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Empty and Filled Intentions in Husserl’s Early Work

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Empty and Filled Intentions in Husserl’s Early Work

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Our theme in this dissertation is the theory of empty and filled intentions (leere und erfüllte Intentionen), as that theory is introduced, developed, and employed in the opening years of Husserl’s career. The first major exposition and employment of the theory is provided by Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900/1). In chapter 1, we show how the introduction of empty and filled intentions in Investigation I arises from Husserl’s attempt to understand the nature and function of signs. In chapter 2, we turn to Husserl’s further exploration and use of the theory of empty and filled intentions in Investigations V and VI.

To elucidate the background and development of the theory of empty and filled intentions, we turn to Philosophy of Arithmetic (Philosophie der Arithmetik, 1891). In chapters 3 and 4, we uncover a series of parallels between the theory of empty and filled intentions in Logical Investigations and the theory of “symbolic and authentic presentations” (symbolische und eigentliche Vorstellungen) in Philosophy of Arithmetic. This leads us to argue that the theory of empty and filled intentions is actually a more mature version of the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations.
Finally, in “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic” (“Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik,” 1894), Husserl (a) argues that Philosophy of Arithmetic’s terminology of “presentations” should be replaced, and (b) introduces the notion that intentions can be filled (or “fulfilled”). We turn to this article in chapter 5, and show how it provides the decisive link between Philosophy of Arithmetic’s theory of symbolic and authentic presentations and Logical Investigations’ theory of empty and filled intentions. By clarifying the terminological and theoretical developments that occur between Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations, chapter 5 completes the argument of chapters 3 and 4. The theory of empty and filled intentions is, in fact, a more mature version of the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations.
This dissertation by Micah D. Tillman fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by Robert Sokolowski, Ph.D., as Director, and by John McCarthy, Ph.D., and Jean DeGroot, Ph.D., as Readers.

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Introduction

In the first decade of his career, Edmund Husserl developed a sophisticated theory with which he could analyze our engagement with objects in both their absence and their presence. This is his theory of empty (leere) and filled (erfüllte) intentions. If we are mentally directed toward an object in its absence, we have an “empty” intention of it. If we are mentally directed toward an object in its presence, we have a “filled” intention of it. The two types of intentions enter into intimate connection, furthermore, rather than simply occurring side by side. Since one and the same object can be intended and recognized through them both, the interplay of the empty and the filled brings out the identity of the object.

The theme of this dissertation will be the theory of empty and filled intentions, as it is introduced, developed, and employed in Husserl’s early work. Our focus will be on Husserl’s three major texts from the decade 1891–1901: Philosophy of Arithmetic (Husserl’s first book), Logical Investigations (his second book), and “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic” (the most important of Husserl’s articles between Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations).

Since the theory of empty and filled intentions receives its first major exposition and employment in Logical Investigations, we will begin there. In chapter 1, we will explore Husserl’s introduction of empty and filled intentions in Investigation I. Specifically, we will see how his attempt to understand the nature and function of signs—both meaningful words and other types of sign (e.g., signals)—leads him to appeal to empty and filled intentions. In chapter 2, we will then study Husserl’s exploration and employment of the theory of empty
and filled intentions in Investigations V and VI, as he examines a number of fundamental philosophical issues (e.g., being, truth, and knowledge).

Having seen the importance of the theory of empty and filled intentions to Husserl’s magnum opus, we will then attempt to elucidate the theory’s background. Husserl did not create the theory ex nihilo and fully formed. In fact, we can trace its roots back to his first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic, and the theory of “symbolic and authentic presentations” (symbolische und eigentliche Vorstellungen) that he developed to explain how we encounter and employ numbers.

In chapters 3 and 4, we will explore Parts One and Two of Philosophy of Arithmetic. These two chapters will elucidate a series of significant parallels between Philosophy of Arithmetic’s theory of “symbolic and authentic presentations” and Logical Investigations’ theory of “empty and filled intentions.” They will make the case that the theory of empty and filled intentions is simply a more mature and nuanced version of the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations.

Our argument in chapters 3 and 4 will then lead us to ask how and why Husserl moved from the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations to the theory of empty and filled intentions. Can we find a bridge between Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations? Chapter 5 will answer this question in the affirmative, as we take up Husserl’s “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic.” In that article, Husserl does two things that are significant for our study. First, he argues that Philosophy of Arithmetic’s terminology of “presentations” should be replaced. Second, he introduces the notion that intentions can be filled (or “fulfilled”).
In chapter 5, therefore, we will see that “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic” provides the decisive link between *Philosophy of Arithmetic*’s theory of symbolic and authentic presentations and *Logical Investigations*’ theory of empty and filled intentions. We will come to understand more clearly the terminological and theoretical developments that occur between *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and *Logical Investigations*.

The present dissertation, then, has three parts. The first consists of chapters 1 and 2, and deals with Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. These chapters explain Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions, and show how that theory can be used philosophically. The second part consists of chapters 3 and 4, and deals with Husserl’s *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. These chapters explore the background for, and ultimate origin of, Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions by explaining his theory of symbolic and authentic presentations. The third part consists of chapter 5, and deals with Husserl’s “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic.” This chapter shows how Husserl begins to reframe the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations as a theory of empty and filled intentions. Chapter 5, in other words, provides the link between the dissertation’s first and second parts, and thus will bring our study to its completion.
Chapter 1

Empty and Filled Intentions in *Logical Investigations*: Investigation I

§1. Overview

Throughout his works, Husserl employs an important distinction between “empty” and “filled” intentions. Intentions are always object-directed, but intended *objects* can be either absent or present. Intentions directed toward an absent object are empty, while those directed toward a present object are filled.

The present study will show the distinction between empty and filled intentions to have numerous consequences in Husserl’s thought. For instance, the distinction allows us to present and refer to the identity of objects, since one and the same thing can be intended both in its absence and presence. If I were to imagine the Eiffel Tower on the basis of pictures and descriptions, and then were to see the tower in person, I would encounter it as being identical with the tower I imagined. Later, after taking a tour of Paris, I might desire to climb the tower, and could return to it, finding it to be identical with tower I had wanted to climb, identical with the tower I had seen before, and identical with the tower I had imagined earlier.

In each visit to the Eiffel Tower after thinking about it—in each filling of an empty intention of the tower—I could ponder the extent to which the tower I had thought of and the tower that I encountered were identical. Furthermore, the tower can show up for me in various modes of presence and absence (e.g., through description, imagination, perception, physical contact), and is, therefore independent of each of those modes. I could consider how the tower’s being what it is—its identity—does not depend on its presence to or absence
from me, but is instead something constant across presence and absence. The filling of empty intentions makes these considerations of the nature and extent of identity possible.

Furthermore, the distinction between empty and filled intentions helps us clarify identities through revealing objective differences. We gain important clues about the nature of an object when we realize that (1) we can only fill intentions of the object in certain ways, and (2) these manners of fulfillment differ from the manners in which we have to present other types of object. For example, to experience the presence of Homer’s *Odyssey*, we must read a book, but to experience the presence of Homer’s homeland, we must travel. To fill our intentions of a symphony requires one set of activities, while filling our intentions of what we name when we use the word “friendship” requires another set. That we can intend each of these things both when they are absent and when they are present helps us to bring out the identity of each. The fact that we must bring things of differing types to presence in differing ways then helps the identity and nature of each object to stand out with greater precision.

Husserl’s engagement with empty and filled intentions is worthy of our attention here both because it is original and because the issues he clarifies in the process are classic. Identity and difference, for instance, are not original to Husserl, but will always be fundamental philosophical issues. The present project does not simply highlight the originality and classicality of Husserl’s work, however; it also remedies a deficiency. Speaking of the relation between empty and filled intentions in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, J. N. Findlay writes:
Nowhere in the literature of philosophy are these matters more subtly treated and more full of an evident clearness and rightness: it is only a pity that they have been so infrequently and insufficiently studied.¹

Since Findlay penned those words in 1970, the theme of empty and filled intentions in Husserl has remained infrequently and insufficiently studied, overall. Certain thinkers, however, have made important contributions:

(1) In the analytic tradition, Christoph Staub’s *Leerintentionen und leere Namen* (Empty Intentions and Empty Names) is similar in scope to the present work. He focuses on Husserl’s understanding of naming through an examination of how Husserl deals with cases of empty intentionality. I, however, will treat not only empty intentions, but also the various consequences of how empty intentions come to fulfillment.

(2) Ullrich Melle has examined Husserl’s rewriting of the Sixth Logical Investigation, and has had to deal with Husserl’s thought on empty and filled intentions.³ He focuses, however, on Investigation VI specifically, while I will be studying not only the *Investigations*, but the background of Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions in his earlier work.


(3) Ernst Tugendhat’s *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*\(^4\) also studies empty and filled intentions in Investigation VI, but with the goal of gaining an understanding of Husserl’s concept of truth. The present study will benefit from Tugendhat’s work, but goes beyond the *Investigations* and the concept of truth to explicate Husserl’s use of empty and filled intentions in formulating his understanding of other topics as well (e.g., numbers).

(4) Iso Kern likewise deals with the distinction between empty and filled intending in his *Idee und Methode der Philosophie*.\(^5\) There, he uses Husserl’s theories as a source for his explication of consciousness, and particularly examines Husserl’s use of empty and filled intentions with regard to the possibility of thinking without language (prepredicative recognition and categoriality), synthesis and identity, and the distinction between noesis and noema. The present work, however, is both more limited and more textually focused than Kern’s; I will be taking the development and uses of empty and filled intentions in Husserl’s early texts as my theme, rather than using Husserl’s thought as a basis for developing other themes.

(5) Finally, Robert Sokolowski draws attention to the importance of the distinction between empty and filled intentions in Husserl and uses it in his own work, especially under the rubric “presence and absence.”\(^6\) The insights provided by his writings will be particularly

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valuable to my examination because they highlight the deeper philosophical import of the theory of empty and filled intentions.

Chapters one and two of this dissertation will consist of a study of empty and filled intentions in Husserl’s first book of phenomenology: Logical Investigations. There, Husserl not only first reveals the theory of empty and filled intentions through his study of signs, but also first uses the theory of empty and filled intentions to help bring completion to his theory of signs. As a way into our examination of empty and filled intentions in Logical Investigations, therefore, we must explore Husserl’s study of signs in Investigation I.

“The First Investigation,” Marvin Farber writes, “is an example of phenomenological descriptive analysis at its best.”7 Husserl begins Investigation I (“Expression and Meaning”) by pointing out an “ambiguity in the term ‘sign’” (§1) and drawing a distinction between indication-signs and expression-signs.8 The next three sections (§§2-4) focus on a clarification of indications. In §5, Husserl begins the task that will take up the rest of the Investigation: his clarification of expression and meaning.

Our goal in the next three sections will be to prepare for the introduction of the distinction between empty and filled intentions in Investigation I, §9. Section 9 falls in the midst of Husserl’s explication of expressions, and Husserl bases his description of
expressions on the contrast between indication and expression. To approach §9 adequately, therefore, we must begin with Husserl’s study of indications. An understanding of indications will facilitate an understanding of expressions, and an understanding of expressions will facilitate our understanding of the distinction between empty and filled intentions.⁹

Having achieved an initial formulation of empty and filled intentions, we will see Husserl’s theory of signs in a new light. We will then be able not only to bring new clarity to the distinction between indications and expressions, but to the concept of sign that underlies them both. With this initial example of the utility of the theory of empty and filled intentions, the stage will be set for the rest of our study.

§2. Indication-Signs

Husserl will use “indication” as a foil for clarifying “expression,” but to do so he must first explain what indication is. In an attempt to uncover the “essence of indication,” Husserl begins §2 of Investigation I by listing several examples of indication-signs: “[A] brand is the sign of a slave, a flag the sign of a nation.” Furthermore, “all marks” which are “characteristic qualities suited to help us in recognizing the objects to which they attach” are also indication-signs. Evidently, indications can be either purposeful creations (brands, flags) or automatic occurrences (marks, characteristic qualities).¹⁰

⁹ Sokolowski writes: “Husserl does not merely postulate empty and filled intentions, nor does he accept them naively from ordinary experience. In *Logical Investigations*, where many of his fundamental concepts are first established, he brings intentions themselves to intuitive presence by a philosophical analysis of meaning. The analysis is based on the way signs work in consciousness” (*Husserlian Meditations*, 111).

¹⁰ Husserl, *LU*, I, §2, 31 (*LI*, 1:183). Rudolf Bernet uses the terms “artificial” and “natural” when discussing this distinction in, “Husserl’s Theory of Signs Revisited,” *Edmund Husserl and the*
That indication-signs need not have only purposeful origins is emphasized in §2’s second paragraph. There, Husserl points not only to a “knot in a handkerchief” (as indicating something to be remembered) but to “fossil vertebrae” (as indicating “the existence of prediluvian animals”). Even “Martian canals,” which once were taken as indicating “the existence of intelligent beings on Mars,” would now be taken as indicating some natural process (like wind erosion).\(^{11}\)

The reason indication-signs can be of either purposeful or automatic origin, we learn, is that their production is irrelevant. Perhaps we call “things, events or their properties,” “signs,” simply because they “are deliberately produced to serve as . . . indications.” Furthermore, perhaps we call such deliberately produced indications “signs,” “whether they exercise this function [indication] or not.” However, Husserl seeks to refine such understandings of indication: “A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to some thinking being.” Whether an intelligent being purposefully fashions a thing as an indication is immaterial, therefore; some intelligent being must experience a thing as an indication for it to be truly an indication.\(^{12}\)

The “common element” or “circumstance” which gives indications their “essential unity” is not their production, therefore, but the fact “that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs.” We see here that an explication of indication must center on the

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\(^{12}\) Ibid.
idea of existence: the existence of the indication-sign indicates the existence of the indicated object. However, Husserl further specifies that this indication of existence involves belief. A person’s “belief in the reality of the one [thing] is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other.” If a person’s belief that A exists motivates her to believe that B exists, she has experienced A as an indication-sign of B.\footnote{Ibid., 32 (LI, I:184). Jocelyn Benoist writes: “By pointing to a past experience that we are to remember, a knot in a handkerchief simply indicates. In itself, such a sign does not ‘express’ anything and does not say anything about the experience in question or about anything else.” Jocelyn Benoist, “Husserl’s Theory of Meaning in the First Logical Investigation,” in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 19. Indications do “say” that what they indicate exists. However, as Kant writes, “‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 504 (A 598/B626). Therefore, insofar as an indication-sign merely alerts some person to the existence of what it indicates, it does not predicate of what it indicates. It is in the sense of not predicating that an indication “does not say anything about” what it indicates.}

“This relation of ‘motivation’ represents a descriptive unity among our acts of judgment,” Husserl continues, “in which indicating and indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker.”\footnote{Husserl, LU, I, §2, 32 (LI, I:184).} We encounter indication-signs because we can form beliefs or make judgments about things, and one belief or judgment can lead us to engage in another belief or judgment. If A does not motivate us to believe in the existence of B, A does not appear (“become constituted”) as an indication and B does not appear (“become constituted”) as indicated.\footnote{Sokolowski writes: “Husserl does not want to prove that we encounter objectivity; he accepts this as a patent fact, but he does want to explain how it is possible, how it can be understood. In other words, he wants to explain how subjectivity ‘constitutes’ objectivity” (Constitution, 39). There seems to be general agreement in the secondary literature on the point that Husserl means by “constitution” the process through which objects come to be presented. For instance, William McKenna writes: “We have understood [‘constitution’] to mean that the being ‘on hand’ (the being present and available to us) of the world is achieved through ways of being conscious that are specific to what we are conscious of.” William McKenna, “Husserl’s Theory of Perception,” in Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook, ed. J. N. Mohanty and William McKenna, Current Continental Research, no. 551 (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, and University Press of America, Inc., 1989), 197. Also, Theodore de Boer writes: “[C]onstitution as we find it in LU . . . is a ‘making something appear’.” Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. Theodore Plantinga, Phaenomenologica, no. 76 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 167.}
Husserl then emphasizes the fact that when we take A and B as indicating and indicated, we do not do so in a disjointed fashion. “This descriptive unity [of motivation] is not to be conceived as a mere form-quality founded upon our acts of judgment,” he writes, “for it is in their unity that the essence of indication lies.” Motivation unites beliefs about the existence of two objects, creating “a unity of judgment” (Urteilseinheit). ¹⁶ We do not experience one belief in the existence of the indication-sign, and then a separate belief in the existence of the indicated object. Instead, we experience one belief as motivating the other, and as united with it; the two beliefs or judgments become two sides of one unified belief or judgment.

If Husserl’s description of the complex judgment in which we encounter an indication is correct, there is an important consequence. When judgments unify into a larger whole, they present the objects about which they are judgments as also belonging to a larger whole.

[T]he ‘motivational’ unity of our acts of judgment has itself the character of a unity of judgment; and, therefore, in the judgment’s being a whole, an appearing objective correlate, a unitary state of affairs—which seems to be in it—is meant. ¹⁷ Husserl’s thesis is that judgments and beliefs are object-directed—they are “about” something—and whether or not a belief or judgment is complex, it remains object-directed.

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¹⁶ Husserl, LU, I, §2, 32 (LI, 1:184).

¹⁷ Ibid. I have altered Findlay’s translation, which is as follows: “[T]he ‘motivational’ unity of our acts of judgment has itself the character of a unity of judgment; before it as a whole an objective correlate, a unitary state of affairs, parades itself, is meant in such a judgment, appears to be in and for that judgment.” The German is as follows: “[D]ie Motivierungseinheit der Urteilsakte hat selbst den Charakter einer Urteilseinheit und somit in ihrer Gesamtheit ein erscheinendes gegenständliches Korrelat, einen einheitlichen Sachverhalt, der in ihr zu sein scheint, in ihr vermeint ist.” It was necessary to sacrifice Findlay’s more-artful rendering for the sake of hewing more closely to Husserl’s text.
A judgment that is a complex unity does not cease to have an objective correlate because of its complexity; it simply has an objective correlate that is itself a complex unity.

The complex belief or judgment inspired by an indication, therefore, also has an objective correlate. That correlate, Husserl claims, will invariably fit the form, “certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given.” The belief or judgment through which a thing becomes an indication-sign for some person is not simply a belief or judgment about the indication-sign or the indicated object, in other words. Its objective correlate is the indication situation as a whole; the complex belief or judgment is about the fact (or “state of affairs”) that the given existence of the indication sign implies the existence of the indicated object.

Through Husserl’s description, we see that there is a special form of cohesion on both the subject and the object sides of an indication experience. The parts of the complex judgment cohere through “motivation.” Without the motivational link, we would experience two judgments, not one complex judgment. The parts of the judged state of affairs, on the other hand, cohere through the “objective connection” expressed by the word “since.” (“Certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given.”) The implication of one existence by the other creates a unified fact, or state of affairs. Without the implicative connection, we would experience two states of affairs, not one complex state of affairs.

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18 Ibid. Because of the contrast here between what is given and what is not given, it will be helpful to note—and then correct—the following statement about indication-signs by Alphonso Lingis: “A sign, really visible, audible, palpable, can refer to some real object, some event or entity present or absent in the world.” Alphonso Lingis, “The Signs of Consciousness,” SubStance 13, no. 42 (1984): 4. However, only absent objects can be indicated. Sokolowski writes: “The absence of what is indicated is necessary to indication; smoke is not a sign of fire when we see both the smoke and the fire. Indication is the paradigmatic case of something absent being intended by consciousness” (Husserlian Meditations, §44, 112). We will discuss this issue more closely below, in reference to LU, I, §8.
experience of an indication involves the correlation of two complex wholes, therefore: one subjective and the other objective.

The issues involved here—mental activity-wholes and their correlated object-wholes—will play important roles in Husserl’s explication of empty and filled intentions. For the moment, however, Husserl believes he must further clarify his description of indications. What he has said so far “applies as much to the ‘demonstration’ [Hinweisen] of genuine inference and proof [Folgerung und Begründung], as to the ‘demonstration’ [Beweisen] of indication.” In §3, therefore, Husserl distinguishes indication from proof, guided by the fact that proofs are meant to provide “insight,” while indications provide simple motivation.20

“In cases where the existence of one state of affairs is evidently inferred from that of another,” Husserl writes, “we do not in fact speak of the latter as an indication or sign of the former.”21 If we think one thing is connected to another by an “ideal rule,” “which extends its sway beyond the judgments here and now united by ‘motivation’,” then we take ourselves to be experiencing a proof.22 Premises entail conclusions; they do not signify them. Thus, there is a difference between acting as a premise and acting as an indication.23

When we take ourselves to be experiencing an indication, on the other hand, we do not speak of “objectively necessary connections” between the indication-sign and the

19 Husserl, LU, I, §2, 32 (LI, 1:184).

20 Ibid., §3, 32 (LI, 1:184).

21 Ibid., 32-33 (LI, 1:184-85).

22 Ibid., 33 (LI, 1:185).

23 Ibid., 33-34 (LI, 1:185).
indicated object “into which one could have insight.”24 Such connections might exist, but this is not immediately relevant to our experience of something as an indication. Compared with proofs, we experience indications as more empirical or factual than ideal (more particular and contingent than formal and necessary).25

That indications do not involve an “essential relation to a necessary connection”26 between sign and referent does not mean indications involve calculated judgments of probability, however: “One thing is sure, that to talk of an indication is not to presuppose a definite relation to considerations of probability.” Instead, Husserl means by indications those things that motivate “modest surmises” (not “confident judgments”) of the existence of some object or state of affairs.27 In fact, the connection we experience between an indication-sign and an indicated object is based on simple association, as Husserl explains in §4.

Chapter 1, §4, “Digression on the Origin of Indication in Association,” is the final section Husserl devotes to indications. There, we discover that one object’s indicating another depends upon a prior relationship of association between the two. In studying the issue of association, however, we once again encounter the concepts of wholes and cohesion.

Association does not merely restore contents to consciousness, and then leave it to them to combine with the contents there present, as the essence or generic nature of either may necessarily prescribe. . . . If A summons B into consciousness, we are not merely simultaneously or successively conscious of

24 Ibid., 33 (LI, 1:185).
25 Ibid., 33-34 (LI, 1:185).
26 Ibid., 34 (LI, 1:186).
27 Ibid., 35 (LI, 1:186).
both $A$ and $B$, but we usually feel their connection forcing itself upon us, a connection in which the one points to the other and seems to belong to it.\textsuperscript{28}

It is not the job of association, Husserl says, simply to call associated things to mind. Association only directs the mind from one object to another because it leads us to experience combinations or unities between those two things. “If $A$ summons $B$ into consciousness,” Husserl claims, “we usually feel their connection forcing itself upon us.”

In fact, Husserl writes that association creates “intentional unities of things which seem mutually pertinent.”

To turn mere coexistence into mutual pertinence, or, more precisely, to build cases of the former into intentional unities of things which seem mutually pertinent, is the constant result of associative functioning.\textsuperscript{29}

Association binds things together in such a way that they can be experienced as forming a unity. To call something an “intentional unity” is to say that it is intended or experienced as a whole—even though it may consist of various parts. This is the first time we have seen Husserl use the technical term “intentional.”\textsuperscript{30} Any object-directed mental activity is an

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., §4, 36 (LI, 1:187).

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.


intention, however, so the fact of intentionality has already been at work in Husserl’s investigations. (His discussion of beliefs and judgments with regard to indications is one prominent instance.)

Even the claim that associated objects can form “intentional unities” is not Husserl’s first use of the idea that certain ways of being conscious of objects can reveal them as forming otherwise-unnoticed wholes. His claim that two judgments can unite through motivation, and can thereby direct themselves toward a unified, complex correlate (a state of affairs) is an earlier example. In §4, however, we encounter for the first time Husserl’s explicit characterization of such an objective whole as “intentional.” In an associative, intentional unity, things are no longer “mere[ly] coexisten[t]”; they are unified.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{LU}, I, §4, 36 (\textit{I}, 1:187). Hedwig identifies two aspects of Husserl’s understanding of intentionality that are relevant to our current purposes. The first is especially relevant to the relationship between intentionality and objective wholes: “In \textit{Philosophie der Arithmetik},” Hedwig writes, “Husserl starts from a concept of consciousness which accentuates the \textit{unifying} trend of cognitional acts.” In his first book, “cognitional acts,” or “intentions,” show up for Husserl precisely as that which establishes certain forms of objective unity. This way of approaching intentionality “may be traced especially to Mill’s conception of ‘consciousness’: ‘Any objects, whether physical or mental, are related, or are in a relation, to one another, in virtue of any complex state of consciousness into which both enter’” (335). Hedwig’s quotation is of John Stuart Mill’s editorial footnote to James Mill, \textit{Analysis of the Phenomena of Human Mind}, vol. 2, ed. John Stuart Mill (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1878), 7–10, n. 3. Husserl uses the same quotation, saying it provides an “essentially adequate answer” to the question of what “the element common to all cases where we speak of a ‘relation’” is. Hua, vol. 12, \textit{Philosophie der Arithmetik mit ergänzenden Texten (1890-1901)}, ed. Lothar Eley (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970), 66. English translation: \textit{Collected Works}, vol. 10, \textit{Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887-1901}, trans. Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 69. It is, in other words, a sufficient condition for two objects’ being related that they be objects of the same “complex state of consciousness.” Hedwig’s argument is that one}
As we continue to follow Husserl in §4, we find that association is responsible at some level for our experience of wholes in general:

All unity of experience [*Erfahrungseinheit*], all empirical unity [*empirische Einheit*], whether of a thing, an event or of the order and relation of things, becomes a phenomenal unity [*phänomenale Einheit*] through the felt mutual belongingness of the sides and parts that can be made to stand out as units in the apparent object before us. That one thing points to another, in definite arrangement and connection is itself apparent to us.\(^{32}\)

Every experienced unity or whole has “sides and parts that can be made to stand out as units.” This does not mean we experience objects as splintering into parts, however. Rather, they have a “felt mutual belongingness” (i.e., an association), and this makes their “phenomenal unity” (their appearing as a whole) possible. We experience parts not as isolated but as associated, and therefore our experience of each part is not isolated from our experiences of the others. Instead, each part of an object “points to another, in definite arrangement and connection,”\(^{33}\) and this leads the experience of each part to connect with the experiences of others.

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\(^{33}\) Melle writes: “[T]here are in perception two different kinds of indications which point beyond (‘Fort- und Hinausweisungen’). First there are intuitive indications that point from that which appears in a certain orientation towards the same moment appearing in ever new orientations; secondly, connected with these intuitive intentions, there are empty intentions of contiguity which point beyond that which appears towards that which is contiguous with it but has not yet come to appearance. The first indications point inwards to an ever richer perception of one moment or side of the object, the second outwards to an ever more comprehensive perception of the object as a whole” (“Husserl’s Revision,” 117).
Husserl then concludes §4, and his discussion of indication, with the following:

In this field of facts the fact of indication also has its place, in virtue whereof an object or state of affairs not merely recalls another, and so points to it, but also provides evidence for the latter, fosters the presumption that it likewise exists, and makes us immediately feel this in the manner described above.\(^34\)

If one thing forms an associative whole with another, it can also indicate that other. Since the two are experienced as united, the existence of one “fosters the presumption that [the other] likewise exists.” An indication-sign forms a whole with the thing it indicates on two levels, therefore. At the level of association, the indication-sign and indicated thing are experienced as belonging to each other and pointing to each other. They are experienced as two parts in a unity. Then, based on their associative unification, one thing can motivate a person to believe in the other. Through this motivation, a person’s judgments regarding the existence of both things are unified; the judgments become one, inclusive judgment, and therefore intend a unitary state of affairs. The things, once parts in an associative whole, are now also parts in a judgmental whole (i.e., an indication situation or state of affairs). Their unity has taken on a new character.

In studying indications, Husserl introduces us to four key theses that he will employ in his explication of empty and filled intentions. To prepare ourselves for Husserl’s discussion of expressions and intentions, therefore, we now recapitulate those key theses:

1. Certain mental events, like acts of belief or judgment, are intentions, and therefore direct themselves toward objects. Even if some constituents of consciousness were pertinent only to themselves, others have objective correlates.

\(^{34}\) indication that Melle identifies here that we are currently discussing as the “association” between parts of a whole. We will discuss both these types of indication, under the rubric “horizons,” in the coming chapters.
2. Mental acts can join together into larger, more inclusive mental acts. When two acts of belief or judgment about the existence of two objects are united through motivation, for example, they come to form a unitary, though still complex, act of belief or judgment.

3. When multiple, object-directed mental acts become unified, the larger, unified act they form is also object-directed. The objective correlate of a complex, unified mental act is itself a complex unity whose parts are the objective correlates of the mental act’s parts. When, for example, an act of belief in thing$_1$ motivates an act of belief in thing$_2$, the two acts of belief form a whole directed toward the implicative state of affairs formed by the two things.

4. Part of what it means to experience a sign is to experience sign and referent as forming a whole. Because indication-sign and indicated object are associated, for example, they point to each other and are intentionally united. Indication-sign and indicated object, therefore, are related as parts within a whole. A similar situation holds, we will see, with respect to expression-signs (and supports the distinction between emptiness and fulfillment).

§3. Expression-Signs from the Hearer’s Perspective

With a clarified and revised understanding of indication in hand, we can now turn to those signs that function as expressions. “From indicative signs,” Husserl says in §5, “we distinguish *meaningful* signs, i.e. *expressions.*” Husserl’s proximate goal in §5 is to give a

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preliminary demarcation of what are to count as expressions, and thereby to “[set] aside . . . a sense of ‘expression’ not relevant for our purpose.”

In §5, we find Husserl not only clarifying his use of a key term, but also indicating that the process of revision will continue in coming sections. The demarcation of expression Husserl gives here is only “for provisional intelligibility”: “We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility,” Husserl writes, “that each instance or part of speech . . . shall count as an expression.” Expressions, therefore, will be found specifically in speech. That is not all, however: “[E]ach sign that is essentially of the same sort” as speech (or some part of speech) is an expression as well. The type of expression Husserl “excludes” from the philosophical notion is “facial expression and the various gestures which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent.”

Husserl bases the exclusion of facial expressions and gestures on considerations of unity: A “man’s mental states” may “achieve understandable ‘expression’ for his environment” through facial or gesticulative “utterances,” but since these “are not phenomenally one [phänomenal eins] with the experiences [Erlebnissen] made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who manifests them,” they do not count as expressions. In speech, on the other hand, there is a phenomenal oneness between expressions and the mental states or experiences the expressions manifest. This unity between mind and word derives from the fact that actual expressions “[involve] . . . an intent to put certain ‘thoughts’

35 Husserl, *LU*, I, §5, 37 (*LI*, 1:187). “It is part of the notion of an expression to have meaning: this precisely differentiates an expression from the other signs mentioned above” (Husserl, *LU*, I, §15, 59 [*LI* 1:201]).

36 Ibid., §5, 37 (*LI*, 1:187).
on record.‖ Mental states or thoughts—taking “thoughts” (Gedanken) not in Frege’s sense of the contents thought, but in Husserl’s sense of the acts of thought—are purposively manifested through the spoken expression; true expression is deliberate or thoughtful (whereas facial expressions may not be). Our mental states, intentions, emotions, and acts of thought may be made known to a hearer who “interpret[s] our involuntary manifestations, e.g. our ‘expressive movements’,” but such expressions “are without meaning in the special sense in which verbal signs have meaning.” They are not true expressions because they do not mean in the same way as spoken or written expressions. Instead of meaning in the proper sense (a sense still to be determined), they indicate certain aspects of the consciousness of the person speaking.

In §6 we learn that the mental states or experiences that are phenomenally one with true expressions are but one side of expression. The other side of every expression is the “expression physically regarded (the sensible sign, the articulate sound-complex, the written

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39 An engagement with Derrida’s reading of Husserl (specifically, Speech and Phenomena, 32–36) seems to bring out this willful aspect of expression for commentators. For example, Steven Galt Crowell, in, “Husserl, Derrida, and the Phenomenology of Expression,” Philosophy Today 40, no. 1 (spring 1996): 62, writes: “Simplifying somewhat, Husserl can be taken as arguing that expression must be voluntary and that this is why linguistic signs are ‘at one’ with the expressed experiences.” Furthermore, Bernet, who frames his “Husserl’s Theory of Signs Revisited” as a response to Derrida (“Theory of Signs,” 1), writes: “‘Expressions’, according to the First Investigation, result from the will to sensuously express and communicate a thought about something primarily by means of speech (§5). Such lingually expressive, sensuous signs not only signify in virtue of a meaning, they also form an intimate unity with their meaning. Husserl says that in this case the sign and its meaning are ‘phenomenally one’ (§5). . . . ‘Phenomenal unity’ means that meaning and sensuous word are given together and experienced as forming a unity which is not fortuitous but necessary” (“Theory of Signs,” 12). Bernet partially misrepresents what Husserl says in §5, however. It may be true that to experience an expression is to experience it as one with its meaning. In §5, however, Husserl is making a different claim: to experience an expression is to experience the expression-sign as one with certain mental states. We will see in §6 that these mental states are not the meanings of expressions; Husserl is explicit on this point.
Expressions, therefore, have both a physical and a mental aspect; they are wholes consisting of at least two parts. It is the mental states, however, that “make [the expression] be the expression of something.” Without being unified with these states, sounds and marks cannot become true expressions.\(^\text{41}\)

Two things seem to turn a physical mark or sound into an expression, therefore: meanings and mental states. At the beginning of §5, Husserl tells us that expressions are not indications because expressions are meaningful; now, we discover that expressions differ from pseudo-expressions in that expressions are one with the mental states they indicate.\(^\text{42}\)

Given that an expression’s being an expression seems to depend on both its having a meaning and its being partly mental, one might be tempted to think an expression’s mental states simply are the “‘sense’ or the ‘meaning’ of the expression.” However, Husserl claims, “we shall see this notion to be mistaken,” particularly “in the special case of names.”\(^\text{43}\)

A name does not name its associated mental states, but some person, place, or thing. Furthermore, to inquire into the meaning of a name is something other than to ask what or whom it names. “President,” for instance, may have named different persons over time in

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\(^\text{40}\) Husserl, \(LU\), I, §5, 38 (\(LJ\), 1:188).

\(^\text{41}\) Ibid., §6, 38 (\(LJ\), 1:188). This should not to be confused with Saussure’s theory that “signs” consist of two parts, the “signifier” and “signified” (in Wade Baskin’s translation), or the “signal” and the “signification” (in Roy Harris’s translation). Ferdinand de Saussure, \textit{Course in General Linguistics}, ed. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), and trans. Roy Harris (Chicago: Open Court, 1986), Part 1, Chapter 1. One also should not confuse Husserl’s “signs” with Saussure’s “signifiers” or “signals”; the former are usually sensible entities while the latter are the mental impressions made by those entities.


\(^\text{43}\) Husserl, \(LU\), I, §6, 38 (\(LJ\), 1:188).
America (e.g., Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln), but tends to mean the same thing whenever it is used in discussions of the American Federal Government. It is synonymous with the longer expression, “The head of the Executive Branch.” Names, however, are not the only expressions for which “[w]e shall need similar distinctions.” “[A]ll expressions,” in fact, have associated mental states, an expressed object, and a meaning.44

Among the “essential logical distinctions” related to expression and meaning, we will discover the difference between empty and filled intentions. To clarify these distinctions, Husserl proposes in §7 that we “first study expressions” in the “communicative function” for which they “were originally framed.” Going back to the origin of expressions in communication, we see that “[t]he articulate sound-complex, the written sign etc., first becomes a spoken word or communicative bit of speech, when a speaker produces it with the intention of ‘expressing himself about something’ through its means.” This purposeful expressive activity involves “endow[ing] [the expression] with a sense in certain acts of mind [psychischen Akten], a sense [the speaker] desires to share with his auditors.”45

This is the first time we have seen Husserl use the term “act,” even though we ourselves have already utilized it when discussing “acts of belief or judgment.” To this point, Husserl has usually employed equivalent terms like “thoughts” (Gedanken), “experiences” (Erlebnisse), and “mental states” (Seelenzustände). For instance, in §6 we saw Husserl argue that the meaning of an expression is not the states that form its mental side. Here, we see that while an expression’s mental states or acts are not its meaning, they do

44 Ibid.

“endow” the expression with meaning or sense (“meaning” and “sense” are synonyms for Husserl in LU). Mental acts are able to make expressions meaningful, even if they are not themselves the meaning of expressions.

In communication, however, a speaker’s goal is not simply to make her expressions meaningful, but to “share” the meaning of her expressions with her interlocutor. If the sharing is to occur, the hearer must join the speaker in being intentional. The speaker must not only have “an intent to put certain ‘thoughts’ on record,” but the hearer must “[take] the speaker to be a person, who is not merely uttering sounds but speaking to him.” Whereas one can experience an indication as an indication whether or not one sees it as having been produced by a person, one cannot experience an expression as an expression without taking it as having been produced by a person. This requires the hearer to see the speaker as “accompanying those sounds with certain sense-giving acts, which the sounds reveal to the hearer, or whose sense they seek to communicate to him.”

To encounter spoken sounds as something other than noise, one must see them as manifesting an active mind. However, Husserl argued in §5 that being able to see mental

46 “‘Meaning’ is further used by us as synonymous with ‘sense’” (ibid., §15, 58 [LI, 1:201]). In his later theory, however, Husserl will begin to use the two words in different senses.

47 Husserl, LU, I, §7, 39 (LI, 1:189).

48 Crowell writes: “[I]t must be said that signs produce no effects by themselves, and indeed are not even signs, without someone to intend them as such. . . . [I]n the absence of any animating intention, ‘I’ is neither a sign, nor does it ‘produce’ a meaning. One might say that since it must be legible in principle to anyone, it is therefore independent of everyone. But this does not mean that a semiotic system can signify all by itself. It is just as implausible to efface the interpreter in favor of ‘magic’ semiosis as it is to marginalize language in favor of an ‘absolute’ interpreting subject” (“Derrida, Husserl,” 62-63). Here, Crowell is critiquing John Caputo, “The Economy of Signs in Husserl and Derrida: From Uselessness to Full Employment,” in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 99–113. What is missing from Crowell’s analysis, however, is the fact that we cannot encounter a sign as an expression without taking it as having been animated—as always already animated—by the person who produced it.

49 Husserl, LU, I, §7, 39 (LI, 1:189).
experiences behind something (e.g., a facial expression) is not enough. One must also see the utterance as united with those mental experiences. Here, Husserl expresses this requirement by saying that the hearer must take the spoken sounds as “seek[ing] to communicate” the “sense” of the “sense-giving acts” that they reveal.50 If the hearer is to take the speaker’s vocalizations as a true expression, the hearer must see the speaker’s mental acts—which no one but the speaker can experience—as purposefully giving the sounds a meaning that he (and anyone else) can access and share. The hearer must take the sounds and acts as if they are purposefully working together to express something, in other words, rather than as if they are unwittingly related. Sounds that are true expressions form a participative unity with their associated mental states.

We see, therefore, that communication cannot occur without both speaker and hearer being, in some way, mentally engaged with the spoken words. We discover this mutual engagement to be a type of participation: “What first makes mental commerce possible, and turns connected speech into discourse,” Husserl says, “lies in the correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences of communicating persons which is effected by the physical side of speech.” It is not as if communication would be possible, just so long as both speaker and hearer are mentally active. Rather, there must be a “correlation among [their] corresponding physical and mental experiences.”51 Hearer and speaker must correlate

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
their thoughts, or think with each other.\textsuperscript{52} We can understand this requirement in the following way.

If the hearer were to mis-take the speaker’s words, and thereby not “[understand] the speaker’s intention,”\textsuperscript{53} there would be no correlation between the thoughts of speaker and hearer. Communication would not succeed. Conversely, if a speaker were deliberately to mask his intentions by purposefully choosing words whose associated mental acts were ambiguous, the hearer could not determine which sense the speaker meant to give his expression. Once again, there would be no correlation between the mental acts of speaker and hearer. Communication would not succeed.

Communication requires a speaker and hearer to act together (mentally): “Speaking and hearing, intimation of mental states through speaking and reception thereof in hearing, are mutually correlated” in communication.\textsuperscript{54} For communication to occur, the expression must give out or reveal (“intimate”) its sense-giving acts, and those acts must be taken in or recognized (“received”) by the hearer. Thus, we see that Husserl’s discussion of expressions

\textsuperscript{52} Sokolowski writes: “When I get someone to think along with me while I speak, I do not name his activity of thinking; I do not say ‘predicate.’ But I say ‘is,’ and this word signals the activity of predicating but does not name it; it names the predicational crease in the object under discussion. Getting someone to think along with me is something like getting him to imitate me while I swing the club or raise the car. I get him to do as I am doing, and this is the way we all begin to think at first until we can take over on our own. However, what I am doing when I express thought is involved with language, and both of us, I and my imitator in thinking, perform our thinking upon the single sounding speech that I speak and he hears” (Presence and Absence, 106).

\textsuperscript{53} Husserl, \textit{LU}, I, §7, 39 (\textit{LI}, 1:189).

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. Cf. C. S. Lewis, in his proto-phenomenological study of literary theory: “A work of (whatever) art can be either ‘received’ or ‘used’. When we ‘receive’ it we exert our senses and imagination and various other powers according to a pattern invented by the artist. When we ‘use’ it we treat it as assistance for our own activities.” C. S. Lewis, \textit{An Experiment in Criticism} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 88.
in communication leads him to the topics of intimation (Kundgabe) and receipt of intimation (Kundnahme). However, as we will see below, intimation is simply a form of indication.

Husserl says that “[i]f one surveys these interconnections” between spoken words and mental acts in communication, “one sees at once that all expressions in communicative speech function as indications.” This is because expression-signs, “serve the hearer as signs” (i.e., indication-signs) of the speaker’s “thoughts” (i.e., acts of thinking) or “sense-giving inner experiences [psychischen Erlebnisse].” Even though a speaker may employ her words as signs of whatever object she is talking about, hearers can take her words as indication-signs of her mental acts. “This function of verbal expressions,” Husserl says, “we shall call their intimating function.”55 That is, for an expression-sign to intimate the mental acts of its speaker is for it to indicate those acts to some hearer.

Since expressions indicate the “inner experiences” of a speaker, Husserl says we can take the word “intimation” in a “narrower” or “wider sense.” “The narrower sense we may restrict to acts which impart sense.” The “acts which impart sense” are the acts with which a hearer must correlate her own if communication is to occur. “[T]he wider sense” of intimation, on the other hand, “will cover all acts that a hearer may introject into a speaker on the basis of what he says.”56 The existence of an expression-sign does not only lead a hearer to believe in the existence of the acts that give the expression meaning. It also motivates the hearer to believe in the existence of other associated acts, states, thoughts, and feelings that do not truly achieve expression.

55 Husserl, LU, I, §7, 40 (LI, 1:189).
56 Ibid.
After discussing intimation, Husserl turns to the receipt of intimation in §7’s final paragraph. What is required of a hearer, if she is to take some sound as an expression (i.e., if she is to take the sound as indicating acts with which she must correlate her own)? Earlier, Husserl said we encounter things as indications through certain beliefs or judgments. What is the nature of a hearer’s belief or judgment about a sound or mark that makes the sound or mark indicate (intimate) mental acts?

Specifically, Husserl asks whether the receiving (Kundnahme) of an expression’s intimation (Kundgabe) is conceptual or perceptual. We might take certain vocalizing bodies as expressive persons because (a) we reason from the existence and nature of their vocalizations to the existence and nature of their mental acts, or because (b) we simply perceive those bodies as persons involved not only in vocalization, but also in sense-giving acts. Husserl finds option b to be more accurate. “To understand an intimation is not to have conceptual knowledge of it, not to judge in the sense of asserting anything about it.” The hearer’s experience of vocalizations as expressions—or of speakers as persons engaged in mental acts—does not require the hearer to make explicit, articulate judgments about the vocalizations or the speaker. Instead, “the hearer intuitively takes the speaker to be a person who is expressing this or that, or as we certainly can say, perceives him as such.”

We experience others as thinking, expressing beings. If we are to understand such experience as a kind of perception, however, we must not restrict the notion of perception too greatly. In a restricted sense of “perception,” one can never “perceive” the mental acts of another person, and therefore can never “perceive” her as a thinking, expressing being. Yet,

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57 Ibid.
Husserl says, “I perceive [someone] as a speaker” or as a “person—even though the mental phenomena which make him a person cannot fall, for what they are, in [my] intuitive grasp.” It is possible, in other words, to “perceive” another person’s acts of thinking, even though we cannot actually have those same acts. In this widened sense of “perception,” we even perceive “other people’s inner experiences” like “their anger, their pain etc.” We can “perceive” that someone is angry or hurting without having their anger or pain (i.e., without experiencing the full intuitive presence of their anger or pain).

The hearer perceives the speaker as manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he also perceives these experiences themselves: he does not, however, himself experience them, he has not an ‘inner’ but an ‘outer’ percept of them.

A hearer can perceive a speaker’s thoughts through her expressions, without those thoughts being so intuitively present to the hearer that they become his own. A hearer perceives the

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58 Ibid. (LI, 1:190). J. N. Mohanty asserts that because intimation allows a kind of perception of the speaker’s acts, intimation cannot be a type of indication. J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, 2nd ed., Phaenomenologica, no. 14 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969) §4.2, 11. Based on what Husserl says about perception in Investigation I, §7, however, I believe Mohanty is mistaken. Husserl writes: “If the essential mark of perception [Wesentlichen Charakter der Wahrnehmung] lies in the intuitive persuasion [anschaulichen Vermeinen] that a thing or event is itself before us for our grasping [als einen selbst gegenwärtigen zu erfassen]—such a persuasion [Vermeinen] is possible, and in the main mass of cases actual, without verbalized, conceptual apprehension—then the receipt of such an intimation is the mere perceiving of it [dann ist die Kundnahme eine bloße Wahrnehmung der Kundgabe]” (LU, I, §7, 41 [LI, 1:190]). To show how this quotation answers Mohanty’s objection, however, we must first note that Findlay’s translation of “anschaulichen Vermeinen” as “intuitive persuasion” seems too strong. Anglophone students of Husserl normally render “anschaulichen” as “intuitive”; however, “Vermeinen,” would be better translated as, “supposition,” than, “persuasion.” Husserl’s concatenation of “anschaulichen” and “Vermeinen” may mean we should read “Vermeinen” in a stronger sense than usual. However, to exchange “supposition” for “persuasion,” while continuing to render “anschaulichen” as “intuitive,” is disproportionate. I suggest, instead, that Husserl means “anschaulichen” here in the common (i.e., non-phenomenological) sense of “vivid” or “clear.” Thus, we should render, “anschaulichen Vermeinen,” as, “vivid” or “clear supposition.”

Contra Mohanty, therefore, it is not obvious that indications cannot lead to perceptions of (i.e., “vivid” or “clear suppositions” regarding) the existence of what they indicate. This is especially true given the fact that an indication-sign forms a whole with what it indicates, and is experienced as such. The whole, containing both parts, appears through the indication-sign. Therefore, the argument that indications cannot provide a kind of perception of what they indicate—and consequently that intimation cannot be a type of indication—requires more support than Mohanty provides.

59 Husserl, LU, I, §7, 41 (LI, 1:190).
speaker’s experiences from (or as) outside, not from (or as) within. This does not mean, however, that hearers do not perceive the thinking of speakers, in an important sense of the word “perceive.”

That hearers do not actually have the acts of thinking of those speaking to them does not mean communication is impossible, therefore. Minds may be separate, and this may make them other than or different from each other, but this does not eliminate communication. Communication does not require that a hearer experience the speaker’s acts of thinking, in the strictest sense of the word “experience.”

Mutual understanding demands a certain correlation among the mental acts mutually unfolded in intimation [Kundgabe] and in the receipt of such intimation [Kundnahme], but not at all their exact resemblance. Kundgabe and Kundnahme must lead to a correlation of the mental acts of hearer and speaker if there is to be communication. This means that if an expression intimates a speaker’s mental acts to a hearer, but the hearer does not actually “receive” that intimation, there can be no communication. The intimating function of expressions allows hearers to perceive the sense-giving acts with which their own acts are coordinated; it allows two minds to act together. However, if the hearer “perceives” acts that are not there, or perceives no acts at all, the hearer will be unable to correlate her mental acts with the speaker’s. This does not mean, Husserl says, that hearers must engage in exactly the same mental acts as the speaker.

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60 We will see in Investigation I, §8 that this changes when one is speaking with oneself.


It simply means that the acts on both sides must be similar to a certain extent, with each person achieving his own acts.\footnote{Mohanty is incorrect, therefore, when he says that Karl Bühler’s ‘‘signal’’ function’’ of expressions “is not recognized by Husserl” (\textit{Theory of Meaning}, §6, 16–17). Mohanty refers to “K. Bühler, \textit{Sprachtheorie}, 1934, pp. 25-28.” No fuller reference is provided, though it would seem he means: Karl Bühler, \textit{Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache} (Jena: Fischer, 1934). The “signal function,” Mohanty reports, is the fact that an expression “works as a signal for the hearer to behave in an appropriate manner” (\textit{Theory of Meaning}, §6, 16). However, Sokolowski (\textit{Presence and Absence}, chapter 10) has used Husserl’s theory of signs to bring out such a “signal function” of expression. Furthermore, three passages from Investigation I, chapter 1 support Sokolowski’s work. In addition to Husserl’s claim here in §7 that “mental commerce” is “possible,” because of “the correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences of communicating persons which is effected by the physical side of speech” (\textit{LU}, I, §7, 39 \textit{[LI, 1:189]}), there are similar passages in §10 and §16. Husserl writes in §10: “The function of a word (or rather of an intuitive word-presentation) is to awaken \textit{erregen} a sense-conferring act in ourselves, to point to \textit{hinzuzeigen} what is intended, or perhaps given intuitive fulfillment in this act, and to guide \textit{drängen} our interest exclusively \textit{ausschließlich} in this direction” (ibid., §10, 46 \textit{[LI, 1:193]}). In §16, he says: “Like every expression a proper name functions as an indication, i.e. in its intimating role. . . . If I hear a proper name uttered, the corresponding presentation is aroused in me, and I know: This is the presentation the speaker is framing in his mind, and that he likewise wishes to arouse \textit{erwecken} in mine” (ibid., §16, 64 \textit{[LI, 1:204]}). Taken together, §7, §10, and §16 reveal—and Sokolowski has argued—that expressions indicate two things: (a) the acts of the speaker, and (b) that the hearer should perform the same acts.}

§4. Expression-Signs from the Speaker’s Perspective

Husserl’s description of communication reaches its completion in §8’s exploration of “[e]xpressions in solitary life” (\textit{einsamen Seelenleben}). To this point, Husserl has focused on expression from the hearer’s point of view. In §8, Husserl takes up the description of expression from the speaker’s point of view. After describing sense-giving acts from the outside, he now attempts to describe them from within.

We will devote this section and the next to a close reading of Investigation I, §8, and will do so for two reasons. First, I, §8 has been the center of intense controversy in the secondary literature since Derrida’s \textit{Speech and Phenomena} argued that it is where Husserl’s
An entire project falls apart. Thus, even though we do not have the space to fully engage this debate, it is important that we not pass over §8 too lightly, taking its cogency for granted.

Second, Husserl’s final clarification of the distinction between indication and expression in I, §8, will lead him to introduce the distinction between empty and filled intentions in §9. Section 8 is, as it were, the event that forces Husserl finally to show his hand. To understand Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions properly, we must understand its place in Husserl’s overall project, and to understand its place in that project, we must understand where Husserl is coming from when he introduces it.

In this and the following section, therefore, we will be investigating the phenomenon with which Husserl is wrestling when he takes up the theory of empty and filled intentions, and asking whether Husserl’s approach to this phenomenon is misguided. Our goal, in other words, will be to clarify the background of Husserl’s turn to the topic of empty and filled intentions, and to ask whether this turn was, in some way, motivated by a mistake. Now, to the text.

“Expressions continue to have meanings,” Husserl says, “and the same meanings as in dialogue,” even when one is merely talking to oneself. Whether I say, “It is raining” to a friend or to myself, the meaning remains the same. The expression does not have to intimate my sense-giving acts to a second person for it to have a meaning. “[W]hen we live in the understanding of a word, it expresses something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not.”

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64 Husserl, LU, I, §8, 41 (LI, 1:190).
65 Ibid., 42 (LI, 1:190).
communication, they continue to be expressions “outside” communication. Or, rather, expressions continue to function meaningfully in the limit case of communication, where the thoughts of speaker and hearer are not simply correlated but identical, because the person speaking and the person hearing are one and the same. This manner of speaking is more appropriate, as we will see at the end of Investigation I, §8; soliloquy is more like communication’s boundary than its negation or outside.

“It seems clear, therefore,” Husserl continues, “that an expression’s meaning . . . cannot coincide with its feats of intimation.” If a speaker’s expression is still an expression (a meaningful sign), even when no one else is there to take the expression as an intimation, then an expression’s indicating a speaker’s mental acts to some second person is not the same thing as its meaning. An expression’s intimating and its meaning must be different.

Someone might object, Husserl notes, that “in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e. as indications, of one’s own inner experiences.” That is, when we frame soliloquy as a kind of communication, we might see that expressions still intimate. If (a) intimation makes communication possible, and (b) soliloquy is communication pushed to its limit, perhaps (c) a speaker not only treats his expressions as signs of what he expresses, but also as signs of his own acts. However, Husserl declares that he “cannot think such a view acceptable.” To show why, he begins an examination of the speaker’s experience of expressing.

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66 Ibid., §7, 39 (LI, 1:189).
67 Ibid., §8, 42 (LI, 1:190).
68 Ibid.
“[I]f we reflect on the relation of expression to meaning,” Husserl writes, we can “break up our complex, intimately unified experience of the sense-filled expression, into the two factors of word and sense.” Rather than simply engaging in the speaker’s experience of expression, Husserl proposes “we reflect on” the speaker’s experience of expression. When we do so, he says, the parts of the experience (which the speaker lives through as a unified whole) stand out for us. While someone speaking has a “complex, intimately unified experience,” someone reflecting can isolate two parts in the experience of expression: the sign and the sense.

Husserl continues, saying that in reflection “the word comes before us as intrinsically indifferent, whereas the sense seems the thing aimed at [‘abgesehen’] by the verbal sign.” We notice, from our reflective stance, that the words are ultimately irrelevant; they are “after something” more important than themselves. The speaker means some meaning about some object by using the words. The words themselves are not the speaker’s focus; they are not what is important to the speaker.

Husserl then says the word-part of an expression is the speaker’s means for meaning some sense: “[T]he word comes before us as intrinsically indifferent, whereas the sense seems the thing . . . meant [gemeint] by its means.” In other words, we see from the reflective attitude that the words a speaker uses are simply a tool for meaning some referent.

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69 Ibid. (LI, 1:190–91).

70 Ibid. (LI, 1:191).

71 Taking “abgesehen” in the colloquial sense of “being after something,” as Husserl indicates we should by putting the word in quotation marks.

72 Husserl, LU, I, §8, 42 (LI, 1:191).
Husserl is not saying, however, that a word means its meaning in the same way that it means its referent.\footnote{Sokolowski writes: “We don’t get from one [the expression] to the other [its meaning] at all. We already have meanings in expressions; that is what makes them more than mere physical objects” (“Structure and Content,” 320).} If he were, an infinite regress would result: Since a sign only means its referent because it has a meaning,\footnote{Husserl writes: “[A]n expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning [Akt des Bedeutens] is the determinate manner in which we refer to our object of the moment, though this mode of significant reference and the meaning itself can change while the objective reference remains fixed” (LU, I, §13, 54–55 [LI, 1:198]).} it would only mean its meaning because it had some second meaning, and would only mean that meaning because it had some third meaning, \textit{ad infinitum}. Instead, we must understand Husserl as saying that a speaker engages in an “act of meaning [Akt des Bedeutens],”\footnote{Husserl writes, LU, I, §13, 54–55 (LI, 1:198).} or sense-giving act, by using an expression-sign. The speaker can engage in this act of meaning because the expression somehow provides support;\footnote{Husserl writes: “There is constituted . . . an act of meaning [Akt des Bedeutens] which finds support in the verbal presentation’s intuitive content, but which differs in essence from the intuitive intention directed upon the word itself” (LU, I, §10, 47 [LI, 1:194]).} and, therefore, it is by the means of the sign that the speaker is able to engage in the act of meaning (is able to “mean the meaning”).

Husserl continues by saying that “the expression” on which we are reflecting “seems to direct \textit{hinzulenken} interest away from itself towards its sense, and to point to \textit{hinzuziehen} the latter.”\footnote{Husserl, LU, I, §8, 42 (LI, 1:191).} The interest he speaks of is not the speaker’s interest, but our own (i.e., those of us who are reflecting on the expression). The speaker does not find herself first interested in her words, and then directed by her words to their sense. In speaking, one is
always primarily engaged in meaning; in speaking, we focus on the objects we express.\textsuperscript{78} In reflection, we can take the speaker’s words as pointing to the speaker’s meaning, but the speaker herself is simply engaged in meaning an object through the means of her words.\textsuperscript{79}

Husserl then writes that “this pointing [\textit{Hinzeigen}],” experienced by those of us reflecting, “is not an indication in the sense previously discussed.” We who are reflecting do not take the speaker’s words as indicating the speaker’s meaning. If we did experience the words as indicating the meaning, we would have to be motivated by our belief in the words’ existence to believe in the meaning’s existence. However, the “existence of the sign neither ‘motivates’ the existence of the meaning,” Husserl says, “nor, properly expressed our belief in the meaning’s existence.”\textsuperscript{80} We can understand this as in the following way.

First, the words used by a speaker do not motivate the speaker’s meaning; they do not motivate him to mean. One does not have to hear oneself speaking before one can begin to mean. A reader or hearer may encounter words as motivating meaning, since the existence

\textsuperscript{78} We can examine “printed word[s]” as physical, rather than “verbal,” objects, Husserl tells us. “If,” however, the word “functions as a word” again, “[t]he word (\textit{qua} external singular) remains intuitively present, maintains its appearance, but we no longer intend it, it no longer properly is the object of our ‘mental activity’ [\textit{psychischen Betätigung}]. Our interest, our intention, our thought [\textit{Interesse . . . Intention . . . Vermeinen}]—mere synonyms if taken in sufficiently wide senses—point exclusively to the thing meant [\textit{gemeint}] in the sense-giving act” (Husserl, \textit{LU}, I, §10, 46–47 [\textit{LI}, 1:193]).

\textsuperscript{79} If I am correct, therefore, Donn Welton misreads this passage when he says: “Initially Husserl argues that in soliloquy the expression ‘deflects’ interest away from itself and ‘points to’ meaning in a way which is different from signs which indicate. . . . [M]onologue is such that expressions are effaced under the weight of their meaning and, in that context, do indeed ‘deflect’ attention away from themselves.” Donn Welton, \textit{The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology}, Phaenomenologica, no. 88 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), 15. First, Welton misses the fact that this “deflecting” and “pointing” occurs not for the speaker, but for someone reflecting on the speaker’s experience. Furthermore, it is not simply in soliloquy that expressions perform such deflections and pointings. Any time we reflect on a speaker’s experience of expression (whether in communication or soliloquy), we will find ourselves deflected and pointed away from the word and toward the meaning. The speaker’s act of meaning through the expression is always more important than the act of speaking, writing, or imagining the expression; and, therefore, the meaning is always more important than the expression.

\textsuperscript{80} Husserl, \textit{LU}, I, §8, 42 (\textit{LI}, 1:191).
of words written or spoken by others motivates us to correlate our mental acts with theirs. A writer or speaker, however, is spurred to mean—and therefore to express—by the things he writes or speaks about. The words are the means, not the archē of meaning.\(^{81}\)

Second, the speaker’s words do not motivate those of us who are reflecting to believe in the existence of the expression’s meaning. We already believe that the meaning exists, because we are the ones who split the “intimately unified experience of the sense-filled expression, into the two factors of word and sense.”\(^{82}\) In reflecting upon the experience of expression, we have already encountered both the words and the meaning; and, therefore, we already believe that both exist.\(^{83}\) Our belief in one does not depend on—is not motivated by—our belief in the other. This means, however, that we can experience neither object as indicating the other. A necessary condition of indication is impossible to meet when both the object that would indicate and the object that would be indicated are already present.

In reflecting on the speaker’s experience of expression, therefore, we can find no indication. Husserl then attempts to show why this is the case, especially in soliloquy. “What we are to use as an indication [Anzeichen (Kennzeichen)],” he says, “must be perceived by us as existent.” It is in our experience of A’s existence as motivating our belief

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\(^{81}\) We will return to this issue at the end of §8, in refuting the claim that meaning depends on indication.


\(^{83}\) The connection between direct experience (or intuition) and belief is strong for Husserl. This is especially true when we can discuss direct experience in terms of “perception.” “Belief is nothing in addition to perception,” Husserl writes, “on the contrary, it is perception in its primitive mode. If we live in a perception that has not been subject to any inhibition, then we perceive; we carry out a perception and with it a belief.” Hua, vol. 23, \textit{Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925)}, ed. Eduard Marbach (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980), Text 15, i, 405. English translation: \textit{Edmund Husserl: Collected Works}, ed. Rudolf Bernet, vol. 11, \textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory} (1898-1925), trans. John B. Brough (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 478. I will cite the German text as \textit{PBE}, and the English text as \textit{PICM}.
in B’s existence that we encounter A as an indication. “This holds [trifft . . . zu] also of expressions used in communication, but not for expressions used in soliloquy.” In hearing or reflecting, we encounter communicative expressions as existent; but in soliloquy, “we are in general content with imagined [vorgestellten] rather than actual words.”

Expressions used in communication can be indications because they have an existent, physical side. If they did not, they could not motivate their hearers to believe in their speaker’s mental acts; in fact, they could have no hearers at all. However, when we speak to ourselves, we need not speak aloud. We can simply imagine the words; and “[i]n imagination a spoken or printed word floats before us, though in reality it has no existence.”

What actually exists when we imaginatively express is the act of imagining. “The imagined verbal sound, or the imagined printed word, does not exist, only its imaginative presentation does so.” A person who was hallucinating might be motivated by the “existence” of the words he imagines he is hearing to believe in the existence of someone

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84 Husserl, *LU*, I, §8, 42 (LI, 1:191). Welton writes: “What we detect in this passage is the introduction of a second opposition: the functional distinction between indicating and expressing pivots on a substantial difference between signs or ‘expressions used in communication’ and expressions or ‘expressions used in soliloquy’” (*Origins of Meaning*, 12). We will see, however, that Welton is mistaken about there being a “substantial difference” between two types of expression.

85 Husserl, *LU*, I, §8, 42 (LI 1:191). Welton writes: “Thus, when we read that the expression can merely be ‘imagined’ or ‘phantasized’ and need not be ‘real’, the quote above extends this to mean that ‘in truth it does not exist at all.’ If real existence is not essential to the being of expressions, then we are able to dispense with indication as well as rules of communication in our definition of meaning, i.e., we are able to cleanly separate the indicative and communicative from a certain set of semantic conditions making possible our use of signs” (*Origins of Meaning*, 13). I would argue that we must not make such talk of “cleanly separa[ing]” indication from semantics the center of our description of Husserl’s mission in Investigation I, §8. Husserl’s task, first and foremost, is to bring out the meaning of expressions. To do so, it is helpful to draw a distinction between meaning and indicating (as activities or functions); but this distinction is a means to an end, not the end itself.

who is speaking to him. If one is “hearing things,” therefore, one might take the expressions one imagines to be indications. The normal person who is talking to himself, however, has no belief in his imagined expressions that could motivate him to believe in someone else.\(^{87}\)

“The word’s non-existence neither disturbs nor interests us,” Husserl continues, “since it leaves the word’s expressive function unaffected.”\(^{88}\) While expressing, we are not

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\(^{87}\) Mohanty objects: “It would not do to say that even if there is no hearer to whom the announcement [Kundgabe, intimation] is made, it is yet possible that the words serve the speaker himself as marks [Anzeige, indications] of his own mental experiences. Husserl’s reason for rejecting this suggestion is hardly satisfactory. He argues that a mark [Anzeige, indication] functions as a mark [Anzeige, indication] only by being itself an existent something, whereas in lonely thought one operates not with actually existent expressions but with mere representations—phantasized or imagined—of them. Since our thought is not disturbed by the non-existence of the words, the expressions concerned do not function as marks [Anzeige, indications]. This argument is not convincing, for the mere representation of a mark [Anzeige, indication] (say, of a danger signal) could under circumstances act as a warning” (Theory of Meaning, §5, 14). It is not clear here precisely what Mohanty’s objection is. In fact, he appears to be confusing acts of imagination with imagined objects—something that Husserl explicitly argues should not be done. Someone’s taking her own act of imagining—which actually exists—as an indication does not contradict Husserl’s claim that imagined objects—which do not exist—do not act as indications.

Mohanty appears to commit the same mistake on the following page: “It is necessary and important for our purpose to thrash out the relevance of Husserl’s contrast between communicative speech and speech in the loneliness of one’s mental life. . . . The contrast under consideration also shows, according to Husserl, that the real existence of the expression as a physical event is not essential to the expression as an expression, so that even the mere representation—imagined or fancied—of the expression would equally well fulfill the essential meaning function” (Theory of Meaning, §5.1, 15). Husserl, however, does not claim that the representation of an expression can play the same role as an expression. Husserl claims that a represented expression can play the same role as an existent expression. Furthermore, Mohanty appears to refer to representations as imagined, while Husserl does not take up the subject of imagining representations (i.e., imagining acts of imagination) in Investigation I, §8.

\(^{88}\) Husserl, LU, I, §8, 42–43 (LI, 1:191). Welton writes that “[t]he contrast in function” between indicating and expressing “is predicated upon a contrast in being” (Origins of Meaning, 14). In this he is partially correct. Only signs that exist can perform the function of indication; however, both signs that exist and signs that are imagined can perform the function of expressing. An expression does not cease to mean (i.e., to be an expression) when it is used in conversation rather than imagination. In fact, the further we examine Welton’s text, the more we see that he reads more into the interaction of ontological status and function than is actually there. First, he claims, “Husserl has argued that existence is not just a necessary condition for the indicative relationship but also for the being of signs” (Origins of Meaning, 14). This is a misrepresentation. Expressions are signs according to Husserl, and they can be both physical and imagined. Therefore, existence cannot be a “necessary condition . . . for the being of signs.” Welton then claims that “expressions are now said ‘not to exist at all’” (Origins of Meaning, 14). This is false. Husserl says that expressions are able to not exist \textit{and yet remain expressions}; an expression can be written, spoken, or imagined. We see the identity of expressions across these contrasting modes of being. Finally, based on these mistaken assertions, Welton concludes: “[W]e seem driven to the conclusion that expressions are a set, perhaps a complementary set, of entities numerically distinct from signs. We would have two distinct groups. This would be to reverse Husserl’s own emphasis on intertwining functions, for it would not be two uses of signs which would be
concerned with our words; we are concerned with the object we are expressing. Whether we imagine our expressions or speak them aloud, therefore, we still mean or express whatever object is in question, and our speech retains its sense.

It is possible to treat oneself as a second person to whom one is communicating, and even to take oneself as the object to be expressed. Even here, however, our words do not indicate (intimate) to us.

One of course speaks, in a certain sense, even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to think of oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to oneself, as e.g., when someone says to himself: ‘You have gone wrong, you can’t go on like that.’ But in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything [teilt sich nichts mit]: one merely conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating.\(^89\)

Even when I explicitly address myself to myself in soliloquy, I do not experience my words as indicating. I still encounter the words as imaginative, rather than existent. Furthermore, I still do not encounter the words as the focus of my experience. They indicate nothing to me both because they do not exist and because I am not concerned with them. If I am talking to myself about myself, for instance, I am concerned with myself (as the object I am expressing), not with my words (as indicating my sense-giving acts).

Furthermore, understanding what I have to say to myself does not require that my words intimate, nor that I receive this intimation. The words do not motivate me to coordinate my own mental acts with the speaker’s, since I am the speaker and am already engaged in those acts (and hence am directly aware of them).

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interwoven but two kinds of things: signs and expressions” (*Origins of Meaning*, 14). The falsity of Welton’s premises, however, invalidates his conclusion.

In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment.\(^9\)

The purpose of indication in communication is to help correlate the mental acts of the hearer with those of the speaker. If the acts of hearer and speaker are already correlated, however, the indication (intimation) performed by expressions would be “quite purposeless.” Its purpose would have already been achieved, because the speaker’s acts “are themselves experienced by us,” \textit{qua} hearers, “at that very moment.” The acts of hearer and speaker are the same; the ideal limit of correlation has been reached. In soliloquy, the telos of intimation has already been achieved before intimation can occur.

Lacking its final cause (its purpose), the intimating function of expressions in soliloquy is not reduced from potency to act. We can explain the same fact from another angle, however. We turn from soliloquy to the communicative situation. Here, because of the separation of minds between speaker and hearer, the hearer can experience the words of the speaker without also experiencing his sense-giving acts. The acts are absent to the hearer. It is the absence—for the hearer—of the speaker’s sense-giving acts that sets his spoken words in relief; this absence makes the words stand out as something to be noted and believed in. The words only indicate the acts behind them because the absence of these acts (for the hearer) leaves the words to stand alone as the center of attention.

In soliloquy, however the hearer’s acts are already the speaker’s acts; one is already the speaker—already caught up and absorbed in meaning—when one becomes a hearer. One

\(^9\) Ibid.
does not thematize the words one speaks.\footnote{The words even direct attention away from themselves for those who—in reflection upon the speaker’s experience of the words—do manage to thematize them. It is as if the speaker’s words do not want to draw attention to themselves (and thereby to give rise to beliefs, motivations, and indications) for anyone but whatever second person they are addressed to.} Since we have always already given them sense—since we are engaged in the acts that give them sense “at that very moment”—we experience the words as a means to meaning, not an indication of meaning.

We now see that meaning does not depend upon indication, at least for the speaker. The claim that indication founds meaning for a speaker would amount to the following. It would imply that the sense-giving acts were brought into existence by our believing that they already exist. Our words would lead us to believe that we are performing acts that we only begin to perform because we believe we are already performing them. The thesis that meaning depends upon indication is the thesis that we are tricked into meaning by our own words. It is the idea that we cannot engage in acts of meaning unless the words we speak lead us to believe falsely that we are already engaged in such acts. If meaning were to depend upon indication, therefore, every expression would begin in self-deception.

Husserl has already told us that a speaker’s words do not motivate her own meaning. We now see that to claim otherwise amounts to asserting that self-deception is the archê of expression. As intriguing as such a counterintuitive claim would be, however, we have no motivation for making it. Indication is “quite purposeless” for someone who simply wishes to express himself; and given that we cannot actually find indication in the speaker’s experience, to claim it is there would be needless conjecture. It is clear that we can mean without first deceiving ourselves about our own acts of meaning.
In our study of expression-signs, we have encountered four theses that prepare us for our study of empty and filled intentions. We can add them, therefore, to the four theses we gleaned from our study of indication-signs. Those four were:

1. Mental acts are object-directed, or “intentional.”

2. Mental acts can join together to form larger wholes, which are themselves mental acts.

3. When mental acts join together into larger wholes, those larger wholes are themselves intentional.

4. To experience something as an indication-sign is to experience that thing as a part in a larger whole that includes the thing indicated by the indication-sign.

The new theses are:

5. Some acts (i.e., intentional mental states) can give sense or meaning to expressions, even though they are not themselves the sense or meaning of those expressions. Husserl has not yet clarified the connection between these acts and the sense or meaning that they “give,” but he will use these acts as his original example of empty intentions.

6. Wholes can be formed of apparently heterogeneous parts. For instance, hearers experience speakers’ sense-giving acts as forming a whole with the expression’s “physical side.” On the other hand, speakers experience meanings as forming wholes with words.\footnote{Sokolowski writes: “In speech, which is taken as the paradigm, an expression is a complex whole made up of words and meaning” (Husserlian Meditations, §45, 113).}

Becoming accustomed to thinking of such wholes helps prepare us to understand the kind of whole that expression-sign and expressed object form in Husserl’s original example of filled intentions.
7. For an expression to function in communication, a hearer must correlate his own mental acts with the speaker’s sense-giving acts. The level of correlation between the hearer’s and speaker’s mental acts can be varied within certain bounds without eliminating communication. “Exact resemblance” between the two sets of acts is not required for communication to occur.

8. The limit of correlation between a hearer’s and a speaker’s acts is reached in soliloquy. There, one is talking to oneself, and so the hearer’s and speaker’s acts are numerically identical. Noting this identity brings sense-giving acts into greater focus, and Husserl will use this heightened focus to explore the nature of meaning. In the process, however, he will also formulate the distinction between empty and filled intentions.

§5. From the Hearer’s to the Speaker’s Perspective

Though Husserl’s explicit introduction of empty and filled intentions is imminent, we must pause for a moment to finalize this stage of our study. Before turning to Investigation I, §9, it is important that we note and respond to some objections—put forward by Mohanty—that are emblematic of a pervasive, yet inadequate, approach to Investigation I, §8. In doing so, we will clarify and complete our own reading of §8, and thereby become properly prepared for §9.

First, Mohanty seems to suspect Husserl of using “private thinking” as a “base” for his “theory of meaning.”93 However, Husserl comes to his description of soliloquy from his

93 “[The fact that] Husserl would seem to be defending the view that it is in private thinking that one catches hold of the meaning function in its purity . . . should justify any attempt to base one’s theory of meaning on the so-called private thinking” (Mohanty, Theory of Meaning, §5.1. 15). Mohanty borrows the terms “private” and “public thinking” from H. H. Price, Thinking and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
theory of communication, and not vice versa. Husserl develops his description of soliloquy in dialogue with his theory of communication, and not vice versa. Furthermore, Husserl’s portrayal of soliloquy leads us, I have argued, to see soliloquy as the limit case of communication. It is the situation in which speaker and hearer are one, making the sense-giving acts on both sides identical. Communication does not occur in soliloquy, not because soliloquy is prior to communication, but because we reach communication’s ideal limit in soliloquy. Even if Husserl were to base his theory of meaning on private thinking, therefore, his theory of private thinking is itself based on his theory of communication.

Second, Mohanty claims that “Husserl would seem to be defending the view that it is in private thinking that one catches hold of the meaning function in its purity.” The question, however, is whom Mohanty means by “one.” Soliloquy may provide phenomenologists with the only expression-situation whose full description need not involve the concept of intimation. However, it would not be true to say that expressing persons only experience the meaning function of expression in its purity while soliloquizing. To see that this is the case, however, one must properly understand not only the argument of Investigation I, §8, but the relation of §7 to §8. This, in turn, means that we must examine the following five points.

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94 Thus, Mohanty puts things in reverse order when he writes (in The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl) that, even though Husserl “recognizes that expressions were originally framed to fulfill a communicative function” he, “as is well known, . . . returns to a solitary monologue” in Investigation I, §8. J. N. Mohanty, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 86. The turn to soliloquy is not regressive but progressive. It is a taking of communication to its limit, not a going back to what is (whether in itself, or for Husserl) before communication.

95 Mohanty, Theory of Meaning, §5.1, 15.
(1) The speaker’s experience of expression forms a sort of “genus,” divided into two “species”: the conversational and the solitary. (2) Husserl’s explanation of why speakers experience no indication in soliloquy actually consists of three independent arguments. (3) The first and third of Husserl’s arguments apply to the entire “genus” of the speaker’s experience of expression, while the second—applying only to one “subspecies”—is an example of what is true of the entire “genus.” (4) Husserl’s use of the soliloquy “species” is due to utility, not necessity. (5) The transition from Investigation I, §7, to Investigation I, §8, is a move from the hearer’s experience of expression to the speaker’s experience of expression.

**Point 1.** The speaker’s experience of expression comes in two general types: one can addresses oneself (a) to a second person, or (b) to no second person. In option (a), one must speak aloud. In option (b), one can either (i) speak aloud, or (ii) speak in imagination. Furthermore, in both options (b)(i) and (b)(ii), one might address oneself to no second person either because one (α) takes oneself as interlocutor, or (β) takes no one at all as interlocutor.96

Option (a) is the speaker’s experience of interpersonal expression (“communication”), while option (b) is soliloquy. These are the two “species” of the “genus” of the speaker’s

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96 J. Claude Evans writes: “Husserl does not speak of ‘inner life’ in §8, and as we have seen, soliloquy can be uttered and can concern the world. And rather than discussing the full range of soliloquy, Derrida focuses on the representation of oneself as talking to oneself.

“Husserl’s example of a merely represented speaking and communicating is an example of self-address: ‘You have gone wrong, you can’t go on like that.’ This is an example, not of solitary speech in general, but rather of the special case in which one not only ‘speaks, in a certain sense, even in soliloquy,’ but in addition things ‘of oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to oneself’ (LI II.1, 366/I, 279–80). There is a three-stage specification here. First we have soliloquy, which need not be addressed to anyone—as when I muse, ‘That simply doesn’t follow.’ Then we have the special case in which I think of myself as speaking—as when I muse, out loud or silently, ‘That simply doesn’t follow, M. Derrida.’ Finally, we have the additional specification that I think of myself as speaking to myself, and this is where Husserl gives his example.” J. Claude Evans, *Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 113.
experience of expression. However, we must use the terms “species” and “genus” analogously, given that the soliloquy “species” is not separate from, but is rather the limit of, the interpersonal “species.” Furthermore, we must not confuse the two “subspecies” of soliloquy (i.e., spoken soliloquy and imagined soliloquy) either with each other, or with soliloquy in general. Neither should we confuse any of the four “sub-subspecies” of soliloquy (i.e., spoken soliloquy addressed to oneself, spoken soliloquy addressed to no one, imagined soliloquy addressed to oneself, and imagined soliloquy addressed to no one) with each other, nor with soliloquy in general.

**Point 2.** Husserl’s case in Investigation I, §8, contains three independent arguments, which can be summarized as follows. First, we do not have to hear ourselves speak before we can mean. Second, imagined expressions cannot indicate, even though imagined expressions are expressions. Third, when a person hears himself speak, the sense-giving acts in which he engages qua speaker are identical to the acts in which he engages qua hearer.

**Point 3.** Husserl’s first and third arguments apply to all expressions, whether they be used in communication or soliloquy. In his first argument, he claims that we do not have to hear ourselves speak an expression before we can begin to mean through it. We do not need our own words to indicate to us that our sense-giving acts exist, before we can engage in those acts. This is true of both the solitary and interpersonal expression, even though Husserl only mentions it in the context of solitary expression.
Husserl’s third argument is based on the fact that whenever I express (whether aloud or imaginally), I hear myself express. I am both a speaker and a hearer, whether I engage in communicative or solitary expression. Therefore, whenever I speak, at least one person (namely, I, myself) who hears my expression is identical to the person (namely, I, myself) who speaks my expression. Furthermore, because these two persons—myself qua speaker, and myself qua hearer—are identical, they share the same set of sense-giving acts. One and the same set of sense-giving acts serves both as the acts of the speaker and as the acts of the hearer.

If I am both a hearer and a speaker whenever I engage in expression, however, there is no need to correlate my own acts with themselves. The two sets of acts are already correlated, because they are one and the same. This means that a speaker does not require intimation in order to engage in expression. Intimation is not needed, because there is no need to spur a speaker (qua hearer) to engage in sense-giving acts similar to the ones in which he is already engaged (qua speaker). A public speaker, therefore, does not require his words to indicate his sense-giving acts to himself, any more than a soliloquizer does. Husserl’s argument applies to expression in both contexts, even though he only mentions it in the context of soliloquy.

Therefore, two of Husserl’s three arguments for why a speaker does not experience her own expressions as intimations apply to expressions used in both conversation and soliloquy. Only one argument (i.e., “imagined expressions cannot indicate”) applies to

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97 As Derrida recognizes: “When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence of this operation that I hear myself [je m’entende] at the same time that I speak” (Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 77). Interpolation by Allison.
soliloquy alone, and it is not a foundation for the validity of the other two arguments. Furthermore, this argument simply provides an obvious case of what Husserl is trying to show in general: The speaker of an expression does not have to experience his expression as an indication if he is to engage in meaning through the expression.

Point 4. Husserl appeals to soliloquy in general, and imagined soliloquy in particular, therefore, due to utility, not necessity. Husserl’s job in Investigation I, §8, is (a) to clarify the nature of expression by (b) filling out his discussion of communication through (c) describing the speaker’s experience of expression. To complete this task, he chooses to examine soliloquy, because in soliloquy the hearer seems to disappear. This allows him to focus his reader’s attention on the speaker’s perspective. In taking soliloquy—where the identity of hearer with speaker is particularly striking—as his example of the speaker’s experience of expression, Husserl makes it less likely that the hearer’s perspective will distract his reader.

Yet, it is only by converting the speaker into a hearer—or, rather, by revealing that every speaker is always already a hearer—that Husserl makes the hearer (momentarily) unobtrusive. He then makes a tripartite argument that it is not a speaker’s being a hearer which leads her to speak, but it is her being a speaker which leads her to hear. No matter how entwined the two are, the speaker’s experience qua speaker cannot be reduced to the speaker’s experience qua hearer; there is something different about it, and it deserves to be studied in its own right.

Point 5. We should not frame Husserl’s move from communication in §7, to soliloquy in §8, therefore, as a move from within communication to without communication.
It is a move from the hearer’s perspective to the speaker’s perspective—a move enacted by “passing to the limit” of communication in soliloquy. This means that Husserl does not “rel[y] on the contrast between private and public thinking,” though Mohanty claims “he does.” More precisely, Husserl does not rely on the contrast Mohanty has in mind. We find Husserl to present “private thinking” as the mode of the speaker’s experience of expression that is the limit case (or boundary point) of “public thinking”—if by “public thinking” one means communication.

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99 Mohanty’s later description (*Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, 87) of the move from §7 to §8 as a kind of “eidetic variation” to reveal the “essence of expression” is helpful. However, it is not accurate to say that “the essence of expression qua expression . . . has to be sought here [in soliloquy] and not in communicative speech situations where more is present than the essence” (Mohanty, *Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, 87). It would be false to claim that we cannot intuit the essence of a thing if we cannot find a situation in which there is nothing but that type of thing present. (On Husserl’s theory of intuiting essences, see Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, chapter 3.)

Sokolowski writes: “When ‘everything is essence,’ even in the registration of eide, the force of a statement about essence is lost. It reaches such an intensity that its impact dissipates. Imaginative variants provide the needed context of the nonessential, for they include attributes beyond those that make up the essence. Free variation does not leave us to surmise about the nonessential, but concretely presents it in the imagined case” (*Husserlian Meditations*, §31, 83). (Sokolowski’s quotation is of Anatole Broyard, “Tilling The Waste Land,” *New York Times*, 3 November 1971, 45.) To intuit a particular essence, we need to see it against the background of things which do not belong to that essence. Even though one may only ever see horses standing on the ground—and, therefore, one may never encounter a horse “in its purity”—this does not mean one can never encounter horiness. In fact, the very impurity of every intuition of a horse—“tainted” as it is by including the sight of a pasture, a race track, or a cobblestone street—helps reveal an important aspect of horiness. Horses, we discover, are walking beings; they belong on land, rather than in the sea or air.

If, on the contrary, to intuit essence A it were necessary to find an intuition that presented only objects that instantiate no other essence than A, then we could never intuit any “abstract” essences. In other words, we could never intuit essences that require (by essence) the co-givenness of another essence. (See Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations*, §22, 67, §29, 80–81.) Color and extension are two obvious examples; they can never be given separately. Instances of the two, however, can be freely varied relative to each other, and thus each can be used to bring out the identity and essence of the other.

We, therefore, should not confuse (a) Husserl’s search for the essence of expression across the variations in the modes of the experience of expression, with (b) a search for the essence of expression in one of those modes. Also, one must not confuse (c) the constraints placed on the phenomenologist if she is to intuit the essence of expression, with (d) the requirements placed on a speaker if he is to engage in expression. A speaker engaged in expression always encounters the essence of expression (i.e., he experiences something that has the essence of expression), whether or not a phenomenologist could intuit the essence of expression from that speaker’s individual experience alone.

100 Mohanty, *Theory of Meaning*, §5.1, 16.
Soliloquy is a kind of extreme of communication, not its complete other or its opposite. The two are not related to each other by simple negation or absolute separation; nor are they related as inside and outside. Better models would be the relations between extension and boundary, or function and asymptote.

§6. The Fulfillment of Expression-Signs

In §9 of Investigation I, the description of expression-signs brings Husserl at last to the distinction between empty and filled intentions. Section 9 opens, however, as if it were an echo of §8. Husserl argues, once again, that expression-signs continue to express and mean across the move from communication-proper to soliloquy. He then warns that, “several relations are . . . intertwined at this point, and talk about ‘meaning’, or about ‘what is expressed’, is correspondingly ambiguous.” To clear up the ambiguity, he follows §8, proposing to approach the subject from a different angle. In §8, he called the new approach “reflection”; here, he calls it “pure description [reinen Deskription].” The result in both sections is the same, however. From our new attitude, we see that “the concrete phenomenon of the sense-informed expression [sinnbelebten Ausdrucks] breaks up” into two parts.

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101 “If we now turn from experiences specially concerned with intimation [speziell zur Kundgebung gehören], and consider expressions in respect of distinctions that pertain to them equally whether they occur in dialogue or soliloquy [ob er in der einsamen oder Wechselrede fungiert], two things seem to be left over: the expressions themselves, and what they express as their meaning or sense” (Husserl, LU, I, §9, 43 [LI, 1:191]).

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., §8, 42 (LI, 1:190); §9, 43 (LI, 1:191). Ursula Panzer notes (ibid., §9, 43 [LI, 1:191], n. 3) that in the first edition of LU, Husserl used the adjective, “psychologischen,” rather than, “reinen.”

Section 9 is the third section in which we have seen Husserl describe expressions in terms of a two-part whole. In §6, he said that “every expression” has a physical aspect and a mental aspect, the latter of which “make[s] it be the expression of something.”\(^{105}\) In §8, he said that we can “break up our . . . experience of the sense-filled expression, into the two factors of word and sense.”\(^{106}\) There, he does not speak of an expression’s first part as its “physical” aspect, but uses the neutral term, “word.” So long as a word appears—whether through perception or phantasy—it can function as an expression.

In §9, Husserl combines the approaches of §§6 and 8. He speaks of “the physical phenomenon forming the physical side of the expression.”\(^ {107}\) Calling the first part of an expression “physical” once again, he decides to consider it simply insofar as it is a “phenomenon.” That is, he wishes to treat the physical or word side of an expression simply insofar as it appears or is experienced.

The second part of an expression, in §6, was the “mental states” that make the expression an expression. We discovered in §7 that these mental states are the acts that give the expression sense. In §8, the second part of the experience of expression is the sense itself. Here, in §9, Husserl returns to §7’s line, calling the second side of an expression, “acts.” However, he brings out a new aspect (or type) of these acts. They give an expression “meaning and possibly also intuitive fullness [anschauliche Fülle].”\(^{108}\)

\(^{105}\) Ibid., §6, 38 (LI, 1:188).

\(^{106}\) Ibid., §8, 42 (LI, 1:190–91).

\(^{107}\) Ibid., §9, 43 (LI, 1:191–92).

\(^{108}\) Ibid., §6, 38 (LI, 1:188); §7, 39 (LI, 1:189); §8, 42 (LI, 1:190–91); §9, 43–44 (LI, 1:191–92).
Though Husserl has discussed the fact that acts can give meaning to expressions before, this is the first time he has mentioned the idea that they can give fullness. He continues to put off a discussion of what meaning is, however, and thus we are not surprised to find no immediate explanation of “fullness” either. Husserl’s focus, for the moment, is on the fact that whether an act gives sense or fullness to an expression, it “constitute[s]” the expression’s “relation to [its] expressed object [gedrückte Gegenständlichkeit].”

To explain this, Husserl begins with the sense-giving acts—acts that are “essential to the expression if it is to be an expression at all, i.e. a verbal sound infused with sense [sinnbelebter Wortlaut].”

A vocalization “means [meint] something” because of its sense-giving acts, “and in so far as it means something, it relates [bezieht] to what is objective.” Because an expression has a meaning, it has a relation to an object. In giving an expression a meaning, an act provides the expression with the thing that relates it to its referent. What it means for a sense-giving act to “constitute” an expression’s relation to its referent, therefore, is to give an expression a relation to its referent through giving it the meaning that relates it to its referent.

Husserl then turns to fullness-giving acts. An expression’s “relation [Beziehung] to an object is realized [realisiert],” he tells us, when the object meant by the expression is “actually present [gegenwärtig] through accompanying intuitions.”

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109 Ibid., §9, 43–44 (LI, 1:192).
110 Ibid., §9, 44 (LI, 1:192).
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
seem, is a mental act through which some object is made present. An expression “relates to what is objective” because of its sense-giving acts, but this relation is not “realized” unless there are “accompanying intuitions” that present the object.

An expression-sign’s relation to its object can also be “realized,” Husserl continues, if the object “at least appear[s] in representation [vergegenwärtigt erscheinen], e.g. in a mental image [Phantasiebilde].” The meant object need not be present through perception. It can also be present (gegenwärtig), or at least “represented” (vergegenwärtigt) through imagination. In either case, the relation between the speaker’s expression and the object she expresses is realized. Thus, the fullness-giving acts of intuition or imagination constitute an expression-sign’s relation to its referent by realizing that relation through making present—or representing—the referent.

That an expression’s relation to its referent is realized through a fullness-giving act does not mean it ceases to have a relation to its referent when no fullness-giving act takes place. An “intuition that will give it its object” “need not occur,” since it is “not essential to the expression as such”; “the expression functions significantly, it remains more than mere sound of words [mehr als ein leerer Wortlaut].” However, the “relation of expression to object is now unrealized [unrealisiert] as being confined to [beschlossen] a mere meaning-

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114 Husserl, LU, I, §9, 44 (LI 1:192).

115 “Der Ausdruck und seine Bedeutung fungieren sowohl in der anschaulichen Anwesenheit als auch in der anschaulichen Abwesenheit des gemeinten Gegenstandes” (Heffernan, Bedeutung und Evidenz, 43).
intention [bloßen Bedeutungsintention].”\textsuperscript{116} The sense-giving act, united with the expression-sign, gives the sign a relation to some referent, making it to be more than an empty word-sound (“mehr als ein leerer Wortlaut”). Being intentional, an expression-sign is not simple noise, but has an expressive-or meaning-function. Even though the sign expresses some object, however, the relation between sign and referent can remain “unrealized.” The sense-giving act, which Husserl now calls a “meaning-intention,” is still there, but the relation it spawns between expression-sign and expressed object is, in some way, less than real (“unrealized”).\textsuperscript{117}

To clarify his understanding of the realization of the relation between expression-sign and referent, Husserl turns to the example of names. “A name, e.g.,” he says, “names its object whatever the circumstances, in so far as it means that object.” The absence of the named or intended object does not negate the naming or intending relation between name and object. However, “if the object is not intuitively before one [nicht anschaulich dasteht], and so not before one as a named or meant object, mere meaning is all there is to it.”\textsuperscript{118} A name whose named object is not present, still means the object, but cannot fully enter into relation with it. The relation between the two is not eliminated by the absence of the referent, but the relation remains unrealized nevertheless.

However, “[i]f the originally empty [leere] meaning-intention is now fulfilled [erfüllt],” i.e., “if the object is [now] intuitively before one,” “the relation to an object is realized.” When the object named is also present, “the naming becomes an actual conscious

\textsuperscript{116} Husserl, \textit{LU}, I, §9, 44 (\textit{LI} 1:192).

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
[aktuell bewußte] relation between name and object named.”¹¹⁹ Without the presence of the named or meant object through intuition, the meaning-intention directed at that object is “empty.” The meaning-intention behind a name (or expression) gives it a relation to the object it names (or expresses), but this relation may not be immediately realized. Only in the presence of the named (the referent) does the relation shift from being potential to being realized, from being unrealized to being “actual[ly] conscious.” The act of intuition fulfills the name’s meaning-intention, reducing the relation between sign and referent from potency to act.

We see now that Husserl has chosen to explain what expression-signs are (e.g., how they come to have a meaningful relation, whether unrealized or realized, to some referent) through studying the mental acts at work “behind the scenes.” An expression-sign has a relation to some referent because it has a meaning. It has a meaning because it is animated (sinnbelebt)¹²⁰ by a meaning-intention. The relation between expression-sign and referent, however, can be either unrealized or realized, depending on whether the referent is absent or present.¹²¹ Yet, whether the referent is present or absent depends on whether there is a fullness-giving act to present it. Behind the realization of an expression-sign’s relation to its referent, therefore, Husserl reveals the fulfillment of the sign’s meaning-intention by an intuition of the referent.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Tugendhat writes: “Im allgemeinen Sinn der (objektivierenden) Erfüllung liegt, daß das Gemeinte nicht nur gemeint, sondern selbst gegeben, gegenwärtig ist” (Wahrheitsbegriff, §4, 64).
Husserl then adds this exhortation: “Let us take our stand on this fundamental distinction between meaning-intentions void of intuition and those which are intuitively fulfilled [anschauungsleeren und erfüllten Bedeutungsintentionen].” The difference between empty (leeren) and fulfilled (erfüllten) meaning-intentions is fundamental, Husserl claims, and the difference has to do with intuition (with the making-present of objects). Meaning-intentions, or sense-giving acts, can be either intuitively empty or intuitively fulfilled. Either they can lack an intuition of the object they mean—and therefore be empty—or they can have an intuition of the object they mean—and therefore be filled.

What, however, is the fulfillment of meaning-intentions by intuitions? How does it occur? Husserl writes:

These acts [of intuition], which become fused [verschmelzen] with the meaning-conferring acts in the unity of knowledge or fulfillment [Erkenntnis- oder Erfüllungseinheit], we call the meaning-fulfilling acts [bedeutungserfüllende Akte].

The act of meaning that animates an expression-sign need not be accompanied by an act of intuition. However, when the meaning-intention is accompanied by an appropriate intuition, the two do not simply occur together. They melt into, or fuse with, one another; Verschmelzen occurs. This coming-into-unity of an expression’s meaning-intention with an intuition of the meant object is the fulfillment of the meaning-intention.

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122 Husserl, LU, I, §9, 44 (LI, 1:192). Sokolowski writes: “Husserl’s notion of intentionality includes both the empty and the filled consciousness; intentionality is not, as the terms might prompt us to think, equated with empty intention. It encompasses both empty and filled intending” (Husserlian Meditations, §7, 22).

123 Husserl, LU, I, §9, 44 (LI, 1:192).

124 On the relation of two parts through fusion in a whole, see Husserl, LU, III, §9.
However, in addition to calling the fusion of intuition with meaning-intention, “fulfillment,” Husserl also calls it a unity or oneness of “knowledge.” Therefore, while expression might not require fulfilling intuitions, knowledge would appear to. It is the meaning-intention, as having-become-one with a fullness-giving intuition, that is knowing, and this knowing is “meaning-fulfillment.” \(^{125}\)

We now see the ultimate import (for our study) of Husserl’s earlier thesis that acts of consciousness can join together into wholes.\(^{126}\) Here, he calls the manner of joining, “fusion.” Yet, it is only through his attempt to understand how (meaningful) signs work that Husserl returns to the topic of uniting acts. In fact, he goes on to say that intuitions do not just fulfill (i.e., fuse with) meaning-intentions; they also fulfill the expression-signs animated by those meaning-intentions.

Certain intuitions, Husserl writes, “stand to [expressions] in the logically basic relation of fulfilling.” \(^{127}\) Such fullness-giving acts have the role of “confirming [bestätigen]” or “illustrating [bekräftigen, illustrieren]” an expression “and so actualizing [aktualisieren]” its relation to its object.” Where Husserl spoke before of fullness-giving acts as “realizing” the relation between expression-signs and their referents, he now speaks of “actualizing” that relation. Furthermore, such a realization or actualization is the fulfilling, confirming, and illustrating (terms Husserl presents as synonyms) of the expression itself. \(^{128}\)

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\(^{125}\) Husserl, *LU*, I, §9, 44–45 (*LI*, 1:192). We will study Husserl’s theory of knowledge more closely in chapter 2, below.

\(^{126}\) See above, pp. 12–14, 17.


\(^{128}\) Ibid.
The thinking behind Husserl’s choice of the terms “confirming” and “fulfilling” seems to be the following. If an intuition of an expression-sign’s referent occurs, we see the sign was not just putting on airs. The expression is confirmed as truly having the relation it seemed to claim. Its being an expression-sign of some object was not a false front, for here the referent is, intuited in the flesh and still named by the expression. The relation we could only assume was there, turns out to be real; we are no longer kept in suspense, no longer forced to treat the relation as merely potential. Not only do we experience a fulfillment of our meaning-intention, but the expression-sign itself seems to find fulfillment. It has come into its own, because its own (referent) has come to it. It now seems more complete or settled.

We now also begin to see why Husserl speaks of intuition as “realizing” or “actualizing” the relation between expression-sign and referent. Intuitions make objects present, eliminating the distance or separation which can seem to cut off an expression-sign from its referent. Furthermore, there is a union or fusion in fulfillment that involves not only the sense- and fullness-giving acts, but also the expression-sign itself.

In the realized relation of the expression to its objective correlate, the sense-informed expression [sinnbelebter Ausdruck] becomes one [eint sich] with the act of meaning-fulfilment. The sounded word [Wortlaut] is first made one [ist zunächst eins] with the meaning-intention, and this in its turn is made one [eint sich] (as intentions in general are made one with their fulfillments) with its corresponding meaning-fulfilment.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{LU}, I, §9, 45 (LI 1:192).}

\footnote{This implies, as we will see later, that Husserl sees expression-signs and expressed objects as belonging together in a way that indication-signs and indicated objects do not.}
Here Husserl reasserts his thesis that certain mental acts can form wholes with certain physical entities.\textsuperscript{131} When we speak expressively, we unite our vocalizations with our meaning-intentions, animating the sounds and making them meaningful. Then, if an intuition of the meant object is also present, it fuses with the expression’s meaning-intention. The sign of the object is now one with a meaning-intention, which is itself one with an intuition that makes the object present. The relation between expression-sign and expressed object becomes marked by oneness or unity between sign, intention, and intuition.

Husserl will even go so far as to call fulfillment a unity between \textit{expression-sign} and \textit{expressed object}, in §10. That is, the actualization of the relation between expression-sign and referent is the coming-into-unity, the joining-in-a-whole, of the two. In exploring this aspect of fulfillment, Husserl will bring his description of signs to a preliminary completion.$^{132}$

Before we turn to §10, however, we should recapitulate what we have uncovered so far in §9:

1. Intuitions and acts of imagination can give expressions “fullness.” Intuitions are acts that make an object present, while acts of imagination \textit{represent} an object (though they still make it present, in a manner that simple names do not).

2. The relation between an expression-sign and its referent is “constituted” by a sense-giving act (a meaning-intention) and “realized” or “actualized” by fullness-giving acts that present, or represent, that referent.

\textsuperscript{131} See above, pp. 25–26, 35, 44.
3. The realization or actualization of an expression-sign’s relation to its referent is the “fulfillment,” “confirmation,” or “illustration” of the sign.

4. A sense-giving act (meaning-intention) can be “fulfilled” by a fullness-giving act that presents, or represents, the meant or intended object. When this occurs, the two acts “fuse” together, becoming one. Furthermore, the meaning-intention also unifies with the expression-sign. Therefore, the expression-sign, the meaning-intention, and the fullness-giving intuition form a whole, when the expression-sign or meaning-intention is fulfilled.

5. Both expression-signs and meaning-intentions can be said to be “fulfilled” by intuitions (or acts of imagination) of the object expressed or meant. In fact, the fulfillment of meaning-intentions is “behind” the fulfillment of expressions; Husserl explains the fulfillment of expression-signs in terms of the fulfillment of meaning-intentions.

6. Meaning-intentions that have not been fulfilled are “empty.” The difference between an empty and a fulfilled meaning-intention depends (a) on the presence or absence of an intuition (or act of imagination) that presents (or represents) the object intended, and therefore, (b) on the presence or absence of the object intended.133 Though it would seem

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132 Only when we have discussed the place of Philosophy of Arithmetic’s “surrogative signs” in Husserl’s theory will we be able to say that Husserl’s theory of signs is brought to a final completion. We will do this in chapter 4, below.

appropriate to also call expressions-signs “empty,” whose relation to their referents are unrealized (especially given the fact that such expressions lack a fullness-giving act), Husserl does not do so.

§7. Toward the Fulfillment of Husserl’s Theory of Signs, through His Theory of Fulfillment

The first task in which Husserl employs the distinction between empty and filled intentions is the completion of his theory of signs. This occurs in three stages. We have just seen the first, in Investigation I, §9. There, Husserl uses empty and filled intentions to explain how an expression-sign’s relation to its referent comes to be constituted and actualized. That is, Husserl uses empty and fulfilled intentions to explain not only how a thing comes to be an expression-sign, but also how its being an expression-sign is “fulfilled.”

We likewise will find stage two in Investigation I, §9, as Husserl uses fullness-giving acts to finalize his description of what expression-signs express. We will then discover stage three in our study of §10, where Husserl uses fulfillment to bring out the part-whole reasoning that grounds his theory of expression. In both stages two and three, Husserl not only reveals the nature of expression-signs more fully, but also clarifies the distinction between expression-signs and indication-signs. Thus, Husserl’s study of empty and filled intentions redounds to the benefit of his theory of signs as a whole.
a. Fulfillment Reveals a Difference between the Extents of Subjective Involvement in Indication and Expression

Husserl argues, in Investigation I, §9, that we can “more properly” say “the fulfilling act,” rather than its meaning-intention, “appears as the act expressed by the complete [vollen] expression.” Therefore, “we may e.g., say, that a statement ‘gives expression’ to an act of perceiving or imagining.” These two types of fullness-giving act—perceptions (i.e., intuitions) and imaginations—are those that fulfill expressions, actualizing their meaning-relations to their referents. As §9 draws to a close, therefore, we see a new aspect of what expressions can be said to express: the act which fulfills the expression.

Husserl will refine this claim in Investigation I, §14, however, arguing that it is more appropriate to say it is the “content” of the fulfilling act that is expressed. The content of a fullness-giving act is the analogue of the sense of a sense-giving act. Since Husserl continues to postpone his discussion of sense and meaning, however, we will likewise postpone our discussion of content till §8, below. What is of moment here is the fact that only a study of fulfilling intuition reveals the totality of what an expression expresses. Before, we could speak of an expression’s expressing its referent, but now we can also properly speak of an expression’s expressing the acts that present that referent. This brings an important distinction between indication-signs and expression-signs to our attention.

Indication-signs are indication-signs because some person experiences them as such. This person, however, need not see himself as involved with what the indication-sign

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134 Husserl, LU, I, §9, 45 (LI, 1:192).
135 Ibid., §14, 56 (LI, 1:199).
indicates. Given one thing, he simply believes the other exists. That he keeps his distance from the indicated object—letting it remain absent—does not leave the indication-sign “unfulfilled,” or with an “unactualized relation” to the indicated object. In fact, if he did bring the indicated object to presence, he would nullify the indication relation.

If we bring an indicated object to presence, we no longer believe in it based on the object that once indicated it, but based on its being intuitively present. Where we once believed in the absent \( B \) because of the given \( A \), we now believe in the given \( B \) because of its being present. However, if the belief in \( A \) is no longer the motivation for the belief in \( B \), \( A \) ceases to indicate \( B \). We can only experience something as an indication-sign because we approach it as such, but if we were also to approach the indicated referent, the indication-sign might cease to be an indication-sign. An indication-sign’s being an indication-sign is most secure when some subject is simultaneously involved with (that is, in the presence of or intuiting) the indication-sign and not involved with (in the presence of, intuiting) the indicated object.

Fulfilled expression-signs, on the other hand, require a subject to be involved with both the expression-sign and the referent. An object becomes an expression-sign when it unites with a meaning-intention directed upon some other object. Its new nature as an expression-sign is characterized by potentiality, however, until the subject who means through it also experiences the presence of the object she means. In fact, it is the (content of the) subject’s fullness-giving act that the expression-sign expresses. Expression-signs, therefore, are (most fully) what they are when some subject is simultaneously involved with the expression-sign and involved with the meant object.
We find the subject present only to the sign in the indication relation, while we find
the subject present to both the sign and the referent in the (actualized) expression relation.
The subject experiencing an indication-sign only turns up, we might say, on one side of the
indication relation, while the subject experiencing an expression-sign turns up on both sides
of the expression relation. The subject is not only the one expressing herself in the
fulfillment of her expression, but is, in a way, expressing herself: she is herself part of what
she expresses, in that she not only expresses some object, but also expresses (the content of)
her act of intuiting that object.

In a fulfilled expression, the subject brings not only the sign-object but also the
signified object to presence; he does not simply content himself with the presence of the sign-
object, as he would with an indication-sign. In expression, therefore, there is a more
thoroughgoing interaction or communion between a subject and (the objects that make up)
his world. However, as we will see below, expression is also a greater communion of the
world with itself. The expressing subject, especially in fulfillment, brings the sign-object
into union with the signified object. A new relation between parts of (i.e., objects in) the
world is established in expression, and consummated in fulfillment.136

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136 Thus, the more one understands the way in which Husserl uses his theory of empty and filled
intentions to clarify and complete his understanding of signs, the more difficult it becomes to agree with
Derrida, who sees Husserl as having to “reduce” the world to uncover the essence of expression (Derrida,
*Speech and Phenomena*, 30, 33). As we study the way in which fulfillment brings expression-signs into their
own, we see more and more how expression involves the expressing subject in the world.
b. Fulfillment Clarifies the Part-Whole
Reasoning at the Heart of Husserl’s
Theory of Signs

The third stage in the completion of Husserl’s theory of signs—which he achieves through his theory of empty and filled intentions—is revealed in §10. Husserl begins §10 with the following:

The above distinguished acts involving the expression’s appearance, on the one hand, and the meaning-intention and possible meaning-fulfillment, on the other, do not constitute a mere aggregate [kein bloßes Zusammen] of simultaneously given items in consciousness. They rather form an intimately fused unity of peculiar character [eine innig verschmolzene Einheit von eigentümlichen Charakter].

If we are to understand fulfillment correctly, we must see it as involving a unity, not an arbitrary conglomerate. There are three parts in it. Rather than saying they are (a) the expression-sign, (b) the meaning-intention, and (c) the intuition of the meant object—as he did in §9—Husserl now says they are (1) the intuition of the expression-sign, (2) the meaning-intention, and (3) the intuition of the meant object. In §9, Husserl says the three parts form one whole, because two of them are “fused”; and in §10 he adds that they are “intimately fused.” They stand out as parts for the phenomenologist who is reflecting on the experience of fulfilling an expression, but the speaker fulfilling her expression in the presence of the referent does not experience the parts separately.

Reasserting what he also claims in §8, Husserl continues:

Everyone’s personal experience bears witness to the differing weight [Ungleichwertigkeit] of the two constituents, which reflects the asymmetry

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137 Husserl, LU, I, §10, 45 (LI 1:193).
138 On the distinction between unities and aggregates, see Husserl, LU, III, §23.
Husserl will focus on the meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilling intuitions because they have greater “weight” than the acts of intuiting the physical side of the expression. The difference in “weight” is due to the “asymmetry” between the expression-sign and the object meant. The object meant is the focus of the expressive experience, not the expression-sign itself. When we are engaged with expressions (at least the type of expressions with which Husserl is concerned while investigating logic), the point is not to play with words but to mean, name, describe, or articulate objects.  

And in so far as we . . . yield ourselves to enacting the meaning-intention and its further fulfillment, our whole interest centers upon the object intended in our intention, and named by its means. (These two ways of speaking have in fact the same meaning.)

To express an object is to concern oneself with neither the expression-sign nor one’s own act of intending. It is to concern oneself with the object one is naming or intending.

Even when one is reading or hearing another person’s expressions, the difference in weight between the experience of the words and the object expressed by the words remains.

The function of a word (or rather of an intuitive word-presentation) is to awaken [zu erregen] a sense-conferring act in ourselves, to point to [hinzugeben] what is

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140 Ibid., §10, 45–46 (LI 1:193).

141 John Scanlon writes: “First of all, Husserl’s distinctions are proposed in his Logical Investigations as essential to the circumscribed project of reflecting upon the sense of logic. To interpret them as if they developed a general theory of language is to distort them from the start.” John Scanlon, “Pure Presence: A Modest Proposal,” in Derrida and Phenomenology, ed. J. Claude Evans and William McKenna, Contributions to Phenomenology, no. 20 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 97.

142 Husserl, LU, I, §10, 46 (LI 1:193).
intended, or perhaps given intuitive fulfillment in this act, and to guide [zu drängen] our interest exclusively in this direction.\textsuperscript{143}

The hearer or reader is spurred to mean the referent by the words she hears or reads.\textsuperscript{144} She is invited to join the speaker or writer in giving sense to the words, to participate with the writer or speaker in expressing ([the content of] intuitions of) the object to which the words point. The hearer or reader encounters the words as intimating the writer’s or speaker’s sense-giving acts, with which she is meant to correlate her own. She experiences the expression-sign, therefore, not only as intimating the speaker’s thoughts, but also as directing her interest toward an object that she is supposed to begin meaning. She encounters spoken sounds as things that are to be turned for her—by her own sense-giving acts—into signs that express some object.

Husserl then begins to echo his description of indication. In indication, association first unites two objects, such that they point to (hinzeigen) each other.\textsuperscript{145} This, therefore, can lead some person to experience his belief in the existence of one as motivating his belief in the existence of the other. The associative unity becomes an indication situation. A similar process occurs with expression-signs.

Such pointing [Hinzeigen] [of expression-sign to referent, for a hearer] is not to be described as the mere objective fact of a regular diversion of interest from one thing to another. . . . To be an expression is rather a descriptive aspect of the experienced unity [Erlebniseinheit] of sign and thing signified.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., §10, 46 (LI 1:193).

\textsuperscript{144} As opposed to the speaker, who is spurred to mean the referent not by the words she speaks, but by the referent itself. See pp. 37–38, 42–43, above.

\textsuperscript{145} Husserl, LU, I, §4, 36 (LI, 1:187).

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., §10, 46 (LI 1:193). Panzer notes (LU, I, 46, n. 1) that in the first edition of LU, Husserl had included the following clause at the end of the quotation’s final sentence: “genauer zwischen sinnbelebter
Just as with indications, it is the fact that sign and referent are experienced as forming a whole which leads one to point to the other. The unity (Einheit) of one with the other is the foundation of the pointing (Hinzeigen) of one to the other.

The question is whether the Einheit formed by expression-sign and expressed object is of the same type as the Einheit formed by indication-sign and indicated object (i.e., the unity of two parts within the same whole). To bring out the part-whole reasoning proper to expressions, we will survey a triad of parallel passages to which Investigation I, §10 belongs.

Investigation I, §10 parallels Investigation VI, §6,147 which, in turn, parallels Investigation V, §15b. Investigation VI, §6 will reinforce and clarify the unity—the relation of forming-a-whole-together—between expression-sign and object. The parallels between Investigation VI, §6 and Investigation V, §15b, then, will bring out what is already implied in Husserl’s talk of the “asymmetry” between expression-sign and referent. The relation of sign to referent in expression is one of part to whole.

In Investigation VI, §6, Husserl is once again describing the state of fulfillment.

I speak, e.g., of my inkpot, and my inkpot also stands before me: I see it. The name names the object of my percept, and is enabled to name it by the significant act which expresses its character and its form in the form of the name. The relation [Beziehung] between name and thing named, has, in this state of union [Einheitsstande], a certain descriptive character, that we previously noticed: the name ‘my inkpot’ seems to overlay [‘legt sich . . . auf’] the perceived object, to belong sensibly [gehört sozusagen fühlbar] to it.148

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147 Husserl even refers explicitly to Investigation I, §§9 and 10 in a footnote in Investigation VI, §6 (Husserl, LU, VI, §6, 559, note [LI, 2:201, n. 3]).

148 Ibid., 558–59 (LI, 2:201).
From the speaker’s point of view, the expressed object is not only meant but also present in the state of fulfillment. Though all expression-signs are encountered as being united with their referents, it is in fulfillment that this unity becomes quasi-tangible (sozusagen fühlbar). In fulfillment, the relation between expression-sign and referent is realized or actualized, as the expression-sign “seems to overlay the perceived object, to belong sensibly to it.” In fact, in such fulfillment, “the expression seems to be applied to the thing and to clothe it like a garment [als dem Dinge aufgelegt und als wie sein Kleid].”

It is not just that the fulfilled expression fits the expressed object “like a glove”; rather, it seems to be lain out upon the object like its clothing (als wie sein Kleid), as if it were an outer layer of the object. In fulfillment, the expression-sign “dresses up the object”—to borrow Husserl’s metaphor from Krisis—or makes it presentable; however, the expression-sign does not cover over the object to hide it. Husserl says: “In this mode of

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149 As we saw above, p. 69–70 (Husserl, LU, I, §10, 46 [LI 1:193]).

150 Husserl, LU, VI, §6, 559 (LI, 2:202).

151 In Krisis, Husserl writes: “In geometrical and natural-scientific mathematization, in the open infinity of possible experiences, we measure the life-world—the world constantly given to us as actual in our concrete world-life—for a well-fitting garb of ideas [Ideenkleid], that of the so-called objectively scientific truths. . . .

"Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas [Ideenkleid], or the garb of symbols [Kleid der Symbole] of the symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses everything which, for scientists and the educated generally, represents the life-world, dresses it up [verkleidet] as ‘objectively actual and true’ nature. It is through the garb of ideas that we take for true being what is actually a method. . . . It is because of the disguise of ideas that the true meaning of the method, the formulae, the ‘theories’, remained unintelligible and, in the naïve formation of the method, was never understood.” Hua, vol. 6, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), II, §9h, 51–52. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), II, §9h, 51–52.

Fulfilled expression-signs and scientific theories may both function as “garb” for their referents, but the fulfilled expression-sign unites with its referent, rather than functioning in the place of its referent. In fulfillment, a speaker does not mistake her own expression-signs for the “objectively actual and true” nature of their referents. A scientist may mistake his theory in this way, but not a speaker in fulfillment. There is an asymmetry between expression and referent, with the referent being of greater weight; the expression-sign, in fact, is quasi-transparent, as we will see below.
naming reference,” (i.e., in the state of fulfillment), “the name appears as belonging [gehörig] to the named and as one with it [und mit ihm eins].”\textsuperscript{152} The sign does not constitute a barrier or screen between speaker and object, but is experienced as being fitting or appropriate to the object; it becomes one with, or is absorbed into, the object.

Investigation I, §10 and Investigation VI, §6 reveal for us the fact that expression-sign and expressed object form a unity or whole that is actualized in fulfillment. Yet, questions remain. For instance, is the unity between expression-sign and referent the unity of two parts within a whole (as in the case of indication-signs), or the unity of a part with its whole?\textsuperscript{153} A brief examination of a second passage that parallels §6 of Investigation VI will show us the answer: an expression-sign forms a unity with its expressed object as a part does with its whole.

c. The Relation of Expression-Sign to Referent Is a Relation of Part to Whole

In Investigation V, §15b, Husserl employs metaphors similar to Investigation VI, §6’s “overlaying” and “clothing.” Rather than expressive experience, however, Husserl is describing affective experience in Investigation V, §15b. Instead of describing how objects and events can be intuited as expressed, he is describing how they can be intuited as emotional. Yet, in either case—whether we intuit (come into the presence of) an object that

\textsuperscript{152} Husserl, \textit{LU}, VI, §7, 561 (\textit{LI}, 2:203).

\textsuperscript{153} Two things are joined as parts in a “unity” (\textit{Einheit}) or whole in one of two ways: either one “founds” the other (or they found each other reciprocally), or together they found a third “part,” such as a “moment of unity.” In either way, the two things are united through the relation of foundation, and thus form a whole (Husserl, \textit{LU}, III, §21, 282 [\textit{LI}, 2:34], §22, 286–88 [\textit{LI}, 2:36-38]). Similarly, Husserl writes: “Objects
we are expressing or one we are finding emotional—Husserl claims we experience our expression or emotion as *united* with the object.

Husserl argues that the affectivity of an object or event “is at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling-subject, and also as an objective property.” ¹⁵⁴ From outside the experience, one would likely identify the source of a positive (pleasant, joyous) event’s emotional aspect as lying in the subject experiencing the event. However, from within the subject’s experience of the event, even the *event itself* is emotional. Husserl says it “seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam [von einem rosigen Schimmer umflossen].”¹⁵⁵ A positive emotion flows about (umflossen) the event or object. Just as expressions seem to *overlay* their objects in fulfillment, emotion seems to *overflow* affective objects, when such objects are present. Emotion covers them in a translucent glow (it does not hide the objects, but rather we see the objects *through* it) that we experience as a property of the objects.

Husserl continues, saying that a “sad event, likewise, is not merely seen in its thinglike content and context [dinglichen Gehalt und Zusammenhang], in the respects which make it an event: it seems clothed and colored with sadness [es erscheint als mit der Färbung der Trauer umkleidet].”¹⁵⁶ Literally, “it seems clothed with the coloring of sorrow.” Even though the object’s color of sorrow is not like its visual color (the color of sorrow does not can be related to one another as Wholes [Ganzen] to Parts [Teilen], they can also be related to one another as coordinated parts of a whole” (Husserl, *LU*, III, §1, 229 [LI, 2:4]).


¹⁵⁵ Ibid. Panzer notes (*LU*, V, §15b, 408, n. 2) that Husserl continued in the first edition: “die Lust erscheint als etwas an dem Ereignis” (that is, “the delight seems to be something attaching to the event”).

belong to either the object’s “thinglike Gehalt” or “thinglike Zusammenhang”) the object is “seen in [vorgestellt nach]” this color. To limit a description of the object—from within the experience of the object—to just the context and properties studied by physics would be to leave out a significant aspect of the object.

In both Investigation V, §15b, and Investigation VI, §6, Husserl draws the same distinction between properties that belong to an object physically, and properties that belong to an object in experience. In the experience of an affective object, the object’s affective coloring belongs to it as a property, but not as a property that fits into its physical content or context. Similarly, in the experience of an expressed object, the object’s expression-sign belongs to it, but not to its physical content or context:

This belonging [Zugehörigkeit] is of a peculiar kind. The words do not belong [gehören] to the objective context [objektiven Zusammenhang] of physical thinghood [physisch-dinglichen] they express: in this context they have no place, they are not referred to [gemeint] as something in or attaching to [in oder an] the things that they name.157

Though one with the expressed object, the expression-sign is not ingredient in (a) the physical context to which the expressed object belongs, or (b) the physical content of which the expressed object consists. It is experienced as one with the expressed object, just as joy or sorrow is experienced as one with (i.e., lending a glow to, or coloring) an affective object. Yet, especially from outside the experience of fulfillment, one would not see the expression-sign “as something in or attaching to” the object it expresses. Just as with affective

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properties, we see expression-signs both as belonging to their referent (from within the experience of fulfillment), and as deriving from the expressing subject.

Husserl leads us, therefore, to make the following argument:

1. Given Investigation I, §10 and Investigation VI, §6, the experienced oneness or unity between expression-sign and referent—which grounds the meaning-relation between expression-sign and referent—is realized or actualized in fulfillment. This oneness or unity in fulfillment is experienced as the expression-sign’s being lain upon, or being a kind of clothing for, the referent. The fulfilled expression-sign’s overlaying or clothing its referent is its belonging to or being one with its referent.

2. The best way to understand this “laying upon” that is a “belonging to” and a “being one with” is revealed in Investigation V, §15b—a section which Husserl expects his reader to have encountered and understood before reaching Investigation VI, §6. Husserl expects his reader to come to his talk of an expression-sign’s overlaying and clothing its object—when the object is present (in fulfillment)—from his talk of an emotion’s overflowing and clothing its object—when the object is present. When an affective object is experienced, it has an emotional glow or color that belongs to it as an objective property, even though this property does not belong to the object physically. Likewise, when an expressed object is experienced (i.e., in fulfillment), it has an expression-sign that belongs to, and is one with, even though this sign does not belong to the referent physically.

3. Given (a) the parallels between the descriptions of (i) the emotive property’s overflowing or clothing the affective object and (ii) the expression-sign’s overlaying or clothing the expressed object, and given (b) the distinction Husserl draws in both cases
regarding what belongs experientially to the object and what belongs physically to the object, we should assume (c) it is appropriate to understand the relation of expression-sign to expressed object (in the fulfilling presence of the referent) on the same terms as we understand the relation of emotion to affective object (in the presence of the object): the relation is that of a (quasi) property to its object.

4. Since the relation between expression-sign and referent is a relation of a (quasi) property to its object, we should see an expression-sign as related to its referent as a part to its whole. After all, properties are parts of the whole (object) to which they belong. While we experience indication-signs as related to their indicated objects as parts within a whole, in other words, we experience expression-signs as related to their referents as parts to wholes.

5. That the unity of expression-sign with referent should be seen as that of a part with its whole (rather than that of two parts within a whole, as in indication) is further supported by the following. (a) Husserl claims that the act of meaning an object is more weighty than the act of intuiting the expression through which one means the object, because the relation between object and expression is asymmetric. (b) The relation of part to whole is asymmetric (if \( p \) is a part of \( W \), then \( W \) is not a part of \( p \)) and the whole is more “weighty.” However, (c) the relation of two parts within a whole (in its most basic form) is symmetric. If \( p \) and \( q \) are unified because they belong to the same whole, then \( p \) belongs to the same whole as \( q \), and \( q \) belongs to the same whole as \( p \). Furthermore, the issue of “weight” is irrelevant.

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158 Husserl writes: “Every non-relative ‘real’ (reale) predicate, therefore points to [weist . . . hin] a part of the object which is the predicate’s subject: ‘red’ and ‘round’, e.g., do so, but not ‘existent’ or ‘something’” (LU, III, §2, 231 [LI, 2:5]).
Therefore, we find it most appropriate to see the unity between expression-sign and referent not as two parts unified by the whole to which they belong, but as a part unified with its whole by its being a part of that whole. Outside of fulfillment, the relation between expression-sign and referent is *in potentia*. Inside fulfillment, it is *in actus* (it is “realized” or “actualized”). In fulfillment, we find the expression-sign to truly belong to, to actually be a (quasi) property or part of, the object. Thus, the expression is fulfilled, confirmed, or illustrated.

The question remains, however, “What gives rise to the experience of the unity of an expression-sign and its referent?” In Investigation VI, §6, Husserl writes: “Not word *and* inkpot, . . . but the act experiences . . . in which they make their appearance, are here brought into relation.”\(^{159}\) This is the *Verschmelzen* he discusses in Investigation I, §10. From outside the experience of fulfillment, the investigator sees that the unity between word and inkpot, which the speaker or hearer experiences, is grounded not on a physical union between word and inkpot, but on the fusion of meaning-intention and inkpot-intuition. This fusion is what grounds the experienced relation of part to whole between sign and referent.

Once again we see that Husserl explains the fulfillment of expression-signs through a description of the empty and filled intentions that occur “behind the scenes.” Husserl’s attempt to understand meaningful signs forces him to study intentional acts. We have learned the following, therefore.

It is in fulfillment that the expression-sign’s relation to its object as part to whole is realized or actualized. In fulfillment, we most fully encounter the expression-sign as being

\(^{159}\) Ibid., VI, §6 559 (*LI*, 2:201).
the (quasi) part that it is of the object it expresses. Fulfillment reveals the true nature of the expression-sign. Furthermore, we now can see that fulfillment brings out the full character of expression-signs in their difference from indication-signs. Fulfillment highlights not only the extent of subjective involvement, but also the particular type of part-whole reasoning that is proper to each. When you get to the thing signified, you abandon the indication, but not the expression; rather, the expression and the signified object unite.

This reinforces what we noticed with regard to indication-signs. Husserl’s theory of signs is either built upon, or a branch of, his theory of parts and wholes—in interaction with his theory of subjectivity or intentionality. Thus, any study of Husserl’s sign theory which did not properly take into account Husserl’s theories of parts and wholes, and empty and filled intentions, would necessarily be inadequate.\(^{160}\)

With this, we must bring our exploration of the development and use of the theory of empty and filled intentions in Investigation I to a close. Though in doing so we leave many stones unturned, it is time to turn to Husserl’s further development and use of the theory in Investigations V and VI. Chapter 2 will deepen our understanding of empty and filled intentions, and reinforce our sense of their centrality and utility.

\(^{160}\) Derrida’s *Speech and Phenomena* is one such study. Therefore, the value of *Speech and Phenomena* as an explication of Husserl’s thought must be brought into question.
In chapter 1’s study of Investigation I, we considered empty and filled intentions only with reference to expression and meaning. Turning to Investigations V and VI, we will broaden and shift our focus. First, we will study empty and filled intentions in general, examining them both outside the context of expression (§8) and in their internal structure (§§9–10). Then, we will shift our focus from Husserl’s development of the theory of empty and filled intentions, to his use of that theory (§§11–12).

§8. Empty and Filled Intentions outside the Context of Meaning and Expression

In deference to Husserl’s own order of exposition, we have so far only studied empty and filled intentions as they relate to meaningful signs. Therefore, it may have seemed that all empty intentions are meaning-intentions, and all fulfillments are meaning-fulfillments. However, as the reader progresses through the Investigations, he will discover that there are other types of empty and filled intentions as well. Thus, we may begin to speak of “empty and filled intentions in general.”

The most explicit and extended study of fulfillment outside of Investigation I can be found in Investigation VI. Yet even there, Husserl first takes up empty and filled intentions in relation to linguistic meaning. It is not until the tenth section of Investigation VI that Husserl shifts his focus from meaning-intention and -fulfillment specifically, to empty and filled intentions in general.
However, VI §10 presupposes an earlier discussion of intentionality in V §13; we should, therefore, examine that passage first. There (V §13), Husserl writes:

The term ‘intention’ hits off the peculiarity of acts by imagining them to aim at something, and so fits the numerous cases that are naturally and understandably ranked as cases of theoretical or practical aiming.¹

The term “intention,” in other words, is a kind of image or metaphor. To think about or “intend” an object is to “aim” at it (or “be directed” toward it). However, this “aiming” (or “being directed”) is peculiar, in that it does not involve the usual connotation of guided spatial movement. We are to understand “intentions” as aiming in a more “theoretical or practical” sense, rather than in a throwing or shooting sense.

Nevertheless, “[i]n our metaphor,” Husserl continues, “an act of hitting the mark corresponds to that of aiming, and just so certain acts correspond as ‘achievements’ or ‘fulfillments’ to other acts as ‘intentions‘.”² If the image of aiming at objects leads us to wonder whether any experiences “hit” their objects, Husserl answers affirmatively. There are, we might say, mental “bull’s-eyes”; consciousness involves not only intentions, but also “fulfillments.”

Husserl goes on to say, therefore, that we can speak of intentions in both a “wider” and a “narrower” sense. In the narrow sense, only empty acts are true intentions; only they point to both an object and their own fulfillment. Nevertheless, in the wider sense,

¹ Husserl, LU, V, §13, 392 (LI, 2:102). Findlay omits the phrase “or practical” (“oder praktisches”), which I have restored. The German is: “Der Ausdruck Intention stellt die Eigenheit der Akte unter dem Bilde des Abzielens vor und paßt daher sehr gut auf die mannigfaltigen Akte, die sich ungezwungen und allgemeinverständlich als theoretisches oder praktisches Abzielen bezeichnen lassen” (emphasis on “Intention” is Husserl’s; emphasis on “theoretisches oder praktisches” is mine).

² Husserl, LU, V, §13, 393 (LI, 2:102).
“fulfillments are . . . themselves acts, i.e. ‘intentions’.”\textsuperscript{3} A fulfilled intention does not point to its own fulfillment, but it still points to its object. Both empty and filled intentions, therefore, count as intentions.\textsuperscript{4}

For examples to flesh out the metaphors of “aiming” and “hitting,” we can turn now to VI §10. There, Husserl writes:

We may now further characterize the consciousness of fulfillment by seeing in it an experiential form which plays a part in many other fields of mental life. We have only to think of the opposition between wishful intention and wish-fulfillment, between voluntary intention and execution, of the fulfillment of hopes and fears, the resolution of doubts, the confirmation of surmises etc., to be clear that essentially the same opposition is to be found in very different classes of intentional experiences: the opposition between significant intention and fulfillment of meaning is merely a special case of it.\textsuperscript{5}

In wishing for something, intending to do something, hoping for something, fearing something, doubting something, and guessing something, Husserl argues we experience intentions that can be fulfilled. In fact, these are all intentional experiences precisely because of their “being able to provide the basis for relations of fulfillment.”\textsuperscript{6} The distinction between “significant intention[s]” (i.e., meaning-intentions) and their fulfillments, therefore, “is merely a special case of” the distinction between empty and filled intentions in general.

In VI §13, Husserl says that we can organize this new mass of (types of) empty intentions by examining their fulfillments. Empty intentions are each specified by what

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{5} Husserl, \textit{LU}, VI, §10, 572 (\textit{LI} 2:210).

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
fulfills them; similar types of fulfillment indicate similar types of intention, and different types of fulfillment indicate different types of intention.\textsuperscript{7} This is especially clear when we contrast intentions based on signs with intentions based on images.

Husserl writes:

\textit{[F]ulfillment of like by like internally fixes the character of a synthesis of fulfillment as imaginative. . . . [However, it] is . . . of the very essence of a significative intention, that in it the apparent objects of intending and fulfilling acts (e.g. name and thing named in their fully achieved unity) ‘have nothing to do with one another’. It is clear, therefore, that descriptively distinct modes of fulfillment, being rooted in the descriptively distinct character of our intention, can help us to detect these latter differences, and to find definitions for them.} \textsuperscript{8}

We can see that meaning-intentions (“significative intentions”) differ from image-intentions, by observing the differences in their fulfillments. Even though “the name and thing named” reach a “fully achieved unity” in fulfillment,\textsuperscript{9} they “have nothing to do with one another.” The word “ambulance,” for example, looks nothing like an ambulance, and yet meaning-intentions based on the word can be fulfilled by perceptions of the vehicle. In contrast, when we intend something based on an image, that intention can only be fulfilled by something that looks like the image. A police officer, for instance, intends a missing person based on a photograph. Her intention of the missing person, therefore, will only be fulfilled if she sees someone who looks like the photograph.

Husserl’s argument is that the \textit{fulfillment} of a meaning-intention is different from the \textit{fulfillment} of an image-intention, and thus meaning-intentions are different from image-intentions. He then shows that this tool for intention-type-differentiation can be applied to

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, §13, 584 (LI 2:217).

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., §14a, 588 (LI 2:219–20).

\textsuperscript{9} As we have discussed above, chapter 1, §7c, pp. 72–78.
other cases as well. For example, pointing to differences in fulfillment, Husserl distinguishes both meaning-intentions and image-intentions from sense-perceptions (perceptive intentions).

Therefore, if we wish to understand the difference between various types of empty intentions (e.g., to see the difference between doubt-intentions and surmise-intentions, or between wish-intentions and will-intentions), we should look for differences in their fulfillments. Where we find differences in fulfillment, we have found clues to differences in intention. As Husserl says, “It is clear . . . that descriptively distinct modes of fulfillment, being rooted in the descriptively distinct character of our intention, can help us to detect these latter differences, and to find definitions for them.”

§9. The Internal Structure of Intentions

After discussing the wide variety of empty and filled intentions, Husserl turns to one of his more-frequent examples: the experience of listening to a melody.

When, e.g., a familiar melody begins, it stirs up definite intentions which find their fulfillment in the melody’s gradual unfolding. The same is the case even when the melody is unfamiliar. The regularities governing melody as such, determine intentions, which may be lacking in complete objective definiteness, but which nonetheless find or can find their fulfillments. As concrete experiences, these intentions are of course fully definite: the ‘indefiniteness’ of what they intend is plainly a descriptive peculiarity pertaining to their character.

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11 However, Husserl does not believe that *difference* is the only relation between types of intention. For example, despite the differences image-intentions and perceptual intentions, Husserl concludes that there is a “mutual affinity of percepts and imaginations.” Likewise, both have a “common opposition to ‘signitive’ intentions” (*LU*, VI, §14b, 591 [*LI* 2:222]). That is, both image-intentions and perceptions are intuitive intentions, and, therefore, can bring (some level of) fulfillment to signitive (i.e., empty) intentions.

We may say, in fact, with correct paradox . . . that ‘indefiniteness’ (i.e. the peculiarity of demanding an incompletely determined completion, which lies in a ‘sphere’ circumscribed by a law) is a definite feature of such an intention. Such an intention has . . . a range of possible fulfillment.\footnote{Ibid., §10, 572–73 (\textit{LI} 2:210). See also ibid., §15, 594 (\textit{LI} 2:224).}

If we know the melody we are hearing, we expect it to progress in a certain way. The expectations that the melody’s beginning creates in us are—if the melody continues to play out as expected—eventually fulfilled. Husserl also notes that the same can be true of melodies we do not know. If we are at least familiar with the genre to which a melody belongs, we know, in general, what to expect of it. We have a “feel” for where the melody will likely “go”—and how it will continue to be identified or presented as itself—without having to think about it explicitly. Our expectations (or “intentions”) are indefinite, but they can still be filled—in a number of generally predictable ways.

Husserl then tries to combat any appearance he may have created that intentions always involve expectations. “\textit{Intention},” he insists, “\textit{is not expectancy}, it is not of its essence to be directed to future appearances.”\footnote{Ibid., §10, 573 (\textit{LI} 2:211).} Intentions are more formal or structural than expectations; they do not involve waiting for something to arrive or occur, and need not be emotionally charged (with, e.g., excitement or trepidation), as the state of expectancy so often is.

Husserl continues:

If I see an incomplete pattern, e.g. in this carpet partially covered over by furniture, the piece I see seems clothed [\textit{behaftet}] with intentions pointing to further completions—we feel as if the lines and colored shapes go on ‘in the sense’ of what we see—but we expect nothing. It would be possible for us to expect something, if movement promised us further views. But possible
expectations, or occasions for possible expectations, are not themselves expectations.\textsuperscript{15}

To see a carpet as having portions hidden by furniture is not the same as expecting those portions to be revealed. We can emptily intend those parts of a carpet which are covered by furniture, without entering into a state of expectancy. We even experience the visible portions of carpet as contiguous with non-visible portions; that is, Husserl points out, our empty intentions affect the way we experience what is actually given. Nevertheless, to \textit{emptily intend} the hidden patches of carpet—even while we see the visible patches—is not to \textit{wait} for someone to rearrange the furniture. We can emptily intend the hidden patches as they are here and now, not only as they would appear (if and when they were uncovered). It \textit{is} sometimes possible, Husserl admits, to \textit{convert} an empty intention into an expectation. Given the right circumstances, we can shift from a simple awareness of what is absent into full-blown expectancy. However, our ability to morph an experience of empty intention into an attitude of awaiting, is no support for simply equating empty intentions and expectations.

In addition to seeing that intention and expectation are distinct, we also learn from Husserl’s carpet example that perceptual experience may be partially-empty. When we perceive a carpet’s pattern, we “see” it as having parts we cannot see. Part of our intention of the carpet is empty (unfulfilled). Thus, Husserl introduces us to the internal structure of intentions.

All perceiving and imagining is, on our view, a web of partial intentions, fused together in the unity of a single total intention. The correlate of this last intention is the thing, while the correlate of its partial intentions are \textit{the thing’s parts and moments}. Only in this way can we understand how consciousness reaches out

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
beyond what it actually experiences. It can so to say mean beyond itself, and its meaning can be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{16}

Earlier, Husserl argued that we encounter an indication-sign when two judgments (about the existence of the sign and the existence of the referent) are united into one judgment (about the entire indication situation).\textsuperscript{17} Here, Husserl claims that perceptions and acts of imagination are likewise unities-in-multiplicity, but on a level of experience deeper than that of judgment. When we perceptually or imaginatively intend an object, our intention is a whole that consists of many “partial intentions” directed toward the object’s individual properties, aspects, sides, and parts.

To intend a book, for example, is not only to intend the book, but also (implicitly) to intend its cover and pages, its weightiness and color, its length and tactile character. All of the intentions directed upon these individual aspects of the book are united within a single intention directed upon the book as a whole. Therefore, if we emptily and vaguely intend a book, we are not surprised later to discover that it has a cover or pages, a weight or color, a length or “feel.” We implicitly intended all of these things when we intended the book as a whole, even if we do not explicitly distinguish them from the whole.

Among the partial intentions of which any perceptual or imaginative intention consists, Husserl believes we will find intentions directed upon non-given aspects of the object.\textsuperscript{18} Such partial intentions, Husserl tells us, are either empty or imaginative.\textsuperscript{19} The

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 574 (LI 2:211).

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., I, §2, 32 (LI, 1:184). See above, chapter 1, §2, pp. 12–14, 20.

\textsuperscript{18} Compare the carpet pattern example, above (pp. 84–85).

\textsuperscript{19} Husserl, LU, VI, §15, 594–95 (LI 2:224): “We may therefore rightly see, in inadequate percepts and imaginations, interwoven masses of primitive intentions, among which in addition to perceptual and
former involve “contiguity”; the given aspects of an object support partial intentions directed toward contiguous (but non-given) aspects of the object. The latter involve “analogy”; the given aspects of an object inspire us to imagine other (non-given) aspects of the object.  

We can bring the empty or imaginative partial intentions to fulfillment in further experience (e.g., by turning over the book to see its back cover, or by moving the furniture). In other words, even intuitive, perceptive intentions can “require fulfillment.” Even intuitions can be intentions in the narrow sense: they can point not only to their objects, but also to the fulfilling, fuller presence of their objects.

§10. The Sensory Content of Acts

Intentional experiences can be complex in more than one respect. Every act, Husserl tells us, has a sensory side, in addition to its intentional side. Not only might an act consist of multiple partial intentions, therefore, but every act also contains “sensuous” (or “sensational”) “content.”

imaginative elements, there are also intentions of a signitive kind. We may therefore maintain, in general, that all phenomenological differences in objectifying acts reduce to their constituent elementary intentions and fulfillments, the former bound to the latter through syntheses of fulfillment.”

20 Ibid., 594 (LI 2:224).

21 See Husserl, LU, VI, §16.

22 More on this topic in §10, below.

23 Husserl, LU, V, §21, 433 (LI, 2:123). De Boer writes: “This new element is the ‘fullness.’ It is that by which an intuitive act (whether perceptual or imaginative) differs from an ‘empty’ signification. This ‘fullness’ is formed through the representative contents, through the sensations of the perceptual act” (de Boer, Development, 144). Likewise, Barry Smith writes: “Where we are dealing with acts of ordinary perception such representative content is of course ultimately just the sensory content of the relevant acts” (Barry Smith, “Logic and Formal Ontology,” in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 48).

24 See, e.g., Husserl, LU, V, §14, 395 (LI, 2:103).
Husserl argues that “sensations” cannot present objects by themselves; they must be *aufgefasst*—“apprehended” or “interpreted”—by intentions to do so. This does not mean, however, that acts intend sensations. Rather, acts intend objects *through* sensations; the sensory content of an act is the medium through which the act’s object appears. The intentional side of an act unites with its sensory content—it “apprehends” or “interprets” that content—and thus the whole act, with its sensory content, becomes the appearing of the object.

An act’s sensory content may help bring certain aspects of an intended object to givenness; when it is functioning in this way, Husserl calls sensory content, “intuitive content.” For example, the visual content provided by seeing a face, insofar as it actually helps to bring the face to presence, is intuitive. Likewise, the auditory content provided by hearing a shout helps to bring that shout to presence, and is therefore intuitive.

On the other hand, an act’s sensory content may merely support partial intentions that point to non-given aspects of the object; when it is functioning in this way, Husserl calls sensory content, “signitive content.” For example, the visual content one experiences while

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25 See, e.g., ibid., I, §23.


27 Husserl writes: “The perceptual presentation arises in so far as an experienced complex of sensations gets informed by a certain act-character, one of conceiving or meaning. To the extent that this happens, the perceived object appears, while the sensational complex is as little perceived as is the act in which the perceived object is as such constituted” (ibid., I, §23, 80 (*LI* 1:214)). See also, ibid., V, §11, 387 (*LI*, 2:99).


29 Ibid., VI, §§24–25.

30 Ibid. The terms “signitive” and “significative” are equivalent to “empty” for Husserl in *LU*. He writes: “I shall . . . often speak of significative or signitive acts, instead of acts of meaning-intention, of meaning etc. . . . ‘Signitive’ also offers us a suitable terminological opposite to ‘intuitive’. A synonym for ‘signitive’ is ‘symbolic’, to the extent that the modern abuse of a word ‘symbol’ obtains—an abuse already denounced by
reading the words, “a face,” does not actually help to bring a face to givenness. Rather, such content merely supports our empty intention of some face. Likewise, seeing the words, “a shout,” may provide us with visual content that helps us emptily intend such a noise, but this content does not actually bring it to givenness; only auditory content could do so.

To complicate matters, Husserl argues that one and the same content can function simultaneously as intuitive and signitive. For example, the visual content provided by reading the words, “a face,” helps to bring those words to presence; it is, therefore, intuitive. However, the same visual content is also signitive, in that it supports our empty intention of a face.

Kant—which equates a symbol with a ‘sign’, quite against its original and still indispensable sense.” (LU, VI, §8, 567, n. [LI, 2:207, n. 5 [2:356]])

On Husserl’s eventual distinction between “signitive” and “significative” intentions, see Ullrich Melle, “Signitive und significative Intentionen,” Husserl Studies 15, no. 3 (October 1998): 176–78, and John Drummond, “Pure Logical Grammar: Anticipatory Categoriality and Articulated Categoriality,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11, no. 2 (June 2003): 129–131. Melle and Drummond describe the distinction as follows: To take an object as a sign is to signitively intend it, while to be meaningfully directed toward the sign’s referent is to significatively intend that referent. In a signitive intention, we take something as a sign, and thus are led to significitively intend the sign’s referent. In other words, Husserl eventually reserves the term “signitive” for those intentions in which we intend an object as a sign, while relegating “significative intention” to the role that he had previously filled with the term “meaning-intention.”

Husserl writes: “We have so far considered only the purely intuitive or purely signitive acts. If we bring in the mixed acts as well, those we ordinarily class as intuitive, we find them peculiar in the fact that their representative content is pictorial or self-presentative in respect of one part of what it objectively presents, while being merely denotative as to the remaining part. We must accordingly range mixed representatives beside purely signitive and purely intuitive representatives: these represent signitively and intuitively at the same time” (LU, VI, §25, 620 [LI, 2:242]). Continuing, Husserl writes: “Each concretely complete objectifying act has three components: its quality, its matter and its representative content. To the extent that this content functions as a purely signitive or purely intuitive representative, or as both together, the act is a purely signitive, a purely intuitive or a mixed act” (ibid., 620–21 [LI, 2:242]).

Husserl writes that “when we turn out attention to the sign qua sign . . . we have an external percept . . . just like any other, whose object loses its verbal character.” However, he continues: “If this object again functions as a word, its presentation is wholly altered in character. The word (qua external singular) remains intuitively present, maintains its appearance, but we no longer intend it, it no longer properly is the object of our ‘mental activity’. Our . . . intention . . . point[s] exclusively to the thing meant in the sense-giving act. This means . . . that the intuitive presentation, in which the physical appearance of the [word] is constituted, undergoes an essential phenomenal modification when its object begins to count as an expression. While what constitutes the object’s appearing remains unchanged, the intentional character of the experience alters. There is constituted (without need of a fulfilling or illustrative intuition) an act of meaning which finds support in the
Likewise, the visual content provided by seeing the front of a building helps to bring that front to presence. However, it also supports our empty intention of the back of the building. When we see the front, we do not take it as a *free-standing wall*, but rather believe (even if implicitly) ourselves to be encountering a *building*. In seeing the front, we also understand there to be a back that we cannot currently see. Thus, the visual content we experience is both intuitive (bringing the front to givenness) and signitive (helping to support implicit empty intentions directed toward the back).  

Husserl says the relation of signitive to intuitive content in each act can be expressed by the equation, “$i + s = 1$.” In this equation, “$i$” signifies the “weight” of the act’s *intuitive* content. The more aspects (of its object) the act *intuits*, the more its sensory content is

33 Husserl writes: “The features which enter into perception always point to completing features, which themselves might appear in other possible percepts, and that definitely or more or less indefinitely, according to the degree of our ‘empirical acquaintance’ with the object. Every percept, and every perceptual context, reveals itself, on closer analysis, as made up of components which are to be understood as ranged under two standpoints of intention and (actual or possible) fulfillment” (ibid., §10, 573–74 [LI, 2:220]). “Perception, so far as it claims to give us the object ‘itself’, really claims thereby to be . . . an act, which . . . requires no further fulfillment. But generally, and in all cases of ‘external’ perception, this remains a mere pretension. The object is . . . not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is. It is only given ‘from the front’, only ‘perspectivally foreshortened and projected’ etc. While many of its properties are illustrated in the nuclear content of the percept, at least in the (perspectival) manner which the last expressions indicate, many others are not present in the percept in such illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc., are no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, symbolically suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves part of the intuitive, i.e. of the perceptual or imaginative content, of the percept” (ibid., §14b, [LI, 2:220]). “[E]ven what is not presented in an intuitive presentation is subsidiarily meant, and . . . an array of signitive components must accordingly be ascribed to the latter, from which we have to abstract if we wish to keep our *intuitive* content pure. This last gives the intuitively presenting content its direct relation to corresponding objective moments: other novel and, to that extent, mediate, signitive intentions, are attached to these by contiguity” (ibid., §23, 611 [LI, 2:236]).

34 Husserl writes: “If we now define the *weight* of the intuitive (or signitive) content as the sum total of the intuitively (or signitively) presented moments of the object, both ‘weights’ in each presentation will add up to a single total weight, i.e., the sum total of the object’s properties. Always therefore the symbolic equation holds: $i + s = 1$. The weights $i$ and $s$ can plainly vary in many regards: the same, intentionally same, object can be intuitively given with more or less numerous, ever varying properties. The signitive content also alters correspondingly, it is increased or diminished” (ibid.).
functioning intuitively, and the greater the “weight” of its intuitive content. The variable, “$s$,” on the other hand, signifies the “weight” of the act’s signitive content. The more aspects (of its object) the act signitively intends, the more its sensory content is functioning signitively, and the greater the “weight” of its signitive content.

The equation, “$i + s = 1$,” therefore, shows how acts can be more or less intuitive or signitive. As $i$ approaches 1, $s$ must approach 0. More of the act’s partial intentions—which are directed upon the various aspects of the object—have intuitive content. They intuit more of the object, and thus the overall act becomes more intuitive (more “filled”). Conversely, as $s$ approaches 1, $i$ must approach 0. More of the act’s partial intentions have signitive content. They signitively intend more aspects of the object, and thus the overall act becomes more signitive (more “empty”).

Therefore, if $i$ and $s$ both range between 1 and 0, “basically intuitive” intentions can still be partially empty, and “basically empty” intentions can still be partially intuitive. Just as we saw in Husserl’s carpet pattern example, not all intuitions are completely intuitive; they can contain empty partial intentions. Conversely, not all empty intentions are completely empty; they can contain intuitive partial intentions.

If this is true, however, we discover that not all fulfillments need be complete fulfillments. In fact, Husserl says, there is the possibility of a “[g]raded series of fulfillments,”35 in which an intention becomes evermore fulfilled by evermore-intuitive intuitions. There is the possibility, in other words, of “[a] continuous increase in

fulfillment,‖ fulfillment up to the ideal of what Husserl calls “adequation.” Adequation is the complete fulfillment of an intention by an intuition. In adequation, all (implicitly and explicitly) intended aspects of an object are brought to givenness; the object in its totality becomes intuited; the weight of the act’s intuitive content reaches “1.”

Husserl’s understanding of the content of acts as sensations, and as something that must be apprehended by the rest of the act, has come to be called the (matter/form or apprehension/apprehension-content) “schema” in the secondary literature. The “schema,” however, has come under criticism. One critique is that it represents a kind of empiricistic sensualism that either doesn’t work, or that Husserl was trying to move beyond in Logical Investigations. Another criticism is that Husserl’s theory of apprehension progresses beyond that found in Logical Investigations. In fact, by the time Husserl began to rewrite Investigation VI for the 2nd Edition (in 1913), he had already decided more precision and depth were required than he had at first seen.

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36 Ibid., 615 (LI, 2:239). See also ibid., §10.

37 Ibid., §29. However, Staub (Leerintentionen, 72–73) and Tugendhat (Wahrheitsbegriff, §4, 78) point out that adequation becomes a kind of Kantian regulative idea for Husserl, as his thinking on the subject progressed.

38 Dieter Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition,” in One Hundred Years, 134–35; Melle, “Einleitung” to LU Ergänzungsband I, xxxiv; Sokolowski, Constitution, 55–56, 177, 202–6, 210; Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditation, §58, 154.


41 Husserl argues in the rewritten text for Investigation VI, that every intuition not only intends an object (or aspect of an object), but intends it as (a) able to be given in other ways, and (b) belonging to a context of non-given objects (or aspects of the same object) (LU Ergänzungsband I, §§16–17). We will examine these two points in turn.
Nevertheless, Sokolowski argues that “the schema of datum versus apprehension is still valid, and will continue to be valid, in Husserl’s descriptions of how we perceive spatial things in the world.”

Even if Husserl dropped the schema in explaining other types of intentions in an empty intention’s fringe (a) also have a core/fringe structure, or (b) are simple. For example, if I emptily intend a person’s head from the front, that empty intention has a fringe that points, among other things, to the back. Does the empty fringe intention pointing to the back of the person’s head intend the back of the head as being presentable for multiple angles, and as belonging to a wider context? Or does it simply intend the back of the head, tout court? In other words, are the fringe intentions in an empty intention complex or simple?

Husserl opts for the latter option (ibid., §16, 90–91, §18, 95; Beilage IV [to §33], §4, 244; Beilage V [to §33], §4, 250). Empty partial intentions—those Husserl refers to as “contiguity” (ibid., §§16–18), “fringe” (§16, 90–91, §30, 134, §33, 142–44, etc.), or “horizon” intentions (§33, 142; Beilage V [to §33], §4)—do not have a core/fringe structure. In fact, from what Husserl says, it would seem that they do not even have their own “signitive” content, but instead find support in the sensory content used by the core of the larger intention to which they belong. (On the foregoing, see Melle, “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” especially xxxv–xxxvii.)

Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, §58, 154. Lohmar writes: “[W]e need to recognize that Husserl accepts this model of how to understand intuitivity for the categorial intuition as well as for sense
experience—e.g., categorial experience\textsuperscript{43} and time consciousness—he retained it in explaining sense-perception of material things.\textsuperscript{44} Our experience of the sensible world involves not simply the input of mind, nor simply the input of the senses, but the cooperation of both.

The involvement of sensation in bringing objects to fulfilling presence cannot be ignored, and this is what Husserl is trying to “get at” through his examination of sensory content and apprehension.\textsuperscript{45} Whether Husserl has to deepen or revise his analysis of how sensibility and intentionality relate, therefore, what is primary is the fact that mind and senses cooperate in presencing objects. There are acts that make their objects present, and acts that do not, and differences in sensation can be fundamental to these differences in act.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43}Husserl writes: “It does not affect what I have said to add that, after twenty years of further work, I should not write at many points as I then wrote, and that I do not approve of much that I then wrote, e.g. the doctrine of categorial representation” (LU, V, “Vorwort,” 535 [LI, 2:178]).


\textsuperscript{45}Husserl writes: “The idea of a pure intellect, interpreted as a faculty of pure thinking (= categorial action), quite cut off from a ‘faculty of sensibility’, could only be conceived before there had been an elementary analysis of knowledge in the irrefragable evidence of its being” (LU, VI, §60, 712 [LI, 2:306]).

\textsuperscript{46}See especially ibid., §55. There Husserl writes: “Representing contents constitute the difference between ‘empty’ signification and ‘full’ intuition” (ibid., 700 [LI, 2:299]).
§11. The Role of Empty and Filled Intentions in Husserl’s Explication of Topics in Investigation VI

We may now turn from our study of Husserl’s development of the theory of empty and filled intentions, to our study of Husserl’s use of said theory—its application to other philosophical issues. As we saw in chapter 1, Husserl put his understanding of empty and filled intentions to work almost immediately, using it to bring a new level of completion to his theory of signs. Our task now is to explore some of the ways in which Husserl uses empty and filled intentions as a tool for explicating other topics.

Our goal in what follows is not to achieve an in-depth study of the various topics that Husserl takes up in Investigation VI; entire books could be devoted to each subject. Instead, our goal is to note the way in which even a summary account of several central topics requires one to employ the distinction between empty and filled intentions. Specifically, we will examine four topics: being and truth, objects and intuition, authentic and inauthentic thought, and Husserl’s claimed advance over the epistemological tradition (especially over Kant’s critique of reason).

a. Being and Truth

The concepts of being and truth depend for their clarification on empty and filled intentions. The “objective correlate” of “an identifying act” (an act of fulfillment) is “being in the sense of truth,” says Husserl. Later, he says that we obtain “the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense)”—the sense employed in statements like, “x is
y”—from the objects of “the fulfillments of judgments.”\footnote{Ibid., §44, 669–70 (LI, 2:279).} Without fulfillment—and thus without the difference between empty and filled intentions—we would have no concept of being (at least “in the copulative sense”).

If the “objective correlate” of “an identifying act” is “being in the sense of truth,” however, we must understand what Husserl means by “truth.”\footnote{Sokolowski writes: “The elementary parts involved in being truthful are three: empty anticipation of what we are concerned with, intuitive possession (fulfillment), and recognition of it as the same in both states (identity synthesis). This formal structure is at work on all levels of experience, from inner time-consciousness to the confirmation of scientific hypotheses” (Sokolowski, \textit{Husserlian Meditations}, 4).} Husserl presents four different senses of the word,\footnote{Husserl, \textit{LU}, VI, §39.} and we will see that each depends on the distinction between empty and filled intentions.

The first sense of “truth” is as follows.

\[\text{[T]ruth as the correlate of an identifying act is a state of affairs (Sachverhalt), as the correlate of a coincident identity it is an identity: the full agreement of what is meant with what is given as such.}\] \footnote{Ibid., 651–52 (LI, 2:263).}

We notice here that Husserl does not say, “the full agreement of thought and thing,” but rather, “the full agreement of what is meant with what is given as such.” He avoids altogether the question of how thought is supposed to “correspond” with thing, and instead appeals to the correspondence of thing (as intended) with thing (as given). The focus and
emphasis is on the two ways an object is given, not on a relation between a subjective entity and an objective one. The *emptily intended object’s* being the same as the *intuitively given object*—in fulfillment—is Husserl’s first sense of truth.

Husserl continues:

A second concept of truth concerns the *ideal relationship* which obtains in the unity of coincidence which we defined as evidence, *among the epistemic essences of the coinciding acts*. . . . [It is] the Ideal of absolute adequation as such. 51

“Evidence” is provided by fulfillment, and can be, therefore, of differing “degrees and levels.” 52 The highest level is “absolute adequation”—that is, the level of complete fulfillment, in which no partial intentions are left empty. Truth, in the second sense, is complete adequation, understood as the empty intention’s being exactly the same as the fulfilling intuition (excepting the difference between emptiness and fullness). Truth is the total fulfillment of an empty intention by an intuition, and thus is an ideal to approach, not something ever actually achieved.

51 Ibid., 652 (LI, 2:264).

52 Ibid., §38, 651 (LI, 2:263). Tugendhat writes: “Vielmehr kommen jetzt Wahrheit und Evidenz gemeinsam zur Aufklärung aus dem phänomenologisch konkret vorgegebenen Spannungsverhältnis zwischen (setzender) Intention und (letzter) Erfüllung” (Tugendhat, Wahrheitsbegriff, §5, 92). “The synthesis of evidence,” Carr writes, “operates over at least two acts of different evidence characters, . . . one a presentation of an object which is more intuitive . . . than the other, and the other an empty presentation. . . . Given two such acts and the synthesis of evidence, the intuitive intending is said by Husserl to fulfill the empty intending” (Lloyd Carr, “Husserl’s Philosophy of Language,” in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 139–140).

“[I]n [Investigation VI],” Henry Pietersma adds, “Husserl . . . sets out to elucidate the notion of the evident by way of sketching out [its] context. . . . He characterizes this implicit context by means of a contrast between intention and fulfillment” (Henry Pietersma, “Truth and The Evident,” in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 218–19). “What is seen,” he continues, “is identified as that which was meant. . . . What is now meant is just what is given; and nothing is meant that is not given. Something is evident to a person if that person is aware of this agreement or accord” (ibid., 223–24).

Finally, Herbert Spiegelberg writes that in LU, Husserl “makes self-evidence simply a correlate of actual self-givenness, as it occurs particularly in the processes of the intuitive fulfillment of our unverified ‘significative’ meanings.” Herbert Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology of Direct Evidence,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2, no. 4 (June 1942): 430.
Therefore, though we find truth$_1$ on the object side of the situation, truth$_2$ is on the subject side. Again, Husserl avoids the debate over how thought and thing are supposed to correspond. Instead, truth$_2$ refers to the fact that an experience of truth is a fulfillment (an evidencing), and therefore involves the relating of an intention to an intuition.

With the third sense of “truth,” Husserl returns to the object side of the situation.

We also experience in evidence, from the side of the act which furnishes ‘fullness’, the object given in the manner of the object meant: so given, the object is fullness itself. This object can also be called being, truth, the ‘truth’ in so far as it is here not experienced as in the merely adequate percept, but as the ideal fullness for an intention, as that which makes an intention true (or as the ideal fullness for the intention’s specific epistemic essence).\footnote{Husserl, \textit{LU}, VI, §39, 652 (\textit{LI}, 2:264).}

This, it seems, is the sense of truth used in: “Now I see the truth of the matter.” In an act of fulfillment or “evidence,” the object given by the fulfilling intuition provides the empty intention with fullness—with truthfulness. In contrast with truth$_1$—truth in the sense of the identity of the object intended with the object intuited—therefore, truth$_3$ is simply the intuited object itself. The intuited object is the truth. (Once again, we see that Husserl avoids the issue of “correspondence,” and instead uses the blend of empty and filled intending.)

Finally, with the fourth sense of “truth,” Husserl returns to the “subject side” of the situation.

[C]onsidered from the standpoint of the intention, the notion of the relationship of evidence yields us truth as the \textit{rightness of our intention}, \ldots its adequacy to its true object, or the \textit{rightness of the intention’s epistemic essence}.\footnote{Ibid., 653 (\textit{LI}, 2:264).}

Only here do we encounter something like the correspondence theory of truth. Husserl says that in fulfillment, we discover that our empty intention was correct; we did in fact intend the
object as it actually is. However, this shows us once again that the “correspondence” of thought and thing is not primary (at least, not in the order of discovery). Only because an intention has been fulfilled can we think of intention and object as “corresponding.” If Husserl is correct, the correspondence theory of truth is founded on fulfillment, and, therefore, on the distinction between empty and filled intentions.

In analyzing the concepts of being and truth, Husserl employs his theory of empty and filled intentions. More precisely, he argues that we derive our understanding of being and truth from the experience of filling empty intentions. Fulfillment is, for Husserl, the phenomenon to be analyzed if we wish to clarify what we mean by “being” and “truth.”

b. Objects and Intuition

Husserl argues that we must expand our concepts of “object” and “intuition” if we are properly to account for the phenomenological facts. He claims that we must recognize more than one kind of object, and more than one kind of intuition, if we are to make sense of our experience. To understand what Husserl means—and how this is involves empty and filled intentions—we will examine two particular cases: categoriality and universality.

Categorial objects are complex wholes, founded on their parts. Sokolowski writes:

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55 This recalls, of course, Husserl’s talk of the fulfilling of expression-signs as their “confirmation” (ibid., I, §9, 44 [LI, 1:192]). See chapter 1, §6, pp. 59–61, above.


57 Husserl writes: “[A] founded act, by its very nature or kind, is only possible as built upon acts of the sort which underlie it, and, . . . as a result the objective correlate of the founded act has a universal element of form which can only be intuitively displayed by an object in a founded act of this kind” (ibid., §58, 706 [LI, 2:303]). “Evidently the outcome of a categorial act, e.g. one of collection or relation, consists in an objective ‘view’ of what is primarily intuited, a ‘view’ that can only be given in such a founded act, so that the thought of a straightforward percept of the founded object, or of its presentation through some other straightforward intuition, is a piece of nonsense” (ibid., §61, 715–16 [LI, 2:308]). “What we have are acts which, as we have
A categorial intention is one in which we intend not a simple perceptual object, but an object infected with syntax. A fact or state of affairs, a group, a relation with its relata, are categorial objects.\textsuperscript{58}

Here Sokolowski is drawing on the correspondence Husserl sees between the syntax of our sentences and the structures of objects.\textsuperscript{59} The structure of a sentence can bring out the structure of its referent, and referents like states of affairs, groups, and things-in-relation, can only be fully expressed if their structures are articulated (i.e., if they are meant as structured, and meant in the very way in which they are structured).

Sense perception, however, can only fulfill the “content”—rather than the “form”—of an expression.\textsuperscript{60} We take, for example, the sentence, “The card is blue and in the deck.” Husserl would argue that sense perception can only fill its content: “card,” “blue,” and “deck.” However, filling its form (“\emph{x} is \emph{y} and in \emph{z}”; the card’s \textit{being} blue \textit{and} \textit{being in} the deck) is not something for which mere sense perception is adequate.

Nevertheless, our complex, categorial intentions of complex, categorial objects are often fulfilled.

If we are asked what it means to say that \textit{categorically structured meanings} find fulfillment, confirm themselves in perception, we can but reply: it means only that they relate to the object itself \textit{in its categorial structure}.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} Sokolowski, \textit{Husserlian Meditations}, §10, 31.


The complexity of our categorial intentions—the fact that they intend more than sense-perception can present—does not keep them from “find[ing] fulfillment.” Rather, “[t]he object with these categorial forms is not merely referred to, as in the case where meanings function purely symbolically, but it is set before our very eyes in just these forms.” There is a difference between emptily intending a categorial object, and actually encountering such an object; and, Husserl is arguing, we must accept that both occur.

Husserl seems, therefore, to be making two contradictory claims. First, he says that the categorial forms of objects cannot be perceived; that is, they cannot be intuited by the senses. Then, he says that categorially-formed intentions can be fulfilled; yet fulfillment requires intuition. Therefore, Husserl seems to be saying both that we cannot intuit categorial forms, and that categorially formed objects can be intuited as categorially formed.

To make sense of this, Husserl, says we must expand our notion of intuition; “there must at least be an act which renders identical services to the categorial elements of meaning that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elements.” Over and above mere sense perception, there must be a special kind of act worthy of the name “categorial intuition.” We must be capable of something more than simple sense-perception, since we can “see” categorially-formed objects.


62 Husserl, LU, VI, §45, 671 (LI, 2:280).

63 See, e.g., ibid., §61.

64 Ibid., §45, 671 (LI, 2:280).
However, categorial intuition does not consist in giving objects categorial form. On the contrary, Husserl argues, categorially formed objects are brought to presence in categorial acts without falsification. While we must engage in special (“categorial”) acts to intuit categorial objects, this is not because our acts are the source of categoriality. We do not impose or project categorial forms on objects. Instead, it is simply the case that categorially-articulated objects can only “show themselves” through “correspondingly articulated . . . acts.”

Whatever our theory of the way in which categorial intuition occurs, Husserl believes we must admit it does occur. The fact that we can fulfill intentions of categorially-formed objects forces the conclusion upon us. Therefore, categorial objects deserve to be called objects—just as much as simple perceptual objects do—and it is necessary to say we intuit them.

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65 Ibid., §61, 715–16 (LI, 2:308).
66 Ibid., §46, 675 (LI, 2:283), §48, 683 (LI, 2:288). To use a fenestral metaphor: a window in a wall allows a tree outside the house to appear (to those inside). The architect’s insertion of a window into the wall brings the tree to presence. However, the window does not bring the tree into being; a gardener—not the architect—planted the tree. The tree, we might say, requires the window, in “the order of presence” (or “presentation”), but not in “the order of being.” Likewise, categorial objects require categorial acts to be intuitively presented as categorial objects, but not to be (categorial objects). See also ibid., §51, 689 (LI, 2:291), §52, 690 (LI, 2:292), §53, 694 (LI, 2:295), §57, 705 (LI, 2:302).
67 Husserl himself changed his ideas on this topic (ibid., “Vorwort,” 535 [LI, 2:178]). See p. 94, n. 43, above.
68 Husserl, LU, VI, §§45–47, §57, 705 (LI, 2:302).
Husserl also claims that the intuition of universals or essences is possible; they too can be objects of intuition. Once again, he uses the distinction between empty and filled intentions to show the legitimacy of such talk.

In an act of abstraction . . . the universal itself is given to us; we do not think of it merely in significative fashion as when we merely understand general names, but we apprehend it, behold it. Talk of an intuition and, more precisely, of a perception of the universal is in this case, therefore, well-justified.

There is a difference between referring to a universal and actually engaging or encountering it. I may say the words, “Crimson is darker than scarlet,” but this does not mean I actually see and understand that crimson is darker than scarlet. In some acts, we “think of [the universal] merely in significative fashion,” while in others “the universal itself is given to us” through “eidetic variation,” a process Husserl will only fully explain later. In other words, Husserl says that some of our intentions of universals are empty, while others are filled. How can we make sense of this fact, if not by concluding that the intuition of universals is possible (and thus that we must add “universal intuition” to the widened sense of “intuition”)?

Therefore, Husserl argues that objects need not be simply sensuous, but can be categorically formed. Likewise, intuition need not be purely sensuous, but can involve categoriality. Neither need intuition be of the individual, says Husserl; it can be of the

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Ibid., §52. For more extensive treatments of essence, see Gilbert Null, “Husserl’s Doctrine of Essence” in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 69–105; Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, chapter 3; Tugendhat, Wahrheitsbegriff, §7.

Husserl, LU, VI, §52, 691 (LI, 2:292).

See, e.g., Husserl, CM, IV, §34, and EU, §87. For a survey and explication, see Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, chapter 3.
universal as well. In each case, Husserl founds his argument on the distinction between empty and filled intentions.

c. Authentic and Inauthentic Thought

We now reach the pinnacle of Husserl’s epistemology in *Logical Investigations*. Having discussed topics like intuition and truth, Husserl is ready to engage the question of thinking in general. Without thought, there would be no rational experience, encounter with truth, discovery of being, or development of science. Therefore, without an understanding of thought, an examination of those other topics would be incomplete.

To explain his concept of “thought,” Husserl has recourse to two other concepts: understanding and categorial intentionality. The realm of thought, for Husserl, is the realm of understanding (as opposed to sensation). However, the realm of understanding is the realm of categorial intentionality. In other words, to think is to exercise one’s understanding, and to exercise one’s understanding is to engage in categorial intending. To think, therefore, is to categorially intend.

However, because empty intentions—even categorial ones—are naturally ordered to fulfillment, Husserl claims that “a ‘categorial intuition’ . . . [is] a case of thought in the

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72 Though not in his thought as a whole, as we will see at the end of this subsection.

73 When we engage in categorial intentions, “the sphere of ‘sensibility’ has been left,” says Husserl, “and that of ‘understanding’ entered” (*LU*, VI, §47, 680–81 [*LI*, 2:286]). “Understanding,” Husserl says, is simply “the capacity for categorial acts, [and] also, perhaps, . . . a capacity for expression and meaning directed upon such acts” (ibid., §64, 726 [*LI*, 2:315]). Not only is the Kantian legacy of the term “understanding” at stake here, but Husserl is thematizing the very “relation between thinking and intuiting,” (ibid., §66, 730 [*LI*, 2:317]) which lies at the heart of epistemology (ibid., “Einleitung,” 538–39 [*LI*, 2:184]). Husserl’s definition of understanding as the ability to engage in categorial acts sheds light upon what thinking itself is (ibid., §47, 680 [*LI*, 2:286], 680–81 [*LI*, 2:286], §64, 726 [*LI*, 2:315], §66, 730 [*LI*, 2:317]). In fact, Husserl claims, categorial acts are those “in which all that is intellectual is constituted” (ibid., §57, 705 [*LI*, 2:302]).
highest sense.”

Categorial intuitions are acts of thinking, brought to fulfillment. Just as expressions are actualized in fulfillment, thoughts are actualized in fulfillment. Both expressions and thoughts “come into their own” in the presence of their objects.

There is, therefore, a ranking of thoughts. Empty categorial intentions are acts of thinking in a lower, “inauthentic” sense, while fulfilled categorial intentions are acts of thinking in a higher, “authentic” sense.

If one includes under the rubric of ‘acts of thinking’, all the categorial acts through which judgments, as predicative significations, gain fullness and their whole value for knowledge, we must distinguish between authentic acts of thinking and inauthentic ones [zwischen eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Denkakten zu unterscheiden]. The inauthentic acts of thinking would be the significant intentions behind statements and, by a natural extension, all significative acts which could possibly function as parts of such predicative intentions: all significative acts can plainly function in this fashion. The authentic acts of thinking would lie in the corresponding fulfillments, i.e. the intuitions of states of affairs, and all intuitions which function as possible parts of such intuitions. All intuitions can function in this manner.

Here Husserl says inauthentic acts of thinking are empty, judicative (or predicative), categorial intentions, while authentic acts of thinking are fulfilled, judicative (or predicative), categorial intentions. However, there is a sense in which even simple empty intentions are

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75 See above §6, pp. 60–61.
76 Ibid., §63, 722 (LI, 2:312).
77 Matheson Russell writes: “[T]he meaning given to the intended object(s) prior to their being experienced ‘in person’ may or may not be accurate. . . . Until proof is adduced, Husserl states, we cannot claim knowledge; we operate in the realm of ‘inauthentic’ (Uneigentlich) or ‘signitive thinking’ (LI II, Inv. VI, §§17–20). In signitive thinking, one deals with meanings in abstraction from any sensuous or intuitive constraints.” Matheson Russell, Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 101.

Walter Hopp adds: “Inauthentic thinking is thinking that has lost sight of its relation to the things that it is about. And signitive or symbolic thinking constantly runs the danger of being inauthentic because it can proceed so well without corresponding intuitions, which bring us into contact with the things that signitive thinking is supposed to bear upon. At its worst, inauthentic thinking degenerates into mere calculation, the manipulation of a syntax according to formal rules, which is precisely what the bulk of mathematics and logic...
acts of inauthentic thinking, and even *simple* fulfilling intuitions are acts of authentic thinking. Husserl says that any intention that could function as a part of an empty, judicative, categorial intention also counts as an act of inauthentic thinking. Likewise, any intuition that could fulfill part of an empty, judicative, categorial intention also counts as an act of authentic thinking.

The distinction between acts of authentic and inauthentic thinking is not quite as simple as Husserl first portrays it, however. Later, Husserl seems to say that acts of inauthentic thinking are inauthentic (empty) because they are not actually, fully “executed.” He writes:

We have simplified the matter to the extent of confining our discussion to two extremes only: we opposed completely intuitive, i.e. actually executed act-forms, on the one hand, to purely signitive, i.e. not authentically executed act-forms, on the other, forms only to be realized in the processes of possible fulfillment. The ordinary cases are, however, mixtures: thought proceeds intuitively in many stretches, in many stretches signitively[;] here a categorial synthesis, a predication, [or] a generalization is really carried out[;] there a merely signitive intention directed to such a categorial synthesis attaches to the intuitively, or to the only verbally presented members. The complex acts arising in this manner have, taken as a whole, the character of inauthentic categorial intuitions: their total objective correlate is not actually, only inauthentically, presented.\(^78\)

What is peculiar about this passage is that Husserl speaks as if categorial acts are signitive *because they are not truly performed*. Signitive categorial acts are “not authentically executed,” and are “only . . . realized in the processes of . . . fulfillment,” he says. Just as the

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Paul Livingston writes, “[I]t becomes possible for a proposition to express a meaning that cannot be fulfilled by any real intuitive content. Husserl calls such propositions, and the non-intuitive presentations they embody quite generally, inauthentic. For instance, a sentence reporting the existence of a ‘round square’ might fulfill all the syntactic rules necessary for a proposition to have meaning, but it will have no possible intuitive fulfillment.” Paul Livingston, “Husserl and Schlick on the Logical Form of Experience,” *Synthese* 132, no. 3 (September 2002): 254.
relation between an expression-sign and its referent is only “realized” in fulfillment, a categorial act (and, therefore, any act of thinking) is only “realized” (i.e., shifted from “inactual” to “actual”) in fulfillment.

Outside fulfillment, therefore, acts of thinking are inauthentic (unrealized). Rather than being full categorial acts, they are “merely signitive intention[s] directed to [their] categorial synthes[es]” (to their categorically-formed objects). Furthermore, an act of inauthentic thinking can remain inauthentic (signitive) even if the parts of its categorial object are intuitively given. An act of inauthentic thinking, Husserl say, may “[attach] to the intuitively, or to the only verbally presented members” of its object. Therefore, the intuitive givenness of the parts of a categorial object does not guarantee the intuitive givenness of the whole. Whether the parts of its object are given or not, an act of inauthentic thinking is inauthentic because it does not actually “get to work” on those parts; it does not explicitly pick them out and unite them within the whole. It does not fully bring out the structure of the object it intends, but merely (emptily) gestures toward that structure, as it were.

It would seem to follow, therefore, that an act of inauthentic thinking is an act of authentic thinking in potentia. It is an act that remains merely potential or unexecuted (in

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79 See above, §6, pp. 60–61.


81 Sokolowski writes: “In the languid use of formal terms, in sensuous association, and in mere mention, the underlying acts do not get to work and coincide, so registration does not take place. An empty intending of a state of affairs if fulfilled when the underlying acts do get to work, when the articulation and coincidence come to pass, and the actual registration occurs—when we begin to think about what is before us” (Husserlian Meditations, §17, 55).
some way), and thus remains signitive or empty. If it were actually carried out or executed, it would be fulfilled; it would become an act of authentic thinking.

Certain rules—the rules we would recognize as basic logical principles—govern authentic thinking, Husserl tells us. These rules, he argues, are “normative” for inauthentic thinking. That the rules of authentic thinking are normative for inauthentic thinking is based on the relationship of fulfillment. To be fulfilled, an act of inauthentic thinking must be converted into an act of authentic thinking; therefore, any act of inauthentic thinking must be “compatible” (as it were) with the rules of authentic thinking. Otherwise, it could never be fulfilled—it could never “become itself” (be “actualized”).

The conclusion Husserl draws from this is that the laws of thought are not merely psychological. They do not simply describe how thoughts relate to each other, but how mind relates to world.

The laws of inauthentic thinking do not hold psychologically like empirical laws governing the origin and change of such thought, but as the possibilities or impossibilities of adequation founded in their ideal purity in the variously formed acts of inauthentic thinking in relation to corresponding acts of authentic thinking.

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82 Husserl, *LU*, VI, §64, 727–28 (LI, 2:316): “In so far as the logical thought of experience is . . . conducted inadequately and signitively, we can think, believe, many things which in truth, in the manner of authentic thought, the actual carrying out of merely intended syntheses, cannot be brought together at all. Just for this reason the a priori laws of authentic thinking and authentic expression become norms for merely opinion-forming, inauthentic thought and expression. Put somewhat differently: on the laws of authentic thinking other laws are founded, formulable too as practical norms, which express in a manner suited to the sphere of signitively or admixedly signitive presentation, the ideal conditions of a possible truth (or rightness in general), the ideal conditions, that is, of ‘logical’ compatibility (logical, since related to possible adequation) within this sphere of admixedly signitive thinking.” Here Husserl speaks of “‘logical’ compatibility,” but see also his discussion of how the rules of logical transformations (ibid., §63, 723 [LI, 2:313])—rules that authentic thinking must follow—are also normative for inauthentic thinking.

83 Ibid., §64, 728 (LI, 2:316).
The rules of thinking, Husserl is arguing, describe the necessities inherent in the possible presencing of the world (i.e., adequation, fulfillment). These rules do not merely describe human thinking, but the very essence of any thinking that actually brings its intended object to presence.

Thus, Husserl insists, “[o]ne requires no metaphysical or other theories to explain the agreement of the course of nature and the ‘native’ regularities of the understanding.” It is not as if the principles of logic and the rules of reality are independent of each other; we do not have to account for their correlation, since they are united by the nature of authentic thinking (that is, categorial fulfillment). “Instead of an explanation,” Husserl continues, “one needs only a phenomenological clarification of meaning, thinking and knowing, [Bedeutens, Denkens, Erkennens].” If we come to an understanding of what meaning, thinking, and knowing are—by means of a “phenomenological clarification”—Husserl argues that we will see the necessary connection between the rules of thinking and the rules of reality.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl believes we have obtained the very clarification we need. To mean, Husserl has shown us, is to engage in an empty intention; to think is to engage in either an empty or filled categorial intention; to know is to fulfill a meaning-intention. If we understand these things phenomenologically, we see why “the course of

84 Ibid., §65, 729 (LI: 2:316).
85 Thus, Husserl titles VI §65, “The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical” (ibid., 728 [LI: 2:316]).
86 Ibid., 729 (LI: 2:316).
87 Findlay renders the word “erkennen” (and its derivatives) both by “to recognize” (and its derivatives)—as in LU, VI, §§6–8—and by “to know” (and its derivatives)—as in the quotation above.
nature and the ‘native’ regularities of the understanding” must necessarily agree, Husserl claims. A proper description of the phenomena—a description, it turns out, that employs the distinction between empty and filled intentions—reveals the problem of the connection between thought and world to be only apparent.

Supplementary Note. We observed above that there seem to be two stages to Husserl’s description of inauthentic and authentic acts of thinking. At first, Husserl presents the difference between inauthentic and authentic thinking as simply being the difference between empty and filled categorial intentions. Later, however, he specifies that empty categorial intentions are only potential categorial intentions—they are not truly performed. Even if one were in the perceptual presence of an object, he argues, one could fail to truly intend it categorically, and thus one’s intention would be empty (one’s act of thinking about it would be inauthentic).

However, this leads us to ask whether any act of thinking about a perceptually absent object could ever be authentic. Is there such a thing as a truly performed, yet empty categorial intention; or is authentic thinking only possible in the presence of the objects about which one is thinking? From what we have seen above, it would appear that Husserl—at the time of writing the Investigations—would have had to answer that an authentic act of

Occasionally, Findlay employs a hendiadys: “The ‘recognition’, the ‘knowing’ [das ‚Erkennen‘] of which we speak when a significantly functioning expression encounters corresponding intuition must not be conceived . . . as an actual classification” (ibid., §7, 564 [LI, 2:205]). “In the previously considered static relation among acts of meaning and intuition, we spoke of a recognition, a knowing [sprachen wir von Erkennen]” (ibid., §8, 566 [LI, 2:206]). Findlay renders the first “sentence” in the title of VI §65 as: “The synthesis of knowing (recognition) [des Erkennens] as the characteristic form of fulfillment for objectifying acts” (ibid., §65, 572 [LI, 2:216]). Investigation VI, §§6–8 make clear that Husserl understands “erkennen” as fulfillment.

88 Ibid., §65, 729 (LI: 2:316).

89 Once again, we note the title of VI §65: “The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical” (ibid., 728 [LI: 2:316]).
thinking is impossible in the absence of its object. However, Husserl later came to a different conclusion in *Formal and Transcendental Logic (FTL)*. In *FTL*, Husserl separates the following issues from each other: (1) Whether or not the categorial act is actually performed, and (2) Whether or not the categorically intended object is present or absent. The former has to do with whether the categorial act is “distinct” or “vague.” A categorial act that is not truly performed—what Husserl would have called an “inauthentic” act of thinking in *Logical Investigations*—is “vague,” while one that is “explicit[ly] perform[ed]” is “distinct.” To move from a vague act to a distinct act is a kind of fulfillment, yet both acts can still be empty; the object intended can remain absent, even if the categorial act has become distinct.

On the other hand, whether a categorial act is “clear” or not depends on whether the intended object is present or absent. Only those categorial acts that are intuitions of their objects are “clear,” and therefore truly fulfilled. What this means is that Husserl eventually came to distinguish between actually-performed (i.e., “distinct”) categorial acts that are empty, and actually-performed (“distinct”) categorial acts that are filled. Furthermore, it

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90 Sokolowski writes: “The disadvantage of [Husserl’s] analysis [of categorial intentionality in *Logical Investigations*] is that it limits the authentic exercise of syncategorematicals to situations in which the mind is in the perceptual presence of the ingredients of the categorial object. It implies that a categorial intention can operate *only* when the mind is in active perceptual contact with the objects ingredient in the categorial object” (*Husserlian Meditations*, §17, 55).


93 See especially Husserl, *FTL*, I, §16a, 61–62 (ET 56), 65 (ET 60), §21, 74 (ET 69).

94 Husserl, *FTL*, §16b–c.
would seem that Husserl might have preferred (in retrospect) to limit the term, “authentic act of thinking” to the *latter* (that is, to distinct categorial acts that are *filled*).  

*d. Husserl’s Claim to an Advance over the Epistemological Tradition*

“The conception of categorial acts as intuitions,” writes Husserl, “first brings true perspicuity into the relation of thought to intuition—a relation that no previous critique of knowledge has made tolerably clear: it is the first to render knowledge itself intelligible, in its essence and its achievement.” In the history of epistemology, Husserl claims, at least two things have always remained obscure: “the relation of thought to intuition” and “knowledge itself.” However, he says, his theory of categorial intuition has clarified both topics.

What are we to make of this claim? First, we have seen that Husserl clarifies “the relation of thought to intuition,” by arguing that thoughts are intuitions; authentic acts of thinking are categorial intuitions. All other thoughts are inauthentic. They are empty, and thus point to their own fulfillments in (categorial) intuition; they are inactual, and thus point to their own actualization. Therefore, Husserl has portrayed the relation of authentic thought

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95 Husserl writes: “[O]nly a judging with full clarity can be actual present cognition; and, as such, it is a new evidence, pertaining to a givenness originaliter of the affairs themselves, of the predicatively formed affair-complex itself, at which one aims in the judging that strives toward cognition—even where the judging is still quite unclear, intutionally quite unfulfilled” (*FTL*, §16b, 53–54 [ET 61]). “Cognition in the ideal sense is the title for the actually attained true being of the objecitvities themselves, in respect of all the categorial formations in which their being shows its true being, the formations in which it becomes constituted originally as true; and so far as that has already occurred, just ‘so far’ is there something truly existent from the standpoint of cognition. Actually progressing cognition of true being is followed by cognition in the sense of habitual possession in consequence of original acquisition, with the corresponding potentiality of actualization. None of this becomes altered by the method of criticism, which, on the contrary, is intended to make certain the attainment of true being or to diminish the gap between imperfect and perfect cognition” (*FTL*, I, §46, 115 [ET 129]).

to intuition is one of identity, and the relation of inauthentic thought to intuition is one of potency to act.

Second, Husserl clarifies “knowledge itself, . . . in its essence and its achievement” through his theory of fulfillment. Knowledge is fulfilled intending; knowledge is achieved through fulfillment.\(^{97}\) Furthermore, through his theory of categorial intuition, Husserl has shown how we can be truthfully said to know supersensible, categorial objects (in addition to merely-sensible, simple objects). That is, he has shown how we are able to fulfill syntactically-complex expression-signs (i.e., judgments about, and predications of, objects).

Therefore, Husserl argues that it is through his theory of categorial intuition that he has achieved what “no previous critique of knowledge”\(^{98}\) could. However, if this is true, it is actually his theory of empty and filled intentions that is ultimately responsible for his progress. As we saw above, Husserl bases the legitimacy of his theory of categorial intuition on the distinction between empty and filled intentions. Without a theory of categorial intuition, there could have been no epistemological advance; yet without the theory of empty and filled intentions, there would have been no theory of categorial intuition.

That Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions is actually the source of his advance over the epistemological tradition, is confirmed several sections later. There, Husserl lays out four “oppositions, whose confusion has vexed epistemological research . . . and whose distinctness has become quite clear to ourselves.”\(^{99}\) Those distinctions are as follows.

\(^{97}\) Husserl, *LU*, VI, §6–8. See p. 109, n. 87, above, on the Findlay’s translation of *erkennen*.


Signification vs. intuition: This is the distinction between empty intentions and the acts that fill them. That Husserl lists this distinction first is telling.

Sensuous intuition vs. categorial intuition: This is the distinction between the acts that fill simple acts of meaning, and acts that fill (or actualize) complex acts of meaning.

Inadequate intuition vs. adequate intuition: This is a distinction within those acts that fulfill empty intentions, with respect to whether they contain partial intentions that are also empty.

Individual intuition vs. universal intuition: This is the distinction between intuitions that present real objects, and those that present ideal objects (e.g., meanings or essences).100

The tradition in general did not make these four distinctions, and suffered the consequences, Husserl claims. Yet Husserl’s understanding of each of the distinctions involves his theory of empty and filled intentions. That is, (a) Husserl explicates each “opposition” by employing the distinction between empty and filled intentions, (b) two of the four oppositions (“signification vs. intuition,” and “inadequate vs. adequate intuition”) are themselves instances of that distinction, and (c) the other two oppositions (“sensuous vs. categorial intuition,” and “individual vs. universal intuition”) are oppositions between types of filled intentions. Lacking the distinction between empty and filled intentions, therefore, it is no surprise (from a Husserlian standpoint) that epistemologists before Husserl would have been unable to come to a proper understanding of the “oppositions.”

100 Ibid., 731 (LI, 2:318).
Husserl then turns from a criticism of the epistemological tradition in general, to a short critique of Kant in particular. “Kant’s theory of knowledge,” he says, “bears the impress of the failure to draw any clear distinction among these oppositions.”

First: [Kant] fails to achieve our fundamental extension of the concepts of perception and intuition over the categorial realm, and this because he fails to appreciate the deep difference between intuition and signification, their possible separation and their usual commixture.

Had Kant recognized the distinction between empty and filled intentions, he would have been forced to recognize categorial intuitions, Husserl says. However, Kant missed the fundamental distinction between empty and filled intentions, and therefore did not properly appreciate the true nature of categorial intuition. Thus, Husserl argues, Kant misunderstood the relation between sensuous and categorial intuition because he did not thematize the difference between signification and intuition.

Having dealt with the first two oppositions (signification vs. intuition; sensuous vs. categorial intuition) in one sentence, Husserl moves on to the third opposition. He writes that Kant “does not complete his analysis of the difference between the inadequate and adequate adaptation of meaning to intuition.”

The complete fulfillment of a meaning-intention by an intuition—the “adequation” of intention to intuition—can only be fully understood if the structure and complexity of fulfillment has been thematized. However, having left the dichotomy between empty and filling acts unexplored, Kant could not complete the task of understanding adequation.

101 Ibid., 731–32 (LI, 2:318).
102 Ibid., 732 (LI, 2:318).
103 Ibid.
The gaps in Kant’s epistemology have consequences for his ontology, Husserl says.

[Kant] . . . also fails to distinguish between concepts, as the universal meanings of words, and concepts as species of *authentic* universal presentation, and between both, and concepts as universal objects, as the intentional correlates of universal presentations.\(^\text{104}\)

In other words, Kant never came to a proper understanding of the relation between acts and universals—never accomplishing, for example, a study of the fourth opposition (individual vs. universal intuition). Thus, Kant (like the rest of the epistemological tradition) did not adequately deal with *any* of the four fundamental oppositions—oppositions which only Husserl’s *Investigations* have brought to light.

Husserl does not believe his originality to be trivial. It is not just that Kant’s failure to accomplish what Husserl has accomplished kept him (Kant) from completing his own brand of the critique of reason. Rather, Husserl says:

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\text{[T]he only possible aim of a strictly scientific critique of reason . . . [is] the investigation of the pure, essential laws which govern acts as *intentional* experiences, in all their modes of sense-giving objectivation, and their fulfilling constitution of ‘true being’.} \tag{105}
\]

In other words, no critique of reason can even succeed at *being* a critique of reason if it does not seek to understand the nature of empty intentions (“acts . . . in . . . their modes of sense-giving objectivation”) and filled intentions (“acts . . . in . . . their modes of . . . fulfilling constitution”). Husserl continues:

Only a perspicuous knowledge of these laws of essence could provide us with an absolutely adequate answer to all the questions regarding our understanding,

\(^{104}\) Ibid.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., “Zusatz” to §66, 733 (*LI*, 2:319).
questions which can be meaningfully raised in regard to the ‘possibility of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{106}

Having thematized the “laws of essence” of empty and filled intentions, Husserl is now in a position to account for “the ‘possibility of knowledge’.” Having developed a theory of empty and filled intentions, Husserl can now carry out a true critique of reason, and thus “provide . . . an absolutely adequate answer to all [epistemological] questions.” In his theory of empty and filled intentions, therefore, Husserl claims to have discovered the tool that Kant was missing, and that every other theorist who attempts a critique of reason must use.

\section*{§12. Addendum: Empty and Filled Intentions in the \textit{Prolegomena}’s Study of Logic and Science}

Before closing our study of \textit{Logical Investigations}, we should briefly turn to their \textit{Prolegomena}. Husserl does not explicitly employ the terms “empty” and “fulfilled intentions” in the \textit{Prolegomena}, since he will not introduce that language until he begins to study signs (in Investigation I). Nevertheless, it becomes clear in the \textit{Prolegomena} that Husserl believes the distinction between empty and filled intentions gives rise to science and logic.

“The driving motive which set modern philosophy going,” writes Husserl in \textit{Prolegomena}, chapter 2, is “the Idea of the completion and the transformation of the sciences.”\textsuperscript{107} However, Husserl did not title his book, \textit{Scientific Investigations}. Rather, “our discipline,” he says, is “\textit{logic} in the sense of a theory of science.”\textsuperscript{108} Logic, for Husserl, is

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{107} Husserl, \textit{Prolegomena}, §60, 222 (\textit{LI}, 1:138).

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., §8, 37 (\textit{LI}, 1:23). Emphasis added.
not just a set of axioms, rules, and practices for determining the potential truth-value of statements (or the validity of arguments). It is a theory of science; it is “a normative and practical discipline relating to the Idea of science,”¹⁰⁹ which “investigates” what “makes sciences into sciences.”¹¹⁰

It is, therefore, through *logical* investigations that Husserl participates in the “driving motive” of modern philosophy: “the completion and the transformation of the sciences.”¹¹¹ Science, after all, cannot be completed if we do not first have a theory of science to guide it (and by which to judge its status).

Logic seeks to search into what pertains to genuine, valid science as such, what constitutes the Idea of Science, so as to be able to use the latter to measure the empirically given sciences as to their agreement with their Idea, the degree to which they approach it, and where they offend against it.¹¹²

Logic acts as the standard for science, according to Husserl. Logic presents the criteria by which we determine whether something is a science or not. Logic’s job is not simply to decide whether a particular statement is possibly true, but to discover whether a particular science is true to “the Idea of Science.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., §6, 27 (*LI*, 1:16).
¹¹⁰ Ibid., §5, 27 (*LI*, 1:16).
¹¹¹ Ibid., §60, 222 (*LI*, 1:138).
¹¹² Ibid., §11, 41 (*LI*, 1:25).
¹¹³ Rubin Gotesky writes: “Briefly, then, it may be said that logic, for Husserl, is the art of discovering and applying those rules or laws by means of which the various sciences can be distinguished and built up.” Rubin Gotesky, “Husserl’s Conception of Logic as Kunstlehre in the Logische Untersuchungen,” *The Philosophical Review* 47, no. 4 (July 1938): 382. Bernet writes: “For normative logic forms the normative conditions to which every science ought to adhere. Furthermore, it judges concretely whether a given assertion or a scientific theory adheres to these norms.” Rudolf Bernet, “Different Concepts of Logic and Their Relation to Subjectivity,” in *One Hundred Years*, 26. Barry Smith adds: “Husserl’s logic is, then, a theory which seeks to determine the conditions which must be satisfied by a collection of acts if it is to count as science” (“Logic,” 30).
What, then, is Husserl’s idea of science? Science, Husserl says, is “grounded knowledge, i.e. [the] explanation or proof”\(^{114}\) of propositions. The scientist’s goal is not simply to make truth-claims, but to find and develop “grounded validations \([\text{Begründungen}]\)\(^{115}\) for her truth-claims—validations that will provide “evidence.”\(^ {116}\) Husserl writes:

> The evidence on which all knowledge ultimately reposes, is no gift of nature, appearing together with the mere idea of states of affairs without any methodically artful set-up.\(^ {117}\)

“Evidence” is an achievement; it does not simply arise from the empty intention (i.e., having “the mere idea”) of a state of affairs. Rather, Husserl is saying, obtaining evidence depends on knowing how to fulfill one’s intention\(^ {118}\)—how to evidence (bring to presence) the intended state of affairs.\(^ {119}\) He continues:

> People would otherwise never have thought of building up sciences. The longeurs of method would lose their sense if to intend meant to succeed. Why

\(^{114}\) Ibid., §64, 236 \((LI, 1:147)\).

\(^{115}\) Ibid., §6, 30 \((LI, 1:18)\).

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 31 \((LI, 1:19)\): “The evidence, moreover, which stamps one presented state of affairs as having real being . . . is, in fact, only immediately felt in the case of a relatively quite limited group of primitive facts. Countless true propositions are only grasped by us as true when we methodically validate them. In their case, a mere regard to our propositional thought, will not induce evidence, even if it does induce judgmental decision. Both are, however, induced, certain circumstances being normal, where we set forth from certain known truths, and tread a certain path in thought to our intended proposition.” I have changed Findlay’s rendering of “Evidenz” (as “inward evidence”) to “evidence” \(\text{tou court}\), to better reflect the German text.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., §6, 31 \((LI, 1:19)\). I have changed Findlay’s rendering of “Evidenz” (as “inward evidence”) to “evidence.”

\(^{118}\) On Husserl’s understanding of “evidence” in terms of fulfillment, see p. 97, n. 52, above.

\(^{119}\) Husserl (via Landgrebe) writes, in \(EU\), “To speak of evidence \([\text{Evidenz}]\), of evident givenness \([\text{evidenter Gegebenheit}]\), then, here signifies nothing other than self-givenness \([\text{Selbstgegebenheit}]\), the way in which an object in its givenness can be characterized relative to consciousness as ‘itself-there,’ ‘there in the flesh,’ in contrast to its mere presentification \([\text{Vergegenwärtigung}]\), the empty, merely indicative idea of it” \((§4, 11–12 \([EJ, 19])\). I have altered the translation to replace “self-evidence” (and its derivatives) with “evidence” (and its derivatives), to better reflect the German text.
should one search into relations of entailment or construct proofs, if one shared in truth through immediate intimation? If everything proposed were present—if all intentions were immediately fulfilled—there would be no need for science, Husserl argues. If we did not have to work to fulfill our intentions—if our empty intentions fulfilled themselves—there would be no science. In other words, if empty intentions did not exist (because all empty intentions were immediately fulfilled), science would not exist.

The scientific “method,” whereby empty intentions are filled, is conducted through what Husserl calls, “validating arguments” (Begründungen) (in the form of syllogisms, inferences, deductions, and proofs). That is, the kind of science Husserl has primarily in mind is what he calls the “abstract,” “theoretical” or “nomological” sciences (e.g., “universal arithmetic,” “geometry,” “analytical mechanics,” and “mathematical astronomy”). In contrast, sciences like “geography, history, astronomy, natural history, anatomy,” and “meteorology” are “descriptive” or “ontological” sciences. Furthermore, they are sciences only insofar as they (a) are unified by application to some unitary object, and (b)
implicitly employ the principles of the “genuine” (i.e., theoretical) sciences in the description and explanation of that object.\textsuperscript{127}

Nevertheless, even the “abstract” sciences are not merely deductive systems from a set of principles or axioms. Rather, the deductive unity of a given science\textsuperscript{128} is an expression of the essential unity of its object (i.e., its “field”\textsuperscript{129} or “manifold”\textsuperscript{130}). The validated propositions that make up a genuine science are connected to each other not just by chains of reasoning, but by reference to the essential structure of the object about which they are all judgments. A science has structural unity because it expresses its object’s structural unity.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., §64, 237 (\textit{LI}, 1:148). Husserl writes: “It is at any rate clear that the abstract or nomological sciences are the genuine, basic sciences, from whose theoretical stock the concrete sciences must derive all that theoretical element by which they are made sciences. Quite understandably, it is enough if the concrete sciences attach the objects they describe to the lower rungs of law in the nomological sciences, and at best indicate the main direction of ascending explanation. For the reduction to principles, and the general build-up of explanatory theories, is the proper field of the nomological sciences; it already exists in such sciences, where fully developed, in the most universal form and as a finished achievement” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{128} Husserl writes that “every explanatory interconnection is deductive” (ibid., §63, 235 [\textit{LI}, 1:147]), and “a science is, as we know, grounded knowledge, i.e. explanation or proof (in the pointed sense). Essential unity among the truths of a single science is unity of explanation” (ibid., §64, 236[\textit{LI}, 1:147]).

\textsuperscript{129} Husserl writes: “In the general correlation which subsists between truth and objectivity, there is a unitary objectivity which corresponds to the unity of truth in one and the same science: this is the unity of the scientific field. In relation to this, all the singular truths of the same science belong together in their subject-matter” (ibid., §62, 232–33 [\textit{LI}, 1:145]).

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., §70.

\textsuperscript{131} Near the beginning of the \textit{Prolegomena}, Husserl writes: “That we look upon, and practically strive after, systematic form as the purest embodiment of the Idea of science, does not evince some merely aesthetic trait in our nature. Science neither wishes nor dares to become a field for architectonic play. The system peculiar to science, i.e. to true and correct science, is not our own invention, but is present in things, where we simply find or discover it. Science seeks to be a means towards the greatest possible conquest of the realm of truth by our knowledge. The realm of truth is, however, no disordered chaos, but is dominated and unified by law. The investigation and setting forth of truths must, therefore, likewise be systematic, it must reflect the systematic connections of those truths, and must use the latter as a ladder to progress and penetrate from the knowledge given to, or already gained by us to ever higher regions of the realm of truth” (ibid., §6, 30–31 [\textit{LI}, 1:18]).

Likewise, near the end of the \textit{Prolegomena}, Husserl writes: “Two meanings can be attached to this objective interconnection which ideally pervades scientific thought, and which gives ‘unity’ to such thought, and so to science as such: it can be understood as an interconnection of the things to which our thought-experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally directed, or, on the other hand, as an interconnection of truths, in which this unity of things comes to count objectively as being what it is. These two things are given together
Furthermore, the progress of validating argument in a given science need not depend solely upon the theoretical working out of deductions “on paper.” It can also include what we might call “field work.” Husserl writes:

[All scientific methods which do not themselves have the character of actual validating arguments . . . are, on the one hand, abbreviations and substitutes for such validating arguments, . . . [or] on the other hand, represent more or less complex auxiliary devices, which serve to prepare for, to facilitate, to ensure or to render possible future process of validation. . . .

Examples of the first group of methods are provided by . . . the methodical procedures for establishing objectively valid empirical judgments, such as the various methods of determining the position of a star, electrical resistance, inert mass, refractive index, the gravitational constant etc. Each such method represents a set of provisions whose choice and arrangement is fixed by a validatory context, which shows, in general, that such a procedure, even when blindly performed, must necessarily lead to an objectively valid individual judgment.132

In other words, the progress of a scientific proof of (or validatory argument for) a proposition, may include empirical methods. The method, for example, whereby one “establish[es] objectively valid empirical judgments” about contingent facts and fundamental physical constants may require sophisticated measuring instruments. Such methods can be used “blindly,” Husserl says; that is, they can relieve their users of having to make certain calculations and inferences themselves. Rather than conducting an involved syllogistic “proof” of the value of the gravitational constant, for example, a scientist can instead conduct experiments using reliable measuring equipment. So long as the method (including its

\[a \text{ priori} \], and are mutually inseparable. Nothing can be without being thus or thus determined, and that it is, and that it is thus and thus determined, is the self-subsistent truth which is the necessary correlate of the self-subsistent being. What holds of single truths, or single states of affairs, plainly also holds of interconnections of truths or of states of affairs. . . . In these truths or interconnections of truths the actual existence of things and of interconnections of things finds expression” (ibid., §62, 230–31 [LI, 1:144]).

On the contrast between genuine sciences—which have an “essential” unity in themselves, in addition to the unity of their field—and descriptive sciences—which have only the unity of their field—see ibid., §64.

equipment) has been designed according to the requirements of its “validatory context,” this delegation of responsibility on the part of the scientist does not keep her from reaching “objectively valid individual judgment[s].”

In summary, science—as described by Husserl in the Prolegomena—is the practice of systematically obtaining evidence for propositions that express unitary, objective “fields,” through the means of “validating arguments” and their substitutes (e.g., empirical experiments). That is, science, for Husserl, is a special, organized method of fulfilling empty intentions. If this is correct, therefore, it would seem the very existence of science depends on the distinction between empty and filled intentions. Furthermore, a fully-developed logic—being the theory of science—would seem to require an understanding of empty and filled intentions.

Husserl leads us, in other words, to the following conclusion: both science and logic arise from the difference between empty and filled intentions. He writes:

[T]hat we need grounded validations in order to pass beyond what, in knowledge, is immediately and therefore trivially evident, not only makes the sciences possible and necessary, but with these also a theory of science, a logic. Not everything is “immediately . . . evident”; not all intentions are automatically fulfilled. What makes science and logic “possible and necessary,” Husserl says, is the fact that we desire “to pass beyond what . . . is immediately . . . evident.” In other words, it is because there is a difference between empty intentions and fulfillments that science and logic are

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133 Ibid., 39 (LI, 1:24).
134 This is, in fact, how Husserl seems to present logic. Logic is concerned with validity and evidence: ibid., §§6–7, 31–34 (LI, 1:19–20), §§50–51, §62.
135 Ibid., §6, 32 (LI, 1:19).
“possible and necessary.” The “need [for] grounded validations”—that is, for a specific kind of fulfillment of empty intentions—gives rise to science, and, therefore, to the need for “a theory of science, a logic.”

In conclusion, while portraying science as requiring logic for its completion, Husserl portrays both as arising from the dichotomy between empty and filled intentions. If Husserl is to participate in the driving motive of modern philosophy—the completion of science—therefore, he must carry out an analysis of this dichotomy. As a modern philosopher, he seeks to aid science; to aid science, he investigates logic; and in his logical investigations he—as we have seen—studies empty and filled intentions.
a. Overview

We now turn to Husserl’s first book, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (“PA”), in an attempt to understand the issues and theories that lie behind—and lead to—Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions. *PA* was published in 1891. The first four chapters of Part One, however, are based on Husserl’s *Habilitationsschrift* of 1887, “Concerning the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses.” Husserl acknowledges this when he says that “a part” of Part One “was already included, almost word-for-word, in [his] *Habilitationsschrift.*”

*PA*, however, is not simply a repetition of “Concerning the Concept of Number.” It adds another nine chapters after employing the material from Husserl’s *Habilitationsschrift*. There is, therefore, substantially more new material in *PA* than material recycled from the *Habilitationsschrift*. Where Husserl’s *Habilitationsschrift* focused simply on the “concept of number,” *PA* seeks to explain (a) how and why we symbolize numbers, and (b) how and why we work with those symbolizations, rather than with the numbers themselves.


2 The German of Husserl’s *Habilitationsschrift*, from 1887, can be found in Hua XII, 289–338, while Willard’s English translation can be found in *Collected Works*, vol. 10, 305–356. In Hua XII, Eley labels the *Habilitationsschrift* the “Ursprüngliche Fassung des Textes [i.e., of PA] bis Kapitel IV” (289), which Willard translates as the “Original Version of the Text [i.e., of PA] through Chapter IV” (PA(ET), 306).
PA has the following general outline. In Part One, Husserl works with the contrast between groups and numbers. He explains how we bring groups to presence, and then shows how bringing groups to presence enables us to bring numbers to presence. In Part Two, he shows that we are unable to bring large groups to direct presence, and explains how this keeps us from bringing large numbers to presence as well. Then, he argues that our inability to bring large numbers to presence leads us to present those numbers by using signs. Finally, he explains how our need for number signs leads us to develop procedures for working with those signs. That is, our need for number signs leads us to develop arithmetic.

The primary purpose of Part One, therefore, is to explain how we come to be aware of numbers in their presence, while the primary purpose of Part Two is to explain how working with numbers in their absence leads to the development of arithmetic. However, to begin to flesh out these generalities, we should turn to a brief description of the chapters that make up the two Parts.

Of the nine chapters of Part One of PA, the first four are based on Husserl’s Habilitationschrift, while the final five introduce new material. Chapter one is entitled, “The Origination of the Concept of Multiplicity through that of the Collective Combination.”\(^4\) In it, Husserl argues that to understand what groups are, we must first understand how individual objects come to be “combined” into groups. Rather than using the term “group” however, Husserl uses the technical term “multiplicity.”

\(^3\) Husserl, PA, 8 (ET 8).

\(^4\) Ibid., 14 (ET 15).
Multiplicities are collections of objects of any type whatsoever.\(^5\) The question Husserl must answer, therefore, is, “What could combine any and all objects into groups, regardless of the nature of those objects?” What is the “collective combination” that holds the members of multiplicities together? (On chapter one, see §14, below.)

Chapter two carries the vague title, “Critical Developments.”\(^6\) In it, Husserl critiques attempts by other researchers to specify the nature of the collective combination. Chapter three, entitled “The Psychological Nature of the Collective Combination,”\(^7\) lays out Husserl’s own theory. Objects are united into a multiplicity when (a) each of them is individually intended in a “distinct act,” and (b) they are all “[g]ras[p][ed] . . . together” in “a new act, which . . . includes those distinct acts.”\(^8\) This act of “grasping . . . together” is itself the collective combination; it is what unites the members of a multiplicity and therefore brings the group to presence. (On chapters two and three, see §15, below.)

In chapter four, “Analysis of the Concept of Number in Terms of Its Origin and Content,”\(^9\) Husserl describes the ways in which we move from intending multiplicities to intending numbers. There are two options. First, we can move from the general concept of multiplicity to the concepts of particular numbers.\(^10\) Second, we can move from the intuition

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\(^5\) Ibid., 16–17 (ET 17–18).
\(^6\) Ibid., 22 (ET 23).
\(^7\) Ibid., 64 (ET 67).
\(^8\) Ibid., 74 (ET 77).
\(^9\) Ibid., 77 (ET 81).
\(^10\) Ibid., 81 (ET 85).
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of a particular multiplicity, to the number of that multiplicity’s members.\(^{11}\) (On chapter four, see §16, below.)

In chapter five, “The Relations of ‘More’ and ‘Less’,”\(^{12}\) Husserl further explains how we bring numbers to presence.\(^{13}\) To grasp the numbers themselves, he says, we must compare multiplicities with each other, uncover their relationships of identity and non-identity, and classify them as being greater than, less than, or equal to each other.\(^{14}\) (On chapter five, see §17 below.)

In chapter six, “The Definition of Number-Equality through the Concept of Reciprocal One-to-One Correlation,”\(^{15}\) Husserl critiques the suggestion that the equality of two multiplicities consists simply in our being able to establish a one-to-one correlation between the members of multiplicities. Then, in chapter seven, “Definitions of Number in Terms of Equivalence,”\(^{16}\) Husserl argues that “the concept of equivalence does nothing and can do nothing for the definition or analysis of the concept of number.”\(^{17}\)

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 82 (ET 86).

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 90 (ET 95).

\(^{13}\) Miller writes: “Having shown in the previous chapters [i.e., chapters one through four] how ‘multitude’ [i.e., ‘multiplicity’] is made authentically present, he proceeds in these chapters [i.e., chapters five through seven or nine] to show how . . . number as such is made authentically present.” J. Phillip Miller, *Numbers in Presence and Absence: A study of Husserl’s Philosophy of Mathematics*, Phaenomenologica, no. 90 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 41. Referred to hereafter as “NPA.”

\(^{14}\) Husserl, *PA*, I, 95 (ET 100).

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 96 (ET 101).

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 111 (ET 117).

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 125 (ET 131).
The final two chapters of Part One are devoted to clearing up some debates about unity, multiplicity, and number. In chapter nine, “The Sense of the Statement of Number,” for example, Husserl argues that “[t]he number is the general form of multiplicity under which the totality [that is, the ‘multiplicity’] of objects \(a, b, c\) falls. . . . Considered formally, number and concrete group are related as are concept and conceptual object.” Every group—considered as a multiplicity of mere “units”—has a “form” or “concept.” This form or concept is its number.

Husserl then closes Part One with an appendix entitled, “The Nominalist Attempts of Helmholtz and Kronecker.” In claiming that numerals simply are the numbers themselves, Husserl argues, the nominalists “have confounded symbol and thing.” Numbers are not numerals, but are the forms of multiplicities.

Part Two of PA consists of only four chapters, but it is here that we find PA’s ultimate description of how arithmetic works. Therefore, though Part One is two-thirds longer than Part Two, it is primarily a preparation for the study of arithmetic which we find in Part Two.

The first chapter of Part Two—chapter ten—is misleadingly titled, “Operations on Numbers and the Authentic Number Concepts.” The chapter’s actual point is expressed by the title of its final section: “Arithmetic Does Not Operate with ‘Authentic’ Number

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18 Ibid., 161 (ET 169).
19 Ibid., 166 (ET 174).
20 Ibid., 170 (ET 179).
21 Ibid., 177 (ET 186).
22 Ibid., II, 181 (ET 192).
After describing how the operations of addition and subtraction would work if we could genuinely (“authentically”) deal with numbers in their presence, Husserl argues that we generally do not deal with numbers in their presence at all. In arithmetic, we usually present numbers symbolically. (On chapter ten, see §20, below.)

Rather than moving on to discuss number signs in chapter eleven, however, Husserl devotes chapter eleven to the “Symbolic Presentations of Multiplicities.” In it, he argues that we cannot simultaneously and distinctly notice each individual member of large multiplicities; therefore, we cannot genuinely intuit such large multiplicities as multiplicities. Instead, when we believe ourselves to be seeing a large sensuous multiplicity, Husserl argues we must be encountering something that acts as a sign or symbol that what we are seeing is a multiplicity. Husserl calls this sign or symbol the multiplicity’s “figural moment,” which, as we will see, is something like a pattern or gestalt proper to the group. We may not genuinely intuit the multiplicity, therefore, but we do intend it as a multiplicity on the basis of its figural moment. (On chapter eleven, see §21, below.)

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23 Ibid., 190 (ET 200).

24 Ibid., 193 (ET 206). Willard uses “representation” to translate Vorstellung, and “Representation” to translate Repräsentation (Willard, translator’s introduction to PA(ET), lxi). The term “representation” connotes an indirect presentation, like an image. The verb vorstellen, however, lacks this connotation; instead, it connotes a form of direct presentation. Furthermore, if we render Vorstellung as “representation,” we might give the false impression that Husserl holds a “representational theory of knowledge.” Therefore, (a) to better convey the sense of vorstellen/Vorstellung, (b) to avoid making Husserl sound like a representationalist, and (c) to better reflect the lexical distinction between Vorstellung and Repräsentation, I will modify Willard’s translations in the following way. I will use “presentation” for Vorstellung (and “to present” for vorstellen), reserving “representation” for Repräsentation (and “to represent” for repräsentieren). In this quotation, for example, I have rendered Vielheitsvorstellungen as “Presentations of Multiplicities,” rather than Willard’s “Representations of Multiplicities.”

25 Husserl does not draw a distinction between “sign” and “symbol” in PA; signs are symbols, and symbols are signs.
Chapter twelve, “The Symbolic Presentations of Numbers,” then returns to the topic of symbolic number presentations. Since there are (at least potentially) an infinite number of large multiplicities that we cannot genuinely intuit, there are also (at least potentially) an infinite number of numbers that we cannot genuinely intuit. If a multiplicity is too large to grasp, the number of its members must likewise be too large to grasp. Thus, just as we turn to symbols to present large multiplicities, we turn to symbols to present large numbers; these symbols are not figural moments, however, but are the more precise kind of sign that we know as numerals. In chapter twelve, therefore, Husserl provides an in-depth study of number signs and number sign systems. (On chapter twelve, see §23, below.)

Finally, in chapter thirteen, “The Logical Sources of Arithmetic,” Husserl describes how calculation in particular, and arithmetic in general, develops out of our use of number signs. In the attempt to discover how number signs relate to each other—e.g., whether one sign presents a number that is larger than, smaller than, or equal to the numbers presented by other signs—we must come up with certain rules and procedures. These rules and procedures, which arithmetic provides, then enable us to calculate with number signs. (On chapter thirteen, see §25, below.)

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26 Husserl, PA, II, 222 (ET 235).

27 Husserl writes: “Along with the obvious lack of restriction on the symbolic expansion of groups, the same is also given for numbers” (ibid). That is, we could expand any given group or number indefinitely, forming ever new and larger groups or numbers. Husserl discusses this process of expansion with regard to groups, and its function in forming symbolic presentations of infinite groups, at the end of chapter 11 (ibid., 218–21 [ET 230–34]). Husserl discusses this process of expansion with regard to numbers later in chapter 12 (ibid., 226–27 [ET 238–40]).

28 Ibid., 222 (ET 235).

29 The reader may note the shift here from the term “symbol” to the term “sign.” As noted above, Husserl does not draw a distinction between “sign” and “symbol” in PA.
b. Connection to Themes in *Logical Investigations*

In summary, we can say the following. In his attempt to develop a philosophy of arithmetic, Husserl finds himself having to answer two questions. First, how do we experience the presence of groups and numbers? Second, how do we continue to deal with, or be directed towards, groups and numbers in their absence? Part One of *PA* presents Husserl’s answers to the first question (“How do we experience the presence of groups and numbers?”). Part Two presents his answers to this second question (“How do we continue to deal with, or be directed towards, groups and numbers in their absence?”).³¹

In *Logical Investigations* (“*LI*”), Husserl would have answered the question of how we experience the presence of an object by using the technical terminology of “intuitions,” “fulfilled intentions,” or “authentic thinking.” When describing our experience of the presence of an object in *PA*, however, Husserl uses the term “authentic presentations” more prominently than the term “intuitions,” and he never uses the terms “fulfilled intentions” or “authentic thinking.”

In *LI*, Husserl would have answered the question of how we continue to deal with, or be directed towards, an object in its absence by using the technical terminology of “empty intentions,” “signitive intentions,” or “inauthentic thinking.” However, in *PA*, Husserl

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³¹ Miller writes: “But it is not just the presence of number that Husserl studies in *PA*. He also examines, in Part Two of the work, several different modes of absence or ‘symbolic presentation’ distinctive of the realm of number” (*NPA*, 41).
describes our dealings with, or directedness toward, objects in their absence in terms of “inauthentic presentations” or “symbolic presentations.”

Therefore, rather than speaking of “intentions” in \( \textit{PA} \), Husserl speaks of “presentations” (\textit{Vorstellungen}). A presentation, like an intention, is a mental act in which we “have” or “are directed toward” an object. An authentic presentation—like a filled intention—is when we actually “have” an object because we “are directed toward” it in its presence. An inauthentic presentation (or symbolic presentation)—like an empty intention—is when we do not actually “have” an object, because we “are directed toward” it in its absence.

Therefore, before Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions, there was his theory of inauthentic and authentic presentations. What connects the two theories is the fact that

\[32 \text{ One might ask whether figural moments have a place in } \textit{LI}. \text{ A search of that text reveals discussions of figural moments in both Investigations III and VI.} \text{ In Investigation III, for instance, Husserl writes: “the ‘moments’ of unity in the intuitive contents, ‘moments’ built on the elements that we primarily distinguish, by which such elements are similarly or dissimilarly associated into sensuous intuitive wholes” are “the same as the contents called . . . “figural” moments by myself” (Husserl, \textit{LU}, III, §4, 237 [\textit{LI}, 2:8]). We may be able, Husserl says here, to distinguish between two parts of a sensuous whole. However, when we see those two parts together, we also notice that they found a “moment of unity,” or—which is the same—that they have a “figural moment.”}

\text{In Investigation VI, Husserl writes that “[w]e must . . . guard against confusing the straightforward percepts of sensuously unified manifolds, series, swarms etc., with the conjunctive percepts in which alone the consciousness of plurality is itself properly constituted. I have tried to show in my \textit{Philosophy of Arithmetic} how the sensuously unifying characters—I there called them ‘figural’ or ‘quasi-qualitative’ moments of sensuous intuitions—serve as signs of plurality. This means that they serve as sensuous points d’appui for the signitively mediated cognition of plurality as such. . . . [This] cognition now has no need of an articulated grasp and knowledge of individual items, but does not therefore as yet possess the character of a genuine intuition of the collection as such” (Husserl, \textit{LU}, VI, §51, 689–90 [\textit{LI}, 2:291–92]). Here, Husserl is discussing the difference between (a) understanding that what one is seeing is a group, and (b) actually intuiting a group as a group. That a sensuous object has a particular kind of figural moment can serve as a sign that the object is a group, even if we do not engage in a conjunctive intuition of each individual member of that group (and, therefore, even if we do not have “a genuine intuition of the collection as such”; see §21, below). Figural moments, therefore, seem to involve a kind of intermediate presentation (between totally empty and totally filled intentionality), much like images. Alternatively, we might see figural moments as parallel to intimations (i.e., to spoken expressions that indicate the meaning-intentions that animate them, and thus allow the hearer to “perceive” those meaning-intentions; see p. 30, n. 58, above).} \]
both are ways in which Husserl describes—at different points in his career—how we are
directed toward objects in their absence and in their presence.

J. Phillip Miller writes, “Although this fact is obscured by the organization of the
work, Husserl does make an attempt in PA to exhibit the structures of presence and absence
within which numbers . . . emerge as identities.”33 Likewise, Miller tells us, PA is “a study of
the intentional structures at work in our dealings with number.”34 Therefore, though Husserl
does not use this terminology, he is dealing in PA with how we fulfilledly intend numbers in
their presence, and how we emptily intend the same numbers in their absence. That is, even
though “the Husserl of PA himself [may not have] understood what he was doing in just
these terms,”35 he is in fact studying how numbers show up as identical with themselves
across their various modes of presence and absence, or across our various modes of
fulfilledly and emptily intending them.

Therefore, though the terminology of “identity in presence and absence” is not
present in PA, the fact of identity in presence and absence is. Likewise, though the theory of
filled and empty intentions is not present in PA, the analogous theory of authentic and
inauthentic presentations is.36 Husserl’s language and theory change between PA and LI;
however, (a) fundamental issues with which Husserl is concerned are the same in both texts,
and (b) the theories he uses to explore those issues are importantly similar.

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33 Miller, NPA, 41.
34 Ibid., 23.
35 Ibid., 41.
36 Miller writes: “[T]he complex of acts within which the aggregate emerges include those which are
‘empty’ as well as those which are ‘filled.’ To be sure, the terms ‘empty’ and ‘filled’ are not actually used in
A final connection that we should note between *LI* and *PA* is the fact that in both texts, the issue of signs is closely associated with the theory of intentions or presentations. For example, in *LI*, Husserl introduces the theory of empty and filled intentions to bring his understanding of expression-signs to completion. Furthermore, many empty intentions are based on signs, and therefore Husserl calls those empty intentions, “*signitive intentions.*”

In *PA*, on the other hand, Husserl uses signs to explain the difference between authentic and inauthentic presentations. Inauthentic presentations, in fact, are based on signs or symbols. Thus, Husserl calls inauthentic presentations, “*symbolic presentations.*”

In summary, Husserl holds in *LI* that when we are directed toward something in its absence, we are often directed toward it on the basis of some sign. Husserl holds in *PA*, however, that whenever we are directed toward something in its absence, we are directed toward it on the basis of some sign. Therefore, in both *LI* and *PA*, Husserl’s theory of signs helps to explain how we are directed toward at least some objects in their absence.

With these introductory statements completed, it is now time that we turn to a closer reading of the text. First, in §14, we will examine Husserl’s theory of multiplicities, and of the way in which we encounter numbers through multiplicities. Then, in §15, we will examine Husserl’s theory of number signs and arithmetic. As we proceed, our primary goal will be to understand (a) the ways in which Husserl is trying to deal with the facts of presence, absence, and signs, as he develops his philosophy of arithmetic, and (b) how those

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37 Husserl, *PA*, II, 193 (ET 205). Husserl, we note once again, does not draw a distinction between signs and symbols in *PA*.
ways of dealing with presence, absence, and signs relate to (or prepare for) Husserl’s eventual distinction between empty and filled intentions.

§14. Chapter One: From Multiplicities to the Collective Combination

Husserl opens chapter one of PA by citing a traditional definition of number, namely, “The number is a multiplicity [Vielheit] of units.” He does not find this definition helpful, however. “What,” he asks, “is multiplicity”? Furthermore, might not “multiplicity” and “number” be simple synonyms, and would the definition not therefore be redundant?38

In response to these questions, Husserl says that multiplicity and number differ, and yet have an “intimate connection.” “[T]he determinate numbers,” for example, “are to be regarded as determinations of the concept of multiplicity, which bears a certain indeterminacy within it.” Furthermore, Husserl writes, “Wherever a multiplicity is given, the question of ‘How many?’ is in order, and it is answered precisely by the appropriate number.”39 A multiplicity, being indeterminate, invites a determination.

These opening statements foreshadow Husserl’s conclusions in chapter four.40 What Husserl must do in the meantime, therefore, is to build the case that supports those conclusions. Outlining his case, Husserl says he will “attempt the analysis of the more general concept of multiplicity” first. Afterwards, he will “characterize those determinations which give rise to the series of determinate numbers and the generic concept of the whole

38 Husserl, PA, I, 14 (ET 15).

39 Ibid. One assumes that Husserl means that the question “How many?” can be answered in principle for any given multiplicity, if not always in practice.

40 See §16, below (beginning on p. 144).
number which presupposes them.⁴¹ He will, therefore, begin by (a) studying the concept of multiplicity; then he will proceed to (b) studying the generation of the whole numbers; and finally, he will conclude with (c) studying the concept of whole number.

Husserl says there can be “no doubt” about which objects we must experience, in order to obtain the concepts of multiplicity and number. “They are totalities,” he says, “multiplicities of certain objects.” (Here, we see Husserl’s tendency to use “totality” [Inbegriff] and “multiplicity” [Vielheit] interchangeably.) We all know when something is a multiplicity, he goes on to claim, even if we cannot yet explain “the essence and origination of the concept” of multiplicity.⁴²

Next, Husserl specifies the way in which we must experience multiplicities, if we are to obtain the concepts of multiplicity and number.⁴³ He writes: “We limit ourselves at the outset to multiplicities that are authentically presented.” Though multiplicities might also be “symbolically presented,” Husserl proposes that we “exclude” such multiplicities for the time

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⁴¹ Husserl, PA, I, 15 (ET 16).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ At no point in PA does Husserl thematize the nature of the distinction between multiplicities and the concept of multiplicity, or between numbers and the concept of number. In fact, Husserl will not achieve full clarity on the nature of concepts until FTL. Until then, his readers are forced—unless Husserl specifies otherwise—to work with their prephilosophical understandings of what a “concept” is, and how “concepts” differ from the “things of which they are concepts.”

Willard holds that “representation” (Vorstellung; which we have been translating as “presentation”) and “concept” (Begriff) are equivalent “without interesting exception” in Husserl’s “earliest writings.” Dallas Willard, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: A Study in Husserl’s Early Philosophy (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984), 26. (Referred to hereafter as “LOK.”) “A concept or representation [i.e., presentation] is treated by Husserl as a repeatable and shareable thought” (Willard, LOK, 27).

Willard’s position accords well with the basic facts that one can glean from the text of PA. Husserl clearly assumes that the concept of multiplicity is not itself a multiplicity. He believes that the concept of multiplicity is something “mental”—like a “thought,” “idea,” or “presentation”—that is “about” or “of” multiplicities, while actual multiplicities can include physical objects (and are not “about” anything). The distinction between numbers and the concept of numbers is more murky, however, since—as we will see—Husserl treats the individual numbers as if they were themselves concepts. (The concept of number, then, would seem to be a concept of a certain class of concepts, in PA.)
Therefore, in Part One, Husserl will study those experiences in which multiplicities are actually present ("authentically presented") rather than those in which multiplicities are only presented through a sign ("symbolically presented").

“Our domain, accordingly, must be that of the ‘totality’ of distinct objects,” Husserl continues, “themselves separately given and held together in the manner of a collection.”

In other words, the authentically presented multiplicities that Husserl will study are those whose member objects are (a) each presented individually, and (b) all “collect[ed]” together. From studying such multiplicities, we will come to understand “the authentic concepts of multiplicity and number.”

Husserl’s description of authentically presented multiplicities specifies nothing about the kind(s) of objects that multiplicities must contain. This is because “[a]ny imaginable object, whether physical or psychical, abstract or concrete, whether given through sensation or phantasy, can be united with any and arbitrarily many others to form a totality.” It “makes no difference at all” what types of objects are united in an authentically presented multiplicity. Objects can be formalized—treated not as objects of a particular type, but simply as objects—when they are gathered into a collection.

If the members of a multiplicity can be of any type, Husserl notes, then there is no intrinsic property that all members of multiplicities share. However, if there is no intrinsic

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44 Husserl, PA, I, 15 (ET 16).
46 Ibid., 16 (ET 17).
47 Ibid.
48 See p. 146, n. 86, below.
property that all members of multiplicities have in common, Husserl asks how we can
abstract the general concept of multiplicity.\textsuperscript{49} “However easy it is to overlook it,” Husserl
writes, “there still is present in [multiplicities] something more than the particular contents.”
That is, a multiplicity does not just consist of its member objects. Rather, all multiplicities
also involve a “\textit{combination} of the particular elements into the whole.”\textsuperscript{50} A multiplicity is a
certain number of objects, united by a particular kind of “combination.”

“Those combinations,” Husserl says, “which, always the same in kind, are present in
all cases where we speak of multiplicities are then the bases for the formation of the general
concept of multiplicity.”\textsuperscript{51} If the one thing that all multiplicities share is the type of
relationship that combines their constituent objects, Husserl reasons, the concept of
multiplicity must be based upon this relationship of combination. In fact, it is precisely “by
means of reflexion upon the peculiar . . . manner of unification of contents” in multiplicities
that “the concept of multiplicity has originated.”\textsuperscript{52}

Husserl “designate[s] that sort of combination which is characteristic of the totality” a
“collective combination.”\textsuperscript{53} In chapter two of \textit{PA}, he examines various mistaken views of the
“collective combination.” Then, in chapter three, he presents his own view.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 18 (ET 18–19).
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. (ET 19).
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 19 (ET 20).
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 20 (ET 21).
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
§15. Chapters Two and Three: From Incorrect Understandings of the Collective Combination to the Correct Understanding

Husserl examines and rejects a series of theories about the nature of the collective combination in chapter two of PA. These theories fall into three categories: those that present the collective combination as a temporal relation; those that present the collective combination as a spatial relation; and those that present the collective combination as the relation of difference.

The collective combination cannot simply be the fact that the members of a multiplicity are simultaneously present to consciousness, Husserl says.\(^\text{54}\) “Quite a number of phenomena make up, in each moment, the total state of our consciousness.”\(^\text{55}\) However, “a totality . . . can have as elements only such contents as we are aware of in the manner of things separately and specifically noticed.” Multiplicities are formed of those objects in which we have taken a particular interest, not all those objects of which we happen to be more or less aware at the moment. “All other contents . . . which are present only as things incidentally noticed. . . cannot yield elements out of which a totality is constituted.”\(^\text{56}\)

If “the collective ‘together’ must not be described as a temporal ‘simultaneously’,” however, perhaps it could be describe as a temporal succession. Perhaps “what characterizes the multiplicity . . . is the circumstance that in it \textit{mere succession} puts the contents into relationship.”\(^\text{57}\) On this view, “each total presentation” of a multiplicity “would have to have

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 22 (ET 23).
\(^{55}\) Ibid., 22–23 (ET 23–24).
\(^{56}\) Ibid., 23 (ET 24).
\(^{57}\) Ibid., 25 (ET 26).
originated through successive acts of noticing and relating the particular partial contents.”

This much Husserl finds unobjectionable. “One is,” he says, “quite justified in designating . . . groups and numbers as results of processes.” What he questions is the idea “that temporal order . . . is the special relationship which characterizes pluralities as such.”

If the collective combination is the relation of temporal succession, then temporal succession “would . . . actually have to form the object of explicit attention in all cases [of the presentation of a multiplicity]. But this certainly does not hold true.”

When we present “a totality of objects A, B, C, D,” for example, through a “sequential process”—first A, then B, then C, and finally D—we do not end up with the totality, “D, just-passed C, earlier-passed B, up to [earliest-passed] A.” “Rather,” our presentation is of “nothing other than (A, B, C, D),” says Husserl. “The presentation takes in every single one of the contents without regard to the temporal differences and the temporal order grounded in those differences.”

After examining and rejecting the identification of the collective combination with the temporal relations of simultaneity and succession, Husserl examines theories that present the collective combination as a kind of spatial relation. However, Husserl rejects these

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58 Ibid., 27 (ET 28).
59 Ibid., 28 (ET 29).
60 Ibid., 29 (ET 30).
61 Ibid., 31 (ET 32).
62 Ibid. (ET 33).
63 Ibid., 31–32 (ET 33).
theories as well.\textsuperscript{64} “If,” Husserl says, “space is the all-inclusive form, then it unifies not merely the contents just enumerated, but rather these along with \textit{all} present contents whatever.”\textsuperscript{65} Therefore, it could not be space that “constitutes, for example, the \textit{special} unity of the collection of five things formed just now,”\textsuperscript{66} “but only . . . certain synthesizing acts.” Furthermore, we would not come to see the collective combination by focusing on the spatial relationships of objects, but rather by “reflec[ting] upon those acts” of synthesis.\textsuperscript{67}

Finally, Husserl “turn[s]” to what he takes to be the most “scientific and plausible” theory so far.\textsuperscript{68} This theory holds that “[i]n the presentation of a concrete multiplicity, . . . each single object is thought of both as an object which is different from all of the others and as an object which is identical with itself.”\textsuperscript{69} The members of a multiplicity, therefore, are united simply by the relation of difference. The problem with this view, Husserl says, is that it confuses the noticing of “two different contents” with the noticing of “two contents \textit{as different from one another}.”\textsuperscript{70} In other words, it confuses the “presentation of a totality” with

\textsuperscript{64} “The combination of the colligated contents in the multiplicity, and of the enumerated ones in the number, is not a spatial combination, just as little as it can be taken for a temporal one” (Husserl, \textit{PA}, I, 41 [ET 42]).

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. (ET 42–43).

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 41 (ET 43).

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 42 (ET 43).

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 48 (ET 49).

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 49 (ET 50).

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 54 (ET 55–56).
the “presentation of a difference.”\textsuperscript{71} It confuses “collecting and enumerating” with “[d]istinguishing.”\textsuperscript{72}

Having examined and rejected attempts to base the collective combination on time, on space, and on difference, Husserl proceeds in chapter three to present his own view of the collective combination. “Since we know that the most heterogeneous of contents can be united in the collective manner,” Husserl writes, “all relations with a range of applicability restricted by the nature of specific contents fall aside without examination.” As examples, Husserl points to “relations like similarity, gradation, continuous combination, etc.” Such relations are only possible between objects of particular types, while the collective combination can unite any and all objects, regardless of their types. In the end, Husserl can find no relation among “the familiar sorts” which answers to his description of the collective combination.\textsuperscript{73} Thus, he decides that he must “claim for the collective combination a novel class of relations.”\textsuperscript{74}

The collective combination is a “psychical” relation, Husserl argues. In psychical relations, “a unitary psychical act is directed upon several contents,” and “with regard to it, the contents are combined or are related to each other.”\textsuperscript{75} The collective combination, therefore, “has its subsistence only in certain psychical acts that embrace the contents [of a multiplicity] in a unifying manner.” More specifically, collective combinations are “those

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. (ET 56).
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 59 (ET 60).
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 65 (ET 68).
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 66 (ET 69).
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 69 (ET 72).
elemental acts that are capable of taking in any and all contents, however unlike they may be."\textsuperscript{76}

In summarizing his position, Husserl writes:

\begin{quote}
A totality originates in that a unitary interest—and, simultaneously with and in it, a unitary noticing—distinctly picks out and encompasses various contents.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

Objects are collectively combined into a multiplicity, in other words, when each is not only “distinctly” presented for itself, but is also presented together with all the others in one act.

To make this idea more explicit, Husserl writes:

\begin{quote}
For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of \textit{second order}.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

Thus, the collective combination of objects is accomplished by a complex act. The act is a “second order” act, which unites the members of the multiplicity by “including” the individual acts that are directed upon those members.

\section*{§16. Chapter Four: From Authentic Presentations of Multiplicities to the Concepts of Multiplicity and Number}

In chapter four, Husserl announces his intention to “bring to completion our task of exhibiting the origin and content of the concepts \textit{multiplicity} and \textit{cardinal number}, and those of individual numbers as well.” He assumes the following principle. “No concept can be

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 74 (ET 77).
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
thought without foundation in a concrete intuition.” His assumption, specifically, is that we “abstract” the concept of multiplicity from intuitions (authentic presentations) of multiplicities.  

“As we have established,” Husserl writes, “total abstraction from the peculiarities of the individual contents colligated must be effected, retaining, however, their combination.” What all multiplicities share, after all, is the collective combination, not the nature(s) of their members. What, however, does it mean to “abstract from the peculiarities of the individual contents”? “To . . . abstract from something,” Husserl argues, “means merely to give it no special notice.” 

Therefore, “[i]n abstractively passing over” from collectively combined “individual contents,” “to the general concept” of multiplicity, we focus “upon [the contents’] collective combination,” while treating the contents “themselves . . . only as some contents in general.” That is, we treat “each [content] as a certain something, a certain one.” Furthermore, Husserl argues, “the collective combination can [itself] be indicated in language by the conjunction ‘and’.” This means, he concludes, that “[m]ultiplicity in general . . . is nothing other than: a certain something and a certain something and a certain something, etc.; or

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79 Ibid., 79 (ET 83).
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. See also ibid., 75–76 (ET 78–79).
some one and some one and some one thing, etc.; or, more briefly, *one and one and one*, etc.*

“The expression ‘one and one and one, etc.’,” Husserl writes, “clearly expresses the content of the concept of multiplicity.” Furthermore, it “refers by means of the ‘etc.’ to a certain indeterminateness that is essential to the concept in its broad sense.” This does not mean, however, that the concept of multiplicity only applies to infinite groups. It is simply that “no determination is set” by the concept of multiplicity “with respect to an upper bound”. That is, the concept of multiplicity is indeterminate; it does not specify how many members a multiplicity may have (so long as there are, in fact, multiple members).

“The numbers,” Husserl says, “are the distinct species of the general concept of multiplicity.” That is, we might say that multiplicity is the genus, and the individual numbers are its species. Once we have obtained the concept of multiplicity, therefore, we can begin to speak about definite, finite numbers. We can speak not only of the indeterminate concept of multiplicity, but also of determinate types of multiplicity. As examples, Husserl mentions the following: “*one and one; one, one, and one; one, one, one and one,* and so forth.” These types of multiplicity are the numbers we call “two,” “three,” “four,” etc. Thus, Husserl says we can obtain the particular numbers by focusing on the various determinate types of multiplicity, and thereby “do[ing] away with [the]

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84 Ibid., 80 (ET 83–84).

85 Ibid., 81 (ET 85).

86 Husserl, *PA*, II, 222 (ET 235). Husserl refers to the various determinate types of multiplicity—i.e., to the particular numbers—as “concepts”; he says, e.g., “the concept of multiplicity immediately splinters into a manifold of determinate concepts that are most sharply bounded off from each other: the numbers,” and speaks of “concepts such as: *one and one; one, one and one; one, one, one and one,* and so forth” (ibid., 81 [ET 85]).
indeterminateness” of the general concept of multiplicity. Such a procedure, however, would be rather abstract and disconnected from the actual experience of groups. It would be merely the procedure of specifying the generic sense of multiplicity.

There is a second way of “deriv[ing] . . . the number concepts,” Husserl then notes. Rather than “assum[ing] the general and indeterminate concept of multiplicity as mediator,” he says, we can also “come by [the number concepts] directly, setting out from arbitrary concrete multiplicities.” Given an authentic presentation of a multiplicity, we perform essentially the same process of abstraction that leads to the general concept of multiplicity. In (a) treating each of the “contents grasped together” as “a ‘something’ or ‘one’,” and (b) “taking account of the collective combination of them,” we acquire (c) “the general form of multiplicity appertaining to the multiplicity at hand: one and one, . . ., and one.” This “one and one, . . ., and one,” Husserl says, is “a form with which a definite number term is associated.”

Husserl, therefore, has described the nature and origin of numbers in two complimentary ways. First, he presented an abstract procedure, which begins from the concept of multiplicity and then derives the individual numbers from that concept. Second, 

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87 Husserl, PA, I, 81 (ET 85). As we have already noted in passing (p. 138, above), Husserl is dealing with the formalization of objects as part of his exploration of multiplicity and number. That is, our coming to be aware of multiplicities and numbers is, for Husserl, intimately connected with our coming to be aware of objects not as objects of a given type, but as mere “somethings” (whose only significant attribute, perhaps, is that they are identical with themselves; see LU, VI, §62). In bringing a number to presence especially, we treat each member of a given multiplicity of objects not as a particular kind of object, but as “anything whatsoever” (etwas überhaupt). (For Husserl’s use of “etwas überhaupt” with regard to mathematics, see e.g., FTL, §24, §27a.)

88 Ibid.

89 Ellipsis in original.

90 Husserl, PA, I, 82 (ET 86).
he described a procedure in which we abstract the particular numbers from concrete groups of objects that are perceptually given to us.

Now that he has explained how we can generate, and hence obtain, individual numbers, Husserl turns to the question how we obtain the general concept of number. The “concepts”—i.e., the particular numbers—“that arise” from abstractive reflection on multiplicities “are clearly akin to each other,” says Husserl. “Their similarity rests upon” two things. First, there is “the sameness of the partial presentations that make them up (the ‘ones’ or units).” Second, there is “the elemental similarity of the psychical acts combining those presentations.” To “explain [the] concept” of cardinal number, therefore, we can only “[point] to the similarity which all of the number concepts have to each other.”

Finally, Husserl asks “[h]ow . . . the concepts cardinal number and multiplicity [are] related to one another.” They are very similar, he says. However, the concept of cardinal number “originates from the comparison of determinate multiplicity forms or numbers, as species concepts,” while “[t]he concept of multiplicity . . . arises directly out of the comparison of concrete totalities.” This places the concept of multiplicity on “a considerably lower level of concept formation” than the concept of cardinal number. Our experience of multiplicity, in other words, is more basic or fundamental.

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid. (ET 87).
93 Ibid., 83 (ET 87).
94 Ibid.
Husserl’s “goal” in chapter five is to provide a “psychological analysis of [the] relations of *more* and *less*”\(^95\) between the various “number concepts” that he has been discussing. Husserl has studied how we become aware of numbers. Now he wishes to study how we become aware of relations between numbers. To do so, he proposes that we “turn back once again to the sphere of concrete phenomena.”\(^96\)

Given a group of balls, for example, we might either add balls or remove balls. If we add balls, “the new group has *more* balls by those added.”\(^97\) If we remove balls, then the balls in the group “are *less* by those taken away.” Husserl then asserts that “such an adding to and taking away is [also] present” “in cases where we collectively *think* contents together.” “While certain contents are thought ‘together’ by us,” Husserl says, “still other contents can then be added and grasped together with the ones already present.” In this case, we have not a physical act of addition, but a mental act of addition. “The original act is expanded by the taking in of new contents.” Alternatively, he says, “[s]ome of the contents already brought together [can be] omitted, while the unifying act retains and includes only the remaining ones.”\(^98\) In this case, we have not a physical act of subtraction, but a mental act of subtraction.

\(^95\) Ibid, 90 (ET 95).
\(^96\) Ibid., 91 (ET 95).
\(^97\) Ibid. (ET 95–96).
\(^98\) Ibid. (ET 96).
What he has just described, however, is not enough “to ground the relational concepts of the ‘more’ and the ‘less’,” Husserl notes. “As any relation requires that the terms be together in a single act of consciousness, so also with our relations of more and of less.” In the case of adding balls to a group, for example, to see that the new group is more than the original group, “the original and the expanded totality [must] be present to us simultaneously and in one act.”

Furthermore, Husserl says, if we are to see that the new group is more than the original group, “the [expanded] totality must even appear as the ‘sum’ of two totalities, one of which is recognized as identical with the original totality, while the other represents the totality of the newly added contents.” For example, Husserl proposes that we take “the totality (A, B, C)” and “expand” it “to form (A, B, C, D, E).” If we are then to judge that (A, B, C, D, E) is more than (A, B, C) “by D and E,” Husserl says, we must “simultaneously” present the two totalities “in one act” as follows: “(A, B, C), (A, B, C, D, E) and (A, B, C; D, E).” That is, we must not only present the original totality (A, B, C) and the expanded totality (A, B, C, D, E), but we must also present the expanded totality as a combination of two parts: “A, B, C” and “D, E.” If we do so, Husserl claims, we will be able to see (A, B, C, D, E)’s being more than (A, B, C).

The presentations required to see the relation “more than” are “psychical acts of higher order,” says Husserl, “i.e., psychical acts which are directed in turn upon psychical acts.” Each multiplicity to be compared already involves two levels of acts: first order acts

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 92 (ET 96).
101 Ibid. (ET 96–97).
directed upon the members of each totality, and a second order act that “unites them all.”\(^{102}\) The comparison of the multiplicities then requires a third order act that brings together the multiplicities united by the second order acts.\(^{103}\)

Husserl then turns from comparing “totalities which proceed from one another through augmentation or diminishment,” to “the comparison of wholly arbitrary totalities.” The ability to compare two totalities “in terms of more and less” does not depend upon the one being created out of the other by addition or subtraction; they are not functionally related to each other. Augmenting or diminishing multiplicities, on the one hand, and comparing multiplicities in terms of more and less, on the other, are independent activities that can be brought into relation. We could also pick any two totalities at random and compare them.\(^{104}\)

In order to compare “arbitrary totalities in terms of more and less,” however, the totalities “must consist . . . of contents that are the same on both sides.”\(^{105}\) If the two multiplicities have generically-identical contents (both being collections of trees, for example), we can compare the multiplicities in the same way that Husserl described before. If they do not have generically identical contents, however, “then one can only compare their numbers in terms of more and less.”\(^{106}\) “[N]umbers,” says Husserl “represent totalities of

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\(^{102}\) Ibid. (ET 97).

\(^{103}\) Here, Husserl is not entirely clear about why the higher order acts need to be directed upon the lower order acts, rather than upon the objects of the lower order acts. Earlier, for example, he had spoken instead of higher order acts “including” lower order acts (ibid., 74 [ET 77]).

\(^{104}\) Ibid., 93 (ET 98).

\(^{105}\) Ibid.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.
like contents, namely, of units,”¹⁰⁷ and thus “can likewise be compared with one another with respect to more and less, just like totalities of homogeneous concrete elements.”¹⁰⁸

After explaining how we can become aware of the relations of more and less between multiplicities, Husserl makes the following statement. “The multiplicity relations of equal, more and less essentially condition the origination of the number concepts.”¹⁰⁹ We could not obtain the number concepts, in other words, were it not for the “relations of equal, more and less” between multiplicities. Such relations are logically prior to number concepts. Furthermore, Husserl says that the “numbers two, three, etc., presuppose” our having “compared and differentiated” multiplicities “in terms of more and less.” In fact, he continues, we can “form” the number series only if we have “classified multiplicities” into types.¹¹⁰ Whether these statements mean that there would be no numbers—and no number series—without such comparisons and classifications, is a question over which Husserl’s readers have disagreed, and with which we will deal below.

Husserl then concludes that classifying multiplicities into types depends upon our having uncovered the relationships of “identity and non-identity” between multiplicities. In comparing multiplicities, we will (a) sometimes find two multiplicities to be equal, and (b) sometimes find one multiplicity to be “more,” and the other to be “less.” That is, in some

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 93–94 (ET 98).
¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 94 (ET 99).
¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹¹⁰ Ibid., 95 (ET 100).
cases, we will find that the multiplicities are identical; in other cases, we will find that they are not identical, because “one is identical with a part of the other.”

§18. Debate: The Objectivity of Numbers

How are we to take Husserl’s claims that “the determinate numbers, two, three, etc., presuppose a comparison and differentiation of delimited multiplicities,” and that “we must classify multiplicities of units” in order to “form the series of numbers, two, three, etc.”? Does Husserl believe that our comparing, differentiating, and classifying of multiplicities is a necessary condition for the existence of numbers? Would there then be no numbers if no one were to compare, differentiate, and classify multiplicities? Husserl himself says, “numbers are, . . . in a certain manner, purely mental creations,” since they “are based upon psychical activities which we exercise upon contents.” How are we to understand the qualification that numbers are “mental creations” “in a certain manner”? Does Husserl believe numbers to be objective or subjective entities?

Scholars have come to a range of conclusions about Husserl’s view of numbers, answering the question, “Does Husserl believe numbers to be objective or subjective?” in different ways. At what we might call the “subjective” end of the spectrum, we find Frege’s reading of PA. Frege took Husserl to be saying that numbers depend upon minds for their

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111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., 45 (ET 46).
existence. Frege claims that “everything becomes presentation” in *PA*, including numbers. “Everything is shunted off into the subjective” for Husserl, Frege says, and “the boundary between the subjective and the objective is blurred.”

However, Frege admits that in Part Two of *PA*—which we will study below—Husserl begins to talk of numbers as if (a) they are objects that can be presented either authentically or symbolically, and (b) they exist even when we can only present them symbolically. If one and the same number can be presented in various ways, and if numbers can exist even though they are not actually (authentically) presented, then, Frege notes, numbers could not be the presentations in which they are presented. Rather, they could only be the objects of those presentations. Nevertheless, Frege seems to think that Husserl does not realize the implications of what he says.

Dallas Willard’s reading of *PA* is, in a sense, the reverse of Frege’s. Where Frege takes Husserl to actually believe that numbers are subjective, even though Husserl might sometimes speak in ways that indicate the opposite, Willard takes Husserl to believe that

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115 Ibid., 315.

116 Ibid., 322 (cf. 323–24).

117 Ibid., 316.

118 Ibid., 323.

119 Ibid., 323–24.

120 Frege writes: “[I]t is the very thing of which we seek to make presentations to ourselves that is the object of our concern, and that our assertions are about it. And expressions [by Husserl] to this effect occur several times in the second part [of *PA*]; which is the more remarkable, the less it really agrees with the author’s whole mode of thought” (ibid., 323).
numbers are objective, even though Husserl might sometimes speak in ways that indicate the opposite. Willard argues, for example, that mental acts do not “make the totality and its specific number,” but rather “only make them present.”

In support of this reading of PA, Willard argues that the collective combination is not a psychical act, but is an objective relationship revealed by a psychical act. Thus, Husserl does not believe groups to be united by a subjective act of collection, claims Willard, but are wholly objective entities. Our reading of PA, however, would support the opposite conclusion; the unity of a group (its “collective combination”) simply is the authentic presentation of that group. Thus, I would concur with J. Phillip Miller, who argues that “the

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121 Willard, translator’s introduction to PA(ET), xxvii.

122 In both his translator’s introduction to PA(ET) (p. xx) and LOK (p. 43), Willard includes the following diagram:

He then explains the diagram as follows: “Here A through G are objects in a given field of consciousness. The unbroken lines to B, D, and F are those characteristic acts of noticing which are involved in enumerating. The small arrows crossing between the unbroken lines are awarenesses of earlier such acts built into subsequent such acts, ordering them into a progression. The diffuse arrow formed from the broken lines is the founded consciousness of the higher order object, the totality BDF. The dotted lines connecting B to D to F are the ‘collective combinations’ in virtue of which these three elements form a number of things, excluding the other objects in the field of consciousness. Please note that the totality as thus represented by the closed curved line, like the relations of ‘collective combination’ which it contains, is not a part of the complex act in which it is grasped” (Willard, translator’s introduction to PA(ET), xx–xxi, repeating Willard, LOK, 44, almost verbatim).

Willard then comments: “We can see, then, that Husserl made a disastrous choice of terminology in deciding to call the collective combination a ‘psychical’ relation and describing it as having a ‘psychological nature’ (translator’s introduction to PA(ET), xxi). In LOK, he had written: ‘But such a choice of terminology must be described as a disaster. . . . [I]t did and does suggest to the reader that the collective combination is mental, a part or aspect of some mind’ (54).
unity of a multitude [in PA] is nothing other than the ‘mental act’ in which the items are collected.”

However, Miller goes further than we have. Not only do groups depend upon subjectivity, but numbers as well. He asserts, “The unity of a multitude or number . . . is identical with the unity of the collecting act which engenders it.” Furthermore, Miller speaks (a) of “the categorial activity which engenders multitudes,” (b) of the activity of comparison as “generat[ing the] relations” of more and less, and (c) of “authentic counting” as being the activity “in which number originates.”

Therefore, it may seem that Miller holds numbers to be significantly subjective entities for Husserl. Nevertheless, Miller writes:

If Husserl had not implicitly recognized the ‘objectivity’ of number, he could not have taken the distinction between symbolic and authentic presentation as the very basis of his early approach to the philosophy of mathematics.

This is the same point as was made by Frege. The fact that numbers can be presented both authentically and inauthentically would imply that numbers are something other than presentations. Thus, Husserl “implicitly recognize[s]” numbers to be objective in PA, claims Miller, even if Husserl is not explicit about the issue.

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123 Miller, NPA, 70.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 55.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 41.
128 Ibid., 21–22.
129 Ibid., 22.
Though Miller and Frege agree that Husserl’s treatment of numbers ultimately implies that numbers are, at least in some sense, objective, it would be wrong to identify Miller’s reading with Frege’s. Frege does not attempt to reconcile Husserl’s treatment of numbers as objective with Husserl’s treatment of numbers as subjective. He simply sees the two treatments as being inconsistent, and takes the “subjective” treatment to reflect Husserl’s true opinion.\footnote{Frege, “Review,” 323.} Miller, on the other hand, insists that “[t]he difficulty is not that Husserl reduces multitudes and numbers to mental entities, but rather that he construes them as curious halfbreeds, as wholes consisting partly of objects and partly of mental acts.”\footnote{Miller, \textit{NPA}, 71.} It is not that Husserl sometimes treats numbers as subjective, and sometimes treats numbers as objective, according to Miller. It is that Husserl treats numbers as entities that are partially subjective and partially objective.

Robert Sokolowski’s reading of \textit{PA} agrees with Miller’s to this extent: both hold that multiplicities are—in some sense—simultaneously objective and subjective in \textit{PA}. Unlike Miller, however, whose focus is on what he understands to be the contrasting objective and subjective \textit{components} of multiplicities in \textit{PA}, Sokolowski focuses on the contrast between (a) the apparently objective status of multiplicities, and (b) their apparently subjective origin. Multiplicities “have a certain objectivity,” Sokolowski writes, “and yet exist only by virtue of subjective acts.”\footnote{Sokolowski, \textit{Concept of Constitution}, 16–17.} This, Sokolowski says, is a “paradox,” though “not [one] due to inconsistency on Husserl’s part.” Rather, it is due “to the nature of groups.”\footnote{Ibid., 17.}
Sokolowski’s reading of PA’s view of numbers is much the same. First, their origin is—in some sense—subjective. He writes:

[T]he explanation given by Husserl for the origin of authentically given number concepts, and the explanation given for all the categories treated in the first part of Philosophy of Arithmetic, is a constitutional explanation. It accounts for the origin of logical and mathematical categories by means of subjective mental acts.¹³⁴ Second, despite its origin in “subjective mental acts,” Sokolowski says that “we can identify” a number “as identically the same individual in a series of different occurrences.”¹³⁵ This gives numbers “objectivity,” because “the same number. . . can appear at different places and times.”¹³⁶ Thus, Sokolowski presents numbers in PA as being—in some sense—both subjective and objective.

Perhaps, then, the scholarly debate over whether Husserl saw numbers as objective or subjective is due to the fact that Husserl’s view is unexpectedly nuanced (i.e., perhaps numbers are objective entities, but derive from subjective acts). Alternatively, perhaps the cause of the debate is that Husserl’s terminology is not nuanced enough. Sokolowski writes:

In comparison with his later works, . . . Husserl’s presentation is not clear. He does not explicitly distinguish between the study of empirical psychological facts and the explanation of logical categories of thought. His terminology is especially misleading, for he uses such terms as “psychic acts,” “inner experience,” and “concrete phenomena,” all of which have a distinct psychological connotation, to express factors which belong in the logical, constitutional sphere.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Ibid., 21–22.
¹³⁵ Ibid., 18–19.
¹³⁶ Ibid., 19.
¹³⁷ Ibid., 22.
It is at least the case, in other words, that Husserl’s language seems to confuse the objective with the subjective (the logical with the psychological).

It may even be the case, however, that Husserl himself confused the objective with the subjective (the logical with the psychological). Sokolowski writes that, “it seems that [Husserl] did not clearly perceive the distinction between the logical and psychological during the writing of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.“\(^{138}\) Thus, perhaps it is not surprising that Husserl’s terminology was unclear; how could it be otherwise if his own thinking was not yet sufficiently clear?

Nevertheless, Sokolowski says, “the nature of the categories [Husserl] was trying to explain forced him to treat them differently from ordinary psychological facts.”\(^{139}\) In other words, even if the distinction between logic and psychology was unclear to Husserl while writing *PA*, he was in touch with the truth of numbers enough not to completely reduce them to psychological entities. Therefore, Sokolowski sees *PA* as at least terminologically confused, and perhaps conceptually confused, but not as reducing numbers to the status of subjective entities.

Richard Tieszen’s reading of *PA* is similar to Sokolowski’s, in that Tieszen finds both a confusion of the subjective and objective in *PA*, along with at least an implicit recognition, on Husserl’s part, that numbers are more than subjective. Thus, while Tieszen agrees with Frege that there is “blur[ring of] the distinction between the subjective and the objective” in

\(^{138}\) Ibid.

\(^{139}\) Ibid.
PA. Tieszen has the benefit of being able to read PA in light of Husserl’s later work. Therefore, Tieszen is more guarded than Frege in his critique of PA. He writes that “there is a core of ideas in PA that [Husserl] never abandoned,” even “after . . . repudiat[ing] psychologism.” In fact, it would be better, Tieszen claims, to see PA’s “investigation” as “an epistemological, not a psychological, undertaking.” Thus, despite the flaws noted by Frege, PA’s approach is not completely faulty.

Claire Ortiz Hill, however, comes to a different conclusion than both Frege and Tieszen. She writes that “Husserl did not mix the subjective and the objective in the manner in which Frege argued he did in his review.” In fact, “understood on his own terms, Husserl did not exactly mix them at all.” Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock even goes so far as to say that “Claire Ortiz Hill has shown” that “Husserl was not the propounder of a naive extreme psychologism in Philosophie der Arithmetik as Frege and his uncritical followers” (amongst whom Tieszen is not) “would like us to believe.” Nevertheless, Hill does claim that “Husserl’s particular attempts to define the relationship of the subjective to the objective” in PA “is framed in paradoxes that lend some legitimacy to Frege’s charge.”

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141 Psychologism is, to state the matter concisely, is the attempt to reduce logic to psychology.

142 Tieszen, “Philosophy of Arithmetic,” 319.


144 Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, “To Be a Fregean or To Be a Husserlian: That Is the Question for Platonists,” in Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, Husserl or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 200. In this quotation, Rosado Haddock refers to Claire Ortiz Hill, “Frege’s Attack on Husserl and Cantor,” in Husserl or Frege?, 95–107.

145 Hill, Word and Object, 80.
Therefore, it may be best to conclude, with Tieszen, that “PA is not nearly as clear on the matter” of whether numbers are subjective or objective “as it could be.” While there seems to be general agreement amongst Husserl scholars that Husserl at least spoke of numbers as being subjective and as being objective, there is disagreement about what Husserl actually believed while writing PA. Did he believe numbers to be either subjective or objective (even though he sometimes spoke of them as if they were the opposite); did he believe numbers to be both subjective and objective; or did he believe numbers to be objective, but to have a subjective origin? This dissertation, unfortunately, cannot attempt to settle the debate (especially not before having examined Part Two of PA).

§19. Summary of Part One

In Part One, Husserl’s goal was to explain the concept of multiplicity and the concept of number. He began by explaining how we authentically present concrete groups (which he calls “multiplicities”). When we authentically present a concrete group, we engage in a complex, two-level mental act, which presents each member of the group and collects them all into one whole. Husserl calls the authentic presentation of a group the group’s “collective combination.”

To obtain the concept of multiplicity, we must authentically present (at least) two concrete groups, and compare those groups with each other. We discover, through this comparison, that the concept of multiplicity can be expressed as, “something and something and something, etc.,” or “one and one and one, etc.” In this expression, (1) the words

“something” or “one” tell us that the members of the group can have any nature whatsoever, (2) the word “and” tells us that the members of the group are united by a collective combination, and (3) the word “etc.” tells us that there need be no particular number of members in a multiplicity (so long as there are, in fact, multiple members).

Husserl then tries to show how we develop the concept of number. In chapter five, he says we bring particular numbers to presence by comparing and classifying concrete groups in terms of more and less. Then, he says that the concept of number can only be explained “by pointing to the similarity which all of the number[s] . . . have to each other.”¹⁴⁷ In other words, the concept of number—like the concept of multiplicity, and the particular numbers—originates in acts of comparison.

Thus, Husserl believes he has fulfilled Part One’s goal of explaining the concepts of multiplicity and number. Now we must discuss the ways in which Part One has helped us move closer to fulfilling our goal of understanding the roots of Husserl’s theory of empty and filled intentions. We will begin with a statement Husserl made about PA in 1929.

Husserl writes:

[PA] was the first investigation that sought to make “categorial objectivities” of the first level and of higher levels (sets and cardinal numbers [Mengen und Anzahlen] of a higher ordinal level) understandable on the basis of the “constituting” intentional activities, as whose productions they make their appearance originaliter, accordingly with full originality of their sense.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Husserl, PA, I, 82 (ET 86). Here Husserl uses the term “number concepts,” by which, in PA, Husserl means the same thing as “numbers.”

¹⁴⁸ Husserl, FTL, §27a, 91 (ET 87). On groups as categorial objects, see especially Husserl, LU, III, §23, 288–91 (LI, 2:38–39), §23, 289, n. (LI, 2:350, n. 8; this note belongs to text on p. 38). See also, Husserl, LU, VI, §45, 672–73 (LI, 2:281); §51, 689–90 (LI, 2:291–92), §60, 713 (LI, 2:307), §62, 716 (LI, 2:309). Miller writes: “Now the distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘symbolic’ presentation is explicitly applied by Husserl to what he would later call categorial objects” (NPA, 39).
If groups and numbers are “categorial objects,” then authentic presentations of groups and numbers must be “categorial intuitions.” That is, the authentic presentation of a group or number must be what \( LI \) would call a “higher level” or “founded” intuition, rather than a “straightforward” or “founding” (i.e., “sensuous”) intuition.\(^{149}\)

What can we learn about the roots of the distinction between empty and filled intentions from the fact that \( PA \)’s “higher order authentic presentations” are what Husserl would later call “categorial intuitions”? Categorial intuitions are acts in which a categorial object is not only intended, but is given as it is intended. That is, categorial intuitions are one type of filled intentions. Thus, if Part One of \( PA \) presents Husserl’s early theory of what he would later call “categorial intuition,” this must mean Part One presents (at least part of) Husserl’s early theory of what he would later call “filled intentions.”

This does not mean, however, that Part One of \( PA \) presents Husserl’s early theory of fulfillment. Fulfillment occurs in the transition from an empty intention to a filled intention, and \( PA \) does not study this transition. Miller writes:

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\text{[T]here is no explicit discussion in this work of the ‘fulfillment’ of an empty (or ‘symbolic’) act by an intuitive (or ‘authentic’) one. The notion of fulfillment was introduced only after the publication of \( PA \). Nonetheless Husserl does regard authentic and symbolic acts as capable of being directed toward the same object, even in this early work.}^{150}\]

\(^{149}\) Husserl, \( LU \), VI, §47 (\( LI \), 283). This leads us to the following question. Is the distinction between lower level and higher level acts of intuition already present in \( PA \), or does that distinction make its first appearance only later in Husserl’s thought? I would argue that the distinction is already present in \( PA \). There, Husserl speaks of “first order” authentic presentations and “second order,” or “higher order,” authentic presentations (Husserl, \( PA \), I, 92 [ET 97]). First order authentic presentations bring individual objects to presence, while higher order authentic presentations bring groups and numbers to presence. Therefore, if we were to explore the roots of \( LI \)’s distinction between sensuous and categorial intuitions, we would have to go back to \( PA \)’s distinction between first order authentic presentations, and higher order authentic presentations.

\(^{150}\) Miller, \( NPA \), 39.
In fact, “[t]he relation asserted in PA to hold between empty and filled acts is the static one of ‘logical equivalence,’ not the dynamic one of fulfillment.” (On the issue of logical equivalence, see below, pp. 176–77.)

Furthermore, PA does not discuss fulfillment, even though its structure is based, in a certain way, on the distinction between empty and filled intentions. Miller writes:

[T]he complex of acts within which the aggregate emerges include those which are ‘empty’ as well as those which are ‘filled.’ To be sure, the terms ‘empty’ and ‘filled’ are not actually used in PA in the relevant senses. Husserl does however distinguish in this work between ‘symbolic’ and ‘authentic’ presentation. Indeed, the very structure of the work is based on this distinction.

Part One of PA is an exploration of authentic presentations, while Part Two—which we will study below—is an exploration of symbolic presentations. PA, in other words, begins with filled intentions and then proceeds to empty intentions. In LI, by way of contrast, Husserl starts with signitive intentions (I, §§1–8 and VI §§1–3), and then discusses filled intentions (I, §§9–10 and VI §§4–10). LI, in other words, begins with empty intentions and then proceeds to filled intentions. In LI’s transition from the empty to the filled, the subject of fulfillment becomes central. However, in PA’s transition from the filled to the empty, the subject of fulfillment does not arise at all.

As we now turn from our study of Part One of PA to our study of Part Two, therefore, we will not expect Husserl to take up the issue of fulfillment. Instead, we will expect him to begin exploring the ways in which we deal with, or are directed toward, groups and numbers in their absence. With our study of Part Two, therefore, we will begin to explore the roots of

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151 Ibid., 44, n. 38.
152 Ibid., 38.
Husserl’s theory of empty intentions. This will help us complete our mission of uncovering the roots of the distinction between empty and filled intentions in Husserl’s early work.
Husserl opens chapter ten—the first chapter in Part Two of *PA*—with the following sentence.

After the discussion and resolution of the subtle questions connected with the analysis of the concepts *unity*, *multiplicity*, and *number*, our philosophical investigation proceeds to the task of making psychologically and logically intelligible the origination of a calculation-technique based upon those concepts, and of investigating the relationship of that technique to arithmetical science.¹

While the goal of Part One was, ultimately, to come to a philosophical understanding of numbers, the goal of Part Two will be, ultimately, to come to an understanding of calculation and arithmetic. Husserl begins his examination of calculation by attempting to ascertain to what extent it would be possible to calculate with authentic number concepts. He will claim that there are definite limits to our ability to calculate with authentic number concepts; once we have seen those limits, we will be motivated to turn to the exploration of calculation using symbolic number concepts.

Husserl begins his discussion by asking how calculation is to be understood, if numbers are concepts. How, for example, do we combine “the concept 2 and the concept 3” in such a way that “the concept 5 . . . emerges”?² Husserl’s answer is that the numerals and

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² Ibid.
number names used in arithmetic do not refer to the number concepts, but to the groups falling under those concepts.\footnote{Ibid., 181–82 (ET 191).} Therefore:

\[ 5 + 5 = 10 \] means the same as: a group . . . falling under the concept five, and any other group falling under the same concept, when united yield a group falling under the concept ten.\footnote{Ibid., 182 (ET 191–92).}

There are, Husserl claims, two “Fundamental Activities . . . upon all numbers, . . . through which alone we can form new numbers from given numbers,” namely, “Addition and Partition [Teilung].”\footnote{Ibid. (ET 192).} “To add,” Husserl writes, “is to form a new number by collective combination of the units from two or more numbers.”\footnote{Ibid., 183 (ET 193).} Multiplication, he then argues, is nothing but repeated addition,\footnote{Ibid., 185–86 (ET 195–96).} and exponentiation is nothing but repeated multiplication (i.e., repeated repetitions of addition).\footnote{Ibid., 186–87 (ET 196–97).}

If “[a]ddition links a given plurality of numbers into one new number,” Husserl says, “[p]artition segregates a given number into a plurality of partial numbers.”\footnote{Ibid., 188 (ET 198).} There are, however, “two special cases of partition,” namely, “subtraction and division.” In subtraction, we ask, “If a given number \( a \) can be split up into two partial number in such a way that \( b \) is one of the two, what is the other one?”\footnote{Ibid.} In the case of division, on the other hand, we
“partition a number into a given number of equal parts,” and then “determine the common numerical value of the parts obtained.”

Addition and partition are the only two numerical operations, Husserl says, “[i]f we understand by operations actual activities with and upon the numbers themselves.” What we normally think of as “operations,” Husserl claims, are actually “indirect symbolizations of numbers, which characterize the numbers merely by means of relations, instead of constructing them through operations.” For example, the “2 + 4” indirectly symbolizes 6; it expresses 6 in terms of a relation between 2 and 4, but does not actually perform the operation of adding 2 and 4 together (which would produce 6).

Furthermore, it would be impossible for “each arithmetical operation [to be] an activity with and upon actual numbers,” Husserl claims. This is because only our presentations of “the first few [numbers] in the number series” can be authentic. The rest “are symbolic, and can only be symbolic.” In other words, we can only genuinely bring a few numbers to presence, and therefore can only genuinely perform arithmetical operations upon those few. The rest we must intend absently, and therefore we cannot perform arithmetical operations upon them.

Our inability to bring most numbers to presence “totally determines the character, sense, and purpose of arithmetic.”

11 Ibid., 189 (ET 199).
12 Ibid., 190 (ET 200).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. (ET 200–1).
If we had authentic presentations of all numbers, as we do of the first ones in the series, then there would be no arithmetic, for it would then be completely superfluous.\textsuperscript{15}

If we had authentic presentations of all numbers, we could also attain authentic presentations of their relations with each other—even “[t]he most complicated of [those] relations”—without resorting to “intricate calculations.”\textsuperscript{16} We would simply see the relations between numbers, rather than having to work them out using arithmetical techniques. In fact, “the whole of arithmetic is . . . nothing other than a sum of artificial devices for overcoming the essential imperfections of our intellect.”\textsuperscript{17}

What, however, are our limitations? “Only under especially favorable conditions,” Husserl says, “can we present authentically concrete multiplicities of approximately a dozen elements.”\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, “twelve (or a lower number close to it) is also the ultimate limit for the conceptualization of authentic number concepts.”\textsuperscript{19} Beyond that, we can symbolically present numbers, but cannot actually intuit them.

“Nonetheless,” Husserl notes, “no one feels restricted by these constraints.”

Inside and outside of science we speak as though we could continue the sequence of numbers to infinity, i.e., beyond any limit attained. In addition, these concepts are even regarded as the logically most perfect ones in the domain of human knowledge.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 191 (ET 201).

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 192 (ET 202).

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. Later Husserl writes, once again, that even “under the most favorable of conditions . . . we take in not more than a dozen elements” (ibid., 196–97 [ET 209]).

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 192 (ET 202).
We seem to work with numbers that Husserl claims are not actually given, and we seem to work with them as if we had a genuine, reliable grasp upon them. “But how can one speak of concepts which one does not genuinely [eigentlich] have?” Husserl asks. “And how is it not absurd that upon such concepts the most secure of all sciences, arithmetic, should be grounded?”\(^{21}\)

Rather than giving up on his theory, Husserl replies as follows. “Even if we do not have the concept given in the authentic [eigentlicher] manner,” he writes, “we still do have it given—in the symbolic manner.”\(^{22}\) That is, while we cannot present most numbers authentically, we can present them symbolically, and these symbolic presentations are adequate for our purposes.

From the perspective of our study of empty and filled intentions, the foregoing claims are perhaps the most important in all of PA. They assert that our inability to bring most numbers to presence, and our corresponding need to intend most numbers symbolically, is what makes arithmetic necessary. In the language of LI, the necessity of relying on empty, signitive intentions in our dealings with most numbers leads to the development and use of arithmetic.

In addition, while Husserl does see our use of empty intentions in arithmetic as an indication of our human limitations, he does not see it as undermining the certainty of arithmetic. The fact that we cannot bring most numbers to full presence does not mean that we lack full certainty about most numbers. Arithmetic springs from the distinction between

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\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid. (ET 203).
empty and filled intentions, and remains a thoroughly reliable science even without the possibility of fulfilling most of the number intentions it involves.

Husserl concludes chapter ten with the following. “The discussion of this essential distinction” between authentic and symbolic presentation, “and the psychological analysis of the symbolic number presentations, are to form the task of the following chapters.” He will begin, however, in chapter eleven, with a study of the symbolic presentations of multiplicities.

§21. Chapter Eleven: From Sensible Multiplicities to Figural Moments

Husserl opens chapter eleven by announcing that “the distinction between symbolic and authentic presentations . . . is fundamental to all further discussions” in the remainder of PA. “A symbolic or inauthentic presentation,” he then explains, “is . . . a presentation by means of signs,” rather than a presentation of the thing itself.

If a content is not directly given to us as that which it is, but rather only indirectly through signs which univocally characterize it, then we have a symbolic presentation of it instead of an authentic one.

We have an authentic presentation of a thing, then, when it is “directly given to us as that which it is,” and a symbolic presentation of a thing when it is “given to us . . . only indirectly through signs which univocally characterize it.”

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23 "[T]he common and naïve view . . . does not take into account the distinction between symbolic and authentic presentations of number, and . . . does not do justice to the fundamental fact that all number presentations that we possess, beyond the first few in the number series, are symbolic, and can only be symbolic. This is a fact which totally determines the character, sense, and purpose of arithmetic” (ibid., 190 [ET 200–1]).

24 Ibid., II, 192 (ET 203).

25 Ibid., 193 (ET 205).
Husserl claims to have obtained his understanding of the distinction between authentic and symbolic presentation from Franz Brentano. Nevertheless, Husserl says his “definition is not identical with that given by Brentano.” He continues:

I have thought it especially necessary to emphasize the univocality of the characterization, in order to keep inauthentic presentations clearly distinct from general presentations.26

General presentations are those that can present anything to which a particular concept applies.27 Husserl’s example of a general presentation is the term, “a man.”28 Even though “a man” can present any being to which the concept man applies, Husserl argues that “no one would designate the general presentation ‘a man’ as a presentation (even as a symbolic one) of a determinate man Peter.”29 The reason Husserl offers for this claim is as follows.

[The presentation “a man”] contains only a part of the defining properties appropriate to the characterization of [a determinate man Peter], and only through the addition of further properties is it to be filled out in such a way that we may designate it as an (inauthentic) presentation of the individual, which then is capable of surrogating for the authentic presentation of the same.30

From this, we learn two things. First, if a presentation is to count as a symbolic presentation of some object, it must be detailed (or specific) enough to present only that object. (In contrast, general presentations do not, in and of themselves, pick out any particular object.

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26 Ibid., n. 1 (ET 205, n. 1).
28 Husserl, PA, II, 193, n. 1 (ET 205, n. 1).
29 Ibid. It is interesting to note here a certain ambiguity in Husserl’s language. Husserl says both that “[a] symbolic or inauthentic presentation is . . . a presentation by means of signs” (ibid., 193 [ET 205]) and that the complex sign (phrase or term) “a man” is itself general presentation. In one case, he speaks of presentation as if it were an activity that employs signs, while in the other he speaks of signs as if they were themselves presentations.
30 Husserl, PA, II, 193, n. 1 (ET 205, n. 1).
but instead can be used to present any and every object to which a given concept applies.)

Second, a consequence of being a symbolic presentation of an entity is being able to “surrogate for” an authentic presentation of the same entity. (In contrast, Husserl evidently believes that a general presentation could never surrogate for an authentic presentation of an object, and thus could never count as a symbolic presentation of that object.)

To understand what Husserl means by symbolic presentations “surrogating” for authentic presentations, we must turn to the examples of authentic and symbolic presentations which he provides. The first is as follows.

We have . . . an authentic presentation of the outer appearance of a house when we actually look at the house; and we have a symbolic presentation when someone gives us the indirect characterization: the corner house on such and such side of such and such street.

When we see a house for ourselves, we have an authentic presentation of it, but when we are merely given a description of the house, we have only a symbolic presentation of it. Here, Husserl uses the difference between the firsthand, visual intuition of an object, and a secondhand, verbal description of the object, to elucidate the difference between authentic presentation and symbolic presentation.

Husserl continues:

Any description of a perceptual object has the tendency to replace the actual presentation of it by a surrogate sign-presentation. Characteristic properties mark the object in such a manner that it can be recognized again as occasion demands, and thus all judgments adhering to the symbolic presentation can subsequently be

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31 Ibid., 193 (ET 205).

32 We note once again the order of Husserl’s exposition. First, Husserl describes the authentic presentation, and then he describes the symbolic presentation. He moves from the filled to the empty, and the phenomenon of fulfillment remains undiscussed.
carried over to the object itself. Accordingly, the symbolic presentation serves us as a provisional surrogate for the actual presentation.33

Here, Husserl claims that we do not need an authentic presentation of an object to make valid judgments about it. In fact, we have a tendency to judge about objects using symbolic presentations of them, rather than using authentic presentations.34 He speaks rather cryptically here, but will return to the issue once more below.

Husserl’s second and third examples of the distinction between authentic and symbolic presentation are meant to show that “abstract and general concepts” “can be symbolized . . . as well” as sense-perceptible objects.

A determinate species of red is authentically presented when we find it as an abstract Moment in a perception. It is inauthentically presented through the symbolic determination: that color which corresponds to so-and-so many billion vibrations of aether per second.35

We have an authentic presentation of a species of red when we intuit it in some object, while a description of that species is, in and of itself, only a symbolic presentation. Thus, just as in

33 Husserl, PA, II, 194 (ET 206). Husserl’s phrasing here is unfortunate. He should write, “all judgments adhering to the [object as] symbolic[ally] present[ed] can subsequently be carried over to the object [as authentically presented].”

34 Husserl does not explain the “tendency” of symbolic presentations “to replace” authentic presentations, but he no doubt means something like the following. We can only authentically present an object when and where the object is actually present. However, we can symbolically present an object, as that which has certain “characteristic properties,” whenever and wherever we please. If we make a judgment about an object, while in its presence and authentically presenting it, our judgment form will be something like, “This object x, here before me, is y.” However, we will only be able to make such judgments when we are authentically presenting the object, and thus only when we are in the presence of the object. Alternatively, if we make a judgment about an object, while symbolically presenting it as having certain characteristic properties, our judgment form will be something like, “The object x, which has characteristic properties a, b, c, etc., is y.” Furthermore, we will be able to make such judgments whenever and wherever we please. Therefore, instead of waiting until we are authentically presenting the object in order to make judgments about it, we have a tendency to begin symbolically presenting the object, and making judgments about it on the basis of our symbolic presentations, whenever and wherever we please. Symbolic presentations begin to take the place of, or “surrogate” for, authentic presentations in our judgments.

35 Husserl, PA, II, 194 (ET 206).
the first example, Husserl explains the distinction between authentic and symbolic presentation in terms of the distinction between visual intuition and verbal description.\textsuperscript{36}

Husserl then offers his third example, which is likewise meant to show that “abstract and general concepts” “can be symbolized . . . as well” as sense-perceptible objects.

If we associate the name “triangle” with the concept of a closed figure bounded by three straight lines, then any other determination which belongs in univocal exclusiveness to triangles can stand in as an adequate sign for the authentic concept.\textsuperscript{37}

As an example of such a determination or sign, Husserl offers: “that figure the sum of whose angles equals two right angles.”\textsuperscript{38}

This third example differs significantly from the two preceding it. Instead of pointing to the difference between seeing a triangle and describing a triangle, Husserl points to the distinction between two different ways of conceptualizing triangles. While the “authentic concept” (that is, the essence or definition) of triangle is that “of a closed figure bounded by three straight lines,” triangles also happen to be the only figures “the sum of whose angles equals two right angles.”\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, we could define a triangle by its properties, rather than

\textsuperscript{36} One notable difference between the first two examples is that a distinction between firsthand experience and secondhand description is present in the first example, but is not obviously present in the second example. It is clear in both examples that the authentic presentation is a case of firsthand intuition. The person sees the house or the species of red for himself. However, while it is clear that the symbolic presentation in the first example is a case of secondhand description (i.e., the person symbolically presents the house through someone else’s description of it), it is not clear that the symbolic presentation in the second example is a case of secondhand description (i.e., it is not clear whether the person symbolically presents the species of red through someone else’s description of it, or through his own description of it).

\textsuperscript{37} Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 194 (ET 206).

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 194 (ET 206).
its formal definition. In doing so, Husserl claims we would be symbolically presenting the authentic concept of triangle. (Interestingly, Husserl does not specify precisely what having an authentic presentation of the authentic concept of triangle would amount to.)

Husserl’s fourth example has to do with what he calls “external signs.” “[B]y ‘C₃,’” he writes, “the non-musician will merely present to himself the indirect characterization: that tone which musicians indicate by means of the sign ‘C₃.’” (Husserl, once again, does not specify the corresponding authentic presentation.) He then says that we are employing “external signs” whenever we use language. However, in logical studies—such as the one in which Husserl is engaged in PA—we are only concerned with “such signs” when they genuinely express the “concept of that which is to be designated.” (Husserl does not specify the authentic presentations that would correspond to such external signs.)

Finally, Husserl returns to the subject of surrogation and judgment, by way of the subject of logical equivalence.

[T]he authentic presentation and a symbolic presentation correlative to it stand in the relation of logical equivalence. Two concepts are logically equivalent when

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40 That is, we could define triangles using their “propria” rather than their essence. “Propria” are “accidents that are necessary consequences of having a certain essence. . . . Since propria are necessarily connected with the essence, we can use the propria to signify the essence.” Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 66.

41 Husserl, PA, II, 194 (ET 206).

42 There would seem to be at least two options. If “the indirect characterization: that tone which musicians indicate by means of the sign ‘C₃’” is the symbolic presentation, then perhaps the authentic presentation is the direct characterization: “the tone C₃,” when spoken with understanding by a musician. Alternatively, perhaps the authentic presentation is the actual hearing of the tone C₃.

Here, for the first time, Husserl begins with the symbolic presentation. He does not then move on to the corresponding authentic presentation, however, and he leaves the phenomenon of fulfillment undiscussed.

43 Husserl, PA, II, 194 (ET 206).

44 One would assume that the nature of the corresponding authentic presentations depends upon the nature of the objects designated.
each object of one is also an object of the other, and conversely. That—for the purposes of our interests in forming judgments—symbolic presentations can surrogate, to the furthest extent, for the corresponding authentic presentation rests upon this circumstance.45

Here, Husserl uses the logical equivalence of two concepts to explain the surrogation of a symbolic presentation for an authentic presentation. If the objects to which one concept applies are the same as the objects to which the other applies, and vice versa, the two concepts are logically equivalent. The same, evidently, goes for symbolic and authentic presentations. That is, a symbolic presentation is logically equivalent to an authentic presentation if the object it presents is the same as the object the authentic presentations presents, and vice versa. When this is the case, the symbolic presentation can surrogate for that authentic presentation. That is, when a symbolic presentation and an authentic presentation both present one and the same object, the symbolic presentation (a) is logically equivalent to the authentic presentation, and (b) can take the place of the authentic presentation in judgments about that object.

In practice, this means that anything we can truthfully judge of an authentically presented object, we can also truthfully judge of the same object presented symbolically. For example, for “the corner house on such and such side of such and such street”46 to be a symbolic presentation of the house I see before me (the house I authentically present), everything that is true of “the corner house on such and such side of such and such street” would also have to be true of the house I see before me, and vice versa.

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45 Husserl, PA, II, 194 (ET 206–7). Here we have the issue of identity, which will become central in Husserl’s later theory of empty and filled intentions, coming to the fore.

46 Ibid., 193 (ET 205).
We can summarize what we have learned about authentic and symbolic presentations, therefore, as follows. (1) Where an authentic presentation gives the object itself, a symbolic presentation would give the very same object through the intermediary of a “univocal” sign. That is, while an object is present itself when we authentically present it, what is most truly present in a symbolic presentation is not the object presented, but something that acts as a sign for that object (and for that object alone).

(2) The object authentically presented, and that same object symbolically presented, are identical. That is, the identity of an object does not change when it is presented in its absence, as opposed to its presence (or in its presence, as opposed to its absence). Here, we see the theme of identity in presence and absence, which will become more prominent as Husserl develops his theory of empty and filled intentions.

(3) Everything that is true of an object as authentically presented is true of the object as symbolically presented (and vice versa). Therefore, (4) both authentic and symbolic presentations can be used in valid judgments about an object. However, (5) we have a tendency to rely on symbolic presentations in our judgments, rather than authentic presentations.

“After these preliminaries,” Husserl says, “we turn to an in-depth study of the origination and signification of symbolic presentation in the domain of number.” However, just as we first had to study the authentic presentation of multiplicities before we could understand the authentic presentation of numbers, Husserl says we first must study the

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47 The theme of symbolic presentations replacing authentic presentations will return when we discuss systematic numbers and systematic number signs below. It is especially interesting in contrast with LI’s theme of the teleological connection of empty intentions to filled intentions. In PA, symbolic presentations tend to
symbolic presentation of multiplicities before we can understand the symbolic presentation
of numbers.  

In the next paragraph, Husserl compares and contrasts the intuition of “the individual
sense perceptible thing” with the intuition of “the sensible group.” We intuit both individual
sensible things and sensible groups first as wholes; however, both can be seen, upon
“subsequent analysis,” to consist of parts. What distinguishes a sensible individual from a
sensible group is the kind of parts it contains. The sensible individual’s parts are
“properties,” while the sensible group’s parts are “discrete partial intuitions.” That is, in
intuiting the parts of a sensible individual, our “attention rests upon the combination of those
parts with the whole,” while in the case a sensible group, the “combination [of the parts]
within the intuition of the whole recedes into the background.” “Each [part]” of a sensible
group, to put it in other terms, “stands on its own.” 

Since the parts of sensible groups sometimes “draw a dominant and unitary interest to
themselves,” Husserl says, “our primary intention [ursprüngliche Intention] is directed
toward the formation of a totality presentation [Inbegriffsvorstellung] that grasps each of
these partial intuitions for itself and draws it into unison with the others.” In other words, if
we first see a sensible group as a whole, and then its individual members come to stand out
independently, we begin to intend to reunite the members with each other. However, Husserl

replace authentic presentations, while in LI something like the reverse is the case. Empty intentions are ordered
to fulfillment, and find their fulfillment in filled intentions.

48 Ibid., 195 (ET 207).
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., n. 1 (ET 207, n. 3).
says, “we lack the corresponding mental capacities to completely satisfy [this intention] with larger groups.”

There are, therefore, “serious and striking difficulties” to understanding how we come to symbolically present large sensible groups as groups, Husserl says. Nevertheless, we do present large groups as groups, and can even do so (apparently) in a single instant. Husserl provides two examples. “We step into a large room full of people. One glance suffices and we judge: A group of people.” Likewise, “[w]e look up into the starry heavens, and in one glance judge: Many stars.” Furthermore, “[t]he same holds true for groups of wholly unrecognizable objects.” The question Husserl must ask, therefore, is “How are such judgments possible?” How can a presentation in “one glance” be sufficient for us to judge that we are presenting a group?

Husserl proceeds to offer four possible explanations of how we are apparently able to present a large group as a group in a single instant. He begins by noting the following.

For the actual presentation of groups we need . . . as many psychical acts as there are contents, unified by a psychical act of second order. And only with respect to this form of psychical combination of individually grasped contents do the names ‘group,’ ‘multiplicity,’ ‘totality,’ etc., acquire their signification.

In other words, we derive the concept of group, multiplicity, or totality from the authentic presentation of groups (as Husserl argued in Part One of PA). One might suspect, therefore, that to judge that something is a group—i.e., to “subsume” something “under the concept of

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51 Ibid., 195 (ET 207). Although Husserl uses the word “intention” here, he means it not in his later technical sense, but in the common volitional sense (i.e., as equivalent with “goal” or “desire”).
52 Ibid., 196 (ET 208).
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
group”—we must first authentically present it as a group. Once we have authentically presented a group as a group, then we can see that the concept of group applies to it, and thus we can explicitly judge it to be a group.

Husserl’s question, then, is whether we instantaneously accomplish the entire “complicated psychical activity” required to authentically present a group when we judge that the room we have just entered is filled with a group of people, or that the sky we have just glanced up at is filled with a multiplicity of stars. “[A]re we here to be mastering perhaps a hundred [people or stars], quite without effort, almost instantaneously?” Husserl asks rhetorically. Such a “hypothesis” would be “too improbable for us to base anything on it.”

“There can be no doubt,” therefore, “that the concrete multiplicity presentation” in those cases where we immediately judge that we are perceiving a large group “is no authentic one [ist . . . keine eigentliche].” It would even seem that it is inauthentic, and hence symbolic, given what Husserl says next: “the subsumption under the general concept of multiplicity which is given with the use of the name ‘group’” (when we instantaneously judge that we are perceiving a large group) “could take place only in the symbolic manner.”

However, there is some ambiguity in this way of putting the issue. Before we can be sure

55 Ibid. (ET 209).
56 Ibid. (ET 208–9).
57 Ibid., 197 (ET 209).
58 Ibid.
59 For instance, it is not clear whether (a) Husserl identifies the presentation of a large group as a group with the judgment that what we are presenting is a group, or (b) he understands the two as distinct acts that are nevertheless related. Perhaps, for instance, the presentation of the group as a group is a judgment that the group
that Husserl believes the presentations in question to be symbolic, therefore, we must wait for a more explicit statement.

What we can say here is that Husserl has pointed to two types of group presentations, and argued that they are not identical to each other. On the one hand, we have authentic group presentations. On the other hand, we have presentations of large groups, which at least seem to be performed in an instant. These latter are not the former, Husserl argues; instantaneous presentations of large groups are not “lightning fast”\(^6\) authentic presentations.

Husserl then proceeds to offer two more possibilities. First, he says, there are group presentations in which we begin to authentically present the group, but “break off” (after having intuited only a few members) “by forming the surrogate presentation: a total collection of objects which would be produced by fully carrying out the process just begun.”\(^6\) Might, perhaps, the instantaneous presentations of large groups, which we are seeking to understand, simply be this kind of presentation? Husserl answers in the negative. “What enables us to know that a ‘total collection’ is to be intended?” he asks. “For this nothing less would be necessary than the already realized subsumption of the sensible

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\(^6\) Husserl, *PA*, II, 197 (ET 209).

\(^6\) Ibid.
intuition of the group under the concept of group.\textsuperscript{62} In other words, if we (a) perceive some object, then (b) begin to authentically present it as a group, but (c) switch to presenting it as being the group we would authentically present were we to complete the process of authentically presenting it, we would (d) have to already have presented the group as a group. In other words, this proposal would not answer the question Husserl is asking: how can we present large groups as groups in the first place (especially when we do so apparently in an instant)?\textsuperscript{63}

Having now rejected two types of group presentations as explanations for our instantaneous presentations of large groups, Husserl then turns to a third.

The resolution of these difficulties will come more easily if we first also examine more closely those symbolic presentations of groups in which the inauthentic subsumption under the concept of group does not come about in instantaneous immediacy (or else under the mere mediation of the individual apprehensions of a few members of the group), but in which, rather there is accomplished by the authentically requisite psychical activities that which after all must be accomplished: namely, the successive apprehension (even though not the unitary grasping together) of all members of the group. It is to be expected that these symbolic presentations, as closer to the corresponding authentic ones, will form, as it were, the bridge between these latter and those other, more distant symbolizations.\textsuperscript{64}

These two sentences are highly significant, but also quite dense. We must, therefore, take some time in unpacking them. First, the presentation of a group by intuiting each of its

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. (ET 210).

\textsuperscript{63} Husserl does not specify whether a presentation of the type he has just described is authentic or symbolic. However, since it is not an authentic presentation of the whole, but a presentation of the whole on the basis of an authentic presentation of a part, it would seem to fall somewhere between authenticity and symbolicity. The question remains open (for the moment), whether Husserl would view a presentation that is only partially authentic as actually symbolic, or whether he holds that there is an intermediate category between authentic and symbolic presentation. Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that Husserl does not believe our instantaneous presentations of large groups to be identical with this kind of (partially-authentic) presentation.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 198 (ET 210).
members, but not uniting those intuitions into a single act, is not the full performance of an authentic presentation. This seems to be why Husserl calls it “symbolic.” That is, Husserl seems to be treating the dichotomy between authentic and symbolic presentations as strict or exclusive: if a presentation is not fully authentic, it counts as symbolic.

Second, we can see from the above quotation that some symbolic presentations are closer to being authentic than others. Husserl says that the presentation of a group by running through every member of the group, yet not uniting our intuitions of the members within a single act, is closer to being authentic than “those other, more distant symbolizations.”\(^65\) To which “symbolizations,” however, is he referring?

In the quotation above, Husserl mentions only two other kinds of group presentations. (a) He mentions the presentations that he is trying to understand (i.e., instantaneous presentations of large groups) by referring to those presentations “in which the inauthentic subsumption under the concept of group . . . come[s] about in instantaneous immediacy.”\(^66\) (b) He mentions those presentations in which we present a group as the group we would authentically present were we to complete the process of authentically presenting it (referring to the “inauthentic subsumption” of a group “under the concept of group” through “the mere mediation of the individual apprehensions of a few members of the group”).\(^66\) These, then, must be the “those other, more distant symbolizations.”\(^67\)

Three things become clear from this. (1) Husserl believes the presentation of a group as the group we would authentically present were we to complete the process (which we have

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\(^65\) Ibid.

\(^66\) Ibid.

\(^67\) Ibid.
just begun) of authentically presenting it to be symbolic. They are “more distant symbolizations” than the presentations—which he calls “symbolic”—in which we intuit every member of a group but do not unite those intuitions into a single act.\textsuperscript{68} A presentation that is a “more distant symbolization” than a symbolic presentation must itself be symbolic.

(2) Husserl believes the presentations he is trying to understand—in which we instantaneously present a large group as a group—to be symbolic. They likewise are “more distant symbolizations” than the presentations—which he calls “symbolic”—in which we intuit every member of a group, but do not unite those intuitions into a single act.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, Husserl later refers to the instantaneous presentations of large groups as “inauthentic apprehensions of groups [\textit{uneigentlichen Mengenauffassungen}]”\textsuperscript{70} and “inauthentic presentations of groups [\textit{uneigentlichen Mengenvorstellungen}].”\textsuperscript{71}

(3) It would be safe to conclude (though Husserl does not say this) that a presentation of a large group as the group we would authentically present were we to complete the process of authentically presenting it is closer to being authentic than an instantaneous presentation

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70} Husserl writes: “Our theory of the inauthentic apprehension of groups also explains the fact, noticed by \textit{Stumpf}, that ‘. . . the accurate differentiation of one plurality from another already . . . <is> a higher function than the perception of a plurality in general.’ (\textit{Tonpsychologie}, Vol. II, p. 371) That perception is certainly, as a rule, a symbolic one, mediated through the figural character of the whole intuitive unity of the group; and there then occurs no individual apprehension of the members of the group, as will in general be required for the purposes of an exact comparison of the group with other groups, or for its enumeration” (ibid., 212, n. 1 (ET 224, n. 10). On the issue of “figural characters,” see below.

\textsuperscript{71} “The conceptualization of those inauthentic presentations of groups here considered is usually accompanied by a few steps of individual apprehension of some of the members of the group” (ibid., 212 (ET 225). However, it is not always so accompanied: “in the course of a thinking which proceeds more rapidly, external intuition also frequently can become the symbolic replacement for the authentic group presentation merely in virtue of its figural character—and without any rudimentary process” (ibid., 213–14 (ET 226)). On the issue of “figural characters,” see below.
of a large group as a group. This is because the presentation of a group as the group we would authentically present were we to complete the process of authentically presenting it contains the “rudiments”\(^{72}\) of an authentic presentation, while the instantaneous presentation of a large group as a group does not.\(^{73}\) A presentation that contains a partial authentic presentation must be closer to being authentic than a presentation which does not.

Therefore, we have gained an important insight into Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between authentic and symbolic presentations: (a) if a presentation is not completely authentic, then it is symbolic, and (b) there are a range of symbolic presentations, in which some are closer to being authentic than others. For example, a presentation of a large group by way of intuiting each member of the group, but not uniting the individual intuitions into a single act, is not fully authentic, and hence is symbolic. However, it is closer to being authentic than (i) a presentation of a large group as the group we would authentically present were we to complete the process of authentically presenting it, which, in its turn, is closer to being authentic than (ii) a presentation of a large group as a group in a single instant.

In summary, Husserl has introduced us to four types of group presentations, which we can now list in order of distance from authenticity:

1. authentic group presentations
2. symbolic group presentations in which we intuit each member of the group, but do not unite the intuitions into a single act
3. symbolic group presentations in which only the rudiments of an authentic presentation are performed

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 197 (ET 209).

\(^{73}\) Or, rather, it need not (as we saw above [pp. 182–83], and as Husserl says on \(PA\), II, 213–14 [ET 226]).
Husserl’s goal in all of this has been to understand how type (4) presentations (those in which we instantaneously present a large group as a group) are possible. First, he rejected the possibility of identifying type (4) presentations with type (1) presentations (those in which we authentically present a group). Second, he rejected the possibility of identifying type (4) presentations with type (3) presentations (those in which we symbolically present the group on the basis of authentically presenting part of the group). Now, Husserl asks whether we might identify type (4) presentations with type (2) presentations (those in which we symbolically present the group by intuiting each of its members, without uniting the individual intuitions into a single overarching act).

What if, Husserl asks, we ran through a large group extremely quickly, but did not hold all our intuitions of the individual members together in one act? Could this be what we are doing when we present a large group as a group in “one glance”? Husserl, once again, answers in the negative, “for reasons similar to those earlier applied to the analogous supposition” that when we instantaneously present a large group, we have performed a very fast authentic presentation. Such a process is simply not possible for the human mind to perform so quickly.

Finally, Husserl asks, what if we begin such a process of intuiting each member of the group (without uniting the individual intuitions within one act), “but break off immediately by forming the surrogate presentation: a totality of objects which the process just begun

74 Husserl, PA, II, 199–200 (ET 212).
75 Ibid., 200 (ET 212).
would, in its full execution, bring to successive individual apprehension”?” Might this be what we are doing when we instantaneously present a large group as a group? Husserl’s answer, once again, is negative. “It is clear that nothing less would be required than the already realized subsumption of the intuition before us under the concept of group.” That is, to be able to symbolically present a group as the group we would symbolically present, were we to complete the process of intuiting each of its members (without uniting those intuitions into a single act), we would have to have already presented the group in question as a group. But what we are trying to explain is how we can recognize a large group as a group in the first place.

Though Husserl does not say it, those group presentations in which we present the whole on the basis of intuiting a few members (without uniting those intuitions into a single act) must be symbolic. This is because they do not come as close to being authentic as a symbolic presentation in which every member of the group is intuited (but the intuitions are not united into a single overarching act). Rather than presenting the group on the basis of having intuited every member, they present the group on the basis of having intuited only a few members. Thus, they are farther from being authentic than a type presentation that Husserl calls symbolic, and therefore we must conclude that Husserl would call them symbolic as well.

76 Ibid. This is similar to the second type of presentation Husserl examined and rejected above (those based on the partial performance of an authentic presentation of the group). However, it is not the same. It is based not on the partial performance of an authentic presentation of the group, but on the partial performance of a symbolic (though nearly authentic) presentation of the group.

77 Ibid.
Furthermore, a symbolic presentation of a group as the group we would present were we to complete the process of intuiting its members (without uniting those intuitions into an overarching act) must be even further from authentic than those symbolic presentations in which we symbolically present the whole on the basis of an authentic presentation of a part. Rather than authentically presenting a part (by intuiting a few members and uniting those intuitions into a single act directed upon the subgroup formed by those members), they symbolically present a part (by intuiting a few members without uniting those intuitions into an authentic presentation of the subgroup formed by those members). And, we must assume, a symbolic presentation of a group based upon a symbolic presentation of part of the group is further from authenticity than a symbolic presentation of a group based upon an authentic presentation of part of the group.

Moreover, since we have just learned that the instantaneous presentations of large groups are not identical with those in which we intuit some of the members of the group, it would seem we must understand them as being even further from authentic. After all, a symbolic presentation of a group in which none of the members are individually intuited must be further from authentic than one in which some of the members are individually intuited. We can, therefore, arrange the group presentations Husserl has been discussing in order of distance from authenticity as follows.

(1) authentic group presentations
(2) symbolic (but nearly authentic) group presentations, in which we do intuit all the members of the group, but do not unite all those intuitions into a single act
(3) symbolic group presentations based upon a partial presentation of type (1)
(4) symbolic group presentations based upon a partial presentation of type (2)
(5) instantaneous symbolic presentations of large groups.
However, we still seem to be no closer to understanding exactly what this last type of presentation is. We have simply discovered four things it is not.

“Only one way out is conceivable here,” Husserl concludes.

In the intuition of the sensible group there must be present immediately graspable indications [Anzeichen] through which its character as group can be recognized, in that they indirectly guarantee that the process described above can be realized. With these indications [Anzeichen], then, the name and concept of the group could also be immediately associated.78

Perhaps, Husserl is saying, there is something in our experience of sensible groups that acts as a sign that what we are seeing is a group, because it (a) tells us that we are actually seeing a plurality of objects by (b) “guaranteeing” that we could engage in a process of serially intuiting a plurality of objects (even without uniting the individual intuitions into a single act). If we intuit some sensible whole, and discover in its appearance a certain “indication” that we associate with the process of serially intuiting multiple objects, in other words, this can lead us to understand the whole we are intuiting as a group.

What, however, could such an indication or sign be? Husserl offers three options. First, perhaps the relations between the members of the group “fuse into fixed unities which would then impart to the whole appearance of the group an immediately perceptible specific character—a sense perceptible quality of second order, so to speak.” He continues:

These quasi-qualitative characters . . . could then provide the support for the association [between our intuition of the group as a unitary whole, and the concept of groups] in each case. They would indirectly guarantee the existence of a relational complex, and therewith that of a multiplicity of relational terms founding it.79

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78 Ibid., 201 (ET 213). I have altered Willard’s rendering of Anzeichen (as “tokens”) to “indications,” for the sake of consistency with Findlay’s rendering of Anzeichen (as “indications”) in LU.

79 Ibid., 201 (ET 213–14).
Second, perhaps “in the unitary intuition of the group, . . . the intuitively separated group members themselves” (“or some abstract positive Moments in them”) fuse with each other, (or “with the ‘background’”). Third, perhaps the signs in question arise sometimes from the fusion of the members’ relations with each other, sometimes from the fusion of the members (or their properties) with each other (or with the background), and sometimes from both types of fusion simultaneously.

A sense-perceptible group, therefore, Husserl proposes, might have a “pronounced characteristic” or “perceptible quality” produced by the fact that the members of the group (or their relations) perceptually fuse with each other (or with the background). That is, sense-perceptible groups might have the “look” of being a fusion of independent, individual objects, even when we see those groups as singular wholes. Over time, we might repeatedly see an object that has the “perceptible quality” of being a fusion of individual member objects, and then run through its member objects in processes of serial intuition. Eventually, we could begin to associate that “perceptible quality” with the process of serial intuition. That is, if we see what appears to us to be a singular whole, and yet that whole has the telltale look of being a fusion of individual members, we might experience an immediate association with the process of intuiting a plurality of individual objects.

Furthermore, Husserl continues, a second association would arise. If we come to experience the look of fusion that sense-perceptible groups have with the process of serially intuiting a plurality of individual objects, then we would also come to associate the look of

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80 Ibid., 202 (ET 214).
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 202–3 (ET 215).
fusion “with the concept group.” Thus, when we see a sense-perceptible object that has a certain kind of “perceptible quality” (produced by the fusion of its individual member objects [or their relations] with each other [or with the background]), we would experience an association with the concept of group. This would be what allows us to “immediate[ly] recogni[ze] as a group . . . what is at first a unitary sensible intuition.”

In confirmation of this hypothesis, Husserl points to “the language of common life.” We do not just speak of “soldiers,” “apples,” “trees,” “hens,” “birds,” and “geese,” but also “of a file of soldiers, of a heap of apples, of a row of trees, of a covey of hens, of a flight of birds, of a gaggle of geese, and so on.” This shows, Husserl claims, that there is “a certain characteristic property of the unitary total intuition of the group, which can be grasped at one glance.” In such cases, we have a “certain [distribution] of objects within the visual field” which presents what Husserl calls a “configuration” or “figural Moment”—something “that we grasp . . . just like we do a quality: in one glance.” In fact, Husserl says:

Each variation in relations of position [between the group’s members] conditions a variation in the figure, and conversely. But we observe the variation of the figure before it comes to our consciousness that these or those positions have been changed.

That is, we can be aware of the configuration of a group (its “figural moment”) prior to being aware of the individual members within the group that are so configured. For example, in “arbitrary cases of simple or complex sequential orders,” Husserl writes:

The intuition of the whole is modified, depending on whether the particular terms and the particular sequences are closer together or further apart, are equally

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83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 203–4 (ET 216).
85 Ibid., 205 (ET 217).
spaced out, or whether they run parallel to each other or at an angle. The figural Moment leaps out at us immediately, and only on subsequent reflection do we notice the conditioning relations, changing as they do from case to case.\textsuperscript{86}

Therefore, Husserl argues that we come to associate these configurations, or “figural moments,” with the concept of groups.

If we have in fact carried out the traversive process of exhaustive (or supposedly exhaustive) apprehension of the individuals in many discrete distributions of objects within the visual field, eventually we come to recognize immediately each new distribution—and even without that process—as a group. The analogy of all the configurations to each other—or the analogy with respect to complex Moments that easily ground recognizable group-types—mediates the association [between the given figural moment and the concept of group].\textsuperscript{87}

Here Husserl claims there is an “analogy” between all figural moments; all figural moments are “recognizable” similar. Thus, wherever we “recognize” a figural moment, we experience an association with the concept of groups, because of the associations we have experienced between figural moments and the activity of running through the members of groups one-by-one in the past.

Husserl then turns back to “the examples from which we set out.”

[T]he figural character led to special names such as “file”, “herd”, “flight”, etc. Two files, herds, or flights are never exactly the same; but their similarity grounds the genus concepts, which, directly cognized, then also mediate the direct knowledge of the character \textit{group}.\textsuperscript{88}

Thus, we see that, for Husserl, we can instantaneously recognize large groups as groups because we can instantaneously take some aspect of their total appearance—some “figural moment”—as a sign that they are a group.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 212 (ET 224).

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
This, then, is Husserl’s basic “theory of the inauthentic apprehension of groups [uneigentlichen Mengenauffassungen].”\textsuperscript{89} However, he also notes that many symbolic presentations of sensible groups depend on a combination of the group’s figural moment with “a few steps of individual apprehension of some of the members of the group.”\textsuperscript{90} Not all symbolic presentations of groups need such “rudimentary processes”;\textsuperscript{91} the symbolic presentation of a group can be founded on the figural moment alone. Nevertheless, the symbolic presentation of a group can rest on both that group’s figural moment and the partial, serial intuition of some of the group’s members.

Furthermore, Husserl claims that “even in the apprehension of small groups, where an authentic collocation can still be spoken of, figural Moments often play a not inconsiderable role. Any, even the smallest, group . . . is characterized as an intuitive unity by a figural Moment.”\textsuperscript{92} Therefore, while we require figural moments in order to present large sensible groups as groups (rather than as single individuals), we can also employ them to represent small sensible groups as groups. The fact that we can authentically present a sensible group need not keep us from symbolically presenting it.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 212, n. 1 (ET 224, n. 10). Husserl also calls the instantaneous presentations of large groups, with which he has been concerning himself, “inauthentic presentations of groups [uneigentlichen Mengenvorstellungen]” on ibid., 212 (ET 225).

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 212 (ET 225).

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 214 (ET 226).

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 216 (ET 228).

\textsuperscript{93} In these cases, therefore, we could move from a symbolic presentation of a group to an authentic presentation of that same group, and thus we could experience fulfillment. In the case of larger groups, fulfillment would be impossible, since authentic presentations of larger groups are impossible; but in the case of smaller groups, authentic presentations are possible, and thus fulfillment should be as well. However, Husserl does not discuss this issue.
We must ask, however, in what sense such presentations are inauthentic (i.e., symbolic). When we instantaneously recognize a large group as a group, the reason our presentation is symbolic is not that we take its figural moment as a sign of the group. The figural moment is a sign of the group’s “group character” — that is, it signals that what we are intuiting is a group — but is not a sign of the group itself. Our presentation of the group is symbolic, then, because our consciousness of the group as a group is mediated by the group’s figural moment, not because we see something other than the group which acts as a sign for the group. Rather than authentically presenting the group — intuiting each member of the group, and uniting the individual intuitions into one overarching act — we intuit the group as a whole, and take it to be a group (rather than a single individual) because we associate its figural moment with the process of serially intuiting multiple objects. Therefore, though we see the group directly, our consciousness of it as a group is (in some sense) indirect, and hence our presentation of it as a group is inauthentic or symbolic.

94 Husserl writes: “In the intuition of the sensible group there must be present immediately graspable indications through which its character as a group can be recognized, in that they indirectly guarantee that the process described above can be realized. With these indications, then, the name and concept of the group could also be immediately associated” (PA, II, 201 [ET 213]). I have replaced Willard’s “tokens” (for Anzeichen) with “indications,” for the sake of consistency with Findlay’s rendering of Anzeichen (as “indications”) in LU.

95 Husserl writes: “Since from early life on we have run through apprehensions of individuals with the most heterogeneous types of sensible groups, those characteristics (or else their various generic types) had to become associated with the concept of such processes — and, in further consequence, with the concept group — and to thus erect in each case the bridge to the immediate recognition as a group of what is at first a unitary sensible intuition of the type here considered” (ibid., 203 [ET 215]). Later, he adds: “If we have in fact carried out the traversive process of exhaustive (or supposedly exhaustive) apprehension of the individuals in many discrete distributions of objects with the visual field, eventually we come to recognize immediately each new distribution — and even without that process — as a group. The analogy of all the configurations to each other — or the analogy with respect to complex Moments that easily ground recognizable group-types — mediates the association” (ibid., 212 [ET 224]).

96 On the indirectness of the consciousness involved, see n. 94, above. Husserl, however, seems to have no qualms about speaking of knowledge as simultaneously mediated and direct: “Two files, herds, or flights are never exactly the same; but their similarity grounds the genus concepts, which directly cognized, then also mediate the direct knowledge of the character group” (ibid., 212 [ET 224]). That is, when we see
Thus, we see that Husserl’s definition of a “symbolic or inauthentic presentation” as “a presentation by means of signs,” in which “a content is not directly given to us as that which it is, but rather only indirectly through signs which univocally characterize it” requires nuancing.\textsuperscript{97} In the symbolic or inauthentic presentations of large groups which Husserl has described, the groups are “directly given to us”—that is, we intuit them—but not “as that which [they are].” We do not intuit them as groups, but as mere sensuous objects.\textsuperscript{98} It is their figural moments “which univocally characterize [them]” as being groups;\textsuperscript{99} the figural moments are what “clue us in” (as it were) to the fact that the things we are intuiting are in fact groups. Thus, our presentations of them as groups (a) go beyond what we in fact intuit, and (b) involve a kind of signal or sign. It is in this sense that they are inauthentic or symbolic.

The symbolic group presentations that Husserl is studying, then, are not like the symbolic group presentations, “the United States Congress, who meet down on Capitol Hill,” or “the coins I left in my car.” They are not symbolic in the sense of being based on a sign for the group being presented. Rather, they involve an intuition of the group in question, and thus are more authentic than symbolic presentations based on mere descriptions would be. In something (through its figural moment) as a file, herd, or flight, we are enabled to recognize it as a group, and this knowledge is not indirect like it would be if we were simply informed that the file, herd, or flight is a group. We see the group; we do not just hear about it. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the file, herd, or flight’s group character is more indirect than it would be if we were to authentically present the group.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 193 (ET 205).

\textsuperscript{98} Husserl writes: “Since from early life on we have run through apprehensions of individuals with the most heterogeneous types of sensible groups, those characteristics (or else their various generic types) had to become associated with the concept of such processes—and, in further consequence, with the concept group—and to thus erect in each case the bridge to the immediate recognition as a group of what is at first a unitary sensible intuition of the type here considered” (ibid., 203 [ET 215]).

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 193 (ET 205).
fact, because they involve intuition and are more authentic than mere descriptions, they might remind us of image intentions in LI. Images provide us with an intuition of the imaged object, and thus are more filled than mere meaning-intentions; nevertheless, they invite further fulfillment. Perhaps, then, we should understand our instantaneous presentations of large groups in a similar way. However, one might argue that in the instantaneous presentation of a large group, we have an intuition of the group itself, and thus our presentation is even more intuitive than an image intention would be.

That Husserl would call a presentation “symbolic” in PA, even though it involves an intuition of the presented object itself, while calling image intentions “intuitive” in LI, points to an important shift in his thinking. In PA, if a presentation is not fully authentic, it is symbolic, and there are a range of symbolic presentations (with some being closer to authenticity, and others being further from authenticity). In LI, on the other hand, there are a range of both intuitive (filled) and signitive (empty) intentions, such that an intention need not be completely filled to be intuitive, nor completely empty to be signitive.

However, we should not use PA’s understanding of the symbolic presentation of large groups only as an occasion to contrast PA with LI. To see what we would miss if we focused solely on the differences, we need simply to recall LI’s discussion of inauthentic thinking.100 As we saw above (chapter 2),101 an act of inauthentic thinking is an empty categorial intention in which the picking out and uniting of parts within the categorial whole does not fully take place. The object may be intuitively given, but we may only mentally

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100 See, e.g., Husserl, LU, VI, §§63–64.

gesture at it as a categorically-formed structure in a “languid” fashion. Thus, even if the object is intuitively present to us, we may not actually undertake the acts that would genuinely fulfill our categorial intention of it. We would then have not an authentic thought of the object (a fulfilled categorial intention), but an inauthentic thought (an empty categorial intention). Husserl’s description of the instantaneous presentation of large groups is very similar—perhaps even identical. In such inauthentic presentations, we have the group itself before us and yet do not (perhaps because we cannot) perform the mental acts necessary to authentically present it as a group. Nevertheless, we do present it as a group, and do enjoy an intuition of it.

Thus, perhaps the most striking thing about Husserl’s understanding of the instantaneous presentations of large groups is the extent of similarity it reveals between PA’s theory of authentic and symbolic presentation and LI’s theory of filled and empty intentions. Not only does the theory of authentic and symbolic presentations parallel the theory of filled and empty intentions by including the notion of a range of more or less symbolic (i.e., more or less signitive or empty) presentations, but it also seems to have strong affinities with what we might see as the culmination in LI of Husserl’s theory of filled and empty intentions: his theory of authentic and inauthentic thinking.103

102 Here we are paraphrasing Sokolowski: “In the languid use of formal terms, in sensuous association, and in mere mention, the underlying acts do not get to work and coincide, so registration does not take place. An empty intending of a state of affairs is fulfilled when the underlying acts do get to work, when the articulation and coincidence come to pass, and the actual registration occurs—when we begin to think about what is before us” (Husserlian Meditations, §17, 55).

103 On the theory of authentic and inauthentic presentation as the culmination of Husserl’s epistemology in LI (which epistemology is founded upon the distinction between empty and filled intentions), see chapter 2, above, pp. 104–12.
At the conclusion of chapter eleven, Husserl addresses two issues: (1) whether we can carry out arithmetical operations on groups that are only symbolically presented, and (2) whether his theory of symbolically presented groups changes the basic concept of groups. As regards the first issue, Husserl says that it is possible, in a certain sense, to perform arithmetical operations on symbolically presented groups. He writes:


[O]ne can . . . extend the concepts of the elemental operations and relations to symbolically presented multiplicities in which once again the figural Moments will often serve as mediators.\(^\text{104}\)

He then proceeds to describe how addition, partition, and comparison would work if we were dealing with symbolically presented groups, rather than authentically presented groups.

Beginning with addition, Husserl assumes that two sense-perceptible groups take on a shared figural moment if we place them side-by-side. We can then use the new figural moment to symbolically present the “additive conjunction” of the two groups. Figural moments can serve, therefore, to present inauthentically not only each of the two basic groups but also the combination of the two into a larger whole. The combination itself can be inauthentically presented by a figural moment.\(^\text{105}\) Even if we perform no actual operation of addition, then, we can still symbolically present the result of such an operation.

Next, Husserl describes partitioning. A sensible group as a whole has a figural moment, through which we can symbolically present the group as a whole. However, Husserl assumes that the parts of a sensible group can also have figural moments. Therefore, we can symbolically present not only the whole group through its figural moment, but also

105 Ibid. (ET 229–30).
the parts of the group through their figural moments. The partitioning of the whole can be inauthentically presented by figural moments. Thus, even if we perform no actual operation of partitioning—we might neither authentically present the whole, nor authentically present its parts as if they were separate wholes—we can still symbolically present the result of such an operation.  

Besides discussing symbolic addition and partitioning, Husserl also describes inauthentic ways of comparing groups. Such comparisons can be carried out in two ways. First, we could attempt to pair each member of one group with a member of the other. If one (or more) members of one group remains unpaired with a member of the other, then the group with the unpaired member is the greater. If there are no unpaired members on either side, then the two groups are equal. 

Alternatively, we can count the members of a group, simply by running through the series of number names (“one,” “two,” “three,” etc.). The name we reach upon “counting” the final member of the group will signify the number of members in that group. We can then perform the same process with the other group, and compare the resulting numbers. If the number corresponding to one group is the same as the number corresponding to the other, then the groups are equal. If the numbers we reach in counting the two groups differ, then the group with the larger number is the greater.

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107 Ibid., 218 (ET 230).
108 For Husserl’s discussion of this process, see ibid., I, 106–10 (ET 111–15).
109 Ibid., II, 218 (ET 230). See also, ibid., I, 104–6 (ET 109–11). This is the “symbolic” method of counting, which we will discuss in greater depth below.
In neither of these ways of comparing groups do we authentically present the groups to be compared. Therefore, we do not actually compare the groups themselves. Rather, we compare them via proxies, and allow that symbolic process to stand in for the actual comparison. In pairing the members of the two groups, or in counting the two groups using the number name series, we symbolically present a comparison of the two groups—and even discover what the result of such a comparison would be—and yet do not actually perform that comparison.

Then, Husserl turns to the second issue: does his theory of symbolically presented groups change the basic concept of groups? He says it does not. “[T]he modifications which the multiplicity presentation undergoes through all of the symbolizations described do not affect its logical content.” He continues:

Multiplicity remains the concept of a whole, of a determinate collection of separate contents. Only, in the cases now considered, the segregation of contents and their collocation, instead of coming to actual realization, remains either wholly or for the most part a mere intention [bloße Intention].

Here Husserl says that in symbolically presenting a multiplicity, we have the “mere intention” of “the segregation” and “collocation” of the members of the multiplicity, rather than the “actual realization” of this segregation and collocation. We do not actually, distinctly present each member, and then unite each with all the others in a single presentation. Instead, we merely intend to do so, in some sense. In the symbolic presentation of a multiplicity, our intention to bring the multiplicity to authentic presentation remains “empty,” as it were, but it intends the very same multiplicity that we would have given to us if we were to achieve the authentic presentation.

110 Ibid., II, 218 (ET 230).
What Husserl says here can be profitably compared to what he says in *LI* about inauthentic thinking (which we discussed above, in chapter 2). Acts of inauthentic thinking are empty categorial intentions, which are empty because they are not fully executed. They are acts of thinking that remain potential, to some extent—rather than being completely actualized—and bringing them to fulfillment involves fully, distinctly executing them. The situation is similar with the symbolic presentation of groups in *PA*. In the quotation above, Husserl speaks of the symbolic presentation of a group as a presentation in which the explicit noticing of each member, and the uniting of all members by one second order act, are merely intended, rather than actually executed. That is, the symbolic presentation of the group involves an intention to authentically present the group, but that intention remains unfulfilled.

§22. Critique: Miller on Husserl’s Theory of Figural Moments

In *Numbers in Presence and Absence*, Phillip Miller questions Husserl’s argument that large sensuous multiplicities must be presented symbolically through their figural moments. Miller’s critique involves two objections. First, he says that it seems illegitimate to infer from a sensible object’s figural moment that the object is a group. Second, he argues

111 See esp. pp. 106–8, above.

112 What Husserl says here fits very well with his later technical theory of intention and fulfillment, even though he is using (a) the term “intention” in a more volitional sense than he usually does in *LU*, and (b) the term “realization” instead of “fulfillment.” Furthermore, it is interesting to note that this is the closest we have come to seeing Husserl discuss fulfillment, and yet what he is actually doing is discussing a case (the inauthentic presentation of a group) in which fulfillment does not occur.
that when we experience large sensuous groups, we experience those groups themselves, not just their figural moments. We will examine his two objections in turn.

Explaining his first objection, Miller writes:

It is difficult to see how the configuration [i.e., the figural moment] by itself could ever be said to serve as a sign ‘through which the group character can be known’ (PA 201). In some situations, we might indeed take the features of an object as a sign of the object. For example, we might take the chemical properties of an unknown body as a sign that the body in question is aluminum (cf. PA 3[40] f.). But for this inference to be plausible, the chemical properties in question would have to be true characteristics of aluminum. A moment of configuration, however, is not truly characteristic of a sensuous group. A material thing and a sensuous group of three items might both exhibit a ‘triangular’ figure; they would have the same figural moment, even though the former obviously would not be a sensuous group at all.113

Miller’s argument, here, is as follows. If we are examining an object of whose type we are unaware, the characteristics of the object can act as a sign for us, on the basis of which we infer the object’s type. His example—from Husserl’s unpublished essay of 1890 (or 1891),114 “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”—involves a piece of metal. If we do not know

113 Miller, NPA, 50. Miller’s second citation is of “PA 304 f.,” but was evidently meant to be a citation of “PA 340 f.” Hua XII (to which Miller refers as “PA”), pp. 340–5 makes no reference to aluminum, while Hua XII, pp. 340–1, contains the passage to which Miller seems to be referring. It reads as follows. “[W]e take any conceptual mark [begriffliche Merkmal]—so far as it serves, precisely as a distinguishing mark [sofern es eben als Merkmal dient]—to be a sign [als Zeichen]. Any characteristic [Beschaffenheit] whatsoever, whether it be an absolute or relative one, can upon occasion serve as the signitive mark [Merkzeichen] for objects that possess it. This obviously is the source of the equivocation in the term ‘mark’ [Merkmal]: In its original signification it meant the same as ‘sign’ [Zeichen]. But then it was constricted to cover characteristics as signs, in order finally—in an extended sense—to signify the same thing as characteristic in general. However, a characteristic does not in all circumstances serve us as a mark, even though any characteristic can serve that purpose upon occasion. At one time we are interested, for example, in the characteristics of aluminium [die Beschaffenheiten des Aluminiums] as such, so far as they enrich our knowledge of this metal. But at other times just those very same properties, confirmed as belonging to an as of yet unknown body, can serve as the signitive mark [Merkzeichen] to determine that the body is, precisely, aluminium.” Edmund Husserl, “Zur Logik Der Zeichen (Semiotik),” in Hua XII, 340–1. English translation: “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic),” in Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. Dallas Willard, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, vol. 5 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 21. “On the Logic of Signs” is dated to 1890 by Eley (“Logik der Zeichen,” 340, n. 1), but to “very late 1890, or, better, 1891” by Willard (“Logic of Signs,” 20, n. 1).

114 See the end of n. 113, above.
that the piece of metal is aluminum, but do know that the piece of metal has the characteristics of aluminum, we can take these characteristics “as a sign that the body in question is aluminum.” That is, Miller says, we can use the characteristics to infer that the piece of metal is aluminum.

Miller then argues that figural moments are not like the objective characteristics of aluminum. While the objective characteristics of aluminum (at least, in toto) belong to aluminum alone, figural moments can belong to both groups and single individuals (i.e., non-groups). Thus, Miller claims, an object’s having a particular figural moment gives us no grounds for inferring that the object is a group, and this means that figural moments cannot act as signs for us that the objects to which they belong are groups.

Miller’s first objection rests on the following two assumptions. (a) To experience a figural moment as a sign that the object to which it belongs is a group, is to infer from its figural moment that the object in question is a group. (b) All figural moments of groups are, or at least can be, identical to the figural moments of individual objects (i.e., non-groups). These two assumptions, however, face certain important questions.

First, we might question Miller’s assumption that to experience a figural moment as a sign is to make an inference. Does Husserl in fact believe that when we experience an object’s figural moment as a sign that the object is a group, we are inferring the object’s group character from its figural moment? Might he not, alternatively, simply hold that we associate (certain) figural moments with groups? Husserl speaks, in PA, of an association between an object’s figural moment and the object’s being a group, but I have found no

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place in which he speaks of our making an inference on the basis of an object’s figural moment.

Furthermore, when Husserl says that a figural moment acts as a sign, in PA, he uses the word “indication” (Anzeichen).\textsuperscript{116} Later, in LI, Husserl argues that indication (Anzeige, Hinweis) and inference (Folgerung, Beweis) are phenomenally distinct.\textsuperscript{117} The experience of indication, Husserl claims in LI, is something more immediate and basic than the experience of inference. When we experience something as an indication-sign for something else, we make no inference; rather, we are simply “motivated” by the existence of the indication-sign to believe in the existence of what the indication-sign signifies. We (immediately and unreflectively) experience the two as associated.\textsuperscript{118}

We should not attempt to impose LI’s theory of indication and inference onto PA. Nevertheless, we have appealed to LI in order to show that there may be an alternative to the first assumption on which Miller’s first objection to Husserl’s theory of figural moments rests. (Miller’s first objection is that it seems illegitimate to say we infer from an object’s figural moment that the object is a group. The first assumption on which this objection rests is that to take an object’s figural moment as a sign that the object is a group, is to infer that the object is a group from its figural moment.) It is not immediately clear, therefore, that we must accept that assumption.

\textsuperscript{116} Husserl writes: “In the intuition of the sensible group there must be present immediately graspable indications [Anzeichen] through which its character as group can be recognized. . . . With these indications [Anzeichen], then, the name and concept of the group could also be immediately associated” (ibid. [ET 213]). I have replaced Willard’s “tokens” (for Anzeichen) with “indications,” for the sake of consistency with Findlay’s rendering of Anzeichen (as “indications”) in LU.

\textsuperscript{117} Husserl, LU, I, §3.

\textsuperscript{118} See above, chapter 1, §2, pp. 14–20.
We now turn to the second assumption on which Miller’s first objection rests. As we saw above, Miller writes:

A moment of configuration, however, is not truly characteristic of a sensuous group. A material thing and a sensuous group of three items might both exhibit a ‘triangular’ figure; they would have the same figural moment, even though the former obviously would not be a sensuous group at all.\textsuperscript{119}

Here, Miller claims that both sensuous groups and individuals can have figural moments that are “the same.” Miller’s example is a “triangular” figural moment that belongs both to a group of three and to a triangular individual. However, Miller seems to mean this as but a typical example; that is, he seems to assume that any figural moment belonging to any group could conceivably also belong to some individual object. Therefore, one cannot make a legitimate inference from the fact that an object has a particular figural moment to the fact that the object is a group.

In response to Miller’s example, we might ask two questions. First, does Husserl believe we are making an inference when we take a figural moment as a sign that the object to which it belongs is a group? Second, could a group of three objects in fact have “the same” figural moment as some individual triangular object? In response to the second question, we note the following.

The figural moment of a group of three objects would be produced by the apparent fusion of those three objects. The figural moment of a triangular physical object, on the other hand, would (presumably) be produced by the apparent fusion of its three sides or edges. Would the way three independent objects appear to fuse in a unitary intuition be the same as the way three connected sides or edges appear to fuse in a unitary intuition?

\textsuperscript{119} Miller, \textit{NPA}, 50.
If there is a difference between the way independent objects appear to fuse in the unitary intuition of a sensuous group, and the way the various aspects of an individual object appear to fuse in the unitary intuition of a sensuous individual, then the figural moments of groups and individuals might never be specifically identical. Therefore, it is not immediately clear that we must accept the second assumption on which Miller’s first objection to Husserl’s theory of figural moments rests. (Miller’s first objection is that it seems illegitimate to say we infer from an object’s figural moment that the object is a group. The second assumption on which this objection rests is that the figural moments of sensuous groups can also belong to sensuous individuals.) Furthermore, since it is not immediately clear that we must accept either of the assumptions on which Miller’s first objection rests, it is not immediately clear that we must accept Miller’s first objection itself.

In his second objection to Husserl’s theory of figural moments, Miller questions the idea that when we experience a group through its figural moment, we never experience the group itself.

By saying that we first experience the figural moment, then take it as a sign of the sensuous group, Husserl seems to be suggesting that the sensuous group itself is not actually present to us at all, that it is merely inferred on the basis of the figural moment.\textsuperscript{120} Miller asserts that this understanding of our experience of sensuous groups is “surely . . . incorrect.”

When we ‘see’ a group in a single glance, it is precisely the group itself that we see. The group itself is present to us, not something else which allows us to infer the group character of what we see.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
Once again, I would question Miller’s reading of Husserl.

As we discussed above, Husserl believes that we first see sensuous groups as wholes. Their parts then begin to stand out as independent member objects, which motivates us to reunite them within a unitary, explicit group presentation. Thus, the authentic presentation of a sensuous group has, in Husserl’s account, three stages: (1) initial holistic intuition of the group as a single, individual object; (2) subsequent explication of the group into multiple, individually-noted objects; (3) attempted reintegration of the objects with each other into a whole (within a unitary presentation).

In the case of larger groups, Husserl denies the possibility of reintegration, not the possibility of initial intuition. We see the group itself (stage one: initial intuition) and somehow already know it is a group without having completed the process of authentically presenting the group (which would require us to pass through stages two and three: explication and reintegration). Even though what we actually intuit is, in some sense, just an undifferentiated object, on a level with any individual object, we are somehow aware that we are seeing a group.

Our ability to see the group, therefore, is not in question for Husserl. It is only because we see the group, after all, that its figural moment appears; its figural moment is one aspect of the group’s appearance. What is in question is how we can intuit large groups as groups. The problem that figural moments solve, for Husserl, is how we come to be aware

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122 See above, pp. 179–80.

123 “Multiplicity remains the concept of a whole, of a determinate collection of separate contents. Only, in the cases now considered, the segregation of contents and their collocation, instead of coming to actual realization, remains either wholly or for the most part a mere intention [bloße Intention]” (Husserl, PA., II, 218 [ET 230]).
that the object we are seeing is a group (rather than an individual), without having articulated it into its members, and then reunited those members within a single group presentation.

Therefore, I would argue that Miller goes too far when he says that “Husserl seems to be suggesting that the [large] sensuous group itself is not actually present to us at all, that it is merely inferred on the basis of the figural moment.”¹²⁴ There is an important sense in which the group is not present to us, since we have not performed the categorial activity necessary to bring the group to genuine presence as a group.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, we intuit the group as an unarticulated object, and we know that it is a group (through its figural moment.) Therefore, there is also an important sense in which the group is present to us (since we intuit it), and even present as a group (since we know that what we are seeing is a group). This may not be a full, or completely genuine, presence, but it is a kind of presence.

In conclusion, while Miller has raised important challenges to Husserl’s account of the symbolic presentation of groups, it is not immediately clear that we must accept Miller’s objections. In fact, there would appear to be alternative ways of reading PA, which would lead us to question Miller’s critiques. We must, however, leave final resolution of these issues to another essay.

¹²⁴ Miller, NPA, 50.

¹²⁵ Husserl writes: “We must also guard against confusing the straightforward percepts of sensuously unified manifolds, series, swarms etc., with the conjunctive percepts in which alone the consciousness of plurality is itself properly constituted. I have tried to show in my Philosophy of Arithmetic how the sensuously unifying characters—I there called them ‘figural’ or ‘quasi-qualitative’ moments of sensuous intuitions—serve as signs of plurality. This means that they serve as sensuous points d’appui for the signitively mediated cognition of plurality as such, and of plurality of the kind in question—which cognition now has no need of an articulated grasp and knowledge of individual items, but does not therefore as yet posses the character of a genuine intuition of the collection as such” (LU, VI, §51, 689 [LI, 291–92]).
§23. Chapter Twelve: From Symbolic Presentations of Multiplicities to Symbolic Presentations of Numbers

At the beginning of chapter twelve, Husserl briefly discusses his reason for exploring our symbolic presentations of large groups. He writes:

The symbolic presentations of groups form the foundation for the symbolic presentations of numbers. Had we only the authentic presentations of groups, then the number series would at best end with twelve, and we would not even have the concept of a continuation beyond that.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 222 (ET 235).}

This quotation will require explication. As we saw in chapter five of \textit{PA}, we authentically present numbers by comparing and classifying authentically presented multiplicities in terms of equal, more, and less. However, in chapter eleven, Husserl argued that we can only authentically present the smaller groups we encounter (and thus we symbolically present the others). If we cannot authentically present certain groups, we cannot genuinely compare and classify them in terms of equal, more, and less, and so we cannot authentically present the numbers that correspond to them.

Nevertheless, Husserl says, “we . . . can say . . . that a determinate number accrues to” each and every group.\footnote{“To each concrete multiplicity, whether it be authentically or symbolically presented, there corresponds a determinate multiplicity of units: a number. . . . In the symbolic sense we thus can say of any arbitrary group that a determinate number accrues to it even before we have formed that number itself; indeed, even when we are not in a position to undertake the actual formation of it. Likewise we may with good reason state that two arbitrary groups must be of the same or of a different number, whether we can conceptualize the number or not” (ibid).} In other words, even if we cannot authentically present the number that “accrues” to a large group, we can at least symbolically present that number (as, for example, “The number that accrues to this group”). Therefore, that there are groups larger
than we can authentically present, and that numbers “accrue” to such large groups, reveals to us that the number series extends beyond the authentically presentable small numbers (which “accrue” to authentically presentable small groups). Our encounters with large groups, lead us to become (at least vaguely) aware of an entire—perhaps even infinite—range of large numbers, of which we will only ever have symbolic presentations.128

However, “[t]he remote symbolizations which we have attained to up to this point certainly can be of no use, given their vague generality, for the purpose of enumerating and calculating.”129 That is, a simple awareness that there are large numbers beyond the smaller ones we can authentically present, does not allow us to actually work with those larger numbers. Even symbolic presentations like, “Whatever number of members are in this large group,” would be too vague to have any practical function.

What we need, then, Husserl says, are “symbolic formations richer in content, which, coordinated in their rigorous distinctiveness with the true—but to us inaccessible—number concepts ‘in themselves,’ are well suited to stand in for those concepts.”130 That is, we need rigorous and distinct ways of symbolically presenting the numbers we cannot authentically present. Husserl devotes the rest of chapter twelve to describing how we develop these rigorous and distinct ways of symbolically presenting numbers.

128 “In a symbolic but wholly determinate sense we can speak of numbers where their authentic presentation is forever denied to us; and on this level we are even in position to establish the Ideal infinity of the realm of numbers”(ibid., 223 [ET 236]).

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid. Here we have one of many instances in which we can see Husserl’s tendency in PA to treat numbers as if they were concepts.
To begin, we might imagine that we are trying to present the number of members in each of several large groups, but can only authentically present the numbers up to ten.\footnote{Assuming that ten was the last authentically presentable number, then there are various possibilities for denumerating those groups that are not exhausted by the numbers up to ten (ibid., 224 [ET 236–37]).} Instead of symbolically presenting the numbers that accrue to those groups in a vague way (e.g., “Whatever number of members happen to be in this group,” “Whatever number corresponds to that group,” or, “The total number of members in that group”), we could partition each large group into two or more authentically-presentable subgroups.\footnote{Any arbitrary decomposition of the group—or any decomposition of it that is suggested by the character of the group intuition—into authentically enumerable partial groups leads to the symbolic construction of the concept of a number which is additively composed from the authentically presentable numbers of the partial groups. What we thus grasp in concrete cases we can generalize, and there result symbolic number formations such as ‘10 + 5,’ ‘9 + 6 + 8,’ ‘7 + 10 + 5,’ and the like (ibid. [ET 237]).} We might, to use Husserl’s examples, partition the first group into subgroups of ten and five, the second into subgroups of nine, six, and eight, and the third into subgroups of seven, ten, and five.\footnote{Ibid.} Our partitioning of each group, Husserl claims, would then “[lead] to the symbolic construction of the concept of a number which is additively composed from the authentically presentable numbers of the partial groups.”\footnote{Ibid.} For example, because we have partitioned the first group into subgroups of ten and five, we could now symbolically present the total number of its members as, “The number produced by summing ten and five” (or, as Husserl writes it, “10 + 5”). Likewise, because we have partitioned the second group into subgroups of nine, six, and eight, we could now symbolically present the total number of its members as, “The number produced by summing nine, six, and eight” (or, “9 + 6 + 8”). Finally,
because we have partitioned the third group into subgroups of seven, ten, and five, we could now symbolically present the total number of its members as, “The number produced by summing seven, ten, and five” (or, “7 + 10 + 5”).\textsuperscript{135}

In the foregoing examples, we have seen how we might replace vague, symbolic presentations like, “Whatever number of members happen to be in this large group,” with more distinct, though still symbolic, presentations like, “The number produced by summing nine, six, and eight.” This is a helpful advance, but it does not solve all of our difficulties.

First, when we articulate a larger number into a sum of smaller, authentically presentable numbers, it becomes possible for us to authentically present each and every part of the larger number. However, as Husserl puts it, “[i]n spite of the articulations, we can no longer hold such large groups of units clearly distinct in unitary presentation.”\textsuperscript{136} Thus, Husserl says, “an important function is fulfilled by the number names or number signs.” In fact, he continues:

> The composition of the signs is our crutch. As we reflect step by step upon their signification, the individual numbers in the sum enter our consciousness in the form of a determinate succession. Even if, as the new number turns up, the previous one blurs into obscurity—and, accordingly, the actually intended sum-presentation cannot be realized—we still have the sensible composition of the names (or written symbols) as the fixed framework within which the succession of the conceptual elements in the sum, mediated through the symbolization, can always be generated in the same determinate manner.\textsuperscript{137}

When we articulate a large number into a sum of smaller numbers, and then write the sum down, the signs we use help us, in a certain sense, to hold our various authentic presentations

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{136} Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 224 (ET 237).

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
of the smaller numbers together within a symbolic presentation of the larger number as a whole. For our symbolic presentations of large numbers to be distinct, therefore, we need not only to partition the groups to which they belong into authentically presentable subgroups, and thus to articulate the large numbers into sums of authentically presentable small numbers, but also to properly employ signs.

A further problem, noted by Husserl, is that “[o]ne and the same group admits of various articulations,” and thus its number also admits of various articulations. We might, to use Husserl’s examples, partition a group into subgroups of ten and five, and thus articulate its number as “10 + 5.” Alternatively, we might partition the same group into subgroups of nine and six, and thus articulate the same number as “9 + 6.” Likewise, we might partition the same group into subgroups of eight, two, and five, and thus articulate the same number as “8 + 2 + 5.” The problem is, Husserl says, that “one . . . would never suspect” that these three sums symbolically present the same number. That is, if we were just to “happen upon” the three sums 10 + 5, 9 + 6, and 8 + 2 + 5, it would not be immediately obvious that all three pointed to the same number (namely, 15).

“Accordingly,” Husserl says, “such systemless sum formations are totally useless for the purposes of number comparison.” That is, if we articulate larger numbers as sums of smaller numbers, without following a consistent rule, then we might articulate a number (e.g., 15) as one sum (e.g., 9 + 6) on one occasion, and as a different sum (e.g., 8 + 2 + 5) on another occasion. We would then be unable to tell, “merely by looking at them,” whether

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138 “One and the same group admits of various articulations, each of which will lead to a new symbolic number form; while the identity of the actual number corresponding to them all is guaranteed through the identity of the group in question. But one certainly would never suspect this from the diverse forms (e.g., 10 + 5, 9 + 6, 8 + 2 + 5, and so on)” (ibid., 225 [ET 238]).
any two of our sums (e.g., 9 + 6 and 8 + 2 + 5) articulated the same number, and thus we would be unable to use our sums to compare the numbers they articulate. Likewise, we would be unable to use our sums to compare the groups whose numbers they articulate. “With this,” Husserl writes, “the chief aim of all enumeration would be missed.”

Our symbolic number presentations would be distinct but useless, because they would not reveal the relationships among the numbers or groups.

To be able to compare large groups and numbers, therefore, we must employ a number system, because a system would allow us to see easily where each number or group lies in the system. The number system with which we are most familiar is the decimal (base-ten) system. However, a few other bases are (relatively) widely used. For example, in the world of computing technology, the base-two and base-sixteen systems have become fundamental. Writing long before the computer age, Husserl obviously does not discuss the base-two and -sixteen systems. Nevertheless, he does examine the decimal system—though he notes that “mathematicians consider the duo decimal system as preferable”—and he fills the rest of chapter twelve with a painstaking and minute investigation into the nature of number systems in general.

Lacking the space to explore this investigation in detail, we must simply summarize the main point. A number system does two things, Husserl tells us. First, it articulates each

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139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., 226 (ET 238–39).
141 Compare ibid., 235–37 (ET 249–51).
142 Ibid., 237 (ET 250–51).
larger number into one, and only one, combination of smaller numbers. Husserl calls each such combination of smaller numbers a “systematic number.” Second, a number system signifies each of its systematic numbers with a complex numeral. This complex numeral reveals the way in which smaller numbers have been combined to form the systematic number.

It will help us to understand Husserl’s view if we compare the way two number systems deal with the same integer. As our examples, we will use the base-ten (“decimal”) system, which we all employ on a regular basis, and the base-sixteen (“hexadecimal”) system, which is employed primarily by computer scientists, programmers, and graphic designers. For our example integer, we will need to choose a number that is large enough to show how both the base-ten and a base-sixteen systems articulate “larger” numbers. Twenty-six—which we arbitrarily obtain by adding our two bases (ten and sixteen)—will be large enough for our purposes.

Thus, though Husserl never does this himself, we shall provide a concrete example of how two number systems (the decimal and hexadecimal) handle the same integer (twenty-six). In the process, we will see what Husserl means by claiming that a number system (a) articulates each larger integer into a “systematic number” (a unique combination of smaller

143 Ibid., 226 (ET 239).

144 “To each natural number there corresponds a wholly determinate systematic number (equal to it), and to this latter, in turn corresponds a wholly determinate designation mirroring its manner of formation. The systematic number concept would therefore be the mediator between the natural number and the systematic denomination” (ibid., 233 [ET 247]).

145 For example, the colors displayed on a computer screen are usually specified (in picture creation and manipulation programs, and on websites) by a six-digit hexadecimal number (ranging from 000000, for black, to FFFFFF, for white). Thus, even graphic designers, who otherwise do not need to know any special computer programming codes, have to be at least somewhat familiar with hexadecimal numbers.
integers) and (b) signifies each of its systematic numbers with a complex numeral that reveals the way in which smaller numbers have been combined to form the systematic number. We begin with the decimal system.

The decimal number system articulates twenty-six in only one way: as two tens and six ones. The sum, “two tens plus six ones,” therefore, is the unique “systematic number” for twenty-six in the decimal system. The decimal system then signifies this systematic number through the numeral “26.” It places a “2” in the “tens column” of the numeral, to signify the two tens, and a “6” in the “ones column,” to signify the six ones. Thus, in the decimal system, the complex numeral “26” tells us that the systematic number it signifies can be constructed by combining two tens with six ones.

The hexadecimal system also articulates twenty-six in only one way: as one sixteen and ten ones. The sum, “one sixteen plus ten ones,” therefore, is the systematic number for twenty-six in the hexadecimal number system. The hexadecimal system then signifies this systematic number through the numeral “1A.” It places a “1” in the “sixteens column” of the numeral, to signify the single sixteen, and an “A” in the “ones column,” to signify the ten ones. (“A” is the numeral for ten in hexadecimal notation; “A” to “F” designate respectively 10 to 15.) Thus, in the hexadecimal system, the complex numeral “1A” tells us that the systematic number it signifies can be constructed by combining one sixteen with ten ones.

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146 Technically—and using base-ten numerals—twenty-six is $2 \times 10^1 + 6 \times 10^0$.

147 Technically—and using base-ten numerals—twenty-six is $1 \times 16^1 + 10 \times 16^0$. 
A number system, therefore, has what Husserl calls a “two-fold aspect.”148 First, it provides a “system of concept formation grounded upon certain basic concepts.”149 The decimal system, for example, constructs all of its systematic numbers using the basic integers one through ten. The hexadecimal system, on the other hand, constructs all of its systematic numbers using the basic integers one through sixteen.150

Second, Husserl says, a number system provides “a system of number designation grounded upon some few basic signs” to “correspond . . . in rigorous parallelism” with its “system of concept formation.”151 A successful number system will find the right sign for each number. The decimal system, for example, constructs the signs for its systematic numbers using the basic numerals “0” through “9,” while the hexadecimal system uses the basic numerals “0” through “9” and “A” through “F.” The rules that both systems employ for combining their basic signs into complex numerals parallel the rules they employ for combining their basic numbers into systematic numbers. Thus, a complex numeral from a

148 The systematic . . . presents . . . a two-fold aspect. On the one hand, it provides for each number a systematic mode of formation (as symbolic replacement for the missing authentic number concept) utilizing certain elemental numbers, 1, 2, . . ., X, that are given. And on the other hand, it provides, starting from the number names ‘1,’ ‘2,’ . . ., ‘X,’ a systematic mode of formation for the number name appertaining to each one of the numbers’ (Husserl, PA, II, 237 [ET 251]). This, of course, is not quite accurate, given the use of the numeral “0” in modern number systems. A number system does not use the numerals “1” through “X” (where “X” is the numeral for the base number of the system), but the numerals “0” through “X−1” (where “X−1” is the numeral for whatever number is one less than the base number of the system). There is no simple (noncomplex) numeral for the base number in any modern number system. Rather, the base number is always signified as “10” in modern number systems. (“10” signifies ten in the decimal system, two in the binary system, sixteen in the hexadecimal system, five in the base-five system, etc.)

149 Ibid., 228 (ET 241–42). Here we see that Husserl not only thinks of numbers as concepts in PA, but also thinks of “systematic numbers” as concepts.

150 Therefore, the decimal system implicitly assumes that we can authentically present the positive integers up to at least ten, and the hexadecimal system that we can authentically present the positive integers up to at least sixteen.

151 Husserl, PA, II, 228 (ET 241–42).
number system not only signifies a systematic number from that system, but also tells us—by the way in which the numeral combines the system’s basic signs—how to combine the system’s basic numbers to form that systematic number. But that complex numeral will designate that number signitively and not intuitively, as something to be obtained through the operations and values indicated by the complex formulations.

In summary, chapter twelve of *PA* discusses: (a) how symbolic presentations of large groups lead to symbolic presentations of large numbers; (b) how we can make our symbolic presentations of large numbers more distinct by articulating large groups and numbers into conjunctions of authentically presentable groups and numbers; (c) the need to systematize the ways in which we articulate the numbers we cannot authentically present; and (d) the way in which number systems use number signs to signify their “systematic numbers.”

In the terminology of *LI*, then, chapter twelve is Husserl’s study of (a) how the empty intending of large groups leads to the empty intending of large numbers; (b) how we can partition groups to make our empty intentions of their numbers more distinct; (c) how our need to compare emptily intended groups and numbers leads us to develop systems for distinctly, though still emptily, intending numbers; and (d) how we use number signs to systematically signify our more distinct, though still empty, number intentions.

§24. Miller on the Absence of Numbers

In addition to critiquing Husserl’s theory of how we symbolically present large groups, Miller’s *Numbers in Presence and Absence* also critiques Husserl’s belief that large
numbers can only be symbolically presented.\footnote{Miller, \textit{NPA}, 76–78.} It would be worth quoting Miller’s critique in full.

In explicating a large group we cannot retain each of the apprehending acts with full distinctness, as we can when we explicate small groups. But this should not be taken to imply that large numbers have no presence of their own. The phenomenological differences between large and small numbers could be compared to those between three-dimensional things and two-dimensional surfaces. We cannot experience a three-dimensional thing ‘all at once,’ in the way we can experience a two-dimensional surface. No matter what perspective we adopt, there is always a ‘back side’ that is not actually given. But we do not for this reason say that three-dimensional things have no presence at all, or that they have a merely ‘symbolic’ mode of being. Material things have a mode of presence all their own; and if this mode of presence differs from others, we should not for that reason consider it a mode of absence. The same, we suggest, is true of large numbers: they are not presented in the manner of small numbers, but there is nonetheless a mode of authentic presentation that is fully appropriate to them. We make a large number present in the manner appropriate to large numbers when we count it authentically, when we explicate a large sensuous group and compare the resulting multitude to other multitudes.\footnote{Ibid., 78.}

Here, Miller compares the difference between small and large numbers to the difference between two-dimensional surfaces and three-dimensional objects. We can bring small numbers to presence (in authentic presentations) “all at once,” just as we can “experience” a two-dimensional surface “all at once.” In both cases, there can be a kind of complete presence, or adequate intuition, even in a momentary intuition. Large numbers, on the other hand, are like three-dimensional objects, Miller argues; bringing them to full presence requires a temporally-extended act. We cannot see the object from all sides in a single moment, nor can we completely intuit a large number in a single moment. However, just as we can intuit a three-dimensional object sequentially “from all sides” in a temporally-
extended intuition, we can bring a large number to presence through the temporally-extended act of “count[ing it] authentically.” At any given moment within the extended act, there may be aspects of the object or number that have slipped into absence, but this does not mean that we never actually bring the object or number to presence. Therefore, we might be able to directly view “parts” of the large number and acknowledge them as parts of the whole, even if the entire large number can never be comprehensively given.

Miller, then, would question Husserl’s belief in PA that we cannot authentically present large numbers, and instead can only symbolically present them. However, this does not mean that Miller believes every number presentation to be authentic. In fact, he writes, “It is extremely important to take account of the easily overlooked fact that numbers can be named and intended in their absence.”154 We can intend numbers both in their presence and in their absence—both fulfilledly and emptily. Specifically, from analyzing Husserl’s understanding of how we present numbers, Miller concludes that “there are at least six senses in which we may speak of the absence of number.”155

“We have, first of all, the case in which we intend a number . . . in the absence of the sensuous group in question.”156 Numbers are the various species of multiplicity, and thus cannot be brought to presence if there is no bodily multiplicity present (no group of apples or oranges, for example). If we do not authentically present a multiplicity, we cannot authentically present its corresponding number.

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154 Miller, NPA, 69.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
“As a second form of absence closely related to this,” Miller continues, “we have the absence of number that is at work in the presence of what is only ‘one’ or ‘none’.¹⁵⁷ For example, Miller writes, “Suppose I emptily intend the number of apples in a bowl” as being “four, . . . even though the apples are not sensuously present.” Then, he continues, “suppose I seek to bring this intention to fulfillment . . . [b]ut instead of finding that there are four [apples], I find that there is only ‘one’ or even ‘none.’” In this case, what we have “is not a ‘number’ of apples,” since there is no multiplicity to be had, but “a lack or ‘privation’ of number.”¹⁵⁸

“The third case,” Miller writes, “is that which comes about when we have a sensuous group present to us, but fail to count it authentically: we neither explicate it nor compare it.”¹⁵⁹ What Miller calls “authentic counting” is the two-step process of “explication”—i.e., the authentic presentation of the multiplicity—and “comparison”—i.e., the comparing of authentically presented multiplicities with regard to more and less. If we do neither of these, then we can make no number present; we can only symbolically present the number corresponding to the present group.¹⁶⁰

Furthermore, Miller writes:

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 67. Compare Husserl’s discussion of one and zero (PA, I, 129–34 [ET 136–41]). Husserl writes, for instance, “Number answers the question ‘How many?’” (ibid., 130 [ET 137]), and “One and none—these are the two possible negative answers to the ‘How many?’” (ibid., 131 [ET 138]).

¹⁵⁹ Miller, NPA, 69.

¹⁶⁰ We should note here that if we do not authentically present a group as Husserl describes (by individually noting each of its members, and uniting all those individual acts of noticing within a single overarching presentation), then it is not present to the fullest extent as a group. Nevertheless, Miller believes that when we see a group, the group is present—in some important sense—even if we have not authentically presented it in the way Husserl describes (Miller, NPA, 50; see pp. 207–9, above).
The fourth and fifth forms of absence arise when we either compare sensuous groups without explicating them or explicate them without comparing them. In each case we perform one of the two categorial acts that are needed to make number present, but not both.\textsuperscript{161}

In other words, just because we have authentically presented two multiplicities does not mean we have actually compared them with regard to more and less. Likewise, just because we have compared two multiplicities does not mean we have authentically presented them. In either case, no number could be made present; we would only be able to symbolically present the numbers that correspond to the multiplicities in question.

“A final form of absence arises,” Miller concludes, “when we count authentically, but do not carry our counting through to its completion.”\textsuperscript{162} It is possible, in other words, to begin to authentically present two groups, and to compare them with each other, but to fail to complete the process. In such a case, no number would be made present; we would only be able to symbolically present the number that we would attain if we were to complete the counting process.

In summary, it would seem we can divide Miller’s six cases into two categories. There are those in which we do not actually bring a group to presence, and therefore cannot bring any number to presence. Alternatively, there are those in which we do bring a group to presence (to some extent), but do not (fully) perform the necessary acts to bring the group’s corresponding number to presence. In all such cases, if we intend a number at all, our intention will be empty; our presentation will have to be symbolic.

\textsuperscript{161} Miller, \textit{NPA}, 69.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
What we learn from Miller’s analysis, therefore, is that even if large numbers can be presented authentically (contra Husserl), symbolic number presentations remain important. That is, even if we concede that large numbers can be authentically presented, Miller shows that symbolic number presentations are still needed. And this is exactly what Husserl is trying to do in chapters twelve and thirteen of PA.

§25. Chapter Thirteen: From the Number System to Calculation

We now come to the final chapter of PA, in which Husserl will at last expound his philosophy of arithmetic. Arithmetic, Husserl says, is “the science of the relations among numbers.” In studying “the relations among numbers,” Husserl continues, arithmetic has an “essential task”: “[to find] other numbers from given numbers by means of certain known relationships that obtain between them.” Arithmetic fulfills this task through calculation, which, “in the broadest sense,” is “any mode of derivation of numbers sought starting from numbers given.”

Here, we find Husserl defining both arithmetic’s essential task and calculation in terms of the difference between numbers sought and numbers given. That is, both arithmetic’s essential task and calculation depend upon the difference between numbers intended in their absence (the “numbers sought”), and numbers intended in their presence (the “numbers given”). Therefore, both arithmetic’s essential task and calculation depend, whatever our terminology, upon the difference between emptily and fulfilledly intended numbers (and, therefore, between empty and filled number intentions).

163 Husserl, PA, II, 256 (ET 271).
This does not mean, however, that calculation involves numbers alone. Calculation can also involve signs.

Now, as to the method of derivation of sought numbers from given numbers, there are two conceivable cases: either this derivation is an essentially conceptual operation, in which case the designations play only a subordinate role, or it is an essentially sense perceptible operation which, utilizing the system of number signs, derives sign from sign according to fixed rules, only claiming the final result as the designation of a certain concept, the one sought.\footnote{Ibid., 257 (ET 272).}

Here, Husserl argues that there are two ways to approach calculation: conceptually and sense perceptibly. What he means is that, in calculation, we can primarily operate with either numbers (the “conceptual method”) or number signs (the “sense perceptible method”).\footnote{Here we see Husserl’s tendency in \textit{PA} to refer to numbers (actual numbers, systematic numbers, and nonsystematic numbers) as “concepts.”} If we calculate primarily with numbers, we might also employ number signs, but those signs merely help us to focus on the numbers (rather than being the focus themselves).\footnote{See, e.g., Husserl’s reference to signs as a “crutch” (\textit{PA}, II, 224 [ET 237]) or “support” (ibid., 242 [ET 256]).} Alternatively, if we calculate primarily with number signs, we need not focus on the numbers until we reach the end of the calculation. We can then take the final, resultant number sign as a symbolic presentation for some number, and thus (as it were) turn our attention back to the realm of numbers.

In general, Husserl claims, people think all calculation is a conceptual activity, in which numbers are derived from numbers.\footnote{Once again, we see Husserl’s tendency to treat “the numbers” and “the number concepts” as synonymous. To deal with the numbers themselves is to engage in a “conceptual” activity, because the numbers themselves are concepts, for Husserl.} However, he argues that calculation with only signs “has the preference in our domain, and also abundantly deserves it.” In fact, the
method of calculating by signs “makes the conceptual method entirely superfluous.”\(^{168}\) That is, once we have learned to calculate using signs alone, we no longer need to calculate using numbers. Therefore, Husserl says, most calculation actually proceeds by the method of signs, not the method of concepts.\(^{169}\) Most calculation, in other words, is a kind of sign manipulation, rather than an operation with numbers.

Having come to this conclusion, Husserl offers a second definition of calculation.

One can . . . conceive of calculation as any rule-governed mode of derivation of signs from signs within any algorithmic sign-system according to the “laws”—or better: the conventions—for combination, separation, and transformation peculiar to that system.\(^{170}\)

Thus, any algorithmic “derivation of signs from signs,” simply following some set of rules for sign manipulation, counts as calculation. Numbers need not necessarily be involved at all.

After stating his second, sign-focused definition of calculation, Husserl says that it “from now on is the only one we wish to use.”\(^{171}\) Nevertheless, in what must strike the reader as a bit of irony, Husserl then begins a study of calculation via numbers, not of calculation via signs. He writes:

Only the systematic combination of the concepts and their interrelationships, which underlie the calculation, can account for the fact that the corresponding designations interlock to form a coherently developed system, and that thereby we have certainty that to any derivation of signs and sign-relations from the

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\(^{168}\) Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 257 (ET 272).

\(^{169}\) “The method of sensible signs is, therefore the logical method of arithmetic. Here, then, is presented that concept of calculating which (with regard to the extent of its application) we can designate as the one most commonly in use. It encompasses any symbolic derivation of numbers from numbers which is substantially based on rule-governed operations with sense perceptible signs” (ibid., 257–58 [ET 272–73]).

\(^{170}\) Ibid., 258 (ET 273).

\(^{171}\) Ibid., 259 (ET 274).
symbolism, there must correspond a derivation of concepts and conceptual relations from concepts given, valid in the sense that thoughts are. Accordingly, for the grounding of the calculational methods in arithmetic we will also have to go back to the number concepts and to their forms of combination.\footnote{Ibid.}

Here, Husserl is claiming that, while calculation usually proceeds by employing only signs, a process of calculation via signs is only valid if it parallels a legitimate (even if unperformed) process of calculation using numbers.\footnote{We might say: a process of calculation via signs is only legitimate if it is a kind of description of a legitimate process of calculation via numbers.} If we wish to understand how calculation via signs can lead to legitimate results, therefore, we must examine calculation via numbers, because calculating with signs is meant to represent calculating with numbers, and ultimately working with groups.

In the rest of chapter thirteen, Husserl studies calculation using a distinction between systematic numbers and nonsystematic numbers.\footnote{Beginning on Husserl, PA, II, 260 (ET 275).} Though we have already encountered systematic numbers above,\footnote{See above, pp. 215–219.} this is the first place in which we have explicitly dealt with both systematic and nonsystematic numbers together. Therefore, it would be well for us to elucidate this distinction before we proceed. We begin with examples.

The following are systematic numbers: 5, 13, 74, 123. The following are nonsystematic numbers: 2 + 3, 15 − 2, 2 × 32, (20 × 5) + 23.\footnote{Though inspired by Husserl’s examples, these are of my own construction.} The most obvious difference between systematic and nonsystematic numbers, judging from these examples, is that nonsystematic numbers consist of (a) systematic numbers, combined with (b) number
operations (like addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division). The nonsystematic number \((20 \times 5) + 23\), for example, consists of the systematic numbers 20, 5, and 23, combined with the number operations of multiplication and addition.

Another way of explaining the distinction between systematic and nonsystematic numbers is to say that systematic numbers are signified by the (simple or complex) signs we call “numerals,” while nonsystematic numbers are signified by the complex signs we call “arithmetical expressions.”\(^{177}\) In distinguishing between systematic and nonsystematic numbers, however, Husserl is focusing on differences in conceptualization or meaning, rather than differences in signs. For example, when we think about the number twelve as the systematic number 12, we think about it as one ten and two ones. However, when we think about twelve as the nonsystematic number \(4 \times 3\), we think about it as four threes. The systematic number 12 and the nonsystematic number \(4 \times 3\) are, in Husserl’s terminology, different “number concepts,”\(^{178}\) not just different signs. They are, we might say, different ways of “conceptualizing” or “meaning” the number twelve itself.

In any given number system, Husserl reminds us, there is only one systematic number equivalent to each actual number.\(^{179}\) To provide our own examples, we might note that in the decimal number system, 20 (i.e., two tens and zero ones) is the only systematic number that is equivalent to the actual number twenty. Every other systematic number in the decimal system is equivalent to a different actual number. Likewise, in the hexadecimal system—

\(^{177}\) Although, as we will see below, nonsystematic numbers also come in the form of equations.


which we discussed above\textsuperscript{180}—the systematic number 14 (i.e., one sixteen and four ones) is the only systematic number equivalent to the actual number twenty. Every other systematic number in the hexadecimal system is equivalent to a different actual number.

While each number system contains only one systematic number for every actual number, Husserl notes that there are an infinite number of nonsystematic numbers that are equivalent to each actual number.\textsuperscript{181} For example, we can use the decimal system to construct the following nonsystematic numbers: $13 + 7, 14 + 6, 2 \times 10, 4 \times 5, 21 - 1, 22 - 2$. Each of these nonsystematic numbers (and there are an infinite number of them) is equivalent to the actual number twenty. Likewise, using the hexadecimal system, we can construct the following nonsystematic numbers: $D + 7, E + 6, 2 \times A, 4 \times 5, 15 - 1, 16 - 2$. Each of these nonsystematic numbers (and there are an infinite number of them) is also equivalent to the actual number twenty.

Thus, in any number system, there is only one systematic number that is equivalent to a given actual number, but we can construct an infinite number of nonsystematic numbers that are also equivalent to that actual number. Because the systematic numbers are unique (within a given number system), and each refers to a different number, we “can immediately decide, for two systematic numbers, whether they represent the same or different numbers.” For example, (assuming that we are dealing with a single number system) we can easily tell that the systematic numbers 12 and 12 “represent” the same actual number, while 12 and 13 “represent” different actual numbers. Furthermore, Husserl continues, “in the latter case we

\textsuperscript{180} See above, pp. 216–218.

\textsuperscript{181} Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 260 (ET 275).
also can immediately state which is greater and which smaller.” That is, when we see that two systematic numbers represent different actual numbers, we can immediately tell which represents the larger number and which represents the smaller number. For example, it is obvious not only that 12 and 13 represent different actual numbers, but that 12 represents the smaller, and 13 the larger.

However, Husserl notes, “[i]t is quite otherwise with the nonsystematic symbolizations of numbers.” That is, it is not always obvious whether two nonsystematic numbers represent the same number or different numbers (and which, if they represent different numbers, represents the larger or the smaller number). To use Husserl’s example, it might not be immediately obvious that 18 + 49 represents an actual number that is less than the actual number represented by $7 \times 36$. (That is, it might not be immediately obvious that 18 + 49 is less than $7 \times 36$.) However, this fact becomes clear when we “reduce” the two nonsystematic numbers to their systematic equivalents. The nonsystematic number 18 + 49 is equal to the systematic number 67, while $7 \times 36$ is equal to 252. Since it is immediately obvious that 67 represents an actual number that is smaller than the actual number represented by 252, we conclude that 18 + 49 also represents an actual number that is

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182 Ibid., 260–1 (ET 276). This echoes a similar discussion in chapter 12 of PA. See above, pp. 214–15.

183 See, e.g., ibid., 262 (ET 277).

184 Ibid. (ET 276). It might be profitable at this point to compare the distinction between nonsystematic and systematic numbers to the distinction between vague and distinct judgments in FTL. It is not always clear to us whether two nonsystematic numbers symbolically present the same actual number (or different actual numbers). Our intentions of the numbers they present are, therefore, “vague,” in some sense. However, it is clear whether two systematic numbers symbolically present the same actual number (or different actual numbers). Our intentions of the numbers they present are, therefore, “distinct,” in some sense.
smaller than the actual number represented by $7 \times 36$. (That is, because 67 is clearly less than 252, we conclude that $18 + 49$ is also less than $7 \times 36$.)

We should note here that Husserl holds a nonsystematic number to be equal to a systematic number if, and only if, both symbolically present the same actual number. For example, the nonsystematic number $2 \times 6$ is equal to the systematic number 12 because both $2 \times 6$ and 12 symbolically present the same actual number: twelve. However, as will become clear in the quotations below, we eventually begin to ignore the actual numbers altogether, and to treat the systematic numbers as if they were the actual numbers.

Husserl writes:

[W]e regard each nonsystematic formation not as something completed and given, but rather as something problematic. It poses a problem that demands a solution: namely, the problem of finding the systematic number which corresponds to it and determines its classification. How much is $18 + 48$? We answer: 66. And with this we have located this sum-number within the number sequence.

Nonsystematic numbers, in other words, are not things with which we can rest content. We experience each nonsystematic number not as ―completed and given,‖ but rather as “problematic.” Specifically, a nonsystematic number “poses a problem” to us “of finding the systematic number which corresponds to it.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Here we can see the difference between empty and filled intentions to be implicitly at work. Nonsystematic numbers, in being problematic—in posing us a problem to solve—are not “completed and given” (ibid). This, I would argue, is because we see a nonsystematic number as pointing beyond itself (to an absent systematic number) when we bring that nonsystematic number to presence as a nonsystematic number. In other words, it would seem that when we fulfilledly intend a nonsystematic number as a nonsystematic number, we are led to emptyly intend the systematic number to which it is equivalent.

In this, nonsystematic numbers are like the expression-signs of $LI$. The meaning-intentions that animate expression signs are empty, even though the signs they animate are intuitively present. Expressions are only “realized” when they are fulfilled in the presence of that to which they point. (See above, chapter 1, §6.)
Husserl continues:

For these reasons, then, the systematic numbers—although themselves only symbolic surrogates for other concepts that are inaccessible to us—are regarded in arithmetic as the ultimate number concepts, which all other number forms only lead back to and therefore can, in addition, be reconstructed starting from. But in truth they only function as normative numbers—fixed standards, as it were—which all other number forms are referred back to for the purposes of an exact comparison among themselves with respect to more or less.  

Here, Husserl says that the systematic numbers we invent to stand in for the actual numbers, and which we design to symbolically present those actual numbers, come to function as if they were the actual numbers. They are the standards we use to compare nonsystematic numbers. Therefore, instead of seeing nonsystematic numbers as “leading” us “back to” the actual numbers themselves, we find they lead us back only to the systematic numbers. We remain with the symbols.

Thus, Husserl says, it is “a general postulate of arithmetic” that “the symbolic formations that are different from the systematic numbers must, wherever they turn up, be reduced to the systematic numbers equivalent to them, as their normative forms.” In fact, perhaps, therefore, we have in Husserl’s talk of nonsystematic numbers being neither “completed” nor “given,” an early hint of his later understanding of signs in terms of the part–whole relationship. (See above, chapter 1, §7.)

188 Husserl, PA, II, 261 (ET 276).

189 Ibid., 262 (ET 277). Stefania Centrone claims, in passing, that “interpreting systematic numerical constructions as normal or canonical forms” was “a profound and surprisingly modern idea” for Husserl to put forward in 1891. Stefania Centrone, “Husserl on ‘The Totality of All Conceivable Arithmetical Operations’,” History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (August 2006): 215. Centrone, however, does not explain her comment any further.

It is of interest to note that Husserl also refers to the rules of authentic thinking as normative for inauthentic thinking, in LI (see our discussion above, p. 108). Thus, we have compared LI’s inauthentic and authentic thinking to FTL’s vague and distinct judgments (above, pp. 110–12). We have also compared PA’s nonsystematic and systematic numbers to FTL’s vague and distinct judgments above (p. 231, n. 184), and will do so again below (p. 239, nn. 213–14). (See also, above, pp. 210–16, summarized on p. 219.) It would seem, therefore, that the connection between nonsystematic and systematic numbers in PA, inauthentic and authentic thinking in LI, and vague and distinct judgments in FTL, would be worthy of further study.
arithmetic’s “first and essential task lies in the discovery of general rules for the reduction of the diverse forms of number to certain normative forms.”¹⁹⁰ When we encounter a nonsystematic number, in other words, we understand that we are meant to seek out the systematic number that is equal to it, and it is the first task of arithmetic to help us to achieve this reduction.

We should note here, however, that this “first task of arithmetic” does not deal with the ultimate realities on which mathematics is based. It is groups, after all, that finally ground the whole system. Though arithmetic may help us reduce nonsystematic numbers to systematic numbers, systematic numbers were originally designed to point us to the actual numbers. These actual numbers—which are the determinate species of groups—however, point us to groups of objects. It is with groups that our mathematical intentions find their final fulfillment, even if we are so often satisfied merely with the task of reducing nonsystematic numbers to systematic numbers.¹⁹¹

Arithmetic, we learn, fulfills its first task by developing arithmetical operations. In fact, “by the so-called ‘arithmetical operations’,,” Husserl writes, “nothing other is to be understood than methods for carrying out this reduction” of nonsystematic numbers to their systematic equivalents.¹⁹² The operation of addition, for example, is simply the method for reducing nonsystematic numbers like 20 + 20 to systematic numbers like 40. Likewise, the

¹⁹⁰ Husserl, PA, II, 262 (ET 277).

¹⁹¹ Here we have an example of what LU would call a “graded series of fulfillments” (Husserl, LU, VI, §24, 614 [LI, 2:238]; see above, pp. 91–92; also, see below, pp. 238–39). Intentions based upon nonsystematic numbers find partial fulfillment in systematic numbers, greater fulfillment in actual numbers, and final fulfillment in actual groups (“multiplicities”) of objects.

¹⁹² Husserl, PA, II, 263 (ET 277–78).
operation of multiplication is simply the method for reducing nonsystematic numbers like 5 \times 20 to systematic numbers like 100.

Husserl argues, however that arithmetic does not have to do “with true and authentic number concepts and the laws of their combinations or ‘operations.’” That is, when we calculate, we do not work with the numbers themselves, and thus do not engage in actual number operations. Instead, arithmetic’s “true underlying substance consists of symbolic number formations,” \(^{193}\) and thus our number operations become “symbolic” as well.\(^{194}\) That is, we begin to use systematic and nonsystematic numbers “in place of” the actual numbers themselves, and likewise begin to engage in symbolic operations “in place of” the actual number operations.

For example, we no longer complete the operation of addition by unifying “several totalities—and accordingly several numbers— . . . into a single one that encompasses all of their units.” That would be the genuine, or authentic, number operation of addition. Rather, “when we speak of an addition, e.g., of 7 + 5, we have in mind a certain systematic (natural or decimal) number that is equivalent to this sum.”\(^{195}\) That is, when we see the nonsystematic number 7 + 5, we simply intend some (unknown) systematic number that we understand it to be our job to discover.

If we no longer perform the genuine arithmetical operations, however, what are the “symbolic” operations we employ in their place? If, on the basis of the nonsystematic number 7 + 5, for example, we intend some unknown systematic number, how do we go

\(^{193}\) Ibid., 262 (ET 277).

\(^{194}\) Ibid., 263 (ET 278).

\(^{195}\) Ibid.
about actually finding that number (without genuinely adding 7 and 5)? One possibility would be as follows. We might “add” 7 and 5 simply by (a) starting at 7, and then (b) counting past 7 another 5 places (i.e., “8, 9, 10, 11, 12”), and finally (c) taking the final number (i.e., 12) as our result.\(^{196}\) In doing so, we would not have authentically added the two numbers, but we would have discovered what the result of such an addition would be. That is, we would have substituted a symbolic operation for the authentic operation of addition.

Having seen this possibility for “symbolically” performing addition, a possibility for symbolically performing subtraction immediately presents itself. For example, faced with \(7 – 5\), we might simply start at 7, and “count backwards” 5 places (i.e., “6, 5, 4, 3, 2”). We could then take the number we reach (i.e., 2) as the answer we seek, without having operated on any actual groups or numbers.\(^{197}\) We would not have genuinely subtracted 5 from 7, and yet we would have discovered what the result of such a subtraction would be. That is, we would have substituted a symbolic operation for the authentic operation of subtraction.

Along with addition and subtraction, Husserl says, we can also develop symbolic methods for multiplication\(^{198}\) and division.\(^{199}\) Furthermore, as arithmetic matures, we can move on to developing “higher operations”\(^{200}\) (like exponentiation and logarithms), as well as techniques for dealing with the “mixing of operations.”\(^{201}\) Arithmetic, in other words,

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\(^{196}\) Ibid., 264–65 (ET 280).

\(^{197}\) Ibid., 270 (ET 285).

\(^{198}\) Ibid., 268 (ET 283–84).

\(^{199}\) Ibid., 271 (ET 286–87).

\(^{200}\) Ibid., 276 (ET 292).

\(^{201}\) Ibid., 278 (ET 294) (extending to 280 [ET 295]).
must not only enable us to reduce nonsystematic numbers like \(2 + 4\) or \(4 \div 2\) to their systematic number equivalents, but also nonsystematic numbers like \(2^4, \log_2(4)\), and \(((2 \times 4) + \log_2(4))^2\). Finding ways to determine the systematic equivalents of all such nonsystematic numbers, says Husserl, is the first task of arithmetic.\(^{202}\)

However, Husserl argues that arithmetic has a second task as well.

A number can also be symbolically defined as an unknown constituent of such a precisely characterized structure of numbers whose value is already known or is to be calculated by means of an operation structure built up completely out of known numbers. In one word, numbers can also be defined by *equations*.\(^{203}\)

Arithmetic, in other words, must also develop methods for reducing equations, and even systems of equations,\(^{204}\) to systematic numbers. After all, 8 can be “defined” not only through normal operations (e.g., \(6 + 2\)), higher operations (e.g., \(2^3\)), or mixed operations (e.g., \(2\log_2(16)\)), but also through equations (e.g., \(2x = 16\)), and systems of equations (e.g., \(\{2x = y; y = (2 \times 5) + 6\}\)).

In concluding chapter thirteen, Husserl writes the following.

[W]e have characterized the two vast groups of problems which require for their solution a general arithmetic—and logically demand it. The *first* has to do with an indirect determination of numbers by means of an equivalent complex of given conjunctions of known numbers, and the task here consists in reducing to a minimum the difficulties and complications involved in the actual execution.\(^{205}\)

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\(^{202}\) Husserl has mentioned arithmetic’s first task at least twice before (see above, pp. 224, 233).

\(^{203}\) Husserl, *PA*, II, 281 (ET 297). Here, Husserl seems to be saying that equations essentially involve unknown numbers. This might lead us to ask, then, what would Husserl call things like \(3 + 4 = 7\) and \(2 \times 5 = 10\). They appear to be equations, and yet involve no “unknown constituents.” Rather than as equations, therefore, might Husserl understand them as a kind of record of a nonsystematic number’s (e.g., \(3 + 4\) or \(2 \times 5\)) having been reduced to its equivalent systematic number (e.g., \(7\) or \(10\))?\(^{204}\)

\(^{204}\) Husserl, *PA*, II, 281 (ET 297).

\(^{205}\) Ibid., 282–83 (ET 298–99).
That is, arithmetic must develop methods for finding the systematic numbers equivalent to any and all possible (well-formed) arithmetical expressions.

In summarizing the first task of arithmetic above, Husserl says arithmetical expressions are “conjunctions of known numbers,” 206 which symbolically present unknown numbers. In the contrast between known and unknown numbers, we see the implicit difference between filled and empty intentions. For example, in the expression, “$15 + 3^2$,” the numbers 15 and 3 are “known,” while the solution we seek (the result of the operations signaled by “+,” and the superscript “2”) is unknown. We intend 15 and 3 in some type of presence, 207 but intend the solution in total absence. Our intentions of 15 and 3, therefore, are filled—at least in comparison with our empty intention of the solution number.

Husserl then summarizes the second task of arithmetic.

The second has to do with a number determination which is indirect to a yet much higher degree, by means of a complex of operations that are only incompletely given, inasmuch as the unknown number itself functions as one term in the conjunctions. And the task here consists in determining the unknown—whether completely, or at least by means of an equivalent complex of the first type, which then (presupposing that the relevant methods of evaluation are already sufficiently elaborated) can be calculated out at any time, and consequently can be regarded as the representative of a known number. 208

That is, arithmetic must develop methods for finding either (a) the systematic number “solutions” to equations (and systems of equations), or (b) arithmetical expressions that are equivalent to those solutions.

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206 Ibid. (ET 298).

207 We may not intend 15 and 3 in full presence. For example, to genuinely bring 3 to presence, we would need to authentically present a group of 3, and compare it with other authentically presented groups. However, the 3 in $15 + 3^2$ is more present to us than the solution (24), especially when we do not yet know what the solution is.

208 Ibid., 283 (ET 299).
In summarizing the second task of arithmetic above, Husserl says the number operations in algebraic equations “are only incompletely given,” because they involve the very unknown numbers we are seeking.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 283 (ET 299).} For example, in $x - 3 = 10$, the operation $x - 3$ is “only incompletely given” because we do not know what $x$ is. Operations like this are themselves, in some sense, not fully present, since at least one of the numbers involved is absent.

Furthermore, Husserl says that algebraic equations are “indirect to a . . . much higher degree” than arithmetical expressions.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 283 (ET 299).} For example, both the expression $10 + 3$ and the equation $x - 3 = 10$ indirectly present the systematic number 13. However, $x - 3 = 10$ is \textit{more} indirect. Thus, 13 is “farther away” (as it were) when we symbolically present it through $x - 3 = 10$, and “closer” (as it were), when we symbolically present it through $10 + 3$.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 283 (ET 299).} In fact, as we solve $x - 3 = 10$, we might obtain $10 + 3$, and thus bring 13 “closer.” For example, we might begin to solve $x - 3 = 10$ by “moving the 3 to the other side.” This would produce the equation, $x = 10 + 3$. Upon arriving at this new equation, we would see that $10 + 3$ symbolically presents the number we seek, and this number (i.e., 13) would become more

\footnote{Similarly, Husserl had said before that arithmetical expressions are neither “complete” nor ”given” (ibid., 261 [ET 276]). There would seem to be an important sense, however, in which operations like adding 5 to $x$ (i.e., $x + 5$) are even less complete and given than operations like adding 5 to 10 (i.e., $10 + 5$). Operations like $x + 5$ are incompletely given because one of their constituents is missing, while operations like $10 + 5$ are incompletely given only because they point beyond themselves to a systematic number.}

\footnote{Furthermore, we might add that reducing an equation to its equivalent systematic number, requires us to first reduce one or more arithmetical expressions to their systematic number equivalents. (For example, solving the equation $x - 3 = 10$ requires us to “add 3 to both sides,” and thus to reduce the expressions $-3 + 3$ [on the left] and $10 + 3$ [on the right] to their equivalent systematic numbers.) To fulfill our intention of an equation’s equivalent systematic number, therefore, we must first fulfill our intentions of the systematic number equivalents of one or more arithmetical expressions.}
present. Our intention of the solution would become less empty. As we solve an equation, therefore, we are moving through what Husserl would later call a “graded series of fulfills,”\textsuperscript{212} with our initially empty intention of the solution becoming more and more filled.

In closing, then, we should note that the “reduction” of a nonsystematic number to its equivalent systematic number is a process of what Husserl would later call fulfillment. We begin with a nonsystematic number, and understand it to symbolically present some systematic number “solution.” That is, on the basis of the nonsystematic number, we emptily intend its equivalent systematic number. “Reducing” the nonsystematic number—using number operations—to the intended systematic number, means bringing the intended systematic number to presence. That is, it means fulfilling an empty intention.\textsuperscript{213} Nevertheless, our intention does not find its ultimate fulfillment in the systematic number, since a systematic number points beyond itself to some actual number (i.e., to some determinate species of group). Our intention is fulfilled, but only partially.\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{212} Husserl, \textit{LU}, VI, §24, 614 (\textit{LI}, 2:238) (see above, pp. 91–92, and p. 233, n. 191). That our intention of a systematic number (e.g., 13) is more filled when we present that number through an expression (e.g., 10 + 3) than when we present it through an equation (e.g., \(x - 3 = 10\)) can be seen through the following quotation. Husserl says that “the task [when dealing with an equation] consists in determining the unknown [systematic number equivalent]—whether completely, or at least by means of an equivalent complex of the first type [i.e., an arithmetical expression], which then . . . can be calculated out at any time, and consequently can be regarded as the representative of a known number” (Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 283 [ET 299]). If, in solving an equation, we reduce it to an equivalent arithmetical expression, we have largely, though not completely, fulfilled our task of “determining” the solution number. This implies that our intention of that solution number has been partially fulfilled. (In other words, a number intention is more filled when based upon an arithmetical expression than when based upon an equivalent equation.)

\textsuperscript{213} Likewise, we might note here that the process of “reducing” a nonsystematic number to its systematic equivalent is similar to the process of moving from a vague judgment to a distinct judgment in \textit{FTL}. (See above, p. 230, n. 184, and p. 232, n. 189.)

\textsuperscript{214} What we have in calculation, in other words, is akin to the partial fulfillment provided to an empty intention by an image (in, e.g., \textit{LI} and \textit{PICM}), or the fulfillment of making a vague judgment distinct (in \textit{FTL}).
Thus, we see that both tasks of arithmetic implicitly involve the difference between empty and filled intentions. More specifically, the two tasks of arithmetic involve discovering the ways in which we might go about fulfilling those intentions of systematic numbers that are based upon either arithmetical expressions (arithmetic’s first task) or algebraic equations (arithmetic’s second task). Were it not for the fact (a) that we can intend one and the same systematic number both in its absence and in its presence, and (b) that, after intending a systematic number in its absence, we can use number operations to bring that same systematic number to presence (fulfilling our empty intention), the two tasks of arithmetic would be meaningless.

§26. Critique: Willard and Hartimo on Number Signs

Before turning to our final summary and evaluation of PA, we must deal with an issue that, if Willard is correct, shows PA’s entire program to be founded on a mistake. Willard argues, specifically, that the theory of authentic and symbolic presentations, on which PA is based, cannot ultimately account for the functioning of number signs. When we realize that calculation is usually not a derivation of numbers from numbers, but of signs from signs, we also realize that we do not usually treat number signs as presentations of numbers when we calculate. Rather, we treat number signs “mechanically,” as if they were pieces in a game.215 And, as mechanical game pieces, number signs present nothing, claims Willard. He writes:

Calculational technique cannot be explained as an extension of arithmetical knowledge, whether authentic or symbolic. Rather it is arithmetical knowledge

which must be explained by means of calculational technique, and that technique itself is not a matter of representing any domain of objects. Being a ‘mechanical’ and hence non-representational function, it cannot be explained by a theory of representations. A logic that attempts to explain it merely by discussing different types of representations must, therefore, inevitably fail.\textsuperscript{216}

However, one will not find in \emph{PA} any explicit admission that the logic of authentic and symbolic presentations has failed. In fact, Willard finds only one passage in which Husserl seems to recognize that something has gone wrong. There, Husserl claims that “[t]he relationship of arithmetic and calculational technique has . . . certainly now been changed”\textsuperscript{217} by his second definition of calculation (calculation as the derivation of signs from signs).

Willard comments:

> These few words are, within the \textit{Philosophy of Arithmetic}, the whole of his acknowledgment of the momentous fact that the conceptualization which had guided the entire enterprise whose development is expressed in that book is in fact abandoned in its final chapter.\textsuperscript{218}

In fact, we must look to \emph{LI}, Willard argues, to find Husserl’s admission that the Brentanian logic of authentic and symbolic presentations had failed. In \emph{LI}’s introduction, Husserl says that he has “just abandoned” a certain “psychologistic logic.”\textsuperscript{219} That “psychologistic logic,” Willard claims, is \emph{PA}’s theory of authentic and symbolic presentations.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{216} Willard, \textit{LOK}, 110. Willard uses “representation” as a translation of \textit{Vorstellung}, where we have been using “presentation” instead.

\textsuperscript{217} Husserl, \emph{PA}, II, 259 (ET 274).

\textsuperscript{218} Willard, \textit{LOK}, 110.

\textsuperscript{219} Husserl, \textit{LU}, “Vorwort,” 8 (\emph{LI} 1:3). Husserl is, in part, quoting Goethe.

\textsuperscript{220} Willard, \textit{LOK}, 111–18.
Can *LI*, then, account for number signs? More specifically, is Husserl’s new theory of indication and expression able to explain the functioning of such signs? Mirja Hartimo argues that the answer is “no.”

Husserl had spoken of numerals in *PA* as (a) being “surrogates” for the numbers they were meant to signify, and (b) functioning as if they were pieces in a game. He seems to hold the same position in *LI*. There, we find that numerals belong to a class of signs that have a “surrogative function” (Findlay’s rendering of *stellvertretende Funktion*); they do not signify numbers, but rather stand in for, or replace, them. This does not mean, however, that they have no meaning or significance; rather, they have what Husserl calls *Spielbedeutungen*. Surrogative signs have “game-meanings”; they have the same kind of “significance” that a piece in a game would have.

However, Hartimo writes:

The game-meanings that play an important role both in the writings of early Husserl and the Husserl of the *Crisis*, do not seem to fit into Husserl’s own architectonics of his *Logical Investigations*. The game-meanings are not properly either symbolic expressions or indications. Whereas symbolic expressions relate to meaningful thought and hence to what Husserl calls logic, the indications are arbitrary signs by means of which nothing is even attempted to be said. The game-meanings are not arbitrary signs as they owe their “game-meaning” to a system of rules. But they are not symbolic expressions either because they do not as such refer to extra-semiotic reality.

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222 Husserl, *PA*, II, 265 (ET 280). Husserl also speaks of the systematic numbers as being “surrogates” for the actual numbers (Husserl, *PA*, II, 260 [ET 275]).

223 Ibid, 237, 239 (ET 251, 253).


225 Hartimo, “*Spielbedeutungen*,” 76.
Here, Hartimo argues that the surrogative function of such signs does not fall on either side of the indication–expression dichotomy. Surrogative signs (e.g., numerals) stand in for things (e.g., numbers), but do not *mean* those things in the way that expression-signs mean. Likewise, surrogative signs function as they do because of a system of rules (e.g., the rules of the “game” of calculation), while indication-signs function as they do because of experienced associations.226

Thus, Hartimo comes to the (in her words) “somewhat perplexing conclusion” that “surrogative signs” are neither indication-signs nor expression-signs. Yet, Hartimo believes, indications and expressions are the only two categories of sign available to Husserl in *Logical Investigations*.227 According to Willard and Hartimo, then, neither *PA* nor *LI* can account for number signs.

How are we to respond to Willard and Hartimo’s claims? Of the two, we can deal with Hartimo’s more quickly. In *LI*, Husserl’s description of numerals as pieces in a game is essentially the same as his description of numerals in *PA*.228 Furthermore, it is true that, as Husserl describes them, they are neither indications nor expressions. However, we might ask why we should expect them to be either indications or expressions. Husserl at no point in *LI* says that indications and expressions are the only two types of signs (*pace* Derrida).229

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226 See above, chapter 1, §2, pp. 15–20.
227 Hartimo, “*Spielbedeutungen,*” 76.
229 Husserl, Derrida claims, writes as if there are only two kinds of signs, but actually believes that only indications are truly signs (*Speech and Phenomena*, 42).
Thus, the difficulty that numerals pose for Hartimo derives from a questionable assumption about the nature of signs in *LI*. The difficulty that numerals pose for Willard, however, will require a more extended discussion. To answer Willard, we must deal with Husserl’s talk in *PA* of number signs being like pieces in a game,\(^{230}\) and of our “mechanical”\(^{231}\) (or “external”\(^{232}\)) use of those signs. In doing so, we must attempt to settle the question of whether or not signs, when used mechanically—as pieces in a game—truly present nothing.

We will commence our response to Willard with Husserl’s discussion of constructing the numeral series (i.e., “1,” “2,” “3,” . . . “11,” “12,” “13,” etc.). To construct the numeral series, Husserl says we can begin as follows.

Let us abstract from the signification [*Bedeutung*] of the designations “1,” “2,” . . . , “X,” as well as from the designations of the operations of addition, multiplication and exponentiation, and take them as totally arbitrary symbols without signification [*bedeutungslose Zeichen*] (as, for example, with the counters in a game [*Spielmarken*]). Let us replace number definitions and operation rules, which are the regular medium of systematic procedure, with corresponding, conventionally fixed formulas expressing the equivalences of sign combinations.\(^{233}\)

Here, numerals and number operation signs become like “counters in a game” when we ignore their original meanings, and instead focus on the question of which “sign combinations” are equivalent to which other sign combinations. That is, we begin to think of

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\(^{231}\) Ibid., I, 104 (ET 109), 105 (ET 110), 128 (ET 135), 132 (ET 139), 153 (ET 161); II, 238 (ET 252), 239 (ET 253), 250 (ET 265), 257 (ET 271), 267 (ET 283), 268 (ET 284), 271 (ET 287), 273 (ET 289), 275 (ET 290), 280 (ET 296).

\(^{232}\) Ibid., I, 177 (ET 186); II, 194 (ET 206), 214 (ET 226), 225 (ET 237–38), 238 (ET 252–53), 239 (ET 253), 242 (ET 256), 250 (ET 265), 275 (ET 290).

\(^{233}\) Ibid., 237–238 (ET 251).
sign combinations as simply being interchangeable with other sign combinations, and thus we cease to treat the individual numerals and number operation signs as signs for actual numbers and number operations.

To construct the number sign series, Husserl continues, we need rules about how to (a) construct “sign combinations,” and then (b) replace those combinations with equivalent, but simpler combinations.

The sequential process of formation of the designations will proceed in such a way that, in typical form, sign is step by step annexed to sign (e.g., \(X + 1\), \(X + 1 + 1 = X + 2\), \(X + 2 + 1 = X + 3\), and so on, and likewise \(X^2 + 1\), \(X^2 + 2\), \(X^2 + 3\), \ldots), whereby certain composite signs are always replaced by simpler ones (e.g., \(1 + 1\) by \(2\); \(2 + 1\) by \(3\), etc.; according to the formulas \(1 + 1 = 2\), \(2 + 1 = 3\), \(3 + 1 = 4\), \ldots). After attaining a certain level there occurs, conforming to determinate types, a simplifying transformation of the articulate sign attained (e.g., \(X + X\) becomes \(2X\), \(X + X + X\) becomes \(3X\); \(XX\) becomes \(X^2\), \(XXX\) becomes \(X^3\), \ldots), where upon the uniform process of annexation begins again. And so on.

In this paragraph, Husserl notes that we can replace the sign complex “\(X + 1 + 1\)” with its simpler equivalent “\(X + 2\),” because we already know (i.e., we have already memorized the fact that) the sign complex “\(1 + 1\)” can be replaced by the sign “\(2\).” Likewise, other substitutions can be made as we continue to elaborate the number sign series, replacing sign combinations for the addition of identical numbers with sign combinations for the multiplication of those numbers (e.g., replacing “\(X + X\)” with “\(2X\)”\), and sign combinations for the multiplication of identical numbers with sign combinations for the exponentiation of those numbers (e.g., replacing “\(XX\)” with “\(X^2\)”\).

\[\text{Ibid., } 238 \text{ (ET 252). Ellipses in original.}\]
In fact, by this very kind of replacement-with-equivalent-signs, Husserl argues that we can mechanically calculate additions, multiplications, subtractions, and divisions. What is required is that we have memorized the appropriate “tables” for the basic additions (“1 + 1” = “2,” “2 + 1” = “3,” etc.), multiplications (“2 × 1” = “2,” “2 × 2” = “4,” etc.) subtractions (“9 – 1” = “8,” “8 – 1” = “7,” etc.), and divisions (“6 ÷ 1” = “6,” “6 ÷ 2” = “3,” etc.). Then, when we are faced with a sign combination not already contained in our memorized tables, Husserl argues we can articulate that combination into other sign combinations that are contained in our memorized tables. We take the following, for example.

If we do not have the equivalent of “23 + 45” memorized, we can think of “23 + 45” as arranged in columns:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
23 \\
+45
\end{array}
\]

This helps us to visualize “23 + 45” as two sign complexes: “2 + 4” (for the “tens column”) and “3 + 5” (for the “ones column”). Both of these new sign complexes are contained in our memorized tables, so we can easily replace them with their equivalent signs. The sign complex “2 + 4” is equivalent to “6” (which we place in the tens column) and “3 + 5” is equivalent to “8” (which we place in the ones column).

235 Ibid., 267 (ET 282–83).
236 Ibid., 268 (ET 283–84).
237 Ibid., 270–71 (ET 286).
238 Ibid., 271 (ET 286–87).
240 This is example, while inspired by Husserl’s discussions, is of my own construction.
Therefore, we can replace the sign complex “23 + 45” with the equivalent numeral “68.”

These considerations, then, might lead us to make the following argument. When we encounter a sign combination like “2 + 4,” we use our memory of the addition tables to call to mind its equivalent sign. Though the sign combination “2 + 4” is present, we “look beyond it,” as it were, to its equivalent sign “6.” On the basis of the present sign combination, we intend an absent sign solution. That is, sign complexes like “2 + 4” seem to function as symbolic presentations of numerals like “6.” Contra Willard, then, it would seem that mechanical calculation does involve presentation.

Husserl does not only describe “mechanical” calculation, however. He also describes mechanical enumeration.

It is clear that as soon as the systematic was mastered through practice, the mental process of concept formation automatically had to vacate the field to the external reproduction mechanism of name formation. Originally one counted by a mental action, picking out of the group one member after another: one, one and one is two, two and one is three, and so on. . . . But after long practice it automatically came to pass that one counted mindlessly, so to speak, or mechanically, by following out the sequence of names and sentences—which in part were firmly imprinted upon the memory and in part produced mechanically following the principle of the systematic—without any reflexion upon their conceptual signification.

To count, in other words, we no longer have to actually bring each number to presence in order, understanding each as being one more than the one that proceeded it. We simply have to bring each number name to presence, understanding it as the one that comes next, whether

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241 This example, though inspired by Husserl’s, is of my own construction.

242 Husserl, PA, II, 250–51 (ET 265).
because we have memorized the sequence, or because we understand the general principle by which the number names are constructed and ordered. We cease to be focused on “forming” the next number, given the present number (“one, one and one is two, two and one is three”), and become focused on forming the next number name, given the current number name (“‘one’, then ‘two’, then ‘three’”).

Husserl then helpfully rephrases what he had just said.

From a conceptual procedure for the generation of the number concept there arose in a natural manner, by the falling away of the psychical correlates of the individual steps, a symbolic and exterior procedure for the systematic derivation of the number name corresponding to the concept, and only thereby of the concept itself. For all of this one merely required mnemonic mastery of the sequence of numbers and number definitions up to ten, and familiarity with the decimal system of number word formation.\footnote{Ibid.}

Counting is no longer about “generating” “number concepts,” but about “deriving” the “name” that corresponds to the “number concept” we seek. “The psychical correlates,” as Husserl puts it, “fall away”; that is, we cease to bring the numbers to presence through their names, and simply work with the names themselves. We no longer rely on the number series to give order to the process of counting, but instead rely on our memory of the number names and our understanding of how to construct new number names in the proper order (within the number system with which we happen to be working).

Does this mean, then, that the number names in mechanical enumeration cease to present anything? Husserl writes:

\[\text{[In mechanically enumerating a group] it suffices that we have a step by step symbolization of the group members by means of the sequence of number names,}\]
and the last name used in the symbolization will necessarily have to be that of the concept sought.\textsuperscript{244}

Here, Husserl refers to the number names used in mechanical enumeration, as “symbolizations” of the group members with which they are correlated. It is not clear, however, (a) whether he thinks we actually (actively) take those names as symbolizing the members of the group, or (b) whether he merely thinks that we could take them as symbolizing the group members (if we so chose). Whatever the case may be, Husserl presents the process of mechanical enumeration as one in which we are “seeking” something. Later, he makes the same point:

In enumeration one quite simply follows the systematic of the designations, ultimately attaining to a composite sign whose mode of formation conceals within it precisely that of the concept sought.\textsuperscript{245}

Both these quotations make clear that even when we are enumerating a group mechanically, using signs alone, we are still “seeking” to discover the number of members in the group. This number—“the concept sought,” as Husserl puts it— is signified by the last number sign we reach in the process of enumeration. Thus, for all intents and purposes, in seeking that number, we are seeking its sign.

Therefore, even in mechanical enumeration, we are intending to discover the sign that signifies the number of members in the group. Though it is not present as we are enumerating—rather, whatever number name we happen to “be on” at the moment is present—we are still “looking forward to it.” We, as it were, would seem to symbolically present the final sign through the entire process of enumeration.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 239 (ET 253).

\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 240 (ET 254).
In summary, “[t]he method of mechanical enumerating and calculating” is one that “does not hold the underlying concepts [i.e., numbers] before the mind,” but instead holds present number signs or names before the mind. That is, it seems that enumeration and calculation become “external” or “mechanical” for Husserl because we cease to engage with things he sees as properly “conceptual” (i.e., numbers, which he treats as concepts) and instead begin to exclusively engage with things that he sees as external and physical (e.g., number names or signs). We cease to be involved in “concept formation,” and instead begin to be involved in sign formation or manipulation.

Nevertheless, it would seem plausible, on Husserl’s understanding of calculation and enumeration, to hold that number signs are still functioning in symbolic presentations, even when we are using them “mechanically.” They may no longer function individually as presentations of numbers, but they join into larger wholes (e.g., arithmetical expressions) which do symbolically present something (e.g., other numerals). Thus, we cannot accept Willard’s conclusion that PA’s “logic” of authentic and symbolic presentation is inadequate for describing the functioning of number signs.

However, Willard is correct to point out that Husserl seems to have undergone a major change between PA and LI. Part of that change has to do with leaving behind the terminology of authentic and symbolic presentations and adopting the terminology of empty and fulfilled intentions. Yet, to what extent the change is a change of “logic” or theory, and to what extent it is merely terminological, is something we shall have to explore below.

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246 Ibid., I, 153 (ET 161).
§27. Review and Conclusion

In this final section of chapter four, we will review PA in preparation for asking the following question: to what extent is PA’s theory of symbolic and authentic presentation actually the same as LI’s theory of empty and fulfilled intentions? Our review will have two parts. First, we will recapitulate PA’s analysis of seven specific subjects, and note the ways in which those analyses can be recast in terms of LI’s empty and filled intentions. Second, we will revisit the general structure of PA, and show how it too can be easily understood in terms of LI’s empty and filled intentions.

a. Review of Seven Specific Subjects, with Regard to Empty and Filled Intentions

It is now our task to summarize the evidence for the claim that it is possible, on PA’s theory, to present certain objects both symbolically and authentically. That is, PA leads us to conclude that we can present certain objects both in their absence (symbolically) and in their presence (authentically). In LI, Husserl discusses the same distinction in terms of “empty” and “fulfilled intentions.” To present an object in its absence is to “emptily intend” it. To present an object in its presence is to “fulfilledly intend” it. Thus, Husserl’s terminology changes between PA and LI. However, since he is dealing with the same basic distinction (between being mentally directed toward an object in its presence, and in its absence) in both texts, it is relatively straightforward—as we will see below—to recast PA’s analysis in LI’s terms.

We begin with the subject of small sensuous groups. Husserl tells us that we can authentically present a small group by individually noting each of its members, and uniting
all these acts of noticing within a single act directed upon the group as a whole.\footnote{247} In doing so, we bring the group to full and genuine presence as a group. We authentically present, or fulfilledly intend, it.

However, Husserl tells us that we symbolically present a small group when its figural moment (e.g., its shape, or gestalt) simply indicates to us that it must be a group.\footnote{248} In such cases, we do not perform the mental acts necessary to “authentically present” the group, and thus we do not achieve its full and genuine presence. Nevertheless, we do present it, and present it as a group. We symbolically present it or emptily intend it.

The implication of all this, which Husserl does not state in PA, is that we might go from symbolically presenting a small group to authentically presenting it. That is, we might begin by (a) intending a small group as a group, simply because its figural moment indicates to us that it must be a group, and then (b) go on to confirm that it is in fact a group (by individually noting each if its members, and uniting those acts of noticing within a single act directed upon the group as a whole). In doing so, we would have brought the symbolically presented group to full presence; we would have moved from an empty intention of the group, to a fulfilled intention of the same group. That is, we would have fulfilled a group intention.

We now turn to our second subject: small numbers. Husserl tells us that we can authentically present small numbers by authentically presenting groups, and comparing those groups with each other with regard to equality, more, and less. This is the process Miller

\footnote{247}{See above, pp. 138, 143–44.}

\footnote{248}{See above, p. 194 (with pp. 190–93, for context).}
refers to as “authentic counting.” In authentic counting, we bring numbers to presence. We authentically present, or fulfilledly intend them.

However, Husserl also tells us that we can symbolically present small numbers through systematic and nonsystematic numbers, as well as number signs. That is, we can present small numbers as collections of even smaller numbers (as when we present twelve as “five more than seven,” or as “two sixes,” or as “12”). When we do this, however, we do not bring the number to full or genuine presence. We symbolically present it, or emptily intend it.

The implication of all this, which Husserl does not state in PA, is that we might go from symbolically presenting a small number to authentically presenting it. That is, we might begin by (a) symbolically presenting a small number as a systematic or nonsystematic number (or by using a number sign), and then (b) go on to authentically present the same number by “authentically counting” a group with that number of members. In doing so, we would have brought the symbolically presented number to presence; we would have moved from an empty intention of the number to a fulfilled intention of the same number. That is, we would have fulfilled a number intention.

Our third subject is that of large sensuous groups. Large sensuous groups are not authentically presentable; they have so many members that we cannot individually note each, and unite all these acts of noticing within a single act directed upon the whole group.

Miller, NPA, 69 (see above, pp. 222). For our discussion of authentically presenting numbers, see above, pp. 147–53.

Husserl says: “[I]t proves in general feasible and preferable to substitute certain symbolizations even for the number concepts accessible to us in the form of authentic presentations—indeed, to put it plainly to substitute external signs” (PA, II, 236 [ET 250]). By “symbolizations,” Husserl is referring to systematic and nonsystematic numbers (see, e.g., above, pp. 227–234).
Nevertheless, we can symbolically present them through their figural moments. Their figural moments indicate to us that they must be groups, even though we cannot authentically present them as such.251

For a group to show its figural moment to us, however, the group must appear, and thus be perceptually present, to some extent.252 Therefore, if we present a group through its figural moment, we symbolically present it—or emptily intend it—in a partially intuitive manner. Our symbolic presentation, or empty intention, is not completely empty, because the group we intend is at least partially present.

In contrast with the partial presence of symbolically presenting a large group through its figural moment, we might simply describe the group when not in its sensuous presence. This is a possibility that Husserl never discusses in PA, but it follows from his analysis. As long as our description of a group is univocal—as long as it picks out that group, and that group alone—it meets Husserl’s requirement for symbolic presentations,253 and thus is a symbolic presentation of the group. In this case, however, the group would be completely absent; our intention of it would be totally empty.

The implication of all this, which Husserl does not state in PA, is that we might go from symbolically presenting a large group in its complete absence, to symbolically presenting it in its partial presence. That is, we might begin by (a) symbolically presenting a large group simply by giving a univocal description of it in its perceptual absence, and then (b) go on to symbolically present the same group through its figural moment, in its perceptual

251 See above, pp. 179–94.
252 See above, pp. 208–9.
253 See above, pp. 171–74.
presence. In doing so, we would have brought the symbolically presented group to partial presence; we would have moved from a completely empty intention of the group, to a partially fulfilled (though still partially empty) intention of the same group. That is, we would have (partially) fulfilled a group intention.

Our fourth subject is that of large numbers. We cannot authentically present large numbers, Husserl tells us, and thus we can only symbolically present them. However, we can symbolically present large numbers as “systematic” or “nonsystematic numbers”—that is, as wholes whose parts are smaller, authentically presentable numbers. Thus, even if we cannot bring a large number to complete presence, we can (a) bring its parts to presence, and (b) in the presence of its parts, intend it as a whole. It would seem, therefore, that we could intend a large number in its partial presence, by bringing about the presence of its parts.

In contrast, Husserl points out that we can also symbolically present large numbers through their numerals, without actually thinking through the meanings of those numerals. For example, we might read that the number of votes cast in an election was “987,654,321,” but only vaguely intend the number represented by “987,654,321” as, “whatever number is represented by ‘987,654,321.”

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254 See above, pp. 210–11.

255 See above, pp. 212–216, 227–32.

256 Husserl writes: “In what way do we have, for example, the concept of a twenty-place number? We obviously first think the mere concept: a certain number which corresponds to this sign complex. If one inquires about the exact content of the concept—thus about the sense of this symbol—then there begins a chain of explications which has its support in the unity of the special mode of formation in the composition of the sign” (PA, II, 242 [ET 256]).

257 This is an example of my own construction, though it is based on what Husserl says.
the number of votes as a systematic number (as a collection of smaller numbers),\footnote{See above, pp. 215–19 (cf. pp. 212–14).} we would not actually do so in this case. We would not bring the number to even the partial presence that a systematic number would provide. Our presentation would be inauthentic, our intention empty.

While we might begin by (a) symbolically presenting a large number as “whatever number is represented by this numeral,” Husserl tells us that we could (b) go on to actively think through the meaning of the numeral.\footnote{Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 242 (ET 256). See the quotation in n. 256, above.} For example, when we read “123,” we might begin by simply intending “whatever number is represented by ‘123’.” However, we might then go on to actively understand “123” as “one set of ten tens, plus two tens, plus three ones.” That is, we could go on to symbolically present that large number as a systematic number (as a collection of smaller numbers). In symbolically presenting the large number as a systematic number, we would have brought the large number to partial presence. We would have moved from a completely empty intention of the number, to a partially filled (though still partially empty) intention of the same number. That is, we would have (partially) fulfilled a number intention.

Our fifth subject is that of \textit{systematic numbers} as they are targeted through the use of nonsystematic numbers in calculations. The first task of arithmetic, Husserl tells us, is to discover the methods whereby nonsystematic numbers can be “reduced” to their systematic equivalents.\footnote{See above, pp. 230–33.} Though nonsystematic numbers were originally designed as symbolic presentations of the actual numbers (the determinate species of group), Husserl tells us that
we come to treat the systematic numbers as if they were the actual numbers. Nonsystematic numbers then “lead us back” to the systematic numbers, rather than “leading us back” to the actual numbers. This implies, though Husserl does not say so explicitly, that nonsystematic numbers have become symbolic presentations of systematic numbers.

When we are faced with a nonsystematic number, therefore, it would seem that we symbolically present, or emptily intend, its absent systematic equivalent. As we perform the necessarily calculation, that absent systematic number is brought to presence. We move from a symbolic presentation, or empty intention, of the systematic number, to an authentic presentation, or fulfilled intention. Thus, though Husserl does not say so in PA, it would seem that in calculation, our empty intentions of systematic numbers can be fulfilled.

Our sixth subject is that of numerals as they are targeted in mechanical calculation. Husserl understands mechanical calculation as follows: when we are faced with a sign complex like “3 + 6” or “x – 2 = 7,” we set out to find the numeral (e.g., “9”) which is its solution. While the sign complex is present, its numeral solution is absent. Though Husserl does not say so, therefore, it would seem that we symbolically present the numeral solution, or emptily intend it.

We can, however, bring the absent solution numeral to presence by carrying out the necessary operations. For example, we change “x – 2 = 7” into “x = 7 + 2,” by “moving the ‘2’ to the other side.” We then replace “2 + 7” with its equivalent numeral, “9.” At the beginning of a mechanical calculation, we emptily intended the absent numeral solution, and

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261 See above, pp. 231–33.


263 Compare this with pp. 245–48, above. This is an example of my own design.
at the end of the mechanical calculation, we have brought that numeral to presence. That is, though Husserl does not say so in PA, it would seem that mechanical calculation involves fulfilling empty intentions of numerals.

Our seventh subject is that of *numerals* as they are targeted in mechanical *enumeration*. Husserl presents mechanical enumeration as a goal-oriented activity: we wish to discover the number of members in a group. To do so “mechanically,” we simply count up the members by rote recitation; as we proceed from one group member to the next, we speak (or bring to mind) the next numeral in the numeral series.

What is present to us in the middle of the enumerative process is the current group member and numeral. Nevertheless, we still must have in mind—to some extent or other—the final numeral (the sign that will signify the number of members in the group). In the middle of the process, this final numeral is absent, and yet our whole activity of enumerating is leading up to it. We must, therefore—though Husserl does not say this—be symbolically presenting, or emptily intending that final numeral, in some way.

As we complete the process of enumeration, we bring the final numeral to presence. Our symbolic presentation, or empty intention of the numeral, is replaced by an authentic presentation, or fulfilled intention. That is, though Husserl does not say so in PA, mechanical enumeration seems to involve fulfilling empty intentions of numerals.

In each of the above seven issues, Husserl’s analysis entails, or at least implies, that we can transition from presenting a certain type of object in a more inauthentic (symbolic)
manner, to presenting it in a more authentic manner. In some of his analyses (e.g., in his analyses of calculation), this fact is “closer to the surface”; in others (e.g., in his analyses of small groups and numbers), this fact is not as obtrusive. Nevertheless, when we approach \( PA \) from the point of view of \( LI \) and its theory of empty and fulfilled intentions, we see just how close \( PA \) is to being a study of fulfillment in the realm of mathematics.

b. Review of the Structure of \( PA \), with Regard to Empty and Filled Intentions

If we then switch from a review of specific issues in \( PA \) to a review of \( PA \)’s general structure, we see much the same thing: \( PA \) is a study of the presentation or intending of mathematical objects in their presence and absence, and thus is close to being a study of fulfillment in the realm of mathematics.

In Part One, Husserl is concerned with the authentic (intuitive) presentation of groups and numbers. First, he argues that we authentically present a group by individually noting each member of the group, and uniting these objects within a unitary act directed upon the whole group.\(^{267}\) Because of this, he argues that we can authentically present only those groups that are relatively small. We do not have the mental powers necessary for individually noting and uniting a great number of objects.\(^{268}\)

Since we can only authentically present groups that are relatively small, Husserl argues that we can only authentically present numbers that are relatively small.\(^{269}\) This is

\(^{267}\) See above, pp. 138, 143–44.

\(^{268}\) See above, p. 179–80.

\(^{269}\) See above, p. 168.
because we authentically present numbers by (a) authentically presenting groups, and (b) comparing those groups to each other with regard to equality, more, and less. The limitations we face in authentically presenting groups impose limitations on our ability to authentically present numbers.

Using later Husserlian terminology, in summary, the primary issues with which Part One of PA is concerned are (a) how do we intend groups in their presence?, (b) how do we intend numbers in their presence?, and (c) how does intending groups in their presence help us to intend numbers in their presence? From LI’s point of view, in other words, Part One is primarily concerned with the fulfilled intending of groups and numbers.

In Part Two, Husserl is concerned with the symbolic (inauthentic) presentation of groups and numbers. First, he argues that we cannot authentically present those groups that are relatively large. We simply do not have the mental power required to individually note and unite a great number of objects. Nevertheless, Husserl argues that we can symbolically present the larger groups, if they are sensuous, through their figural moments.

Since we cannot authentically present large groups, we cannot authentically present large numbers. Nevertheless, our symbolic presentations of large groups lead us to symbolically present large numbers. We realize that large groups must have corresponding numbers, and thus we begin to symbolically present those large numbers.

Using later Husserlian terminology, in summary, the primary issues with which Part Two of PA is initially concerned are (d) how do we intend groups when we cannot bring

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270 See above, pp. 147–53.

271 See above, pp. 190–97.

272 See above, pp. 210–11.
them to full and genuine presence (i.e., how do we intend groups in their absence)?, and (e) how do we come to intend numbers that we cannot bring to full and genuine presence (i.e., how do we intend numbers in their absence)? Therefore, from LI’s point of view, Part Two is concerned with the empty intending of groups and numbers.

Husserl then proceeds, in Part Two, to explain how calculation arises. We symbolically present larger numbers, he argues, as collections of smaller numbers.\(^{273}\) A number system, Husserl claims, gives us a consistent set of rules for doing so.\(^{274}\) For example, the decimal number system tells us to symbolically present larger numbers as collections of tens, as much as is possible (e.g., it tells us to think of fifty-four as five tens, with four ones tacked on).

Husserl calls the symbolic presentations of numbers which are produced by number systems, “systematic numbers” (e.g., 22, 54, 103). He calls the symbolic presentations of numbers which are not produced by number systems, “nonsystematic numbers” (e.g., 17 + 5, 60 – 6, 5 \times 20 + 3). Systematic numbers are preferable, Husserl argues, to nonsystematic numbers;\(^{275}\) they are, as it were, closer to being authentic (intuitive) number presentations.

Conceptual calculation is the reduction of nonsystematic numbers to their systematic equivalents.\(^{276}\) It is the transformation of a worse (less intuitive) symbolic presentation of some number into a better (more intuitive) symbolic presentation of the same number. In this process, we find that number signs can be invaluable; they help to support our symbolic


\(^{274}\) See above, pp. 215–16, 218–19.

\(^{275}\) See above, pp. 214–16, 229–33.

\(^{276}\) See above, pp. 229–36.
number presentations.\textsuperscript{277} However, we eventually learn to calculate with the signs alone. We find that we need not think about systematic and nonsystematic numbers in order to calculate. Rather, we can calculate “mechanically,” simply by following the rules that govern the number signs.\textsuperscript{278}

Using later Husserlian terminology, in summary, the second set of issues with which Part Two is concerned are (f) how does trying to find better (more intuitive) ways to intend numbers in their absence lead to calculation?, and (g) how does trying to find better ways to intend numbers in their absence lead to the use of number signs? Therefore, from \textit{LI}’s point of view, Part Two is concerned with empty (or “signitive”) number intentions.

c. Summary

In this final section of chapter four, we have reviewed \textit{PA} in preparation for asking the question: to what extent is \textit{PA}’s theory of symbolic and authentic presentation actually the same as \textit{LI}’s theory of empty and fulfilled intentions? We have seen how the distinction between being mentally directed toward objects in their presence, and being mentally directed toward objects in their absence, figures not only in Husserl’s analysis of specific subjects in \textit{PA}, but helps to structure \textit{PA} as a whole. We have seen how straightforward it is to recast \textit{PA}’s analyses—in which Husserl uses the terminology of authentic and symbolic presentation—in terms of \textit{LI}’s fulfilled and empty intentions. Furthermore, we have seen how \textit{PA}’s analyses can be completed by thematizing the ways in which we \textit{fulfill} our

\textsuperscript{277} See above, pp. 213, 225–26.

\textsuperscript{278} See above, pp. 225–27.
intentions of mathematical objects. In fact, when we approach the book from *LI*’s point of view, *PA*’s analyses seem to invite this kind of completion.

Therefore, we have seen no reason to understand Husserl’s transition from the theory of authentic and symbolic presentation, to the theory of fulfilled and empty intentions, as a radical break. That is, we have seen no reason to understand Husserl’s transition from the theory of presentations to the theory of intentions as involving a significant rejection of the theory of presentations (even though it involves a significant change of terminology). Rather, it would seem that Husserl’s theory of fulfilled and empty intentions is a kind of natural development, or more mature version, of his theory of authentic and symbolic presentations. In fact, it would now seem clear that *PA*, and its theory of authentic and symbolic presentation, is preparatory for *LI*, and its theory of empty and fulfilled intentions.

To what extent, then, is *PA*’s theory of symbolic and authentic presentation actually the same as *LI*’s theory of empty and fulfilled intentions? We would now have to answer, “At heart, the two theories seem to be very much the same.” The theory of symbolic and authentic presentations would seem simply to be an early version, or “first draft,” of the theory of empty and filled intentions. Furthermore, Husserl gives his greatest attention in *PA* to what he would later call categorial objects. Specifically, Husserl is primarily concerned in *PA* with groups and numbers, which can be authentically presented only through complex acts that are “founded” or “categorial” in the sense of *LI*. Therefore, we might say that *PA*’s theory of authentic and symbolic presentations is closest to *LI*’s theory of empty and filled *categorial* intentions (and thus is closest to his theory of authentic and inauthentic thinking).
Chapter 5
Background for Empty and Filled Intentions in “Psychological Studies”

§28. Introduction

Having reached the final chapter of this dissertation, we turn to the article in which Husserl first revealed his theory of fulfillment to the philosophical world.\(^1\) The piece in question is, “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik” (“Psychological Studies”) and was published in 1894—three years after PA.\(^2\) Our task will be to explore Husserl’s transition from PA to LI. Specifically, our task will be to see how Husserl moves from the theory of authentic and symbolic presentation to the theory of empty and filled intentions.

a. The Importance and Place of “Psychological Studies”

Before examining the content of the article, I wish to discuss its importance. That is, we must answer the question, “Why conclude the present dissertation with a study of this

\(^1\) Theodore de Boer writes: “Here for the first time Husserl describes the ‘transitional experience’ between two acts and thereby touches on the theme of the synthesis of acts, a theme which was later to undergo great development.” Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, Phaenomenologica, no. 76, Theodore Plantinga trans. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 15.

\(^2\) Original version: Edmund Husserl, “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik,” Philosophische Monatshefte 30 (1894): 159–91. Standard version: Edmund Husserl, “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik,” in Hua, vol. 22, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910), ed. Bernhard Rang (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), 92–123. We will be citing the Hua version along with the English translation: “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic,” in Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. Dallas Willard, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, vol. 5 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 139–70. However, the article has also been translated by Richard Hudson and Peter McCormick as “Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic,” in Husserl: Shorter Works, Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston eds. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 126–42. There (p. 126, n.), it is mistakenly claimed that the journal in which the article was originally published was Philosophia Mathematica (which, in actuality, only began publication in 1964).
particular article?” To answer this question, we will examine what a number of Husserl scholars have had to say about the text.

Theodore de Boer, for example, writes that the “series of articles on logic and psychology” to which “Psychological Studies” belongs is of “exceptional importance” if we are “to understand the development of Husserl’s thought.”

Richard Hudson, furthermore, adds that “Psychological Studies” is “probably the most important” of the articles in that series. Thus, since we are here attempting “to understand the development of Husserl’s thought” from the theory of authentic and symbolic presentations, to the theory of fulfilled and empty intentions, an examination of “Psychological Studies” would seem to be in order.

Scholars are of two minds about the place of “Psychological Studies” in Husserl’s early work, however. De Boer, for example, links “Psychological Studies” to PA. While discussing Husserl’s “first period,” de Boer focuses primarily on two texts: PA and “Psychological Studies.” Furthermore, de Boer sees “Psychological Studies” as “closing” this “first period,” in which PA is clearly Husserl’s major work. Thus, for de Boer, “Psychological Studies” belongs with PA.

Other scholars, however, link the “Psychological Studies” to LI, which came seven years later. Hudson, for example, notes that “various parts of the ‘Psychological Studies’ are reproduced in the Logical Investigations, particularly in the third investigation, and also in

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4 Hudson, “Introduction,” 121.

5 De Boer, Development, 3.
the fifth and the second.‖6 Furthermore, Sokolowski calls “Psychological Studies” “a good companion-piece to the Investigations.”7

Bernard Rang, for his part, writes:

After his studies of logical calculus, Husserl began a series of investigations in 1893/94 into the theory of intentionality, which found their preliminary conclusion in volume two of Logical Investigations (1901).8 Rang includes “Psychological Studies” in this series.9 Thus, for Hudson, Sokolowski, and Rang, “Psychological Studies” belongs with LI.

We can explain the fact that de Boer links “Psychological Studies” to PA, while Hudson, Sokolowski, and Rang link it to LI, if “Psychological Studies” is, in fact, the text that links PA and LI to each other. “Psychological Studies,” in other words, belongs not only to PA, nor only to LI, but rather to both. It is the center or transition point that connects Husserl’s first two books.

The centrality of “Psychological Studies” for the period between PA and LI, is confirmed by Willard. In his translator’s introduction to Husserl’s Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Willard writes:

The primary intent of this volume is to give the English reader access to all the philosophical texts published by Husserl between the appearance of his first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik, and that of his second book, Logische Untersuchungen—roughly, from 1890 through 1901. Along with these texts we

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6 Hudson, “Introduction,” 120.


8 Bernard Rang, editor’s introduction to Aufsätze und Rezensionen, xxviii. The German is as follows. “Nach seinem Studien zum Logikkalkül begann Husserl in den Jahren 1893/94 mit einer Reihe von Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Intentionalität, die ihren vorläufigen Abschluß im zweiten Band der Logische Untersuchungen (1901) gefunden haben.”

9 Rang, editor’s introduction to Aufsätze, xxix.
have included a number of unpublished manuscripts from the same period and dealing with the same or closely related topics.\(^{10}\)

“Psychological Studies,” Willard later tells us, is a “crucial paper, the centerpiece of the present volume.”\(^ {11}\) That is, if we take Husserl’s writings between \textit{PA} and \textit{LI} as constituting a kind of whole, “Psychological Studies” is the central work within that whole. Thus, “Psychological Studies” does not belong just with \textit{PA}, nor just with \textit{LI}. Rather, it is central to the papers that form the bridge between \textit{PA} and \textit{LI}.

If, therefore, we wish to understand (a) how and why Husserl moved from the theory of symbolic and authentic presentation in \textit{PA} to the theory of empty and filled intentions in \textit{LI}, and (b) to what extent those two theories are in fact the same, it would seem we must turn our attention to “Psychological Studies.” What, then, is the content of this central, early article?

“Psychological Studies” is divided into two parts. Part I (“The Distinction between Abstract and Concrete”),\(^ {12}\) though interesting in its own right, is beyond the scope of the present dissertation. Part II, on the other hand, is over twice the length of Part I, and will be our main concern. Part II is entitled, “Concerning Intuitions \textit{[Anschauung]} and Representations \textit{[Repräsentation]}.”\(^ {13}\) Its goal is (a) to replace \textit{PA}’s language of “presentations” with the new terminology of “intuitions and representations,”\(^ {14}\) and then (b)

\(^{10}\) Willard, translator’s introduction to \textit{Early Writings}, vii.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., xxix.

\(^{12}\) Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” I, 92 (ET 139).

\(^{13}\) Ibid., II, 101 (ET 148). (Willard leaves “Repräsentationen” untranslated in the title of Part II.)

\(^{14}\) Hudson writes: “Husserl divides the second study into seven sections. In these sections he attempts to replace the term ‘presentation’ by two other concepts: intuition and representation” (“Introduction,” 123).
to explain the difference between intuitions and representations by showing the different ways in which they relate to their “contents.”

We will study Part II of “Psychological Studies” in §29, below. In §30, then, we will assess (1) the connections between the terminology of PA, “Psychological Studies,” and LI, and (2) the ways in which the theories behind the terminology of PA, “Psychological Studies,” and LI are the same or different. Before we begin, however, we must attempt to clarify an important, though highly ambiguous, term on which Husserl relies heavily in both Parts I and II of “Psychological Studies.”

b. Clarifying Husserl’s Ambiguous Term, “Content”

In Part II of “Psychological Studies” (as we will see below), Husserl examines and rejects PA’s terminology of “authentic” and “inauthentic presentations.” He then attempts to replace that terminology with talk of “intuitions” (Anschauungen) and “representations” (Repräsentationen). To explain the difference between intuitions and representations, however, Husserl prominently employs a third term—“content” (Inhalt)—in ways that today’s readers may find ambiguous and problematic.

For example, in the first paragraph of “Psychological Studies,” Husserl speaks of “perceptible things” as if they were “contents” of perception. In the second paragraph, however, he distinguishes the “[o]bjective things” that show up in “perceptual appearances,”

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15 Husserl writes: “There are certain complex contents which become objects of discrete acts of noticing with relatively greater ease. They press themselves upon our attention as, so to speak, ‘natural’ unities; and they exhibit vis-à-vis the observable contents that show up in union with them a characteristic independence, such as is not found in the members of other types of connections. This is true of the intentional content of perceptible things, in comparison to the less complex, and yet just as intuitable content which we call the intrinsic qualities (color, form, etc.) of such things” (“Psychologische Studien,” I, §1, 92 [ET 139]).
from the “contents” of those perceptions.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, in the first paragraph “contents” seem to be the objects we see, while in the second paragraph “contents” seem not to be the objects we see.

Then, in §3 of Part I, Husserl claims that “things are not the actual contents of our presentations, but objective unities, and thus are presumed, merely intended, contents.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus, Part I of “Psychological Studies” leads us to conclude that the objects we perceive are (1) contents, (2) not contents, and (3) “presumed” or “intended” contents, but not “actual” contents.

If we are to attempt a reading of Part II of “Psychological Studies,” therefore, we must first attempt to gain some clarity regarding Husserl’s use of the term “content.” For assistance, we turn to Dallas Willard. Willard identifies four types of “content” for the early Husserl. There are “sensations,” “modified sensations,” “acts,” and “objects.”\textsuperscript{18}

Beginning with sensations, Willard writes: “[T]he most obvious contents of consciousness are,” for the early Husserl, “sensations.”\textsuperscript{19} Sensations “possess ranges of qualities and relations that in a large measure resemble, or are even identical with, the properties and relations which ordinary objects of perception appear to have.”\textsuperscript{20} Thus, it is

\textsuperscript{16} Husserl writes: “Objective things reciprocally act upon each other, and thereby they condition relations of dependence between the perceptual appearances, and hence, also, between the intuitive contents of those appearances” (ibid., 92–93 [ET 139–40]).

\textsuperscript{17} Husserl writes: “It has been objected that ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ are terms which could find application only to presentations, but never to the things presented. To things, certainly not. [But] why not to the contents? The things are not the actual contents of our presentations, but objective unities, and thus are presumed, merely intended, contents” (ibid., §3, 99 [ET 146]).

\textsuperscript{18} Willard, LOK, 38.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 36.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
possible to use the same predicates in talking about sensations and the objects they purportedly represent. (We might, for example, call both a sensation and a ball “red.”)

Willard then turns to the second type of “contents”: “modified” sensations. He writes:

[Sensations] have the capacity to change, or at least to be succeeded by closely resembling sense contents. This may occur on their own, or they may be changed by the mind in which they exist. For example, sensations become mere images, which may then function in memory or imagination or other cognitive capacities. They also can be purposively decomposed and recombined, associated in various ways, generalized and abstracted, to form what is more properly called a [“presentation” (Vorstellung)] or even a “concept.”

In other words, we need not merely receive sensations as they first come to us. Sensations can also be modified, and employed “in memory or imagination or other cognitive capacities.” We can even use them to form abstract “presentations” and “concepts.” In each case, these modified sensations are within the mind, and therefore are also “contents.”

Then, Willard turns to the third type of “contents”: “functions” or “mental acts.”

The “sense data” for red, round, etc., function or are used in a characteristic manner in the perception of this apple, for example. The “function” is of course contained in consciousness, as one of its aspects, parts, or processes, and hence is also a content of consciousness. But functions are not qualitatively similar to sensations modified or unmodified. . . . [M]ental activities, functions, or acts can themselves have functions or be used in further acts of cognition.

In other words, unmodified and modified sensations do not simply sit in the mind. Rather, the mind takes them to be presenting objects. These mental acts of “taking” are also within the mind, and therefore also count as “contents.”

Then, Willard turns to the fourth type of “content”: “objects.”

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21 Ibid., 37.

22 Willard, LOK, 37.
[F]inally—and precisely in virtue of the “function” of (or the “acts” bearing upon) modified primary contents—consciousness enters into relationship with certain *objects* and their properties and relations. For example, it grasps this tree next to the wall, or the British Isles, or the Second World War, themselves no parts or aspects of the consciousness which grasps them. It seems that Husserl never doubted that consciousness *did* grasp objects transcendent to itself.23

That Husserl would call objects outside the mind “contents” of the mind might be surprising. Nevertheless, “the objects meant are counted among the ‘contents’ of consciousness.”24

“Content,” for the early Husserl, therefore, can refer to (1) sensations, (2) modified sensations, (3) mental acts, and (4) the objects presented. Given that Husserl can mean any of these four things by “content,” an accurate interpretation of Husserl’s early texts can be difficult. However, knowing the four possible meanings of “content” will help us to properly distinguish the various uses of the word in Part II of “Psychological Studies.”

§29. Part II of “Psychological Studies”

a. Section 1

Part II, “Concerning Intuitions and Representations [*Über Anschauung und Repräsentation,*]” begins with a significant section for our study, in which Husserl’s older language from *PA* (“authentic and inauthentic presentations”) mixes freely with the language he is trying to promote in “Psychological Studies” (“intuitions and representations”),25 as well as the language that will become dominant in *LI* (“fulfillment” and “intentions”).

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23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 38.

25 Hudson writes: “The question Husserl is interested in here is how representations operate and what distinguishes them from intuitions.” (“Introduction,” 122). Willard writes: “Now [Part II’s] purpose is to achieve clear concepts of intuition and [r]epresentation, and of some of their contrasts and interrelations” (translator’s introduction to *Early Writings*, xxxii).
Husserl begins §1, “Introductory Analyses of Examples,” with “reflections which are suited to illustrate the range of the actual use of the word ‘intuition,’ and the appreciable nuances of its signification.”

“Intuition [Anschauung],” Husserl writes, “in the original sense is just seeing, and thus the perceiving of visible objects,” though it has come to be extended to include “perception in general.” Psychologists, however, Husserl notes, distinguish between a proper and a popular sense of the word “intuition.” “They tell us that not everything is actually perceived which we in non-reflective experience take to be perceived.”

From the psychologist’s point of view, for example, we realize that we cannot “grasp” in “one glance” an entire physical object like a theater. We may “presume” we are intuiting the whole object, but in reality we see “only a small part,” or “only a few aspects.” Using language that would be much more at home in LI than PA, Husserl writes that only part of what we intend is actually given in the act “just as [it is] intended.”

As non-psychologists, we do not realize the difference between the “perceptual presentation” we have of a physical object and a full intuition of that object, because of the stark difference between merely talking about an object and actually seeing it. Perception is so obviously intuitive, when placed in opposition to mere description, that we think of perception as purely intuitive. Nevertheless, we are mistaken, Husserl says. It is not in the

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27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 102–3 (ET 149).
29 Ibid., 102 (ET 149).
momentary, one-sided perception of an object that we actually intuit it, but in an extended, all-sided perception.

The complete content of the thing-presentation only comes to intuitive presence through a continuous flow of contents, in connection with which there are certain psychic acts. These acts accompany sequences of obtrusive partial intuitions, identify the ones reciprocally referring to each other, and—running their course within a single continuous act—spell out the respective objective unity.\(^{30}\)

In this, we find echoes of PA’s description of authentic group presentations. The authentic group presentation is a higher-level act, and includes lower-level acts directed upon the various members of the group. Here, Husserl speaks of the intuition of a whole object as requiring an extended, “continuous act” that includes acts directed upon the various parts of the object.

Husserl then proceeds to clarify the manner in which he wishes to use “intuition.”

A “presentation” in that inauthentic sense where we have a mere deputization by parts, images, signs, and the like, or a mere definition by characteristic marks, is not an intuition. By such means the presented is in truth not set here before us at all.\(^{31}\)

Here, Husserl contrasts intuitions with “‘presentation[s]’ in [the] inauthentic sense.” That is, Husserl is defining intuitions in contrast with PA’s “inauthentic” (or, “symbolic”) “presentations.” In such presentations, Husserl says, “the presented is not set here before us at all.” (In saying this, Husserl is playing on the etymological sense of Vorstellung: foreshutting, or setting before. The same wordplay in English would be something like, “in such presentations, the thing presented is not made present at all.”)

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., 103 (ET 149–50).

\(^{31}\) Ibid. (ET 150).
Husserl then defines intuitions as true presentations, in that they actually make something present.

Rather, an intuition is a “setting before” [Vorstellung] in a more authentic sense, where the object is actually put before us in such a manner that it is itself the substrate of the psychical activity.\(^\text{32}\)

After contrasting them with inauthentic presentations, Husserl now defines intuitions in terms of “authentic presentations.” Intuitions, he says, are Vorstellungen “in a more authentic sense.” Here, we see Husserl in the process of replacing PA’s terminology of authentic presentations with the terminology of intuitions.

Husserl then applies the new terminology—and the stringent criterion that only what is actually given is actually intuited—to “ordinary perception.” The entire perceived object is not intuited, Husserl claims, but “[i]f a special interest . . . is turned upon the content present at a given moment, as upon the appearance of one side of a thing, just as it is, then we have an intuition in relation to that momentarily given content.”\(^\text{33}\) Therefore, perception meets the criterion of intuition only with regard to that aspect of the object which is actually present at any given moment.

Next, Husserl notes that “our term ‘intuition’” is also used in the case of “phantasy presentations, in the widest sense of that phrase”\(^\text{34}\) (which includes memory). He writes:

There is nothing out of the ordinary when one says that he still has an intuition of the swordsman in the Borghese Gallery, instead of saying that he has a vivid memory presentation thereof. . . . However, many a psychologist will take

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
exception here. . . . He will object that an intuition of the swordsman is something we have, in our example, only in an inauthentic sense.\textsuperscript{35}

In English, we would not call the memory of a sculpture from a gallery an “intuition” of that sculpture. However, we might say something like, “I can still see the sculpture now,” with much the same meaning. Furthermore, we would grant Husserl’s psychologists that when we remember the sculpture, we “see” or “intuit” it “only in an inauthentic sense.”

Continuing to analyze memory, Husserl notes that the content of a memory can have a great deal in common with the content of an intuition. Nevertheless, in a memory presentation, the corresponding “intuition” of the remembered object “is not present.” Rather, that intuition “is merely intended.” Thus, Husserl says, a memory presentation involves “an intention that reaches out beyond the immanent content of the act” toward the content of the corresponding intuition. A memory, therefore, is not an intuition, in a “fully justified” sense, unless its “fulfillment . . . is to some extent realized” by the “intended content becom[ing] immanent content.”\textsuperscript{36}

In the foregoing, we have not only the first instance of Husserl’s use of the term “fulfillment” in “Psychological Studies,” but also an example of “Psychological Studies’” mixture of terminologies. Husserl uses (a) the terminology of “intuitions,” which he is trying to promote in “Psychological Studies,” (b) the terminology of “presentations” from \textit{PA}, which he is trying to leave behind, and (c) the terminology of “intending” and “fulfillment,” which will become dominant in \textit{LI}.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 103–4 (ET 150).

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 104 (ET 150–51).
Phantasies (e.g., memories), therefore, intend—and can be fulfilled by—intuitions. The phantasy presentation itself is not an intuition, because it intends a content not immanent to it; it is a presentation of something not present. Furthermore:

In the case of phantasy presentations of external things there comes into consideration besides the inauthenticity just mentioned, yet another inauthenticity which we became acquainted with in the corresponding perceptual presentation. For also in phantasy a thing is, as a rule replaced by inadequate representants—by a partial and more or less fragmentary “aspect.”

Even in phantasy, in other words, only one side or part of the phantasied object is “present” to us. Thus, even though we take ourselves to be phantasying the object as a whole, what we actually grasp is but some “more or less fragmentary ‘aspect’” of the object.

Phantasy presentations, therefore, are inauthentic in two respects. That is, there are two ways in which they do not present the object itself. First, the object they present is not actually present. Second, what they actually present is only one side or aspect of that absent object.

In PA, while explicating the difference between authentic and symbolic presentations, Husserl employed examples from the “conceptual” realm. He does the same thing here in “Psychological Studies.” He writes:

Many even more striking examples of the opposition between the intuitional and the non-intuitional are supplied to us by the broad domain of conceptual acts of presentation.

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37 Ibid. (ET 151).
38 Ibid.
39 See above, pp. 174–76.
40 Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §1, 104 (ET 151).
He then proceeds to argue that while intuitions of (some) concepts are possible, not all concepts can be intuited.\textsuperscript{41} Self-contradictory concepts cannot be intuited, for example; but, he argues, they can still be intended.\textsuperscript{42}

Husserl then unites his discussion of phantasy with his discussion of concepts. “The first intuition of a conceptual presentation,” he writes, “frequently is directed upon a corresponding phantasy presentation; and when this latter is given, we generally say that we then have the intuition intended.”\textsuperscript{43} However, Husserl says, we will have to wait until §5 to see how it is that phantasy—a type of “representation” (Repräsentation)—can also be an intuition.\textsuperscript{44} “Here we only mention,” he writes, “that we did not deny intuitive character to the phantasy presentation in every sense or every case.”\textsuperscript{45}

To close §1, Husserl turns to signs. Though “one does occasionally hear it said that a sign presents what it designates,” Husserl says, “[o]ne will hardly be inclined to call this presenting an intuiting.” He continues:

The sign and what it designates are here totally different kinds of contents, and are only united by association. The sign thus does not render intuitive that which is thought of, but rather only refers to it. Moreover, in the case . . . of arithmetic, what is designated is almost always something which cannot be made intuitable at all.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{41} We will see what it means to “intuit a concept,” in the following paragraph.

\textsuperscript{42} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §1, 104 (ET 151).

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 104–5 (ET 151).

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 105 (ET 151).

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. (ET 151–52).

In contrast with phantasies (e.g., memories), the content that is present in a sign presentation—where a sign is supposed to stand for something, and no attempt is made to bring what is designated to presence—is connected to the content intended only by way of association, rather than similarity. The sign itself is nothing like what it signifies, and thus does not make what it signifies present. Thus, signs, in and of themselves, do not provide intuitions of what they present. The understanding presentation of a sign is not, in and of itself, an intuition of what the sign signifies.

Before moving on to Part II, §2, we should note the following. We have seen Husserl contrast intuitions with PA’s inauthentic (symbolic) presentations, identify intuitions with PA’s authentic presentations, and then examine different types of experiences in order to determine whether those experiences have an intuitive character. We might now ask whether Husserl’s change in terminology—from “authentic presentation” to “intuition”—also signals a change in theory. Is Husserl’s theory of intuition different from his theory of authentic presentation, or is the difference only terminological?

I would argue for a significant continuity between the theory underlying the terminology of “authentic presentations” in PA and the theory underlying the terminology of “intuitions” in “Psychological Studies.” For instance, when Husserl is first elucidating the distinction between authentic and symbolic presentations in PA, he writes: “We have . . . an authentic presentation of the outer appearance of a house when we actually look at the house.”\footnote{Husserl, PA, II, 193 (ET 205).} Even though we are perceiving the house, we have an authentic presentation of only the “outer appearance of [the] house.” This seems to match Husserl’s position in
“Psychological Studies,” that when we are perceiving some physical object, we only actually have an intuition of “the appearance of one side of [that] thing.”\textsuperscript{48} That is, Husserl would say in \textit{PA} that when we perceive a physical object, \textit{we authentically present} only the appearance of part of it, while Husserl would say in “Psychological Studies” that when we perceive a physical object, \textit{we intuit} only the appearance of part of it. The terminology has changed, but the point in both texts seems to be the same.

Two further points of continuity can be seen in Part II, §1, between \textit{PA} and “Psychological Studies.” First, in \textit{PA}, Husserl claims we can authentically present some concepts, but not others,\textsuperscript{49} while in “Psychological Studies” he claims that we can intuit some concepts, but not others. Likewise, in \textit{PA}, Husserl says that presentations by way of signs are inauthentic (symbolic) presentations—\textit{not authentic presentations}\textsuperscript{50}—and in “Psychological Studies,” he says that sign presentations are not intuitions. Thus, Husserl seems to be using “intuition” in the same way as he had used “authentic presentation.” The theory behind the term “authentic presentation” seems to be largely continuous with the theory behind the term “intuition.”

We \textit{can} see two important changes in Husserl’s theory, however. First, “content” plays a much more prominent role in “Psychological Studies”’ theory of intuition than it did in \textit{PA}’s theory of authentic presentation. Likewise, “Psychological Studies’” theory of

\textsuperscript{48} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §1, 103 (ET 150). De Boer writes: “Husserl’s standpoint with regard to perceived contents did not change essentially in the article of 1894” (\textit{Development}, 21). Furthermore: “Husserl did not alter his theory of perception in the article of 1894” (ibid., 51).

\textsuperscript{49} E.g., the “concepts” of large numbers cannot be authentically presented, while the “concepts” of small number can be authentically presented.

\textsuperscript{50} See Husserl, \textit{PA}, II, 193 (ET 205), and our discussion of this passage on pp. 171, above.
intuition seems to include a theory of phantasy (including memory), while phantasy was either absent, or else not significantly emphasized, in PA’s theory of authentic presentation. Thus, while (what we have seen so far of) “Psychological Studies’” theory of intuition does not seem to be radically different from PA’s theory of authentic presentation, the theory of intuition does seem to be more “nuanced” or “developed” than the theory of authentic presentation.

b. Section 2

Like §1, §2 will repay a close reading. Husserl begins by saying that the “series of reflections” from §1 “yields a division of presentations into those which are intuitions and those which are not.”51 Where in PA, presentations were divided into those that are authentic, and those that are inauthentic or symbolic, here they are divided into those that are intuitions and those that are not. Husserl is no longer willing simply to modify the term “presentation” with “authentic” or “symbolic,” but instead is in the process of replacing the terminology of “presentations” altogether.

Husserl continues:

Certain psychical experiences, in general called “presentations” [Vorstellungen], have the peculiar character of not including their objects in themselves as immanent contents (and thus, as present [gegenwärtige] within consciousness). Rather, in a certain manner which still must be more precisely characterized, they merely intend their objects.52

52 Ibid.
Here, Husserl describes the presentations that are not intuitions. These presentations “merely intend their objects.” That is, they are mere intentions, or what *LI* would call “empty intentions.”

Husserl then proceeds to give a more detailed characterization of these presentations.

The phrase “merely intended” here signifies precisely that a content is a content not given in consciousness, but one aimed at, minded, or referred to with understanding, by means of some contents which are given in consciousness. These latter contents are used, with understanding, as representants of the former; and, indeed, they are so used without the intervention of conceptual knowledge of the relationship which obtains between the representation and the intended object. Such presentations [Vorstellungen] we will call “representations” [Repräsentationen].

Here, at last, Husserl names the presentations that are non-intuitional. They are “representations.” Thus, his replacement of *PA*’s terminology is complete. For authentic presentations, he now has the term “intuitions,” and for symbolic presentations, he now has the term “representations.” In *PA*, Husserl had defined the distinction by saying that authentic presentations give an object directly, while symbolic presentations give an object indirectly through something that acts as a univocal sign. Here, Husserl says much the same thing, though using the theory and terminology of “contents.” A representation has an immanent content that differs from the object it intends. The content of a representation is not the object represented, but some content that represents that object.

An intuition, on the other hand, contains its object—the thing it is an intuition of—as its own immanent content.

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53 Ibid., 107–8 (ET 154).

54 Husserl, *PA*, 193 (ET 205) and 193, n. 1 (ET 205, n. 1). See our discussion of this passage and note above, pp. 171–73.
In contrast to [representations] stand other psychic processes [Erlebnisse], likewise called “presentations” in the language of many psychologists. But these processes do not merely intend their “objects.” Rather, they really include those objects within themselves as their immanent contents. Presentations in this sense we call “intuitions.”

The opposite, it would seem, of “merely intending” an object is “really including” it. It is this difference that defines the distinction between representations and intuitions, in “Psychological Studies.”

Husserl then proceeds to distinguish between two senses of intuition. An intuition in the first sense (a) is an intuition of an object that was previously only represented, and (b) includes an awareness that this is the same object as had previously been represented. An intuition in the second sense (a) is an intuition of an object simply as it stands before us, and (b) does not include any awareness of the object’s being the same as had previously been represented.

The difference between the two senses of intuition depends upon the following fact.

Each representation, whether direct or indirect, points to an intuition that corresponds to it but is not actual. By contrast, it is not true that every intuition refers back to a determinate representation appertaining to it.

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
Every representation, in other words, includes an awareness of the intuition that would actually bring the represented object to presence. The reverse, however, is not the case. Some intuitions “refer back” to a representation of the intuited object, and thus are intuitions in the first sense, but others do not, and thus are intuitions in the second sense.

While some intuitions include an awareness of intuited the object of a previous representation, and others do not, Husserl argues that the term “intuition” itself includes an implicit contrast with representations.

Nonetheless, it is the clear intention of the term “intuition” to set a presentation of the group covered by it into relation with some determinately or indeterminately conceived representations, as when we say, for example, that $X$ is intuited, and not merely presented, or that a given representation passes over into its corresponding intuition, and so on.\(^6^0\)

That is, to understand what intuitions are, is to understand them in contrast with representations. Part of what it means to be an intuition is to not be a representation, or to be that which could bring to presence what a representation merely intends.

Nevertheless, Husserl claims he will use the term “intuition” only to refer to those intuitions that do not include an awareness of intuited the object of some previous representation.\(^6^1\) Instead of calling the other type of intuitions—intuitions that do include an awareness of intuited the object of a previous representation—“intuitions,” Husserl claims he will use a “paraphrase.”

If a representation goes over into its correlative phenomenon, e.g., into an intuition immediately intended by it, then the immediate psychical experience of the fact that the intuited is also the intended shall be designated as consciousness of the fulfilled intention [erfüllter Intention]. Of the intuition involved in such a

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\(^6^0\) Ibid.

\(^6^1\) Ibid., 108–9 (ET 155).
case we say that it is borne upon a consciousness of fulfilled intention. Of the representation we say, more simply, that it has found its fulfillment.\textsuperscript{62}

Here, Husserl defines fulfillment, and uses the term “fulfilled intention,” for the first time in “Psychological Studies.” Since Husserl has reserved the term “intuition” for those intuitions in which there is no awareness of the intuited object’s having been previously represented, Husserl now offers the term “fulfilled intention” as a roundabout way of referring to those intuitions in which there is such an awareness. He even brings in the issue of the identity of the object intended with the object intuited, saying that “consciousness of the fulfilled intention” is “the immediate psychical experience of the fact that the intuited is also the intended.” A fulfilled intention, in other words, is one in which the object intended is identical to the object intuited, and a representation has reached “fulfillment” when it “goes over into” an intuition of the object it intends.

“Fulfillment,” Husserl says, “will be used by us in general to designate the non-mediated or mediated correlate of a representation.” He continues:

It is commonly the case that representations are only mediately directed upon intuitions, but are immediately directed upon other representations. Thus, for example, only the concept of a product of $n$ factors of $a$ is directly represented by the arithmetical concept $a^n$.\textsuperscript{63}

For example, while 8 is the ultimate solution to $2^3$, $2 \times 2 \times 2$ is what $2^3$ most directly represents.\textsuperscript{64} Husserl continues:

If the former concept [e.g., $2 \times 2 \times 2$] itself comes in turn into representative presentation, then the consciousness of fulfilled intention likewise sets in with

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 109 (ET 156).

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid..

\textsuperscript{64} In \textit{LII}, VI, §18, Husserl uses just such an example to illustrate the possibility of intermediate fulfillments between a signitive intention and its complete fulfillment.
regard to $a^n$ [e.g., $2^3$]. But by means of the new phenomenon the intention is extended onward.\(^{65}\)

That is, once we realize that $2^3$ is $2 \times 2 \times 2$, we have brought our representation to fulfillment. Nevertheless, on the basis of $2 \times 2 \times 2$, we represent $2 + 2 + 2 + 2$. That is, in fulfilling our representation, we find ourselves faced with another representation, rather than a full intuition. Thus, “already with this simple case,” Husserl says, “we have a whole series of representations mediating between the original one and the full intuition.”\(^{66}\)

Husserl then provides new terminology to use in such situations. First, we have the distinction between “proximate” and “ultimate” fulfillments.

With reference to such cases we will call the correlative phenomenon most nearly adjoined to the representation its \textit{proximate fulfillment}. The \textit{ultimate} fulfillment of any representation is the \textit{intuition proper} to it.\(^{67}\)

Second, we have the contrast between “pure” and “impure” intuitions.

[An ultimate fulfillment] is \textit{pure} intuition—a term which expresses the fact that a content bears no representational function whatsoever. In contrast to this, we speak of an intuition which is \textit{impure}, or is \textit{deputizing}, where a representing content, in virtue of the identity or similarity of its content with what is represented, temporarily serves us as an equivalent, provisional replacement for the latter.\(^{68}\)

That is, pure intuitions bring the intended object to complete presence. Impure intuitions, on the other hand, bring some aspects of the object to presence, but only represent other aspects.

\(^{65}\) Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §2, 109 (ET 156).

\(^{66}\) Ibid. Hudson writes: “Although some fulfillments may themselves serve as representations of yet other contents not present to consciousness, the ultimate fulfillment is always purely an intuition. As in the \textit{Philosophie der Arithmetik} such an ultimate fulfillment is denied to certain representations—for example, mathematical ones—since there is no intuition corresponding to them” (“Introduction,” 123). Furthermore: “It is clear that there are many different kinds of representations for Husserl, some of which are more symbolic and more inauthentic than the others. In fact, unlike the inauthentic presentations of the \textit{Philosophie der Arithmetik}, some of the representations can be ‘fulfilled,’ \textit{e.g.} we can sometimes intuit what is represented—as when we see what we were only talking about” (ibid.).

\(^{67}\) Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §2, 109 (ET 156).

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 109–10 (ET 156).
These nuances in Husserl’s theory of intuition indicate a recognition on Husserl’s part that an intuition need not be fully “adequate” (to use his later terminology) in order to count as an intuition. Likewise, they indicate a recognition that a fulfillment need not be a final fulfillment, based upon a completely adequate intuition, in order to count as a fulfillment. The distinction between intuition and representation, in other words, is not a simple dichotomy. Rather, pure representations and pure intuitions are the two ends of a spectrum of different types of (more or less) intuitive or representative acts.

Before moving on to §§4 and 5, we should note the following. In §1, Husserl began his replacement of the terminology of “authentic” and “inauthentic (or symbolic) presentation,” by introducing the term “intuition” as a replacement for “authentic presentation.” In §2, we have seen him bring the process of replacement to completion, by introducing the terminology of “representation” to replace the terminology of “inauthentic (or symbolic) presentation.”

Husserl has also introduced certain nuances that were not present in his original theory of authentic and inauthentic presentation. First, there is the distinction within intuitions between those that simply intuit their object, and those that also include an awareness that the object intuited is the same as was merely represented before. The latter type of intuitions Husserl has labeled “fulfilled intentions.” Second, there are the “intermediate types” of act between representations and intuitions, with the accompanying notion of “mediate” fulfillments.

In both these new nuances, we see the connection of “Psychological Studies” to LI. For example, LI will continue to use both the terms “intuition” and “fulfilled intention.”
Likewise, *LI* will also emphasize the range of intermediate types of act and fulfillment between completely empty and completely filled intentions.

Furthermore, I would argue that these nuances are just that: nuances. They do not amount to rejections of *PA*’s original theory, though they accompany a rejection of *PA*’s terminology. Rather, they are developments out of *PA*’s original theory, which make that theory more accurate and rich.

### c. Sections 4 and 5

In §4, Husserl argues that “[o]nly what is separately and specifically noticed (*fur sich bemerkt*) can be designated as intuited.” The background, though perceived, is not specifically noticed, and thus is not properly intuited.\(^69\) However, even if several objects are “separately and specifically noticed,” we might only be focused on—and thus only intuit—one of them.\(^70\) For example, when we are listening to a melody, other sounds might stand out from the background, but only that to which we are giving our primary attention—the melody—is properly intuited.\(^71\)

Thus, Husserl concludes the following.

Intuition [*Anschauung*] is . . . a peculiar type of engagement with, or a characteristic manner of being turned toward, a content that is separately and specifically noticed. It is a delimited and delimiting act, which cannot be said of the consciousness of the background or of other contents which, although

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\(^69\) Ibid., §4, 113 (ET 159).

\(^70\) Ibid. (ET 159–60).

\(^71\) Ibid. (ET 160).
separately and specifically noticed, are excluded from the content delimited by the intuitive act.\footnote{Ibid.}

An intuition, in other words, can have up to three different kinds of contents: (1) those that belong to the background, which are not properly intuited; (2) those that belong to the foreground, which are noticed but are nevertheless not properly intuited; and (3) those that are in the center of attention and with which we are immediately engaged. When we speak of the contents of an intuition, Husserl argues, we mean this third type.\footnote{Ibid.}

In §2, Husserl said that presentations divide into two types: intuitions (\textit{Anschauungen}) and representations (\textit{Repräsentationen}). This may make it sound like intuitions and representations are just two different flavors of the same basic type of act. However, in §5, Husserl asks “[w]hether perhaps (regardless of what the meaning of the word ‘presentation’ may be in our definition) it can be concluded that in both of the functions in question [i.e., intuition and representation] the same mode of consciousness is present [\textit{gegeben}].”\footnote{Ibid., §5, 114 (ET 161).} His answer, we will see, is “no.” In fact, Husserl claims that “a sharp descriptive distinction concerning the mode of consciousness (of ‘having in mind,’ of psychical involvement) separates representations from intuitions.”\footnote{Ibid., 115 (ET 161).}

To “see” this “sharp descriptive distinction,” Husserl suggests we “[c]onsider . . . the case where certain figures or arabesques first effect us purely aesthetically, and then there suddenly flashes the understanding that they could be symbols or word signs.”\footnote{Ibid.} There is
clearly a shift of consciousness when we realize that what we had at first taken to be a design is actually a sign. We shift from seeing (or enjoying) to reading. Nevertheless, what we are actually seeing does not change. The same “visual content,” as it were, is present.\footnote{Hudson writes: “For Husserl the difference between the two situations cannot lie in the immanent contents, since in both cases what is immanent is the arabesque. Thus the difference must lie elsewhere. For Husserl the new psychic situation which results when the word is understood means that we are dealing with a new ‘mode of consciousness.’ Somehow consciousness does not passively receive the arabesque as its content, but it actively goes beyond the immediate content to yet another. De Boer sees here the first indication of Husserl’s later concept of the meaning-conferring activity, and ultimately of the concept of constitution” (“Introduction,” 123–24). Hudson is citing, “De Boer, \textit{De Ontwikkelingsgang}, pp. 578, 22, 582, 40–41” (“Introduction,” 125, n. 16). Cf. de Boer, \textit{Development}, 16–17, 21, 34, 51. De Boer, for his own part, writes: “Although Husserl did not alter his theory of perception in the article of 1894, we do find the beginning of a new concept of intentionality. In this article consciousness is no longer a passive possession of contents that are ‘simply there.’ What attitude consciousness takes toward contents is of the greatest importance. In this discovery of sense-giving activity on the level of language lies the point of departure for an important theme of the later Husserl. It was to become ever more clear to him that consciousness plays a role in the appearing of the object, and that this process of constitution must be described in a correlative analysis. In 1894 Husserl had not yet come this far. The new concept of intentionality can only be developed when it is applied to perception and so becomes of universal significance for the relation between consciousness and the appearing world” (Development, 51). Furthermore, Willard writes: “The sense of our doing something to or with an object (the sign) ‘itself present’ to confer upon it its signitive character steps onto the stage by 1894, . . . and moves toward full flower in later works, as the ‘stuff’ of the mental act is increasingly filled out in Husserl’s view” (translator’s introduction to \textit{Early Writings}, xxiv).}

Husserl then provides three other examples. In the first example, we hear a word as a mere sound, without wondering whether it has any meaning.\footnote{Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §5, 115 (ET 161).} This may happen, for instance, when listening to songs sung in a language we do not know. We have no way of telling when meaningful words are being sung, and when the equivalent of “Fa la la!” is being sung. We, therefore, merely listen to the sounds sung, rather than hearing meaningful words.\footnote{This is an example of my own construction.}
In the second example, we hear a word whose meaning we know, but we fail to take the word as meaningful.\textsuperscript{80} Husserl’s example is those cases in which we are so engrossed by “a peculiar tone of the voice or an oddness in pronunciation,”\textsuperscript{81} that we forget to pay attention to what it is exactly that is being said.

In the third example, we begin to take an object as a representative for all objects of its type.\textsuperscript{82} This may happen, for instance, when we see an animal, observe its behavior, and then take it as a representative for its entire species (attributing its behavior to all as being “typical”).\textsuperscript{83}

How are we to understand these examples? Each involves a distinction between merely experiencing something as a thing, and experiencing that thing as a sign for something else. What accounts for the difference between these two ways of experiencing something? What happens when we shift from seeing something as a thing, to seeing it as a sign for something else?

Husserl argues that this shift does not derive from an addition of new contents. “In these examples,” he writes, “which could be increased arbitrarily, what we have is obviously no mere distinction of content.”\textsuperscript{84} The content is the same both before and after the change: one and the same design, sound, sign, or thing is present. Therefore, Husserl argues, the change has to do with the way in which we take the content already present. He writes:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §5, 115 (ET 161).
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 116–17 (ET 163).
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 115 (ET 161).
\item \textsuperscript{83} This is an example of my own construction.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §5, 115 (ET 162).
\end{itemize}
If anywhere at all, it is here that the witness of inner experience is clear, and yields the conviction that there exists in the two cases in question a different mode of receiving the content into consciousness, a different manner of psychical engagement with or in the content.85

Our mode of consciousness changes, when we shift from intuiting an object, design, or sound, to representing something else on the basis of that object, design, or sound. We change from intuiting the present content to representing some absent object on the basis of that present content. Thus, Husserl proceeds to argue, it would not be correct to say that in this new mode of consciousness we continue to intuit the present content.

Husserl begins with words, saying that when “the arabesque becomes a sign” we continue to “see” it, “[b]ut our focus is not upon it, and we do not intuit it.”86 Here, we have the application of §4’s conclusion: if something is not the focus of attention, it is not properly intuited. Likewise, Husserl writes, “if words have their natural effect, then they are not intuited, though they are heard.”87 Once we have begun to read or hear the word, it is as if the word becomes transparent. We begin to look or listen through it (as it were) to what it means.

Thus, Husserl argues, intuition and representation are two different modes of consciousness. Representations are not intuitions with extra content. They are not intuitions

85 Ibid., 116 (ET 163).
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 117 (ET 163). Commenting on Husserl’s claims here, Sokolowski writes: “[Husserl] uses the contrast between being interested in an arabesque or a sound as an object in itself, and taking it as a word or a symbol. This distinction became the distinction between empty and filled intentions in the Investigations (the term ‘fulfillment’ is found in this essay) and while working it out Husserl made use of the schema of sensations versus intentional acts. Thus some concepts that are central to his later work are developed in this paper” (“Review,” 142).
at all. They are a completely different way of taking the content that is present, such that we intend an object that is not present.

However, as we noted before, Husserl’s theory is nuanced. He recognizes that the dichotomy between intuition and representation is not a mere binary, but is mediated by various mixed types of act. This can be seen in perception, phantasy, and conceptual thinking. Husserl begins with perception.

When we ‘intuit’ a thing there . . . is commonly present, when the matter is more closely considered, an intermingling of the two sorts of activities in question. What is genuinely seen serves as an instrument of the understanding in relation to the whole thing, which is merely represented. But on the other hand we are, in such cases, also intuitively focused upon that aspect genuinely seen, so that here the two functions are combined.\(^{88}\)

That is, when we perceive a thing, we intuit the side or aspect that is actually present to us and we represent the non-intuited other sides or aspects on the basis of the side or aspect we do intuit. Therefore, we are not only engaged in intuition, but also representation.

Next, Husserl turns to phantasy (which includes memory).

Again, phantasy presentations have a representative function in relation to the perceptual intuitions corresponding to them. But this does not prevent our also being able to focus intuitively upon such presentations themselves, which often enough we in fact do.\(^{89}\)

One is capable, it would seem, of (a) taking a phantasy as representing what we would intuit if we were actually to intuit the phantasied object, and (b) enjoying the phantasy for what it is in itself—and thus intuiting it. (It is not clear here, however, how this is an “interweaving” of both functions. Instead, it seems to be alternative ways of taking one and the same “phantasy content,” which we may engage in at different times.)

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\(^{88}\) Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §5, 117 (ET 163).
Finally, Husserl turns to conceptual thinking.

And when the geometer operates with intuition, whether with reference to a perceived or a phantasized figure, then once again both functions come into play. And likewise with all conceptual thinking which takes its start from intuitions or accompanies intuitions or reverts to them—as, for example, in “A flower like the (intuited) one before me.”

A geometer not only is focused upon and intuitions the figures he draws, but also understands that they are meant to represent ideal figures that he could not draw. A botanist, on the other hand, may focus on—and thus intuit—the flower before him, and yet also use that flower as a representant of all the flowers of its type. In both these cases, we have not only an intuition, but a representation, Husserl claims.

In fact, Husserl writes:

There quite certainly are many ways in which a representation can attach itself to, or ground itself upon, an intuition. And this does not in the least contradict the above thesis, that the immanent content of a representation is, as such, not intuited.

That is, if a representation has “attach[ed] itself to, or ground[ed] itself upon, an intuition,” this does not mean that the representation intuits the content of that intuition. The representation intends another object beyond the present content.

Finally, Husserl takes on the problem of what to call those cases in which intuitions and representations are interwoven. This problem is solved if one of the two interwoven types of mental act is merely the support for the other. If the intuition interwoven with the representation is a mere support for the representation, then the experience as a whole is a

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89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. (ET 163–64).
91 Ibid. (ET 164).
representation. If the representation is a mere support for the intuition, likewise, the experience as a whole is an intuition.\textsuperscript{92}

In fact, there are some cases in which “the founding function determines the character of the whole in such a way that . . . an undoubted representation forces us to designate it as an intuition.” What Husserl has in mind are phantasies (e.g., memories). Though they are, strictly speaking, representations, their “representing contents, because of their identity or similarity with what is represented, are turned into foundations of a primarily intuitive focus (and thus are not mere means for a representation).”\textsuperscript{93}

d. Section 6

In §6, Husserl thematizes his shift away from the terminology of “presentations.” The section is, in essence, a repudiation of the manner of speaking that dominated PA. Earlier, in Part I, Husserl had stated his opposition to the language of “presentations” as follows. “I think that it is a good principle to avoid such an equivocal word as ‘presentation’ [Vorstellung] so far as possible.”\textsuperscript{94} Here in §6 of Part II, we will see him add a second objection. Not only is the word “presentation” simply too equivocal to be the primary term by which we describe mental acts, it tends to obscure the fact that representations and intuitions are actually different kinds of acts.

Husserl begins §6 as follows.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 117–18 (ET 164).

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 118 (ET 164).

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., I, §3, 99 (ET 146).
The foregoing considerations, however much they may require filling out, have surely evoked or strengthened the conviction that in the intuition and the representation we have to do with characteristically different types of conscious states.\(^{95}\)

We have, in other words, established a distinction that was not clear before: intuitions and representations are different species of mental act (rather than the same species of act, with different types of contents). However, this does not mean we now can say precisely what intuitions and representations are. Husserl says, “[w]e still do not even know whether in these two states simple or composite phenomena are given—and thus also, how they are related to additional known phenomena, provided, indeed, that they are not wholly reducible to such phenomena.”\(^{96}\) That there are intuitions and representations, and that they are two different types of act, in other words, does not tell us whether they are simple or complex wholes. We do not yet know whether we have reached the “ground floor” of analysis, as it were.

One thing Husserl is sure about is that the terminology of “presentations” will be of no use in any deeper analyses. In fact, Husserl claims that his use of the term “presentation,” while having been necessary in earlier parts of “Psychological Studies,” has made no long-term contribution to delimiting precisely what intuitions and representations are. That is, Husserl has used the term “presentation” to point us to the phenomena he wishes to understand, but has not claimed the term actually helps us to understand the phenomena.\(^{97}\)

\(^{95}\) Ibid., II, §6, 118 (ET 164–65).

\(^{96}\) Ibid. (ET 165).

\(^{97}\) Ibid., 118–19 (ET 165).
Now that we know that intuitions and representations are different kinds of acts, to go on using the term “presentations” to refer to both would, Husserl argues, get us into trouble. This is because the term “presentation” either refers to a species of mental act, or to a genus of mental act. If “presentation” were a species term, we could not apply it to both intuitions and representations. After all, intuitions and representations are different species of mental act, and therefore require different species terms.\textsuperscript{98} If, on the other hand, we used “presentation” as a genus term, this would be de facto unsafe. Referring to both intuitions and representations using the same term (“presentation”) would lead us to think of both species as being the same (and as only differing with regard to their content).\textsuperscript{99} In fact, Husserl writes that “errors of disastrous consequence have been caused in epistemology and psychology by overlooking and falsely interpreting the distinction between intuitional and representing consciousness, and therefore not sufficiently doing justice to that distinction.”\textsuperscript{100} Therefore, he claims to “have here avoided recourse to terms composed from the term ‘presentation’ [Vorstellung]”\textsuperscript{101} (e.g., “inauthentic presentation” and “authentic presentation”). Husserl does not want the terminology of “Psychological Studies” to be guilty of leading to more disastrous consequences.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 119 (ET 165).

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid. De Boer writes: “In PA these two forms of consciousness are distinguished as genuine and non-genuine presentation. But Husserl now discovers a dangerous ambiguity in speaking in both cases of ‘presentation.’ In mere intending we have to do with a totally different mode of consciousness, and therefore it is not correct to include both this consciousness and intuition under one concept. In place of non-genuine presentations he now speaks of ‘representations’” (\textit{Development}, 13).

\textsuperscript{100} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §6, 119 (ET 165).

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. (ET 165–66). Husserl writes: “In fact, the distinction itself, although never sufficiently investigated, has long been known. Already with the Scholastics it had not entirely escaped notice. It is to representations that terms such as ‘inadequate,’ ‘inauthentic,’ or ‘indirect,’ refer; and to intuitions the corresponding opposite terms” (ibid., 119 [ET 166]).
Nevertheless, just a few years earlier, in PA’s attempt to “do justice” to the distinction
between intuitions and representations, Husserl himself had used those potentially disastrous
“terms composed from the term ‘presentation’.” And he clearly sees a kind of continuity
between his older terminology and the new. In fact, in §6 he identifies representations with
inauthentic presentations, and intuitions with the “opposite”—that is, with authentic
presentations (just as he had earlier in “Psychological Studies”).

e. Section 7

Finally, we turn to §7 of “Psychological Studies,” which is entitled, “An Excursus
Concerning the Psychological and the Logical Significance of the Two Functions, and the
Importance of Research Concerning Them.” We can see Husserl’s enthusiasm for the
subject in the way he starts the section, using terms like “fundamental significance” and
“extreme interest.”

For the whole of psychology, and in particular for the psychology of knowledge
and logic, the investigation of the two psychical functions under discussion here

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102 See the quotation in n. 101, above (ibid). However, Husserl also notes two differences between his
new understanding of the distinction between intuitions and representations, and two older understandings—which
he may have adopted at points in PA—of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic presentations.
First, Husserl notes, some have used the terms “authentic and inauthentic presentation” to refer to concepts. For
instance, they used the term “authentic presentation” to refer to those concepts of which we can actually intuit
instances, and the term “inauthentic presentation” to refer to those concepts of which we can never intuit any
instances (ibid.). Husserl clearly does not wish to assign similar meanings to the terms “intuition” and
“representation” now.

Second, Husserl says, some have used the terms “authentic” and “inauthentic presentation” to refer to the
contents of consciousness. Some, evidently, have called whatever content is immanent to consciousness an
authentic presentation, and anything that we think about, but do not actually intuit, an inauthentic presentation
(ibid., 120–21 [ET 166]). Once again, Husserl clearly does not wish to assign similar meanings to the terms
“intuition” and “representation” now.

103 De Boer writes: “This analysis of representative presentation is of great importance for descriptive
psychology, for it leads ultimately to a basic modification of the concept of intentionality. It was a startling
discovery that filled Husserl’s own mind with a sense of wonder. The language he uses gives us the impression
that he did not know just what to do with his new discovery” (Development, 16).
appears to me to be of fundamental significance. Especially is this true of the representation, which is of extreme interest.\textsuperscript{104}

Here, Husserl refers to the “psychology of knowledge and logic.” Although he would later understand his investigations as phenomenological, rather than psychological,\textsuperscript{105} his basic mission remains unchanged: we must understand the structures of experience in order to understand knowledge and logic. More specifically, we must understand the ways in which we experience the presence and absence of things—intuition and representation.

Husserl then proceeds to provide evidence for his claims that understanding representation in particular is important to psychology. “[T]here is a series of the very most important psychical acts,” he writes, “which essentially require presentations, in the sense of representations, as bases or presuppositions.” As examples, he offers “desire and will.”\textsuperscript{106} Desire and will involve representing a state of affairs or event (e.g., having an object, reaching a place, finding a job) that does not currently obtain. One, after all, does not desire something that is already the case. Neither does one will that something begin to happen which is already happening.\textsuperscript{107}

After these psychological issues, Husserl turns to logical issues. “[C]oncepts, judgments, and all other sorts of logical activities,” he claims, “themselves belong within the group of functions just singled out as requiring a representative base.” He continues:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 120 (ET 166).
\item \textsuperscript{105} Sokolowski writes: “What looks epistemological and psychological at this stage will, of course, become phenomenological as Husserl’s thought matures” (“Review,” 142).
\item \textsuperscript{106} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 120 (ET 166).
\item \textsuperscript{107} These are examples of my own construction. Cf. St. Thomas on the question of whether the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity will remain after their “object” (God) has been “obtained” (\textit{Summa Theologiae}, I-II, q. 67, aa. 3–6).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
I believe that I can safely say, in particular, that no theory of judgment can do
justice to the facts unless it is supported by a deeper study of the descriptive and
genetic relationships between intuitions and representations.¹⁰⁸

Husserl will begin his exploration of judgment, and of how it involves representation and
intuition, in LI. In LI, that exploration finds its culmination in Investigation VI’s theory of
authentic and inauthentic thinking. However, the exploration is not finally complete until
FTL and EU.

Despite §7’s unusually expressive opening paragraph, Husserl is even more
expressive in the second. He writes not only that “representation [is] a function of extreme
interest,” but also that it is “an occasion for astonishment.” Then, using more guarded
language, Husserl writes that “it is certainly a fact most worthy of consid-
eration that a
psychical act can reach out beyond its own immanent content to another content which is not
really met with [bewusst] at all.”¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, “while we are engaged with the
representing contents, we take ourselves to be employed about the represented objects
themselves.”¹¹⁰

To save oneself from astonishment, one might reduce the difference between
representation and intuition to a difference in content, and thus eliminate the fact that
representations seem to “reach out beyond [their] own immanent content to another content
which is not really met with at all.”¹¹¹ More specifically, one might claim that

¹⁰⁸ Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 120 (ET 166). We note here Husserl’s distinction
between “genetic and descriptive relationships.” Though one normally thinks of Husserl’s “genetic
phenomenology” as belonging to the latter part of his career, we can see he already has genetic investigations in
mind before he has even written LI.


¹¹⁰ Ibid. (ET 167).

¹¹¹ Ibid. (ET 166).
representations involve the addition of phantasy images of the absent, though intended, object. Husserl, however, thinks this approach will not work.

First, Husserl says, “[i]n the flow of conceptual thinking, optical and acoustical sequences of words, in most cases, do the representing alone or almost alone.”\textsuperscript{112} That is, when we are thinking about “abstract” or “conceptual” matters, we are usually involved merely with the signs or words we are using. The things we are talking about, which Husserl here calls “[t]he significational contents” \textit{(Bedeutungsinhalte)} “enter into consciousness either not at all or only in a quite rudimentary fashion.”\textsuperscript{113} That is, we are representing them, but not imagining them.

Husserl adds that “[o]ccasionally wholly different contents, which stand in a distant relation to” the objects we are representing, “will act as surrogates for them: as when at the mention of London merely the shape of Great Britain indistinctly comes to mind.”\textsuperscript{114} Yet these wholly different contents are not the objects we are representing. Saying that we have them as “contents” of consciousness still does not explain away the fact that we are representing something that our minds do not contain.

Husserl then turns to “everyday life.” Even in common conversation about sensuous objects in the physical world, we do not accompany all our representations with added phantasies of the objects we represent. And where we do experience a phantasy of the object about which we are talking, that phantasy is usually a poor stand-in for an actual intuition of

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. (ET 167).

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 120–21 (ET 167).
The object we are representing is clearly something much more than the phantasy content we have “within” consciousness.

“But all of this does not trouble us,” Husserl writes. “It seems as if the meant objects themselves underlay the sequence of words.” When we talk about an object, we are talking about that object, and it is irrelevant to us (a) whether or not there are “contents” in the mind, (b) if so, which contents are there, and (c) whether or not they are identical with the object we are talking about. “The state of affairs in question here is so far removed from the customary direction of attention,” Husserl continues, “that it has been left out of consideration even by the best of psychologists and logicians.”

Therefore, neither those who are unaware of the theory of mental contents (i.e., the common person), nor those who are aware of it, have taken notice of the surprising nature of representations. “And yet,” Husserl says, “here lie great, unsolved puzzles. We stand close to the most obscure parts of the theory of knowledge.”

Husserl then seeks, once again, to explain the importance of understanding representations. Beyond the fact that they are worthy of study in their own right, they seem to be fundamental to “scientific knowledge.”

By that I do not have in mind the psychological elucidation of this illusion and of the entire situation in general, although that has to be regarded as fundamental for all subsequent work. Rather, I refer to the possibility of knowledge in general.

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115 Ibid., 121 (ET 167).
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Hudson writes: “Of the two functions, representations are clearly the more interesting for Husserl” (“Introduction,” 122).
Scientific knowledge—the kind of knowledge which will first come to mind here—is totally based upon the possibility of our being able to abandon ourselves completely to thought that is merely symbolic or is otherwise most removed from intuition, or of our being able purposively to prefer such thinking, with certain precautions, over thought more fully adequated to intuition.\textsuperscript{120}

We recognize here two themes that were also present in \textit{PA}. The first is the theme of science’s being “symbolic,” rather than “intuitive.” (We saw this theme in \textit{PA}’s repeated insistence that mathematical thinking and calculating is, for the most part, not authentic, but rather symbolic.) The second theme is that of the tendency of symbolic thought to replace intuition. (We also saw this theme in several places in \textit{PA}—e.g., when discussing the tendency of symbolic presentations to replace the authentic presentations of small numbers, the tendency of counting to become mechanical, and the tendency of calculation to become mechanical.)\textsuperscript{121}

The first theme—that science involves symbolic, rather than intuitive, thought—is striking for the following reason. Willard claims that arithmetical signs are not involved in presentation,\textsuperscript{122} but the quotation above militates against this. Husserl says that science—which includes arithmetic, as we will see below—is based on symbolic thought. Since the quotation is part of his argument for the importance of studying representations, he seems to be taking “symbolic thought” and “representation” as synonyms. In addition, “representation” is his replacement for \textit{PA}’s “inauthentic presentation.” Therefore, he could

\textsuperscript{120} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 121 (ET 167).


\textsuperscript{122} Willard, \textit{LOK}, 110–18, and “Husserl on a Logic that Failed,” 46–64. See our discussion above, pp. 240–41.
just as well have written that science in general, and arithmetic in particular, is based on inauthentic (or “symbolic”) presentation. Although this is far from conclusive evidence, it supports my contention (contra Willard) that arithmetical signs are involved in symbolic presentation.\footnote{123}

The second theme—that representations have a tendency to replace intuitions in scientific endeavors—seems to run counter to the very sense of representations, as Husserl has described them in “Psychological Studies." All representations, Husserl tells us, intend their corresponding intuitions, and find fulfillment in those intuitions. That science would prefer representations, rather than the intuitions those representations are intrinsically geared toward, is intriguing (and, as it were, counterintuitive).

Husserl then identifies another way in which the tendency to rely on representations in scientific reasoning is surprising. “[H]ow,” he asks, “is rational insight possible in science?"\footnote{124} After all, if representations are opposed to intuitions, how can representations provide insight? Insight would seem to belong more naturally with intuition. Furthermore, Husserl asks, “how with such a style of thought does one even come to mere empirically correct results?"\footnote{125}

As an example of the strangeness of the situation, Husserl offers the then-current state of mathematical knowledge. Mathematics, works in practice, he says, and yet there is great disagreement about the principles on which that practice is based.\footnote{126} Furthermore, Husserl

\footnote{123} See Willard, LOK, 110, and our discussion above, pp. 244–47, 250.

\footnote{124} Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 121 (ET 167).

\footnote{125} Ibid.

\footnote{126} Ibid., 121–22 (ET 167–68).
claims, mathematics suffers from a lack of insight, even though we are just as confident of it as if we had complete insight into its justification. We function in it without intuitions, and yet it works in the real world we intuit.\textsuperscript{127} Given this state of affairs—which extends to science in general\textsuperscript{128}—we can understand the urgency Husserl apparently feels about understanding non-intuitive mental acts (i.e., representations).

In response to these difficulties, one might suggest we look to logic. However, Husserl writes that neither “the old logic [n]or the new” can help. In fact:

Logic, the “theory of science” (“\textit{Wissenschaftslehre}”), must concede, if it will be honest, that all science is a mystery to it. This is where we stand today, in spite of the efforts applied to logic in recent decades by a number of truly outstanding minds.\textsuperscript{129}

What we need, then, is an exploration and understanding of intuition and representation. In fact, “without a more penetrating insight into the essence of those elementary processes of intuition and representation, . . . one surely cannot obtain a full and truly satisfactory understanding of symbolic thought or of any logical process.”\textsuperscript{130} Thus, as Husserl seeks to “obtain a full and truly satisfactory understanding of symbolic thought” and “logical process[es],” he will continue to explore intuition and representation. This will lead him to work out his theory of filled and empty intentions in \textit{LI}, and then to continue to develop that theory in the works that follow.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 122 (ET 168).

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.\textsuperscript{.} Willard’s interpolation.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. (ET 168–69).

\textsuperscript{131} Hudson writes: “Although the ‘Psychological Studies’ belongs to Husserl’s period of logical psychologism, the descriptive analyses are such that they can be taken over, in some cases word for word, in the
In the penultimate paragraph of “Psychological Studies,” Husserl turns back to the issue of psychology, and more specifically to “the much discussed problem of the origin of the presentation of space.”\footnote{Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 122–23 (ET 169).} “[N]o serious step can be made” “toward the solution” of this problem, he claims, without “insight into our two psychic functions.”\footnote{Ibid.} He then concludes as follows.

These indications will, in any case, suffice to make clear the importance of the problems here raised. I do not delude myself that I am capable of overcoming those most weighty difficulties barring us from their solution. Perhaps, however, my subsequent reflections may serve, at least on some few points, to clarify, or even merely to stimulate others.\footnote{Ibid.} 134

As I hope we have seen, Husserl’s “subsequent reflections” have served both “to clarify” and “to stimulate others.”

§30. Review and Conclusion

How, then, are we to understand the relationship between \textit{PA}, “Psychological Studies,” and \textit{LI}? I have argued that “Psychological Studies” is an important transition text between \textit{PA} and \textit{LI}, in which Husserl (more or less) explicitly rejects the terminology of \textit{PA} in favor of new terminology, and also introduces terminology that will dominate in \textit{LI}. Specifically, in “Psychological Studies,” Husserl rejects \textit{PA}’s terminology of “authentic” and “inauthentic presentations,” in favor of the terminology of “intuitions” and “representations.” However, he also introduces some of the terminology that will characterize \textit{LI}: “fulfillment,” analyses of descriptive psychology in the \textit{Logical Investigations}. In the later work the themes and problems of the early work are continued and further developed” (“Introduction,” 124).

\footnote{Husserl, “Psychologische Studien,” II, §7, 122–23 (ET 169).}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., 123 (ET 170).}
“intentions,” and “fulfilled intentions.” In fact, the primary term Husserl is missing at this point is “empty intentions” (though he does use the term “mere intention”).

Without “Psychological Studies’” discussion of the terminology of “presentation,” and of why Husserl rejects it in favor of his new terminology, it might be difficult to see the connection between the terminology of PA and LI. However, with “Psychological Studies,” we can see that the terminology of LI arises out of a purposeful and explicit replacement of the terminology of PA. “Psychological Studies” makes it clear that Husserl made a deliberate decision to replace the terminology of “authentic” and “inauthentic” or “symbolic presentations,” which he had used in PA, with the terminology of “intuitions”—which he, in one place, equates with the term “fulfilled intention”—and “representations.” In LI, then, he continues to employ the terminology of “intuitions”—although now also using the terminology of “fulfilled intentions” prominently—and replaces the terminology of “representations” with the terminology of “empty intentions.”

Given “Psychological Studies,” therefore, we can establish a kind of “genealogy” for LI’s terminology of “empty and filled intentions.”

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PA</th>
<th>“Psychological Studies”</th>
<th>LI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Authentic Presentations”</td>
<td>“Intuitions” (and, in one place, “Fulfilled Intentions”)</td>
<td>“Intuitions” and “Fulfilled Intentions”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Inauthentic” or “Symbolic Presentations”</td>
<td>“Representations”</td>
<td>“Empty Intentions”</td>
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I have argued that the theory behind PA’s language of authentic and symbolic presentations is essentially the same as the theory behind “Psychological Studies’” language of intuitions and representations. Nevertheless, we have also seen important differences. The most prominent difference is the focus on “contents” in “Psychological Studies.” In PA,
the “content” of authentic and symbolic presentations was not a central concern. In “Psychological Studies,” however, Husserl explains the difference between his replacements for authentic and symbolic presentations by arguing that they relate to their contents differently. An intuition’s content and object are one; that is, the object toward which an intuition is directed is “immanent” to it, and thus the object is its content. A representation’s content and object, however, are not one; that is, the object toward which it is direct is not “immanent” to it. A representation “reaches out beyond” its content toward its object.

Husserl continues to talk about “contents” in *LI*, even referring to “sensations” as contents. However, he now believes that the contents of intuitions are not identical with the objects of intuitions.

In fact, Husserl now understands such “sensations” or “contents” as “representative”; they “represent” the various parts of the intuited object.\(^\text{135}\) In *LI*, both empty intentions and

\[\text{[T]ruly immanent contents, which belong to the real make-up (reellen Bestande) of the intentional experiences, are not intentional: they constitute the act, provide necessary points d’appui which render possible an intention, but are not themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act. I do not see color-sensations but colored things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer’s song, etc. etc.}^{135}\]

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\(^{136}\) Ibid., §44, 525–26 (*LI*, 2:173–74); VI, §§22–28. De Boer writes: “As Husserl describes this new mode of consciousness, he nonetheless discovers that in one way or another we can be consciously occupied with a transcendent content not immediately present. In this way too he prepares the way for the new concept of perception that comes to the fore in *LU*. Then perception too is a directedness toward a transcendent (i.e. interpreted as transcendent) object. The analogy with sense-giving on the level of language seems to have prepared the way for the new theory of perception. What Husserl has now discovered is that consciousness is not a concept with one meaning only. We cannot be satisfied with the simple view that contents are ‘in’ consciousness. There are, after all, great differences in the attitudes which consciousness adopts in relation to contents. The task and future of descriptive psychology is to be sought in an analysis of the various forms of consciousness” (*Development*, 17).

Furthermore: “Husserl was later to distinguish sharply between the immanent content (that which is experienced) and the transcendent object (that which is apprehended). Although by 1894 Husserl had already
intuitions have to look beyond their contents, to the objects they intend. The difference is that the content of an intuition actually helps to make the intended object present, while the content of an empty intention does not. The content of an empty intention might help to make some other object present (e.g., a sign for, or image of, the intended object), but the content of an empty intention does not help to make the intended object itself present.

We can now see, therefore, that Husserl’s terminology is not the only thing that changes between *PA* and *LI*. There is also some change in his theory, at least in regard to his treatment of “contents.” We can represent the situation as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act:</th>
<th>“Psychological Studies”</th>
<th><em>LI</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Content in this Act:</strong></td>
<td>Authentic Presentations $\rightarrow$ Intuitions (and, in one place, Fulfilled Intentions) $\rightarrow$ Intuitions and Fulfilled Intentions</td>
<td>Thematized in the text. Content and intuited object are within the act. Content and intuited object are one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Act:</strong></td>
<td>Inauthentic or Symbolic Presentations $\rightarrow$ Representations $\rightarrow$ Empty Intentions</td>
<td>Thematized in the text. Content is within the act, and represents some object other than the intended object. $^{137}$ Neither the represented nor the intended object is within the act. Content and intended object are not one.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{137}$ For instance, in the case of empty intentions based on signs, the contents represent the sign, not the signified object.

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discovered sense-giving on the level of language, it did not yet influence his theory of perception. For Husserl as for Brentano, perception is a possession of immanent contents” (ibid., 21).
The second change in Husserl’s theory, introduced by “Psychological Studies,” has to do with fulfillment. In *PA*, Husserl holds that authentic and symbolic presentations can present one and the same object. He does not, however, thematize the transition from a symbolic presentation of an object to an authentic presentation thereof. We saw above that such transitions must occur in processes that *PA* describes (e.g., calculation or enumeration), though *PA* fails to mention them. In “Psychological Studies,” on the other hand, Husserl identifies the experience of fulfillment, and discusses it briefly. Then, in *LI*, we find Husserl’s full exploration and explanation of the subject.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>PA</em></th>
<th>“Psychological Studies”</th>
<th><em>LI</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The third change in Husserl’s theory is the explicit introduction by “Psychological Studies” of intermediate types of acts—acts that, like phantasies, are neither purely authentic (or intuitive) nor purely inauthentic (or non-intuitive). In *PA*, Husserl seemed to think that the distinction between authentic and symbolic presentations is strict; he writes as if each presentation is *either* authentic *or* symbolic. Though he acknowledged a range of presentations on the symbolic side of the divide—some being closer to authentic, and others being further from authentic—he did not acknowledge something similar on the authentic side of the divide. If a presentation was not completely authentic, it was symbolic.

In “Psychological Studies,” however, Husserl sees the distinction between intuitions and representations as less strict; between pure intuitions and pure representations, there is a
range of acts that mix both intuition and representation. \textit{LI}, for its part, is the same as “Psychological Studies.” Completely empty intentions fall at one end of the scale, completely filled intentions fall at the other, and phantasies or images (as well as other types of act) fall in between. In \textit{PA}, by way of contrast, there is no scale; there are two categories: fully authentic presentations, and everything else (i.e., a range of symbolic presentations).\textsuperscript{138} The types of symbolic presentation do not gradually shade off into types of authentic presentations, nor the types of authentic presentations into types of symbolic presentations.

Thus, one might describe Husserl as moving from a “strict dichotomy” in \textit{PA} (authentic presentations versus a range of symbolic presentations), to a “mediated dichotomy” in “Psychological Studies” (intuitions versus representations, mediated by phantasies and other types of mixed acts), and a “mediated dichotomy” in \textit{LI} (empty intentions versus filled intentions, mediated by phantasies and other types of mixed acts). However, we saw above that even \textit{PA} implies that there are intermediate presentations between the purely authentic and the purely symbolic (even if they all officially fall on the symbolic side of the divide). While Husserl talked as if all presentations were either purely authentic or purely symbolic, his analyses implied that some presentations are somewhere in between.

It is not so much, in other words, that “Psychological Studies” introduces intermediate types of acts for the first time. It is, rather, that \textit{PA} only treated the intermediate types of acts implicitly, while “Psychological Studies” and \textit{LI} treat them explicitly. We can, therefore, represent the situation as follows.

\textsuperscript{138} See above, pp. 183–89 and 196–98 (as well as pp. 233 [n. 191] and 238–9).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PA</th>
<th>“Psychological Studies”</th>
<th>LI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strict Dichotomy</strong> (with implicit mediation on one side)</td>
<td>Mediated Dichotomy</td>
<td>Mediated Dichotomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authentic Presentations</strong></td>
<td>Intuitions (and, in one place, Fulfilled Intentions)</td>
<td>Intuitions or Fulfilled Intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[implicit intermediates]</td>
<td><strong>Symbolic or Inauthentic Presentations</strong></td>
<td>Representations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>explicit intermediates (e.g., phantasy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the terminological changes we have identified were significant. Husserl’s progression from one set of terms to the next was a progression by rejection and replacement. He began with (a) “authentic presentations,” then rejected this terminology in favor of (b) “intuitions” and “fulfilled intentions.” Similarly, Husserl began with (c) “symbolic presentations,” then rejected this terminology in favor of (d) “representations.” However, even this terminology was then replaced by (e) “empty intentions.”

The theory behind Husserl’s terminology also changed, as he moved from PA, to “Psychological Studies,” to LI. However, the change in theory is one of addition, enrichment, or nuancing, rather than one of replacement. The theory of content is added, the theory of fulfillment—which was implicit—is made explicit, and intermediate types of act—which had also been implicit on the “symbolic” side of the dichotomy—are made explicit on both the authentic and symbolic sides. Husserl’s theory of empty and fulfilled intentions in LI, therefore, is a more fully developed or mature version of the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations in PA.
Furthermore, if we put the nuances and additions to one side, we see that Husserl is concerned in all three texts with two basic kinds of act: acts directed upon present objects, and acts directed upon absent objects. We can represent the situation as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>“Psychological Studies”</th>
<th>LI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act:</td>
<td>Authentic Presentations</td>
<td>Intuitions (and, in one place, Fulfilled Intentions)</td>
<td>Intuitions and Fulfilled Intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Mental acts directed upon a present object</td>
<td>Mental acts directed upon a present object</td>
<td>Mental acts directed upon a present object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act:</td>
<td>Inauthentic or Symbolic Presentations</td>
<td>Representations</td>
<td>Empty Intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Mental acts directed upon an absent object</td>
<td>Mental acts directed upon an absent object</td>
<td>Mental acts directed upon an absent object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, in all three works, the two types of mental act are central to Husserl’s investigation. In PA, the distinction between the two types gives rise to calculation and arithmetic (and gives the book its structure). In “Psychological Studies,” the distinction between the two types is fundamental to psychology and logic. In LU, the distinction between the two types is fundamental to logic, knowledge, truth, being, meaning, and the theory of signs.

The distinction between empty and filled intentions (coupled with the themes of fulfillment and identity) remains important to Husserl’s later thought as well. Here, we have only explored the origin, early use, and background of Husserl’s theory. Much work remains to be done.
Conclusion

We began this dissertation by exploring $LI$’s introduction and use of the theory of empty and filled intentions. We then turned to the background and development of that theory in $PA$ and “Psychological Studies.” In doing so, we saw just how central the theory of empty and filled intentions is to each of the three main texts in Husserl’s early work. We found the theory’s mature version at the heart of $LI$, its nascent version at the heart of $PA$, and its developing version at the heart of “Psychological Studies.”

Our exploration has shown a significant amount of continuity between $PA$ and $LI$—the books that open and close Husserl’s early work. This continuity, however, can be easily overlooked because it is masked by a major change in terminology. Husserl moves from speaking about “symbolic” and “authentic presentations” in $PA$ to speaking about “empty” and “fulfilled intentions” in $LI$.

Both $PA$’s theory of presentations and $LI$’s theory of intentions, however, are closely connected to Husserl’s theory of signs. In $PA$, Husserl calls one category of presentation “symbolic,” defines that category in terms of signs, and then uses the theory of symbolic and authentic presentations to develop his theory of number signs. In $LI$, Husserl introduces the theory of empty and filled intentions in his attempt to understand how signs in general, and meaningful signs in particular, work. In both texts, Husserl is attempting to understand how we deal with objects that are merely signified (i.e., that are absent), in addition to dealing with objects that are actually intuited (i.e., that are present). Although Husserl’s terminology changes between $PA$ and $LI$, his central concerns remain the same.
Having seen how a study of empty and filled intentions can reveal continuity between the main texts in Husserl’s early work, we might now ask whether a study of empty and filled intentions might also reveal continuity between Husserl’s early and later work. We have, in fact, already alluded at several points to certain affinities between Husserl’s positions and theories in his early work and his positions and theories in his later work. This dissertation, therefore, sets us up for the task of exploring the role and development of the theory of empty and filled intentions in the texts that follow *LI*. It is but the first step in the study of empty and filled intentions in Husserl’s work as a whole.
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