Divine Ideas: 1225–1325

Vater, Carl (Author); The Catholic University of America (Degree granting institution); Noone, Timothy (Thesis advisor); Doolan, Gregory (Committee member); White, Kevin (Committee member)

Degree Awarded: Ph.D. Philosophy. The Catholic University of America

599

Philosophy; Metaphysics; Creation, Divine Knowledge, John Duns Scotus, Medieval Philosophy, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham

http://hdl.handle.net/1961/cuislandora:67496

http://hdl.handle.net/1961/cuislandora:67496

Creation; Divine Knowledge; John Duns Scotus; Medieval Philosophy; Thomas Aquinas; William of Ockham

2017-01-01T00:00:00Z

2017-01-01T00:00:00Z

A theory of divine ideas was the standard Scholastic solution to the question “How does God know and produce creatures?” Such a theory was only held to be successful if it upheld the nobility of God’s perfect knowledge without violating his supreme simplicity and unity. The theories of divine knowledge coming from philosophers like Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes, which posit no divine ideas, uphold divine simplicity, but seem to compromise the nobility of divine cognition because they are forced to say either that God does not know creatures at all, or that he only knows them in a universal (and therefore imperfect) or indeterminate way. They also seem to compromise divine causality because they have to posit either necessary (as opposed to voluntary) or mediated (as opposed to immediate) creation. Yet, positing multiple ideas in God as Augustine does seems contrary to divine simplicity. Faced with these difficulties, the medieval Schoolmen were forced to articulate very precisely how God can know and create a multiplicity of creatures without jeopardizing the divine simplicity. A complete explanation of how God knows and produces creatures requires the Schoolmen to answer a number of questions that can be divided into two types. The first type of question concerns the status of divine ideas: questions such as what is an idea? Are they speculative or practical? Are divine ideas multiple and, if so, how? How many divine ideas are there? How are the divine ideas related to God? What sort of existence, if any, does an idea enjoy? What is the status of non-existing possibles? The second type of question asks about the scope of divine ideas: questions such as are there divine ideas of singulars, evil, prime matter, genera, species, and number? These questions cause Scholastics to articulate clearly, among other things, their positions on the nature of knowledge, relation, exemplar causality, participation, infinity, and possibility. The goal of this dissertation is to trace the way in which reflection upon the theme of divine ideas in the period between 1250 and 1325 became increasingly refined as the metaphysical, epistemological, and logical topics related to them became subject to greater scrutiny.

Dissertation

Vater_cua_0043A_10834.pdf

The Catholic University of America

2017