Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis

A DISSERTATION

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Hervaeus Natalis’s *De secundis intentionibus* represents the crystalization of an important philosophical tradition concerning the nature of logic. As the 14th century opened, thinkers focused on the nature of logic vis-à-vis the inherited Aristotelian schema of sciences and ontology. Hervaeus’s treatise considers in detail the metaphysical claims necessary for maintaining that second intentions—i.e. notions such as *genus*, *species*, *enunciation*, *syllogism*, and others—are *relationes rationis* that are a kind of “non-being” in comparison with the ten categories. The *De secundis intentionibus* shows itself to be a generally conservative attempt to explain the nature of logic from a broadly Peripatetic perspective. This dissertation articulates this interpretation of the treatise.

The first chapter frames the *De secundis intentionibus* from the perspective of Aristotle’s remarks in the *Metaphysics* regarding “being as the true and the false” and Avicenna’s brief remarks regarding second intentions at the beginning of his *Liber de prima philosophia*. Then, two emblematic 13th century figures are considered, namely Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas.

The second chapter focuses on the advances and ambiguities found in the thought of John Duns Scotus, who is presented as an important proximate source for Hervaeus’s treatise. The chapter emphasizes Scotus’s use of the distinction between subjective and objective existence in explaining his views concerning logic and second intentions. This distinction is important for Hervaeus, and its likely Scotistic provenance is not given adequate attention in the scholarly literature. The chapter also discusses the ambiguities found in Scotus’s remarks regarding the
relationship between the various acts of intellec
tion and the formation of second intentions. It
advocates a broader interpretation of Scotus’s position than is sometimes advanced in the
scholarly literature on this topic.

The third chapter presents the overall view of Hervaeus’s intentionality doctrine. The
doctrine is presented as being part of medieval discussions concerning Aristotle’s “being as the
ture and the false.” This dissertation challenges the reigning hermeneutic applied to the treatise,
a hermeneutic that tends to emphasize questions pertaining to cognition and “realism.” This
chapter explains Hervaeus’s position that second intentions are relationes rationis formed by all
three acts of the intellect. It focuses on the fact that for Hervaeus “intentionality” indicates a
non-real relation from the known thing to the knower. The consequences of this view are
discussed at length.

The fourth chapter considers the final question of the De secundis intentionibus in detail.
It explains Hervaeus’s defense of the possibility of a science of second intentional being. The
chapter also discusses Hervaeus’s distinction between second intentions and other kinds of entia
rationis, emphasizing how the treatise greatly expands the inherited Peripatetic domain of “being
as the true and the false.” The chapter closes by defending the claim that the De secundis
intentionibus is primarily a work of metaphysics, not logic or epistemology.

By reading the De secundis intentionibus in light of the broader medieval question
concerning the nature of logic and the Aristotelian division of “being as the true and the false,” it
is clear that Hervaeus’s treatise aims to present the philosophical distinctions necessary for
delineating a robust, broadly Peripatetic metaphysics of logic.
This dissertation by Matthew Kenneth Minerd, Ph.L. fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L., as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D. and Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D. as Readers.

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Ce qui me préoccupe le plus, c’est le problème de l’intentionalité. Je m’indigne de ne trouver dans aucun ouvrage aristotélicien, ni ancien ni modern, une théorie d’ensemble de l’être intentionnel, et je vais jusqu’à concevoir l’ambition outrancière d’écrire les premiers stades de cette théorie, qui m’est devenue nécessaire pour continuer de vivre.

-- Yves. R. Simon, Letter to Jacques Maritain, July 30, 1932

Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis.

-- Thomas Aquinas, De Trinitate q.6 a.1 sol. 2 ad 3

The notion of relation can be found realized in its place among the other categories of being . . . . But the notion of relation has exceptional privileges and properties. First of all, the notion of relation continues to exist even when it is deprived of all reality and thus passes into the purely logical world. These are logical relations or relations of reason . . . Secondly, the notion of relation continues to exist when the process is reversed by intensifying its reality until its reality is made to coincide with that of the Absolute.

-- Charles Journet, The Wisdom of Faith, 203-204n24

Now the paths of non-being—once one has, by a kind of inverted intuition, become conscious of it and of its formidable role in reality—are as difficult as those of being.

-- Jacques Maritain, God and the Permission of Evil, 32
Table of Contents

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1: From Scientia sermocinalis to Scientia intentionum ................................................................. 19
  1.1 Logic as Scientia sermocinalis .............................................................................................................. 19
  1.2 Aristotelian Sources .............................................................................................................................. 22
    1.2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 22
    1.2.2 Metaphysics Γ: Τον σωφρονί, διαλεκτικό, και φιλοσόφοι .............................................................................. 24
    1.2.3 Metaphysics Δ and Ε: Being as the True and the False ...................................................................... 28
  1.3 An “Avicennian Moment” in Intentionality and the Subject of Logic .................................................. 38
  1.4 Two Transitional Figures: Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas .................................................. 46
    1.4.1 Logic, Reality and Discourse in the De ortu scientiarum of Robert Kilwardby .............................. 46
        1.4.1.1 Introductory Remarks .................................................................................................................. 46
        1.4.1.2 Situating the Scientiae Sermocinales in the De ortu scientiarum ................................................... 48
        1.4.1.3 Logic, Discourse, and Reality in the De ortu scientiarum ............................................................... 54
    1.4.2 Thomas Aquinas – Intentions, Ens rationis, and Logic ................................................................. 73
        1.4.2.1 Introductory Remarks .................................................................................................................. 73
        1.4.2.2 Aquinas and Second Intentions ..................................................................................................... 75
        1.4.2.3 Aquinas as Logical Commentator .................................................................................................. 88
        1.4.2.4 Aquinas, the Metaphysics, and “Being as the True and False” ...................................................... 108
  1.5 Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................................... 122

Chapter 2: Scotus as a Source for the De secundis intentionibus ............................................................... 127
  2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 127
  2.2 Duns Scotus—A Critical Figure in the Proximate Background ............................................................ 137
    2.2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 137
    2.2.2 Scotus’ Logical Works and the Subject of Logic ........................................................................... 142
    2.2.3 Scotus, Second Intentions, and Acts of the Intellect ....................................................................... 160
    2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and Esse Obiectivum ........................................... 176
    2.2.5 Ens Verum and Logical Being ......................................................................................................... 196
  2.3 Concluding Remarks Concerning Interpretational Trajectory ............................................................ 208

Chapter 3: Hervaeus’s Treatise Qq. 1–4 — Intentions and Reality ............................................................... 215
  3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 215
  3.2 Hervaeus on Logic and “Being as the True and False” ........................................................................ 219
    3.2.1 In What Domain of Being? ............................................................................................................... 219
    3.2.2 Explicit Remarks on Being as True and False ................................................................................. 237
  3.3 Beyond the Categories: The Ontology of Second Intentions ............................................................ 248
    3.3.1 Important Distinctions ...................................................................................................................... 248
    3.3.2 Relationes rationis: Their Non-Categoriality .................................................................................... 263
  3.4 A Brief Hervaean Catalogue of Second Intentions ............................................................................ 282
    3.4.1 Many Other Things Than the Predicables ....................................................................................... 282
    3.4.2 Founding one Intention on Another ................................................................................................. 294
    3.4.3 An Aside: The Ultimate Foundation of Second Intentions ............................................................ 304
    3.4.4 Returning to the Main Thread: Founding More Complex Second Intentions ............................... 322

Chapter 4: Hervaeus’s Treatise Q. 5 — The Subject of Logic .................................................................. 330
  4.1 Is Logic Possible? ................................................................................................................................. 330
    4.1.1 Logical Reflection .......................................................................................................................... 330
    4.1.2 First Principles in a Secondary Way of Knowing .......................................................................... 336
  4.2 What is Logic About and Not About? The Broad Domain of Ens Rationis ........................................ 350
  4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental? .......................................................... 382
4.4 Final Thoughts ........................................................................................................................................407

5. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................413

Appendix One: Intentional Reception of Forms and “Supervenience” ..............................................426

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................433
Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Aristotelian Fourfold Schema of Being</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A Possible Hervean Schema of Being</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A Hervean Fourfold Schema of Being</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Various Senses of &quot;Intention&quot; and &quot;Intentionality&quot;</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>An Incorrect Representation of the Divisions of Being</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A Better Representation of the Divisions of Being</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Founding the Predicables</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Founding of One Intention On Another</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Broad Domain of <em>Ens Rationis</em></td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

De An.  Aristotle, *De Anima*
De Int.  Aristotle, *On Interpretation*
DSIDoyle Hervaeus Natalis, *De secundis intentionibus*, ed. John Doyle
In Peri.  Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in libros Perihermenias Aristotelis*
In Porph. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*
Lect.  Duns Scotus, *Lectura*
Meta.  Aristotle, *Metaphysics*
Phys.  Aristotle, *Physics*
Ord.  Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*
Soph. El. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*
SCG  Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*
ST  Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*
Introduction

Today, one is perhaps less likely than in past decades to find a strong claim like that
made by Armand Maurer in his *Medieval Philosophy* when he stated: “In comparison with the
thirteenth century, the fourteenth was a period of disunion and disintegration. . . . It is only to be
expected that the fourteenth century would reflect this tendency toward division and decline.”¹
Maurer, a well-known medievalist and author of a balanced and fair study of William of Ockham
(c.1285-1347)²—perhaps *the* quintessential figure of the standard “decadence picture” of late
scholasticism³—is far from the most adversarial of intellectual historians treating medieval
thinkers. Although Maurer was an accomplished medievalist, any such claims should be
adjudicated against the writings of the period. The “logic-chopping” of such later-day
scholastics may well bear witness to a change in perspective. Such a new set of concerns may
well appear to be “decadence”—but only to one who judges the period by the canons of another
period’s concerns and authors.

According to the well-known narrative, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were faced
with the monumental task of integrating the works of Aristotle into a Christian milieu. In this
environment, the pagan thought of the Stagirite represented particular claims for human wisdom

¹ Armand Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, revised ed. (Toronto: PIMS, 1982), 265.
³ This narrative was popularly expressed in Richard Weaver, *Ideas have Consequences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). The same story lives on to this day. For instance, see Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 38, 54-57, 64. Combining a negative assessment of post-Scotistic thought with a briskly defined “Occam’s razor,” Gregory remarks on page 64 in a way that is quite sensational: “But its *intellectual bases* [i.e. the intellectual bases of unbelief] remain what they were in the seventeenth century, and even more deeply, what they were in the late Middle Ages: a univocal conception of being and the use of Occam’s razor in the relationship between natural causality and alleged divine presence, whether in the United States, Britain, or Europe. Nothing *conceptually* original, including Darwinian evolution, has been added for many centuries.”
that had to be adjudicated against the Christian belief in the higher, revealed wisdom of theological and mystical knowledge. This context required not only an evaluation and interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus but also necessitated further reflection on the sapiential heritage of the earlier Middle Ages. Hence, an emblematic concern of the period was the understanding of the nature of theological science as a particular kind of wisdom, distinguished both from Aristotelian metaphysical wisdom as well as from the kind of contemplative wisdom that was believed to be the peak of the spiritual life.4

Such concerns regarding the nature of theological wisdom did not abate with the inception of the 14th century. Just to take one example, William of Ockham devotes the lengthy prologue of his Sentences commentary to determining the nature of theological knowledge.5 However, this same century is also one in which Ockham wrote the important Summa logicae and during which thinkers like Walter Burleigh6 and John Buridan7 focused extensively on logical matters. As James Weisheipl noted in several insightful studies regarding medieval classifications of the sciences, the 13th century was replete with various schemata for understanding the divisions and nature of human knowledge. However, by the 14th century, this sort of literature no longer played the prominent role that it did in the earlier century.8 Instead,

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4 Above all, the doctor of such reflections was Bonaventure of Bagnoregio in whose work this theme can be found repeatedly. See Bonaventura, Collationes in hexaemeron in Opera Omnia (Ad Claras Aquas: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), XIX.7-18 (V:421-423). Bonaventura, In III Sent. d.35 a.unic. q.1 in Opera Omnia, III:776b. Bonaventura, Collationes de donis spiritus sancti, 4.2 (V:474a). Bonaventura, Itinerarium mentis in deum in Opera Omnia, V:293-316. Bonaventura, Reductione artium ad theologiam in Opera Omnia, V:317-325.


7 An excellent introduction to Buridan, self-consciously focusing on his logical doctrines, can be found in Gyula Klima, John Buridan, Great Medieval Thinkers Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

the focus of the fourteenth century shifted to new topics in natural philosophy and logic. Just as
the thirteenth century necessitated a prise de conscience regarding the schematization of human
and divine wisdom, the fourteenth century marked a kind of prise de conscience concerning
logical matters (among other topics).  

Even within the scope of earlier Peripatetic philosophy, the question of the nature of logic
in relation to other sciences and arts was quite complex. The question gave rise to various
interpretations offered by commentators like Porphyry and Boethius among others, all of whom
wrote in light of the particular logical commitments represented by Hellenistic thought,
especially that of the Stoics. Among Islamic philosophers, similar questions arose for thinkers
like al-Farabi and Avicenna, the latter of whom would play a pivotal role in the development
of Medieval logic.

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9 This same insight is voiced by Hester G. Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic
Thought, 1300-1335,” PhD diss. University of Wisconsin, 1974, 1-11. See also the treatment of the new concerns in
logic and physics discussed in Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, 245-264.

10 For a concise account of Boethius’s commentaries on Porphyry, though with an eye to an exposition
pertaining to Aquinas, see Ralph McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of

11 See Mushin Mahdi, “Science, Philosophy, and Religion in al-Farabi's Enumeration of the Sciences,” in

12 See Amos Bertolacci, “The ‘Ontologization’ of Logic. Metaphysical Themes in Avicenna's Reworking of
the Organon,” in Methods and Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, ed. Margaret Cameron
Paul Thom, “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna's Modal Syllogistic,” in The Unity of Science in the Arabic
York: Springer, 2008), 361-76.

13 See A. Maierù, “Influenze arabe e discussioni sulla natura della logica presso i latini fra XIII e XIV
secolo,” in La diffusione delle science islamiche nel Medio Evo europeo, ed. B. Scaria Amoretti (Rome: Accademia
It was Avicenna who wrote in the *First Philosophy* of his *Kitāb Al-Šifāʾ* that, in contrast to the subject of metaphysics, logic has second intentions for its subject.\(^\text{14}\) This dictum is often cited for its importance in medieval Latinate logic, but it did not, of itself, provide a unitary manner for understanding the discipline. Indeed, the Latin text of Avicenna's *First Philosophy* does not directly refer to “second intentions” but instead to “secondarily understood intentions” (*intentiones intellectae secundo*) or, as rendered by Marmura from the Arabic text, “secondary intelligible ideas.”\(^\text{15}\) Even if one accepts the expression *secundis intentionibus* as an equivalent for this, the ontological status of these second intentions is far from clear. Furthermore, even within the immediate context of medieval thought, the debt of these thinkers to Avicenna is not always explicitly cited. For example, Duns Scotus appears to cite the aforementioned dictum while simultaneously claiming that it was stated by Boethius, not by the Persian philosopher! This fact led the editors of Scotus' *Quaestiones in librum porphyrii Isagoge* to add a suggestion that the passage in question is not Boethian in origin but instead was taken from the *First Philosophy* of Avicenna.\(^\text{16}\) Additionally, Avicenna’s dictum is only one option among a number cited by Scotus as candidates for the subject of logic. This array of competing candidates illustrates well that it was far from universally accepted that the subject of logic is second intentions at the time of Scotus’s writing.

In order to understand the conceptions of logic at play during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it is best to start with a fundamental division between two options proposed


for the subject of logic. One outlook focuses on logic as a *scientia sermocinalis*, often including within its concerns a number of linguistic and grammatical concerns. On the other hand, particularly with the development of Aristotelianism in light of the Arabic sources, there arises the aforementioned view that logic is a science of second intentions. Surprisingly, these two particular understandings of the nature of logic are not always cited in contemporary literature on medieval logic. For example, in a recent text by Terence Parsons, the author neglects to remark on either of these understandings of logic. Whether or not this oversight is a byproduct of his desire to write for modern logicians, such an interpretation risks misunderstanding the place of logic among the various disciplines accepted by medieval thinkers in their attempts to appropriate the Aristotelian canon of writings. That is, it fails to ask the question, “What did each of these thinkers mean by 'logic' within his overall cosmology and metaphysics?”

A complete history of the integration of medieval logic into the schema of Aristotelian sciences waits to be written. The works of De Rijk, Pini, Ashworth, Spade, and others

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provide a vast array of detailed insights regarding this history. However, the details surrounding the debates on topics like cognition and mental intentions often distort the focus of scholarship on texts written by authors of the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth century. An exemplary instance of this phenomenon can be seen in the case of the *De secundis intentionibus* of Hervaeus Natalis (d.1323). Born in Brittany in approximately 1250-60, Hervaeus entered the Order of Preachers in 1276, ultimately earning his licentiate in theology from the University of Paris in 1307 and occupying the French chair in the faculty of theology from 1307 until either 1309 or 1310.24 After serving as the provincial of the French province of the Order from 1309-1318,25 he was elected its master general, serving in that office until his death in August of 1323.26 During his lifetime, Hervaeus penned defenses of Aquinas27 and also was active in polemics against Henry of Ghent (d.1293),28 James of Metz, and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain.29

Slightly before Hervaeus’s death, Pope John XXII canonized Thomas Aquinas. However involved Hervaeus might have been in the proceedings leading to the canonization,30 such support does not guarantee absolute fidelity to the thought of Thomas. The Renaissance

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25 See Guimarães, 56-69.

26 Regarding his term as master general, see ibid., 69-76. Regarding the dating of his death, see ibid.,77-80. The exact date of his death is disputed in several sources, which list August 7 and August 10. See Guimarães, 79. Roensch, 110.

27 See Roensch, 107.

28 This included works explicitly written against Henry. See Hervaeus Natalis, *De quattuor materiis, sive determinationes contra magistrum henricum de gandavo*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Vol. 1-2. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011-2013). The third volume of this series awaits completion by the students of De Rijk who are posthumously finishing his editorial work.


30 See Guimarães, 75-76.
Dominican logician Sylvester da Prierio (1456-1527) considered Hervaeus and John Capreolus (d.1444) to be the two masters of highest repute regarding the thought of Aquinas. Other thinkers, including Peter Nigri (d. c.1483), Paul Soncinas (d. 1495), and Chrysostom Javelli (c.1470-1538) likewise held Hervaeus in esteem, while still others including Capreolus and John of Naples (d. ca. 1350) greatly critiqued Hervaeus's doctrines concerning the nature of truth and beings of reason. Interestingly, later figures such as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1468-1534), Sylvester of Ferrara (1474-1528), and John Poinsot (1586-1644) rarely or never cite Hervaeus on topics pertinent to beings of reason and truth—the two topics most directly related to his particular doctrines regarding the nature of logic. Finally, contemporary scholarship has tended to emphasize the divergence of Hervaeus’s thought from that of Aquinas concerning the distinction of essence and existence, the nature of truth, and in his use of Scotus’s distinction between esse subjectivum and esse obiectivum.

In recent decades, Hervaeus’s treatise *De secundis intentionibus* has generated interest in the scholarly literature. Although Hervaeus was mentioned in the nineteenth century by thinkers like Franz Brentano and Carl Prantl, most contemporary literature concerning Hervaeus is

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32 A rather amazing fact, given that Da Prierio held both Hervaeus and Capreolus in such high esteem!

33 An excellent overview of all these thinkers' relationship to Hervaeus can be found in Michael Tavuzzi, “Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance,” *Doctor Communis* 45 (1992), 134-152.


35 Johann Adam Möhler, *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. 2, ed. Pius Bonifacius Gams (Regensburg: Georg Joseph Manz, 1867), 570. Brentano’s authorship is noted in page 526 of the text. Brentano’s remarks are very brief. The *De secundis intentionibus* appears as *De intentionibus secundis*.
traced to the work of Jan Pinborg on Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus, and Peter Auriol. More recent work has been done by Dominik Perler, Christian Rode, Fabrizio Amerini, L.M. de Rijk, Michael Tavuzzi, Judith Dijs, Georg Koridze, and John Doyle. Of particular importance are the works of Dijs, Koridze, and Doyle, all of whom have written thematically on the *De secundis intentionibus* as a whole treatise instead of merely writing about particular

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36. Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, vol. 3 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1867), 264-273. In contrast to the citation from Brentano, Prantl discusses a number of texts from Hervaeus's corpus, drawing on his commentary on *Sentences*, quodlibetal questions, and what appears to be the *De secundis intentionibus* (here cited as *De intentionibus*).


41. See note 18 above.

42. See note 31 above.


doctrinal themes. Doyle’s work is most fully represented in his 2008 semi-critical edition of Hervaeus’s text, published with an accompanying English translation and editorial notes. Dijs’s 2012 dissertation provides a more thorough critical edition of the first two questions of Hervaeus’s five-question text. Koridze’s 2004 dissertation represents the only major study of the De secundis intentionibus devoted to the question of the philosophical grounding of logic. Koridze’s account provides a detailed reading of the text of the De secundis intentionibus, setting his work apart from many others which merely address this or that particular aspect of the text. However, like most contemporary interpreters of Hervaeus, his work reads Hervaeus within a hermeneutic focusing primarily on questions of cognition that are, in fact, a mere presupposed background for Hervaeus’s main claims regarding the relational nature of logic.

The most extensive published historical treatment of Hervaeus’s work is found in De Rijk's monograph-length introduction to the De secundis intentionibus of Giraldus Odonus (d. 1349). This essay provides an impressive history of the “debate” concerning intentionality that occurred from approximately 1250 to 1350 AD. De Rijk’s treatment of Aquinas focuses on the psychological notions of intentionality. However, the later authors discussed in his introduction are more directly concerned with questions of intentionality as pertaining to logic, above all as regards the nature of first and second intentions. As is quite clear in De Rijk’s treatment of Simon of Faversham (ca.1260-1306) and Radulphus Brito (d.ca. 1320), questions concerning intentionality pertain to topics other than the metaphysics of cognition. In particular,

46 See Dijs, “De secundis intentionibus, distinctiones I & II,” 12n38, 81-93. However, as will be noted in various footnotes below, there are places in her text that express inexplicable small errors, requiring Doyle’s edition for clarification of the passages in question.

47 See note 18 above.

48 I have reservations about referring to a debate as though there were one, unified discussion among the authors of the 13th and 14th century. Such a supposed debate may well be a pure ens rationis, having no reality other than in the claims made by our scholarly histories. Still, even though I will critique aspects of De Rijk’s lengthy introduction, the work remains a very important source for anyone wishing to enter into the details concerning topics pertaining to second intentions in 13th-century / 14th-century authors.
the discussions of first and second intentions require interpretation that thematically recognizes
the logic-oriented concerns of the writers in question. In this context, it is possible to speak of
“logical intentions”\(^\text{49}\) in distinction from epistemological intentions as well as volitional
intentions. Nevertheless, De Rijk's narrative remains primarily centered on the epistemological
aspects of the notion of intentionality, focusing on many details of the metaphysics of knowledge
as well as the relation of first and second intentions to knowledge of extramental objects.\(^\text{50}\) As
regards his account of Hervaeus, De Rijk applies such a cognitionally-oriented hermeneutic, as is
evidenced by his summary evaluation: “Hervaeus has written a fully-fledged treatise on the
diverse problems of intentionality. [The] basic theme of the work is the nature of second
intention and its relationships to the extramental objects and to its counterpart, first intention.”\(^\text{51}\)
De Rijk’s second sentence is key for understanding the overall hermeneutic operating in his
interpretation of the texts in question: the concern is with the nature of first and second intentions
as well as their relationship to the external world.

Granted, these questions are very important in Hervaeus’s treatise. Indeed, four of the
five questions treated in the De secundis intentionibus pertain to such relations between external
things, first intentions of them, and second intentions. However, as Judith Dijs has astutely
noted,\(^\text{52}\) the thematic orientation of the De secundis intentionibus is only understandable in terms
of the lengthy fifth question, which aims to define the domain of logic in terms of second

\(^{49}\) De Rijk, “A Study,” 178.

\(^{50}\) The conclusion of De Rijk's study shows a similar concern with the relation of these debates to what he
takes to be the “Ancient metaphysical presuppositions of Realism.” See ibid., 356-7. This same cognition-centric
approach is quite standard regarding treatments of medieval theories of intentionality. A recent, high-quality
collection of essays from Fordham University Press undertakes its topical explorations in light of this hermeneutic
for considering “intentionality.” As will be seen, Hervaeus’s treatise is written from the perspective of the known
object instead of from the perspective of the knower. Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 294.

\(^{52}\) See Dijs, “Hervaeus Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic,” 197–205. Also, see Dijs, “Hervaeus
Natalis, De secundis intentionibus,” 3, 9n27, 15n7.
intentions. The first four questions therefore presuppose certain doctrines regarding the
cognitional apparatus necessary for explaining human knowledge. However, the primary focus
of the treatise is not the metaphysics of knowledge. Instead, the De secundis intentionibus aims
to explain how second intentions, as a type of mind-dependent being, are fit to be the subject of
a speculative science. Thus, the first four questions are concerned with the nature of second
intentions and their status vis-à-vis mind-independent, real existents. However, as a whole, the
treatise is concerned with situating this particular kind of mind-dependent being within the
structure of sciences so that it may meet the canons set forth in the Posterior Analytics for
determining the demonstrative character of a body of knowledge.

Dijs' studies on this hermeneutical point have been very brief. Her longest work on the
De secundis intentionibus is her 2012 dissertation in which she hints at her critique of De Rijk’s
perspective. In addition, she has penned a brief article calling for the hermeneutic that her
dissertation advances for the De secundis intentionibus. However, even the 2010 article ends
by focusing on cognition-related questions—matters that Dijs herself had argued are merely
preparatory to the treatise's overall purpose. Koridze has more directly approached the De
secundis intentionibus as a treatise concerned with establishing the groundwork for what he calls
“philosophical logic.” By this term he means not the application of logic to philosophical topics

and Ralph Austin Powell (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2013), 465-466. I have opted for this as an
alternative to the expression “rationate being” as coined by Robert Schmidt as a possible translation for ens rationis.
Though Schmidt has very carefully considered the suitability of this translation, it risks being more artificial and
confusing than is the couplet “mind-dependent / mind-independent.” Granted, it is also unfortunate to use "mind" in
this context, as some thinkers (including Deely's master Poinsot) hold that even the estimative sense of animals can
be considered as creating intentions that are types of entia rationis. Deely notes this in ibid., 466n107. Also, there
are occasional times when things like acts of intellection could be called “mind-independent” insofar as such entities
are “real” as opposed to entia rationis such as second intentions (at least according to thinkers like Aquinas, Scotus,
and Hervaeus). More remarks on this translational issue will be discussed at the appropriate time below. Any
translation limps, as is the case here. For Schmidt, see Robert W Schmidt, “The Translation of Terms Like Ens

54 See note 52 in the above.
but, instead, a discussion of logical topics placed in the context of epistemology. Of course, the modern term “epistemology” is problematically anachronistic. However, what he means in using the term is the philosophy of knowledge found in medieval approaches to the Aristotelian corpus. Both in his 2004 dissertation, as well as the articles noted above, he has probed various aspects of the treatise. However, neither of these scholars has focused on details of Hervaeus’s treatment of logical intentionality vis-à-vis his immediate historical context as well as the broader claims of Peripatetic metaphysics (especially what might be called the “metaphysics of relation”).

The current state of interpretation of Hervaeus’s work is understandable. As Scotus remarks in *Rep. Par.* II d.13, q.1, there is a clear risk of equivocation when speaking of intentions. In this text, he enumerates four main divisions for the term *intentio*: (1) one of the will’s acts (as in volitional intention), (2) a thing’s formal *ratio* as when the intention of a thing taken from a genus differs from the intention of the thing taken from its specific difference, (3) a concept, or (4) the general tendency of something toward an object, just as a similitude is called the *ratio tendendi* to that of which it is the similitude. Likewise, at the very beginning of the *De secundis intentionibus*, Hervaeus notes a similar kind of equivocation. He provides his own four-fold division, though initially divided according to the will or the intellect: (1a) The act of the will tending to the end through a means, (1b) the thing so intended (as when a thirsty man’s

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55 See Koridze, *Intentionale Grundlegung*, 17-25. While the introduction clearly sets out the place of Hervaeus’s logical project, Koridze does not thematically discuss the very topic that will be central to this dissertation’s reading of Hervaeus—namely, the central role played by the notion of relation in Hervaeus’s parsing of mind-dependent and mind-independent being.

56 A critical edition of this text is in the process of being collected and edited. For our purposes, the point is only minor, as later discussions will not be based upon this particular text. The Vivès edition is cited by Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 30. See *Rep. par.* II d.13, q.1, n. 4. (Vivès, 44a): “Tamen hoc nomen ‘intentio’ aequivocum: uno modo dicitur actus voluntatis; secundo, ratio formalis in re, sicut intentio rei a qua accipitur genus differt ab intentione a qua accipitur differentia; terto modo dicitur conceptus; quarto, ratio tendendi in obiectum, sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est...”
intention is to drink), (2a) anything that leads the intellect to know something (e.g., the intelligible species, act of understanding, or the mind’s formed concept), or (2b) a thing that is understood in as much as the intellect tends toward it cognitively.57

These two brief selections serve to show that the notion of intentionality is a complex affair. Depending on the context, a given treatment of *intentio* might pertain to the metaphysics of knowledge, epistemology, philosophical psychology, ethics, or logic. Most often in contemporary discussions, the concerns with intentionality are treated in topics pertinent to epistemology, philosophical anthropology, and ethics. In 20th century continental philosophy, discussions of intentionality have been influenced by the tradition arising from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl.58 In analytic philosophy, the moral dimensions of intentionality have been brought to the fore in light of Elizabeth Anscombe’s *Intention*,59 as well as John Searle’s


Intentionality. Searle’s study considers many of the topics found listed in the aforementioned equivocations assigned to the term *intentio* by Duns Scotus and Hervaeus. While both Brentano and Anscombe have well-known intellectual debts to scholastic thought, neither of these authors approaches questions of intentionality as applicable specifically to the nature of logical entities. The intellectual context of much of the literature concerning intentionality is thus influenced by this interpretive milieu, often distracting attention from Hervaeus’s explicit intention to write about intentionality as it pertains to *logical* intentionality.

This dissertation aims to fill a hermeneutical lacuna in the literature regarding Hervaeus’ *De secundis intentionibus* by providing a coherent framing for the work, presenting it as marking a key moment in the post-Avicennian understanding of logic as a science of second intentions. I argue that although Hervaeus was not the first thinker to declare that logic is the study of second intentions, the *De secundis intentionibus* marks a historical watershed in that it provides the first known unified and detailed account of the nature of the subject of logic. As such, it deserves an important place in the history of logic, if only as a moment marking the crystallization of this discussion of second intentions in medieval logic. As such, the treatise provides a model for the methodology and questions pertinent to any proemium on the nature of the subject of logic.

The initial two chapters of this dissertation set the general historical scene regarding the discussion of intentionality and logic. Beginning in the first chapter, a directed treatment of the...

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61 One could also add to a semi-contempoary list the work of Henry Veatch, *Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952). While drawing on John Ponsot, Veatch succumbs to his desire for a logic based upon epistemological realism, often conflating psychological realities (such as formal signs), *ens rationis* in general (a notion that includes more than second intentions according to Poinso— and according to Scotus and Hervaeus as well, as will be seen below), and second intentions (a particular kind of *ens rationis*). In the end, the “intentionality” discussed vis-à-vis epistemology creeps into Veatch’s quasi-scholastic attempt at redeeming logic for his brand of epistemological realism. For a gracious critique of this aspect of Veatch’s text, see John J. Glanville, “The Confrontation of Logics,” *New Scholasticism* 28, no.2 (1954): 187-198.
aforementioned shift in the understanding of the nature of logic is presented. This chapter outlines the establishment of an understanding of logic differentiated from the other major medieval claimant, namely a notion of logic as a *scientia sermocinalis*. In order to understand this transition, an account will be given of several important Aristotelian texts from the *Metaphysics* that will play a central role in the accounts of logic given by the figures considered in this dissertation. Likewise, a brief account will be provided of the dicta found in the Latin *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* of Avicenna, for the later terminology of “second intentions” relies upon usages found in his text. Following these background accounts, two important transitional figures will be considered, namely Robert Kilwardby (c.1215-79) and Thomas Aquinas (c.1224/25-74), each of whom bears witness to the issues being considered regarding the nature of logic and its relation to second intentions, as understood in the second and third quarters of the thirteenth century.

The second chapter aims to establish a new hermeneutical context for reading Hervaeus’s treatise. Most studies of the *De secundis intentionibus* have approached his work in view of earlier writers including Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito. What is most amazing about these studies is their minimalistic treatment of the thought of Duns Scotus. As recent historical work has emphasized the Scotistic influences on Hervaeus’s thought, the current state of historical research inadequately addresses the fact that the Subtle Doctor is a likely candidate as a proximate source for the doctrines in the *De secundis intentionibus*. While other earlier thinkers, especially Faversham and Brito, did make important contributions to the background discussions informing Hervaeus’s thought, it will be seen in the third and fourth chapters that his manner of approaching the nature of logic and of second intentions deploys a

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62 These works will be discussed at the close of 2.3 Concluding Remarks Concerning Interpretational Trajectory.
markedly Scotistic vocabulary. Attempting to avoid presenting a pastiche of figures from the late thirteenth century, the second chapter will be devoted to the Subtle Doctor’s thought concerning logic and the ontological status of second intentions. A careful reading of pertinent texts will help to provide a much more directed reflection on this important source for the debates and doctrines that were pivotal for Hervaeus’s discussion of these matters.

The third chapter then provides an exegesis of the first four questions of Hervaeus’s treatise. This chapter specifically focuses on Hervaeus's method of crafting his responses in light of the overall project of the treatise, namely the defense of a conception of logic as a science of second intentions. In particular, I will focus thematically on his dicta regarding intentionality vis-à-vis the Aristotelian division of being known as ens verum by medieval authors or more literally as “being as the true and the false.”

In the fourth chapter, the important fifth question of the De secundis intentionibus is presented. This chapter provides a close reading of Hervaeus’ text. This exegesis will justify the hermeneutic developed in the first three chapters of this dissertation, namely that the primary concerns addressed in the first four questions are all subordinate to his defense of logic as a speculative science of second intentions, which themselves are a kind of relative non-being in comparison with the purely mind-independent being pertaining to the ten Aristotelian categories. Hervaeus’s conclusions will be interpreted as part of the 13th and 14th century discussion regarding the identification of the subject of logic and its placement in the broader Aristotelian cosmology / metaphysics.

Taken as a whole, this dissertation thus aims to clarify an approach to logic that could be called “metaphysical” insofar as Hervaeus's approach makes its first task the clarification of the ontological status of logical entities in contrast to extramental realities. Having thus clarified
their status, it is possible to ask if such entities can be investigated in a manner compatible with
the requirements expressed by the *Posterior Analytics* regarding demonstrative science. An
exposition of Hervaeus's treatise will provide an important outline for understanding one
particular approach to logic that would remain fundamental to Renaissance Dominican
logicians.\(^\text{63}\) Likewise, a clear understanding of the doctrinal viewpoint of the *De secundis
intentionibus* is illuminating regarding later scholastic debates regarding supertranscendentals\(^\text{64}\)
and helps to provide important historical clarifications regarding the semiotic of John Poinsot,
whose thought has garnered increased attention due to the contemporary work of John Deely.\(^\text{65}\)

By paying careful attention to Hervaeus’s methodology for disambiguating and analyzing
the notions involved in the medieval Aristotelian heritage regarding relations, second intentions,
and the subject of logic, this dissertation aims to shed light on the assertion that logic is a science

\(^{63}\) See notes 31 and 33 above.

\(^{64}\) This relationship is astutely noted by Doyle in his work on Hervaeus. Doyle’s own work on Baroque
scholasticism clearly formed him to make these observations.

\(^{65}\) In particular, see the misunderstanding of Hervaeus's doctrine of logical intentionality found in John
Hervaeus’s doctrine regarding the direction of logical intentionality from the viewpoint of *ens reale*. This is
unfortunate, for such an interpretation is in line with what he has elsewhere called (following Maritain) "Cyclopean
Thomists" whom he believes pay attention to *ens reale* to the detriment of the realm of *ens rationis*. See John
Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of
the Twenty-first Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 360-361n245. Jacques Maritain, *God and

Indeed, see the continuation of the passage cited by Deely from Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323)
on Intentionality,” 92: “The initial tending is in the act of the understanding which is presupposed by an order of
prior to posterior with respect to all relations of things to the mind. Without this basic act, and the thing or object it
presupposes as its terminus, there would be no further intentions or intentionality. But once more: *precisely as such,
intentionality for Hervaeus first arises in a reverse direction inasmuch as things or objects terminate the tendings of
the intellect.*” However, Deely does seem to notice the ramifications of this point in a note made in his bibliography.

Indeed, Doyle stresses this point multiple times in his article, which was inspired by the fact that this
discourse of intentionality was striking in that it understood intentionality, in this particular context, as being the non-
real relation (i.e. an *ens rationis*) from the known to the knower. See Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) on
Intentionality,” 86, 89, 92, 93. This same doctrine has elicited similar surprise from Laurent Cesalli, who was
surprised to find the doctrine in Hervaeus' student Francisco da Prato. However, Cesalli does not trace the complete
historical connection to Hervaeus. See Laurent Cesalli, “Postscript: Medieval Logic as Sprachphilosophie,” *Bulletin
de philosophie médiévale* 52 (2010), 124-125.
of second intentions. In so doing, it will also provide a model for the types of reflections that must be undertaken in carefully distinguishing the science of logic from other sciences in the Aristotelian heritage. I will not argue one way or the other regarding Hervaeus’s success in providing the most decisive answer to this problem. However, the upshot of the historical and textual investigations that follow will help to provide some clarity to the hazy boundary between being and knowing. In so doing, this dissertation aims to provide some small amelioration to a perennial situation once wittily observed by Yves Simon:

Logic is surrounded by neighbors that have absolutely no scruples, for instance the psychology of the intellect, the critique of knowledge and, worst of all, the ethics of thought. These neighbors are always ready to swallow it up. There are on the market indefinitely many books of logic, especially perhaps since the beginning of the nineteenth century, where there is a little logic and much that may be very good in itself but is not logic. However, what is very good in itself and is not logic becomes vicious when it is called logic.66

Chapter 1: From *Scientia sermocinalis* to *Scientia intentionum*

1.1 Logic as *Scientia sermocinalis*

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, logic had an accepted place within the curriculum of the liberal arts and, in particular, among the three disciplines of the *trivium*, namely, grammar, rhetoric, and logic. However, throughout late antiquity and into the Middle Ages, the assorted schemata expressing the overall topography of the disciplines varied a great deal. At a cursory glance, the eclecticism of this period may be overlooked. The major schemata for the division of the sciences—such as those of Augustine (354-430), Boethius (c.475-524), Isidore of Seville (d.636) and Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141)—all share in having general divisions of human knowledge into speculative and practical knowledge. Often, these two main divisions are accompanied by another major branch pertaining to logic or reasoning.¹ Thus, the basic divisions give the false impression of unity and agreement. However, beyond these major “high-level” divisions, the details greatly varied from schema to schema.

The tradition of dividing knowledge into the speculative and the practical is one that can be traced at least to Plato, though it has well-known and important relations to Peripatetic thought as well.² As regards the independent status of logical disciplines, it is necessary to take into account another significant tradition within medieval classifications of the sciences, namely

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² In ibid., 465, Weisheipl remarks that Plato did not clearly distinguish the contemplative pursuit of the Good from the practical life. This is not the place to discuss the topic of the “Socratic problem” in ethical theory. However, it is worthwhile to note that although Aristotle was clearer than Plato concerning the distinction of the speculative and the practical, it is quite likely that he took an insight on this matter from his teacher. See Plato, *Statesman* in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, D.S. Hutchinson, trans. C.J.Rowe (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 258d-260b.
the tripartite Stoic categorization of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic. The Stoic and Peripatetic viewpoints on the sciences would provide an important context for most debates concerning the scientific status of logic. In their most basic form, these debates were concerned with determining whether logic is a science (i.e. the Stoic position) or only an instrument of science (i.e. the traditional Peripatetic position). In his logical writings, Boethius explicitly contrasts the Stoic view of logic to that of the Peripatetics, attempting to find a middle ground that acknowledges both points of view. It has also been suggested that there are Stoic influences operative in the writings of Arabic thinkers including Avicenna whose writings played a critical role in the interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy in the medieval Latin West.

As regards the nature of logic and its place among other branches of knowledge, Avicenna would play an important role in altering the medieval outlook. Throughout the mid-thirteenth century, logic was predominantly held to be a scientia sermocinalis—a science of discourse that is not easily distinguishable from the concerns of grammar and rhetoric. As will be discussed below, aspects of Avicenna’s dicta concerning second intentions would play an important (if sometimes unacknowledged) role in the process leading to a view of logic as a scientia rationalis focusing primarily (or exclusively) on the mind-dependent realities constituting logical being.

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3 Citing Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and others, Diogenes Laertius attests to this division: “[The Stoics] say that philosophical theory is tripartite. For one part of it concerns nature [i.e. physics], another concerns character [i.e. ethics] and another concerns rational discourse [i.e. logic].” See Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 197), II-2 (p.110).


5 See McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, 50-53.


7 See Kann, 106.
Medieval writers concerned with questions of metaphysics would attempt to specify the exact relationship between logical notions and those studied in the speculative sciences. In order to properly understand the project being undertaken by Hervaeus in his *De secundis intentionibus*, it is critical that one understand the types of questions that were being asked in the thirteenth century regarding what might be called the “metaphysics of logic.” This milieu is at least as important as the contemporaneous debates concerning the nature of human cognition, although the latter have garnered much more attention in the literature concerned with the context for Hervaeus’s treatise.⁸

The current chapter establishes the remote medieval context for this dissertation’s proposed hermeneutic for interpreting the *De secundis intentionibus*. This dissertation argues that Hervaeus’s treatise is best understood in light of medieval opinions concerning Aristotle’s “being as the true and the false.” In contrast to all mind-independent being, this domain of mind-dependent reality is the “ontological space” within which logical notions “reside.” Thus, to understand the nature of the topics treated in the *De secundis intentionibus*, it is pivotal that one understand the full import of Hervaeus’s claims regarding the mind-dependent status of second intentions.

This chapter will outline and interpret the critical components of the Aristotelian backdrop to such a project. It will begin by considering the texts of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* in which the Stagirite discusses “being as the true and the false.” Next, a brief exegesis will be provided for an important text from the beginning of Avicenna’s *First Philosophy*, which played an important role in shaping the general medieval approach to logic, one that was increasingly important by the time of Hervaeus. Then, selected texts of two thirteenth-century thinkers will

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⁸ See note 52 in the introduction to this dissertation.
be contrasted so as to provide a context for understanding the nature of logic. First, Robert Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum* will serve as a text that is clearly within the older tradition treating logic as a *scientia sermocinalis*. However, as will be seen, Kilwardby’s text expresses views that are related to later opinions regarding the placement of logical concerns within the domain of “being as the true and the false.”

Thomas Aquinas will be the second thirteenth century author considered in this section. Aquinas does not provide a unitary account of the nature of logic. Although he is more forceful than Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum* regarding logic’s focus on mind-dependent being, he does not completely clarify the distinction between mind-independent and mind-dependent being as it relates to the subject of logic. Therefore, several important texts from Thomas’s corpus will be considered. Particular emphasis will be placed on his commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. In his remarks on “being as the true and the false” in this commentary, Aquinas clearly expresses a view of *ens rationis* that emphasizes the “non-real” status of logical notions. The considerations undertaken in this chapter will provide the necessary historical context for understanding the more systematic and thematic treatment that will follow in the next chapter. However, before that task is taken up, it is necessary to turn to the pertinent texts of the Stagirite as well as those of Avicenna, Kilwardby, and Aquinas.

### 1.2 Aristotelian Sources

#### 1.2.1 Introduction

In a charming passage at the end of the *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle remarks:

> Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. . . . [O]n the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject
of deduction, we had absolutely nothing else of an earlier date, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches.\(^9\)

Understandably, the textual locus for most discussions of Aristotelian logic is the so-called Organon. However, not all thinkers agree on the scope of the texts to be included in the Stagirite’s treatment of the logical instruments involved in human discourse. For those following the modern editions of Aristotle’s work, it is standard to include in the Organon six of the Aristotelian treatises, namely the Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations. However, in contrast to the modern manner of constituting the Organon, Alexandrian, Arabic, and Medieval thinkers included the Rhetoric and the Poetics as parts of the logical canon as well.\(^10\)

For the purposes of this dissertation, it is necessary to turn to another set of texts, taken from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in order to find the loci that would be quite important for medieval discussions of the “metaphysics of logic” and the scientific status of the logical disciplines. The first of these texts from the Metaphysics is nothing more than a point expressed by Aristotle in passing. However, it would become an important locus for later commentators to express their thoughts concerning the nature of logic. The second set of texts is concerned with a topic that is actually distinguished within the Metaphysics, namely the notion of “being as the true and the false.” Aristotle states that metaphysics is not directly concerned with this domain of being because it is mind-dependent. In the Metaphysics, he is looking for the principles and causes of mind-independent being qua being, especially the properties and causes of substance.\(^11\)

However, various medieval thinkers would see “being as the true and the false” as providing the

\(^9\) See Aristotle, Soph. El., 34, 184b34-184b2. See also Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things, 7-10.

\(^10\) See Deborah Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1990), esp. 1-16.

\(^11\) See p.27ff below.
ontological space in which the “entities” (loosely speaking) treated by logic are to be found. It is the central contention of this dissertation that Hervaeus’s treatise must be interpreted in light of this division of being at least as explicitly as it is interpreted in light of the medieval debates concerning cognition. In this section, the pertinent Aristotelian texts will be presented in outline so as to provide adequate background for the discussions that will follow.

1.2.2 *Metaphysics* Γ: The σοφισταί, διαλεκτικοί, and φιλοσόφοι

When a text becomes part of a commentary tradition, certain passages of the work can take on a life of their own and garner far more attention than expected after a cursory glance at the passages in question. This phenomenon will be seen upon considering a perfunctory example offered by Aristotle in Book Γ of the *Metaphysics*. The text itself is deceptively simple and will require little exposition for the purposes of this dissertation. It comes in the midst of Aristotle’s preambulatory remarks regarding whether or not the philosopher of being *qua* being is rightly concerned with proving the basic axioms that apply to all being. As he states in the beginning of the third chapter of this book:

> We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance. Evidently the inquiry into these also belongs to one science, and that the science of the philosopher; for these truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them, for they are true of being *qua* being, and each genus has being.\(^{12}\)

In the chapter preceding this remark, Aristotle discusses the problem of finding unity for the science of being *qua* being treated in the *Metaphysics*. He opens this second chapter by stating, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous [i.e. completely equivocal].”\(^{13}\)

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\(^{13}\) Ibid., Γ.2, 1003a33-34.
This one thing to which all forms of being are related is substance, and he argues that there can be a science of being *qua* being insofar as the philosopher investigates the principles and causes of substance, relating other senses of being to substance and its principles.14

He continues at some length regarding the unity of the science as regards types of substance as well as the notions of unity and plurality, which he states are related to substance as well. While important for understanding the *Metaphysics*, a full treatment of these texts would involve a long review of the contentions surrounding the unity of the text as a whole. Since the purpose of this section is merely to draw attention to the remarks that will be taken up by later medieval authors, these complex issues will be set aside, though numerous sources can be consulted regarding the unity of the *Metaphysics* as a whole and of this passage in particular.15

From the standpoint of the text as received, the pertinent passage comes directly after a concluding remark that states, “It is evident then that it belongs to one science to be able to give an account of these concepts [i.e. those such as unity, similarity, privation, and so forth] as well as substance.”16 Aristotle’s concern in this passage is to explain the universal scope of the philosopher’s investigation. Examples are given such as determining the sameness and difference of (1) Socrates and (2) Socrates sitting, as well as questions pertaining to the nature of contrariety as such.17 The point he is driving at in this passage is that such matters are not properties of things insofar as they are some particular kind of being. Instead, the questions being raised are about “essential modifications of unity *qua* unity and of being *qua* being.”18 In a

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14 See ibid., 1003a35-1003b18.
17 See ibid., 1004b1-5.
18 Ibid., 1004b5-6.
remark that ties these points to his earlier discussions, he states, “Those who study these properties err not by leaving the sphere of philosophy, but by forgetting substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these other things.”

The schema presented thus asserts that the science of being *qua* being considers first and foremost the nature of substance. All of its other investigations are related to that. However, insofar as unity and being are directly related, this science considers unity *qua* unity (as well as being *qua* being). In addition, it considers the “essential modifications” of unity and non-unity, such as sameness, similarity, contrariety, and so forth.

It must be stressed that the point being defended throughout this passage is the fact that the philosopher investigates all things, at least from a certain perspective (namely that of being *qua* being and unity *qua* unity). Aristotle then provides an image to buttress his claim that philosophy considers all things. It is a deceptively simple remark, comparing the similar appearances found in dialecticians (διαλεκτικοί), sophists (σοφισταί), and philosophers (φιλοσόφοι). He remarks that dialecticians and sophists have the appearance of being philosophers, for they both treat of all things, as does the philosopher. As he states, sophistry and dialectic “turn on the same class of things [lit. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται] as philosophy.” That is, both sophistry and dialectic have the same universal scope as philosophy. However, they are not the equivalent to it. Sophistry differs from it “in respect of the purpose of the philosophical life.” It is a kind of mere semblance of philosophy, not concerned with

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19 Ibid., 1004b8-10.
20 See ibid., 1004a23-35.
21 Ibid., 1004b22-23.
22 Ibid., 1004b24-25.
anything other than seeming truth. Dialectics on the other hand differs from philosophy as regards the particular kind of ability that the dialectician has, for the dialectician critiques opinions, while the philosopher is concerned with certain knowledge.

The observation is not expressed as a decisive argument. Aristotle is only providing a “sign” (σημεῖον) of the fact that the philosopher investigates all things. There are three types of people who all have the same appearance—the philosopher, the dialectician, and the sophist. Each one discusses all things, but it cannot be the case that the three figures discuss them in the same way. The dialectician does so from probable reasons and not with the proper principles of any particular investigation. The sophist investigates by creating the appearance of truthfulness. Thus, since there is a kind of universal truth that is mere seeming truth (i.e. the truths proposed by the sophist) and a kind of universal non-demonstrative truth (i.e. the limited ability of the dialectician), there is still a space for there to be a kind of truth that is demonstrative, considering all things according to the proper principles of substance (i.e. the truth of the philosopher of being qua being). After proposing this sign, Aristotle continues the main thread of his discussion, setting behind him what has effectively been an aside. However, as will be seen below, the passage will furnish a locus for the discussion of important questions concerning the nature of logic in the texts of Kilwardby and Aquinas.

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26 In the same notes by Sokolowski, these matters are treated at some length on pages 40-42. While I have not directly expressed his conclusions here, I am indebted to the fact that he gives careful consideration to this passage in his exposition of the text.
1.2.3 Metaphysics Δ and Ε: Being as the True and the False

At the beginning of Metaphysics Ε, Aristotle provides a brief account of the division of the sciences that is a well-known mainstay of the Peripatetic division of knowledge.27 The main lines of this division are threefold, namely: (1) practical, (2) productive, and (3) theoretical. The first two have principles within the one who acts or makes. Practical actions derive from choice, and products derive from the art possessed by the one who produces.28 In classifying the theoretical sciences, Aristotle notes that natural science (φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη) investigates substances that have their principle of rest and movement in themselves.29 In this case at least, the science in question (i.e. natural science) investigates a reality with principles that are not dependent upon the person investigating. In the case of the practical and the productive sciences, the principles of the science are intrinsic to the one investigating. In the case of natural science, the principles are in the nature itself. Thus, the theoretical forms of knowledge are distinguished from the practical and productive because of the status of the principles of the subject of investigation. In what follows, Aristotle includes among the theoretical sciences (in addition to natural science) the mathematical sciences and first philosophy (the science he is discussing in the Metaphysics).30

It is important to note that, in this passage at least, Aristotle has been quite unclear about what one should think about logical investigations. In truth, nothing has been said about where logic fits into the schema of sciences. It does not seem to fit well within the theoretical sciences, for these pertain to things that have principles independent of human knowledge. It does not

27 See Aristotle, Meta., E.1, 1025b19ff.
28 See ibid., E.1, 1025b21-25.
29 See ibid., 1025b19-21. See also Aristotle, Phys., 2.1, 192b9-193b21.
30 See Aristotle, Meta., E.1, 1025b28-1026a32.
seem appropriate to place it within the practical sciences, for logic studies the nature of reasoning, not of choice. Perhaps one could argue that logic is a productive science, for it does teach one how to “make an argument.” However, even this last explanation does not seem sufficient. In most productive enterprises, the thing made is external and physical. However, it is not at all clear how a syllogism is “made” by reason. Furthermore, while the principles of such “logic-making” are in the knower, how are they dependent upon the knower? For example, does the syllogism have its own kind of principles that are independent of the knower?  

Aristotle does not answer these questions. Indeed, he does not even raise them here. In *Metaphysics* K, he does distinguish from the other theoretical sciences “the science which investigates into demonstration and science.” As to its place in the division of the sciences, he neither asks the question nor provides an answer. Therefore, one must be very careful not to foist upon him answers to questions that were not even his own. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is germane, nevertheless, to ask whether Aristotle did in fact provide some elements of a general intellectual topography that would help to place logic among the various branches of human knowledge. 

An affirmative answer to this question is at least encouraged by remarks like those made repeatedly by John Doyle in the notes accompanying his translation of Hervaeus’s *De secundis*

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33 This state of affairs is well summarized in Spade, *Words, Thoughts, and Things*, 11 and Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 129n95.
intentionibus.\textsuperscript{34} Doyle sees Aristotle’s remarks about “being as the true and the false” as pivotal for situating logic vis-à-vis the broader Peripatetic metaphysics. However, Doyle is not alone in making this assertion. The same interpretation was suggested by numerous medieval thinkers, including Kilwardby, Aquinas, Scotus, and Hervaeus—all of whom will be discussed below. Likewise, several similar (and striking) observations are made concerning this point in Franz Brentano’s Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. However, in order to understand these remarks, it is necessary to consider the passages of the Metaphysics in which Aristotle divides being into its various senses.

The first relevant passage is found among the numerous terms defined in Metaphysics Δ. In seventh chapter of this book, Aristotle presents a four-fold division of being. The first major division is into the accidental (τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός) and the essential or per se (τὸ δὲ καθ’αὑτό). As regards the first, one might say, “The just is musical.” Perhaps, someone is both just and musical. It is not utterly repugnant to the notion of justice that a just person may also be musical. However, strictly speaking musicality is outside the essence of justice. Thus, someone that is just is at best accidentally musical. There is nothing about justice in itself (i.e. per se, qua justice) that is musical. In contrast, consider per se predication regarding justice, such as, “Justice is a quality” and “the just is virtuous.” Aristotle writes that the per se are said of things according to his categorical schema. He writes also that being is different for each of these categories.\textsuperscript{35}

Aristotle then proceeds to provide a third division (located within the per se), namely being and non-being with regard to truth and falsity.\textsuperscript{36} Here, he writes that “is” means that

\textsuperscript{34} See DSIDoyle, 41n15, 62n70, 81n99, 86n115, 100n145, 148n242, 157n255, 244n434.
\textsuperscript{35} See Aristotle, Meta., Δ.7, 1017a23-30.
\textsuperscript{36} See ibid., 1017a31-34.
something is true and non-being indicates falsity. The examples given are said to hold for affirmation and negation. Thus, one could say, “Hervaeus is intelligent,” or, “Hervaeus is not alive.” Granting the truth of these claims, Aristotle is asserting that in both cases he is dealing with being. Thus, following the methods used by Ross in his translation of the text, one could emphasize the sentences, “Hervaeus is intelligent,” and, “Hervaeus is not alive.” These assertions deal with being as it is and hence are true. The contrast to this is falsity, for which Aristotle does not use a contingent fact like those mentioned above but instead uses the mathematical example, “The diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side” (emphasis added, following Ross).37 Thus, non-being here is on the side of falsity in that, of its essence, the square’s diagonal is not commensurate with the side.

The fourth and final division is with regard to actuality and potentiality.38 One can say that Hervaeus is a philosopher both when he is potentially thinking philosophically as well as when he is actually thinking philosophically. In each case, it is true to say, “Hervaeus is a philosopher,” though “is” means something different in each case. Even when Hervaeus was a baby, he was potentially a philosopher in a way that a monkey or a slug would never be. Even as a very remotely potential philosophical thinker, it was true to say of him, “Hervaeus is (potentially) a philosopher,” while it is never true to say, “The slug is (potentially) a philosopher.”39 Aristotle, then, defers a detailed treatment of this division to Book Θ.40

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37 Ibid., 1017a33-34.

38 Literally, τὸ δ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ and τὸ μὲν δυνάμει in the Greek.


40 See Aristotle, Meta., Δ.7, 1017b1-9, Θ1045b27ff. As regards the inclusion of divisions 2-4 in the per se, see Aquinas in In V Meta. lect. 9, n.889 (Marietti, p.238).
At the beginning of the second chapter of Book E, Aristotle refers to this fourfold division. The purpose of this chapter is to show how there is no science of accidental being.\textsuperscript{41} The overall goal in Book E is to situate the science being treated in the Metaphysics and to explain its proper subject. Though relatively obvious in the text, it is important to keep this goal in mind when coming to chapter four in which the Stagirite takes up the question of “being as the true and the false.”

When Aristotle takes up this division of being in Book E, he is more explicit in pointing out that this being and non-being depends upon the combination or separation made by human reasoning. Thus, truth arises in an affirmation when things are in fact compounded, as in the example, “Hervaeus is intelligent.” However, truth also holds for the negation when two things are separated, as when one says, “Hervaeus is not alive.”\textsuperscript{42} Falsehood arises when these cases do not hold in reality. Here, he does not give an example and does not develop a thorough account of how truth and falsity are apprehended in their relation to the world. However, the case of falsity presumably is like what was noted above, namely when something is predicated of a subject when it does not hold for the subject. For instance, it is always and everywhere false that the diagonal of a square is commensurate to its side. Likewise, one could say, “A triangle is not a five-sided figure,” meaning that it is false to say that a triangle is such a figure. With regard to contingent beings and facts, Aristotle does not here give an adequate account. This is not surprising, for as will be noted, this is not his direct concern.

It is important to notice, though, that the truth and falsity in question here are not “in” the things. This kind of combination and separation only occurs by the intervention of a knower:

\textsuperscript{41} See Aristotle, Meta., E.2, 1026b3-5.

\textsuperscript{42} See ibid., E.4, 1027b18-22.
“Falsity and truth are not in things . . . but in thought.”\textsuperscript{43} The combination or separation of two things is true because of its relation to reality. However, the world itself is neither true nor false in this sense. Thus, Aristotle says that being in the sense of being true or being false “is some affection of thought.”\textsuperscript{44} Because of its derivative and mind-dependent nature, it is excluded from the subject of the inquiry in the \textit{Metaphysics}, as was the case for accidental being. Thus, first philosophy studies being according to the categories and being according to actuality and potentiality.\textsuperscript{45}

In this section, Aristotle \textit{does} promise to discuss the question of truth and falsity with regard to knowledge of simple things. It has been noted by commentators such as Aquinas\textsuperscript{46} and much more recently by Joseph Owens\textsuperscript{47} and Kurt Pritzl\textsuperscript{48} that Aristotle does indeed take up this investigation at \textit{Θ}.10 where he discusses how the truth of judgments briefly remarked on in the passages from \textit{Δ} and \textit{Ε} is related to the apprehension of incomposite realities. In \textit{Θ}.10, he discusses a kind of truth that is really a matter of “contact and assertion” and falsity is ignorance or “non-contact.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 1027b25-26.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 1028a1.
\textsuperscript{45}See ibid., 1028a1-1028a5.
\textsuperscript{46}See Aquinas, \textit{In VII Meta.}, lect.1, n.1245.
\textsuperscript{47}Owens, \textit{The Doctrine of Being}, 411-414.
\textsuperscript{48}Kurt Pritzl, “Being True in Aristotle's Thinking,” \textit{Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy} 14 (1998): 187-191 and 199-201. Pritzl’s treatment should be read in light of his position that truth through noetic contact (i.e. that discussed in \textit{Θ}.10) is more central for the Aristotelian account of truth than that of the truth of propositions. The evaluation of this claim is outside the scope of this dissertation.
From within the aims of the *Metaphysics*, the passages discussed above from Books Δ, Ε, and Θ appear to be all that is said about “being as the true.”\(^{50}\) This division does not pertain to first philosophy. The true and the false are derivative in a twofold manner. On the one hand, they depend upon human apprehension. On the other hand, they depend upon mind-independent being insofar as truth and falsity depend upon the actual state of reality.\(^{51}\) Since this type of being is outside the main concerns of the *Metaphysics*, the paucity of remarks is not surprising. However, there is one interesting passage to which Franz Brentano calls attention. This passage helps to situate “being as the true and the false” as part of the Stagirite’s broader intellectual topography.

The passage in question is in chapter 4 of *Metaphysics* Γ. It is made in the course of Aristotle’s introduction to his treatment of what later philosophical terminology would call the Principle of Non-Contradiction. Aristotle opens the fourth chapter of this book by asking, “Whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance.”\(^{52}\) In the midst of his justification that this task falls to the science being treated in the *Metaphysics*, he makes an important remark in passing:

> And the attempts of some who discuss the terms on which *truth* should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic [lit. ‘a lack of learning of the analytics,’ Gk. ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν]; for they should know these things already when they

\(^{50}\) There is an additional passage in Book K, which basically reiterates the same point made in E for excluding accidental being and being in the sense of truth and falsity from the discussion. See Aristotle, *Meta.*, K.8, 1065a22-25.

\(^{51}\) See ibid., Θ.10, 1051b5-9: “This being so, when is what is called truth or falsity present, and when is it not? We must consider what we mean by these terms. It is not because we think that you are white, that you are white, but because you are white we who say this have the truth.” Indeed, directly before this passage, Aristotle directly links being and non-being in their strictest senses directly to truth and falsity. On this point, see the remarks in Aquinas, *In IX Meta.* lect.9, n.1895 (Marietti, p.456): “Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ens et non ens ei oppositum dividantur dupliciter: uno modo secundum diversa praedicamenta, quae sunt substantia, quantitas, qualitas et cetera; alio modo secundum potentiam et actum, vel unius, vel alterius contrariorum, quia utrumque contrariorum contingit actu esse et potentia: hoc quod est in actu, maxime proprie dicitur aut verum aut falsum.”

come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are pursuing it (emphasis added).  

In commenting on this text, Aquinas interprets Aristotle as meaning that one must have skill in the part of analytics that treats of demonstration, namely the Posterior Analytics. Given the strict text of Aristotle, this appears to be a likely reading, for it would mean that one should know the role of principles in demonstration before searching for the principles in a given science. Aquinas’ reading is additionally bolstered by Aristotle’s own use of τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, which would seem to indicate that he is, at most, speaking of the Prior and the Posterior Analytics. In any case, “truth” is here related to topics covered by what can be broadly termed logic.

In his text on the senses of being in Aristotle, Brentano closes his treatment of “being as the true and the false” by noting this correlation between logic and “being as the true and the false”. He states that although Aristotle excludes “being as the true and the false” from the subject of the science being investigated in the Metaphysics, this exclusion should not be seen as being equivalent to the exclusion of “being as the accidental” from the science. In the section on per accidens being, Aristotle clearly states that there can be no science of the accidental. The exclusion of “being as the true and the false” does not imply that there cannot be a science of this particular domain of being. Brentano ventures an interpretative remark that deserves to be quoted in full:

Unless we are mistaken, all of logic has no other object, regardless of whether it deals with genus, species and difference, definition, judgment, or argument. In any case, none of these has any sort of being outside the mind; thus they can only have being in the sense

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53 See ibid., 1005b2-5.
54 See Aquinas, In IV Meta., lect. 5, n.594 (Marietti, p.164-165).
55 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, E.2, 1026b3-4.
of being true; hence logic as a purely formal science is distinguished from the other, real parts of philosophy.\textsuperscript{56}

In an annexed footnote, he makes a remark that illuminates his reading concerning this matter (and likewise bears witness to his scholastic training):

Logic belongs to the theoretical, not to the practical or technical, sciences. . . . Nonetheless it is not assigned any place in the division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics, and first philosophy. This striking phenomenon is explained by the fact that only the latter [i.e. physics, mathematics, and first philosophy] consider real being. They differ according to the three degrees of abstraction of their viewpoint and are distinguished accordingly, while logic treats only of merely rational being [\textit{on hos alethes}].\textsuperscript{57}

He supports this comment by noting the passage from \textit{Metaphysics} \textup{Γ} discussed above.

A few critical remarks on Brentano’s interpretive comments will also serve to provide a summary for this section, thus helping to clarify what \textit{is} and what \textit{is not} to be asserted about the general topography proposed in this dissertation. In the Aristotelian texts considered above, Aristotle attempts to situate the subject of first philosophy. In order to do so, he distinguishes theoretical, practical, and productive forms of knowledge. The science he is treating in the \textit{Metaphysics} pertains to theoretical knowledge, for it is a science having principles that exist independently of human choice or art.

However, the term “being” has many uses. At the beginning of Book \textup{Γ}, Aristotle proposes that relation to substance can provide enough unity to constitute a science. In the text of Book \textup{E}, he discusses what should and what should not be discussed as qualifying as “being qua being.” Hence, he excludes accidental being, for no science can be had of it. He likewise excludes “being as the true and false” because this type of being is derivative and really exists only in a knower who composes and divides things that have been known.


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 159n44.
Now, even if one sets aside the vexed question of the unity of the text of the *Metaphysics*, these selections do not give a conclusive answer regarding the status of “being as the true and false.” Furthermore, they do not clearly indicate if this division of being has a particular science that investigates matters pertaining to it. The remarks in Book Θ indicate that Aristotle does have some interest in returning to the topic in the *Metaphysics*. However, given his aforementioned rejection of it as a candidate for the subject of first philosophy, the reader of the *Metaphysics* is in something of a predicament regarding what science should treat of this particular division of being.

As the text in Book Ε shows in particular, “being as the true and the false” depends upon two types of principles. On the one hand, truth and falsity depend upon reality, not upon thought alone. The truth of the judgment, “Hervaeus is intelligent,” depends upon reality. However, truth and falsity are also caused by an “affection of thought” (τῆς διανόιας τι πάθος) and thus have a principle that is also within the human person. Thus, they exist in a kind of undefined borderland. Brentano’s reading of this situation is suggestive, but it should be taken as indicating a possible interpretation at best. Brentano seems to have been aware of the tentative nature of his interpretation, as is indicated by the words at the beginning of the first quote cited above: “Unless we are mistaken.”

Thus, by surveying the situation from the vantage point of “being as the true and false,” it is possible to draw several conclusions regarding this division of being as well as the possibility for its inclusion among the division of sciences according to a Peripatetic schema. First, if this division of being is in fact scientifically studied, its principles are not drawn from things or from the human knower. Instead, its principles seem to be drawn from both. Second, this division

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58 See note 15 above.

presupposes a certain view of cognition (for it is formulated in terms taken from Aristotle’s treatment of human cognition). Third, its nature is not treated in explicit detail in the *Metaphysics*, and a much broader study of the corpus is needed to justify any detailed claims regarding the nature of such a science. Fourth, however, its possibility need not be excluded. As noted above, the *Metaphysics* does exclude accidental being from scientific discussion. It does not explicitly exclude “being as the true” from scientific discussion but merely excludes it from the subject of the science being treated in the *Metaphysics*. To find an explicit definition of a single domain of being that falls to the investigations of logic, it is necessary to turn to later thinkers. To understand how such a project could be taken for granted by the thirteenth century, it is first necessary to consider several important remarks in the Latin translations of Avicenna’s *Kitāb Al-Ṣifāʾ*.

1.3 An “Avicennian Moment” in Intentionality and the Subject of Logic

In histories of medieval logic, it is a commonplace to note that the discussion of “second intentions” relies upon the dicta found in the Latin translation of Avicenna’s *Kitāb Al-Ṣifāʾ*. The particular passage of note is found at the beginning of the *Prima philosophia sive scientia divina*, where he writes that logic is concerned with *intentiones intellectae secundo*.\(^{60}\) It would be deceptive to think that this text exercised a self-conscious role in all medieval thinkers who accepted the claim. For example, although the term *secunda intentio* (and cognate expressions) are sparse in Aquinas, when he does use such expressions, he does not acknowledge Avicenna as a source.\(^{61}\) Even more telling is Duns Scotus’ own attribution of the Avicennian dictum to

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\(^{61}\) This does not mean that one should discount links to Avicenna, as is particularly evident in the vocabulary found in *De Trinitate*, q.6 a.1 sol.2 ad 3. See pages 73ff below.
Boethius. Although the works of Avicenna were not integrated into the curricula of the Latin West in the same manner as were those of Aristotle, texts from the Latin translation of his Kitāb Al-Šifāʾ played an important role in the development of Medieval Aristotelianism. As will be seen in the course of the following chapters, this simple dictum of Avicenna provides an important context for understanding the nature of Hervaeus’ *De secundis intentionibus*.

It is outside of the scope of this dissertation to discuss the development of Avicenna’s logical doctrines as well as the scope of their reception in the Latin West. Of the portion of the *Kitāb Al-Šifāʾ* dealing with logic, only three sections are known to have been translated into Latin, namely those concerned with Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, the division of the sciences, and rhetoric. In contrast to the logical works, sections concerning natural philosophy and first philosophy were more thoroughly translated into Latin. Much historical work is still required before adequate treatment of the reception of the Avicennian corpus can be told with complete historical accuracy.

For the purposes of this dissertation, it is not necessary to provide a complete treatment of Avicenna’s own logical doctrines. The focus of Hervaeus’s treatise is not primarily upon logical matters. Instead, it is concerned with the metaphysical question of the status of second intentions and how such logical entities can be the subject of scientific treatment. The context of the *De

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62 See note 16 above.


secundis intentionibus is neither primarily cognitional nor primarily logical in scope. Instead, it addresses a set of questions that are primarily concerned with the “metaphysics of logic.” Therefore, it is most helpful to consider carefully the nature of the important dictum found in the Latin Philosophia prima sive scientia divina of Avicenna. As will be seen, the text discusses the nature of logic in a manner that is congenial to the development of longer treatments concerning the metaphysics of logic. The basic medieval claim that logic is concerned with second intentions has obvious connections to Avicenna’s metaphysical treatise. The medieval developments concerning this topic will help to provide important details regarding the Aristotelian domain of “being as the true and false.”

The text in question is found in the midst of Avicenna’s initial discussion of the nature of first philosophy. His focus is primarily on the standard threefold partition of the speculative sciences, dividing these into the natural, mathematical (lit. doctrinales), and divine sciences (i.e. first philosophy). In the particular section that discusses intentiones intellectae secundo, Avicenna is attempting to distinguish how each science considers its object. All of this is done in an attempt to understand what is particular to the way that first philosophy is concerned with topics treated in the other sciences. In order to understand the import of this passage, it is best to read the text closely.

Avicenna begins with natural science, which is said to have bodily reality as its subject. He states that it considers bodily reality neither insofar as it is being, nor insofar as it is substance, nor even insofar as it is composed of matter and form. Instead, it only studies such

66 See notes 50, 51, and 52 in the Introduction above.
matters insofar as body is subject to rest and motion. The sciences that are contained under natural science are even more remote from first philosophy than is general natural philosophy. He states that the same holds for moral sciences.⁶⁸

Avicenna further states that mathematical (lit. doctrinalis) sciences are concerned with that which is measured or numbered, abstracting from whether or not such realities exist in matter or in the intellect without matter. He does not establish the status of these realities. Instead, Avicenna suggests that the mathematical sciences are concerned with the properties that can be predicated of such mathematical realities, once they have been posited. The subordinate mathematical sciences are only concerned with the nature of the various accidents that follow upon such posited mathematical realities. Such subordinate sciences are thus concerned with realities that are even less general than those treated by mathematical sciences dealing more proximately with the fundamental properties of measuring and numbering.⁶⁹

Then, in addition to the classic Peripatetic speculative sciences, Avicenna adds a remark concerning logic. Implicitly referring to earlier discussions in the Kitāb Al-Šifāʾ, he says,

The subject of logic, as you already know, are notions that are known secondarily [lit. intentiones intellectae secundo], which are applied to those which are known primarily, so that by means of them one is able to come to the unknown from the known—not insofar as these are known and have intelligible existence [lit. habent esse intelligibile], which in no way follows from matter, or it follows from matter but not corporeal matter.⁷⁰

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⁶⁸ See Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, 1.2 (p.9:59-63): “Dico autem quod suum suiectum scientiae naturalis est corpus, non inquantum est ens, nec inquantum est substantia, nec inquantum est compositum ex suis duobus principiiis, quae sunt hyle et forma, sed inquantum est sujectum motui et quieti. Scientiae vero quae sunt sub scientia naturali remotores sunt ab hoc, similiter et morales.”

⁶⁹ See ibid., p.9:64-10:72: “Subiectum vero scientiae doctrinalis est mensura, sive intellecta absque materia sive intellecta in materia, et numeros, sive intellectus absque materia sive intellectus in materia. Non enim inquirit stabilire an mensura vel numeros intelligatur absque materia vel in materia, sed consideratio de his est de dispositionibus eorum quae accidunt eis post positionem eorum huius modi. Scientiae vero quae sunt sub disciplinalibus, convenientius est ut non considerent nist de accidentalibus consequentibus posita, quae sunt minus communia quam ipsa posita.”

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.10.73-78: “Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo, secundum hoc quod per eas pervenitur de cognito ad incognitum, non
The term *intentiones* used in the Latin text translates the Arabic *maʾnā*.\(^{71}\) It has been recommended by Kwame Gyekye that this would have been better translated by the Latin *conceptus*. His assertion is based on a purported equivalence between Avicenna’s use of *maʾnā* and al-Fārābī’s use of *maʿqūl*. The latter, Gyekye asserts, is the Arabic term used for *νόημα*, meaning concept or thought.\(^{72}\) Deborah Black has noted that Gyekye’s historical conclusions are highly speculative. In addition, she voices her concern that this evaluation of the etymology and history of the term *maʾnā* ignores the fact that *maʾnā* may well refer also to the intentions formed by non-intellectual powers such as the power of estimation found in non-human animals.\(^{73}\)

Given such ambiguities, it is difficult to provide a direct translation for the word *intentio* in the Latin. Above, the term *intentiones* was translated as “notions.” Although this English word is likely to be interpreted in a “mental” or “conceptual” manner, it is less explicitly mental than is the word “concept.” It would be less appropriate to use the term “reality”\(^{74}\) (or even “thing”\(^{75}\)) for *intentio*, although Avicenna clearly does indicate that there is a way of discussing inquantum ipsae sunt intellectae et habent esse intelligibile, quod est nullo modo pendet ex materia, sed non corporea. Non fuerunt autem aliae scientiae praeter eas.”

\(^{71}\) Though other Arabic terms are also translated by *intentio*, the Latin-Arabic lexical index of the *Philosophia prima* attests to a majority of cases being *maʾnan*. See Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, vol.3, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1983), 245-246.


\(^{73}\) See Deborah L. Black, “Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy,” *Quaestio* 10 (2010): 68n9. Of course, one could argue that all the internal senses express their perceptive knowledge by means of phantasms, which are a kind of perceptual (in contrast to intellectual) concept. See Deely, *Intentionality and Semiotics*, 51-56. Still, I will defer to the general judgment of Black on these matters as regards Gyekye’s article.

\(^{74}\) While it may seem inappropriate to translate the term “reality”, later medieval authors (including Hervaeus) will consider possible understandings of *intentio* that do refer to the *reality that is known*. Thus, a first intention considered materially and concretely is according to Hervaeus the mind-independent reality that is known (such as “this man”). A second intention considered concretely and materially would be the mind-dependent notion such as “universal.” Although it is mind-dependent, “universal” names something that can be discussed and known. These are neatly summarized in Dijs, “Hervaeus Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic,” 204.

\(^{75}\) Though, as regards “thing” one would be in more justified territory, given the philosophical history of what could be called a kind of “tinology” that stresses that “thing” is broader than being in scope. Thus, even purely mental *entia rationis* are “things” even if they are not beings in the proper sense. This sort of thought can be found
the ontological status of intentiones intellectae secundo. Thus, these second intentions are “realities” in an extended sense. However, just as “concept” would be too “mental,” “reality” (or “thing”) would be too “physical.” Thus, “notion” is used with the proviso that the reader does not forget that the ontological status of such notions is still undetermined.

The “notions” written of in Avicenna’s text could be considered both “mentally” and “ontologically,” though one must be very careful in how these interpretations are understood. In the passage, he begins by remarking that logic is about notions known secondarily and applied to notions that are known primarily. He remarks immediately, however, that logic has a particular manner of investigating such notions. The logician considers them only insofar as they lead from the known to the unknown. That is, logic is concerned with intentiones intellectae secundo insofar as they are involved in human ratiocination.

Importantly, Avicenna contrasts the logician’s manner of considering these notions to another manner of considering them. Namely, one could also consider them insofar as these secondary notions have intelligible existence. Just as the mathematical sciences are not concerned with the real or mental existence of measure and number, so too is logic not concerned with the mode of existence proper to such secondarily understood notions. Indeed, it is concerned neither with the manner in which humans come to know of them nor with the way that they have “intelligible existence.” He does not conclude here whether or not logical notions involve non-corporeal matter, but he does clearly exclude corporeal matter from the esse intelligibile proper to these notions. The point is that in addition to considering these matters as


The term “first intentions” would risk leading the reader to conclude that Avicenna’s terminology is equivalent to that of later medieval authors. For this reason, the more clumsy (but also more literal) expression “notions known primarily” is being used.
pertaining to human ratiocination, one can also discuss the “ontological” status of such secondarily understood notions. That is, in what manner do they exist (e.g. in contrast to corporeal and mathematical entities)?

However, the text does not provide an immediate answer to this question. Instead, Avicenna is primarily concerned with the nature of first philosophy. This is quite obvious in what follows:

Therefore, there ought to be separately a consideration concerning [1] substance inasmuch as it is being or is substance, or body inasmuch as it is substance, as well as a consideration concerning [2] measure and number inasmuch as they have being [esse] and in what manner they have being [esse], and a consideration concerning [3] theoretical things [de rebus formalibus, i.e. logical matters], which are not in matter (or, if they are in matter, are not in corporeal matter) as well as what manner they exist [quomodo sunt illae], and what mode [of being] is more nearly particular to them.77

These remarks are the obvious correlate to the remarks that Avicenna had made earlier in this chapter. Although the particular branches of theoretical philosophy have their own proper topics, they do not address the complete nature of their respective subject matters. There is one important similarity with regard to all of the deficiencies found in the sciences: none of them are directly concerned with their particular subject’s mode of being. The natural philosopher does not consider corporeal reality inasmuch as it has substantial being. The mathematician treats only of the properties following upon the abstracted quantities under consideration, not determining the mode of being proper to measure and number. Finally, the logician, whose discipline is mentioned here alongside the speculative sciences,78 does not treat of either its epistemological or ontological basis. The overall implication, therefore, is that all such matters

77 Avicenna, Philosophia prima, 1.2 (p.10:79-84): “Deinde consideratio de substantia inquantum est ens vel est substantia, vel de corpore inquantum est substantia, et de mensura et numero inquantum habent esse et quomodo habent esse, et de rebus formalibus quae nonsunt in materia, vel, si sint in materia, non tamen corporea, et quomodo sunt illae, et quis modus est magis proprius illis, separatim per se debet haberi.”

78 Though, as is obvious from the translation, the expression used here to describe the topics treated is de rebus formalibus.
fall to first philosophy, which must discuss the deeper metaphysical foundations for each of these topics.

The chapter continues by considering the nature of first philosophy. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the most important thing to note is the way that the overall problem has been formulated. By stating that intentiones intellectae secundo constitute the subject of logical science (at least insofar as they are considered vis-à-vis their role in ratiocination), this text provides a tantalizing way of formulating the issue of logic’s scientific status. By stating the matter this way, it is very tempting to draw direct focus to the existential status of these kinds of secondarily known realities. To make the point clear: this manner of speaking appears to assert that logic studies some “thing”—even though that “thing” only has esse intelligibile.

As will be seen in the remainder of this dissertation, this is precisely the “space” in which the problem of the metaphysics of logic will be discussed by certain medieval thinkers, many of whom will look to ground these realities in the domain of “being as the true and the false.” The history of this discussion is multifaceted and complex. However, several important themes will be at play in the thirteenth century as thinkers grapple with explicating the place of logic among the sciences. Two characteristic thinkers will be considered in the remainder of this chapter.

The first is Robert Kilwardby, whose De ortu scientiarum directly ties him to the earlier medieval conception of logic as a scientia sermocinalis. In addition, the De ortu scientiarum expresses an overall viewpoint of the metaphysics of logic that could be called “realistic” insofar as he asserts strongly the mind-independent foundation of logical realities. Following this, the

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See Paul Thom, “Logic and its Objects: A Medieval Aristotelian View,” in The Metaphysics of Logic, ed. Penelope Rush (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 147-159. Thom notes some of the ambiguities in Kilwardby’s account. Quite importantly for this dissertation, he notes similar points regarding the relationship between “being as the true and the false” and logic. As will be seen, these ambiguities find parallels in Kilwardby’s Notule libri priorum, which is estimated to have been written around 1240. The exact chronology of Kilwardby’s opinions on the “metaphysics of logic” is difficult to enunciate at this point in time. As noted below, Thom and Scott, in their recent edition of the Notule, conflate the De ortu outlook with that of the Notule. Regarding the
writings of Aquinas will be considered. His remarks bear witness to a multi-faceted outlook concerning logic. While his position is not systematically explicated, in important respects it focuses on the mind-dependent reality of logic in a manner not found in Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum*.

**1.4 Two Transitional Figures: Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas**

**1.4.1 Logic, Reality and Discourse in the *De ortu scientiarum* of Robert Kilwardby**

**1.4.1.1 Introductory Remarks**

Among the texts composed in the mid-thirteenth century, the *De ortu scientiarum* of Robert Kilwardby is a striking testimony to the sophisticated self-awareness exercised by the Latin scholastics in their assimilation of the Aristotelian corpus of sciences. 80 During his life prior to entering the Dominican Order (c.1245-1250), Kilwardby was a member of the Parisian faculty of arts, thus penning a number of commentaries among which are numbered detailed treatments of the Aristotelian logical corpus. In the context of the condemnations of 1277, he is often presented as a figure in the history of conservative reactions to Aristotelianism in the faculties of Arts at Paris and Oxford. 81 However, the aforementioned commentaries bear witness to the fact that Kilwardby was deeply read in Aristotle’s works and had accepted much of the Aristotelian corpus as part of his overall worldview.

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This fact is particularly evident in the *De ortu scientiarum* in which Kilwardby repeatedly refers to the Aristotelian corpus to explain much of the structure of the sciences. He wrote the *De ortu scientiarum* in approximately 1250 at the request of fellow members of the Dominican Order. The text stands at the end of a long tradition of compiling, organizing, and explaining the order and nature of human disciplines. Kilwardby’s text is particularly reliant upon the *Didascalicon* of Hugh of St. Victor and the *De divisione philosophiae* of Dominicus Gundissalinus. In the traditions lying at the foundation of Kilwardby’s sources are a number of threads that reach not only through the Stoic and Peripatetic accounts found in the West but also through Arabic Aristotelianism, for Gundissalinus had written a summary of al-Farabi’s *Enumeration of the Sciences*.

For the purposes of this dissertation, Kilwardby’s text is being chosen as a landmark at a particular moment in the history of thirteenth-century Latin thought concerning the nature of logic. In general histories of philosophy, it is customary to focus on the productions of theologians like Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and the like. However, given that Kilwardby spent an extended time teaching in the Parisian faculty of arts before entering the Dominican Order, his writing from this period can provide a lens upon the philosophical milieu in Paris during the second quarter of the thirteenth century. In addition, the text helps to provide a summary of one “high level” view concerning the nature of the sciences and their interrelation. Instead of being detained with the many technical issues that must be handled in a commentary on one of Aristotle’s logical writings, the *De ortu scientiarum* is able to provide a

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82 The remarks by Albert Judy in the preface to his edition of the *De ortu scientiarum* are quite appropriate. See Robert Kilwardby, *De ortu scientiarum*, ed. Albert Judy (Oxford: The British Academy and PIMS, 1976), vii: “Kilwardby attempted to do for the thirteenth century what Hugh of St. Victor, in his *Didascalicon* did for the twelfth, namely to capture the full range of scholarly interests of his day and integrate them in a single, brief work, written in the style of his day. The *De ortu* is rich with citations from the complete corpus of Aristotelian writings. It exemplifies how thoroughly the methodology of the Stagirite was reshaping the understanding of the known arts and sciences into an intelligible and interconnected system.”
global view concerning the nature of logic according to Kilwardby at the time of his writing of the text. The viewpoint found in Kilwardby’s text serves as a helpful point of contrast to views expressed later in the thirteenth century by Aquinas, whose writings will be discussed below as well.

1.4.1.2 Situating the Scientiae Sermocinales in the De ortu scientiarum

The *De ortu scientiarum* is primarily focused on the various branches of the philosophical sciences. However, it opens by expressing a first fundamental division of the sciences, namely between divine sciences and human ones.\(^83\) The divine sciences are those that have been given to humanity through the authority of God, though they have been written up by means of human instruments. They are, unsurprisingly, divided into the Old and New Testaments.\(^84\)

Within the human sciences, which Kilwardby explicitly calls philosophy,\(^85\) he adopts a pair of definitions taken from Isidore of Seville. The first concerns the subject about which philosophical sciences are concerned: “Philosophy is a commendable science of human and divine things, inasmuch as they are possible for man.”\(^86\) Kilwardby states that Isidore’s second definition in the same section of the *Etymologies* is based upon the goal or end of philosophy: “Philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things conjoined with devotion to living

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\(^{83}\) See ibid., cap.1 (p.9): “Scientiarum alia est divina alia humana.”

\(^{84}\) See ibid.: “Divinam dico quae Deo auctore hominibus tradita est, quamvis humano ministerio sit scripta; cuiumodi est *Vetus testamentum et Novum*.”

\(^{85}\) See ibid., cap.2 (p.10): “De secunda [scientia], quae est philosophia.”

Thus, viewing philosophy in terms of the first definition, things human and divine comprise the whole of philosophy. However, if the goal (finis) of philosophy is considered, all human knowledge is ordered to living a virtuous human life.88

Kilwardby, then, states that the first major division in philosophy is between the two “things” that are discussed in philosophy, namely, divine matters and human matters. The divine sciences are concerned with God and all those of which He alone is or will be the cause. The human sciences are concerned with those things that He makes through human agency, namely human discourse (sermones) and human acts.89 The divine sciences—namely, the sciences of physics, mathematics, and metaphysics discussed in chapters four to thirty-three of the De ortu—are called in common “speculative.” However, there is no common name provided for the mechanical, ethical, and sermocinal sciences, which comprise the sciences of human acts.90

After treating the speculative sciences at length, Kilwardby expresses his principles for dividing the other, non-speculative part of philosophy. Its main division is that of the active disciplines and those of the sermocinal.91 He states that both classes of knowledge (active and

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88 Ibid.: “Res igitur divinae et humane subiectum sunt totius philosophiae; studium autem bene vivendi finis, quia omnis cognitio ad honestam vitam ordinatur, sicut infra patebit.”

89 See ibid. cap.3 (p.11): “Nota igitur quod cum omnium quaecumque sunt vel fiunt Deus causa est, tamen quaedam dicuntur res divinae et quaedam humane: divinae, Deus et omnis creatura quam facit non per nos—facit enim nostros sermones et opera, sed per nos; humanae, quas facit per nos, cuiusmodi sunt sermones et actus nostri.”

90 See ibid. (p.10): “Quare cum philosophia sit de rebus divinis et humanis, ut iam dictum est, omnis pars eius aut est de rebus divinis aut de humanis. Prima nomen habet in genere. Dicitur enim speculativa. Secunda non habet umum nomen in genere cum continet ethicam mechanicam et sermocinalem.” Weisheipl understandably renders sermocinalis as “verbal.” This is indeed part of the ambiguity that must be treated when Kilwardby’s treatment of logic as a member of the scientiae sermocinales is discussed below. For now, this division will be rendered as “sermocinal” in order to keep open the interpretive possibilities contained in this ambiguous term that has no exact modern English equivalent. See Weisheipl, “Nature,” 480.

91 See Kilwardby, De ortu, cap.34 (p.122): “Divisio illius partis philosophiae quae est de rebus humanis per activam et sermocinalem.”
sermocinal) treat of things that are made by humans as well as the effects of those things. The
active sciences treat of human operations and their effects. They are called, in general, practical
or operative sciences. Kilwardby devotes chapters thirty-five to forty-four to these disciplines,
distinguishing the mechanical and ethical disciplines from each other and discussing issues
relevant to them. As to human discourses (lit. *sermones*) and their effects, these are treated by
sermocinal science, which he states may also be called logic. He justifies this latter name by
noting that the Greek word *λόγος* is the equivalent of the Latin word *sermo*. However, as will
be discussed below, the ambiguity of this title is an important aspect of his notion of logic.

After treating the mechanical arts and ethical sciences, Kilwardby makes several
important clarifications before he begins to treat the sermocinal sciences. He states that
throughout his treatment of the operative sciences, he has sometimes used the term “art” and at
other times “science.” To clarify his usage, he writes that a given form of knowledge is called an
art when it treats of something having the appearance of truth or only subject to opinion. He
reserves the terms “discipline” (lit. *disciplina*) or “science” (lit. *scientia*) for those things which
are not subject to such opinion or appearance of truth but instead are not able to be arranged in
any other way. In saying this, he is stressing the unchanging nature of demonstrative
reasoning.

92 See Kilwardy, *De ortu*, cap.34 (p.122): “Sunt autem res humanae quae ab homine fiunt, quae non sunt
nisi operationes nostrae et locutiones et earum effectus.”
93 See ibid.: “De operationibus humanis et earum effectibus est scientia practica sive operativa.”
94 See ibid., cap 35-44 (p.123-145).
95 See ibid: “De sermonibus autem et eorum effectibus, sermocinalis scientia sive logica, prout logica
dicitur a logos quod est sermo. De istarum ortu per ordinem aliquid temptandum est.”
96 See ibid., cap. 45 (p.145): “Si quis autem, quia supra dictas artes aliquando scientias, aliquando artes
nominavimus, quae aut proprie et differentias inter artem et scientiam, dicendum quod ars dicitur quando alicuid
verisimile at opinabliile tractatur, disciplina sive scientia quando ex his quae aliter se habere non possunt alicuid
disseritur.”
Earlier in the *De ortu* in the forty-first chapter, Kilwardby asks about the nature of the practical sciences as divisions of philosophy and concludes that they are more appropriately called arts than sciences. 97 Though this earlier chapter is devoted primarily to questions of the active disciplines, Kilwardby makes several observations expressing his views about the nature of logic among the disciplines considered in the *De ortu*. He does so in response to several objections that might be made against ranking the practical disciplines among the philosophical disciplines.

The first objection recalls the dictum from the *Posterior Analytics* 98 that science is concerned with the universal and the necessary. However, the ethical and mechanical disciplines are concerned with matters that are both singular and contingent. This appears to call into question their ability to be treated scientifically. 99 Indeed, Kilwardby adds in the objection that this same line of reasoning can even be extended to physics, which is concerned with contingent things that, for the most part, are subject to generation and corruption. 100

He begins his response to this objection by recalling that in the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle is speaking of demonstrative sciences. However, citing *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5, he writes that Aristotle states that this type of science does not apply to the active part of

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97 See ibid., cap. 41 (p.133): “Quomodo scientiae practicae pertinent ad philosophiam, et quod potius dicuntur artes quam scientiae.”

98 See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 1.4-1.6 (73a21-75a37).

99 See Kilwardby, *De Ortu*, cap.41, n.379 (p.133-134): “Nunc restat quaestio de dictis artibus practicis: quomodo ponuntur pars philosophiae? Non enim videntur debere numerari inter scientias: tum quia scientia de universalibus est, ut ostenditur in I Posteriorum, sed ethica et mechanica potius de singularibus sunt, quia de operationibus et operibus humanis, operationes autem singularium sunt et singulares ac circa singularia; tum quia scientia de necessariis est, ut ibidem ostendit Aristoteles, sed ethica et mechanica de contingentibus quae ab humana voluntate procedunt.”

100 See ibid. (p.134): “Et haec ratio se extendi ad physicam quae de contingentibus est quae generantur et corrumpuntur pro magna parte.”
philosophy. The active part of philosophy does not need to prove anything demonstratively. For this reason, the active disciplines are not prevented from considering singular things.\footnote{See ibid., cap. 41., n. 381 (p. 134): “Ad primum igitur dicendum quod hoc quod ostendi Aristoteles scientiam esse de universalibus, ostendi de scientia demonstrativa, et ideo illud pertinet ad speculativam partem philosophiae quae habet demonstracionem facere et demonstrative probare, et non ad activam quia ipsa non habet demonstrative probare aliquid, ut docit Aristoteles in Ethicis. Nihil igitur impedit ipsam singularia considerare.”}

At this point, it seems that Kilwardby has conceded that the forms of knowledge treated in the active part of philosophy are not sciences, at least if “science” is reserved for demonstrative science proceeding from first principles. However, he states that these practical forms of knowledge are both scientific and practical. Inasmuch as they are sciences, they have a certain kind of speculation and are thus akin to speculative truths, being concerned with knowledge concerning universal matters. Even when these disciplines are practical, they have knowledge with regard to the ability to act. That is, they are not merely about the \textit{hic et nunc}. He states that they are concerned with a vague individual (lit. \textit{singularia vaga}) and only accidentally with a given individual. He uses the example of the art of building a house, which is concerned with the manner of acting in order to construct a house, not this or that house except insofar as a given artisan is working here and now. Thus, inasmuch as it is knowledge, it is not concerned primarily with the particular individual (lit. \textit{singularia signata}).\footnote{See ibid. (p. 134-135): “Notandum tamen quod scientiae practicae et scientiae sunt et practicae. In hoc quod scientiae sunt, speculationem quandam habent et veris speculativis assimilantur, et haec earum speculatio proprae circa universalia est. In hoc autem quod practicae sunt, inest eis cum scientia potentia operandi, et sic respicient singulae—tamen notandum quod singularia vaga per se et proprae, singularia autem signata tantum per accidentes. Ars enim domificandi considerat modum operandi in constructione domus simpliciter quantum est de natura artis practicae per se, et non magis respicit hanc domum quam illam nisi per accidentes, scilicet in quantum artifex hic et nunc operatur.” On the Avicennian basis for the notion of the vague individual, see Maierù, 385.}

The second objection states that speculative and practical sciences are both called philosophical only in an analogical manner. Indeed, the nature of philosophy (lit. \textit{ratio philosophiae}) is found unequally in practical and speculative matters. The objector adds that it is found unequally among all of the particular speculative sciences as well, given the different
abstraction proper to each. Thus, it is concluded that one should not search for scientific equality in all the branches of knowledge.\footnote{See ibid., cap. 41., n.380 (p.134): “Et dicendum quod philosophia de speculativis et practicis non aequo primo dicitur, sed analogice, sicut syllogismus de demonstrativo et dialectico syllogismo et rhetorico . . . . Et ideo non tam perfecte neque aequo primo inventitur ratio philosophiae in practicis sicut in speculativis, sed nec in speculativis omnibus aequaliter, ut patuit supra per differentem abstractionem in ipsis. Per consequens igitur neque ratio scientiae aut disciplinae in omnibus aequaliter quaerenda.”}

The objector’s position is somewhat close Kilwardby’s own position for which he argues at length, discussing the various degrees of science and certitude found in speculative and practical disciplines.\footnote{See ibid., cap.41, n.382-392 (p.135-137).} For the purposes of understanding this question as related to the sermonic sciences, his conclusion will be noted in full:

True and certain science is found first and foremost in metaphysics and mathematics. However, it is found foremost in metaphysics because of the dignity of its subject while it is found foremost in mathematics because of its certain mode of demonstrating. Then, science is found less truly and certainly in physics. Thirdly, it is found even less truly and certainly in ethics. However, it is found most minimally in the mechanical sciences, as follows from what was discussed earlier in this chapter.\footnote{Ibid., cap.41., n.392 (p.137): “Prius enim et magis inventitur vera et certa scientia in metaphysica et mathematica, magis tamen in metaphysica pro dignitate subjecti, magis autem in mathematica pro certo modo demonstrandi; deinde minus et posterius in physica; tertio adhuc minus et posterius in ethica; ultimo autem et minime in mechanica, sicut patet ex dictis.”}

In the forty-fifth chapter of the De ortu, Kilwardby assumes this difference but adds another taken from Hugh of St. Victor:

Art is that which occurs in a material subject and is explained by means of operation, as in the case of the architectural sciences. However, a discipline or science is that which consists in speculation and is explained only by means of reasoning, as in the case of logic.\footnote{See ibid., cap.45, n.416 (p.146): “Scilicet quod ars est quae fit in subiecta materia et explicatur per operationem, ut architectionica; disciplina vero sive scientia quae in speculatione consistit et per solam explicatur ratiocinationem, ut logica.” See Hugonis de Sancto Vitore, Hugonis de Sancto Victore. Didascalicen. De studio legendi, ed. Charles H. Buttimer (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 1939), 2.2 (p.24).}
However, Kilwardby goes beyond Hugh and continues: “And all the speculative sciences insofar as they are such [i.e. explained only by means of reasoning].”\(^{107}\) He compares this to remarks from the end of the *Posterior Analytics*,\(^{108}\) where the Stagirite states that the universal in the soul is the principle of art if it is the principle of bringing something about, but is the principle of science if it is concerned with the very being of the thing in question.\(^{109}\)

From all of this, it is possible to see that Kilwardby has placed the sciences and arts in his overall division of philosophy, assigning to them various levels of certainty and scientific status. The speculative sciences are most properly sciences, though even among these disciplines there are distinctions to be made, for some are more certain (and hence more scientific) than others. The practical disciplines have much less certainty and are much less scientific than the speculative sciences, to the point that they are better called arts than sciences. In the transition from the practical disciplines to the sermocinal sciences, it seems that Kilwardby approvingly cites Hugh’s dictum, which grants a scientific status to logic. However, in the passages discussed earlier in this section, it is not completely certain how the sermocinal disciplines fit into the larger scheme of sciences. The next section will focus on those passages that are most critical for understanding the status of logic among these disciplines.

### 1.4.1.3 Logic, Discourse, and Reality in the *De ortu scientiarum*

Kilwardby’s treatment of the sermocinal sciences in the *De ortu* merits a lengthy treatment, for it bears witness to the impressive sophistication of the Parisian arts faculty’s

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\(^{107}\) See Kilwardby, *De ortu*, cap.45, n.416 (p.146): “Et omnes scientiae speculativae secundum quod tales sunt.”


\(^{109}\) See Kilwardby, *De Ortu*, cap.n.55, n.416 (p.146): “Hanc autem differentiam videtur insinuare Aristoteles in fine *Posteriorum* dicens quod universale existens in anima *principium est artis et scientiae*, et *siquidem circa generationem, artis est principium, si vero circa esse, scientiae*. Saepe tamen communiter accipitur ars pro scientia et e converso.”
understanding of Peripatetic logic. However, a brief overview of salient points from this lengthy portion of the text will suffice to highlight Kilwardby’s understanding of the status of logic among the speculative disciplines. This overview will highlight the theoretical questions pertinent to the nature of logic. Likewise, it will bear witness to the influence being played by several of the Aristotelian passages discussed above in section 1.2.

This section of Kilwardby’s treatise opens with his account of the source (de ortu) of the sermocinal sciences in general. He states that just as mechanical skills were first merely found in the regular use of man, only later to become fully expressed as arts, so too were forms of knowledge initially found in use, only later to become scientifically elaborated. He continues, “However so long as they were merely being used [and not understood explicitly], there was found to be in them many things that were diminished, superfluous, and faulty. This is not a surprising fact, either, for their exercise was governed only by nature and chance.” It was from this situation of bare use that the art of reasoning was investigated in order to distinguish the kinds of reasoning that are always fallacious from those which never are fallacious as well as from those which are only moderately certain regarding their conclusions. The discovery of these disciplines allowed for the rectification and completion of the bodies of knowledge that had been heretofore sought without such direction.

111 See Kilwardby, De ortu, cap. 46, n.417 (p.146).
112 Ibid., n.418: “Sed dum solum erant in usu, multa in eis erant diminuta, multa superflua et multa prava; nec mirum quia exercitium earum natura tantum et casu gubernabatur.”
113 See ibid., n.419 (p.147): “Ideoque modum ratiocinandi qui in usu fuerat sub regimine naturae et casus ipsi satagerunt reducere in artem, inquirentes quis modus ratiocinandi semper fallit, quis numquam, quis mediocrer se habet. Et distinxeunt modum ratiocinandi fallace a modo vero, et modum verum per illum qui ex probabilibus probabilia concludit, et illum qui ex necessariis necessaria.”
114 See ibid., n.420: “Et ideo scientia ratiocinandi dicitur ars artium vel scientia scientiarum, quia ipsa est digestiva, completiva et rectiva sui et aliarum, sicut manus dicitur organum organorum, quia rectificat non solum quae cira se sunt, sed etiam quae cira alia membra corporis.”
As the section closes, it is clear that Kilwardby is writing from the perspective of the Western curriculum, given the importance of the trivium for his schema.\textsuperscript{115} The remarks made heretofore appear to be nothing more than an acknowledgement of certain branches of logic (e.g. demonstrative, fallacious and dialectical).\textsuperscript{116} However, he then adds that teaching and learning required also a mastery of speaking and writing as well, thus requiring these subjects to be added to topics studied in logic.\textsuperscript{117} As he concludes, it is clear that he has not excluded linguistic matters from the general nature of the sermocinal sciences (i.e. all three of the subjects of the trivium):

From all of these aforementioned remarks, the subject of the sermocinal sciences in general can be understood, namely that it is discourse [lit. sermo] and its parts. Likewise, its end can be seen as well, namely expertise in rightly speaking, writing, and reasoning in all matters. Thus, also is its definition obvious from what has been said: Sermocinal science is the part of philosophy concerning discourse [lit. de sermone], teaching how to speak, write, and reason rightly. And this is called by the common name of logic, as will be discussed in detail later.\textsuperscript{118}

His next chapter is devoted to answering several objections to the idea that there can be a science concerning discourse. However, more directly pertinent discussions are found in the forty-eighth chapter, entitled, “About the manner in which matters concerning reasoning are able to be a science, as well as the manner that such matters can be the subject of a single science and

\textsuperscript{115} While, as noted above, there are clear debts to al-Farabi through Gundissalinus, the De ortu remains very much within the Latinate tradition of the curriculum. This fact differentiates Kilwardby’s approach from that of Avicenna, for whom the Trivium was not a constituted portion of the curriculum. See Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” 747.

\textsuperscript{116} Of course, as will be noted, this division is itself clearly of Aristotelian provenance.

\textsuperscript{117} See Kilwardby, n.421 (p.147): “Ideoque propter commoditatem addiscendi et docendi et omnino mutuos conceptus animi exprimendos modum loquendi et scribendi, qui prius in solo usu erat, per studii diligentiam redegerunt in artem.”

\textsuperscript{118} See ibid., n.423 (p.148): “Ex his perpendi potest subiectum sermocinalis scientiae in genere, scilicet sermo et partes eius; finis etiam, scilicet peritia recte loquendi, scribendi et ratiocinandi in omnibus. Patet etiam definitio eius ex dictis talis: Sermocinalis scientia est pars philosophiae de sermone docens recte loqui, scribere et ratiocinari. Et haec communi nomine logica dicitur, ut infra patebit.”
also something supporting all the sciences.”

The chapter is presented as a pair of objections with responses offered by Kilwardby. In the response to the first objection, he makes several important remarks that help to explicate both his view of the sermoninal sciences as distinct disciplines as well as their relation to mind-independent reality.

The first objection is simply that since reasoning is common to all the sciences, it cannot have anything proper to itself. In responding to this objection, he begins with a dictum taken from *Topics* I.11, where Aristotle states, “A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and does that either by itself or as a help to the solution of some other such problem.” Citing what appears to be the translation of Boethius, Kilwardby sees this as offering a twofold definition of a dialectical problem. On the one hand, such a problem can be taken in itself (i.e. as purely a matter of dialectics). On the other hand, it can be understood as something supporting others. Although Aristotle does not mention non-dialectical manners of syllogizing in this passage from the *Topics*, Kilwardby believes that this same division can be applied without qualification to the science of syllogizing (lit. *scientia syllogizandi*). Therefore, demonstrative science (lit. *scientia demonstrativa*) can consider demonstration in itself or demonstration as a support to other forms

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119 Ibid., cap.48 (p.153): “Quomodo de ratiocinatione possit esse scientia, et quomodo ipsa est subjectum scientiae unius et adaminiculans omnibus.”

120 See ibid., n.444: “Sed adhuc est dubitatio difficilis quomodo de ratiocinatione possit esse scientia. Quod enim commune est omnibus scientiis nulli videtur esse proprium. Sed ratiocinatio omnibus est communis, quia omnes utuntur ea eo quod sine illa non est scientia.”


122 See Kilwardby, *De ortu*, p.154n1.

123 See Kilwardby, *De ortu*, cap. 48, n.447 (p.154): “Istam distinctionem ratiocinationis et ratiocinativae scientiae tangit Aristoteles in I *Topicorum* in definitione problematis dialectici dicens quod est ut *ipsum vel ut adminiculans*.”
of knowledge. Insofar as reasoning is considered in itself, this is the subject of logic itself. In the other sense, namely as a support to the other sciences, it is their instrument.

He states that the difference between these two considerations of reasoning are only based upon their matters, not their forms. There is no diversity of form between reasoning about logic as such and the reasoning found in sciences that use logic as an instrument. This is because in both of these forms of reasoning, there are involved the same modes and figures of syllogistic reasoning. However, they treat of different matters. When reasoning supports the other sciences, it is concerned with the predicaments themselves. When reasoning is considered in itself, it is something that is concerned with the modes or meanings of things (lit. super modos sive rationes rerum).

This remark on the modes or meanings of things is quite important for understanding Kilwardby’s position regarding the nature of logic as well as its relation to mind-independent reality. Attention has been drawn to this by De Rijk who remarks in his study on intentionality from 1250 to 1350, “Kilwardby’s account of the pair ‘first and second intention’ is rather vague.” De Rijk’s study only briefly touches on this problem, though, and seems to have

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124 Note that he is still here using “logic” in the broad sense that is applicable to all of the sermocinal sciences.

125 See ibid.: “Et quamvis non exprimat hoc de aliis modis ratiocinationum, aestimo tamen hoc esse verum, ut scientia syllogizandi simpliciter considerare potest syllogismum ut ipsum vel ut adminiculantem, et scientia demonstrativa similiter potest considerare demonstrationem ut ipsa aliquid est vel ut adminiculans est, et primo omnium horum modorum pertinet ratiocinatio ad logicum et est in logica subiectum, secundo modo ad omnem scientem et est omnium instrumentum.”

126 See ibid., cap. 48, n.448: (p.154): “In forma, dico, non est diversitas, quia utrimque modus et figura secundam unam et eandem artem ratiocinandi est .”

127 See ibid. (p.155): “In materia est [diversitas], quia cum sint res ipsae praedicamentales et modi sive rationes rerum, ratiocinatio considerata ut adminiculans super ipsas res decurrit et in ipsis operatur, et ratiocinatio considerata ut ipsa est in se aliquid super modos sive rationes rerum decurrit et de ipsis proprie est.”

128 De Rijk, “A Study,” 20. Also, see Pini, Categories and Logic, 29. The remarks found in Pini are limited to only one of the texts noted by De Rijk. While he does discuss selections of Kilwardby’s commentaries on the Categories and Porphyry’s Isagoge, Pini writes as though nothing else were said of these matters in the De ortu scientiarum. As will be seen below, these remarks are part of an intricate viewpoint elaborated by Kilwardby, especially as regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics. Maierù remarks that Kilwardby’s use of the
focused only on the two applicable index entries for \textit{intentio} in Judy’s edition of the \textit{De ortu}.

One of these entries is found in the forty-eighth chapter, while another is found earlier in remarks concerning the relationship of metaphysics to the other sciences. However, in order to understand the full breadth of Kilwardby’s position on these matters, it is necessary to consider several additional passages.

Before the passage cited by De Rijk, Kilwardby makes several pertinent observations. Quite remarkably, Kilwardby grounds logical concepts directly in the mind-independent things about which human reasoning is concerned. As an example, he considers the cases of geometers and the natural philosopher, both of whom can reason as such:

\begin{quote}
Since every continuous thing is divisible . . . .
And every line is a continuous thing . . . .
Therefore, every line is divisible.
\end{quote}

Terms such as those used in this syllogism (e.g. “line,” “continuous thing”) are in the category of quantity and signify true predicamental realities.\footnote{See Kilwardby, \textit{De ortu}, cap. 48, n.449: “Verbi gratia, geometer vel naturalis concludit quod omne continuum est divisibile, et omnis linea est continua, quod omnis linea divisibilis; et isti termini, \textit{linea}, \textit{continuum} et huiusmodi, de praedicamento quantitatis sunt et significant veras res praedicamentales—omnino similiter ratiocinatur arithmeticus in numeris et quilibet philosophus in rebus quas considerat proprie sua scientia.”} However, Kilwardby states that it is not sufficient if one explains scientific knowledge of the things in question by discussing solely mind-dependent matters. It is necessary that there be \textit{in things themselves} certain modes by whose mediation reason is able to discourse concerning the given things. In striking language, he remarks that if universality were not in the things in question, it would be impossible to form arguments that arrive at universally affirmative or negative conclusions.\footnote{See ibid.: “Sed super istas res non esset decursus rationis huiusmodi nisi inessent rebus quidam modi mediantibus quibus ratio decurreret super illas. Nisi enim esset \textit{divisible} universale respectu \textit{lineae}, id est in plus ad expression is evidence that the Avicennian corpus has influenced the Parisian arts faculty, making discussions of second intentions a “common usage among the masters of arts.” See Maierù, “Robert Kilwardby on the Division of Sciences,” 385. It is likely undeniable that Avicenna’s texts are exerting an influence here, though a full history of the doctrines held by the Parisian faculty of arts in the mid-thirteenth century still awaits being written.} Indeed, he states
quite explicitly that in the things themselves, there are notions like *universalitas*, *particularitas*, *antecedentia*, and *consequentia*.  

He says quite starkly, “Therefore, concretely with the things themselves, these modes or meanings [lit. *rationes*] make [those] things to be knowable [lit. *rationabiles*].”

In addition to knowing these modes as they are in the things, he states that it is possible to abstract them from the things and consider those modes comparing them one to another.  In so doing, one produces abstract statements about logical consequences such as, “Since the first term is said of the middle term completely [lit. *de toto medio*], and the middle term of the final term completely [lit. *de toto extremo postremo*], therefore the first term is said completely of the final term.” This kind of abstraction can be made with regard to demonstrative syllogistic knowledge as well as to dialectical knowledge, in each case abstracting the *rationes rerum* involved and comparing them to one another to understand their structure.

It must be stressed that Kilwardby repeatedly states that these *rationes* are found *in the things themselves*. Thus, logical realities are somehow, so to speak, ensconced in mind-

131 See ibid., cap.48, n.450: “Quia igitur rebus insunt universalitas, particularitas sive antecedentia et consequentia.”

132 See ibid.: “Isti igitur modi rerum sive rationes concrete cum rebus faciunt res rationabiles.”

133 See ibid., cap. 48, n.451: “Sed modo licet bene rationi abstrahere dictos modos a rebus et considerare eos apud se et comparare ipso ad invicem codem modo quo iam per ipsos comparatae sunt res.”

134 Ibid: “Quia primum dicitur de toto medio et medo de toto postremo, ideo extremum primum de toto extremo postremo.” Kilwardby is quite clear on the very formal nature of this way of abstracting, stating that one can thus use letters like A, B, and C for any of the terms abstracted in this way. See ibid. (p.156): “Possunt etiam poni termini qui nullius facultatis res significant, sed ab omnibus abstrahant, ut A, B, C.”

135 See ibid., cap. 48, n.452-453 (p.156).

136 Thus, see again, ibid., cap.48, n.455: “Ars igitur sive modus ratiocinandi decurrens super res ipsas praedicamentales, quae considerantur a scientiis realibus, ars dici potest congrue, et sic est omnium instrumentum et omnibus administrandis. Eadem autem decurrens super modos sive rationes rerum abstractas a rebus, scientia est, et est una distincia ab aliis non administrandis aliis; et primo modo est ratiocinatio eius instrumentum, secundo modo
independent reality. For him, this is a pivotally important fact, for were this not the case, there would be nothing in reality that grounds syllogistic reasoning in its various forms. Thus rationes like part, whole, genus, species, contrariety, and similarity are aspects of reality that ground dialectical reasoning. Likewise, in demonstrative reasoning, rationes like property (lit. passio), subject, and cause are found in the things only later to be abstracted for consideration in logic concerning demonstration. Pure syllogistic considers the further abstracted rationes of antecedent, consequent, universal, particular, and so forth. Inasmuch as logic principally considers such rationes, it is given the name “rational science” (lit. rationalis scientia). As will be seen below, Kilwardby also gives logic this name because it is concerned with reasoning itself (lit. est de ratiocinatione). However, his explanation will also show that he does not wholly distinguish it from spoken discourse.

Because of the explicit ontological claims made by this position, it is very difficult to see how logical concepts and reality are distinguished. Although the mind is involved in the abstraction that discovers these rationes rerum, they are found in the things and thus appear to be constituents of being as being. Indeed, this fact was recognized clearly by De Rijk who notes the

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137 See ibid., cap.48, n.454 (p.156): “Quando igitur rationes rerum communes abstrahit quae non magis in rebus disciplinalium scientiarum sunt quam in aliis, nec in disciplinalibus magis respiciunt conclusiones quam principia, dialectia est; et tales rationes sunt totum, pars, genus, species, contrarium, simile et huiusmodi aquibus trahuntur loci dialectici.”

138 See ibid: “Quando autem abstrahit rationes utrimque inventas, cuiusmodi sunt antecedens, consequens, extraneum, universale, particular, extremum, medium et consimilia, ut praedixi, et eius forma consistit in figura et modo in inventione existentibus.”

139 See ibid: “Quando autem abstrahit rationes utrimque inventas, cuiusmodi sunt antecedens, consequens, extraneum, universale, particular, extremum, medium et huiusmodi, et in eas considerat formam ratiocinandi communem dialecticae et demonstrativae, syllogistica est simpliciter.”

140 See ibid., cap. 48, n.458 (p.157): “Quia igitur tales rationes rerum principaliter considerat logica, ideo rationalis scientia dicitur.”

141 See ibid.: “Alia potest dici ratio, scilicet quia est de ratiocinazione de qua infra dicitur.”
role of intentiones in a passage earlier in the De ortu where Kilwardby is considering the relation of metaphysics to the other sciences. In the particular selection in question, Kilwardby is answering why metaphysics does not demonstrate the conclusions of the particular sciences in a manner similar to the relationship between arithmetic and a subalternate science like harmony. He answers that unlike the case of concepts proper to harmony, the particular sciences have first principles that are outside of the simple concepts considered in metaphysics as properties of being absolutely speaking (lit. proprietas entis simpliciter), among which he includes universality, particularity, generality, diversity, and other such notions. Remarks such as these lead the reader to see that metaphysical and logical notions are very close in Kilwardby’s overall ontology.

Kilwardby is forced to address these same issues again in the De ortu when he takes up a thematic treatment of Aristotle’s discussion of the differences and similarities among the dialectician, the sophist and the metaphysician. In his treatment, Kilwardby cites a dictum taken from the Latin Averroes: “The philosopher investigates concerning being in a demonstrative manner, while the logician does so by means of probable reasoning.” In the footnotes to the critical edition of the De ortu, Albert Judy notes the presence of text that is similar to the Arabo-Latin version of the Metaphysics in which διαλεκτικοί is translated logici.

143 See ibid., cap.32, n.330: “Si autem quaeritur quare metaphysica non potest demonstrando descendere in alias speciales speculativas sicut arithmetica in harmonicam.”
144 See ibid: “Passiones enim propriae circuli trianguli et aliarum huiusmodi magnitudinum et numeri et aliorum partialium entium sufficierent scintur et demonstrantur ex propriis causis praeter cognitionem harum intentionum quae sunt proprietates entis simpliciter, scilicet universalitatis, particularitatis, generalitatis, specialitatis, contrarietatis, diversitatis, dissimilitudinis et huius modi, et ideo non descendit hic demonstratio.”
145 See pages 23ff above.
146 See ibid., cap.58, n.570 (p.196): “Philosophus considerat de ente consideratione demonstrativa, logica autem consideratione probabilis.”
147 See ibid., p.195n4.
This ambiguity is key for understanding two objections to which Kilwardby responds in chapter fifty-eight of the *De ortu*. Unlike the cursory remark found in *Metaphysics* Γ, Kilwardby’s reflection on Aristotle’s dictum (thus translated incorrectly) gives rise to pronouncements on the very nature of logic (in addition to that of dialectics covered in the *Topics*).

The first objection hinges on the fact that logic itself teaches the other disciplines the very form of demonstration. The objector states that since first philosophy considers being demonstratively, so too must logic have a demonstrative consideration of being in addition to the kind of treatment found in dialectical logic. Thus, logic in its fullest extent, including both dialectical and demonstrative logic, is a universal science along with first philosophy.\(^{148}\)

Having stated this first point, the objector is not finished but instead continues with several additional remarks. It is asked whether Aristotle is considering logic and sophistics as they are in themselves or only as they support the other sciences. The objection states that Aristotle appears to be considering them as they are in themselves. When logic is considered merely as a support, it is better called an art than a science. Furthermore, as a support, it is *circa omnia* rather than, strictly speaking, about all things (lit. *de omnibus*). Thus, the objector attributes to Aristotle the assertion that metaphysics has the same scientific subject as logic and sophistics, for they are *de omnibus*. From this point, the objector raises even more questions. If it is about all things, how can logic be about reasoning or the nature of the syllogism? Likewise,

\(^{148}\) See ibid., cap.58, n.571 (p.196): “Sed istud non videtur sufficere, quia cum omnis scientia demonstrativa formam demonstrandi sumat a logica, prima philosophia, quae considerat de ente consideratione demonstrativa adeo vere facit de ente considerationem sicut logica dialectica. . . . Ergo non solum dialectica est communis scientia cum prima philosophia, sed etiam demonstrativa quamvis aliquo modo magis communis sit dialectica quam demonstrativa. Et ita per logicam non solum videtur intelligendum esse dialecticam in verbis Aristotelis, sed ipsam totam scientiam ratiocinativam circa thesim, quae complectitur dialecticam et ratiocinationem.”
how is it possible for logic to be part of the sermocinal sciences if it is concerned with being without qualification (sit de ente simpliciter) just as metaphysics is?\(^{149}\)

Answering this lengthy objection, Kilwardby restates his view regarding the modes of being. He states that human reason would not make compositions and divisions (whether they be merely propositional or fully ratiocinative through a middle term) except by truly considering (lit. intuendo) the being and non-being of things. Furthermore, it would not be possible for there to be such reasoning were there not modes of the beings by which one can see things as differing or agreeing and from such knowledge also gather the rationes that make reasoning possible. He continues by noting that these rationes (or properties [lit. proprietates]) are properties of being without any qualification (i.e. merely inasmuch as it is being).\(^ {150}\)

Because it thus considers these rationes and likewise teaches the manner of reasoning (lit. modum ratiocinandi), logic is called a rational science (lit. ratiocinalis scientia). However, Kilwardby notes that logic is also called a sermocinal science because it treats of reasoning that is expressed in discourse (lit. per sermonem expressa) and not only as it remains in the mind (lit. in mente latente). From this point of view, one should say that logic is about ratiocinative

\(^{149}\) See ibid., cap.58 n.572-573 (p.197): “Deinde quaero utrum illic accipi debent logica et sophistica ut per se considerantur vel prout adminiculantur. Et videtur quod primo modo, quia prout adminiculantur potius sunt artes quam scientiae, et ideo potius circa omnia sunt quam de omnibus, quia ratiocinativa adminiculans est aliis scientiis forma. Nunc autem vult Aristoteles quod sint de eodem genere subjecto de quo metaphysica, et ita videtur quod ipsae ut scientiae sunt et in se consideratae cadunt in dictis verbis Aristotelis, quod et puto verum esse. [n.573] Sed tunc plura occurrunt dubitabilia. Primum, quomodo logica sit de ratiocinazione vel de syllogismo; et quomodo sit pars scientiae sermocinalis si sit de ente simpliciter sicut metaphysica, et per consequens de omnibus in genere?”

\(^{150}\) See ibid., cap.58 n.577 (p.198): “Et non facit ratio huiusmodi compositionem et divisionem apud se nisi intuendo ad esse rerum et non esse. Et ideo non solum considerat ratiocinans ipsas suas compositiones et divisiones quas apud se facit, sed et res respectu quarum eas facit. . . . Hinc enim sumit rationes extraneitatis, antecedentis, consequentis, convertibilis, subjecti, praedicati, extremi, medii et huiusmodi per quas connectit propositiones et ratiocinationes tam negativas quam affirmativas. Et quia huiusmodi rationes sive proprietates non magis inveniuntur in uno genere entium quam in alio sed communiter in omni, constat quod sunt proprietates entis simpliciter secundum quod est ens.”
Before continuing with the remainder of his response to this objection, it is helpful to pause to consider this assertion regarding the nature of logic as a *scientia de sermone ratiocinativo sive de ratiocinatione sermocinata*. Thus far, it has been stressed that Kilwardby expresses what could be called a “realistic” view regarding logical notions in that he believes that they are the *rationes rerum* (or *rationes entium*) found in being insofar as it is being. As will be seen with increasing clarity through the time of Hervaeus’s treatise, the emphasis will shift among certain authors who will stress the fact that logic is really about the non-real, in the sense of being about mind-dependent relations, not about mind-independent realities. Kilwardby’s emphasis on the foundation of logic in mind-independent reality is focused in a different direction, so to speak. Certainly, his views concerning the *rationes entium* lacks the sophistication that will arise in the continued discussions concerning *entia rationis* and second intentions in the decades following him. Still, this “realistic focus” is not the whole story concerning the view of logic that he presents in the *De ortu scientiarum*.

To emphasize Kilwardby’s complete viewpoint, it is helpful to consider remarks made in the fifty-third chapter of the treatise. In this chapter, he is introducing his specific study of the origins and nature of logic as a distinct sermocinal science. It is a long chapter detailing the relationship of logic to each of the books of the Aristotelian Organon. In the course of discussing these matters, he expresses a view that clearly indicates the importance of non-mental

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151 See ibid., cap. 58, n.578 (p.198): “Est igitur logica rationalis scientia quia modum ratiocinandi docet et rationes entium considerat. Est et sermocinalis quae agit de ratiocinatione per semonem expressa et non solum in mente latente.”

152 See Kilwardby, *De ortu*, cap.53 (p.167): “De nomine logicae et ortu, sufficientia, subiecto, fine ac definitione.” For him, these are the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Topics*, *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*. He does not include the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* as would others. See the work of Deborah Black cited above in note 10 of this chapter.
discourse in his conception of logic. Beginning with a remark taken from the *Didascalicon* of Hugh of St. Victor, he remarks that the term “logic” is equivocal, stating that this arises from the equivocation in the Greek term λόγος, which can signify both an account (lit. *ratio*) as well as a discourse or word (lit. *sermonem*). Thus, on one hand, logic can be used to describe the whole of the sermocinal sciences, including grammar and rhetoric. On the other hand, it can be used to describe the science principally concerned with reason (lit. *scientia rationalis*) and is thus a distinct science in the trivium.\(^{153}\)

In the next paragraph of this chapter, Kilwardby makes a statement that is quite important if one is to understand his conception of logic. As was already expressed in remarks above concerning the fifty-eighth chapter of the *De ortu*, logic is concerned with ratiocinative discourse (lit. *de sermone ratiocinativo*) or discussed ratiocination (lit. *de ratiocinatione sermocinata*). In the fifty-third chapter, he is even clearer in expressing his belief that logic is intrinsically concerned with expressed, verbal discourse:

> From what has been said, it must be known that logic is therefore not called a rational science [lit. *rationalis scientia*] because it considers things of reason as they are by reason alone, for if this were the case it would not, properly speaking, be a sermocinal science. Instead, it is called a rational science because it teaches the manner of reasoning [lit. *modum ratiocinandi*] not only as it exists in the mind but also as it exists in discourse [lit. *in sermone*]. Likewise, it is called a rational science because it considers things of reason and the notions [lit. *rationes*] by which things explained by discourse are understandable [lit. *rationabiles*] by the mind. Indeed, it is on account of this that the syllogism is called a speech [lit. *oratio*] in which a conclusion necessarily follows from certain things that have been posited [as premises]. Therefore, logic is a ratiocinative (or rational) science because it teaches one how to use the movement of reason artfully. It is also a sermocinal science because it teaches one to discourse with skill.\(^ {154}\)

\(^{153}\) See ibid.: “De logica scendiendum quod nomen ipsum aequivocum est, quia, ut dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore in suo Didascalicon, hoc nomen sumitur a Graeco nomine *logos*, quod apud eos significat sermonem et rationem, et ita apud illos est aequivocum. Et ideo logica apud nos uno modo est scientia sermocinalis, et sic comprehendit grammaticam, rhetoricam et logicam proprie dictam. Alio modo est scientia rationalis, et sic est una trivialis scientia divisa contra grammaticam et rhetoricam, et sic de illa modo intendimus.”

\(^{154}\) See ibid., c.53, n.493 (p.167-168): “De qua scendiendum quod non ideo rationalis scientia dicitur quia considerat res rationis ut apud solam rationem sunt, quia sic non esse proprie sermocinalis scientia, sed quia docet modum ratiocinandi non solum in mente existentem sed etiam in sermone, et quia res rationis considerat et rationes quibus res sunt rationabiles a mente per sermonem explicitas. Hinc enim est quod syllogismus dicitur oratio in qua
In a recent article that draws attention to this passage, Alfredo Storck treats Kilwardby so briefly that it is possible to miss several unique aspects of the thirteenth century author’s view.\textsuperscript{155} Storck quite rightly draws attention to the fact that Kilwardby’s conception of logic is intrinsically tied to discourse in a way that would be absent from some later authors. (In particular, Storck focuses on Albert the Great.) However, while noting the fact that \textit{sermo} and the sermocinal play a critical role in Kilwardby’s remarks here, Storck neglects to draw adequate attention to the fact that Kilwardby’s particular ontological commitments are also evidenced in the passage translated above.

As can be noted in the passage, Kilwardby provides a twofold reason for calling logic a rational science. He does, indeed, note that it is so called because it teaches the manner one should follow in discursive reasoning. However, he also states that it has this name because it considers “the notions [lit. \textit{rationes}] by which things explained by discourse are understandable [lit. \textit{rationabiles}] by the mind.” Storck translates these notions as, “The reasons why things set forth in discourse can be reasoned about by the mind.”\textsuperscript{156} His translation does not wholly distort the passage, but the passage’s Latin, “\textit{rationes quibus},” is arguably better translated, “the reasons by which.” This is not merely for the sake of a slavish adherence to the Latin grammar, but instead to draw attention to the fact that the \textit{rationes} in question are the realities found in mind-independent reality that make reasoning possible. They are the very \textit{rationes} by means of which

\begin{quote}
\textit{ex quibusdam positis ex necessitate sequitur conclusio. Haec igitur scientia ratiocinativa est sive rationalis, quia motu rationis docet uti artificialiter, et sermocinalis, quia docet illum artificialiter sermocinari.}
\end{quote}

In the recent edition of the \textit{Notule libri priorum}, Thom and Scott read the \textit{Notule} as asserting this same outlook, basing themselves on Kilwardby’s use of Boethius notion of logic as an \textit{ars disserendi}. As will be seen below in note 163, it is not quite so clear that Kilwardby expresses himself in identical manners in the \textit{Notule} and the \textit{De ortu}. See Kilwardby, \textit{Notule libri priorum}, xviii-xix, prol. (p.10:1-8).


\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 145.
reasoning is possible. According to Kilwardby, were it not for these rationes, things could not be reasoned about discursively at all.

For now, it is merely important to note that the position expressed by Kilwardby in the De ortu uniquely combines several important aspects. First, the “reasoning” that is considered by logic is not merely mental reasoning. Instead, it is the reasoning that occurs in externalized discourse. By emphasizing the sermocinal aspect of reasoning, Kilwardby remains an exponent of the tradition in logic that would refuse to dissociate internal mental discourse from external verbal discourse. Second, his view of logic comes with its own ontological presuppositions. Among the things that it considers are rationes that are found in mind-independent reality and that ground the intelligible nature of reality. Finally, one would distort the position expressed by Kilwardby in the De ortu were one to ignore the fact that he unhesitatingly refers to logic as a rational science. Of course, he is quite clear that it is rational in the way that human reason is said to be rational—namely as part of discursive reasoning expressed in words.

Returning now to the fifty-eighth chapter, one finds similar conclusions expressed as Kilwardby completes his response to the first objection offered in the chapter. As noted above, he is quite clear about the role of non-mental discourse in logic. He continues his explanation of the relationship between logic and metaphysics by stating that logic is concerned with being in general, as is metaphysics, precisely because logic does not teach one to reason in a merely fictive manner (lit. non docet ratiocinari figmentaliter) about reality, but instead is grounded in reality precisely by means of rationes that pertain to being as such and make reality knowable.\footnote{See Kilwardby, De Ortu, cap.58, n.578 (p.198): “Est et de ente simpliciter sive de omnibus in genere sicut metaphysica, quia non docet ratiocinari figmentaliter, sed per comparationem ad id quod in rebus invenitur de esse et non esse, ut per id quod de rebus notum est, veniatur ad id quod ignotum est. Et hoc facit indifferenter in rebus omnibus per conditiones entis generales quae consequuntur ens secundum quod ens est, super quas discurrit sua consideratio componens et dividens, ut iam ostensum est.”}
In the conclusion of his response, Kilwardby states that the subject of logic can be spoken of in a threefold manner. In one way, the subject of logic is said to be ratiocination. As he states earlier in this paragraph, it is so called because it teaches the manner of reasoning (lit. \textit{modum ratiocinandi}). In a second way of speaking, the subject of logic is ratiocinative discourse (lit. \textit{sermo ratiocinativus}) since logic is not limited to reasoning that remains solely in the mind.\footnote{See Kilwardby, \textit{De Ortu}, cap.58, n.578 (p.198): “Sic igitur manifestum est quod logicae subjectum uno modo dicitur ratiocinatio, alio modo sermo ratiocinativus.”} Finally, the subject of logic is said to be, “Being simply speaking taken as being able to be understood [lit. \textit{ens simpliciter ratiocinabile}] or all things in general compared one to another by means of ratiocinative discourse.”\footnote{Ibid.: “Tertio modo ens simpliciter ratiocinabile vel omnia in genere sermone ratiocinativo ad invicem collata.”} This last definition could be called the most metaphysical definition of logic, for it expresses the important ontological claims at the basis of Kilwardby’s conception of logic. All three of these aspects must be expressed in order to understand his position, as he states in concluding the response to the first objection: “And so, all three of these manners of speaking come to the same thing because each one of them brings with itself the other two meanings, and without the other two meanings, the third would not exist.”\footnote{See ibid.: “Et haec omnia tria in idem redeunt quia unumquodque eorum secum alia duo portat et sine illis non est.”} Several important final observations can be taken from Kilwardby’s response to a third objection offered in this chapter. In the objection, it is asked in what manner logic, sophistics, and metaphysics are related to each other. According to the objector, it would seem that if each of these sciences were more universal than the others, each science would be more universal than itself. For instance, if metaphysics were a universal science with regard to logic, and logic a
universal science with respect to metaphysics, metaphysics would seem to be universal to itself.\footnote{161}

In response to this objection, Kilwardby asserts that each of the three sciences (logic, sophistics, and metaphysics) is indeed universal with respect to all sciences that are other than themselves. However, he makes a clarification that is important and that will receive increased attention in future discussions of this problem. Reasoning and ratiocinative discourse are particular kinds of being and therefore fall under the consideration of the metaphysician. However, the metaphysician treats of being under two aspects, namely \textit{ens completum} (or “real” being) and \textit{ens diminutum} (both accidental conjunctions and \textit{ens verum}—being as true [as well as false], a kind of being “only in the soul”).\footnote{162} Insofar as the metaphysician considers \textit{both} of these types of being, it is more universal than logic.\footnote{163}

\footnote{161 See ibid., cap.58, n.574: “Tertium, quomodo sese habent ad invicem istae scientiae, cum enim quaelibet earum sit communis omnibus scientiis? Quia quaelibet considerat in genere omnia, quaelibet est communis aliis duabus, et per consequens etiam sibi. Si enim metaphysicia est communis omnibus scientiis, ergo et sibi, item ergo et logicae. Sed logica est communis omnibus eadem ratione, ergo et sibi et metaphysicae. Sed si metaphysica est communis logicae et logica metaphysicae, ergo metaphysica sibi. Eodem modo et aliae erunt sibi et aliis communes per eandem rationem.”}

\footnote{162 On the sources of this translation from the Arabic versions of the \textit{Metaphysics} as well as Averroes’s large commentary, see Armand Maurer, “\textit{Ens Diminutum}: a Note on its Origin and Meaning,” \textit{Mediaeval Studies} 12 (1950): 216-222. This topic will be taken up in brief below in section 2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and \textit{Esse Obiectivum}.}

\footnote{163 See Kilwardby, \textit{De Ortu}, cap.58, n.580: “Ad tertium dicendum quod unaquaeque dictarum triumscientiarum est communis omnibus scientiis aliis a se. Cum enim ratiocinatio et sermo ratiocinativus sit aliquod ens, de ipso secundum quod ens est habet considerare primus philosophus, quia eius est considerare omne ens secundum quod ens, scilicet non solum ens completum sed et ens diminutum, et hoc duplex, ut docet Aristoteles in fine VI \textit{Metaphysicae}, scilicet ens casuale et verum quod est in anima tantum, et ita metaphysica est communis logicae.”}

It is here that one senses that Kilwardby’s \textit{rationes entium} are not quite as “mind-independent” as they appear in the other passages discussed above. This same point is found at times in the \textit{Notule libri priorum}. As remarked above in note 154, Thom and Scott appear to hold that the \textit{Notule} is primarily sermocinal in outlook. However, in several important passages, Kilwardby appears to hold logical entities to be wholly “beings of reason” (or, more literally, “things of reason,” \textit{res rationis}). A full discussion of the ambiguities involved here (both for Kilwardby’s view of logic as a sermocinal science and his claims regarding the \textit{rationes entium}) is beyond the bounds of this dissertation. However, the texts should be noted, for they are resonant with ideas that would become central to discussions concerning the “metaphysics of logic” in the decades following Kilwardby.

See Kilwardby, \textit{Notule libri priorum}, prol. (p.14:70-16:84): “Sed adhuc restat dubitatio, quia cum scientia specialis modum iueniendi et iudicandi determinare non habeat sed scientia communis, scientia autem communis est duplex scilicet logica et metaphysica, dubitatur quare magis apud logicam determinatur iste modus quam apud
The implication of this assertion is very important for what follows and likewise buttresses the claim made above based on Brentano’s remarks. Quite explicitly in the text Kilwardby states that he has in mind the division found in *Metaphysics* E. He is clear also that *ens diminutum* pertains to both accidental being (lit. *ens casuale*) and being as the true (lit. *ens verum*), the latter of which is only in the soul (lit. *quod est in anima tantum*). The implication (all but stated directly in words) is that the particular kind of being that applies to *ratiocinatio* and *sermo ratiocinativus* is *ens diminutum*, in particular being in the sense of *ens verum*. Hence, the ontological domain into which logical entities fall is that of “being as the true and false” mentioned in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. For all of his strong statements of mind-independent realism regarding the *rationes entium*, Kilwardby here concedes a bit of ground, explaining logical notions as being slightly “less real” than hard-and-fast “real” entities.

As for the universality of logic with regard to metaphysics, Kilwardby implicitly draws on his theory of the *rationes entium*. He states that insofar as being and its properties are considered *secundum rationem entitatis*, they are understandable things (lit. *sint aliqua rationabilia*). As he has stated at length elsewhere in the *De ortu*, reasoning applies to things...
insofar as they are *rationabile* because of the *rationes rerum* or *rationes entium*.\(^{164}\) In this way, logic is universal with regard to metaphysics. As he closes his response, he states that each of the sciences is universal with respect to the others but in different manners and that the same holds for sophistics. Since they are related to each other in differing ways, the objector’s point does not hold.\(^{165}\)

With the exception of the two brief passages noted by De Rijk and Pini,\(^{166}\) the theme of second intentions is absent from the vocabulary of Kilwardby. For his conception of logic, he is concerned with the concepts that are founded in the *rationes entium*, which are ontological aspects of mind-independent reality, abstracted and considered by the logician. While this notion of logic could be called “realistic” insofar as it stresses the mind-independent foundations of logic, Kilwardby likewise expresses himself in a way that acknowledges that the reasoning and rationcinative discourse considered by the logician is not a kind of *ens completum* but, instead, is a secondary form of being, an *ens diminutum*. Finally, he is very clear in stating that logic is a truly sermocinal science, treating external discourse as an essential part of its subject matter. In order to understand the positions that will be taken by Hervaeus, it is helpful to contrast Kilwardby’s focus to that expressed by Aquinas, whose outlook on logic can be said to focus more on the mind-dependent aspects of logic than on the mind-independent foundations of logical science.

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\(^{164}\) See ibid.: “Item cum ens et eius proprietates secundum rationem entitatis considerata sint aliqua rationabilia, de eis secundum quod huiusmodi sunt habet considerare logica, et ita logica est communis metaphysicae.”

\(^{165}\) See ibid.: “Non enim sequitur quod si aliqua istarum sit omnibus scientiis communis, quod sit sibi communis, sed omnibus alis a se. Nec sequitur quod si metaphysica sit communis logicae et logica metaphysicae, quod eadem metaphysica sibi, quia diversimode est una reliquiae communis et e converso, ut patet ex iam dictis secundum quod diversae sunt considerationes earum circa ens. Eodem modo dicendum de sophistica, ut patet ex praecedentibus.”

\(^{166}\) See note 128 above.
1.4.2 Thomas Aquinas – Intentions, *Ens rationis*, and Logic

1.4.2.1 Introductory Remarks

It is very telling that in Jean-Pierre Torrell’s biography of Aquinas, the word “logic” is used only five times, once in reference to Kilwardby,\(^{167}\) twice regarding an inauthentic work attributed to Aquinas,\(^{168}\) and in two passing comments. In the last of these comments, Torrell laments that many readers have formed misconceptions of Aquinas, in part, because of “commentators more concerned about logic than was Thomas himself.”\(^{169}\) If anything, this lamentation asserts that Aquinas was not greatly concerned with matters of logic. Indeed, among the authentic works of the Angelic Doctor, only two are wholly dedicated to logic, namely the *Expositio libri posteriorum* and the *Expositio libri pereremenias*, the latter of which was left unfinished by Aquinas, who only completed his commentary up to Bekker number 19b26.\(^{170}\)

Of course, this does not mean that Aquinas had little to say about the nature of logic. Robert W. Schmidt’s *The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas*\(^{171}\) attests that this is far from the case. This study is a well-documented attempt to delimit the nature and scope of logic in the thought of Aquinas. However, the monograph represents a complete reconstruction of the purported doctrine, ahistorically spanning Aquinas’s entire corpus. Furthermore, as Schmidt’s extensive bibliography indicates,\(^{172}\) the author is knowledgeable regarding later developments in scholastic logic. This background knowledge clearly plays a

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\(^{168}\) See ibid., 11 and 359.

\(^{169}\) See ibid. 17.

\(^{170}\) See Torrell, 224-227, 343-343.

\(^{171}\) See Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*.

\(^{172}\) See ibid., 320-333.
role at times, especially in Schmidt’s repeated use of the Suarezian notion of the “objective concept.” These regulatory ideas function to clarify points that are imprecise in Aquinas’s own vocabulary, as will be discussed below.

The fact that Aquinas’s writing did not systematically address logical questions was not lost on those who came after him. Among the spurious works once attributed to him, a number of texts are concerned with matters pertaining to logic. For instance, in the inventory made by Gilles Emery, one can find *De propositionibus modalibus, De demonstratione, De fallaciis, De natura syllogismorum, Primus tractatus de universalibus, Secundus tractatus de universalibus, De natura generis, and the Summa totius logicae Aristotelis*. This last text would remain a key text for later Dominicans such as Poinsot, who believed the work to be an authentic expression of the thought of Aquinas. These spurious works fill lacunae not addressed in a systematic manner in Aquinas’s authentic writings.

As Schmidt’s text indicates, however, Aquinas seems to have held a number of settled opinions on topics pertaining to the nature of logic and logical entities, though he expressed such views only in passing. As noted earlier, Schmidt was forced to gather such remarks from throughout Aquinas’s entire corpus. Though a full thematic presentation is outside the scope of this dissertation, three main groups of texts can serve to provide an outline of Aquinas’s overall position regarding second intentions and the nature of logic. The first group contains those in

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173 See ibid., 171, 173, 186, 187, 192. Schmidt himself admits this difficulty, though he also is honest regarding some of his use of later sources in interpreting the works of Aquinas. See ibid., iv-xiv. Regarding the notion of the “objective concept” in later scholasticism see Marco Forlivesi, "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri," Les études philosophiques 60 (2002): 3-30. A very clear exposition is also found in John Frederick Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), 132-212. Note that although Peifer acknowledges that the terminology is not that of Aquinas, he does interpret Aquinas (by the intermediary of Poinsot) in light of the distinction between the formal and objective concept.

174 See Torrell, 359-361. On Emery’s role in compiling the inventory, see ibid., xxi.

175 Indeed, this work is sometimes attributed to Hervaeus. For detailed citations regarding this dispute, see Roensch, 117, 160-161n409-411. Details of the current status of this attribution will be discussed in the opening of the second chapter of this dissertation.
which Aquinas’s vocabulary is most closely related to the explicit term *secundis intentionibus*. These texts will serve to indicate that strict use of this expression is quite rare in the Angelic Doctor’s vocabulary. As will be seen, these texts are almost always directly related to theological problems concerning knowledge of God, the persons of the Trinity, and the two natures of Christ. The second set of texts will be taken from Aquinas’ logical commentaries, namely those on Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* and the *Posterior Analytics*. These texts will be supplemented by further insights gleaned from the beginning of the commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Finally, several very important texts will be considered in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, highlighting matters concerning the nature of logic in relation to metaphysics. These insights will be key for understanding the topics considered in the next chapter’s preparation for interpreting Hervaeus’s treatise.

1.4.2.2 Aquinas and Second Intentions

John Deely has remarked that the semiotician must always bear in mind that there are two main strands of semiotics among late medieval and early modern authors. On the one hand, there is the “low semiotics” that treats questions of sign-relations primarily in logic, especially in the context of understanding Aristotle’s *On Interpretation*. On the other hand, there is always present a “high semiotic” whose sources are theological and sacramental, thus often in the context of the fourth book of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*. The same division of “low” and “high” could be used for the treatment of second intentions among authors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. So much so is this the case that De Rijk’s major study of the debates

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176 See Schimdt, *Domain of Logic*, 123-124n90. See De Rijk, “A Study,” 120-130. Quite telling are the remarks found in Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 33: “Thomas Aquinas does not state that logic deals with second intentions; indeed, the very term ‘second intention’ does not seem to belong to his technical vocabulary. According to Aquinas, logic deals with acts of the intellect.”

177 See John Deely, *Four Ages*, 224, 458.
concerning intentionality includes a series of texts directly pertaining to Trinitarian theology—all annexed to a volume that is ostensibly a purely logical work by Giraldus Odonis.\(^{178}\)

The term *intentio* in Aquinas has a variety of uses that cannot be reduced to a single meaning.\(^{179}\) The term can pertain to the act of will that orients an agent to a given end (whether proximate or final).\(^{180}\) It can, at times, refer to the intelligible species understood as the principle by which cognition is initially specified.\(^{181}\) However, this use of *intentio* appears to be less appropriate than that which applies to the final intellectual intention (i.e. the intellectual word) formed by the intellect in its act of knowing.\(^{182}\) In any case, these various senses appear to be more important for Aquinas’s own vocabulary than any sense of *intentio* applying to logical second intentions. The texts pertinent to this last type of intention can be thematically divided according to the two main topics in which they arise, namely human knowledge of God and, secondly, certain issues pertaining to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

The first text is found in the solution to *In I Sent.* d.2 q.1 a.3, where Aquinas asks whether the names of God are plural only in our intellect or are also plural in God. In answering this question, he makes a threefold division regarding the relation between the intellect’s conception and reality. One case is the conception of something that exists outside the soul, such as a man. Such concepts are immediately founded in reality (lit. *habet fundamentum in re immediate*).\(^{183}\)

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\(^{178}\) See De Rijk, “Appendices,” in Giraldus Odonis, *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 2 *De intentionibus*, 599ff.


\(^{180}\) See ST I-II q.12 a.1-3 (Leon.6.94-96).

\(^{181}\) See *In II Sent.* d.19 q.1 a.3 ad 1 (Mandonnet, tom.2, p.489), *De Veritate* q.10 a.8, (Leon.22.2/1.318-326) et passim. See especially the texts gathered in Schmidt, *Domain of Logic*, 99n16.

\(^{182}\) See esp. *SCG* 1.53 (Leon.13.150-151).

\(^{183}\) See Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d.2 q.1 a.3 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.67): “Unde scieendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem que est extra animam. Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine homo; et talis conceptio intellectus
The second case is most important and will be considered below in more detail. The third kind of conception pertains to those that have no foundation in reality whatsoever. Such things would include *chimerae*.

The second category presented here is most important regarding logical entities. These are conceptions of things that are not mind-independent but only follow upon the manner of understanding the mind-independent thing. Such conceptions are the intentions that our intellect devises (lit. *adinvenit*[^184]) in things. They include things like genera and other such intentions that are only remotely founded in the thing known, though proximately are founded in the intellect that knows the mind-independent natures.[^185] A very similar threefold schema is presented in *In I Sent.* d.30 q.1 a.3.[^186]

A similar exposition is found later in Aquinas’s career in *De Potentia* q.7 a.6, where he asks, “Whether these names [i.e. of God] are synonyms.”[^187] In the course of his main discussion, he notes that some things are attributed to mind-independent realities only insofar as they are understood. This holds in the cases of genera, species and other intellectual intentions (lit. *intentionum intellectualium*). These are not false notions, however, for they are not attributed to mind-independent reality. Instead, they are only attributed to the thing known insofar as it is in


[^185]: See Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d.2 q.1 a.3 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.67): “Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam: et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significantum hujus nominis genus non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem genericis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa.”

[^186]: See Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d.30 q.1 a.3 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.706-709).

[^187]: See Aquinas, *De Pot.* q.7 a.6 (Marietti, p.60): “Sexto quæritur utrum ista nomina sint synonyma.”
the intellect. As will be discussed below, however, important clarifications are needed in order to understand Aquinas’s meaning for something to be “in the intellect.”

The two aforementioned texts pertain to the Divine Names. Another set of relevant texts are focused on the notion of person. As is well known, the notion of “person” in the West has received most of its impetus from theological speculation on the Trinity. In these texts, the concern that generates Aquinas’s discussion of logical intentions pertains to how one can speak of intentions of individuality and universality. A few clarifying remarks should be made in order understand the problem that he is addressing.

It is most common to speak of an “individual” as though one were simply speaking of a mind-independent individual. It would thus seem that the “universal” is something logical or mental and the “individual” something mind-independent. However, as Jorge Gracia convincingly argues, there are several senses on which the term “individual” operates, especially in medieval thinkers. The problem of individuation can be considered from logical, ontological, or linguistic perspectives. When the logician speaks of “man,” this notion can be considered either in its universal scope or merely as a particular. In the first case, it is conceptualized with an intention of universality, whereas in the second case the nature is considered with the logical

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188 See ibid. (Marietti, p.61): “Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in se ipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt; sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei, et aliarum intentionum intellectualium: nam nihil est in rebus quae sunt extra animam, cuius similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus: quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in se ipsum reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas: et sic, sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio,—cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam,—ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio, cui respondet res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei, respondet solum res intellecta.”


intention of individuality. Certain logical laws (e.g., rules of propositional opposition) will apply differently to each of these. This “logical” perspective must be kept in mind when reading the following texts concerning personhood in the Trinity.

In \textit{In I Sent.} q.23 q.1 a.3, Aquinas asks, “Whether person signifies substance?” In the course of discussing how we signify the notion of “person,” he notes a two-fold manner of signifying an individual. On the one hand, it is signified through a name of second intention (lit. \textit{nomen secundae intentionis}). “Individual” in this sense signifies not a singular thing but only the logical intention of singularity. To this is contrasted “individual” taken as a name of first intention (lit. \textit{nomen primae intentionis}), by which is signified the individual thing. What seems to be operative in his vocabulary is the Porphyrian or Boethian distinction of names of first and second imposition mentioned briefly in the introduction to this chapter. However, the use of \textit{nomen} makes this passage an insufficient locus for gleaning much more regarding logical intentions. Furthermore, his concerns continue on to the signification of “person,” not to matters of logic. Similar texts can be found in \textit{ST I} q.29 a.1 ad 3 as well as \textit{ST I} q.30 a.4. He likewise considers closely related problems as regards the attribution of \textit{hypostasis} to God in \textit{In I Sent.} d.26 q.1 a.1 ad 3, \textit{In III Sent.} d.6 a.1 a.1 sol.1, and \textit{De Potentia} q.9 a.2 ad 2. The contexts of these discussions are focused on theological matters, not logical ones.

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191 See Aquinas, \textit{In I Sent.} q.23 q.1 a.3 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.560): “Utrum persona significet substantiam.”
192 See ibid., p.563: “Sed individuum dupliciter potest significari: vel per nomen secundae intentionis, sicut hoc nomen individuum vel singularem, quod non significat rem singularem, sed intentionem singularitatis; vel per nomen primae intentionis, quod significat rem, cui convenit intentio particularitatis; et ita significatur hoc nomine persona; significat enim rem ipsam, cui accedit intentio individui.”
193 See Aquinas, \textit{ST I} q.29 a.1 ad 3 (Leon.4.328).
194 See Aquinas, \textit{ST I} q.30 a.4 (Leon.4.341).
195 See Aquinas, \textit{In I Sent.} d.26 q.1 a.1 ad 3 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.623-624).
196 See Aquinas, \textit{In III Sent.} d.6 a.1 a.1 sol.1 (Mandonnet, tom.3, p.224-225). Indeed, in this text Aquinas uses both \textit{nomen primae impressionis} and \textit{nomen secundae impressionis} instead of \textit{nomen primae intentionis} and \textit{nomen secundae intentionis}. It seems that at this period of his writing, he is using these terms as near cognates for
This same kind of focus can be found in several other texts pertaining to the nature of the category of relation. The text of *In I Sent.* d.26 q.2 a.1 raises the question, “Whether the Divine Relations are altogether nothing.”198 While answering that there are indeed relations in God and that they are the Divine Persons,199 Aquinas quickly outlines his position concerning the nature of the category of relation.200 He states that two things must be considered with regard to relation, just as with all accidents. On the one hand, there is its existence (lit. *esse suum*) and, on the other hand, its intelligible nature (lit. *rationem suam*). According to its existence, one notes that relation is an accident existing in a subject. However, it is placed in its particular category because of its intelligible nature, namely, in that it denotes a being that is purely a reference to another. Because of this, relation is unique among the accidents because it has nothing in its intelligible nature that requires one to speak of a subject in which it inheres.201 Relation primarily indicates a “towardness.”

Because of the unique nature of relation, Aquinas notes that there can be true relations that are not mind-independent.202 That is, there are “certain relations that place nothing in the

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197 See Aquinas, *De Pot.* q.9 a.2 ad 2 (Marietti, p.71).
198 See *In I Sent.* d.26 q.2 a.1 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.628): “Utrum relationes divinae sint omnino nihil.”
200 See also, *In I Sent.* d.8 q.4 a.3 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.223-225). The doctrine explained from this passage is explained by reference to a number of texts in *Schmidt,* 133-140. As always, much light is shed on the question, but Schmidt gathers the texts in bulk, often citing them without taking time to consider their context or to provide a detailed exegesis of the text.
201 See *In I Sent.* d.26 q.2 a.1 (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.630): “Et ad hujus intellectum scieendum est, quod, ut supra dictum est, dist. 8, quaest. 4, art. 3, in relatione, sicut in omnibus accidentibus, est duo considerare: scilicet esse suum, secundum quod ponit aliquid in ipso, prout est accident; et rationem suam, secundum quam ad aliquid refertur, ex qua in genere determinato collocatur; et ex hac ratione non habet quod ponat aliquid in eo de quo dicitur; sicut omnes aliae formae absolutae ex ipsa sua ratione habent quod aliquid in eo quod dicuntur, ponant.”
202 This is a repeated point in the work of Deely. See Deely, *Intentionality and Semiotics,* 119-125.
thing of which they are said.” Aquinas notes that this tempts some to think that all relations are only second intentions (lit. *de intentionibus secundis*), existing only in the soul. In *In I Sent. d.26 q.2 a.2*, he will again use the term *intentionibus secundis* when making the same point about certain thinkers’ denial of the reality of relation. Later in his career, in *De Potentia q.7 a.9*, he will make this same point using slightly different terminology, namely, *secundis intellectibus*.

While the details of Aquinas’s theory of relation are not the direct concern of this dissertation, there is an important passage in *De Potentia q.7 a.11* in which Aquinas addresses a similar question, here asking whether relations like that of creature to Creator are really in God. In the course of his answer, he posits an initial twofold division in mind-dependent relations.

On the one hand, there are relations between understood things *inasmuch as they are understood*. This division is tied explicitly to logical relations of genus and species. Aquinas

203 See *In I Sent. d.26 q.2 a.1* (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.630): “Et ideo inveniuntur quaedam relationes nihil ponentes in eo de quo dicuntur.”

204 See ibid.: “Et hoc attendentes quidam philosophi dixerunt, quod relatio non est aliquod unum genus entium, nec est aliquid in rerum natura; sed est tantum quidam respectus respersus in omnibus entibus, et quod relationes sunt de intentionibus secundis quae non habent esse nisi in anima.”

205 See *In I Sent. d.26 q.2 a.2* (Mandonnet, tom.1, p.633): “Sed inter omnia alia relatio est debilioris esse, ut dicit Commentator, adeo quod quidam reputaverunt eam esse de intentionibus secundis, ut dictum est, artic. antec.”

206 See Aquinas, *De Pot.* q.7, a.9 (Marietti, p.62-63): “Dicendum quod relatio ad Deum est aliqua res in creatura. Ad cuius evidentiam scendunt est, quod sicut dicit Commentator in XI Metaph., quia relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta, ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Prima enim intellecta sunt extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit.”


208 See Aquinas, *De Pot.* q.7 a.11 (Marietti, p.65): “Utrum istae relationes temporales sint in Deo secundum rationem.”
states that some relations are devised (lit. *adinvenit*) in things. These are relations like genus and species, both of which are devised by considering the order between knowledge (lit. *intellectum*) and extramental things as well as the order between various objects of knowledge (lit. *intellectum*). Here, the ambiguity of *adinvenit* is quite important, and it shows the limits of what can be concluded concerning Aquinas’s treatment of these issues. It is understandable that Schimdt chose to translate *adinvenit* as “devises.” It would not be completely appropriate to say that these relations are “discovered” in things. If the language of “discovery” were pushed to the extreme, it would imply a position akin to that of Kilwardy’s *De ortu scientiarum*. If discovered in mind-independent reality, logical relations would seem to designate mind-independent notions.

This is does not seem to be what Aquinas means. Even if these relations are “discovered,” they presuppose that we are discussing the understood things *inasmuch as they are understood*. They are not relations that are wholly mind-independent, awaiting discovery *in mind independent reality as such*. Still, in contrast to the second division of mind-dependent relations (to be discussed below), relations like *genus* and *species* seem to be more “discovered” than they are “devised.”

Nonetheless, to differentiate Aquinas from the strong realism of Kilwardby, I will follow Schmidt translating *adinvenit* as “devises,” though this has its limitations. If misunderstood, it could be taken to mean a kind of making that is akin to practical “making”—a kind of logical

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209 See ibid. (Marietti, p.65): “Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem.”

210 See note 184 above.

demiurgy among *real* beings. Nevertheless, Schmidt’s choice of “devise” is understandable and acceptable if it is taken in the sense found in the informal expression, “Rupert is devising a plot to take over the world.” The plot being thus devised is ambiguous in the same way manner as the relations mentioned above. It is mind-dependent, for it depends upon Rupert’s careful planning. However, it does have a bearing upon mind-independent reality. Otherwise, it would be an utter fiction with no possibility of being acted upon. Aquinas’s position on logical relations should be read as having this kind of ambiguity, and the use of “devises” arguably expresses the ambiguity of *adinvenit* well.

The second set of mind-dependent relations mentioned by Aquinas (in *De potentia* q.7 a.11) are relations between mind-independent things following in some manner upon understanding, though they are not discovered (or, devised [lit. *adinvenit*]) in the same manner as the aforementioned kinds of relations. Such relations are ones like comparisons that involve future contingents that don’t actually exist or the relation of the known thing to the knower, which is a mind-dependent relation. He hastily uses this this second category of relation,

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212 See the work of Tedesco cited above in note 31.

213 Aquinas, *De Pot.* q.7 a.11 (Marietti, p.65): “Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad alium; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quodam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (qua eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad alium. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et alium futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad alium, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentia est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subjecto; unde talis relatio relationem ad quodcumque alium rationis est tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquum cum ordine ad alium, in quantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad alium: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum; et sic cum quodam ordine ad scientiam, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationum creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.”
especially the case of the relation of known and knower, to explain the *relationes rationis* of God to creatures. In this text, Aquinas does not seem interested in considering here a detailed ontology of second intentions.

As regards the use of Latin terms most closely related to the English expression “second intentions,” a final text selection can be taken from questions found in Aquinas’s commentary on Boethius’s *De Trinitate*. This commentary is believed to have been written at some point between 1257 and early 1259, during Thomas’s first period as a master of theology in Paris. The work is therefore relatively early in his academic career. However, as it contains remarks that will find resonance in later works, it is helpful to consider this particular passage. Several others will suffice to provide fuller context for the remark.

The fifth and sixth questions of the *De Trinitate* provide a wealth of texts regarding Aquinas’s positions regarding the sciences, at least in this early period of his writing. A full investigation into these matters is not possible in this dissertation. However, an important response should be noted. In the second sub-question found in q.6 a.1, Aquinas considers the order of learning and the place of mathematics therein. In the third objection to this sub-question, the objector states that the learner begins not with mathematics but with logic, for logic is required for mathematics as well as for all of the other sciences. For this reason, the objector questions the truth of the dictum that mathematics proceeds *disciplinabiliter* (in the manner of learning). \(^{215}\)

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\(^{214}\) See Torrell, 68.

\(^{215}\) See Aquinas, *De Trin.* q.6 a.1 sol. 2 obj. 3 (Leon.50.158.59-62): “Set initium addiscendi accipitur a logica, quam oportet preaddiscere mathematice et omnibus alis. Ergo disciplinalis modus magis conuenit logicae quam alis.”
In response to this objection, Aquinas notes that we must sometimes start by learning things that, simply speaking, are not the easiest. Hence, given the dependence of other sciences upon logic, it is necessary to learn logic before those sciences. However, logic is not first because it is the easiest of sciences. On the contrary, he states, "It is most difficult [lit. habet maximam difficultatem] since it deals with things known secondarily [lit. sit de secundo intellectis]." Although Armand Maurer translates secundo intellectis as “second intentions,” it is helpful to recognize that Aquinas does not speak of secundis intentionibus here.

Similar remarks are made in q.5 a.1 ad 10 where Aquinas notes another inversion of order with regard to mathematics. He states that insofar as mathematical knowledge requires less experience, it should precede the natural sciences. However, given that natural things are more apportioned to our intellect (given its relation to sense knowledge), mathematical knowledge is more abstract and, hence, more difficult. In q.5 a.1 ad 3, Aquinas places logic among the liberal arts, justifying this by citing the same passage from Metaphysics α that he

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216 Ibid., q.6 a.1 sol.2 ad. 3 (Leon.50.161:305-306): “Habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis.” For the complete response, see Leon.50.161:298-162:311: “Ad tertium dicendum quod in addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilitius, sed ab eo, a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia alie scientie ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis. Oportet autem primo scire modum scientie quam scientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II metaphysice.”

217 See Aquinas, “Division and Methods of the Sciences,” p.70.

218 See ibid., q.5 a.1 ad 10: (Leon.50.141:382-387): “Ad decimum dicendum quod quamuis naturalis post mathematicam addiscenda occurrat, ex eo quod universalia ipsius documenta indigent experimento et tempore, tamen res naturales, cum sint sensibiles, sunt naturaliter magis note quam res mathematicae a sensibili materia abstracte.”

cites in q.6 a.1 sol.2 ad 3. Likewise, in q.5 a.1 ad 2, he appears to approve of Boethius's dictum that logic is more an instrument of science than a science.

The relation of logical concepts to mind-independent reality is treated briefly in q.6 a.1 sol.1c. There, Aquinas is considering whether it should be said that it is characteristic for natural science to proceed rationally. In the body of his response, he answers affirmatively but distinguishes the particular way that natural science proceeds rationally from two other meanings of "rationally." These other two meanings provide information concerning his positions regarding logic during this early period of his writing.

The first way a science is said to be rational is due to the principles from which it proceeds. Thus a science could be called "rational" when it has as its principles coming from the works of reason, that is to say, things that logicians consider as principles, such as genera, species, opposition, and so forth. Thus, a process of reasoning is called "rational" when one uses the principles of logic just as they are treated in logic itself. It is said that his use of logical principles in other sciences is improper because sciences must proceed from their own principles (i.e., not from purely logical ones). In this passage, Aquinas states that this manner of using

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220 See Aquinas, De Trinitate, q.5 a.1 ad 3 (Leon.50.139:216-221): “Et hoc etiam consonat uerbis Philosophi, qui dicit in II Metaphisice quod modus scientie debet queri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam, que docet modum omnium scientiarum debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias scientias, ad quam pertinet triuim.”

221 See ibid., q.5 a.1 ad 2 (Leon.50.139:199-207): “Et ideo logica non continetur sub speculatiua philosophia quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quiddam reductum ad philosophiam speculatiuam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et diffinitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in scientiii speculatiuis indigemus. Unde secundum Boethium in commento super Porphyrium non tam est scientia quam scientie instrumentum.”

222 See ibid., q.6 a.1 (Leon.50.157:3-4): “Utrum oporteat uersari in naturalibus rationabiliter.”

223 See ibid., q.6 a.1 sol.1c (Leon.159.119-121): “Responsio. Dicendum. Ad primam questionem, quod processus alius qua proceditur in scientiii dicitur rationabilis tripliciter.”

224 See ibid. (Leon.50.159:121-126), “Vno modo ex parte principiorum, ex quibus proceditur, ut cum alius qua procedit ad aliqoud probandum ex operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus et species et oppositum et huiusmodi intentiones, qua logic considerant.”
principles is, however, acceptable for metaphysics. As will be seen below, Aquinas expresses his position on this matter in a different manner in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

The second procedure that he outlines is opposed to demonstrative sciences. In contrast to the resolution to first principles that occurs in such sciences, there is also a method of investigation that occurs when several options remain, allowing for probable arguments only. He claims that this use of probable reason in this sense is called rational insofar as it is not demonstrative. This is not quite the same as the first notion of a rational manner of proceeding. The first is considered “rational” insofar as logical notions are used within the teachings of the very science being considered. In this second case, it is an instrumental use of probable / dialectical reasoning in a given subject, though not as strictly speaking part of the demonstrations of that science.

A few terminological points are necessary to understand Aquinas here. However, more will be said when the commentary on the *Metaphysics* is treated, as that text is clearer in its discussion. The distinction being used here is that of *logica utens* and *logica docens*, a

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225 See ibid. (Leon.50.159:126-136): “Et sic dicetur aliquis processus esse rationabilis, quando aliquis utitur in aliqua scientia propositionibus, que traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur logica, prout est docens, in aliis scientiis. Set hic modus procedendi non potest proprio competere alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur. Contingit autem hoc propri et convenienser fieri in logica et metaphisica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subjectum quodammodo.”


227 See Aquinas, *De Trinitate*, q.6 a.1 sol.1 (Leon.50.159:137-155): “Alio modo dicitur processus rationalis ex termino in quo sistitur procedendo. Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet, est intellectus principiorum, in que resoluen do iudicamus; quod quidem quando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio rationabilis, sed demonstratiua. Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad predictum terminum perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione, quando scilicet inquirenti adhuc manet uia ad utrumlibet; et hoc contingit, quando per probabiles rationes proceditur, que natae sunt facere opinionem uel fidel, non scientiam. Et sic rationabilis processus dividiitur contra demonstratiuum. Et hoc modo rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet scientia, ut ex probabilibus paretur via ad necessarias probationes. Et hic est alius modus, quo logica utimur in scientiis demonstratiuis, non quidem ut est docens, set ut est uten.”
distinction that is not unique to Aquinas.\textsuperscript{228} In this passage, Aquinas says that one can utilize logical notions (as they are used when logic itself is being taught—i.e. in \textit{logica docens}) in certain sciences like metaphysics in the very teaching of that science. Hence, he states, “\textit{Et sic dicetur aliquis processus esse rationabilis, quando aliquis utitur in aliqua scientia propositionibus, que traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur logica, prout est docens, in aliis scientiis.”\textsuperscript{229} In contrast to this, there are times when we merely \textit{use} the principles of logic without making that usage part of the demonstrations of the science. Hence, regarding this, he states, “\textit{Et hic est alius modus, quo logica utimur in scientiis demonstratiuis, non quidem ut est docens, set ut est utens.”\textsuperscript{230} This kind of reasoning appears to be dialectical reasoning, akin to that proper to the \textit{Topics}. However, Aquinas’s remarks here are inchoate at best. More light will be shed on his more mature position when texts are considered from his commentaries on the texts of Aristotle.

1.4.2.3 Aquinas as Logical Commentator

Aquinas’s commentaries on the works of Aristotle provide synthetic accounts of his views concerning logic, though such views are admittedly brief. The most direct sources among these texts can be found in the proemia to his commentaries on works from the \textit{Organon}, namely his commentaries on \textit{On Interpretation} and the \textit{Posterior Analytics}, as well as the beginning of his commentary on the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}. While thinkers like R.-A. Gauthier and Joseph Owens have stressed the broader theological context of these commentaries,\textsuperscript{231} it is more

\textsuperscript{228} See the remarks found below in note 298.

\textsuperscript{229} Aquinas, \textit{De Trinitate} q.6.a.1 sol.1 (Leon.50.159:126-130).

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid. (Leon.50.159:153-155).

plausible that these commentaries are stylistically limited to philosophical exposition. While the doctrine exposited in the bodies of the commentaries must be judged carefully so as to distinguish the authentic position of Aquinas (in contrast to those which he merely attributes to Aristotle), it is possible to use such texts as testimonies to Aquinas’s philosophical positions. This is particularly true in the cases of the commentaries’ proemia. In these, Aquinas often discusses the nature of the text in his own voice. Such is the case with each of the following texts in which Aquinas expresses in his own voice various manners of situating the given work within the *Organon* as well as within the broader scheme of Aristotelian sciences.

The *Expositio libri Periermenias* was undertaken by Aquinas in approximately 1271 and was incomplete when it was finally delivered to the arts masters of the University of Paris at their request after Aquinas’s death in 1274. In addition to its obvious reliance upon the Aristotelian text of the *On Interpretation*, the commentary’s two principal sources are Boethius and Ammonius. The proemium to the commentary quickly outlines the nature of logic and then situates *On Interpretation* in light of those remarks. As will be seen below, the proemium itself does not completely explicate the character of the subject matter of logical science.

The commentary begins with remarks regarding the operations of the intellect and their interrelation. Citing III *De Anima*, Aquinas remarks that there are two operations of the intellect. The first is the apprehension of something’s essence, whereas the second pertains to

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232 On the matter of interpreting the commentaries of Aquinas, see John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), xix-xx, 53. Likewise, see Torrell, 236-239. Also, for remarks on the philosophical insights that can be gleaned from the introductions to the commentaries, see Kevin White, “Philosophical Starting Points: Reason and Order in Aquinas’s Introductions to the *Posterior Analytics*, *De Caelo*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*,” in *Theology Needs Philosophy: Acting Against Reason is Contrary to the Nature of God*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 135-153. In particular, see White’s amusing but insightful remarks on p.136: “These introductions make up a set of philosophical starting points that are especially attractive to anyone looking for that apparently elusive thing in Aquinas’s work, *philosophia pura*.”

233 See Torrell, 226.

234 See Aristotle, *De An.*, 430a26ff.
the composition and division of concepts so apprehended. He adds that in addition to these two operations, there is a third intellectual operation of proceeding from the known to the unknown, namely the discourse of reasoning. Of these operations, the second depends upon the first, for two things must be apprehended before a judgment is made with regard to their combination or separation. Likewise, syllogistic reasoning cannot occur unless one has formed a judgment of truth that can be related to other judgments. Therefore, reasoning depends upon judgment. 235

This manner of speaking is not unique to Aquinas, but was regularly used by the so-called Parisian Modistae in their treatment of logic 236 and can also be found in the Summulae dialectics of Roger Bacon. 237 It would likewise become a hallmark of later treatments of logic, for example, in the tripartite structure of Ockham’s Summa Logicae 238 as well as in baroque summulae of formal logic such as that found in John Poinsot’s Cursus philosophicus. 239 Thus, one should not overemphasize this way of speaking as though it were unique to Aquinas. It had currency before his writing and would have a long and a storied history after him. However, it is important to note this general manner of approaching logic. As will be seen in the following

235 See Aquinas (Leon.1*/1.5:1-14): “Sicut Philosophus in III De Anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem, que dicitur indiuisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essenciam uniuscuiusque rei in seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et diuidentis. Additur autem et tercia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum. Harum autem operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse compositio et diuisio, nisi simplicium apprehensorum. Secunda uero ordinatur ad terciam: quia uidelicet oportet quod ex aliquo uero cognito, cui intellectus assenciat, procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis.”


chapters, it is an important part of the controversies pertinent to the period preceding Hervaeus’s treatise. Thinkers including Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito explicitly link questions concerning intentionality with this threefold schema of intellectual operations. This same manner of proceeding is evidenced in Hervaeus’s De secundis intentionibus.

Aquinas continues in his commentary by noting that logic is a rational science and therefore must be concerned with the things pertaining to these three operations. He then goes on to note that the Categories are concerned with matters of the first operation, On Interpretation with those pertaining to the second, and the Prior Analytics as well as the other books of the Organon with those pertaining to the third operation. In the proemium itself, nothing is said about the nature of the “things” mentioned as pertaining to the operations. It is not clear whether or not these are “things” that are purely mind-dependent relations or pertain to the operations as “real,” qualitative accidents of the intellect in its ratiocinative discourse.

This same kind of ambiguity remains in a telling exposition in the course of Aquinas’s commentary. In the passage under consideration, Aristotle is considering the types of oppositional relationships obtaining between universal and particular enunciations. Aquinas offers a clarification of the ways that something can be said of the universal, listing four manners, arranged as a pair of subdivisions of a first major division:

1. The universal considered separately from the individuals

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240 Aquinas, In I Pery. (Leon.1*/1.5:15-32): “Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis sciencia, necesse est quod eius consideratio uersetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres predictas operationes rationis. De his igitur que pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his que simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in Libro Predicamentorum. De his uero, que pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat Philosophus in Libro Perihermeneias. De his uero que pertinent ad terciam operationem determinat in libro Priorum et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de sillogismo simpliciter et de diversis sillogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud. Et ideo secundum predictum ordinem trium operationum, liber Praedicamentorum ordinatur ad librum Perihermeneias, qui ordinatur ad librum Priorum et sequentes.”

241 See Aristotle, De Int., 7, 17a38-18a11.
a. Can attribute something to it which is mind-dependent, e.g., predicability of many (universality) as in, “Man is predicable of many”

b. Can attribute to it something true of the universal obtaining in mind-independent reality, though the given nature is not one in reality, e.g., “Man is the noblest of creatures”

2. The universal considered with regard to the individuals

a. Something essential, as when one predicates a genus or property of the individual in cases like, “A man is an animal,” or “A man is able to laugh”

b. Something accidental, pertaining only to a given individual’s activity, as when one says, “A man is walking.”

The most directly relevant text is that which applies to (1a) above. In this case, Aquinas is explaining how something may be attributed of a universal nature inasmuch as it is in the intellect. This is a well-known point repeated throughout various texts in Aquinas, clearly linked to the Avicennian notion of absolute consideration of an essence. Inasmuch as that nature is outside of the intellect, it exists singularly. However, insofar as it is within cognition, that nature takes on universality and other such properties. However, even in this case, there are

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242 See Aquinas, In I Pery. (Leon.1*/1.51:130-166): “Est autem considerandum quod de uniuersali aliquid enunciatur quatuor modis. Nam uniuersale potest uno modo considerari quasi separatum a singularibus, sive per se subsistens, ut Plato posuit, sive, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. Et sic potest ei aliquid attribui dupliciter. Quandoque enim attribuitur ei sic considerato aliquid, quod pertinet ad solam operationem intellectus, ut si dicatur quod homo est praedicabile de multis, sive uniuersale, sive species. Huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas naturae intellectae, secundum quod comparat ipsam ad res, quae sunt extra animam. Quandoque vero attribuitur aliquid uniiversali sic considerato, quod scilicet apprehenditur ab intellectu ut unum, tamen id quod attribuitur ei non pertinet ad actum intellectus, sed ad esse, quod habet natura apprehensa in rebus, quae sunt extra animam, puta si dicatur quod homo est dignissima creaturarum. Hoc enim convenit naturae humanae etiam secundum quod est in singularibus. Nam quilibet homo singularis dignior est omnibus creaturis irrationalibus; sed tamen omnes homines singulares non sunt unus homo extra animam, sed solum in acceptione intellectus; et per hunc modum attribuitur ei praedicatum, scilicet ut un rei. Alio autem modo attribuitur universali, prout est in singularibus, et hoc dupliciter. Quandoque quidem ratione ipius naturae universalis, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod ad essentiam eius pertinet, vel quod consequitur principia essentialia; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, vel homo est risibilis. Quandoque autem attribuitur ei aliquid ratione singularis in quo inventitur, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod pertinet ad actionem individui; ut cum dicitur, homo ambulant.”


244 Hence, there is a latent equivocation in such language. Universality implies some degree of unity in comparison to some many of which that one thing (whether a given nature or a mere name) pertains (at least potentially). If a “universal” is in a singular, it may be as a common nature, but that is a modified sense of “universal.” In a passage such as this one, Aquinas does not distinguish concerning these matters. As regards his own position, see discussion in the text of Owens cited in the previous footnote. This will be important in the discussions undertaken in the next two chapters of this dissertation, especially insofar as we isolate the logical notion of universality articulated by Hervaeus.
some things that apply to the nature as such so that these same attributes obtain in mind-independent reality. Hence, in division (1b) above, Aquinas notes that we can attribute something universally to the nature that holds in mind-independent reality although that nature does not exist as a single unitary reality outside of the mind according to the adopted Aristotelian point of view.\textsuperscript{245} Such is the case as when one predicates something per se of the given essence as when one says, “Man is risible.”

In the text, Aquinas states that the intellect forms the intentions of genus and species by attributing such intentions to the known nature inasmuch as the intellect compares the given nature to things that are outside of the soul.\textsuperscript{246} That is, the intention of “species” is attributed to the intention of “man” inasmuch as that nature is predicable of many. Schmidt marshals a number of texts from throughout Aquinas’ corpus to show that intentions such as genus and species are indeed mind-dependent relations (lit. relationes rationis) but that they are remotely founded on reality.\textsuperscript{247} This was also discussed in several of the texts considered in the previous section. However, texts like the one cited from the Commentary do not discuss the matter in detail.

For this dissertation’s purposes, it is important to note that the notion of being “in the intellect” is quite ambiguous. Without further qualification such an expression could well be understood as referring to either the species intelligibilis or the verbum, both of which are real

\textsuperscript{245} As to the relation of this problem of the unity of the species precisely as it exists commonly among existents before the mind’s apprehension of it, a detailed treatment of the problem from an erstwhile Thomist is found at length in John of St. Thomas, Ars logica, p.2 q.3 a.1-4 (p.313-337). This issue will play an important role in our discussion of Scotus in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{246} See Aquinas, In I Pery. (Leon.1*/1.51:140-143) “Huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas nature intellecte, secundum quod comparat ipsam ad res, que sunt extra animam.”

\textsuperscript{247} See Schmidt, Domain of Logic, 81-93, 122-129, 166-174.
qualities inhering entitatively in the knower.\footnote{248} Thus, the intentions of species and genus, without further qualification, could refer to attributes of real entities. That is not to say that they would be attributes of the given mind-independent thing that is known. In the text from the Commentary on \textit{On Interpretation}, Aquinas clearly denies that. However, without further qualification, the intentions of genus and species could well be considered properties of the \textit{qualitative accidents} that inform the intellect, hence, being attributable to the essence or nature insofar as it is an accident inhering in the knower.

Schmidt defends Aquinas against such a reading, but his interpretation likewise bears witness to a vocabulary that is relatively foreign to that of Aquinas. Aquinas does not hesitate to use terminology of intentionality to explain the kind of union that holds between the knower and the known as well as the manner in which the known exists in the known.\footnote{249} However, Schmidt regularly refers to a usage of the term “objective” that is never justified by his citations from Aquinas, though it bears a striking resemblance to a distinction that will be accepted without question by the time of Hervaeus, namely, that between subjective and objective existence.\footnote{250}

\footnote{248} As regards the \textit{verbum} or \textit{conceptus}, this is explicitly held by Peifer, whose work draws extensively on the language of Poinsoi for interpreting Aquinas. See Peifer, 189-212. However, even the extensive textual gathering of Lonergan shows that it is far from clear whether the term \textit{verbum} refers to a psychological state or to something akin to the later scholastic notion of the objective concept. See Bernard Lonergan, \textit{Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas}, ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 1-11. These same ambiguities are openly admitted and parsed, though in admitted dependence on Poinsot, in Jacques Maritain, \textit{The Degrees of Knowledge}, ed. and trans. Gerald Phelan et al. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 127-136, 411-441.

\footnote{249} For an extensive gathering of such texts, see Stephen L. Brock, “Intentional Being, Natural Being, and the First-Person Perspective in Thomas Aquinas,” \textit{The Thomist} 77 (2013): 103-133. However, it is helpful to note that \textit{esse intentionale} does not play the role in Aquinas’s thought that many neo-Thomists would be given to think. On this, see the exchange between Étienne Gilson and John Deely recounted in John Deely, “Quid sit postmodernismus?,” in \textit{Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy}, ed. Roman T. Ciapalo (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 92-93.

\footnote{250} Especially, see Schmidt, \textit{Domain of Logic}, 168: “The rationate relation which follows upon the act of understanding is \textit{in the things understood}. This does not mean in the external thing which happens to be known, but in the thing precisely \textit{as known}, that is in the objective concept.” Schmidt goes on to speak of how the relation is one “between concepts.” Though he does not go into details concerning the nature of the concept under discussion, the implied distinction of subjective and objective existence appears to be presumed (or the parallel Suarezian distinction between the formal and the objective concept).
Indeed, it is precisely this distinction that Gilson included among a list of “doctrinal peculiarities” in Hervaeus, calling into question his fidelity to Aquinas.  

This development will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, for its elaboration is closely tied to the thought of Duns Scotus. However, it is helpful to make a brief aside regarding this distinction so as to understand more fully the way that Schmidt uses it to justify a much more coherent account of Aquinas’s texts than they often merit at first glance. Once again, this is not to deny all of Schmidt’s conclusions. A full evaluation of his conclusions would be a large exegetical undertaking, far outside the boundaries and immediate tasks of this dissertation. However, if Aquinas’s texts are to be used in brief, it is necessary to consider

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A very impressive history of much of these matters can also be found in Kobusch’s *Sein und Sprache* in which the author traces the theme of objective existence (and related themes / notions) from the time of Aquinas all the way through Husserl. Though the history is sweeping, Kobusch’s work is a testimony to the importance of the theme throughout the history of philosophy. See Theo Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache: Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 79-328.
important qualifications that must be made to claims regarding the purported unity proposed in an account like that offered by Schmidt.

In order to understand the distinction between objective and subjective being, one must recognize that the late-medieval expression of this distinction runs directly counter to what is expressed by “subjective” and “objective” in contemporary, colloquial English. John Deely has well noted this fact in a number of his works, though without a complete thematic treatment of its history. Unless the context is completely clear, this dissertation will hereafter use *esse subiectivum* and *esse obiectivum* to refer to the post-Scotistic division of being prominent in the medieval authors under consideration, especially Hervaeus. This explicit use of the Latin expressions will serve to express quite clearly the diametric opposition between the medieval and the contemporary notions of objectivity and subjectivity.

To the contemporary reader, “objective” likely means something close to “external to thought” or “independent from any subjective opinion or interpretation.” However, a telling contrast can be found in the Oxford English Dictionary entry for the term. The dictionary notes two diametrically opposed meanings in its third definition for the adjective “objective”:

253 Doyle notes this in a summary remark in *DSIDolye* 182n294. For a somewhat systematic example of Deely’s use of the distinction, see John Deely, *Purely Objective Reality* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 8-120. Indeed, Deely has elsewhere lamented the fact that many neo-Thomists, ignoring the distinction between objective and subjective existence, have tended to treat *entia rationis* as psychological realities, a mistake that confounds *ens rationis* with that against which it is to be distinguished, namely *ens reale*. Perhaps this common mistake can be explained by the state of Aquinas’s text, noted above. Even if the Angelic Doctor adequately makes distinctions that allow for these later developments, this is far from saying that the later developments are *directly* operative in his texts. Thus, a kind of strictly textual approach to the works of Aquinas will do little to provide a certain foundation for addressing later questions that were not the direct concern of Aquinas himself. See Deely, *Intentionality and Semiotics*, 111, 121.

A very clear remark on the notion of object can be found in Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. E.I. Watkin (London: Sheed and Ward, 1932), 253n1: “It may also be observed that certain philosophic terms understood in a material sense, have acquired a meaning totally different from their original significance. Take, for example, the term object. For the ancients the object meant what is placed before the mind or presented to it, considered formally as such. Hence imaginary beings, the chimera for example, were said to exist objectively or as objects present to the mind but not really or as things existing outside the mind. The moderns, on the contrary, understand by an object the thing itself or the subject which is presented to the mind, and to exist objectively is therefore the same as to exist really or outside the mind.”
1. Existing as an object of thought or consciousness as opposed to having a real existence; considered as presented to the mind rather than in terms of inherent qualities.

2. That is or belongs to what is presented to consciousness, as opposed to the consciousness itself; that is the object of perception or thought, as distinct from the subject; (hence) (more widely) external to or independent of the mind.\(^{254}\)

The second meaning is closest to popular parlance’s use of the notion of “objectivity.” One would certainly never bring “subjective feelings” into a courtroom, but “objective facts” are supposedly incontestable, given their purported mind-independence. However, as the OED entry readily attests, there really are two notions of objectivity that should be noted, and they are basically antonyms. On the one hand, something objective is “[exists] as an object of thought,” while on the other hand, it is something “external to or independent of the mind.” The two definitions are related, but one can see the lack of equivalence between the two options.

In its definition for “subjective,” the OED clearly notes the scholastic background to this terminology and the shift that occurred between meaning (1) and meaning (2) listed above.\(^{255}\)

Whereas contemporary parlance would have one speak of “subjective” matters being “mental” and “objective” ones being mind-independent, the older view is subtler. Something that exists according to \textit{esse subjectivum} may does “in the mind”—as an accident exists in the subject / substance in which it inheres. That is, a “concept” that is described as existing in \textit{esse subjectivum} is the mind-independent quality inhering as an accident in the knowing person in real existence.\(^{256}\) It is a predicament of the category of quality and perfects the knower


\(^{256}\) It is important to note at this juncture that the very language of “mind-dependence” and “mind-independence” has its limitations here as well. After a manner of speaking, following the terminology being used in this dissertation, a quality in an intellect is “mind-independent”—a strange sounding description. The point is that it falls into the category of quality and is, hence, a “real” kind of being. However, when we begin to talk about “real” and “rational / ratiocinate / logical / etc.” relations, the pairing of “real” and “ratiocinate / etc.” will likewise cause its
ontologically. The “subject” is precisely the intellect or substance in which the given concept exists. Such subjective existence is also exercised by any other mind-independent reality, such as substances, real quantities and so forth. Thus, to be “subjective” in this sense is far from being “unreal” or “non-physical.” Indeed, it means precisely to be physical in the broad sense of actually existing as an ontological entity, whether in the soul of a brute animal or in the immaterial soul of a human being.

In contrast to esse subjectivum, to exist according to esse obiectivum implies that something exists as an object of a power of the soul. Most commonly, this is applied to the case of the intellect’s objects. Here, one could consider, for example, a tree. Broadly speaking, the tree itself has an existence according to esse subjectivum in itself. More properly speaking, insofar as it is known, its form has existence according to esse subjectivum in the intellect of the knower. However, when we say that the tree itself is related to the knowing intellect, it also has existence according to esse obiectivum. This answers the question, “What kind of existence does the tree have in the intellect?” In order for the essence of a tree to be known, the knower must be really qualified by a concept that exists in esse subjectivum. That explains the relation of the knower to the known thing. Inasmuch as it exists in as an object of cognition (i.e. exists according to esse obiectivum), it is able to accrue second intentional predicates. It is only as an object (in this sense) that one says, “Tree is the subject of a proposition,” or “Tree is universal.”

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257 Granted, exactly what counts as being independently existing will differ depending on the thinker’s positions regarding extramental categorial being.

258 On the use of “physical” to describe either spiritual or material substances, see the clear remarks in Deely, *Four Ages*, 382 and 475n110.
The details of this division will be discussed in the next chapter, which will present the proximate historical developments needed for understanding the *De secundis intentionibus*.\(^{259}\)

In the texts of Aquinas, this distinction between subjective and objective being is not expressly stated. Thus, the ontological status of the *intentiones* discussed in the passage cited above from the commentary on *On Interpretation* remains vague. What is not clear is the proximate foundation of the second intention—whether it is the concept that inheres subjectively in the intellect or whether it is the essence of the known thing insofar as it exists objectively in the intellect.\(^{260}\)

These same ambiguities can be found in the proemium to Aquinas’s only other commentary on the works of the *Organon*, namely, his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*. This text opens by comparing art and reason in human life, noting that unlike other animals, human beings act by means of arts, which are “nothing other . . . than a given ordering of reason by which means human acts arrive at a due end by means of determined means.”\(^{261}\) He further distinguishes this notion of the arts, which thus far applies indifferently to the liberal and mechanical arts. Thus, he continues, noting that such rational control need not be only that exercised by reason over the lower powers of the soul (as would be the case with the external acts of the mechanical arts). Reason can also direct its own acts in an orderly manner with ease.

\(^{259}\) Likewise, it should not be thought that this is the only way of solving such questions. For instance, the status of second intentions might be handled by means of discussion of supposition. For instance, see Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, 1.63-77 (p.193-238).

\(^{260}\) Recalling a text discussed earlier, he remarks at one point in his career that the intellect is the proximate foundation of such intentions. See note 185 above.

\(^{261}\) Aquinas, *In I Post. An.*, Proem. (Leon.1*/2.3:9-11): “Nichil enim aliud ars esse videtur, quam certa ordinatio rationis quomodo per determinata media ad debitum finem actus humani perueniant.”
and without error. He refers to the art of directing reason as being logic, which he also refers to using the aforementioned term *rationalis scientia*.\(^{262}\)

However, the remarks that follow this classification of logic retain the ambiguities discussed above. All arts are concerned with how to act in accord with reason. Logic, Aquinas states, uniquely concerns itself with the act of reason itself (*ipse actum rationis*) as its proper matter (*sicut circa propriam materiam*).\(^{263}\) He continues by dividing logic according to the acts of reason in a way similar to that discussed above. In this text, he considers at length an analogy between the acts of nature and those of reason inasmuch as some natural acts have absolute necessity, some qualified necessity (succeeding on the whole, though occasionally failing), and others defective agency. By means of this analogy, he further specifies the books of the *Organon* (including the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*) in a detailed manner not found in the *On Interpretation*, specifically accounting for the *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations* as well as the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.\(^{264}\)

Once again, following the explicit remarks of a text like this, it is not wholly clear what Aquinas means about the “act of reason.” In this text, he does refer to logic as being a “rational science,” but the dictum could well mean that logic is concerned in some way with “real” being insofar as it is concerned with the very acts of reason itself as to the proper matter of the science. Likewise, it is not completely clear whether logic is a speculative or a practical science based on

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\(^{262}\) See ibid (Leon.1*/2.3:12-25): “Ratio autem non solum dirigere potest inferiorem partium actus, set etiam actus sui directius est. Hoc enim est proprium intellectiue partis, ut in seipsam reflectatur: nam intellectus intelligit seipsum et similiter ratio de suo actu ratiocinari potest. Si igitur ex hoc, quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur, adinuenta est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quedam necessaria est, quae sit directius ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et hec ars est logica, idest rationalis scienza.”

\(^{263}\) See ibid., (Leon.1*/2.3:25-29): “Que non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod est omnibus artibus commune); set etiam ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam.”

\(^{264}\) See ibid (Leon.1*/2.4:32-7:120). See also the text by Deborah Black cited in note 10 above.
These two proemia have given the general outline of the logical disciplines, clearly linking them to the operations of the intellect. However, what is not certain is the ontological status of these operations as considered by the logician.

Thus far, however, only the various branches of logic have been considered in their interrelations. Some additional light can be shed on this matter when one turns to Aquinas’s commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This commentary was written in approximately 1271-1272, so it dates from the same period as the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*. At the opening of this commentary, Aquinas presents a division of the sciences that one does not find elsewhere. Unlike the aforementioned commentaries, this set of remarks contrasts logic *as a whole* to the other branches of human thought.

In the *Ethics* commentary, Aquinas notes the maxim from the *Metaphysics* stating that the office of ordering belongs to the wise man, for wisdom is above all about knowing the order of one thing to another. Such order may either be that of the parts to each other in a group, as the parts of a house are organized among themselves. However, order may also be that of things to an end, as when an army’s internal organization is derivative of the soldier’s ordination to the commander’s direction. This latter type of order is said to be more important.

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265 For an extensive searching of texts in an attempt to argue that logic is reductively speculative for Aquinas, see Schmidt, *Domain of Logic*, 24-31.

266 See Torrell, 227. Strictly speaking, this commentary is of the *sententia* genre, as opposed to the *expositio* style of the other two commentaries discussed above. See R.-A. Gauthier, “Le cours sur l’Ethica noua d’un maîtres ès arts de Paris (1235-1240),” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 43 (1975): 76-77.


268 See Aquinas, *In I Ethic*. lect.1 (Leon.47/1.3: 1-7): “Sicut Philosophus dicit in principio Metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem; nam, etsi vires sensitiva cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis.”

269 See ibid. (Leon.47/1.3:7-44): “Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus: unus quidem partium aliusius totius seu aliusius multitudinis ad invicem, sicut partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in
He then proceeds to show how reason is ordered to various ends so that a fourfold schema may be outlined. First, reason may consider natural things in which is found an order that reason does not make. Second, reason may consider the order reason makes in its own acts. This order is found in its concepts as well as in the words that signify these concepts vocally. Third, there is the order made by reason in operations of the will. Finally, there is the order made by reason in external things of which it is the cause, such as in the making of houses or boxes in which to store things.  

This fourfold division represents the major division among the sciences. The first division is said to be that of natural philosophy, in which is included mathematics and metaphysics. This first division pertains to the speculative sciences according to the standard Peripatetic account. Moral philosophy is said to be concerned with the order found in acts of the will (the third class above). The mechanical arts are concerned with the order created by reason in external things (the fourth class above). Interestingly, Aquinas explains that the order found in the acts of reason pertains to rational philosophy, which considers the order of the parts of spoken words (lit. *partium orationis*) to each other as well as the order of principles to the conclusions of arguments (lit. *ordinem principiorum in conclusiones*).  

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270 See ibid. (Leon.47/1.4:15-17): “Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu puta cum ordinat conceptus suos ad invicem et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae; tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationis voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus quorum ipsa est causa, sicut arca et domo.”

271 See ibid. (Leon.47/1.4:28-31): “Nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit, ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam.”

272 See ibid. (Leon.47/1.4:32-35): “Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum in conclusionibus.”
This “rational order” is not equivalent to that which is found in things prior to reason’s intervention. Perhaps, “natural order” could include all of the “subjective” aspects of knowledge including the ontology of knowledge (i.e. the treatment of entitative being as involved with human knowers), while “rational order” would pertain only to aspects of reality that depend upon reason objectively (in the sense discussed above). It would pertain to the order created by reason in its own process of reasoning. This order would be nothing “natural” in the sense of being found directly in mind-independent being. However, the passage is ambiguous by itself. Without the appropriate clarifications, it could well be an order that is particular to a given kind of real being, namely, the concepts of the intellect as well as the exterior signs used to express reasoning. In this case, it would be difficult to see how to distinguish the ontology of knowledge from the treatments strictly pertinent to logic. Clearly, Aquinas means to express a different type of formal object, for logic is concerned with a kind of order that is found not only in the acts of knowing but also in words themselves.\(^{273}\) Thus, it is an order that is shared by reasoning as well

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\(^{273}\) Interestingly, this brief remark brings his position closer to the earlier notion of logic as a \textit{scientia sermocinalis}. This is not Aquinas’s customary manner of speaking of logic and logical entities.
as external discourse. This would favor the conclusion that the order in question is only the very mind-dependent ordering shared by both thoughts and words.

It is helpful to reflect further on the ambiguities in play, particularly in their meaning for the major divisions of the sciences. Note, however, that it is one thing to notice these ambiguities, while it is, of course, another matter altogether to assert that Aquinas thought that logic was a science bearing on real entities. The aforementioned study by Schmidt is enough in itself to question such a simplistic interpretation. Likewise, the remarks in the Ethics commentary caution against such a conclusion. However, the last text is far from adequate in providing a complete view of the nature of the entities investigated in the rational sciences and, hence, in logic.

Concerns about these potential ambiguities are not without merit and contemporary accounts of Aquinas’s doctrines could lead the unwary reader into confusions concerning these matters. For example, in his Boethius and Aquinas, McInerny states boldly, “Logic bears on each of these mental operations,”274 then goes on to summarize the remarks noted above in the proemium to the Posterior Analytics. Later, after summarizing portions of the De ente et essentia pertaining to the relation of universals to mind-independent entities,275 McInerny makes a claim that uses the distinction of first and second intentions:

But parlor game idealism would in effect conflate what Thomas calls first and second intentions and make any claim about reality the witting or unwitting projection outside the mind of the mental. Thomas sees Platonism as such a conflation but one that sees the logical as a further description of the way things are, rather than the way things are as a projection of the logical into the real order.276

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274 See McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, 54.
275 See ibid., 82-92. Though not considered in detail here, the De ente shows explicit dependence upon Avicennian notions, among which the doctrine of the threefold consideration of essence plays an important role. In particular, see De ente, cap.3 (Leon.43.374:1-375:155).
276 Ibid., 92.
This assertion is problematic on at least two counts. First, it overstates the case regarding Aquinas’s use of the terms “first and second intentions,” making it seem that these terms are part of his standard vocabulary. In addition, as noted above, Aquinas’s remarks about logic’s relation to the operations of the intellect are not always clear about the relationship between mind-independent and mind-dependent being.

This same kind of ambiguity is present in other places in McInerny’s text. For instance, he states bluntly:

But as soon as we see the difference between what is categorized and category, we see a way out of the confusion [regarding the status of the text of the Categories]. The former is real, the latter is a feature of our thinking. Logic always presupposes the real, for it is known reality that is ordered, affirmed, denied, inferred, and the like. To see the real through the lens of such mental ordering is characteristic of logic in the classical sense.\(^277\)

The exact distinctions between the real and the mental are far from clarified by such remarks, even if they are implied therein.

Earlier in the same text, there is a remark made by McInerny regarding Boethius’s views concerning the relationship of logic and philosophy: “His solution is ingenious enough, but the problem would not even arise for one who proposes logic, ethics and physics as the nets in which to catch the truths of philosophy.”\(^278\) Here, the reader has the feeling that McInerny believes the classic debates between the Peripatetics and the Stoics on this question were nothing more than a case of a fly being trapped in a pre-Wittgensteinian (or pre-McInernian) bottle. However, the text itself does not clearly explicate the distinctions between the real and the mind-dependent orders of being even though this distinction is clearly presupposed for McInerny’s remarks.

A much less egregious, though equally telling, case can be taken from recent remarks made by Robert Sokolowski in his *Phenomenology of the Human Person*. Near the end of this

\(^{277}\) Ibid., 81-82.

\(^{278}\) See ibid., 7-8.
text, Sokolowski takes up a brief discussion of Aquinas to assay what he believes are promising
as well as troublesome aspects of his epistemology. In a section entitled, “Three Acts of the
Intelect,” Sokolowski makes a number of observations that are quite perceptive regarding
Aquinas’s treatment of the interior (mental) word (*verbum*).²⁷⁹

One passage from the *Prima secundae* draws Sokolowski’s attention in particular. In the
first question of Treatise on Law (*ST* I-II q.90 a.1), Aquinas asks whether law is something
pertaining to reason.²⁸⁰ In the second objection to this question, the objector states that if law
were something of reason, it would be either the intellect as a power (*potentia rationis*), a virtue
of the intellect, or an act. However, it is not the intellect itself. Nor is it habit of the intellect,
which would pertain to the speculative virtues of wisdom, science, understanding, art, or
prudence. Finally, the natural law is not an act of reason, for such a law would cease to exist
when one is not actually thinking, as when one is asleep. Thus, he concludes that the natural law
cannot be something pertaining to reason.²⁸¹

In response to this, Aquinas makes a comparison to external action, such as that of
building. We can consider in such activity the very act of the builder as well as the product that
he builds, for example a house. He then makes a comparison with the acts of reason. On the one
hand, one could consider the very act of reasoning, namely understanding and ratiocination (lit.
*intelligere et ratiocinari*). On the other hand, there are those things that are constituted (lit.

²⁷⁹ For a recent work on this topic, one to which Sokolowski himself is indebted, see Yves Floucat,

²⁸⁰ See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II q.90 a.1 (Leon.7.149): “Utrum lex sit aliiquid rationis.”

²⁸¹ See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II q.90 a.1 obj. 2 (Leon.7.149): “Praeterea, in ratione non est nisi
potentia, habitus et actus. Sed lex non est ipsa potentia rationis. Similiter etiam non est aliquis habitus rationis, quia
habitux rationis sunt virtutes intellectuales, de quibus supra dictum est. Nec etiam est actus rationis, quia cessante
rationis actu, lex cessaret, puta in dormientibus. Ergo lex non est aliiquid rationis.”
For each of the intellect’s acts, there is such a product, namely a definition, an enunciation, or a syllogism / argumentation. Aquinas continues by remarking that since there is a practical syllogism in the works of practical reasoning, there must be something akin to (presumably first) propositions of speculative reason. These can be held habitually when not being actually considered and these can hold the place of law in the case of practical reason. The implied reference in this passage appears to be to the habitual knowledge Aquinas holds to be known through synderesis, but that is not the direct concern of this dissertation.

Instead, the important thing to note for understanding Sokolowski’s interpretation is the remark made regarding the acts of reason. In this passage, it is not at all clear what is the ontological status of the acts and products in question. If read most literally, both the acts and the products are ontological realities inhering in the intellect as accidents. This raises the

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283 See Aquinas, ST I-II q.90 a.1 ad 2 (Leon.7.149) : “Ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huissmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secundo, enunciatio; terto vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio.”

284 See ibid: “Et quia ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo in operabilibus, ut supra habitum est, secundum quod Philosophus docet in VII Ethic.; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huius modi propositiones universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter consideratur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenetur.”


286 Clarity on this point is quite important. Since further discussion of the problem will not occur until the next chapter, a brief aside should serve to elaborate the problem at greater length without deterring from the narrative above. The primary issue here is not the well-worn issue of the ontological status of immanent action—whether it pertains to the category of action or to that of quality. See the sources in Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 226-228.

Instead, the primary problem is with the very reality or non-reality of the products of these operations. Here, however, we must be careful to note that “non-reality” means primarily “non-predicamental.” The relation of the intellect to the thing known is real and hence predicamental. The relation from the thing known to the knowing power is not real and hence not, strictly speaking, predicamental. To call this non-being does not mean that it is absolute nothingness. Instead, this non-real relation of the thing to the intellect is precisely what opens up the possibility of the order of “non-real” sciences.
question, however, of whether or not such things as an enunciation or a syllogism should be primarily thought of in terms of a psychological entity. Sokolowski reads Aquinas in this manner, speaking of there being a threefold classification of mental word corresponding to these three acts. He even cites a discussion in Schmidt’s text, which does verify such a psychological interpretation of these passages. However, later in the text, Schmidt goes to lengths to show how the definition, proposition, and syllogism are all second intentional, mind-dependent “beings”, constituted as various mind-dependent relations accruing to known things insofar as they are “in the intellect.” Thus, in the two uses of “intention” there is a latent equivocation that potentially masks a distinction between “real” predicamental qualities and mind-dependent relations established by the activity of reasoning.

1.4.2.4 Aquinas, the Metaphysics, and “Being as the True and False”

The last texts that are helpful for understanding the status quaestionis for Aquinas are those found in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It is above all in these texts that one senses that Aquinas’s conception of ens rationis clearly demarcates logic as a science of secondary, mind-dependent realities. It is important to recall that in the first set of texts

As we will see in the chapters that follow, this point is pivotal for Hervaeus’s treatise. The ordering of concepts into (e.g.) a syllogism is something that follows on this non-real relation of the thing to the intellect. This relation presupposes that the intellect has been informed by the intelligible species and is actually knowing a given quiddity of a thing. However, the syllogism itself is the ordering of relations between things as known. It is another issue whether or not this knowing also must produce qualitative changes that are found to perfect the intellect as an entititative being in the real, mind-independent order. Hence, for this reason, the distinction between objective and subjective existence will be key as will be seen in the next chapter’s discussion of Duns Scotus. The details of that distinction will be left to that chapter.

Aspects of this understanding of the problem are not absent from Aquinas, as our remarks regarding Schmidt’s work will show. However, the reconstruction offered by Schmidt requires an extremely varied gathering of texts from Aquinas in order to justify the positions that Schmidt advocates there.

288 See Schimdt, Domain of Logic, 175-301.
considered in this section,\textsuperscript{289} it was quite clear that Aquinas thought of logical intentions as being mind-dependent notions, even though they are remotely founded on reality. In the commentary on the \textit{Metaphysics}, he provides a number of salient points regarding the object of logical science and its relation to the other “real” sciences in the Aristotelian division of the sciences.

Before beginning his treatment of the aporiae found in \textit{Metaphysics} B, Aquinas offers three explanations for Aristotle’s procedure, namely of listing all of the unsolved problems at once without solving each one in course. Aquinas’s first explanation is that the universality of the science being investigated requires a universal study of truth and the problems pertaining to the truth. Thus, they must be laid forth together and not each in particular, as is Aristotle’s manner in other texts.\textsuperscript{290} However, as a second option, Aquinas states that this expositional order may have been followed because of Aristotle’s own scientific approach to the material being considered in the \textit{Metaphysics}. Given his methodology of passing from the sensible to the nonsensible, Aristotle wished to avoid the pitfalls of other philosophers who were the source of such \textit{aporiae}. The problems generated by previous philosophers could be arranged together. However, given that Aristotle would solve these problems according to his own manner of exposition, his method would require him to approach the aporiae in due course throughout the text of the \textit{Metaphysics}.\textsuperscript{291} Offering a final interpretive possibility, Aquinas cites Averroes, who

\textsuperscript{289} See pages 75ff above.

\textsuperscript{290} See Aquinas, \textit{In III Meta.}, lect.1, n.343 (Marietti, p.97): “Cuius ratio est, quia aliae scientiae considerant particulariter de veritate: unde et particulariter ad eas pertinet circa singulas veritates dubitare: sed ista scientia sicut habet universalem considerationem de veritate, ita etiam ad eam pertinet universalis dubitatio de veritate; et ideo non particulariter, sed simul universalem dubitationem prosequitur.”

\textsuperscript{291} See ibid., n.344 (Marietti, p.97) : “Potest etiam et alia esse ratio; quia dubitabilia, quae tangit, sunt principaliter illa, de quibus philosophi aliter opinati sunt. Non autem eodem ordine ipse procedit ad inquisitionem veritatis, sicut et alii philosophi. Ipse enim incipit a sensibilibus et manifestis, et procedit ad separata, ut patet infra in septimo. Alii vero intelligibilia et abstracta voluerunt sensibilibus applicare. Unde, quia non erat eodem ordine determinaturus, quo ordine processerunt alii philosophi, ex quorum opinionibus dubitationes sequuntur; ideo praeelegit primo ponere dubitationes omnes seorsum, et postea suo ordine dubitationes determinare.” This kind of remark is evidence of Aquinas’s presupposition that the \textit{Metaphysics} is a single and complete whole. See remarks and texts cited in note 15 above.
remarks in his Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* that this manner of proceeding is due to the relationship between the science being treated here and that of logic.\(^\text{292}\)

Aquinas explicitly links Averroes’s remark to the passage in book Γ where Aristotle compares and contrasts sophists, dialecticians, and philosophers. As was the case for Kilwardby, this same passage from the *Metaphysics* affords Aquinas an opportunity to remark on the nature of logical science. In commenting on the difference between the dialectician and the philosopher, Aquinas remarks that the philosopher proceeds demonstratively regarding matters that are treated only in a probable manner by the dialectician.\(^\text{293}\) To explain this difference, Aquinas remarks that being is twofold (lit. *ens est duplex*), divided into *ens rationis* and *ens naturae*. In distinction from *entia naturae*, *entia rationis* are those intentions (or notions [lit. *de illis intentionibus*]) that reason devises (lit. *adinvenit*) in things. Such intentions are only found in the things following upon the consideration of reason and include things as genera, species, and so forth. Properly speaking, Aquinas continues, the subject of logic is *ens rationis*.\(^\text{294}\)

While continuing his exposition concerning these remarks, Aquinas focuses on the fact that *entia rationis* are equal in extension to *entia naturae*. Thus, it is possible for the dialectician and the metaphysician to cover the same extension of beings, though they do not do so in the same manner. Clearly in what follows, he is speaking of the dialectician *strictly speaking* as one

\(^{292}\) See ibid., n.345 (Marietti, p.97): “Tertiam assignat Averroes dicens hoc esse propter affinitatem huius scientiae ad logicam, quae tangitur infra in quarto. Et ideo dialecticam disputationem posuit quasi partes principales huius scientiae.”

\(^{293}\) See Aquinas, *In IV Meta.*, lect. 4, n.574 (Marietti, p.160): “Philosophus quidem a dialectico secundum potestatem. Nam maioris virtutis est consideratio philosophi quam consideratio dialectici. Philosophus enim de praedictis communibus procedit demonstrative. Et ideo eius est habere scientiam de praedictis, et est cognoscitivus eorum per certitudinem. Nam certa cognitione sive scientia est effectus demonstrationis. Dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilitibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quandomdiam opinionem.”

\(^{294}\) See ibid.: “Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et simillium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.”
who uses common logical intentions to discourse concerning being. Thus, dialectics does not extend to the whole of logic but only to that which is proper to the *Topics*, which searches by means of non-proper principles for the proper principles of the distinct demonstrative sciences.\(^\text{295}\)

Aquinas continues by making several further, important distinctions that are quite important for clarifying the aforementioned remarks concerning the nature of the various branches of logic. As discussed above, it is especially evident in the proemium to the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* that he makes space for the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations* as separate parts of logic. Insofar as these texts respectively are concerned with sophistical and dialectical argumentation, they would seem to be subjective parts of logical science taken most broadly, that is, as a general science of *entia rationis*.\(^\text{296}\)

As was attested earlier in the *De ortu scientiarum*, this manner of viewing the logical disciplines was current decades before the time of Aquinas. Later authors would pose straightforward questions such as, “Is sophistics a science?” However, in Aquinas’s commentary, the remarks are summary at best. Still, they are revelatory concerning aspects of his thought.

Aquinas states that although he has said that philosophy is scientific knowledge and that the sophist and the dialectician do not have such knowledge, it should not be concluded that

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\(^\text{295}\) See ibid. (Marietti, p.160-161): “Philosophus igitur ex principiis ipsius procedit ad probandum ea quae sunt consideranda circa huiusmodi communia accidentia entis. Dialecticus autem procedit ad ea consideranda ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere.” Cf. Aquinas, *In Post. An.*, Proem. (Leon.1*/2.6:88-106): “Secundo aucte rationis processui deservit alia pars logice, quae dicitur inuentiua. Nam inuentio non semper est cum certitudine. Unde de his, quae inventa sunt, iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur. Sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus quidam attenditur, quia quanto uirtus nature est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo effectu, ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur.—Per huiusmodi enim processum, quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scienza, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex quibus proceditur: quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et ad hoc ordinatur topica siue dialectica. Nam sillogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus est, de quo agit Aristoteles in libro Topicorum.”

sophistry and dialectics cannot be sciences in their own rights.\textsuperscript{297} He notes that these disciplines can be considered from two viewpoints. On the one hand, they can be considered as a theory to be taught (lit. \textit{secundum quod est docens}). On the other hand, they can be considered as something to be used in particular sciences (lit. \textit{secundum quod est utens}).\textsuperscript{298}

It is important to be quite clear about the meanings of \textit{logica utens} and \textit{logica docens} as Aquinas is using the terms here. John Rowan’s translation of the passage in question is indicative of how easily this discussion can become occluded by the choice of words. He translates \textit{docens} to mean, roughly, “from the viewpoint of theory” and \textit{utens}, roughly, “from the viewpoint of practice.”\textsuperscript{299} In a manner of speaking, this distinction is about theory and practice. However, the terms could make it seem as though Aquinas is speaking of logic as being both a theoretical and a practical discipline. However, this is not the aim of this passage. Schmidt’s use of “pure” and “applied” logic\textsuperscript{300} is perhaps a bit better. Nevertheless, a close reading of the text is necessary in order to see exactly what Aquinas means in using these terms here. As will be seen, this use of \textit{utens} and \textit{docens} differs from the presentation found in the \textit{De Trinitate} in important ways.

\textsuperscript{297} See Aquinas \textit{In IV Meta.} lect.4, n.576 (Marietti, p.161): “Licet autem dicatur, quod philosophia est scientia, non autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc removetur quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae.”

\textsuperscript{298} On this division of logic, helpful historical remarks can be found in Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, “From Natural Thinking to Scientific Reasoning: Concepts of \textit{Logica naturalis} and \textit{Logica artificialis} in Late-Medieval and Early-Modern Thought,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 52(2010): 91-93, 106n84, 107n88, 107n91. As Hoenen’s work shows, however, the use of the terms is not equivalent diachronically. They bear various relationships to conceptions of artificial and natural logic as well. However, the terms became standard parts of scholastic parlance. As his work shows, the terminology was influential down through the texts that would have influenced thinkers like Immanuel Kant. The divisions would be taken up quite explicitly again by C.S. Peirce. See Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, ”Cultivating Habits of Reason: Peirce and the \textit{Logica Utens} versus \textit{Logica Docens} Distinction,” \textit{History of Philosophy Quarterly} 22, no.4 (Oct., 2005): 357-372.


\textsuperscript{300} See Schmidt, \textit{Domain of Logic}, 36-37.
The division revolves around whether or not the intentions themselves are considered by a given science. A given branch of logical study qualifies to be called *logica docens* inasmuch as it studies the various intentions involved (lit. *habet considerationem de istis intentionibus*), whether in sophistical or in dialectical reasoning. *Logica docens* studies these intentions in a scientific manner and does so demonstratively. By stating this, Aquinas means quite explicitly that such bodies of knowledge are sciences in the true sense of the word, for *demonstrative* here means that the science fulfills the necessities of the *Posterior Analytics* for being a demonstrative science.

In contrast to this, *logica utens* pertains to the way that a given logical science may be used in other disciplines.\(^{301}\) Here, salient differences are noted between dialectical, sophistical, *and* demonstrative reasoning. In the case of dialectical reasoning as *logica utens*, the intentions discussed in *logica docens* are applied to particular sciences in order to reach probable conclusions. Thus, as Aquinas notes both earlier and later in this chapter, both the dialectician and the philosopher study contraries, but only the philosopher has scientific knowledge about them, reducing them to unity and being.\(^{302}\) Thus, insofar as dialectics (as *logica utens*) can only lead to probable conclusions, it falls short of being scientific (lit. *recedit a modo scientiae*).\(^{303}\)

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\(^{301}\) It would seem that this holds for all disciplines, whether speculative or practical, according to Aquinas. The examples are presented by him in contrast to the clearly demonstrative cases of the speculative sciences. However, Aquinas does place rhetoric among the particular branches of logic, leading one to believe it possible that there can be a similar distinction between *logica docens* and *logica utens* even in the case of rhetorical arguments. The issue concerning the application of rhetorical rules to moral matters will be handled by Hervaeus in a different way, for Hervaeus holds that rhetoric is concerned with the application of dialectical syllogisms to moral matters. He does not give it the same status in the logical corpus as does Aquinas. See note 59 in chapter four below.

\(^{302}\) See Aquinas, *In IV Meta.* lect.4 n.570-571, 574, 578-585 (Marietti, p.160-162).

\(^{303}\) See ibid., lect.4, n.576 (Marietti, p.161): “Licet autem dicatur, quod philosophia est scientia, non autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc removetur quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae. Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de istis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis probabiliter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. Utens vero est secundum quod modo adinvento utitur ad concluendum aliquid probabiliter in singulis scientiis; et sic recedit a modo scientiae.”
He basically states the same point with regard to sophistical reasoning. However, he does remark that as *logica utens*, sophistical reasoning fails in presenting a manner of true argumentation (lit. *deficit a processu verae argumentationis*). Thus, one can have a true, scientific knowledge of dialectical and sophistical reasoning, that is, as *logica docens*. However, insofar as they are applied to other forms of knowledge, that is, as *logica utens*, they are not equal. Dialectics at least procures probable knowledge, while sophistry acquires only the semblance of truth.

The case of demonstrative logic (i.e. that of the *Posterior Analytics*) is different. In this case, there is only *logica docens*. Whereas the dialectician applies logical principles to real beings, the demonstrative sciences proceed from first principles that are taken from things themselves. Thus, truly demonstrative sciences proceed to their conclusions in light of these principles, not using logical intentions as principles (*non utendo intentionibus logicis*) for investigation as is the case in dialectics as *logica utens*.

Every translation is an interpretation, so it is important to note a slightly different interpretation that could be made of this passage. The passage states that the use of demonstrative logic consists in using the principles of things *de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis*. The subordinate clause, “*quae ad scientias . . . ,*” is key to understanding what is (and is not) asserted in this passage. This could be understood as meaning, “[in using the principles of things] from which is made the demonstration which pertains to sciences of mind-independent being, not by using logical intentions [as principles].” However, another translation is found in Rowan’s rendering, and it

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304 See ibid.: “Et similiter dicendum est de sophistica; quia prout est docens tradit per necessarias et demonstrativas rationes modum arguendi appaerenter. Secundum vero quod est utens, deficit a processu verae argumentationis.”

305 See ibid., n.577 (Marietti, p.161): “Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis.”
asserts something quite different: “[in using the principles of things], from which proceeds
demonstration (which properly belongs to the sciences that deal with real beings), and not in
using the conceptions of logic.”

The focus in this passage has been on the contrast between using the principles of
dialectic to treat mind-independent reality as opposed to using the proper principles of that
reality. Demonstrative logic is said to be solely logica docens precisely because it does not exist
as a kind of logica utens that applies its own principles to other realities being studied
demonstratively. Note again what Aquinas states:

However, although it is said that philosophy is a science while dialectics and sophistry
are not, this assertion does not withdraw the possibility that dialectics and sophistry are
sciences. In fact, dialectics can be considered in as much as it is docens . . . [According
to such a consideration of dialectics as logica docens], it has consideration of the these
intentions, establishing the manner by which one can proceed by means of them in the
particular sciences to conclusions that are given with probable force [ad conclusiones . . .
probabiliter ostendendas]; and it makes this sort of consideration [i.e. as logica
docens] in a demonstrative manner, and according to this [way of speaking, i.e. as
logica docens] it is a science (bold emphasis added).

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the status of logic in Peripatetic science is far
from clear. Doubt as to the demonstrative status of logic would remain throughout later
Renaissance commentators on Aristotle. However, in this passage, it seems quite clear that
Aquinas allows for a wide array of logical sciences, each of which is demonstrative in character.
Indeed, dialectics, sophistry (sophistics), and demonstrative logic all seem to be sciences with

307 Aquinas, In IV Meta. lect.4, n.576 (Marietti, p.161): “Licet autem dicatur, quod philosophia est scientia,
on autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc remotetur quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae.
Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod
est docens, habet considerationem de istis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad
conclusiones in singulis scientis probabiliter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia.”
308 See Owens, The Doctrine of Being, 129n95.
their own first principles, thus able to proceed demonstratively concerning their own proper subjects of inquiry.

The interpretation extended by Rowan’s translation is not warranted and obscures the meaning that Aquinas wishes to express. Aquinas is merely stating that the principles of demonstrative logic cannot be applied to mind-independent reality precisely because demonstrative science must have principles that are taken from the reality being investigated. However, dialectics can apply logical principles to reality because it is a science eliciting only opinion and probable conclusions. This does not mean that demonstration “properly belongs to the sciences that deal with real beings.” Were this assertion pressed to the extreme, it would mean that logic is scientific in an improper sense. This would gravely impair the claims that could be made regarding the rational explication of the nature of predication, opposition, syllogisms, and so forth. However, in fairness to Rowan, it must be admitted that these texts in Aquinas are far from detailed.

Thus, the conclusions that can be reached based on this section could be summarized in three main points. First, logic is a science concerned with entia rationis, which are intentions that reason devises in things. Such intentions are not real intentions. That is, they are not mind-independent. Second, all of the logical disciplines, even sophistry, can be considered demonstratively inasmuch as the intentions are considered in themselves as opposed to in their use with regard to knowledge of real beings. Third, demonstrative science never functions as logica utens, for it does not apply logical intentions to reality but instead uses the proper principles of the reality being investigated. However, dialectics can use logical intentions to
discourse on real matters, though only to arrive at probable opinions, whereas sophistry falls short of any kind of sound reasoning in use.\textsuperscript{309}

There are several additional passages in the commentary that will help to explain further Aquinas’s position as expressed in this text. The first of such comments is found in a brief remark concerning Book $\Gamma$. In this passage, he is discussing the claim that first philosophy should defend the principles of other sciences. The discussion ultimately hinges on the relation of such principles to the principle being discussed in \textit{Metaphysics $\Gamma$}. Aquinas here defines the principle in terms that are akin to later scholasticism’s notion of the “principle of non-contradiction” and the “law of the excluded middle”: “Affirmation and negation are not simultaneously true, and there is no middle between these two.”\textsuperscript{310} These are said to be the most proper principles of first philosophy since they follow upon the notion of being (lit. \textit{sequentur rationem entis}).\textsuperscript{311}

Here, however, Aquinas makes a move that is very important regarding the distinction between logic and first philosophy. The aforementioned principle, as studied in first philosophy, \textit{must not} be understood as a logical principle stating that two propositions cannot be true and false at the same time. Strictly speaking, truth and falsity are in the mind (lit. \textit{sunt in mente}). He notes that this will be discussed in Book $\varepsilon$, namely in the treatment of being as the true and the false.\textsuperscript{312} The true and the false are not the \textit{first} constituents of this principle as it is used in first

\textsuperscript{309} However, recall that according to Aquinas, both dialects and sophistics can be independent logical sciences, studying the rules of dialectical reasoning and the general “rules” of fallacious reasoning. See note 297 above.

\textsuperscript{310} See Aquinas, \textit{In IV Meta.}, lect. 17. n.736 (Marietti, p.736): “Affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera, et quod nihil est medium inter ea.”

\textsuperscript{311} See ibid.: “Illa autem sunt propriissima huius scientiae, cum sequantur rationem entis, quod est huius philosophiae primum subiectum.”

\textsuperscript{312} See ibid.: “Verum autem et falsum pertinent proprie ad considerationem logici; consequuntur enim ens in ratione de quo considerat logicus: nam verum et falsum sunt in mente, ut in sexto huius habetur.”
philosophy. Insofar as the principle speaks of the true and the false, this must be further resolved into matters of being and non-being: “From error concerning being and non-being there follows error concerning the true and the false, for it is by being and non-being that the true and the false are defined . . . For the true is when being is said to be or when non being is said not to be. The false, however, holds conversely.”

Being and non-being pertain primarily to first philosophy and upon these do the principles of truth and falsity depend. Thus, while Aquinas’ formulation of the principle is not detailed in the text, his further remarks make clear that it is not a logical principle. Insofar as the principle of non-contradiction pertains to being and non-being (and the impossibility of both holding of the same thing at the same time in the same respect), the principle is a principle of first philosophy. However, insofar as it is a matter of truth, falsity, and the exclusion of a middle between these two, the principles pertain to logic, for as he says here: “Properly speaking, the true and the false pertain to the consideration of logic, for the true and the false are in the mind, as will be discussed in Book 6 (E).” 314 The reference here is precisely to Aristotle’s elimination of “being as the true and false” from the subject of first philosophy.

In Book Δ, Aquinas clearly sees this same division of being in relation to ens rationis. After commenting on Aristotle’s remarks regarding accidental being, he notes the three other members of Aristotle’s division. These are all modes of being considered per se. 315 When he comes to being as it is true and false, Aquinas remarks that this is a unique manner of being (lit.


314 See note 312 above.

315 See In V Meta., lect.9, n.889 (Marietti, p.238): “Deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguat modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit.”
modum entis), namely, inasmuch as it is in the mind. In his treatment of this division of being, he focuses on the dependence of truth and falsity upon being and non-being.

In these discussions, Aquinas also notes that such entia rationis are not real (in the mind-independent sense) and therefore must have their relation to reality clearly explained. Here, one expects him to discuss how all entia rationis are related to reality. However, he notes that while it is truthful to say, “A man is blind,” it is not acceptable to say that blindness exists like the predicaments in mind-independent being. Being is predicated of negations and privations insofar as they exist in the mind being understood after the manner of positive, mind-independent being. There is nothing positively existing in reality that directly pertains to these entia rationis. Likewise, truth and falsity in knowledge is accidental to mind-independent being.

Now, this section does not discuss a number of issues in detail. For instance, Aquinas does not consider the kind of relations that are specific to logical intentions such as genera, species, propositions, and syllogistic consequences. Instead, he focuses on two very obvious entia rationis, namely, negations and privations. In these two cases, it is quite obvious that a kind of non-being (e.g. blindness or nothingness) is understood as though it were a positive being. Although in other texts Aquinas states that logical relations are not real relations, he does

316 See ibid.: “Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente.
317 See ibid., n.895 (Marietti, p.239).
318 See ibid., n.896 (Marietti, p.239): “Sed, quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationem et huiusmodi.”
319 See ibid.: “Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid de ipsa vere affirmetur intellectu vel voce. Nam res non refertur ad scientiam, sed e converso.”
320 However, based upon other internal evidence to the Metaphysics commentary that will be discussed more below, Aquinas holds that the entia rationis of logic pertain to “being as the true.” This fact is confirmed as being his manner of reading this division when one considers a remark made in De Potentia, q.7 a.9 (Marietti, p.207-208): “Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit. Secundum ergo hanc positionem sequetur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam, sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et secundum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta ut patet V Metaph.”
not adequately discuss here the details of such *entia rationis*. Furthermore, he does not discuss at length how such beings can function as the subject of propositions, as when we state, “Blindness is a lack of sight.” One would expect an explanation of this manner of predicking. However, such a discussion is not given in detail. As will be made clear in the following chapters, such questions are only answerable if one is quite clear about the kind of intentional or objective existence that things have in the mind *as known*.\(^\text{321}\)

Such details are not external to concerns regarding the scientific status of logic. If demonstrative logical sciences are possible—at least in the sense of *logica docens* discussed above regarding dialectics, sophistry, and deductive logic—it is necessary to explain the way that truth and falsity occur in these kinds of sciences. Conformity with the principles of mind-independent reality may well give sufficient grounding for speculative demonstrative sciences. However, if the realities being investigated are mind-dependent, it is more difficult to understand just what kind of conformity justifies the demonstrative truth claims of such sciences. The passage discussed from Aquinas’s comments on Book \(\Delta\) provides only the scantiest outlines of a discussion of these matters.

This same problem is quite evident in the related remarks in Book \(\text{E}\) concerning “being as the true and false.” In this later book, Aquinas makes remarks that are not surprising at first glance. Once again, he says that truth and falsity exist only in the mind because they arise from the combination and separation that occurs in the intellect (lit. *est tantum in intellectu, non in rebus*).\(^\text{322}\) He states that this is most obvious in the case of self-predication when someone says

\(^{321}\) This is not to say that Aquinas’s position here explicated cannot make room for these later qualifications. It does mean, however, that this passage is quite brisk and cannot provide a full schema for matters pertaining to such being *in mente*.

\(^{322}\) See Aquinas *In VI Meta.*, n.1241 (Marietti, p.311): “Sed illa compositio vel divisio, qua intellectus coniungit vel dividit sua concepta, est tantum in intellectu, non in rebus.”
something like, “Man is man.” Here, one thing is considered twice—once as subject and again as predicate. Clearly, the truth or falsity of this judgment depends upon the fact that one thing is conceived twice and then predicated one of the other. Hence, “man is,” is true only insofar as “man” is conceived and thus able to be predicated of itself—as in the full expression, “Man is man.”

However, this very passage does little to clarify the way that truth and falsity might be accounted for with regard to logical notions. That is, it does not add to earlier remarks regarding the remote foundation of logical intentions on reality. The treatment of truth and falsity in commenting on the *Metaphysics* does not provide details regarding the way that the truth of logical sciences is determined. Of course, this was not Aristotle’s focus in the *Metaphysics*, so it is unsurprising that Aquinas does not consider it thematically.

It is tempting to dismiss this problem by saying that Aquinas is not concerned with the problem of the nature of logic here. However, he makes remarks that show that quite the contrary is the case. In this same lesson in the *Metaphysics*, he makes two telling remarks. Near the end of the text, he explains Aristotle’s dismissal of “being as the true and false” from first philosophy by restating the Stagirite’s assertion that truth and falsity are kinds of affection of the mind (or of thought). Because of this relation to thought, it pertains to the science concerning the intellect (lit. *pertinet ad scientiam de intellectu*).\(^{323}\)

To understand this assertion, it is helpful to recall a brief statement that Aquinas makes earlier in this same lesson. Unsurprisingly, he bases himself on the dictum that truth and falsity depend upon the intellect’s combination and division. Thus, simple apprehension of concepts are not said to be true or false. Likewise, spoken words (lit. *voces*) are said to be true and false.

\(^{323}\) See ibid., n.1242 (Marietti, p.311): “Illius vero, scilicet entis veri, causa est aliqua passio mentis, idest operatio intellectus componentis et dividendis. Et ideo pertinet ad scientiam de intellectu.”
only insofar as they signify the mind’s combination and division.\textsuperscript{324} None of these remarks are surprising, given the texts in question and Aquinas’s general approach to them.

However, Aquinas does close by making explicit Aristotle’s brief remark, “While with regard to simple things and essences falsity and truth do not exist even in thought. We must consider later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense.”\textsuperscript{325} Aquinas states that this will be taken up in Θ.10, where knowledge of simples is considered.\textsuperscript{326} However, it must not be forgotten that being as the true and false have been excluded from the proper inquiries of the \textit{Metaphysics}. Therefore, Aquinas adds that these matters are also considered in the \textit{De Anima} and in Aristotle’s treatises on logic (lit. \textit{in logicalibus}).\textsuperscript{327} He continues by saying, “For all logic seems to be concerned with being and non being said in this way [namely, as true and false].”\textsuperscript{328}

\textbf{1.5 Concluding Remarks}

In the Aristotelian corpus, it is not at all clear how one should place logic in the schema of sciences that Aristotle regularly provides. Even when the speculative sciences are situated with respect to moral and technical forms of knowledge, the place of logic among these disciplines is far from certain. Although the \textit{Posterior Analytics} provides the tools for understanding the nature of demonstration, one still wonders whether the very teachings

\textsuperscript{324} See ibid., n.1223 (Marietti, p.309): “Hoc autem ens, quod dicitur quasi verum, et non ens, quod dicitur quasi falsum, consistit circa compositionem et divisionem. Voces enim incomplexae neque verum neque falsum significant; sed voces complexae, per affirmationem aut negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent.”

\textsuperscript{325} Aristotle, \textit{Meta.} E.4, 1027b26-29.

\textsuperscript{326} See Aquinas, \textit{In VI Meta.}, n.1233 (Marietti, p.310-311): “Et ulterius concludit, quod quaecumque oportet speculari circa ens et non ens sic dictum, scilicet prout ens significat verum, et non ens falsum, posterius perscrutandum est, scilicet in fine noni.”

\textsuperscript{327} See ibid. (Marietti, p.311): “Et etiam in libro de anima, et in logicalibus.”

\textsuperscript{328} See ibid: “Tota enim logica videtur esse de ente et non ente sic dicto.”
presented in the *Posterior Analytics* are themselves believed to be demonstrative in character.

The question is not directly raised by Aristotle, so it would be ill-advised to foist upon his works an answer that does not reflect his direct concerns. However, the briefly treated domain of “being as the true and the false” does provide just the sort of ambiguous space in which later thinkers could place logical science among the other Aristotelian disciplines. This particular domain of being is problematic within the Aristotelian ontology. In a twofold sense, “being as the true and the false” is derivative. On the one hand, truth and falsity presuppose the apprehending mind that can combine and separate things that are known. On the other hand, truth and falsity presuppose the mind-independent reality upon which truth and falsity depend. “Being as the true and the false” has a kind of two-faced nature, but does it have a unique mode of reality specific to itself?

Medieval attempts to situate logic would not immediately and clearly do so in terms of “being as the true and the false.” The earlier notion of logic as a sermocinal science would naturally direct the attention of thinkers to the world of expressed discourse. For this reason, it is unsurprising to find Robert Kilwardby refusing to make logic a science of mental beings. Indeed, even the beings that make reasoning possible, the *rationes entium*, are ontological realities that are, then, abstracted for consideration. According to this view, logic is somehow grounded directly in the ontology of mind-independent reality. Still, after one grants this “realistic” bias to Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum*, it is possible to find him making statements explicitly linking reasoning and speech to the diminished domain of being that is “being as the true and the false.” This diminished ontological realm seems to be the realm in which logical entities are situated. The problem is not worked through in detail in Kilwardby, so once again, it is necessary to avoid attributing too much clarity to his treatment.
With the increasing influence of the Avicennian dictum that logic is concerned with second intentions, the manner of posing the question became altered. A full history of this was not provided above, for that would require several monographs to complete in full. However, the most important point for this dissertation is to note the impetus arises from stating that logic studies a given class of “things” (namely, intentiones intellectae secundo). Such a manner of speaking readily creates a frame of mind encouraging questions like: “What kind of ‘things’ are these intentions?”, “What is their reality?”, and “How can one study their natures and properties?”

The opinions expressed by Aquinas in his commentary on the Metaphysics explicate a particularly vigorous stand emphasizing the mind-dependent nature of logic. The entities in question are entia rationis—“beings” that exist only because of the apprehension of reason. In so doing, it contains an inner élan that would situate logic explicitly within the hazy domain of “being as the true and the false.” However, because logic is necessarily tied to the nature of the ratiocinative human intellect, Aquinas likewise makes statements like those expressed in the commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and On Interpretation where he seems to make the acts of intellection to be subject of logic.

Granting these ambiguities in Aquinas’s corpus, it is nevertheless helpful to consider the important contrast that must be made between his treatment of entia rationis and Kilwardby’s rationes entium. The very vocabulary involved in these two conceptualizations bears witness to two importantly different outlooks regarding logic and reality. In Kilwardby, the rationes entium are abstracted from reality and compared to one another to understand the nature of logic. For Aquinas, entia rationis are related both to the mode of presence that known things have in the mind as well as the various operations of the human intellect. Kilwardby, stressing the fact that
logic has its foundation in reality, asserts that logical notions are *rationes entium*—the rational structure in beings. In Aquinas, however, logic is concerned with *entia rationis*—beings of reason which do not exist in reality even though they have a remote foundation in mind-independent reality.

The startling difference between these two conceptions must not be underrated, for the distinction is critical for understanding the position that Hervaeus takes in the *De secundis intentionibus*. It was this very issue that generated the opinion that startled John Doyle in the course of his work on Hervaeus, namely, that intentionality, when considered by the logician, is not a real relation of the knower to the known but instead is the non-real relation of the known to the knower.329 In the *De secundis intentionibus*, the *rationis* portion of *entia rationis* is quite prominent. The whole order of second intentions begins with this first non-real relation of the known thing to the intellect. This kind of non-being (i.e. this *non-real* relation) creates the domain within which one finds the entire realm of logical discourse, at least according to Hervaeus’s position. One realizes here the great wisdom expressed by Jacques Maritain: “*Now the paths of non-being*—once one has, by a kind of inverted intuition, become conscious of it and of its formidable role in reality—are as difficult as those of being.”330 This remark is just as true for understanding Hervaeus’s position concerning the foundations of logic as it is for the problem of evil that Maritain was considering in the quoted text. Indeed, as we will see in the third chapter of this dissertation, Hervaeus’s own student, Francisco da Prato, when he penned his *Tractatus de ente rationis*, keenly sensed the same issues regarding non-being as did Maritain

329 See article cited in note 45 of the introduction.

many centuries after the fourteenth century. However, before beginning our discussion of Hervaeus’s *De secundis intentionibus*, it is necessary to consider several important themes in the works of Duns Scotus. It is to these topics that the next chapter will be devoted.

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331 See Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de ente rationis* in Giralduus Odonis, *De intentionibus*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, appendix G, n.53 (p.765:17-24): “Ad quartum dico quod, licet excellens doctor magister Herveus multum subtiliaverit se ad faciendum magnum tractum de secundis intentionibus, que sunt entia rationis, non propter hoc potest argui quod entia rationis non sint nichil formaliter, quia beatus Thomas, qui fuit excellenter eo, subtiliter et diffuse tractavit de peccato originali, veniali et mortali et disputavit etiam questiones de nichilo, et tamen secundum eummet et beatum Augustinum peccatum sive malum est formaliter nichil.”
Chapter 2: Scotus as a Source for the *De secundis intentionibus*

2.1 Introduction

When considering the “textbooks” that would influence late thirteenth century pedagogy in logic, we might expect that the Aristotelian / Avicennian line of thought concerning the “metaphysics of logic” would play a greater role as the century comes to its end. However, this is not the case, at least when one considers two texts of great influence in during this period, namely the *Introductiones in Logicam* of William of Sherwood (d.c.1266-1272) and the massively influential *Summulae logicae* of Peter of Spain, whose identity and origin remain the subject of lively debate.²

Sherwood’s work remains staunchly within the tradition of the older medieval notion of logic as a *scientia sermocinalis*. In his topography of the disciplines, Sherwood divides “things” according to the source of their principles, namely whether their principles come from nature itself or the human soul. The natural sciences pertain to the first division, which reminds one of the broad division of natural sciences discussed in this dissertation’s previous chapter, namely as found in Aquinas’ Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Such sciences could well include topics like mathematics and metaphysics.³

However, the sorts of entities (lit. *res*) that have principles in the soul are themselves divided by Sherwood. On the one hand, there are operations of the soul that are used in the

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attainment of virtues. Ethics is concerned with these operations. On the other hand, there are the operations of the soul for the attainment of knowledge. These operations are studied in the *scientia sermocinalis*. Sherwood keeps the three subjects of the trivium together as defining the parts of the unitary science of discourse. Grammar is concerned with speaking well, and rhetoric is concerned with proper ornamentation for linguistic expression. Logic teaches one “to speak truthfully” (lit. *docet vere loqui*). However, logic’s concerns are primarily focused on the syllogism, as well as the propositions and terms involved in syllogistic reasoning.⁴

It is telling to note the ambiguity of this viewpoint. As a *scientia sermocinalis*, logic is differentiated in opposition to natural things. Thus, the source of logic is the human soul in its ratiocination. Hence, Sherwood expresses a view of logic that acknowledges its mind-dependence. Still, the overall problem of the “metaphysical situating” of logic is not in the fore in his text. As the *Introductiones* is primarily concerned with teaching logic (and not metaphysics), this is unsurprising and unproblematic. Still, the ambiguity is telling and should be noted, for it is precisely to discuss this ambiguous space that Hervaeus wrote his *De secundis intentionibus*.

The *Summulae logicales* of Peter of Spain would remain an influential text in logic until the close of the Middle Ages.⁵ Current scholarship places the likely dating of the text to as early as 1220 and as late as even the 1250s.⁶ The *Summulae* is within the ambit of the older approach to logic, opening by expressing its concerns vis-à-vis oral disputation. In the text, we do not find

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⁵ See Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, 9-16.

a pure rational science of second intentions. Instead, the character of the *Summulae* is that of a manual teaching the art of disputation. Sherwood’s *Introductiones* and Peter’s *Summulae* express views of logic that express little in the way of the changes that were underway in during the middle of the thirteenth century. As will be seen in this chapter, by the end of the thirteenth century, the role of *ens diminutum* hinted at in Kilwardby would be placed in a thematic context likely far beyond the imaginings of the Dominican bishop.

Of course, within the developing curriculum of the thirteenth century, there would be texts that began to break new territory. Thus, the works of Simon of Faversham provide testimony to the kinds of questions that were being raised during the second half of the century. Although many of his questions on the logical writings of Aristotle are relatively brief, they pose a number of directed inquiries regarding not only the nature of logic but likewise about particular topics in each of the texts of the Aristotelian Organon.7

Among the texts produced by Dominicans of the first quarter of the fourteenth century, there is numbered the *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis*. This work, which was once attributed to Aquinas, has in the twentieth century gone through numerous ascriptions, for some time attributed to Hervaeus Natalis, though most recently attributed to the fourteenth century Dominican Gratiadeus de Asculo.8 The text would continue to play a significant role in the

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8 See Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, 117, 160-161n409-411. Angel D’Ors, “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II): Further documents and problems,” *Vivarium*, 39, no. 2 (2001): 238. A thorough treatment of the disputes surrounding the authorship of the *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis* can be found in James J. Cannon, “The Development of Logic in the Dominican School,” PhD diss., Yale University, 1961, 1-194. This dissertation should be consulted as a source for situating the current state of research on the *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis*. It also contains a full translation of the opusculum, drawing especially upon the Georgetown University dissertation of Mary Corrigan. It should be noted that the *Summa totius* was not universally ascribed to Thomas, even in earlier centuries. See ibid., 27-50.
Dominican school of Thomism, especially that associated with Poinsot, though by the mid-20th century the text was beginning to be decried as an aberration sinning against the direction of Thomistic thought.9

For our purposes, this text will present a testimony to the new vocabulary found in the fourteenth century, especially as pertains to the role played by the distinction between subjective and objective being in establishing the ontological space into which logical science falls. This testimony will merely show how one strand of the Dominican tradition became quite influenced by a particular manner of speaking of logic, one with likely roots in Scotism. It is this same manner of approaching the questions that would be most influential on the concerns of the De secundis intentionibus.

A close reading of a single text will help to parse the developments that are visible in the Summa totius. It is taken from the first chapter of the second tractate in the text, entitled, “Concerning the various modes of predicating.”10 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the division of the ten categories and the type of predication proper to them. This involves the author of the Summa totius in a brisk discussion of topics of univocation and equivocation, as well as analogous and denominative predication. After this brief treatment of signification and predication, the author turns to discuss the real and non-real status of the predicaments. What is most interesting in this text is the manner that the author treats the division of being from Metaphysics Δ.

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10 See De totius logicae Aristotelis summa in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera Omnia, vol. 16 (Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1865), 2.1, p.64: “De diversis modis praedicandi.” In this dissertation, I will continue to use the more traditional name Summa totius logicae Aristotelis.
Directly before his citation of *Metaphysics* Δ, the author proposes that the notion of the categories as the most general genera may be taken in a twofold manner. On the one hand, a category (as *genus generalissimum*) could be understood as the universal intention pertaining to the given kind of entity. Thus, we could speak of “quantity” as one particular, most general genus—hence as a universal genus of being. On the other hand, it could be understood as the thing itself upon which such a universal category is based, namely the mind-independent thing taken in a particular mode of being. Thus, we could speak of the “quantity” of a particular thing—e.g. the book sitting to my right, containing the *Summa totius*. The former pertains to *ens rationis*, while latter pertains to *ens reale*.\(^{11}\)

To this somewhat superficial observation, the author feels the need to add a lengthier discussion concerning the point that he wishes to make. In order to do so, he explicitly turns to the division of being found in *Metaphysics* Δ. At first, the author’s remarks appear to state little that is unique. He begins by stating that the first division of being, taken in its broadest universality, is the division between *ens per se* and *ens per accidens*.\(^{12}\) Unlike Aristotle, he makes no explicit discussion about the divisions of *ens per se* into the ten categories and being as it is said according to act and potency. Instead, he divides *ens per se* into that which exists in the mind and that which exists outside of the mind. This chapter emphasizes that *ens per se* is the

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\(^{11}\) See ibid.: “Ad videndum praedicamenta, sciendum est quod praedicamentum, seu genus generalissimum, dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo pro ipsa intentione praedicamentali, seu universalitatis. Alio modo pro ipsa re, in qua talis intentio fundatur, ut dictum est: primo modo praedicamentum est ens rationis; secundo modo est ens reale.” More discussion of the contraction of *ens* to various modes of being is found in the remainder of 2.1, p.64-65. Although not exactly the same, the language of the division brings to mind remarks by Scotus concerning the nature of universals in his questions on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. As will be mentioned below in note 15, there are other potential Scotistic “resonances” in the text as well. See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, ed. R. Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1999), q.7 n.24-26.

\(^{12}\) See ibid.: “Ad majorem autem notificationem horum sciendum est quod ens in sua maxima universalitate dividitur 5 Metaph., in ens per accidens et in ens per se. In ens per accidens tot modis dividitur, quot modis aliquid praedicatur per accidens, de quibus supra dictum est.”
mode of being proper to substance. However, as is evident in the following chapter, the author accepts the fact that all ten categories have a *per se* character that can be contrasted to *per accidens* predications regarding each particular category.

It is within the division of *ens in anima* that we find the most interesting shift in terminology, one not seen in Aquinas. Here, the author is quite careful to parse the various senses that can apply to “being in the mind.” He offers a threefold division, noting that the first two divisions are, in fact, real being as well. The first such sense would be *esse in anima* effective, as the artifact is “in the mind” of the artisan before it is made. The second such sense would be *esse in anima* subjective, as one says that the habit of science, the act of intellection, or the internal word (lit. *verbum*) of knowledge is in the soul according to the manner of an accident inhering in a subject. Presumably, the author means to state that the *esse* *effective* of the creative idea is also such an accidental being in the mind of the maker. The author states that these two types of being are forms of *ens reale*, stressing the point by stating that *res* is not taken from *reor, reri* (to think) but from the adjective *ratus*, *-a, -um* (established or fixed), which he even further stresses by stating what he wishes to use as a synonym, namely *firmum*.

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13 See ibid., p.65: “Secundum autem quod a nullo priori dependet cui innitatur, significatur ut ens per se: et isti modi sunt idipsum quod substantia, differentes sola ratione animae concipientis ipsam secundum diversas habitudines: quae ratio non est fica, sed accipiitur a re, ita enim in re est: nam et substantia substrat accidentibus et nulli innititur. . . . Primi autem modi quibus contrahitur ens, sunt esse per se, et esse in alicubi. Esse autem per se est modus praedicamenti substantiae; esse vero in alicubi est modus aliorum novem praedicamentorum.”

14 See ibid., 2.2, p.65: “Sed quia dictum est quod substantia est ens per se, notandum quod per se dividitur contra per accidens: sicut dicimus quod homo est animal per se, est autem albus per accidens; et hoc modo nunc sumitur hic per se: nam quantitas et qualitas non sunt entia per accidens, sed per se, ut dictum est, quia ens per se dividitur in decem praedicamenta. Alio modo esse per se dividitur contra esse in alicubi. Secundo modo solum substantiae convenit esse per se, et iste est modus proprius ejus.”

15 I make this distinction in that I would like to leave open the possibility that one might consider the content of the idea as having an objective existence. Whether or not this is the position of the author is ambiguous. He may also have in mind the division used by Scotus in his questions on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. See the discussions below in the section entitled “2.2.5 Ens Verum and Logical Being.”

16 See ibid., 2.1, p.64: “Ad scienendum autem quid sit ens in anima nota quod tripliciter aliquid potest esse in anima. Uno modo effective, sicut dicimus, quod arca est in mente artificis antequam fiat. Alio modo subjective, sicut dicimus quod scientia est in anima, vel actus intelligendi, vel verbum, quae sunt in anima sicut accidentis in subjecto.
The third manner of understanding being in the soul is *esse in anima obiectivum*. Such *esse obiectivum* in the soul may itself be understood in a twofold manner. On the one hand, we can consider the *thing* that exists as an object of the intellect, for example (as the author states) wood. Though it is an object of intellection, the wood has its own mind-independent nature. On the other hand, inasmuch as it is considered solely according to its objective existence in the soul, it is the subject of logical intentions such as the fact that “essence of wood” can be considered in abstraction from this or that particular instance of wood.\(^{17}\) It is tempting to say that these remarks do little to add to the medieval discussions surrounding the Avicennian threefold consideration of essence, at least insofar as that discussion took into consideration that certain properties accrue to the essence of a material thing only insofar as it is was in the intellect of the knower.\(^ {18}\) However, this would be to read the texts in a deflationary manner.

Instead, the texts presented here should be read within the context of the inherited Peripatetic tradition that is trying to specify the exact mode of being applicable to things that are known. *Esse in anima* must be carefully parsed if one is to understand the ontology in question for a given entity that is known. The *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis* shows an appropriation of the fourfold division of being\(^ {19}\) that draws to the fore quite explicitly the claim that *esse in anima*

\[\ldots\] Duobus primis modis ens in anima est ens reale; et dico reale, non ut hoc nomen res dicitur a reor reris, sed ut dicitur a ratus rata rum, idest firmum.” The direct source of this distinction is not clear in the text itself, but it takes on thematic prominence in Henry of Ghent, and thus, in Scotus when the latter treats of the Divine Ideas. In Scotus, see *Ordatio* I d.36 q.unica, n.32-47 in *Opera omnia* (Città del Vaticano: Typis Vaticanis: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), n.48-52, p.290:5-292:4. On the thematic place of Henry in the discussions of *esse intelligibile*, see De Rijk, “A Study,” 79-85. Also, see Tobias Hoffmann, “Henri de gand. Idees divines et essences,” in *Sur la science divine*, ed. Jean-Christophe Bardout and Olivier Boulnois (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), 226-44.

\(^{17}\) See ibid.: “Tertio modo aliquid dicitur esse in anima objective, sicut lignum intellectum dicitur esse in anima objective. \ldots\) Tertio modo sumpto ente, scilicet ut est objective in anima, in eo possimus duo considerare: scilicet id quod est objective in intellectu, puta lignum; et istud adhuc est res: vel illud quod convenit ligno solum ut est objective in intellectu, et non convenit sibi secundum esse reale, scilicet esse abstractum ab hoc ligno et ab illo.”


\(^{19}\) Though, as noted above, the author only utilizes three of the four divisions, not mentioning act / potency.
**objective** is a unique division of being that pertains to being *per se* and does not itself pertain to the psychological state of the knower. Vis-à-vis *ens reale, ens in anima objective* is a kind of non-being. However, the non-being in question should also be considered as a mode of being distinguished from all other modes of being in the division found in *Metaphysics Δ*. *Any* category of being can exist in the soul in such an objective manner. The “content” of intentional knowledge exists as a mind-independent thing that also exists objectively. Certain essential notes pertain to it as a mind-independent reality, while other properties accrue to it inasmuch as it exists objectively. Beyond this, there can be realities such as negations, privations, and mind-dependent relations of reason that, while being founded upon mind-independent nature (albeit remotely), can themselves exist solely as known objects.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, the theme of *esse obiectivum* would play an important role in Scotistic metaphysics, logic, epistemology, and natural theology. The literature concerning Hervaeus’s treatise does not draw attention in a focused manner to this kind of Scotistic language shift that occurred regarding problems of logic in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The main interlocutors on these topics are presented as being figures like Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito. It is the contention of this dissertation that a number of themes in Scotus’ treatment of logic are just as important for understanding Hervaeus’ treatise as are these other figures.

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20 As a forward pointer to vocabulary discussed in the third chapter below, this would be to refer to what Hervaeus terms first intentions concretely considered.

21 As well as the sometimes cognate expression *esse intelligibile*, when the expression is taken in the sense seen, for instance, in Avicenna’s remarks discussed in chapter one, namely about the *esse intelligibile* that pertains to second intentions.

22 As will be seen in the following chapter, there are themes in other thinkers that are cognate to those discussed in this chapter regarding Scotus. However, it remains the contention of this dissertation that an understanding of Scotus’s position provides important insights for understanding Hervaeus’s doctrines.
Thus, for the sake of clarity regarding this dissertation’s pending interpretation of Hervaeus’s treatise, a choice has been made to minimize the discussion of Faversham and Brito in this chapter. Their particular theories concerning second intentions are important aspects of the background environment for discussing Hervaeus’s treatise. However, it has become apparent that such an approach would risk reiterating much of what has been said in De Rijk’s extensive study as well as the studies undertaken by Dijs, Pinbourg, and (to a lesser extent) Koridze. In chapter 3, it will be possible to consider the role of certain important doctrines expressed by Faversham and Brito. As will be seen at that time, Hervaeus clearly has their theories in the back of his mind as he presents certain divisions and analyses of first and second intentions.

In this chapter, however, it is more important to pay attention to the important doctrines of Scotus, which are mentioned only in a passing manner by De Rijk in his study. De Rijk’s choice is stunning, not only because of Hervaeus’ use of Scotistic themes concerning esse obiectivum but also because De Rijk’s detailed and learned monograph is meant to serve as an introduction to the De intentionibus of a fourteenth century Franciscan, Giraldus Odonis. Given

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23 The qualification regarding Koridze’s dissertation is primarily due to his focus on such figures in footnotes. Given that his dissertation presents a close reading of much of Hervaeus’s text, his work is congenial to themes discussed in this dissertation. However, he does not emphasize the structural importance of discussing the Aristotelian theme of “being as the true and the false” for understanding Hervaeus’s treatise. Though he does note Hervaeus’s doctrines of relation, he continually comes back to a perspective that is epistemological. Protesting that he is not psychologizing the concerns of the treatise, he nonetheless distracts from the the most important aspects of Hervaeus’s doctrine. As will be discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4, while one must consider important aspects of epistemology (e.g. the acts of intellection, the one-way relation of the knower to the known, etc) to understand Hervaeus’s doctrine, it is fundamentally a theory that provides a relational foundation for logic as a science of mind-dependent relations “made” by the intellect. The theme that I propose regarding the De secundis intentionibus does come to the fore a bit more clearly in Koridze’s brief article, “Wissenschaft und das intentional Gedachte bei Hervaeus Natalis,” 97-107.

24 See De Rijk, “A Study,” 158-163. De Rijk well notes the mind-dependent status of second intentions in the Subtle Doctor’s thought. However, his cursory presentation of Scotus does not draw to the fore the implications involved in the details of Scotus’s doctrines concerning esse objectivum and mind-dependent relations. In other places in the text, De Rijk discusses briefly certain aspects of Scotus’s views on the existence of the known as known, but his ambitious historical narrative seems to force De Rijk to speed quickly over the texts, working through the issues in an almost bibliographical manner instead of by means of a careful study of particular texts. See ibid., 37, 92, 137.
both that Odonis writes as a Franciscan author, as well as one who is contesting the *De secundis intentionibus* (influenced by themes that appear to be Scotistic, as I will argue), it is perplexing that De Rijk’s commendable study lacks any extended discussion of Scotus’s positions regarding the metaphysics of logic and the nature of second intentions. Indeed, in his concerted discussion of *esse obiectivum*, he discusses the issue of Divine Ideas in Henry of Ghent, only then to frame the theme of *esse obiectivum* in terms of the thought of James of Ascoli and William of Alnwick.\(^{25}\)

While these thinkers would undoubtedly play an important role in the intellectual milieu of the second and third decades of the fourteenth century, it is perplexing that De Rijk does not begin his discussion of the theme from the perspective of Scotus’s thought. As will be seen, the notion of *esse obiectivum*\(^{26}\) plays a pivotal role in Scotus’s understanding of second intentions. This same interweaving of logic notions and *esse obiectivum* will provide a central aspect of Hervaeus’s discussion in the *De secundis intentionibus*. Understanding well the complexities of the issue in Scotus helps to illuminate Hervaeus, who clearly utilizes a broadly Scotistic vocabulary, whatever might have been his uncited proximate sources.

By considering Scotus’s definition of *esse obiectivum* as being nothing other than the mind-dependent relation of the known thing to the knower inasmuch as that thing is an object of cognition, we will shed light on a very important theme for Hervaeus’s doctrine of intentionality. Indeed, on several occasions, he expresses himself in a manner quite close to Scotus’s language concerning this matter. A careful study of Scotus on this point will help us to establish an important context for understanding Hervaeus’s remarks on *esse obiectivum*, which plays a pivotal role in his treatment of first and second intentions.

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\(^{25}\) See ibid., 85ff.

\(^{26}\) Though, as will be noted below, Scotus’s exact terminology / wording is a bit varied.
While De Rijk’s choice of choosing texts from James of Ascoli and William of Alnwick is understandable, given that they too treat the issue of *esse obiectivum* in a historical context close to that of Hervaeus (and, especially, Giraldus Odonis), his account of Scotus’s understanding of second intentions should be extended by considering the issues at play in the Subtle Doctor’s ontology of second intentions and *esse obiectivum*. As we will see, the latter’s thought provides a helpful context for understanding the issues at stake in Hervaeus’s *De secundis intentionibus*.

Therefore, this chapter will present a lengthy discussion of Scotus’s thought on these two topics. I will advance a somewhat unique reading of Scotus’s dicta concerning second intentions, especially as regards the various operations of the intellect by which they are formed. Above all, however, this chapter will stress the central role played by the metaphysics of relation and *esse obiectivum* in the Subtle Doctor’s understanding of second intentions and the nature of logic among the Peripatetic sciences. By discussing these topics, this chapter will present a detailed account of Scotus’s thought on these matters so that an appropriate hermeneutical context may be established for interpreting the doctrines and import of Hervaeus’s *De secundis intentionibus*.

### 2.2 Duns Scotus—A Critical Figure in the Proximate Background

#### 2.2.1 Introduction

Although Koridze provides an excellent study of Hervaeus’ text in his dissertation, his attention to Scotus is relatively minimal, though he does note several important places in which Scotus’s thought is operative in Hervaeus’s treatise.27 Likewise, in a recent article, Scotus is

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27 See Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung,” 34, 74n253, 92-104, 256-262. In both of these sections, Koridze focuses much on the comparison of questions pertaining to matter cognitional / epistemological. He does
mentioned briefly at the beginning of the essay, but remarks late in the essay leave the reader wondering about Koridze’s minimal discussion of the Scotistic context of Hervaeus’s treatise. At the close of the article, he discusses the notion of the formal and objective concept with respect to its later thinkers like Capreolus and even Suarez. However, the Scotistic discussions of esse objectivum are absent from Koridze’s remarks. Likewise, it is quite unfortunate that he overlooks Scotus’ discussion of formal and objective truth, which speaks to the fact that Capreolus’ vocabulary is far from unique. Also, in his dissertation, Koridze discusses Hervaeus in relation to various later Dominican Thomists. This kind of presentation risks distorting Hervaeus’ explicit project in the De secundis intentionibus. Though Hervaeus’s treatise was important for thinkers like Francisco da Prato and Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, it is important to recall that the treatise is not written as a “Thomistic” work.

not overlook the fact that Hervaeus and Scotus share themes regarding the ontology of second intentions. However, he passes over this point in a summary fashion after spending much more space discussing epistemological matters. One thus is led to overlook some of the very important points that link Scotus and Hervaeus when it comes to the very question of the ontological status of second intentions (and, as will be seen below, the relational status of objective existence itself). It must be stressed that Koridze’s work is impressive in its scope, but his focus continually diverts the reader’s attention from the issue that is so central for Hervaeus’s treatise: second intentions are non-real relations, and this requires the philosopher to carefully indicate the foundational reasons for this state of affairs and what it means for the possibility of a science of the unreal.

Note also that his discussion on page 34, Koridze does mention Dominik Perler, Repräsentation bei Descartes (Franfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996), 100-112. This text excellently, though briefly, notes the relationship between the vocabulary of Scotus and Hervaeus on objective existence. Also, Perler notes this relationship (including Auriol’s relationship to Scotus as well) in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 306-317. I suspect that this awareness also explains his passing mention of Hervaeus in an article otherwise devoted to discussions among early Scotists. See Dominik Perler, “What are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists” in Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 211n17.


29 See ibid., 236-238. However, he does note Scotus in Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung,” 43.

30 See note 188 below.

31 See ibid., 270-272.

32 See notes 31 and 33 in the introduction to this dissertation.

33 This fact can be lost in the midst of Koridze’s discussion of the fate of Hervaeus’s thought among later Thomists. See Koridze, 269-278.
Koridze’s writings (especially his dissertation) have the merit of drawing attention to the fact that the *De secundis intentionibus* is primarily concerned with explicating the grounding for a philosophical view of logic. It is quite easy for this to be overlooked in the midst of the interpretation presented by De Rijk. However, the lack of integration into the history concerning *ens verum, ens deminutum*, and *esse obiectivum* unbalances Koridze’s treatment. Importantly, his treatment of Scotus is presented in a manner that is more like an afterword, when, in fact, Hervaeus’s vocabulary concerning logical being has important Scotistic resonances. Even though his approach and conclusions are unique, Hervaeus’s strategic deployment of the notion of objective being, as well as his relational account of second intentional being, should be approached with Scotus’s thought in the background.\(^{34}\) Instead of seeing Hervaeus as an exponent of some form of Thomism,\(^ {35}\) it is more helpful to observe his deployment of terminology in response to a particular problem, namely a full account of the kind of being proper to logic as a science. In order to understand his text, it is essential that one understands Scotus’s own approach to cognate issues.

Thus far in the literature concerning Hervaeus, an extended thematic treatment of possible Scotistic themes has not been undertaken.\(^ {36}\) Among the difficulties in reading the *De secundis intentionibus*, not least is the fact that Hervaeus does not cite his sources. As will be

\(^{34}\) This remark is not meant to downplay possible Thomistic sources on this issue as well, for as seen above in the previous chapter, the Angelic Doctor’s remarks on second intentions are formulated in terms of mind-dependent relations. Indeed, Schmidt’s thorough and insightful study uses such remarks as key elements in defending that this is, in fact, Aquinas’s settled position.

\(^{35}\) This comes through especially in Koridze, “Intentionale Grundelgung,” 269-278. (Though, it should be noted that he ends with an interesting remark while considering quite briskly the relation of Suarez’s thought to that of Hervaeus: “Dabei steht schon jetzt fest, dass er die ausschließlich objektiv Seienden im Verstand lehrt. Was bei Suarez bereits verschwunden ist, ist das Verständnis der Intentionalität als einer Relation vom Gedachten zum Denkenden.” However, such very important points regarding the connection between mind-dependent relations and the *res intellecta* are lost in the midst of Koridze’s overall remarks, which tend do focus on topics pertaining, ultimately, to the metaphysics of knowledge.)

\(^{36}\) However, as will be seen at the close to this chapter, there have been important studies and remarks on Scotistic elements in Hervaeus’s writings.
seen below, on occasion, it is possible to connect his text to authors whose works are known. Still, difficulties remain in making definitive statements regarding his sources. The goals of this dissertation are not purely historical in nature. Hence, it cannot attempt to outline every thinker’s position on these matters. As stated in the introduction, it is the aim of these investigations to help situate the very question being answered by the *De secundis intentionibus*. The intellectual history being presented herein is subordinated to this hermeneutic goal. Given my contention that Scotistic thought appears to be a key element of that hermeneutical context, it will be necessary to explain the key concepts involved in that context.

These procedural remarks are quite necessary as regards the interpretation of Hervaeus’s thought vis-à-vis that of Scotus. Scotus’s time in Paris (1301/2-6) temporally overlaps Hervaeus’s time as a student (1303-7) and a master (1307-9/10).\(^{37}\) If one were limited to this point of contact, the most obvious candidate for influence during this period would be Scotus’s Parisian lectures. However, given the dating of the *De secundis intentionibus*, it is arguable that one need not presume that the Parisian lectures alone would be operative in the intellectual milieu in which Hervaeus composed his treatise. Whether one follows De Rijk in dating the text at ca. 1313\(^ {38}\) or Doyle at 1316,\(^ {39}\) the work dates from a period when Hervaeus was already the French provincial of the Order of Preachers. This not only removes Hervaeus from the Parisian scene but also provides more time for him to have been exposed to disputes regarding the thought of the Subtle Doctor. Among the Subtle Doctor’s own followers on the European continent, there were extensive discussions of topics concerning *esse intelligibile* that would

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\(^{37}\) For Hervaeus’s chronology, see the discussions in the introduction to this dissertation. For that of Scotus, see Antonie Vos, “Duns Scotus at Paris,” in *Duns Scot à Paris 1302-2002*, ed. Olivier Boulnois et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 3-19.

\(^{38}\) See De Rijk, “A Study,” 252.

\(^{39}\) DSIDoyle, 14-15. The latest date would seem to be early 1317 at the very latest, for a manuscript of Auriol’s *Sentences* commentary from May of that year refers to Hervaeus’ work. See DSIDijs, 81.
engage pertinent texts from the *Ordinatio*.\(^\text{40}\) While such evidence is circumstantial, it supports the possibility that Hervaeus was in touch with Scotistic thought that drew on various parts of the Subtle Doctor’s corpus.

As concerns the details of Scotus’s views regarding the nature of logic, the most comprehensive and unified remarks are found early in his career in his *Quaestiones* on logical works such as the *Isagoge, Categories, On Interpretation,* and *Sophisticical Refutations.* Especially in the *Isagoge* questions, Scotus provides the outlines of his opinions on logic that likely date to early in his career.\(^\text{41}\) While these views lack the subtlety that one might expect of the Subtle Doctor, there are important outlines of his views that are not treated in such a unified manner later in the corpus.

Therefore, for the sake of expositional clarity, this chapter will begin with these earliest logical commentaries. These help to frame the overall conceptual landscape for understanding Scotus’ general placement of logic within the framework of the Peripatetic sciences. As will be seen, it is clear that for Scotus the domain of logic pertains to second intentional being, though logic itself *is not,* strictly speaking, a science of second intentions. Instead, it is a science of the syllogism and things related thereto.

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\(^{40}\) See Petri Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili,* ed. Garrett R. Smith (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015), lxxxi-lxxxv. Likewise, see the very clear parsing of these issues in Dominik Perler, “What are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists,” 203-226. Perler’s text takes as its point of departure these texts on the Divine Ideas. This is understandable, given the direction taken by early Scotists as well. However, as will be discussed below, I am following a textual path similar to that taken by Giorgio Pini, relying primarily on the strictly philosophical texts that help to shed light on matters most pertinent for Scotus’s understanding of second intentions. Also, as noted above, extensive (though quite sweeping) history is given for medieval, late-medieval, modern, and late-19th century authors concerning objective existence in Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache,* 79-328.

\(^{41}\) On the dating of the questions on the *Isagoge,* see Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge,* xxxi. Also, see the more general claims regarding his logical commentaries, made in the same introduction in the midst of remarks concerning the *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta,* ibid., xxxvii-xxxviii. As we will see, the primary commentaries for our concerns will be the logical commentaries and the commentaries on the *Metaphysics.* The *De anima* questions will not directly engage our concerns at length.
As regards the metaphysics of second intentional being, it will be important to draw from those places where Scotus discusses the nature of second intentions as mind-dependent relations. Drawing on several studies, especially the recent work of Giorgio Pini, it will be argued that the doctrine presented by Scotus is inchoate at best. However, with careful attention to remarks found in Scotus’ treatment of *ens verum* (i.e. being as the true and the false) in the third question concerning Book E of the *Metaphysics*, I also will argue that his general theory of second intentions as mind-dependent relations can be related to the overall narrative discussed in the previous chapter. In the questions on the *Metaphysics*, Scotus implicitly employs the notion of objective being to help explain the way that second intentions are related to mind-independent being. Though not a complete exposition of the nature of logic, it will be seen that his remarks in question three concerning the sixth book of the *Metaphysics* help to understand the interpretive milieu for the doctrine of intentionality expounded by Hervaeus in his treatise.

### 2.2.2 Scotus’ Logical Works and the Subject of Logic

Scotus’ first question concerning the *Isagoge* is concerned with proving whether or not logic can be a science at all. In his solution, he concludes that it is indeed a science. He states that logic has all that is necessary for demonstration, namely a subject of which proper accidents can be demonstrated by means of defined middle terms. However, he quickly makes a distinction that is already familiar from our earlier discussion of Aquinas’ own use of the notions of *logica docens* and *logica utens*. Scotus states that logic is understood as a *scientia* when it is *logica docens* and thus demonstrates necessary conclusions. He makes another point, which is similar to that made by Aquinas in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. When logic is

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42 *In Porph.*, q.1 n.4, p.4:10-12, “Sunt etiam in logica omnia requisita ad demonstrationem: ut subiectum, passio demonstrabilis de subiecto per medium, quod est definitio.”
considered as *utens*, it involves the application of common notions to the subject considered in
the science using logic.

On this last point, it is necessary to register a clarification with regard to the annotation
provided in the critical edition of Scotus’s works. This will help to confirm what is meant in this
passage. In his remarks on *logica utens*, Scotus states:

In another manner, logic can be understood, [namely] inasmuch as we use logic, by
applying it to those things [i.e. those sciences] in which it is used. According to this
manner of speaking, logic is not considered from proper principles of a science but
instead from common ones; nor is it a science [according to this manner of speaking].
This manner is obviously used by Aristotle in his writings on natural philosophy where
he uses logical reasonings that proceed from common [i.e. not proper] middle terms and
do not, properly speaking, lead to scientific knowledge.\(^{43}\)

The editors cite *Physics* 1.2 (184b25-185a4). In this section at the beginning of the *Physics* in
which Aristotle discussion of the number of principles involved in natural philosophy. It is
arguable that Scotus may also have in mind a location like Aristotle’s dialectical treatment in the
*Physics* concerning the possibility of an infinite body.\(^{44}\)

Now, based on this view, the common nature of logic would appear to be limited to its
dialectical usage in the applications of logical notions to non-logical realities in *logica utens*.
This was Aquinas’s approach discussed in the last chapter. However, in his questions on the
*Sophistical Refutations*, Scotus clarifies how both dialectical and demonstrative reasoning can be
called common.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) Ibid., q.1 n.7, p.5:1-6: “Alio modo in quantum utimur logicá, applicando ad illa in quibus est usus, et sic
non est ex propriis sed ex communibus, nec est scientia. Sicut patet in naturalibus ubi Aristoteles ponit rationes
logicas quae procedunt ex medio communi et non faciunt scire proprie loquendo.”

\(^{44}\) See Aristotle, *Physics* 3.5 (204a8-206a8). Cf. Aquinas *In III Phys.* lect.8 n.349 (Leon.2.125): “Dicuntur
autem primae rationes logicae, non quia ex terminis logiciis logice procedant, sed quia modo logico procedunt,
scilicet ex communibus et probabilibus, quod est proprium syllogismi dialectici.”

\(^{45}\) See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis*, ed. R. Andrews et al. (St.
logica quantum ad doctrinam sit ex communibus, diversus tamen est usus doctrinae quae traditur in dialectica et in
demonstratione.”
In the first of these questions, Scotus contrasts dialectical and demonstrative use of logic by noting that dialectical reasoning argues in a given science from common principles to “proper” conclusions, that is to conclusions that are appropriate to the given science, while demonstration argues from proper principles to proper conclusions. Thus, one might argue that love and hatred are received in the same subject, not arguing strictly from the properties of love and hatred but instead from the logical premise that contraries come about in one and the same subject. In this dialectical usage, logic might be called a “common science.” Demonstrative logic is common in its own manner, namely in that it pertains to the nature of the syllogism, which is commonly used in all sciences. However, in particular sciences, demonstrative argumentation is applied by means of proper middle terms.

In the second question concerning the Isagoge, a single objection is raised to the assertion that logic is a common science. It is argued that the commonality of a given science can only extend as far as the commonality of the subject of that science. However, given that logic has a subject distinct from every other science, it would seem to be distinct and most definitely not common. To this, Scotus responds that “common” can be understood in two ways. Something could be common by being predictable of the subjects of every other science. However, logic is not common in this manner. Instead, it is common insofar “as its subject falls into the use [lit. cait in usum] of the other sciences.”

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46 See ibid., n.7, p.272:23-28: “Nam dialectica est ex communibus, et in singulis scientiis ad proprias conclusiones ex communibus arguit. Nam ostendit quod amor et odium sunt in eodem susceptibili, non sumens proprietatem amoris vel odii sed hoc medium quod ‘contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem.’ Unde ex communibus non arguit ad communia, sed ex communibus arguit ad proprias conclusiones.”

47 See ibid., n.8, p.272:29-273:2: “Illa autem pars logicae, quae demonstrativa est, etsi doctrina traditur ex communibus, ut puta de syllogismo, tamen in speciali arguit per proprium medium.”

The second question on the *Isagoge* is structurally intriguing for two reasons. First of all, it is brief. The problem is considered at greater length in the first question on the *Sophistical Refutations*, discussed above. Second, the question presupposes the answer to a question that has not been asked, namely, “What is the proper subject of logic?” It is only in the third question on the *Isagoge* that Scotus answers that the syllogism is the subject of logic.

However, before turning to that third question, it is helpful to note several important remarks made in the second *Isagoge* question as well as further remarks in the first question on the *Sophistical Refutations*. These further remarks will help to clarify the reason for logic’s twofold character, at once common and particular. In the second *Isagoge* question, Scotus misattributes Avicenna’s dictum concerning second intentions, citing Boethius as the source of the doctrine stating that logic is concerned with second intentions that are applied to first intentions. The language is close to that of Avicenna, and the editors of the text note this fact in their annotation. Scotus relies on the authority of this dictum in order to introduce his claim that logic can indeed be considered common. He states that since second intentions are applied to all first intentions, logic must be common in some manner.

In the first question on the *Sophistical Refutations*, Scotus considers the doctrinal understanding of logic in addition to its use in other sciences. His general aim in this regard is to differentiate logic and metaphysics, for both sciences are common in their own ways. As regards the nature of metaphysics, his Aristotelian / Avicennian language sounds quite akin to Aquinas, stating that the subject of first philosophy is being insofar as it is being (lit. *ens in quantum est ens*). However, Scotus’ explicit focus in this passage is upon the *quiddity* of beings. First modo non est communis logica nisi forte per accidens, si subiectum eius sit applicabile omnibus. Secundo modo est communis.”

49 See ibid., q.2 n.2, p.9:8: “Logica est de secundis intentionibus applicatis primis.”

50 See ibid: “Sed illae [scilicet, intentiones intellectae secundo] sunt applicabiles omnibus primis.”
philosophy considers all being insofar as it is concerned with the quiddity of things (lit. *considerat rem secundum suam quiditatem*). Indeed, it is because of this concentration on the quiddity of things that first philosophy is able to prove things of its own subject as well as of any other subject.\(^{51}\) Rather than focus on the specific details made by Scotus at this early point in his career concerning the nature of first philosophy, it is necessary only to note the primary rationale provided for distinguishing this kind of scientific universality from the case of logic’s commonality vis-à-vis the other sciences.

Unsurprisingly, the crux of the division is explained by the fact that logic considers notions that are mind-dependent. In this text, Scotus clearly distinguishes *ens naturae* from *ens rationis*, noting that *ens naturae* is the domain of beings such that their existence does not depend upon the soul. In contrast, *ens rationis* is spoken of with regard to “certain notions [lit. *intentionibus*] that reason devises [lit. *adinvenit*] in things themselves, among which are included genus, species, definition, and other things of this sort.”\(^ {52}\) These notions are equal in scope with mind-independent being (lit. *ens naturae*), not insofar as *ens naturae* falls under the scope of *ens rationis* but instead insofar as mind-dependent beings are able to be founded on mind-independent beings. Logic is common insofar as it is concerned with such mind-dependent notions that are applicable to all things.\(^ {53}\)


\(^{52}\) Ibid., n.5, p.272:10-12: “Sed ens rationis dicitur de quibusdam intentionibus quas adinvenit ratio in ipsis rebus, cuiusmodi sunt genus, species, definitio et huiusmodi.”

\(^{53}\) See ibid., p.272:11-19: “Ens autem dictum isto secundo modo aequalitatur secundum communitatem enti dicto priori modo. Non enim est aliquod ens naturae quin possit cadere sub ente rationis, et quin super ipsum fundari possit aliqua intentio, ut generis vel speciei vel proprii vel individui, vel saltum causae vel causati. Quia ergo logica est de huiusmodi intentionibus, quae applicables sunt omnibus rebus, ideo logica dicitur ex communibus procedere.”
At this point, Scotus provides no more precision regarding the nature of second intentions. There are important ambiguities that should be noted in this text. Other thinkers in the late 13th century, such as Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, held that all three acts of the intellect create second intentions.54 In this selection, at least, Scotus limits his discussion of second intentions to notions that appear to pertain to the first operation of the intellect, such as the notions of genus, species, and definition. As will be seen in turning to the third question on the Isagoge, it does seem in these texts that Scotus also wishes to retain a second-intentional status for logical entities like the syllogism. However, as will be seen later in this chapter, Scotus’ customary manner of writing shows a greater comfort with discussing second intentions with regard to the products of the second act of the intellect than with regard to the others.

Another important ambiguity remains with regard to the foundation of second intentions. In this text from the questions on the Sophistical Refutations, Scotus’ language is actually quite close to that of Aquinas. As noted in the translation above, the Subtle Doctor goes so far as to use the Latin adinvenit, which was discussed in the previous chapter’s treatment of Aquinas’s thought. The term is difficult to translate into English precisely because of its ambiguities. The term cannot directly mean, “to find,” in the sense of invenit. However, the notion of “devising” that has been adopted for a translation, following Schmidt, is not meant to indicate, on the other hand, pure fabrication. Thus, Scotus’ text can be grouped in the same ambiguous terrain as the uses offered not only by Aquinas but also by Simon of Faversham’s use of the verb fundare to describe the way that second intentional being is related to reality.55 Below, we will consider

55 See Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii, q.1, p.17:19-25: “Quod [logica] non sit pure speculativa patet quia, ad hoc quod aliqua scientia sit pure speculativa, oportet quod in ea intendatur veritas, que est perfectio intellectus speculativi; talis autem veritas est vera rei quiditas; et ideo sciencia pure speculativa considerat quiditates rerum; sed logica non considerat tales quiditates; ideo non est pure speculativa; sed logica
considerat intenciones, quas intellectus fundat in rebus et sunt extranæ rei; ideo ab aliquibus logica dicitur philosophia extranea.”

Ibid., q.2, p.18:35-19:30: “Dicendum est quod universale potest nominare duo, scilicet intensionem universalitatis et rem subjectam intencionem. Loquendo de universali quantum ad rem (a) subjectam intentionem universalitatis, sic de universali potest esse scientia. Et ratio huius est quia scientia quaedam cognicio intellectualis est, et ideo de omni eo quod est per se intelligibile [sic] potest esse scientia vel per diffinicionem, vel per demonstracionem; nunc autem res subjecta intentione universalitatis est per se intelligibilis ab intellectu, aliter enim intellectus non fundaret in ea intentionem universalitatis; ideo etc.

Item loquendo de universali quantum ad intentionem universalitatis, sic adhuc de universali potest esse scientia. Et ratio huius est, quia intellectus est agens per cognicionem, et ideo intellectus nihil agit eorum quae sunt, nisi cognoscat ea; autem intellectus operatur intentiones secundas in ipsis rebus; propeter hoc dicit Commentator III De anima, quod intellectus agit universalitatem in rebus: oportet ergo quod intellectus cognoscat intentionem universalitatis; intellectus ergo de universali quantum ad intentionem universalitatis habet scientiam et cognitionem; huius autem intencio universalitatis est intencio generis et speciei, et sic de aliiis, de quibus intentionibus dicitur esse logica. Propter hoc enim dicitur esse rationalis scientia; unde non dicitur esse rationalis scientia quia per rationem procedat, quia sic omnis scientia esset rationalis; sed dicitur rationalis, quod est de hiis quae sunt causata ab intellectu. Cum autem intellectus causat tales intentiones, et movetur ab apparentibus in re; et propter hoc intellectus diversas intentiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas intentiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates. Unde logicus non diceret hanc esse veram, Homo est genus, sed hanc, Homo est species. Ideo tota logica accipitur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset figmentum intellectus, quod non dicimus. Ex quo sequitur quod qui logicam inventit, logicos non fuit; ex quo enim consideravit naturas rerum logicos non fuit, cum logicos, secundum quod logicus, non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intentiones solas; vel si res consideret, hoc solum est, sub intensionibus sunt. Sic igitur appareat quod de universali utroque modo potest esse scientia, et quantum ad rem subjectam intentionem, et quantum ad ipsam intentionem. De universali quantum ad intentionem est logica, quod tota est accepta ab intentionibus.”

Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones veteres super libro Elenchorum, q.2, p.32:43-54: “Sed aliquis quaereret ulterius: si sophistica est scientia, cuius <modi> scientia est? Aut realis, aut rationalis. Planum est quod non est realis, quia non est de rebus veris extra animam. Est tamen rationalis; non tamen quia per rationem procedit, quia sic omnis scientia est talis; nec quia de tali quod cadit sub ratione, quia omnis scientia sic est de ratione; sed est rationalis tamquam causatum a ratione, quia si ratio non esset, non esset syllogismus sophisticus. Et quia scientia sophisticata est applicabilis ad omnem scieniam, ideo est scientia communis. Verum est tamen quod ista scientia alio modo est communis et metaphysica, licet circa idem laborent; quia illud quod metaphysicus considerat est ens non contractum ad aliquod genus entis, sophisticata vero est de uno generi entis sicut de syllogismo sophisticato.”


Note in the selection from question two on the Isagoge how Simon’s discussion implies a kind of distinction between a metaphysical and a logical consideration of the universal. See especially the first paragraph of the selection cited above from q.2. Regarding the “foundation” of logic, I believe that one must be very careful interpreting Simon’s remarks about second intentions vis-à-vis mind-independent reality. Most accounts, while acknowledging that second intentions are not directly properties of mind-independent objects, still over-emphasize Simon’s occasional remarks about the ultimate grounding of logic in mind-independent reality. His remarks being moved ab apparentibus in re may well be quite similar to Scotus’s own early remarks about mind-independent things being the occasion for the formation of second intentions. See, with caution, Martin Pickavé, “Simon of
several texts in which Scotus does make some important clarifying remarks regarding the ontological status of such second intentional notions.

At this point, it would seem that second intentions are the subject of logic. Scotus has cited the Avicennian dictum and used it as the means of affirming the common character of logical science. However, in the third question on the Isagoge, it is obvious that Scotus holds that logic is not precisely concerned with second intentions as its primary subject. Instead, he will argue that the syllogism is the subject of logic. In the second question, he anticipates this assertion. Thus, logic is common to the sciences because all sciences reason syllogistically. Hence, they “use” the subject of logic insofar as they involve such syllogistic reasoning.

In the third question concerning the Isagoge, Scotus asks whether the subject of logic is the syllogism. After the initial objections, he notes six possible candidates for the subject of logic. The first is closest to that of Aquinas’s remarks in the commentaries on On Interpretation and the Posterior Analytics, stating that the subject of logic is the concept formed by reason, divided in a threefold manner based upon the threefold acts of the intellect. The second option provided is taken from Avicenna’s dictum, again attributed to Boethius, namely that logic “is concerned with second intentions applied to first intentions.” The third candidate for the subject of the science is being, based on the claim from Metaphysics Γ discussed in the last

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56 See Scotus, In Porph., q.3 n.7, p.12:7-13:2: “Dicitur quod subiectum logicae est conceptus formatus ab actu rationis, quia ille communis est omnibus consideratis in logica. Nam cum actus rationis sit triplex: primus indivisibilium intelligentia, secundus compositio vel divisio illorum indivisibilium, tertius discursus a noto ad ignotum: de conceptu formato a primo actu rationis est liber Praedicamentorum, qui est de incomplexo; de conceptu formato a secundo actu est liber Perihermenias, qui est de enuntiatione; de conceptu formato per tertium actum est nova logica quae est de syllogismo et eius partibus subjectivis.” Also, see Pini’s remarks regarding the ambiguities in Aquinas and Giles of Rome’s clarifications concerning these matters. Pini, Categories and Logic, 33-34.

57 Ibid., q.3 n.8, p.13:3-4: “Est de secundis intentionibus applicatis primis.”
chapter regarding the metaphysician, the dialectician, and the sophist.\textsuperscript{58} The final three options are speech (lit. \textit{oratio}), argumentation, and the syllogism.\textsuperscript{59}

Scotus will settle on the final option, though not after carefully distinguishing three conditions needed for something to be the subject of a science. Clearly, his discussion is being guided by the claims of the \textit{Posterior Analytics} regarding the nature of demonstrative science. First, before demonstration can be undertaken, it is necessary to know both \textit{that} the subject of the science exists and \textit{what} it is. The second thing required are the principles through which the properties are demonstrated of this subject. Finally, it is necessary that everything discussed in the given science be reduced to some one thing on account of which these other matters are discussed.\textsuperscript{60} In \textit{Metaphysics} I, it is substance which gives this kind of unity to the science considered by Aristotle.\textsuperscript{61} As will be seen below, Scotus holds that it is the syllogism that gives this kind of unity to logic as a science. That is, logic can be viewed as a unified discipline, and not a mere aggregate of topics discussed \textit{ad hoc}, only insofar it discusses things like definition and predication with eye to how these are pertinent for syllogistic reasoning.

Scotus will use these three conditions to explain what is lacking in the options provided as potential candidates for the subject of logic. It is easiest to understand his remarks if his own position is considered first. Then, in light of the concerns of this dissertation, it is most helpful to consider his remarks regarding the first three potential candidates. His responses to these

\textsuperscript{58} See ibid., q.3 n.9, p.13:6-8: “Tertio modo ponitur ens esse subiectum, quia per Aristotelem IV Metaphysicae, circa idem laborant metaphysicus, dialecticus et sophista; metaphysicus laborat cira ens; igitur etc..

\textsuperscript{59} See ibid., q.3 n.10-12, p.13:9-15: “Quarto modo ponitur oratio quia de ipsa et eius partibus determinatur in veteri logica . . . ; ponitur etiam in definitione syllogismi in I Priorum. Quinto modo ponitur arumentatio. . . . Sexto modo ponitur syllogismus.”

\textsuperscript{60} See ibid., q.3 n.13, p.14:3-10: “Notandum quod tres condiciones sunt requisitae subiecti in scientia, videlicet quod sit notum ‘quid est’ et ‘quia est’, nam haec duo oportet prae supponere demonstrationi, ut dicitur I Posteriorum. Secundum est quod per eius ‘quid est’ demonstrentur in scientia passiones illius subiecti de eo. Tertia est quod ad ipsum omnia alia determinata in scientia reducantur et propter ipsum considerentur. Aliter enim ab eius unitate non esset unitas scientiae.”

\textsuperscript{61} See Aristotle, \textit{Meta} Γ.2 (1003a33-1005a18).
positions not only help to give precision to his particular claims regarding the central role of the
syllogism in logical as a science but also help to draw to the fore some very important
indications regarding the status of logical science according to the Subtle Doctor.

In stating his own opinion, Scotus affirms that the syllogism has all the conditions needed
for something to be the subject of a science. He cites the opening of the *Prior Analytics* where
Aristotle discusses the subject of his enquiry, namely demonstration, as well as related topics
such as propositions, terms, and the nature of perfect and imperfect demonstration. Second, he
states that Aristotle’s treatment of the syllogism in the *Prior Analytics* explains how a number of
properties can be attributed to the syllogism concerning the moods and figures of syllogisms, the
relation of various syllogistic forms to perfect syllogisms of the first figure, and so forth. Finally, Scotus remarks that it is on account of the syllogism that one discusses incomple
expressions, enunciations, and subjective parts of the syllogism (i.e. demonstrative and
dialectical syllogisms). Likewise, the study of the nature of the syllogism involves study as
sophistical syllogistic as well. One and the same science must study both a given proper subject
as well as its privation.

In one of his responses to the principle objections, Scotus makes clear that he does not
wish to reduce logic to a kind of pure formalism that is concerned with the syllogism as treated
in the *Prior Analytics*. Instead, he proposes that logic treats of the syllogism in a manner similar

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63 See Scotus, *In Porph.*, q.3 n.20, p.17:2-7: “Et secundam, quia in eodam multas passiones de illo ostendit per illam definitionem, ut modum et figuram, in illis de inesse at modo—uthabere tres terminos—in illo capitulo ‘Quoniam igitur in his’ per hoc quod est de necessitate accidere conclusioni etc.”

64 See ibid., p.17:8-12: “Et tertiam, quia propter ipsum detminatur de partibus eius, scilicet de incomplexo et enuniciatione et integralibus partibus eius subjectivis in libro *Priorum et Posterium*; et de aliis speciebus argumentationis quia reducuntur ad ipsum ut imperfectum ad perfectum; et de syllogismo sophistico, ut de privatione eius, quia eiusdem est cognoscere habitum et privationem. Sic ergo penes eius divisionem et attributa ilii patet divisio logicae.”
to how Aristotle treats mobile being in his works on natural philosophy. In a way, it is possible
to say that the *Physics* is merely a part of the natural philosophy. When mobile being is taken in
the general manner that it is in the *Physics*, it is still necessary that a number of things be
determined regarding it. Although he does not list them explicitly, Scotus is indicating that the
full scope of mobile / changeable being is able to be understood only by undertaking studies such
as the various treatises on animals, *On the Soul, On the Heavens*, and so forth. The *Physics*
treats mobile being *as such*, hence considering the properties that accrue to mobile being
*precisely inasmuch as it is mobile* (and for no other reason). The other natural sciences treat of
various subjective parts of the general notion of mobile being.

Now, the implication is that the *Prior Analytics* has a place in logic that is analogous to
the case of the *Physics* in natural philosophy. The *Prior Analytics* treats of the *syllogism as such*.
Texts like the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* treat of more and less perfect types of
syllogistic reasoning. These represent subjective parts of the whole of logic and thus fall into the
overall consideration of the syllogistic proper to logic. The particular treatises of the Aristotelian
corpus of natural philosophy do not lose any of their natural character on account of the
particularity of the subjects that they treat. In a similar manner, the particular subjective parts of
logic do not lose their syllogistic character even though they treat of particular kinds of
syllogisms (i.e. demonstrative, dialectical, or sophistical). All other topics are treated either as
integral parts of the syllogism or at least insofar as they are related to syllogistic reasoning.
Hence, one will treat in logic of topics like those found in the *Categories* and *On
*Interpretation.*

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65 See ibid. n.24, p.19:1-14: “Ad secundum argumentum principale dico quod syllogismus quod proprietates formaliter ipsum consequentes est subiectum libri Priorum. Est autem subiectum totius logicae quod omnes passiones in se vel in suis partibus integralibus vel subjectivis vel reducibilibus ad ipsum. Nec oportet subiectum praedicari de omnibus consideratis in scientia, sed esse propter quod alia considerantur, ut patet de
While discussing how the first three of the six candidates for the subject of logic lack both the definition of a subject as well as properties to be predicated of a subject,\(^\text{66}\) Scotus makes some interesting remarks regarding the claim that being is the subject of logic (i.e. the claim based on *Metaphysics* Γ). He argues that the subject of logic must be either mind-independent being (lit. *ens reale*) or it must be mind-dependent being (lit. *ens rationis*). Scotus briskly dismisses the possibility of logic being a science of mind-independent being. However, he feels it necessary to clarify what is meant by *ens rationis* as he is using it. In one way, one could speak of *ens rationis* merely as indicating that something is considered by the intellect. This does not differentiate any of the sciences from each other, for all science depends upon the consideration of reason or the intellect, given that demonstrative knowledge is based upon universal natures considered intellectually. Instead of this meaning of *ens rationis*, he means the kind of being that is *caused* by the intellect.\(^\text{67}\)

This notion of the intellect causing the being of second intentions is quite important, as will be seen in remarks below regarding just the type of being that is thus caused, namely a mind-dependent relation. As will be seen, Scotus is clear that second intentions are mind-dependent relations among known things *insofar as they are known*. While he will express

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\(^{67}\) See ibid., p.15:1-8: “Et de tertia probatur: quia aut ens reale est subjectum hic, aut ens rationis. Si primo modo, igitur haec scientia est reales, quod falsum est. Si secundo modo, aut igitur tum tum est de ente causato a ratione. Si primo modo, sic adhuc poterit esse reales. Nam nihil est subjectum alicuius scientiae nisi consideratum ab intellectu vel ratione, quia non nisi ut est universale. Igitur, oportet dare quod sit de ente causato a ratione, quod est idem cum aliis.” Cf. Scotus *Quaestiones super praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q.1 n.18, p.253:16-18: “Unde per se [logica] debet dici scientia rationalis, non tantum quia traditur per rationem siqu quaelibet alia scientia, sed cum hoc est de conceptibus formatis ab actu rationis.” This passage includes his rejection of logic as a sermocinal science as well as a real science.
himself in a variety of manners throughout his career, it will be argued below that the general outlines of his conception of logic remain intact throughout his writings.

Before moving to this next task, several summary points will help to clarify the state of affairs discussed thus far. To take *ens rationis* in the sense of beings caused by reason requires the recognition that logical entities such as the syllogism and other matters treated in logic do not subsist in brute facticity in mind-independent reality. By itself, this claim is not all that bold. However, it requires that one recognize quite clearly that topics of logic and metaphysics pertain to two distinct scientific domains.

This fact can be seen, for example, in Scotus’s manner of handling the way that the term “universal” can take one “two faces,” depending on which vocabulary one is using—i.e. “metaphysical vocabulary” or “logical vocabulary”. There can be a “metaphysical face” that pertains to the formality of the common nature found in mind-independent reality. However, there will also be the “logical face” that pertains to the second intention by which the notion of “universal” indicates the predicability of one concept to many inferiors. Between these two orders of mind-independent and mind-dependent reality, there is a clear distinction.68 Understanding Scotus’ position concerning logic relies on noting the strong distinction between these two orders.

The clear division between the orders of mind-independent and mind-dependent being was well articulated by Daniel Dahlstrom in a 1980 article in *Vivarium*. Dahlstrom vigorously defends the distinction between the metaphysical treatment of the universal (i.e. as a common nature that may or may not have various distinct formalities) and the logical treatment of that universal (i.e. as a second intentional reality). His contention is:

By isolating a purely logical meaning for universals and by establishing the predicables as the logical types of universals solely in terms of this logical meaning, Scotus greatly insures the autonomy of logic from metaphysics, psychology, and grammar.69

While he does not deny that there is an ontological basis from whence the predicables arise, Dahlstrom does present the logical order as being largely independent from ontology:

In effect, by comprising the basic structure for predication, the predicables may be said to constitute the structure of cognition. So construed, the predicables are not ontologically neutral. Yet the content of their basic structure is sufficiently minimal to neither generate nor be derivative of an explicit theory of essences or an explicit theory of reference. Rather their irreducible structuring simply tells how much of what is can be known and known essentially or not.70

In a recent article responding to a criticism by Todd Bates, Giorgio Pini stresses the “second-order” nature of logic.71 In particular, he emphasizes the twofold consideration that might be given to a given essence, namely a “metaphysical” and a “logical” consideration. First intentions, or direct knowledge of mind-independent objects, thus have two “faces” in that they can be considered either as pertaining to their extra-mental “content” or as being the foundation for a second intention. Pini reads Bates’ criticism as a confusion of first and second intentions:

From what I can understand, he [Bates] thinks that the distinction amounts to the distinction between a generic concept such as animal (which, as a concept, is in our mind, but nonetheless represents something outside our mind) and its foundation in reality, i.e., what Bates takes to be the formality animality. So the distinction between logical and metaphysical genus for Bates amounts to the distinction between a generic concept and its correlate in reality.72

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70 Ibid., 111.


72 Pini, “How is Scotus's Logic Related to His Metaphysics?”, 286.
Pini admits that Scotus does speak of both a logical and a metaphysical consideration of terms, but he clarifies Scotus’ position well by stating,

But when Scotus speaks in this way, he is not contrasting two distinct entities (a concept in the mind and a thing in reality), as Bates maintains. He is merely distinguishing two ways of considering the same term, i.e., insofar as it signifies something outside the mind and insofar as it signifies something in our mind. It is because Bates fails to appreciate this point that he thinks that Scotus should address the question of the real foundation of generic concepts in his logical works.\(^73\)

In fine, Pini takes a very strong stance regarding Scotus’s distinction between logic and metaphysics, one that is at least as strong as that as Dahlstrom, though perhaps even stronger, given the striking emphasis in his words:

The logician does not have to take any stance about the deep metaphysical reason why a concept such as animal is predicated of more items than a concept such as human being. Granted, there must be a reason. But to ascertain what this reason is, is the concern of the metaphysician. As a consequence, Scotus does not have to commit himself to any specific metaphysical view in his logic. Of course, he does have to assume that there is an ultimate metaphysical reason why a concept such as animal has a larger extension than a concept such as human being. But, while doing logic, he does not have to concern himself with any of the available explanations. . . . Scotus does not need to posit a separate entity in the extramental reality corresponding to each separate second intention. . . . In my opinion, Bates’s criticism fails to take into account the subtle but not at all gratuitous way in which Scotus and his contemporaries distinguished between logic and metaphysics. When Bates thinks that he is talking about logic, he is actually talking about what Scotus and his contemporaries would call ‘metaphysics’.\(^74\)

The viewpoint that Pini is opposing in Bates can be found in a striking way in the work of Constantino Marmo as well. In the essay, “Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus,” Marmo stresses the close connection between propositional relationship and the relationships (and formalities) found in things. Especially evocative in this regard are his remarks that there is “a strict correspondence between relationships of terms in propositions and

\(^73\) Ibid., 286

\(^74\) Ibid., 287-288.
relationships of things in reality: between predication and composition of objects.”

Likewise, he states, “To the predication of terms corresponds the composition between formalities, which constitute the essential structure of individuals.”

Interestingly, this same view is expressed by De Rijk, who explains medieval thought as generally presupposing a “parallelism postulate”—i.e. an outlook holding that there is a “fundamental parallelism existing between the various ontic articulations of things in the outside world, on the one hand, and the different natural ways in which we understand things, on the other.” He cites approvingly remarks from Ernst Moody’s dated study of Ockham in which Moody states,

Logic is, for Ockham, an art and not a speculative science; for Duns Scotus it is speculative, and deals with a conceptual order that parallels a synthetic structure internal to things. But according to Ockham, the logician is interested in the discursive operations of the mind, not because they reveal a common structure internal to things qua adequated to the mind, but because an accurate grasp of what is constant in human modes of apprehension and of complex signification, makes possible an accurate differentiation between things apprehended or signified.

De Rijk continues, seemingly accepting Moody’s view, interpreting the latter’s remarks by stating, “In fact, Ockham, too, adheres to the parallelism postulate, but appears to simply presuppose it, unlike Scotus to whom the structure of the mind reveals the ontic structure of things.” The borders of logic and metaphysics are blurred in such statements, and as we will see in the next two sections, it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Scotus’s position on logic not to grasp the second-order nature of logic. This does not necessitate that logic has no

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76 Ibid., 180.
connection to reality, for as Scotus will say clearly, the logician must, for instance, presuppose
the ways that the three acts of the human intellect relate to reality. However, logic is a science
of mind-dependent relations in such a manner that it is not primarily concerned with the same
sorts of “realities” as is one who is concerned with mind-independent realities.

Dominique Demange cites the passages from Marmo as well as Dahlstrom’s study,
noting how differently these two thinkers approach the question of logic and metaphysics.
Indeed, he notes that the passage used from the twelfth question of the Quaestiones in librum
Porphyrii Isagoge approaches the question of the predicables in a manner common to other
thirteenth century expositors. Indeed, he says, “It is doubtful, however, that this text is able to
respond to the question of the relationship between logic (or semantics) and metaphysics.”
His further remarks are quite insightful:

First of all, one will note that Duns Scotus’s realism—a realism that can be summarized
by a celebrated formula of the Theoremata [namely, theorema 4] according to which
every degree in a given entity corresponds to a certain universal—does not imply an
adherence to a certain correspondence between the logical properties of concepts (or the
semantics of terms) and the realities which they signify.

To express the same point differently: “universal” is equivocal, depending on whether it
refers [1] to the nature of a concept insofar as it has the property of suppositing for a class
of individuals, or corresponds to a certain real nature (i.e. that which one calls a “first
intention”), and whether it refers [2] to the property which pertains to it inasmuch as the
intellect produces it, or places it in relation with other concepts (i.e. that which one calls a
“second intention”). The first sense is concerned with the question of realism, the second
does not imply it at all. It is thus that a concept of second intention (like “genus”) is a
logical universal, whose definition uniquely involves regarding that which the intellect
produces when it places in relation two concepts under the mode of “to-be-the-genus-of,”

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80 See note 121 below.
81 See Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 264-265.
82 Ibid., 264: “Il est douteux pourtant que ce texte puisse répondre à la question du rapport entre la logique,
ou la sémantique, et la métaphysique.”
83 See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Theoremata, ed. M. Dryeyer, H. Möhle, and G. Krieger (St. Bonaventure,
NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2004), prop.4 n.30 (p.600:7-8): “Cuiiibet universali correspondent in re aliquis gradus
entitatis, in qua convenient contenta sub ipso universali.”
but without any link with the question of the relationship between a particular genus and the reality which it “covers.”

This is not because Duns Scotus holds that from any reality or degree of reality it is possible for one to abstract a corresponding universal concept—a concept which one calls a first intention—that he holds that there is a correspondence between logic and metaphysics (that is to say, between first and second intentions). The question of the realism of universals and that of the relationship between logic and metaphysics are two distinct questions.

Indeed, all of the semantic of propositions—starting with the question of the signification of the copula “to be”—falls under the study of the operations of the intellect, that is to say of second intentions—and not with the study of the formal properties of realities. . . . The intellect, in its formation of a concept, certainly always goes along with a certain reality, which is for it the occasion of knowing a formal reality; logic is not therefore totally disconnected from the real. However, there is not a formal correspondence between the operation of the intellect and the structure of reality, that is to say, between logic and metaphysics (emphasis added). 84

The point that is being stressed in particular by Pini and Demange, though also by Dahlstrom, is that logic and metaphysics are situated in two distinct domains for Scotus. Texts discussed in the next section will make clear the derivative and “diminished” character of the kind of being proper to such logical entities. Even within the early logical commentaries, it is

84 See Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 265-266: “On notera tout d’abord que le réalisme de Duns Scot—réalisme que l’on peut résumer par une célèbre formule des Theoremata selon laquelle tout degré dans l’entité correspond à un certain universel—n’implique pas une adhésion à une certaine correspondance entre les propriétés logiques des concepts (ou sémantiques des termes) et les réalités qu’ils signifient. Pour le dire différemment: ‘universel’ est équivoque, selon qu’il renvoie à la nature d’un concept en tant qu’il a la propriété de supposer pour une classe d’individus, ou correspond à une certain nature réelle (ce qu’on appelle une ‘intention première’), et selon qu’il renvoie à la propriété qui lui revient en tant que l’intellect le produit, ou le met en relation avec d’autres concepts (ce qu’on appelle une ‘intention seconde’). Le premier sense intéresse la question du réalisme, le second ne l’implique en rien. C’est ainsi qu’un concept d’intention seconde, comme ‘genre’, est un universel logique, dont la définition implique uniquement de regarder ce que l’intellect produit lorsqu’il met en rapport deux concepts sous le mode d’‘être-le-genre-de’, mais sans aucun lien avec la question du rapport entre un genre particulier et la réalité qu’il recouvre. Ce n’est pas parce qu’Duns Scot soutient qu’à partir de toute réalité ou degré de réalité il est possible d’abstraire un concept universel correspondant, concept qu’on appelle d’intention première, qu’il tient pour une correspondance entre logique et métaphysique, c’est-à-dire entre intentions premières et secondes. La question du réalisme des universaux et la question du rapport entre logique et métaphysique sont deux questions distinctes. Et toute la sémantique des propositions, à commencer par la question de la signification de la copule ‘esse’, relève de l’étude des opérations de l’intellect, c’est-à-dire des intentions secondes—et non des propriétés formelles des réalités. . . . L’intellect, dans la formation d’un concept, part certes toujours d’une certaine réalité, qui est pour lui totalement déconnectée du réel; mais il n’y a pas correspondance formelle entre l’opération de l’intellect et la structure de la réalité, c’est-à-dire entre logique et métaphysique.”
possible to see the general outlook by means of which he will later situate the domain of logical entities explicitly in the domain of “being as the true and the false.”

An example of this can be seen when Scotus responds to the Avicennian\(^{85}\) claim that logic is concerned with second intentions. He makes a rather bold statement that is easily overlooked. Scotus says that logic is indeed concerned with second intentions. However, such second intentions are not the primary subject of the science. No, he states that they are “the more common [lit. communius] subject, just as we say that all science [lit. scientia] is concerned with being because no science is concerned with non-being.”\(^{86}\) This is not to say that logic is concerned with second intentions as a common subject in the manner that the syllogism was discussed above as a common subject to all logical inquiry. Instead, this remark indicates that just as ens reale provides the ontological context for each scientia realis, so too does second intentional being (as a kind of ens rationis\(^ {87}\)) provide the ontological context for each scientia rationalis considered as a branch of logical inquiry. The full implications of this position, which will play a key role in the background for Hervaeus’s treatise, will be discussed in the closing section of this chapter.

2.2.3 Scotus, Second Intentions, and Acts of the Intellect

Scotus’s positions on logic have garnered attention in recent scholarly literature. Antonie Vos,\(^{88}\) Richard Cross,\(^{89}\) and Olivier Boulnois\(^ {90}\) have all stressed what they take to be a linguistic

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\(^{85}\) Though, as noted above, it is cited as though it were a claim from Boethius.

\(^{86}\) See Scotus, In Porph., q.3 n.14, p.15:12-14: “Ad auctoritatem Boethii dico quod logica est de illis, sed illa non sunt primum subjectum, sed communius subjecto, sicut dicimus quod omnis scientia est de ente quia nulla de non-ente.”

\(^{87}\) As will be discussed below, Scotus does partly delimitate the particular kind of ens rationis that applies to logical mind-dependent relations (though his exposition is not as explicit as what will be found in Hervaeus).

\(^{88}\) See Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 151-157. Vos’s remarks on page 151 are stunning, reading Scotus as being a kind of medieval Wittgenstein: “Important parts [of the Lectura and the Ordinatio] are theological parallels to Wittgenstein’s philosophical
focus in Scotus’s conception of logic. In sundry manners, each of these recent interpreter’s accounts can make Scotus appear to have a position quite closer to that of the medieval sermocinalists than the position discussed above. Occasional remarks by the Subtle Doctor can make his position appear in this light. For instance, his commentary on *On Interpretation* appears to indicate that logic is concerned with a kind of mental language that is distinguished from external linguistic discourse. Indeed, such passages not only seem to point backward in history to the earlier tradition of sermocinalism but likewise points toward fourteenth century thinkers like William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and John Buridan for whom mental language would play a pivotal role in both logic and epistemology.

However, Scotus never explicitly changes his anti-sermocinalist position, which is very forcefully expressed in his early writing. In the first question on the *Categories*, he explicitly states, “Logic considers neither discourse [*sermonem*] nor the properties of discourse, nor does it consider its subject from the perspective of such discourse.” Using language that is akin to that of the introduction to *On Interpretation*, he remarks that one can consider three things in signification, namely the thing itself, the discourse (or voice) and the concept (or *passio*) formed by the intellect. He takes for granted that there are sciences of mind-independent things (lit. *per

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90 See Boulnois, “Être, luire et concevoir,” 133-134.

91 Claude Panaccio also sees Scotus in the historical trajectory that leads to this sort of conception of logic. See Claude Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham* (Paris: Éditions du seuil, 1999), 214-219, 238-239.

92 See note 98 below.


94 See Scotus, *Quaestiones super praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q.1 n.18, p.253:8-10: “Dico quod logica nec est scientia reals nec sermocinalis, quia nec sermonem nec passiones sermonis considerat, nec suum subjectum sub ratione sermonis.”
se de rebus). He states that grammar and rhetoric both consider the properties of vocal expressions insofar as they are vocal expressions, namely being fitting and well adorned (lit. *congruum et ornatum*). Logic is a rational science because it deals with concepts that are formed by the act of reason.  

In his questions on *On Interpretation*, he is equally forceful in his rejection of something akin to sermocinalism for his conception of logic. Explicitly referencing his first question on the *Categories*, he states that “No part of logic has vocal expression as its subject, . . . because all of the properties of the subjects in logic would equally belong to them even if there were no voice existing.” He continues by stating that the enunciation (lit. *enuntiatio*) is the subject of *On Interpretation*, making clear that he means, “‘The enunciation in the mind,’ for this is caused by the second operation of the intellect.” *On Interpretation* discusses the various properties of enunciations (such as logical opposition). If these properties happen to be vocally expressed propositions, this is true only insofar as they are signs of mental enunciations.

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95 See ibid., p.253:10-18: “Immo quod ista divisio sit insufficiens sic ostenditur: medium inter rem et sermonem vel vocem est passio; ergo sicut est aliqua scientia per se de rebus, aliqua per se de vocibus significativis, ut grammatica, rhetorica, quae considerant passiones vocis in quantum vocis, scilicet congruum et ornatum, ita potest aliqua scientia esse de conceptu per se; haec est logica. Unde per se debet dici scientia rationalis, non tantum quia traditur per rationem sicut quaelibet alia scientia, sed cum hoc est de conceptibus formatis ab actu rationis.”


97 It would be improper to call it a “judgment,” for we can create a complex enunciable without judging it to be true. It would be improper to call it the “proposition,” for propositions refer to judgments (or enunciations) used in the process of ratiocination. On Scotus’s theory of proposition, see Demange, *Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir*, 240ff. The relation of aspects of Scotus’s thought to that of Gregory of Rimini concerning this topic can be found in Murlalt, “La Doctrine Médiévale de l’es esse objectivum,” 127ff. For a summary of these points, though more directly under the influence of Poinsot, see Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic*, 2, 82-93.


99 See ibid., p.44:6-12: “Quia quae hic [scil. enuntiatio in mente] determinantur, propter ipsum determinantur, puta primo de partibus eius integralibus, ut puta de nomine et verbo; secundo de eius genere, quod est oratio; deinde quid est ipsa, et de divisione eius in suas primas species; et consequenter de eius proprietatibus,
Though Scotus speaks of “interior language,” his concept of the enuntiatio in mente is linked to the second operation of the intellect, namely insofar as it composes and divides what it knows. Most regularly in Scotus’ works, this product of the intellect’s second operation is explicitly said to be a kind of mind-dependent relation, and it is this relation that is a second intention. As Dominik Perler’s essay in the Cambridge Companion to Scotus shows quite clearly, one cannot speak of Scotus’ semantic and linguistic concerns without soon being faced with the question of second intentions and their ontological status. While Perler’s remarks on this question are quite brief, Giorgio Pini’s Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus provides a detailed articulation of the most important aspects of Scotus’ views concerning second intentions. While this dissertation will qualify some of Pini’s claims, the overall conclusions of his study are measured and clear. In particular, this clarity stands in marked contrast to one of the few other major studies on second intentions in Scotus, namely that of Stefan Świeszawski.

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opposition scilicet, habitudine, et ceteris huiusmodi. Si autem istae proprietates insint enuntiationi in voce, hoc non est per se primo, sed in quantum illa est signum enuntiationis in mente.”


Swieżawski’s reading of second intentions focuses on the role of reason’s comparison between two terms. In some ways, this aspect of the interpretation is actually quite close to that offered by Pini, which will be critiqued below. Świeszawski equates such comparing of one thing to another with the second operation of the intellect. In so doing, he explicitly chooses to set aside the discursive third act of reason as being of secondary importance. See ibid., 209: “Le raisonnement occupe, non seulment dans le problème de l’intention, mais aussi en général, parmi les différents actes de la raison, une place en quelque secondaire. Par contre les deux premier actes constituent les deux ‘opérations’ principales de notre raison.”

I contest that while the first and second acts of the intellect seem to receive the most attention, not only in Scotus but in the general tradition up to his time, it is arguable that any account (like Scotus’s) that emphasizes the role of syllogistic reasoning as central to the nature of logic must grant importance to the third operation. As will be argued below, Scotus’s account likely does not go far enough toward explaining the relationship between second intentions and the ontological status of syllogistic reasoning. However, the account makes important advances insofar as the Subtle Doctor deploys the notions of esse objectivum and mind-dependent relations in important manners vis-à-vis the question of the ontological status of second intentional being.

Interestingly, Świeszawski does make a remark that is much closer to one point defended below, namely that second intentions are implicitly formed even by the direct act of reason. However, his account of this relation is a bit odd, as it seems that he holds it to be a mind-dependent relation with the object of the simple act of
Often, discussions of second intentions have the five predicables of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in the immediate background. This background context moulds, in important ways, the framing of the question, “What is a second intention?” The second intentions that garner the most attention understandably will be terms like “universal,” “genus,” “species,” and so forth. These second-order concepts are handled as being obvious candidates for mind-dependent notions. However, this kind of focus can lead to astounding interpretive leaps, as when De Rijk skips the question in Hervaeus’s treatise concerning whether one second intention can provide the foundation for another—a question in which Hervaeus takes up the problem of second intentions pertaining to the intellect’s second and third acts (i.e. those forming complex enunciations and syllogistic consequences).102

Scotus’s own language concerning the various “types” of second intentions is itself ambiguous. Most often, the Subtle Doctor speaks of *genera* and *species* as second intentions. At times, he also includes enunciations and their properties among second intentions. However, it is apprehension (as opposed to a comparative act). This is a relation from the knower to the known—a relation that is *not* an *ens rationis*, though he seems to hold that it is such. As will be discussed below, the mind-dependent relations involved in second intentions are *in the objects themselves*, though only insofar as they exist objectively, hence presupposing the intellect’s apprehension. See ibid., 211-212: “De même que l’intention seconde résulte de l’acte rationnel comparatif, l’act simple est cette activité de notre raison qui produit les intentions premières. En effet, par l’act simple, nous connaissons tous les objets d’une manière absolue, non relative—c’est pourquoi l’intention première se définit chez Brassavola et Sarnanus comme objet soit simplement connaissable, soit actuellement connu. Par analogie avec l’intention seconde, on pourrait d’ailleurs dire que l’intention première est aussi une *relatio rationis* (donc un être de raison) en tant qu’elle implique un relation de la raison avec l’objet de son acte simple, par opposition à l’intention seconde où le rapport s’établit entre la raison et l’objet de son acte comparatif.”

His article was critiqued at some length in Christine Verhulst, “À propos des intentions premières et des intentions secondes chez Jean Duns Scot,” *Annales de l’Institut de Philosophie de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles* 7 (1975): 7-32. Verhulst’s critiques both his view on *ens rationis*, mind-dependent relations, and the ontological status of first and second intentions. While her presentation draws to the foreground the derivative and “non-real” status of second intentions as mind-dependent relations, it still does not give a full account of the metaphysics involved in such relations and the role of *esse objectivum* in Scotus’s understanding of mind-dependent relations. Although De Rijk understandably prefers her view to that of Świężawski, I agree with Pini’s remark that both studies should be read “with some caution.” See De Rijk, “A Study,” 159n74. Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 166n37.

102 See DSIDoyle, 442-454. De Rijk’s interpretive choice is understandable, given that he wished to limit himself to the passages in the *De secundis intentionibus* that are directly pertinent vis-à-vis the discussions undertaken by Giraldus Odonis, to whose *De intentionibus* is affixed De Rijk’s long study on matters pertaining to second intentions. However, this focus can occlude important themes from Hervaeus’s own treatise.
not immediately clear what Scotus thinks regarding the intellectual acts that form second intentions. I will argue that although a passage in the Lectura may lead the reader to hold that Scotus believes that second intentions are formed only by the intellect’s second act, it is more likely the case that the Subtle Doctor’s position regarding second intentions is able to accommodate an interpretation asserting that second intentions are formed by all three acts of the intellect.

As was discussed in the last chapter, I Sent. d.23 is a classic locus for disputing whether or not “person” is a name of first or second intention. Both in the Lectura and the Ordinatio, Scotus expresses himself in similar manners. A careful reading of a critical difference in these two texts can help draw to the fore an important ambiguity in the Subtle Doctor’s thought. In the Lectura, he directly states that a second intention is a particular kind of mind-dependent relation (lit. relatio rationis), namely the sort of relation that pertains to the composition and division effected by the intellect in its second operation.\footnote{See Ioannis Duns Scoti, Lectura 1 d. 23 q.unica, n.12 in Opera omnia (Città del Vaticano: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), XVII, p.306:10-12: “Intentio secunda est relatio rationis, et non quaecumque, sed relatio rationis pertinens ad actum intellectus, qui est componere et dividere.”} Thus, he concludes, “Second intentions pertain to the union or to the extremes of the union (such as the predicate or the subject).”\footnote{Ibid., p.306:12-13: “Unde intentiones secundae pertinent ad unionem vel ad extrema unionis (ut predicati et subjicii).”}

In the Ordinatio, Scotus expresses a view that is nearly identical, though with an important small change. He adds several details to his remarks and also strengthens the rhetorical force of his assertion. First, as regards the kind of mind-dependent relation that is a second intention, Scotus states that it “pertains to the extreme of the act of the intellect composing and dividing or at least [lit. saltem] [the act] of comparing one thing to another.”\footnote{See Ioannis Duns Scoti, Ordinatio 1 d.23 q.unica in Opera omnia (Città del Vaticano: Typis Vaticanis: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959), V, p.352:13-14: “Pertinens ad extremum actus intellectus componentis et dividentis vel saltem conferentis unum ad alterum.”}
In addition, he states that this should require little explanation: “This fact is obvious, for a second intention – according to everyone – is caused by the act of the intellect working upon [lit. negotiantis circa] a thing of first intention, which cannot cause anything concerning the object except for a mind-dependent relation or relations.”

Pini understandably interprets this as meaning that only the second operation of the intellect creates second intentions. For Radulphus Brito and Simon of Faversham but also in less clear manner in Aquinas and Giles of Rome, all three operations of the intellect were said to be involved in the creation of second intentions. Pini uses an example from the seventh book of the Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis to support this interpretation. In the eighteenth question of this book, Scotus remarks that “universal” can be taken as meaning the mind-dependent relation of something predicable in relation to that of which it can be predicated. For example, the expression, “Animal is universal,” means that the concept “animal” has a relation of being prediciable of many things, among which is included the notion “man.” In this case, “animal” is the subject of a relation that is founded upon the generic character of “animal” vis-à-vis “man.” This relation of universality only exists in the intellect apprehending and comparing these natures. Therefore it is a mind-dependent relation.

Now, when reading a text like this, it seems that universality is a mind-dependent relation that only arises because of a certain mode of predication. Scotus’ own language explicitly says


107 See notes 54 and 56 above.

108 See Pini, Categories and Logic, 117-120. See Scotus, In Meta. 7, q.18 n.38 and 42: “Quandoque pro intentione secunda, quae scilicet est quaedam relatio rationis in praedicabili ad illud de quo est praedicabile, et hunc respectum significat hoc nomen ‘universalis’ in concreto, sicut et ‘universalitas’ in abstracto. . . . Ista comparatio, quae est intentio secunda, non est nisi obieci ut in intellectu comparante.”
that the mind-dependent relation is *in praedicabili ad illud de quo est praedicabile.* As the *Lectura* selection particularly states, the second intention relates to the union of the extremes or to the extremes themselves. Thus, the second intention could refer *either* to the product of the second operation of the intellect (the union of the two extremes of a statement) or to the products of the first operation of the intellect (the extreme terms themselves). As Pini understandably reads the texts in question, the extreme terms are not the subject of a second intention *except* insofar as they are involved in the composition and division involved in the intellect’s second operation.

This is quite important regarding the internal coherence of Scotus’ own views regarding the nature of logic and its relationship to second intentional being. Recall from the previous section that he does not assert in the *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge* that second intentions are the *subject* of logical science. Indeed, he makes the striking assertion that second intentions are “the more common [lit. *communius*] subject, just as we say that all science [lit. *scientia*] is concerned with being because no science is concerned with non-being.”110 This remark is striking because it implies that in logical matters second intentional being plays a analogous role to that played by mind-independent being in the *scientae reales*.

It is difficult, however, to fit certain mind-dependent relations into this domain, given the aforementioned remarks on the relation of second intentions to the intellect’s second operation. At first sight, the assertion that second intentions are formed only by the intellect’s second operation does not seem to be capable of explaining how syllogisms are a kind of second intentional being. The aforementioned text from the questions on the *Isagoge* leads one to believe that they are a type of second intention. What is not clear, however, is the way that these

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109 Scotus, *In Meta.* 7, q.18 n.38. See previous note for text.

110 See note 86 above.
can be product of the second act of the intellect, at least if with follow Pini’s interpretation of the passages from the Lectura and the Ordinatio.

As regards cases like universality, generality, or even individuality, it is easy to think that such second-order notions arise because of enunciative combinations and divisions. The genus animal would thus appear to have its generic character precisely because it is involved in enunciations that express its predicability of many different species such as dog, slug, and baboon. Thus, because we can form enunciations of this type, it would seem that we form second intentions as the product of such activity of enunciative combining and dividing. This is the outlook suggested by the texts from the Lectura and the Ordinatio.

However, the nature of the syllogism does seem to arise solely from this kind of composition and division. In a manner of speaking, one could think that the human intellect “composes” the premises in order to create a conclusion. However, this manner of speaking is not that found in Scoto, nor in the general medieval Peripatetic tradition regarding the formation of syllogistic inferences. Composition and division pertain to the second operation of the intellect, which either combines or separates a pair of concepts in a single, complex enunciation. It does not pertain to syllogistic inference by means of a middle term.

I will suggest that Scoto’s full opinion is slightly more ambiguous (and subtle) than what Pini presents in his monograph. This is not to controvert fully his reading of the texts in question. Ultimately, I think that the Subtle Doctor’s position is not pellucidly clear in the texts. However, I will recommend an interpretation of the texts that allows for the possibility of second intentions arising from all three acts of the intellect.

Based especially on the text of the Lectura treatment of I Sent. d.23, Pini’s reading recommends itself quite understandably. However, his interpretation is in fact based upon the
Ordinatio’s discussion of this distinction of the Sentences. It is helpful to consider the differences between these two texts, as the chronologically later Ordinatio does indicate certain increased subtleties concerning Scotus’ position.

Recall that in the Lectura passage Scotus writes, “Second intentions pertain to the union or to the extremes of the union (such as the predicate or the subject).” This statement implies that there are two kinds of second intentions being discussed. On the other hand, there are second intentions that pertain to the nature of the union expressed in the composition or division. In the Lectura passage, Scotus writes ad unionem, which almost certainly refers to the complexum created by the act of the second operation when the intellect either combines or separates. Thus, one might refer to a proposition as having the modality of “possible” or “necessary” or even the denomination of being true or false. That such notions are second intentions is expressed in remarks made by Scotus at the close the third question on the sixth book of the Metaphysics. We will revisit this important text below. For now, it is important to note that Scotus includes among notions pertaining to the study of logic mind-dependent relations, “Such as ‘possible’, ‘impossible’, and all of the modes of composition.”

Returning to the text from the Lectura, there is a second class of second intentions to consider. These are those which Scotus states, “Pertain . . . to the extremes of the union.” The two examples that he uses are the predicate and the subject of an enunciative statement. Thus, just as the union of two terms can have a particular kind of second intention—e.g. the relation of

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111 See note 104 above.

112 For example, see remarks at the close of an important question to be discussed below, namely the third question of book six of the questions on the Metaphysics. As he is concluding his remarks, Scotus refers to truth in the second operation of the intellect as being “verum in intellectum complexo.” See ibid., lib.6 q.3 n.70, p.82:11.

possible modality involved in a given statement—so too can there be second intentions pertaining to the terms themselves. Note, however, that this passage chooses a kind of relation that is *intimately* involved in an enunciation created by the intellect’s second operation. Thus, to say, “*Water* is a *subject,*” affirms something of water that is true only insofar as water functions in a statement.\(^{114}\)

By the time of Hervaeus’s *De secundis intentionibus*, the issue of the psychological causes of second intentions plays an important role in the debates concerning their nature. In addition to giving some account of the proximate, reflexive cognition involved in knowing second intentions, numerous authors (including Hervaeus) emphasize the fact that all three acts of the intellect form second intentions naturally in the process of human reasoning. It is tempting to think that Scotus is here stating that the only remote psychological cause of second intentions is the second act of the intellect. For example, something is a subject or a predicate only insofar as it functions in an affirmative or negative statement. However, does this mean that other second intentions such as “genus” and “species” are possible only because of the second operation of the intellect?\(^{115}\) Even if the proximate cause of our awareness of something as a species or a genus involves some comparison by the second act of the intellect, does Scotus hold that the other acts of the intellect do not play at least a material role in the creation of second intentions—not only ones such as “universal,” “species,” and “genus” but also ones such as “conclusion” and “syllogism”? Scotus does not discuss this matter at length, but it is arguable

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\(^{114}\) As will be evident in discussions below, this is *primarily* the “statement” in the intellect. See especially the text cited in note 96 above.

\(^{115}\) As will be discussed in the next chapter, by a kind of reverse confusion, Hervaeus will state that “subject” and “predicate” are formed by the first act of the intellect. See, especially, notes 186 and 189 in the next chapter.
that one should not hastily draw the conclusion that he holds that second intentions are only caused by the second act of the intellect.

This is a very important issue that will help draw out the important contrast of the *Lectura* text to that of the *Ordinatio*. When Scotus discusses the five predicables (i.e. genus, species, difference, property, and accident) in his *Quaestiones on the Isagoge*, he writes as though these second intentional concepts arise from predication. Thus, insofar as something is predicated in *quid* of the whole of its subject, it is a species. Thus, when one says, “Duns Scotus is human,” the predicate *human* is predicated of the whole of the subject. In contrast, one only predicates something partial in *quid* when saying, “Duns Scotus is an animal.” In his treatment of question 12 on the *Isagoge*, it would appear that Scotus holds that genus and species are derived from the way that something can be predicated in an enunciation. Thus, they would be similar to the case of subject and predicate discussed in the *Lectura*. Thus, the intellect would seem to cause second intentions like genus and species by its second operation.

Based on the *Lectura* text, this would seem to be the best way to read Scotus. However, this is not exactly the way he expresses himself in the *Ordinatio*. In order to see the important differences between these two texts, a side-by-side comparison will be used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lectura I d.23 n.12</th>
<th>Ordinatio I d.23 n.10</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Intentio secunda est relatio rationis, et non quaecumque, sed relatio rationis pertinens ad actum intellectus, qui est componere et dividere; unde intentiones secundae pertinential ad unionem vel ad extrema unionis (ut praedicati et subiecti).  

117 | [Persona non est intentio secunda] quia omnis intentio secunda est relatio rationis, non quaecumque, sed pertinens ad extremum actus intellectus componentis et dividentis *vel saltam conferentis unum ad alterum* (hoc patet, quia intentio secunda – secundum omnes – causatur per actum) |

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Pini bases his interpretation of Scotus on both of these texts, though most of his discussion is focused on the text of the *Ordinatio*. He does not appear to see any major differences or developments in vocabulary between these two texts. However, it is very important to note the different concerns addressed in each text. Both texts agree that second intentions are mind-dependent relations (*relationes rationis*). Likewise, both texts note that second intentions do not pertain to all mind-dependent relations. Arguably, this only means that second intentions do not include such mind-dependent relations such as self-identity (comparing one thing to itself) and the mind-dependent relation of God to the world. Likewise, according to the Subtle Doctor, the *ad placitum* relation of a sign to an imposed meaning is also a *relatio rationis*.

However, in the *Ordinatio* approach to this issue, Scotus adds an intriguing expression. He says that in addition to the act of the intellect composing and dividing, it is also possible that

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120 See Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Ordinatio* 4 d.1 p.2 q.1 n.200 in *Opera omnia* (Città del Vaticano: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2008), XI, p.70:210-71:220: “Tertio dico quod in ratione nominis prae ducta includitur aliquid quod dicit ens rationis, scilicet hoc quod est signum ‘ex institutione’, nam ista relatio non consequitur fundamentum ex natura rei, quia etsi in re sit aptitudo ad significandum effectum significatum, tamen actualis significatio non convenit sibi nisi per actum imponentis. Restringendo ergo definitionem ad ‘quid’ proprium dictum extra animam, ista definitio non exprimit ‘quid’ sacramenti; ergo non potest esse definitio eo modo quo definitio est ratio entis complecti extra animam. Sed eo modo quo definitio exprimit ‘num et conceptum per se in intellectu’, sive ille conceptus sit rei extra sive rei rationis, bene potest definire.” This will be a critically important theme below in 4.2 What is Logic About and Not About? The Broad Domain of Ens Rationis and 4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental?.

He continues by explaining how logical concepts are able to be defined. See ibid., n.201, p.71:221-228: “Et hoc modo tantum, et non aliter, definiuntur omnes intentiones logicales: non enim significant quiditates extra animam, sed tantummodo conceptus in anima per se unos; et sic habere definitionem sufficit ad scientiam propriam dictam, aliquin logica non esset scientia. In talibus etiam definitionibus inventur genus et differentia et proprium, eo modo quo logicus loquitur de genere, differentia et proprio, quia ibid praedicamentum in ‘quid’ et in ‘quale’ essentiale, et in ‘quale’ accidentale, convertibile.”
a second intention pertains to the mind-dependent relation arising from the intellectual act “of comparing one thing to another.” In contrast to Pini, I do not think it necessary to hold that such comparisons always arise in the second act of the intellect. Instead, it is equally possible that all three acts of the intellect involve comparisons. Pini tries to avoid making any strong genetic claims regarding development in Scotus’ corpus, and this is the general outlook of this dissertation. A much more complete study would be required to judge concerning such changes. However, based on the questions on the *Metaphysics*, a text that is key for Pini’s conclusions, one can find Scotus stating, “Logic presupposes a consideration concerning the acts of intellection by which second intentions are formed.”¹²¹ The remarks are ambiguous and might apply only to different sorts of combinations and divisions. However, it is just as possible that second intentional being could be formed by all three of the acts of the intellect according to the generally accepted threefold schema of the acts of reason.

To clarify my point, consider a contrast between potential candidates for mind-dependent relations formed by the first and second operations of the intellect. The comparison of *rational* to *animal* does not need to involve an operation of the second act of the intellect. Presupposing that the knower is aware of the notions *rational* and *animal*, it is possible to compare the two,

¹²¹ Scotus, *In Meta.* 6, q.3 n.70, p.83:1-2: “Praesupponit tamen logicus considerationem de actibus intelligendi quibus secundae intentiones formantur.” Now, it is a dangerous affair to read Hervaeus in light of later Thomists. However, there is a very clear remark made by Joseph Gredt (from Poinsot’s perspective) that clearly elaborates this point. I am looking to show how the ambiguities in Scotus are more fully articulated in Hervaeus, though it most certainly seems that the Dominican owes a good deal to discussions that developed within the Scotistic school regarding *esse intelligibile / esse objectivum.* Gredt expresses very clearly my suggestion about various relations formed by the acts of the intellect, though the reader should bear in mind that his clarity is even a bit more pellucid than that found in Hervaeus. See Josephus Gredt, *Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae,* 13th ed., vol. 1, *Logica et philosophia naturalis*, ed. Eucharius Zenzen (Barcelona: Herder, 1961), n.131 (p.125-126): “Actus comparativus intellectus potest sumi dupliciter: a) ut pertinet ad secundum et tertiam operationem intellectus, b) ut pertinet ad primam, per quam unum non attribuitur alteri neque deductur ex alio, sed tamen cognoscitur unum ut ordinatum ad alium et non in se absolute, sicut relatio cognoscitur simplici apprehensione, cum concipitur vel definitur. Cognitione secundae operationis attribuitur aliquid subiecto tamquam praedicatum, et ita hoc actu comparativo potest praedicari natura de inferioribus et potest etiam ipsa universalitas praedicatur de natura, quam denominat tamquam forma (natura est universalis). At vero per comparationem primae operationis non attenditur attributio praedicati ad subiectum, sed cognoscitur natura ut respiciens terminum, ad quem ordinatur.”
noting that *rational* is a specific difference of *animal*, allowing one to contract the meaning understood in the concept *animal* to the specific case of *rational animal*. Thus, one would say, “The notion *rational* is a qualitative specific difference vis-à-vis the comprehension of the genus *animal.*” Contrast this case to a judgment (i.e. a second act of the intellect), as when one says, “The animal is rational.” This expression would mean, “*Rational* is related to *animal* by a *per accidens* predication.” Likewise, by the first operation of the intellect, one could compare the notions *animal* and *human*, noting that the first is the genus in relation to the second. Thus, the properties of *animal* as a genus would involve, for example, a greater extension in comparison with *human*, as well as the smaller comprehension involved in its explicit meaning in comparison with *human*. In contrast, the affirmation, “The human is an animal,” involves a relation of *animal* to *human* as a *per se* predication in the first mode.122

It is perhaps easier to show how Scotus’s language in the *Ordinatio* allows one to include among the class of second intentions the products of the intellect’s ratiocination, that is, of its third act. Consider the following syllogism: “All *men* are *rational beings*. All *rational beings* are *able to laugh*. Therefore, all *men* are *able to laugh*. A syllogism is a relation of two extremes by means of a middle term. Thus, this syllogism is a relation of *men* to *able to laugh* by means of the middle term *are rational beings*. Thus, the syllogism is a kind of relation of two terms, though it is a relation that is mediated by a common third term (i.e. the middle term).

I suggest that modified language in the *Ordinatio—vel saltem conferentis unum ad alterum*—opens a space for such possibilities. So long as the intellect, by means of its natural three acts, is involved in some way with first intentions, it makes particular mind-dependent

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122 See parallel, though not identical, discussions of such matters in Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic*, 21-30, 76-79. As will be openly discussed by the end of this chapter, I am obviously reading Scotus with a potentially “Hervaean eye.”
relations that are called second intentions—*intentio secunda* . . . *causatur per actum intellectus negotiantis circa rem praeae intentionis.*

It is essential to note that these mind-dependent relations are *first* formed by a direct act. As Pini well observes, a second intention is only known by a reflection on the primary act that creates it.\(^{123}\) Thus, someone first knows the syllogism discussed above, grasping the relation of *men* to *able to laugh* by means of the middle term *rational*. It is only after that act that the knower can then come to know the very mind-dependent relations involved in the syllogism. Likewise, when one thinks *green eggs*, that person directly thinks of a particular kind of egg (namely, one that has the qualitative accident *green*). However, in reflecting upon the relation between *green* and *eggs*, the knower is aware of the mind-dependent relation between the accident *green* and *eggs*, which does not include the color in its definition.

Thus, when one speaks of second intentions, one indicates a particular kind of “non-real” being, in the sense that the being is not a mind-independent relation, even if it arises because of knowledge of a mind-independent reality. A true, mind-independent relation would exist even if no person exited to make the comparison between the two beings.\(^{124}\) Such relations would include similitude and mathematical ratios (among numerous possible examples). However, even something as simple as “green eggs” can be the occasion for the creation of second intentional relations. The relation of the notion “green” to that of “eggs” *can* depend upon the mind apprehending each notion and comparing them to each other as part of an expression (i.e. “green eggs”) or of a proposition (i.e. “the eggs are green”). Thus, as part of the expression “green eggs,” the notion “green” can be called an accidental, qualitative *difference* in the

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\(^{123}\) See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 120-126.

accidental definition “green eggs.” In mind-independent reality, “green” is just a quality of the existing substance “egg,” not a difference in an accidental difference involving “egg” as the quasi-genus.\textsuperscript{125} Likewise, given its role in the aforementioned proposition, “green” can be called a predicate. It is never called this in its mind-independent existence as a qualitative accident.

Second intentions only exist if there is a human intellect to make the comparison between two relata.

2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and Esse Obiectivum

In order to understand Scotus’ account of mind-dependent relations, it is critical that one understand the distinction between esse subjectivum and esse obiectivum. As discussed in the last chapter, this distinction can be confusing to contemporary readers, for the medieval meanings of “objective” and “subjective” run counter to the ways they are used in contemporary colloquial discourse. A classic locus for discussions of esse obiectivum is the problem of the Divine Ideas. Without shattering the unity of the Godhead, it is necessary to explain how God can have many ideas of particular things. The celebrated manner of describing Scotus’ approach to this question is according to moments of nature, distinguished according to priority and posteriority, within the Divine Eternity. God must first know His Essence, then produce the Divine Ideas according to their intelligible notes, which then establishes a relationship between the known Idea, a relation which God can reflexively know in some way. Existing in esse obiectivum (i.e. as objects of knowledge) and being related to the Divine Intellect, they have a

\textsuperscript{125} Granted, in this kind of accidental definition, the quasi-genus egg is in a category (i.e. substance) different from that of green (i.e. quality). This is of the nature of being a definition by accident, which is really a definition only in an improper and attenuated sense. See John Oesterle, Logic: The Art of Defining and Reasoning, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 63-71. An impressively systematic exposition of this topic can be found in Austin M. Woodbury, Logic, The John N. Deely and Anthony F. Russell Collection, St. Vincent College Library, Latrobe, PA, 121-134. See especially the schematic on ibid., 125.
kind of diminished being in comparison with the Divine Nature considered in Itself. A full discussion of this complex topic in its own right is outside the scope of this dissertation, but it is important to keep in mind as one important locus for Scotus’s discussion of esse obiectivum.

For the purposes of this philosophical dissertation, it is more important to see the question of esse obiectivum in a more mundane light. In the last chapter, it was noted that

126 See Maurer, “Ens diminutum,” 221-222.
128 In this, I agree with remarks made in Giorgio Pini, “Scotus on Objective Being,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofia medievale 26 (2015): 337-367. Pages are cited from an updated edition posted online by Pini. See Giorgio Pini, “Scotus on Objective Being,” Academia.edu, accessed March 31, 2016, http://www.academia.edu/18167801/Scotus_on_Objective_Being, 5: “I actually think that another reason why interpreters have been baffled by Scotus’s views on objective being is that they have moved too quickly from what Scotus said about the divine case to what can be surmised about the human case.”

Another example of this (quite related to this dissertation’s concerns) can be found in remarks made by Dominik Perler. In his “Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality,” he tentatively links Hervaeus’s own doctrine of objective existence to Scotus. However, his reading “ontologizes” the notion, missing the centrality of the theory of mind-dependent relations (especially the relatio rationis of the known thing to the knower) in Scotus’s and Hervaeus’s theories of objective being. As will be seen, in Scotus’s questions on the Metaphysics, the Subtle Doctor states that the very meaning of “to exist objectively” is (roughly stated) “to be subject to a mind-dependent relation to a knower—i.e. to a cognizing being first related by a ‘real’ relation to the known quiddity.” Objective existence is not a kind of hazy “reduplication” of the known thing. This same doctrine will be key for Hervaeus.

Thus, in the following remark from the aforementioned article, Perler puts his finger on what may well be the key historical-doctrinal link from the late-13th century to Hervaeus’s early-14th-century treatise, while simultaneously obscuring the matters at hand. See Perler, “Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality,” 234: “The innovative character of [Hervaeus’s thesis] becomes clear when it is assessed against the background of later thirteenth-century discususions. Several authors from Roger Bacon onward identified intentions with species and, consequently, focused on the problem of how cognition is to be explained as regards the intellect. They asked: What is a mental likeness of a thing, and how is it produced? They were interested mainly in explaining the mental processes and mental products in a cognitive act. Hervaeus instead emphasizes the understood thing and asks: What kind of thing do we know immediately and directly when we cognize a thing? What ontological status does the thing qua understood have? Perhaps these questions were stimulated by Scotus’s remark that, in a cognized thing, the intellect grasps an esse intelligibile which is neither the extramental existing thing nor something purely mental. Rather, it is something having ‘objective existence.’ But Scotus did not spell out how this peculiar kind of existence is to be understood, nor did he explain in detail how the esse intelligibile is related, on the one hand, to the extramental thing and, on the other, to the mental likeness of the thing. Hervaeus tackled this largely neglected problem by introducing an ontological classification of the different things involved in an act of cognition.”

Perler cites Ord. I, dist. 36. As noted above, Pini believes that starting in such theological texts actually muddles the doctrine. I agree and have decided to remain on the level of Scotus’s strictly philosophical remarks. This has the added advantage, as will be seen, of shedding significant light on Hervaeus’s own position / doctrine. It also has the advantage of clarifying the opacity that Perler attributes to the Subtle Doctor’s remarks concerning objective existence.
Avicenna remarked that second intentions have *esse intelligibile*.129 Recall that by stating that *intentiones intellectae secundo* constitute the subject of logical science (at least insofar as they are considered vis-à-vis their role in ratiocination), Avicenna’s text provides a tantalizing way of formulating the issue of logic’s scientific status. By stating the matter this way, it is very tempting to draw direct focus to the existential status of these kinds of secondarily known realities. To make the point clear: this manner of speaking appears to assert that logic studies some “thing”—even though that “thing” only has *esse intelligibile*. However, while Avicenna speaks of the *esse intelligibile* of second intentions in the *Prima philosophia*, the early Arabo-Latin translations of Aristotle would attribute a diminished mode of being (lit. *ens diminutum*) to true and false being. As Armand Maurer discusses in an important study on the matter, this mistranslation would play an important role in the medieval interpretation of Aristotle in a number of thinkers.

In the course of discussing the fourfold division of being in *Metaphysics* E, the Latin text based upon the Arabic rendering of the *Metaphysics* refers to both accidental being as well as *ens verum* as being “in a diminished division of being [lit. *in genere diminuto entis*].” The Greek text states that accidental and true being are related to the other two divisions of being (i.e. being as it is said of the ten categories and being as it is divided according to act and potency). However, for reasons that Maurer admits are at best conjectural, the source Arabic text seems to have been rendered in manner leading to the later Latin translation into *ens diminutum*. That this is not merely an error in translation from Arabic to Latin is supported by the fact that Averroes’s

129 See note 70 in the previous chapter.
long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* clearly treats *per accidens* being and “being as true and false” as “diminished” kinds of being.\(^{130}\)

Maurer briefly states that the notion of *ens diminutum* was an important text for a number of medieval writers, among whom he lists Roger Bacon, Adam Buckfield, Siger of Brabant, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent.\(^ {131}\) As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the terminology is also found in passing in Robert Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum*. In his study, Maurer does note that *ens diminutum* plays a particularly important role in Scotus’s treatment of second intentions. As regards the status of *esse obiectivum* and its relation to *ens diminutum*, the matter is not completely clear. Maurer interprets Scotus as holding that *ens diminutum* is not *esse obiectivum* as such, for even the universals in the intellect exist objectively in the intellect, and they do not have diminished being in this state.\(^ {132}\) As will be discussed in this section, while the universals are not “diminished” as though they were a copy-object in the intellect, their very relation to the knowing mind is *what is meant by objective existence*. That is, “to exist objectively” means “to have a *relatio rationis*—a mind-dependent relation—to a knower.” When that very “being objectively in the intellect” is reflexively known, it is a diminished kind of being, for it is a *non-real relation*.

The ontology of *esse obiectivum* can be quite nebulous. It could seem to be a kind of quasi-Meinongian object\(^ {133}\) or “spooky existence” as Richard Cross recently referred to it.\(^ {134}\) Cross, substantially agreeing with Peter King, argues that by the time of the *Reporatio*, Scotus’s

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\(^{130}\) See Armand Maurer, “*Ens Diminutum,*” 217-220.

\(^{131}\) See ibid., 217-218.

\(^{132}\) See ibid., 221.

\(^{133}\) For a full account of Meinong’s ontology, see Dale Jacquette, *Alexius Meinong, The Shepherd of Non-Being* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015).

\(^{134}\) Cross, *Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition*, 182, 184.
account of esse obiective / intelligibile was very deflationary. Cross argues in particular that Reportatio I d.36 and Quodlibet q.3 bear witness to a tendency in Scotus to explain esse intelligibile as being “simply the real structure of the representational item that explains its content; nothing supervenient on it.”

Many of Cross’s concerns are linked to Scotus’s uses of the language of ens diminutum. It is possible that such diminished being could be interpreted as a kind of “second rate” mind-independent being. To the degree that Cross emphasizes that such an overly ontological misreading is possible, his work is commendable. However, by minimizing the distinction to the point of identifying the esse objectivum with the real representational structure of the mental content, his interpretation of Scotus reads more like Ockham’s account of natural signification than the language that what one generally finds in Scotus’s accounts, especially in his distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent relations involved in cognition. It likewise

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135 See Peter King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” in Duns Scot à Paris: Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 Septembre 2002, ed. Olivier Boulnois, Elizabeth Karger, Jean-Luc Solère, and Gérard Sondag (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 65-88. Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 182-199. Recent work by Giorgio Pini very well summarizes the state of research on these matters. His conclusions confirm this dissertation’s reading of Scotus’s theory of objective being as being nothing more than the relatio rationis to the knower. See note 156 below. As will be seen, this is the same position that Hervaeus attributes to objective existence or to the intentionality of the known to the knower.


137 Indeed, in an article that is excellent on the whole, Philip Neri Reese offers this as a possible option for ens diminutum, suggesting that it might refer to accidental being. He then later does offer the second explanation that it might refer to the diminished status of esse objectivum. However, as will be discussed below, it is clear that this is what Scotus means in the passaged cited by Reese. The language of ens diminutum for purely mind-dependent realities is used in the early accounts of the Divine Ideas in which esse objectivum / intelligibile plays a prominent role. See Philip-Neri Reese, “Supertranscendentality and Metaphysics: An Aporia in the Thought of John Duns Scotus,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90, no.3 (2016): 539-561.

138 Cross very openly compares his interpretation of Scotus to Ockham. See Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 200-203. On the theory of relations, there is a very troubling remark made in Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 166-167. There, Cross expresses perplexity at a remark by Scotus in Quodlibet 13 to the effect that the relation of the cognitive act to the thing known is real from the side of the act, though not from the side of the object. Cross rightly notes that this is due to the asymmetry of the relation in question (i.e. from the measured to the measure). However, he inordinately oversteps the bounds of an interpreter when he writes, “Scotus does not really mean ‘real’ here.” He then proceeds to comment in a way that indicates that he does not see that the relation of measure to measured involves a condition of mind-dependence that makes one speak of two different relations based on what is the subject of the relation. Thus, insofar as the knower is the subject of the relation involved in
requires one to reject centuries of Scotistic commentary concerning *esse intelligibile*, which seem to have been elaborate among even the earliest Scotists. According to Cross this was mostly a wasted exegetical effort due to the supposed development he sees expressed in the several texts consulted at the end of his study.

Fortunately for this dissertation, it is not necessary to ascertain the complete account of *esse obiective / intelligibile* in Scotus’ late thought. Such a study will require a full critical edition of the *Reportationes* available from the Parisian period as well as a full critical edition of the *Quodlibet*. Cross’s study utilizes a selected number of texts to make quite a strong claim, one that appears to requires significant alteration in Scotus’ theory of cognition as well as his theory of relation. As Giorgio Pini notes in a recent article, while the deflationary account does offer important insights regarding the fact that objective existence is not, of itself, a kind of diminished real being, he questions the need for seeing a major shift in Scotus’s thought, given that there is evidence for deflationary claims even in the *Quaestions on the Metaphysics*.

A proper understanding of *esse obiectivum* is critical for understanding Scotus’ account of mind-dependent relations and, hence, second intentions. Indeed, it is on the subject of second intentions that Cross’s remarks appear to bear fruit in a grave misunderstanding of the very nature of second intentional being according to Scotus. Cross interprets the distinction between knowledge, it involves a real relation from the knower to the known thing. However, in order for the mind-independent thing to be understood as an object of knowledge, we must posit a mind-dependent relation having the thing as its subject and presupposing the actual knowing of the thing. A full discussion of Cross’s interpretation would involve consideration of Scotus’s late-career treatment of abstractive and intuitive cognition, a topic well outside the bounds of this dissertation. See the discussion of *Quod*. 13 in note 150 below, for there Scotus does undertake relevant discussions there.

139 For instance, see Petri Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, lxxxi-lxxxv.
first and second intentions merely in terms of the extension of such concepts.\footnote{142} This outlook fails to see what is most central in Scotus’ treatment of second intentional being—precisely because it fails to emphasize the fact that, according to Scotus, second intentions are not mere concepts of concepts. \textbf{They are reflexively cognized\footnote{143} mind-dependent relations in things insofar as they are cognized.}

To begin to get a feeling for the problematic nature of holding that second intentions differ from first intentions merely by being “concepts under whose extension concepts fall,” one should consider a very early remark from Scotus’ questions on the \textit{Perihermenias}. The text is so striking that it should be quoted in full:

\begin{quote}
I say that the composition and division [in question] is not a composition and division of \textit{species} but of things, not however as they exist [extramentally] but insofar as they are known. And therefore, it [namely, the composition or division] is said to be true or false on account of the composition and division of the intellect, for that composition is caused by the intellect and is in the knower as the known is in the knower, not however as an accident is in a subject. And thus I concede concerning the parts of a composed statement [\textit{de partibus compositionis}] that they are in the intellect simply as the known is in the knower; and in this manner are \textbf{things} in the intellect, not only \textit{species} (bold emphasis added).\footnote{144}

This small passage deploys the distinction between \textit{esse obiectivum} and \textit{esse subiectivum}, though the language does not use the technical terms. The contrast Scotus is drawing is between the subjective presence of the known thing in the intellect as a subjective quality (a \textit{species}) and its presence as an object of thought by means of human cognition. This is what he means about

\footnote{142}{See ibid., 198.}

\footnote{143}{As will become increasingly evident in what follows, this is an important aspect of the second order nature to second intentions for Scotus.}

\footnote{144}{B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, \textit{In Peri.}, q.2 n.41, p.56:19-57:3: “Dico quod compositio non est ipsarum specierum sed rerum, non tamen ut existunt sed ut intelliguntur. Et ideo dicitur esse veritas et falsitas circa compositionem et divisionem intellectus, quia illa compositio causatur ab intellectus, quia illa compositio causatur ab intellectu et est in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente, non autem ut accidens in subiecto. Et ita concedo de partibus compositionibus, quia sunt in intellectu simplici ut cognitum in cognoscente; et isto modo sunt res in intellectu, non species solae.”}
being *in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente*. Note carefully that *esse obiectivum* pertains not merely to thought for Scotus. It is a mode of being that pertains *to the thing that is known*, insofar as it is an object of cognition. One and the same thing can be considered in three manners: as existing, as an object present to a knower, and as a partial causal source of the *species* that is in knower as an accident is in a subject.

In the questions on the *Metaphysics*, Scotus’s treatment of mind-dependent relations (*relationes rationis*) utilizes this manner of speaking to explicate his position regarding how the intellect “makes” (lit. *facit*) the relation. Once more, Scotus’s own words deserve full citation:

> The intellect makes this relation by means of the act of considering something, and it has its foundation in that thing insofar as it is considered [by the intellect]. However, [note that it does not have its foundation] in the consideration itself, as it [i.e. the intellect’s act of considering] is a real [mind-independent] thing. Indeed, in this way the relation could be real, just as the diversity between heating and intellection is a real [i.e. mind-independent] relation. And since intellection is truly a real [i.e. mind-independent] action, the relation that is founded in it will be real, inasmuch as it [i.e. the intellection] is real [i.e. mind-independent]. It [the intellection] follows from the nature of the thing [known]—granted that it is such a thing [namely a real accident].

However, a mind-dependent relation is only in the thing insofar as it is considered [by the intellect]; and through such consideration it is compared to something else, for consideration is the comparison of one thing to another. Therefore, the relation between the intelligible thing and the intellect is real in both. However, the relation of universal and particular is a mind-dependent relation.

You might ask, “What really is a mind-dependent relation?” In response, I first ask, “What really is the object of the intellect insofar as it is understood?” Indeed, it has no

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145 On the possible source for this expression in Henry of Ghent, see remarks in note 252 of the previous chapter. Pini notes in “Scotus on Objective Being,” 2n2, that the Subtle Doctor’s phrases *esse obiectivum, esse intelligibile, esse cognitum, esse in intellectione, esse in opinione*, and *esse repraesentatum* generally function synonymously.

146 The translation of the terse Latin is mine, but the notes made in Wolter and Etzkorn’s edition are helpful. See John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, vol. 1, trans. Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), 530n56: “That is, the relation of the knowable object to the concept, of which it is the partial instrumental cause, is real and the relation of the concept, as the partial effect of that intelligible object, is also real.” This is an extremely subtle but important distinction that must be made to understand just what is the nature of a mind-dependent relation. It will be discussed in my interpretive remarks in the body of the dissertation.

147 As explained at the end of the section before the break. See also footnote 146.
being [lit. *nullum esse*] except in “being understood”—according to others this is what it means to found a mind-dependent relation. Moreover, a mind-dependent relation will be a lesser sort of being [lit. *minus ens erit*], for it is a quasi-accident of the thing—such is the manner of being of mind-dependent relation.

Therefore, it is false to say that a mind-dependent relation is founded immediately in the act of intellection. This is so because the object (inasmuch as it is understood) is not formally the act of intellection. It is also false to say that a reflexive act makes a mind-dependent relation. Rather, it is made by a first act, namely a direct act [of intellection], that is, of the intellect comparing this to that. However, when the intellect reflects upon itself, understanding this very comparison as an object, in such a case it does not cause a mind-dependent relation. Instead, it understands the relation and this is a logical consideration.

This is a capital text for understanding what Scotus means by a mind-dependent relation.

Although he does not use the terminology, the distinction of *esse obiectivum* and *esse subiectivum* is operative in his explanation. He clarifies the point that the foundation of the relation in question is not the real, qualitative accident that is the act of intellection. If it is a question of the relation between the knowing intellect and the known thing in this manner, one would be speaking of a real relation. Indeed, although the language is dense, he states that according to this manner of speaking, there is a real relation both from the knower to the known

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148 The editors quote Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.63 q.4, which is not in modern edition. They cite the Paris edition of 1520. See Scotus, *In Metaph.* 5, q.11, p.582n44: “Appellantur autem relationes secundum rationem illae quae totaliter aut saltem completive habent esse et causari a consideratione rationis…non autem ab eo quod naturaliter et realiter habet esse in subiecto relato.


Si quaeratur ‘quid realiter est relatio rationis?’ Responsio: quaero primo ‘quid realiter sit obiectum intellectus in quantum intelligitur?’ Nullum enim habet nisi ‘intelligi’—hoc est fundare relationem rationis secundum alios. Et ultra, minus ens erit. Quod est, est quasi accidens eius, cuiusmodi est relatio rationis. Falsum est ergo quod relatio rationis fundatur immediate in actu intelligendi. Quia obiectum, in quantum intelligitur, non est actus intelligendi formaliter. Falsum est etiam quod actu reflexo intelligendi fit relatio rationis; fit enim primo actu, scilicet directo, intellectus comparantis hoc ad illud. Quando autem reflectit, intelligendo comparationem istam ut obiectum, tunc non causatur relatio rationis, sed consideratur, et est consideratio logica.”

As will be seen from the Latin text, I have chosen to be a bit loose in the translation, though I have kept Wolter and Etzkorn as a guide, for their translation is closer to Scotus’s literal wording, which is very awkward.
thing *and* from the known thing to the knower. Insofar as the thing is involved in the causality of intellection, it *does* have a real relation to the act of intellection.\(^{150}\)

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\(^{150}\) In the midst of a discussion concerning the relationship between the knower and the known object in intuitive cognition in Quodlibet XIII (at least in the Wadding edition), Scotus makes some remarks that are quite relevant, given Hervaeus’s own later thought and deployment of the relation of the measured (or, the measurable) to the measure. In this passage, it appears that Scotus presupposes that this relation, though non-real in the measure, is nonetheless *not* a candidate for being a second intention. This is how Francesco Lychetus (c.1465-1520) interprets him as well. The role of comparing one thing to another remains centrally important for his conception of *relationes rationis* and second intentions. Nonetheless, the ambiguous border—namely, the non-real relation of the known to the knower—remains hazy, though Scotus does not seem to want to include it in second intentional being, strictly speaking. The reader will note as well the subtleties that he engages in regarding the physical or “real” causality of the object, as opposed to its causality in the order of knowledge. As has been noted before, there seem also to be ambiguities about the hazy status of intentional existence according to him—i.e., whether it is presupposed as the foundation of said relation, or whether the two go together. This theme has been central in the text associated with footnotes 126-156 of this chapter.

On details concerning status of of the manuscript tradition of Scotus’s quodlibet, see Timothy B. Noone and H. Francine Roberts, “John Duns Scotus’ Quodlibet,” in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 7, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 139-159. An illuminating text is cited here from Wadding as a testimony to the apparent state of the Subtle Doctor’s late thought on this matter, though the full question deserves separate treatment. See Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones quodlibetales a quaestione prima usque ad tertiam decimam*, Opera omnia editio nova iuxta editionem Wadding XII tomos continentem a patribus Franciscanis de observantia accurate recognita XXV (Paris: Vivès, 1895).

The text’s context is explained by the preliminary Scholium from Cavellum on p.524: “Docet in actu cognoscendi intuitive esse duas relationes reale ad objectum, una est mensurabilis ad mensuram, altera est unionis seu attingentiae. Quod est distinguantur, patet, quia in alius invenitur prima sine secunda, et e contra ut in exemplis. Quod sint reales, patet, quia requirunt extrema existential et distincta, ad quorum positionem necessario resultant. Explicat optime relationem rationis, et qualiter relatio mensurabilis fit realis, quod contingit, quando entitas mensurabilis participatur, seu accipitur a natura.”

See Scotus, *Quod* q.13, p.525-6: “Ista distinction actus cognoscendi supposita potest dici quod primus, scilicet, qui est rei existentis, in se necessario habet annexam relationem realem et actualem ad ipsum objectum; et ratio est, quia non potest esse talis cognition, nisi cognoscens habeat actualiter ad objectum talem habitudinem, quae nessesario requirit extrema in actu et realiter distincta, et quae etiam naturam extremorum necessario consequitur.

In speciali autem videtur esse duplex relation actualis in isto actu ad objectum. Una potest dici relatio mensurati, vel verius mensurabilis ad mensuram. Alia potest dici relatio unientis formaliter in ratione medi ei ad terminum, ad quem unit, et ista relatio medi ei unientis specialiori nomine potest dici relatio attingentiae alterius, ut termini, vel tenditenta in alterum, ut in terminum.

Ista autem distinctio duarum relationem, scilicet mensurabilis ad mensuram, et attingentiae ad terminum, satis videtur esse manifesta, quia utraque ab altera separari potest, sicut in essentiis, superior habet rationem mensurae respecto inferioris, nec tamen semper inferior habet respectu superioris relationem attingentiae, de qua loquimur; actus etiam voluntatis, vel intellectus totaliter causantis objectum videtur habere relationem tendentiae respecto eius, ut termini intellections vel volitionis, sive ista relatio sit realis, sive tantum rationis, non tamen talis intelliection et vel volitio habet respectus talis objecti relationi mensurabilis, sed magis relationem mensurae.

De prima relatione scilicet mensurabilis, loquitur Aristoteles 5. *Metaphysicae*, quod illa proprie pertinet ad terium modum relativorum. Ubi sciedum est, quod aliquid mensurari est intellectum de eius quantitate determinata per alium certificari, ita quod mensurari importat respectum ad intellectum, cui fit certitudo, et ad mensuram, per quam fit certitudo. Prima non est realis, sicut nec scibilis ad scientiam. Secunda est causati non in esse, sed in cognosci ad causam in cognosci, et haec est relatio realis, quantum est ex parte dependentiae causati ad causam, quae dependentia est ratione extremorum, et non tamen per actum intellectus comparantis hoc ad illud; tamen quia
However, the thing—this is emphasized because the point is critical—can exist intellectually as something known is present to and known by a knower. In this case, Scotus is talking about *esse obiectivum*. The known thing, present to the knower as an object, provides the foundation for the mind-dependent relation from that known thing to the knower. Insofar as the thing known is present to the knower as an object, it is possible to say that there is a mind-independent relation between the thing and the intellect. Thus, it is founded on the thing, presupposing the intellect’s consideration of the thing. In particular, Scotus once again notes that such a relation is made by the comparison of one thing to another. Thus, the relation that he has in mind in this passage is one that is between two things insofar as they are known. The relation has its foundation in the thing known (as it exists in *esse obiectivum*) and as it is compared to something else. This relation is caused by a direct act of comparison, only later to be cognized by a reflective act of knowledge that notes that the direct act involved the creation of this sort of mind-dependent relation.

On p.536, the commentary of Lychetus remarks: “Sequitur, et ideo ista habitudo, scilicet mensurati ad mensuram, non est simpliciter realis habitudo, scilicet certificati ad illud, per quod fit certitudo, nec tamen est ita rationis, sicut est illa, quae est universalis ad singular, quia prima est tantum habitude obiecti cogniti ad obiectum cognitum. Secunda vero est secunda intention, quae vel est comparatio unius cogniti ad alius cognitum, vel aliquid derelictum ex tali comparatione, ut alias exposui.”
However, it is important to stress that even in the case of a direct knowledge without any further comparison, there is formed a mind-dependent relation from the thing to the knower. If there were no act of cognition, the thing would not exist in *esse obiectivum* as the direct object of an act of intellection. When the knower reflects and focuses on this mind-dependent relation, at such a time he or she would be considering something that is *not* mind-independently real. While it is not “real” in this manner, it *is* still a relation and depends upon the mind-independent fact that the knower is knowing. In reflecting on this mind-dependent relation, the knower is thus considering something pertaining to an order of being that is different from mind-independent being. Hence, Scotus calls it a “logical consideration.” This mind-dependent relation is a second intention, for as Scotus states elsewhere in the questions on the *Metaphysics*, “A thing of first intention has a complete quiddity without [consideration of human] reason; a second intention does not [have a complete quiddity without taking into consideration human reason].”\textsuperscript{151}

To summarize this difficult point—but one that is extremely important for understanding Hervaeus’s own labyrinthine treatise—we can say: For Scotus, a second intention is a mind-dependent relation in the thing known insofar as it is present as an object of cognition. One only comes to know the second intention when one reflects upon the direct act that creates this relation. To know this relation is to know that it presupposes the activity of reason. Hence, the relation (i.e. the second intention) is only fully explicable (i.e. has its complete quiddity) by taking into account the kind of objective presence made possible by the intellect itself.

Scotus’s language in this passage does appear to express the view that second intentions are formed by the second act of the intellect or at least a comparison of the intellectually known

\textsuperscript{151}See Ibid., q.5-6 n.169, p.487:9-10: “Res primae intentionis habent completam quiditatem sine ratione; res secundae non.”
thing to particulars: “Rather, it is made by a first act, namely a direct act [of intellecction], namely of the intellect comparing this to that.” While his language generally encourages this kind of interpretation, there is one passage that cautions against making this the Subtle Doctor’s final word concerning this point. This text, found in the questions on the *Metaphysics*, seems to express the possibility that even the very first act of intellecction could be the source of a mind-dependent relation that is a second intention.

The text in question is concerned with whether or not a universal can be said to exist in the thing known. Once more, the text deserves full citation:

As regards the second part of the question, namely whether [the universal] is found in the thing, I offer the following response. To be in the intellect in the aforementioned first or second manner of speaking [namely, objectively in the intellect habitually in first act or actually in second act] is nothing other than to have a mind-dependent relation to the intellect. However, that which is in the thing [i.e. the common nature] does indeed have such a relation; therefore that which is universal is in the thing. This argument is confirmed as follows.

This is the case because otherwise when we would know anything concerning universals, we would know nothing about the things but only about our concepts. Likewise, our opinion would not be changed from being true to false when there was a change in the thing that exists in a mind-independent fashion. Therefore, the universal is able to be in the thing in such a manner that it is the same nature, which in mind-independent existence [lit. *in existentia*] is determined to grade of singularity, also is in the intellect in an indeterminate manner—and to be in the intellect means to have a relation to the intellect as the known to the knower. Thus it is that just as these two manners of existing [lit. *ista duo esse*] coincide per accidens in the same nature, and either one can be without the other, so also can the determination and indetermination spoken of before. And from this it is clear that which is universal is not necessarily in the thing, although it is

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152 See Noone, “Universals and Individuation,” 106.

153 As noted above, this suggestion ultimately arises from a kind of “Hervaean eye” with which one may read Scotus. The matter is not necessarily that clear in his own text.

154 Scotus, *In Metaph.* 7, q.18 n.44, p.348:17-21: “Et distinguo quod dupliciter potest aliquid esse in intellectu objective, sicut modo loquimur de ‘esse in’. Uno modo habitualiter, et alio modo actualiter; sive in actu primo et secundo. Primo modo est ibi quando est ibi ut immediate motivum ad intellecctionem, secundo modo quando actualiter intelligitur.”

possible [for it to be there] just as it is necessary for it to be in the intellect (emphasis added).

This text clearly has Avicenna’s threefold division of essence in the background. In his more developed presentations of the common nature Scotus stresses the mind-independent minor unity of the common nature in the things themselves. What is important to note for our purposes is that the common nature can exist in the intellect, by which he means that it has “a relation to the intellect as the known to the knower.” Now, the language in this passage is a bit ambiguous, for Scotus refers to the common nature as being both indeterminate and universal in the intellect. This passage by itself does not carefully distinguish between the indeterminacy of the nature itself as opposed to the universal mode by which it is known. However, the passage introduce a very important possibility: the language of indeterminacy could be interpreted here as meaning that the nature is present to the intellect in a universal manner.

As will be seen below, this does not mean that the nature is first known as being universal. Instead, to be present to the intellect in a universal manner merely means that the nature is related to the knower by a mind-dependent relation. In knowing a given nature, the knower is directly aware of its intelligible notes. However, given the nature of intellectual knowledge, universality is the mode of presence corresponding to the mind-dependent relation of

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156 Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q.18 n.58-59, p.354:13-355:2: “Quoad secundum membrum quaestionis, siclicit an sit in re, responsio: esse in intellectu primo modo vel secundo non est nisi habere relationem rationis ad intellectum. Illud autem, quod est in re, bene habet istam relationem; ergo illud quod est universale, est in re.

Confirmatur: aliter in sciendo aliqua de universalibus, nihil sciremus de rebus sed tantum de conceptibus nostris, nec mutaretur opinio nostra a vero in falsum propter mutationem in existentia rei. Potest igitur universale esse in re, ita quod eadem natura est, quae in existentia per gradum singularitatis est determinata, et in intellectu—hoc est ut habet relationem ad intellectum tamquam cognitum ad cognoscens—est indeterminata. Ita quod sicut ista duo esse concurrent per accidens in eadem natura, et posset utraque esse sine altera, ita etiam determinatio et indeterminatio praedicta. Et ex hoc appareat quod non est necesse illud, quod est universale, esse in re, licet possit, sicut necesse est ipsum esse in intellectu.”

For the translation, I have consulted but altered Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, vol.2, 305. Also, on this important passage, see the recent remarks of Pini, which support this dissertation’s contention. See Pini, “Scotus on Objective Being,” 18-24.

the known thing to the knower. Thus, to say, “The nature is universal,” is to attribute to the
indeterminate common nature the mind-dependent relation of that nature to the knower. Thus, if
one says, “Horseness is universal,” this is possible only in a logical sense, for it predicates of the
common nature (i.e. horseness) a mind-dependent relation (i.e. universality) that the nature has
only insofar as it is the terminus of an act of intellection.

It is critical that a very subtle distinction is made here in order to understand what is
being proposed. It is best understood by contrasting the attribution of universality with the
attribution of specificity. In order to form the second intentional relation “species,” it is
necessary for the knower to compare the nature to the individuals of which it can be predicated.
Hence, in the questions on the *Isagoge*, Scotus can write:

Indeed, the intellect in considering the nature of man as being a kind of one in many and
about many, by such a property discovered in the in the nature considered after this
manner [namely, as a one found in many and about many], is moved to cause a [second]
intention; and it attributes this intention to the nature of which it is the property from
which it was taken.  

That is, the intellect compares the nature (which is in itself indifferent but does exist in the
intellect objectively) to the individuals. This relation, which is wholly mind-dependent, is the
second intention “species”.

However, this second intention is not the same as the second intention universal. To be
universal is a condition of the thing known insofar as it is known—just as to be imagined is a
condition of the thing insofar as it is the object of the imagination. The intention “universal”
applies to the nature merely because it is intelleceted. The direct act of knowledge is of the
common nature as such. However, insofar as the nature can be considered insofar as it is an
object of the human intellect, then it can be said to be universal. However, to make such an

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et de multis, ab aliqua proprietate reperta in natura sic considerata movetur ad causandum intentionem; et illam
causatam attribuit illi naturae cuius est proprietas a qua accipitur.”
attribution of universality would require the reflexive act of noting the relation of the known to
the knower—a relation of universality—which is then predicated of the nature, not *per se* but
secondarily (or *per accidens*).\(^{159}\)

Thus, one knows *horseness* in a universal manner—directly knowing the quiddity *horseness* but as the object of a faculty that knows *horseness* in a way that abstracts it from any
individual instances. Then one reflects on the conditions of this knowledge, which includes a
mind-dependent relation of the common nature to the human intellect (as the object of that
intellectual knowledge). By reflexively grasping that relation, the knower can then think,

“*Horseness is universal*”—thus attributing to the nature the mind-dependent relation that was
thus reflexively grasped. Following on this awareness of universality, it is *then* possible to
further determine what kind of universal it is—a *genus*, a *species*, a *property*, etc. Likewise, one
can consider this same quiddity as bearing a relation that arises from the second and third
operations of the intellect—hence, to be a *subject*, a *predicate*, a *major term*, etc.\(^{160}\)

\(^{159}\) Hence, one understands quite clearly Scotus’ early language concerning the predication of second
intentions. They are in no way predicated *per se* of any nature. See ibid., q.9-11 n.28, p.50:3-15: “Dicendum quod
tales non sunt per se. Quod patet de primo modo sic: in primo modo praedicatur definitio vel pars definitionis de
definitio. Impossibile est autem aliquam rem seculandae intentionis definire rem primae intentionis, quia tunc illa res
secundum suam essentiam partim esset a natura et partim ab intellectu, et ita a dh ordinatis; quare non esset unum
essentialiter. Igitur impossibile es aliquam intentionem primo modo per se praedicare de re. Nec secundo modo,
quia non causatur intentio ex per se principiis subjecti. Nec quarto modo, *quia res non est causa efficiens intentionis,
sed intellectus*. Nec universaliter aliquo modo, quia tunc esset natura sufficiens causa talis accidentis. In
quocumque igitur esset illa natura, illi inesset accidens, quod falsum est” (emphasis added).

\(^{160}\) The most pressing difficulty with regard to this interpretation is how to relate it to the distinction of
intuitive and abstractive cognition. The details of this resolution are not wholly available and merit an independent
study of all the sources in the Subtle Doctor’s corpus, including those that are still in the process of being edited into
critical editions. It is arguable that the quiddity that is known in intuitive cognition is still known in a universal
manner, and that the awareness of that quiddity is itself modified. Thus, intuitive cognition is a modification of an
act of human awareness that is thus immediately in touch with the fact that *in this particular experience* the quiddity
in question is known as existentially present. Awareness of the quiddity of (e.g.,) horseness is experienced in the *hic
et nunc* as actually obtaining in the particular living creature before my eyes. I see that the quiddity, objectively
present in a universal manner, is also present in and through the immediate experience of the horse that is before my
eyes and under the caressing motion of my hand. Intuitive cognition is thus a kind of awareness of the common
nature both as a direct object of intellection and simultaneously as a principle of existence experienced in mind-
independent reality.
The seventeenth century Hungarian Jesuit Péter Pázmány (1570-1637) attributes to Scotus (as well as Antonio Andreas and Agostino Nifo) the view that, without an act of comparison of one thing to another, a nature can be considered abstracted but not universal. He bases himself on II Sent. d.3 without further specifying the question or edition. This indicates that in later Scholasticism there was a reading of Scotus that would seem to give second intentional status to predicates that did not arise from the second act of the intellect. According to Pázmány’s passage, one could say, “Horseness is abstract” merely because of the relation of the known nature to the knower.

It would seem, however, that one could even go further that Pázmány’s reading of Scotus. In Ordinatio II d.3 q.1, Scotus states in the midst of his discussion of the principle of individuation:

However, not only is this nature indifferent [of itself] to being in the intellect and in particulars—and by this fact also to being universal or particular (or singular)—but also this nature, having existence in the intellect does not have primarily of itself [primo ex se] universality. Indeed, however, it is known under universality as under the mode of its being understood. However, universality is not part of its primary conceptualization, for [such a universal] concept is not a metaphysical but a logical concept. (Indeed the logician considers second intentions applied to the first, according to Avicenna). Therefore, the first form of knowledge is of the nature and not of its mode—[hence, it is of] neither that which pertains to it as being in the intellect, nor that which pertains to it outside of the intellect. Although universality is the mode of knowing what is known, the mode [i.e. universality], however, is not understood!

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162 See Scotus, Ordinatio II d.3 p.1 q.1 n.33 in Opera omnia (Città del Vaticano: Typis Vaticanis: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1973), VII, p.403:15-404:3: “Non solum autem ipsa natura de se est indifferens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse universale et particular (sive singulare),—sed etiam ipsa, habens esse in intellectu non habet primo ex se universalitatem. Licet enim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitate ub sub modo intelligenti ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars eius conceptus primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici (logici enim considerat secundas intentiones, applicatas primis secundum ipsum). Prima ergo intellecto est ‘naturae’ ut non cointelligitur aliiquis modus, neque qui est eius in intellectu, neque qui est eius extra intellectum; licet illius intellecti modus intelligenti sit universalitas, sed non modus intellectus!” For the somewhat opaque ending to this text, as well as the reference to Avicenna (secundum ipsum) I am roughly following Paul Vincent Spade, Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 64.
The direct concept is of the nature itself. It is known under the mode of being a universal but that universality, as such, is not known. Though my overall interpretation of the intention of universality is not identical to his, Noone expresses the point currently under discussion quite clearly when he writes, “Yet a universal, more precisely speaking, is not the content of that-which-is but rather the mode under which such an essence is understood” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{163}

Because it is intellectually known, the essence of the thing is known in a universal manner, though the intellect must reflect on its own act in order to realize that the direct act of knowledge involves a mind-dependent relation—namely, from the thing known to the knower. This mode of knowing, i.e. universality, can then be predicated of the essence (considered only insofar as it exists objectively).

Such a mode of predication is a logical manner of speaking because the mind-dependent relation of universality pertains to the thing known only insofar as it exists as an object of intellection. Hence, such a universal is rightly called a “logical universal” in distinction from a “metaphysical consideration” of the common nature\textsuperscript{164} precisely because the predication of universality does not pertain to the essence per se in any of the four modes of per se predication\textsuperscript{165} but only per accidens to the essence, namely only insofar as it is an object of intellection (i.e. in esse obiectivum). Thus, even in the very early-career fifth question concerning the Isagoge, we find Scotus writing:

The first object of the intellect, namely ‘that which is,’ is understood under a universal notion [lit. sub ratione universalis]. However, this notion [lit. ratio] is not in essence identical with “that which is”, but its accidental mode. Therefore, the intellect is able to know the difference between its first object and that mode, for it is able to distinguish between everything which is not essentially the same. But every power, knowing per se

\textsuperscript{163} Noone, “Universals and Individuation,” 106.

\textsuperscript{164} See texts cited in notes 68-79 above.

\textsuperscript{165} See note 159 above.
the difference between two things knows each thing under its proper notion [lit. *ratione*], as Aristotle states in *De Anima* II. (However, in this place he proves that there is a common sense.) Therefore, the intellect is able to know that universal mode (or notion [lit. *rationem]*) *per se* and according to its proper notion [lit. *ratione*]. In this way, by reflecting, the intellect knows itself, its operation, its mode of operating, and other things that pertain to it.\(^{166}\)

Thus, to return to the manner of speaking from above based on Pini’s lucid treatment, it is possible to go one step further than Pini has gone. He has limited all second intention formation to the second operation of the intellect, a conclusion that is understandable given the texts of the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* on distinction 23 of the first book of the *Sentences*. Recall, however, the *Ordinatio*’s assertion, namely that second intentions can be created by comparison of one thing to another. This kind of intention is formed most clearly in the second and third acts of the intellect, which clearly presuppose mind-dependent relations between things that are known. However, from the texts that have been discussed, it seems possible to say that Scotus holds that even the first act of the intellect, in its first direct apprehension of a quiddity, forms a second intention, namely the mind-dependent relation of the thing known to the intellect that knows it. The knower can then reflect upon this mind-dependent relation, namely the mode of universality of the essence as known, and predicate it of the essence. Perhaps an awareness of this relation also implies a knowledge of non-repugnance to exist in many inferiors—though without explicitly comparing to inferiors as one would do when attributing a relation like *genus*, *species*, etc. to a given known nature.\(^{167}\) In doing such, it is functioning logically, for a mind-dependent

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\(^{166}\) Scotus, *In Porph.*, q.5 n.4, p.27:15-28:11: “Dicendum quod universale est per se intelligibile. Quod patet sic: primum obiectum intellectus, scilicet ‘quod quid est’ intelligitur sub ratione universalis.ILLA autem ratio non est idem essentialiter cum illo ‘quod quid est’, sed modus eius accidentalis. Igitur intellectus potest cognoscere differentiam inter suum primum obiectum et illum modum, quia potest distinguiere inter omnia quae non sunt essentialiter eadem. Sed omnis virtus, cognoscens per se differentiam inter aliqua duo, cognoscit utrumque extremum sub propria ratione, per Aristotelem II *De anima*. Per hoc enim probat sensum communem esse. Igitur intellectus potest cognoscere illum modum sive rationem universalis per se et sub propria ratione. Hoc modo, reflectendo, cognoscit intellectus se et suam operationem et modum operandi et cetera quae sibi insunt.”

\(^{167}\) Once more, this reading is a mere *open possibility*. It certainly is reading with a kind of “Hervaean eye,” noting possibilities in the Subtle Doctor’s way of posing a problem. As will be discussed in the next chapter,
(i.e. non real) relation is thus predicated of the known quiddity, which of itself is not per se universal. Hence, even the first act of the intellect would form the second intention of universality before any explicit comparison to inferiors of which it can be predicated in various ways—e.g. as a genus, a species, but also contracted to a particular individual as in “this man.”

To this end, the view expressed by Pázmány actually appears to be potentially applicable to Scotus:

To establish the argument [it must be admitted] that all of the species of universals [i.e. the predicables] cannot be distinguished among themselves without being compared to an inferior. Whence, e.g. [the quality] white, when it is considered in general [lit. in communi] is a universal at this point indifferent to being a genus, a property, or an accident\textsuperscript{168}; nor is it known to be a genus or a property\textsuperscript{169} except by such a comparison to an inferior. However, from this alone does it follow, to be able to be something universal, although it is not known whether it is a genus, etc.,\textsuperscript{170} which is not an absurd position. Whence things of this nature, before they are compared to an inferior, only agree in that they are universal, not however that they are this or that species of universal [i.e. not that they are this or that predicable].\textsuperscript{171}

Hervaeus holds that the second intention universal is a privative second intentional notion in this manner. I hesitate in drawing this conclusion too strongly regarding Scotus. For instance, see the remarks of Joseph Gredt regarding Scotus (likely taken through Poinsot and Cajetan) in Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, vol. 1, n.131 (p.126): “Secundum Scotum solo actu abstractionis non potest effici nisi universale metaphysicum, ad universale vero formale habendum requiritur insuper actus comparativus. Similiter Suárez et alii, distinguendo inter universale metaphysicum et logicum, docent illud fieri per solum actum abstractionis, ad hoc vero efficie ndum requiri comparisonem.”

I have avoided referring to the “‘metaphysical consideration’ of the common nature” as a “metaphysical universal,” given the unique meaning of this term in later scholasticism. Clearly, Gredt is taking the notion of universale metaphysicum from later Baroque discussions, which would distinguish this direct knowledge of the universal from any comparison whatsoever. I am noting his remark only as an important qualifier from later in the interpretive tradition, one that should at least qualify my claims regarding Scotus’s position. On this point, Austin Woodbury provides a very clear differentiation of the “metaphysical universal” from the “logical universal” in Woodbury, Logic, 63. The schema found on this page can be expressed on these two points as follows: “The Universal [sic] is something REAL or the NATURE OF THE THING, which if it be considered . . . as ABSTRACTED from real existence . . . but not from mental existence, is universal and can be considered either in itself AS REGARDS THE THING CONCEIVED, [in which case] it is the METAPHYSICAL UNIVERSAL, or relatively to inferiors (OR, AS REGARDS MODE [sic] OF CONCEIVING), whose property is PREDICABILITY, which is aptitude for predication, [in which case] it is the LOGICAL UNIVERSAL.”

\textsuperscript{168} Interpreting his words, I would add: a species.

\textsuperscript{169} I would add: or an accident, or a species.

\textsuperscript{170} Hence, based on this looseness of his expression, I believe that notes 168 and 169 are justified interpretations—and ones that can be said of Scotus’ own position.

\textsuperscript{171} Pázmány, Dialectica, q.5 dub. 3, p.148: “Ad secundum respondeo: convincere argumentum, quod non possint omnes species universalium inter se, sine comparatione ad inferiors. Unde album v.g. consideratum in communi, universale est, adhuc tamen indifferentes, ut sit genus vel proprium, vel accidens; nec nisi per
A final text from the questions on the *Metaphysics* will show that Scotus explicitly refers to this sort of mind-dependent relation as falling to the investigations of logic. This question arises in the midst of the Subtle Doctor’s probing of Aristotle’s exclusion of “being as the true and the false” from the subject of metaphysics. It is to this final text that we will now.

### 2.2.5 Ens Verum and Logical Being

In a recent article, Philip-Neri Reese discusses at length an important aporia that is reflected in Scotus’ position on the division of metaphysics and logic. He examines Scotus’ thought in light of the later scholastic tradition of supertranscendentals. This term, about which John Doyle has written much throughout his career, can seem quite odd to readers familiar with medieval theories of the transcendentals such as being, one, true, and good. As stated by Aertsen in the text that Reese uses as an introductory quotation for his essay, “The idea of a

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comparisonem ad inferiorea cognoscitur esse genus, vel proprium. Ex hoc autem solum sequitur, posse esse aliquid universale, quamvis non cognoscatur an sit genus etc., quod nihil absurdi est; unde huiusmodi naturae, antequam comparatur ad inferiorea, tantum convenit quod sit universale, non autem quod sit haec vel illa species universalis.”

A very similar position can be found in John Poinset, who as Muralt rightly observes, is greatly influenced by Scotus (through various means in the Dominican tradition as well as the Jesuit tradition) with regard to matters of cognition. See Muralt, “La doctrine médiévale de l’*esse objectivum*,” 92-98, esp.98. However, the two positions are not equivalent. Doyle also notes the proximity between Poinset and Hervaeus on several important points in Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality,” 91-92 and 96. See the important qualifying remarks in note 167 above.

See Ioannis a Sancta Thoma, *Ars logica seu de forma et materia ratiocinandi*, p.2 q.2 a.4 (303a42-b33): “Et dixi in conclusione, ‘ut entia rationis dicantur formaliter esse et non solum fundamentaliter.’ Nam fundamentum relationis rationis non requirit istam comparationem, ut patet, quando simplici abstractione denudatur natura a conditionibus individuantibus, et tamen ibi non est actus comparationis, sed sola praeecessio ab inferioribus. [NB:] Sed tunc universale non est logicum formaliter, sed metaphysicum, quod est fundamentum intentionis logicae, ut infra q. 4 dicetur.

[NB:] Unde colliges, quod in relationibus rationis contingit fieri denominationem, etiam antequam actu cognoscatur per comparationem ipsa relatio, solum per hoc, quod ponatur fundamentum. V.g. natura denominatur universalis hoc ipso, quod abstrahitur, etiam antequam actu comparatur; et litterae in libro clauso sunt signum, etiamsi actu non consideretur relatio signi, quae est rationis; et Deus denominatur Dominus, etiamsi actu non consideretur relatio dominii, sed ratione potentiae dominativae. In quo differentur relationes rationis a realibus, quia reales non nominant nisi existant, sicut non dicitur aliquis pater, nisi actu habeat relationem ad filium, nec similis, nisi habeat similitudinem, etiamsi habeat fundamentum. [NB:] *Cuius ratio est*, quia in relationibus rationis esse actuale ipsarum consistit in actualiter cognoscere obiective, quod non provenit ex fundamento et termino, sed ex intellectu.”
“supertranscendental” seems rather grotesque: Why and how should the most common concepts be transcended once again?”172 The question of supertranscendental properties arose in the course of questions asking whether or not certain predicates such as “intelligible” and even “being” are predicable of both mind-dependent and mind-independent being.173 The existence of such predicates would seem to open the way for a science that embraces the domain of metaphysics along with that of logical entities. This fact has led Doyle to muse that these problems are remote ancestors to modern discussion in epistemology, especially Kant’s conception of a pure object.174

Reese argues that there is an aporia in Scotus’ works due to his position concerning the univocity of being. Despite Scotus’ protestations that metaphysics and logic are separate sciences, Reese believes that arguments can be marshaled to show that metaphysics must include mind-dependent beings (i.e. entia rationis) in its scope. This would seem to make metaphysics a supertranscendental science, straddling the orders of mind-dependent and mind-independent being.175 Interestingly a similar sort of aporia vexes Doyle as he offers interpretive remarks to his edition of Hervaeus’ De secundis intentionibus. He states that he is not certain the discipline to which the treatise falls. Indeed, he states that while working on the edition, he was “expecting [Hervaeus] to introduce a form of epistemology or to expand either Metaphysics or Logic to

172 Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 635.


175 The issue is discussed throughout Reese, “Supertranscendentalism,” 542-560.
consider objective being and objectivity as such."\textsuperscript{176} This would squarely place the treatise in the domain of supertranscendentalism.

As regards Hervaeus, this does not seem to be a necessary conclusion. As will be argued below in chapter four, his remarks in the final question of the treatise appear to indicate that he is undertaking an extended metaphysical inquiry regarding the ontological status of second intentions. To the degree that it undertakes this project, the text is not wholly unrelated to De Rijk’s claim that the treatise is concerned with second intentions and their relationship to reality. However, as noted above, De Rijk’s monograph diminishes the visibility of the driving question behind the detailed inquiries undertaken in Hervaeus’ treatise. The question is not merely, “What is the ontological status of second intentions in relation to cognized reality?” It is, “What is the ontological status of second intentions in relation to reality, and can there be a science of such entities?” The second question is not a mere appendage. Instead, it rounds out the considerations in question, helping to locate \textit{ens verum} in its proper place within the domain of Aristotelian sciences.

Reese’s claims regarding Scotus have their merit, but this dissertation is not directly concerned with problems directly pertaining to the univocity of being. However, it is necessary to draw attention to several texts in a question from the \textit{Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis}. The critical question, one that is also utilized by Reese, is concerned with \textit{Metaphysics} E. As discussed above, this is one of the two locations in which the fourfold division of being is undertaken by Aristotle. Indeed, in Book E, Aristotle particularly was concerned to defend the unity of the science being discussed in the \textit{Metaphysics}. To

\textsuperscript{176} DSIDoyle, 23.
reiterate an important point from above: Aristotle felt it necessary to eliminate “being as the true
and the false” from the subject of this science.

Furthermore, it was argued in the previous chapter that in spite of the significant
differences in their conceptions of logic, thinkers as diverse as Kilwardby and Aquinas
recognized that this domain of being seemed to be proper to logic. For Aquinas, especially in the
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, this kind of being is an *ens rationis*. To the degree that second
intentions are non-real relations for Aquinas, they fall into this domain. To attribute this latter
position to Thomas requires a much more protracted study like that undertaken by Schmidt,
discussed above. Interestingly, even with his strongly “realist” tendencies, Kilwardby fits into
this general intellectual landscape. In one passage discussed above from the *De ortu*, he remarks
that speech and rational entities can only be said to exist in a diminished manner, thus linking
himself with the Arabico-Latin textual heritage that places true and false being within the domain
of *ens diminutum*. As discussed above, Scotus often uses language of *ens diminutum* in the
context of discussions of *esse obiectivum*, although as Cross’s recent study suggests, Scotus
might have become increasingly hesitant regarding the use of language concerning “diminished”
being for fear of reifying something that was not mean to express a firm manner of being akin to
mind-independent being.

In his third question on *Metaphysics* E, Scotus asks, “Whether *ens verum* falls under the
consideration of metaphysics.” The expression *ens verum* names the same domain as “being as
the true and false” discussed in Aristotle. For convenience in exposition, this brief Latin
expression will be maintained throughout what follows. In his conclusion to the question, Scotus
does not exclude every sense of truth from the considerations of metaphysics. This conclusion is
based upon the long arguments given throughout the body of the article. To understand the
distinction that he makes here, it is necessary to consider a set of divisions that he provides much earlier in his argumentation.

The divisions proposed by Scotus are quite complex, befitting his well-known subtlety. Before handling the question regarding *ens verum* vis-à-vis metaphysical science, Scotus notes that we must distinguish between truth inasmuch as it is found in things and inasmuch as it is found in the intellect. The first will be noted as $t\text{Real}$, the second as $t\text{Mind}$.$^{177}$

He proceeds to divide the first subdivision into a pair of further divisions. The first of these is the kind of truth that can be attributed to something inasmuch as it is compared to that which produces it. As will be seen, the context of this division is exemplarity. Therefore, this will be denoted as $t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity}}$. However, it is necessary to go further, for Scotus subdivides this group into three further subgroups: (1) absolute, (2) adequate, and (3) imitative. These will be represented respectively as $t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity[absolute]}}$, $t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity[adequate]}}$, and $t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity[imitative]}}$.\footnote{See *In Metaph.* 6, q.3, p.65:6-7: “Et primo distinguendum est de ‘vero’. Est enim veritas in rebus et veritas in intellectu.”}

In order to understand this division, it is easiest to begin with the latter two categories. Scotus remarks that $t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity[adequate]}}$ pertains to the Son of God, who Himself is truth and purely imitates the Father. This, he says, “Is pure conformity with adequation.”\footnote{Ibid., n.25, p.66:1: “Haec enim est conformitas cum adaequatione.”}

$t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity[imitative]}}$ applies to the kind of assimilation creatures have in any manner to their exemplar cause.\footnote{See ibid., p.66:1-3: “Tertius modus inventur in creatura quae imitatur exemplar cui aliquo modo assimilatur.”} The first manner that he provides, namely $t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity[absolute]}}$ is conformity of a product to its producer. While this type of exemplarity is, in a manner, found in the other

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$^{177}$ See *In Metaph.* 6, q.3, p.65:6-7: “Et primo distinguendum est de ‘vero’. Est enim veritas in rebus et veritas in intellectu.”

$^{178}$ See ibid., n.24, p.65:12-15: “Primo modo [scilicet per comparationem ad producentem]: aut dicitur veritas absolute, conformitas producti ad producens; aut determinate, conformitas talis secundum adaequationem; aut tertio modo determinate, conformitas secundum imitationem.”

$^{179}$ Ibid., n.25, p.66:1: “Haec enim est conformitas cum adaequatione.”

$^{180}$ See ibid., p.66:1-3: “Tertius modus inventur in creatura quae imitatur exemplar cui aliquo modo assimilatur.”
two categories, he states that according to the strict notion of each of these three, the senses of “truth” are equivocal.\(^{181}\)

The other division within \(t\text{Real}\) that Scotus proposes the kind of truthfulness that can be found in things insofar as they are compared to an intellect. Because this manner of speaking pertains to the intelligibility of real beings, it will be referred to as \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility}}\). In a manner similar to \(t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity}}\), he subdivides \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility}}\) into three subcategories as well. A careful understanding of this division will help to draw to the fore the ontological status he gives to second intentions.

The first two divisions of \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility}}\) pertain to wholly mind-independent being. The first is what Scotus calls “manifestive” truth. This is the very intelligibility of a given being such that it can manifest its nature to an intellect.\(^{182}\) Even if there were no intellect to know the given being, it would still be apt to manifest itself.\(^{183}\) This is the kind of verum in re that is here termed “manifestive” \((t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility[manifestive]}})\). The second kind of truth is called said to be the kind of truth spoken of because the thing in question is found in created (i.e. finite) intellects, which are “assimilative” \((t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility[assimilative]}})\).\(^{184}\) By this, he means to indicate the fact that finite intellects can have the qualitative alteration of the knower in real relation to the form of what is known. This second manner of speaking of “truth” would be the way that one thing is a “true

\(^{181}\) See ibid., p.65:16-19: “Et licet primus istorum trium modorum videatur esse communis secundo et tertio, tamen si nomen ‘veri’ imponatur ad significandum quodcumque trium praedictorum secundum proprietatem rationem, erit aequivocum.”

\(^{182}\) See ibid., n.26, p.66:5: “Primo, quia sui manifestativa—quantum est de se—cuicumque intellectui potenti manifestationem cognoscere.”

\(^{183}\) See ibid., n.28, p.66:17: “Quia si nullus esset intellectus, adhuc quaelibet res secundum gradum suae entitatis esset nata se manifestare.”

\(^{184}\) See ibid., n.29, p.67:1-3: Esse autem assimilativum dicit rationem activi respectu assimilabilis, et sequitur naturaliter esse manifestativum vel esse disparatum non habens ordinem ad ipsum.”
similitude” to another thing. Thus, the act of intellection (or the concept) can be a true similitude in which reality is known.

As regards the third kind of truth that is in the thing, it is there only as the known is in the knower (tReal_intelligibility[known in knower]).\textsuperscript{185} This kind of truth is always preceded by tReal_intelligibility[assimilative] “because such being in the intellect [i.e. esse objectivum] is posterior by nature to the act of intellection, for it is nothing other than a mind-dependent relation founded in the known object with respect to the act [of understanding].”\textsuperscript{186} Thus, the final kind of “truth” that is said to be “in” the thing is there only insofar as it exists in esse objectivum and has a mind-dependent relation to the intellect that knows it.

As Reese well notes in his discussion of this question, from the perspective of the generation of “entities”, ontological priority must be given to the acts of intellection that really occur in the knower.\textsuperscript{187} However, he only briefly remarks in a footnote a point that is quite important for understanding what Scotus is saying here. Namely, this is a truth that is found in things but only insofar as they are objects of intellection. This is the kind of objective being by which the known thing is present to the knower precisely as an object of knowledge. There is a world of difference between being a mind-independent thing that is not known and being a mind-independent thing that is an object of knowledge. To say that something is an object is to say that it is known. To be an object is to be related to a knowing power, albeit by a mind-dependent, or non-real, relation.

\textsuperscript{185} See ibid., n.26, p.66:8-9: “Tertio, quia facta manifestione vel assimilatione, res est in intellectu sicut cognitum in cognoscente.”

\textsuperscript{186} See ibid., n.29, p.67:3-6: “Sed semper assimilativum et assimilatio respectu intellectus assivi praecedet hoc quod est esse in intellectu, quia illud esse est posterius natura ipso actu intelligendi; nam non est nisi relatio rationis fundata in obiecto intellecto ad actum.” On the interrelation of the three types of truth, see the very difficult and subtle distinctions that Scotus makes in n.30 of the same question.

\textsuperscript{187} See Reese, “Supertranscendentality,” 555.
However, it would not be appropriate to call this sort of truth “objective truth.” This term should be reserved for the actual apprehension of the conformity of a judgment to reality. When Scotus carefully discusses the traditional Peripatetic adages regarding truth being found in judgments, he distinguishes between “formal” and “objective” truth. A judgment can be formally true even if one does not apprehend the conformity of the judgement to reality. It is only by means of the latter apprehension that truth is objectively in the intellect, i.e. when the knower is aware of the mind-dependent relation of conformity of the judgment to reality.¹⁸⁸ Scotus discusses this point while contrasting the truth and falsity of judgments to the ignorance (as well as “virtual falsity”) and truth proper to the intellect’s first operation.¹⁸⁹

Important as these discussions are, what is most important for our purposes is to note how the aforementioned six-fold division of $t_{Real}$ is a separate matter from the sorts of truth and falsity pertaining directly to the intellect’s operation—i.e. $t_{Mind}$ mentioned above. As Scotus closes his discussion of the question of $ens$ $verum$ and the subject of metaphysics, he states, “Aristotle precisely excludes ‘truth in complex knowledge [in judgments],’ just as is expressly obvious in his own words, and quite understandably so.”¹⁹⁰ He says that this is either because

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¹⁸⁸ See Scotus, *In Metaph.* 6, q.3 n.36-37, p.69:5-19: “Secunda differentia est in modo essendi veritatis in hac operatione et illa [scil. prima]. Licet enim sit in utraque operatione veritas propria formaliter, non tamen obiective, sed tantum in secunda. Nam neutra veritas est in intellectu obiective nisi reflectente se super actum suum, comparando illum ad objectum, quae reflexio in cognosendo, scilicet quod actus talis est similis vel dissimilis, non est sine compositione et divisione. Patet autem distinctio istorum modorum essendi veritatis in intellectu, scilicet formaliter et obiective quantum ad primam operationem.

Quoad secundum operationem declaratur: quia intellectus multas propositiones format et apprehendit actu secundo, quae tamen sunt sibi neutrae, ex I *Topicorum*. Licet ergo sit in illo actu formaliter veritas vel falsitas—aut quia est conformis rei extra aut non—, tamen non est obiective, quia non apprehenditur ista conformitas.” See also, Demange, *Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir*, 240-260.

¹⁸⁹ See ibid., n.31-64.

¹⁹⁰ See ibid., n.70, p.82:10-12: “Ad propositam igitur quaestionem dico quod Aristoteles praecise excludit ‘verum in intellectu complexo’, sicut expresse patet in littera eius, et rationabiliter.”
such truth is a real accident in the mind, hence falling to the *De anima* for investigation.\(^{191}\) or because such truth is a mind-dependent relation (lit. *relatio rationis*) founded in the act of reason, particularly the kind of mind-dependent relation (lit. *habitudine rationis*) that is found between objects that are compared by knowledge. Thus, truth is in this sense is a second-intentional property of judgments, just as are modes of predication such as “possible” and “impossible.”\(^{192}\)

However, after laying out his interpretation of Aristotle’s explicit intention, the Subtle Doctor then pronounces his opinion concerning the full truth of the matter. He states that all three of \(t\text{Real}_{\text{exemplarity}}\) pertain to metaphysics, as they do contract being neither to material quantification nor to motion. Hence, they are apt for metaphysical discussions. In the division of \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility}}\), only \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility} [\text{manifestive}]}\) pertains to metaphysics, for all beings are manifestive of their intelligibility. Unsurprisingly, \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility} [\text{assimilative}]}\) does not pertain to metaphysics, for such being is limited to the mind-independent qualities such as the act of intellection. This is only a particular category of being and is not convertible with the whole of being as such.

Now, the case of \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility} [\text{known in knower}]}\) is most interesting. Scotus’s conclusion deserves citation in full:

> The third [namely \(t\text{Real}_{\text{intelligibility} [\text{known in knower}]}\)] is a diminished sort of being [lit. *ens deminutum*] and properly speaking a logical being. Whence, all second intentions are predicated of such being, and therefore they are excluded from metaphysics. However, this kind of being is convertible with being in some manner, for the logician considers all things in some manner just like the metaphysician. However, they do so by different manners of consideration, namely through something real and through a second intention. [They consider all things equally] just as there is a convertibility of unqualified being [lit. *entis*]

\(^{191}\) See ibid., p.82:12-15: “Patet enim ex dictis quod vel est mentis aliqua passio realis, scilicet relatio, secundum secundam opinionem, et tunc illa, sicut et prima veritas, pertinet ad considerationem libri De anima.”

\(^{192}\) See ibid., p.82:17-83:1: “Vel est relatio rationis fundata in actu intelligendi, aut magis in habitudine rationis, quae est inter objecta comparata per actum intelligendi, secundum primam opinionem. Et tunc est mentis aliqua passio originaliter, sed formaliter pertinet ad considerationem logici, sicut et 'possibile' et 'impossibile' et modi compositionum omnes.”
simpliciter] and diminished being [lit. *ens deminutum*], for neither exceeds the other in commonality; indeed, anything that is unqualified being is able to be diminished being. As concerns the two modes of truth in the intellect, the case has already been stated.\textsuperscript{193}

This passage is quite striking in its consequences. Recall that much earlier in this question, Scotus had stated that *tRealintelligibility [known in knower]* is “nothing other than a mind-dependent relation founded in the known object with respect to the act [of understanding].” In the longer text translated above, he says that second intentions are predicated of such beings. What he exactly means by this is a little opaque. It would seem that he is stating that insofar as something is considered as a foundation for a mind-dependent relation, it can function as the foundation for a second intention. However, this would seem to imply that he means that first intentions are also a kind of diminished being, a point that he explicitly denies later in his career in *Ord.* 4 d.1 q.2.\textsuperscript{194} If the language is taken very strictly, it could seem that he is saying that second intentions are predicated of the relation itself. This does not make complete sense.

Perhaps the passage can be understood in the following manner. To speak of a first intention already requires one to be discussing the fact that the thing known exists as an object of cognition. Thus, a first intention could be said to have “two faces.” On the one hand, when one


\textsuperscript{194} See Scotus, *Ord.* 4 d.1 p.2 q.2, n.184, ed. Vat. XI, p.64:62-75: “Nec est—tertio—ens rationis, quod est tantum ens deminutum, quia proprie ‘quid’, sicut et ens, non competit nisi enti reali ut patet V et VI Metaphysicae. Nec intelligo hic ‘ens rationis’ quod est in intellectu objective (quia sic omne universale est in anima), nect illud quod est tantum in intellectu subjective (quia sic intellectio et scientia sunt in anima, quae tamen scientia et consideratio sunt formae reales et in genere qualitatis); sed intelligo ens in anima tamquam secundo consideratum, non tamquam primum consideratum (ad quod considerandum movetur primo anima a re extra), sed tamquam ens in primo considerato in quantum consideratum; et tale, ut in summa sit dicere, non est nisi relatio rationis, quia nihil habet praecise esse in considerato ut considerato, nisi comparatio qua consideratum comparatur ad alium per actum considerantis. Ens ergo deminutum, ut hic accipitur, universaliter est ens rationis.” See also Maurer, “*Ens diminutum,*” 221n26.
speaks of a first intention, what could be meant is the concrete thing known—the quiddity
directly known, though in a universal manner. However, the first intention could also be taken
as referring to the quiddity specifically paying attention to the fact that it is known. Thus, the
first way of speaking would be concerned with a known thing, whereas the second would be
concerned with a known thing. To discuss the first intention in this manner would be to
prepare to discuss it as a foundation for second intentions.

This second way of speaking is perhaps the more proper way of speaking of “first”
intentions. By denoting them as “first”, we imply the fact that we are looking toward
second intentions. Thus, our focus is on the fact that the first intention is a known thing. We
are aware of the fact that it involves a mind-dependent relation to the knower precisely because
we are focusing on an object of intellection.

However, because the objective content of the first intention is the essence itself, it is
easy to begin speaking of first intentions in a manner that confuses the mind-independent and
mind-dependent aspects involved in such intentions. Indeed, given that the formal content of a
first intention is a mind-independent essence, to speak of a first intention in a concrete manner is
indeed to speak of the first intention as something mind-independent. The latent equivocation of
these two senses of “first intention” is very important and must be heeded. To borrow a term

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195 See De Rijk, “A Study,” 23. This theme comes to the fore with regard to Hervaeus in Hamid Taieb,
“The ‘Intellected Thing’ (res intellecta) in Hervaeus Natalis,” Vivarium 53 (2015): 26-44. This article, which has
many important things to say regarding Hervaeus’s theory of cognition, suffers from a heavily “cognitional
hermeneutic” in its remarks concerning the De secundis intentionibus when the Taieb interprets selections from this
text. The author does admit that the treatise is concerned with the subject of logic. However, he also shows that he
has not thoroughly considered the problem of relation as central to the text’s goals. Hence, on page 27, Taieb
briskly refers to second intentions as “concepts of concepts, for example ‘species’ or ‘genus’, ascribed to first
intentions, i.e., concepts of things.” This is far too simple of a posing of the problem, and it completely misses the
broader role of relation in establishing the nature of all of the various kinds of second intentions that can be formed
by the intellect.

196 This is well brought out in Pini, Categories and Logic, 27-32.
from Doyle, first intentions have their natural habitat, so to speak, “on the borders of being and knowing.”

Thus, to return to the passage from Scotus, when we consider first intentions precisely insofar as they are the potential foundation for second intentions (i.e. insofar as they are known), they are a kind of diminished being. In this passage, it would seem that such second intentions could even be predicated of the objects of the first operation of the intellect. A first intention could be denominated “known” merely by comparing the knower and the first intention, noting that the first intention has a particular kind of relation that accrues to it. Thus, just as James can be called a father because of his mind-independent relation to his son, so too can humanity be denominated “known” because of the mind-dependent relation that it has to the intellect which has it for its object.

At this point, however, we return to my somewhat unique reading of Scotus’ texts on second intentions. From what has been said in the previous section as well as this one, I believe that this reading is justifiable. It helps us to understand how Scotus can hold that the syllogism is the subject of logic and that logic has second intentional being as its common domain of being. Anything, insofar as it is known, can be the subject of a second intention. Whether that second intention be established by the first, the second, or the third act of the intellect, it is a kind of mind-dependent relation made among things that are known. The one unique case seems to be the relation found at the beginning of the process, namely the unidirectional relation of the knower to the known. In this case, the direct act of knowledge, with no further activity or ordering, establishes a comparison that implies a mind-dependent relation (namely from the thing known to the knower). Thus, a comparison is involved, though only in an implicit manner.

\[197\] See footnote 75 in the introduction.
It must be stressed that Scotus does not deal in detail with these issues. However, his constant opinion that second intentions are mind-dependent relations provides a framework for understanding second intentions beyond the viewpoint of the five predicables discussed in the *Isagoge* as well as the logical intentions of universality and particularity (or individuality).

2.3 Concluding Remarks Concerning Interpretational Trajectory

Admittedly, this reading of Scotus’s position is unique in comparison to contemporary literature. The Subtle Doctor is not always clear on this matter, so the interpretation is only offered as a possible reading of the texts in question. The benefit of this reading is that it shows the forward-looking potential of the Subtle Doctor’s thought. In addition to later self-proclaimed Scotists, various aspects of Scotus’s thought (including, but not limited to the notion of *esse obiectivum* or *esse intelligibile*) would remain operative in the Dominican tradition of Thomistic interpretation.  

198 These two major *scholae*, presupposing a robust account of relation as part of their understanding of logic, offer doctrinal options that are distinct in contrast to the approaches that would arise in later nominalism. Though all of these schools would crossfertilize with the passage of time, it is important to note the beginning élan that is detectable in the Subtle Doctor himself.

199 As regards Hervaeus’s own doctrine in the *De secundis intentionibus*, it is inexplicable that studies of the text have paid only the slightest of attention to possible Scotistic influences. As will be seen in the next two chapters, the doctrines exposited in the text are uniquely Hervaeus’ own articulations. However, they are framed from the very beginning in terms that

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198 See note 171 above.

199 Aspects of this commingling can be seen in the narrative presented in John Deely, *New Beginnings: Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). Some caution should be taken in reading Deely’s narrative, as he clearly wishes to promote his own particular opinions about the importance of Poinset’s treatment of signs.
are very reminiscent of Scotus’s language. Indeed, the distinction of *esse subiectivum* and *esse obiectivum* plays a central and explicit role from the first question onward. Likewise, the entire theory of second intentions explicated in the text is a relational theory. It is not merely a matter of carefully distinguishing *relationships* among cognitional “tools”, as one is led to believe in light of the lengthy study presented by De Rijk.\(^{200}\) This sort of interpretation fails to understand the careful reasoning of Hervaeus’s treatise wherein he utilizes the nature of the Aristotelian category of *relation* with great care to explain just what sort of mind-dependent relations are second intentions.

A theory of second intentions as non-real relations is, of course, not unique to Scotus. As observed in the first chapter, this same viewpoint can be attributed to Aquinas. Schmidt’s monograph attempts to do just this, though not without himself occasionally using a form of the doctrine of *esse obiectivum*. As regards Hervaeus, Scotistic influence is almost certain. Isabel Iribarren has argued convincingly that Hervaeus’s accounts of relation evidence a mixture of Scotus’s doctrine of the formal distinction and Aquinas’s distinction between the *ratio* and *esse* of relations to explain the particular kind of reality involved in relational being.\(^{201}\)

Similarly, in a study devoted to Scotus’s late career positions concerning mental content and *esse obiectivum*, Peter King notes the linkage between the vocabulary of the Subtle Doctor and Hervaeus. King opines that Scotus “seems to have been the first to use this turn of phrase.”\(^{202}\) Likely, Henry of Ghent lies behind some of Scotus’s use of *ut cognitum in cognoscente* as a synonym for *esse obiectivum* in contrast to *esse subiectivum*.\(^{203}\) Likewise, at

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\(^{200}\) See De Rijk, “A Study,” 296.

\(^{201}\) See Isabel Iribarren, “The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis’s Interpretation of Thomism,” 607-627.

\(^{202}\) King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” in *Duns Scot à Paris*, 79n25.

\(^{203}\) See remarks in note 252 in the previous chapter.
least one reference in Simon of Faversham suggests that, prior to Scotus, there was discussion of
distinction akin to that between esse obiectivum and subjectivum. In particular, consider the
striking remarks made in Quaestiones veteres super libro Posteriorum, q.17 ad 3:

The expression “to perceive something” is able to be understood in a twofold manner—
either objectively [lit. obiective] or informatively [lit. informative]. Something is
perceived by the intellect under the notion of an object [lit. sub ratione obieci] and
something under the notion of informing [sub ratione informantis]. The nature and
quiddity of the thing is perceived by the intellect sub ratione obiecti because that which is
the object of any power is that the knowledge of which perfects the given power. Now,
however, cognition of the thing according to its quiddity and essence is that which
perfects the intellect, for it is not content with the species that informs it—but, by means
of the species, it is led to cognition of the thing with respect to its interior, as with respect
to its quiddity and nature, and therefore the essence and the quiddity of the thing is thus
considered from the perspective of being an object [lit. se habet in ratione obiecti].
However, the species and similitude are considered from the perspective of informing the
intellect [lit. se habet in ratione informantis intellectu], and the intellect that is thus
informed by the species is led into the very thing itself. Therefore, the intellect perceives
the thing under the notion of being an object [lit. sub ratione obiecti] and the similitude
under the notion of informing [lit. sub ratione informantis].

Nevertheless, as was seen in the discussions of Scotus, the Subtle Doctor uses the
distinction extensively in his works, even when referring to it using terminology other than the
strict expressions esse subjectivum and esse obiectivum. In any case, what is most interesting is
that King remarks about Hervaeus’ usage of esse obiectum in his De intellectu et specie as well
as in his third quodlibet. King notes that contemporary Parisian debates are clearly in the
background of Hervaeus’ writings. This leads him to speculate, “It is plausible to think that

204 This text is cited in Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 273n1. A critical edition has been
made available online by John Longeway. See Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Posteriorum, ed. John
Longeway, last modified January 1, 2014, accessed November 20, 2015,
https://longeway.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/table-of-contents-for-fav1.pdf. See Quaestiones veteres super libro
Posteriorum, q.17 ad 3: “Percipere aliquid” potest intelligi dupliciter, vel obiective vel informative. Aliquid
percipiatur ab intellectu sub ratione obiecti et aliquid sub ratione informantis. Natura et quidditas rei percipiatur ab
intellectu sub ratione obiecti, quia illud quod est obiectum alciuvis potentiae est illud cuius cognitio perficit illam
potentiam. Nunc autem cognitione rei quantum ad suam quidditatem et essentiam est quae perficit intellectum, non
enim est contentus specie informante ipsum. Sed per speciem, fertur in cognitionem rei quantum ad interiora eius, ut
quantum ad quidditatem et naturam, et ideo essentia et quidditas rei se habet in ratione obiecti. Species autem et
similitudo se habet in ratione [in]formantis intellectu, et intellectus sic informatus specie fertur in ipsam rem. Sic
ergo intellectus percipiatur rem sub ratione obiecti et similitudinem sub ratione informantis.”
Scotus was the direct or indirect source of those debates.” As noted above, given that the topic of esse intelligibile took on an important life in the Scotistic school, it is at least plausible that these debates were influential at the time of Hervaeus’s writing of the De secundis intentionibus, which builds its entire doctrinal apparatus on the initial distinction between esse subiectivum and esse obiectivum.

Finally, another likely candidate for Scotistic influences on a cognate topic in Hervaeus can be found in his treatment of the Divine Ideas. As noted above, esse obiectivum (or esse intelligibile) plays a critical role in Scotus’ account concerning this classic medieval topic. In the introduction to his edition of the De secundis intentionibus, Doyle notes that the theme of objective existence is attributed to Hervaeus’ treatment of divine cognition by later Baroque scholastics. In particular he notes John Poinsot’s citation of Hervaeus in the context of disputations concerning the Divine Eternity. Poinsot’s citation is really second hand, taken from a remark made by Molina. The immediate concern is whether or not an existing thing is contained and measured by the Divine Eternity even before it exists in itself. Molina cites Hervaeus’s I Sent. d.38, which is concerned with the question of predestination and merit. The claim is that in the text in question, Hervaeus expresses a view that would have the known thing in the Divine Intellect only according to objective existence. This exact language is difficult to find in Hervaeus himself even if this general doctrinal outlook is arguably in the text.

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205 See King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” 79n25.


Actually, this attribution to Hervaeus helps to draw light to the general difficulty of placing him directly in a line of “Thomistic defenders.” Granted, as discussed above in the introduction, Hervaeus is said to have penned a defense of Aquinas in the midst of his varied polemics. However, in the text cited by Molina, Hervaeus does not make an explicit defense of Thomas. The explicit sort of defense that seems to be indicated by Molina’s text should, instead, be looked for in the other sources, namely the Conflatus ex Sancto Thomae of Sylvestro Mazzolini Prieras and the Novarum Defensionum Doctrinae Angelici Doctoris Beati Thomae de Aquina super Primum Librum Sententiarum of Didacus de Deza (1444-1523). At least according to the current state Hervaeus’s texts, he does not express his position in terms of a defense of the Angelic Doctor. A careful study of the text is needed to see if it agrees exactly with exposition that Molina attributes to him. A fair and complete treatment of this topic is outside of the scope of this dissertation.

Still, it is helpful to realize that concerns with objective existence are not absent from Hervaeus’ Commentary on the Sentences, even if they are sparse. In the context of his discussion of the Divine Ideas in I Sent. d.34, he does make a strikingly clear usage of objective existence as he responds to a final objection in the text. He states that creatures are present in the Divine Intellect objectively, one with the perfection of the Divine Essence. The remark is quite close to what is attributed to him in the context of Poinsot’s disputation. A full and measured study of Hervaeus’ treatment of Divine Cognition would require a devoted textual

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208 See note 27 in the introduction to this dissertation.  
209 See Fredosso’s remarks in Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, 100n7.  
210 See Hervaeus, In I Sent. q.34 a.3 ad 3 (p.144): “Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud esse secundum quod creatura relucet in intellectu Dei ut quoddam repraesentatum, & intellectum, est ipsum esse creatum existens, vel possibile existere, & illud sic obiective existens in intellectu, una cum perfectione divinae essentiae: est causa dictae diversitatis: & illud esse non idea, sed est ideatum: unde ponere quod diversitas creaturarum intellectuarum sit ratio diversitatis idearum: nec est ponere quod idem sit causa suipsius.”
work before a critical edition could exist even as a source text for such an investigation.

Nevertheless, the presence of the theme of objective existence in such important topics would indicate that this is an important presupposition to his thought. Given that he uses the distinction from the beginning of the *De secundis intentionibus*, it is puzzling that this point is not stressed more clearly in the interpretive literature on the treatise.

In the following two chapters, an exegesis of Hervaeus’s treatise will be presented. The focus of this reading will be to trace two key themes. The first will pay heed to the account of second intentions expressed in the first four questions of the treatise. The specific goal of the interpretation will be to bring out the overall thematic development expressed in Hervaeus’s treatise. After this, the fifth question will be read in detail to help understand Hervaeus’s own detailed account on the relationship between second intentional being and the domain of logic.

In the course of the third and fourth chapters, it will become evident that many of the treatments of Hervaeus’s treatise fail to see the complete speculative import of the project undertaken therein. The key division at hand is that of *esse subiectivum* and *esse obiectivum* and the precise manner that the latter domain pertains to logic. As regards the metaphysics of mind-independent being, it could be said that the treatise develops in greater detail the distinction already at play in Scotus’s thought, namely between the mind-independent thing and that same thing considered as the object of cognition.²¹¹

²¹¹ On this point, see the clear remarks that were marshalled in Hervaeus’s defense by his student Francisco da Prato, cited in note 163 of the next chapter.

Jacques Maritain, trained as he was through the medium of Poinso (whose writings contain many Scotistic resonances), sees part of the difficulties at play in Scotus concerning the issue of objective existence, though he seems to miss the mark regarding Scotus’s doctrine of *esse obiectivum*. In *Degrees of Knowledge* 137n125, Maritain directly links Scotus’s doctrine of *esse obiectivum* to Cartesian idealism, giving *esse obiective* a kind of intermediary status. This unfortunate interpretation on the part of Maritain seems to be tied to the cited article by Roland Dalbiez. For instance, see Dalbiez, 467: “Pour Scot, l’*esse cognitum* n’est pas un être réel, c’est certain, et Scot polémique longuement contre Henri de Gand, auquel il reproche une thèse de ce genre, mais il n’est pas davantage une relation de raison; Scot l’en distingue expressément, puisqu’il déclare qu’une relation de raison l’accompagne. . . . Descartes et Scot accordent à l’être objectif la même consistance indéfinissable.” Again, ibid.,
subtle nuances that help to communicate the metaphysics involved in this distinction. In what follows, it will be argued that Hervaeus perspicaciously develops these metaphysical topics with impressive depth.

465: “Pour les thomistes l’esse objectivum n’est qu’un être de raison; pour les scotistes, il est plus qu’un être de raison.” This interpretation is understandable if one overly reifies ens diminutum in Scotus. For instance, one could read the text in note 193 above in this manner. However, the benefit of studies like King’s and Cross’ is to show the growing awareness Scotus had for the need to be careful about such language.

These matters are treated by Pini, who notes both ways of interpreting Scotus. Importantly, too, Pini makes a critical distinction between (1) being mind-independent and (2) existing extra-mentally. Even when something “Dodo” is understood, the essence in question is mind-independent, though given that it only exists as an object of thought, it happens to exist only “in the mind”—i.e. as both a subjective quality and as a quiddity that is related to the knower as an object (i.e. as having a relation of the known to the knower). See Pini, 23-24. See also remarks in note 58 in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Hervaeus’s Treatise Qq. 1-4 — Intentions and Reality

3.1 Introduction

Hervaeus Natalis has a reputation for a labyrinthine and difficult style.¹ This attribution of difficulty is understandable, given the nature of the treatise. As the back-matter of Doyle’s edition of the text wittily states, it is a “multi-layered reflection on things and non-things, [a] reflection on Hervaeus’s thinking itself, and [a] reflection on his thinking about things and non-things.”² Still, as Judith Dijs has argued in a recent article, the text is indeed a well-articulated whole with one primary goal, namely the explication of the nature of the subject of logic.³

From the perspective of the order of themes, this topic is the obvious terminus ad quem of the treatise. The treatise is divided into five questions, each of which is divided into particular articles addressing the question’s main concern.⁴ The first two questions are concerned with the nature of first and second intentions, each considered in themselves. From the first question, which is primarily concerned with first intentions, Hervaeus clearly has in mind his upcoming discussions, both of second intentions themselves (the subject of the second question) and of the relationship between first and second intentions (the subject of the third and fourth questions).

¹ See Dijs, “Hervaeus Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic,” 197: “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that Hervaeus Natalis is not the clearest of writers. His explanations are elaborate and intricate and the structure of his arguments is often very complex.”
² See DSIDoyle, back matter.
³ See Dijs, “Hervaeus Natlis on the Proper Subject of Logic,” 197-198.
⁴ Lacking a better edition, I have chosen to follow Doyle’s method of referring to each major division as a “question” and each sub question as an “article.” Dijs’s edition refers to these as “distinction” and “question,” respectively. (De Rijk favors this as well.) At times, Hervaeus’s own language, at least as represented in Doyle’s text, leads one to favor “question” where Doyle uses “article.” Still, granted that scholarship by Amerini, Koridze, and Taieb all use the same method as used by Doyle, I have chosen to follow his method of referring to the divisions of the text.
The fifth question is concerned with human cognition of second intentions, specifically how they are considered by the logician⁵ as well as by the metaphysician.⁶

From a merely quantitative standpoint, this fifth question receives the greatest amount of discussion by Hervaeus. Dijs is correct to note this by stating that this question is “by far the largest part of the book.”⁷ Strictly by the number of pages devoted to each question, the treatise’s five questions respectively have lengths of 35, 48, 40, 56, and 86 pages. Thus, the final question is 30 pages longer than the next longest question. Given that the questions respectively have 5, 6, 4, 3, and 4 articles each, the average page count per article for each question is 7, 8, 10, 18.67, and 21.5 pages. If we were to exclude the fifth question’s brief final article concerning how metaphysics is concerned with second intentions, the difference would be even more striking, yielding an average page count of 26 pages for the first three articles in the fifth question, significantly more than for any of the other questions.

Granted, philosophical matters cannot be naively measured in terms of the category of quantity. Thus, the statistics are, at best, an indicator regarding Hervaeus’s interest in the De secundis intentionibus. As was stated in the introduction to this dissertation, only Koridze has undertaken a full treatment of Hervaeus’s treatise, reading the text as laying the foundations for what he terms “philosophical logic.”⁸ His treatment is primarily a sequential reading of the text, though he does aver to the views of other figures in the course of his exposition. Other scholars have read select portions of Hervaeus’s treatise in light of earlier thinkers, especially Simon of

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⁵ See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1-3 (p.511-588).
⁶ See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.4 (p.595).
⁷ Dijs, “Hervaeus Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic,” 198. However, her article’s focus on the divisions of senses of “intention” ultimately shifts the focus to the matters early in the treatise, briskly passing over the whole of question five in a matter of two paragraphs.
⁸ See note 44 above in the introduction.
Faversham and Radulphus Brito, or in light of later thinkers like Giraldus Odonis, Peter Aureol, William of Ockham, and later Dominicans.

In this chapter and the next one, I will present a set of thematic treatments that will combine the methodologies that have been prevalent in the literature concerned with Hervaeus. My primary method will be careful textual exposition on the key themes needed for understanding Hervaeus’s project in the *De secundis intentionibus*. This method is most akin to that of Koridze, but unlike his work, I will not always proceed through the text in the order of Hervaeus’s own exposition. While I will draw attention to the overall argumentative structure of the treatise, I intend to present thematically the key structural points in the treatise that help to show its place in the overall narrative sketched in the first two chapters of this dissertation, namely the placement of logic in the Aristotelian domain of “being as the true and the false.” This thematic treatment will draw to the foreground Hervaeus’s doctrine of logical intentionality in a clear manner.

In the course of presenting this thematic content, I will occasionally engage with the known background to Hervaeus’s treatise. The clearest authoritative source for him is Aristotle, though he also cites Averroes and Porphyry. As regards his contemporary interlocutors,

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9 Such has been the work of Dijs, Pinborg, and De Rijk. See notes 18, 37, 43 in the introduction.

10 This is the master hermeneutic for De Rijk, whose monograph actually considers a number of thinkers, some times with a bit of eclecticism, which in particular is evidenced by his treatment of topics like objective existence. On this point see note 24 and 25 in the second chapter of this dissertation. As will be noted below, since De Rijk focuses on questions that are directly pertinent to Giraldus’s critiques of Hervaeus, he overlooks some critical passages where Hervaeus shows that he is interested in clarifying not only the basic questions of the ontology of second intentions vis-à-vis the Porphyrian predicables but also as regards the products of the three operations of the intellect.

11 Such has been the work of Perler. See note 38 in the introduction.

12 Such has been the work of Rode and Amerini. See notes 39 and 40 in the introduction.

13 Such has been the work of Tavuzzi especially, though some of this topic gets focus from Koridze. See note 31 in the introduction.

14 See DSIDoyle, 22.
Hervaeus does not explicitly cite the personages who are the sources for the objections raised in his text, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact authors against whom he is writing. Where there are clear cases of such authors in the background of Hervaeus’s treatise, their positions will be noted in order to help elucidate Hervaeus’s own thought.

The fourth chapter of this dissertation will be devoted to an exposition of the fifth question of the *De secundis intentionibus*, explaining Hervaeus’s placement of logic among the other disciplines. The current chapter is devoted to the major conceptual themes that are necessary for addressing the concerns discussed in the fourth chapter. Thus, this third chapter primarily focuses on content taken from the first four questions of the treatise, though at times it will be necessary to draw from the fifth question to round out discussions of some topics.

Following the current introductory remarks, there are four subsections to the current chapter. The first main section is devoted to Hervaeus’s own explicit remarks situating the treatise vis-à-vis the concerns of logic. In this section, special emphasis will be given to his explicit remarks that situate the *De secundis intentionibus* vis-à-vis Aristotle’s domain of “being as the true and the false.” From these discussions, the second major theme will arise, namely Hervaeus’s position regarding the ontological status of second intentions, namely as mind-dependent relations. This second subsection most clearly ties Hervaeus’s outlook to that of Scotus, though he adds a number of details to those found in the Subtle Doctor. Finally, the third section provides a brief catalogue of what counts as a second intention for Hervaeus. In this regard, Hervaeus builds on the themes discussed above regarding the intentions formed by all three acts of the intellect. In light of this full catalogue of second intentions, this final section will close by presenting Hervaeus’s account of the relationships between things, first intentions, and the various kinds of second intentions.
3.2 Hervaeus on Logic and “Being as the True and False”

3.2.1 In What Domain of Being?

The exact discipline appropriate to the *De secundis intentionibus* is difficult to ascertain at first glance. It is understandable that Doyle had expected something akin to the 17th century discussions of supertranscendentals that has been the focus of much of his research. Hervaeus’s treatise clearly is treating something more metaphysical than the types of topics initially raised in Aristotelian discussions of the *De anima*. In particular, his extensive discussions of objective being and its distinction from real being explicitly attempts to expand the Aristotelian domain of “being as the true and false.”

The primary difficulty for interpreting the disciplinary scope of the treatise lies in the fact that one could argue in either of two manners. On the one hand, one could say that Hervaeus’s aim is to delineate the context of logical science and establish the scope of the subject of the science. In this manner, it can seem to be the propaedeutic to logic and, hence, a treatise in an expanded form of Aristotelian logic—one that is more self-conscious about the need for discussing the nature of the science’s subject than was the Stagirite but still an enterprise that is primarily logical.

On the other hand, it is arguable that the treatise is a portion of a broader metaphysical project, namely the discussion of second intentions as one being among the various types of mind-dependent being, ultimately related to the mind-independent being discussed in metaphysics. While these discussions help to clarify one’s conception of logic, they are not primarily matters of logic. Instead, the *De secundis intentionibus* would function to expand the discussions of metaphysics so as to help relate mind-dependent types of being within the broader
Aristotelian ontology, which primarily is focused upon being in the ten categories, especially as illuminated by substance and discussions of act and potency.\footnote{Though numerous commentators have noted this through the centuries, a recent and lucid study can be found in Aryeh Kosman, \textit{The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).}

Without wholly disavowing the importance of the \textit{De secundis intentionibus} vis-à-vis the first perspective, this dissertation will argue for the second general option. However, as will become evident in the discussions in the next chapter, Hervaeus’s treatment is incomplete at best. This fact is no major problem, for the \textit{De secundis intentionibus} is primarily a set of disputed questions focused on the nature of second intentions. It is not a kind of \textit{cursus metaphysicus} in the style of later scholastic authors. Nevertheless, in the course of the disputed questions in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}, Hervaeus manages to make numerous important observations regarding the ontology of logical relations.

Having prefaced with these remarks, it will be helpful nevertheless to consider several passages in which Hervaeus clearly enunciates the logical importance of his discussion of second intentions. By considering several texts from the body of the first four questions of the treatise, it will be clear that his interest is directly focused on the final question of the treatise, namely the question pertaining to second intentions’s suitability as a subject for scientific treatment in logic. While I will argue that this “logic-oriented focus” is ultimately a “metaphysical affair” (insofar as the task itself requires Hervaeus to provide what could be called a “metaphysics of second intentionality”), it remains pivotally important to heed the trajectory of his writing, namely toward the \textit{terminus ad quem} that is the fifth question.

It is telling that Hervaeus is quite clear that he is worried about logic-related affairs from the very first question of the treatise. The first question of the treatise opens by asking whether it is proper to say that a first intention is the intelligible species. In the course of deploying a series
of distinctions that will be discussed in section 3.3 of this dissertation, he makes a remark that is
telling about the concerns of the whole treatise. After noting that there is a way to say that the
intelligible species is a “first” intention, he states,

[Such a concession] does little for for the [question] proposed because when one asks
about a first intention insofar as it is being considered here, that is, insofar as logic
employs [the notions of] first or second intention, it is not taken from the
perspective of the intellect [lit. ex parte intellectus] as an accident inhering in it. Rather,
it is taken insofar as it holds from the perspective of the thing that is known [lit. ex parte
obiecti] in the way that has already been discussed and as will be said now (emphasis
added). 16

It is important to note that from the beginning, Hervaeus is quite clear that his concerns are not
primarily with matters of cognition. He is concerned with logic and, as will be seen, with the
continuous clarification of just how a non-real relation can be the foundation for the logical
sciences. Indeed, his perspective is on the thing known [i.e. ex parte obiecti], not the knower
[i.e. ex parte intellectus].

In q.2 a.1, Hervaeus asks whether a second intention is the actual act of intellection. 17 In
the course of presenting the fourth principal objection, the interlocutor states—as though it were
quite evident without much argumentation—that acts of understanding and second intentions are
the formal object of logic. 18 The upshot of the complete argument is that all second intentions

16 DSIDijis, q.1 a.1 (p.120:20-24): “Sed hoc parum facit ad propositum, quia quando quieritur de intentione
prima, non accipitur intentio prout se tenet ex parte intellectus ut accidens ei inhaerens, sed prout se tenet ex parte
obiecti modo quo expositum est, et sic iam dicetur.”

17 In the beginning of his response, Hervaeus dismisses what appears to be Radulphus Brito’s position,
which he had already discussed and dismissed in the course of q.1 a.2 of the treatise. Another possibility is
considered as well, namely, that the act of intellection is a second intention, while the thing itself is the first
intention. On Brito’s division of the senses of “intention,” see note 90 below where this is discussed in closer
proximity to Hervaeus’s own division. As regards Hervaeus’s response to the second possibility, see note 68 below.

18 See ibid., q.2 a.1 (p.165:3-16): “Ea quae sunt unum obiectum formale intellectus, sunt unum re et ratione.
Sed secunda intentio et actus intelligendi sunt huiusmodi. Ergo, etc. Maior patet quia: Unum formale obiectum
intellectus est unius rationis, quia ad diversitatem rationis diversificatur obiectum formale intellectus, et per
consequens est unius realitatis, nam quae sunt diversa formaliter, realiter (saltem in quae different specifice)
differunt ratione. Minor probatur quia: Illa quae sunt unum formale obiectum alicuius scientiae, sunt unum obiectum
formale intellectus, cum scientia sit habitus determinans intellectum ad aliquod genus intelligibilium, unde non
potest esse quod aliqquid sit aliquod obiectum scientiae et non sit unum obiectum intellectus. Sed actus intelligendi
must be real beings, indeed acts of the intellect since a single formal object must be one both in reality and in notion [lit. ratione]. Hervaeus’s response to this makes an important distinction.

At first, he grants that one might consider the act of understanding to be the per se subject of Logic. However, this will lead to the situation that second intentions will not be the subject nor the primary object of the science. Second intentions would only be something that is referred to the primary subject of the science. This is because second intentions follow things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect. Therefore, they are posterior to acts of understanding and must be understood as having a reference to them. 19

He then presents another option, ultimately anticipating his own position that logic is concerned with second intentions as about its first and essential subject. In this case, logic does not treat of the acts of the intellect as the first and essential subject. Instead, as a science of second intentions, logic would be concerned with acts of the intellect as the cause of its subject. However, he makes a very important qualification, noting that he is speaking of cause only insofar as one can speak of causes when it comes to second intentions. 20

In this response, he merely states that acts of intellection are the “cause” of second intentions insofar as they depend upon acts of reason for that which is known to exist objectively. In his edition of the text, Doyle understandably cites Suarez’s later discussion of the causes of entia rationis. In his fifty-fourth Metaphysical Disputation, Suarez expresses an

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19 See ibid., q.2 a.1 ad 4 (p.178:10-16): “Esse secunda intentio non est per se subictum praedicatum et per se obiectum eius numero; tunc logica considerabit de secunda intentione ut de eo quod habet attributionem ad per se subiectum eius. Nam ea quae consequuntur res intellectus ut sunt objective in intellectu, habent attributionem ad actum intelligendi, et maxime secundum quod considerantur a logico.”

20 See ibid. (p.178:16-21): “Si autem ponatur quod logica sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subiecto, tunc logica non est de actu intelligendi ut de suo per se subiecto, sed determinabit de actu intelligendi sicut de causa sui subjici; eo modo quo potest esse causa in talibus quae habent tantum esse rationis, inquantum scilicet secunda intentio dependet ab actu rationis, quia scilicet non consequitur res nisi prout sunt objective in intellectu.”
important distinction regarding the efficient cause of *entia rationis* in general. While he is not singling out second intentions, these are clearly included in addition to privations and negations.\(^{21}\)

Suarez states that there must be some kind of cause for *entia rationis*, for they can be said to have objective existence. They do not always have this, for they only exist objectively when they are thought. Therefore, they must have some sort of efficient cause that gives them this objective existence.\(^{22}\) However, he makes an important distinction. He states that the efficient causality involved *does not* terminate at the being of reason as at something that is produced by that efficient causation. Instead, the efficient causality involved terminates at the formal concept in the mind—that is, at the qualitative accident in the mind. However, this formal concept terminates “in some manner” [lit. *aliquo modo*] as at an object, namely the given mind-dependent being (i.e. *ens rationis*) that is known.\(^{23}\) In this particular assertion of the *Disputationes*, Suarez is directly concerned with how any mind-dependent being, when *it* is known, can be said to have an efficient cause. The point is that the intellect is the remote efficient cause insofar as it creates the psychological quality in the intellect of the knower who is thinking of a particular being of reason. However, he notes that the causation stops at the production of the concept, not at the object that is known. Thus, the causation is concerned with

\(^{21}\) See Francisco Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 26, ed. Carolo Berton (Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1861), disp. 54, sect. 3 and 4 (p.1026-1031). This topic receives lucid discussion in Daniel D. Novotný, *Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 58-79. It is important to note that Suarez represents one form of “objectualism” that clearly is indebted to Scotistic categories. In later Baroque thinkers, greater consistency was attempted by self-identified Scotists such as Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto. See ibid., 138-163.

\(^{22}\) See ibid., sect.2 n.3 (p.1019) : “Probatur, quia quamvis ens rationis non habeat esse reale, habet tamen esse objectivum, quod tamen non semper habet; ergo quod nunc illud habeat, et non antea, in aliquam causam aliquo modo efficientem referendum est.”

\(^{23}\) See ibid.: “Tota vero illa efficientia, ut ad terminum realis productionis terminatur ad formalem conceptum ipsius mentis, et ibi sistit; inde tamen fit, ut illemet conceptus formalis terminetur aliquo modo, ut ad objectum, ad ipsum ens rationis, quod cogitatur aut fingitur.”
the qualities existing according to *esse subjectivum* but only indirectly with regard to the *esse obiectivum* involved in the mind-dependent being.

This Suarezian insight is related to the qualification that Hervaeus is trying to make in this text, and it is important to consider this matter if we are to understand exactly how he understands the overall project of the *De secundis intentionibus*. An important clarification is made in q.2 a.2. Hervaeus asks whether a second intention is in the intellect as in a subject.24 In the course of the first article of this question, he denies that second intentions are the very act of intellection. However, this second article continues to pursue the possibility that second intentions may have some real being.

The first two objections are illuminating for the issue being considered now. In the first objection, the interlocutor states that obviously the agent intellect must create something real whenever abstraction occurs vis-à-vis the phantasms. Since the action of the agent intellect is something real, its effect, namely something that is abstract, must also be real. Thus “being abstract” (lit. *esse abstractum*), which is said to be a second intention, is real as well. Hence, the objector argues that second intentions must exist in the intellect as in a subject, that is as real qualities.25

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24 In Brito, it is not always clear whether a second intention should be taken as a qualitative accident, something that is representative (thus, having, according to him, a diminished mode of being), or as a relational kind of knowledge. See De Rijk, 225-230. Once again, while he is clearly in the background in some places, Hervaeus’s language is still much closer to Scotus, at least as interpreted in the previous chapter, than the other thinkers.

25 See DSIDij s q.2 a.2 obj. 1 (p.180:3-9): “Illud quod fit ab intellectu agente et a fantasmate in intellectu possibili est aliquid reale existens in intellectu possibili sicut in subiecto; nam ipsa est actio naturalis terminata ad aliqua naturam realem. Sed per actionem intellectus agentis fit in intellectu possibili aliquod abstractum a fantasmate, ut omnes concedunt. Ergo esse abstractum dicit aliquod reale existens in intellectu sicut in subiecto.”

The issue concerning the “real” causality of the agent intellect (here, with regard to the intelligible species) was a hotly debated issue during Hervaeus’s time. The argument presented here at least has resonances with the lengthy rebuttal made by Scotus against Godfrey of Fontaines in Scotus, *Ord.* 1 d.3 p.3 q.2, n.422-450, 512-527, ed. Vat. III, p.256:10-271:11, 303:14-314:13. In particular, Scotus is concerned with positions articulated in Godfrey’s *Quod.* V q.10, VI q.7, VII q.6, VIII q.2 and IX q.19. An overview of some of the topics pertaining to this issue can be found in Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, 184-202.
The second objection is akin to this. There, the objector notes that any real action must have a subject in which it creates some form. Citing Averroes, he notes the common dictum that the agent intellect causes universality in things. However, this universality is not caused in things outside the mind. Were that the case, universality would have being extramentally. Therefore, it seems that universality must be something in the mind as in a subject. Otherwise one could not explain the causality involved in the activity of the agent intellect.26

Note that these two objectors are pressing on the critical point that will concern Suarez (and others27) in later decades and centuries. If it is conceded that the agent intellect is the source of universality, it would seem that such universality must be concerned with a real being, namely a quality in a subject. This sort of ambiguity is quite clear in a text like that of Simon of Faversham’s second question on the Isagoge. This particular passage is regularly cited to show how Simon’s view of second intentions seems to base them ultimately on the things themselves.28 Although he regularly writes (in this passage and in others) that the intellect causes [lit. fingere] second intentions in things, in this passage he does make a qualification that seems to link second intentions directly to mind-independent being:

[Logic] is said to be a rational science which is about these things that are caused by the intellect. However, since the intellect causes such intentions and it is moved by the appearances of things [lit. ab apparentibus in re]; and on account of this the intellect attributes various logical intentions to things on account of various properties [of things]. . . . Therefore, all of logic is taken from the properties of things, for otherwise logic would be a mere figment of the intellect—which we do not state. From this it follows

26 See ibid., obj. 2 (p.180:10-18): “In omni actione reali praesupponitur subiectum in quo acquiritur aliqua forma sive aliquid actus realis in aliquid sicut in subiecto, scilicet in subiecto quod praesupponitur. Sed secundum Commentatorem intellectus facit universalitatis in rebus. Ergo in ista actione aliqua forma sive aliquid actus realis acquiritur in aliquid sicut in subiecto, scilicet in subiecto quod praesupponitur; aut ergo in re extra, aut in intellectu. Non in re extra, quia universale non habet esse in re extra. Relinquitur ergo quod universalitatis sit aliqua res aquisita in ipso intellectu sicut in subiecto per actionem illam quae facit universalitatem.”

27 On these matters, see the many details discussed with great clarity in Novotný, Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel.

that he who found logic, was not himself a logician. Indeed, for this reason, he who considered the nature of things was not a logician \[ex quo enim consideravit naturas rerum logicus non fuit\], since the logician (inasmuch as he is a logician) does not undertake considerations concerning the natures of things but only about intentions—or, if he does consider things, he only does such as they are under [or, insofar as they found] intentions. 29

The aforenamed commentators are right to see the ambiguity caused by stating that second intentions are caused \textit{ab apparentibus in re}. It is not exactly clear in this passage how Simon means to distinguish the way that mind-independent formalities are distinct from the formalities proper to the logical intentions in question. However, it should be noted that this viewpoint is also expressed by Scotus early in his career in his fourth question on the \textit{Isagoge}. Indeed, Scotus’s own early view contains an important ambiguity that is found earlier in the aforenamed text from Simon. The Subtle Doctor states:

\begin{quote}
The universal is from the intellect. When it is said, “Therefore it is something that is a mere figment,” I say that this point does not follow, for a mere figment corresponds to nothing that is outside the soul. Instead, something corresponds to the universal outside of the soul by which the intellect is moved to create such an intention. . . . Therefore, I say that the universal arises from the efficient causality of the intellect \[lit. effective est ab intellectu\] but that it is materially (originally or as by an occasional cause) caused by the properties found in the thing. This set of circumstances does not hold for mere figments \[lit. figmentum autem non sic\]; therefore, the universal is not a mere figment. 30
\end{quote}

In both of these texts, there really are two issues regarding the causality involved in the formation of second intentions. The first is the causality that is caused \textit{from the known thing} to the knower. However, there is the equal problem regarding the causality involved by the

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29 See Simon of Faversham, \textit{Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii}, q. 2 (19:17-20, 22-26): “Sed [logica] dicitur rationalis, que est de his que sunt causata ab intellectu. Cum autem intellectus causat tales intensiones, et movetur ab apparentibus in re: et propter hoc intellectus diversas intentiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates. . . . Ideo tota logica accipitur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset figurum intellectus, quod non dicimus. Ex quo sequitur quod qui logicam inventit, logicus non fuit; ex quo enim consideravit naturas rerum logicos non fuit, cum logicus, secundum quod logicus, non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intensiones solas; vel si res consideret, hoc solum est, ut sub intentionibus sunt.”

30 Scotus, In Porph. q.4, n.12 (p.25:1-4, 6-8): “Dico quod univesale est ab intellectu. Cum dicitur ‘igitur est figurum’, dico quod non sequitur, quia figurum nihil correspondet extra; universali autem alicuius correspondet extra a quo movetur intellectus ad causandum talem intentionem. . . . Dico igitur quod effective est ab intellectu, sed materialiter sive originaliter sive occasionaliter a proprietate in re; figurum autem non sic; igitur non est figurum.”
intellect. In this text from Scotus, this comes across in his dictum that the universal is caused by the intellect. As regards the Subtle Doctor, it is possible to claim that this refers only to the subjective quality that arises in the course of cognition. As was discussed above, there is a real relation between the mind-independent thing and the accidents in the intellect. Thus, there is a real relation between the common nature and the accidents in the intellect. However, one can also speak of a logical universal. This refers to the mind-dependent relation that follows upon a thing insofar as it is an object of intellection. Therefore, the real causality of the intellect involved in cognition “makes” the universal in conjunction with the thing known. However, insofar as the thing exists in esse objectivum, that thing has mind-dependent relations that are not real (i.e. mind-independent) relations.\(^{31}\) Thus, one can see in the Subtle Doctor elements of what would much later be taken up by Suarez in his careful parsing of this problem.

In Simon’s text, the intellect’s causality is expressed in a manner that closely matches the objections presented by Hervaeus. The general point Simon is considering is whether or not there can be a science of the universal. In the course of affirming that there can indeed be such a science, he makes a distinction between two kinds of universal—the intention of universality and the thing subjected to this intention.\(^{32}\) The second of these appears to be close to the “metaphysical consideration” of the common nature later deployed by Scotus, for Simon states, “The thing subjected to the intention of universality is per se intelligible by the intellect; indeed, otherwise the intellect would not found in it the intention of universality.”\(^{33}\)

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\(^{31}\) See footnotes 146, 147, and 164 in the previous chapter. For complete treatment, see the complete section “2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and Esse Objectivum.”


\(^{33}\) Ibid. (p.19:3-5): “Nunc autem res subiecta intensioni universalitatis est per se intelligibilis ab intellectu, aliter enim intellectus non fundaret in ea intensionem universalitatis.”
However, what is key is the “intention of universality” that is created by the intellect. In discussing this sense of “universal,” Simon is referring to what I have been calling the “logical universal.” It refers to what is created by the intellect in knowing. He states that there can be a science of this sense of “universal” as well and that this science is logic. In the course of arguing his position, he ambiguously states, “Now, however, the intellect creates second intentions in things. For this reason, the Commentator says concerning III De Anima that the intellect makes the universality that is in things.”

Such intentions of universality include that of being a species, a genus, and other such intentions. All of these are said to be considered in logic.

A remark like this leaves open the situation discussed above as regards Hervaeus’s objections. If the intellect is a real cause, it would seem that second intentions must themselves be a kind of real being. Although Simon does in some texts treat second intentions as “accidental” or “respective” forms of cognition that compare one thing to another, he does not appear to clarify the ontological details involved in this kind of respective cognition. The reader is left wondering about the relation of the real cause (the intellect) and its effect (the intentions in question).

As noted at the close of the previous chapter, there is evidence that Simon at least once deployed a distinction akin to that between objective and subjective existence. However, he does not seem to discuss the subtleties needed to explain the ontological status of second

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34 Ibid (p.19:10-11): “Propter hoc dicit Commentator III De Anima, quod intellectus agit universitalitatem in rebus: oportet ergo quod intellectus cognoscat intencionem universalitatem.” Note that this same passage from Averroes is cited in the text used for q.2 a.2 obj. 2 found in note 26 above.


36 See Pini, Categories and Logic, 72-75.

37 See footnote 204 in the previous chapter.
intentions so as to avoid giving them an unambiguously “non-real” status. While Scotus expresses a similar ambiguity in the aforementioned question on the *Isagoge*, his treatment of relation in the *Questions on the Metaphysics* clarify in what sense the intellect and the thing known are considered causes and in what sense they are not. There, the notion of objective existence is important for explaining the mind-dependent relation that arises in cognition, relating the thing known to the knower by means of a non-real relation. Indeed, “to exist objectively” means “to have a mind-dependent relation to an intellect that is really related to that which is known.”

At last, we are in a place to see how Hervaeus treats the objections mentioned above. His answers show two important conclusions about his viewpoint. First of all, they reiterate his concern with delineating logic as a science. Secondly they testify to the fact that he is aware that his position requires him to hold that logic is not concerned with any *real* being whatsoever. This latter point lies at the heart of his own explicit affirmations that logic pertains to *ens verum* in the four-fold schema of being offered by Aristotle in books Δ and E of the *Metaphysics*.

As noted above, *De secundis intentionibus* q.2 a.2 obj. 1 states that since the phantasm and the agent intellect create a real effect in the possible intellect, it is necessary to state that second intentions like “to be abstract” (*lit. esse abstractum*) are real beings. In response to this objection, Hervaeus distinguishes between two senses that can be used for “being abstract” (*lit. esse abstractum*). On the one hand, one can consider something as being abstract according to (mind-independent) reality (*lit. secundum rem*). Thus, one can speak of how the concept, in the intellect as in a subject, is abstract from that of which it is the concept. As he states:

One manner [of speaking of being abstract] is taken according to reality. According to this manner of speaking, that which is in the intellect as in a subject is separate from the individual things contained under the thing known, just as the mind’s concept or the act of intellection is abstract. According to this manner of speaking, it [being abstract] does
not designate a second intention—just as, similarly, one does not classify as a second intention scientific knowledge [lit. *scientia*], which is a virtue [lit. *habitus*] really separate from all of the individuals of the thing that is known about which that science is concerned.  

Thus, in one way of speaking, Hervaeus says that the actual mental quality—here listed as either a concept, act of intellection, or a scientific *habitus*—is abstract from the individuals inasmuch as multiple individual entities are represented by this particular quality. More will be said about this point when he addresses the second objection.

On the other hand, one can speak of something being abstract according to reason (lit. *secundum rationem*). In this way, one thing is said to be abstract in comparison with some other things, as when we say that “man” is notionally abstract in comparison to inferiors, such as Socrates and Plato. This kind of abstraction pertains to things insofar as they are in the intellect objectively. As he states in full:

According to another manner of speaking, something is called abstract and separate according to reason—just as “man” states something that is abstract from Socrates and Plato. And such a thing, as regards its abstraction, designates a second intention. And such a thing is not in the intellect as in a subject but is in the intellect objectively as something known to it—just as “man” is set as an object before the intellect itself, while not knowing Socrates and Plato.

This manner of speaking of “abstraction” is a second intention. Later in this chapter, a helpful synopsis of Hervaeus’s treatment about how “abstraction” is a particular second intention

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38 DSIDij, q.2 a.2 ad 1 (p.185:20-186:2): “Uno modo secundum rem; et isto modo illud quod est in intellectu sicut in subiecto, est separatum ab individuis contentis sub re intellecta, sicut conceptus mentis vel actus intelligendi et abstractum. Isto modo non dicit secundam intentionem sicut etiam nec scientia, quae est habitus realiter separatus ab omnibus individuis rei scibilis de qua est illa scientia, est secunda intentio.”

My translation is following a slight difference in DSIDoyle, who has a form that is noted in Dijs’s notes for p.185:22-23. See DSIDoyle, 382:9: “contentis sub re intellecta sicut est conceptus vel actus intelligendi.”

39 DSIDij, q.2 a.2 ad 1: “Alio modo dicitur abstractum et separatum secundum rationem, sicut ‘homo’ dicit aliquod abstractum a Sorte et Platone. Et tale, quantum ad suam abstractionem, dicit secundam intentionem. Et tale non est in intellectu sicut in subiecto, sed est in intellectu obiective; cui sicut cognitum obicitur homo, non cognito Sorte et Platone.”

Once more, I am following a slight difference in Doyle. His text expresses with slightly better clarity the same point being made at the end of Dijs’s text. See DSIDoyle, 382:15-16: “Sed est in intellectu obiective sicut quoddam sibi cognitum, sicut obicitur homo ipsi intellectui non cognito Sorte et Platone.”
will help to flesh out some of the subtleties involved in his theory about the formation of second intentions. In this response to the first objection, the primary point is to concede the fact that he agent intellect and the phantasm do indeed create something that can be called "abstract." That manner of "being abstract" pertains only to the subjective qualities in the mind that are abstract from the individuals that they represent. However, it is important to address just what is meant by this kind of representation, and it is this issue that Hervaeus addresses in his response to the second objection.

Recall that the objector used Averroes’s dictum about the intellect creating universality to endorse the conclusion that second intentions are "real" (in the sense of being real mind-inhering qualities). Hervaeus answers the objector by distinguishing between two senses for the term "universal." The first sense is universality by way of representation. This is the kind of universal that is real and "made" by the agent intellect. The second is universality as pertains to predication. This kind of universality is a second intention.

Regarding universality by way of representation, he states:

And thus [being a universal by way of representation] the act of intellection and the species (if one believes that there is an intelligible species\(^{40}\), and] the mind’s concept are called universal. And, “universal” said in this way is not a second intention—taking the meaning of “intention” from the side of the intelligible [that is known]—and [is not] distinct from real being, just as we now take it. And concerning such a universal, it is true that the agent intellect makes universality or the universal [itself] by means of a real action. For, it [the agent intellect] really causes the aforementioned—namely, the species, or act of intellection, or concept, or even all of these [lit. \textit{et etiam omnia haec}], and these are in the intellect as [an accident] in a subject.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{40}\) While Spruit claims that Hervaeus seems to deny the need for intelligible species late in his career, I see no reason to think that he holds any such position in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}. Although he will concede in this manner on several occasions, he does not appear to deny the need for the intelligible species in the cognition process. He seems to be conceding the view of such opponents, trying to prevent them from being detained in reading his remarks on the intelligible species. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to adjudicate the correctness of Spruit’s claims. See Leen Spruit, \textit{Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge}, Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 273.

\(^{41}\) See DSIDijq, q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.186:11-19): “[Duplex est universale; scilicet per representaionem,] et sic actus intelligendi et species, si ponatur species, conceptus mentis dicitur universale. Et universale sic dictum non est secunda intentio accipiendo intentionem ex parte intelligibilis et distinctam contra esse reale, sicut nunc accipimus.”
Here, Hervaeus is referring to the kind of relation that the cognitional components have to the thing that they enable the knower to know. Thus, the concept itself (as well as the intelligible species and the act of intellection) all can be said to represent the known universally to the knower. One and the same concept—as a subjective quality—is part of the relationship that the knower forms to the known. In saying this, his language expresses elements of what would later become part of the discussions of natural signs, namely insofar as the concept is a natural (i.e. real) element in the cognitional process, it re-presents the known to the knower.\(^\text{42}\)

However, it is key to note that he is not interested here in addressing that issue. Instead, he

\[\text{Et de tali universalii verum est quod intellectus agens facit universalitatem sive uni- versale actione reali. Nam realiter causat aliquod praedictorum, scilicet speciem vel actum intelligendi vel conceptum vel etiam omnia haec, et ista sunt in intellectu sicut in subjecto.}\]

The side remark about the intelligible species (see footnote 40 for discussion) is not found in Doyle’s edition. Note also that Dij’s sentence is missing what appears to be a necessary \textit{et} directly before \textit{conceptus mentis}. See DSI Doyle, q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.382:20-21): “\textit{duplex est universale}, scilicet, per repraesentationem, et sic actus intelligendi et species et conceptus mentis dicitur universale.”

Given that Hervaeus so hastily mentions the points regarding the real causality of the agent intellect, it seems that he wants to avoid getting bogged down in the various controversies of his time regarding these matters. As has been stressed throughout this dissertation, these matters are not his direct concern in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}.

\(^{42}\) See the brief remarks in Deely, \textit{Four Ages}, 390-391. Indeed, it is on this point that Hervaeus must be viewed as quite different from Ockham (and others) who would reduce the conversation on these matters wholly to matters of mental language and subjective qualities. On this point, Koridze makes insightful remarks. However, he only hints at the importance of the dividing line between thinkers like Ockham and Hervaeus.

We should note that it is not merely a matter of Hervaeus’s insistence on objective existence in contrast to Ockham’s ultimate denial thereof. Likewise at issue are the significantly different positions regarding relation expressed by each thinker. As will be stressed in this chapter (and was already indicated in discussions concerning Scotus), “to exist objectively” means “to have a ‘non-real’ relation as a known thing to a knower.” Only the knower has a “real” relation to the known thing.

Still, later discussions of natural signs will not be without merit even from a strictly Hervaeus perspective. The “real” relation (i.e. the natural sign) is \textit{critical}. Without that subjective quality, none of the objectivity would exist. However, the difficulties come when one has to parse out the unique language that occurs when you have such “one-way” relations from the knower to the known thing—for such “one-way” relations denominate known things with non-real relations “in the other direction” (i.e. from the known to the knower). Hervaeus’s discussions of objective being, second intentions, and other topics provide only the beginning of the details of such matters.

See Koridze, “\textit{Intentionale Grundlegung},” 265-269. On the importance of the question of relation as pertains to all these matters, see Deely, \textit{Intentionale and Semiotics}, 117-118. Also, pertinent aspects of this problem are noted in Julius Weinberg, “The Nominalism of Berkeley and Hume,” in \textit{Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three Essays in the History of Thought} (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 3-63. Also, on issues surrounding natural signs and objective existence in Ockham, see Perler, \textit{Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter}, 319-397.
merely wants to say that those elements in the cognitional process refer to subjective elements of the cognitional process. As such, they are not distinguished from real being. This is a key point, and it indicates that Hervaeus wants to distinguish second intentions from all real, mind-independent being. His focus is more on the “dividing line” between mind-dependent and mind-independent being than it is on the details of the cognitional process in question.43

Thus, as Hervaeus continues regarding universality by way of predication, we see elements of the same issue that would later bother Suarez regarding the causes of entia rationis:

According to another manner of speaking, “universal” is said to be by way of predication, and “universal” said in this manner does not have a real making [lit. factionem] but [instead] follows upon a real action existing in another [namely, in the soul].44 For, once there has been made in the intellect an intellection (or conception) representing the thing universally and indeterminately (as when there is made a conception representing “man” indeterminately apart from [e.g.] Socrates and Plato), there follows that “man” is indeterminately represented and is objectively in the intellect indeterminately. And this [latter case] is not a real making [lit. factionem]. Indeed, just as when we say that something is made in the intellect [or, some thing is made to be known, i.e. comes to be known45], this does not place a real making in that thing [i.e. that which is known], so also it is not the case that, when the thing is said to be made universal (that is, known indeterminately) no making is really in the thing nor is anything real acquired in it.46

Hervaeus continues with important remarks after this selection, but several interpretive remarks will help to direct consideration of that passage. Here, he is splitting the two

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43 See note 128 in the previous chapter. The remarks of Perler cited there, though problematic, do attest quite clearly to the fact that Hervaeus’s focus taken from the perspective of what is known, not from the perspective of the knower.

44 Compare DSIDIjs q.2 a.2 obj 2 (p.186:20-21): “sed consequitur ad actionem realem existing in alio” to DSIDoyle, q.2 a.2 obj 2 (p.382:28-29): “sed consequitur factionem realem existentem in animo.”

45 Both senses seem to be necessary. Compare again Dijs and Doyle. See DSIDIjs q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.187:3-4): “Sicut enim quando dicimus quod res aliqua est facta in intellectu.” DSIDoyle, q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.382:33-34): “Sicut enim quando dicimus quod res aliqua est facta intellecta.”

46 DSIDIjs, q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.186:19-6): “Alio modo dicitur universale per praedicationem, et universale sic dictum non habet factionem realem sed consequitur ad actionem realem existentem in alio. Nam facta in intellectu intellectione vel conceptione repreaesentante rem universaliter et indeterminate sicut facta conceptione repreaesentante hominem indeterminate absque Sorte et Platone, consequitur hoc quod est hominem esse indeterminate repreaesentativum et esse objective in intellectu indeterminate. Et hoc non habet factionem realem. Sicut enim quando dicimus quod res aliqua est facta in intellectu, non ponitur factio realis in illa re, ita nec, quando dicitur facta universalis, idest indeterminate intellecta, nulla factio realiter est in ea nec aliquid reale acquiritur in ea.”
considerations. On the one hand, there is the domain of discourse that pertains to the various
qualities and powers involved in the cognition process. These components can be said to have a
kind of universality by representation. However, having presupposed this cognitional apparatus
in the soul of the knower, there can be another manner of speaking.

This point is very important for understanding the entire perspective of the *De secundis
intentionibus*: “There follows [upon the subjective aspect] that ‘man’ is indeterminately
represented and is objectively in the intellect indeterminately.” Hervaeus is saying that once we
consider the act of cognition actually occurring from the perspective of the knower, we then need
to invert our viewpoint and then consider the thing that is known. When the known thing falls
into the “vision” of the intellect, it is possible to begin speaking of it as existing objectively.
That is, presupposing intellection, one can say, “Man is objectively in the intellect.” As he says,
this change of affairs does not “make” anything that is real. However, just as Scotus subtly
distinguished, existing objectively implies a mind-dependent (i.e. non-real) relation of the known
thing to the intellect. Thus, to speak of “man” as an “object” means that it is present in
cognition. The perspective is from the side of the thing known, not from the perspective of the
knower. The primary concern is what could be called (though, improperly), “The metaphysics of
objectivity.”

What is important, therefore, is to notice how Hervaeus writes from the perspective of
that which is known and not from the perspective of the knower. More will be said about this
below. However, he continues with an important remark. After reiterating that the agent
intellect makes a real universal only in the sense of being a universal by representation, he
continues:

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47 See note 149 in the previous chapter.
But a universal by predication (which is a second intention) does not come about by some real making which directly [lit. *per se*] is terminated at such a universal [namely, the universal by predication]. Nor is it [namely, the universal by predication] something really acquired in another as in a subject. Rather, once a universal has been made by way of representation, the universal by way of predication follows the thing as it is objectively in the intellect. To the thing so existing objectively in the intellect (according to such being that it has objectively in the intellect) no real making belongs (*emphasis added*). 48

The emphasis added to the passage above serves to draw attention to several points that will guide everything else that follows in this dissertation. In this particular passage, Hervaeus had to address the use of “universal.” Note that his concern is not with the “metaphysical consideration” of the common nature vs. the “logical universal” as was encountered in the last chapter in our discussions of Scotus. Hervaeus’s “universal by way of predication” is the “logical universal.” However, his “universal by representation” is concerned with the way that cognitional components come to be called representative of what is known. The aforementioned “metaphysical consideration” of the common nature guarantees that one can say, “Man is universal—in the sense that before the mind knows anything, there is a less than numerical unity in reality.” The Hervaean “universal by way of representation” permits one to say something akin to, “There is a real relationship between the knower and the known by way of the similitude of the cognitional components.” One mental concept (i.e. what would become known as the “formal concept” in baroque scholasticism) is universal vis-à-vis the many individuals that it represents. This kind of universal is taken from the perspective of the knower. It pertains to the

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48 DSIDijs, q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.187:10-16): “Sed universale per praedicationem quod est secunda intentio, non fit ab aliqua factione reali quae per se terminetur ad tale universale, nec est aliquid realiter acquisitum in aliquo sicut in subiecto; sed facto realiter universali per repraesentationem, universale per praedicationem consequitur rem prout est obiective in intellectu secundum tale esse quod habet obiective in intellectu, cui rei sic existenti obiective in intellectu nulla factio realis convenit.”

Again, Doyle’s edition is slightly clearer at the end, which rambles into the last sentence in Dijs’s edition. They substantially make the same point, but I have followed Doyle for clarity. See DSIDoyle, q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.383: 8-10): “... rem prout est obiective in intellectu. Cui rei sic existenti obiective in intellectu secundum tale esse quod habet esse obiective in intellectu nulla factio realis convenit.”
kind of relations that exist between the various actual mental qualities involved in knowing and
the thing that is known.

On the other hand, the “universal by way of predication” is spoken of from the
perspective of the thing itself. As Hervaeus states in the passage translated above, this universal
“follows the thing,” though only “as it is objectively in the intellect.” Here, “universal” is said of
“man” in the sense of saying, “Man, insofar as it is known, is universal.” Here, the reference is
to the essence of man, not to the mental quality.

It is important to see that Hervaeus’s concern fits into the broader tradition of the
Avicennian threefold mode of essence—as singular in the thing, as universal in the intellect, and
as merely the essence when taken in itself. However, his concern is to clarify just what is meant
by “in the intellect.” When one says the essence “man” is objectively in the intellect, one is
speaking of a mode of existence proper to the thing as being related to the knower by a non-real
relation. The sense of “in the intellect” that most interests him is “in the intellect’s ‘sight.’”

Thus, the causality involved with the “universality” in question is merely a kind of
second-order causality. In the order of mind-independent being, the agent intellect and the
phantasm together produce the mental qualities involved in the process of knowing. However,
along with this alteration in the knower, who is thus related to the known thing, the thing itself
can be denominated as “known.” Thus, when I “understand” the nature of this or that tree, I may
understand it universally. To say that the nature of what-it-is-to-be-a-tree is thus understood in
its universal notes involves the positing of a non-real relation from that nature to me as to a
knower. Thus, one can say, “Tree is universal,” meaning that the given nature is known in a
universal manner. Here, one refers to the nature in question, stating that a given mind-
independent reality has a particular attribute (universality) because it exists according to \textit{esse obiectivum}.

This account of universality is not complete. More will be later in this chapter regarding Hervaeus’s account of how one forms the intention of universality. As will be seen, it is \textit{not} the fundamental second intention according to Hervaeus’s view. However, to explicate that point, several key terms will have to be explained.\footnote{Another parallel could have been drawn here between the two senses of particularity, namely one that pertains to metaphysical questions and one that pertains to logical intentionality. Hervaeus mentions this point in DSIDij\textsc{s} q.1 a.3 (p.146:7-14): \textit{Quod autem particularitas sit secunda intentio patet etiam per istos quorum positio rectata est. Nam dicunt quod hoc quod dico ‘particulare,’ est nomen secundae intentionis. Hoc etiam de se patet, quia considerare rationem particularitatis secundum quod huiusmodi pertinet ad logicum tantum, cuius est considerare secundas intentiones. Non tamen defino adnunc quod ad solum logicum pertineat considerare secundas intentiones.} Likewise, there is another parallel passage in q.2 a.3 that likewise considers the relations involved in representation vs. second intentionality. See DSIDij\textsc{s}, q.2 a.3 (p.198:9-18): \textit{Omnis relatio fundata super actum intelligendi vel speciem intelligibilem, vel est relatio repraesentantis ad repraesentatum, vel est relatio effectus ad causam. Relatio autem repraesentantis ad repraesentatum est relatio intelligentis ad rem intellectum; repraesentatio etiam actus intelligendi ut est effectus, est ad rem intellectam; repraesentatio etiam actus intelligendi ut est effectus, est ad rem intellectam; si ponatur quod objectum moveat sive non, illa relatio actus intelligendi ut est effectus, nihil facit ad propositum, quia illa est relatio actus intelligendi ut est effectus, nihil facit ad propositum, quia illa est relatio realis. Illa autem de quibus quaerimus, scilicet secundae intentiones, dicunt ens rationis tantum. Et ideo nulla relatio quae pertineat ad secundas intentiones, potest fundari in intellectu, nisi sit illa quae est intelligentis ad rem intellectam vel eversus.}\textit{}}

\textbf{3.2.2 Explicit Remarks on Being as True and False}

Before that, however, it is necessary to note that Hervaeus explicitly sees his treatise as filling in the domain of “being as the true and the false” in the Aristotelian \textit{Metaphysics}. He is quite clear that his idea of second intentions pertains to something separate from real being. Whereas the relation from the knower to the known is something real, it is unacceptable to say that a second intention is a relation of this sort. As he says in q.2 a.3, “It is not possible for a second intention to be the relation by which the knower is referred to the thing known, because

\footnote{Note that Doyle’s edition (p.390:29-30) reads, \textit{‘Illa autem de quibus est logica, scilicet secundae intentiones, dicunt esse rationis tantum.’ DSIDij\textsc{s}, cited above, reads, \textit{‘Illa autem de quibus quaerimus, scilicet secundae intentiones, dicunt ens rationis tantum.’ In either case, Hervaeus’s intention is clearly to explicate the ontological space into which logic falls.}}
that relation is a real relation. Second intentions, however, designate mind-dependent being [lit. *ens rationis*] divided in contrast to mind-independent being [lit. *ens reale*].”

His goal is to indicate how the mind-dependent relations involved in second intentionality are not real being. Several exemplary passages can be cited in which he explicitly ties this distinct status of *ens rationis* to the distinction between categorical being and “being as the true and the false.”

Although Koridze is not unaware of the strict division between *ens reale* and *ens rationis*, this is occluded in his narrative, which is tinged throughout by his concern for stressing the “realism” of Hervaeus’s contentions in the treatise. The basic historical narrative that he provides to introduce the medieval issue of logical intentionality does not draw to the fore the

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50 DSIDij s.q.2 a.3 (p.197:10-14): “Non potest esse relatio qua intelligens refertur ad rem intellecta, quia illa relatio est relatio realis, secundae autem intentiones dicunt ens rationis divisum contra ens reale.”

51 This concern is obvious from the very first article in which he parses the meaning of “first intention.” More will be said in the next section about the body of this article’s response. However, note the words of the *sed contra*. See DSIDij s.q.1 a.1 *sed contra* (p.115:5-7): “Esse reale distinguuitur contra esse intentionale. Sed species praedictae [scil. species intelligibilis] habent esse reale. Ergo non sunt intentiones.” He goes on to argue at length about how the intelligible species is a bad candidate because of the real causality involved in the production of the intelligible species.

52 As will be argued throughout these two chapters, Hervaeus’s treatise is about non-being and mind-dependent relations. To emphasize again a point already mentioned: It is not primarily cognitional. However, Koridze states his perspective quite clearly from the beginning of his dissertation. See Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung,” 18: “Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich der Intentionalitätstheorie des Hervaeus Natalis wie sie im Traktat „De secundis intentionibus“ vorgestellt wird. Die Theorie knüpft an die scholastische Lehre der gedanklichen Intentionen an, die bereits vor Hervaeus entwickelt wurde” (emphasis added). It should be noted that he does not overlook many important details regarding the nature of *ens rationis*. However, the focus that is established from the beginning leads to a minimizing of discussion / emphasis on the placement of the treatise in its self-consciously Peripatetic context vis-à-vis the *Metaphysics*. As mentioned above, the theme is slightly more evident in his brief article, “Wissenschaft und das intentional Gedachte bei Hervaeus Natalis,” 97-107.

In some locations, as will be evident from my footnotes, there is much to be commended in Koridze’s study. When he is directly addressing Hervaeus’s text, he provides a careful reading of passages. His dissertation’s focus on the *De secundis intentionibus* is thus like a parallel summary and commentary. At times, this will throw light on key themes—though only to return to the continued summary, submersing the point in the remaining details of the text in question.

Although his dissertation’s conclusion implies important aspects concerning the metaphysical import of the treatise, Koridze submerges this again by presenting a long narrative of the supposed Thomistic credentials of Hervaeus (against later commentators) and ends with reflections on the import of the treatise vis-à-vis contemporary questions of intentionality. He focuses so much on epistemological questions that the thematic importance of *relatio rationis* is not treated. This is vexing for the reader, for in the body of the dissertation, Koridze does not wholly overlook Hervaeus’s deployment of *relatio rationis* and *ens rationis*. Alas, though, it is ultimately occluded. See ibid., 269-294.
central role of the Hervaeus’s doctrines about the non-real relation that is intentionality itself (at least in the sense he is speaking, taking the perspective of the thing known, not that of the knower).\(^{53}\) Clearly, Koridze is aware that *entia rationis* (including *relationes rationis*) exist only in a manner equivocal to the existence exercised by mind-independent beings.\(^{54}\) However, he does not thematically consider the implications of this point for the treatise. A significant portion of the dissertation is an orderly, article-by-article summary of the treatise. However, while not neglecting to note Hervaeus’s claims concerning *relationes rationis*, Koridze’s thematic concerns with the “realism” (and the supposed “Thomism”\(^{55}\)) of Hervaeus’s treatise occludes the thematic importance of non-being in Hervaeus’s treatise.\(^{56}\)

Koridze’s focus is not unique. As already noted, in his detailed introduction to his edition of Odonis’s *De intentionibus*, De Rijk frames his discussions from the perspective of questions of cognition. Indeed, he cites as remote Aristotelian sources texts from the *De anima* on the ontology of cognition and also frames a brief citation from *On Interpretation* in terms of

\(^{53}\) This comes across clearly in the texts from Aristotle, Henry of Ghent, and Aquinas presented in ibid., 46-60. Though the general logical question is treated as a distinct domain in the texts gathered in this section from Aquinas, the focus does not draw to the fore the doctrines of relation involved from the beginning of Hervaeus’s treatment. Then, he frames the *De secundis intentionibus*’s designs in terms of the realism of logic and other epistemological issues. See ibid., 60-66. As will be seen in remarks below, Koridze is not wholly outlandish in his claims about parts of the treatise. However, by framing the question this way, he thematically misses just where the treatise fits within the inherited Peripatetic framework presupposed by Hervaeus.

\(^{54}\) See ibid., 74ff, 90-91, 115.

\(^{55}\) A striking example of this can be found at ibid., 272: “So kann man von einer thomistischen Logikschule sprechen, die von Hervaeus iniziert und die dominikanischen Lehranstalten des 14. Jahrhunderts dominierte.” Tavuzzi’s work has indeed shown that Hervaeus was important for a number of later Thomists concerning matters pertaining to the metaphysics of logic. However, Hervaeus *never* writes in the *De secundis intentionibus* as though he were defending a Thomistic position, and his language most certainly is not that of Thomas on these matters. Clearly, he shares much with Aquinas (as well as with many later Thomists who would pay little heed to the *De secundis intentionibus*). However, it is not helpful to see the treatise as being an explicitly Thomistic work. Later Dominicans may well have integrated it into such a self-conscious tradition-narrative. However, such was not Hervaeus’s manner of writing in the treatise whatsoever.

\(^{56}\) As has been stressed in footnotes above, however, he is not wholly unaware of these points. When he is summarizing texts, he often notes important points. However, he does not express clearly the thematic place of *relationes rationis* vis-à-vis “being as the true and the false” in the scholastic discussions.
the “affections in the soul” spoken of in the opening of the text. This helps to occlude the fact that Hervaeus’s treatise takes as its thematic perspective the division of ens reale from ens rationis (understood in terms of Metaphysics Δ and E).

Given that all of the literature (except for Doyle’s remarks) fails to emphasize that the division between categorial being and “true and false being” is the main perspective for Hervaeus’s treatise, I believe that it is very important to consider texts in which he openly states that this is his general perspective. What follows, therefore, will be text and commentary, for explicit attention to Hervaeus’s own words is necessary if one is to understand the overall hermeneutic needed for reading the De secundis intentionibus. This selection of texts is not meant to be exhaustive, for various small asides throughout the treatise also aver to this division. Instead, the selection is meant to gather texts that quite clearly show the importance of this division for Hervaeus.

First, consider a general remark on the two classes of intelligibility of things known:

Therefore, the two classes of intelligibles, according to which something is called a first or a second intention, is taken according to [the division between] mind-independent being [lit. esse reale] and mind-dependent being [lit. esse rationis]. And everything that pertains to things in their reality (whether true or fictional is taken according to mind-

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58 Here, he refers to his position that notions like “chimerae” are not of themselves beings of reason. “To be a fiction” is a being of reason. However, the general notion of “chimera” is not of itself a being of reason insofar as one can consider this essence while circumscripting the intellect. There are a number of issues related to this. Some ideas are completely impossible (as in the square circle), but there are also beings like “chimerae” and “golden mountains” that are possible, even though they happen to be fictional. However, these details cannot be taken up here. See DSIdij, q.1 a.5 (p.155ff): “Utrum figmenta pertineant ad primas intentiones.”

The question of chimerae and other fictions is often passed over quickly, though they raise important questions regarding esse obiectivum and how we form ideas of things the reality of which we are uncertain at the time that we form said ideas. That is, we do not know if those ideas necessarily are fictional and hence subject to only objective existence. As noted above in the final footnote of the previous chapter, being mind-independent does not always guarantee that a quiddity has extramental existence. (The quiddity of the Dodo remains mind-independent even though it can only exist as an object of cognition—to the degree we can think about such matters.) See the final footnote of the previous chapter for a reference to Pini concerning this final matter.

It was this point that was likely at the root of a sage, though passing remark made by Yves Simon in “The Real and the Ideal in Nature,” in The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space, 105: “We have mentioned incidentally that there exist—notice that I am very conscious that I say ‘exist’ here, and I mean it—beings of reason that have no
independent being (whether affirmatively or negatively\textsuperscript{59}), [that is,] with the act of the intellect being circumscribed—that is, such that in its notion [lit. \textit{in sua ratione}] there is not included a relation to the intellect, nor some mode happening to things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect. However, that which is taken according to mind-dependent being is that which occurs to things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect.\textsuperscript{60}

Note, therefore, that the distinction between the first and second classes of intelligibles pertains to a distinction between mind-independent and mind-independent being. That is, it pertains to the distinction between notions like \textit{man} and \textit{ox} and notions like \textit{genus} and \textit{syllogism}. Secondly, note that the mind-dependent being implies in its very intelligible notes existence as an object of intellection. After discussing the remarks of an unnamed objector, Hervaeus expresses what he takes to be the primary reason for the division of mind-dependent and mind-independent beings. It is not, as the other position would seem to indicate, merely a matter of what is first known and what is second known. This criterion fails to say something specific about the distinction of first and second intentions. Even within first intentions, there are things that we know first and second—for example when a positive state (e.g. sight) is known before a foundation in the real world, that are constructed, indeed, out of parts taken from the real world but whose construction is arbitrary. These are not governed by any necessity inherent in the real world. Consequently, they are never scientific objects. You cannot study the physiology of chimeras. Such beings of reason may have a part to play in culture but not in scientific research. For example, a centaur is a monster which is supposed to combine the nature of the horse and that of man. Is such a combination possible? Note that if it is possible, the centaur is not a being of reason. A chimera is a monster that combines the ehad of a woman and a goat. Is that combination impossible? I am not so sure after all. Is it absolutely impossible to have the psychological and emotional characteristics of a woman in a physical body partly shaped like that of a goat? Try to show that it is impossible! It sounds unlikely but that is about all we can say. A centaur and a chimera are not perfect examples of beings of reason without foundations in the real world. If by a zombi [sic] we mean a living corpse, then we are sure we have a being of reason. For then there is a contradiction embodied in that notion and that makes it a perfectly safe example.”

\textsuperscript{59} Here, he is referring to in what way privations are and are not second intentions. Details of this position fall outside the scope of this dissertation. However, see DSIDijs, q.1 a.4 (p.149-154).

\textsuperscript{60} DSIDijs, q.1 a.2 (p.136:22-137:2): “Duplex ergo genus intelligibilium secundum quod dicitur prima intentio et secunda: Accipitur secundum esse reale et esse rationis. Et accipitur secundum esse reale, sive affirmativa sive negative, omne illud quod rebus convenit in sua realitate vel vera vel ficta, circumscripto opere intellectus, sic scilicet quod in sua ratione non includit habitudinem ad intellectum nec aliquem modum convenientem rebus ut sunt objective in intellectu. Accipitur autem secundum esse rationis esse illud quod convenit rebus ut sunt objective in intellectu.”
privation (e.g., blindness), when something absolute is known before it is known as related,\textsuperscript{61} or even when (in the case of mind-dependent beings) we first understand the general notion of “species” before we understand the notion of “most specific species.”\textsuperscript{62} Thus, this kind of comparison between first known and second known is not the fundamental criterion for understanding the division between first and second intentions. To reiterate this dissertation’s theme: the perspective is not that of cognition (or “psychology”). Instead, as Hervaeus states:

And therefore, it seems to me that one must speak otherwise, namely that the comparison between second and first intentions does not designate the primacy of numerically one thing or one species with regard to another. Rather, it designates the primacy of one class [lit. genus] or general mode of being with regard to another mode of being\textsuperscript{63}—as if it were said that, since there are two general modes of being (namely mind-independent and mind-dependent [lit. secundum rem et secundum rationem]), the first mode of being is the mode of being and non-being according to mind-independent being, while the second mode of being is the mode of mind-dependent being and non-being.

And the first [mode of being] is the first class of intelligibles, while the second [mode of being]\textsuperscript{64} is the second class of intelligibles, although in either one of these classes [lit. sub utraque parte] there is found something that is first known and something that is second known. . . .

However, the cause for why these first two kinds intelligibles are taken according to the aforementioned two kinds of being [lit. ista duo esse] is that likewise\textsuperscript{65} the first distinction of being is into mind-independent and mind-dependent being, and all other divisions [of being] fall under either of these two divisions (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{61} See DSIDoyle, q.1 a.2 (p.62n68). There, Doyle notes that Hervaeus’s use of forte qualifies the remark by giving room for the fact that we know of relations through the accidents of the absolute substances that are thus related.

\textsuperscript{62} See DSIDij, q.1 a.2 (p.137:14-22): “Licet autem quantum ad istud ultimum (scilicet quod inter esse rei et esse rationis est ordo ex natura secundum prius et posterius notum) dicant isti verum, tamen quantum ad alia duo non videtur mihi quod dicant verum. Nam ex parte rerum invenitur aliquid prius notum altero. Unde prius notus est habitus privacione, quorum utrumque pertinet ad primum genus intelligibilium, et forte absolutum est prius notum relato. Ex parte autem rationis prius notum est genus et species simpliciter quam genus generalissimum et species specialissima; et ista etiam sunt prius nota quam genus subalternum vel species subalterna.”

\textsuperscript{63} Note that I am translating for clarity with regard to this important distinction.

\textsuperscript{64} As will be seen, the Latin reads, secundum genus, as in secundum genus entis. For clarity, I am translating this as “second mode of being.”

\textsuperscript{65} Perhaps Hervaeus means that in addition to the epistemological priority of one to the other. This etiam is missing from Doyle. See DSIDoyle, q.1 a.2 (p.350:19).

\textsuperscript{66} See DSIDij, q.1 a.2 (p.137:23-138:5, 138:7-10): “Et ideo videtur mihi aliter esse dicendum, scilicet quod comparatio inter secundam et primam intentionem non dicit primitatem unius rei numero vel unius speciei ad
In this passage, Hervaeus is stating the primary aspect that one should consider in distinguishing what is known when one knows a first intentional or a second intentional concept. The distinction between these two is based upon two modes of being proper to each kind of intelligible thing. Indeed, as he states at the end of the passage, the very first division of being is between mind-dependent (lit. *esse rationis*) and mind-independent being (lit. *esse rei*). First intentions pertain to the kinds of notions that fall into the latter category (e.g. *man, ox*, etc.), while second intentions into the first (e.g. *genus, syllogism*, etc.).

One implication of this division is that mind-dependent being is *not* divided according to the categories. The categories divide mind-independent being, not mind-dependent being. At various times in the treatise, Hervaeus avers to this fact to indicate that second intentions cannot be considered as part of mind-dependent categorial being—even the category of relation. This fact is quickly evident when one considers how the notion “species” can be applied transcendentally, that is across the various categories. Thus, one can say, “*Mauve is a species in the genus purple,*” and, “*Cuddlefish is a species in the genus animal.*” In the first case, *genus* and *species* are being spoken of as regards qualities, while in the second, they are used in the category of substance. However, this kind of transcendentality is quasi-transcendentality, for in both cases we are not speaking of how some notions such as *being* and *one* transcend the various mind-independent categories so much as we are speaking of how such logical notions are

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aliam, sed unius generis sive modi generalis essendi ad alium modum. Ut si dicatur quod, cum sint duo modi essendi generales, scilicet secundum rem et secundum rationem; primus modus essendi est modus essendi vel non essendi secundum rem, secundus autem modus est modus essendi secundum rationem.

*Et primum est primum genus intelligibilium, et secundum genus est secundum genus intelligibilium, licet sub utraque parte inveniatur prius et posterius notum. . . . Quare autem primae duae intelligibilium accipientur secundum ista duo esse, causa est quia etiam prima distinctio essendi est in esse rei et esse rationis, et omnes aliae divisiones cadunt sub altero istorum membrorum.*
applicable to mind-independent categories insofar as they are considered mind-dependent (i.e. insofar as they are objectively in the intellect).

Thus, in q.2 a.1 Hervaeus argues that second intentions are not the act of intellection, explicitly citing *Metaphysics* E:

[Major:] That which is distinguished in contrast to every mode of mind-independent being is in no way the act of intellection.

[Minor:] However, a second intention is something of this sort [namely, distinguished in contrast to every mode of mind-independent being]

[Conclusion:] Therefore, [a second intention is in no way the act of intellection].

I prove the major premise as follows. That which is distinguished in contrast to mind-independent being [*esse reale*] is not that which designates true mind-independent being, for that which designates something real is not able to be distinguished in contrast to every real being—for in such a case, that thing would differ from itself. However, the act of intellection designates a real being. Therefore, that which is distinguished against every mode of real being is not an act of intellection—although, indeed, the act of intellection is not simply the mind-independent being of that which is known through it [i.e. through the act of intellection], though it is in itself a certain kind of mind-independent being [namely a quality].

I prove the minor premise as follows. That which is distinguished in contrast to being in general [lit. *ens commune*] divided into the ten categories is distinguished in contrast to every real being, for every real being is contained in some one of the aforementioned predicaments in some manner—namely as a species or a difference or as a principle of that which is in a given genus. However, second intentions are something of this sort [namely something divided in contrast to being in the ten categories], for it designates mind-dependent being [lit. *esse rationis*] which the Philosopher distinguishes in *Metaphysics* VI in contrast to being in general [lit. *ens commune*] divided into the ten categories. Therefore, second intentions are distinguished in contrast to every real being.

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67 I am following Doyle here. It seems that Dijs has improperly punctuated her edition. See DSIDijs, q.2 a.1 (p.170:15-16): “licet enim actus intelligendi non sit simpliciter esse reale illius. Quod intelligitur per ipsum est tamen in se quoddam verum esse reale.” Compare to DSIDoyle, q.2 a.1 (p.371:15-17): “Licet enim actus intelligendi non sit simpliciter esse reale ipsius quod intelligitur per ipsum, est tamen in se quoddam verum esse reale.”

68 DSIDijs, q.2 a.1 (p.170: 8-24): “Ilud quod distinguitur contra omne esse reale, nullo modo est actus intelligendi. Sed secunda intentio est huiusmodi. Ergo etc.

Probo maiorum quia: Illud quod distinguitur contra esse reale, non est illud quod dicat verum esse reale, quia illud quod dicit aliquod esse reale non potest distinguili contra omne esse reale, quia tunc esset diversum a seipso. Sed actus intelligendi dicit verum esse reale. Ergo illud quod distinguitur contra omne esse reale, non est actus intelligendi, licet enim actus intelligendi non sit simpliciter esse reale illius. Quod intelligitur per ipsum, est tamen in se quoddam verum esse reale.
Here, Hervaeus explicitly places his concerns in the domain of the Aristotelian division of “being as the true and the false.” Note that, for Hervaeus, the main division of being is between mind-dependent and mind-independent being. As presented in the first chapter of this dissertation, the Aristotelian discussion of being might be represented as:

![Diagram of Aristotelian Fourfold Schema of Being](image1)

**Figure 1: The Aristotelian Fourfold Schema of Being**

Given that Hervaeus first splits being into *ens reale* and *ens rationis* and that he speaks only of the ten categories, one might be tempted to schematize his perspective as follows:

![Diagram of A Possible Hervaean Schema of Being](image2)

**Figure 2: A Possible Hervaean Schema of Being**

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Minor probatur quia: Illud quod distinguuitur contra ens cummune divisum in decem praedicamenta, distinguuitur contra omne esse reale, nam omne esse reale continetur in aliquo dictorum predicamentorum aliquomodo, scilicet vel sicut species vel sicut differentia vel sicut principium eius quod est in genere. Sed secunda intentio est huiusmodi, quia dicit esse rationis quod Philosophus distinguuitur in sexto Metaphysicae5 contra ens commune divisum in decem praedicamenta. Ergo secunda intentio distinguishit contra omne esse reale. Et sic patet minor.”
However, if one presumes that *per accidens* does not indicate accidents but, instead, accidental combinations of beings in two categories (as in the case of a threshold being an accidental combination of a given shape and a given substance\(^{69}\)), it is possible to say that Hervaeus’s division of *ens reale* and *ens rationis* occurs within *per se* being—understanding *per se* merely to mean “having an essential notional unity / intelligibility.” Thus, one could schematize his general claim as:

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**Figure 3: A Hervaean Fourfold Schema of Being**

He explicitly cites the same division from *Metaphysics* E in the *sed contra* of q.2 a.3, where he writes:

- **[Major:]** That which is divided in contrast to the kind of being that is divided into the ten categories does not designate some real being existing in the nature of things.
- **[Minor:]** However, second intentions are things of this sort [namely, something divided in contrast to the kind of being that is divided into the ten categories]
- **[Conclusion:]** Therefore [second intentions do not designate some real being existing in the nature of things.]

The major is evident because that which is divided in contrast to the kind of being that is divided into the ten categories is neither substance, nor accident. However, that which is neither substance nor accident does not designate some real being. Therefore, [that which is divided in contrast to categorial being does not designate some real being.]

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\(^{69}\) See the text and discussion in note 54 of the next chapter.
The minor is evident by means of the Philosopher’s own words in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, where he divides mind-dependent being [lit. ens secundum rationem] in contrast to the kind of being that is divided into the ten categories. However, second intentions designate mind-dependent being [lit. ens secundum rationem]. Therefore, [second intentions are divided in contrast to categorial being.]  

This passage is quite important, given the interpretive claims regarding Metaphysics E discussed above in the first chapter of this dissertation. In this particular passage, Hervaeus equates “being as the true and the false” with mind-dependent being that is distinct from the ten categories. Similarly, he takes up this same division in contrast to the ten categories without hesitation in the midst q.5 a.2, where he writes,

Here, we do not take mind-dependent being as standing for acts existing in the intellect as in a subject, which are real things and have mind-independent being [lit. esse reale]. However, we are here taking mind-dependent being for that which follows the thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect, just as it was expressed above that it is distinguished in contrast to mind-independent being that is divided into the ten categories.

This general hermeneutical choice by Hervaeus places him in line with the same general choice expressed by Aquinas in his commentary on the Metaphysics as well as by Scotus in his third question on Metaphysics E. Indeed, remarks elsewhere show that there are remote

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70 DSIDij, q.2 a.3 sed contra (p.189:7-15): “In contrarium est quia: Illud quod dividitur contra ens divisum in decem praedicamenta, non dicit aliquam entitatem realem in rerum natura existentem. Sed secundae intentiones sunt huissmodi. Ergo etc.

Maior patet quia: Illud quod dividitur contra ens divisum in decem prae- dicamenta non est substantia, nec accidens; sed quod non est substantia vel accidens, non dicit aliquam entitatem realem. Ergo etc.

Minor etiam patet per Philosophum sexto Metaphysicae, ubi dividit ens secundum rationem contra ens divisum in decem praedicamenta, secundae autem intentiones quia dicunt ens secundum rationem. Ergo etc.”

I am following Doyle for the very end of this sentence. See DSID Doyle, q.2 a.3 sed contra (p.385:1-2): “praedicamenta. Secundae autem intentiones dicunt ens secundum rationem.”

71 DSID Doyle, q.5 a.2 (p.574:5-9): “Hic non accipimus ens rationis pro actibus existentibus in intellectu sicut in subiecto, quae sunt vera res vere esse reale habentes. Sed accipimus hic ens rationis pro eo quod consequitur rem prout est objective in intellectu, sicut supra expositum fuit quod distinguitur contra ens reale divisum in decem praedicamenta.”

Doyle stresses again the importance of this division in a footnote to his English translation. See DSID Doyle, q.5 a.2 (p.302n546).
connections between Hervaeus’s treatise and the theme of \textit{ens diminutum}, which was discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, for Hervaeus will conclude that logic is concerned with a particular kind of “diminished relation.”\textsuperscript{72} However, it is important to note the shift that is expressed above schematically. Having now established the general domain into which Hervaeus has placed second intentions, it is time to consider the primary elements of his doctrine of logical intentionality and how he defends the claim that second intentions are not absolute non-being.

### 3.3 Beyond the Categories: The Ontology of Second Intentions

#### 3.3.1 Important Distinctions

Even though Hervaeus’s prose is somewhat terse and subtle, the very opening of the \textit{De secundis intentionibus} gravely challenges the contention that he is a difficult author to read. At the very beginning of the first question, he presents several distinctions. Two of these are quite important and play a critical role throughout the rest of the treatise. This first is a distinction among senses that one can use the term “intention.” The second\textsuperscript{73} is a distinction among the senses that something can be said to be “in the intellect.” A careful consideration of these two sets of distinctions help to set in relief the architechtonic notions deployed by Hervaeus throughout the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 ad 4 (p.553:7-9): “Ens autem rationis si dicat relationem non dicit eam in speciali sed dicit quoddam genus relationis diminutum, non contentum in genere relationis quod es praedicatum.”

\textsuperscript{73} Which itself is the third among the distinctions.

\textsuperscript{74} These initial remarks enlighten the whole argumentation undertaken in the treatise. Indeed, regarding the final distinction to be discussed below, Hervaeus states, “It is greatly necessary for knowledge of those things that are said concerning first and second intentions.” DSIDijs, q.1 a.1 (p.119:1-2): “Tertia distinctio quam praemitto est de esse in intellectu, quae necessaria est valde ad notitiam eorum quae dicuntur de primis et secundis intentionibus.” I am reminded of remarks by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange concerning Ambroise Gardeil: “Father Gardeil was one of those who thought that the explication of the \textit{Summa theologiae} of St. Thomas consisted especially in underlining the great principles which enlighten the whole thing, in calling attention to the most elevated summits of
The first distinction has drawn the attention of Dijs in an article that stresses the logical focus of Hervaeus’s treatise. However, she does not draw to the fore the pivotal role played by objective existence and the metaphysics of relation involved in Hervaeus’s thought. Indeed, it is so central that even in the aforementioned triplicate set of divisions, Hervaeus anticipates the importance of differentiating esse obiective from esse subiective by utilizing the terms even in his first set of distinctions. While it might be preferable to look ahead to Hervaeus’s remarks about objective existence, even before treating the first division that he provides, this strategy risks increasing confusion. Hervaeus’s discussion of that matter involves several subtleties that will connect this section’s concerns to the rest of this chapter.

The first set of distinctions pertains to various ways that one can use the word “intention.” He begins by noting uses of the term regarding matters of human volition. From this perspective, the term “intention” can be used in one of two ways. On the one hand, one can say that “intention” is act of will tending to an end through a given means, as when one wills to achieve human fame by means of doing philanthropic work. A second way that one can use “intention” is when one speaks directly of the thing intended. Hervaeus uses the tangible example of slaking one’s thirst, as when one says, “Drinking is his intention.” This refers to the thing that is intended [lit. the res intenta]. These volitional senses are not important for the De secundis intentionibus.

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75 See Dijs, “Hervaeus Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic,” 197-205.
76 Her remarks about relations are only brief and mostly repeat the basic points made by Hervaeus in these opening articles. She does not plumb the depths of his use of the Aristotelian category of relation (all the while exceeding its scope into the domain of esse rationis). See ibid., 201-205. Likewise, she notes the theme of objective existence only in sentences that are nearly direct translations of Hervaeus’s dicta in various places. See ibid., 200 and 202.
77 See ibid. (p.116:2-14): “Sciendum est igitur quod intentio pertinet tam ad voluntatem quam ad intellectum. Et quia videtur quod intentio importet tendentiam in quoddam alterum, intentio tam voluntati tendenti in
Unsurprisingly, the important class of “intention” is that pertaining to the ways that the term is used in the context of intellect. In this domain, Hervaeus posits an important subdivision. The first way that “intention” can be used is from the perspective of the knower. This sense will not be the direct concern with the treatise. It pertains to the cognitional “tools” such as the intelligible species, the concept, and the act of intellect. Indeed, as he states here, it even pertains (in an extended sense) to any kind of similitude that leads a knower to know something else. Hence, one could even call a portrait an intention in this extended sense. However, when he speaks of first and second intentions in the De secundis intentionibus, this is not his perspective. His doctrine of intentionality will not focus on the ontology of the knower. Instead, his perspective is that of the thing that is known. From this perspective, one can take the term “intention” in the material and concrete sense or in the formal and abstract sense. In the former manner, an intention is merely whatever one knows—man, ox, genus, or syllogism. On the other hand, one may speak abstractly, as when one discusses the “intentionality” of the given thing known. This intentionality (of the thing known, not the

suum obiectum quam etiam intellectui respectu sui obiecti convenit. Dicitur igitur dupliciter intentio ex parte voluntatis. Uno modo ipse actus voluntatis tendentis ad assequendum aliquem finem per aliqaud medium; sicut si aliquid vellet ire ad ecclesiam propter gloriem hominum sive laudem, diceretur de tali quod per talem actum intendit habere gloriam sive laudem; si autem iret propter Deum, diceretur intendere Dei honorem. Alio modo dicitur intentio res intenta, sicut quandoque dicitur voluntas res volita, quam scilicet aliquid vult; sicut dicitur quod bibere est voluntas sitiens.”

78 See ibid., (p.116:15-21): “Ex parte autem intellectus dicitur intentio dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis esse scilicet illud quod per modum alciusius praepensationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis sive actus intelligendi, sive conceptus mentis quando format perfectum conceptum de re. Isto modo etiam posset extendi nomen ‘intentionis’ ad quamcumque similitudinem sive exemplar ducens in cognitionem rei. Ex parte autem intellectus dicitur intentio dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis esse scilicet illud quod per modum alicuius praepensationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis sive actus intelligendi, sive concep- tus mentis quando format perfectum conceptum de re. Isto modo etiam posset extendi nomen ‘intentionis’ ad quamcumque similitudinem sive exemplar ducens in cognitionem rei.”

\textit{knower}\textsuperscript{80} “designates the terminus of this very tendency or that very tendency, which is a certain relation of the known thing to the act of intellection.”\textsuperscript{81} As should be anticipated based upon the discussions in the previous two chapters, this relation is the mind-dependent relation of the known thing to the knower.

He continues by making several important observations based upon the types of things that one means by names of first and second imposition.\textsuperscript{82} In so doing, he stresses again that his whole discussion will be taken from the perspective of the thing known. In addition, he anticipates his own remarks about objective existence. This is an indication of the centrality of the distinction of \textit{esse obiectivum} from \textit{esse subiectivum} for his entire doctrine of intentionality. Indeed, from his very first terminological division, he cannot help but deploy the distinction. For now, the notion of \textit{esse obiectivum} can be understood in accord with the discussions of the previous two chapters of this dissertation. As regards the matter at hand, he writes,

It must be known that, when one says “first intention” and “second intention” inasmuch as it is said that names of first imposition signify a first intention (e.g. “man,” “ox,” and other such things) and that names of second imposition signify a second intention (e.g. “universal,” “genus,” “species,” and other such things), first and second intention are not in these cases taken from the perspective of the knower—for in that case a first intention would only be the intelligible species (which is false, as will soon be obvious in the course of the article’s argument). Rather, first and second intention is taken from the perspective of the thing that is known—and it is taken according to the twofold categorization of intelligibles at which the act of intellection is terminated.

For some [such things] are those which do not pertain to things known from the operation of the speculative intellect, namely inasmuch as they are objectively in the intellect. Nay rather, with such objective being left out of consideration (in a manner that will be

\textsuperscript{80} This is precisely the foundation of what was such a surprising doctrine not only to Doyle but also to Cesalli, who noted it in Hervaeus’s student Francisco da Prato. See note 65 in the introduction to this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{81} See ibid., q.1 a.1 (p.116:25-57). I follow DSIDoyle at “sive ispam terminationem” in Dijs’s edition. DSIDoyle, q.1 a.1 (p.333:13) has a much more intelligible form, namely, “sive ipsamet tendentiae.” Given the remarks in the subordinate clause following this, Doyle’s reading clearly has the meaning of the text correct.

\textsuperscript{82} As noted in the first chapter, this was the terminology preferred by Aquinas, itself related to an earlier Porphyrean-Boethian vocabulary for speaking about the division of these matters. See note 196 in the first chapter of this dissertation.
discussed below), they pertain to things—whether affirmatively (as in the case of “man,” “ox,” “white,” “black,” or other such things) or privatively (as in the case of “blind,” “deaf,” and other such things). And these pertain to first intentions spoken of materially, as has been said; for first intention, taken concretely and materially, designates that which is known.

The other [namely, second intentions] are those things which pertain to things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect (such as “to be abstract,” “universal,” and other such things). And these pertain to second intentions—and concerning these, much will be made clear in what follows (emphasis added).

Thus, in this selection, he reiterated that his perspective is that of the thing that is known. Using the accepted division of names of first and second imposition, he then notes that first intentions designate formalities pertaining to things only insofar as one leaves out of consideration what arises from something being objectively in the intellect. However, second intentions are those notions that apply to something insofar as they are in the intellect, objectively speaking. He continues, clearly deploying the distinction from Metaphysics E without citing the text, and noting from the start his opinion that second intentions are all of the various kinds of mind-dependent relations that pertain to a thing insofar as it is in the intellect:

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83 See note 59 above.


Alia sunt quae conveniunt rebus secundum quod sunt objective in intellectu (sicut ‘esse abstractum’ et ‘universale’ et consimilia); et ista pertinent ad secundam intentionem, et de his magis infra patebit.”

Note that I am translating, “Nam quaedam sunt quae conveniunt rebus intelligibilibus (non ex operatione intellectus speculativi) prout scilicet sunt objective in intellectu,” without the added parentheses. These confuse the sense of the sentence, for the phrase beginning with “prout” describes the status of affairs “ex operatione intellectus speculativi.”
Furthermore, it should be known that an intention considered from the perspective of the knower is *not distinguished in contrast to real being, simply speaking*. Nay rather, they are genuine [lit. *vera*] beings—namely, intelligible species or acts of intellection. Also [it should be noted], a first intention taken from the perspective of the thing known with respect to that which it designates concretely and materially, is not distinguished in contrast to mind-independent being [lit. *esse reale*]; for that which is known (with respect to the first general category of intelligibles, at least) sometimes is a thing outside of the soul (such as a man, whiteness, blackness, and other such things).

However, that which is formally implied by a first intention—namely a relation of the known thing to the act of intellection—is only a mind-dependent being [lit. *ens rationis*], distinct in contrast to mind-independent being [lit. *esse reale*]; for such a relation is a mind-dependent relation [lit. *relatio rationis*]. Also, that which is implied by a second intention—both when it is taken formally (namely, as the aforementioned relation to the act of intellection) and when it is taken materially (namely, as that which is understood secondarily, such as universality, “to be abstract,” and other such things)—designates only mind-dependent being [lit. *ens tantum secundum rationem*], distinct in contrast to mind-independent being.

For now, this point is presupposed, for it will be proven below [throughout numerous questions in the treatise].

Thus, from the very beginning, Hervaeus states numerous aspects of his overall intentionality doctrine. Schematically, this could be summarized schematically in the following diagram:

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85 Doyle is right to note on DSIDoyle, 44n23: “‘True being’ is real or genuine being which is in some way mind-independent as opposed to ‘being as true’ which is mind-dependent.” Hervaeus’s use of *ens verum* is not quite the same as that which was observed in the last chapter when Scotus was seen to use the term to refer to “being as the true and the false.”

86 Namely, notions signified by terms of first imposition.

87 I believe that he qualifies his language in this manner both because one can know something that no longer exists and, also, one can also know something that is merely possible. Indeed, as discussed in q.1 a.5, he holds that even fictions are first intentions, at least as regards their objective content.

88 See DSIDijs, q.1 a.1 (p.117:19-118:3): “Ulterius scendum quod intentio quae se tenet ex parte intelligentis, non distinguitor contra esse reale simpliciter, immo sunt res verae, scilicet species vel actus intelligendi. Intentio etiam prima quae se tenet ex parte rei intellectae quantum ad illud quod concretive et materialiter dicit, non distinguitor contra esse reale, quia illud quod intelligitur (quantum ad primum genus intelligibilium saltem) quandoque res vera est extra animam (ut homo, albedo, nigredo et consimilia).

Sed illud quod formaliter importatur per primam intentionem, scilicet habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi, est mere ens rationis distinctum contra esse reale, quia talis habitudo est relatio rationis. Illud etiam quod importatur per secundam intentionem tam formaliter (scilicet praedicta habitudo ad actum intelligendi) quam materialiter (illa scilicet quae intelligitur secundario, ut universalitas, esse abstractum et consimilia), dicitur ens tantum secundum rationem distinctum contra esse reale.

Et hoc supponatur advnunc, quia infra probabitur.”
Figure 4: Various Senses of "Intention" and "Intentionality"
A division of intentions according to concrete and abstract senses can be found in thinkers like Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, both of whom focus (in unique ways) on the thing that is subjected to a given second intention—i.e. making the concrete second intention focused on the mind-independent quiddity (such as homo) to which second intentions applied. However, their means of formalizing these matters differ substantially. From the beginning,

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90 This does not mean to imply that Hervaeus was not interested in these thinkers. Clearly, that is not the case, for we will see some passages where he directly engages with Brito (as well as other unnamed contemporary authors). I only mean to redirect the conversation on this topic, for I think that the important groundbreaking work of Pinborg on these matters has long misdirected the attention of the literature, somehow missing the deep resonances (though, certainly, not equivalences) between the language of Hervaeus and that of Scotus.

For instance, consider merely Brito’s remarks about the second intentions formed by the first act of the intellect in Pinborg, “Radulphus Brito’s Sophism on Second Intentions,” n.49 (p.141): “Intentio enim in abstracto nihil aliud est nisi quaedam informatio intellectus, per quam intellectus intendit in aliud. Unde intentio est illud per quod intellectus tendit in rem, et istud est quaedam ratio intelligendi rem vel quaedam rei cognitio quam habet intellectus penes se. Modo duplex est rei cognitio: quaedam enim est prima rei cognitio qua res primo cognoscimus secundum modum essendi proprium rei secundum quamcumque operationem intellectus. Hoc sit sicut per primam operationem intellectus apprehendo hominem vel asinum secundum modum essendi fantasiatum talis rei, sicut intelligendo hominem secundum istum modum essendi qui est ratiocinari et animal secundum istum modum essendi fantastiatum qui est sentient, et sic de alis. Et ista cognitio est prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic cognita dicitur prima intentio in concreto. . . .

Et ideo cognitio hominis secundum se et absolute dicitur prima cognitio. Sed cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus dicitur secunda cognitio. Et ista cognitio rei in habitudine ad aliud dicitur secunda intentio in abstracto, et res sic cognita dicitur intentio secunda in concreto, sicut quantum ad primam operationem intellectus cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus est secunda intentio, quae est universalitas. Et homo sic cognitus est secunda intentio in concreto, quae est universale.”

In this passage, Brito endorses the view that second intentions, abstractly speaking, are the subjective qualitative accidents informing the intellect: “Intentio enim in abstracto nihil aliud est nisi quaedam informatio intellectus, per quam intellectus intendit in aliud.” Furthermore, notice that according to him one can speak of: (1) direct knowledge (i.e. the qualitative accident) of the thing (e.g. homo) (= abstract first intention); (2) the thing that is known in this knowledge (= concrete first intention), (3) the knowledge (i.e. the qualitative accident) of one thing in relation to another (= an abstract second intention), and (4) the very thing (e.g. homo) that is known in this secondary, relational manner (= a concrete second intention).

His use of concrete and abstract are very different from Hervaeus’s usage of concrete intention and abstract notion of intentionality for each first and second intentions. Though Hervaeus at times will engage aspects of Brito’s outlook, the two thinkers are radically different in their most primordial intuitions concerning the matters in question. Hence, I reiterate again that this dissertation has chosen Scotus as a much more illuminating foil for considering Hervaeus’s treatise, given the much deeper resonances between the thought of these two thinkers than between Hervaeus and Brito. For brief remarks on Hervaeus’s apparent critique in q.1 a.2, see Judith Dijs, “Intentions in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century,” 213-223. For very brief remarks on these two as well as Auriol, see Jan Pinborg, “Zum Begriff der ‘Intentio secunda’: Radulphus Britu, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 13 (1974): 49-59. Also, similar issues are addressed by Brito in Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Priora Analytica Aristotelis*, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016), proem. (p.8:125-10:164), I q.1 ad 4 (p.22:161-166), I q.8 (p.50:83-88). Also, it is
Hervaeus focuses on the fact that concretely speaking, terms like genus and syllogism focus on something that accrues to known things only insofar as they exist objectively. Concretely speaking, first and second intentions immediately split into two very different classes of being.

When intention is denoted abstractly as the intentionality of the given concrete intention, it designates the relation of the known to the knower. From the beginning, Hervaeus’s language is that of objective existence, the division of ens reale from ens rationis, and the language of the Aristotelian category of relation. It bears much closer resemblance to that of Scotus discussed in the previous chapter, and for this reason, I have focused more on this relationship than on the standard comparisons of Hervaeus’s thought to that of Brito and Faversham, who actually differ quite significantly from Hervaeus.

As noted above, the final division presented by Hervaeus is a distinction of senses in which one can speak of “being in the intellect.” His remarks have been anticipated since the first chapter of this dissertation, so it should not surprise the reader that Hervaeus makes a distinction between esse obiective and esse subiective. However, it is important to pay heed to this remark found at the very beginning of the De secundis intentionibus.

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interesting to note that in a set of questions on the Metaphysics, an author whom Sten Ebbesen holds likely to be Radulphus, does not devote questions to the status of ens verum (in the sense discussed in e.g. Scotus) vis-à-vis the subject of metaphysical science. However, he does dedicate three out of six questions on Book E to discussions regarding the issue of ens per accidens! See Sten Ebbesen, “Radulphus Brito on the ‘Metaphysics,’” in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, ed. Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 469.

In the last days of this dissertation’s editing, Timothy Noone shared an interesting passage from a text by Pseudo-Roger Bacon. The point is brief, made in the midst of a discussion of the fourfold sense that he gives to the notion of abstraction. The author’s manner of speaking of the second intentions is different from Hervaeus’s, who focuses on their status as reflexively known and attributed to the known thing by the intermediary of the relatio rationis of intentionality (as will be seen in the discussions below). Nonetheless, there are clear Avicennian tones in the Pseudo-Baconian text, making it an interesting voice in the discussions during the late-13th and early-14th century. Note also that this text speaks only in terms of Porphyry’s predicables. See (Pseudo- ) Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros quatuor physicorum aristotelis, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, vol. 8 ed., Ferdinand Delnorme and Robert Steel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p.71:22-28: “Quarta est abstractio intentionis ab intentione, et hec fit in logyca: unde ex istis primis intentionibus ‘homo’, ‘leo’ et hujusmodi, abstrahitur una communis intention, que est species, que est universal in logyca; et ita patet quod logyca est de secundis intentionibus adjectis primis; et similiter dicendum est de aliiis universalius, scilicet genus, differentia etc.”
Hervaeus begins this distinction by separating being subjectively in the intellect from being objectively in the intellect. Unsurprisingly, subjective existence pertains to those things that are in the intellect as an accident in a subject. Hence, he includes among such things the intelligible species, acts of intellection, and scientific *habitus*[^91] that have been acquired by knower through the process of learning and investigation of various subjects.[^92] As will be seen, his remarks here already hint that second intentions are in no way such subjective accidents. He will argue for this position at length throughout the first two questions of his treatise.

He then subdivies “being objectively in the intellect” into two further subdivisions. On the one hand, he proposes that something can be considered in the intellect as something like a house is said to be in the sight of one who sees it. This means merely that the object directly falls into one’s vision, as when one says, “The house is an object of sight.” Similarly, when the intellect understands a human or an ox, one can say that human or ox is in the “sight” of the intellect, as when one says, “The ox is an object of intellection.” As he states here, this sense of “being objectively in the intellect” pertains to the way that something is *directly* known and is distinguished from its own subjective existence outside the mind as well as whatever subjective qualities make possible knowledge of it. In short, in this sense, one is taking about “object” as meaning the *thing itself*. Following the terminology of thing vs. object, we are speaking merely of the the *thing*.

However, it is further distinguished from a second sense in which one can say that something is “objectively in the intellect.” To distinguish this sense, he uses two analogous

[^91]: In general, agree with Yves Simon that *habitus* is too difficult to translate, given the possibility of understanding it as being a mere habit. See his perceptive remarks in Yves R. Simon, *The Definition of Moral Virtue*, ed. Vukan Kuic (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 47-61

[^92]: See DSIDijs, q.1 a.1 (p.119:5-7): “Subjective dicitur esse in intellectu illud quod est in eo sicut in subiecto; et isto modo species, actus intelligendi et habitus scientiae dicuntur esse in intellectu.”
cases, both pertaining to kinds of abstraction, to make his point. Whenever one says that “man” is abstracted from both Socrates and Plato, this state of being abstracted, follows “man” insofar as it is in the intellect. Similarly, one can say that the abstraction of whiteness from sweetness exists only insofar as a sugar cube is objectively in the sight of one seeing, though this kind of “abstraction” is not the case subjectively for the cube in reality. In the first case, one is speaking of how the nature of something is intellectually considered without considering its inferiors, even though in mind-independent existence it exists in each of those inferiors. In the second, the point is that qua seen an object is considered only from the perspective of color, even though it may well also have a taste in reality. The overall point is being-objectively-in-the-intellect follows the thing in a manner akin to abstract or visible-without-taste. That is, it follows the thing only insofar as it is the terminus of an act of intellection. Strictly speaking, this is when a thing becomes an object—when it has a mind-dependent relation to the knower.

A remark from q.1 a.2 ad 1 will help to clarify this point. The text in question is the response to the first objection offered, defending the claim that a first intention is the act of understanding. The objector states that intentions must be founded either upon (1) the things

93 According to Hervaeus, this is the nature of the logical intention of universality, which will be discussed below.

94 See DSIDij, q.1 a.1 (119:17-120:5): “Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse objective in intellectu quia scilicet consequitur rem prout est objective in intellectu, sicut esse abstractum a Sorte et Platone consequitur hominem prout est objective in intellectu. Separatio enim hominis sive abstractio a Sorte et Platone et sic de aliis, non convenit homini prout est in aliquo subjective, quia constat quod homo non est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. Unde non convenit hominem esse sicut subjective in intellectu sine Sorte, nec convenit esse hominem in re extra et naturam humanam sine Sorte et Platone et consimilibus singularibus, sed hoc ei convenit prout est objective in intellectu, quia scilicet homo est in conspectu intellectus sicut objectum cognitum non cognito Sorte vel Platone et sic de aliis; sicut etiam in visu est objective albedo lactis sine dulcedine, quia constat quod albedo non est in visu sicut in subiecto, nec est in lacte in quo est sicut in subiecto. Unde albedo lactis in nullo est sicut in subiecto sine dulcedine, sed aliquando est objective in visu sine dulcedine inquantum albedo lactis est objectum visus, non visa dulcedine.”

Although Hervaeus does not agree with Godfrey of Fontaines’s rejection of the subjective necessity for an intelligible species, his argumentation (especially the use of the examples of whiteness, sweetness, milk, Socrates, and Plato) bears the marks of Godfrey’s thought. See Godfrey of Fontaines, Les philosophes Belges: Les Quodlibets cinq, six et sept, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’université: 1914), Quod. V q.10 (p.37-40). On the issue concerning the causality involved in intellection, see the text and remarks in note 25 above.
according to their real being, (2) on the act of understanding, or (3) in some kind of aggregation of both the thing and the act of understanding. He rejects the first option, for it would mean that there must be separately existing universals akin to Platonic forms. He rejects the third option because of the diversity of kind between the act of intellection and the thing itself, preventing them from aggregately functioning as the foundation of the relation. Thus, the objector states, we seem to be left with the second option, namely that a first intention are founded on the act of intellection.

In the response to this objection, Hervaeus offers another option to the objector. He states that in addition to the three options provided by the objector, a fourth is possible, “namely that a first intention is founded on the thing inasmuch as it has objective being in the intellect.” However, he immediately notes that this option could pose problems. If being in the intellect objectively already implies that the thing is related to the act of understanding, then one must ask how that relation to the intellect is founded.

To deal with this issue, Hervaeus differentiates between two manners of speaking about being objectively in the intellect. Here, he uses the designations “materially and concretely” and “formally and abstractly.” It is easiest to follow the text directly. He first considers how one can speak “formally and abstractly” about being objectively in the intellect:

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95 See ibid., q.1 a.2 obj 1 (p.125:14-126:4): “Aut praedictae intentiones fundantur in solis rebus secundum suum esse reale, aut in solo actu intelligendi, aut in aggregato ex utroque. Primo modo non potest esse, quia tunc oporteret ponere universalia realiter separata, ut dictum est. Si secundo modo, habetur propositum. Si tertio modo, tunc arguo quia: Nullum compositum habens partes realiter differentes potest esse aeque immediate et formaliter ratio alcuius passionis vel prae dicati per illas duas partes si sint partes diversarum rationum; quia quae sunt diversarum rationum, sunt diversorum generum inter se, et per consequens in comparatione ad tertium. Sed totum aggregatum ex re intellecta et actu intelligendi est diversa realiter et diversarum rationum, quia res intellecta et actus intelligendi sunt diversarum rationum. Ergo illud aggregatum non potest esse immediatum fundamentum secundarum intentionum per utrumque istorum. Oportet ergo quod res vel actu intelligendi sit immediatum fundamentum. Sed res secundum se, ut saepe dictum est, non potest esse immediatum fundamentum earum, quia oporteret dare univer- salia realiter separata. Relinquitur ergo quod actu intelligendi sit imme- diatum fundamentum.”
[In one manner,] “being in the intellect objectively” can be taken formally and in the abstract. And then, in this case, it is only a mind-dependent being and is the relation of the thing understood to the act of intellection. And although, perhaps, certain mind-dependent relations are founded the thing by the mediation of that mind-dependent being [namely, the relation of the known to the knower], however, that mind-dependent being (i.e. that mind-dependent relation [of the known to the knower]) is not founded upon the thing by the mediation of this very mind-dependent being—for in such a manner, we would inquire about it [the process of founding] ad infinitum.96

Here, Hervaeus is appealing to what was said in his first division in q.1 a.1 between a first intention taken abstractly. As he says multiple times throughout the treatise,97 the abstract term “intentionality” refers to nothing other than the mind-dependent relation from the thing known to the knower. Note, however, a very important point that he makes in these remarks. He states that there may well be other kinds of mind-dependent relations that are themselves founded upon the relation of the thing to the intellect. He is referring here to the other kinds of second intentions that are founded on the thing but only by the mediation of this initial relation of the thing to the knower. His discussion of this topic will be taken up below in section 3.4. However, note that he does claim that intentionality—i.e. the abstract term designating the relation of the thing known to the knower—is founded on the thing itself, presupposing the act of intellection (which implies a one-way real relation of knower to known). His further remarks continue on this point by discussing the concrete and material sense of being in the intellect objectively:

In another manner, “being in the intellect objectively” is said materially and concretely, namely that very, true [i.e. truly existing] thing that is known. For example when I know a stone, this very stone is objectively in the intellect.98 Only, I say that the thing

96 DSIDijs q.1 a.2 ad 2 (p.139:15-20): “dico quod ‘esse obiective in intellectu’ potest accipi et formaliter et in abstracto; et tunc est esse rationis tantum et habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi. Et, licet forte quaedam habitudines rationis fundentur in re mediante isto esse rationis, tamen illud esse sive habitudo rationis non fundatur in ipsa re intellecta mediante alia, quia codem modo quaeretur de illa et sic iretur in infinitum.”

97 Once again, the proliferation of the usage of “intentionality” in this manner quite surprised Doyle in the article cited in note 45 of the introduction to this treatise.

98 One rightly senses here resonances of Scotus’s treatment in Ord. I d.36 q. unica. See ibid., n.32-47, p.283:13-290:3.
which is thus objectively in the intellect, that is the very thing that is known, is the foundation of this mind-dependent relation [to the knower].

When you ask whether this thing is the foundation of such a relation according to itself (i.e. with the act of intellection circumscribed) or with an act of reason mediating [concommitantly], I say that neither the thing according to itself (i.e. with every act of intellection circumscribed), nor the act of intellection is the foundation of this mind-dependent relation, nor is [the foundation] an aggregate from the thing and the act of intellection. Instead, the genuine [lit. *vera*] thing itself that is known inasmuchas the act of intellection corresponds to it as the foundation of the opposite relation [namely, from the knower to the known] is the foundation of this mind-dependent being.  

What still remains difficult is sorting out just what is meant by Hervaeus's claim that the thing itself is the foundation of the relation of the known to the knower. He does clarify his claim to a degree, noting that the thing itself is the foundation for the mind-dependent relation to the knower only insofar as the act of intellection is the foundation of the opposite relation, namely of the knower to the known. Thus, although an act of intellection is presupposed for saying, “The tree is an object of knowledge,” that act of intellection is not part of an aggregate that makes up the foundation of the relation. Instead, the thing itself is the foundation, at least based on what he says in this passage.

However, in order to understand more clearly the division between these two senses of “being objectively in the intellect,” it is necessary to understand his detailed position regarding the foundation of first and second intentions. In so understanding this set of distinctions, it will also be possible to explain how it is that the materially and concretely denominated intention is

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99 Reading here with DSIDoyle, q.1 a.2 (p.351:22), “relationis,” not “rationis” as in DSIDijs, q.1 a.2 (p.139:25).

100 DSIDijs, q.1 a.2 ad 2 (p.139:20-140:5): “Alio modo dicitur esse in intellectu obiective materialiter et concretive, scilicet ipsa res vera quae intelligitur; quando scilicet intelligo lapidem, ipse lapis est obiective in intellectu. Modo dico quod illud quod est sic obiective in intellectu, idest ipsa res vera quae intelligitur, est fundamentum huius relationis rationis. Quando tu quaeis utrum ista res sit fundamentum talis rationis secundum se circumscripto actu rationis, vel mediante actu rationis, dico quod nec res secundum se circumscripto omni actu intelligendi, nec actus intelligendi est fundamentum huius relationis rationis, nec aggregatum ex re et actu intelligendi; sed ipsa vera res quae intelligitur ut sibi correspondet actus intelligendi ut fundamentum oppositae relationis est fundamentum istius esse rationis.”
related to its abstractly and formally denominated correlate. Upon understanding this, we will also be able to understand precisely how it is that Hervaeus relates mind-independent things, first intentions, and second intentions to each other. To understand this set of relationships is to understand the theme of thing and object with which the second chapter of this dissertation closed above.

3.3.2 Relationes rationis: Their Non-Categoriality

The distinctions (and relationships) between the abstract and concrete senses of intention are key to mediating the relationship between mind-independent things and second intentional concepts (and, correspondingly, the domain of logic). Most importantly, one must understand that that a first intention said abstractly (i.e. intentionality itself) is a second intention said concretely.\textsuperscript{101} Put another way, this position means that the abstract notion of a first intention (i.e. intentionality itself), when considered itself in a concrete manner (as a kind of direct object of intellecction) is a second intention—indeed, the very first of all second intentions. In q.2 a.5, where he asks whether the relation of the thing to the intellect is a kind of second intention, this is precisely the point that Hervaeus wishes to stress in his proper response to the question.

He begins by noting that one cannot say that the abstract intentionality that is common to both first and second intentions primarily designates a second intention. Abstract intentionality in both cases is just the relation of the thing known to the intellect. This doesn’t really help to differentiate first and second intentions. However, following a line of thought that was found clearly in Scotus\textsuperscript{102} (though it has antecedents, for instance, in Aquinas\textsuperscript{103}), he notes that an act of

\textsuperscript{101} This is very briefly but neatly summarized in Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality,” 93.

\textsuperscript{102} See notes 147, 166, and 188 in the previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{103} See note 320 in chapter one above.
intellection can reflect upon itself. He self-consciously does not focus on the epistemological difficulties involved in explaining this process of reflection. Instead, he merely notes that one can reflect upon the relation of the object to the intellect. That is, one can reflect upon the intentionality (i.e. abstractly taken) of a given object of knowledge to the intellect and posit it as a direct object of knowledge. This relation is not, however a real being but instead is a mind-dependent being. Therefore, it belongs to the “second class of intelligibles”, that is, to the domain of second intentions.

In q.2 a.6, he does express an important point that leaves open a much broader domain for entia rationis than just this one simple type of mind-dependent relation. As was presented at the end of the last chapter, there is a way that one can read Scotus’s remarks about the formation of mind-dependent relations such that his position is closer to Hervaeus’s. However, it was also obvious that the Subtle Doctor was not altogether clear about how various acts of the intellect form second intentions. The points made by Hervaeus in q.2 a.6 set the stage for other explanatory remarks he makes later in the De secundis intentionibus regarding other such second intentions.

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104 See DSIDijs, q.2 a.5 (p.219:9-13): “ad cuius evidentiam sciemund quod, quia actus intelligendi reflecti potest super se, saltm super illud quod est eiusdem generis secum. Quod ideo dico quia hoc nolo definire utrum idem actus intelligendi numero sit reflexibilis super seipsum (ita quod ipse idem numero sit quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur)” (emphasis added).


107 The article by Dijs cited above in note 101 does note that the relation of the known to the knower is the first of the second intentions (and that it is the only second intention that is directly founded on the thing, a point to be discussed presently in our considerations of q.3 of the De secundis intentionibus). However, she does not expressly discuss the overall framework into which Hervaeus’s treatise must be placed. Therefore, her article is mostly a careful reading of several texts without explaining the heart of Hervaeus’s doctrine on the subject of logic and second intentions.
In the body of the article, he briskly proposes what he takes to be an obvious point. As regards privative terms like *one in genus, one in species*\(^\text{108}\) or *to be abstract*, he flatly states that these certainly do not designate a mere relation of the thing known to the intellect. However, since they are concrete second intentions, this means that second intentional notions must designate more than the relation of the known thing to the intellect of the knower.\(^\text{109}\) In a similarly brisk fashion, he concludes that such a relation of one thing to another most definitely is not the relation of a known thing to the intellect, whether one takes notions like *species* and *genus* as designating one understood thing to another or one act of understanding to another.\(^\text{110}\) In the course of his response, he does opt for the conclusion that such terms designate the relation of one known thing to another known thing and not of one act of intellection to another.

The topic of how various types of second intentions are interrelated is best left to the final section of this chapter, where we will consider several important texts that explain the specific details of how particular second intentions are formed as well as some general remarks that Hervaeus makes regarding the formation of second intentions by the various acts of the intellect.

Hervaeus’s overal schema makes room for three types of second intentions: (1) the relation of intentionality (i.e. of the known to the knower), (2) relations between things known, (3) privative denominations following upon either (1) or (1) and (2) together. Furthermore, Hervaeus’s remarks develop another important point that was mentioned above concerning the

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\(^{108}\) See remarks in note 118 below about the privative nature of this second intention.

\(^{109}\) See DSIDijjs, q.2 a.6 (p.225:20-25): “Tertium scilicet quod praedicta habitudo non sola est secunda intentio concretive accepta potest patere dupliciter, scilicet ex his quae dicunt privationem sicut unum specie vel genere vel abstractum, quia talia formaliter non dicunt aliquam habitudinem, ut supra dictum est, sed talia dicunt secundas intentiones concretive acceptas. Ergo non sola habitudo praedicta est secunda intentio.”

notion of *ens diminutum*.\(^{111}\) It is the mind-dependent relation that is such a diminished being. This includes even the very first second intention, namely the intentionality of the known to the knower. Although Scotus did not articulate it exactly in this manner, he does express the idea that second intentions (*understood as mind-dependent relations*) have only this kind of being.\(^{112}\) Since they only exist in things considered objectively, they must be understood as contra-distinguished against all real, mind-independent being. Hence, one can understand the deflationary account of Cross regarding *esse obiectivum* in Scotus’s thought.\(^{113}\) It is only “being” in the most qualified of senses.

However, it is important to hold on to the fact that thinkers in this vein—whether it be Scotus, Hervaeus, or (in a less detailed manner) Aquinas—wish to retain the overall Peripatetic categorial structure while articulating their views on logic. There is a kind of faithful Aristotelianism implied by the distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent relations, though such discussions obviously go beyond the Stagirite’s own focus and doctrine. As Fabrizio Amerini remarks in an article on the “Hervaean” responses against Ockham marshalled by Francisco da Prato and Stephanus de Reate, the Venerable Inceptor’s work is understandably seen as both a horizontal and a vertical reductionism in the Aristotelian categorial scheme—horizontal in its reduction of the categories to substance and quality, vertical in its exclusion of universal species, genera, and differences from mind-independent being.\(^{114}\)

\(^{111}\) See, especially, the discussions at the beginning of 2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and *Esse Obiectivum*. Recall, also, that the notion was deployed even by Kilwardby. See notes 162 and 163 in the first chapter.

\(^{112}\) This is the overall theme of 2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and *Esse Obiectivum* above.

\(^{113}\) See notes 135 - 140 in the previous chapter. Note especially the important recent remarks of Pini cited in those notes.

\(^{114}\) Amerini, “What is Real,” 189-190.
To see the adherence to Aristotle’s vocabulary even while altering it, one needs only to consider how Hervaeus both uses and excludes the category of relation from the domain of second intentions. In a way, even though logical being is clearly not categorial for Hervaeus, he did feel it important to build his model of logical being on the accepted ontology of relations, all the while noting the limits of this model. That is, his discussions of mind-dependent relations maintains a fidelity to the claim that there must be mind-independent, categorial relations as well. It likewise notes that the essential character of what a relation is (namely an ad aliud) is distinct from the fact that it is real or not.\footnote{However, it should be noted that Hervaeus does not stress this second fact in detail in the De secundis intentionibus.}

However, one must carefully trope the meaning of “relation” from its categorical meaning to its use regarding mind-dependent relations. The “towardness” of relation presupposes a mind-independent foundation in the case of categorial relations. In the case of mind-dependent relations (and, in particular for the concerns of the De secundis intentionibus, second intentions), one has to take into account the conditions involved in forming the relation in question, namely the acts of intellection involved and the kinds of comparisons between things known that constitute those relations. In the remainder of this section and the next sub-section, Hervaeus’s remarks concerning the “diminished” ontological status of these relations will be considered. Then, in the final major section of this chapter, I will recount his remarks concerning the various ways that second intentions are formed by each of the three acts of the intellect.

As regards the diminished status of mind-dependent relations, there are important and clear remarks made in the course of his response q.2 a.4 obj. 1 in which the objector states,
A mind-dependent being [lit. *ens rationis*] or a second intention is not only a mind-dependent relation. This is the case because just as the other categories designate mind-independent being [lit. *ens reale*], so too does the category of relation designate mind-independent reality. However, it does not happen concerning the other categories that there are mind-dependent beings [corresponding to those categories], for it is not said that there is some kind of mind-dependent substance [lit. *substantia rationis*] or some kind of mind-dependent quality [lit. *qualitas rationis*]. Therefore, as it seems, there cannot be said that there is such a thing as a mind-dependent relation, nor (by consequence) can a second intention be truly called a mind-dependent relation.\(^{116}\)

Hervaeus responds to this objection in his *sed contra*, his proper response, and in his explicit response to the objection. In the *sed contra*, Hervaeus cites the “common dictum, namely that second intentions designate such relations [i.e mind-dependent ones].” He states that it is only in the category of relation that one finds both something mind-independent [*secundum rem*] and something mind-independent [*secundum rationem*]. However, he notes that this observation can only lead to a probable conclusion that mind-dependent beings are mind-dependent relations. \(^{117}\)

He opens his proper solution with remarks concerning the distinction between positive second intentions (e.g. *genus*, *species* and others) in distinction from privative ones (e.g. *abstract* and *one in genus or species*).\(^{118}\) Notions like *species*, *genus*, *predicate*, and *subject* each pertain

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\(^{116}\) DSIDij, q.2 a.4 obj. 1 (p.208:21-209:4): “Et arguitur quod ens rationis sive secunda intentio non sit tantum relatio rationis quia: Sicut alia praedicamenta dicunt ens reale, ita praedicamentum relationis dicit ens reale. Sed non consequitur de aliis praedicamentis quod sint entia rationis, quia non ponitur quod sit aliqua substantia rationis vel aliqua qualitas rationis. Ergo nec potest poni, ut videtur, relatio rationis. Nec per consequens intentio secunda potest dici vere relatio rationis.”

\(^{117}\) See ibid., q.2 a.4 (p.210:4-10): “In contrarium est dictum commune, scilicet quod secundae intentiones dicunt quasdam habitudines. Ratione etiam potest argui quia: In nullo alio genere inventur aliquid dici secundum rem et aliquid secundum rationem nisi in genere relationis, nam bene est quaedam relatio rei et quaedam relatio rationis. Non autem dicitur quaedam substantia vel qualitas vel quantitas rationis. Ergo, ut videtur, ens rationis in solo genere relationis inventur.”

\(^{118}\) Here, both Dijs’s punctuation and Doyle’s italicization could be confusing to the unwary reader. See DSIDij, q.2 a.4 (p.210:18-19): “Sicut hoc quod dico ‘abstractum’ sive hoc quod dico ‘unum specie’ vel ‘genera.’” Also, DSID Doyle, q.2 a.4 (p.398:31): “Sicut hoc quod dico abstractum, sive hoc quod dico unum genere vel specie.”

There should be no split in the expression *unum specie vel genere*. He continues by making clear that he is speaking of particular kinds of unity. Thus the expression “As when I say, ‘One in species or genus’, could be translated, “As when I say, ‘One in genus,’ or, ‘One in species’.” As will be discussed in the final section, these kinds of second intentions pertain to a kind of lack of division (i.e. a kind of second-intentional privation).
to a kind of relation between two things, though only insofar as they are known. Hence, one can say concerning the term *man* in the proposition, “*The man is white,*” “*Man is a subject.*” This latter assertion designates the relation between two known things, not insofar as they exist in mind-independent reality, but only insofar as they function in the course of predication. Unlike mind-independent relations (e.g. one thing being double the length of another), the notion of *subject* implies the work of the intellect relating one thing to another.\(^{119}\) It is arguable that this is the reason that Hervaeus seems to hedge his language slightly, referring to such relations as either *relations* or *habitudines.* Throughout the treatise, he uses the terms somewhat interchangeably, but remarks like his passing comment, “Those things which designate in a positive manner [e.g. *subject, predicate, species, genus,* etc.]. . . understandably are said to signify certain *relationes sive habitudines.*”\(^{120}\) Doyle remarks in his English translation of this passage that he is “at a loss to distinguish sharply between *relatio* and *habitudo* as used here.”\(^{121}\) This is an understandable sentiment. A full textual study would be necessary, but perhaps Hervaeus’s preferred usage of *habitudo* for mind-dependent relations is due to his discomfort with calling mind-dependent relations *relations* in exactly the same way that one speaks of categorically real relations. However, his use of *relatio rationis* in numerous locations would require a separate and specific study focusing in detail on his vocabulary of *relatio rationis* in contradistinction to *habitudo rationis.*

What is certain, from the text in question, is that Hervaeus explicitly states that such mind-dependent relations are not in any category whatsoever. In this text, he does not aver to a

\(^{119}\) How this is presupposed will be discussed in the next subsection.

\(^{120}\) Dijs has *convenienter,* Doyle has *communiter.* I am following the former, though the choice is not of major importance for what is argued. Cf. DSIDoyle, q.2 a.4 (p.399:13).

\(^{121}\) See DSIDoyle, 117n186.
device akin to Aquinas’s distinction between the esse and the ratio of a category, though he does use aspects of this distinction in texts related to the Trinity.\textsuperscript{122} Instead, he observes, “Although such things are not mind-independent relations, they are, however, more akin to relations than to other beings and recede less from the notion of relation than from the notion of the other categories.”\textsuperscript{123} He defends this claim from the perspective of categorial relations as well as from the perspective of the nature of mind-dependent being.

From the perspective of relation, he argues that mind-dependent being is most like categorial relations insofar as the latter have the least amount of being among the categories:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [Major:] That which designates only mind-dependent being has a greater similarity to that which holds the least place concerning mind-independent being and (in consequence) recedes less from its notion [lit. \textit{ratione}].
  \item [Minor:] However, among all the categories, relation has the least entity.
  \item [Conclusion:] Therefore, that which designates only a mind-dependent being is more similar to relation than to any other category and recedes less from its notion.\textsuperscript{124}
\end{itemize}

From the perspective of mind-dependent being, he states that such things only belong to things when the extrinsic relation to the intellect is noted with regard to the thing:

However, mind-dependent beings do not belong—with a relation to something extrinsic left out of consideration—to the things of which they are said. This is the case because they do not belong to things except insofar as they are objectively in the intellect (whether simply apprehending the thing or comparing one thing to another, such as a predicate to a subject or a superior to an inferior [as in a genus to a species]).\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{122} Regarding Aquinas’s text, see note 201 in the first chapter of this dissertation. As regards the mixed sources of Thomas and (likely) Scotus in Hervaeus’s Trinitarian doctrine, see the article by Iribarren in note 201 in the second chapter.

\textsuperscript{123} See DSIDijs, q.2 a.4 (p.211:16-19): “Licet non sint relationes reales, magis tamen assimilantur relationibus quam aliis entibus et minus recedunt a ratione relationis quam a ratione aliorum praedicamentorum.”

\textsuperscript{124} DSIDijs, q.2 a.4 (p.211:21-212:3): “Illud quod dicit ens rationis tantum, maiorem similitudinem habet ad illud quod minimum habet de entitate reali, et per consequens minus recedit ab eius ratione. Sed omnis inter omnia praedicamenta relatio minus habet de entitate. Ergo illud quod dicit ens rationis tantum magis assimilatur relationi quam cuicumque alteri predicamento et minus recedit a ratione eius.”

\textsuperscript{125} Note that it appears here that “simple apprehension” refers to the most simple kind of second intention by which something can be denominated an intention. He is not contrasting the first and the second operation of the
reason, they are not able to designate anything positive except either a relation of a known thing to the act of intellection or a relation of one known thing to another known thing, namely insofar as they are objectively in an intellect comparing one thing to another.126

He makes several further remarks that qualify the extension of things that can be called mind-dependent beings. Aspects of these remarks will be better handled in the next chapter, when we discuss Hervaeus’s position that there are types of entia rationis that are not studied as topics in logic.127 However, one point should be noted so as to clarify the aforementioned case of privative second intentions such as abstract or one in species or in genus. As will be explained in more detail in the final section of this chapter, these kinds of second intentions formally designate only a privation, for example, the fact that a species has a lack of numerical division or a genus has a lack of specific division.128 These are not directly designating either the relation of the known thing to the intellect or the relation of the genus to its species. Such relations are involved in each case, but the focus is on the lack of division as when one says, “Animal is one in genus [or, put another way: has generic unity],” as opposed to, “Animal is a genus [i.e. in relation to some subspecies].” The point is subtle, but in one case the lack of intellect here. As will be seen in the final section of this chapter, he holds that the intellect forms intentions of superiority and inferiority (hence of genus and species) in the first operation of the intellect. His continued remarks in this quote support this claim. The “simple apprehension” appears to be in parallel to the kind of apprehension that directly establishes the relation of a thing known to the intellect. See also remarks on the text from Gredt found in note 121 in the previous chapter.

126 See ibid., (p.212:6-14): “Sed entia rationis non conveniunt rebus de quibus dicuntur circumscripta habitudine ad aliquod extrinsecum, quia non conveniunt rebus nisi prout sunt obiective in intellectu, vel simpliciter apprehendente rem vel comparante unam rem alteri (puta prae dicatum subiecto) vel superius inferiori. Propert quod non possunt dicere aliquod positivum, nisi vel habitudinem rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi, vel habitudinem unius rei intellectae ad aliam rem intellectam prout scilicet obiective sunt in intellectu comparante unum alteri. Et sic aliquo modo patet de secundo.”

127 See 4.2 What is Logic About and Not About? The Broad Domain of Ens Rationis.

128 Hence, even though I made stonger claims for the possibility of reading Scotus as holding a positive notion of universality, I also qualified my lanuage, stating, “Perhaps an awareness of this relation [of the known to the knowler] also implies a knowledge of non-repugnance to exist in many inferiors—though without explicitly comparing to inferiors as one would do when attributing a relation like genus, species, etc. to a given known nature.”
division (i.e. generic unity) is the main focus, whereas in the latter case, the comparison of genus to species is the focus.\textsuperscript{129}

Hervaeus’s response in q.2 a.4 ad 1 reads like a summary of the points made in the main body of the article:

To the first opposed argument, it must be said that—as is obvious from what has already been said—no being in any category is a mind-dependent being. This is so because the aforementioned relations [lit. habitudines] are not relations [lit. relationes] existing in the category of relation [lit. relationis]. However, mind-dependent beings have a greater agreement with the category of relation that with the others, as was shown just now. And therefore, although all the categories agree in the fact that none of them designate only a mind-dependent being, however they differ in the fact that the notion of the category of relation is less repugnant to mind-dependent being than to any other the others.\textsuperscript{130}

In light of the discussions so far in this dissertation, this assertion is not groundbreaking. However, its implications must be made quite clear. From the perspective of the categories, mind-dependent relations are nothing. They do not designate anything that actually exists in real being whatsoever. Thus, even mind-dependent relations are not, in an unqualified manner of speaking, relations (in the categorial sense). Schematically represented, it means from Hervaeus’s perspective that one cannot represent the divisions of being from Metaphysics $\Delta$ and $E$ in the following manner:

\textsuperscript{129} See ibid. (p.212:16-26): “Licet omnia entia rationis consequantur res tantum prout sunt obiective in intellectu, non tamen omnia entia rationis dicunt habitudines; immo quaedam, ut dictum est, dicit privationes, quia, licet non possint esse sine tali habitudine, non tamen formaliter dicunt tales habitudines. Illa enim quae sunt unum secundum rem, possunt esse obiective in intellectu sicut invicem. Ex quo sequitur: quaedam privationes secundum rationem tantum, quia secundum rem non sunt sicut invicem. Sed in positivis, ut dictum est, nullum ens rationis formaliter potest dicere nisi vel habitudinem rei intellecte ad intellectum, vel habitudinem unius rei intellecte ad aliam rem intellectam prout ab intellectu una res comparatur alteri.”

\textsuperscript{130} DSIDij, q.2 a.4 ad 1 (p.214:6-14): “Ad primum ergo in oppositum dicendum quod, sicut patet ex dictis, nullum ens alcuinus praedicamenti est ens rationis; quia, licet praedictae habitudines non sint relationes existentes in praedicamento relationis, tamen maiorem convenientiam habent entia rationis cum praedicamento relationis quam cum aliis, ut ostensum est modo. Et ideo, licet quantum ad hoc conveniant omnia praedicamenta quod nullum eorum dicit ens rationis tantum, tamen quantum ad hoc differunt quod ratio praedicamenti relationis minus repugnat entibus rationis quam ratio aliorum.”

At least as matters are here discussed, Hervaeus thus differs from Aquinas and later Thomists like Poinsot who hold that relationes secundum esse are indifferently categorial or mind-dependent.
Figure 5: An Incorrect Representation of the Divisions of Being

Instead, a better way to represent the situation would be as follows:

Figure 6: A Better Representation of the Divisions of Being
What must be faced is a fact that has been indicated since the first chapter, namely that all such logical entities (or mind-dependent beings) do not fit into the ontological domain of the ten categories. Thus, following the remarks with which the first chapter closed, they are, strictly speaking, non-being. Luckily, for the reader of the *De secundis intentionibus*, this issue is directly taken up in q.2 a.3. A consideration of that passage will help to round out this section’s overall discussion.

### 3.3.3 Non nihil: Second Intentions as Non-Nothing

What does it mean to be “non-real” but simultaneously “not nothing”? Between being and non-being there seems to be no middle notion. However, Hervaeus contends that there indeed is a middle ground, at least insofar as mind-dependent relations do presuppose reality (both of what is known\(^ {131}\) as well as of the human intellect itself). The non-being of such non-real relations is not the absolute non-being of nothingness. Hervaeus argues in the *De secundis intentionibus* that in the very notion of absolute nothingness there is no such supposition of anything real.\(^ {132}\) Thus, one can say that there are different degrees to which something is called non-being.\(^ {133}\) It is to this important issue that we will now turn.\(^ {134}\)

\(^{131}\) At least remotely, i.e. as initially known quiddities of material beings.

\(^{132}\) However, knowledge of absolute nothingness does suppose that it is an object of cognition. Hervaeus will dismiss this as not being a problem, as will be explained in what follows.

\(^{133}\) These same points were taken up by Hervaeus’s student Francisco da Prato, who draws not only on the thought of his teacher but likewise offers what he takes to be salient corrections based on the thought of Aquinas. Indeed, as was noted at the very close of the first chapter of this dissertation, the problem of non-being also figures highly in Thomistic discussions of the problem of evil. Therefore, it is not surprising to find statements like the following in Da Prato’s treatise. See Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de ente rationis* in Giraldis Odonis, *De intentionibus*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, appendix G, n.53 (p.765:17-24): “Ad quartum dico quod, licet excellens doctor magister Herveus multum subtiliaverit se ad faciendum magnum tractum de secundis intentionibus, que sunt entia rationis, non propter hoc potest argui quod entia rationis non sint nichil formaliter, quia beatus Thomas, qui fuit excellenterio, subtiliter et diffuse tractavit de peccato originali, veniali et mortali et disputavit etiam questiones de nichilo, et tamen secundum eumnet et beatum Augustinum peccatum sive malum est formaliter nichil.” Merely to cite one text, graciously pointed out by Tobias Hoffmann, see Aquinas, *In II Set*, d.34 q.1, wherein he discusses the existence, essence, causes, subject, and causality involved in evil.
In the body of q.2 a.3, Hervaeus picks up with a fourth point that he promised to discuss in the article, namely how it is that second intentions differ from absolute nothingness. He considers the problem from two perspectives. On the one hand, one can take the perspective of the known thing (i.e. the various kinds of mind-dependent relations themselves, considered as objects of knowledge). On the other hand, one can take the perspective of the knower, explaining how one who is knowing a mind-dependent being differs from someone who is knowing a mind-independent being.

From the perspective of the thing understood thing, he notes that one can speak of either kind of mind-dependent relation, namely of the thing to the intellect or of one known thing to another known thing. As regards the former, he says that it is quite clear that such a mind-dependent relation requires the presupposition of mind-independent being. He bases this on two presuppositions. First, there is the fact that non-being is only known as a negation of being and that privation is only known as the lack of a given, possessed form. Second, there is the fact that even though knowledge of something does not posit any kind of being in the thing that is known,

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134 See Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung,” 109-121. Also, see related discussions in Georg Koridze, “Primae et secundae intentiones: Einige Grundzüge der Intentionalitätslehre des Hervaeus Natalis,” in Philosophical Debates in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 225-238. In the course of his reading of the text, Koridze discusses this section. Once again, his method of close reading leads him to note a number of the pivotal points about the treatise’s focus on second intentions as ens rationis. However, the careful reading of the treatise remains occluded by his overall posing of the question. Thus, one is told about Hervaeus’s position regarding the relative non-being of second intentions (thus saving one from a form of psychologism) while lacking an appropriate overall orientation that shows that the De secundis intentionibus is concerned with a careful mapping out of “being as the true and the false.” In much of the purely textual sections of Koridze’s dissertation, one reads much that is excellent regarding Hervaeus’s position—including the centrality of relation. However, this viewpoint becomes occluded when he returns to the overall situating of the questions addressed by the text.

135 Once more, showing how thoroughly organized he can be in the treatise.

136 See DSIDijq, q.2 a.3 (p.199:10): “Quantum ad quartum quomodo praedictae scilicet secundae intentiones different ab omnino nihil.”

it does presuppose the mind-independent entity of the thing that is directly known. Here, if ever, is an example of what De Rijk has referred to as the “optimistic confidence that it is up to the human mind to really discover the truth about things.”\footnote{138} In this passage, Hervaeus is presupposing the fact that the intellect is first attuned to knowledge of mind-independent things, even though it can then come to understand the “non-being” of the relation of the thing known to the intellect. He provides no detailed justification for the assertion here. However, the point is that the relation of the known thing to the knower presupposes something that is real. He contrasts this to absolute nothingness, which “neither formally posits something nor supposes something.”\footnote{139} He notes that it will be necessary to explain how such pure non-being does suppose some being from the perspective of the knower.\footnote{140}

However, he must consider the other sorts of things that can be known as mind-dependent beings, namely the relation of one known thing to another. He uses the predicables of Porphyry as his explicit example, especially the case of \textit{genus} and \textit{species}. He promises further discussion of the other predicables later in the treatise.\footnote{141} These details will be taken up in the next section.

As regards the predicables \textit{genus} and \textit{species}, Hervaeus’s point is straightforward:

\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{Notes}
\footnote{138}{See De Rijk, 25. This is a position that he variously refers to as the “parallelism postulate.” As regards the truth of the matter, this is only part of the issue regarding such so-called realism. Another critical aspect, almost ubiquitously overlooked, is the fact that the ultimate connection of the mind to the world (at least in the case of the human knower) must include a defense of the absolute passivity of the external senses in contrast to the synthesizing role played by the various internal senses as well as the active insight of the intellect. On this point, see Deely, \textit{Intentionality and Semiotics}, 155-158. Also, Josephus Gredt, \textit{De cognitione sensuum externorum: inquisitio psychologico-criteriologica circa realismum criticum et objectivitatem qualitatum sensibilium}, editio altera, aucta et emendata (Rome: Desclée & Socii, 1924).}

\footnote{139}{DSIDijs, q.2 a.3 (p.200:8-9): “Omnino autem nihil nec formaliter aliquid ponit nec aliquid supponit.” For the whole argument, see p.199:15-200:9).}

\footnote{140}{See ibid., p.200:10-14. He likewise continues by noting that the case is similar for expressions like “a chimera is a chimera” and “nothing is nothing.” See ibid., p.200:20-25.}

\footnote{141}{See ibid., p.201:14-16: “Et quantum ad hoc simile est de differentia[,] proprio[,] et accidente, de quorum quolibet postea quaeretur in speciali quomodo conveniat eis ratio intentionis secundae.”}
Indeed, *to be a genus* or *to be a species*, though they do not formally posit any being in that of which they are said, however, do suppose mind-independent being in the things of which they are said. For to be a *species* of some *genus* does not belong to anything unless they designate different forms or formally different kinds of being. Similarly, to be a *genus* does not belong to something unless it designates some kind of being belonging to such formally diverse things.\(^{142}\)

That is, one cannot speak of such second intentions unless there truly are differences regarding the notions presupposed. For example, only if there is a difference between *being a tree* and *being an oak* can one justify the claim that *being a tree* is related to *being an oak* as a *genus* to a *species*. Such second intentions require at least a thin ontological description of mind-independent being, though Hervaeus is clear that details of that ontology are left to the metaphysician.\(^{143}\)

Thus, from the perspective of that which is known—whether it be the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower or the mind-dependent comparison of one known thing to another—some real entity is presupposed in the very meaning of such relations, even though these do not posit any kind of mind-independent being. Having discussed this point, he goes on to discuss the matter from the perspective of the knower. These discussions require several careful distinctions to make sense of what he noted above, namely that absolute nothingness not only does not posit some kind of real entity but also does not suppose any sort of real entity.

This assertion is more involved than what might appear at a cursory glance, for it requires one to defend how one can form an idea of *non-being* without supposing the act of intellection by which it is taken into account. That is, insofar as it is known, *absolute non-being* seems to suppose at

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\(^{142}\) Ibid., p.201:3-7: “Esse enim genus et esse speciem, licet nullam entitatem ponant formaliter in eo de quo dicuntur, tamen supponunt entitatem realem in eis de quibus dicuntur. Nam esse species alicuius generis non convenit aliquibus nisi dicant diversas formas sive diversas entitates formaliter differentes. Nec similiter esse genus convenit alicui nisi et quod dicit alium entitatem talibus diversis formaliter convenientem.” He goes on to explain how it is that *genus, species*, and (by implication) the other predicables are applicable to privations only in a kind of imitation of the way that they are applicable to positive forms of being.

\(^{143}\) This will be discussed in more detail below in 4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental?
least the kind of objective existence (or mind-dependent being) that pertains to everything that is a terminus of an act of intellection. This seems to imply that even absolute non-being must somehow recede from nothingness. Indeed, this even makes one wonder if absolute non-being can be understood at all, for knowing it seems to already distort its “nonbeingness.”

In response to such difficulties, Hervaeus notes that there are two different ways that one can understand one thing while not understanding something else. On the one hand, there are some notions that can be left out of the nature of what is understood. For example, an accident like whiteness can be left out of consideration when one truly understands the nature of what it is to be human, though one cannot ignore the fact that man is a rational animal when one knows the nature of what it is to be human. This is the way that one forms an idea of absolute non-being:

And in this way, absolute nothingness [lit. nihil] can be understood without any other being that is concomitantly understood. This is just as when someone forms a conception concerning the fact that I am saying nothing that person understands nothingness (or, non-being itself) in such a way that some positive entity is not included in his formal object [of this at of knowing] but only negatively.

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144 See ibid., p.202:26-203:5: “Sed tunc videtur sequi quaedam difficultas, scilicet quod omnino nihil non possit intelligi. Si enim omne quod intelligitur, ex hoc ipso quod intelligitur habet esse rationis, iam recedit ab omnino nihil. Et sic nihil ex hoc ipso quod intelligitur iam recedit ab omnino nihil, et per consequens videtur sequi quod omnino nihil non possit intelligi. Quantum ad hoc dico quod nihil omnino potest intelligi quantum ad hoc quod obiectum quod intelligitur quandoque ab aliquo, sit ipsum nihil.”

Also, see ibid., p.203:20-24: “Sed adhuc contra possit obici, quia quando omnino nihil intelligitur, quaero utrum illud quod intelligitur dum intelligitur, habet aliquod esse aut non habet aliquod esse. Si habet aliquod esse, sequitur quod illud quod intelligitur non est omnino nihil, quia quod habet aliquod esse non est omnino nihil.”

145 See ibid., p.203:7-10: “Uno modo ut dicatur intelligi sine eo cointellecto, sicut homo in eo quod homo non potest intelligi non intelleceto animali, potest tamen intelligi sine colore, quia non cointellecto colore potest homo intelligi.”

In my explanation, I am combining the texts of Dijs and Doyle (cf. DSIDoyle, p.393:24). It appears that some readers of the treatise wanted to alter the genus animali to the specific difference rationali. It seems that the point that Hervaeus is making is that notions that are in quid cannot be left out of consideration. Perhaps, the choice of animal is correct insofar as to avoid the fact that “rational” is a proper accident that reveals the substantial difference of human nature. On this, see Aquinas, De spirtualibus creaturis, a.11 ad 3. Aquinas, De veritate, q.10 a.1 ad 6. Aquinas, In VIII Meta. lect. 2.

146 See DSIDijs, q.2 a.3 (p.203:10-14): “Et isto modo omnino nihil potest intelligi sine aliquo esse cointellecto, sicut quando aliquis format conceptionem de hoc quod dico ‘nihil’, ipse intelligit ipsum nihil sive ipsum non-entitatem, ita quod in suo formali obiecto non includitur aliqua entitas positive, sed negative tantum.” Note that I am consciously choosing to follow Doyle’s manner of rendering de hoc quod dico nihil, which I think is correct, not the punctuation offered by Dijs. Cf. DSIDoyle, q.2 a.3 (p.111).
Although this is a very brief manner of stating the point, Hervaeus seems to believe that this is different from the case of privations such as *blindness* and *deafness*. A remark earlier in the question does help to make sense of the distinction between the two cases. In the case of privations such as *blindness* and *deafness*, one must presuppose the being of the subject of which the blindness or deafness is (at least potentially) said.\(^{147}\) In contrast to this, Hervaeus states that absolute nothingness only negatively expresses its content, not presupposing any entity in its formal object whatsoever, even though it supposes first that one knows something mind-independent directly—for, as Hervaeus has stated above, such negative concepts can only be formed after initially known positive ones. It just happens to be in the case of privations like *blindness* that the being of the mind-independent subject of blindness “leaks into” (to speak loosely) the formal object of *blindness* itself.

If we grant this distinction offered by Hervaeus, there still remains the problem that absolute nothingness seems to presuppose the objective existence involved in any kind of knowledge. In order to address this problem, he begins by offering an example similar to the one noted above. One can consider the way that *human nature* is related to the intellect in knowledge. In this way, it is proper to affirm the fact that knowledge of *whiteness* does not occur concomittantly with knowledge of *human nature*. However, whenever one speaks of the man in his mind-independent existence, it is false to say that the man who is understood is not white.\(^{148}\)

Hervaeus proposes that this is similar to the case of knowing absolute nothingness. Whenever a knower speaks of absolute nothingness in reference to the intellect—that is, in

\(^{147}\) See DSIDij, q.2 a.3 (p.202:15-17): “In privativis inventur aliquid recedere ab omnino nihil ex hoc quod saltem materialiter supponat aliquid, sicut dicitur quod caecum non est nihil, quia supponit subiectum.”

\(^{148}\) See ibid., p.204:1-16.
reference to its intelligible content—that person does not actually think about the fact that absolute nothingness is being thought about. That is, his or her concern is only with the direct thought: “absolute nothingness.” It is only when one asks about the fact that one is knowing absolute nothingness that one must then include the fact that this has objective existence. It is only when this kind of reflection\textsuperscript{149} is undertaken that one must say that the notion of \textit{absolute nothingness} includes the idea of some kind of being—namely, the qualified manner of speaking of being proper to objective existence.\textsuperscript{150}

According to Hervaeus, the case is different for second intentions. Although a mind-dependent relation does not posit something in reality as a “real” accident, second intentions do suppose certain things about reality. Whereas the direct concept of “absolute nothing” does not suppose anything in this manner (except by the aforementioned sort of reflection), second intentions do presuppose reality in their very meanings. On the one hand, to say that something \textit{is abstract} or \textit{is objectively in the intellect} includes in its general notion that there be, “in the nature of mind-independent things, an act of intellection whose object is said to terminate the act of intellection or to be thus abstracted.”\textsuperscript{151} Even the simplest of second intentions, namely the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower, presupposes that there is actually a correlative, categorial relation from the knower to the known. Likewise, in contrast to absolute

\textsuperscript{149} This kind of reflection is a psychological or epistemological reflection, not a logical reflection. See the discussion in the next chapter 4.1.1 Logical Reflection.

\textsuperscript{150} See ibid., p.204:17-26: “Similiter quando omnino nihil intelligitur, quando quaeritur utrum illud quod intelligitur habet aliquod esse vel non, si quaeratur in ordine ad actum intelligendi, dicendum quod non, quia: Quando aliquis intelligit omnino nihil, cum hoc quod est omnino nihil nullum esse cadit in apprehensione ita quod apprehendatur cum eo, quia licet ita sit quod, quando omnino nihil apprehenditur, verum sit dicere quod ipsi omnino nihil convenit intelligi cum hoc ipso quod est omnino nihil intelligi, non cadit sub apprehensione cum ‘omnino nihil’. Non enim oportet quod qui intelligit non-entitatem, intelligat se intelligere istam non-entitatem, vel illam non-entitatem a se intelligi.” He continues along these lines again on ibid., 205:1-19.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p.393:1-4: “[Et similiter etiam non conveniret alicui esse intellectum obiective loquendo vel esse abstractum nisi esset aliquis actus intelligendi in rerum natura cuius obiectum diceretur terminare actum intelligendi vel esse sic abstractum.]”
nothingness, when one knows “intentionality” (or, “to be objectively in the intellect,” which means the same) the very notion presupposes the idea of intellection and a known object that is related to that act of intellection.

Similarly, second intentions presuppose a thin amount of ontological knowledge regarding the mind-independent reality that is known. On this matter, Hervaeus notes that, for instance, the five predicables presuppose some basic details of the ontology of that which is known:

However, there are some things that, while they do not formally speaking posit being in the thing that is known, nevertheless do presuppose real being—as in the case of the five predicables. Indeed, although being a species or a genus formally speaking posit no being in that of which they are said, nevertheless they do presuppose mind-independent being in the things of which they are said. For to be a species of some genus does not belong to anything unless there are diverse forms (or diverse beings that are formally different). Similarly, to be a genus does not belong to anything except to those that designate some being formally belonging to such diverse things [i.e. the aforementioned forms].

Even though the second intentions are not “real,” their very notions do contain traces of the reality upon which they depend. Absolute nothingness, in its direct signification, does not contain such a supposition of reality, even though one can only begin to form such an idea of nothingness by understanding it in counterdistinction from one’s experiences of reality. One senses in this the very edges toward which the Peripatetic ontology is being pushed. In the domain of second intentions, one enters a world of what is formally speaking “not real”—a domain that is, at the same time, not so lacking in ontological density as to be absolutely

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152 Ibid., p.392:8-14: “Alia autem sunt quae si non ponant formaliter aliquam entitatem in re intellecta tamen entitatem realem supponunt sicut sunt omnia quinque praedicabilia. Esse enim genus et species, licet nullam entitatem ponant formaliter in eo de quo dicuntur, tamen supponunt entitatem realem in eis de quibus dicuntur. Nam esse species aliquius generis non convenit aliquisb nisi dicant diversas formas sive diversas entitates formaliter differentes. Nec similiter esse genus convenit aliquibus nisi eis qui dicunt aliquam entitatem talibus diversis formaliter convenientem.”
This domain has a broad extent, far beyond the five predicables of Porphyry. It is to those broader vistas that we now turn.

3.4 A Brief Hervaean Catalogue of Second Intentions

3.4.1 Many Other Things Than the Predicables

The fact that the intellect forms intentions by its various acts is suggested by a number of medieval authors. In an oblique way, it is suggested by comments like those at the beginning of Aquinas’s Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* and *On Interpretation*. Likewise, the position is found in Brito and Simon of Faversham. As discussed in the previous section, the matter is ambiguous in Scotus, who seems to emphasize the role of the second act of the intellect in forming second intentions. However, it was argued there that Scotus’s vocabulary can be interpreted as being open to the possibility of the formation of mind-dependent relations (i.e. second intentions) by all three acts of the intellect. For Hervaeus, this latter possibility is enunciated quite clearly, all in a manner that utilizes the notions of objective existence and mind-dependent relations in a very Scotistic manner.

The domain of second intentions could be envisioned as a massive domain of logical notions, all denoting various types of mind-dependent relations, connected to reality by the tenuous thread of one single mind-dependent relation, namely that of the known thing to the

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153 The final section of chapter four will flesh out some details about Hervaeus’s position regarding how the logician considers mind-independent being (whether as regards the cognitional process itself or the things that are known).

154 And, indeed, according to Hervaeus the domain of *ens rationis* extends quite far beyond that of second intentions in particular. This will be quite obvious by the end of the final chapter of this dissertation.

155 See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 81-82, 96-98. De Rijk, “An Study,” 171-173. On Simon, see the final text cited in note 55 of chapter two of this dissertation. For Brito, see the text in note 90 above in this chapter. Note that in the case of Brito, remarks about all three acts of the intellect can be found in the text immediately surrounding the particular selection cited in the note above.
intellect. In a telling pair of remarks, Hervaeus provides just such a picture, noting that according to his doctrine…

It must be said that mind-dependent being [lit. *ens rationis*], although it does not belong to mind-independent being according to its mind-independent being [lit. *esse reale*] (i.e. formally inasmuch as in such a predication the denoting thing would be a real being [lit. *esse reale*]), nevertheless mind-dependent being does *foundationally* [or, *fundamentally*] belong to mind-independent being according to its mind-independent being. However, this is said presupposing the act of intellection, whether in act or aptitudinally, as the foundation of the opposite relation.\(^\text{156}\)

A few comments will help us parse this dense discussion of mind-dependent and mind-independent being. Recall that Hervaeus’s focus from the start of the *De secundis intentionibus* is taken *ex parte obiecti*, i.e. from the perspective of the known object. Thus, when he says that mind-dependent being does not pertain to mind-independent being, precisely according to its mind-independent entity, he wishes to draw a stark dividing line between *ens rationis* and *ens reale*. There is no *ens rationis* that is an accident of an *ens reale*.

However, he then concedes the one important “connecting thread” between these two domains. This point will be taken up at greater length below in “3.4.3 An Aside: The Ultimate Foundation of Second Intentions.” Nonetheless, a brief explanation is needed to help remove the obscurity of the remark quoted above.

At the end of the citation translated above, Hervaeus makes the somewhat vague comment,\(^\text{157}\) “*praesupponendo tamen actum intelligendi vel actu vel aptitudine ut fundamentum oppositae relationis.*” By saying this, he is establishing the general context for the possibility of saying that a mind-dependent being (i.e. an *ens rationis*) is founded upon a mind-independent

\(^{156}\) DSIDoyle, q.4 a.1 (p.465:15-19): “Dicendum quod ens rationis, licet non conveniat entibus realibus secundum suum esse reale, formaliter in quantum in tale praedicatione ipsum denominans sit esse reale, tamen enti reali secundum suum esse reale convenit fundamentaliter ens rationis, praesupponendo tamen actum intelligendi vel actu vel aptitudine ut fundamentum oppositae relationis.”

\(^{157}\) Doyle notes no variants on this text.
being (i.e. an *ens reale*). The **key** presupposition is the actual occurrence (or, at least, the aptitudinal potency for such an occurrence\(^{158}\)) of an act of intellection of a given mind-independent thing. Presupposing the act of intellection related (in an asymmetric manner) to what is known, we can then say that the known thing provides the foundation for an *ens rationis*. It is only in the context of the known thing measuring the intellect in its act of knowledge\(^{159}\) that the mind-independent thing is said to be the foundation of a relation to the knower. However, unlike the “real” relation from knower to known (i.e. the relation of measured to measure), the relation of the known thing to the knower (i.e. the relation of the measure to the measured) is only a *relatio rationis*.

Thus, always speaking *ex parte obiecti*, Hervaeus’s point can be summarized as follows. No *ens rationis* is directly founded upon an *ens reale*. No mind-independent thing, **solely** considered in its *esse reale*, is a foundation for an *ens rationis*. However, **if we presuppose the act of intellection**\(^{160}\) as founding the relation of knower to known,\(^{161}\) **we can say that the known thing is the foundation of the relation back to the knower**, although that relation (i.e. of known to knower) is only an *ens rationis*. Indeed, as we will see, this is what we could call

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\(^{158}\) e.g. As when something can be known by a knower who has the relevant *intelligible species* in his or her intellectual memory. However, Hervaeus does discuss the details of such matters here.

\(^{159}\) However, Hervaeus is not utterly explicit that this is the type of relation occurring. The point is presupposed without going into the requisite discussions necessary for articulating the details of this particular kind of relation. Pini notes the same point in Scotus, who likewise presupposes this kind of asymmetrical relation of measured to measure. See notes 138-141 in the previous chapter and note 222 below in this chapter.

\(^{160}\) Whether actually happening or as being only aptitudinally possible. Regarding the much lengthier discussions one needs to undertake regarding these matters, see the remarks surrounding footnote 37 in the next chapter.

\(^{161}\) Notice, too, that Hervaeus does not take up the very subtle points made by Scotus regarding the ways that the thing known has a *relatio realis* to the knower inasmuch as the thing is involved in the causality bringing about the act of intellection. On this see the remarks in note 146 of the previous chapter, as well as the surrounding texts and discussion. In the *De secundis intentionibus*, Hervaeus takes for granted the asymmetric relation of measured intellection to the known thing that measures it. He does not discuss the difficulties that one finds Scotus reflecting upon in the aforementioned text.
the very first second intention. It is presupposed for every other second intention to be formed by the intellect in its process of knowing. It alone is founded on mind-independent reality, though we can only say this if we presuppose the act of intellection, which has a “real” relation to what is known. To put it another way: the relatio rationis of the known to the knower is founded on ens reale only if we are speaking of an ens reale as a known object (i.e. related to a knower). Outside of this case, it does not, strictly speaking, provide a foundation for any ens rationis.

In my order of exposition, I have chosen to lead with an explanation of the many types of second intentions that Hervaeus takes for granted. This helps to show the way that he differs from the discussion set forth in the previous two chapters. However, when we come to his discussion of the ultimate foundation for second intentions (and, hence, the relation of esse reale and esse obiectivum, as we will see), it will be evident that his overall ontology of second intentions would have been impossible without his deployment of generally Scotistic vocabulary of esse obiectivum and the relatio rationis of the known to the knower. Indeed, this very relatio rationis is the constitutive element of esse obiectivum. By this relation, which presupposes the real relation of knower to known, the mind-independent entity (or brute thing) becomes an object (or, an intention).

For now, we will return to our text from q.4 a.1 in order to indicate that for Hervaeus there is a vast domain of second intentions beyond this one particular relatio rationis of the known to the knower. He continues with a passing remark that there are “many other things” to

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162 On this particular point, Dijs’s article in Quaestio is clear.

be considered among the domain of second intentional concepts in addition to the predicables of Porphyry:

However, with regard to other beings [namely, mind-dependent beings or *entia rationis*], the act of intellection is presupposed by one intelligible thing is known in relation to another intelligible thing. For, *genus, species, and difference*—and many others [lit. *plura alia*]—do not designate the relation of the intelligible thing to the intellect but, instead, the relation of one known thing to another known thing, a relationship which follows such known things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect.\(^{164}\)

In this section, only a brief treatment can be given to the various mind-dependent relations that are treated by Hervaeus as being members of the domain of second intentional mind-dependent beings. To begin, several texts will be cited as explicit witnesses of his position regarding the role of the three acts of the intellect in the formation of such intentions. With this general framework established, I will then consider his explanation of how the very first second intention (namely of the known to the knower) is founded on mind-independent reality. Finally, I will discuss his explication of how several cases of second intentions are formed.

A first, though simple text, can be taken from q.5 a.2. Although the details of the fifth question of the treatise will be taken up in the next chapter, Hervaeus makes a succinct and helpful remark in this response to the second objection to the given article. There, he is discussing how it is that one may say that logic is about the syllogism, though he does not hold that it is the first and essential subject of logic (as did Scotus). After noting that “syllogism” refers not to the qualitative accidents involved in discursive knowledge but instead to the “mind-
dependent relation following upon the very thing that is known, inasmuch as it is in discursive intellec­tion," Hervaeus continues:

Indeed, “antecedent” and “consequent,” or “inferring” or “inferred,” do not designate discursive cognition [i.e. a mental quality or activity]. Instead, they designate a relation of one known object to another known object inasmuch as one comes from one known object to another object that is yet to be known. This is just as “predicable,” “genus,” and “species,” do not designate simple knowledge itself [i.e. a mental quality] but instead designate a relation of one simply known intelligible thing to another simply known intelligible thing, inasmuch as one is sayable [lit. dicibile] of another (or, superior with respect to another)—and this relation follows the thing insofar as it is in the intellect grasping simple intelligibilities.

Here, we see Hervaeus making a claim that was not exactly made in Scotus, though the interpretation afforded to the Subtle Doctor above was stated in a way that was open to such a doctrinal position. In this brief remark, Hervaeus is noting how various types of relationships can be formed among things that are known such that those relationships themselves can be designated by various second-intentional concepts. In this remark, he mentions relations formed by discursive intellec­tion (i.e. the third act of the intellect) and several formed by the knowledge of simple intelligibilities (i.e. the first act of the intellect). Indeed, this remark supports an interpretive claim made on behalf of Scotus in the last chapter, namely that the comparison involved in forming the second intentions pertaining to the predicables of Porphyry need not be formed by the second act of the intellect, which is above all concerned with the formation of complex notions that combine multiple intelligibilies in an enunciation (or judgment). They are formed by the first act of the intellect (which seeks above all to express the definition of the quiddity of things).

165 DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 2 (p.577:12-14): “Quia syllogismus non dicit ipsam cognitionem discursivam. Sed dicit ens rationis consequens ipsam rem intellectam prout est in intellectu discursivo.”

166 Ibid., p.577:15-21: “Antecedens enim et consequens, vel inferens vel illatum non dicunt cognitionem discursivam. Sed dicunt habitudinem unius objecti intellecti ad alius objectum intellectum secundum quod ex uno noto venitur in aliud notificandum sicut et praedicabile, genus, species, non dicunt ipsam notitiam simplicem. Sed dicunt habitudinem unius intelligibilis simplicis ad alius intelligibile simplex, prout unum est dicibile de alio et superius respectu alterius, quae habitudo consequitur rem prout est in intellectu simplici.”
In the body of this same question, Hervaeus explicitly links mind-dependent beings to the acts of the intellect. He does so by noting that mind-dependent beings can be distinguished either materially or formally. Thus, one species is said to differ from another species materially because the second intention species applies to two different subjects—as when one says that the species of horse differs from the species of man. The distinction between species in these two cases derives only from the beings to which the notion species applies. However, formally speaking, species expresses the same kind of second-intentional relation in both cases.

More importantly for the study of logic, however, is the kind of formal distinction that one can make among various kinds of second intention. This kind of distinction derives its most fundamental divisions from the various ways that things can be objectively in the intellect, namely from the various ways that things are objects of the intellect’s acts:

However, the formal distinction among mind-dependent beings is taken according to the various modes of being objectively in the intellect—just as “antecedent” and “consequent” are taken inasmuch as things are objectively in the intellect in its discursive activity [lit. in intellecto discursivo]. However, “contrariety,” “contradiction,” and other similar things are taken insofar as things are objectively in the intellect in its activity of complex enunciation [lit. in intellecto complexo enunciante], apart from any discursive reasoning. Indeed, “genus” and “species” are taken inasmuch as things are objectively in the intellect in its activity of simple apprehension [lit. in intellectu simplici]. Furthermore, those given modes are subdistinguished, namely insofar as those general modes are subdistinguished into various manners of being objectively in the intellect.

Insofar as this remark notes that he is talking about the formal distinction of different kinds of mind-dependent relations (or mind-dependent beings), it should be seen as a further development of a point made earlier in the body of q.5 a.2, namely,

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167 See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.566:14-21).
The first difference among mind-dependent being is taken according to the general modes of knowing [lit. *modos generales intelligendi*] according to which things have objective being in the intellect. And this is obvious, for mind-dependent being is that which follows a thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect. However, logic considers those things that follow upon [known] things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect—either inasmuch as it considers the general modes of knowing or the first general modes—for such modes of knowing [lit. *tales modi intelligendi*] are three—namely, knowledge of simples, abstract knowledge of composites, and discursive knowledge. And there are no more general modes of knowing.

Logic, however, considers things with regard to these general modes. Thus, with regard to the first [namely, knowledge of simples], there are *genus* and *difference, predicated* and *predicable*, and other such things. With regard to the second [namely, abstract knowledge of composites], there are *contradictories, contraries, true, false*, and other such things. As regards the third [namely, discursive knowledge] there are *antecedent and consequent, premise, conclusion*, and other such things. Therefore, logic considers the first differences of mind-dependent being, inasmuch as mind-dependent being is divided.\(^{169}\)

In this passage, we are confronted with several other second-intentional concepts that have not been mentioned heretofore, such as “premise” and “conclusion,” as well as even “true” and “false.” This latter pairing should not be surprising, for it was quite clear in thinkers like Scotus whose discussion of objective truth makes clear the second-intentional status of notions like the truth and falsity of judgments.\(^{170}\) Indeed, this remark should remind the reader of the language of Parisian modism that was clearly evident in Robert Kilwardby’s manner of speaking


Logica autem considerat res quantum ad istos modos generales. Sic quantum ad primum, se habent genus et differentia, praedicatum et praedicabile, et consimilia. Quantum ad secundum, se habent contradictorium, contrarium, verum, falsum, et consimilia. Quantum ad tertium, se habent antecedens et consequens, praemissa, conclusio, et consimilia. Ergo logica considerat primas differentias entis rationis, inquantum sufficienter dividitur ens rationis.”

\(^{170}\) See 188 in the previous chapter. This should not be taken to state that Scotus was the first to note this. In general, some position akin to it falls to thinkers who follow Aristotle’s remarks on truth being in the intellect. Just as a matter of example, a very clear exposition of this from a Thomistic perspective (albeit one influenced by Cajetan and Poinsot) can be found in Yves R. Simon, *An Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge*, trans. Vukan Kuic and Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990), 136-149.
of logic. Recall from the first chapter that according to Kilwardby, the logician studies the *rationes entium*, which in at least one place he refers to as the *modi sive rationes rerum*.\(^{171}\)

Likewise, recall that these *modi rerum* appeared to be wholly mind-independent notions to be abstracted and studied by the logician. As will be discussed in the next section, while Hervaeus’s position is quite distinct from Kilwardby’s conception of second intentions, he is willing to say that the *modi intelligendi* do follow upon the *modi essendi* insofar as “in things there is an aptitude for being understood in this or that way and that the modes of understanding follow upon such a disposition.”\(^{172}\)

In the next section, we will discuss how these various second intentions are founded on each other and ultimately on reality. However, before that task is undertaken, I will close this section with a brief catalogue of the second intentional terms that Hervaeus notes throughout the treatise. While this list attempts to be comprehensive, it will not cite every passage where he remarks on a given second intention. Such a series of citations would become quite long for some of the second intentions to which he commonly avers in examples or in addressing particular problems of interest. This list is meant to help provide an overarching view of the numerous kinds of mind-dependent relations involved in second intentions according to Hervaeus.

With regard to the first act of the intellect, Hervaeus distinguishes between second intentions that are positive and those that are privative in nature. The “very first” of all second intentions is the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower, founded in the thing, though presupposing the opposite relation of knower to known. This is the abstract *intentionality*

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\(^{171}\) See note 127 in the first chapter.

\(^{172}\) DSIDoyle, q.4 a.3 ad 6 (p.508:10-11): “In rebus est aptitudo ad hoc quod sic vel sic intelligantur et talem habitudinem consequantur modi intelligendi.”
involved even in every first intention. When known by a reflex act, this mind-dependent relation is a second intention, concretely speaking. This second intention could be called either *intentionality* or *being-objectively-in-the-intellect.* Unsurprisingly, the positive first intentions include all of the predicables of Porphyry: *genus, species, difference, property, accident.* Indeed, even *predicable* itself is a second intention, as are the various kinds of superior and inferior relations within a given predicamental line (i.e. *most general genus, most specific genus, most specific species, and subalternate species*). He also includes *category* and *particular,* as well as *predicate* and *subject.* This last pairing is interesting, as *predicate* and *subject* pertain to simple terms *insofar as they are parts of an enunciation.* As will be seen, Hervaeus does not consistently handle this of “second-intentional cross-fertilization” of the products of various acts of the intellect.

In addition to these positive second intentions, Hervaeus names several that designate privatively. Among these one finds *abstract* and *universal.* Likewise, insofar as unity indicates a lack of division, one can refer to *unity in genus* and *unity in species* as being

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173 This will be discussed at greater length below in 3.4.3 An Aside: The Ultimate Foundation of Second Intentions.

174 These recur over and over throughout the treatise, so a full list of citations would be very lengthy. For a concentrated treatement of these, see DSIDoyle, q.4 a.3.

175 See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.3 (p.436:6), q.3 a.4 (p.444:5), q.5 a.2 (p.565:10), q.5 a.2 ad 2 (p.577:19). Also as he says at ibid. p.568:16-17, there is a second intention of “predicable in general” as well as the various ways that “predicable” is said “in particular.”

176 As regards these last four, see ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.568:17-18).

177 See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.568:16) and q.5 a.2 ad 1 (p.577:3).

178 See DSIDjjs, q.1 a.3 (p.145:4-17) and DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.566:7).

179 See DSIDjjs, q.2 a.6 (p.222:1-14), DSIDoyle, q.3 a.2 (p.428:12) and q.5 a.2 (p.565:10).

180 See note 189 for a brief remark on this matter.

181 See DSIDjjs, q.2 a.1 (p.171:1-15), q.2 a.2 (p.184:2), q.2 a.6 (p.228:9), and DSIDoyle, q.3 a.3 (p.436:7).

182 See DSIDjjs, q.2 a.1 (p.172:15-173:23), q.2 a.2 (p.184:3), q.2 a.2 ad 1 (p.185:19-186:7), and q.2 a.6 (p.228:9). More discussion of these will be undertaken below.

183 See text and remarks in note 118 above.
second intentions. Finally, he includes the idea of being separate (as one might say that a universal is “separate from singulars”) among privative second intentions.\(^{184}\)

Finally, there are certain properties that one finds among second intentions as well. Hence, with regard to the predicables, there are relations of \textit{superiority} and \textit{inferiority},\(^{185}\) as well as being sayable.\(^{186}\) With regard to \textit{genus}, there are properties such as \textit{being predicated in quid} and \textit{exceeding the essence} (i.e. \textit{having a broader extension than an inferior species}).\(^{187}\) Likewise, at one point, he seems to imply that various modes of \textit{supposition}\(^{188}\) are properties of simple terms of intellection as well. It should be noted, however, that similar to the case of \textit{subject} and \textit{predicate} noted above, \textit{supposition} applies to simple terms given their role in propositions.\(^{189}\) Arguably, the aforementioned “being separate” is also a property of this kind, applying both to the notion of universality as well as to that of being abstract—though, Hervaeus does not specify this one way or the other.

With regard to the second act of the intellect, Hervaeus does not produce as extensive of a list of second intentions. When the intellect forms a complex (lit. \textit{complexus} or “intertwined”) notion such as “man-being-an-animal” or any other such synthesis of two notions, it forms a

\begin{footnotes}
\item\(^{184}\) See DSIDijs, q.2 a.1 (p.171:1-15) and q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.218:19-187:6).
\item\(^{185}\) See DSIDijs, q.2 a.1 ad 1 (p.175:16-17) and DSIDoyle, q.3 a.2 (p.428:12).
\item\(^{186}\) In DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 2 (p.577:19-22), he seems to imply that such \textit{being sayable} is a property of \textit{being a predicable}. Thus, the sense of \textit{predicable} would always be substantive “a predicable” and not an adjective derived from the property \textit{able-to-be-predicated}. If this were the case, a full explanation of \textit{sayability} in contradistinction from enunciative predication (and as the presupposition for the latter) would go a long way in explaining how the predicables pertain only to the first operation of the intellect and not the second. Also, see remarks in note 121 of the previous chapter.
\item\(^{187}\) See ibid., q.5 a.1 ad 2 (p.543:17-24). Indeed, this is a fascinating but all too brief passage in which Hervaeus notes how such properties can allow for per se propositions—hence, immediate starting points for scientific discourse.
\item\(^{188}\) See ibid., q.4 a.2 (p.482:28-483:9).
\item\(^{189}\) Regarding how simple terms can accrue second intentions based on their role in propositions (and, in particular, the cases of supposition and subject / predicate), see the remarks in Jacques Maritain, \textit{Formal Logic}, 56-72.
\end{footnotes}
second intentional relation of *enunciation*, which itself can be considered either in general or as specific types of *enunciations*, namely as *affirmative* or *negative enunciations*. Given the various kinds of opposition that can be formed between enunciations, there are further second intentions that are properties of enunciations, including *contradictory* and *contrary*. Likewise, given that enunciations are susceptible to being *true* or *false*, these also are second intentions that are properties of enunciations.

With regard to the third act of the intellect, Hervaeus unsurprisingly includes *syllogism* as a mind-dependent relation formed by this act. Likely, one could add that he holds that this is subdivided into the various kinds of syllogism (i.e. demonstrative, dialectical, or sophistical), though he is not explicit about those kinds of second intentions. Likewise, among the second intentions formed by the third act, he includes a number of further modifications that seem to pertain to the products of the intellect’s second act. Recall that the cases of *supposition, subject, and predicate* mentioned above all pertained to simple terms of intellection, though viewed in light of their role in enunciations. With regard to the third act of the intellect, Hervaeus lists second intentions that really pertain to the products of the second operation, though as they are used in the course of discursive reasoning. It is not clear why he did not follow this same procedure with regard to *supposition, subject, and predicate*, for it seems that he holds that these are formed by the first act (especially *subject and predicate*). In any case, he notes that when used in discursive reasoning, *enunciations* can become *antecedents* and *consequents* as well as

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190 He seems to accept these terms implicitly in his response to DSIDijs q.2 a.1 obj 5 (p.165:17), which uses “enunciable” and “enunciated.”

191 See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 ad 4 (p.553:1-10).

192 See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.565:11). Presumably, too, one could say that *opposition* is a second intention.

193 See ibid.

194 See ibid., q.2 a.2 ad 2 (p.577:13-15).
Likewise, they can take on the properties of being provable\textsuperscript{196} as well as inferring or inferred\textsuperscript{197}.

In the De secundis intentionibus, Hervaeus does not appear to intend to provide a full list of second intentions. At times, he trails off, remarking that there are “other such” intentions formed by a given act of the intellect.\textsuperscript{198} As will be noted in the close of the fourth chapter below, he sees the treatise as discussing second intentions only \textit{in communi} not \textit{in speciali}. Such remarks, as well as his overall tone throughout the treatise, justify the thought that there are many more second intentions than those to which he refers here. All of the various topics discussed in logic would provide one with a host of such additional second intentions.\textsuperscript{199} However, the De secundis intentionibus is more focused on the metaphysics involved in second intentions than on such detailed logical matters. Hence, it is appropriate now to turn to Hervaeus’s account of the ways that second intentions are founded on each other and, ultimately, on reality.

### 3.4.2 Founding one Intention on Another

The most important aspects of the discussion of the relationships among various second intentions, as well as their relations to mind-independent reality, takes place in the third and fourth questions of the treatise. For the purposes of this dissertation, we will begin by discussing

\textsuperscript{195}See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.565:12-13).

\textsuperscript{196}See DSIDijs, q.2 a.1 ad 5 (p.179:1) and DSIDoyle, q.2 a.1 ad 5 (p.376:24). For this, he is not explicit about which act is involved, though it is most arguable that it is similar to the case of the other kinds of modifications that are made to our language about enunciations when we consider those enunciations in light of discursive reasoning. A statement is provable only in light of the ability to prove (i.e. through discursive syllogizing). However, it is quite possible that this is actually a textual mistake, for it is registered only in Doyle’s edition. Dijs’s has praedicabilitatis, which probably should read praedicabile. Perhaps the genitive that she registers is what led a later editor to alter it to probabile for some reason. It would make sense to say praedicabile, which would be paired with praedicatum just as enunciabile is paired with enunciatum in the same passage.

\textsuperscript{197}See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 2 (p.577:16).

\textsuperscript{198}See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.565:9-13).

\textsuperscript{199}Hence, modality of propositions, extension of terms, figures of syllogism, and so forth would all be among the various topics discussed as being particular second intentions.
the general problem of how one class of second intentions can become involved in the “higher order” second intentions formed by more complex acts of intellection. As this topic is discussed, it will be necessary to discuss the ultimate foundation of second intentions on mind-independent reality.200

Hervaeus’s treatment of this topic is clearest with regard to the relationship between the first and second acts of the intellect. The complex nature of the enunciation made by the second act was considered at length in fourteenth century scholasticism in terms of the complex significabile.201 This issue pertains to how we understand complex enunciations (i.e. affirmations or denials of a combination of terms) in contrast to knowledge simple terms that do not express any affirmation and denial of two terms in relation to each other.202 In Hervaeus, we only get the outlines of this issue, but what he does discuss is informative regarding his views on how the various acts of the intellect “interact” in the formation of various kinds of second intentions. As regards the specifics involved in the metaphysics of cognition pertaining to this issue, he only once discusses them in some detail.203

We will first consider some general passages in which he discusses the interaction of various acts of intellection. Then, for the sake of clarifying Hervaeus’s position, I will undertake a discussion of his conclusions regarding the ultimate foundation for all second intentions. Finally, I will close by finishing our discussion of the intentions formed by in complex

200 Because the question of foundations is very important for Koridze, his dissertation provides a very good summary of many of the details of the pertinent articles that will be considered here according to their most important assertions and considerations. See Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung,” 127-158.

201 Remarks on this topic vis-à-vis Gregory of Rimini (but also in light of discussions of Scotus, as well as others) can be found in Muralt, “La doctrine médiévale de l’esse objectivum,” 127-167. In terms of later scholasticism (especially the thought of Poinsoin), this point is explained with clarity in Maritain, Formal Logic, 84-98. Also, Simon, Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge, 136-158.

202 Or, to express the same couplet in another manner used in medieval authors—without such combination or division.

203 See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.4 (p.449:14-452:35).
enunciation. By the end of this subsection, we will have addressed not only Hervaeus’s examples of how the second intention enunciation is formed. We will also have considered his descriptions of the formation of the second intentions abstract, the various predicables, and that “very first” of second intentions, intentionality itself.

Begin by considering Hervaeus’s remarks in a somewhat lengthy passage from q.4 a.2 of De secundis intentionibus:

It is impossible that someone understands something as agreeing with another and that he not understand those two things in some manner. Whence, the Philosopher says in On Interpretation 204 that the word “is” (which signifies the very agreement of predicate with the subject) cannot be understood without the extremes. Therefore, it is false to say that man-being-an-animal, with regard to this complete notion, is not understood by one act of intellection.

However, if the act of intellection by which it is known that one thing (such as “man”) agrees with another (such as “animal”) is not itself one act, it follows that both man and animal are understood as certain simple intelligibles.205 However, this complex, man-being-an-animal would not be understood—and this is false. Therefore, it remains that this complete notion, namely man-being-an-animal, is understood by one act simultaneously. This is so because whatever things are understood by one simple and indivisible act as not being multipled are understood simultaneously.

But, perhaps it might be said to this that those two acts by which man and animal are understood remain and from them is composed one act that represents man-being-an-animal. However, this does not seem to hold, for it does not seem that two acts of intellection make one composite act (as is the case with something composed from two two diverse things of which one is the subject or matter and the other is the act or the form). That this is so is due to the fact that it does not seem probable that some operation is the subject of another operation. However, if some act of intellection would result from those two acts—just as a middle color results from two “extremes” [e.g. orange from yellow and red]—then in that resulting act those two simple acts do not remain except “virtually.”206 Just as the extreme colors truly remain according to their own


205 That is, after the manner of the first operation of the intellect, by which simple terms are grasped.

206 This “virtual presence” pertains to discussions of how the elements of a new compound are related to substantial forms. The example of color is really an imperfect one, though it provides a metaphor. In the mixture of two colors, each color really remains, though minutely mixed throughout. To understand in a simple manner what is at stake, one can consider the way that a chemical compound like water contains hydrogen and oxygen, though neither of the latter exercise their agency in a way equivalent to how they acted in separation from the higher compound. For a fuller, though concise, discussion of these matters, see the discussion of Joseph Gredt in defense of the thesis, “In mixtione perfecta elementa non manent actu neque formaliter, sed virtualiter, inquantum manent
nature in the middle color [formed by their combination] and just as the middle color is not in reality composed from two distinct essences (nay rather, is one essence in an unqualified manner), so also that act of intellection [namely, the complex notion man-being-an-animal] is, essentially speaking, simple (although the preceding acts are said to remain “virtually” in it, insofar as by one act those two are understood insofar as they agree with each other. And then, we will have what has been proposed earlier, namely that those two things are understood by one act that is simple as regards its essence, although it virtually contains many acts.

This particular issue is more broadly related to the question of how one second intention can be founded upon another. This problem has broad implications for the whole of the Hervaean doctrine of second intentions. As has been discussed above, Hervaeus’s doctrine stresses the fact that the very “first” second intention formed is that of the known to the knower. That mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower indicates that the thing in question is in the intellect objectively—in its “gaze”. However, presupposing this basic intentionality of the known object, there are two other classes of second intentions that one might consider. On the


207 This is a slightly problematic matter, addressed in note 206 above.

208 That is not to say that the complex act of the second operation is “simple” in the sense of simple apprehension of quiddities. Instead, it is to say that it is its own whole and not made up of an aggregation.

209 DSIDoyle, q.4 a.2 (p.479:8-480:6): “Quia impossibile est quod aliquis intelligat aliquid ut conveniens aliter, et quod illa duo non intelligat aliquo modo. Unde Philosophus dicit in primo Perihermenias quod hoc verbum est, quod significat ipsum convenientiam praedicati ad subiectum, non potest intelligi sine externis. Et ideo falsum est dicere quod hoc quod est hominem esse animal, quantum ad hoc totum non intelligatur uno actu intelligendi. Si autem actus intelligendi non sit unus, quo actu intelligatur unum illorum ut conveniens alteri, sequitur quod tam homo quam animal ut quaedam simplicia intelligibili intelligentur; hoc tamen complexum quod est hominem esse animal non intelligatur, quod falsum est. Relinquitur ergo quod hoc totum, quod est hominem esse animal, intelligitur uno actu et simul. Quia quaecumque uno actu simplici et indissolubili non multiplicate sunt intellecta simul intelligentur.

one hand, there are those which are relations of one known thing to another known thing. These kinds of second intentions positively designate a particular kind of mind-dependent relation, as when genus indicates the relation of something to its inferiors that differ in kind. On the other hand, there are those second intentions that designate privations. Thus, second intentions like abstract and one in genus indicate a privation of difference among the inferiors in question.

In the case of these latter two classes of second intentions, it is necessary to ask just how they are “founded” upon the very first second intention. A basic account of mind-independent relations would, for example, have the relation between X as double the height of Y founded upon the quantity of X with respect to the quantity of Y. However, as regards second intentions, two questions arise: (1) how can one mind-dependent relation provide the foundation for another, and (2) how do the second intentions formed by simpler acts of the intellect serve to found the second intentions formed by more complex acts (such as when two judgments are part of a syllogism or two terms part of an enunciation)?

Hervaeus takes on these issues in q.3 a.4 De secundis intentionibus—“Whether one second intention is founded upon another one.” Disappointingly, De Rijk does not concern himself with this question in his monograph, for Giraldus Odonis does not directly attack anything discussed in this article of the treatise. However, in this particular article, the unique character of Hervaeus’s thought becomes quite clear, as does his strong adherence to the theses regarding relation that have been a cornerstone of this dissertation’s presentation of his concerns regarding ens rationis. With marked clarity, he opens by presenting several initial remarks before explaining his response to the question, which answers affirmatively.

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210 Ibid., q.3 a.4 (p.442:5): “Utrum una secunda intentio fundetur super aliam.”
The first point is relatively simple. He is clearly aware of the fact that discussions of “foundations” must be somewhat attenuated when one speaks of mind-dependent being. Since they do not designate mind-independent beings, they really can’t function as the subject of a relation. However, one can trope the senses of “subject” and “foundation” just as one tropes the sense of “being” when understanding “mind-dependent being.” Thus, one can speak of a “mind-dependent subject.” This attenuated meaning of “subject” (and “foundation”) will be used in the body of his argument. 211

For his second preliminary point, he takes another example from mind-independent being to help in this kind of troping. In the case of accidents founded in mind-independent subjects, some accidents are founded directly in the subject, while others are founded by the mediation of another. Thus, quantity is directly founded upon the substance while whiteness is founded upon the surface as upon a mediating accident. The quantity of surface is presupposed for the quality of whiteness. In a similar manner, second intentions are founded on the object of the act of intellection by the mediation of some second intention. 212

However, there are two manners in which such a mediation can occur. In this regard, Hervaeus makes a set of observations akin to those noted above regarding enunciations and how the terms remain virtually present in the complex notion such as man-being-an-animal. He uses

211 See ibid., p.444:6-12: “Primo, praemitto quod, licet entia rationis non dicant aliquam entitatem realem vel existentem in aliquo subiective, et per consequens non habent subjectum realiter loquendo, tamen sicut sunt entia rationis, sic attribuendum est eis subjectum secundum rationem. Et hoc subjectum vocamus fundamentum, in quo talia entia rationis sive secundae intentiones fundantur. Et ideo oportet loqui de fundamento eorum quodammodo, ut de subiecto sive de materia in qua aliquid fundatur.”

212 See ibid., p.444:13-20: “Secundo, praemitto quod, sicut in accidentibus realibus est dari secundum rem aliquid ut principale subjectum in quo accidens reale principaliter fundatur, et alid in quo fundatur sicut in ratione mediante qua inest principali subjecto—verbi gratia, albedo fundatur in corpore sicut in principali subjecto sed in superficie fundatur sicut in eo quod est ratio mediante qua inest albedo corpori—ita suo modo est in entibus rationis, scilicet quod aliquando dicuntur fundari in aliquo sicut in fundamento principali fundantur.” See also ibid., p.444:20-30.
the example of dough being made from bread and water, though a parallel (and perhaps
metaphysically more robust\textsuperscript{213}) example would be that of a molecule being made of atoms:

Something can be founded in something in a twofold manner, namely either by another
thing mediating and itself remaining or by another thing mediating as something that in
itself passes away, though it remains in another manner virtually. Indeed, we see this in
mind-independent beings that sometimes a form being introduced into a subject or matter
presupposes some disposition that does not remain with the form; and while it does not
remain in itself it is said, however, to remain virtually as [for example] the form of dough
presupposes the disposition of water and flour which do not [themselves] remain with the
form of dough. And the form of bread pre-requires [lit. \textit{preexigit}] the disposition of
dough which does not, in itself, remain with the form of bread.

However, it is said to remain virtually in that which is made as such because one would
not arrive at the bread except that the dough were to have preexisted. This is so because
by a natural agent\textsuperscript{214} one could not arrive at the form of bread unless the dough preexists.
Sometimes a mind-independent form pre-requires a disposition with that which
remains—as when the soul pre-requires the disposition of flesh and bones and when
whiteness pre-requires a surface.

Thus also is it with regard to the mind-dependent beings that are called second intentions.
Some second intention pre-requires another another second intention that does not remain
with it and sometimes it pre-requires another intention remaining with it—and this will
soon be apparent in the solution to the question.\textsuperscript{215}

He first defends the general claim that one second intention can be the principal
foundation of another second intention. However, he does note that “principal foundation” must
be taken in an attenuated sense. Technically, only a mind-independent thing can be such a

\textsuperscript{213} See remarks above in note 206.

\textsuperscript{214} Doyle notes at DSIDoyle 116n266 that this is a “natural agent” as opposed to God, who could create the
bread by a miracle.

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., p.445:1-16: “[Tertio, praemitto aliam distinctionem quod scilicet,] aliquum fundari potest in aliquo
dupliciter, scilicet, mediante alio manente in se vel mediante alio ut transeunte in se, licet aliquo modo maneat in
virtute. Hoc enim videmus in entibus realibus quod quandoque forma introducenda in subiectum vel materiam
praesupponit aliquum dispositionem non manentem cum forma; et hoc in se licet dicatur manere in virtute sicut
forma pastae, praesupponit dispositionem aquae et farinae quae cum forma pastae non manent. Et forma panis
preexigit dispositionem pastae quae cum forma panis non manet in se. Dicitur tamen manere in virtute in eo quod fit
et pro tanto quia ad illud non pertingeretur nisi illud praexisteret, quia non pertingeretur per agens naturale ad
formam panis nisi pasta praefuisse. Quandoque forma realis praexigit dispositionem cum ea manentem sicut
anima praexigit dispositionem carnis et ossis et albedo praexigit superficiem. Sic etiam est in entibus rationis quae
dicuntur secundae intentiones quod aliqua secunda intention praexigit aliam secundam intention non manentem
secum, et quandoque praexigit aliam intentionem manentem secum, et hoc iam apparebit in solutione quaestionis.”
irreducible principle foundation. Hence, one can understand why he argues that the very first second intention is founded upon the thing itself, insofar as it exists aptitudinally outside the mind when it is also the direct object of cognition. However, as regards all other intentions, they are founded on the formal object of intellection—whatever might be that object, even if that foundation includes some second intentional being. He draws a parallel to primary and secondary causes. Even though secondary causes depend upon primary causes for their agency, they are true causes of their effects. In a similar way, the object of intellection, though perhaps ultimately dependent upon some mind-independent thing, can itself be the true foundation of further mind-dependent relations. That is, even though they are secondary in nature, these second intentions have a true intelligibility that can be understood and signified. Thus, when a thing is denominated from this mind-dependent relation, this relation can serve as the foundation for another relation among the things that are known.

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216 This will be discussed soon, in the next subsection.

217 See ibid., p.445:28-446:7: “Sciendum quod hic non accipitur fundamentum principale illud quod non possit reduci in aliquod primum, quia sic sola res extra diceretur esse fundamentum principale, quia est primo in isto genere. Sicut etiam principalis causa solum non dictur de prima causa quae in nullius virtute agit. Sed de multis secundis dicitur quod sunt causae principales licet aliquam causam praesupponant. Illud ergo vocatur hic principalis causa sive principale fundamentum intentionum quod est formale obiectum intellectus, ita quod in qualibet actu intelligendi illud dicitur esse principale fundamentum intentionis vel intentionum consequentium res intellectas tali actu intelligendi. Illud dicitur esse principale fundamentum quod est principale obiectum, licet praesupponat alius obiectum quod natum est intelligi alio actu intelligendi. Unde sicut ipsum est formale obiectum intellectus quod actu intelligitur, ita etiam est fundamentum principale intentionum sequentium ad talem intellectum sive ad tale obiectum.”

218 Indeed, in this text one can see quite clearly that Hervaeus’s outlook is different from others such as Ockham and (at times) Brito, both of whom stress in various degrees the subjective qualitative aspect of second intentions. Still, Hervaeus allows that his argument holds for thinkers who would say that a second intention is an act of understanding (and not a mind-dependent relation). However, he sets aside this point after only a brief discussion. His own position is quite distinct from it. See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.4 (p.446:25-447:2). On Ockham, see Maurer, Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham, 22-23. Also, see Christian Rode, “Sein oder Nichtsein, Hervaeus Natalis und Wilhelm von Ockham über das Ens rationis,” 77-97. On Brito, see the remarks above in notes 24 and 90 above.

219 See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.4 (p.446:19-24): “Illud quod potest esse significatum formale alicuius termini potest esse obiectum formale actus intelligendi. Quia non significamus nisi illud quod intelligimus. Sed ens rationis sive sunda intentio est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Constat enim quod significatum formale universalis, generis, et speciei, et huius quod est esse relatum ad intellectum, est ens rationis sive secunda intentio. Ergo etc.”
However, Hervaeus notes that there are two ways that such a second foundation can happen. He recalls again—indeed, stating, “as has been often shown”—that a first intention in the abstract (i.e. intentionality, the relation of known to knower) is a second intention in the concrete. Thus, to know *that very* mind-dependent relation is to know something that is second intentional in nature.\(^{220}\) This initial relation of the known to the knower is a kind of medium that remains in that for which it serves as the foundation. Intentionality (i.e. the relation of the known to the knower) “is entirely inseparable from the known object—for it is impossible for something to be a known object and not have a relation to an actually understanding intellect.”\(^{221}\) Indeed, as he stresses, such intentionality *is what it means to be objectively in the intellect*. That is, when it is said that something is objectively in the intellect, all that is meant is that the thing known has a mind-dependent relation to the knower, who has a “real” relation to the thing that is known. “To have objective existence” does not mean that something has a “spooky” or “dim” second existence, as though objective existence were a diminished copy of mind-independent existence. It merely means that something has a mind-dependent relation to the knower. This “non-real” relation itself may be said to have a “diminished being,” given that it is formally non-being from the perspective of mind-independent being—though, it is not absolutely nothing.\(^{222}\)

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\(^{220}\) See ibid., p.447:15-21: “Quia saepe ostensum est quod intentionalitas, quae est habitudo objecti ad intellectum, sive sit prima intentio in abstracto dicta, ut habitudo quae fundatur super primum genus intelligibilium, sive sit secunda intentio in concreto accepta, super quam fundatur habitudo ad intellectum sicut super secundum genus intelligibilium, tamen est semper secunda intentio concretive dicta, quod, scilicet, pertinet ad ens rationis quod est secundum genus intelligibilium.”

\(^{221}\) Ibid., p.447:27-29: “Sed ista intentionalitas est omnino inseparabilis ab objecto cognito, quia impossibile est esse aliquid objectum cognitum et non habere habitudinem ad intellectum actu intelligentem.” See also, ibid., 447:35-36: “Ista intentionalitas, sive habitudo objecti ad intellectum, nihil aliud est quam esse in intellectu objective et esse terminum operationis intellectus.”

\(^{222}\) On this, note the remarks made in the passage cited from Da Prato above in note 133. See also the discussions of texts noted above in 3.3 Beyond the Categories: The Ontology of Second Intentions. Also, it is important to stress that *this* is the view that Scotus’s language concerning objective existence seems to bequeath. Cross is correct to note that objective existence (or *esse intellectum*) is not a kind of hazy tracing of mind-independent existence. However, for Scotus, it is not merely a matter of semantic content. It has to do with a kind of denomination that occurs with one-direction real relations (of the measured intellect to the measuring object) that
Every second intention, however, presupposes that something is in the intellect objectively. This means that every second intention presupposes the initial relation of known to knower. Thus, no matter how complex the mind-dependent relations become—whether in explaining how one thing a genus in relation to another thing that is a species, how a subject is related to a predicate, how a premise is related to a conclusion, etc.—it is always necessary to remember that the “things” in question are “things that are known” (i.e. are objectively in the intellect). The very first mind-dependent relation of intentionality “follows” every thing insofar as that thing is an object and hence, as the condition sine qua non of any further mind-dependent relation. That is, it remains in all further intentions that then are “built” upon the presupposed founding rationale of being objectively in the intellect:

That which belongs to the known object, insofar as it has being in the intellect, belongs to it by the mediation of what is being in the intellect objectively. This is because this very being in the intellect is what is posited as the reason why [for example] a predicate belongs to a subject. However, other intentions belong to a subject according to the being that they have in the intellect. For example, that man is one in species does not belong to man except according to the being that it has objectively in the intellect, and similarly also for “to be abstract” and other such intentions. Whence, one understands first that “man” is in the intellect objectively before one knows that it is without Socrates or Plato [i.e. that it is abstract]. This is so because “man” is said to be abstract from them [i.e. Socrates and Plato] because it [i.e. “man”] has a relation to the intellect as the known to the knower without those other things being known.
3.4.3 An Aside: The Ultimate Foundation of Second Intentions

At this point of our discussion of q.3 a.4, a slight aside will be helpful. On what is this first relation founded? That is, while the very first relation of known to knower can function as a foundation for all later intentions, upon what is that intention founded? Whether it is founded upon the mind-independent thing or on the intellect that knows that thing, it seems that this very first second intention is founded on a “real” being and hence cannot be a mind-dependent being that is distinct from all of the categories of mind-independent being. On the other hand, if it is founded on something that is already interior to the mind, it seems that the “realism” of all of this logical intentionality is at stake, for it never “touches down” in reality.

Hervaeus takes up this problem in q.3 a.1 and 2 of De secundis intentionibus. In the second article, he concludes that there is one second intention that is founded on the thing itself,

Unde est prius intelligere hominem esse in intellectu obiective quam esse sine Sorte et sine Platone. Quia ex hoc dicitur esse abstractum ex illis, quia, scilicet, habet habitudinem ad intellectum ut cognitum ad cognoscentem sine illis cognitis.”

225 Given the remarks on the nature of objective being noted above, this clearly cannot be Hervaeus’s position—given that being objectively in the intellect means nothing other than being related by a relatio rationis to the knower. The objective existence is not something presupposed by that very relation. It is that very relation. However, one does have to face this question directly, as will be done in the upcoming discussion. It should be noted that it is very tempting to read Hervaeus as meaning that the thing known is always something interior to cognition—even when that thing known is something that is clearly a mind-independent being that is naturally apt to move the human intellect to cognition.

For such a reading as this, see the recent work of Taieb, “The ‘Intellected Thing’ (res intellecta) in Hervaeus Natalis,” 26-44. Taieb interprets the fact that every object of cognition is related to the knower as meaning that the res intellecta is always internal to cognition. He considers the discussions of q.3 a.1 on aptitudinally existence outside the intellect as indicating this interpretation. This is problematic to the degree that Hervaeus is there trying to ascertain just what is the foundation for the relation of intentionality. As will be discussed soon, the critical fact is that the very first class of objects that we know are (at least according to Hervaeus) mind-independent quiddities that can exist both outside the mind and as objects of cognition. What is known is that very quiddity, which itself can function as the foundation for the mind-dependent relation—for it is not repugnant to it qua quiddity to be such a foundation. The res intellecta qua res is mind-independent from the fact that it is a quiddity not fabricated by the intellect, though qua intellecta, it has a mind-dependent relation to the knower. As has been noted elsewhere, the Avicennian division of considerations of essence is implicitly at play in such a position. On the notion of mind-independence vs. external existence, see the insightful remarks of Pini cited above in note 211 of the previous chapter.
namely the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower. The most difficult part of the whole matter is how one parses the sense of the word “outside.” It seems impossible that a mind-dependent relation can be directly founded upon something that is mind-independent (i.e. the known thing, considered only as a thing, leaving out of consideration every act of intellection). Indeed, the thing itself has no such relation unless it is already something that is known. However, if one says that the relation of the known to the knower is founded on the thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect, it would seem that the very objective being—which is nothing other than the relation of the known to the knower—is founded upon itself.226

For Hervaeus (as for numerous other scholastics), when we consider the intellection process at its very beginning—i.e. when one is considering the immediate and first object of intellection, which Hervaeus holds to be mind-independent being227—“what” is known is the nature itself.228 When it is known, this nature has a mind-dependent relation to the intellect. As Hervaeus explains, it is only because this nature “is in the gaze of a knower” that it is objectively in the intellect.229 “Objectively in the intellect” merely means “related by a mind-dependent relation to a knower.”230 Therefore, to say that a thing is objectively in the intellect is the same as saying that the thing is related by this mind-dependent relation (dependent upon the real relation of the actual knower to that known thing) to the knower. That is, insofar as it is known,

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226 See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.2 (p.428:18-429:2).

227 See ibid., q.3 a.1 (p.422:21-22): “Sed obiectum immediatum et primum intellectus sunt res habentes esse reale in rerum natura.”

228 Hence, it is just the essence itself—a theme reminiscent of the Avicennian threefold consideration of an essence.

229 See ibid., p.421:22-23: “Nihil aliud est esse obiective in intellectu quam esse in prospectu intellectus ut cognitum est in prospectu cognoscentis.” Indeed, the language of esse obiectivum is here quite close to the same sort of language used by Scotus when he uses the expression “ut cognitum in cognoscente” in a manner that pertains to objective existence as opposed to subjective existence. See 144 in the previous chapter.

230 See ibid., q.3 a.2 (p.428:26-27): “Ipsum esse in intellectu obiective formaliter est illa habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum qua dicitur intentionalitas ipsa.” See also remarks above in note 222.
the thing accrues a mind-dependent relation as accident (or, as Hervaeus indicates, a kind of quasi-accident, given that it is a mind-dependent relation).

It is very important to note, however, that Hervaeus is restricting his discussion of “intentionality” only to the kind of abstract intentionality that pertains to first intentions. While it is necessary to say that the relation of known to knower cannot occur without that given first intentional nature being known, it is not the case that the very relation of the known to the knower is itself the foundation of something being in the intellect objectively. If we recall his words carefully, this would be the same thing as saying that being objectively in the intellect is the foundation of being in the intellect. Instead, the relation is “in” the known nature, though only insofar as one presupposes the corresponding act of intellecction that is related to it.

This kind of accidental inherence is unique in contrast to mind-independent relations. The whole domain of objectivity only occurs because of the existence of knowers. Only with knowers can there be mind-dependent relations. However, according to Hervaeus, all such relations also presuppose (at least at their most basic moments), direct knowledge of mind-independent essences—concrete first intentions. Thus, the first thing that can be called an object is an essence that can at least possibly exist as a mind-independent thing that is then capable of

231 See note 243 below.
232 Which is, in fact, also a kind of “towardness”, given the nature of relation. More on this unique status will be stated in note 243 below.
233 It should be added that later scholastics would extend this to more than intellectual knowledge. For example, it is only proper to say, “The leaf is edible,” if one acknowledges the role of the so-called estimative sense. This “desirability” only accrues to the leaf insofar as it is the object of the estimative sense of (e.g.) the given bug. Hence, the concerns of Black cited in note 73 in the first chapter as well as those of Deely and De Haan discussed in note 116 in the next chapter. It should be noted that aspects of this problem were clearly in sight within Hervaeus’s lifetime, as is evidenced by claims such as those made by Auriol regarding the role of objective (or, “apparent”) even in sensation (according to his account). On this see Lička, “Peter Auriol on Perceptual Acts and their Objects,” 49-76.
234 And it is here that the so-called “parallelism postulate” noted by De Rijk is indeed at least somewhat in force. See remarks in note 138.
being denominated as a known-thing from the mind-dependent relation that arises in human cognition.\textsuperscript{235}

To make sense of this important point,\textsuperscript{236} consider four stages. (1) The essence of the mind-independent thing has its own ontological character, for instance \textit{squid}, independent of any human\textsuperscript{237} knower whatsoever. This is what a concrete first intention will be \textit{when it is known}. (2) When a concrete first intention is known intellectually, the mind-independent essence is known. Thus, one may know \textit{squid}. This \textit{squid} is an object now that it is known. (3) The knower’s gaze can remain on the “concrete first-intentional level” and thus predicate various things of \textit{squid}, all pertaining to its nature as a mind-independent essence (e.g. \textit{having eight tentacles}). (4) However, the knower can also say, “\textit{Squid} is an object,” which is the same as saying, “\textit{Squid} is related to the knower because it is the terminus of the relation of knower to known,” or merely, “\textit{Squid} is known [i.e. is related to the knower].”

In the final case, the knower has passed from the world of notions of first intention to predicates that are no longer mind-independent. Note again that that to which the relation of known to knower is attributed is the directly known essence—(1) \textit{squid}\textsuperscript{238} is (2) \textit{known}\textsuperscript{239}. This is capitally important for understanding what Hervaeus says about the foundation of this very first mind-dependent relation. \textit{It is squid that is related to the knower, insofar as the act of intellection is presupposed as bearing upon it. To repeat:} the nature, \textit{squid}, provides an adequate explanation for this relation, so long as the given act of intellection is presupposed.

\textsuperscript{235} I add the qualify “at least possibly” exist because non-existent real beings (e.g. Dodos) can be known in a first intentional manner. See Pini’s perceptive remarks cited in note 211 of the previous chapter. As regards Hervaeus, see my remarks above in note 58 of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{236} Which was introduced, albeit briefly, in part at the close of the second chapter above.

\textsuperscript{237} Hence, I am sitting aside the problem of natural theology that requires one to relate the intelligibility to the Divine Knowledge.

\textsuperscript{238} i.e. The nature.

\textsuperscript{239} i.e. Is related to the knower as known.
Once this relation is noted and predicated of the nature, the intellect has to make a kind of “turn,” for it is no longer considering anything in the domain of mind-independent relations. Hence, the consideration has thus become “logical”. The immediate object of the intellect is the immediate foundation of the aforementioned intentionality. However, the first and immediate object of the intellect pertains to things that have mind-independent existence in the nature of things. However, the relation of the thing known to the knower is not that which is known except when the intellect reflects on its act and on the relations that there are between the act and its object. Therefore, such things are immediately the foundation of the aforementioned intentionality. However, such things have existence outside the intellect in the aforementioned manner.

This “aforementioned manner” is what is most important to the central point of his argument, though it is only now possible to present the text in question in an intelligible manner. Thus, earlier in q.3 a.1, Hervaeus writes:

That upon which the aforementioned intentionality is founded—when in actuality such intentionality is founded upon it—is not a being that is objectively and actually outside of the intellect. Nay, rather, it is actually a being existing in the intellect objectively—[and here is the important qualification:] although it [i.e. that being] is not that very being-in-the-intellect, as has been shown. Indeed, it is that to which is accidentally attributed (or asserted [lit. convenit]) this very being-objectively-in-the-intellect—at least in the manner by which mind-dependent beings are able happen to something [or, in other

240 Hence, the expression of Scotus found in note 149 in the previous chapter: “Quando autem reflectit, intelligendo comparationem istam ut obiectum, tunc non causatur relatio rationis, sed consideratur, et est consideratio logica.”

241 See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.1 (p.422:19-26): “Nam obiectum immediatum intellectus est immediatum fundamentum praedictae intentionalitatis. Sed obiectum immediatum et primum intellectus sunt res habentes esse reale in rerum natura. Nam relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum non est illud quod intelligitur nisi quando intellectus reflectit super actum suum et super habitudines quae sunt inter actum objectum [sic]. Ergo tales res sunt immediate fundamentum praedictae intentionalitatis. Tales autem res habent esse extra modo praedicto. Ergo etc.” Hervaeus then goes on also to provide a second argument from the impossibility of an infinite sequence of founding one intention on another or one thing on another thing.

242 Indeed, in an amazing and unexpected mistake, Doyle seems to have totally skipped the expression that follows, namely, “licet non sit ipsum esse in intellectu!” Although the continued translation can help the reader to overcome this mistake, it does not help in clarifying this important and difficult point!

243 Perhaps Hervaeus’s qualification here (as also voiced in his continued remarks) is because he wants to avoid drawing a strict equivalence between accidental predication among real beings and those that occur when mind-dependent relations are attributed to mind-independent things. This text is fruitfully compared to that of Scotus cited in notes 149 and 166 in the previous chapter. See, especially in the first note, “Quod est, est quasi accidens eius, cuiusmodi est relatio rationis.” Also, note that in this text Scotus denies that the foundation of the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower is the act of intellection itself.
words, to be accidents]. However, it [i.e. the being to which the intentionality (or objective existence) pertains] is aptitudinally (and in proximate potency) a being that is outside the intellect, distinct in opposition to being objectively in the intellect.\textsuperscript{244}

When one is at stage (2) above, the essence in question is directly known, but it is not yet reflexively known that it is objectively in the intellect. It is only a question of direct knowledge of the essence. This concrete first intention is something that can\textsuperscript{245} exist outside the mind. It is this ability to exist outside the mind that seems to justify Hervaeus’s ability to speak of its “proximate potency” or “aptitudinal” capacity to do so: “Absolutely, however, that which is known [by such direct knowledge—i.e. the nature] is naturally apt to exist without an act of intellec­tion.”\textsuperscript{246}

Thus, the first second intention (i.e. the relation of known to knower) is founded upon the mind-independent thing directly insofar as it is founded upon its essence, which in direct cognition is known directly, though it is simultaneously functioning as the foundation of the mind-dependent relation to the knower (precisely because the act of intellec­tion is

\textsuperscript{244}See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.1 (p.421:7-15): “Dicendum quod illud super quod praedicta intentionalitas fundatur, quando actu talis intentionalitas super ipsum fundatur, non est ens extra intellectum objective et actu. Imo [sic] actu est ens existens in intellectu objective, licet non sit ipsum esse in intellectu, ut ostensum est. Est enim illud cuiu accidentaliter attribuitur vel convenit ipsum esse in intellectu objective eo modo quo entia rationis possunt accidere. Sed aptitudine et in potentia proprinqua est ens extra animam distinctam per oppositum ad esse in intellectu objective.”


\textsuperscript{246}See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.4 (p.450:31-451:29).
simultaneously functioning as the foundation for the real relation of the knower to the known).

In q.5 a.1 ad 1, Hervaeus describes this kind of direct knowledge in language that is quite reminiscent of a theme from Scotus discussed in the previous chapter:\(^{247}\)

In the first cognition by which [e.g.] man is known by the intellect, it is indeed known abstractly. However, that mode by which it is known (namely this very abstraction or universality) is not that which first occurs to the intellect but, instead, man or stone or something of this sort. But, immediately and consequently it naturally occurs to the intellect that it understands man as not being concerned with Socrates or Plato. And then, it understands the mode by which it first was understanding man. And thus, in a certain order, the very thing that was the first object moves [the knower] to both kinds of knowledge.\(^{248}\)

The predication of a second intention—be it intentionality, abstract, or any other such mind-dependent notion—requires that one has understood the mind-dependent relations involved, formed objects of them, and then predicated them of the nature, which can exist mind-independently. In this logical manner of speaking, the knower no longer judges of what belongs to the thing as thing. With this initial judgement, the knower has chosen to consider the thing as object of intellection. However, given that mind-independent and and mind-dependent being are distinct, separate domains of being, is it possible for one to say that the thing that is known can be the foundation in this manner? In other words, does the opposition between ens reale and ens rationis prevent one from speaking of a mind-independent thing functioning as the foundation for the relation to the knower (if one agrees with Hervaeus’s use of the aptitudinal existence of the known thing for existing in a mind-independent manner)?

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\(^{247}\) See notes 163-166 and discussion in the previous chapter.

\(^{248}\) See DSID Doyle, q.5 a.1 ad 1 (p.539:9-15): “Unde in prima cognitione qua cognoscitur homo ab intellectu, cognoscitur quidem abstracte. Sed tamen ille modus quo cognoscitur, scilicet, ipsa abstractio vel universalitas non est illud quod primo occurrit intellectui, sed homo, vel lapis, vel aliquid tale. Sed statim, et consequenter, natum est occurrere intellectui quod intelligit hominem non concernendo Sortem vel Platonem. Et tune intelligit modum quo primo intelligebat hominem. Et ad utramque cognitionem, quodam ordine, movet ipsa res quae fuit primo obiectum.”
In q.3 a.1 ad 1, Hervaeus considers this very problem. There, he considers several ways
that things can be opposed. Strictly speaking, “opposition” should be limited to the cases like
qualitative opposition between accidents like *black* and *white*, which are not only opposed in
their character (lit. *ratio*) but also cannot coexist in the same subject. However, in addition to
this strict case of opposition, Hervaeus notes that there are other cases that are better named
“distinctions.” For example, while the notions of *beginning* and *end* are opposed to each other,
one and the same point can function as the start of one line and the finish of another. Another
case of such distinction is that of “essential identity,” as in the case of the distinction between
quantity and quality. Such things are so distinct that one can never be the other. That is, it is
never proper to consider a change from twelve feet to purple; it would be proper, however, to
consider a change from orange to purple.

This last category is the kind of distinction that is at play between a thing known and its
intentionality, for there is a distinction between the relation and its foundation. In his response,
Hervaeus does stress that he is not talking about two realities being distinct like two categories
(strictly speaking). The relation of intentionality is not a mind-independent one. Still, so long as
one presupposes that in addition to the thing there co-exists an act of intellection, the thing is the
foundation for the relation to the knower.\(^{249}\) The thing and its mind-dependent relation to the
knower are distinct, thus able to coexist.

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\(^{249}\) Ibid., q.3 a.1 ad 1b (p.424:21-425:11): “Respondendum est quod quaedam sunt quae habent oppositas
rationes, quia, scilicet, ratio unius non est ratio alterius (non tamen dicunt oppositas res), sicut principium et finem,
quae semper habent oppositas vel saltam disparatas rationes et habent eamdem realitatem quandoque sicut est de
puncto respectu diversarum linearum. Quandoque autem aliquae habent oppositam aliquam circa identitatem
essentialem, quia impossibile est ea esse eadem per essentiam vel unum; sicut qualitas et quantitas, quia impossibile
est unum esse alterum realiter. Quaedam autem habent oppositam quae propriam dicunt opposita quae sunt circa
idem subjectum [sic] sicut de albo et nigro. Modo dico quod illa quae habent oppositam primo modo et secundo,
quae magis debent dici disparatio quam oppositio, sic se habent quod unum potest esse fundamentum alterius.

Tamen necesse est inter ipsum quod fundatur et ipsum super quod fundatur esse disparationem, quia idem
re et ratione non fundatur super seipsum. Modo dico quod esse rei et esse rationis, vel res vel intentio, non habent
oppositionem tertio modo, sed secundo modo. Non tamen intendo dicere quod different sicut ea quae dicunt duas
These remarks of Hervaeus in q.3 a.1 ad 1 illuminate an example that he uses in the body of the article itself. There, he notes that the quality of whiteness can be understood as being founded upon that which is not white, namely the substance. Similar to the aforementioned example of quantity and quality, substance and quality are distinct but not strictly opposed. Thus, by carefully noting the sense of the denominative used, one can say, “White thing,” emphasizing a particular white thing. This emphasis draws attention to the fact that the whiteness (i.e. a quality) is founded upon that which is not-white, namely the substance. He proposes that the case is analogous with regard to that which is known and its relation to the knower:

However, according to habitual aptitude and existence, taking “white” [lit. *album*] in this manner—namely, for what is conjoined with whiteness—it is possible that whiteness is founded on that which is not white, for it [i.e. whiteness] is founded upon that which is naturally apt to be joined whiteness even if it were not joined whiteness. However, it is always true to say that whiteness is founded upon something that is not white—that is, upon that which is not whiteness. And the same can be said concerning relation if it is asked whether it [i.e. a relation] is founded on the related or upon the non-related.250

In light of the discussions undertaken in q.3 a.1, Hervaeus’s conclusions in q.3 a.2 and 3 follow quite clearly. In q.3 a.2, he provides what could be called the “thin thread of realism in logical intentionality.” This is the *only* second intention that is directly founded on mind-independent being, namely the very intentionality (i.e. the mind-dependent relation) pertaining to a first intention. This intentionality is the abstract intentionality founded on the concrete first

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250 Ibid., q.3 a.1 (p.419:11-17): “Sed secundum habitualem aptitudinem et existentiam accipiendo formaliter album isto modo, scilicet, pro coniuncto albedini, possibile est quod albedo fundetur super non album, quia fundatur super illud quod naturum est esse coniunctum albedini etiam si non esset coniunctum albedini. Tamen semper est verum dicere quod albedo fundatur super non album, id est, super illud quod non est albedo. Et idem posset dici de relatione, si quaeretur utrum fundatur super relatum vel non relatum.”
intention (i.e. the thing known), presupposing the act of intellection as founding the opposite relation.\footnote{Hence, one can see the importance of emphasizing the difference between Hervaeus’s language of concrete and abstract intentions in contrast to that of someone like Brito. Hervaeus’s doctrine moves on the level of \textit{thing}, \textit{object}, and \textit{relation} in order to explain the intentional order from the very beginning. It is a very different way of framing “what” one is talking about by using terms like \textit{first intention}, \textit{first intentionality}, etc. See remarks above in note 90.}

Reflecting upon this abstract first intention (i.e. the intentionality), the knower then knows in a concrete manner a second intention. Every other second intention presupposes this first second intention:

All second intentions, as is sufficiently self-evident, presuppose not only an object\footnote{Note that here “object” refers to the mind-independent \textit{thing}.} but also its being in the intellect (or, being the terminus at which an act of intellection is terminated), which indeed is this very intentionality. And as a consequence, nothing other than that [i.e. intentionality] which immediately follows from a first-known thing (that is, from a mind-independent being that is known). Therefore, only the aforementioned intentionality, which is a first intention abstractly said and a second intention concretely said, immediately follows the thing outside the soul (taking “thing outside the soul” as was said above).\footnote{Ibid., q.3 a.2 (p.431:10-16): “Omnes secundae intentiones, ut de se satis patet, supponunt non solum obiectum sed suum esse in intellectu, sive esse terminum ad quem terminatur actus intelligendi, quod quidem est ista intentionalitas. Et per consequens nulla alia ab illa consequitur immediate prima intellecta, scilicet, ens reale intellectum. Ergo praedicta intentionalias sola, quae est prima intentio abstracte et secunda concretive dicta, consequitur immediate rem extra, acceptioni rem extra ut supra.” Indeed, notice how tightly Hervaeus ties the discussions of q.3 a.2 to q.3 a.1 in the final remark.}

In q.3 a.3, Hervaeus explains in slightly more detail how it is that second intentions are always mediately or immediately founded upon first intentions. In this article, he explains at some length how even privative second intentions like \textit{abstract} and \textit{universal} are ultimately founded upon things. These kinds of second intentions are distinct from two other classes that have been taken for granted in the discussions so far, namely the mind-dependent relation of a known thing to the knower and the mind-dependent relation formed between two known things. Second intentions like \textit{abstract} designate a privation of relation and not, positively speaking, a relation.
In the previous chapter, it was suggested (with due qualifications) Scotus could hold that the second intention *abstract* is based directly on the relation of the known to the knower, given the intellect’s mode of understanding. This was only a suggestion, likely extrapolating beyond what could be said directly from the Subtle Doctor’s texts, which only treated of such matters briefly and partially. Hervaeus explicitly denies this way of speaking,\(^{254}\) for he believes that “universal” does not designate the very being objectly in the intellect, which is designated by *intentionality* (i.e. the relation of known to knower, supposing the corresponding, real, opposed relation). Instead, “abstract” is a privative term that indicates that the given nature in question is being considered *without taking into account that for which it may supposit*.

Hence, “abstract” broadly applies to a number of cases. Thus, for example, the genus *animal* can be called *abstract* insofar as one understands *animal* without designating any particular species of animal contained under it. However, in a more direct example of *abstract*, one can designate *squid* as being *abstract* insofar as it is known, *squid* does not designate this or that particular squid. Thus, the attribution of the second intention *universal* designates a *privation* in the nature in comparison to its inferiors. It is as though on were to say, “I know X as not being this or that inferior—*whatever that might be*.” However, while this privation (i.e. this *universality*) does exist in the intellect, in mind-independent being, that nature does not exist without the supposit of which it is the nature. The attribution of universality is only possible because the thing exists objectively in the intellect:

However, such things do not follow upon the thing outside the intellect, with every operation of the intellect left out of consideration. Nor do they, formally speaking, designate this very being in the intellect, for this very being in the intellect is the relation

\(^{254}\) And, perhaps, such could be denied of Scotus’s teaching as well. However, that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In the previous chapter, I meant only to make a suggestion, based upon the state of the question as expressed in the texts in question.
of the known object to the intellect. However, such things designate a relation of one thing known to another or of one intelligible to another inasmuch as such things follow upon the first object having existence in the intellect objectively by the mediation, however, of the being of intelligibles.

For example, abstract designates a thing without the suppositos that are contained under it, although that “without” does not pertain to the thing in its mind-independent being but [instead] pertains to it in the intellect such that it first has being objectively in the intellect before it is understood to be without such things [i.e. its suppositos]. Whence, that being without such things [i.e. its suppositos] pertains to the first objects [of knowledge] by the mediation of that very being in the intellect. And the case is similar with regard to others as can be made obvious through particular examples.

If second intentions like abstract are privative in nature, what can we say about second intentions that are positive? As has already been hinted at by earlier discussions, a clear example of such notions would be the so-called predicables of Porphyry. In q.4 a.3, Hervaeus provides a lengthy and interesting discussion about how the intentions of genus, species, difference, property, and accident are formed.

To clarify his discussion of this matter, Hervaeus opens by defending again the thesis discussed above, namely, “This relation (namely, to-be-known or to-be-objectively-in-the-intellect) is founded upon the thing . . . as there corresponds to it an act of intellection as the foundation of the opposite relation.” However, he adds a clarification regarding how the thing

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255 Thus, note well, for Hervaeus, objective being is that mind-dependent relation. It is not something distinct from the relation, like a kind of intra-mental copy. See remarks above in note 222.

256 DSIDoyle, q.3 a.3 (p.436:7-17): “Talia autem non consequuntur rem extra, circumscripito opere intellectus. Nec dicunt ipsum esse in intellectu formaliter loquendo, quia ipsum esse in intellectu est habitudo obiecti intellecti ad intellectum. Talia autem dicunt habitudinem eius rei intellectae ad aliam sive unius intelligibilis ad alium ut talia consequuntur prima obiecta existentia in intellectu objective, mediante tamen esse intelligibilium. Verbi gratia, abstractum dicit rem sine suppositis contentis sub ea, modo istud sive non convenit rei in suo esse reali, sed convenit ei in intellectu ita quod prius habet esse in intellectu objective quam intelligatur habere esse sine talibus. Unde illud esse sine talibus convenit primis obiectis mediante ipso esse in intellectu objective. Et simile est de aliiis sicut potest patere per singula.”

257 Note, importantly, that the positive notion of species is distinct from the privative notion of being one in species or one in genus. On this, see the remarks above in note 118.

258 See ibid., q.4 a.3 (p.494:29-32): “Ista habitudo, silicet, esse intellectum sive esse objective in intellectu fundatur super rem ut est intellecta primo modo, id est, super rem ut ei correspondet actus intelligendi ut fundamentum oppositae relationis.”
can appear to the intellect that knows it. One and the same thing can be known in various ways. For example, the first time that someone experiences a creature, he or she may first not even notice that it is living. Thus, it has the “intellectual appearance” of *substance*. Then, when it moves from some internal principle, one can say that it is a *living substance*, though he or she does not know what it is. However, it can also be known as a *moving being* and, likely too, as a *sensing being*. Thus, one and the same mind-independent *thing* can give rise to many *objects*. To put this another way, one and the same *thing* can be *objected* to the intellect in various manners.

Hervaeus notes this experience using language that is quite akin to that of Simon of Faversham regarding the *apparentia rerum* as offering the final grounding for logic. In an oft-cited text, Faversham remarks that the logician is, of course, dependent upon reality insofar as the intellect is moved by how things appear. This passage has been taken by some commentors to indicate a fundamental ambiguity in Simon’s conception of second intentions, as though there were at least a general tendency in his thought leading him to the kind of strong realism that one finds, for instance, in the notion of the *rationes entium* of Kilwardby. Hervaeus, who most certainly *does not* think second intentions are “real” in a hard-and-fast, mind-independent sense, is not afraid to accept one sense of saying that the modes of understanding follow the modes of being, namely, “That in things there is an aptitude for being

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260 See the discussions in the first chapter of this dissertation especially in 1.4.1.3 Logic, Discourse, and Reality in the *De ortu scientiarum* and 1.5 Concluding Remarks.
understood in this or that way and that the modes of understanding follow upon such a disposition.”

For Hervaeus, it is obvious that a discussion of the *apparentia rerum* need not threaten the mind-dependent status of logic. All that it means is that one and the same *thing* can be an *object* of intellection taken from various intellectual viewpoints. The particular immediate objects of knowledge such as *animal*, *rational*, *moving*, etc. are all various concrete first intentions. Thus, even though they indicate different aspects of one and the same thing, these natures—when actually known—provide the foundation for the mind-dependent relation of intentionality:

It must be known that the thing moves the intellect to diverse cognitions according to diverse appearances—as when the intellect is moved to understand (or apprehend) *man* insofar as it appears as that which is *rational* and [at another time] to apprehending it insofar as it appears as that which is *sensate*, and so in other ways. With regard to being *such a thing or to be an animal or to be rational or sensate or bodily* or some other such thing, such things do not designate mind-dependent beings or second intentions. Nay, rather, they designate mind-independent being existing in the nature of things. For those (i.e. *man, body, animal*, and other such things) are one thing in mind-independent

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261 DSIDoyle, q.4 a.3 ad 6 (p.508:9-11): “Quod in rebus est aptitudo ad hoc quod sic vel sic intelligantur et talem habitudinem consequantur modi intelligendi.”

262 More will be said below in 4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental? However, it is appropriate at this juncture to note that in q.5 a.3 ad 2, Hervaeus remarks that the logician may even need to take these kinds of various appearances into consideration, not for the purpose of cognitional questions nor concerning the metaphysics involved in such “appearing.” Instead, the logician will be interested in answering just how how such a multiplicity of such appearances are related in the unity of one science. Such would be akin to topics like those discussed briefly at the close of the *Posterior Analytics* and also in later inquiries like those undertaken by Poinsot, who in the course of his Material Logic considers topics pertinent to the problem of universals, the categories, and especially (as related to this topic) the nature of the unity and the diversity of the sciences.

See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.3 ad 2 (p.587:29-588:2): “De illis autem quae consequuntur determinatum ens reale, ex quibus praedictus modus procedendi in scientiis non accipitur, non habet tractare in speciali in quantum consequitur tale ens determinatum, licet forte de eis posset considerare inquantum sunt secundae intentiones, vel inquantum est quaedam pluralitas rationis de hoc etiam scilicet quomodo unitas eius a quo sumitur ratio istorum entium rationis facit ad hoc quod habeatur una scientia de eis.”
reality. However, those things are said to differ among each other according to reason and to be diverse objects of the intellect.

However, the human intellect is not limited to the simple contemplation of this or that aspect of what it knows. Instead, one known thing can be compared to another known thing. Nevertheless, it is key to remember that “to be known” should also be understood as meaning “to be known in this or that way.” To understand how this comparison of one thing to another forms one of the predicables as a second intention, consider the following set of stages of cognition.

(1) Hervaeus knows the notion of animal. (2) He then knows the notion of squid. (3) He then knows the notion slimy. (4) Then, drawing on his experience, he knows, “In comparison with squid, animal is a genus.” (5) He also knows, “In comparison with squid, slimy is an accident.”

As will be discussed in the next chapter, metaphysics will discuss whether or not there is a distinction between genus and species in mind-independent reality. Likewise, it will discuss the nature of accidents. Also, particular sciences may discuss, for instance, why it is accidental to squids that they be slimy. However, logic is concerned with this question: “What are the properties that follow upon the relation that I have just posited between squid and animal?”

Thus, the logician will consider questions of extension, of supposition, how these relate to predication, and other such topics. Likewise, the logician will be interested in what is meant by the relation of accidentality between squid and slimy insofar as that relationship is involved with

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263 Here, Hervaeus implicitly is stating the metaphysical position that there is no real, mind-independent distinction among the various genera involved in a given existent. He does not take up here the overall problem of how there can be a kind of “isomorphism” between thought and reality. This is not his direct concern in the De secundis intentionibus.

264 See DSIDoyle, q.4 a.3 (p.495:11-19): “Sciendum quod cum res moveat intellectum ad diversas cognitiones secundum diversa apparentia, sicut quando movetur intellectus ad intelligendum vel apprehendendum hominem secundum apparens quod est rationale, et ad apprehendum eum secundum apparens quod est sensibile, et sic de aliis: hoc quod est talem rem esse, vel esse animal, vel esse rationale, vel sensibile et corporeum, et consimilia, non dicunt entia rationis vel secundas intentiones. Immo dicunt verum esse reale in rerum natura existens. Nam ista sunt una realiter: homo, corpus, animal, et consimilia. Sed ista differre dicuntur secundum rationem ad invicem et esse diversa objecta intellectus.”

265 See, especially, the section 4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental?
human reasoning (such as how an accident cannot be predicated necessarily of every subject of which it is said):

For example, if it is posited that color (or even whiteness) is a common accident with respect to some subject and a property with regard to some other thing, then the very same thing is able to be the remote foundation of the intention that is genus. This is so because that thing really is color and is able to be understood insofar as it is color. And that very same thing is able to be the foundation of the intention that is species. This is so because that very same thing which is color is also blackness or whiteness and can be understood as blackness or whiteness. Or it can be known by comparing it to those thing which are of its genus—for example to whiteness and to blackness and vice-versa [i.e. as species compared “back up” to the genus].

At this point, it is necessary to address what appears to be a textual problem. As written, the very next sentence reads, “And in comparing whiteness to this whiteness and that whiteness, the same thing is able to be the foundation of this intention which is difference inasmuch as it is taken as dispersing or concentrating of sight—dispersing if it is white, concentrating if it is blackness.” The points about concentrating and dispersing sight are unproblematic from the perspective of standard discussions of the nature of light in medieval Peripateticism. What is troubling is the opening expression, for it makes no sense that the comparison in question is from whiteness to this or that other whiteness. This would mean that the main clause of the sentence could be interpreted as, “Whiteness is able to be the foundation of difference between that which concentrates and that which disperses light.”

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266 Notice, he is explaining how the mind-independent thing can be a remote foundation for every intention other than the initial relation of intentionality (which itself is proximately founded on the thing).

267 DSIDoyle, q.4 a.3 (p.499:3-10): “Verbi gratia, si ponitur color esse accidens commune respectu alicuius subiecti et propria passio respectu alterius, vel etiam albedo, illa eadem res poterit esse fundamentum remotum intentionis quae est genus. Quia illa res realiter est color et potest intelligi secundum quod color. Et illa eadem res potest esse fundamentum intentionis quae est species. Quia illa eadem res quae est color est etiam nigredo vel albedo, et potest intelligi ut albedo vel nigredo, vel comparando ea ad illa quae sunt sui generis: puta colorem ad albedinem et nigredinem, et e contrario.”

268 For instance, DSIDoyle 228n401 readily cites Aristotle, Topics 1.15 (107b29-30), 3.5 (119a30-31), 4.2 (123a2), and 7.3 (153a38). Aristotle, Metaphysics, 10.7 (1057b8-19).
It seems that what Hervaeus meant to express (and perhaps did express in an early edition of the text) is that the same thing can be the remote foundation for the intention of specific difference insofar as the thing is understood as dispersing or as concentrating light. Perhaps the text was a very terse and ellipsed form (not unexpected, given Hervaeus’s style at times) like, “Et comparando ad hanc et illam.” As will be seen in my reading of the text, it would imply that color is the object of comparando and and that albedo and nigredo are the referents of hanc and illam. Given the state of the text, I at least propose my reading as a meaningful interpretation. It seems to fit well with the remarks cited in the selection above in which he explains the intention of genus. Otherwise, the passage is utterly unhelpful and, indeed, unintelligible. Thus rendering Hervaeus in this manner, we are able to see several additional, though brief, remarks on the predicables difference, property, and accident:

And, comparing color to whiteness and blackness, the same thing can also be the [remote\(^{270}\)] foundation of the intention that is difference inasmuch as it [i.e. the thing] is taken as being dispersing or concentrating of vision—dispersing if it is whiteness; concentrating if it is blackness. Also, inasmuch as it is compared to a subject it is able to be the foundation of those intentions which are property and accident. For the same accident is the foundation of the intention property in comparison with a subject with respect to which it is a proper and essential passio but it is the foundation of the intention accident with respect to a subject of which it is a common accident.\(^{271}\)

\(^{269}\) I can verify this same rendering in an edition that is dated ca.1500 edition, but it makes little to no philosophical sense as written. No earlier manuscript or printed form is readily available. It seems that Doyle did not, indeed, find any other rendering in the other editions that he consulted. However, he did translate the text directly in his English edition of the work. This makes it very confusing and unhelfpul. For the aforementioned edition, see Hervaeus Natalis, *De intentionibus secundis*, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, http://bildsuche.digitale-sammlungen.de/index.html?c=viewer&l=en&bandnummer=bsb00054061&pimage=00004&v=100&nav= (accessed December 5, 2016).

\(^{270}\) I add “remote” because this was clearly his focus at the beginning of the last passage.

\(^{271}\) See DSID Doyle, q.4 a.3 (p.499:11-19): “[Et comparando albedinem ad hanc albedinem et illam; reading as: Et comparando ad hanc et illam], idem etiam poterit esse fundamentum huius intentionis quae est differentia prout capitur ut disgregativum vel congregativum visus: disgregativum si sit albedo; congregativum si sit nigredo. Prout etiam comparantur ad subiecta poterunt esse fundamenta iatarum intentionum quae sunt proprium et accidens. Nam idem accidens in comparatone ad subiectum respectu cuius est proprium et per per se subjecti respectu cuius est accidens commune erit fundamentum huius intentionis quae dicitur accidens.”
Thus, the predicables do not find their deepest explanation in the fact of certain relationships that are expressed in predications formed by the second operation of the intellect. Instead, the various predicables are formed by a comparison of various objective appearances of things as related to one another in an incomplex manner. Being predicable of many things in a complex enunciation is something that follows upon the more basic notion of the mind-dependent relation that is genus or species. We might come to know this later fact first, as various predications are more immediate to our experience of discourse. However, the complex predicability itself presupposes the relation between the two, simple objectifications of a thing before any complex enunciation is considered.

This could be represented schematically as follows:

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272 Hervaeus seems to hint at this interpretation at ibid, p.498:6-9: “Sed sid dicamus sic quod homo secundum tale apparens existens in intellectu objective ut quoddam indifferentia ad plura numero de quibus est dicibile, esse sic intellectum, dicit secundum intentionem quae est species, suppositis aliis quae ad hoc concurrunt, scilicet, praedicari in quid.”
Notice that in all of the various predicables, the relation of intentionality (i.e. of the known to the knower) is presupposed. This is what Hervaeus means when he states that it is the one second intention that remains in every other second intention—the further relations presuppose that the thing is known. This point is somewhat difficult because we do not naturally think of a relation being a characteristic (or quasi-accident) of something. However, at least for Hervaeus it is such. Consider an analogous case: Peter, who is 190 lbs, is heavier than Paul, who is 150 lbs, and is lighter than Lawrence, who is 230 lbs. In this case, quantity provides the foundation for the relation. So too, in the case of mind-dependent being, every possible second intention presupposes at least that the things involved be known things—i.e. that they have a relation to a knower. However, in addition to the way that intentionality remains in every second intention, the case can become more complex as higher-order second intentions are founded. It is to this topic that we will now return.

3.4.4 Returning to the Main Thread: Founding More Complex Second Intentions

In q.4 a.3, Hervaeus considers a number of other points regarding the remote and proximate foundations involved in various second intentions created by the intellect in its various operations (i.e. not only the first operation). Those details are beyond the limits of this dissertation’s concerns. However, after this lengthy aside about the ultimate foundations of second intentions, it is possible to return to q.3 a.4, where Hervaeus discusses the foundation of one second intention upon another. Although every second intention requires that something be objectively in the intellect, there are various manners that the thing can be in the intellect objectively. A thing can be objectively present to the intellect as something that is simply apprehended (i.e. as grasped in the first act of the intellect). Likewise, a given thing can be in the intellect as in a complex enunciation, related to some other thing that is affirmed or denied as
pertaining to it (i.e. as grasped in an act of the second act of the intellect). Finally, a given thing can be part of the syllogistic progression through terms in ratiocination (i.e. as grasped in the third act of the intellect).\textsuperscript{273} The domain of mind-dependent relations formed by the human knower is vast and varied.

In all three of these cases, some simple known thing coexists with another simple known thing (or, indeed, multiple other known things). This was the point of the discussion above regarding the enunciation \textit{man-being-an-animal}. However, even in the case of second intentions involved in the first act of the intellect, there is a need for more than one object, as when one compares a genus to its inferior species, thus keeping in mind at least two things that are known—the superior object and the object that is (or multiple objects that are) subordinate to it. Obviously, the case is similar even in the simplest syllogism: “All \textit{living things} are \textit{things that have souls}. \textit{Trees} are \textit{living things}. Therefore, \textit{trees} are \textit{things that have souls}.” In a manner similar to the passage discussed above regarding the second operation of the intellect, one could represent the relation of \textit{tree} to \textit{thing that has a soul} as \textit{tree-being-a-thing-that-has-a-soul-as-revealed-through-the-middle-term-of-being-a-living-thing}.\textsuperscript{274} In all of these cases, there are parts presupposed, though in different manners. One cannot understand a syllogism without the propositions and terms that compose it, an enunciation without presupposing the terms united in

\textsuperscript{273} See note 168 above.

\textsuperscript{274} Hervaeus gives brief evidence to this distinction in his distinction between mere knowability and scientific knowability. See note 136 in the next chapter. In that section is discussed a reference made by Doyle to Ponsio. The reference is helpful for understanding the point now under consideration, though in the aforementioned footnote, important qualifications are added. See Ioannis a Sancto Thoma, \textit{Ars Logica}, p.2, q.27, a.1 (823a:15-22): “\textit{Esse scibile} [i.e. scientifically knowable] addit supra esse intelligibile talem modum cognoscendi, scilicet quod aliquid intelligatur non simplici modo, sed modo illativo, ex causis seu praemissis procedendo ad conclusiones; scire enim est cognoscere causam, ob quam res est, etc.”
that complex statement, and that something known is a genus without presupposing the comparison to an inferior species or multiple species.\footnote{Helpful remarks on this point can be found in Maritain, *Formal Logic*, 1-4, 90-93, 148-154. It should be noted that Maritain is working from an explicitly Thomistic position, particularly in a context influenced by later scholastics (especially Poinot, but likely also that of the Benedictine Joseph Gredt as well as Dominican manualists who may have been recommended to him).}

Hervaeus only explicitly considers this issue with regard to how that which is known simply is presupposed by enunciations (i.e. complex objects of the second operation of the intellect) and, likewise, how the latter are presupposed for the process of syllogistic reasoning. In all of these kinds of combination, one can presuppose that what is known—whether simply, complexly, or discursively—remains objectively in the intellect. That is, one must presuppose that the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower remains (as discussed at the close of the last subsection). However, in contrast to this, the various second intentions involved with the simpler parts of more complex acts do not remain in act. They are merely presupposed.

For instance, it is only because something like *animal* is a genus is superior to a species like *man* that it makes sense to relate *man* to *animal* in a proposition like, “Every man is an animal.” However, the complex thus formed, namely *every-man-being-an-animal* has its own properties as an enunciation, such as convertability, truth or falsehood, and so forth. Thus, the intentions of *genus* and *species* must be present, but that presence is only a virtual presence, for the things known have been taken up into a more complex whole:

[There are other second intentions that are founded] by the mediation of another second intention that itself does not, in itself, remain. This is because just as the act of understanding simple things precedes a composite act and a complex act of understanding precedes a discursive [lit.\textit{collativi}]\footnote{In his English translation, Doyle switches at times between “comparative” and “discursive.” The latter is clearer and prevents one from confusing the comparisons that can arise in any of the three acts of intellection—taking “comparison” in a very broad sense.} or syllogistic act of understanding, so too do the second intentions following the object of a simple act precede the intentions that follow a complex act. Similarly, the intentions that follow the object of a complex act of understanding precede those which follow the object of a discursive act of understanding.
And, thus, by consequence, it follows that the second [kind of second intentions] presuppose the first [kind of second intentions] and the third [kind of second intentions, i.e. discursive ones] presuppose the second [kind of second intentions]. Thus, the second [kind of second intentions] are founded in the first [kind of second intentions], and the third [kind of second intentions] are founded through the mediation of the second [kind of second intentions]. And thus, we have in those intentions that one is founded by the mediation of the other.

However, that something, by the mediation of which something else follows upon an object, does not remain along with that which follows the object by means of that very mediation can be made obvious as follows. This is so because, as is commonly posited, two acts of intellecction cannot exist simultaneously and as a consequence neither can the relations that follow upon the object of one exist with the relations following upon the object of the other act. Therefore, since acts of simple apprehension and acts of complex apprehension are diverse acts, it follows that when there are relations that follow the object understood complexly, those relations that follow the object of a simple act do not remain. Therefore, since, as has been said, the second intentions that follow upon the object of a complex act follow that very act by the mediation of the intention following upon the object of a simple act, it follows that those intentions that follow the object of the complex act are founded mediately, with [the other] second intention not remaining. And the same appears to be the case with regard to a discursive act with regard to complex acts.

277 Doyle merely refers to this as the “second intentions” and the later class as the “third intentions.” Though understandably a very literal translation of the passage, it serves only to obscure the passage. Only a careful reading realizes that the so-called “third intentions” are actually the second intentions pertaining to the third operation of the intellect. Koridze notes this same difficulty as well. See Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung,” 157.

278 Of course, the obvious sense is that the second intentions of complex acts are founded by the mediation of those arising from the simple acts of understanding. This will be obvious in what follows.


Quod autem illa mediante qua alia consequitur obiectum, non maneat cum illa quae consequitur obiectum mediante ipsa, potest sic patere. Quia, ut communiter ponit, duo actus intelligendi non possunt esse simul et per consequens nec habitudines consequentur obiectum unius possunt esse cum habitudinis consequentibus obiectum alterius actus. Ideo cum actus simplicis apprehensionis et actus apprehensionis complexae sint diversi actus, sequitur quod quando sunt habitudines consequentes obiectum intellectus complexi, tunc non manent habitudines consequentes obiectum actus simplicis. Cum ergo, ut dictum est, intentiones secundae quae consequuntur obiectum actus complexi consequuntur ipsum, mediante intentione consequente obiectum actus simplicis, sequitur quod illae intentiones quae consequuntur obiectum intellectus complexi fundatur mediante, intentione secunda non manente. Et idem videtur de actu collativo respectu actus complexi.”
Thus, the formation of intentions continually builds upon the relations established among things that are known.\textsuperscript{280} For example, one first perceives \textit{man, animal,} and \textit{having-sensation.} Based on these simply apprehended things, and given their relations to one another as \textit{genus, species,} and \textit{property,} one can then conceptualize \textit{man-being-animal} and \textit{animal-being-sensation-having.}\textsuperscript{281} These views of reality are able to be called \textit{enunciations,} though they have their own unique character. \textit{Man-being-animal} is in the first form of \textit{per se} predication, while \textit{animal-being-sensation-having} is in the second form. These characters do depend upon the second intentions of \textit{genus, species,} and \textit{property,} but in the enunciations, these second intentions fall into the background, giving way to the enunciation-focused second intentions formed by the second act of the intellect. Similarly, in discursive cognition, these two enunciations can become the \textit{major and minor premises} of a \textit{syllogism} that validly reaches a \textit{conclusion,} namely \textit{man-being-sensation-having.} Indeed, as mentioned above, in the syllogism itself, the \textit{enunciations} take on the further designation of being \textit{premises} and a \textit{conclusion.}\textsuperscript{282} Schematically, all of this could be represented as follows:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{280}] In q.3 a.4, Hervaeus discusses some of the possible issues involved in the psychology of such reflection and formation of notions of higher complexity. However, we cannot discuss the details of this and related matters in the context of this dissertation’s concerns.
  \item[\textsuperscript{281}] As direct concepts, these are of the order of first intention. From what has been discussed above, this should already be clear. However, see the body of q.1 a.5 in which Hervaeus explains how false statements (such as “man being an ass”) and false notions (such as “goatstag”) can be considered as being first intentions. See DSIDoyle, q.1 a.5 (p.363-364).
  \item[\textsuperscript{282}] And, I would note as well that the simple terms of the enunciations in question, because of their roles, accrue additional second intentions such as \textit{minor term, major term,} and \textit{middle term.}
\end{itemize}
All of these various second intentions require that *things* be *objectively in the intellect*; that is, they all require the initial relation of *intentionality*, which has a mind-independent quiddity as its foundation. However, one must be very careful in making claims that this logic is a “realistic” logic. This is a true claim, but the so-called realism of Hervaeus’s position is most tenuous. The direct foundation on reality is limited to *one* out of the entire domain of second intentions.\(^{283}\) Every other second intention is only mediately founded upon reality. Indeed,

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\(^{283}\) This point is well expressed by Koridze, “Intentionale Grundleung,” 281: “An diesem Verhältnis der erfassten Sache zum Verstand, *habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum*, hängt der ganze hervaesche Realismus, dessen Mitte in die Grundlegung der philosophischen Logik gesetzt wird.”
when one becomes a bit too zealous in proclaiming the “realism” of Hervaeus’s logic, it is always helpful to be reminded that although the relation of intentionality is indeed founded on mind-independent reality, that very relation is a mind-dependent relation and hence is, in itself, not real in a strict, mind-independent, categorical sense of real.

Hervaeus’s doctrines on these points represent an important amplification of the general doctrine of “intentionality” when viewed from the perspective of Aquinas’s dicta. In this regard, De Rijk was quite correct to note the background importance of questions about the notion “cum fundamento in re.”284 However, whereas for Aquinas, only first intentions have a direct foundation in reality,285 for Hervaeus the relation of reason of the thing known to the knower is founded in reality (though always presupposing the opposite relation of the knower to the known).286 This one relation provides a kind of bridge between mind-independent reality and a vast domain of mind-dependent reality. However, to stretch the analogy, while that bridge begins in reality, it partakes already in the mind-dependent “unreality” into which it leads.

What unites this one relation to every other second intention is the fact that it is a mind-dependent relation. This is no minor point, either, for it shows that beyond the fact that this one tenuous (but imporant) thread is connected to reality, all other claims about “realism” must be carefully attenuated. The domain of logic is not the domain of real being. Indeed, it is not even about some small parcel of reality, namely about relations. Instead, it is about a domain of being

285 See note 185 in the first chapter.
286 The difference between the two here is subtle. For Hervaeus, the very first second intention is ultimately founded upon the quiddity, though this very first second intention only exists actually (in the manner that a non-real relation can be said to “exist actually”) when a knower is actually knowing the quiddity. Still, the foundation is upon the quiddity insofar as it is naturally apt to be manifested of a knower.
quite distinct from all mind-independent being—ens rationis, the Hervaean\textsuperscript{287} heir to Aristotle’s “being as the true and the false.” However, the domain of ens rationis is quite broad—much broader than the domain of logic itself. Thus, in order to consider the metaphysical boundaries of logic, it is necessary to turn our attention to these broad vistas. It is in q.5 that Hervaeus discusses such matters.

\footnote{287 Really, the generally medieval heir, for others do also divide ens reale and ens rationis in a manner akin to Hervaeus (at least in broad outlines).}
Chapter 4: Hervaeus’s Treatise Q. 5 — The Subject of Logic

4.1 Is Logic Possible?

4.1.1 Logical Reflection

From the perspective of Hervaeus’s doctrine of intentionality, there is an important ambiguity and perplexity hidden in the expression “thinking like a logician.” In common parlance, this could mean nothing more than “thinking logically” as when someone reasons validly in one’s own discipline. Thus, the physicist can think logically, as can any person who organizes his or her own thoughts in a disciplined manner. However, to “think like a logician” is a bit stranger of an affair. The object of speculation thematically considered by the logician, according to Hervaeus, is a mind-dependent relation that is nothing “real” in the world. It is neither a “thing outside the intellect,” nor is it “a concept in the intellect subjectively,” nor is it even the relation between the actually knowing intellect and that which it knows. Instead, it is a domain of non-real relations arising consequent to the knowledge of such mind-independent realities.

To understand this perplexing situation, it is necessary consider what it means to think reflexively about these mind-dependent relations. This reflexive knowledge is not the knower’s knowledge of his or her own cognitive process, as when a person can say, “I know that I am knowing in this or that manner (i.e. through this or that act of intellection, informed by this or that intelligible species, etc).” The logician does not undertake this kind of psychological reflection. Likewise, it may be quite laudible for a person to reflect upon his or her actions, considering whether or not they are desirable or undesirable, laudible or condemnable, and so
forth. However, such moral self-reflection is not logical reflection according to Hervaeus either.\(^1\)

Instead, the reflection undertaken by one who is thinking about logical matters focuses on the mind-dependent relations themselves.\(^2\)

Although Hervaeus does not address the issue of a moral sense of “reflection,” in q.2 a.6 of De secundis intentionibus, he does implicitly distinguish what I have been calling “psychological reflection” from the reflection pertaining to one who is thinking about second intentions:

For example, when I understand *man*, the relation of the understood man to the intellect is that very abstract intentionality according to which the understood man is called a first intention in a concrete sense. And this very relation is not itself understood when *man* is understood as the first and essential object [of the intellect]; instead, it is a certain mind-dependent relation following upon the very thing that is known. But, afterwards, because the intellect is able to be reflected back upon its own act and upon the relation that follows the known thing from the fact that it is understood, such a relation (which at first was a relation of the thing understood and not the thing that was understood) is afterward able to become the object that is known.\(^3\)

Although this text does not thematically discuss the distinction between the two types of reflection, it is implied in the distinction between [1] the act and [2] the relation in question. As was noted in the previous chapter, the act of intellection and the other subjective qualities involved in intellection pertain to the first class of intelligibles, that is, to those things pertaining

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\(^1\) It is easy to become muddled on these points, however, as is attested to by the observation of Yves Simon cited at the end of the introduction to this dissertation.

\(^2\) The point is not utterly unique to Hervaeus but instead represents a continued development of the antecedent tradition regarding the kind of reflection involved in thinking about second intentions. Hence, the expression of Scotus found in note 149 of the second chapter above: “Quando autem reflectit, intelligendo comparationem istam ut obiectum, tunc non causatur relatio rationis, sed consideratur, et est consideratio logica.” Likewise, see note 320 of the first chapter. There, Aquinas is nearly as clear on the same point—and indeed even makes the move of distinguishing *ens rationis* from mind-independent being: “Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta ut patet V Metaph.”

\(^3\) DSIDijs, q.2 a.6 (p.227:14-22): “Verbi gratia, quando intelligo hominem, habitudo hominis intellecti ad intellectum est ipsa intentionalitas abstracta secundum quam homo intellectus dicitur intentio prima concretive. Et ista habitudo non est ipsum intellectum quando homo intelligitur ut primum et per se obiectum; sed est quaedam relatio rationis consequens ipsum rem intellectam. Sed, ulteriorius, quia intellectus potest reflecti supra suum actum et supra habitudinem quae consequitur rem intellectam ex hoc quod intelligitur talis habitudo quae prius fuit relatio rei intellectae et non res intellecta, potest postea esse obiectum intellectum.”
to the ten categories. According to Hervaeus, however, the mind-dependent relations that are second intentions are nothing “real,” in the sense of belonging to the categories. They belong to things only when those things are the terminus of an act of intellection and are involved in the human objectification of reality through defining, enunciating, and reasoning.\(^4\)

The radical difference between first and second intentions is easy to overlook, particularly if one is not careful in reading Hervaeus’s prose. As is evident from the discussions in the previous chapter, he clearly holds that mind-dependent being is formally distinct from the mind-independent being of the ten categories. Thus, “what” is known is quite unique; second intentions are in a class (i.e. a unique genus intelligibilium) all of their own. At first unknown when one is directly in the process of reasoning, they are then revealed reflexively as a domain of unique “properties” pertaining to things involved in the process of human though.

Such “properties” are quite different from the properties discussed in sciences of mind-independent being. It is one thing to say that man is able to laugh or that animals possess the power of sensation. These properties pertain to their subjects according to mind-independent being. It is quite another thing to speak of “properties” that in fact only hold for a thing only insofar as it is known. In this case, the “properties” flow not purely from the essence of mind-independent being.

\(^4\) Although, at one point in q.3 a.4, Hervaeus makes room for a kind of reflection on second intentions that would be psychological. However, this is merely a concession to a potential objector. He notes that if one holds that second intentions are the act of intellection (a position that seems to be close to that of Brito, though Doyle also notes that it will later be expressed by Ockham), one second intention could function as the foundation of another. On these two thinkers, see the texts cited in notes 24, 90, 133, and 218 above. However, also, see Pini, Categories and Logic, 93-94 for important qualifications regarding Brito, who does want to avoid problems pertaining to positing two simultaneous acts of intellection, thus making him a less-likely candidate for the position being expressed by Hervaeus.

However, this really is not a very important portion of q.3 a.4, as Hervaeus briskly sets it aside, noting that it doesn’t at all fit his doctrine of intentionality, which greatly differs from it. See DSIDoyle, q.3 a.4 (p.446.25-447.2). See especially his closing remarks: “Non tamen teneo quod actus intelligendi sit secunda intentio. Immo teneo quod secundae intentiones, prout hic loquimur de illis, sunt illa quae consequuntur rem prout est objective in intellectu nostro modo quo expositum est.”
independent being. Instead, they presuppose the objective presence of the known to the knower.

As Hervaeus states quite clearly in q.2 a.5 ad 3:

Just as it is also in the case of the mind-independent properties [lit. in passionibus realibus] that follow upon a thing in mind-independent being [namely that] a property is outside of the nature [lit. ratione] of the subject [that is, the nature] by which a subject is a subject, so too is this the case for the properties that follow upon the thing in mind-dependent being. The relation to the intellect is outside the nature of that which is known, according to which we say that the thing is the foundation of such a mind-dependent relation by reason of the fact that it is known.

It must be known, however, that although [there are] mind-dependent beings that follow upon known things insofar as they are known, it is not necessary that they [i.e. the mind-dependent beings] be known by the very fact that they follow the understood things insofar as they are known. Nay rather, quite the opposite is the case. However, it pertains to none of them to be concretely called an intention unless it is known. For it was said above that it is concretely called a first or a second intention because it is the foundation of a relation to the intellect, as a certain terminus at which is terminated the act of intellection—so that in such a way second intentions have to follow upon [lit. habent consequi] things that are known. And from this, they do not need to be intentions [i.e. concrete intentions] nor to be understood.

However, they are properties of the things known and are certain intelligibles naturally apt to be understood by the intellect reflexively. And just as the first class of intelligibles concretely are called first intentions not when they are [i.e. merely according to mind-independent being] but when they are known, so also is the second class of intelligibles—namely, mind-dependent being—pertains to second intentions concretely speaking, not when they follow upon the concretely said thing of which they are a property but when they are known (emphasis added). 5

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5 Ibid., q.2 a.5 ad 3 (p.407:11-28): “Sicut etiam est in passionibus realibus quae consequuntur res in esse reali, passio est extra rationem subiecti per quam subiectum est subiectum, ita etiam in passionibus quae consequuntur res in esse rationis sit. Habitudo ad intellectum est extra rationem intellecti, secundum quod dicimus quod res per hoc quod intellecta est fundamentum talis habitudinis rationis.

Est autem scendum quod, licet entia rationis quae consequuntur res intellectas ut intellectae sunt, non oportet quod sint intellecta ex hoc ipso quod consequuntur res intellectas ut intellectae sunt. Immo oppositum magis. Tamen nulli eorum convenit concretive dicitur intentio nisi sit intellectum. Nam supra dictum est quod concretive dicatur aliquid prima intentio vel secunda quia est fundamentum habitudinis ad intellectum, ut quidam terminus ad quem terminatur actus intelligendi, ita quod secundae intentiones habent consequi res intellectas. Et ex hoc non habent esse intentiones nec esse intellectum. Sed sunt passiones rerum intellectarum, et sunt quaedam intelligibilia nata intelligi intellectu reflexo. Et sicut primum genus intelligibilium dicetur concretive prima intentio, non quando est sed quando intelligitur, ita etiam secundum genus intelligibilium, scilicet, ens rationis, est secunda intentio concretive dicit, non quando consequitur rem concretive dictum cuius est passio, sed quando intelligitur.”

The reader will note the slight switch in number that I have made in my translation near the end in order to make Hervaeus’s use of prima intentio and secunda intentio a little more understandable.
Thus, as was discussed at length in the last chapter, the problem of intentionality lies upon the very borderland of thinghood and objectivity. Nothing is rightly called an intention unless it is actually known. However, so long as one is concretely speaking of a first intention—dog, ox, squid, etc—one is designating the mind-independent thing pertaining to that intention. However, as soon as the intention is considered qua intention (i.e. qua object), then one must pay heed to the fact that insofar as it is an intention, anything known has the property of being the foundation of a mind-dependent relation back toward the knower and also to be involved in the nexus of various relations established by the intellect’s three kinds of operations.

Using Hervaeus’s own terminology, we can say that concrete first intentions have their own mind-independent properties. For example, the squid has the power of secreting ink, the latter being a property that remains wholly in the order of mind-independent being. However, given that this mind-independent quiddity (i.e. squid) is aptitudinally capable of being known, it can function in act as the foundation of another set of properties, namely of second intentions. Immediately, the quiddity is the foundation for the relation of intentionality, i.e. the mind-dependent relation of the known to the knower when the knower actually knows the quiddity. To speak of squid formally and actually as a first intention—i.e. “Squid is a first intention”—is the same as saying, “Squid is actually related as known to knower,” or, “Squid has intentionality.” According to Hervaeus, this very relation is already an ens rationis, and it functions as a kind of quasi-property that remains in all further operations of the intellect concerning this quiddity. Thus, when the knower compares squid to animal as inferior to superior, thus knowing that squid is a species of animal and that squid has a lesser extension than animal, we are faced thus with relationes rationis that are second intentions.6

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6 As has been noted before, Hervaeus is not detailed in his discussions of the comparative operations that establish second intentions by the first operation of the intellect, though he clearly holds that the first operation
As discussed at greater length in the previous chapter, the knower can then go further and form second intentions through the intellect’s other acts. By means of direct cognition, the knower can form the syllogistic inference, “Every *squid* is a *cephalopod*. Every *cephalopod* is *an ink producing creature.*” Therefore, every *squid* is *an ink producing creature.*” Even in the midst of this complex, syllogistic act, the intellect first bears upon the known quiddities; each none of the terms is *formally* known as being a first intention, none of the enunciations (or judgments) are *formally* known to be such, and the syllogism itself is not *formally* known as being a syllogism. Just as in the simpler cases discussed above, it is only by reflection that the knower then can say something like, “*Cephalopod* is a *middle term*.” The quasi-property *middle term* is a second intention accruing to *cephalopod* precisely because it is known and has been part of the syllogistic process of the intellect’s third operation.

To investigate such second intentional quasi-properties of the known thing (as well as the properties of these second intentions) is the task of the logician. However, it does seem strange that there is such a “science of the unreal,” for logical reflection represents an intellectual “turn” toward non-being and non-properties (at least from the perspective of purely mind-independent reality). In *De secundis intentionibus*, q.5 a.1, Hervaeus takes up this very quandry: “Whether some science is concerned with second intentions as with a first and essential subject.” It is to this topic that we will now turn.

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7 We will take this as being true for our purposes.

8 DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.511:2-3): “Utrum aliqua scientia sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subiecto.”
4.1.2 First Principles in a Secondary Way of Knowing

In fact, it is a “double scandal” that there should be a science of such non-being. Yes, on the one hand second intentions are “not real.” However, from another perspective, they simultaneously seem to be parasitic on real being. It would seem that the mind should always be tethered to into mind-independent being, which second intentions presuppose. If mind-independent being is what is always first known (as Hervaeus clearly holds), second intentions appear to be so parasitic on mind-independent reality that these mind-dependent relations cannot function as the first known subject of the science of logic. In order to constitute the subject of logic, it would seem that the reflexive knowledge of second intentions would always have a kind of “tracing” of the real being upon which it depends—thus requiring a first knowledge of said mind-dependent being. This threatens the autonomy of logic as a unique scientia rationalis.

Indeed, as he writes in q.5 a.1 obj.2:

That which is not known except through something that is previously known in that science is not itself the first and essential thing known in that science. However, a second intention is not known except through something previously known, for such things are known by reflection and obliquely [lit. per partes exteriores]. This is just as in the case of the act of intellection. Indeed, it always presupposes some prior object that is previously known. Therefore, second intention is not able to be the first and essentially known thing in any science of which it is the object.9

The main body of q.5 a.1 is impressive for its orderliness. Hervaeus begins by outlining what he takes to be the three requirements for something to be a first and essential subject of a science. He discusses each of these conditions at some length. Then, he notes that his proposed third condition is the most important condition for the issue at hand. He then shows how second intentions meet that criterion. Finally, he briskly shows how the other two criteria follow from

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9 See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 obj.2 (p.512:5-11): “Illud quod non cognoscitur nisi ex aliquo prius noto in illa scientia non est primo et per se notum in illa scientia. Sed secunda intentio non cognoscitur nisi in aliquo prius noto, quia talia non cognoscentur nisi per reflexionem et per partes exteriores. Sicut nect actus intelligendi; semper enim praesupponit aliqua objecta priora prius nota. Ergo secunda intentio non potest esse primo et per se nota in aliqua scientia cuius est objectum.”
that. In this section, I will provide a summary of this discussion. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will return to various points from q.5 a.1 inasmuch as they are pertinent for the broader concerns that arise in the course of the final three questions of Hervaeus’s treatise.

According to Hervaeus, the first condition required of a first and essential subject of a science is that the subject is something that is “first known” in that science. By “first known” he does not mean mere temporal priority, as though the subject were the first thing in the order of efficient causality that leads the knower to have scientific knowledge pertaining to the particular science’s subject. To this end, he uses the example of natural philosophy to show that even in a subject that seems quite suited to the human intellect, the subject of the science is not, temporally speaking, the first thing known. Instead, he notes that in Book I of the Physics, Aristotle starts from the experience of motion\(^\text{10}\) to arrive at the subject and principles of the science.\(^\text{11}\)

Hervaeus notes that if one speaks from the perspective of final causality, the subject of a science is something that must be first known. It is “that for the sake of which” everything else is done in the science. However, another distinction must be made, namely between the way that the subject is the goal of practical sciences versus how it is the goal of speculative sciences. Regarding practical sciences, he notes that the goal is something to be made (lit. \textit{praxis}) or a work (lit. \textit{opus}). In speculative sciences, however, the goal is full knowledge of the subject of that science. It is in this sense that the subject of a science is “first known”—“first” in the order of final cause, for it is that for the sake of which everything else is known.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{10}\) Motion being a \textit{property} of the subject of natural philosophy, not the very subject itself.

\(^{11}\) This point will be important again below. See note 132 below.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., q.5 a.1 (p.532:2-27).
The second condition is similar to remarks noted in the second chapter of this dissertation where Scotus was shown to hold that the syllogism is the subject of logic. Hervaeus notes that everything must be referred to the subject, whatever it may be. Such a reference is to be either cause to effect or effect to cause, property to a subject, or “some other reference.” This kind of attribution is needed because the subject itself must contain within it adequate intelligibility so as to explain the other contents of that science. Otherwise, the consideration of matters totally unrelated to the subject of the science would exceed the capacity of the subject for unifying the science. As he states:

For [in the case of a science that considers things not related to the subject] that science would exceed the virtual capacity of its first and essential subject for in such a case it would not be the adequate object of that very science, nor in consequence would it be the first and essential subject. However, the first and essential subject (or object) does not virtually contain in its knowability except insofar as something has attribution to it. Therefore, a science does not have for its consideration things other than its first and essential subject except insofar as such things have some reference to it.

The final condition pertaining to a scientific subject is that it must provide the formal character for every other reduction. This point will be taken up again in the final section of this chapter, for it helps to explain why the treatise is not logical but, instead, metaphysical in its overall bent—and most certainly is not supertranscendental. For now, it is adequate to note that Hervaeus holds that this position flows directly from the aforementioned second requirement. Given that everything in a science must reduced to the first and essential subject, everything else

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13 For more on Hervaeus’s rejection of this option, see discussions of this below at the end of the next section of this dissertation.

14 See ibid., p.532:29-32: “Quod illa considerentur inquantum habent attributionem ad ipsum sive sicut causa ad effectum, vel e converso, vel sicut passio ad subiectum, vel secundam aliquam aliam attributionem.”

15 Here, the idea is that the subject of the science has ultimate intelligibility that contains an explanation for everything else, even though it is not explicitly deduced until the reasoning mind does so.

16 See ibid., p.524:10-16: “Quia illa scientia excederet virtualem continentiam sui primo et per se subiecti, quia tunc non esset obiectum ipsi scientiis adaequatum, nec per consequens esset primum et per se subiectum. Sed primum et per se subiectum sive obiectum non continet virtualiter in sua cognoscibilitate nisi ea quae habent attributionem ad ipsum. Ergo scientia non habet considerare alia a primo et per se subiecto nisi inquantum habent attributionem ad ipsum.”
in that science will be marked with the character of that subject. One and the same thing can be studied with many different foci. For example, the logician studies the acts of intellection as the source of mind-dependent relations, while the natural philosopher studies it in terms of the ontology of a particular kind of changing being, and the metaphysician studies intellection in terms of being qua being. As noted above, Hervaeus holds that scientific reduction can be considered according to relations of causes and their effects, properties to their subjects, and inferiors to their superiors.

With regard to cause and effect, if the subject of the science is the cause in question, the effect will be explained only in light of the cause. However, if there is an imperfect cause being considered, then one considers the cause for the sake of the effect, as when one considers the art of medicine (an imperfect cause) for the sake of the healthiness that it aims to cause. Likewise, there can be a case in which the cause is so perfect that it cannot be known fully through the effect, as when the human intellect knows the First Cause as the Cause of motion. Such knowledge will be in terms of the effect that is first known. Thus, the First Mover will be known from the perspective of being the First Cause of motion.17

With respect to reduction of properties to their subjects, he initially uses an example of purely mathematical properties. Curved can be considered with regard to surface and quantity, leaving out the consideration of substance, for continuous quantity provides the sufficient explanation for the relation of the purely mathematical notion curved to the quantified qua quantified.18 Hervaeus holds that this differs from the way that various quantitative attributes are

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17 These points are only briefly noted now, though they will be important in the final section of this chapter. See ibid., p.525:35-529:12.
18 This is well summarized in the remark in ibid., p.530:16-19: “Sed a sciendum utrum talia consequantur quantitatem in eo quod quantum, non est necesse scire dependentiam quantitatis ad aliquid aliud. Unde etiam primum et per se subjectum geometriae quae tales passiones considerat est quantum in eo quod quantum.”
related to physical (i.e. not purely mathematical) notions such as breathing or even progressive motion. In such cases, quantity does not provide a complete explanation for the notion of breathing, even though is presupposed an aspect of any changing material being.\textsuperscript{19}

The final kind of reduction that he considers is that of an inferior to a superior. In a way, this is akin to the point discussed with regard to properties before. The general point is that an inferior concept such as to have sensation or to have appetite do not, properly speaking, pertain to man or to horse but instead to animal. However, there may be other properties that do uniquely apply to each man and animal, such as being able to laugh applies to man and being able to neigh applies to horse. In this section, he discusses the position of an unnamed contemporary, advocating that this kind of relation among inferiors and superiors allows for many different sciences, even among the natural sciences, which could perhaps have as many different scientific subjects as there are natural species.\textsuperscript{20}

However, he does not engage this position at length. He is content to conclude that there can be subordinate sciences that do not require a kind of complete reduction that would lead to metaphysics being the sole science:

It is certain that it is not always necessary that the same science be concerned with a superior and with everything contained under it both with regard to what is common as well as with what is proper to each thing contained under it. For [if this were the case], then it would follow that there would be no science of mind-independent being as a first and essential subject unless that science were concerned with being in general—concerning which metaphysics treats. This would be the case because everything else must be reduced to being in general as an inferior to a superior. And thus there would not be any real science except for metaphysics—which nobody proposes.\ldots

\textsuperscript{19} See ibid., p.530:20-26: “Alio modo potest se habere praecedens passio ad sequentes, scilicet, quod ipsa non sit sufiiciens ratio qualiter insit sibi sequentes passiones, nec connexio sequentium passionum ad eam potest esse evidens modo praelocito, nisi per reductionem ad primum subiectum cuius est illa passio prior. Sicut licet respirare, vel motus progressivus, requirunt quantitatem, non tamen quantitas est sufiiciens ratio quare ista insunt. Nec per rationem quantitatis, non facto reductione in alium, tali possent sufiicienter esse nota.”

\textsuperscript{20} For these points, see 532:1-533:6. He notes there that these separate sciences would be more closely related to natural philosophy than to mathematics, however.
But for the present time, I accept what everybody concedes, namely, that it is not always necessary that one and the same science be concerned with that very common thing with regard to its own properties and [at the same time] with regard to that which is inferior to it with regard to those things that are the properties of that inferior. And, as a consequence, it is not always necessary that the science that treats of an inferior must be reduced to a superior as to a first and essential subject.  

Having thus laid out the three conditions (and their relevant subconsiderations), Hervaeus turns to the main issue, namely whether or not “second intention” fulfills these requirements for being a first and essential subject of a science. As stated above, he begins by defending it in light of the third condition. He believes that on this condition the other two depend. Thus he offers the following argument. Note, however, that he tends to equivocate between \textit{ens rationis} (mind-dependent being) and “second intention” in this article. He will be making some precisions in his language in the remaining articles. Bearing this in mind, the following is his argument (in the form of \textit{modus tollens}) that “second intention” or mind-dependent being is a possible subject for scientific investigation:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [Major:] If the scientific process is not able to stop at mind-dependent being as a first and essential subject of some science, this is case because it is necessary to reduce it with regard to its knowability either as an effect to a cause, or as a property to a subject, or as an inferior to a superior.
  \item [Minor:] But it does not seem to be necessary for mind-dependent being to be reduced with regard to its knowability in any one of these manners.
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[21] See ibid., 533:9-15, 21-26: “Hoc etiam certum est quod non oportet semper quod eadem scientia sit de superiori et omni contento sub eo tam quantum ad communia quam quantum ad propria unius ciusque contenti sub eo. Quia tunc sequeretur quod de nullo ente reali esset aliqua scientia, ut de primo et de per se subjecto, nisi solum de ente commune de quo tractat metaphysica. Quia omnia alia habent reduci ad ens commune sicut inferior ad superius. Et sic non esset aliqua scientia realis nisi metaphysica—quod nullus ponit. . . .

Sed hoc quantum ad praesens accipio quod ab omnibus conceditur, scilicet, quod non oportet semper quod una et eadem scientia sit de ipso communi quantum ad suas proprias passiones et de inferiori eiusdem quantum ad eam quae sunt propria ipsius. Et, per consequens, non oportet quod semper scientia quae tractat de inferiori quantum ad sua propria reducatur ad superius ut ad primum et per se subjectum.”
  \item[22] See ibid., 534:14-20.
\end{itemize}
Therefore, [it seems that the scientific process is able to stop at mind-dependent being as at a first and essential subject of a science.]\textsuperscript{23} He states that the major premise of this hypothetical syllogism is obvious from the discussions that he had undertaken earlier in the article. The entire proof of his argument lies in his proving the minor to be true.\textsuperscript{24} For this, he offers three arguments, each pertaining to the aforementioned reductions—namely with regard to causality, properties, or inferiority and superiority.

He begins by denying that mind-dependent being even has a cause—whether efficient, final, formal, or material. He quickly eliminates the latter two, based on the fact that mind-dependent being does not designate a mind-independent being. Hence, it clearly isn’t a hylomorphic entity. However, the surprising denial of \textit{per se} efficient and final causality is not as surprising as it first appears, for it is based firmly on his assertions regarding the non-real character of the relations in question:\textsuperscript{25}

As was said earlier,\textsuperscript{26} mind-dependent being does not formally posit some mind-independent being in that about which it is said, although it does presuppose that being without which would the mind-dependent being “exist.” On account of this—as has been said—it does not have a cause \textit{per se}. Whence, the fact that it is truly said about something that it is an “understood thing” does not have a cause that places something in the thing that is [thus] understood.

And when it is said that something is made to be understood [lit. \textit{factum intellectum}], this “making” does not pertain to that thing that is known except according to the notion of being understood [lit. \textit{secundum rationem intelligendi}]. So also those things that follow upon the thing known—as it is objectively in the

\textsuperscript{23} See ibid., p.534:21-27: “Et hoc potst ostendi tali ratione, quia si processus scientificus non possit stare ad ens rationis sicut ad primum et per se subiectum alicuius scientiae, aut hoc est quia oportet ipsum reducere quantum ad suam cognoscibilitatem sicut effectum in causam, aut sicut passionem in subiectum, aut sicut inferius in superius. Sed non videtur quod oporteat ens rationis quantum ad suam cognosibilitatem reduci in aliquem istorum modorum. Ergo etc.”

\textsuperscript{24} See ibid., p.534:30: “In probatione minoris stat tota vis quae habet tria partes.”

\textsuperscript{25} This position could be interpreted as the \textit{strong} and \textit{sobering} requirement of a position that robustly refuses to see second intentions as being anything \textit{directly} involved in the subjective, qualitative aspects of knowing.

\textsuperscript{26} See 3.3.2 \textit{Relationes rationis}: Their Non-Categoriality.
intellect—do not have a “making,” nor do they, per se, have an efficient cause. For example, the fact that man or anything else, is abstract or universal has neither an efficient cause nor a making per se.27

From continued remarks, Hervaeus seems to think that, at best, second intentions only have an accidental cause.28 This seems strange, for it would seem that the intellect and the thing together somehow are a true cause of the second intention. However, Hervaeus’s focus is primarily on the thing that is known. Insofar as that thing is not the entire reason for the mind-dependent relation that is founded in it, that mind-dependent relation doesn’t have a cause, properly speaking. He seems, at best, to allow for causality in the case of the “real” relation of the knower to the known. It is as though every other relation is a mind-dependent relation in or among things, but only arising indirectly and “in the wake” of these real relations of the knower to the known. At least, such seems to me at this time the best way for explaining Hervaeus’s stated positions on these matters.29

It is essential to remember that for Hervaeus, all second intentions are about the kinds of relations that can be made between things insofar as they are objects (or, what amounts to the same thing, intentions). That is, they are all about the kinds of relations “made” (in a qualified sense30) among things—presupposing that those things are have in them a mind-dependent

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27 Ibid., p.535:7-15: “Sicut supra dictum est, ens rationis non ponit formaliter aliquam entitatem realem in eo de quo dicitur, licet supponat aliquam entitatem sine qua nullo modo esset ens rationis. Propter quod, sicut dictum fuit, [ens rationis] nec habet causam per se. Unde quod vere dicatur de aliquo quod sit res intellecta, non habet causam ponentem aliquid in re intellecta. Et quando dicitur quod aliquid est factum intellectum, ista factio non convenit ipsi intellecto nisi secundum rationem intelligendi. Ita etiam et ea quae consequuntur rem intellectam, ut est obiective in intellectu, non habent factionem, nec habent per se causam efficientem. Puta quod homo vel aliquid consimile, sit abstractum vel universale, non habet causam efficientem nec factionem per se.”


29 As Doyle rightly notes, these issues would become quite detailed in the discussions of later Scholastics, through the end of Baroque scholasticism. See DSIDoyle, 263n472. For a lucid explanation of this topic in several thinkers, see Novotný, Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel, 58-79.

30 Hence, the ambiguity of Aquinas’s (and Scotus’s) use of adinvenit was discussed in chapters one and two above.
relation to a knower. As was discussed in the previous chapter, he holds that initial mind-dependent relation is in the mind-independent nature (though, always presupposing the actual knowing of a knower). However, since it does not follow from the very nature of the thing in its mind-independent nature, this relation is not a property (strictly speaking) of that thing. Therefore, no mind-dependent relation is a property of the purely mind-independent thing. For this reason, Hervaeus flatly denies that mind-dependent being is reduced to mind-independent being as a property is reduced to a subject.  

All of this appears a bit baroque, and, indeed, without intending a pun, the question of the causality involved in forming second intentions remained a vexed topic well into the period of Baroque Scholasticism. The outlines of this topic are well documented by Daniel Novotný in his recent monograph Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. Thinkers such as Hervaeus and Scotus (as well as later thinkers such as those discussed in Novotný’s monograph), wish to avoid applying “real” (i.e. mind-independent, subjective) causality to the order of entia rationis. The complexities involved make one wonder if it is even necessary to undertake these discussions. It would seem more parsimonious just to cut out esse obiectivum from one’s ontology and reduce all discussions to matters pertaining to esse subiectivum. Indeed, it was for similar reasons that Cross, in his recent monograph on Scotus’s theory of cognition, opined that Scotus’s position became increasingly akin to that of Ockham, effectively eliminating esse obiectivum.

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31 See 3.4.3 An Aside: The Ultimate Foundation of Second Intentions.
32 See ibid., DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.536:12-537:6).
33 See Novotný, 58-79, 131-133, 154-159. Indeed, as one can see from his treatment of the Scotists Bartolomeo Mastri, and Bonaventura Belluto, interesting insights can be gleaned regarding the more detailed accounts provided by objectualists such as the aforementioned Scotists. In particular, see ibid., 257n54.
34 See notes 134, 136, 138, and 140 in the second chapter above. Heed in particular the text cited in note 136, in which Cross explicitly states that esse intelligibile is “simply the real structure of the representational item that explains its content; nothing supervenient on it.” See my lengthy remarks in note 37 below concerning the Thomistic school’s later attempts to distinguish subjective reception of forms from objective reception of forms. These discussions were undertaken at great length within the context of exponents of the scholae of Scotism, various
One may attempt to explain the way that second intentions accrue to *known things*\(^\text{35}\) by using the philosophical notion of supervenience, which attempts to explain how higher level properties always depend upon lower level ones. Discussions of supervenience in topics pertinent to contemporary “philosophy of mind” show that the debates regarding the reducibility (and non-reducibility) of mental events to physical events remain contested in the vast literature pertaining to supervenient properties. An adequate discussion of such matters would take us beyond the scope of this dissertation.\(^\text{36}\) One should be careful in deploying a vocabulary that is non-scholastic, at least in its detailed development in contemporary analytic philosophy. Nonetheless, the notion that one level can supervene on another, relying upon that other level without directly requiring causal explanations *from* the lower level *to* the higher level, can at least help us to understand how the order of intentionality (or *esse obiectivum*\(^\text{37}\)) indeed prerequires certain “real” causal occurrences (i.e. *secundum esse subiectivum*) all the while not being fully explicable in terms of the “real” causality. Indeed, within the later Thomistic tradition, one can find similar discussions that engage with issues related to this same transition between the reception of form in a subject and the reception of a form intentionally (or, objectively) by a knowing faculty (whether sensitive or intellective).\(^\text{37}\) In addition to the *absolutely necessary* subjective qualities that alter the knower (thus, making the knower become

\(^{35}\) Recall again, they do not accrue to concepts (or, in contemporary parlance to brain states); Hervaeus’s attention is *ex parte obiecti*. As we will see, we can speak of second intentions as supervening on *things* given the reception of their quiddities by knowers. However, there are risks that supervenience become a *deus ex machina*. See the remarks in the next two footnotes.


\(^{37}\) This difficult topic is too lengthy to be treated here. An outline of the issues involved can be found in Appendix One at the end of this dissertation.
aliud), the objective union of knowledge supervening upon the physical conditions (whether it be sense knowledge or intellectual knowledge) makes the knower become aliud a se. Although the knower must be subjectively altered in the cognitional process, insofar as the known thing is objectively in the knower,\textsuperscript{38} it is present as other. It is one thing for the animated sense organ, even of an animal, to receive the heat of the sun (thus, itself becoming aliud); it is another matter for the sense power to become the known intentionally—for example, to sense that the sun is present or to know a given quiddity is present at mind as an object of knowledge.\textsuperscript{39}

Novotný has termed the Scotistic and Suarezian accounts of entia rationis as being forms of “objectualism” because of their manners of deploying esse objectivum in their accounts. One could call Hervaeus’s account a form of “objectualism,” given his reliance on similar metaphysical and cognitional claims. Within such forms of Scholastic Aristotelianism, thinkers often have difficulties explaining how certain properties (i.e. second intentions) supervene upon the known thing when it is known without claiming that it requires a per se cause. We can say that the order of intentionality (i.e. the order that begins with the relation of the known to the knower) supervenes upon known things so long as the subjective cognitional occurs. Whatever may have been the reductionistic claims made by later scholastics such as Ockham on this score,

\textsuperscript{38}Hence, one understands, for example, Scotus’s appropriation of language concerning the known being in intellectu sicut cognitum in cognoscente. On the unique character of objective union, see Woodbury, Natural Philosophy, 500.

\textsuperscript{39}See Garrigou-Lagrange, Le Réalisme, 181: “La difficulté vient de ce que le connaissant diffère du non connaissant en ce qu'il doit avoir une certaine spiritualité pour recevoir en lui la forme des autres êtres, \textit{ut quodammodo fiat aliud a se}, pour devenir en quelque sorte l'autre être qu'il connaît. La plante, sous l'influx du soleil, de froide qu'elle était devient chaude, mais elle reste enfermée en elle-même; elle reçoit une autre forme, alteram formant, mais elle ne reçoit pas la forme d'un autre être, formant rei alte-rius. Au contraire le chien voit le soleil: non seulement son œil reçoit comme la plante le rayonnement de la chaleur solaire, mais il voit le soleil; son âme sensible par la faculté visuelle devient en quelque manière, dit Aristote, \textit{(De Anima, I. III, c. 8)}, toutes les choses sensibles qu'il voit, et dont il reçoit la représentation, d'une façon non matérielle. Comme l'a remarqué Averroès: \textit{Cognoscens et cognitum sunt magis unum, quam materia et forma}, le connaissant et le connu sont quelque chose de plus un que la matière et la forme, car la matière ne devient pas la forme, mais la reçoit, l'individualise, l'approprié, tandis que le connaissant devient en quelque sorte la réalité connue, et reçoit la forme de celle-ci sans l'approprier, sans la faire sienne, il la reçoit comme forme de l'autre. Il y a un abîme entre la réception matérielle qui apprivoie la forme reçue et la réception non matérielle qui ne l'approprie pas.”
Hervaeus, as well as important elements of the Scotist, Thomistic, and Suarezian schools did not reduce the intentional to the subjective, *entitative* order. Although Hervaeus does not provide a detailed treatment of the issue, it is safe to say that he holds that the intentional order is a unique, “non-real” (i.e. non-entitative, albeit relational) order supervening on the known things insofar as they are known.

Returning to Hervaeus’s text, one final condition remains, namely that of irreducibility after the manner of an inferior to a superior. Hervaeus believes that this point is “more easily manifest.” His answer comes down to being a denial of there being a supertranscendental science of *ens reale* and *ens rationis*. The details of this argument will be discussed below in the final section of this chapter. In short, he believes that there would be a mere equivocal unity to such a science. Furthermore, Hervaeus states that this should not be surprising, anyway, for he already had discussed at length how even in the sciences of mind-independent being there need not be a reduction of inferior to every superior, as though every science would need to be reduced to metaphysics as the only demonstrative science. Thus, he says that it is not surprising that there need not be a reduction of mind-dependent being to mind-independent being as an inferior to a superior.

Having shown that the third of his conditions holds for “second intention,” he believes that the other two conditions immediately follow. Given that one can reduce back to mind-dependent being as to a final stopping point in resolution of intelligibility, it is just the sort of thing that can serve as a reference point for everything else in a science (i.e. for the 2nd condition discussed above). Furthermore, such a thing can serve as the principle “first thing” that is the goal of the science, for as a stopping point, it provides an adequate reference point toward which

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40 See ibid., p.537:7: “Tertia pars facilius patet.”
41 See the texts cited below in note 171
all other things can be reduced with regard to the goal of a given kind of scientific ordering of knowledge (i.e. meeting the first condition discussed above).\textsuperscript{42} Thus, at the conclusion of q.5 a.1, Hervaeus has answered affirmatively that there \textit{can} be a science of mind-dependent being (or, in other words, of second intentions).\textsuperscript{43} However, it will be necessary to add precision to this claim, for merely stating the fact that such as science is possible does not completely explain exactly what it is and how it differs from other sciences (though some of these matters have already been intimated in the course of q.5 a.1).

Before passing to these questions, it is necessary to remark on Hervaeus’s answer to the objection mentioned above, namely q.5 a.1 obj. 2. There, it is objected that mind-dependent being could not be a subject of a science because it must be formed secondarily to mind-independent being. This seems to prevent it from being something “first known.” Unsurprisingly, in his response to this objection, Hervaeus notes that mind-dependent being can be first known when “first” is taken according to the nature of final cause or goal, as discussed in the body of his article.\textsuperscript{44}

While discussing this claim, he likewise defends the fact that there can be \textit{per se nota} propositions pertaining to the kinds of concepts involved in our knowledge of second intentions. He contrasts this to a kind of direct \textit{per se nota} simplicity that would limit what can be \textit{per se notum} to what is not known through anything else whatsoever. He claims that such \textit{per se nota} notions would only be of things that “immediately fall under the senses”\textsuperscript{45}—perhaps referring to the kinds of notions that would be immediately derived from the act of intellectual abstraction

\textsuperscript{42} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.538:1-23).
\textsuperscript{43} Though, as will be seen, he will note that second intentions are really just one among several kinds of mind-dependent being. His language in q.5 a.1 is a bit loose.
\textsuperscript{44} See ibid., q.5 a.1 ad 2 (p.541:8-16).
\textsuperscript{45} See ibid., 543:8-16.
from the phantasms without any further intellectual activity. Instead, he holds that there can also be various self-evident notions that arise from the comparison of one term to another. He gives an example of such a case with regard to logical notions, “Indeed, having come to know what a *genus* is and what a *species* is, other things are known to be in them without some proof—namely that a genus is predicated essentially [lit. *in quid*], that it is predicated as exceeding the essence [lit. *in plus*], and some other such things.”

In the course of his remarks, he makes another statement that pushes him to the edges of supertranscendentalism. There, he notes that since the intellect’s object must extend to everything that is known syllogistically either by way of *propter quid* or *quia* demonstration:

Therefore, since the first and essential object of a cognitive power extends itself to whatever is known, that which is *first known* in both manners [i.e. both first known from the perspective of efficient causality / time and ‘first known’ as final cause] falls under the first and essential object of a cognitive power. Whence, the first and essential object of the intellect—that is, being—extends itself to that which is *per se notum* in either manner. Nay, rather, it extends itself to that which is *per se notum* in any way whatsoever.

His remark is made in passing, but it implies that the intellect extends equally to the *per se nota* principles of *ens reale* and *ens rationis*. As will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, Hervaeus believes that these two notions are only equivocally called “being.”

Although his doctrine of reflexive understanding partly explains how knowledge of second intentions is different from direct knowledge of mind-independent being, he does not provide in

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47 Ibid., p.542:5-10: “Et ideo quia primum et per se objectum potentiae cognitivae se extendit ad qualitercumque notum, primo notum utroque modo cadit sub primum et per se objectum potentiae cognitivae. Unde primum et per se objectum intellectus, quod est ens se extendi ad per se notum utroque modo. Immo se extendit ad per se notum quocumque modo.

48 Indeed, this view is expressed in the body of q.5 a.1.
the *De secundis intentionibus* a full account of how it is that the intellect has for its formal object *ens*—a notion that seems to be equivocal at best.\textsuperscript{49}

While he does not fully address the issue of supertranscendentalism vis-à-vis the formal object of the intellect, Hervaeus does note that with regard to the scientific manner of syllogistically knowing something, “It suffices that [the essential subject of the science] be first known because knowledge of it is intended more principally, that is, because from the fact that its nature [lit. *ratio*] is formally known many other things are inferred and many other things are referred to it.”\textsuperscript{50} The character of the subject will thus color the considerations of everything that is inferred about it (and from its principles), as well as everything that is referred to it. Hervaeus will use this insight to distinguish logical consideration of second intentions from metaphysical consideration of them. Likewise, he finds it necessary to distinguish logic from several other sciences—ones that also consider types of mind-dependent being that *are not* the second intentions that he so regularly refers to as *entia rationis*. It is the task of the final two sections of this chapter to discuss the character of the subject of logic, especially in contrast to the subjects of these other disciplines.

### 4.2 What is Logic About and Not About? The Broad Domain of Ens Rationis

In the final section of the previous chapter, it was noted that the domain of second intentions is quite broad for Hervaeus. Encompassing the relations formed by all three operations of the intellect, the Peripatetic domain of “being as the true and the false” receives

\textsuperscript{49} On some of the issues involved here, see the recent insightful work of Philip-Neri Reese on this same issue in Scotus, cited above in notes 137, 173, 175, 187 of chapter two of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{50} DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 ad 2 (p.542:12-14): “Sed sufficit quod dicatur primo notum, quia eius notitia intenditur principalius quia scilicet ex sua ratione formaliter nota plura inferuntur, et ad ipsam plura referuntur.”
ample expansion at the hands of the Dominican philosopher.\textsuperscript{51} However, the domain is much larger than one may expect at first sight. Second intentions are mind-dependent relations formed insofar as things are naturally apt to move the intellect to one of its three operations. However, is it possible that there are mind-dependent relations formed in a way that is not merely according to the nature of the human intellect but also insofar as humans are actively involved in the world by the making of free choices?\textsuperscript{52} Hervaeus will explicitly answer this inquiry positively. He considers the question only insofar as it allows him to uniquely designate the domain of mind-dependent being to which second intentions are limited. However, what he does say in this regard helps to provide a general placement of what could be called “the metaphysics of social being” within the broader domain of Aristotelian metaphysics. In the course of thus distinguishing the domain of logic, he will note that second intentions are only one among many mind-dependent relations involved in human experience. Indeed, mind-dependent relations proliferate throughout human experience to such an extent that it is easy to overlook the significant role played by them. Several examples will help to illustrate this point, thus helping to see the deep importance of Hervaeus’s brief remarks, which will be considered after these examples.

Consider the notion of an army commander. According to purely mind-independent being, the commander \textit{qua commander} is not a substance. Instead, he or she is a conjunction of the substantial human nature of the given human person and a great number of other accidents in various categories. The substantial human being is able to support the various accidents that are

\textsuperscript{51} Of course, as noted in the same chapter, Hervaeus was not unique in ascribing the generation of second intentions to the various acts of the intellect.

\textsuperscript{52} This point will be revisited below in note 25 in the conclusion of the dissertation. Also, see Tobias Hoffmann, “Freedom Beyond Practical Reason: Duns Scotus on Will-Dependent Relations,” \textit{British Journal for the History of Philosophy} 21 (2013):1071-1090.
involved with being a commander—various ways of being clothed, various qualities of soul, various relations to other soldiers, etc. The complete whole—“commander”—does not have persity in and of itself, at least if we limit ourselves to thinking only in terms of mind-independent being.

However, this does not mean that the notion of “commander” is nothing more than an accident of natural history—i.e. the fortuitous combination of a long list of min-independent categorical accidents. However, to grant any sort of per se character to the “commander,” what is presupposed is the various customary and moral choices of a people. The notion of “commander” has complete fixity as a kind of per se unit of intelligibility only if we presuppose the long moral experience of a people, which has (through the long accumulation of custom as well as explicit public choices at critical historical junctures) deigned ad placitum to designate some particular set of accidental coincidence with the concept “commander.”

Two further examples will help to round out the illustration of this important point. The border between two jurisdictional states within the federal union of the United States of America cannot be described solely by recourse to the physical facts of the case. A person standing on the border of Ohio and Pennsylvania can point to a good deal of grass and stone and say, “This is the border of Ohio and Pennsylvania.” However, were the appropriate juridical bodies to decide that the border should be changed, one could no longer designate the mind-independent grass and stones as being “the border between Ohio and Pennsylvania.” By a single decision, a new set of relations between the physical environments of the two territories is designated. One accidental unity becomes a new kind of per se unity (i.e. the new border) while another such ad placitum

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53 Indeed, the soldiers, qua soldiers, are also such a conjunction of various categories of being.
unity (i.e. the old border) dissolves back into its purely accidental character, no longer having the *ad placitum* perseity that had heretofore applied to it.

The same kind of dynamic is at play with the case of tools such as screwdrivers. Taken according to their natural being, these entities really are nothing more than a large set of accidental unities among various mind-independent beings. Taken according to mind-independent being, a “screwdriver” is, in fact, nothing more than the fortuitous arrangement of metal and plastic. From the perspective of mind-independent considerations, the screwdriver is *not* a substance.\(^{54}\) The quasi-substantial perseity that is readily associated with the being of an artifact like a screwdriver only accrues when one takes into consideration the human ends toward which these accidentally united\(^{55}\) materials will be used.

Indeed, this insight can go far to remediating medieval philosophy with regard to the contemporarily popular, if quite overutilized, notion of social construction.\(^{56}\) The domain of mind-dependent reality is quite broad, encompassing far more than merely the logical notions regularly associated with second intentions.\(^{57}\) Carefully attenuating and altering the meaning of

\(^{54}\) Hence, for one who solely keeps his or her interpretive lense for reality focused on this mind-independent perspective, it is wholly correct to deny perseity to the screwdriver as such. Yes, the material components of the screwdriver do have their own *per se* natures. These *per se* characteristics are rightly contrasted (from the perspective of mind-independent being) to the *per accidens* configurations that may accrue to them later. The importance of this point—though, I reiterate, *solely from the perspective of mind-independent being*—is well expressed in Kosman, *The Activity of Being*, 87-121. Such accidental unities represent the kind of “accidental being” rejected from the metaphysician’s concerns. However, once we take into account the uses to which things can be applied (i.e. apply a “technical eye” to them), there is a *per se* in contrast to the *per accidens*. For instance, a screwdriver is not a chair. (Hence, there is something *per se*.) However, it is accidental to the screwdriver *qua screwdriver* that it is made of mere iron or of steel, just as it is accidental to the chair *qua chair* that it is made of wood or stone.

\(^{55}\) To reiterate: from a *purely* mind-independent perspective.


\(^{57}\) John Deely well recognizes that the full breadth of this domain is quite underserved by medieval philosophy (and latter-day “scholastics”), though as will be seen, Hervaeus’s work testifies to the fact that it is by far not wholly unrecognized. Likely, a full study of the sacramental theology of the 13th – 17th centuries would provide many insights regarding the medieval and early-modern appreciation for the ontology of socially constructed realities. See Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding*, 350-358, 468-479. In his *Introducing Semiotic*, he provides a
“subjective” and “objective,” the words of John Searle could well be adapted to scholastic vocabulary regarding mind-dependent being within the unexpectedly broad domain of “being as the true and the false”:

I know it sounds odd to say that the fact that this is a screwdriver is a species of mental fact, that is ontologically subjective even though epistemically objective; but this consequence follows from the observer-relative character of all functional attributions. Furthermore, since all assignment of function is ultimately on brute facts, this feature of the taxonomy refers back to the existence of brute facts in our first level.\(^{58}\)

In Hervaeus, there is only found the nucleus of this awareness. However, it is important to note the broader implications, as such awareness helps to see the significant impoverishment that occurs whenever one has a cyclopean focus upon realism and upon mind-independent being. While mind-independent being is presupposed in various ways for mind-dependent being to be formed, the latter remains \textit{non-real}. If one is not careful, a commitment to some form of realism—if over-emphasized—will wholly blind one to the domain of “non-being” involved in so much of human experience.

In the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}, the broad domain of mind-dependent being opens up for Hervaeus when he confronts the possibility that either grammar or rhetoric are concerned with second intentions. In the course of responding to this possibility, he elaborates some important distinctions regarding mind-dependent being. While he does not pursue the pertinent issues at great length, his clear awareness of the salient topics express avenues of thought that mark an important systematic element of discussing just what is involved in the small domain of “being

as the true and the false”—a domain that is broader and deeper than one would ever expect when reading the cursory remarks of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*.

These issues come to the fore most clearly in q.5 a.2 and 3 of the *De secundis intentionibus*. In the second article, they are addressed in the final two objections (namely, the ninth and the tenth) presented before main body of the article. In the ninth, the objector states that since rhetoric deals with dialectical reasoning, at least insofar as it is applied to moral matters, it has mind-dependent being as its first and essential subject. In the tenth objection, it is noted that grammar deals with second intentional notions like “proper” and “appelative” as with first and essential subjects. Thus, based upon these observations, it seems that subjects other than logic deal with mind-dependent beings as first and essential subjects. That is, the consideration of *entia rationis* seems to fall to various subjects outside of logic.

These same kinds of concerns are reiterated in the body of the article as well. They arise again when Hervaeus reiterates an inquiry, namely, “Whether some other science than logic is concerned with mind-dependent being or with some second intention as with a first and essential subject.” To this point, he makes three observations about grammar and one about rhetoric, stressing the seeming fact that these subjects deal with mind-dependent being.

His first observation regarding grammar presupposes it is universal among all speakers. He briskly concludes, therefore, that it is not concerned with the mere vocal sounds (or, by

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59 DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 9 (p.555:21-23): “Rhetorica est de ente rationis ut de primo et per se subiecto, quia est de syllogismo dialectico applicato ad materiam moralem. Sed rhetorica non est logica. Ergo etc.”

60 See ibid., q.5 a.2 ad 10 (p.555:24-29): “Sicut universale et particulare dicunt diversas secundas intentiones, ita etiam proprium et appellativum. Sed grammatica tractat de proprio et appellativio, et de supposito et apposito, et de consimilibus, ut de primo et per se subiecto, quia tractat de oratione congrua et de partibus eius, quorum per se passiones sunt illa quae dicta sunt. Ergo videtur quod grammatica sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subiecto. Non ergo sola logica.”

61 In the final section of this chapter, a related issue will be considered, namely how it is that metaphysics considers mind-dependent beings.

62 DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.560:3-5): “[Nunc restat dicere de alia parte quaestionis,] utrum, scilicet, aliqua scientia alia a logica sit de ente rationis sive de aliqua secunda intentione ut de primo et per se subiecto.”
extension, written symbols) involved in human communication. One reason for this conclusion is based on his assumption of a universal grammar beyond particular languages. However, he also rejects the thought that grammar investigates the mind-independent, brute sounds involved in communication, as though the grammarian were to totally circumscribe the role of the intellect in the formation of the signs involved in written and spoken communication.63

This leaves Hervaeus with two options. On the one hand, grammar could be concerned with, “Things insofar as they are signified.” On the other, its subject could be, “Utterances [lit. voces] insofar as they are significative.” In either case, however, he argues that they involve mind-dependent relations or mind-dependent being. His remarks to this end anticipate a concession that he will make regarding mind-dependent being in the details of his response to his observations regarding grammar and rhetoric:

Whichever one of these positions is taken, it follows that grammar has as its first and essential subject either mind-dependent being or second intentions. In the case of things insofar as they are signified, this is so because nothing is placed in those things—just as when they are known—except for mind-dependent beings. Similarly, in the case of expressions insofar as they are significative nothing is added to the expression [i.e. the sound or written symbol] itself as though a kind of quality were added to it—except a certain mind-dependent relation following from the human will instituting the expression for the sake of signifying [lit. secundum placitum significandi], for we say that grammar is concerned with expressions signifying by agreement [lit. secundum placitum].

63 See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.560:13-18): “Non de ipsis vocibus quantum ad ipsas voces, quia tunc grammatica non esset eadem apud omnes. Nec etiam est de ipsis rebus ut de primo et per se subjecto quantum ad suum esse reale absolute, quia tunc grammatica esset de aliquo existente in rerum natura, circumscripto omne opere intellectus et voce. Relinquitur, ergo, quod grammatica sit de primo et per se subjecto, vel de rebus ut sunt significatae, vel de vocibus ut sunt significativae.”

On this last point, similar observations were made in the 13th century by (for example) Albert the Great. However, as will be seen in his continued remarks, Hervaeus’s use of this notion of voces quantum ad ipsas voces may well reflect standard themes in Paris of the early 14th century. Regarding the aforementioned view of Albert the Great, see Pini, Categories and Logic, 24: “According to Albert, science deals only accidentally with speech, for speech by itself is not meaningful, but science only deals with what is meaningful. Speech acquires a meaning only insofar as there is a concept in the intellect corresponding to what is said in speech.” This same insight is likely behind Kilwardby’s seeming inclusion of “ratiocinatio et sermo ratiocinativus” among diminished forms of being. See notes 163-165 in the first chapter above.
Therefore, it follows that grammar is about mind-dependent being [or, second intentions] as its first and essential subject.64

His second and third reasons regarding the mind-dependent status of grammar are stated much more quickly. The second clearly shows a background influence of Modist vocabulary. In short, the argument states that the *modi significandi* studied in grammar do not have more reality than the *modi intelligendi* studied in logic. Since the latter studies mind-dependent being, so too must grammar study mind-dependent being.65 The third remark about grammar is based on the observation, “Agreeable speech [the subject of grammar] seems to be a mind-dependent being, since it is something that is constituted by the intellect’s operation.”66

He voices a similar potential objection regarding rhetoric are likewise based upon the observation that the human intellect is clearly involved in the kinds of structures created by the rhetorician. The process of finding persuasive means to reaching a given conclusion “seems to be a work of reason or a mind-dependent being.”67 For example, when someone indicates that something is praiseworthy, this praiseworthiness only accrues to the thing because of the art of rhetoric. The study of the science of such attribution of praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness

64 DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.560:19-27): “Quocumque autem istorum dato, sequitur quod grammatica sit, ut de primo et per se subjecto, sive de ente rationis, sive de secundis intentionibus. Quia in rebus, ex hoc quod sunt significatae, nihil ponitur, sicut ex hoc quod sunt intellectae, nisi ens rationis. Similiter in vocibus, ut sunt significativae, nihil additur super ipsam vocem ut qualitas quaedam, nisi quaedam habitudo rationis ex hoc quod voluntas humana instituit vocem secundum placitum significandi, quia hic loquimur de vocibus significantibus secundum placitum. Sequitur, ergo, quod grammatica sit de ente rationis, ut de primo et per se subjecto sive de secundis intentionibus.”


thus appears to be the study of a kind of mind-dependent being. Hence, as in the case of grammatical matters, rhetoric seems to vie with logic as a science of mind-dependent beings.

In order to deal with these difficulties, Hervaeus makes a distinction regarding how something can be said to follow from the very nature of some thing. From one perspective, one can speak of the properties of a mind-independent thing, which follow from the essence of that thing, ignoring all other conditions. Instead of taking his example directly from physical reality, he uses an example from geometry: “[The property of having] three angles that are equal to two right angles obtains to a triangle from the very nature of the thing itself, circumscribed from anything else [e.g. the act of intellection.]”

Hence, in this case, one pays heed only to the very thing in question, not taking into account anything that is extrinsic to that thing. It is in contrast to these sorts of properties that logical second intentions are said not to follow from the nature of things.

This is not a surprising point, for the contrast between mind-dependent and mind-independent being has been stressed well by Hervaeus throughout the treatise.

However, one can oppose the notion of following the nature of something to that which is attributed to something due to conventional institution. In contrast to such things, logical notions can be said to follow from the nature of things, for they do not follow upon the freely willed choice of one who institutes the relation in question at his or her pleasure (ad placitum). Hence, Hervaeus states:

In this manner, the second intentions that the logician considers do follow the things known from the very nature of the thing. Indeed, it is not from the institution of someone according to the choice of that one who institutes it that things are naturally apt to be known abstractly and indeterminately. Nay rather, the intellect naturally is apt to be

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68 Ibid. (p.561:17-19): “Sicut habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis consequitur triangulum ex natura rei quantum ad suum esse reale, circumscripito quocumque alio.”

69 See ibid. (p.561:19-23): “Et sic nulla secunda intentio consequitur rem ex natura sua quantum ad suum esse reale acceptam. Ad nullam enim rem ex natura sua quantum ad suum esse reale, quocumque alio circu[m]scripto, consequituro esse abstractum, vel universale, vel genus, vel speciem, aut aliquid tale.”
moved thus by the thing that it knows in this manner as something indeterminate (i.e. inasmuch as it is objectively in the intellect). And by consequence, [this kind of indetermination] is naturally apt to obtain to the thing in the intellect. And thus, we do concede that certain mind-dependent beings do obtain to the thing according to its own nature—though, in the manner that has just been explained.\textsuperscript{70}

He contrasts such logical mind-dependent beings to those that arise from the institution of some human person. Thus, a piece of paper becomes a charter only because a king freely wills that it represent the receipt of a certain amount of money. In a similar way, Hervaeus argues, various notions pertaining to grammatical signification are related to the things known only because of human convention that relates words to things (for whatever reason or set of reasons). The important thing is that such mind-dependent relations do not follow from the nature of things insofar as they are apt to be part of the definitions, enunciations, and ratiocination undertaken by human intellection. Instead, grammar is a science concerned with conventional mind-dependent beings, thus having a subject primarily and essentially about topics falling outside the scope of logic.\textsuperscript{71}

At this point of the argument, Hervaeus undertakes an important and lengthy defense of the claim that logic is the only science concerned with mind-dependent beings that naturally follow things according to their various modes of objective being—i.e. according to how they are objects of simple, enunciatve, and discursive intellection. For the purposes of this dissertation,

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\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. (p.561:28-35): “Et, illo modo, intentiones secundae quas considerat logicus consequuntur res intellectas ex natura rei. Non enim ex institutio alciuius indeterminate. Immo naturaliter intellectus natus est moveri sic a re quod eam sic intelligat abstracte et indeterminate. Et per consequens nata est consequi rem intellectam isto modo quaedam indeterminatio, prout est objective in intellectu. Et sic concedimus quod quaedam entia rationis consequuntur rem ex natura sua, modo quo expositum est.”
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\textsuperscript{71} See ibid. (p.562:1-12): “Alia autem sunt entia rationis quae consequuntur rem non ex natura sua, sed ex sola institutio alciuius secundum placetum instituentis, sicut ad marellum regis ex sola institutio sequitur assignare actionem tantaee pecuniae. Et ideo illo modo significare hanc rem vel illam, et tali modo vel tali, puta, communiter vel proprie, substantive vel adiective, et habere habitudinem ad ea quae significatur secundum tale significacionem, consequuntur voces ipsas non ex natura rei, sed ex institutio humana instituente tales voces ad significandum talia et tali modo. Si ergo aliquae scientia sit de talibus entibus rationis, ut de primo et per se subjecto, quod ad nunc non pono, talis scientia sit alia a logica. Quia logica non considerat entia rationis quae consequuntur voces vel quaecumque alia signa ex institutione. Sed considerat entia rationis quae consequuntur res eo modo quo apte natae sunt intelligi.”
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it is easiest to consider his responses to the ninth and tenth objections discussed above. These responses encapsulate his overall view regarding what differentiates the *entia rationis* involved in logic from those involved in grammar and rhetoric.

In the ninth objection, rhetoric was proposed as a science of second intentions. In his response to this objection, Hervaeus separates himself from the Alexandrine and Arabic interpretations of the *Organon* embraced by some medieval thinkers (including Aquinas) who included the *Rhetorics* and *Poetics* in the Aristotelian canon of logical works. Hervaeus not only denies that rhetoric considers the very nature of the dialectical syllogism (whether in general or at least a particular kind of dialectical syllogism). He even denies that rhetoric is concerned with how the dialectical syllogism is applied to a particular matter.

Instead, he states that rhetoric is concerned with the very matter to which a particular kind of dialectical syllogism is applied. He does not define what this matter is but instead merely compares the case of rhetoric to “other sciences which make use of the demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with the demonstrative syllogism as with a subject but instead are concerned with some mind-independent being to which the demonstrative syllogism is applied.” In the response itself, little other commentary is provided regarding the kind of subject matter, presumably emotive or moral, that comprises the subject of rhetoric according to Hervaeus.

This lack of precision is not surprising, based on remarks that he makes at the close of the main body of the article. As he closes his remarks on rhetoric, Hervaeus humbly states, “These things have been said by way of discussion and without assertion for I have thought about them

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72 See note 10 in chapter one above.
73 See ibid., q.5 a.2 ad 9 (p.580:19-22): “Sicut dictum fuit in principali solutione, quod rhetorica non considerat de syllogismo dialectico ut de primo et per se subiecto, nec in generali, nec in speciali, nec etiam de ipso applicato ad materiam specialem. Sed considerat de materia cui syllogismus dialecticus est aplicabilis.”
74 See ibid. (p.580:22-25): “Sicut etiam aliae scientiae quae utuntur syllogismo demonstrativo non sunt deipso ut de subiecto, sed sunt de aliquo ente reali cui syllogismus demonstrativus est aplicabilis.”
only a small amount." Thus, his statements should be interpreted as being tentative. However, what he says is interesting, for it is clear that at the time of his writing this article, he held that rhetoric is an application of the dialectical reasoning discussed in the *Topics*, akin to how demonstrative sciences apply the rules for demonstration discussed in the *Posterior Analytics*. He states,

Now, however, rhetoric does not consider as its formal object the very mode of making probable inferences from one thing to another. Nay rather, it considers the very things from which there is probable or persuasive inference. Hence, it teaches one how to consider both the conditions of judging and the conditions of cause—from which one is able to persuade.  

Whence, it seems that, just as the demonstrative sciences of mind-independent being are related to the mode of demonstrating discussed in the *Posterior Analytics*, similarly does rhetoric stand in relation to the mode of inferring in a probable manner found in the *Topics*. . . . [Similar to the relation found between the other sciences and the *Posterior Analytics*,] rhetoric also does not have for its first and essential subject this very mode of persuading or inferring in a probable manner. Instead, it has for its subject the things in whose consideration such a mode of consideration is naturally apt to occur.

These brief remarks do not help to place rhetoric with absolute certainty in the overall schema of sciences. However, based on Hervaeus’s other remarks, rhetoric is distinguished from logic because of its focus on matters that are moral / customary and not merely reducible to the kinds of mind-dependent relations that follow on things insofar as they are known. When he refers in quotation above to the things “in whose consideration such a mode of consideration is

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75 Ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.576:23-24): “Et haec dicta sint discurrendo, et absque assertione, quia parum de his cogitavi.”

76 Ibid. (p.576:11-15): “Nunc, autem, rhetorica non considerat ut obiectum formale ipsum modum inferendi probabiliter unum ex alicie. Immo considerat ipsas res ex quibus sit illatio probabilis sive persuasivus. Unde docet considerare et conditiones iudicii, et conditiones causae, ex quibus habet persuadere.” Note that the final two commas somewhat obscure the correlative *et . . . et . . .* construction.

77 Ibid. (p.576:16-23): “Unde videtur quod, sicut scientiae reales demonstrativae se habent ad modum demonstrandi in libro Posteriorum, ita se habet rhetorica ad modum probabiliter inferendi in libro Topicorum. Sed scientiae reales non habent pro primo et per se subiecto modum demonstrandi determinatum in libro Posteriorum, sed magis res in quorum consideratione talis modus demonstrandi inventur. Ergo, a simili, rhetorica non habet pro primo et per se subiecto ipsum modum persuadendi sive probabiliter inferendi, sed res in quorum consideratione talis modus natus est inveniri.”
naturally apt to occur,” one can possibly take him to mean that such “things” are the moral and political matters of choice (and emotional response) that are treated in the *Rhetoric*. Clearly, he cannot mean that it is concerned with the kind of mind-dependent relations naturally apt to occur in things insofar as they are known. This latter domain he has quite explicitly delegated to the second intentions pertaining to logic.

In order to understand the response to the tenth objection, it is helpful to consider the distinctions that Hervaeus makes regarding grammar as he closes the main body of q.5 a.2. There he proposes some further distinctions regarding possible ways of interpreting the nature of grammar. On the one hand, one could consider grammar as being concerned with “significant expressions insofar as they are singificative.” On the other hand, one may consider it as being concerned with “mental concepts insofar as they agreeably express things.” As was the case with his remarks on rhetoric, one suspects that Hervaeus has only given limited philosophical reflection to these matters.

Hervaeus’s first definition for the subject of grammar is almost identical to what we find in Kilwardby’s *De ortu scientiarum* concerning the subject of grammar. In c.51 of the *De ortu*, Kilwardby concludes that the subject of grammar is “the significative *sermo* inasmuch as it is something of this sort [i.e. significative],” and inasmuch as the end of the science is the “fitting and suitable [lit. *conguus et aptus*] manner of signifying every conception of the mind,” one can define grammar as “the science concerning discourse [lit. *de sermone*] teaching one to

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79 See ibid. (p.573:15-16): “De conceptibus mentis, prout congrue exprimunt res.”

80 Kilwardby, *De ortu*, n.484 (p.165:12): “Subiectum enim sermo significativus est secundum quod huiusmodi.”

81 Ibid., n.484 (p.165:13-14): “finis, congruous et aptus modus significandi omnem mentis conceptionem.”
signify every conception of the soul fittingly.”82 From this perspective, grammar is about the rules signifying (or, expressing) one’s thoughts fittingly.83

The other option offered by Hervaeus is a bit odd at first glance. This second option would have grammar be a science of thoughts (and not significative words). Whereas the first definition of grammar would have it be a science concerned with the way that words signify thoughts, this second option offered by Hervaeus would posit grammar as a science of how thoughts represent things. The direct source of this theory is not certain,84 and as we will see below, Hervaeus only briefly considers either of these options, intending to dismiss quickly the possibility that grammar could vie with logic for having ens rationis as its unique scientific subject.

The first option runs the greatest risk of seeming to assert that grammar is concerned with mind-dependent beings in the same way as is logic. If grammar is concerned with the significative as such, is it not concerned with entia rationis (i.e. with the class of mind-dependent relations pertaining to signification)? Hervaeus does not appear to be very interested in engaging this issue in detail. Indeed, begins by stating (as though it is obvious to him), “If the first possibility is posited, it then follows that grammar is not about the mind-dependent being [lit. ente rationis] that follow the thing by its very nature (i.e. inasmuch as it is natural to it to be apprehended by an intellect).”85 Instead, it has a different sort of ens rationis for its subject, namely the kind that is conventional and instituted. Whence, he says that according to this first

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82 Ibid., n.484 (p.165:14-15): “Definition, scientia de sermone docens omnem animi conceptionem congrue significare.”

83 For a detailed discussion of Kilwardby’s positions on Logic, not only in the De ortu but in the earlier Commentary on the Priscianus minor, see Kneepkens, “Robert Kilwardby on Grammar,” 17-64.

84 Koridze does not consider the background to this discussion. See Koridze, “Intentionale Grundlegung.” 229-233.

85 See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.573:16-17): “Si ponatur primum, tunc sequitur quod grammatical non si de ente rationis quod consequitur rem ex natura rei, prout nata est apprehendi ab intellectu.”
potential definition, grammar would have as its subject “[either] voice as signifying, or that very sign itself, or the relation of the signified to the sign [that signifies it].”\footnote{See ibid. (p.573:20-21): “Unde primum subiectum et per se erit vox ut est significans, vel ipsum signatum, vel habet habitudinem significati ad signum.”} However, given the conventional nature of grammatical impositions,\footnote{One rightly wonders if Hervaeus has inherited this sensitivity to the volitional element in grammatical matters from some tradition relative to Roger Bacon’s \emph{Summa grammatica} [sic]. On this matter, see Irene Rosier-Catach, “Roger Bacon and Grammar,” in \emph{Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Conmemorative Essays 1996}, ed. Jeremiah Hackett (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 67-102, in particular, 72-74.} Hervaeus seems to take it for granted that we should just set aside such \emph{entia rationis} (or \emph{relationes rationis}) since they do not naturally follow from things inasmuch as they are naturally apt to be understood.

This explanation seems to fit well for discussions of grammar pertaining to this or that particular language. In those cases, the role of custom and institution are obviously present. However, another case needs to be considered, namely grammatical notions like “adjective,” “appellative noun,” and so forth. These kinds of grammatical notions seem to be kinds of second intentions that could be studied in logic. Indeed, this is especially the case when it comes to appellative nouns, for this notion seems to be quite the same as “universal,” pertaining to a kind of community found among several distinct things.

Hervaeus anticipates this objection and addresses it, albeit briefly. He states that the consideration of this kind of community \emph{does} pertain to logic. However, considering the community \emph{as signified} pertains to grammar. The logician considers such matters in abstraction from any conventional signification whatsoever. Hervaeus thus holds that inasmuch as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{The language of fittingness and unfittingness functions as a terminological backbone throughout the various topics covered in the \emph{Summa Gramatica} in Roger Bacon, \emph{Summa Gramatica necnon Sumule Dialectices}, ed. Robert Steele (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 1-190. Although Hervaeus’s immediate sources are not evident, it is important to avoid attributing it to the hazily defined “modistae.” Certainly, his arts education was indebted to the long line of other influential figures who had commented on Prician and Donatus throughout the thirteenth century (e.g. Grosseteste, Kilwardby, Jordan of Saxony, Roger Bacon, et al.) as well as the major figures of the twelfth century (i.e. Abelard, William of Conches, and Peter Helias). For a general history of these matters, see the introductory remarks in Thomas of Erfurt, \emph{Grammatica Speculativa}, ed. and trans. G.L. Bursill-Hall (London: Longman, 1972), 1-28.}
\end{itemize}
appellative community is *appellative*, it pertains to conventionally significative expressions and thus to grammar. However, inasmuch as appellative community involves *universal commonality*, the latter commonality is a second intentional *ens rationis*, founded not upon convention but, instead, upon the nature of things inasmuch as they are naturally apt to move a human intellect to conceive them in a universal manner.\(^{88}\)

Therefore, the grammarian considers signifying words as “embodying” the community that can be explained by the logical second intention in question. The grammarian is aware of the universality involved in appellative community. However, he or she will do so with an explicit eye toward its pertinence in the matters of signification that are important to his or her grammatical speculation. This situation is similar to that of logic with regard to the acts of intellection, which it must consider—but only as presuppositions for the formation of second intentions. Likewise, it is similar to the case of metaphysics, which can discuss second intentions so long as they are discussed in their relation to its primary subject, namely mind-independent being in the ten categories.\(^{89}\) Thus, the grammarian can discuss the logical community (i.e. second intentional universality) involved in appellative nouns *only* insofar as it is necessary for the primary subject of his or her inquiry, namely *community that is signified by appellative nouns*. As Hervaeus will say a little later in this same discussion:

> It should be noted, however, that if grammar does consider some kind of mind-dependent being that follows upon a thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect (as when it was said above that grammar considers the community of a signified thing and from this a signifying noun is called an appellative noun), it [i.e. grammar] does not consider that mind-dependent being as its first and essential subject. Instead, it considers it as a subsequent matter [lit. *ex consequenti*] inasmuch as it has attribution to a representative

\(^{88}\) See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.573:22-574:1): “Unde etsi aliqua consideret grammatical pertinentia ad ens rationis primo modo, sicut quando dicitur quod nomen appellativum est illud quod est pluribus commune, considerare communitatem ipsam secundum se pertinet ad logicam. Sed considerare eam ut significatam, vel considerare rem ut indeterminate signatum, pertinet ad grammaticam. Unde communitas ipsa non erit formale in subiecto grammaticae.”

\(^{89}\) Both of these cases be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
concept or to a signifying expression—just as though one who considers the act of intellection in its mind-independent being [lit. *esse reale*] may also as a subsequent matter consider some beings of reason that follow upon things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect.\(^{90}\) So, therefore, it does not seem that grammar has for its first and essential subject the mind-dependent being that follows upon the object itself naturally (that is, from the manner that it is naturally apt to be understood) and not from institution.\(^{91}\)

Recall Hervaeus’s other option regarding a potential subject for grammar, namely concepts insofar they agreeably (or fitly) express things. As noted above, this is a rather odd definition for grammar’s subject, meaning that it is concerned *not* with the way that words signify concepts but, instead, with how concepts fittingly represent things—i.e. with how concepts fittingly represent things according to their *subjective* (i.e. “real”) being. Grammatical discussions would be concerned with how clear or obscure a given concept is. Citing the division of the ten categories from all mind-dependent being, Hervaeus thus notes that such discussions of clarity and obscurity would really be a discussion of psychological matters and not a discussion of mind-dependent being (in the very strict sense of *ens rationis* or *relatio / habitudo rationis*).\(^{92}\)

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\(^{90}\) Thus, this would be as though the discussions of the *De anima* would consider the formation of the mind-dependent relations in the course of discussing matters directly pertaining to the *De anima* (a branch of *natural philosophy*, not *logic*).

\(^{91}\) DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.575:8-17): “Notandum autem quod, si grammatica consideret aliquod *ens rationis* consequens rem prout est objective in intellectu, sicut supra dictum est quod grammatica consideret communitatem rei signatae, et ex hoc vocatur nomen significans nomen appellativum, non consideraret illud *ens rationis* ut primum et per se subjectum, sed haberet considerare illud ex consequenti in quantum habet attributionem ad conceptum representantem, vel ad vocem significativum, sicut qui consideraret de actu intelligendi quantum ad suum esse *reale* posset ex consequenti considerare aliqua entia rationis quae consequentur res prout sunt objective in intellectu. Sic ergo non videtur quod grammatica habeat pro primo et per se subjecto *ens rationis* quod consequitur ipsum objectum *naturaliter*, scilicet, ex modo quo naturam est intelligi, et non ex institutione.”

\(^{92}\) Ibid. (p.574:3-17): “Si autem ponatur grammatica esse de conceptibus ut de primo et per se subiecto, adhuc sequitur quod grammatica non habebit *ens rationis* pro primo et per se subiecto de quo loquimur. Quia hic non accipimus *ens rationis* pro actibus existentibus in intellectu sicut in subjecto, quae sunt verae res vere esse reale habentes. Sed accipimus hic *ens rationis* pro eo quod consequitur rem prout est objective in intellectu, sicut supra expositorum fuit quod distinguitor contra *ens reale divisum* in decem praedicamenta. Sed conceptus mentis sive sit idem quod actus intelligenti sive aliquid diversum ab eo sunt actus reales existentes in mente sicut in subjecto. Ergo etc.
However, he presses further and considers a sub-objection:

Just as mind-dependent being [\textit{ens rationis}] follows the thing inasmuch as it is said to be understood absolutely, so too does it seem that an \textit{ens rationis} follow upon the understood thing inasmuch as it is said to be fittingly understood—and grammar treats of this sort of mind-dependent being \textit{[ens rationis]}.

The whole issue comes down to determining the nature of the relation of the known to the knower, for it seems that “being fittingly understood” is an \textit{ens rationis} because they indicate relations of the known to the knower. \textsuperscript{94} “To be fittingly understood” would follow on things insofar as they are in an intellect that fittingly or “less-than-fittingly” understands a particular thing. Thus, just as “to be an intention” is a mind-dependent relation following on the thing insofar as it is the terminus of the opposite relation of the knower to the known thing, so too would “to be understood in a fitting manner” be a mind-dependent relation of the thing to the knower who thus knows the thing in a fitting manner. \textsuperscript{95}

To this possibility, Hervaeus responds in a somewhat cryptic manner, though his general point is intelligible. \textsuperscript{96} He states,

Some thing, as it is understood, is not denominated from a mind-dependent being [i.e. from an \textit{ens rationis}]. \textsuperscript{97} Instead, it is denominated from the act of intellection by an

\textsuperscript{93} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.574:19-21): “Sicut ens rationis consequitur rem prout absolute dicitur intelligi, ita videtur quod etiam ens rationis sequitur ipsam rem intellectam prout dicitur congrue intelligi, et de tali ente rationis tractat grammatica.”

\textsuperscript{94} A similar issue was at play in Scotus’s attempts to be very precise about the various kinds of relations of known to knower. On this, see notes 146-149 in chapter two above. For sources regarding Thomistic discussions of this matter, see the remarks in note 37 above.

\textsuperscript{95} See ibid., p.574:18-21: “Et si dicatur contra hoc, quod sicut res dicitur congrue intelligi, et sicut ens rationis consequitur rem prout absolute dicitur intelligi, ita videtur quod etiam ens rationis sequitur ipsam rem intellectam prout dicitur congrue intelligi, et de tali ente rationis tractat grammatica.”

\textsuperscript{96} Indeed, the confusion attendant upon this passage is well reflected in the manuscript notation provided by Doyle. Clearly, editors had trouble with this passage throughout various editions. Doyle’s reads as well, if not better, than those attempted emendations.
extrinsic denomination. However, when it is said to be a first or second intention, or when it is said to be “universal” or “particular,” it is then a denomination from a mind-dependent being [i.e. from a relatio rationis that is an ens rationis, not a real, subjective quality]. And likewise, when a thing is said to be clearly or obscurely understood, or when it is said to be conceived fittingly or unfittingly, this is not a denomination from a mind-dependent being, but instead is a denomination from the act of intellection or from the concept.98

In this terse remark, Hervaeus is saying that insofar as we say that the known as known is said to be obscurely known, we are actually attributing the subjective, mental clarity directly from the relation of the concept (or act of intellection) in question to the thing known. It is akin to saying that this or that subjective concept is more or less similar to the known thing. Hence, to say, “Tree is fitly understood,” is really to note the relation of similitude between the subjective concept and thing known. Hence, the relation in question remains on the plane of “real” relations and hence is not second intentional in nature.99 Therefore, given that ens rationis stands wholly in contrast to being in the ten predicaments (including the category of relation), it does not seem that the possible definition for grammar’s subject implies a conflict between the subject of grammar and the subject of logic.100

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97 Here we run into a problem that has been mentioned before regarding my chosen language of “mind-dependent being.” To express Hervaeus another way, “Some thing, as it is understood, is not denominated from a relatio rationis but, instead, from an act of intellection [or concept] really existing in esse reale.” This is interesting, for it shows that one must be careful how to parse the equivalencies (and “inequivalencies”) between the senses of “to be understood” and “to be an intention.” Sometimes, Hervaeus uses them in a synonymous sense; sometimes (like here), they are opposed as denomenations from, on the one hand, esse reale and, on the other hand, esse rationis.

98 See ibid., p.574:22-575:1: “Ad hoc dicendum quod aliqua res, ut est intellecta, non denominatur ab ente rationis. Sed denominatur ab actu intelligendi, denominatione extrinseca. Sed quando dicitur esse primam vel secundam intentionem, vel quando dicitur esse universalis, vel particularis, tunc est denominatio ab ente rationis. Ita etiam, quando dicitur res clare vel obscure intelligi, none st denominatio ab ente rationis; vel quando dicitur congrue vel incongrue concipi, sed est denominatio ab actu intelligendi vel a conceptu.”

99 I choose to remain silent regarding the representationalism involved in this kind of discussion. There are several different paths that this can go vis-à-vis later scholastic epistemologies. Hervaeus is not interested in adjudicating those matters regarding “realism” here, so it is best to be careful only to note the general implications of his statements.

100 He also notes that second intentions are found uniformly throughout cases of being conceived clearly, obscurely, etc. That is, merely because something is obscurely understood, that does not mean that it is, for example, a genus, for the relation of being one in genus can be attributed to known things whether they are clearly or
The explicit response that Hervaeus makes to the tenth objection basically reiterates the points that he has already made in the body of the article. According to him, no matter how one considers grammar, it is concerned with matters that fall outside the concerns of the logican. Either it is concerned with “non-natural” (i.e. instituted / customary / choice-derived) mind-dependent beings or it is concerned with the fittingness expressed in the (qualitative and “real”) concept’s expression of reality. Even when grammar does treat of notions that depend upon logical relations (such as the dependence of appellative nouns upon logical universality and particularity), it does so only as a secondary concern that is ultimately related to verbal signs that signify *ex institutione* and not to the nature of mind-dependent relations that naturally accrue to things when they are grasped by the intellect.  

In addition to the kinds of mind-dependent beings that are involved in such “moral” or *ad placitum* matters, there are mind-dependent beings that occur in various other sciences. They only occur because one thing is compared to another by human inquiry. Hervaeus uses two examples, one taken from mathematics and another taken from theology. For instance, there is a mind-dependent relation involved in calling one and the same mathematical point “start” or “finish,” all depending on how it is compared to two segments of which it is part. Likewise, there is no real distinction among divine attributes, although in theology we compare one attribute to another. On this second point, he provided clear remarks in q.2 a.4:

> Whence, although no substance or no quality is a mind-dependent being (in an unqualified manner, that is), however we say that the justice of God, which [in fact] is his substance, is a quality according to reason (or, in other words, according to our manner of understanding). However, when we say this we intend neither to say that the justice of

101 See ibid. (p.575:1-7). 102 Whether one takes this as being “natural” or “supernatural” theology is of little import here, for the theme is not discussed in detail by Hervaeus in the *De secundis intentionibus.*
God is a mind-dependent being (in an unqualified manner) nor that some quality is a mind-dependent being (in an unqualified manner). Instead, we intend to say that one absolute thing belongs to another absolute thing in a qualified manner—that is according to a kind of similarity [to the case of a substance and a qualitative accident], insofar as according to our manner of understanding, we first understand the substance of God in comparison to his justice. This is similar to the manner that, with regard to the way that we know things [lit. apud nos in rebus nobis notis], substance is presupposed [as known] with respect to quality and any other accident—though, neither substance nor quality is a mind-dependent being (in an unqualified manner). . . .

It should be noted, however, that although the Justice and Substance of God are not a mind-dependent being in an unqualified manner, however [to distinguish] between the Justice and the Substance is to give a mind-dependent relation which designates only a mind-dependent being. This is just as when we say that in comparison to our intellect, the Justice in God presupposes His Substance, the notions of “to presuppose” and “to be presupposed” designate only a mind-dependent relation. And these notions do not designate an absolute (i.e. mind-independent) entity, formally speaking, but instead designate the relations of a presupposition to what is presupposed as well as of the presupposed to the presupposition.

In q.5 a.2, Hervaeus mentions such kinds of entia rationis in order to note that they are not studied in common—as though logic potentially would study them. Instead, each such notion would be explained in terms of that on which it is based. Thus, the notion of “start” and “finish” would be discussed in geometry, which treats of continuous quantity. Likewise, theology (whether natural or supernatural) would treat of the mind-dependent distinctions among the Divine Attributes in relation to the Divine Simplicity. Such “particularized” entia rationis

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103 DSIDij’s, q.2 a.4 (p.213:4-14): “Unde licet nulla substantia vel nulla qualitas sit ens rationis simpliciter loquendo, tamen dicimus quod iustitia Dei, quae est eius substantia, sit qualitas secundum rationem sive nostrum modum intelligendi, nec per hoc intendimus dicere vel quod iustitia Dei simpliciter sit ens rationis vel quod aliqua qualitas sit simpliciter ens rationis, sed intendimus dicere quod unum absolutum conventit alii absoluto secundum quid, idest secundum quandam similitudinem, inquantum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi praesentium substantiam Dei sua iustitiae, sicut apud nos in rebus nobis notis praesupponitur substantia qualitati et cuiolibet accidenti. Tamen nec substantia nec qualitas est simpliciter ens rationis.”

Here, Dij’s rendering is clearer than Doyle’s. The first alicui absoluto is alicui absolute in Doyle’s edition. This causes his translation to be quite unclear (though still understandable). See Doyle q.2 a.4 (p.400:15): ”non alicui absolute, puta, substantiae, qualitati, quantitati.”

104 Ibid. (p.213:24-214:4): “Notandum tamen quod, licet iustitia vel substantia Dei non sit simpliciter ens rationis, tamen inter iustitiam et substantiam Dei et substantiam Dei est dare habitudinem rationis quam solum ens rationis dicit, sicut quando dicimus quod in comparatione ad intellectum nostrum iustitia in Deo.”
are thus explained in the various sciences in which they are deployed, not in some overarching science such as logic.\textsuperscript{105}

With these remarks from q.5 a.2 having been considered, it is simplest to consider Hervaeus’s remarks in q.5 a.3, which presents a synoptic reprise of the conclusions of q.5 a.2 most important for this dissertation’s concerns. This article provides a fine summary of the relation between logic and its subject matter, namely mind-dependent being. Indeed, the article is a model of Hervaeus's overall structural clarity.

He begins by proposing several distinctions that should now be familiar to the reader, based upon his more detailed discussion in q.5 a.2. He first notes the twofold character of mind-dependent being, namely into the "conventional" and the "natural," taking "natural" in the qualified sense discussed above—naturally apt to be formed, presupposing the relation of the knowing intellect to the known thing. Thus, he names among conventional mind-dependent beings such grammatical notions such as "to be a noun," "to be a verb," "to be a significant expression," "to be a proper noun," and so forth. Likewise, he names among “natural” mind-dependent beings a standard assortment of second intentions, such as "universal," "particular," "genus," "antecedent," and others.\textsuperscript{106}

As in the previous article, he also distinguishes within the class of naturally occurring mind-dependent beings. Thus, there are the general kinds of mind-dependent beings that pertain to all categories of being. These are logical second intentions, for notions like "genus," "antecedent," and so forth are not limited to any one of the ten categories. However, there are also particular kinds of mind-dependent beings that are predicated of this or that entity only because it is known by a discursive intellect. Thus, it is only because of the way that humans

\textsuperscript{105} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.570-572).

\textsuperscript{106} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.3 (p.582:6-16).
know mathematical realities that a given point is called at one and the same time the start of a segment or the end of a segment. Likewise, it is only according to human conceptualization that there is a distinction between justice and knowledge in God, in whom there are, in fact, no distinctions whatsoever.107

Continuing on an explicitly declared path, he then makes explicit a point that he is taking as a supposition:

Namely, that logic has for its consideration mind-dependent being (that is, those [notions] that follow upon things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect), insofar as consideration of them is valuable for having a manner of proceeding in other sciences. That is, namely, insofar as in other sciences one proceeds first by defining simple terms, the definition of which are constituted from genus and specific difference and, likewise, as one proceeds from common things to specific ones, from things that are more known to those that are more knowable in themselves, and so forth in other ways of proceeding [in the sciences].108

He argues for this supposition only briefly, in part basing himself upon the accepted dicta concerning logic as providing scientific knowledge concerning the order that constituted naturally by the human intellect. While his remarks are not earth-shattering, he does make an argument that helps to place him the broader historical arch that is being proposed in this dissertation. In the first chapter, the inchoate state of the question in the 13th century was discussed. In particular, the upshot was to note not only the transition from the view of logic as a *scientia sermocinalis* to a *scientia rationalis* but also the evidence of a change in perspective, a change well summarized in the contrast between the kind of "hyper-realist" view expressed by Kilwardby in his notion of *rationes entium* and Aquinas's discussion of *ens rationis*, especially as

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108 Ibid., p.582:25-31: "[Praemitto quoddam suppositum,] scilicet, quod logica considerat de ente ratione, scilicet, de his quae consequuntur res ut sunt obiective in intellectu inquantum consideratio eorum valet ad habendum modum procedendi in alii scientiis inquantum, scilicet, in alii scientiis proceditur primo definiendo simplicia, quae definitio constituitur ex generi et differentia, et proceditur etiam a communibus ad specialia, et a notis nobis ad illa quae in se sunt nota, et sic de aliiis modis procedendi."
found in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics.\(^{109}\) In addition to this point of change, a theme in Aquinas was noted in passing, namely about how various sciences consider different kinds of order. In particular, it was noted that logic considers the order created by the mind in its ratiocination, i.e. the order among things that are known.\(^{110}\)

However, in the course of the first chapter's discussion, it was also evident that there was not complete clarity in the terminology employed by Aquinas. Without denying the role of notions like intentional existence in his overall opinion regarding human cognition, it was noted that he did not undertake a concentrated discussion of distinctions involved in the notion of being "in the intellect", especially in his discussions of matters pertaining to logic. For this reason, Scotus's thought was considered at length in the second chapter, for his treatment of \emph{esse objectivum}, mind-dependent relations, and second intentions help to provide not only the general notional context for Hervaeus's treatise but also many of the elements of Hervaeus's own vocabulary.

This overall trajectory is recalled because Hervaeus's remarks in q.5 a.3 connect aspects of Aquinas's insight about various kinds of order with the technical vocabulary of \emph{esse objectivum} that likely is of Scotistic provenance. Defending the supposition that logic treats of the way of proceeding used in other sciences, Hervaeus states:

> The common manners of proceeding in science are taken according to the order of superior to inferior, and that of genus to difference and species, and vice-versa. They are also taken from the order of that which is first known to that which is later known, as well as in similar kinds of order. However, this sort of order does not follow upon the external thing according to its mind-independent being, wholly leaving the intellect out of consideration. Nay rather, this order follows the thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect. Indeed, the aforementioned order, namely that of a genus to a species (or vice-versa), is not a mind-independent order. Therefore, the common manners of proceeding

\(^{109}\) Though, it should be noted that the theme of \emph{ens diminutum} is found even in Kilwardby, and this fact diminishes the propriety of overstating such "hyper-realism." On this point, see 163 in the first chapter.

\(^{110}\) See notes 268-272 in the first chapter.
in the sciences is taken from these things that follow upon things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect.\footnote{DSIDoyle, q.5 a.3 (p.583:12-20): "Quia modi communes procedendi in scientia sumuntur secundum ordinem superioris ad inferius, et secundum ordinem generis ad differentiam et speciem, et e converso. Et secundum ordinem prius noti ad posterius notum, et sic de consimilibus. Sed praedictus ordo non consequitur rem extra secundum suum esse reale, circumscripto intellectu. Immo consequitur rem prout est obiective in intellectu. Ordo enim praedictus, scilicet, generis ad speciem, vel e converso, non est ordo realis. Ergo modi communes procedendi in scientiis sumuntur ex his quae consequuntur res prout sunt obiective in intellectu."}

Logic is concerned with understanding the nature of “rational order”—the order naturally created by the human intellect in the form of second intentional mind-dependent relations.

Having posited these initial distinctions and his supposition regarding logic, Hervaeus states four conclusions in the body of his article. The first is unsurprising based upon the discussion undertaken in q.5 a.2, as well as the opening of q.5 a.3. Logic does not investigate mind-dependent beings of reason that pertain to the concerns of the grammarian. This point has been both implied and openly stated throughout much of the discussion considered in this section. To this point, Hervaeus merely adds two brief arguments on behalf of his contention.

The first argument deals with the fact that things that follow upon human institution (such as "to be a proper name") depend upon the human will. However, as regards the way that things are naturally apt to move the intellect, Hervaeus argues that the will is not involved, for whether or not someone is willing to know a given thing, that thing remains naturally apt to move the human intellect. Insofar as things are naturally apt to become part of the human activity of defining, enunciating, and reasoning, they do not intrinsically depend upon the will for that very aptitude for moving the human intellect. Granted, the knower must will to know. However, the denomination of some verbal or written sign as "verb" or "appellative noun" implies some sort of willing (whether customary or explicit). The denomination of a notion like "tree" as a "consequent," only indicates a mind-dependent relation formed by the discursive act of the mind,
whatever might have been the volitional desire of the knower in question.\footnote{112}

Hervaeus's second argument is quite bolder. There, he remarks that the investigation undertaken by the sciences does not require the use of words or significative (i.e. conventional) signs. Thus, logic, which considers the nature of rational investigation, does not require treatment of matters pertaining to conventional mind-dependent beings. He does not defend this claim at great length, but it should be noted that this position places him in strong opposition to any kind of sermocinalism that would blur the distinctions between external discourse and mental discourse. His position regarding the role of conventional imposition in the constituting of grammatical mind-dependent relations creates a high wall between those kinds of mind-dependent being and the mind-dependent relations that are naturally apt to be formed by things insofar as they are objects of one of the intellect's acts. The latter relations remain, \textit{nulla voce existente}.\footnote{113}

The second and third conclusions proffered by Hervaeus are little more than a reiteration

\footnote{112} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.3 (p.584:16-30).
\footnote{113} See ibid., p.585:1-6. I am taking the Latin phrase from a similar sort of remark made by Scotus. See note 96 in chapter two above.

It should be recalled, however, that the "wall" is not quite so permeable as it might appear at first glance. As noted in the discussions above regarding remarks in q.5 a.2, Hervaeus does note that notions like appellation presuppose logical relations. Hence, the grammarian can consider these logical matters insofar as they are needed for his or her particular purposes, though not in detail. One wonders, however, how Hervaeus, whose project retains such a robust commitment to the Stagirite's metaphysical dicta, can make a claim like this about the investigations undertaken by the sciences. Indeed, the \textit{via inventionis} most definitely involves the kind of dialectical investigations presented in the \textit{Topics}, part of which includes an investigation of obscurities found in the definitions that are generally accepted. cf. \textit{Top. VI}, 139a24ff.

Thus, grammatical concerns would enter logic in a way similar to how logical ones enter into grammar. However, whereas notions like the grammatical attribution of appellation presupposes the logical relation of universality, the logician's discussion of the \textit{via inventionis} presupposes the grammatical relations as given facts that are more known to us than are the ultimate conclusions that are being investigated. Technically, the grammatical concerns are like a ladder to be kicked away and indeed could differ, depending on just what is more known to the one who is investigating. Still, to the degree that some discussion of grammatical notions enters into dialectical logic, one has a kind of secondary consideration of such notions that are found in things \textit{ex institutione ad placitum institutentis}.

While Hervaeus does not discuss any of this issue in detail, it is helpful to consider such matters, at least in passing, given the implications involved for his conception of the sciences.
of points made in the preceding question. The second conclusion pertains to those kinds of mind-dependent notions that do not span all of the categories (e.g. the idea of a given point being either the beginning or the end of line segment or the mind-dependent distinction of God's justice from His knowledge, His essence, and so forth). Since these kinds of notions do not pertain to the manner of rationally proceeding in the various sciences, they are another kind of mind-dependent being not falling to the investigation of the logician. \(^{114}\)

The fourth conclusion merely states directly what it is that the logician does indeed study. Hervaeus's own words function well as a summary of these points, though the reader must pay close attention to his closing words, lest it be forgotten that there are many other things to be considered in the domain of second intentions than merely the five predicables of Porphyry:

It is easily manifest that logic considers in a general manner all of those mind-dependent beings that follow \([1]\) upon all beings in general, at least that follow upon created beings, such as genus, species, and other such things or \([2]\) upon numerous classes of being such as accident and property. This is so because logic has consideration of all of those mind-dependent beings whose knowledge (or, consideration) is useful for having the common manner of proceeding in any of the other sciences. However, all mind-dependent beings which follow in common upon all beings (such as genus, species, differentia, and similar notions) or upon numerous classes of being (such as accident and property) are things of this kind. Therefore, [logic has consideration of such matters.] For by means of such things [lit. secundum talia] is the process in the sciences ordered from the common to the particular, from the subject to its properties and accidents, and so forth concerning others [i.e. other second intentions and the order following from them]. \(^{115}\)

Thus, logic is a science of mind-dependent being. More specifically, it is a science of second intentions, limiting that term to the particular domain of those types of mind-dependent

\(^{114}\) See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.3 (p.585:7-18).

\(^{115}\) Ibid., q.5 a.3 (p.585): "Logica considerat generaliter omnia entia rationis quae consequuntur generaliter omnia entia, saltem ens creatum, sicut sunt genus, species, et consimilia, vel plura genera entium, sicut sunt accidentis, proprium, patet de facili. Quia logica habet considerare omnia illa entia rationis quorum cognitio vel consideratio valet ad habendum modum communem procedendi in quibuscunque aliis scientiis. Sed omnia entia rationis quae communiter consequuntur omnia entia, sicut sunt genus, species, differentia, et consimilia, vel plura generae entium, sicut sunt accidentis, proprium, sunt huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Nam secundum talia ordinatur processus in scientiis a communi ad speciale, a subiecto ad passiones, et ad accidentia, et sic de aliis."
relations that are apt to be formed by the intellect without any intervention of the will. Indeed, those mind-dependent relations are the ones that are commonly involved in the process of defining, enunciating, and reasoning—not the other particular kinds of mind-dependent relations and privations involved in particular sciences (e.g. in the geometer’s comparison of one point to another or the theologian's distinctions among the various Divine Attributes).

Hervaeus seems to be most concerned about the reduction of notions in the science of logic back to the status of being entia rationis. Hence, his greatest concern is to show that everything is reduced back to the mind-dependent beings that follow upon things insofar as they are naturally apt to be involved in any of the three operations of the intellect. Recall that Duns Scotus, at least early in his career, concluded that the syllogism itself was the subject of logic, with other topics (i.e. categories, enunciations, etc.) having reference to that. He did allow that there could be treatments of the syllogism (i.e. as sophistical, dialectical, and demonstrative) subordinate to a study of the syllogism in general just as there are subordinate divisions of natural philosophy in addition to the topics studied in the Physics. However, one could only say that logic is “about” second intentions in the way that one says that all the sciences of mind-independent being are “about” being. That is, the being proper to second intentions is the “logico-metaphysical domain” proper to the logical sciences.

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116 Or, I would add, of the appetitive powers more generally, for the intellect carries out its converse with the world not only with the will but also with that vast domain of “estimations” that are made by the animal intelligence as well as the ways that rationality is led along by virtuous inclinations that rectify the sensitive appetite in the pursuit of the moral good. An impressive discussion of this, basing itself on Aquinas’s texts, can be found in Daniel D. De Haan, "Moral Perception and the Function of the Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas's Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 25 (2014): 289-330.

This is also a constant theme stressed by John Deely, though most often in the context of conversations that took place in Iberian Baroque Scholasticism, namely over how it can be said that non-intellectual beings form entia rationis, at least in a material manner of speaking even if they cannot directly conceive these relations as can human persons. See Deely, Four Ages of Understanding, 351. Indeed, see also my remarks in note 53 in the introduction of this dissertation, where I qualify my choice of the expression "mind-dependent being.”

It should also be added that one could consider all mind-dependent being to be "second intentional” in the sense that it is secondary to direct apprehension of reality. However, this is not the use that one finds in Hervaeus.
For Hervaeus, the syllogism is not the subject of logic. Instead, he explicitly rejects this option in q.5 a.2 ad 2. Apparently he holds that logic has mind-dependent being in general (in the sense of “second intention” as discussed above) as its subject. Insofar as reasoning is completed in discursive cognition, he believes that logic is about the syllogism more than the other kinds of second intentions. Nevertheless, he does not seem to want to allow for a strict breakdown of the sciences of logic into separate domains:

It must be said that I do not think that the first and essential subject of logic is the syllogism but is being of reason in general—whether it is objectively in simple understanding, or in absolutely complex, enunciative understanding, or in discursive understanding. And this point is made sufficiently obvious by running through all of the books of logic. However, logic is said to be more about the syllogism than about the others because the process of understanding is terminated and completed in discursive cognition—as much from the perspective of the act of the intellect as from the perspective of mind-dependent being that follows the known thing inasmuch as it is objectively in the intellect.

In the sciences of mind-independent being, this kind of universalizing tendency, eliminating distinct subordinate sciences, is rejected by Hervaeus in the De secundis intentionibus when he discusses various mind-independent sciences. As discussed above, he remarks that a given objection would ultimately entail that metaphysics would be the only science. He rejects this as out of hand—a position that he says nobody takes. In the same place, in a discussion concerning the natural sciences, he appears to be supportive (though without final

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117 One will find a similar position in later Baroque thinkers like Poinsot. The details of this school’s thought are well summarized in Woodbury, Logic, 4: “Hence, logic can be defined essentially (a) either from its adequate formal object [as being] the speculative science of mental being [ens rationis] of second intention; or (b) from its object of attribution [as being] the speculative science of reasoning (note that the object of attribution of a science is that whereunto everything which is treated in a given science is attributed or ordered; as for example, moveable body in natural philosophy, and substance in metaphysics; or (c) from its principle object [as being] the speculative science of demonstration (note that the principal object of a science is that which is more principally and principally [sic] intended by a given science, so that everything which is treated in that science is treated intentionally on account of it, [e.g.] Pure Act in metaphysics.”

118 See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 2 (p.577:5-12): “Dicendum quod, non puto primum et per se subiectum logicae sit syllogismus, sed ens rationis generaliter, prout est obiective in intellectu simplici, vel in intellectu complexo absolute enuntiativo, sive in intellectu discursivo. Et hoc satis patet discurrendo per omnes libros logicae. Dicitur tamen terminatur et completur process intellectus, tam ex parte actus intellectus, quam ex parte entis rationis consequentis rem intellectam prout est obiective in intellectu.”
determination) regarding a position that he takes from an unnamed contemporary, namely that there are many particular natural sciences subordinate to natural philosophy, each having unique subjects of which are predicated accidents pertaining only to that common subject—as though there were a science of what is proper to man qua man and horse qua horse. The general principle that he follows in this section is that the formal subject of the sciences in question dominate the concerns of each unique science. Thus, given the various formal characters of their subjects, the sciences of mind-independent being—and indeed, within one subordinate class of sciences, namely those pertaining to natural, material entities—exhibit a great deal of variety, leading to many unique subjects of inquiry.\(^{119}\)

Why is the case of logic unique? That is, why is its first and essential subject “second intention,” leaving no room for subordinate logical sciences? Hervaeus was explicitly aware of this difference in the case of logic, which takes into its domain second intentions \textit{in general as well as in particular}. In q.5 a.2 ad 8, he responds to an objection that asserts that just as there are various sciences of mind-independent being, so too must there be various sciences of mind-dependent being. In his reply, Hervaeus denies that the two cases are the same.

He says that general character of mind-independent being isn’t taken in relation to a particular being. Presumably, he is asserting that there is not a strict univocal reference point for the notion of “being” as applicable to the ten categories, even if there is an order of priority and posteriority among these senses, giving priority to substance. Thus, the discussion of “being in general” undertaken in metaphysics leaves room for unique subjects in sciences that are subalternate to it. In contrast to this, all mind-independent being all has reference to a particular kind of being, namely to the human intellect (at least insofar as the thing is referred to the

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\(^{119}\) As discussed above, this is covered at some length in ibid., q.5 a.1 (p.530:27-534:4). In the midst of these discussions, the clear parallel for him is the case of the mathematical sciences, which can discuss the quantified qua quantity, abstracting from quantity’s role as the first accident of real substances.
intellect as something *objectively* in the intellect to which it is referred\textsuperscript{120}. Thus, since this reference colors all of them, they have the same formal character—unlike the different formal characters found between, for example, *mobile being* and *being in general*. Thus, the study of simple definitions, enunciations, and the syllogism in general (as well as of various kinds of syllogisms) all have the same overall character, namely to be united by their relation to the human intellect in all of its various acts.

I must admit that this interpretation does extrapolate on Hervaeus’s brief and difficult text. However, it does seem to agree with a remark that he makes in passing much earlier in the treatise in q.2 a.5 ad 4, namely, “The formal feature [lit. *formalis ratio*] of his [i.e. the logician’s] object is perhaps this very [mind-dependent] relation [of the thing to the knower].”\textsuperscript{121} He then goes on to mention how other second intentions “imply” (lit. *important*) this same relation—a point discussed in the last chapter about the way that all “higher” second intentions all presuppose the very first relation of intentionality. In any case, it is best to consult directly Hervaeus’s own explicit words in q.5 a.2 ad 8 in which he thus contrasts the significant diversity of sciences of mind-independent being with the unity of logical science:

In response, it must be said that the point is obvious from the main solution. For mind-dependent being, although it is found to pertain to every category of being—and in this manner denominatively just as “to be understood” pertains to all of them—nevertheless, mind-dependent being thus denominatively common has its [own] formal notion [lit. *rationem formalem*] in an order to a determinate class of being—namely in an order to the intellect.\textsuperscript{122} However, the [formal] notion of mind-independent being is not taken from an order to a determinate class of being and therefore other than the science concerned with [mind-independent] being in general, there are other sciences that treat concerning various classes of beings. And, therefore, the case is not the same as regards mind-independent and mind-dependent being, the latter of which takes its formal

\textsuperscript{120} And, hence, *not* denominated vis-à-vis the subjective quality itself. That would be a denomination that remains on the level of real relations (e.g. of similitude, clarity of representation, obscurity of representation, etc). See the texts and remarks associated with notes 92-98.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., q.2 a.5 ad 2 (p.407:30): “[Immo,] forte, formalis ratio sui obiecti est ipsa habitudo.

\textsuperscript{122} See the remarks in footnote 120 above.
character from an order to a determined class of being.\textsuperscript{123}

Thus, as regards the domain of logic, Hervaeus allows only for a unified discipline, having “second intention” as its subject, and referring everything to that ultimately.\textsuperscript{124} However, as the fourth conclusion of q.5 a.3 states, it is possible that another science can take into account matters pertaining to second intentions. By stating this, Hervaeus does not mean to point merely to the way that a grammarian may use logical notions to explain the nature of appellative nouns. Instead, he is transitioning to the final topic covered in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}, namely how it is that metaphysics undertakes a discussion of the second intentions that the logician considers from the perspective of the common process followed in the various sciences.\textsuperscript{125} In metaphysics, there will be another, unique formal viewpoint from which second intentions (and indeed, all mind-dependent being) is viewed. It is to this final topic that we will now turn.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{123}] See ibid., q.5 a.2 ad 8 (p.580:10-18): “Dicendum potest patere ex principali solitione. Nam ens rationis, licet inveniatur convenire omnibus generibus entium, et hoc denominative sicut esse intellectum omnibus eis convenit, tamen ens rationis sic commune denominative habet suam rationem formalem in ordine ad determinatum genus entis, scilicet in ordine ad intellectum. Ratio autem entis realis non sumitur sic in ordine ad determinatum genus entium, et ideo praepter scientiam de ente quae est in communi sunt aliae scientiae tractantes de diversis generibus entium. Et ideo non est simile quantum ad hoc de ente reali et de ente rationis cius ration non sumitur in ordine ad determinatum genus entis.”
\item[\textsuperscript{124}] Hence, \textit{second intention} is considered in whatever form it might take—as formed by the first, second, or third act of the intellect. Because of this general reference to being objectively in the intellect, it is still about one subject, namely \textit{second intention}. All types of second intentions have one thing in common—the mind-dependent relation of \textit{intentionality}—thus they are all studied in a single science. According to Hervaeus, the science remains unified in being concerned with this one point: “What does it mean for something to be a second intention?”
\item[\textsuperscript{125}] See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.3 (p.586:1-7).
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4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental?

The final question that must be asked is, “Can another science take up the investigation of second intentions?” In questions prior to this, Hervaeus makes room for this possibility.\(^{126}\) It is not surprising that he does permit the possibility of a "metaphysical consideration" of second intentions. While unsurprising, it is important that we understand his reasoning on this matter if we are to understand exactly what Hervaeus is doing in the *De secundis intentionibus*—that is, to understand the science to which the treatise’s questions belong. As was remarked in the beginning of the third chapter, Hervaeus is said to be a difficult writer. However, like a number of other questions in the treatise, q.5 a.4 is very clearly laid out by the author. While his style is a bit terse at times, the overall plan of the article is articulated with clarity from the very start of his proper response.\(^{127}\)

He opens by making the primary distinction that rules the remainder of the discussion in this article. There are two considerations that one can have for mind-dependent beings. On the one hand, there is a consideration of mind-dependent beings in their relation to mind-independent being:

One such consideration is taken in relation to mind-independent being. Such a consideration occurs, for example, if one considers whether such beings have, formally speaking, mind-independent being [lit. *entitatem realem*]. Likewise, it occurs if one considers whether in mind-independent being there is a genus that is really separate from its species and a species from its individuals. Likewise again, such a consideration occurs if one considers in what manner such mind-dependent beings are founded in mind-independent being—namely, whether they may be founded from the nature of the thing itself with every act of the intellect left out of consideration or whether they are

\(^{126}\) See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.546:1-10): “Et est sensus quod scientia quae considerat de prima et secunda intentione, id est de ente reali quod est primum genus intelligibilium, et de ente rationis quod est secundum genus intelligibilium, quod illa scientia non haberet pro primo et per se objecto [sic] secundam intentionem sive ens rationis, quod prius est consideratio entis realis quam consideratio entis rationis, sive pertineant ad eamdem scientiam sive ad diversas. Undi si eadem scietia esset de utroque, illa scientia non haberet pro se et primo subiecto ens rationis. Utrum autem eadem scientia tractet de utraque patebit ex sequentibus.” See also the text of q.5 a.2 ad 4 cited below in note 154.

\(^{127}\) See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.4 (p.588:24-27).
founded by the mediation of an act of the intellect. Likewise, such a consideration occurs when anything is investigated concerning second intentions in relation to mind-independent being.\footnote{DSIDoyle, q.5 a.4 (p.589:4-9): “Est una in habitudine ad ens reale, si consideretur utrum talia habeant formaliter entitatem realem; et utrum in entitate reali sit genus realiter separatum a speciebus et species ab individuis; et quomodo etiam talia fundantur in ente reali, utrum scilicet, fundentur ex natura rei, circumscripto actu intellectus, vel hoc fiat mediante actu intellectus; et quicquid investigari de his potest in habitudine ad esse reale.”}

As Hervaeus describes this kind of consideration, the reader rightly should perceive a description of what the Dominican philosopher has been doing in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}. This first manner of speaking could be called the "metaphysical consideration" of second intentions. However, one may consider mind-dependent beings with respect to their own properties. It is this kind of directed attention that pertains to the logic as a science:

There can be another consideration concerning mind-dependent being according to that which pertains to them inasmuch as they are taken as something constituted in mind-dependent being and according to those things which pertain to them in themselves [lit. \textit{secundum se}]. For example, it pertains to a genus to be predicated essentially [i.e. \textit{in quid}] and of several things that differ in species whereas it pertains to a difference to be predicated as a substantial qualification [lit. \textit{in quale substantiale}]. Other examples could be proffered in like manner.\footnote{DSIDoyle, q.5 a.4 (p.589:10-14): “Alia potest esse consideratio de ipsis quantum ad hoc quod convenit eis secundum quod accipiuntur ut constituta in esse rationis, et quantum ad ea quae conveniunt eis secundum se: sicut generi convenit praedicari in quale substantiale, et sic de aliis.”}

The nature of the first and essential subject of a science, as well as the principles that subject, "color" all of its investigations. Thus, when one gives metaphysical consideration to second intentions, the properly "metaphysical way" of seeing things will lead one to note things like, “Only one second intention is founded on reality,” and, “Second intentions presuppose the reality of a relation formed by the intellect to the thing that it knows, though it does not presuppose anything else (such as the role of the will designating a relation \textit{ad placitum}).” In these cases, the metaphysician does \textit{not} focus on the intrinsic intelligibility of second intentions—e.g. the “nature” of a logical genus or of a syllogism. Instead, he or she only pays attention to its relation to mind-independent reality.
To understand this point, it is helpful to consider a similar case. For example, one may consider an “intermediate” or “subalternate” sciences such as mathematical physics. When mobile, changing reality is investigated qua quantified, the concepts involved in such a science will take on the peculiar combined character of both the mathematical and the physical. For instance, one can consider the gravitational motion involved in an idealized mathematical body. The three-dimensional surface (a quantitative reality) is considered as moving body (a physical notion). The thing under consideration is “in-between” two ways of looking at reality. It is not a purely quantitative reality (i.e. the surface), for it is involved in efficient and final causality vis-à-vis gravitation. However, it is not a purely physical notion (i.e. a substantial body susceptible to motion), for such entities are not merely quantitative but instead have qualities and other accidents accrue to them in addition to their quantitative dimensions. They are also involved in act-potency relationships of efficient causality not found in the realm of mathematical notions. Thus, the mathematical physicist considers the measurable, moving body by focusing his gaze only on measurable and quantitative aspects of a changing body. This creates a unique viewpoint that is neither purely “physical” nor purely “mathematical.” Thus, while the

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130 This is not meant, however, to foist on to Hervaeus a full theory of subalternation. However, he clearly holds to the Aristotelian line expressed in passages like *Metaphysics* 3.2, 996a29-32, namely that purely mathematical sciences do not make demonstrations regarding efficient and final causality. See DSI Doyle, q.5 a.1, p.256n462. See ibid., p.529:22-24: “Et hoc quia talis causa insufficienter cognoscitur, vel quia est insufficiens causa, vel quia illa quae considerantur non important habitudinem ad aliquam finalem causam, sicut est in mathematicis.”

At length in q.5 a.1, Hervaeus discusses how one studies mathematical matters, given that quantity is a property of substance, having certain other properties following from it and wholly explainable merely insofar as it is quantified. One could say that mathematics, according to this view, is a study of the *quantified qua quantified*. Hervaeus summarizes his viewpoint in q.5 a.1 ad 5 (p.547:5-11): “Supplendo tamen istam solutionem per ea quae dicta sunt in principali solutione quaestionis, quoniam, scilicet, passio non reducitur necessario in subjectum quantum ad hoc quod posit de ea distincta scientia haberi in habitudine ad alias passiones consequentes ipsam, absque hoc, quod processus scientiae reducitur ultra illam passionem in subjectum eius. Et hoc convenit quando sine reductione ad primum subjectum una passio per se est nota de alia priori passione.

Et hoc maxime habet veritatem quando dependentia ad primum subjectum non est sufficiens ration notificandi alia consequentia passionem immediate consequentem primum subjectum, sicut patet de mathematica, quae tracta eam quae consequitur quantum, in eo quod quantum, non ut respicit ad aliquod subiectum prius quanto.”
mathematical physicist can indeed use notions like “cause” or even “essence,” his or her use of these terms will be uniquely colored by his or her determined focus on the measurability of phenomena.¹³¹

Given that all of the conclusions in a given science depend upon the subject and principles to which they are ultimately related, every conclusion will be colored by these initial insights into reality. Thus, if someone begins talking about motion in the sense of quantifiably measurable movement, every conclusion regarding motion will be colored by the this kind of mathematization. If, instead, one speaks of motion in terms of matter, form, and privation (i.e. as involved in potency and act), as Aristotle does in the Physics, scientific demonstration regarding the relation of motion (i.e. a property) to a mobile being (i.e. the subject of the science) will be colored by the act-potency character of the principles of the science of Aristotelian Physics.¹³²

¹³¹ Although dated, Maritain’s observations on this point remain quite informative. The connection of this point with regard to Hervaeus will become obvious in the discussions that are shortly forthcoming. See Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, 159.

¹³² See Vincent Edward Smith, The General Science of Nature (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1958), 255-273. In the De secundis intentionibus, Hervaeus clearly holds this sort of view of the Physics, as can be discerned in a passage in which he notes that the property (i.e. motion) is known before the subject of the science (i.e. mobile substance or mobile body) inasmuch as the latter is a more abstract concept. However, for scientific knowledge, the former will need to be related to the latter by means of the principles of natural philosophy, namely matter (as a kind of potency), form (as a kind of act), and privation. As will be seen in what follows in this section, Hervaeus also holds that the character of the the first principles of a science color the rest of that science’s considerations.

On the role of act and potency in the definition of motion, see the lucide remarks of Yves Simon in “The Philosophy of Change,” in The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space, 59-60: “Aristotle defines motion as the act of a thing in potency, considered as such, that is, considered as in potency. But what does he mean? We have here a quite interesting epistemological problem. He is defining the most basic of all physical realities. For Aristotle at least, there is nothing closer to the core of physics than motion. Yet he is defining it in unmistakably metaphysical terms! Note how he uses exclusively terms of an obviously metaphysical character: thing, act, potency, and when he says, ‘as such,’ what he is using is the concept of identity. So we can say that he defines movement or motion, the physical reality par excellence, not in physical terms but in metaphysical ones.” See also the commentary on this theme in Kosman, The Activity of Being, 37-68.

See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.521:24-34, 522:8-18): “Exemplo sic: quia ponendo, ut communitur ponitur, subiectum naturalis philosophiae substantiam mobile, vel etiam corpus mobile prout corpus stat pro substantia, certum est quod in philosophia naturali illud quod ponitur primum et per se subiectum non est illud quod primo occurrat in philosophia naturali. Immo motus qui ibi consideratur ut passio prius occurrat intellectui nostro quam illud cuius est passio propter quod cognitio nostra incipit as sensu. Motus autem magis cadit sub sensu quam illud cuius est passio. Sed verum est quod ratio formalis subiecti motus prius est nota quam ciatur causa quare motus inest
In *De secundis intentionibus* q.5 a.1, Hervaeus describes this reliance of the contents of a science on the nature of its subject and its principles. He does so in the midst of his long defense of the possibility of second intentions being the first and essential subject of some science. He remarks:

In the process of resolution, it is necessary that the process comes to a stop at that to which all other things [in the science] are reduced and have a reference, such that none of them must be considered except insofar as they have some reference to that [i.e. that to which they are reduced]. This is so because in the process of resolution one always stops at that first thing to which all others are reduced.\(^{133}\)

To explain the way that principles “color” the investigations of a science, Hervaeus takes an example from natural philosophy, namely the proof made for the existence of God. In the case of such a perfect Cause, the human knower only comes to know the cause by means of its effects. This point quite familiar for one accustomed to medieval philosophical proofs for the existence of God. However, Hervaeus is relatively\(^{134}\) unique in focusing his attention to the fact

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\(^{133}\) See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.524:25-28): “Nam in resolvendo oportet processum stare ad illud ad quod omnia habent reduci et habent attributionem, sic quod nihil eorum habet considerari nisi in quantum habent attributionem ad illud. Quia in resolvendo semper stat ad primum ilud ad quod alia reducuntur.”

\(^{134}\) He is only “relatively” unique, for a similar position can be found in Aquinas in passing when he makes a similar observation what is to be outlined here from Hervaeus. See Aquinas, *De Trinitate*, q.5, a.2 ad 3 (Leon. 50.144:141-150): “Terminus autem non est de natura rei, cuius est terminus, sed habet aliquam habitudinem ad rem illam, sicut terminus linee non est linea, sed habet ad eam aliquam habitudinem, ita etiam et primus motor est alterius nature a rebus naturalibus, habet tamen ad eas aliquam habitudinem, in quantum influit eis motum, et sic cadit in consideratione naturalis, scilicet non secundum ipsum, sed in quantum est motor.”

The fifteenth century Dominican Dominic of Flanders takes a similar view, noting that natural philosophy proves the existence of God as cause of motion, while metaphysics proves His existence as cause of being. Indeed, he explicitly states his view as being part of a longer conversation in agreement with Avicenna. These two thinkers are cited merely as anecdotal indications that Hervaeus is part of a larger tradition on this particular point. See Phillip-Neri Reese, “Dominic of Flanders, O.P. (d. 1479) on the Nature of the Science of Metaphysics” (PhL Thesis, The Catholic University of America, 2015), 22-23n40.
that the knowledge reached by such a proof is intimately connected to the way that one understands the particular effect used as the starting point for the proof. The proof of the existence of God as First, Unmoved Mover is not reached by a series of blank and abstract syllogisms that link together in a manner absolutely equivalent to any other proof (such as proofs of God as the cause of being, as might be executed in metaphysics). Instead, the whole character of a conclusion in a science is intimately linked to the principles from which it is derived.

Whatever is first known as the starting point is conceptualized in a given way—e.g. a being understood as a mobile being (and not, for example, a quantified, mobile being or, simply speaking, being). Thus, the First Cause will not be known in Its unique interior life (i.e. as it is in Itself). It will only be known by focusing on one pathway that leads to it—namely the path starting from mobile being and its principles, leading to Its existence as a conclusion proven by discursive reasoning. In order to understand Hervaeus on this point, one must not think that all scientific, syllogistic reasoning is equal. The way that one abstractly conceptualizes the subject and principles of the science is key for everything that will be understood in reference to those

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135 And, other Medieval figures, though this dissertation cannot treat the various dicta of thinkers regarding this point.

136 This is why Hervaeus states that while the unity of the science must be taken from the thing known, it is not taken from that thing simply as it is in itself. Instead, the principles and subject of the science derive their character in relation to the intellect of the knower—that is, things able to be objectified in various ways by the knower. Thus, a knower can understand one thing such as a moving body in several ways: as a being (i.e. metaphysically), as a moving substance (i.e. according to natural philosophy), as a measurable, moving substance (i.e. according to mathematical physics).

See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.525:9-17): “Oportet etiam quod praedicta connexio et reductio acipiatur ex natura rerum non absolute sed in habitudine ad intellectum, prout, scilicet, intellectus abtus natus est duci in cognitionem ipsarum rerum, ita, scilicet, quod secundum aptitudinem naturalem quam res habent ad reducendum intellectum in earum cognitionem, accipatur reductio et connexio unius illarum rerum ad aliam in sua cognoscibilitate. Quia connexionem aliquorum in sua cognoscibilitate oportet accipere in habitudine ad potentiam cognitivam a qua dicuntur cognosci. Sed hic loquimur de connexione rerum in sua cognoscibilitate quae sunt cognoscibilies et scibles ab intellectu.”

Doyle understandably cites Poinsot on a small point in this text. Indeed, Poinsot discusses matters related to this topic at length in Ioannis a Sancto Thoma, Ars Logica, p.2, q.27, a.1 (p.818:40A-830:30A). Likewise, in ibid., a.2 (p.830:35A-839:10B), he discusses how a science is unified as a single habitus. However, the contents of
principles and subject, to which all conclusions in the science are reduced. The subject and principles of a given science are like a light that illuminates everything that is contained in the various discourses of that science.

In presenting his example Hervaeus notes that for scientific knowledge, it is not always necessary to proceed from causes to their effects. However, with regard to the use of effects as a starting point in scientific discourse, he presents a distinction. Sometimes, it is the case that the cause is only a partial and imperfect cause of the effect in question. Hervaeus uses the example of medicine. Since the production of human health is the sole end of medicine, one must know the cause (i.e. the art of medicine) in terms of the effect (i.e. human healthiness).^^137^^

However, there are other cases in which the cause is perfect but cannot be perfectly known. This is the case with regard to knowledge of God that is derived from knowledge of a created effect, namely motion. The fact that God is thus known within the science of natural philosophy colors the focus that the natural philosopher has of Him. He is only understood qua cause of motion:

However, if there is a perfect cause—though, one that is not perfectly perfectly known—then, the effect leads one to cognition of the cause. However, it does so not in an unqualified manner—that is, according to that which it [i.e. the cause] is [i.e. in itself]—but instead it leads to cognition of the cause inasmuch as it is this terminus (i.e. to be the cause of such an effect). This is just as when from motion we come to know the First Mover—not by knowing in an unqualified manner Its nature in particular and in itself but, instead, by knowing that the Mover exists and those things that are required in order that it be a Mover. And then, the process stops at the formal notion of the effect.

Whence, considering the nature of motion, one arrives from that motion to knowledge of the Mover (namely, that the Mover exists) while [at the same time] not knowing Its

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^^137^^ See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.527:18-23): “Immo e converso, quandoque ita est quod effectus notior sit ratio cognoscendi causam, vel simpliciter, vel saltem quantum ad hoc quod est esse causam eius. Nam si sit causa imperfecta, sicut medicina est causa sanitatis, tunc effectus notus est ratio cognoscendi causam simpliciter, quia talis effectus est simpliciter causa finalis causae efficientis. Et propter hoc talis causa habet magis in suum effectum, vel cognosci per suum effectum, quam e converso.”
nature in particular except that such causality pertains to it. Whence also such a process comes to a halt in knowing the formal notion of motion. But if one were to know perfectly the nature of the Cause in itself such that by means of the nature of the Cause thus known one would know perfectly motion, then the process would come to a halt at [or, with the character of] the formal notion of the Cause$^{138}$ (emphasis added).$^{139}$

After this passage, Hervaeus continues with the particular argument in the midst of which he has found himself, namely what sort of reductions are possible and whether or not second intentions can be the terminus of a reduction to principles and a first subject. This was discussed above in the first section of this chapter. For the current discussion, this text is useful for understanding the claim that metaphysics’s treatment of second intentions should not be conceived as being identical to the considerations made concerning second intentions by the logician. If one may speak of “intellectual attention,” the natural philosopher only pays attention to the Prime Mover insofar as It is the First, Unmoved Mover in a sequence of movers. The character of his or her knowledge is limited by the created effect from which a starting point has been taken. There may be other natural proofs for the existence of God, ones more metaphysical in character. Indeed, there may even be revealed truths that theologically reveal the inner life of the Trinity. However, for the natural philosopher $qua$ natural philosopher, the conceptualization always has a particular “lens”—that of mobile being and what it implies.

\footnotesize{$^{138}$ This would be as one would know the nature of natural causality by seeing it “in God” as the cause. However, quoad nos this would require revelation of God’s essence from which the created effect would be known scientifically.}

\footnotesize{$^{139}$ Ibid., p.527:24-528:16: “Si autem sit causa perfecta, non autem perfecte nota, tunc effectus ducit in cognitionem causae non simpliciter, secundum illud quod est, sed quantum ad hoc terminum quod est esse causam talis effectus. Sicut ex motu venimus in cognitionem primi motoris, non simpliciter cognoscendo eius naturam in speciali et secundum se, sed cognoscendo quia motor est et ea quae requiruntur ad hoc quod motor sit. Et tunc statur ad rationem formalem effectus.

Unde considerans de natura motus, ex motu venit in cognitionem motoris, quia motor est, ignorans naturam eius in speciali postquam convenit ei talis causalitas. Unde et processus talis stat in cognoscendo rationem formalem motus. Sed si ita perfecte cognosceret naturam causae in se ita quod per naturam causae cognitam cognoscatur perfecte motus, tunc stare tur ad rationem formalem causae.”}
The metaphysician also is concerned primarily with mind-independent being in the ten categories, using the principles of substance to provide unity for the science. Thus, when metaphysics takes up a consideration of second intentions, it is as if the metaphysician “looks” (intellectually) at the second intention with a gaze that only isolates what it is about it that links it (whether proximately or remotely) to mind-independent being. The metaphysician says, “This is not mind-independent being, though it is founded on it as mind-independent being exists aptitudinally in the intellect objectively. Indeed, it is a kind of mind-dependent relation.” He or she is not particularly interested in the details of that mind-dependent being.

However, mind-dependent beings have a kind of “density” all of their own. They have meanings and properties that deserve attention. Insofar as these relations are among things known (i.e. things insofar as they are variously related as objects and related to one another by means of the intellect’s various operations), knowledge of the properties of these relations (e.g. definitions, enunciations, and syllogisms) will be of benefit for knowing how to proceed well in other sciences. However, this is a different kind of attention from that of the metaphysician, who is only concerned with an ultimate relation to mind-dependent being. As Hervaeus states in the closing of the third main point of q.5 a.4:

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140 This kind of focused attention is one aspect of “abstraction”—not merely leaving out of consideration but also focusing on that which has thus directed the intellectual gaze of the knower. On this, see Deely, *Intentionality and Semiotics*, 81-100.

141 Though, “essence” and “property” take on new meanings here. See Scotus’s remarks cited in chapter two above in note 120. Indeed, in that text, Scotus’s remarks on the nature of *entia rationis ex institutione* should be noted in light of Herveaus’s own remarks. As regards the attenuated sense of terms like “genus” and “species” in logical matters, Hervaeus hints at this in DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.568:33-36): “Ergo logicus in determinando de tali ente rationis descendit usque ad species specialissimas, scilicet, ipsius rationis, vel usque ad ea quae se habent ad modum ipsarum. Quod dico, quia forte in entibus rationis non est proprie genus vel specie.”

Hervaeus does not here propose a robust explanation of these matters—especially just what is involved in explaining, defining, and scientifically discussing the properties pertaining to second intentions. However, this would imply also a very developed doctrine of analogy, one not elaborated in the context of the *De secundis intentionibus*, at least.
Similarly, the unity in relation to which is taken the notion [lit. \textit{ratio}] of the those things [namely, second intentions] makes for the unity of the science which considers those aforementioned mind-dependent beings. That is, this unity is with regard to those things which pertain to them according to themselves and in their mind-dependent being. This is evident with regard to logic, which, existing as one thing [i.e. one science] considers every being of reason—those that follow all or follow several genera of beings—with respect to what is proposed as following upon them taken in themselves and according to their mind-dependent being. For example, “to be predicated essentially [lit. \textit{in quid}],” “to be predicated as qualification [lit. \textit{in quale}],” “to be predicated of different things differing in species,” or “to be predicated of different things differing in number,” and so forth for other second intentions. 142

For from the fact that the notion of them [namely, second intentions] is taken as ordered to one thing—namely to the act of intellection because, that is, it follows things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect—and therefore the first foundation of this notion’s genus [i.e. the “genus”—or, better, “general category” of second intelligible] in them is taken as ordered to the intellect, and they have a certain kind of connection with whatever follows those things according to such a mind-dependent being—for example, genus with difference and species, and vice-versa, and so also with other enunciables, and so with the others [i.e. other kinds of second intentions] by reason of which connection they are reduced to one science.143

As such, the metaphysician is not interested \textit{directly} in the things that pertain to these mind-dependent beings \textit{qua mind-dependent beings}. Indeed, even when it comes to the specifics of the foundation of various second intentions, Hervaeus sees such metaphysical questions as

142 Thus, he is saying that the logician notes that “to be predicated of different things differing in number” is a \textit{property} of the second intention “species”, while “to be predicated of different things differing in species” is a \textit{property} of the second intention “genus.” His examples are brief and somewhat similar to others throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. To these would be added many others—pertaining to the many other kinds of possible second intentions.

143 DSIDoyle, q5 a.4 (p.593:4-18): “Similiter, unitas eius in ordine ad quod sumitur ratio eorum facit ad unitatem scientiae quae considerat de praedictis entibus rationis quantum ad ea quae eis competunt secundum se et in suo esse rationis, sicut patet de logica, quae una existens considerat omnia entia rationis, consequentia omnia, vel plura genera entium quantum ad praemissa quae consequuntur ea secundum se et secundum suum esse rationis, sicut praedicari in quid vel in quale, vel praedicari de differentibus specie vel numero, et sic de aliis.

Nam ex hoc quod ratio eorum sumitur in ordine ad unum, scilicet, ad actum intelligendi quia, scilicet, consequitur res prout sunt objective in intellectu, et ideo primum fundamentum sui generis in eis accipitur in ordine ad intellectum, et habent quadam connexionem cum eis quae consequuntur ipsa secundum tale esse rationis, puta genus cum differentia et specie, et e converso, et ita cum aliis enunciabilibus, et sic de aliis, ratione cuius connexionis habent reduci ad unam scientiam.”

The reader will note that I had to break up the long and winding first sentence of the first paragraph in order to help augment the intelligibility of Hervaeus’s turgid prose. This is likely an example of what vexes many of his readers—though such stylistic issues are not unique to the Domican Master’s Latin. On this same point, see similar remarks in ibid, p.591:13-23.
being driven by the exigencies of the metaphysician’s personal context of philosophical discussion. In Hervaeus’s treatise the problem of objective being and the notion of relation play an important role regarding such questions. However, Aristotle confronted (in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*) the problem of universal forms, given the dominance of Platonic arguments regarding this point:

Conceding the major [of the third initial objection], it must be said that in another manner to the minor premise one can say that metaphysics implicitly (and to a certain extent) treats in a different manner all the beings that are also treated of by logic. For instance, in VII *Metaphysics*, [Aristotle] explicitly treats of universals, saying that they do not exist separately in mind-independent being. Also, in consequence, he shows that such a separate existence does not follow according to their real being. And in a certain way, he treats implicitly of all the mind-dependent beings concerning which logic treats—namely, that they are such things that follow things, though not in their mind-independent existence. Whence, “antecedent” and “consequent” are not thus according to things’ mind-independent being—just as there is not the aforementioned separate existence—and so also for other such things [i.e. other second intentions].

However, it was more necessary to treat of universals more explicitly because the notion that they have being in a mind-independent manner more forcefully appeared to be the case and was more famous at the time of Aristotle. It can also be said that the metaphysician does not only treat of mind-dependent beings such as “antecedent” and “consequent,” but that he or she also treats of whatever mind-dependent being follows upon the thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect or in a discursive act intellection. This is so because the metaphysician treats of the truth of first principles that virtually enter into every syllogistic process. Thus, in some manner does the considerations undertaken in metaphysics extend themselves to every mind-dependent being to some degree, though it is not necessary that metaphysics explicitly treats of one mind-dependent being as much as of another.

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144 I believe that this remark does not merely point to the discussions of the principle of non-contradiction in *Metaphysics* Γ, important as those may be. Insofar as the truth of propositions depends upon grasping the terms of those propositions, it is important to pay heed to the problem of “truth” (in the sense of knowledge and ignorance) pertaining to the grasp of indivisibles. For this, one should turn to *Metaphysics* Θ.10, which Aristotle (and later readers) see as being concerned with aspects of “being as the true and the false” in relation to the primary concerns of the *Metaphysics*. Thus, the metaphysician considers (obliquely) the second intentions involved in all three acts of intellection, though Aristotle’s focus was basically on the first act (with some remarks about those involved in propositional truth as well). These two acts are presupposed for the intentions formed by discursive reasoning. Also, regarding this claim regarding Θ.10, see notes 46-51 in the first chapter of this dissertation. Also, on the question of being “virtually” present, see remarks and text cited in note 206 in the previous chapter.

145 DSIDoyles, q.5 a.4 ad 3 (594:19-595:11): “Ad tertium rationem dicendum quod, concessa maiore, aliqualiter ad minorem potest dici quod metaphysica aliquo modo tractat de omnibus entibus implicate de quibus et logica et quantum ad aliquid. Nam in VII *Metaphysicae* expresse tractat de universalibus dicens ea non esse separata in esse reali. Et per consequens, ostendi quod talis separatio non consequitur secundum suum esse reale. Et implicite quoddammodo tractat de omnibus entibus rationis de quibus tractat logica, scilicet, quod sunt talia quae
The logician’s attention is always marked by his or her own principle concern, namely that of second intentions. Thus, when a logician is considering any mind-independent category as the foundation for a second intention, he or she does so only by considering that category insofar as it exists objectively in the intellect—that is, as presupposing an antecedent act (or acts) of intellection by which the knower has a “real” relation to the known, while the known thing has only a mind-dependent relation to the knower. Thus, only the logician states, “Substance is a category,” if by “category” is meant the relation of subordination that exists as genus to species between (e.g.) substance and all inferior substantial essences or (e.g.) quantity and all inferior quantitative essences.

Hervaeus defends this distinct “logical viewpoint” in several places in the *De secundis intentionibus*. In q.5 a.2 obj. 1, it is objected that it seems logic must have mind-independent being for its first and essential subject because it treats of the categories, which have real being outside of the intellect. In response to this objection, Hervaeus writes,

consequentur res non in suo esse reali. Unde antecedentia et consequentia non est [sic] secundum suum esse realis, sicut nec illa separatio, et sic de aliis.

Tamen explicite magis oportuit tractare de universalibus, quia magis apparebat, et magis famosum erat tempore Aristotelis, quod habereant esse realer esse separatim. Posset etiam dici quod non solus metaphysicus tractat de ente rationis, quod est antecedens et consequens, sed de quocumque ente rationis consequentie rem prout est obiective in intellectu, sive in actu intelligendi discursivo. Quia tractat de veritate primorum principiorum, quae virtualiter intrant omnem processum syllogisticum. Et sic aliqquo modo consideratio metaphysicae se extendit ad omnia entia rationis quantum ad aliquid, non tamen oportet quod ita explicite tractet de uno sicut de altero.”

146 An insightful point is noted in this regard by Pini when he notes that discussion of first intentions really only makes sense when one notes that they are the foundation for second intentions. See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 40-44.

147 Hence, Hervaeus notes, if in passing, that “category” is a second intention. See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.4 (p.591:13-17): “Modo dico quod consideratio entium rationis quae consequuntur omnia vel plura entium genera, sicut est praedicamentum, genus et species, verum et falsum, et consimilia . . . pertinet ad logican.” This will also be seen in the quote to follow in the body of the dissertation.

148 See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 obj. 1 (p.553:22-31): “Primo ergo arguitor quod logica non sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subjecto. Quia illa scientia quae determinat de entibus realibus quae habent esse extra animam non habet pro primo et per se subjecto secundas intentiones. Sed logica est huius modi. Ergo etc.

Maior patet, quia eadem scientia, ut videtur, non habet tractare de ente reali et de ente rationis, et maxime illa scientia quae principaliter tractat de ente rationis et habet ipsum pro primo et per se subjecto.
To the first argument in opposition, it must be said that the major premise [that the science treating of mind-independent being as first and essential subject does not have second intentions for its first and essential subject] is true as regards the science that determines, formally speaking, of matters pertaining to mind-independent beings as its first and essential subject. However, if the minor premise is taken in this sense (namely, that logic undertakes considerations concerning mind-independent beings in this manner), then it is false. When it is said that—nay rather, because!—logic undertakes considerations pertaining to substance, quantity, etc., it must be said in response that it does not undertake such considerations concerning these things as a formal [sic] and essential subject. Instead, it undertakes such considerations inasmuch as its formal [sic] and essential subject is founded in such things—that is, inasmuch as there are found in them the notions of category, genus, species, or other such things.  

As regards the logical concerns one might have with regard to mind-independent reality, Hervaeus notes in q.5 a.2 ad 4\(^1\) how the logician’s focus is turned toward intentionality itself, in a manner akin to how the metaphysics’s concern with mind-dependent being is colored by its primary concern with how mind-dependent being is related to mind-independent being:

If there were some science that principally undertakes considerations of mind-dependent and mind-independent being, it seems that it would more principally undertake considerations pertaining to mind-independent being. In consequence of this, mind-independent being would be its first and essential subject.\(^2\) However, if some science were to undertake considerations concerning mind-independent being not principally but only in a secondary manner (namely inasmuch as mind-dependent being is founded on it [mind-independent being])\(^3\) it is not necessary that such a science be about mind-independent being as its first and essential subject. Therefore, to the minor premise [in the initial objection] it must be said that logic does not principally undertake

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\(^1\)See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 1 (p.576:26-577:3): “Ad primum ergo in oppositum, dicendum quod illa maior habet veritatem in illa scientia quae determinat de entibus realibus de primo et per se subiecto formaliter. Sed si minor accipiatur in illo sensu est falsa, scilicet, quod logica isto modo consideret de entibus realibus. Et quando dicitur quod, immo quia, considerat de substantia, quantitate, etc., dicendum est quod non considerat de ipsis ut de formali et per se subiecto. Sed considerat de ipsis inquantum in eis fundatur suum formale et per se subiectum, inquantum, scilicet, in eis inventur ratio praedicamenti, generis, speciei, vel alterius talis.”

\(^2\)DSIDoyle, p.307 lists this as a response to the fifth objection. As noted in 304n549, Doyle notes the issues involved in the text. However, this appears to be a response to the fourth initial objection on my reading of the text.

\(^3\)I take Hervaeus’s tone here to be tentative insofar as he still has to discuss such matters.

\(^4\)But it should be added, in contrast to the metaphysician’s concerns, the logician is not concerned with the very nature of that foundation. That is the concern for metaphysics. Logic merely presupposes this foundation for logical matters. More will be said below to make this point clear.
considerations concerning mind-independent being except for the sake of considerations of mind-dependent being.

To the proof made in opposition, when it is said [in the conclusion of the fourth objection] that logic undertakes consideration concerning both [mind-dependent and mind-independent being] because it undertakes considerations pertaining to first and second intentions, it must be said that although first intentions pertain to things as to that on which is founded intentionality itself, inasmuch with regard to that very intentionality they pertain to mind-dependent being and are a second intention concretely speaking.  Now, however, logic does not undertake consideration of first intentions with respect to the very things on which such things are founded according to themselves and taken absolutely. Instead, logic considers them only with respect to that very intentionality—and this formally and principally.

Of course, if the logician must consider the intentions that follow upon intellection, then logic must give some attention to the acts of intellection by which these intentions are formed. Obviously, this is because second intentions are not those very mental acts (i.e. acts in esse subiective) but instead are mind-dependent relations that follow upon them because of the objective existence enjoyed by things that are the terminus of the opposed relation of knower to known. Indeed, to stress this point, it should be noted that the extrinsic denomination “known” is not even taken with respect to the subjective mental quality involved. Even though

\[153\] See discussions in 3.4 A Brief Hervaean Catalogue of Second Intentions above.

\[154\] See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 ad 4 (p.579:9-24): “Si esset aliqua scientia quae principaliter consideraret de ente reali et de ente rationis, videtur quod principalius consideraret de ente reali. Et, per consequens, ens reale esset primum et per se subjectum eius. Sed si aliqua scientia consideret de ente reali non principaliter sed secundario prout inventur in eo fundari ens rationis, non oportet quod talis scientia sit de ente reali, ut de primo et per se subjecto. Tunc ad minorem dicendum quod logica non considerat principaliter de ente reali nisi gratia entis rationis. Ad probationem factam in oppositum, quando dicitur quod logica considerat de utroque quia considerat de intentionibus secundis et primis, dicendum quod primae intentiones, licet pertinacat ad res quantum ad id in quo fundatur ipsa intentionalitas, tamen quantum ad ipsam intentionalitatem pertinent ad ens rationis et est secunda intenti concretiva dicta. Nunc autem logica non considerat intentiones primas quantum ad ipsas res in quibus tales intentiones fundatur secundum se et absolute sumptas sed tantum quantum ad ipsam intentionalitatem, et hoc formaliter et principaliter.”

\[155\] Hence, one has quite explicit dicta in this regard, like those of Scotus in note 121 in chapter two above. Likewise, this is likely part of the reason for Aquinas’s remarks cited in notes 261-264 in chapter one above. Of course, it likewise is variously part of the doctrines concerning the three acts of the intellect with regard to second intentions as held by thinkers like Radulphus Brito and Simon of Faversham.

\[156\] See text in note 166 in chapter three above.
this is presupposed for there to be objective existence attributed to the known thing, the mind-dependent relation is taken only insofar as something exists objectively—that is as the terminus of the opposite relation, not as some kind of relation of similitude (or whatever else) from the known thing to the subjective quality “made” in “real” being by the knower. As Hervaeus states in q.5 a.2 ad 3:

It must be said that the expression “the manner of knowing” can be taken in two ways. In one manner, it is taken from the side of the intellect inasmuch as we say that someone understands clearly or obscurely. In another manner the expression can be taken from the side of the thing that is known just as when it is said that something is known—and in this sense, it can also be understood in a twofold manner. For, on the one hand, when the known thing is denominated by means of an extrinsic denomination from the very intellection or from the very “real” mode of this very intellection. For example, this is as when we say that this or that particular thing is understood clearly. However, this may be taken another, namely as when the very thing known is denominated not from the act of intellection but instead from the mind-dependent being [i.e. the mind-dependent relation] following upon it insofar as it is objectively in the intellect—for example, as when the things is said to be “abstract.” And the manner of knowing—that is, by which the thing which is known is so made an object for the intellect according to a such a relation [lit. ordinem—is neither a “real” mode nor a mode of “real” being following upon it in its own “real” being.

Instead, it is a mind-dependent mode of being [lit. modus rationis] that indeed follows upon “real” being but non according to its “real” being but instead inasmuch as it is objectively in the intellect. This mind-dependent mode, formally speaking, does not posit some thing in anything subjectively but, rather, merely supposes it. And logic is concerned, formally speaking, with such a “manner of knowing”—although it materially and secondarily considers other things that are real—whether on the part of the intellect

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157 See notes 22, 139, 142, 156, and 164 in chapter three above. Also, see note 25 in the conclusion to the dissertation.

158 On this, see the important remarks by Hervaeus cited in note 28 in the conclusion to this dissertation.

159 That is, insofar as a given concept clearly or obscurely represents that of which it is the representation. See notes 92 and accompanying discussion above.

160 This is one of those cases in which my choice of “mind-independent” can obscure matters. It is a little strange to say that the mental quality is “mind-independent,” though it is understandable if one presupposes the meaning of the term that I have adopted above for distinguishing ens rationis from ens reale. Still, in this case, it is a bit obscurantist.

161 What this means is that this or that thing has a relation to an intellect that represents it in a clear or obscure manner.

162 See remarks in note 156-158 above.
Indeed, in a passage much earlier in the treatise, namely q.2 a.1 ad 4, Hervaeus remarks on this “logical” consideration given to the acts of intellection. Just as the metaphysician pays attention only to those aspects of *entia rationis* that are related to its own mind-independent concerns, so too does logic focus its attention on the “real” beings involved in cognition only insofar as they allow for the formation of mind-dependent relations. Thus, when the logician considers the acts of the human intellect, he or she is only concerned with them as regards the formation of such relations. As regards all of the details involved in the cognitional process, this *is not* his or her concern. As he states early in q.2 a.1 ad 4:

> It must be said that if the act of intellection is the essential subject of logic, then second intentions will not be the essential subject or the first and essential object of it. Nay rather, then logic would undertake considerations concerning second intentions insofar as they have reference to its essential subject. For those things that follow upon known

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163 See DSIDoyle q.5 a.2 ad 3 (p.577:23-578:6): “Dicendum quod modus sciendi potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte intellectus prout dicitur modus aliquid intelligit clare vel obscure. Alio modo potest accipi modus sciendi ex parte rei scitae sicut quando dicitur quod aliquid scitur, et hoc dupliciter. Nam quandoque res scita denominatur denominatione extrinseca ab ipsa intellectione et ab ipso modo reali ipsius intellectiois ut quando dicitur quod ista res intelligitur clare vel obscure. Quandoque vero ipsa res scita denominatur non ab actu intelligenti, sed ab ente rationis consequente eam prout est objective in intellectu, ut cum dicitur res abstracta. Et modus sciendi, id est, quo res quae scitur sic obiciatur intellectui et secundum talem ordinem non est modus realis nec modus entis realis consequens ipsum in suo esse reali. Sed est modus rationis consequens quidem ens reale, sed non secundum suum esse realis sed prout est objective in intellectu, qui modus formaliter loquendo non ponit aliquid rem in aliquo subjective, sed bene suppost. Et tali modo sciendi formaliter est logica, licet consideret secundario et materialiter de alii quae sunt realiter, sive ex parte intellectus sive ex parte rei intellectae.”

The reader will note some amendments were made in the translation to help make Hervaeus’s prose a bit more intelligible in English.

164 It should be added that the metaphysician will note these same things as well, though as part of the broader project of discussing the relation of mind-dependent and mind-independent being as regards second intentions. The specific details of such cognitional matters are better taken up in a context more akin to the *De anima*, at least according to some form of traditional Aristotelianism. I believe that this is the reason why Hervaeus does not give full consideration to matters pertaining to cognition in the *De secundis intentionibus*, though he presupposes various positions. I think that this is a very important point to be noted, as it should temper the manner in which any reader uses the treatise. It is most definitely not directly concerned with the so-called “debate” about intentinos *ex parte intelligentis*. This is why I think it is problematic that Taieb relies so heavily on the treatise to answer an epistemological question. I believe that this leads to distortions such as those discussed above in note 225 of the previous chapter.
things as they are objectively in the intellect have reference to the act of intellection and most especially so insofar as they are considered by the logician.

However, if it is posited that logic is concerned with second intentions as its first and essential subject, then logic will not be about the act of intellection as its first and essential object [sic]. Instead, it will undertake determinations concerning the act of intellection as the cause of its subject—in the manner in which a “cause” can exist in the case of such things that only have mind-dependent being,165 that is, inasmuch as second intentions depend upon the act of reason (i.e. because they do not follow the thing except insofar as it is in the intellect objectively).166

As we close these final remarks on the De secundis intentionibus, it is appropriate to ask, "Where does the treatise fit among the sciences?" While working on his edition of the text, Doyle had expected Hervaeus to institute a new discipline, one that spanned the gulf between mind-dependent and mind-independent being:

I was constantly expecting Hervaeus to introduce a new discipline beyond those of Aristotle or to radically modify the existing Aristotelian disciplines in one way or another. I was, indeed, expecting him to introduce a form of Epistemology or to expand either Metaphysics or Logic to consider objective being and objectivity as such.167

Such super-transcendental hopes were self-admittedly spurred onward by Doyle's own work on these matters in 17th century scholasticism.168 This interpretive aspiration is laudable, for it does help to draw to the fore the place of the treatise vis-a-vis the division of mind-dependent and mind-independent being. However, as Doyle himself notes, no such hopes pan out in the course of the treatise.

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165 See notes 156-158 above.

166 See DSIDoyle, q.2 a.1 ad 4 (p.376:9-21): “Dicendum quod si actus intelligendi sit per se subjectum logicae, tunc secunda intentio non erit per se subjectum [sic] sive primum et per se objectum eius. Immo tunc logica consideraret de secunda intentione ut de eo quod habet attributionem ad per se subjectum eius. Nam ea quae consequuntur res intellectas ut sunt obiective in intellectu habent attributionem ad actum intelligendi et maxime secundum quod considerantur a logico.

Si autem ponatur quod logica est de secundis intentionibus, ut de primo et per se subjecto, tunc logica non erit de actu intelligendi ut de primo et per se objecto [sic]. Sed determinabit de actu intelligendi sicut de causa sui subjecti eo modo quo causa potest esse in talibus quae tantum habent esse rationis in quantum, scilicet, secunda intentio dependet ab actu rationis, quia, scilicet, non consequitur res nisi prout sunt obiective in intellectu.”

167 DSIDoyle, 23.

168 See DSIDoyle, 24.
Indeed, Hervaeus categorically rejects the possibility of there being such a supertranscendental science. This would imply that the subject of such a science would have “being in general” as it subject, understanding “being in general” to be some concept common to both mind-independent and mind-dependent being. However, even if there is such a common notion, it will have only an equivocal unity, and this does not suffice for constituting a single subject for a science:

Mind-dependent being, with regard to its ability to be known in a scientific manner [lit. *scibilitatem*], does not need to be reduced to any other thing as as an inferior [notion] is reduced to a superior one. This is so because there cannot be given something superior to mind-dependent being except for that which is common to mind-dependent and mind-independent being—if such a common thing could even exist. However, as regards its ability to be known in a scientific manner it is not possible for a reduction to be made to such a common notion.

First of all, this is so because there does not seem to be such a common notion except one that is equivocal—and about such a thing there is no scientific knowledge [lit. *scientia*]. (Here, I am not referring to the intention of equivocation, about which there *can* be scientific knowledge, but instead about that to which such an intention pertains, like this or that thing which I call “dog.”) Secondly this is so because whatever might be the aforementioned commonality [between mind-dependent and mind-independent being], that common notion would not have common properties in which the things contained under it would share—as is self-evident—and, in consequence, one cannot grasp a

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169 Or, really, a common word that signifies two very different concepts. However, he does not discuss in the treatise such issues pertaining to the nature of equivocation. While Doyle notes that Hervaeus here rejects the possibility of supertranscendental properties of such an equivocal term, he believes that in the treatise on relations attributed to Hervaeus there is found at least the possibility sameness and difference being supertranscendental. The text in question is far from conclusive, however, and may well just mean that there are two different manners of speaking of difference—one *secundum rationem* and one *secundum rem*. See Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality,” 97 and 121n175.

170 Hervaeus is distinguishing between the concept of equivocation and equivocal things. The “intention of equivocation” *can* be discussed by the logician, as when the logician might say, “An equivocal term is one that signifies two or more concepts without any formal connection between those concepts.” However, what Hervaeus is concerned with is the very thing signified. The example of “dog” is referring to the standard medieval example of *canis* used to refer both to the “dog star” Cirius or to a dog as animal. Insofar as the former is remotely related to the latter by metaphor because of the shape of the constellation *canis major*, they are not utterly disparate. The shape of the latter is metaphorically transposed to the former. However, we need not be detained with that issue here. The point that Hervaeus is making is that positing a science common to mind-independent and mind-dependent being would be like having a science concerned with the common properties of Sirius and dogs—an impossibility.
connection between the properties of that common notion and the properties of the inferior ones according to which they might be reduced to one science.\textsuperscript{171}

As regards explicit remarks in the treatise itself, Hervaeus is a bit ambiguous about the science to which it pertains. In part, this should not be problematic, for it is not written as an explicit addendum to a logical treatise or to the \textit{Metaphysics}. Its style is that of a series of disputed questions. Granted, the questions are laid out in a very cohesive manner, developing toward the concluding questions regarding the nature of logic as a science. Nevertheless, from its genre alone, it does not need to be assigned to any one particular Aristotelian discipline.

Nevertheless, in Doyle’s edition, at least, the treatise ends with the words, “And these remarks suffice for now concerning second intentions or concerning mind-dependent being in general.”\textsuperscript{172} It could be that this signals that the treatise is concerned with the general points to be discussed in logic before consideration is given to particular second intentions. Based on remarks earlier in the treatise, he clearly does not believe that there is a science of “mind-dependent being in general” if “in general” is taken to mean “a general category containing conventional, logical, and even particular mind-dependent beings used in particular sciences.” Likewise, based on the points discussed at the end of the previous chapter, Hervaeus clearly thinks that within the delimited domain of second-intentional mind-dependent being, one and the same science (namely, logic) treats of such mind-dependent being \textit{in common} and \textit{in particular}.

\textsuperscript{171} See DSIDoyle, q.5 a.1 (p.537:7-18): “Quia scilicet, ens rationis quantum ad suam scibilitatem non oportet reduci ad aliiu sicut inferius ad superius. Quia superius ad ens rationis non potest dari nisi illud quod est commune enti reali et enti rationis, si aliquid tale possit esse. Sed quantum ad suam scibilitatem non potest fieri reduci a tale commune, tum quia tale commune non videtur esse nisi quoddam equivocum de quo non est scientia. Et ut loquimur de equivoco non quantum ad intentionem equivocationis de qua potest esse scientia, sed de eo cui talis intention convenit, sicut hoc quod dico canis. Tum quia, qualiscumque sit praeedita communitas, illud commune non habet communes passiones in quibus commincent contenta sub eo, sicut de se patet, et, per consequens, non potest accipi connexio inter passiones ipsius communis et passiones inferiorum, secundum quam reducantur ad unam scientiam: ergo, etc.”

\textsuperscript{172} See ibid., q.5 a.4 (p.595:11-12): “Et ista sufficient ad nunc de secundis intentionibus sive de ente rationis in communi.”
Finally, at one point in q.4 a.3, Hervaeus explicitly sets aside a discussion as belonging more properly to the metaphysician.\textsuperscript{173}

These points make one believe that the \textit{De secundis intentionibus} is not a treatise of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{174} However, if one considers other aspects of his “project,” the text does appear to be primarily metaphysical in nature and scope. Clearly, Hervaeus holds that metaphysics is concerned with how various mind-dependent beings are founded in reality. Since a great deal of the \textit{De secundis intentionibus} is devoted to such issues, the work has a decidedly metaphysical cast. Even if the questions of the treatise are those of a logician interested in establishing the nature of his science’s subject vis-à-vis mind-independent reality, this very task is itself a metaphysical treatise—an unsurprising point, given that it is written in the style of disputed questions—its

\textsuperscript{173} See ibid, q.4 a.3 (p.499:27-500:2): “Utrum autem ita sit quod non sit aliquod accidens commune respectu alicuius subiecti sit propria et per se passio aut non, non pertinet ad praesens negotium. Immo pertinet ad metaphysicam.”

\textsuperscript{174} Hervaeus’s own approach in the treatise only offers two paths—logic or metaphysics. He does not, himself, envision the possibility of a science that is outside of the accepted Peripatetic schema of his day. Given John Doyle’s work on Baroque Jesuit thinkers, it is understandable that he was looking to see some sort of supertranscendental science or some form of pre-modern epistemology. However, one should consider that Hervaeus’s treatise pushes on the same chords as what one finds in the field semiotics. Already in 1267, Roger Bacon considered in his \textit{De signis} the possibility of recasting the notion of sign as such so as to provide a universal science of signs, far broader than the traditional approach that limited itself to the \textit{De interpretaione}. Though very different in approach from Hervaeus’s own thought, a universal science of signs attempts to recast the philosophical landscape so as to articulate a wider range of phenomena than seem to be addressable by the strict Peripatetic disciplinary categories.

A semiotic approach, as men like Deely have somewhat vociferously forced us to see in contemporary times, does indeed require a full recasting of how one approaches the entire landscape of reality and philosophy. However, unlike the pugnacious and bold Roger Bacon, Hervaeus Natalis remained rather conservative and understated in his claims. As I will discuss in the conclusion to this dissertation, I believe that we must affirm the conservative character of the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}. Hence, only two options really remain for interpreting it—logic and metaphysics. Hervaeus retains the general Peripatetic disciplines of his day, even if he does provide a bit of additional metaphysical speculation on the foundation of logic. On Bacon, see Deely, \textit{The Four Ages}, 365-376. As with much in Deely, the account should be read with a grain of salt, though he does provide a good overview of what is at play and does affirm the importance of Bacon’s work on signs. Also, for an interesting remark about a semiotic proposal in a work from ca.1250 by pseudo-Kilwardby (or, “Kilwardby adscriptus” as Deely would have us call the author), see ibid., 439-441. For more historically balanced remarks on Roger Bacon, see Rosier-Catach, “Roger Bacon and Grammar,” 91-98.
concerns are primarily metaphysical, even though they do not represent a complete treatise on “the metaphysics of being as the true and the false.”

The treatise most certainly is not supertranscendently concerned with mind-dependent and mind-independent being—a point indicated by the discussion above. Hervaeus considers whether there is at least a science concerned with all mind-dependent being. At first, he dismisses the point by observing that there was no such common science at the time of his writing.175 Likely aware that this argument from the de facto to the de iure was less than convincing, he continues by observing that in any case, such a superior science of mind-dependent being in general would be neither grammar nor rhetoric. He states that, as regards the cases of grammar, it is not a subject that is superior to logic itself. To this could be added a point made earlier, namely that certain grammatical notions such as “appellation” require the logical second intentions pertaining to the unity of many things as one in order to be explained. The implication is that grammar depends upon logic, not logic upon grammar.176 Furthermore, he states that rhetoric itself is concerned with a particular kind of mind-dependent being (namely dialectical syllogisms) as utilized in moral matters.177

Seemingly still aware that the arguments have been only partial, Hervaeus provides a more explicit argument. In this argument, he explicitly limits mind-dependent beings to those

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175 See ibid. (p.564:1-5): “Primo probo primam partem, quod non potest esse quod illa alia scientia consideret ens rationis in communi, et logica consideret aliquod ens rationis in speciali ut primum et per se subiectum. Quod patet primo, ex hoc quod de facto adhuc non habemus aliquam scientiam quae tractat de ente rationis magis in communi quam logica. Ergo.”  
176 See note 91 above.  
177 See ibid. (p.564:6-15): “Nam constat quod si, ponatur quod grammatica et rhetorica considerat illud ens rationis ut primum et per se subiectum, quod non credo, nulla tamen earum habet communiorem et nobilioremen considerationem de ente rationis quam logica. Nam secunda intentio de qua tractat logica ut de primo et per se subiecto non se habet ad subiectum grammaticae ut inferius ad superius, sive accipiatur inferius et superius in essentialiter ordinatis, sicut sunt ea quae sunt in linea praedicamentali, sive accipiatur inferius et superius ut totum in modo et pars in modo, qualitercumque accipiatur partes grammaticae, vel de rhetorica, de qua magis constat quod si considerat ens rationis, considerat determinatum ens rationis contractum ad materiam moralem.”
that can be divided according to the acts of the intellect. From what has been said above, he is limiting the notion of mind-dependent being to the kinds of mind-dependent relations that are naturally (i.e. not customarily ad placitum) formed in natural process of definition, enunciation, and reasoning. Though long, the argument should be read as a totality, for it explains just what one would expect from a treatise that is discussing mind-dependent beings “in general” from the perspective of logical science:

By means of reasoning, this point can also be extended, namely that no science is able to have a more common consideration of mind-dependent being than does logic.

[Major:] This is so because that science which considers the first differences of mind-dependent being (into which mind-dependent being, taken in general, is sufficiently divided) is able to have a consideration concerning mind-dependent being as about a first and essential subject.

[Minor:] However, logic is something of this sort.

[Conclusion:] Therefore, [logic considers mind-dependent being, as its first and essential subject, in a more common manner than do any other sciences].

The major premise is obvious, for it belongs to one and the same science to consider, in its very community, something that is common as well as its first differences by which it is sufficiently divided—just it belongs to one and the same science to consider the most common being accepted as well as its first differences.

I prove the minor as follows. The first difference among mind-dependent being is taken according to the general modes of knowing [lit. modos generales intelligendi] according to which things have objective being in the intellect. And this is obvious, for mind-dependent being is that which follows a thing insofar as it is objectively in the intellect. However, logic considers those things that follow upon [known] things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect—either inasmuch as it considers the general modes of knowing or the first general modes—for such modes of knowing [lit. tales modi intelligendi] are three—namely, knowledge of simples, abstract knowledge of composites, and discursive knowledge. And there are no more general modes of knowing.

Logic, however, considers things with regard to these general modes. Thus, with regard to the first [namely, knowledge of simples], there are genus and difference, predicated and predicable, and other such things. With regard to the second [namely, abstract knowledge of composites], there are contradictories, contraries, true, false, and other such things. As regards the third [namely, discursive knowledge] there are antecedent
and consequent, premise, conclusion, and other such things. Therefore, logic considers the first differences of mind-dependent being, inasmuch as mind-dependent being is divided.

And thus is that minor made obvious and, in consequence, the first part of the of the minor of the primary reason that was provided (namely, that it cannot be that some science other than logic undertakes considerations concerning mind-independent being in a way that is more universal than the consideration undertaken by logic and, likewise, that logic considers more greatly mind-dependent being in its particulars with respect to any other science). And because this is plain, it is not necessary to insist any further about it.\(^{178}\)

According to this long argument, Hervaeus is stating that the logican will consider mind-dependent beings insofar as they are divided up according to the various acts of intellecution that provide the first foundation in esse obiectivum for the various mind-dependent relations studied subsequently in particular by the various topics considered in logical science. However, one would then expect the logican to descend into the various kinds of second intentions pertaining to each operation. Thus, the logican would discuss extension, inferiority, superiority, genera, species, enunciations, types of opposition, the general nature of the syllogism, the figures of

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\(^{178}\) Ibid. (p:564:16-565:20): “Ratione etiam potest ostendi, quod nulla scientia potest habere communiorem considerationem de ente rationis quam logica. Quia illa scientia habet communiorem considerationem quae potest haberi de ente rationis ut de primo et per se subjecto, quae considerat primas differentias entis rationis in quas ens rationis sufficienter dividitur in communi. Sed logic est huiusmodi. Ergo etc.

Maior patet: quia eiusdem scientiae est considerare aliquod commune in sua communitate et differentias eius primas in quas sufficierit dividitursicut eius scientiae est considerare ens communissime acceptum et primas eius differentias.

Minorem probo, quia primae differentiae entis rationis accipiuntur secundum modos generales intelligendi secundum quos res habent esse obiective in intellectu. Et hoc patet, quia ens rationis est illud quod consequitur rem prout est objective in intellectu. Sed logica considerat ea quae consequuntur res prout sunt objective in intellectu, quantum ad omnes modos generales, sive quantum ad primos modos generales, quia tales modi intelligendi sunt tres, scilicet, notitia simplicium, et notitia abstracta compositorum, et notitia discursiva. Et non sunt plures modi intelligendi generales.

Logica autem considerat res quantum ad istos modos generales. Sic quantum ad primum, se habent genus et differentia, praedicatum et praedicabile, et consimilia. Quantum ad secundum, se habent contradictorium, contrarium, verum, falsum, et consimilia. Ergo logica considerat primas differentias entis rationis, inquantum sufficienter dividitur ens rationis. Et sic patet illa minor, et per consequens, patet prima pars minoris principalis rationis, quae fuit quod non potest esse quod aliqua scientia alia a logica consideret de ente rationis ut de primo et per se subjecto, ita quod alia illa scientia consideret de ente rationis magis universaliter quam logica et quod logica consideret ens rationis magis in speciali respectu alicuius scientiae. Et quia hoc planum est non oportet plus insistere.”
syllogisms, and so forth. The task of such logical science would be to explain just how each is a related, discussing\textsuperscript{179} the various kinds of second intentions and the order among their properties.

Even these very “high level” discussions about how various kinds of mind-dependent beings are divided is quite scarce in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}. Instead, most of the questions pertain to the way that second intentions are founded in reality and how they are distinct from other kinds of mind-dependent beings that have different manners of being founded in reality. Even in the discussions pertaining to the nature of logical science, these sorts of distinctions are concerned with ascertaining just where second intentions fit into the overall schema of Peripatetic sciences.

Therefore, if the \textit{De secundis intentionibus} discusses mind-dependent being “in general,” it does not seem to be doing so with the eye of a logician who is explicitly dividing second intentions according to their various modes of objective existence, all in preparation for further discussion of the properties of such mind-dependent beings. Instead, he seems to be making the kinds of general remarks that pertain to the metaphysician’s task of explaining how it is that “being” is said of this seemingly “hazy” domain of “being as the true and the false.” That is, in the treatise, Hervaeus works to remove some of this haziness, explain just what is meant by a “second intention,” discuss some details of its relational structure, explain how various kinds of second intentions are related to reality, and finally defend the fact that this domain of “quasi-non-being” (from the perspective of mind-independent being) is still something that can be studied by a particular science.

Thus, while the metaphysician must discuss the second intentions formed by all three acts of the intellect (as Hervaeus does occasionally in the \textit{De secundis intentionibus}), it is done only

\textsuperscript{179} That is, to the way that discourse occurs in logical matters. Recall the remarks voiced by Hervaeus cited in note 141 above.
insofar as metaphysics is concerned with explaining the relation of those second intentions to mind-independent being (as is also the concern in the treatise). Such a focus on mind-independent being reveals many important things regarding the relation of second intentions (and all mind-dependent being) to mind-independent being. However, like a bright light shining on a page of a book, the metaphysician’s focus “bleaches out” a number of topics concerning the number of such second intentions as well as how their various properties are scientifically interrelated. These details are not his or her concern, though such order of subjects and properties does play an important role in constituting a particular kind of scientific knowledge, namely that of logic. This order, however, is not the “intellectual focus” of the metaphysician. Metaphysics is concerned with another order, namely of the ten mind-independent categories vis-à-vis substance as well as act and potency (and the causes of that mind-independent being). The metaphysician is concerned only with giving the topography of entia rationis, placing it in its particular place in an overall view of ontology. This is no unimportant undertaking, and Hervaeus’s discussions of these matters present no small advance on the inherited Peripatetic divisions of being. Thus, expanding on Figure 3: A Hervaean Fourfold Schema of Being, it is now possible to schematically represent the broad vistas of Hervaeus’s ontology as follows:

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180 Hence, accounting for the way that the metaphysician can ultimately be concerned with the First Cause—i.e. as the first cause of ens commune (understanding ens commune as being common to the ten categories). See note 134 above. Regarding Hervaeus’s position on Metaphysics as a science of “being in general” in the ten categories, he occasionally refers to this position. It seems to follow from his regular and explicit initial division of being into ens in decem praedicamenta and ens rationis. He does not develop these points at length, however. See ibid., q.5 a.2 (p.559:7-9): “Metaphysicus considerat ut de primo et per se subjecto de ente in communi quantum ad suum esse reale et quantum ad ea quae ipsum consequuntur in so esse reali.” Cf. ibid., q.5 a.1 sed contra (p.519:14-26).
4.4 Final Thoughts

In much of what has been discussed in this chapter, it likely has seemed that I was preparing to state that Hervaeus’s treatise marks a revolutionary expansion of the domain of metaphysical speculation. The discussions of the De secundis intentionibus do indeed far outstrip the discussions made by the Stagirite in his meager remarks on “being as the true and the false.” Hervaeus does expand this domain so much so that whatever might have remained of the humble Aristotelian ens verum is now articulated as being the vast domain of *ens rationis*, containing all sorts of mind-dependent relations and distinctions—from the “naturo-logical,” to the customary / freely-willed, to the particular kinds of distinctions of reason involved in the
In my opinion, this expansion does not represent a radical break with Aristotle (though Hervaeus’s thought expresses a marked development upon the Stagirite’s *Metaphysics*). By discussing mind-dependent beings derived from human custom, contrasting them to mind-independent being and to second intentions, Hervaeus is performing just that sort of consideration for which he makes a provision in q.5 a.4. He considers those mind-dependent beings in their relation to mind-independent reality. He just does not consider them in detail. This activity does “add” a new task to Aristotelian metaphysics—the metaphysical consideration of all mind-dependent being. However, it does not revolutionize that science, and it most certainly does not open up to a grand task undertaking of a new kind of supertranscendental metaphysics.

Whether or not one must, according to Hervaeus, be a metaphysician before one is truly a logician is of little import. As he notes in q.5 a.1, neither the principles *nor even the subject* a science is temporally “first known”, even in the case of natural philosophy—a subject that would seem quite attuned to the human intellect. Human knowledge must proceed from sensation and imagination to intellection. Hervaeus does not provide a phenomenology of the development of

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181 As stressed above, Hervaeus is, of course, not the only thinker to note this domain. The division of *ens reale* and *ens rationis* as another name for the division of *ens reale* and *ens verum* is found in other thinkers, though without the long and sustained discussions that we find in the *De secundis intentionibus*.

182 As does the thought of any metaphysician who takes Aristotle as a starting point for his or her own unique project.

183 On this point, one is reminded of a remark made by a youthful Yves Simon in a Letter to Maritain in which the former laments the lack of such treatment regarding intentional being and moral being. See Yves R. Simon, Letter to Jacques Maritain on July 30, 1932 in Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon: Correspondance, vol. 1 *Les années françaises (1927-1940)*, ed. Florian Michel (Tours: CLD, 2008), 105: “Ce qui me préoccupe le plus, c’est le problème de l’intentionnalité. Je m’indigne de ne trouver dans aucun ouvrage aristotélicien, ni ancien ni moderne, une théorie d’ensemble de l’être intentionnel, et je vais jusqu’à concevoir l’ambition outrecuidante d’écrire les premiers linéaments de cette théorie, qui m’est devenue nécessaire pour continuer de vivre. . . . Depuis longtemps déjà je remarque qu’on a oublié, dans les traités classiques d’ontologie, deux admirables chapitres: *de ente intentionale* et *de ente morali*. Les circonstances et mon devoir d’état m’obligent à m’y mettre: on verra bien ce que ça donnera.”
the sciences, so conclusive remarks on this matter must be tempered. Still a brief observation will help to round out the discussions of the third and fourth chapters of this dissertation.

Pedagogically speaking, logic should come relatively early in the training of the young student. Granted, it is likely best to begin with a kind of purely inductive approach, one that presents the student with a series of texts containing valid and invalid arguments (as well as rhetorical ones, dialectical ones, and so forth). This can provide an early experiential basis that can make the “problem” of logic a “live problem.” Thus, under the careful guidance of a teacher, the young learner first learns logic by seeing good logic in action, as well as in doing good logic in written assignments.¹⁸⁴

However, there comes a time when the direct experience of good and bad reasoning must become some form of logica docens. That is, the exercised use of logic must eventually take on a scientific and doctrinal character. I would argue that based upon Hervaeus’s discussions in the De secundis intentionibus, one cannot have the intellectual habitus of logica docens in its fully developed form without first having undertaken some set of discussions of the acts of the intellect and having established that the notions deployed in logic are mind-dependent relations. This would require no small amount of philosophical knowledge, including at least a summary of aspects of “philosophical psychology” as well as metaphysics, paying attention especially to the unique character of relation among the ten Aristotelian categories and distinguishing second intentions from all mind-independent forms of being (even mind-independent relations). According to this outlook, one would need some metaphysical and “philosophically psychological” preambles to logic. However, one would not need to undertake all of the discussions of the De Secundis Intentionibus, for they are concerned with a robust metaphysical

¹⁸⁴ Insightful practical reflections on this point can be found in Laura M. Berquist, “Designing Your Own Classical Curriculum,” in Renewing the Mind: A Reader in the Philosophy of Catholic Education, ed. Ryan Topping (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 333-339.
discussion of the relation of second intentions to reality. This is not the “direction” that the logician will need to proceed in his or her studies.

Still, even if such a *cursus* of studies would not require the student of logic to be a fully able metaphysician, it would nevertheless posit a significant “entry barrier” to mature discussions of logic. Likely, at first, the student of logic is not “thinking properly.” However, under careful pedagogical guidance such learning can be slowly adapted to the robust metaphysical requirements presupposed by Hervaeus’s view of logical science. Thus, at first, a student may understand the notions of extension and superiority / inferiority in mathematical terms—there are “more things” in superior concepts than in inferior ones. Likewise, for example, syllogistic reasoning would be understood in terms of such mathematical concepts, covertly thinking of such matters in a quantitative manner. The experience of teaching is always akin to Plato’s observation regarding the eerie similarity between the philosopher and the sophist. Often, lofty matters must be “distorted” so as to enable the less trained mind to begin to understand the full scope of a topic being taught:

**Eleatic Visitor:** One type of imitation is the art of likeness-making. That’s the one we have whenever someone produces an imitation by keeping to the proportions of length, breadth, and depth of his model, and also by keeping to the appropriate colors of its parts.

**Theatetus:** But don’t all imitators try to do that?

**Visitor:** Not the ones who sculpt or draw very large works. If they reproduced the true proportions of their beautiful subjects, you see, the upper parts would appear smaller than they should, and the lower parts would appear larger, because we see upper parts from farther away and the lower parts from closer.\(^{185}\)

The eventual transition would need to be effected so that the logic student (according to the Hervaean stripe) is able to understand that superiority and inferiority pertain to objects

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because of the relations involved between them on account of the abstraction involved in each of their concepts. Thus, the explanation of the relation of genus to species would begin with the various kinds of relations possible from things known to the intellect such that some things are known in a more or less abstract manner. Based upon this initial relation, one can then make the comparison between the things that are denominated by this mind-dependent relation in order to explain how one is a genus with respect to the other. Reflecting on this overall relational structure, then, the student would know that genus indicates a kind of relation and that matters pertaining to extension, superiority, and so forth are ultimately relational notions that follow upon this as various properties.

The quantitative perspective has much power and can take the budding young logician quite far into the domain of the rules of logic. However, such a manner of conceptualizing logical notions will retain a mathematical cast that, if unnoticed, will distort an understanding of logic as a science of second intentional (i.e. mind-dependent) relations. Thus, from the perspective of Hervaeus’s remarks, it is appropriate to suppose that while the logician will not need to fully deal with all the issues pertaining to how second intentions are grounded in reality, he or she will require a good deal of metaphysical thinking before he or she adequately understands exactly what he or she “is talking about.” However, the metaphysician will likewise require that he or she understand logic well enough to get on with his or her science so

186 And, indeed, much of its power is expressed in various forms of symbolic and mathematical logic.
187 By which I do not intend to say that logic should not pay heed to matters of extension. That is quite a different matter. On this, see the insightful observations of Maritain in Formal Logic, 21-28. However, also see his reservations regarding symbolic logic as discussed in ibid., 221-225.
188 This point is somewhat hinted at in a remark by Hervaeus found in note 126 above. There, he writes, “Consideration of mind-independent being is prior to consideration of mind-dependent being—whether they pertain to the same science or to diverse ones.” Thus, it would seem that even to be a “true” logician, one would have to go through adequate metaphysical reflection to differentiate mind-dependent relations (following on things only insofar as they are objectively in the intellect due to its natural activity) from other forms of mind-dependent being as well as mind-independent being.
that the arguments pertinent for his or her discussions are undertaken in a logically cogent and valid manner.

The dependence is not purely circular, but it does indicate that in a given philosopher, the state of his or her *habitus* of science will depend much upon how well pertinent topics have been treated on each side of this “logical-metaphysical divide.” This state of affairs is well summarized by a dictum from Aquinas, expressed in *In Boetium De Trinitate* q.6 a.1 sol. 2 ad 3. With that dictum, this chapter can appropriately be brought to a close:

> It must be said that in teaching, we begin from that which is easier—unless necessity requires something else. Indeed, sometimes it is necessary in teaching to begin not with that which is easier but with that from whose knowledge depends the knowledge that will follow. And for this reason, it is necessary in teaching to begin with logic. This is not because logic is easier than the other sciences. Indeed, it has the greatest difficulty since it is concerned with things understood secondarily [lit. *de secundo intellectis*]. Instead, it is necessary to begin in teaching with logic because other sciences depend upon it (inasmuch as it teaches the manner of proceeding in all the sciences). As is said in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, it is first necessary to know the mode of science before knowing science itself.\(^{189}\)

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\(^{189}\) See Latin text in note 216 in the first chapter of this dissertation.
5. Conclusion

Having brought to a close our exegesis of the themes of Hervaeus’s treatise, it is useful to take a brief retrospective and prospective glance over the overall arch of this dissertation’s discussion. The topics of the *De secundis intentionibus* are not wholly *ex nihilo* in their generation. However, the treatise does mark the solidification of an important way of articulating the place of logic among the intellectual disciplines.

As discussed in the first chapter, the mid-thirteenth century marked a time of transition between two manners of understanding the nature of logic. On the one hand, logic was conceived as a kind of science of discourse, a *scientia sermocinalis* closely allied to the concerns of the other two subjects of the liberal arts studied in the trivium. Robert Kilwardby was discussed as being an advocate of this viewpoint. In addition to holding logic to be a *scientia sermocinalis*, Kilwardby held that logical notions were founded directly in mind-independent reality, waiting to be abstracted by the human knower. However, even Kilwardby’s writing showed the marks of the tradition of *ens diminutum* coming out of the Arabo-latinate translation of the *Metaphysics*’s notion of *ens verum* or “being as the true and the false.” Such a passing remark by Kilwardby did, in fact, place the ontological status of logical notions in a kind of hazy diminished “middle ground.” This middle ground would receive increased attention in the thinkers considered in this dissertation.

In Aquinas’s writings, the overall situation tends toward greater solidification of a non-sermocinal outlook regarding logic. As part of his overall project, he separates the subject of

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1 This should not, of course, be read as indicating that the latter wholly replaced the former. Nor should it be read as indicating that these were the only two viewpoints. Nonetheless, the role of discussions of second intentions did alter the overall discourse from the older medieval notion of logic as a *scientia sermocinalis*. 

413
logic from mind-independent reality. Indeed, in some texts he goes so far as to use language of mind-dependent relations that would become a standard way of explicating the domain of second intentions in the years following his death. However, at times his discussion of second intentions with regard to the intellect’s operations is ambiguous. Still, as is clear in texts like the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, he relegates the topics of logic to the domain as *ens rationis*, which he also sees in direct relation to the Aristotelian division of being known as “being as the true and the false.”

There are two critical distinctions in Hervaeus’s treatise. One is the distinction of *ens rationis* (i.e. the inheritor of the Aristotelian “being as the true and the false”) from mind-independent being. The other is the distinction between subjective and objective being. The importance of the distinction between *esse subiectivum* and *esse obiectivum* is arguably underplayed in the secondary literature, and this is much to the detriment of understanding his treatise. Historically, this required a careful consideration of the use of this distinction by Scotus. Though arguably present in Parisian circles prior to Scotus,² the notion plays a key role in the Subtle Doctor’s own explication of second intentions.

Hervaeus’s treatise considers this problem at length. Arguably, this carries forward (though in an unstated manner) Avicenna’s own remark about how first philosophy ought to consider the mode of being proper to second intentions.³ The *De secundis intentionibus* is thus a kind of “mapping out” of the nature of logical being within the domain of what for Aristotle was “being as the true and the false.” As noted above, there are clearly places where Hervaeus argues in the context Radulphus Brito, as well as other unnamed contemporaries. However, a

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² See my discussion of the usage by Simon of Faversham in note 204 in chapter two of this dissertation. Likewise, see the remarks, especially those pertaining to Henry of Ghent, in note 252 in the first chapter. Contrast this to the claims made by Peter King in the text cited in note 202 in chapter two above.

³ See the texts found in notes 70 and 77 in chapter one above.
clear reading of the treatise must acknowledge the deep resonances that his conceptual schema has to the language of Scotus, whose own followers would be long concerned with matters pertaining to *esse obiectivum* (or *esse intelligibile*).

Hervaeus’s own treatment is unique, though thoroughly dependent upon this Scotistic language. The use of *esse obiectivum* provides one of the important capstones for his overall edifice concerning the nature of logic. In accord with the various ways that things can be objects of intellection—whether in simple apprehension, in enunciations, or in syllogizing—there are different sorts of mind-dependent relations formed by the intellect in its process of scrutinizing and understanding its objects of knowledge. Insofar as things are “objectified” (or, “intentionalized”) by the intellect in its various operations, there are various relations formed among those *objects (or intentions)*. Those various mind-dependent relations are second intentions. Not anything real—in the strict sense of mind-independent reality—they are the unique domain of non-being appropriate to logic as a reflexive science of second intentional being.

The attention in the *De secundis intentionibus* is directed not toward the products (or “tools”) involved in intellection. That is, its attention is not focused on intentions and intentionality from the perspective of the knower. It is directed toward *things*—but not to *things insofar as they are things* but, instead, to *things as objects (or things as intentions)*. Second intentions are those kinds of relations that arise in things according to their status as being related to the intellect, as objects terminating cognoscitive acts. The treatise wishes to explain just how such “non-real” relations are possible and where they fit into the overall scheme of Aristotelian ontology.

As these considerations are brought to a close, I would like to propose some forward
pointers and general interpretive remarks about Hervaeus’s treatise. These remarks are not intended to be of historical nature. The authors of 14th-17th century scholasticism, buried as they are under biases fortified centuries of vitriolic rhetoric, require many more generations of scholars before an honest intellectual assessment can be provided for these authors and their various textual-historical dependencies. Instead, my closing remarks are primarily of a speculative nature and are undertaken only to round out the long narrative of this dissertation, for which the historical narrative presented has ultimately been subordinate to the understanding the full import of Hervaeus’s own claims. Five conclusions can be derived from this dissertation's lengthy discussion of all these matters.

First and foremost, the *De secundis intentionibus* is a highly conservative treatise. Above all, in an age that would see significant reductions in the Peripatetic categorical schema, Hervaeus staunchly retains the ten categories as modes of being that are mind-independent. This presupposition is taken for granted, as can be seen when he deploys without any reservation the distinction between being as divided into the ten categories and the domain of *ens rationis*. Indeed, the fact that second intentions are “diminished relations” presupposes adherence to the reality of relations as a mind-independent modes of being as well.

Second, as discussed at the close of the fourth chapter, the treatise arguably represents a particular “department” of metaphysics. It should be born in mind that the *De secundis intentionibus*...

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4 Though, it is important to reiterate that I will not make a final determination as to whether or not Hervaeus’s doctrine represents the “best” or, at least, “most adequate” doctrine on these matters.

5 See remarks about Ockham above in 114 in chapter three.

6 As regards the details of Hervaeus’s doctrine of relation, the distinction between the fundament and the relation, and so forth, these matters are themselves a topic for separate discussion. What is beyond question is that his aim is to maintain the Peripatetic schema in totality. Partial discussions on this topic are undertaken by the late Thomas Dewender in “Der ontologische Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St. Pourçain, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli,” in *Philosophical Debates in the Early Fourteenth Century* ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 287-307. However, due to its focus on Hervaeus’s controversy with Durandus of St. Pourçain, this article does not give detailed consideration to the full breadth of Hervaeus’s corpus (including the *De secundis intentionibus*).
"intentionibus" is written in the style of disputed questions. Thus, it does not have the "neat and tidy" format that one might find in a textbook or a full metaphysical treatise. Nonetheless, it is concerned with how second intentions are related to mind-independent being— an ultimately metaphysical concern.

Hervaeus’s primary focus is on the distinction between wholly mind-independent being and mind-dependent relations of a particular type. It is an attempt to relate mind-dependent relations to the overall ontology of mind-independent being. Yes, the discussion requires him to discuss the “cognitional apparatus.” However, it does so in a way that is above all concerned with the metaphysics of "being as the true and the false" and not merely with cognitional matters pertaining to intentions considered from the perspective of the knower. That is, it is a treatise about the relational implications of mind-independent things becoming objects (or intentions).

A third, related conclusion follows from this. The De secundis intentionibus should therefore be read as a kind of "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 'Being as the True and the False.'" This playful title is slightly deceptive, of course. While the treatise is conservative, it also breaks new ground (though not without antecedents). The text is really a kind of "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Mind-Dependent Being." Admittedly, its focus is primarily on one particular kind of mind-dependent being, namely the mind-dependent relations that are not customary in nature—i.e. second intentions. However, his overall thrust is that of the metaphysician working out how various mind-dependent beings are related to the mind-independent being of the categories. Thus, he does not focus in detail on the properties of those mind-dependent beings (a logical concern) nor on the ontology of human cognition (a concern akin to that of the De anima). Instead, his treatise helps to “solidify” the boundaries of mind-dependent being, making its nature and status explicit.
A fourth observation follows from this. The enterprise of the *De secundis intentionibus* is not supertranscendental.⁷ Hervaeus is not investigating some domain of properties that might be applied to mind-dependent and mind-independent being equally. Intentionality (i.e. 1ˢᵗ and 2ⁿᵈ intention said abstractly) is the relation of the known to the knower, whether that known thing be a first or a second intention.⁸ However, this does not mean that intentionality is something that pertains to mind-independent being and mind-dependent being. Instead, even though this intentionality is grounded on the mind-independent reality (immediately in the case of the relationship of the known to the knower in first intentions, remotely for every other mind-dependent relation), it is only so grounded insofar as the thing known is taken as the terminus of the opposite relation of the known to the knower.

Thus, in discussing the relation of mind-dependent being and mind-independent being, Hervaeus is maintaining a solid wall between mind-dependent and mind-independent being. The two domains are not wholly unrelated. It is like making an “about face.” The real relation of the knower to the known is “mind-independent” in the sense of being founded upon a “real,” subjective quality (though it certainly is “mind-dependent” in the sense that it is dependent on the activity of the mind).⁹ The qualitative, subjective modification of the knower brings into “being” the entire world of objectivity by making things into objects (or intentions). Those *things-as-objects / things-as-intentions* are related—though now in a “non-real” way—to the knower. To be an *object* (or *intention*) implies this kind of mind-dependent relation. Even in the case of direct objects of cognition (which most certainly are “first” intentions), there is implied a “non-real” relation: “But that which is formally implied by ‘first intention’, namely the relation

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⁷ Likewise, nor does it begin to adumbrate in the direction of a universal semiotic science of signs. See note 174 in the previous chapter.

⁸ See text and discussion in section 3.3.1 Important Distinctions above.

⁹ See the remarks in note 256 of the first chapter and note 42 of the third chapter above.
of the known thing to the act of intellection, is merely a mind-dependent being, distinct from all mind-independent being, for such a relation is a mind-dependent relation.”

Finally and fifthly, I would like to consider an evaluation made by John Deely regarding the importance of Hervaeus's treatise. As noted at the very beginning of this dissertation, in one place, Deely quite unfortunately misunderstands Hervaeus's doctrine of intentionality as pertaining to a real relation of the known to the knower. However, in a bibliographical note, he states something a bit different from the aforementioned footnote:

Yet, I would further note that Doyle’s work on a critical edition of this author [i.e. Hervaeus], the first, seemingly (some two centuries prior to Cajetan’s writings), to point out that intentionality involves relation from the object to the knower even after, as well as before, it is from knower to object, promises to be revolutionary for scholarship in the postmodern discussion of intentionality as it continues to move beyond the late modern one-sided version of phenomenology.

There is great truth in this observation, but one should be careful in evaluating the place of the treatise in this semiotic narrative. Deely's own enterprise could well be categorized as being an unstated kind of quasi-supertranscendentalism. Insofar as his own semiotic program takes its point of departure from Poinset's (and arguably certain aspects of Aquinas’s) doctrine of relation as maintaining its nature whether or not it is real (i.e. because relation is a mode of being that is purely ad aliud). Thus, according to its nature, relation (as emphasized by Deely's interpretation of Poinset's Thomistic tradition) spans the gap between mind-dependent and mind-

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10 DSIDijs, q.1 a.1 (p.117:25-28): “Sed illud quod formaliter importatur per primam intentionem, scilicet habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi, est mere ens rationis distinctum contra esse reale, quia talis habitudo est relatio rationis.”

11 See 65 in the introduction to this dissertation.

12 Here (in saying “as well as before”), Deely seems to be retaining his aforementioned observation that really pertains to sensation, a point that in fact was not Hervaeus’s concern.

13 Deely, Intentionality and Semiotics, 216. Needless to say, Deely’s historical narrative is a bit myopic. Based on the discussions of this dissertation, we can say that Scotus had the same insight, though he did not utilize the explicit term intentionalitas.

14 See notes 201 and 207 in the first chapter of this dissertation.
independent being.\textsuperscript{15}

Certainly, Deely does not assert that every being is a relation. His "quasi-
supertranscendentality" is slightly more nuanced than that. Instead, his account stresses that
every being—whether mind-independent or wholly objective and, hence, mind-dependent—can
be the terminus of a relation. Thus, "to be a terminus of a relation" supertranscendentally applies
to both \textit{ens reale} and \textit{ens rationis}. This lies at the very basis of the unified semiotic vision that
he expresses vis-a-vis the tradition of Poinset.\textsuperscript{16}

As regards Hervaeus's treatise, one must be very conservative regarding assertions in this
regard. As discussed in the third chapter, he calls mind-dependent relations "relations" only in a
qualified sense.\textsuperscript{17} He stresses the priority of categorical relations in comparison to mind-
dependent ones.\textsuperscript{18} Combine this with the fact that he clearly separates mind-dependent relations
from categorical being, and one has a situation quite different from that expressed in Deely's own
semiotic reading of portions of Poinset's Baroque Thomism. The only "unification" of \textit{ens reale}
and \textit{ens rationis} occurs for Hervaeus in metaphysics, which can understandably undertake an

\textsuperscript{15} See Deely, \textit{Intentionality and Semiotics}, 115-142.

\textsuperscript{16} It is not without reason that Doyle, who himself might deserve the honorific title \textit{Doctor}
supertranscendentalis, sees Deely's work as spanning this very gap. See DSIDoyle, 28-29n140.

\textsuperscript{17} See 201 in chapter three of this dissertation. It could be speculated that Aquinas's distinction of essence
and existence allows for a unified perspective regarding relation, for both mind-dependent and mind-independent
relation could have the same \textit{ratio} (essence qua relation) while differing in \textit{esse}. However, Aquinas does not
develop this in detail, and a contrast to Hervaeus on this matter would be highly speculative and require an extensive
study beyond the bounds of this dissertation. Hervaeus does appear to utilize in other works the distinction between
the \textit{ratio} and \textit{esse} of relations, though admixed with Scotistic elements. See Iribarren's article, cited in note 201 in
chapter two above. However, as regards his position on the distinction between essence and existence, the most
current work is that of Elliot Allen from the mid-twentieth century, calling into question Hervaeus's adherence to
Aquinas's thought. However, Geneviève Barrette, a current student of David Piché at the Université de Montréal is
working on a dissertation ("L'être et l'essence chez Hervé de Nédélec : lorsqu'une distinction de raison est une
distinction réelle") that contests this judgment regarding Hervaeus's thought. See "Geneviève Barrette:

\textsuperscript{18} See note 121 and surrounding conversation in chapter three above, where the general vocabulary of
\textit{habitudo} and \textit{relatio} are considered in their pertinence to this matter. Hervaeus's vocabulary deserves an
independent investigation in order to shed light on his understanding of the rigidity of the boundary between mind-
dependent and mind-independent relations according to Hervaeus.
explanation of how the latter is related to the former.\footnote{That being as common to the ten categories is the subject of metaphysics is, of course, justified by Aristotle's own text, though one must also discuss the role of act and potency vis-à-vis the subject of the science. The Renaissance Dominican Thomist, Dominic of Flanders would defend this same outlook regarding the subject of metaphysics. For a treatment of this topic, see Phillip-Neri Reese, "Dominic of Flanders, O.P. (d. 1479) on the Nature of the Science of Metaphysics" (PhL Thesis, The Catholic University of America, 2015). This position could contrasted to other thinkers, such as Chrysostom Javelli, who held the subject of metaphysics to be the being that is common to God and creatures. See Dominic D'Ettore, “A Thomist Re-Consideration of the Subject Matter of Metaphysics: Chrysostom Javelli on What is Included in Being as Being,” paper presented at American Catholic Philosophical Association Conference, Boston, MA, October 2015.}

In concession to Deely's overall bibliographical observation, which I believe is generally correct, Hervaeus's concern in the *De secundis intentionibus* is indeed to "open onto the avenues of non-being windows as large as those open onto the avenues of being."\footnote{Likewise, one could contrast these positions to John Wippel’s interpretation of Aquinas (heavily dependent on *De trinitate* qq.5-6) that sees *ens commune* as those “negatively immaterial” concepts common to matter-bound and immaterial beings. See Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 20-21, 52-54. As regards the relation of these views, as well as Hervaeus's own comprehensive view on the matters, to the thought of Aquinas (and others), that matter must be left for other venues outside of this dissertation, though from the remarks in passing throughout the footnotes and discussion above, he appears to hold that the subject of metaphysics is *ens commune* in the sense of the ten categories, likely unified through its relation to substance (as in Aristotle).}\footnote{Maritain, *God and the Permission of Evil*, 32. Cf. Deely, "Quid sit postmodernismus," 80-82.} However, according to Hervaeus’s outlook, these windows are opened from within the castle of metaphysics, not that of semiotics as a kind of quasi-supertranscendental, semiotic science of relation. From the perspective of the *De secundis intentionibus*, it is the metaphysician who helps to explain not only being but also non-being—*including that particular kind of non-being that pertains to ens rationis*, which is at the same time not absolute nothingness.\footnote{See, especially, 3.3.2 *Relationes rationis*: Their Non-Categoriality above.}

Granted, the *De secundis intentionibus* only accomplishes part of this task. The concerns of these particular disputed questions are primarily focused upon one subset of the avenues of non-being, namely those pertaining to the mind-dependent relations that things are apt to have on account of the very nature of the thing's ability to be the object of intellection, *i.e. the domain of second intentions*. However, as one can readily see in the final question of the treatise, the task of delineating this one segment of the domain of mind-dependent being requires something to be
said about the other domains within the broad domain of *ens rationis*.

Thus, it is correct to say with De Rijk that the primary theme of the *De secundis intentionibus* is “the nature of second intention and its relationships to the extramental objects and to its counterpart, first intention.” However, this should be appropriately understood. To the degree that this is a matter of metaphysics, the *De secundis intentionibus* is indeed concerned with the relation of mind-dependent being to mind-independent being. This is due to the fact that the unity of metaphysics requires all of its investigations be related to its principle subject, namely mind-independent being (i.e. being in the ten categories, especially substance, as well as being divided into act and potency).

However, pace De Rijk, the concerns of the treatise are not focused on issues arising from the medieval discussions of intentions insofar as one is speaking of the cognitional equipment of the knower in relation to the known. Instead, the treatise is concerned with focusing a “metaphysical gaze” into a domain of *relative-non-reality* that is then to be investigated by others. For Aristotle, this domain was named "being as the true and the false." The Stagirite's concerns were delimited to the particular ways that being is involved when one spoke of something being or not being in a given way. The truth and falsity involved in these matters is not wholly mind-independent, so it was set aside by the investigations in the

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23 Indeed, on this point, early in his career Deely made a quite insightful remark regarding the role of act and potency in explanations of the purely intentional order. See John Deely, *The Tradition via Heidegger: An Essay on the Meaning of Being in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 7: “For if the intentional order does not formally touch the entitative order in the particular kind of act / potency relation known as substance / accident composition, yet it does permeate it through other modes of act / potency composition—which is but to say that act / potency analysis as such cannot be reduced to substance / accident ontology, and that it is the former, not the latter, which provides the genuine categories of first philosophy, that is, of Metaphysics.”

I cite the text only a suggestion of a forward path for the reflections undertaken in Hervaeus’s work, which itself does not reflect deeply on the role the vocabulary of act and potency in the discussions of mind-dependent being. However, given that Aristotle’s discussions of “being as the true and the false” at the end of Θ are undertaken at the conclusion of his discussion of act and potency, such matters are not unimportant for the relatively conservative project suggested by Hervaeus’s particular Peripatetic doctrine of intentionality.
Metaphysics.

For Hervaeus, the investigations of the *De secundis intentionibus* direct the reader's gaze to this domain, explaining its connection to mind-independent being. As regards the mind-dependent relations pertaining to logic, the connection to mind-independent reality is quite tenuous, as discussed in the third chapter.24 Be that as it may, the goal of the treatise is to sure up part of the domain of non-being, not leaving it bereft of the metaphysician’s investigation of such matters. Properly speaking, therefore, the metaphysician investigates mind-dependent being so that this domain can be related to mind-independent reality.

However, from another perspective, the gaze is "outward" from metaphysics into the domain of that which is non-being. To ask the question, "What is a second intention?" is to ask, "What is this particular kind of non-being, namely this class of mind-dependent relations?" Thus, the metaphysician asks, “What are the conditions for the possibility of *ens rationis*?”. This does not mean that metaphysics has the investigation of *ens rationis* as its end or goal. Instead, it could be said that such matters are like a flower from the stem metaphysics, a kind of superabundance and promise of future fruit, all found in the topics that should be explicated in other disciplines.

It should be emphasized that such matters are indeed a flower of great import. The discussion of mind-dependent being helps to explicate a number of topics pertinent to understanding human experience. It not only makes possible an understanding of the place of logic, grammar, and rhetoric within the broader Aristotelian metaphysic. It also makes possible

24 See Koridze’s quite insightful remark cited in note 283 in chapter three above as well as the whole of sections 3.3 Beyond the Categories: The Ontology of Second Intentions and 3.4 A Brief Hervaean Catalogue of Second Intentions.
an explication of the kind of being involved in moral and social actions as well as in the products of human technical prowess.

Such matters are most certainly outside of Hervaeus's treatise. Nevertheless, the Doctor perspicacissimus does provide a model for some of the topics to be covered in such a project.

25 By the 14th century, the distinction between esse naturae and esse morale would play a role akin to that between esse naturae and esse objectivum (or intentionale). The role of this distinction can be noted in John Capreolus’s response to Durandus of St. Pourçain, though the vocabulary is not unique to him. It has its antecedents in numerous medieval figures, including Augustine, Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas. See the remarks of Servais Pinckaers in John Capreolus, On the Virtues, ed. and trans. Kevin White and Romanus Cessario (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), xvii-xix.

Esse morale pertains to the “moral ordering” Aquinas notes in his introductory remarks regarding the Nicomachean Ethics. On this, see notes 268-272 in the first chapter above. From the Hervaeus perspective, this kind of moral ordering is only noted with regard to rhetorical and grammatical matters. As discussed at length in the fourth chapter above, the main point is that in order to understand a given word as being (e.g.) “an adjective,” it is necessary to take into account the fact that “being an adjective” implies some kind of human choice—whether explicit or at least implicitly through cultural accumulation. Thus, such a consideration differs from a “purely natural” consideration of the sound, which considers it only in its esse naturae (or reale), as one would in a science like acoustics. Likewise, such a grammatical consideration differs from logic insofar as logic is about the relations that arise from the very nature of the intellect (leaving out of consideration the role of choice / human institution). Even the consideration of “green” as an adjective is about “greenness” insofar as it includes the kind of objective and moral being that “wrap” what would otherwise be a mind-independent notion. It is about a thing as a particular kind of object, namely a known and chosen (i.e. customarily instituted) thing.

This point is explained very well by Robert Sokolowski (especially showing how “seeing” something as being chosen is not a matter of mere mental projection). See Robert Sokolowski, Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 27-28: “Identifying four cars moving is not as unproblematic as it might seem at first sight, and identifying four cars being driven is even more perplexing. Once we have identified them as being cars and being drive, we have already introduced dimensions in which ‘being chosen’ and ‘being done for that purpose’ belong. We do not project something mental into the bodily when we bring in the chosen and the willed; we simply unpack the aspects that show up when we identify four cars being driven on Connecticut Avenue. . . . If we see them as cars being driven—and not as leaves falling from a tree or as grass growing through the sidewalk or objects just rolling down the street—we must also see them with these colorations. And in the case of some cars we might also be able to determine whether they are chosen or not and what they are chosen for. . . . These are categorical recognitions similar to recognizing someone’s approach as threatening or someone’s smile as friendly.” See also the essay of Martin Rhonheimer, “Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to Richard McCormick,” The Thomist 49, no.2 (1995): 279-311. For an introduction to how some later day scholastics would deal with aspects of the problem (at much greater length and precision), see Leonard Lehu, Philosophia Moralis et Socialis (Paris: LeCoffre, 1914), 72-166. Likewise, Leonard Lehu, La raison: règle de la moralité d’après Saint Thomas (Paris: LeCoffre, 1930).

26 See note 71 in chapter four above. This is related to the moral order discussed in the previous footnote, though the social order includes the notion of the common good. Later scholastic discussions of esse morale would take this up in greater detail. A clear, non-technical presentation (indeed, from the perspective of mind-dependent relations) can be found in Heinrich A. Rommen, “Social Being,” in The State in Catholic Thought (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1955), 33-56.

More specifically, he helps to provide a vocabulary for the Thomistic and Scotistic use of the acts of intellection and objective existence to explain the domain and nature of logic as a science of second intentions, i.e. of mind-dependent relations "created" in the process of human defining, predicating, and reasoning. Of course, one should not read Hervaeus as being either purely Thomistic or Scotistic. He is an independent thinker in the De secundis intentionibus. Nevertheless, he should be seen as part of this larger conversation, providing an important voice regarding the nature of logic and opening pathways for metaphysical discussions of non-being, which given all that has been said in the course of this dissertation, should now appear as playing an incalculably important role in human experience. For this accomplishment, the De secundis intentionibus deserves an important place in the history of medieval Aristotelian logic and, especially, metaphysics.

28 Though, recall that insofar as they are not "real", such logical relation-creating is not the kind of logical demiurgy decried, for instance, by Tedesco. See his works, cited in note 31 in chapter one.

Indeed, see Hervaeus’s remarks in DSIDoyle, q.5 a.2 (p.535:6-19): “Et primo ostendo istam minorem ex hoc quod ens rationis non habet causam per se. Ad cuius evidentiam scienium est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ens rationis non ponit formaliter aliquam entitatem realem in eo de quo dicitur, licet supponat aliquam entitatem sine qua nullo modo esset ens rationis.

Propter quod, sicut dictum fuit, nec habet causam per se. Unde quod vere dicatur de aliquo quod sit res intellecta, non habet causam ponentem aliquid in re intellecta. Et quando dicitur quod aliquid est factum intellectum, ista factio non convenit ipsi intellecto nisi secundum rationem intelligendi. Ita etiam et ea quae consequuntur rem intellectam, ut est obiective in intellectu, non habent factionem, nec habent per se causam efficientem. Puta quod homo, vel aliquod consimile, sit abstractum vel universale, non habet causam efficientem nec factionem per se. Sed factio, realiter in intellectu actu intelligendi abstracte et in universali representaente rem intellectam prout est obiective in intellectu consequitur abstractum esse et esse universale.”
Appendix One: Intentional Reception of Forms and “Supervenience”

In the body of this dissertation, I noted that contemporary analytic discussions of “supervenience” have some relevance with regard to scholastic disputes regarding the causality involved in second intentions. However, one must be careful not to rely too much on this sort of language, as it comes with certain post-Cartesian “baggage” that can lead one to misunderstand the scholastic issue at hand. Placed in basic outline, the issues come down to two domains of causality—the subjective causality involved in the knowing process and what might be termed the “intentional” or “objective” causality involved in the reception of forms by knowers. In general, philosophers of mind focus on the question of how mental states might be said to supervene on brain states. In this dissertation, we are actually concerned with a slightly different question—namely, the supervenience of second intentional properties upon things known (recall again Hervaeus’s focus ex parte obiecti).

A related (though not wholly isomorphic) nexus of issues was dealt with in an early-career article by John Deely in which he was concerned with the relation between words, concepts, brain states, and things. In particular, see remarks from his 1975 article, “Reference to the Non-Existent”:

Physical marks, sounds or movements, when functioning in discourse, undergo—thanks to C [i.e. some intraorgasmic factor enabling this change]—a singular and mysterious “elevation” (as Cajetan puts it), during which they exist in a higher way than is proper to them as observable, physical occurrences, and they do so inasmuch as they are the objective effects of the intraorganismic factor C—the concept or idea—within the speaker and hearer of language, a factor which, as it functions in discourse, is itself no more directly inspectable than the significance it causes. This is the point of view proper to a would-be philosophy of language . . . . The point is not to deny that brain states are somehow correlative with and indeed necessary conditions for the existence of
ideas. It is simply to point out the error of reductively identifying C, as that which is conditioned, with a brain state, as that which doubtless conditions C. Whatever difficulties one may have with the terminology of ideas and concepts, they are as nothing compared to the difficulties consequent upon the failure to grasp this principle: the conditioned as such is always other than its necessary and even sufficient conditions” (bold emphasis added).¹

Deely’s selection here is a bit ambiguous regarding the distinction between the subjective and the objective information by the concept (which his tradition of Thomism would have differentiated by using the post-Suarezian vocabulary of formal and objective concepts). A few additional remarks are necessary to clarify the point, for it is important to consider how a kind of supervenience was deployed by a school of thought that, nonetheless, retained the overall character of its scholastic vocabulary.

According to the developed Baroque Thomist position, higher orders do indeed question “supervene” upon the lower, precisely because knowers (even brute animals) receive forms in a loftier, immaterial manner than does non-knower receives forms into its subjective constitution. Although both knower and non-knower must “become other” (i.e. subjectively, or by subjective union) in order to know, knowledge itself implies becoming the other as such (the other inasmuch as it is other, i.e. objectively, or by objective union). This holds from the very start of sense cognition and increases in complexity throughout the elaboration undertaken by the internal sense powers and, in the case of human knowers, in the intellectual apprehension and elaboration of knowledge of reality.

Because of various ecclesiastical factors (e.g. the promotion of Thomism in late-19th and early-20th century scholasticism), the Thomist school articulated this matter at great detail in the 20th century. One must note, however, that to speak here of “supervenience” requires that one use a vocabulary very different from that of contemporary analytic philosophy. The articulation

of “the supervenience of second intentions” will require the deployment of notions including but not limited to: (1) extrinsic formal causality, (2) relationes secundum esse, (3) immateriality (in sensation and in intellection), (4) objective causality (of the phantasm in specifying knowledge), (5) the illumination of the phantasm, (6) subjective (or, physical) information, (7) intentional information, (8) virtual productivity, (9) immanent action, and (10) metaphysical and transcendental action. In addition, an account of reflexive cognition is needed to explain how one comes to know these at-first-unknown supervenient cognitional properties accruing to the thing as known.

A profound discussion of the distinction between material and intentional (or, objective) reception of forms in cognition is found in Simon’s *Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge*, cited on several occasions above. Although the whole text should be consulted, see in particular the first chapter for a dialectical discussion of the distinction between physical nature and cognition. In addition, one should consult his “An Essay on Sensation.”

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within this tradition of Thomism, there are two levels of causality involved in all cognoscitive beings—the intentional (or, objective) and the physical.

In particular, consider the following remark in Simon’s *Introduction*:

Just as an effect, as effect, is definable only in relation to a cause, so an object of cognition, as object and in its form of object, can be defined only in relation to the subject that confronts it, or, even better, in relation to the faculty whose act it causes to be a particular kind of act. Thus describing the object of knowledge *in its form as object* is equivalent to revealing the nature of its relation with the knowing subject or the cognitive faculty.4

He is careful to add in a footnote: “The analogy is incomplete. The case of divine causality aside, the relation of causality is a real relation both in the cause and in the effect; the relation of objectivity is real only in the subject.”5 The latter remark is quite “Hervaean” in its implications.

Similar discussions are undertaken in L.-M. Régis’s *Epistemology*. One suspects in reading Régis that he has benefitted immensely from the Thomistic school’s reflections on these matters, though his notes are heavily reliant only on Aquinas’s texts.6 Like Schmidt’s study cited above, Régis tends toward an amassing of texts, in reality creating his own new synthesis of Aquinas’s thought, though with the deceptive assurance that one can do this without knowing the long controversies that required latter-day Thomists to explicate their master’s texts at such detail.

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4 Simon *Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge*, 7.
5 Ibid., 7n12.
The clearest (though perhaps overly schematized) account of these matters can be found in the notes of Fr. Austin Woodbury, who has been cited in several notes above. Unfortunately, in the iconoclasm that struck the world of Catholic philosophy throughout the 1960s and beyond, Fr. Woodbury’s thought, like that of so many others of all religious orders and scholae, passed into desuetude, although at the height of his Aquinas Academy, he would regularly draw hundreds of students weekly to attend his lectures on Thomistic philosophy and theology.

Although his notes’ style lacks the excellent readability found in Simon, the sweeping philosophizing of thinkers like Maritain, or the careful historical-textual reflections of Gilson and his school, Fr. Woodbury’s philosophical notes far excel anything currently in the English speaking world as a representation of Roman Thomism, which maintained the energetic spirit of engagement with competing scholae by way of mediation through commentators such as John Capreolus, Thomas de Vio Cajetan, John Poinsot, the Salamanca Carmelites, et al. Whether or not (as Tavuzzi would have it) these commentators were favored for adventitious reasons (e.g. Cajetan’s role as Master General), this tradition, like any commentatorial tradition, kept alive an active dialogue and vocabulary for addressing the subtle and penetrating critiques launched against the Thomistic school by Scotists, nominalists, Suarezians, and others.

On the issue of the distinction between entitative and intentional reception of forms, one should consult Woodbury’s notes philosophical psychology. These pages are perhaps the clearest English-language recapitulation of a tradition of philosophy that robustly engages with

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7 Fr. Woodbury, S.M. was a student of philosophy and theology at the Angelicum in the 1930s. A brief account of his life can be found in Austin M. Woodbury, Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Andrew Francis Wood (Sydney, Australia: Donum Dei Press, 2016), iii-xlv.

8 Austin Woodbury, Natural Philosophy, The John N. Deely and Anthony F. Russell Collection, St. Vincent College Library, Latrobe, PA, 472-578.
the other scholae in a magnanimous manner. Mr. Andrew Wood of Sydney Australia is working to have them published.

Two texts are particularly illuminating regarding our concerns. First, as regards the definition of knowledge as such (whether sensitive or intellectual):

Knowledge is to be defined as “having something in self formally and not materially.” Wherein signifies: both “according to its form” and “after the manner of form,” that is: not subjectively and therefore, nor physically, nor compositively but, rather, objectively and therefore supra-physically, incompositively, and according to “not materially,” or immaterially. Wherefore, it may be said that [to] know is [to] communicate immaterially in the very form of something, to wit, of the known. Accordingly, knowledge may equivalently be defined, “Having form in self immaterially or objectively.”

And as regards the perfection involved in having a form immaterially:

Therefore, whereas the having of form materially bespeaks potency and imperfection, the having of form immaterially or cognoscitively bespeaks act and perfection. For which reason knowledge can be formally (not merely virtually) attributed to God. Wherefrom it is clear that knowledge is not an act of the imperfect, as form informing entitatively is an act of matter or of potency, and as movement is the act of the mobile, but [instead, knowledge] is an act of the perfect. [It also follows] that there is a specific distinction and an infinite gulf between plant an animal. There is indeed between plant and animal [a] natural or philosophic specific distinction, for plants are such that they have forms only materially, or as matter has form; whereas an animal, since it has knowledge, has forms immaterially, or not as matter has form. Wherefore, this distinction is: according to be and be-not, that is, according to be-having-form-immaterially and be-not-having-form-immaterially.

As regards the relationship between knowledge (i.e. intentional reception of the other as other) and subjective reception of forms (i.e. physical reception of the other), one should consult Woodbury’s remarks further on in the same text, where he discusses the issue of intellection’s

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9 Ibid., n.630 (p.500).
10 Ibid., n.631 (p.506).
virtual productivity of the concept. On the same topic, one can profitably consult relevant comments by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.

To connect these matters directly to this dissertation’s concerns, we can say the following. As regards the intentional (or, objective) reception of forms by the speculative intellect in its three operations, various relations accrue to the known form such that the causality involved is purely of the intentional (or, objective) order, whatever might be the subjective / esse-naturae order of causality involved the knowing process. These relations supervene on any “real” causality involved in the process. These relationes rationis are “second” intentions precisely because they accrue not to the known thing but to the known thing as known. Hervaeus only begins to sound these issues in the De secundis intentionibus. As noted above, there are many difficult topics that need to be explicated for a full and robust philosophical discussion of these matters.

11 See ibid., n.696-713 (p.567-578). Some writers, such as Yves Floucat think that such discussions bear the mark of Scotist accretion upon Aquinas’s thought. See Floucat, L’intime fécondité de l’intelligence, 111-117. The resolution of this controversy is not this dissertation’s immediate concern. Nonetheless, Woodbury’s philosophical arguments bear the mark of a robust philosophical conversation with scholastics after Aquinas. As is well known, the theme was very important among thinkers in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, including Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Duns Scotus, Peter John Olivi, et al.

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