, the transcedent.\textsuperscript{167} In the Cartesian Meditations, for example, when talking about the transcendency of the world, Husserl says

\textsuperscript{164} Ströker, Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology, 60n34.

\textsuperscript{165} On the distinction between the two methods my understanding is rather closer to the reverse of Ströker's expression.

\textsuperscript{166} CM, 27/66 (§12).

\textsuperscript{167} See above, footnote #79.
that

If this "transcendence," which consists in being non-really included, is part of the intrinsic sense of the world, then, by way of contrast, the Ego himself, who bears within him the world as an accepted sense and who in turn, is necessarily presupposed by this sense, is legitimately called *transcendental*, in the phenomenological sense. Accordingly the philosophical problems arising from this correlation are called transcendental-philosophical.¹⁶⁸

The *correlation* between the transcendental and the transcendent is asserted in this passage; we may also say that this is a correlation between the *producing* and the *produced*. Bearing this correlation in mind, we come to see that the transcendental reductions is rather a "leading back" whose direction is determined by this correlation: the reduction leads *the transcendent* (most prominently, *the world*) back to the *transcendental* as its *producing origin*, that is, to the transcendental ego's pure life as the producing agent.¹⁶⁹ Like the correlation between objectivities and their modes of givenness that has occupied Husserl's whole philosophical life, the correlation between the transcendental and the transcendent is also an all-encompassing topic in need of detailed explication, and this is the work of the transcendental reduction.

¹⁶⁸ *CM*, 26/65 (§11). Elisabeth Ströker in her *The Husserlian Foundations of Science* explains the term "transcendental" and her explanation also precisely interprets Husserl: "the term 'transcendental' means, in the first place, that consciousness contains all transcendent being intentionally. How and in which way it 'contains' the world as a phenomenon was the problem Husserl had to deal with in his later work, and he modified his answers according to the progressive refinement of his procedures." Note that *containing*, *bearing*, and *having* express the same relationship; in Ströker's formulation, we can say that the methodological focus of the transcendental reduction is exactly "how and in which way" transcendental consciousness contains/has the world as a phenomenon. Ströker, *The Husserlian Foundations of Science*, ed. Lee Hardy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 37.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *Crisis*, §41, which is entitled "The Genuine Transcendental Epoché Makes Possible the 'Transcendental Reduction'—The Discovery and Investigation of the Transcendental Correlation between World and World-Consciousness." Also see *Ideas I*, 113/94 and *Hua 3/b*, 499, where Husserl says that "the whole of absolute being... contains within itself, constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies." The term "worldly transcendencies" is interpreted in a later added footnote as "an intentional correlate of the ideally actualizable and harmonious continuable acts of habitual acceptance." This interpretation is clearly about a reduction of transcendencies to their transcendental origin, i.e., the constituting acts.
Under the all-encompassing topic of the transcendental-transcendent correlation, we may group the Husserlian claims that ontological regions, physical things, all sorts of intentional objects, are all "transcendental clues," and that "anything that is—whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs—is an index of a subjective system of correlations."¹⁷⁰ Of course, they are not just claims: they point to concrete studies and actual works, the ultimate achievement of which consists in the elucidation of one simple phrase—"my world." The being of "my world" is rendered utterly intelligible: the world is my having of it, which is at the same time my radical self-having. Thus, in the transcendental ego’s self-having, the having-being dichotomy that we have discussed in the previous chapters disappears.

¹⁷⁰ *Ideas I*, §150; *CM*, §21; *Crisis*, §48.
In Chapter 3 we interpreted the epoché and the transcendental reduction, two important methods of Husserl's phenomenology, from the perspective of having; we have also shown how the universal epoché results in the transcendental ego's radical self-having, which is at the same time the transcendental ego's having of the world. In this chapter we continue to employ the idea of having to explore Husserl's phenomenology. Restricting ourselves to the Cartesian Meditations (which is fairly representative of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a whole), we shall see that Husserl's phenomenology is a phenomenology of having in the sense that he employs evidence (as having) as the method to study manifold phenomena of having.

I begin by discussing three possible ways to explore Husserl's phenomenology of having, i.e., how it can be explored systematically, chronologically, and in a reversed chronological way. I explain why a systematic exploration would be speculative and risky at the present stage of our exploration, why the chronological way involves hard-to-manage details and digressions that belong to the development of Husserl's thought, and why only the third way gives us a neat picture of Husserl's phenomenology. My aim is to justify my choice of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations as the textual basis of our exploration of his phenomenology of having.
I then turn to the *Cartesian Meditations*, and my purpose is to show that *evidence as having* provides us the key to understanding the transcendental phenomenology presented by Husserl in the book. To facilitate the exposition, I distinguish two versions of transcendental philosophy in the *Cartesian Meditations*: they both can be said to be the result of Husserl's hermeneutical appropriation of the Cartesian legacy, and they both can be expressed in the language of having. (1) From a phenomenological perspective, Husserl hermeneutically interprets Descartes' transcendental philosophy as a journey that travels from cognitive poverty (having-nothing) to an all-inclusive cognition (having-all); this journey is in Husserl's opinion the "prototype" of transcendental philosophy. (2) From a purely transcendental perspective, Husserl portrays his own phenomenology as a transcendental-philosophical enterprise whose telos, archē, and methodos can all be understood in terms of evidence (as having)—its telos and archē are the transcendental ego's *self-evidence* (i.e., the transcendental ego's *self-having* resulted from the universal epoché and grasped in different degrees of adequacy), and *evidence* (i.e., intuition) itself also functions as the methodos of this enterprise.

By the end of our study of these two versions of transcendental philosophy we should be able to understand more concretely that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is a phenomenology of having; we should also gain some insight into Husserl's claims that the transcendental ego is for transcendental phenomenology "not only its initial but sole theme," and that even though his transcendental phenomenology can be described as neo-Cartesian, he needs to "reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy."\(^1\)

\(^1\) *CM*, 30/69 (§13) and 1/43 (§1).
The discussion of the phenomenology of having in the *Cartesian Meditations* will bring the present dissertation to a close. To conclude my study, I would like to point out some possible topics—namely, time consciousness, habituality, and Plato and Aristotle on having—that can be explored from the perspective of having on the basis of the research we have undertaken here. It remains for another study to carry out these explorations in full.

**Why the *Cartesian Meditations***?

Unlike Marcel, Husserl himself did not explicitly speak about a phenomenology of having. His silence poses an issue for our study, namely, if the talk about a Husserlian phenomenology of having is meant to be a plausible interpretation of Husserl, the actual existence of such a phenomenology needs to be shown; and the text on which this showing is based should not be arbitrarily chosen. A good choice should help us see that the theme of having does not just occur randomly or incidentally in Husserl's thought. In my opinion, the *Cartesian Meditations* fits this bill nicely, and I would like to justify my choice of this book by reviewing three possible ways to prove the existence of a Husserlian phenomenology of having.

The first is to prove it in a systematic manner. Husserl's phenomenology is extremely rich in its contents and difficult with respect to its formidably complicated terminology; nevertheless, it is possible to obtain a systematic grasp of it if we identify the formal structures that have always already determined both its methodology and its subject matter. For instance, Robert Sokolowski has in his works revealed three such formal structures,
namely, the structures of *parts and wholes, identity in a manifold, and presence and absence*; he has also convincingly shown through his works that Husserlian phenomenology becomes more accessible and understandable if we present it in a systematic manner by employing these formal structures. The kinship between *having* and these three formal structures can be shown if we paraphrase the three structures in the language of having, namely, if we see them as about how the parts are *had* (embraced) by the whole, how the many are *had* (unified) by the one, and how presence and absence are *had* (synthesized) by the mind. So exploring the connections between these formal structures and having does seem to be a good strategy to systematically investigate Husserl's phenomenology of having. In fact, the three formal structures have already been employed in our analysis of having so far. However, advancing abstract assertions about these connections cannot help but seem emtpily speculative at this stage. To avoid this undesirable appearance, I will not pursue this rather risky approach.

The second option is to survey Husserl's works in a chronological order and to see whether or not the development of his phenomenology is also a gradual unfolding of the theme of having. As was pointed out earlier, the theme of having was already present in the *Logical Investigations*, and it can be shown that this theme has received constant refinements and clarifications along with the evolution of Husserl's thought. A developmental and chronological approach therefore appears to be natural and feasible. Nevertheless, this

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2 The three formal structures are concisely explained in the chapter 3 of Sokolowski's *Introduction to Phenomenology*. For more detailed explorations of these structures, see Sokolowski's *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974); and his *Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).

3 Clearly, instead of being a univocal term, "having" is said in many ways.

4 See above, pp. 92-100.
approach has a serious drawback because of a peculiarity inherent in the development of Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the famous zig-zag movement through which Husserl tirelessly reexamined, refined, and reappropriated or rejected his earlier findings. Following the chronological order, we may get lost in the profusion of details and fail to see clearly the forest itself. Hence, the chronological way should not be taken either.

The best approach, so it seems, needs to take into account the peculiarities of both the content of Husserl's phenomenology and the development of his thought. Is this at all possible? In order to answer this question, let us turn to the advice once offered by Dorion Cairns, the faithful and reliable student of Husserl. On the basis of his expertise in Husserl's writings, Cairns maintained that the best way to read Husserl would be to read him in a reversed chronological (or better, a teleological) order, namely, to begin with Husserl's mature works like the *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*; guided by a fair understanding of these works written "at the peak of Husserl's philosophical powers,"\(^5\) one can then make better sense of *Ideas I, Logical Investigations*, and those enormous lectures and manuscripts.

Cairns' advice targets the readers of Husserl in general, but it is also applicable to our current research. Like the themes of temporality and transcendental idealism, the theme of having also ripens in Husserl's late writings. Moreover, the *Cartesian Meditations* stands out when the choice is to be made between it and the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: as Husserl's mature yet "introductory" work, the *Cartesian Meditations* not only fairly

\(^5\) This phrase belongs to Richard M. Zaner, in his foreword to Dorion Cairns' *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, x.
represents Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as an organic and systematic whole, but also abounds with the theme of having (we will see this in a moment) in a manner that is more palpable than does the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

Hence, I will take the *Cartesian Meditations* as the basis of my textual interpretation, and try to reveal the phenomenology of having in it.

My interpretation of the *Cartesian Meditations* does not mean to be comprehensive. My goal is to show that the theme of having runs through the book and that bearing this fact in mind enables us to identify and comprehend the phenomenology of having in it. Let me take my departure from the first portrait of transcendental philosophy that Husserl sketches in the Introduction.

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6 It should be noted that the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* has its unique merits that cannot be substituted by the *Cartesian Meditations*. As Klaus Held says, "it was in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that Husserl explained most clearly the import of the evidence principle for phenomenology." (Klaus Held, "Heidegger and the Principle of Phenomenology," trans. Christopher Macann, in *History of Philosophy*, vol. 2 of *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, ed. Christopher Macann [London: Routledge, 1992], 303.) Moreover, the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* contains some of Husserl's clearest statements on the relation between evidence and having. See, for example, *FTL*, 287/253, 45/40, 127-28/113-14.

The Proto-Journey: from Having-Nothing to Having-All

Husserl invokes the Cartesian ideal of a genuine and all-inclusive science right at the beginning of the book, and he praises Descartes' contribution to the grounding of this science on the subject. Descartes' turning toward the subject is said to have "an eternal significance" for transcendental phenomenology, and Husserl distinguishes two senses in which Descartes' turn should be appreciated: first, it signifies a turning toward the subject as the cognizer who decides to take full responsibility of his cognitions; second, in a deeper sense, it signifies a turning toward the subject as the subject of his own cogitationes. The theme of having is at work in both senses.

It is relatively easy to see why the second sense is related to having, for to emphasize that the subject is the subject of his own cogitationes amounts to emphasizing the ego's ownership of his cogitationes, a topic that we already discussed in our study of the epoché and the reduction. We will have chance to review the second sense when we survey Husserl's portrait of his own transcendental philosophy, i.e., his transcendental phenomenology. At this

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8 It is noteworthy that Cairns, instead of using the English cognate universal to "translate" the German universal, chooses "all-inclusive." In his Guide for Translating Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), Cairns' suggestions for translating the German universal are "all-inclusive, all-embracing, all-pervasive, universal." See the entry "universal" on page 116.

It is possible that Cairns' translation aims at bringing out the original sense of the term universal, which is better captured by "all-inclusive," "all-embracing," or "all-having." Leaving the term "universal" untranslated is effortless, but may also promote thoughtlessness, as the original strength of the word is largely covered up in our ordinary usage of the term. See also CM, §18, where Husserl speaks of the consciousness of internal time as allumspannen, and Cairns translates it literally as all-embracing, which is closer to the original sense of universal.

9 See CM, 2-3.
juncture, let us focus on Husserl's explication of the first sense:

Philosophy—wisdom (*sagesse*)—is the philosophizer's quite personal affair. It must arise as *his* wisdom, as his self-acquired knowledge tending toward universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his own absolute insights. If I have decided to live with this as my aim—the decision that alone can start me on the course of a philosophical development—I have thereby chosen to begin in absolute poverty, with an absolute lack of knowledge.\(^\text{10}\)

Husserl reminds us that philosophy as the all-inclusive unity of sciences must arise as *one's own* wisdom. The stress he puts on the possessive pronoun "his" is worth noting, for it suggests that outsourcing the making of this all-inclusive wisdom or borrowing this universal knowledge from others makes no sense in this epistemic enterprise. The Cartesian scientist must *acquire* everything for himself through *his own* insight, and thus takes full responsibility and genuine ownership of his cognitions: this is why it is necessary for him to start with "absolute poverty," i.e. the "absolute lack of knowledge (*die absolute Erkenntnisarmut*)."\(^\text{11}\) In the language of having, the Cartesian meditator's cognitive enterprise has to start with an absolute *having-nothing* and strives toward the state of cognitive all-inclusiveness, i.e., the genuine and all-inclusive science as the *having-all*. Husserl calls this cognitive journey "the prototype for any beginning philosopher's necessary meditations,"\(^\text{12}\) and to some extent, his own transcendental phenomenology is a radical hermeneutical appropriation of this prototype; so let us make the phenomenological meaning of this *proto-journey* clear to us by replying to the following two objections.

1. It may be objected that Husserl in the passage just quoted uses the language of

\(^{10}\) *CM*, 2.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) *CM*, 2/44 (§1).
possession instead of the language of having: *Armut* in its ordinary usage signifies a lack of material *possessions*; moreover, other possession-words such as *Erwerb* and *Besitz* are also employed by Husserl in the *Cartesian Meditations* to name and describe the transcendental ego's cognitions and convictions.\(^{13}\) To this objection we reply: it is true that *Armut*, *Erwerb*, and *Besitz* normally connote objective, material possessions; but the fact that Husserl does not terminologically distinguish having from possession does not imply that he confounds the two phenomenologically.

First of all, if possession is taken to mean the possession of *independent* things (as Marcel understands it), then it makes no sense for Husserl to talk about the transcendental ego's possessions because nothing is *independent* in relation to the transcendental ego, the *absolute concretum*.\(^{14}\) Moreover, the contexts in which Husserl uses these terms tell us that the meaning he wants to convey through these terms is that cognitions and convictions, once they are acquired by the ego, become *enduringly available* to the ego. It is this enduring availability that allows us to analogously talk about what we *have* in terms of what we *possess*; however, what we *have* and what we *possess* are *set up*, *stored*, *retrieved*, and *replaced* in entirely different ways, and Husserl's phenomenology furnishes rich resources for making these distinctions.\(^{15}\) It would indeed be strange to think that Husserl is ignorant of these distinctions and mistakes the having of knowledge as some kind of material possession.

(2) It may also be objected that the absolute poverty is the poverty, i.e., the having-

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\(^{13}\) See for example, *Hua* 1, 51, 53, and 102.

\(^{14}\) See footnote #16 in Chapter 2 for an explanation of "absolute concretum."

\(^{15}\) For the distinction between having and possession, see the discussions above on pp. 44-48, 57-63.
nothing, of the meditator, but the having-all features the all-inclusive science itself. Is not here a gap to be bridged, a gap between the subjective (or noetic) having-nothing and the objective (or noematic) having-all, and hence is not this journey still haunted by the un-phenomenological subject-object dichotomy? To this objection we reply: yes, it seems to be a gap indeed, but the gap is bridged at once if we take into consideration the fundamental principle of phenomenology, that is, the principle of the apriori correlation between an objectivity and the intentionalities that constitute it. According to this principle, the all-inclusive science can only be brought into existence by a cognizing subject (more precisely, a community of cognizing subjects) who, as the achieving and performing subject, is also the subject of the multiplicity of intentionalities by virtue of which the all-inclusive science in question is set up. This multiplicity of intentionalities has to be all-comprehensive because it is the noetic origin and correlate of this all-inclusive science; needless to say, the subject of the all-comprehensive intentionalities is in this sense also all-comprehensive. Thus we may conclude: the journey from having-nothing to having-all in fact travels from subjective having-nothing to subjective having-all, and thus inherits no problems engendered by the traditional subject-object dichotomy.

Lest this subjective having-all be misunderstood, let us note: phenomenologically speaking, the ego's achieving and having of the all-inclusive science should not be understood as the ego's memorizing or "caching" of all the true propositions that make up the body of scientific knowledge. Rather, it signifies a having in a more original sense, namely,

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16 To identify the having of science as merely memorizing or "caching" true propositions would be similar to the attitude of possession criticized by Marcel in his discussion of ideologist. See above, 67-68. Too bad in our age of information technology the tendency is to even give up on memorizing true propositions: we store all the data...
the ego's having (i.e., experiencing in both actual and potential manner) of all the evidential disclosures that underlie all such true propositions. This conclusion is based upon the phenomenological insight that the more original sense of truth is disclosure, rather than the correctness of judgment.\(^\text{17}\) This insight not only justifies the relocation of truth from its classic locus—i.e., judgment—to transcendental subjectivity (or \textit{Dasein} in Heidegger's case), but also paves the way to the Husserlian position that the genuine science should always be the science \textit{achieved} and \textit{had} by the mind.\(^\text{18}\) In short, instead of one-sidedly focusing on the documented formations of the all-inclusive science, phenomenologists' proper focus should be on the all-inclusive mind.

To sum up, a cognitive journey that starts from having-nothing and strives toward having-all is sketched in the Introduction. This journey, as the result of Husserl's hermeneutical interpretation of Descartes' motifs in the \textit{Meditationes de Prima Philosophia}, is a mixture of both Descartes' and Husserl's ideas. On the basis of this interpretation, however, Husserl can carry out a hermeneutical appropriation of Descartes in a stronger sense; that is, he is now ready to radically modify the Cartesian project, and portray his

\(^{\text{17}}\) On the relation between truth as correctness and truth as disclosure, see Sokolowski, \textit{Introduction to Phenomenology}, 158-59. Cf. \textit{FTL}, 127/113 (§46), where Husserl says that "the true is now the actually existent or the \textit{truly existent}, as the correlate of the evidence that gives the actuality itself." Also see the Sixth Investigation, §39, which is entitled "Self-evidence and Truth," in \textit{LI}, 2:263-67. Heidegger's account of the relation between Dasein and truth can be found in \textit{BT}, §44. Daniel Dahlstrom defends Husserl's understanding of truth as disclosure in his \textit{Heidegger's Concept of Truth} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 139-40. A brief clarification of the relations among evidence, truth, and disclosure can be found in below, pp. 219-20.

\(^{\text{18}}\) The studies undertaken by Husserl in \textit{The Formal and Transcendental Logic} provide such an example.
understanding of philosophy from a purely transcendental-phenomenological perspective. It is to this second portrait that we now turn.

Evidence as the Telos, Archē, and Methodos of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology

Husserl claims that transcendental phenomenology requires us to "reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy." This claim is not to be taken as merely rhetorical. In this section we will see that Husserl does "overhaul" Descartes' philosophical project in the sense that his hermeneutical appropriation of Descartes radically modifies the telos, archē, and methodos of the original Cartesian project. In what follows, we explore Husserl's radical modification by showing how the transcendental ego's self-having (i.e., self-evidence) serves as both the telos and the archē of Husserl's transcendental enterprise, and how evidence as having serves as its methodos. The telos, archē, and methodos of Husserl's transcendental enterprise thus all appear to be a certain type of having. To facilitate our understanding of Husserl's radical modification of the original Cartesian project, we will also make reference to Descartes himself, for whom a deductively structured

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19 This claim of Husserl and his "neo-Cartesianism" have been widely discussed. My interpretation tries to understand Husserl's radical reformation of Descartes' philosophy by contrasting the telos, the archē, and the methodos of two philosophies, and my discussion of Descartes should more precisely be called a discussion of Husserl's interpretation of Descartes. I will not consider, for example, the theology and Scholasticism that play a significant role in Descartes' philosophy, and I do not intend to take issue with the accuracy of Husserl's interpretation of the historical Descartes: both topics are beyond the reach of the present dissertation.

To have a glimpse of how complex these topics can be, one can read W. Coffer's "Husserl's Neo-Cartesianism" (in Research in Phenomenology 11 [1981]: 141-58), where he concisely reviews some important commentators' opinions on these topics, and offers his own interpretation. Ludwig Landgrebe's "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism" (trans. Elveton, in The Phenomenology of Husserl, 259-306) is a classic study of the relation between the Husserlian phenomenology and Cartesian philosophy.
geometry-like science serves in some measure as the telos; *cogito ergo sum*, the statement that expresses the apodictic existence of the ego, is made into an axiom and serves as the archē; and logical deduction serves as the methodos.

*Having as the Telos*

It is suitable for us to discuss the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology first, as this is what Husserl himself has done in the *Cartesian Meditations*. In this section (1) I will explain how Husserl, in a presuppositionless manner, is able to show that evidence as "conscious having" is the goal of all scientific activities in general, and how he is able to validate that an absolutely grounded science is indeed for transcendental phenomenology the ideal, i.e., the telos. We will also see the reason that Husserl refuses to let either geometry or logic to shape the absolutely grounded science, and this is the substance of his criticism of Descartes. (2) I will then discuss from three perspective—the relational, the actional, and the linguistic—the senses in which evidence can be understood and expressed as *having*. (3) Lastly, by interpreting the final paragraph of the *Cartesian Meditations*, I show how the telos of transcendental phenomenology turns out to be the transcendental ego's all-comprehensive life of evidence, namely, its all-embracing self-evidence (that is, self-having).
In §3, Husserl points out that Descartes not only takes for granted the ideal of an absolutely grounded science, but also believes that this "all-embracing science must have the form of a deductive system, in which the whole structure rests, ordine geometrico, on an axiomatic foundation that grounds the deduction absolutely." In other words, a geometry-like science that is deductively grounded on pre-established axiom(s) is the source of Descartes' understanding of the ideal of the absolutely grounded all-inclusive science and the nature of the grounding of this science.

However, setting geometry and deductive logic as the ideal is in conflict with the requirement of beginning with absolute cognitive poverty. That is to say, since "everything that makes a philosophical beginning possible we must first acquire by ourselves," and since geometry and deductive logic are ready-made sciences handed down to us (namely, not acquired by ourselves through first-hand insight), they both "must be included among the sciences overthrown in overthrowing all science." Whether or not the two disciplines should be allowed to shape our new science, or at least, provide us some methodological help, is a question in need of careful investigation.

Now that the ideal of the absolutely grounded science has been called into question, it then becomes necessary for Husserl to phenomenologically figure out the ideal so that he can

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20 CM, 7/49 (§3).

21 CM, 13/53 (§5).

22 CM, 7/48; see also CM, 13/53, where Husserl tells us that "logic is deprived of acceptance by the universal overthrow."
orient his transcendental investigation in a truly presuppositionless way. In such "strange circumstantialities," Husserl's task of searching for the ideal appears to be analogous to the challenge that Socrates faced when Meno formulated the notorious dilemma of knowledge: Husserl cannot claim that we explicitly know the ideal of the new science, say, a geometry-like deductive science, because we then, like Descartes, need not to search for it; nor can he claim that we are entirely ignorant about it because our search will then resemble a blind groping. This analogy goes even further because Husserl tackles his difficult situation just as Socrates tackled his.\textsuperscript{24}

It is well known that Socrates in the \textit{Meno} had recourse to an ordinary phenomenon, i.e., recollection.\textsuperscript{25} Given that our state of mind is normally situated between full and explicit knowledge and sheer ignorance, recollection can be helpful in drawing out the knowledge (which results from our previous cycles of life) that has been forgotten for the time being but potentially still remains \textit{in} us. If only we have the courage and patience\textsuperscript{26} to follow the path of recollection (preferably with some Socratic guidance), clear knowledge would be generated, a process that, according to Plato's account, did happen to Meno's young servant. In other words, Socrates is of the opinion that because recollection is a means to uncover and

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{CM}, 9/49 (§3).

\textsuperscript{24} My reading of the \textit{Meno} is not the only way to relate Plato's well-known dialogue to Husserl's phenomenology. For instance, Burt C. Hopkins' in his article "On the Paradoxical Inception and Motivation of Transcendental Philosophy in Plato and Husserl" (in \textit{Man and World} 24 [1991]: 27-47) studies the relevance of the themes of \textit{aporia} and \textit{anamnesis} in the \textit{Meno} to Husserl's introduction of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

\textsuperscript{25} For an insightful and in a definite sense also phenomenological interpretation of this part of the \textit{Meno} (i.e., 81a-86c), see Jacob Klein, \textit{A Commentary on Plato's \textit{Meno}} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. 88-107.

\textsuperscript{26} Note that Husserl ends §3 of the \textit{Cartesian Meditations} with "Let us go on then with patience."
retrieve our latent and potential having of knowledge, it can help us escape Meno's dilemma.

In a way, we can say that a similar strategy is adopted by Husserl in his discovery (or recovery) of the ideal of science. For he, too, attempts at the recognition of something we potentially and tacitly always already know:²⁷ That is to say, in §4 of Cartesian Meditations we are invited to immerse ourselves in the factual scientific activities that we are all familiar with; then, aiming at uncovering "what is really being aimed at" by these scientific strivings, this immersion promotes a series of reflections that gradually leads us to recognize that the final goal of all cognitive striving and all sciences is to produce well grounded judgments, a goal toward which we scientists tacitly have always already been orienting ourselves. Since a body of systematically structured and well grounded judgments is the prototype of a well grounded science, Husserl is thus able to validate the ideal of an absolutely grounded science;²⁸ a seemingly clueless and infeasible search is thus seen to bear fruit.

We should immediately note that an "absolutely grounded science" means entirely different things for Descartes and Husserl. For Descartes, being grounded means being grounded on axiom(s) and logical deduction(s); for Husserl, being grounded means being

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²⁷ Cf. Hopkins' observation: "Both recollection and reflection involve the rendering explicit or thematic of something which, prior to coming within the ambit of each, was 'hidden' or 'concealed.'" In Hopkins, "On the Paradoxical Inception," 43.

²⁸ Note that being absolutely grounded and being all-inclusive are two different features. Husserl speaks of the Cartesian ideal as an absolutely grounded and all-inclusive science, but in §§3-5 he only manages to prove, in a presuppositionless manner, that being absolutely grounded is a valid feature of the ultimately scientific ideal; he does not explicitly prove the validity of the feature of being all-inclusive. But this does not mean that Husserl's argument is defective, because the feature of being absolutely grounded must have already presupposed the feature of being all-inclusive: due to the essential interconnectedness of cognitions, without universality or all-inclusiveness, a provincial cognition can never be truly genuine, that is, it cannot be truly grounded in an absolute sense. This in a way replies to Roman Ingarden's criticism of Husserl's argument. Cf. J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years, 375.
grounded on evidence. And this is exactly what interests us most: indeed, the theme of evidence and having emerges in Husserl's exposition of the sense of (transcendental) grounding. A judgment is said to be well grounded when, says Husserl, it is based on an act of grounding, i.e., an evidential judging in which that which is judged about (the supposed affair-complexes) is itself had by the judge; Husserl calls this conscious having (Bewußthaben) evidence. As the having of the state-of-affairs itself, evidence obtains an immediacy with the state-of-affairs had and is therefore able to support the mediate judgments that are built upon it. Hence, to produce well grounded judgments means to obtain the evidences that support the judgments in question; and a more general conclusion follows, namely, the telos, or the final cause, of all scientific doing should be evidence too, i.e., as the conscious having of the judged itself. To be sure, it remains for Husserl to characterize more concretely the specific evidence that serves as the telos of transcendental phenomenology.

In sum, it can be said that Husserl makes no "advance judgment . . . in favor of a supposedly unquestionable scientific ideal" in his search for the telos of transcendental philosophy; comparing him with Descartes who took geometry and deductive logic as the

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29 Cf. CM, §12.
30 CM 10/51.
31 In the Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl repeatedly speaks of evidence in terms of having. For example, he states that the "final goal" of "cognitional striving" is "evidence as the having of the meant itself." (FTL, 61-62/54) Needless to say, the phrase "the meant" here is the same as "the state-of-affairs being judged." If the having of the state-of-affairs being judged is the telos of judgment, this conclusion can be generalized and applied to the entire science: the final goal of science can be understood as an all-embracing having (i.e., evidence) that encompasses all actual and potential states-of-affairs.
32 See below, pp. 219-25.
33 CM, 13/53 (§5).
"unquestionable scientific ideal," we conclude that Husserl's train of thought meets the requirement of presuppositionlessness more consistently and radically.

Speaking of evidence in terms of having

Since to speak of evidence in terms of having sounds rather unusual and "awkward," it would be helpful to offer an explanation here. I would like to offer three reasons to explain why it is legitimate for Husserl (and us) to speak of evidence in the language of having: I first explain why the language of having properly expresses the "relation" between consciousness and its object; I then explain why this language also aptly expresses the acquiring aspect of evidence; thirdly, I explain from a linguistic and rather speculative perspective why the language of having is suitable for a philosophy that emphasizes self-responsibility and subjective achievement.

(1) Evidence as the preeminent form of intentionality, i.e., intentional having. In Husserl's phenomenology intentionality is understood as the essential and universal feature of consciousness, that is, it signifies the way in which a consciousness is always a consciousness of something, or how a cogito always bears within itself its cogitatum.\(^{35}\) To be

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\(^{34}\) For example, Dermot Moran says that "[s]omething is evident when it is given just as it is in itself, with the 'consciousness of self-having,' as Husserl somewhat awkwardly puts it." In his "Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Account of Intentionality," *Inquiry* 43 (2000): 50.

\(^{35}\) See *CM* 33/72: "Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear [tragen] within itself its cogitatum."
sure, the "intentional bearing" in Husserl does not mean a psychological containing of the object in a really inherent manner, a mode of containing that he already sharply criticized in the *Logical Investigations.* But to distinguish intentionality from real containing does not necessarily mean to abandon the language of containing or "inexistence." In fact, such language is repeatedly employed by Husserl in the *Cartesian Meditations* to characterize intentionality, as he speaks of a kind of "being-in" [Darinsein], or more precisely, a "being-in-consciousness" [in-Bewußtsein] enjoyed by the object of consciousness. The crucial point is, however, that Husserl now explicitly identifies this being-in-consciousness as the intentional achievement of the *synthesis* of consciousness. Since being-in is one of the connotations of having, intentionality can be understood as a sort of *conscious having* because it signifies the object's "being-in-consciousness."

Now Husserl in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* also tells us that "[t]he concept of any intentionality whatever—any life-process of consciousness—of something or other—and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving of something-itself, are

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36 See the Fifth Investigation, §11, in *LI*, 2:98; also cf. *Ideas I*, 218-19/185-86 (§90).


38 See above, Chapter 1, footnote #60.
essentially correlative." In other words, while there are many (direct and indirect) ways to intentionally have a thing, evidence stands out because it is the way of having the thing in the mode of "it itself." Thus, to the extent that evidence represents the preeminent form of intentional having, i.e., intentionality, Husserl is justified in speaking of evidence as conscious having.40

This sense of evidence as having is clearly expressed by Leo J. Bostar in his article "The Methodological Significance of Husserl's Concept of Evidence and Its Relation to the Idea of Reason":

Since the consciousness of having something itself is not a straightforward possessing but a "having" in an experiential and temporal contexture, evidence must be laid bare with respect to both the "what" that one has and the intentionally projected horizon within which it stands.41

Although Bostar in his article is not primarily concerned with the distinction between having and possessing, his linguistic sensitivity attests to his superb grasp of a crucial distinction; that is to say, he is able to see clearly that evidence is an intentional and synthetic having, and that evidence as such should be distinguished from "a straightforward possessing."42

(2) Evidence as an "acquiring activity." The term "acquiring activity [erwerbende Aktivität]" appears in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, where Husserl discusses the

39 FTL, 160/143.
40 Also see FTL, 157-58/141.
42 The "straightforward possessing" in Bostar's text seems to mean a static or reell containing.
original production and perception of idealities. Since to originally produce (that is, to constitute) an ideality (for instance, a judgment) is also to originally perceive it, and since the original perception of an object itself is called evidence, evidence can therefore be said to acquire what it accomplishes in its original producing; it is in this sense that Husserl calls it an "acquiring activity."

In a similar but more general way, Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations also writes that "[e]very evidence sets up for me an abiding having [eine bleibende Habe]." Here the phrase "abiding having" refers to the cognition that is obtained through intuition; as abiding, such having in its own way influences my current conscious life, and it also awaits the opportunity of future re-appropriations, that is, it also lays open for me the possibility of always returning to it in future confirming evidences.

In a word, since to acquire and to have connote one another, and since what we have acquired (or set up) by virtue of evidence becomes our having, the talk about evidence in terms of having is justified again.

(3) The language of having, radical responsibility, and the "triumph of subjectivity."

Unlike the previous two reasons, the reason I am going to offer now is of a rather speculative nature.

Using the language of having naturally reminds us of our ownership, and normally, we are more readily to assume responsibility for what we own. Thus, speaking of evidence as having gives us a sense of ownership over what we have set up and acquired in evidence, a

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43 FTL, 168/150.

44 CM, 60/95 (§27).
sense of ownership that then raises in us a heightened awareness of self-responsibility for what we have achieved. In other words, the language of having, by virtue of its connotation of ownership, works well (as a reminder) in the context that emphasizes fully conscious self-responsibility. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is indeed such a context: in his hermeneutic appropriation of Descartes' philosophical project, Husserl emphasizes that we need to renew the "radicalness of self-responsibility" implied in Descartes' efforts to radically reform philosophy, and responsibility here means being responsible for the origin and "production" of one's cognitions. Since such responsibility is expected to be fulfilled through evidence, the merit of speaking of evidence in terms of having within the context of transcendental phenomenology is obvious.

I furthermore submit that Husserl's growing favor for the language of having in his late works probably has to do with the maturity of his transcendental idealism, an idealism that, instead of justifying itself by making "sportive argumentations," proceeds in the form of egoic self-explication and endeavors to show that "every sort of existent itself, real or ideal, becomes understandable as a 'product' of transcendental subjectivity." Clearly, this is an idealism that aims solely at revealing the understandability (intelligibility) of all beings, an aim that reminds us of a claim made by Quentin Lauer in his book, *The Triumph of

45 *CM*, 6/48 (§2).

46 This growing favor for the language of having can also be seen from Husserl's talk about *Welthabe* in the *Crisis* and the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (the latter as a work co-authored by Fink and Husserl).

47 *CM*, 86/118 (§41).

Subjectivity. 49 Lauer claims that Husserl's phenomenology thoroughly manifests that (1) being and intelligibility are identical 50 and that (2) they both depend upon transcendental subjectivity. 51 That is to say, the transcendental subject is able to make things intelligible via its constitutive intentionality and the analyses thereof. 52 But the ability to make things intelligible is not a crude fact that occurs just naturally, it is rather, as the title of Lauer's book announces, a "triumph" that needs to be properly acknowledged and expressed.

However, one should be careful in selecting the language to express the triumph of subjectivity, because the intelligibility of being 53 that manifests itself through Husserl's phenomenology is different from the type of intelligibility "imposed upon" being by traditional philosophy that has methodologically relied upon the subject-object dichotomy. 54 For even though in Husserlian phenomenology the intelligibility of being is shown to be the result of subjective constitution and explication, such constitution and explication does not imply the existence of an intrusive or domineering subject. The subject does not achieve its triumph by imposing onto being power in the literal sense, nor does being "suffer" from the


50 This claim can be understood in this way: in Husserl's phenomenology, to be means to be constituted, and to be constituted implies to be explicated, which in turn means to be known; thus, being and intelligibility do coincide. Cf. below, footnote #62.

51 Lauer, *The Triumph of Subjectivity*, 79.

52 Cf. Husserl's claim that "transcendental phenomenology would be ipso facto the true and genuine universal ontology." CM, 155/181 (§64).

53 Since being and intelligibility are identical, "the intelligibility of being" is also "the being of intelligibility."

54 See above Marcel's criticism of the subject-object dichotomy, pp. 72-75.
subject's triumph over it; the subject makes being intelligible via its having of being, and its triumph should be seen as middle-voiced, though its middle-voicedness by no means makes its splendor less splendid.

The language of having suggests itself to us in our search for a language that is suitable to express the triumph of subjectivity, because while the language of having conveys the sense of being able to embrace, and even a scintilla of the sense of being in control (this is why this language does sound "triumphant" in a way, for example, when we say "We have a world"), the embrace and control expressed through it are better to be understood as mutual involvement rather than one-sided manipulation. Husserl's transcendental idealism, in its investigation of the identity of being and intelligibility, recognizes evidence (and intentionality) as a conscious having and employs the language of having (rather than, say, the language of possession or being) to describe it; and thus, it lets the transcendental ego's unintrusive and middle-voiced triumph manifest itself in an equally unintrusive and middle-voiced descriptive language.\(^\text{57}\)

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\(^{55}\) Cf. above, pp. 38-42, on having as a middle-voiced phenomenon and an "immanent activity."

\(^{56}\) See above, pp. 191-94, the exposition of transcendental reduction.

\(^{57}\) Herbert Spiegelberg in his "How Subjective is Phenomenology?" criticizes the notion of "the triumph of subjectivity," the "intriguing title" of Lauer's book. Spiegelberg claims that "the triumph of subjectivity would be a Pyrrhic victory if it achieved scientific rigor only at the price of dissolving all objectivity in a chaos of subjectivities," but his criticism obviously misses the point of Husserl's understanding of subjectivity. However, Spiegelberg also says that "Husserl's enterprise may well be characterized as the triumph of objectivity over subjectivity, or better as the establishment of objectivity in the very heart of subjectivity." It seems to me that the latter formulation—"the establishment of objectivity in the very heart of subjectivity"—in fact depicts the triumph in a middle-voiced, or at least a reciprocal, mode. (Herbert Spiegelberg, Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975], 76.)

In general, we should say that Spiegelberg does not seem to be a proper interlocutor in the context of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, if we judge him on the basis of his another article, "Three Types of the Given: The Encountered, the Search-found and the Striking." As this article (especially through his analysis of the phenomena that are "striking") shows rather clearly, Spiegelberg admits the autonomy of "things" into phenomenology and favors the language of giving (namely, he in effect claims that it is the autonomous thing,
We have thus explained from three perspectives—the relational, the actional, and the linguistic—why evidence can be understood and expressed in terms of having; at this juncture, a new sense also accrues to the transcendental ego's self-having (i.e., the result of the epoché and the reduction according to our study in Chapter 3), namely, since in the transcendental ego's *self-having* the transcendental ego itself is acquired, perceived, and constituted, the transcendental ego's self-having is by definition the transcendental ego's *self-evidence*. In a moment, it will be seen that this self-evidence serves as both the telos and the archē of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

An all-inclusive evidence as the telos

We may now resume our reading of the *Cartesian Meditations*. Having discovered that evidence as conscious having is "what is really being aimed at" by the sciences, Husserl in §5 continues to discuss the significance of this discovery. One important theme that he brings to our attention is the correlation of evidence with truth: "*Perfect evidence* and its
correlate, pure and genuine truth are given as ideas lodged in the striving for knowledge, for fulfillment of one's meaning intention.\textsuperscript{58} Evidence and truth are two essential correlates because (1) evidence is "an 'experiencing' of something that is, and is thus,"\textsuperscript{59} namely, evidence is the experience that discloses the self of something; and (2) the disclosed being-thus of a thing is the most original truth concerning this very thing itself. To put it differently, evidence and truth can be said to be inseparable because truth originates from and resides in evidence.

The clarification of the inseparable correlation between evidence and truth allows Husserl to not only preserve and clarify the pursuit of knowledge and truth in traditional philosophy (more specifically, the pursuit of the all-inclusive genuine science), but also add a new dimension of having (or experiencing) to it, namely: the pursuit of truth in its clarified form is not a pursuit of some "naked truth," because truth is not to be left unhad; the pursuit is rather a pursuit of a truthful life, a life of evidence that is truth-ful because it has truth and experiences truth, or, which is the same, a life that is genuinely truth-ful because it comprises evidence.

In the context of transcendental phenomenology, Husserl's clarification of the pursuit of truth means that the telos, that is, the "final cause," of our scientific activities is not just any evidence: it is a rather specific evidence, i.e., the all-embracing evidence that correlates with the all-inclusive genuine science, or more precisely, the transcendental life that is all-comprehensive and truth-ful because it comprises the all-embracing evidence. This final

\textsuperscript{58} CM, 12/52 (§5).

\textsuperscript{59} CM, 12/52 (§5).
cause, i.e., the truth-ful life that comprises the all-comprehensive evidence, is not just anticipated by Husserl; it is indeed achieved in the *Cartesian Meditations*. The dense passage at the very end of the book attests to the achievement of such an all-inclusive truth-ful life:

> The Delphic motto, "Know thyself!" has gained a new signification. Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain (wiederzugewinnen) it by a universal self-examination. "Noli foras ire," says Augustine, "in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas." 60

Impressively, a transition from the Delphic motto (about the self) to the Augustinian dictum (about truth) via the losing and the regaining of the world (i.e., the effects of the epoché) is made in this text. The self, the world, and truth—the three themes that Husserl has clarified in the book—are woven together, with the epoché as the hub of their relations. Obviously, we need to offer an exposition of how the epoché stands in relation to the epoché-performer's self-knowledge, the losing and having of the world, and the indwelling of truth.

(1) The epoché and the self-knowledge. We have seen that the epoché brings about the epoché-performer's radical self-having, whereas the transcendental reduction, guided by the transcendental-transcendent correlation, describes *in detail* how this radical self-having is at the same time the constitution, i.e., having, of the world. The detailed constitutive analyses carried out under the title of the epoché and the transcendental reduction proceed in the form of self-explication as they analytically unfold the actualities and potentialities of our conscious life. 61 Since phenomenologically speaking, to be known is to be explicated, 62 such

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60 *CM*, 157/183 (§64).

61 See *CM*, 153/179-80 (§64), where Husserl speaks of four forms of self-investigation: the *radical* self-investigation, the *completely universal* self-investigation, the *genuine phenomenological* self-investigation, and *intentional* self-investigation, and claims that they are inseparable from the method of transcendental reduction.

62 Cf. the analogy between knowing/explicating a thing and knowing/explicating oneself in *CM* §46.
self-explication is at once the phenomenological practice of the Delphic motto "Know Thyself": the ego comes to know himself by examining, that is, explicating, himself.

(2) The epoché and the regaining of the world. We have explained in what sense the transcendental ego's radical self-having resulted from the epoché is constitutive of the world, and why it is also the transcendental ego's having of the world. The question we need to answer now is: How is the transcendental ego's having of the world (by virtue of the epoché) related to the two worlds mentioned by Husserl in the text quote above, one that is lost and another regained?

Husserl's claim about the two worlds becomes understandable if we remember that one's world always derives its validity from one's subjective life: since the epoché radically transforms the self from one seemingly indissoluble human ego to the unity of the three egos, it is reasonable to expect that the world previously accepted and "had" by the naïve human ego is also transformed into a different world had by the philosophically awakened transcendental ego. In other words, even though we continue to use the term world before and after the epoché, it is better to talk about two worlds due to the term's changed sense.

The pre-epoché world is the world known as an external attachment to, and an unintelligible possession of, the mundane ego; it is also a world whose transcendency has engendered pseudo-problems and paradoxes such as "how can we prove the existence of an external world" and "how can a subjective part of the world have the world as a whole?"63 This world will get lost when the epoché is performed because of its ego-splitting effect; and

63 Husserl describes the puzzle we have when living in the natural attitude: "The subjective part of the world [i.e., the "I"] swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus itself too. What an absurdity!" Crisis, 180.
the old "positive science" that misconstrues the naïve positivity of the old world is gone with the old world too.

In contrast, the post-epoché world can be called a world "regained" because the epoché renews the sense of the world. That is to say, the transcendency of the world is made intelligible as it is now regarded as the result of the meditator's transcendental-egological explication. An external world "in itself" is thus replaced by the world ( constituted) "in me," and the statement "I have a world" has totally different meaning before and after the epoché. Moreover, with respect to the paradoxes we mentioned above, this replacement eliminates them all: a paradox always involves a baffling sense into which we have no insight, whereas the transcendentally regained world, growing out of senses that originate directly from transcendental subjectivity, is fully grounded on our insight and is, in principle, a paradox-free "new" world. It is in this sense that Husserl can rightly speak about the regaining of a world by phenomenology's universal self-examination.

(3) The epoché and the Augustinian idea of the in-dwelling of truth in man. The regaining of the world via the epoché is equivalent to the in-dwelling of truth (here truth refers to the all-inclusive truth, the all-inclusive and absolutely grounded science) in man because

a) The universal epoché reveals that the transcendental ego's self-having is constitutive of the world. Since a constituting experience always explicates and discloses that

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64 Cf. above, pp. 156-57, on the different meanings of the statement "I have a world" for the three egos.

65 See for example, CM, 154/180 (§64): "[P]henomenology . . . from the very beginning derives its concepts from the originariness of the constitutive performance. . . . In the case of concepts fashioned originarily in this manner, there can be no paradoxes." Also see above, pp. 63-67, the analysis of the having of the body, which shows how paradox can be dissolved by transcendental analysis.
which is constituted, the all embracing world-constituting experience (i.e., the transcendental ego's self-having) is also all-explicating and all-disclosing.

b) It follows that, as all-explicating and all-disclosing, the transcendental ego's self-having is also the all-inclusive having of disclosures and manifestations (in both actual and potential manner).

c) Since disclosure and manifestation are the original sense of truth, the transcendental ego, by having all actual and potential disclosures and manifestations, indeed "houses" truth, i.e., as an all-embracing life of evidence, it is indeed the "locus of truth" with uncontestable originality and dignity.

Thus, the relation between the epoché and the Augustinian idea of the indwelling of truth in man is established. The above explanation also shows that the indwelling of the all-inclusive truth in man is in fact the transcendental life that comprises all-inclusive evidence; thus, the theme that we anticipated earlier in our discussion of the essential correlation between evidence and truth also gets confirmed.⁶⁶ namely, that an all-comprehensive truth-ful life is the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Clearly, the final paragraph of the *Cartesian Meditations* is a depiction of the fulfillment of that telos.

Also worth noting is that in our interpretation of the final paragraph of the *Cartesian Meditations* the following relation of identity is brought to our attention, namely, that (1) the transcendental ego's self-having (as resulted from the epoché), (2) its self knowledge, (3) its having of the world, and (4) its having of the all-inclusive genuine science, are one and the

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⁶⁶ See above p. 220.
same state-of-affairs.\textsuperscript{67} This relation of identity certainly enriches our understanding of the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology because it shows that the one and same telos—the having-all—can be named and described from different angles.

Finally, since the transcendental ego's self-having is also its self-evidence,\textsuperscript{68} the relation of identity helps us to see not only that evidence as having is the telos of Husserl's phenomenology, but also that, evidence and having, as a pair of umbrella concepts, sum up the ultimate interest of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. All of this surely helps us identify his phenomenology as a phenomenology of having.

\textit{Having as the Archē}

In this section we discuss the archē of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. In the second half of the First Meditation (§§6-11) Husserl attempts to make "an actual beginning,"\textsuperscript{69} that is, an actual step forward toward the telos just discovered. Husserl argues that this starting point has to be an evidence, and it has to be apodictic;\textsuperscript{70} with the performance of the epoché, such an evidence is successfully found, that is, the transcendental ego's self-evidence. Interestingly, the transcendental ego's self-evidence turns out to be at

\textsuperscript{67} Cf. Fink's claim that in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, with the execution of the epoché and the reduction, "a thematization of consciousness can become an encompassing knowledge of the world." In his "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish? (The Phenomenological Idea of Laying-a-Ground)," trans. Arthur Grugan, in Research in Phenomenology 2 (1972): 23-24.

\textsuperscript{68} See above, p. 219.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{CM}, 14/54 (§5).

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{CM}, 14/54-55 (§5).
once both the telos and the archē of Husserl's transcendental enterprise (as one and the same evidence grasped in different degrees of adequacy). In what follows I review Husserl's discovery of the archē, and explain in what way the coincidence of the archē with the telos should be understood; I conclude this section by explaining the difference between Husserl and Descartes' understanding of the existential status of the transcendental ego.

The transcendental ego's self-evidence as the archē

In §6 of the Cartesian Meditations Husserl continues the discussion of evidence. With the task of "making an actual beginning" in mind, that is, finding an apodictic evidence that precedes all other evidences, he first makes a distinction between adequate evidence and apodictic evidence: the former is the type of evidence that is in no way affected by any unfulfilled intentions, and the latter is the evidence that is characterized by its "absolute indubitability." Husserl further points out that these two features of evidence do not have to go hand in hand, and he emphasizes that apodicticity is a more important perfection than adequacy; he also suggests that we can enjoy apodictic evidence that is not perfectly adequate. Husserl's observation is of important methodological value, for it implies that one and the same apodictic state-of-affairs can be grasped in different degrees of adequacy at different stages of our journey, and we do not have to meet both requirements simultaneously, especially at the time we initiate our inquiry. As we will see soon, Husserl in §9 makes an important application of this conclusion to the transcendental ego's apodictic self-evidence that results from the epoché.
In §7 Husserl then considers the possibility of taking the evidence of the world as the apodictic starting point. At first glance, the world-evidence does seem to be apodictic because the non-existence of the world seems to be inconceivable; however, since the phenomenological epoché has not been carried out at this point, the name "world" in §7 still designates the "external world" that results from the ego's "mundanizing self-apperception" and is given in and through natural experiences. It follows that this pre-epoché world-evidence bears the same imperfection as does any natural experience, and the naïve positivity of the world is open to criticism and doubt. This is why Husserl claims that it is possible for the entirety of our natural world-experience to turn out to be a "coherent dream,"71 and we should reject this world-evidence as non-apodictic.

In order to find a genuinely apodictic starting point, Husserl proceeds in §8 directly to the universal epoché, a procedure we have discussed extensively in Chapter 3. We already know that the universal epoché results in the transcendental ego's radical self-evidence, and Husserl argues that this self-evidence is apodictic and has priority over all other evidences, and hence it may properly serve as the starting point.72 The archē of Husserl's transcendental

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71 CM, 17/57 (§7).


John Drummond in his "Husserl on the Ways to the Performance of the Reduction" (in Man and World 8 [1975]: 47-69) argues that the Cartesian way and the ontological way are not two independent and self-sufficient ways, because neither of them is able to give us a starting point that is absolute in two senses, that is, being absolutely evident (i.e., being apodictic) and being absolutely prior (to other evidences). (50) In particular, Drummond claims that the starting point provided by the Cartesian way (that is, the transcendental ego's self-evidence) only meets the requirement of being absolutely evident, but falls short of the requirement of absolute priority. However, Drummond does not offer any substantial argument to prove that the Cartesian starting point

enterprise is therefore found; the peculiar thing is that, as we mentioned above, the archē appears to be identical with the telos we found earlier: they both are the transcendental ego's self-evidence. How should this apparent coincidence of the telos with the archē be understood?  

The coincidence of the telos with the archē

An explanation of the coincidence is, in a way, prepared by Husserl in §9 of the *Cartesian Meditations*, where he critically assesses the "range" of the transcendental ego's self-evidence. Husserl applies the conclusion he arrived at in §6 (i.e., that apodicticity and adequacy of evidence do not have to go hand in hand) to the transcendental ego's self-evidence achieved by the epoché in §8, and he points out that, because of the temporal character of transcendental subjectivity, the transcendental ego's self-evidence at this stage has only a core that is unqualifiedly apodictic and adequate, namely, the living present; my apodictic grasp of the living present gives me insight into what is going on in my current conscious life, and the knowledge of the "essentially necessary all-inclusiveness . . . without which I could not exist," that is, "the all-embracing structural forms in which I exist as ego,"

is not absolutely prior: he largely relies on a marginal note by Husserl to support his claim. (61)

It seems to me that, when we speak of evidence as having, it is clear that the transcendental ego's self having (self-evidence) does precede all other possible havings (i.e., evidences): unless the transcendental ego "has" himself, he cannot "have" anything else, and this already implies the absolute priority of "self-having." Cf. above, pp. 33-36, on the originality of the first person mode of having.

73 To be sure, the coincidence of the telos with the archē shows up most clearly in retrospect, that is, after one finishes reading the entire *Cartesian Meditations*. But as our exposition shows, this coincidence is logically already implied in the Introduction when the telos of transcendental phenomenology is identified as an all-inclusive evidence. This coincidence surely supports Husserl's claim that the transcendental ego is for transcendental phenomenology "not only its initial but sole theme." *CM*, 30/69 (§13).
including the temporal form of my stream of experiences.\textsuperscript{74} The apodictically grasped core, however, is surrounded by a horizon that is by and large inadequately perceived, a horizon that comprises the transcendental ego's past, abilities, "habitual peculiarities," and every single egological datum.\textsuperscript{75} Yet the fact that the transcendental ego's self-evidence lacks perfect adequacy at this stage in no way undermines its status as the apodictic starting point; what is unsaid in Husserl's text is rather this: thanks to the inadequacy of the ego's self-evidence, an infinite field of work is laid open for transcendental-phenomenological self-exploration, the task of which consists in making the initially "undetermined universality" determinate, the inadequate adequate, and the unfulfilled fulfilled.

For us, Husserl's assessment of the range of the transcendental ego's self-evidence is instructive, because it points out a way to understand the coincidence of the archē and the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Our point is that, basically, the transcendental ego's self-evidence does not have the same degree of adequacy when it serves as the archē as when it serves as the telos: it has become more adequate when it serves as the telos.

To be sure, by saying that the transcendental ego's self-evidence, qua telos, has become more adequate is not to suggest that, whereas the archē is an apodictic evidence with imperfect adequacy, the telos is an evidence in which the transcendental ego himself is perceived with perfect adequacy: due to the temporal structure of the transcendental ego, such a perfectly apodictic and adequate self-evidence is but a never fully actualizable idea.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{CM}, 103/133 (§46) and 28-29/67 (§12).

\textsuperscript{75} See \textit{CM}, 23/62 (§9) and 103/133 (§46).
Yet if by the phrase "the telos of transcendental phenomenology" we mean the telos that is actually attainable in a phenomenologist's life, we can see that the transcendental-ego's self-evidence at the telos will have become more adequate because the ego’s self-explication has made his egological data determinate in many detailed ways. For instance, in the course of the ego's self-explication, habitualities and convictions have accrued to him as the abiding effects of the already executed phenomenological self-explications; and these habitualities and convictions generate "internal changes" to the transcendental ego (as monad) and influence his self-perception. As a result, the ego knows himself (his all-inclusiveness and his world) better, and his grasp of his essential all-inclusiveness and his having of the world is no longer formal and presumptive, as it was at the beginning. In a word, he obtains a more perfect self-knowledge that was impossible for him when he stood at the archē.

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76 On how habitualities and convictions come into being and how they enrich the transcendental ego's world, see CM, §§32-33.

77 The coincidence of the archē and the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology sheds light also on the fact that Husserl always calls himself a beginning philosopher (and sometimes collectively calling phenomenologists "beginning philosophers"). He is probably not being unduly modest about his "seniority" as the phenomenologist. Anyway, he often said to Heidegger that "You and I are die Phänomenologie." (Cairns, Conversations, 9 [Conversation #VIII].)

Perhaps Husserl sees that a phenomenologist's "seniority" is not an issue in genuine phenomenologizing. No matter how advanced into the work-field a phenomenologist might be, the tasks lying ahead are always infinite—this makes his situation always resembles that of a beginner. Yet, on the other hand, no matter how inexperienced a phenomenologist might be, he in a sense always already apodictically touches the end, and in this sense, phenomenologizing is not a kinesis, but an energeia. The apodictic start already gives the phenomenologist "the substance of things hoped for" (Hebrews 11:1)—a truth-ful life, even though only presumptively.
Husserl's criticism of Descartes' misunderstanding of the transcendental ego

Following Husserl, we have so far found the archē and the telos of transcendental phenomenology and have clarified their coincidence. Before we can examine the methodos that lies in between, we should turn to §10 of the *Cartesian Meditations*. With good reason, Husserl in §10 launches criticism of Descartes' understanding of the transcendental ego, the apodictic existence of which is for Cartesian philosophy the archē. Husserl's criticism in effect explains why a philosophical enterprise whose telos and archē coincide with each other is an impossible thought for traditional Cartesianism; thus it helps us appreciate how radical Husserl's modification of the original Cartesian project is.

Basically, Husserl's criticism boils down to a criticism of Descartes' misunderstanding of the whole-part relationship between the transcendental ego and the world. For Husserl, the transcendental ego is the ultimate whole, the absolute concretum, and it transcendentally bears the world within. If we accept, as Husserl and Descartes do, that the telos of philosophy is characterized by its genuine all-inclusiveness, then we have to say that only the ultimate whole can serve as the end of philosophy. The transcendental ego, as is understood in Husserl's phenomenology, is certainly such a whole; but this is not the case for the transcendental ego in Descartes' philosophy, according to Husserl's interpretation:

[Descartes takes the pure ego as] a little *tag-end of the world* [*ein Endchen der Welt*], as the sole unquestionable part of it for the philosophizing Ego, and [for him] . . . the problem is to infer the rest of the world by rightly conducted arguments, according to principles innate in the ego.\(^78\)

\(^78\) *CM*, 24/63 (§10).
This text spells out Husserl's understanding of Descartes' characterization of the *part-whole* relation between the ego and the world. Husserl here suggests that, the transcendental ego for Descartes is but "a little tag-end of the world"; the mereological meaning of this phrase becomes clear if we note that Husserl later says that we should not take the ego as "a piece of the world" *[ein Stück der Welt]*.\(^7^9\) The term *piece* [*Stück*] is used by Husserl in a rather technical sense—as it is used in the Third Logical Investigation, it refers to an independent part of a whole, and normally it signifies a physical part; and "a little tag-end" indeed signifies such a part. In other words, Husserl insists that one should not see the transcendental ego as an independent part of the world; but he understands Descartes as making exactly this mistake, that is, holding that the pure ego is an independent part of the world.

An independent part is characterized by its ability to subsist by itself without participating in the whole from which it is detached; conversely, the whole in question can continue its own existence without having the part in question. We can therefore say that an independent part and the whole to which that part belongs do not *ontologically imply* the being of each other, at least not intrinsically. In the language of having, their relationship can be expressed as: an independent part of a whole is a part that is extrinsically "had" by the whole, hence the part in question cannot "have" the whole in question with necessity. Thus it is clear that any inference (either logical or causal) that attempts to infer the being of the whole from the being of an independent part is bound to fail—such inference is precluded for

\(^7^9\) *CM*, §11.
lacking ontological grounds. In Descartes' case, since he (according to Husserl's interpretation) sees the ego-world relationship as a relationship between an independent part and a whole, when he attempts to draw a valid (either logical or causal) inference of the existence of the external world from the ego cogito, he is laboring with no avail on a pseudo question resulting from a false ontological characterization of the ego-world relation.

So Husserl's radical modification of the Cartesian project on the issue of the archē is clear. The Cartesian ego, as an "unquestionable," i.e., apodictic, worldly part, may qualify as the beginning of philosophy, but by definition it cannot serve as the end of philosophy. This is why although the statement cogito ergo sum (which expresses the apodictic existence of the ego) functions as the archē of Descartes' philosophy, it continues to work in Descartes' system only as a criterion of truth: the telos of the Cartesian enterprise, the all-inclusive genuine science lies "far ahead" of the apodictic ego cogito. In Husserl, the situation is entirely different because he understands the transcendental ego as the absolute whole. As a consequence, the telos of the Husserlian enterprise coincides with its archē, which means that the transcendental ego is the "alpha and omega" of his transcendental philosophy; and as its initial and sole theme, the transcendental ego becomes an infinite work-field to be cultivated by virtue of evidence.

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80 See Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 22-27, for more examples of the philosophical danger resulted from the confusing of a non-independent part (a moment) with an independent part (a piece).

81 Descartes' misunderstanding of the existential status of the ego also makes him "the father of transcendental realism," as Husserl calls him. (*CM*, 24/63 [§10]) Descartes' version of transcendental realism ascribes to the ego—which is interpreted as a worldly piece—a certain set of unworldly, or more precisely, transcendental, functions, including the ability to pass judgment on the validity of the world as a whole and to derive the real existence of the world from its "inwardness."
Having as the Methodos

We have discussed the telos and the archē of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. The fact that Husserl and Descartes view the archē and the telos of transcendental philosophy differently suggests that they each would also understand the methodos that lies *in-between* in their own way: for Husserl, the essential correlation between evidence and truth makes evidence the official methodos, but for Descartes evidence becomes a psychological *criterion* of truth as he relies mainly on logical deduction and axiomatization. A rich literature on Husserl and Descartes' understanding of evidence and their different philosophical methods is already in existence; in this section I would like to focus on a different aspect of the fact that evidence is the methodos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, that is, I would like to highlight the *appropriateness* of evidence's serving as the methodos in a "work-

82 A classic study of the important role played by evidence in Husserl's phenomenology can be found in Eugen Fink's "The Problem of the Phenomenology of Husserl," trans. Robert M. Harlan, in *Apriori and World: European Contributions to Husserlian Phenomenology*, edited and translated by W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan and L. E. Winters (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), esp. 38-54. George Heffernan has written a series of articles on the concept of evidence, covering the pre-Husserlian history of this concept, the development and the many faces of this concept in Husserl's phenomenology, including a contrast between Husserl and Descartes' different understanding of evidence. See his "An Essay in Epistemic Kuklophobia: Husserl's Critique of Descartes' Conception of Evidence," in *Husserl Studies* 13 (1997): 89–140; "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'Was die Evidenz sei': A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserliana Volume XXX," *Husserl Studies* 15 (1998): 1–75; "A Study in the Sedimented Sources of Evidence: Husserl and His Contemporaries Engaged in a Collective Essay in the Phenomenology and Psychology of Epistemic Justification," *Husserl Studies* 16 (1999): 83–181; "On Husserl's Remark that '[s]elbst eine sich als apodiktisch ausgebende Evidenz kann sich als Täuschung enthüllen' (XVII 164:32–33): Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any Epistemic Infallibility?" *Husserl Studies* 25 (2009): 15-43. The comprehensive treatment of evidence offered by Heffernan in the four articles has been very helpful to me, and the four articles can also be used as a very handy reference to many important Husserlian passages on evidence. It is also noteworthy that in the last article mentioned above, Heffernan discusses how the phenomenological method (as *meta-hodos*) is not only a way, but in a more important sense, functions like a "road map." See esp. 40-42. Also see Sokolowski's *Introduction to Phenomenology*, Chapter 11, "Reason, Truth, and Evidence," where Sokolowski contrasts phenomenology's reliance on evidence with modern philosophy's reliance on logical method and proof, which can also be said to be a contrast between the *awaiting* of the showing of truth and the *mastering,* or even *creating,* of truth. (Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 156-76).
condition" where the archē and the telos coincide, or more precisely, where the archē is the telos in **potentiality**.

When we speak about *the* methodos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, we naturally think of *evidence*. In the famous "principle of all principles" formulated in the *Ideas I*, evidence (that is, intuition) is said to be the only legitimate source of cognition: "every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, . . . everything originarily . . . offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being."\(^{83}\) The same thought is again clearly pronounced in the *Cartesian Meditations*:

It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically . . . must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from "experiences" in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present as "*they themselves*."\(^{84}\)

Needless to say, both passages make evidence the official methodos for Husserl transcendental cognitive enterprise. Given that we have already found the archē and the telos of Husserl's phenomenology, we can now show why it is appropriate for evidence to be the methodos that connects the two.

Evidence appears to be suitable for a "work condition" where the archē and the telos coincide because the fact that both the telos and the archē are the transcendental ego's self-*evidence* suggests that the in-between methodos should be *homogeneous* with them; that is to say, it is reasonable to expect that the methodos itself should also be a kind of *evidence*. Moreover, we have shown that the telos is the same evidence as the archē, only grasped with

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\(^{83}\) *Ideas I*, 44/43.

\(^{84}\) *CM*, 13/54 (§5).
greater adequacy; now, bringing in more evidence is the only way to make an inadequate evidence adequate, thus it confirms that only evidence can lead the phenomenological meditator from an inadequate self-evidence to a more adequate one.

However, the Husserlian meditator in his journey from an inadequate self-evidence to a more adequate one does not just go about collecting evidence haphazardly; in fact, Husserl has devised a few important methods to ensure that the meditator's exploration of evidence proceeds in a systematic and orderly manner. Among such methods are the epoché and the transcendental reduction, the two we have studied in Chapter 3. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl discusses at least another two methods, namely, intentional analysis (or intentional explication) and eidetic intuition.\(^8^5\) While evidence is woven into and becomes an organic part of all the four methods—the epoché gives us the transcendental ego's radical self-evidence; the reduction among other things leads the transcendent back to constitutive transcendental evidences; the method of eidetic intuition is itself an evidencing of the eidos; and finally, intentional analysis draws out the potentialities of our conscious life and turns them into, again, *evidence* or *quasi-evidence* (when the potential is explicated in imagination—here I would like to emphasize the importance of the method of intentional analysis for Husserl's transcendental enterprise.

According to Husserl, the peculiar attainment of the method of intentional analysis is the "uncovering of the potentialities 'implicit' in actualities of consciousness."\(^8^6\) What is

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\(^8^5\) *CM*, §§20 and 34.

\(^8^6\) *CM*, 46/83 (§20). Husserl's explanation of this method in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* is similar; he says that intentional analysis is "an uncovering of the intentional implications, with which there come to the fore, as contrasted with the overt, the finished, sense of the unities, their hidden sense-moments and 'causal' sense-relations." See *FTL*, 208.
meant by Husserl here can be illustrated by his favorite example of the perception of a physical thing. For instance, the perception of a building from a specific aspect (which is the actuality of consciousness) refers the perceiver to further possible perceptions of the same building from different aspects, at different times, and even by different perceivers. All these possible perceptions are the potentialities implied in the actual perceiving of the building from a certain aspect. Along with the uncovering of these potentialities, the wonderful work of synthetic identification is also revealed, and the ego who makes such intentional analysis thus renders intelligible the constitution of an identical spatial object in a multiplicity of actual and potential cogitationes. Despite the seeming simplicity or even triviality of this example, the analysis of the perception of a spatial object, mutatis mutandis, can be applied to all kinds of objects. It therefore can be said to be the prototype of the transcendental ego's self-explication; even the intentional explication of the sense of the Other is modeled on this prototype.

Now that the meaning of the method of intentional analysis has been clarified, the unique role that intentional analysis is able to play in Husserl's transcendental enterprise can be made manifest. The fact that (1) Husserl's transcendental enterprise is characterized by the

The following remark by Fink shows that intentional analysis reverses the "universal constitutive synthesis" that is always going on in the transcendental ego's conscious life: "It is Husserl's decisive, fundamental insight into the essence of intentionality that the apparently simple consciousness-of is the result of a simplification [Vereinfachleistung], such that consciousness-of is a confluence of many multiplicities of consciousness into a compact consciousness-of that conceals the moments of sense which are active and operative in it. The task of intentional analysis is to uncover the modes of consciousness, modes that are laden with sense [sinnerfüllten], which operate in concealment and are veiled by their result." See Fink, "The Problem of the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl," 51.

87 See CM, §20, esp. 48/85-86.

88 Cf. CM, §55, esp. 126-28/154-56.
peculiar coincidence of its archē and telos and (2) the transcendental ego's self-evidence that plays the "double role" is more adequate at the telos than at the archē imply that the archē of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is its telos in potentiality, or equivalently, the telos is the archē actualized. Since the function of intentional analysis is to actualize the potential, unfold the implicit, render the hidden prominent, and fulfill the emptily intended, it can be systematically employed in Husserl's transcendental enterprise: it is able to actualize the potential egoic all-inclusiveness that is presumptively implied in the archē of transcendental phenomenology. The meditator who systematically performs such intentional analysis on objects belonging to all ontological regions can concretize his essential all-inclusiveness and thus puts himself on the way to a more adequate self-evidence, that is, a more perfect self-knowledge (or, which is the same, a more perfect knowledge of the world). Moreover, since intentional analysis does all its work by generating the relevant evidences (and quasi-evidences, if the explication is carried out in imagination), it is clearly inseparably fused with the methodos—evidence—of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

For Husserl, his transcendental enterprise is a "quite personal affair," because it proceeds in the form of transcendental ego's self-explication. In our study we have shown that this self-explication begins with the transcendental ego's self-having, ends with a more perfect self-having, and every move in-between is made on the basis of evidence as having. The phenomenology of having contained in the *Cartesian Meditations* has been revealed.

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89 I hesitate to call the telos an *entelechy* for the reason I spelled out above on p. 229.

90 *CM*, 2/44 (§1).
Pointers to Further Studies

In a sense, our exploration of Husserl's phenomenology of having in the *Cartesian Meditations* has just begun; Meditations Two to Five contain their own problems that can be investigated from the perspective of having: intentionality, being and reason, habituality, time-consciousness, and the Other (as my co-haver of the world). However, the present dissertation has to end, somewhat abruptly, here.

In retrospect, what we have done so far appears to be pretty simple: taking our departure from Marcel's phenomenological criticism of having, we tried to clarify phenomenologically the phenomenon of having, and then the phenomenon of having has been employed by us to evaluate Marcel's criticism of having and to reveal the phenomenology of having in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. In our study, we have broadened the meaning of having in many ways, and thus enriched our understanding of it: we have seen the eidetic structure of having, and we have clarified how having is different from but related to *possession* on the one hand, and *being* on the other. Since *having* has permeated our terminology, methodology, and subject matter, what we have done can itself be called a phenomenology of having.

To conclude, I would like to indicate briefly three important topics the investigation of which is perhaps indispensable if we wish to have a relatively complete phenomenology of having: two of them are treated in the *Cartesian Meditations* and other Husserlian writings, and the third comes from a wider philosophical context.

*Time-Consciousness.* Husserl's meticulous analysis of time-consciousness is
important for his phenomenology. Phenomenology is concerned with meaning and sense, but the "generation and corruption" of meaning and sense in our conscious life is subtle and difficult to grasp. Nonetheless, since our conscious life is governed by an eidetic law of temporalization, the analysis of time-consciousness will enable us to understand the "transmission" of the genetic and apperceptive after-effects of every original act and in this way it makes the peculiar "causality" in our seemingly Heraclitean stream of consciousness intelligible. In §18 of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl discusses the enigmatic relationship between time and meaning by making a distinction between objective time, internal time and consciousness of internal time. Husserl has described that experiences and meanings can be retained (that is, "had") at later stages of conscious life. It seems to me that we can make his descriptions clear to ourselves by analyzing how the absolute consciousness of internal time is able to *have* internal time; I particularly think that the three-level structure of time-consciousness can be interpreted as a structure of having.

*Habitus and Habituality.* In the *Cartesian Meditations*, habituality is a prominent theme and plays an important role in Husserl's conception of a phenomenological monadology. We can see that *habitus* and *habituality* are all etymologically akin to *having* and they can be interpreted as the transcendental ego's having of its own knowledge, life, and world. The analysis of the genesis of habituality in terms of having is not only important for a concrete understanding of Husserl's genetic phenomenology and his monadology, but can also prepare us to understand the relevance of the phenomenon of the having of knowledge to our third topic: the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle.

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91 Cf. above, p. 224.
Plato and Aristotle on Having. In our study of Marcel we have commented that having has been an understudied topic in the history of philosophy, and Aristotle's philosophical treatment of having is a rather unique event. It seems to me that Husserl's phenomenology of having can help us investigate some classical philosophical issues in metaphysics and epistemology, and thus makes the history of having clearer. For example, we may take the phenomenon of the having of knowledge as our starting point. The having of knowledge is discussed in Plato's *Theaetetus*, where Socrates distinguishes between the having [hexis, echein] of knowledge and the possession [ktēsis] of knowledge. We also recognize the metamorphosis of this distinction in Aristotle when he discusses concepts like echein, hexis, energeia, dunamis and entelecheia. In the *De Anima*, Book II, Chapters 1 and 5, Aristotle defines the soul as the actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life, and then claims that the term *actuality* here should be understood as analogous to *epistēmē*, as distinguished from *theorein*. He further describes this *epistēmē* as both a first actuality (entelecheia) and a second potentiality.

This Aristotelian text can be interpreted from a Husserlian perspective: (1) We can justify the translation of *epistēmē* in this context as "the having of knowledge," and then interpret the having of knowledge as a habituality. (2) Habituality is a sort of sedimentation of one's cognitive achievements and this sedimentation is dependent upon the temporal form of our stream of consciousness. (3) The absolute flow of internal time-consciousness in

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92 See above, pp. 25-26.


Husserl can be interpreted as an "immanent activity," whereas the Aristotelian term *entelecheia* has the root *echein* and can be interpreted as "having its telos (or perfection) within itself," which also signifies a sort of "immanent activity." Since we have shown in our discussion of transcendental reduction that for Husserl the meaning of being should be clarified by going back to the whole concrete life embraced by internal time-consciousness, it seems to me that the Husserlian phenomenology of having can be employed to show that Aristotle's way of using the term *entelecheia* is a classical attempt to resolve the problem of being and becoming, namely, that having is the synthesis of being and becoming.

When all these problems are studied, perhaps we will be justified in giving a twist to the battle cry of Husserl's phenomenology. Shall we say, then, *Zu dem Haben Selbst!*?

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Fromm, Erich. To Have or To Be. London: Continuum, 1976.


