Thomas Aquinas and the Method of Predication in Metaphysics

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St. Thomas Aquinas sometimes uses strictly conceptual and logical insights to draw insights about things in reality. I show that, throughout his career, Aquinas’s metaphysics employs a logical procedure that he calls the “method of predication” (*modus praedicandi*). This method consists in using what logic teaches about modes of predicating as a tool for deductive reasoning in metaphysics.

The first chapter examines passages in Aquinas’s Commentaries on *De Trinitate* and on the *Metaphysics* that describe this method of predication or “logical method” as a “fitting” and “proper” way for metaphysics to proceed. This chapter also provides the context for Aquinas’s method by identifying some important classical and contemporaneous sources (Aristotle, Boethius, Averroes), including a discussion on topical arguments and the distinction between doctrinal and instrumental logic (*logica docens*, *logica utens*).

In chapters two and three, I consider the realist framework behind the method of predication. I discuss *cognitive* realism in chapter two focusing on the origin and role of essence or nature (absolutely considered) in predication. I offer an account of how concepts and predications are ultimately caused by (real) things. I discuss *metaphysical* realism in chapter three focusing on the relationship between the subject of logic, rationate being (*ens rationis*), and the subject of metaphysics (*ens communis*), which is real being (*ens naturae*). This chapter
finishes with an examination of essential being (*ens secundum se*) and different types of predication (e.g., *per se, per participationem, denomative*).

In chapter four, after examining Aquinas’s rejection of similar types of arguments from previous authors (Parmenides, Plato, Avicebron), I consider the application of the method of predication to various metaphysical issues. Aquinas uses the method of predication in many different contexts. He uses it in order to derive different properties and categories of being, to distinguish *esse* from essence, to establish the unicity of the substantial form, and to justify the reality of prime matter in a properly metaphysical fashion. These arguments are analyzed for their soundness, and the interpretation of some authors are taken into consideration.
This dissertation by Gaston G. LeNotre fulfills the dissertation requirements for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D., as Director, and by Timothy Noone, Ph.D., and Michael Gorman, Ph.D., as Readers.

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Gregory T. Doolan, Ph. D., Director

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Timothy B. Noone, Ph. D., Reader

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Michael Gorman, Ph. D., Reader
To Kate, Beatrice, Bernard, and Gerard
naturale desiderium rationalis creaturae est
ad sciemum omnia illa quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus;
et haec sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes earum,
quae in Deo videbit quilibet videns essentiam divinam.

— St. Thomas Aquinas

Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedanke, die Notenschrift, die Schallwellen,
stehen alle in jener abbildenden internen Beziehung zu einander
die zwischen Sprache und Welt besteht.
Ihnen allen ist der logische Bau gemeinsam.

— Ludwig Wittgenstein
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ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>De malo</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de malo</td>
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<td>De potentia</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei</td>
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<td>De sensu et sensato</td>
<td>Sententia libros De Sensu et Sensato</td>
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<td>De spiritualibus creaturis</td>
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<td>De veritate</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de veritate</td>
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<td>In De anima</td>
<td>Sententia libros De anima</td>
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<tr>
<td>In De Gen et Cor.</td>
<td>Sententia libros De generatione et corruptione</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In De Hebdomadibus</td>
<td>Expositio libri Boetii de epublicsae</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Ethic.</td>
<td>Sententia libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum Expositio</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Meta.</td>
<td>In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio</td>
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<td>In Peri. erm.</td>
<td>Expositio libri Perymenias</td>
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<td>In Phys.</td>
<td>In octos libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio</td>
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<td>In Post. an.</td>
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<td>In Sent.</td>
<td>Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDdA</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de anima</td>
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<td>QDdVirt</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus</td>
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<td>Quodlibeta</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
<td>Summa contra Gentiles</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>Summa theologiae</td>
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<tr>
<td>Super Ioannem</td>
<td>Super Evangelium S. Ionnis Lectura</td>
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1. The Question of Philosophical Method in Historical Context

The term “method” comes from the ancient Greek for pursuing a way, μέθοδος, (μετα, after; ὁδός, a way), but the sense of ‘systematic arrangement’ is not in the Greek. That sense of method comes much later in the 16th century and following.¹ Those studying mathematics and natural science rely on various types of method in the sense of a system of rules: some authors use an experimental method (e.g. Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke), some an exhaustive classification of individual observations (e.g. Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill), and some a mathematical method of the physical sciences (e.g. Galileo Galilei, Isaac Newton). Even today, “the scientific method” is a phrase that signifies one method for all the sciences.²

As Thomas Aquinas understands it, however, the method of metaphysics (“first philosophy”) does not use the same method of other sciences, especially not in the modern sense of “a set of rules for finding truth.”³ Method (modus) is a mode of operation for Thomas. The mode of operation (“method”) in metaphysics is to analyze (resolvere) and to synthesize (componere) the reasons/explanations for things, reasons that are either outside of the thing


³ See Mark D. Jordan, Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourses in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986). “There is no philosophic ‘method’ in Aquinas as there is a ‘method’ for many of the moderns. It is rather that Thomas’s notion of the mind and its workings save him from thinking there could be such a thing as a method, a set of rules for finding truth, in philosophy. . . . For Thomas, methodus is not a guarantor of truth; it is the summary of experience in inquiry. It does not set out the conditions which are to be met; it only recalls how thing have been found to be” (191).
The question about a method specific to philosophy has puzzled many philosophers before and after Thomas’s time. In his *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933), a rare work devoted to outlining a method specific to philosophy, R. G. Collingwood offers a historical introduction to the question of method from the perspective of someone outside of the Thomistic or scholastic tradition. I wish to briefly rely on his historical account as a jumping off point in order to quickly situate ourselves within history and in order to appreciate both the question of philosophical method and Thomas’s own answer to that question.

Beginning with Socrates and Plato, Collingwood faults Socrates for not explicitly distinguishing between the mathematical method and the dialectical (philosophical) method, and he credits Plato for distinguishing them in his divided line. Collingwood explains that Plato distinguishes the method of mathematics and philosophy in the way each uses a hypothesis.

Mathematics uses hypotheses to arrive at conclusions, and philosophy uses hypotheses to reach the principle of everything, which is the good. Despite this distinction in scope and method, Collingwood faults Plato’s account of method for not further differentiating the method of philosophy from that of mathematics.

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4 See Thomas Aquinas, *De Trinitate* q. 6, a. 1c., ed. Commissio Leonina (Rome-Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992), vol. 50.162:360-382. I explain what these Latin terms mean below and in chapter four.


6 “[In mathematics the mind ‘goes from hypotheses not to a principle but to a conclusion’, whereas in dialectic it ‘goes from hypotheses to a non-hypothetical principle’; and this is further explained by saying that geometricians posit triangles and so forth as hypotheses, and admit no argument about them, but proceed on this basis to demonstrate their conclusions; whereas in dialectic we use hypotheses not as principles, but as the hypotheses which they are, employing them as stepping-stones to reach something which is not an hypothesis but the principle of everything.” See Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, 12-13.
After Plato, Collingwood leaps into the 17th “century of genius” where he outlines two philosophical waves that each started with a treatise on method:

Since the close of the Middle Ages there have been two great constructive movements in philosophy: the Cartesian, following upon the scepticism that dissolved the medieval systems of thought, and the Kantian, following upon the scepticism of the eighteenth century. Each was marked by a general agreement, such as must always exist in any period of achievement and progress, concerning the principles of method; and each was opened, and its main principles were laid down, by a methodological treatise.⁷

These methodological treatises are, of course, René Descartes’s *Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and For Seeking the Truth in the Sciences* (1637) and Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), which Kant himself describes as a “treatise on the method.”⁸

Collingwood retells Descartes’s methodology in light of Socrates’ own: “Socrates had found in mathematics a model for dialectical reasoning; Descartes, disgusted with the dialectic of the schools, went back to the same model, and described the lessons he learnt there under four heads: the canons of evidence, division, order, and exhaustion.”⁹ Like Socrates, however, Descartes did not distinguish between the methods of philosophy and mathematics. In fact, according to Collingwood, “the problem of a special method appropriate to philosophy is one

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⁸ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 113: “Now the concern of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in that attempt to transform the accepted procedures of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution according to the example of the geometers and natural scientists. It is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself” (B xxii).
which he has not raised.” The title of Descartes’s *Discourse on the Method* even tells the reader that there is, for Descartes, only one method (*la méthode*) for discovering truth.

For his part, Kant acutely senses Descartes’ confusion. According to Collingwood, Kant claims that philosophy can proceed without definitions, axioms, or demonstrations. Whereas in mathematical proofs one proceeds “from point to point in a chain of grounds and consequents,” in philosophical proofs one “must always be ready to go back and revise [one’s] premisses when errors, undetected in them, reveal themselves in the conclusion.” Kant masterfully distinguishes between philosophy and mathematics, but the critical nature itself of Kant’s method makes it unsatisfactory. It was not clear to Kant nor to his followers, according to Collingwood, the relation between the propaedeutic nature of the critical method and philosophy itself. The very separation of philosophy into a critical propaedeutic and a substantive metaphysics, that is, prevents Kant from presenting a unified and positive account of philosophical method.

What results from such a basic failure to understand the method of philosophy, according to Collingwood, is “rubbish on the ground” left over from methodological ideas of the 19th century that is “impediment to sight and an obstacle to progress.” In order to avoid a philosophical wasteland, in other words, we need to find a method that is aligned with what

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10 Ibid., 18.
11 Ibid., 22-23.
12 “[Kant] had impaled himself on the horns of a dilemma. If the methodology of philosophy (*Kritik*) is a pro-paedeutic to philosophy itself (*Metaphysik*), the name of philosophical science (*Wissenschaff*) cannot belong to them both; and we get the result, either that this name must be denied to the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself, a paradox rightly rejected by Kant’s followers, or that it belongs exclusively to the propaedeutic and must be denied to substantive philosophy, which was from Kant’s own point of view still more paradoxical. But on the other alternative, if methodology is a part of philosophy, Kant’s programme collapses; for we can no longer hope to settle the methodological problems once for all and then go on with the substantive philosophy, because any advance in that will react upon and reopen the problems of methodology.” See Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, 21.
makes philosophy a distinct field, so much so that the method itself considers the subject of philosophy. In the metaphysics of Thomas, this subject is being as being. Thomas moreover finds being as being through predication: “Those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science. But the term ‘being’ is thus predicated of all beings.”¹⁴ Predication thus serves a tool for Thomas in metaphysics. Although many twentieth century Anglo-American philosophers have also turned to logic and language as a method (or tool) for understanding reality and metaphysics, in what may be called “The Linguistic Turn,”¹⁵ we limit our focus here to the thought of a thirteenth century Friar named Thomas of Aquino.

2. Status Quaestionis

2.1 State of the Question on Thomas’s General Method of Metaphysics

In the only commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate written in the thirteenth century, the young Master Thomas of Aquino produces “his most elaborate reflections on the epistemology

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¹⁴ See Thomas Aquinas, In IV Meta. lect. 1, no. 534, eds. by M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950), 18.151: “Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce, sed analogice de his prae dicetur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem: sed ens hoc modo prae dicatur de omnibus entibus: ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens inquantum est ens, scilicet tam substantias quam accidentia.”

¹⁵ This phrase (“The Linguistic Turn”) was popularised by the first printing (1967) of a monograph of various essays in The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method with Two Retrospective Essays, ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Some early representatives of this methodological turn to language include Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987), and Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000). We do not treat these authors’ ideas or that of analytic philosophy in this dissertation. For a like-minded interpretation and defense of Thomas’s metaphysics in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy, see Turner C. Nevitt, “Aquinas on Essence and Existence” (Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 2015).
of the sciences” (1257-1259). This commentary specifically asks about the methods (de modis) of the speculative sciences, including whether divine science proceeds intellectually. Thomas uses the Aristotelian phrase, “divine science,” for one science under the different names of theology, metaphysics, and first philosophy, which consider the same objects, which are most removed from the indeterminacy of matter and motion, what we can call positively immaterial (e.g. God) and negatively immaterial objects (e.g. being). Thomas attributes to the divine science an “intellectual” method because it studies the most intelligible objects.

Despite the treatment by Thomas devoted to the method of metaphysics, a few notable authors overlook Thomas’s stated views. For example, in his introduction to his work on Thomas’s inner word (verbum), Bernard Lonergan sidesteps Thomas’s own treatment of a metaphysical method and instead makes a generalization: “For performance must precede reflection on performance, and method is the fruit of that reflection. Aquinas had to be content to perform.” Joseph Owens also does not mention Thomas’s Boethian Commentary in his articles

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17 De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1: “Deinde queritur de modis quos scientiis speculatiuis attribuit. Et circa hoc quieruntur quatuor: primo utrum oporteat utriusque naturalibus rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinariter, in divinis intellectualiter” (Leon. 50.157:1-5).


19 See Bernard Lonergan, Verbum, 10. Lonergan is still correct to state that interpreters have to expand upon Thomas’s metaphysical procedure. Although not strictly an interpretation of Thomas’s metaphysics, we might mention here the work of Oliva Blanchette, Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics
on Thomas’s metaphysical procedure. For example, he minimizes as only “preliminary”
Thomas’s methodical study of predication in *On Being and Essence (De ente et essentia)*:

> The relation of the subject of metaphysics to the elements of predication is, of course, only a preliminary aspect of the general problem regarding the approach to the science. The far more important issues at stake are the Thomistic demonstrations of the existence and nature of God and of the spirituality of the human soul. Primarily in relation to these should the question be discussed.\(^{20}\)

Instead, Owens argues that metaphysics first proceeds by considering the being of a sensible thing as something extrinsic to the thing itself and that from this starting-point the act of being can be traced to its source in God. Owens confesses that he finds “no other type of treatment . . . which could be characterized as [Thomas’s] metaphysical procedure.”\(^{21}\)

We find many of Thomas’s interpreters who attempt to explain Thomas’s statements on a metaphysical method. In “What is St. Thomas’s Approach to Metaphysics?”, Henri Renard rejects the view that Thomas’s metaphysical method consists of “intuitive insights” and “existential moments.”\(^{22}\) Rather, Thomas’s method of metaphysics is a way of resolution, according to Renard, that “proceeds by way of reasoned arguments based upon intellectual analyses of conceptual knowledge, which have been obtained through abstractions, judgments,

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\(^{21}\) Ibid., 467-68. “It is perhaps not going too far, moreover, to suggest that the other expressions of Thomistic metaphysical procedure may in one way or another, according to the circumstances of their context, be reduced to this basic type of reasoning” (468). In other words, Owens seems to think that the true metaphysical procedure is according to external causes (*secundum rem*) alone. See also Owens’s “The ‘Analytics’ and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure,” *Mediaeval Studies* (1964): 83-108.

and reasonings.” Renard claims that, for Thomas, the “analyses of conceptual knowledge” even reveals the subject of the sciences. In its analysis of substance, for example, the intellect can form a judgment of separation revealing no necessary connection of substance with matter, for substance is that to whose quiddity is not to be in another.

In “Analyse et Synthèse,” Louis-Marie Régis discusses the resolutive (or analytical) aspect of Thomas’s methodology. Régis brings together texts from both Thomas and his sources to show resolution both as a method of discovery preceding composition and as a way of judgment following composition in order to confirm what has already been discovered.

Edmund Dolan also discusses the importance of the resolutive method. He distinguishes between two different types of resolution that are either “strict” and “loose” depending on whether the method of reasoning applies to speculative or practical discourse. According to Dolan, we use the way of composition in speculative discourse only in the loose sense because it ends with simpler causes. Siegfried Neumann’s Gegenstand und Methode considers the general method outlined in Thomas’s Boethian Commentary. Neumann emphasizes Thomas’s need for a preliminary understanding or insight (intellectus) of being before the rational analysis of being. The rational analysis according to being’s “inner, intelligible, constituted reasons” (according to

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23 Ibid., 64.
24 Ibid., 71.
25 Ibid., 72-73.
intrinsic causes) results in the insight into the many attributes of being, and the analysis according to extrinsic causes results in insight into immaterial beings.  

James C. Doig’s *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, John F. Wippel’s “‘First Philosophy’ according to Thomas,” and Jan Aertsen’s “Method and Metaphysics” continue the discussion of dual axes in Thomas’s methodology: on one axis we find the way of resolution and the way of composition, and on another axis we find a way according to intrinsic causes and a way according to extrinsic causes. The divine science is chiefly resolutive. It is called “metaphysics” when it proceeds according to intrinsic causes by considering being, and it is called “first philosophy” when it proceeds according to extrinsic causes by considering God and the separate substances. As Aertsen puts it, “Both termini of the two resolutions, namely, the immaterial substances and that which is common to all beings, constitute precisely that of which divine science treats.”

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Eileen Sweeney provides us with three distinct notions of resolutive method in her sweeping article, “Three Notions of Resolutio and the Structure of Reasoning in Aquinas.” In this article, she interweaves the direct and indirect sources (Calcidius, Aristotle, Proclus, Scotus Erigena, Pappus of Alexandria) for Thomas’s complex notion of resolution used in various fields of inquiry (practical/theoretical, physical/metaphysical). All three notions of resolution reiterate “a discursive and dialectical structure,” according to Sweeney, that begin from a “starting-point” known incompletely and confusedly and return to that starting-point “with more distinct and complete knowledge.”

The first sense of resolution, according to Sweeney, is a kind of division or reduction. Sources for this notion include Calcidius and Bonaventure who both liken this sense of resolutio to the dissolutio of bodies into the four elements, and another source includes Aristotle who analyses the term “substance” as meaning both matter and form (Met. 7.4.1028b33ff.). Sweeney suggests that Aristotle and Thomas reject this sense of resolution as “decomposition or division . . . as the path to ultimate principles and explanations” when applied to matter as substance because matter does not have the characteristics of substance. The upshot is that this sense of resolution is only exploratory. The opposite movement, compositio, “follows resolutio as union follows separation,” and reconstructs the object by reintegrating the genera, qualities, and forms.

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32 Ibid., 206.
33 Ibid., 210. We shall in chapter four discuss this sense of resolution employed in the proof for prime matter by way of predication. I agree with Sweeney insofar as Thomas rejects this sense of resolution as the only or sufficient path to ultimate explanations.
and resolutio precedes that reconstruction. It is a “preliminary movement of reason, a first sorting out of a complex and indistinctly known whole.”\textsuperscript{34}

The second sense of resolution, according to Sweeney, is reversion. Taking from the Neoplatonic notion of returning to the One, this sense of resolution is a “confirmatory movement” that ends (not with simple components, such as the four elements and matter, but) with “higher and more universal causes and general principles.”\textsuperscript{35} In this sense of resolution, Sweeney states that we resolve propositions to the principle of non-contradiction, arguments to the first figure of the syllogism, the properties of being to being, and created things to God within metaphysics. It is in this sense of resolution that we have science of something for Thomas: “not merely in knowing it but rather in knowing it in or resolving it into its higher and simpler principles and causes.”\textsuperscript{36}

The third sense of resolution, according to Sweeney, is opposed to demonstration. This resolutive process discovers the path from premises to conclusions by figuring out from the conclusion what to do by working backwards from the end to be achieved. This sense of resolution is used by Thomas in his discussion of the method in moral reasoning, which we are not as concerned about because metaphysics seems to proceed differently. In sum, we can state with Sweeney that all three senses of resolution signify an incomplete movement requiring composition to form a “circle” of reasoning which begins from and returns to that from which it started with greater understanding. Although Thomas describes the method of metaphysics as

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 207 and 215.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 225.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 228.
chiefly intellectual, the interplay of resolution and composition indicates, according to Sweeney, a “dialectical structure” or intellectual interplay of reasoning.  

2.2 State of the Question on Thomas’s Method of Predication in Metaphysics

Although Thomas’s general method in metaphysics of composition and resolution must always be kept in mind, this dissertation is not about Thomas’s general method of metaphysics. It is about a specific method that metaphysics sometimes adopts from the logician’s point of view, which as we shall argue Thomas calls the “method of predication.” The study of this type of “dialectical” or “rational” processes in Thomas’s metaphysics arose in the 1950s and 1960s culminating in some monographs specifically devoted to Thomas’s logic, which later influenced scholarship on the medieval derivation of Aristotle’s categories. With a renewed focus on Thomas’s own teachings on logic as a method in metaphysics, we turn to the insights of

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37 Ibid., 238-40. “Ultimately and in all senses the need for resolution and composition, the movements describing and circumscribing the dialectical structure of our reasoning, is a mark of the imperfection of our imitation of the divine intellect in us, of human reason as sequential rather than synoptic, as discursive rather than intuitive, in short, as incomplete yet directed from and toward principles” (243).


several of the most important interpreters of Thomas in this area: James C. Doig, James B. Reichmann, Jan Aertsen, and Rudi Te Velde.

2.2.1 James C. Doig

Doig’s Aquinas on Metaphysics includes a discussion on the method of metaphysics supporting his previous article on the topic, “Aquinas on Metaphysical Method.” Critics either demurred (Wippel) or reproached (Bourke and Dewan) the book, and they more or less ignored Doig’s lengthy treatment on Thomas’s method of metaphysics. Doig approaches the Commentary on the Metaphysics from a unique, historical viewpoint. The argument he makes is that Averroes’s Commentary on the Metaphysics was accepted in Thomas’s time, so Thomas’s purpose in writing a commentary must have been to correct Averroes. Whenever Thomas does not correct Averroes, Thomas must be agreeing with the Commentator. Doig concludes quite

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43 I say “more or less” because John F. Wippel mentions “method of predication” as one of Doig’s chapter titles in his Review of “Aquinas on Metaphysics. A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics by James C. Doig,” Speculum 52 (1977), 133-135. Also, Lawrence Dewan criticizes Doig’s interpretation of the method of predication as rather incomplete in “St. Thomas, Metaphysics, and Formal Causality” in Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006): 131-166, esp. 132-152. “It is clear, then, that in metaphysics, to the extent that we have genuinely to do with the use of logical consideration, while we have what St. Thomas calls a way of beginning particularly suitable for metaphysics, we do not have scientific metaphysical procedure” (145). Dewan’s article is a reprint of “St. Thomas, Metaphysics, and Formal Causality,” Laval théologique et philosophique 36 (1980), 285-316.
plausibly that Thomas must agree with Averroes about the logical nature of the method of metaphysics because Thomas does not correct discussions of Averroes about it.\footnote{See Doig, \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 247-48.}

Doig also helpfully points out the difference between the metaphysician and the logician: even though the metaphysician follows the logical procedure of considering predication, he does not consider predication in “formal terms,” that is, according to the principles of the logician of species or genus.\footnote{See Doig, “Aquinas on Metaphysical Method,” 25ff.} According to Doig, Thomas instead considers “material logic.”\footnote{See Doig, \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 257. The terms “formal” and “material” logic are not Thomas’s own, but they help the modern reader to understand the difference between Thomas’s doctrinal (\textit{logica docens}) and applied logic (\textit{logica utens}). “We agree with Father Doig that doctrinal logic corresponds to the more modern term, \textit{formal} logic, and that applied logic is equivalent to what is now called \textit{material} logic.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 346, no. 6. Full citation below.} Since “all reality comes together in terms of concepts, the metaphysician considers common concepts such as being (\textit{communia}) in its role as a genus or as a species. Whereas “formal” logic studies a concept insofar as the mind has a certain way of relating one concept to another—that is, rules for predicating—metaphysics studies a concept insofar as it expresses the reality of each thing. Metaphysics looks at a concept as expressing the reality of things by “looking at its use” in predication.\footnote{See Doig, “Aquinas on Metaphysical Method,” 29-30; \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 251.}

Doig gives the example of ten ways to predicate something of John (ten predicaments) as ten ways to “express some necessary aspect of material things.”\footnote{See Doig, “Aquinas on Metaphysical Method,” 30-31; \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 259-60.} To say “John is a man,” for Thomas, is to say “John is that which is,” so according to Doig’s interpretation Thomas is looking at being-in-general (\textit{ens commune}) when he examines the content of the predicate, “man.” The predicate expresses something about the subject insofar as it is independent, which
we call “substance,” and the rest of the nine predicates express manners in which “that which is” can be. They “involve a reference” to that which is.\(^{49}\) By arguing based on the content of the predicate alone, however, Doig entirely avoids questions about the copula, the relation of predicate and subject, and the metaphysician’s critical appropriation of the logician’s viewpoint. In fact, Doig argues that the method of predication remains only on the level of simple apprehension and involves “no study of judgment.”\(^{50}\)

Doig argues that, in examining the notion of “that which is,” Thomas also relies on the method of predication to discover the essence-\(esse\) composition in things by examining the content of ‘man’ as something having humanity (\(habens humanitatem\)) so that the “to be” (\(esse\)) of John is to be a man. In order to argue in this logical manner, Doig must reconstruct rather circuitously Thomas’s arguments from passages throughout Thomas’s \textit{Commentary on the Metaphysics}.\(^{51}\) Doig also reconstructs, this time without spanning the whole work, Thomas’s proof for matter (the distinction of matter and form) by way of predication.\(^{52}\) We should state by way of conclusion that Doig’s overwhelming focus is on the Commentary on the \textit{Metaphysics}, and he does not mention the “logical method” of Thomas’s Commentary on \textit{De Trinitate} (q. 6, a. 1a).

\(^{49}\) See Doig, \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 250-51, 259ff.
\(^{50}\) See Doig, “Aquinas on Metaphysical Method,” 33ff.; \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 253ff. “The only method of discovering how a concept expresses reality is to examine our concepts in their very act of expressing reality—in predication, that is, in understanding or apprehension” (256). We agree with Doig that the method of predication is a study of concepts, but Doig seems to think that concepts are only expressed by the first act of the mind. That is a mistaken interpretation of Thomas. For discussion, see chapter two.
\(^{52}\) See Doig, \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 275-80, 316-323.
2.2.2 James B. Reichmann

We turn now to Reichmann’s “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” published only a year after Doig’s article, “Aquinas on Metaphysical Method.”

In his article, Reichmann offers his reader an exegesis on the three rational methods presented by Thomas in his Commentary on De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1a). The “first” rational method is the method that metaphysics employs. Reichmann correctly identifies this method as stemming from and involving “the operations of reason and their products,” such as genus, species, opposition and similar beings of reason.

This rational method differs from the “second” rational method because the second one ends with probable opinion and is “indistinguishable from a purely dialectical process.” By contrast, according to Reichmann, the rational method of metaphysics is “not strictly a logical investigation.” We shall explain this view below.

One of the most important distinctions that Reichmann raises in order to explain the first rational method employed by metaphysics is the distinction between doctrinal logic (logica docens) and applied logic (logica utens). Reichmann points out the unique ability of metaphysics to remain a real science of metaphysics while employing logic as a doctrinal science about things (logica docens). Reichmann emphasizes Thomas’s statement that metaphysics “properly” and “suitably” employs doctrinal logic, and it can do so in a unique way because of

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54 Ibid., 344-50.
55 Ibid., 349.
56 Ibid., 345-46. The third sense of “rational” reflects man’s rational, discursive, mode of knowing through natural science.
57 Ibid., 349.
the “affinity” between metaphysics and logic. Together with logic, metaphysics is a common science, possessing a subject that includes all things.59 Doctrinal logic comprises the consideration of definitions, propositions, and other beings of reason “exclusively from the viewpoint of their intentional existence” and yet directed toward “a scientific and ordered grasp of the world of singular existents.”60 As I will show in this dissertation, Reichmann correctly assesses that doctrinal logic continues to be logic (“dialectics”) when applied to the special sciences, but that it loses its status as logic when employed by metaphysics. 61

Reichmann also addresses the “pejorative overtones” of a rational method and the dangerous possibility of developing a “thoroughly subjective metaphysics.”62 When metaphysics appropriates doctrinal logic, it attends to “the origin of second intentions and to their relation to real being, that is to “the significative determination” of the mode of predication as it refers to the real order of things.63 Reichmann discusses the “isomorphism” or conformity between the knowing intellect and the material thing. The copula signifies the actual inherence, for example, of the form expressed by the predicate.64 This justification of a rational method through Thomas’s realism deserves, however, a more thorough examination than the one Reichmann offers.

59 Ibid., 356-64.
60 Ibid., 351. “The canons of logic which are formulated by the mind through a consideration of things, as known, are what are referred to by the expression, doctrinal logic; while the application of these same canons to real being is what is meant by applied logic” (352).
61 Ibid., 353. Reichmann also distinguishes the metaphysical appropriation of logic from that of grammar because grammar “does not attend to a consideration of the immediate signification of words as signs of concepts . . . but rather to the remote and arbitrary meaning of words” (394).
62 Ibid., 343, 368.
63 Ibid., 370.
64 Ibid., 371.
Finally, Reichmann offers his readers several clear and textually focused instances of the rational method in metaphysics, including arguments for the ten predicaments of being, the reality of prime matter, the unicity of the substantial form, and the real distinction between essence and existence.\(^{65}\) He effectively highlights the prerogative of a universal science to employ logic in this manner. Although he brings up the general antipathy toward logic from Thomists interested in the purity of metaphysics’ concern for the real, Reichmann’s article-length work does not present (possible) objections to the application of the method of predication, as for example Duns Scotus’ many objections to Thomas’s derivation of the ten predicaments.\(^{66}\)

2.2.3 Jan A. Aertsen

We already discussed Aertsen’s presentation of method in “Method and Metaphysics.”\(^{67}\) Now we turn to Aertsen’s *Nature and Creature*, which explains how the question of being may be pursued by way of predication (*per viam praedicationis*). The key, according to Aertsen, is that “predication is an onto-logy in a literal sense: that-which-is is revealed by the logos.”\(^{68}\) Repeating Thomas’s definition of predication as “stating something of another,” he explains that

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\(^{65}\) Ibid., 374-86. Thomas does not himself state that the proof for the real distinction is an instance of the method of predication.


\(^{67}\) Aertsen presents in “Method and Metaphysics” a brief overview of the “logical method.” He comments that first philosophy can take from logic when discussing being in general and the first principles of being such as the principle of non-contradiction. See Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics,” 408.

this type of expression bears the marks of composition and identity.\textsuperscript{69} It is a composition because the subject signifies materially and the predicate formally, and it is an identity because the subject acquires a determined being through the predicate. Aertsen also brings up the important distinction between \textit{per se} and \textit{per accidens} predication. He claims that it is the four \textit{per se} modes of predication that manifest \textit{per se} being of the ten predicaments (substance, quantity, etc.).\textsuperscript{70}

Aertsen lays a special emphasis on the way of definition as laying out the limits or “horizon” of being: “The definition joins together what is gathered in the Greek ‘logos’ . . . . The horizon of the onto-logy, which motivated the ‘what’ question, is the unchangeable, specific persistence, not the particular, corruptible existence.”\textsuperscript{71} The what question (\textit{quid est}) belongs to the way of definition. The way of definition is the non-demonstrative search for a “medium” or middle term in demonstration, a principle of science. The method whereby these definitions are brought to light is also a way of division wherein that which is predicated essentially is arranged hierarchically.\textsuperscript{72} Aertsen ends his chapter by discussing two tracks of predication, predication by essence and predication by participation, insisting that they be connected to what is ontologically prior.

2.2.4 Rudi A. Te Velde

Te Velde’s “Metaphysics, Dialectics and the Modus Logicus according to Thomas

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 70-76.
Aquinas” tries to clarify “the meaning of the *modus logicus*” in Thomas’s works and its “relevance for metaphysics.”

The article focuses on the application of the “logical mode” of reasoning in Thomas’s metaphysical search for substance. Te Velde distinguishes three different meanings of the “logical” mode. Logical or dialectical argumentation can argue 1) from probable or commonly accepted premisses, 2) from common reasons (as opposed to proper reasons), and 3) from the general properties of logical terms.

Te Velde thinks that Thomas adopts the third sense of argumentation (“from a logical point of view”), which is the last one he mentions, in the search for substance in Bk VII of Thomas’s Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Te Velde remarks on the tentative value of the logical mode. The “logical discussion of essential predication and definition appears to be useful because it tells us something of how we should think about the essence,” he explains, but the “logical notification of the essence remains in a sense too abstract and does not touch on the proper principles of reality.” He calls the logical sphere of reason a “convenient” starting-point for metaphysics. It helps to clarify the formal object of metaphysics from the perspective of definition and predication and enables us “to clear the road” for “a philosophical determination of the true nature of the principles of substance.”

Te Velde points out the significance of “metaphysical realism.” Metaphysical realism for Thomas means that things can be known “by means of logical forms and categories of our thought,” and it also means that “the logical categories of our thought do not coincide with the

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74 Ibid., 18 no. 10.
75 Ibid., 28.
76 Ibid., 29.
real principles of things.” They neither mirror nor duplicate the real order. Rather, as Te Velde states, the intellect must elaborate, devise, or construe (adinvenire) the real. We can nevertheless “conveniently” start from the logical sphere of reason as something “more known to us” because “the intelligible order of thoughts has its immediate origin in reason itself.”

Te Velde focuses on the investigation of substance (e.g. matter is substance) in Bk VII of Thomas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics, but I think this focus skews his view on the logical mode in metaphysics. He seems to think it as only a preliminary to philosophical investigation. Pace Te Velde, Thomas rather relies on the logical mode as a philosophical method for many metaphysical insights (e.g. deriving the ten predicaments). Logic must come first in our learning, despite its “greatest difficulty” (maximam difficultatem), because the “sciences depend on it inasmuch as it teaches the method of proceeding in all the sciences.”

3.0 Method and Structure of the Present Work

This dissertation will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter discusses predication as a logical method that Thomas terms the way (via) or method (modus) of predication. In De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1), he describes this method as a way of proceeding in the sciences. Although the use of the method of predication by the particular sciences results in only

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77 Ibid., 30.
78 Ibid., 35.
79 In De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1b ad 3: “quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilius, set ab eo a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, -- habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis - set quia alie scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis; oportet autem primo scire modum scientiae quam scientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II Metaphysice” (Leon. 50.161:300-311). See Reichmann’s “Logic and the Method,” 389.
dialectical conclusions, its use in metaphysics results in metaphysical insights and conclusions. This chapter provides a substantive historical background for Aquinas’s method by identifying some important influences on it (e.g., Aristotle, Averroes), by defining some important technical terms (e.g. *logica docens*), and by comparing it with the speculative grammar of the *modistae*.

In chapter two, I consider the role of essence or nature in predication by offering an account of how concepts and predications have an adequate foundation in reality. I articulate Thomas’s realist view of knowledge whereby the likeness of things causes a likeness in thought in such a way that words (“terms”) signify thoughts and thoughts signify things. This predicative foundation in things entails the union of the possible intellect with the object known due to the isomorphism between thought and reality (*Summa theologiae* Ia 75.5).

In chapter three, I investigate the affinity between logic and metaphysics (*In Metaphysicam* IV.4). With rationate being (*ens rationis*) as its proper subject, logic studies intentions that are equal in extension to the proper subject of metaphysics (*ens commune*), which is real being (*ens naturae*). To make this point, I also discuss two senses of being (*ens*): 1) being as signified in the composition of a proposition formed by the mind and 2) being as divided by the ten categories (*In Metaphysicam* V.9). I explain how the second sense of *ens* grounds the first one. This chapter finishes with a discussion of essential being (*ens secundum se*) and different types of predication (e.g., *per se*, *per participationem*, denominative).

In chapter four, I consider the application of the method of predication to various noteworthy metaphysical issues. First, I examine Thomas’s claim that earlier authors misused this method in treating different metaphysical issues. Then, I examine several of Thomas’s positive applications of the method of predication in a properly metaphysical fashion: the
division of being into general and special modes of being, the manifestation of the unicity of substantial form, the reality of prime matter, and the distinction between esse from essence. These arguments are analyzed for their soundness, and alternative interpretations are considered. I conclude with an overall assessment of the value of this method in Thomas’s metaphysics.
CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY AND NATURE OF THOMAS’S METHOD OF PREDICATION

This dissertation is specifically the study of a certain type of method used by Thomas Aquinas that relies on the teaching of logic about things in order to learn about them. Thomas never wrote an extended treatment on the nature of logic, but we know from his very many comments that he thinks of logic as an art that directs human acts of reason and that it is the “art of arts” because it directs every kind of reasoning. This means that logic, as an art, is an intellectual virtue. Just as mechanics is useful for survival, logic is useful to the arts and sciences because it guides human reason to produce something (e.g. a word).¹ Yet logic differs from art. Whereas mechanics considers external and material things, logic considers immanent and immaterial products of human reason that are concepts and signs of concepts, such as definitions, propositions, and syllogisms.

Thomas also states that the art of logic is a “rational science,” in other words, a science about the products of reason. Following Aristotle, Thomas explains that science (an intellectual virtue) is certain knowledge acquired through demonstration about what is necessarily the case. Accordingly, logic is a practical science, but it is by reduction also a speculative science. It is a practical science insofar as it guides the production of immanent and immaterial beings of reason (entia rationis), beings that make up the subject or formal object of logic. It is also reductively a speculative science insofar as logic is “ordered to the knowledge of things”² and insofar as it “offers the speculative sciences their instruments,”³ through guidance of three different cognitive

¹ ST I-II, q. 57, a. 3.
² In I Peri. e rm. lect. 2, no. 3.
³ De Trinitate q. 5, a. 1 ad 2.
acts of the intellect, which acts are discussed in chapter two.

Logic studies the relation or order between concepts in the mind. Thomas sometimes uses the phrase, the “way,” “mode,” or “method of predication” (per viam praedicationis, ex modo praedicandi/praedicationis, secundum diversos modos praedicationis), to describe the manner in which metaphysics makes claims about reality based on this relation or order between concepts, which fall under one of either two terms in the mind, a subject or predicate. He also simply refers to this method as a “logical method.” Since predication belongs to the study of logic, and since the method of predication represents a paradigmatic example of such a method, we can view the “method of predication” as a synecdoche or paradigm case for the logical method.

In the first chapter, I shall explore the history, nature, and role of this logical method within the science of metaphysics in two sections. The first section will examine a few of Thomas’s precursors, namely Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, Avicenna, and Averroes because these authors are the most seminal influences in Thomas’s thought on a logical method. We shall also focus on some thirteenth century authors that provide an immediate intellectual context for Thomas’s thought. This section will help determine the historical contribution that he offers

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4 In I Ethic., lect. 1, no. 2. For the best account of what logic is for Thomas, see Schmidt, The Domain of Logic.

5 In VII Meta., lect. 2, no. 1287: “Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis Philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae” (Marietti ed., 18.323); ST I, q. 76, a. 3: “Secondo, hoc appareat impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens . . .” (Leon. 5.221); In I Post. an., lect 34: “Hic igitur est unus modus logice demonstrandi propositum, qui sumitur secundum diuersos modos predicitionis” (Leon. 1*/2.127:226-228). See Joseph C. Frisch, “Extension and Comprehension in Logic: An Essay in Doctrine,” Laval theologique et philosophique 24 (1968), 215-57. I define what logic is for Thomas below.

6 As this dissertation is primarily a study on the method of predication in Thomas’s metaphysics, I shall offer a thematic exposition of this type of procedure in other authors. The intellectual development in these authors
with regard to a logical method in metaphysics. The second section will examine Thomas’s own exposition of the method of predication while articulating its basic metaphysical and logical framework.

1. Brief Historical Survey of a Logical Method

To recognize a common historical philosophical method entails recognizing a common terminology or meaning, yet there is no standard expression or meaning for Thomas’s “modus praedicandi.” Nevertheless, some commonality regarding a “logical method” can be approximated in Greek (logicōs), Arabic (manṭiqī), and Latin (logicē) sources.

1.1 Plato

Influenced by Parmenides’ statements that being is intelligible and therefore something attainable through speech (logos), we find the figure of Plato (428-348 B.C.), the chief exponent of dialectic. As a methodology of discovering syntactical rules that govern the combination and division of Forms (eidē), dialectic guides interlocutors along the way from the indeterminate and visible sphere of appearances to the determinate and intelligible sphere of reality, that is from opinion whose object is Non-Being to knowledge whose object is Being (Rep. 478-490). The art (technē) that renders Being intelligible is dialectic. “Dialectic” (dialektos) means discourse, discussion, debate, dialect, or language, and the adjectival form of this word, “dialectical”

will have to be sidelined since that question (e.g. early Plato vs. later Plato) would overextend a brief historical survey.

Charles Kahn calls dialectic the “technical heartland of Platonic philosophy.” See his Plato and Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 292. By including Plato in this study I do not mean to imply that Plato directly influenced Thomas Aquinas.
(dialektikos), names the skill in handling such discourse. Etymologically, dialectic originates from the term, “systematic discussion” (dialegesthai). The dialectician makes claims through speech (logos), and he discovers the real by systematically articulating what is said of it (Statesman 287a, Phaedo 99e5).

The analogy of the divided line, especially in the last division between thinking and insight, should help explain this movement from opinion to knowledge. In thinking, the soul holds speech (logos) with herself on what she sees (Theatetus 189e), and the highest art for parsing up speech about Forms (eidē) is dialectic (Philebus 57e). Dialectic moves the soul from thinking about speech to having insight about Forms. To have insight about the Forms, the philosophic soul thoughtfully interacts with them by cross-examining her speech about them (Rep. 511bc). Though Plato does not describe dialectic with much clarity, avoiding even the question about how one ought to perform it (Statesman, 262e–263b), he considers it as the unique expertise of the philosopher in his difficult task of dividing up, according to natural joints, the highest Forms or genera (e.g. Being and Non-Being, Sameness and Contrary, Motion and Rest) (Sophist 253).

Dialectic nevertheless takes on palpable results in Plato’s Sophist. In contrast to the monist who rejects speech about Non-Being and the sophist who dissembles speech about Non-
Being, the philosopher dialectically (and longingly) converses about Being and its communion through the Contrary with Non-Being and recognizes that (just as language is composed of the all-embracing vowels and consonants) speech is composed of all-embracing Being and other Forms. In his stated aim of defining sophistry, the Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophist* refutes Parmenides’ monism. Through systematic discussion, the Eleatic dialectically purifies his own speech about Being, realizing that Non-Being somehow is because Non-Being is Contrary to Being.\(^{11}\)

The dialectical divisions of Sameness and Contrary situate intelligible realities of extreme generality (*megiste genê*) including Non-Being. The Eleatic discovers that Non-Being is not nothing altogether (*to medamos on*). Through the interweaving of Being and the Contrary, he also discovers that the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher is that the sophist inclines towards Non-Being and the philosopher towards Being (*Soph. 254a-b*).\(^{12}\)

To use another analogy, the blinding light of the Good prevents the soul that has not been purified from dialectic from looking onto Being (*Rep. 509a-510*). This obscurity prevents the unmusical soul from recognizing Non-Being, condemning those who really incline towards Being (such as Socrates) to death for seeming to incline towards Non-Being. For this reason, the

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\(^{11}\) “The Stranger passes from the logical statement, that which is not is that which is not, to the metaphysical conclusion that that which is not is *simpliciter*. One could well describe the *Sophist* as a work that draws substantive metaphysical conclusions from very general ‘logical’ principles.” Myles Burnyeat, *Map of Metaphysics Zeta* (Pittsburg: Mathesis Publications, 2001), 22. In a similar way, Aristotle echoes Plato by way of *pros hen* equivocal predication, “we say even of non-being that it is non-being” (*Met. 4.2.1003b11*).

\(^{12}\) The Eleatic Stranger enigmatically never arrives at a satisfying definition of sophistry. He misses the natural joints because he excludes the Good. Ionescu argues that the recognition of the pseudo-art of sophistry requires that the philosopher know the Forms in such a way as to recognize how a likeness may fall short of the original it imitates: “Originals and copies, philosophers and sophists, cannot be distinguished from one another unless we use axiological considerations” (61). See her “Dialectic in Plato’s Sophist,” 61. See also J. Moreau, “Aristote et la dialectique Platonicienne” in *Aristotle on Dialectic: the Topics*, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. G.E.L. Owen (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 83-86.
philosopher must define sophistry (*Soph. 221c*), and he defines it in the only way that one can define the immaterial, that is, through speech (*logo monon*) (*Statesman* 286a). So the philosopher turns to speech (*logos*). He tentatively makes distinctions, sometimes challenging earlier results obtained through division, until these distinctions are established among the intelligible relations of Forms.

Distinguished from image, speech about the Forms consists of a hypothesis about the Forms that must be purified through a process of classification and division (*Phaedo* 99d-100a). This dialectical ascent takes place when Socrates of the *Republic* inquires into Justice. The difficulty of seeing this Form requires the interlocutors to use a method that entails justifying a hypothesis about Justice in a city formed in speech (*logō*) (369a). The justification of that hypothesis, through the classification and division of the city’s objectives, parts, and virtues, constitutes much of the rest of the *Republic*. Justice consists of the interweaving of Moderation, Courage, and Wisdom both in the city and in the man. Briefly put, the lover of wisdom collects and divides the Forms to find the Forms themselves. In sum, for Plato, we can only philosophize dialectically, that is through speech and reason (*dia logos*).  

1.2 Aristotle

1.2.1 Strong vs. Pure Dialectic

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13 The method of division can be said to serve a more logical purpose in later works, such as in the *Sophist*, and more metaphysical purpose in earlier works, such as in the *Republic*. See Moreau, “Aristote et la dialectique Platonicienne,” 80-90.  
Although Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) often takes issue with Plato’s logical method, he does not hereby condemn logical arguments, for Aristotle himself makes logical (logicōs) arguments to proceed from the known to the unknown. Such arguments take place in the soul, the place of forms (De Anima 3.4.429a27). At one point, Aristotle even commends the Platonists’s logical description of non-being: “some say, emphasizing the linguistic [logicōs] form, that that which is not is—not is simply, but is non-existent” (Met. 7.4.1030a27). Aristotle agrees that non-being is discovered logically by negating the notion of being. One thereby knows the unknown.

This adverbial modifier, “logicōs,” describes for Aristotle a method that is opposed both to analytical (analyticōs) (e.g. An. Po. 82b35-36, 84a7-8) and to empirical (physicōs) (e.g. De gen. 1.2.316a11) procedures, and the term describes arguments as either dialectical (dialecticōs), general (katholou), or empty (kenōs). In these instances, “logical” does not mean the valid form of argumentation. Rather, “logical” expresses a unique mode of taking a look at things, a mode.

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16 “The positive notion of being is held before the mind and is represented as negated. Thereby one knows what not-being is. In this way one has the concept of it. One is expressing it logikōs. The notion of being is brought under the negation, quite as in the accidental categories the basic notion of being is taken with the appropriate categorical modification such as qualitative being instead of the absolute understanding of being. Accordingly something positive and definite always lies at the basis of the concept, and in terms of the modification or privation or negation of that basis the object under consideration is understood. To this extent one knows what the object is. In that way likewise one knows what the unknown is (1030a33-34)” (110). See Joseph Owens, Aristotle’s Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).

that is general enough for the logician’s consideration. In contrast to analytical arguments, according to W.D. Ross, \textit{logical} arguments are “based on principles that apply to all reasoning, not only to demonstrative science.”\(^{18}\)

It is important to note that Aristotle does not use the noun form of “\textit{logicōs},” namely “\textit{logike}” (Gr. \textit{λογική}), and the reason may be that in Aristotle’s time there was no body of knowledge known as “logic,” no thing to which the noun form of “logical” could refer. Indeed, Aristotle can be said to have gradually invented the art of logic. It was debated whether Aristotle’s treatment of reasoning should be considered a part of philosophy (as the Stoics maintained) or as an instrument thereof (as the later Peripatetics maintained), and the title that the students eventually gave to Aristotle’s logical works shows the interpretation of the Peripatetics since “\textit{Organon}” means instrument of science. According to Kneale, the term, “logic,” acquired its modern sense only about 500 years later with Alexander of Aphrodisias.\(^{19}\)

In Aristotle’s \textit{Organon}, the most conspicuous place for a method of argumentation is the \textit{Topics}. Aristotle devotes his \textit{Topics} to describe different “commonplaces” or “general points of agreement” (Gr. \textit{topoi}, Lat. \textit{loci}) for a dialectical type of argumentation. For example, “whatever


\(^{19}\) See William and Martha Kneale, \textit{The Development of Logic} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 24. Bonitz’s \textit{Index} does not have an entry for “\textit{λογική},” which suggests that Aristotle did not use the word for all of logic. See also Eleonore Stump, \textit{Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, Translated with Notes and Essays on the Text} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 186, no. 10: “The origin and history of ‘\textit{logike}’ as a word for logic are not clear.” Full citation of Stump’s work below. “[I]t is all the more significant that Aristotle does not adopt “\textit{λογική}” as an overall term for the subject-matter of his overall writings. In fact, Aristotle does not use any general word to cover everything he does in the works of the \textit{Organon}. Instead he divides the field into dialectical reasoning, studied in the \textit{Topics}, and demonstrative reasoning, studied in the \textit{Analytics}.” See Burnyeat, \textit{Map of Metaphysics Zeta}, 89. See also Robin Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic”, \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy} (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/aristotle-logic/>. 
is in the species is necessarily in the genus; thus, if man is good then animal is also good” (Top. 2.4.111a25ff; also Top. 1.121b1-14). This example given by Aristotle supplies us with a “reason” (general point) about the concepts genus-species, which is necessarily true. Aristotle neither invented nor defined these “commonplaces.” He inherited the notion from previous thinkers, such as the sophists who gave their pupils formulas to memorize and use in argumentation. In sum, the use of “commonplaces” seems like an ad hoc tool for disputation.20

Accordingly, Aristotle’s logical arguments appear merely or purely dialectical at first.21 Based as they are on general premises, which can be applied to many sciences, the arguments do not rely so much on the technical aspect of the sciences, as they do on generally understood conceptual or linguistic facets of experience (legomena) used in a disputation.22

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20 “The purpose of the Topics, as Aristotle says at the beginning of his treatise on them, is to provide a τέχνη of dialectical disputation, but at first glance the major part of the Topics seems not a τέχνη but a repetitious and disordered listing of Topics.” See Eleonore Stump, Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 12; Otto Bird, “The Traditions of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham,” Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962), 307-23, esp. 307-310; Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics, 20-22; Burnyeat, Map of Metaphysics Zeta, 100.

21 There is some ambiguity of the term “dialectic” here. For instance, some of Aristotle’s arguments by refutation are quasi-demonstrative, that is, dialectical. Aristotle considers his argument against those who purport to deny the principle of non-contradiction as a negative demonstration: “[w]e can, however, demonstrate negatively that this view is impossible, if our opponent will only say something. . . . Now negative demonstration [elenchos] I distinguish from demonstration proper, because in a demonstration one might be thought to be begging the question, but if another person is responsible for the assumption we shall have a negative proof, not demonstration “ (Met. 4.4.1006a13, 15-19). Those who deny the principle of non-contradiction demand a demonstration for want of education. Terence Irwin calls this quasi-demonstration “strong dialectic.” See the explanation and reference below.

arguments begin from being as expressed. Despite their contingent origin, however, some dialectical types of arguments serve to articulate principles of demonstration, which the first philosopher needs in order to have science. In that “strong” sense, insofar as they manifest first principles, logical arguments are not merely or purely dialectical.

Demonstrative knowledge or science (epistemē) means knowing something’s proper causes through first principles (archai), but the sciences are not equipped with discovering these first principles, which are less known to us. The sciences need a non-demonstrative procedure from what is more knowable to us towards that which is less knowable to us (and more knowable by nature) (Phys. 1.1.184a15-21; Met. 7.3.1029b3-10). What is most evident to us are appearances (phainomena), and when we work through the perplexities (diaporein) that are contained in these appearances we hold a coherent set of common opinions (endoxa), ensuring at the same time that apparent and genuine endoxa are distinguished (Top. 1.1.100b26).

For Aristotle, dialectic systematically displays these appearances. It lays down what is commonly said (legomena) about a certain topic (EN 7.1.1145b20), entertains conflicting opinions, and unties the knots in our thinking (dianoias), which point to knots in a state of affairs (pragmatos) (Met. 3.1.995a28-32). Dialectic establishes theories to fit as many appearances as possible (EN 7.11.1145b5-7). Whereas demonstration leads to the science (epistemē) of linguistic factors such as homonymy to make real distinctions: “These tests for homonymy imply that dialectic is more than a technique for the conduct of arguments, for it has to reflect our views about the real distinctions between kinds of things. The correct practice of dialectic requires awareness of the real distinctions... The homonymy of being, therefore, implies not primarily a difference of sense in the verb ‘to be’, but a real distinction among beings. Aristotle argues that predication does not always express the same relation, and the items it introduces are of different types” (§27). See Irwin’s Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).  


The role of dialectical and empirical inquiry differ in this respect: dialectical inquiry vindicates sensory
conclusions by establishing necessary causes, dialectic leads to a rational intuition or comprehension (noûs) of first principles by establishing common opinions. Dialectic is a method (methodōn) of criticism “wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries” (Top. 1.2.101b3-4).

Aristotle does not describe in detail how dialectic proceeds in leading us to first principles, yet we see him apply this method to the question of being. In response to the Socratic “what is being (ousia)?” and to the Parmenidean “univocity of being,” Aristotle points out what we say about “being.” He indicates being’s multivocity. The dialectic of the Categories and Topics shows the many ways that being is said (e.g. the four predicables, the ten predicaments), and it leads to a comprehension of beings through common opinions (endoxa), that is, through considering both the phainomena and the legomena of trustworthy sources. The question of being, for instance, can be parsed by examining what is said by previous thinkers, by those in the particular sciences, and by common opinion.

Dialectical discoveries by themselves, however, are not adequate starting-points for science. Despite its unique role in manifesting definitions (An. Po. 2.14), dialectic only probes into the nature of things through their appearance in speech, unlike philosophy which knows the nature of things through their principles and causes (Met. 4.2.1004b25-26). Dialectic can only inquire into terms such as “same,” “other,” “contrary,” “prior,” and “posterior” (Met. 3.1.995b20-23). Because contingent sources yield contingent conclusions, the tentativeness of dialectic appearances, and the empirical inquiry takes their veracity for granted. See Terence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, §22. According to Irwin, dialectical inquiry escapes some of the realist naïveté of empirical inquiry, yet it is confined to seeking out coherence amidst the contingency of common opinion (§§12-16, 18-24).

25 See Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics, 18.
seems to apply, at least in part, to its logical aspect.

This limitation does not mean, however, that logical methods such as inquiries into predicative phenomena inquires into no thing, for to know how some thing appears in speech is to know about the thing that appears. Any explanation (logon) depends upon its state of affairs (pragma), which itself has a natural place within a linguistic sphere. That is why Aristotle uses logical arguments in the natural, ethical, and divine sciences (Top. 1.14.105b19-26). He can do so because generally agreed upon expressions of being show something about being insofar as mature individuals hit the truth with more or less accuracy (Met. 2.1.993b1-7). Despite this trust in the ability of reason, one still has to answer in what way dialectic can lead us to science.

In this regard, Terence Irwin makes a helpful distinction between two different sorts of dialectic in Aristotle’s works. Irwin distinguishes between a “pure” (or “ordinary”) dialectic that takes common beliefs indiscriminately and a “strong” (or “mixed”) dialectic that takes common beliefs in a systematically selective way. I shall be using this distinction. “Pure” dialectic merely establishes the coherence of common beliefs because it disregards the priority of substance (ousia) and neglects being as being (Met. 4.2.1004b8-10). “Pure” dialectic establishes plausible opinions. By contrast, the first philosopher is engaged in second-order reflections on the presuppositions of special (particular) sciences, so he can use dialectic to establish first principles insofar as the common beliefs he begins from are more selective than first order common beliefs. “Strong” dialectic achieves insights.

“Strong dialectic” ultimately regards being as being (Met. 4.1.1003a22-30). Since the

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first philosopher relies on undisputed common beliefs that could not be given up without serious compromise, he makes objective conclusions about first principles, and such logical arguments yield principles that are sufficiently firm for demonstrative ends. They are probative in light of being as being. Although “strong” dialectic cannot demonstrate principles (Met. 4.3.1005b3-5), it makes insights that yield principles for a demonstrative science.

The first philosopher can refute through strong dialectic, for instance, those who deny the first principle of demonstration (Met. 3.2996b26-32), that is, the principle of non-contradiction, and he does so with the efficiency of a negative demonstration (elenchos) by showing the impossibility of the opponent’s stated position. The opponent need only state something significant to be proven wrong (Met. 4.4.1006a13-29). Although Heraclitus says he denies this principle, he cannot hold that opinion. Aristotle defends the principle of demonstration in noetic terms, yet the reason for the impossibility of a contradiction in thought lies in the impossibility of

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28 “To consider being qua being is to examine the presuppositions of the special sciences; and Aristotle implies that such an examination will result in arguments that are not purely dialectical. . . . The arguments of first philosophy belong to strong dialectic, insofar as they rely on a new start that is not simply a matter of general agreement. The assumption that there is such a thing as being qua being is a presupposition of any scientific study of an objective world at all. . . . and if our new start rests on this assumption, it does not simply argue from common beliefs. Aristotle’s account of dialectic and of the starting-point of first philosophy makes it reasonable for him to claim that the method of first philosophy is both dialectical and scientific” (§95). See Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, §8, §19, §§94-97. D. W. Hamlyn provides some criticism in “Aristotle on Dialectic,” Philosophy 65 (1990), 465-76. Although Hamlyn proposes a similar definition of dialectic to Irwin’s, he questions the view that dialectic is simply aimed at attaining truth. He argues that dialectic primarily aims at producing agreement by the scientific community (473).

29 “Aristotle does not characterize his defence of the PNC as logikos, but he is clearly conducting it at a level that can be understood as ‘logical.’” See Weigelt, “The Relation between Logic and Ontology,” 518. In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Thomas places Aristotle’s argument in defence of the principle of non-contradiction as neither a definition nor an absolute demonstration in In III Meta. lect. 5, no. 392: “philosophus non considerat huiusmodi principia tamquam faciens ea scire definiendo vel absolute demonstrando; sed solum elenchice, idest contradicendo disputative negantibus ea, ut in quarto dicetur” (Marietti, ed. 18.110). With R. E. Houser, we may label Aristotle’s argument a reductio ad vegetabilia because “the opponent refuses to act like a human whose differentiating note is speech” (116). See Houser’s “Let Them Suffer into the Truth: Avicenna’s Remedy for Those Denying the Axioms of Thought,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1999), 107-33. Avicenna recommends fire to those who intransigently refuse argumentation because they hold the effects of fire (pain) and non-fire (non-pain) the same (128).
a contradiction in being. It is impossible in thought because it is impossible in being. “Strong”
dialectic proceeds from thought to being, yet the thought has an undeniable foundation in being.

I have dwelt on Irwin’s notion of “strong” dialectic because it most resembles what
Aristotle means by logical arguments when practiced by the first philosopher. To be sure, for
Aristotle they are not proper demonstrations since they are dialectical in nature, yet they
establish the necessary starting points of a demonstrative science. Logical arguments lay out the
first principles of demonstration and have probative force when used by the first philosopher.

1.2.2 The Two Senses of “Logical”

More needs to be said, however, about what the term “logical” means for Aristotle. One
eye early commentator who offers some clarity about the term is Simplicius. The Peripatetic takes
one instance where Aristotle notices a “logical difficulty” (logicōs apeiron) about how the
motion of the mover and of the moved are identical. It is problematic that action and passion are
one in actuality (energeia) (Phys. 3.3.202a21-22). In explicating this passage, Simplicius offers
three meanings for “logicōs”: 1) the puzzle is based on reputable premises, 2) its persuasiveness
is a matter of argument alone without support in empirical fact, or 3) it proceeds from a general
notion rather than from principles peculiar to the subject. I shall focus on Simplicius’s third
sense of generality because it includes the first two senses.

30 Houser explains that, though the first principle or axiom is a “noetic principle,” it is not a merely
subjective principle because “the ultimate basis for the principle is objective, the reality itself which is understood.”
He gives three reasons for his interpretation based on terminology (“hyparchein”), argument (Heraclitus could not
have thought this), and appellation (it is called a first principle of being, “ousin,” in Met. 11.5.1061b34-35). See

31 See Simplicii Aristotelis Physicorum in libros quattuor posteriores Commentaria, ed. Hermann Diels
(Berlin: Typ. et impr. Reimer, 1895), 440.19-441.2. Burnyeat proposes Simplicius’s division as a guide for reading
Z4-6.
The third sense is *logical* in the sense that it does not argue according to the peculiar aspects of a science—whether natural, ethical, or divine. It is based on general principles. Plato’s *argument from contraries* for the immortality of the soul (*Phaedo* 70c-72e) illustrates this type of argumentation. This argument is *logical* because it proceeds from the general notion that all things come from their contraries, and this principle generally applies to many objects and ignores the essential nature of its subject, the soul. By contrast to this type of general argumentation, the *argument from the definition of the soul as self-mover* shows the immortality of the soul according to the proper aspects of the subject (*Phaedrus* 245c-246a). The definition of the soul here comes from natural philosophy, not from a general viewpoint within natural philosophy. Following Burnyeat, I shall call this third sense of *logical*, “Simplicius’s sense.”

I would like to make one clarification. Although this *logical* type of argument finds general viewpoints to make an argument, it need not be so general as to be outside the science itself. It can be taken within the science. In proving that only circular movement can be continuous and infinite, for instance, Aristotle argues both from an appropriate or particular (*oikeios*) viewpoint (*Phys.* 8.8.264b1-265a12) and a general (*logicōs*) viewpoint within natural science (*Phys.* 8.8.264a7-35). Both of these arguments prove the same conclusion.

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33 For Thomas’s comments on Aristotle’s arguments about infinite circular movement from the viewpoint of general or “logical” (*logicōs*) theory, In VIII *Phys.*., lect. 18. This logical argument need not be causal. Aristotle’s refutation of the notion that demonstration proceeds to infinity, for instance, argues according to a general understanding of demonstration. Demonstration cannot proceed to infinity because predicates constituting a thing’s essence must be finite, and these essential predicates make up the middle term of a demonstration, namely the definition (*An. Po.* 1.21.82b35ff.). Demonstration does not proceed to infinity because the parts of a definition are finite. This logical argument based on *definition* as such differs from the analytical (*analetikōs*) argument that Aristotle later makes based on the *inherence* of the thing’s essence. Briefly put, in Simplicius’s sense of the term, logical arguments start from general points of agreement.
We find another example of the *logical* argument in the third sense of proceeding from a general notion (Simplicius’s sense) in Aristotle’s elliptical search for being or substance (*ousia*). This search leads Aristotle to make “*logical*” (*logicōs*) distinctions (*Met. 7.4.1029b13*), namely distinctions through what is generally said (*legomena*). This general criterion for substance is that it be a subject (*hupokēmenon*). Substance is generally expressed as “that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject” (*Cat. 5.2a11-13*) or as “that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else” (*Met. 7.3.1028b36*).34

This subject criterion for Aristotle succeeds in identifying substance over and against non-substances. Things that are predicated of others serve as a medium for a metaphysical inquiry into things themselves, and this medium suffices to demarcate substance within an inquiry about things *as expressed*.35 This subject criterion, however, fails to provide enough

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34 The metaphysical status of the *Categories* need not concern us. Simplicius rejects the view that the treatise is either about significative words (grammar), entities signified by significative words (ontology), or isolated simple thoughts (psychology). According to De Rijk’s *Aristotle Semantics and Ontology*: Simplicius “emphasizes that the categories are not just linguistic entities: They are special because they are linguistic expressions that are significative and so representative of things” (359). De Rijk states that the majority of thinkers in the Middle Ages agreed with these Greek commentators thanks to Boethius. Boethius describes the categories as about “words signifying things in their significative capacity” (360-61). See also, Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā*: *A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought* (Boston: Brill, 2006), 300-301. For a view of the medieval role attributed to the *Categories* see Giorgio Pini, “Reading the *Categories* as an Introduction to Logic: Later Medieval Discussions about Its Place in the Aristotelian Corpus,” in *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories*, ed. Lloyd A. Newton (Boston: Brill, 2008): 145-182.

35 I take it Aristotle does not consider predication as a mere linguistic exercise. One way of articulating this view is to say that, for Aristotle, “the subject is an item in the ontology and not a linguistic item, and more often than not what is predicated is not linguistic either: it is not a predicate, but a predicatable.” See Frank Lewis, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 4-5. A similar point is made by De Rijk in his *Aristotle Semantics and Ontology*. In echoing the research of many authors, he explains, “[u]nlike modern linguistics, [Ancient thinkers] were not so much interested in language itself, but concentrated on the ways in which linguistic expressions are representative of thinking and, by the same token, somehow disclose the diverse features of extra-linguistic ‘reality.’ Thus we find philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, in their search for the true nature of things, making various attempts to present certain linguistic tendencies in rational arguments” (15-16). One of De Rijk’s major points is that Aristotle’s theory of predication is copula-less and hyparctic. In making a statement, the *onomata* and the *rhema* belong to one another without the aid of the copula (86-87). “[P]redication for Aristotle is as much a matter of metaphysics as a matter of grammar.” See Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 
clarity (adēlon) in an inquiry about things as being. When the philosopher applies a subject
criterion in his quest for principles and causes of beings, he stumbles upon substance as subject
(hupokēmenon), that is matter. But Aristotle rejects this conclusion as impossible “for both
separability and ‘thisness’ are thought to belong chiefly to substance” (Met. 7.3.1029a28).36

To recapitulate, the search for substance through what is said-of substance is not based on
any logical works of Aristotle. This procedure is “logical” because it is general enough for the
logician’s consideration (Simplicius’s sense), and the inquiry belongs to the first philosopher
because it is an inquiry into substance and the principles of substance, namely form and matter.
In this case, one disqualifies an essential and determinable part of substance, matter, because it
lacks any determination of itself and so cannot be separately.37

Far from abandoning this logical analysis, in “Simplicius’s sense” of the term, Aristotle’s
first philosopher sharpens his investigation of substance (ousia) through a different logical
approach. Besides Simplicius’s sense, a logical approach can also be taken when an argument or
explanation directly takes what is taught in the study of logic. Burnyeat names this sense of
“logical,” “Andronicus’s sense.”38 Logic in this sense is more about how something is reasoned

36 To put the matter in terms of connotation, the (Boethian) translation of “ousia” into “substantia”
connotatively identifies ousia with substrate, but Aristotle rejects this complete identification. Ousia is said (legetai)
in at least three other senses: essence, universal, and genus (Met. 7.3.1028b33-35). Joseph Owens disapproves of the
translation of “ousia” as “substance” for the same reason, namely that it misleadingly points to the secondary
instance of ousia, that is, matter. Owens opts for the term “entity” instead. See his long discussion in The Doctrine
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963), 137-56. See also
Laurence Bauloye, La Question de l’Essence. Averroës et Thomas d’Aquin, Commentateurs d’Aristote,
Méthaphysique Z1 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 1997), 2-3. I thank Thérèse Druart for suggesting Bauloye’s work.
37 See Owens, The Doctrine of Being, 332.
38 Andronicus of Rhodes recommended logic as preparatory training for students of Aristotelian philosophy.
See Burnyeat, Map of Metaphysics, 24-25. Despite making this distinction, Burnyeat thinks that it not so significant:
“My ultimate aim is to persuade readers of Metaphysics Z that Simplicus’ third meaning and Andronicus’ sense of
‘logical’ are so closely connected that for present purposes they may be treated as one. Both reflect Aristotle’s own
understanding of what he was about in the works that came to be known as the Organon. The logical section of Z
about (Andronicus’s sense) than about how something is generally said (Simplicius’s sense)

Aristotle starts afresh with this new, logical approach. He starts from the teaching of logic
about that which is “in itself” (An. Po. 1.4.73a33-73b5) and transposes this logical distinction in
a philosophical inquiry about substance as such (Met. 7.4.1029b13). Aristotle takes substance “in
itself” (kath’ auto). This new tactic of using logic in “Andronicus’s sense” leads to an additional
criterion, the essence criterion, in which a definition and essence (to ti en einai) must belong to
substance in a primary way (Met. 7.4.1030b5). 39

The phrase “in-itself” or “as such” (kath’ auto) is equivocal (Met. 5.18). In its primary
sense, for Aristotle, it is the form of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of which a man is good is the
good itself. The in-itself in this primary sense is the form. In its secondary sense, it is the first
subject in which an attribute naturally occurs, e.g. color in a surface. The in-itself in this
secondary sense is matter or substratum. The essence then consists of two essential principles,
which are intelligible of themselves without existing independently. The two parts are intelligible
though in reality one, just as potentiality (matter) and actuality (form) are in reality one. 40

Understanding the primary meanings of “in-itself” in Aristotle’s works helps us grasp
parts of a definition whose unity consists of an entailment of its parts, namely genus and
difference. The difference entails the genus. The difference of a definition corresponds to the

39 See Burnyeat, Map of Metaphysics, 24. Concerning where the “logical” discussion ends subsequent to
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974/5), 167-180; Burnyeat, Map of Metaphysics, 6-8; Gabriele
Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Aristotle’s Ontology and the Middle

40 See Marguerite Deslauriers, Aristotle on Definition (Boston: Brill, 2007), 121.
actual, determinate aspect of an essence (form), and the genus of a definition corresponds to the potential, determinable aspect of an essence (matter) (*Met.* 8.6.1045a20-25; 10.8.1058a23). To say that genus is the material aspect of an essence neither means that genus is entirely indeterminate (like prime matter), nor does it mean that it is entirely determinate (like proximate matter). Instead, genus represents the intelligibility of a species in its potential aspect. Genus in the definition represents matter in being potentially what the whole is actually, and the differentia represents the form in actualizing such a potentiality.\(^4\)

Definition expresses the essence of a substance because definition is said to be a formula (*logos*) signifying what-something-is (*ti esti*) (*An.* *Post.* 2.10.93b29; 94a10) and a formula signifying what-IS-Being (*to ti ēn einai*) (*Top.* 1.5.101b38-102a1; *Met.* 7.5.1031a12).\(^5\) Definition signifies timeless being. While eschewing the notion of communion, Aristotle resolves Plato’s dilemma concerning the Forms through a reflection on how being is expressed, namely through its genus (potency) and specific difference (act). Since the genus of a definition is more universal than the species, the (universal) parts of definition are in fact prior to and more knowable than the species (*Top.* 6.4.141b27-34; *Met.* 7.10.1035b3-5, 11-14).\(^6\)

This priority means that the way to reach (at least a nominal definition of) an essence is to know its parts. The structure of definition reflects the structure of essence, so Aristotle analyses definition in order to formulate substance.\(^7\) One understands ‘animal’ before ‘man.’

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 153.
\(^{42}\) “Aristotle’s concern with definition, and therefore with division, is not solely a concern with its formal function in his logic, but also a concern with its adequacy for giving us accounts of natural kinds.” Ibid., 36.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 182.
\(^{44}\) To know the definition of a thing is to know its essence (whatness), and to know a thing’s essence is to know it as a substance. “Far from being confined to giving the meaning of the terms used in a certain language, definitions refer to real objects and pick out real properties essentially belonging to these objects themselves. In this
One sees in ‘animal’ an indeterminacy, a genus, that can be determined by either a ‘rational’ or a ‘non-rational’ difference. ‘Rational animal’ consists of more universal parts that are in themselves more knowable than ‘man.’ Though this method relies on the study of logic to discover substance through definition, the first philosopher’s results through this logical method are not merely logical, for he has as his object being as being. The concern is not about how one speaks, but about how things are. In scrutinizing what is said about the real, that is through predicables that make up propositions (Top. 1.4.101b28), the goal of Aristotle’s first philosopher is to acquire real principles.

The first philosopher takes an uncontroverted or undisputed logical distinction about that which is in itself or about that which is a definition to establish a metaphysical principle that expresses essential being (Met. 7.4.1029b12-13). This “strong” dialectic avoids Platonic failures by starting from and ending with an undeniable insight. Aristotle depends on a logical method in his search for substance through a predicative examination of essence (Met. Z 4-6), definition (Met. Z 10-12), and eventually the universal and individual (Met. Z 14-15). Such an examination yields insights into first principles through a reflexive analysis about what-is-said generally and

sense, a quest of definition is ipso facto a quest of essence and many of the characteristics of essence can be revealed by looking at the corresponding notion of definition. . . . The logical inquiry can be thought as embracing the whole of Z 4-6 and its logical character can be viewed as consisting in an abstract analysis which makes no use of the notions of matter and form.” See Gabriele Galluzzo and Mauro Mariani, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Z: The Contemporary Debate (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2006), 135, 145. Aristotle standardizes the way of stating the definition of a thing in Top. 6-7. De Rijk’s Aristotle Semantics and Ontology, 525-29.

45 See Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, §114.

46 “The term logikōs, then, is not a pejorative designation, as though it denoted a merely dialectical formation in contrast to a real definition. It is meant to express as concisely as possible the metaphysical role of forms, accidental as well as substantial, in the constitution of things. It denotes the way a thing is to be understood when the ultimate explanation in terms of being is sought. Its perspectivity is thoroughgoing in the first and highest sense of per se, namely that it expresses its full meaning in virtue just of what it is in itself. For this reason it is thoroughly a unit just in itself, so much so that whiteness and smoothness would be one and the same notion if the two were combined in the one ‘essential being.’ All this is implied in the notion of logikōs as it is developed by Aristotle in the present section of book Zeta.” See Owens, Aristotle’s Gradations of Being, 110-111.
logically. In this way, Aristotle begins the science of the noble and divine, the highest objects of man’s *eudaimonia* (*EN* 10.7).

1.3 Boethius

Between Aristotle and Boethius (475-526), we find Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero, and Themistius who commented and expanded on dialectic, yet Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius “seems to be the sole surviving representative of a significant development in the history of dialectic” according to Eleonore Stump.\(^\text{47}\) His influence on the mediaevals in the area of logical arguments rivals that of Aristotle. We have many of Boethius’s Latin translations of Aristotle’s works, including the *Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics*, and *Sophistici elenchi*, and we have some of Boethius’s own philosophical works, including his commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and on the *Categories*. In this brief section, I shall be focusing on his translation of Aristotle’s *Topics*, his unfinished translation and commentary on Cicero’s *Topics*, and his textbook *On Topical Differentiae*.\(^\text{48}\)

We have pointed out that Aristotelian dialectic relies on a place or topic (*topos*) of general agreement (*Top.* 1.1.100a25ff.). For Boethius such topics are “maxims” or “maximal propositions” (*maxima propositio*), and he defines these maxims as immediate truths known *per*

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\(^{47}\) See Eleonore Stump, “Between Aristotle and Boethius” in *Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis, Translated with Notes and Essays on the Text* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978): 205-214, esp. 214. Stump’s summary statement: “So, on the basis of Themistius’s and Alexander’s extant discussions of the nature and function of the *Topics*, it seems fair to say that the important differences between Aristotle and Boethius do not stem from either Themistius or Alexander. Theophrastus appears to have begun the change, and the completion of at least a part of the change can be seen in Cicero’s work. But the Boethian method for the discovery of arguments seems to be uniquely preserved in Boethius’s treatises on the *Topics*. There is nothing quite like it in the extant work of any of the intermediaries between Aristotle and Boethius” (214).

\(^{48}\) The works of Boethius are some of the last sources we have for “what the theory of topical argument had become by late antiquity.” See John Marenbon, *Boethius* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 56.
se that aid in the formulation of premises in an argument in order to produce belief. There are innumerable maxims. One example of a maximal proposition is “things whose definitions are different are themselves also different.” Such maxims usually show up as an enthymeme for a number of arguments, and this last example is based on definition.49

Boethius outlines another type of topic, the so-called “differentia” (differentia) of maximal propositions, and they are “differentia” because they distinguish maxims from each other: “In one way a Topic, that is, the foundation of an argument, is said to be a maximal and principal proposition furnishing belief for other [propositions]. But in another way the Differentiae of maximal propositions are called Topics, and they are drawn from the terms that make up the question.”50 The “differentia” collects maxims under it. As Green-Pedersen explains, the “differentia” may be called the topic of the maxims in the same way as the maxims are the topic of the arguments. The “differentia” categorize the maxims. In other words, knowing the “differentia” helps us to recognize the middle term of an argument’s conclusion because they

49 See Boethius, De Topicis differentiis, ed. J. -P. Migne, in Patrologia Latina (PL) vol. 64 (1860), 1185A8-B5; See also Stump, Dialectic and Its Place, 31-56. This scholastic reliance upon maxims or common considerations continued, of course, through the time of Thomas. For instance, Peter of Spain describes topics as an aid in confirming the validity of an enthymeme. See Eleonore Stump, “Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 273-99. See also William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, trans. and intro. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1966).

locate the intermediate premise that would show how a predicate belongs in a subject of the conclusion. Examples of “differentia” include from definition, from genus, and from the lesser.51

Stump rightly notes that Boethius shifts the concern of topical arguments from Aristotle’s emphasis on oral disputation to the view that topical arguments are a tool for knowing the truth, but she rejects the supposition that Boethian maxims function as Aristotelian axioms or first principles in metaphysics.52 This question about maxims as axiomatic in a science is, nonetheless, a matter of interpretation. We cannot ignore the related point though that Boethius assigns the topics as helpful chiefly to dialectic but also to a demonstrative science:

The purpose of the Topics is to reveal [demonstrare] a bountiful supply of arguments which have the appearance of truth. . . . But since, as was said above, some readily believable arguments are necessary and others not, when Topics of readily believable arguments are brought forth, Topics of necessary arguments are also produced. So this discipline [of Topics] is mainly serviceable to orators and dialecticians, and secondarily to philosophers. Insofar as all readily believable arguments are searched out, the dialecticians and the orators are served; insofar as readily believable and necessary arguments are produced, an abundance is provided for philosophical demonstration. So not only the dialectician and the orator but also the demonstrator and producer of true argumentation have something they can take from the Topics since among the Topics of readily believable arguments this teaching [traditio] contains also the starting points of

51 See Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics, 63-64. See also Stump, “Dialectic and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis” in Boethius’s De Topicis Differentiis, 180-81. See Marenbon, Boethius, 60: “The theory of the topics systematizes the process of looking for middle terms. . . . it shows the arguer where to look in the stock of knowledge he has in order find the middle term he needs.” Marenbon also explains, “Boethius himself is silent about exactly how arguers are supposed to use maximal sentences to find arguments. Instead, he asserts that maximal sentences give arguments their force” (TC 280:24-27 [1051D]; TD 1185B-D). This lends credence to the idea that, whereas the differentiae derived from the argumentative strategies set out in Aristotle’s Topics and so were directly linked to finding arguments, the maximal sentences came from the explanations of the arguments that Aristotle sometimes attached to his instructions” (62).

52 See Stump, “Dialectic and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis,” 110 no. 85. “But if the account of Topics that I have been sketching were correct, then the art of Topics would begin to collapse into demonstration; the art of finding arguments would be the art of producing a proof of some proposition from the first principles of the science appropriate to that proposition. As Boethius and Aristotle both clearly indicate, however, the art of Topics belongs to dialectic; and dialectic and demonstration are very different, as Boethius himself is keenly aware” (182). Stump cites Aristotle’s Topics (1.100a18-25) and Boethius’s On Topical Differences (1182B5-15) to show that the art of the topics belongs to dialectic for Aristotle and Boethius. This classification of the study of the topics under dialectic does not mean, however, that the topics cannot be relied upon in a demonstrative science. In fact, the cited text from Boethius indicates that the philosopher (i.e. the metaphysician) can indeed rely upon the topics.
necessary arguments.\textsuperscript{53}

For Boethius, probable premises in topical arguments are serviceable to dialectic and the orator, and necessary premises in topical arguments are also serviceable to demonstration. “It makes no difference,” Boethius remarks concerning the demonstrative science, “whether the arguments are readily believable or not, provided they are necessary.”\textsuperscript{54} This point is significant because it shows that, even though he does not clearly show how topical arguments serve in a demonstration, Boethius thinks that some logical arguments that use commonplace maxims may be used in metaphysics.

Before we shift our attention to later medievalists, we should note however briefly one basic distinction in Boethius’s understanding of logic. At the beginning of his On Topical Differentiae, Boethius mentions a division of logic:

The whole science of discourse [\textit{ratio disserendi}], which the ancient Peripatetics called ‘\textit{λογική}’ is divided into two parts: one of discovering, the other of judging. The part which purges and instructs judgment, called ‘\textit{αναλυτική}’ by them, we can name ‘resolutive.’ The part which aids competence in discovering, called ‘\textit{τοπική}’ by the Greeks, is called ‘Topical’ [\textit{localis}] by us.\textsuperscript{55}


\textsuperscript{54} See Boethius, \textit{De Differentiis Topicis} (PL 64:1182A): “Philosophus vero ac demonstrator de sola tantum veritate pertactat, atque sint probabilia sive non sint, nihil refert, dummodo sint necessaria.” Stump, \textit{TD}, 41.

\textsuperscript{55} See Boethius, \textit{De Differentiis Topicis} (PL 64:1173B1-7): “Omnis ratio disserendi, quam logican Peripateticici veteres appellavere, in duas distribuitur partes, unam inveniendi, alteram judicandi. Et ea quidem pars quae judicium purgat atque instruit, ab illis analytice vocata, a nobis potest resolutoria nuncupari. Ea vero quae inveniendi facultatem subministrat, a Graecis topice, a nobis localis dicitur.” See also Stump, \textit{TD}, 29. This division
The division of logic into the discovery and judgment of arguments seems to have been accepted by Cicero’s time, but according to Green-Pedersen it “does not really play any role in [Boethius’s] own logical works.” Despite these reservations, we can state that the topics serve as means of discovery for Boethius. Logic treats of syllogisms and propositions, including maximal propositions, and this treatment serves as an inventive or insightful end in the hands of dialectic (when premises are merely probable) and also in the hands of philosophy (when premises are necessary).

1.4 Avicenna

The influence of Avicenna (980 -1037) on the Latin, Islamic, and Jewish mind is breathtaking. With regard to the Latin reception of Avicenna, scholars have noted his contribution in medieval psychology such as the five internal senses and the four moments of


57 See Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics*, 130ff. Green-Pedersen proceeds to state that “the medievals” did not know how to use this division of logic (130) and that this division is “never used for any important purpose” (132).


intellectual cognition. Yet Avicenna’s logic also deserves consideration. In adopting Al-Fārābī’s immense respect for logic, Avicenna belongs to the tradition of the Academy that sees in logic a body of knowledge, rather than the tradition of the Peripatetics that sees in logic just a formal scheme of rules useful for philosophy (an “Organon”). Avicenna considers logic as a distinct science with its own subject-matter.

The very nature of the subject-matter of logic is instructive: “secondary intelligible concepts (intentiones intellectae secundo), which depend on the primary intelligible concepts with respect to the manner by which one arrives through them at the unknown from the known.” The subject of logic consists in notions or intentions that lead us from ignorance to knowledge. Since this subject-genus consists of properties acquired by intentions organized for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, “the goal of logical investigation is to help in other investigations.” Far from becoming irrelevant as a speculative science, second intentions made in logic show an aspect of being that other sciences cannot reach on their own.

Avicenna employs the predicable or logical notion of ‘definition,’ for instance, to

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61 Post. An. 1.11.77a32-33; Met. 4.3.1005b3; Sophistical Refutations 170a27. Aristotle does not explicitly state whether logic is a science, and most ancient Peripatetics such as Alexander of Aphrodisias maintained that logic was not a science. See Jonathan Barnes, Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 360-62. See also Deslauriers, Aristotle on Definition, 183ff. We shall consider the way that Thomas thinks of logic as both an art and a science in chapter one.


63 Liber de philosophia prima I, 2, p. 10.73-77 : “Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo, secundum hoc quod per eas pervenitur de cognito ad incognitum, non inquantum ipsae sunt intellectae et habent esse intelligibile.” See also MH, 1.2, 7(4).

disprove the existence of the void. In a lengthy argument, the Persian vizier uses the void’s lack of definition as sufficient evidence to show that the void cannot exist because the notion itself is unintelligible. It has no definable referent. There can be no adequate definition of the void in terms of genus and difference and, hence, no referent for such a vacuous concept. Avicenna’s argument relies on the premise that, since the logical order mirrors the causal order, logical definitions correspond to the true natures of a thing and “thus can function as proxies in logical inferences.”

The subject-matter then of logic and logic’s relation to other sciences indicates logic’s methodological value. Logic serves as a dialectical tool in the special sciences, and it examines with less certitude the same objects (quaesitum) that metaphysics examines. I wish to discuss very briefly one way that Avicenna’s metaphysics depends on the logical order, especially in the way that Avicenna uses logical notions to recall metaphysical notions in his *Metaphysics of the Healing*.

Avicenna singles out the ‘necessary,’ ‘thing,’ ‘one,’ and the ‘existent’ as primitive notions. None of these four notions requires that (the human) imagination occasion the Agent

65 See Jon McGinnis, *Avicenna* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 43. “It is because the logical ordering from more general to more specific mirrors the causal ordering from the more particular (or determinate) to less particular (or determinate) that logical definitions in terms of genus and difference map onto the true natures of thing, where the logical terms can function as proxies for the material and formal causes in logical inferences. The effect of this mirroring of the ontological ordering by the logical ordering is that if any determinate kind exists in the world as a result of certain material and formal causes (or is in some way a composite of potentiality and actuality), then that kind will have a definition in terms of the logical counterparts of matter and form, namely, genus and difference.” See McGinnis, “Logic and Science: The Role of Genus and Difference in Avicenna’s Logic, Science and Natural Philosophy,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 18 (2007), 165-86, esp. 178.

Intellect’s impression on the material intellect, for they are primary intelligible notions in all men. Like the primary axioms, they cannot be defined by a simpler notion. They are universally predictable (common to everything) and most capable of conceptualization by themselves (primary and immediate). These self-evident notions are impressed on the human soul at the first moment of cognition.67

Despite their primitive or self-evident character, less common notions and synonyms help the unlearned remember what these primordial notions mean.68 The notions of the ‘established’ and the ‘realized’ remind one of ‘existent’ because they point to ‘actuality.’69 ‘True nature’ and ‘quiddity’ remind one of ‘thing’ because they signify a determinate intelligible content.70 The logical teaching about scientific necessity (An. Post. 1.2.71b-72a) reminds one of ‘necessity’ because it points to the assuredness of existence.71 In a dialectical turn, Avicenna turns to concepts to remind the reader of more evident concepts. The purpose is not to define the primary intelligibles since they cannot be defined, but to clarify the soul’s vision of the intended meaning of each notion.72

67 Liber de philosophia prima I, 5, 31.2-5. “Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se, sicut credulitas quae habet prima principia, ex quibus ipsa provenit per se, et est alia ab eis, sed propter ea.” MH p. 22 (1).


69 Ibid., 34.51-54.

70 Ibid., 33.37-39.

71 Ibid., 41.80.

72 Ibid., 32.19-33.22. These synonyms can “lead the mind to insight into the meaning of fundamental notions.” See R. E. Houser, “The Real Distinction and the Principles of Metaphysics: Avicenna and Aquinas,” in
1.5 Averroes

Besides Avicenna’s *Metaphysics of the Healing*, the most important Arabic influence for Thomas’s metaphysics is Averroes’s *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*. Studies on the thought of Averroes (1126-1198) usually focus on his philosophy of religion or on his psychology, and these two themes have an important relationship to Averroes’s metaphysics.73 Not unlike natural philosophy’s proof for the existence of separate substances, psychology supplies key principles for the establishment of metaphysics by positing the existence of an immaterial Agent Intellect, a separate, immaterial substance that physics cannot study.74 Psychology’s conclusions necessitate a metaphysics.

Besides this reliance of metaphysics on psychology for the discovery of separate

Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB, ed. by R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 75-108, esp. 78. “It is the difficult task of *MH* I.5–8 to draw our attention to, articulate, and dialectically defend the first principles of metaphysics, beginning with the first principles of conception in *MH* I.5, namely, the primary notions being, thing, the necessary, and the one.” See Daniel D. DeHaan, “A Mereological Construal of the Primary Notion Being and Thing in Avicenna and Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2014), 342.


substances, several authors have noted in Averroes’s works a dependence of metaphysics on logic. It comes as no surprise that Averroes adopts the Aristotelian notion of logic as a method for valid argumentation. The figures of the syllogism, for instance, are an aid to recognizing the truth of a process of reasoning. This is one meaning of “logical.” This ordinary sense of “logical” is only one among others, however, since Averroes sees logic as a science in its own right, not simply a tool for argumentation.

As an illustration of logic as a positive doctrine, Averroes points to Metaphysics 7.1 where Aristotle recounts the many ways that being is said. Of the many ways a thing is said to be—‘the what,’ ‘a this,’ ‘quality,’ and ‘quantity’—Aristotle singles out ‘the what’ as primarily what substance is because every other category says something regarding ‘the what.’ In his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Averroes identifies Aristotle’s account of being as an instance in which metaphysics appropriates propositions from logic regarding the predicables.

The Andalusian Commentator interprets the Stagirite as stating that the predicables, which explain (declarant) the quiddity of the individual designated substance, are more deserving (digniora) of the name being (ens) than the predicables of the other accidents, since these accidents never express the quiddity of substance. That is why what makes known the quiddity of the individual substance is of substance. According to Averroes, the metaphysician


77 In VII Met., c. 1, fol. 153vi: “Et intendebat per hoc, quod praedicabilia, quae declarant quiditatem individui substantiae demonstratæ sunt digniora nomine ens quam praedicabilia aliorum accidentium, cum nunquam notificant quiditatem substantiae et ideo quod declarat quiditatem individui substantiae est substantiae.”
discovers substance by investigating that which most expresses what substance is. Whatever most has the intelligibility of substance is substance primarily. Averroes’s criterion of substantiality relies almost exclusively on the principle of knowing.\textsuperscript{78}

According to Averroes, the quiddity of an individual substance is prior in being (esse) to the quiddity of accidents, and this priority of individual substances to individual accidents is manifest through itself (\textit{manifestum est per se}). With a seemingly peripheral comment, Averroes continues the rationale:

One must realize that this explanation is logical. And many demonstrations in this science (of metaphysics) are logical insofar as propositions in this science are taken from dialectic. Dialectic is employed in two ways. One way as an instrument in other sciences. Another way as taking that which is explained in it in another science. This is the same way in which what is explained in one speculative science can be taken in another, since it considers absolute being [\textit{de ente simpliciter}]. Dialectical propositions are about absolute being [\textit{entis simpliciter}], such as definitions, descriptions, and others said in them.\textsuperscript{79}

It is clear what Averroes generally means in this passage. Doig,\textsuperscript{80} Bauloye,\textsuperscript{81} Di Giovanni,\textsuperscript{82} and

\textsuperscript{78} In VII Met., c. 7, fol. 158ra. I shall discuss the role of knowledge as a metaphysical tool below. “Substances are prior in being to and more real than accidents because they explain their being” (170). See Gabriele Galluzzo, “Averroes and Aquinas on Aristotle’s Criterion of Substantiality,” \textit{Arabic Sciences and Philosophy} 19 (2009), 157-87.

\textsuperscript{79} In VII Met., c. 1, fol. 153vi-i: “\textit{In hoc ergo capitulo intendit declarare, quod quiditas individui substantiae est prior in esse quiditätibus accidentium. Individuum enim substantiae prius esse alius individuis accidentium manifestum est per se. Et sciendo est quod ista declaratio est logica. Et plures demonstrationes in hac scientia sunt logicae, scilicet quoniam propositiones eius sunt acceptae a dialectica. Dialectica enim usitatur duobus modis. Uno modo secundum quod est instrumentum: et sic usitatur in scientiis alius. Et alio modo ut accipitur illud quod declaratum est in ilia in alius scientiis secundum quod accipitur, et secundum quod accipitur illud quod declaratum est in aliqua scientia speculativa ad aliam scientiam, et cum ista consyderat de ente simpliciter. Et propositiones dialecticae sunt entis simpliciter, sicut definitiones et descriptiones et alia dicta in eis.”

\textsuperscript{80} “The actual construction of Aristotelian metaphysics commences with Book \textit{Z}, according to Averroes. The first six books are only preparatory. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the consideration of the use of words, such as it is found in Book \textit{A}, is foreign to metaphysics. Quite the contrary, the metaphysician must discover by a logical method, what intentions one is to study. Apropos of this logical study, Averroes explains that there are two ways of using logic; one way is to use logic as an instrument—such use is found in all sciences; a second way is to accept logical statements about being, for example, statements giving definitions or descriptions, and to use these to discover being as such” (38). See Doig, \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 38.

\textsuperscript{81} “C’est par conséquent à partir de distinctions établies en logique que le métaphysicien détermine ce qui
Galluzzo have noted Averroes’ claims that 1) logic can be seen either as an instrument or as a doctrine and his claim that 2) metaphysics can rely on logic as a doctrine because logic and metaphysics are about absolute being. These two claims, however, deserve some explanation.

In one sense, for Averroes, logic is used to regulate the correct way of thinking in all the sciences. It imposes a standard or canon by which to argue validly in the figures of the syllogism, and this imposition allows the sciences to proceed demonstratively. In this way, logic distinguishes the true from the false. Because the notions and procedures of logic can be applied in every type of reasoning, whether in definitions, schemes of inference, or methods of refutation, all the sciences use logic in this broad sense of instrument. In a second sense that is more pertinent to this dissertation, logic holds a depository of scientific propositions; logic is used not to regulate, but to constitute specific doctrines that are taught in philosophy. These propositions are taught in the logical works of Aristotle, and they are scientific articulations of constitue la réelle substance. Pour Averroès, en effet, la science de la logique joue un rôle considérable dans la constitution de la science de la métaphysique” (68-9). See Bauloye, La Question de l’Essence.


83 “Averroes does not say so explicitly, but clearly for him ‘propositions established in logic’ simply means propositions contained in Aristotle’s logical works” (148). See Gabriele Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 147-50. Though finding important differences from Burnyeat’s view, Galluzzo thinks that Averroes’s claim that Met. Z is logical can be understood in (Burnyeat’s) Andronicus’s sense of logic as something taken from the teachings of logic.

84 See Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 148. See also, Di Giovanni, “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics”; “Averroes clearly takes logic as a discipline concerned with the formal correctness of reasoning and preliminary to other, more substantive, kinds of investigation.” In his otherwise impressive appropriation of Burnyeat’s analysis, Di Giovanni mistakenly interprets Burnyeat’s “Andronicus’s sense” of logic in the instrumental sense (55-56). Because he confuses the terms, Di Giovanni coins a third sense, “Zeno’s sense,” after Zeno of Citium who (reportedly) first treated logic as a science. Yet Di Giovanni’s “Zeno” stands in for Burnyeat’s “Andronicus.” Burnyeat does not discuss “Andronicus’s sense” in reference to formal correctness of arguments. Rather, Burnyeat mentions it in reference to the way the first philosopher appropriates the logical views of being. Metaphysics proceeds in Andronicus’s sense by appropriating the logical notions of being a subject (subject criterion) and belonging in itself (essence criterion). Both Galluzzo and Di Giovanni’s interpretations of Averroes are “inspired” by Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle.
the way things are in such a way that the mind understands. Such are the two basic senses of logic for Averroes in this passage from his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

In an alternate passage taken from his Commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*, Averroes distinguishes not just two but three different types of logic, which he calls “dialectic.” There is the ordinary, instrumental sense of logic, which is concerned with formal validity. There are two other senses of logic as well. Logic is also understood as “demonstrations composed out of many common axioms” (*demonstrationes quae componentur ex accidentibus communibus pluribus*). This type of logic, like Aristotle’s “logical” in the sense of Simplicius, consists of generalized points of agreement that serve as premises for natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics. These arguments begin from basic truths. The axiom that everything that is moved is moved by another (*omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*), for instance, functions as a logical premise in cosmological proofs for the existence of God. It begins from a general understanding of how things are.

In another sense, logic is understood as “demonstrations whose predicates are proper to dialectic” (*demonstrationes quarum praedicata sunt propria dialecticae*). This type of dialectic, like Aristotle’s “logical” in the sense of Andronicus, consists of doctrines that directly belong to

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85 These two senses of logic resemble the Latin distinction between *logica docens* and *utens* insofar as *logica docens* can be taken as science and *logica utens* can be taken as instrument. I shall briefly discuss this view below in Aquinas. Di Giovanni very briefly compares Averroes’s distinction with the Latins. He states that Averroes focuses more on “positive doctrine,” and the Latins focus more on “formal procedures.” See his “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 59. For an interesting overview, Sten Ebbesen, “What Counted as Logic in the Thirteenth Century,” in *Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West*, 500-1500, ed. Margaret Cameron & John Marenbon (Boston: Brill, 2011): 93-108.

86 For the use of logic as an instrument (*secundum instrumentum*) for the sake of formal validity, see Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, fol. 414v-k. Also, Di Giovanni, “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 60.

the study of logic. Logic articulates positive premises (quasi fundamentis positis) for the other sciences. The doctrinal view of logic, taken especially in Andronicus’s sense, guides Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.\textsuperscript{88} Averroes highlights the substance of a thing (substantia rei) as something essential because it answers the question, “what is it?” (quid est). It is the definition of substance that reveals substance. The reason that it reveals substance is that definition is a predicatable composed of two other predicables (genus and difference) spelling out what-it-is.\textsuperscript{89} Insofar as the definition parses out the essence, Averroes views the logical notion of definition as explaining the metaphysical role of substance.

This service of logic as a doctrinal body applies to other parts of Metaphysics Z as well. In Aristotle’s description of substance as cause in Metaphysics Z17, which is a description that would strike the modern reader as a strictly metaphysical discussion, Averroes interprets Aristotle as offering a causal description according to the logical notion of cause described in the Posterior Analytics. The causality of substance should be identified with the role that definition plays in demonstration. The cause that functions as substance is the formal cause because the formal cause is the essence that explains why a sensible substance is what it is.\textsuperscript{90} Averroes hereby espouses, according to Galluzzo, an explanatory criterion of substantiality.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{88} This wide application of the logical view distinguishes Averroes’s commentary from Burnyeat’s analysis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Whereas Burnyeat parses up Aristotle’s text according to metaphysical and logical explanations, Averroes considers the whole of Zeta as logical. See Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 147.

\textsuperscript{89} In VII Met., c. 11, fol. 161rd. See Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 149: “In conclusion, Met. Z’s discussion is dominated by two logical propositions which Averroes traces back to Aristotle’s Organon: the claim that essence is what is revealed by a definition, which guides the argument from Z 4 to Z 16, and the further claim that the substance of sensible things is their cause in the sense of formal cause and essence, which is at the centre of Z 17.”

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., c. 20, fol. 207rc. See Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 149.

\textsuperscript{91} See Galluzzo, “Averroes and Aquinas on Aristotle’s Criterion of Substantiality,” 171.
One may even go further with Averroes and state that secondary substances are most properly called “substance” because they most express what substance is. Form is more substance than a particular sensible substance because form most explains why a sensible substance is a substance, and secondary substance of Aristotle’s *Categories* is more substance than primary substance because it most explains the quiddity of primary substance. One discovers through predication the noetic priority of being. It is by examining the way that one predicates the term, substance, that one is led to the principal meaning of the term and, thereby, to its reality.

Logical propositions help to answer the question, “what is it?” One discovers substance by *predicating* essential (*per se*) and substantial being, and metaphysics can appropriate these propositions because both logic and metaphysics are about absolute being. According to Averroes, metaphysics can appropriate logical propositions made in predication because both metaphysics and logic are universal sciences that treat the same object, namely absolute being (*de ente simpliciter*). Dialectical propositions such as definitions belong to being as such. These dialectical propositions declare something true about being, and metaphysics can borrow these declarations in its own investigation because the objects of the study of metaphysics and logic

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92 “Mais, insistons-y, c’est en tant qu’elle fait connaître ce qu’est la substance première que la substance seconde, qui en est la cause, est elle-même plus proprement substance.” See Bauloye, *La Question de L’Essence*, 67.

93 “Pour Averroès, comme pour Aristote, les divisions de l’être par soi correspondent aux types de prédicats. C’est donc en examinant la manière dont se fait la prédication que l’on peut découvrir la réalité de l’être. Puisque les neuf types de prédicats accidentel réfèrent tous à un prédicat de type substantiel, c’est ce prédicat substantiel (ou essentiel) qu’il faut examiner. En examinant la manière dont on prédique le mot substance, on découvre la réalité de la substance: c’est en s’interrogeant sur les diverses acceptions du nom substance que l’on est amené à découvrir que le sens principal de ce nom est la réponse à la question “quoi?” concernant les individus substantiels: c’est le prédicat essentiel qui exprime la quiddité de la substance sensible. Or l’examen de la prédication n’est rien d’autre qu’un examen logique, car il suppose les propositions du logicien concernant l’être absolu. . . . [L]e métaphysicien accepte et utilise dans son travail les propositions que, concernant l’être absolu, le logicien a d’abord établies.” See Bauloye, *La Question de L’Essence*, 68.
are the same.

Indeed, Averroes repeatedly states that the sciences of logic and metaphysics have the same subject, namely absolute being (*ens absolutum*). These statements seem surprising since for Averroes metaphysics has God as its subject-matter (*pace* Avicenna). Physics proves the existence of separate existents (through *quia* demonstration), and metaphysics studies the nature of these separate existents. Despite this controversial stance, Averroes “oscillates” between two different subject-matters for metaphysics: the ontological realm of being as being and the theological realm of God. Following Di Giovanni’s reading, these discrepancies can be resolved in Averroes’s metaphysics. In knowing Himself, God also knows being and its properties. The First Form (God) knows the nature of absolute being (*ens simpliciter*) because God knows Himself who *is* absolute being.

Some might wish to diminish the importance of these statements. In Doig’s interpretation, the statement that metaphysics and logic are about absolute being betrays a “slight impreciseness of language.” When Averroes states that a logical notion, such as ‘definition,’ expresses something about absolute being, it is a peculiar manner of stating that a predicables

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94 *In III Met.*, c. 1, fol. 36vm- 37ra: “Subiectum enim utriusque scientiae est idem, scilicet ens simpliciter.” See also *In IV Met.*, c. 5, fol. 70vh-k; *In VII Met.*, c. 11, fol. 161rd. See Doig, *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, 39; Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 149. “Averroes considers logic to be not merely related in a special manner to metaphysics, but even fully integrated into metaphysics itself. Logic is, to an extent, a part of metaphysics and an essential element in its configuration; conversely, metaphysics is the inquiry that most appropriates and gives a new orientation to the basic teachings of logic. Metaphysics, in this sense, has a ‘logical’ status.” See Di Giovanni, “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 53-54.


considers absolute being insofar as logical notions are ultimately about absolute being. Doig thereby aligns Averroes’s view of the relationship between metaphysics and logic with that of Thomas Aquinas. This interpretation cannot be maintained, however, not only because Averroes does not speak in this manner but also because Averroes identifies metaphysical notions with logical notions.98

Averroes does not think that logic studies extramental being, of course, yet the Commentator holds that mental beings are simply an aspect of absolute being, being in an unqualified respect. This perspectival view of mental beings means that the sciences of logic and metaphysics consider the same subject-genus under different perspectives. Metaphysical and logical notions are only distinct in reason. In the case of ‘definition,’ for instance, logic considers ‘definition’ insofar as it is an instrument that leads the intellect to understand quiddities of things, and metaphysics considers definitions insofar as it signifies the nature of a thing.99 Yet these approaches to definition are only different ways of considering absolute being.

This status that definition occupies extends to the definition of the essence of things. In a view some Latin scholastics came to accept as their own, Averroes considers the whole essence

98 This view of the analogous subject-matters of logic and metaphysics differentiates Thomas from Averroes: “Contrary to Averroes, Aquinas maintains that similarity means not ‘identity’ but, rather, ‘analogy’ (aequiparatio) between the subject-matter of the two disciplines. In [Thomas’s] view, the subject-matter of logic is somehow similar to, and somehow different from, the subject-matter of metaphysics. It is similar insofar as both subject-matters embrace the totality of what exists (ad omnia se extendit) and are universal in scope (propter utriumque communitatem); but, contrary to Averroes, Aquinas believes that the subject-matter of logic is literally ‘other’ than that of metaphysics.” See Di Giovanni, “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 71.
of species as the form of the part, the substantial form.\textsuperscript{100} What this means is that the substantial form is really identical to and only notionally distinct from the species.\textsuperscript{101} This stance is not problematic for Averroes since, according to his interpretation of Aristotle’s writings, one must exclude any kind of matter when defining what something necessarily is (\textit{to ti en einai}). One must even exclude common matter.\textsuperscript{102} The only way to distinguish between form and species, for Averroes, is in the mode of consideration. Though each term numerically identifies the same thing, one speaks of “form” insofar as it exists in the extramental world, and one speaks of “species” insofar as it exists in the soul. Both terms express different aspects of the same thing. Mental being (e.g. species) and extramental being (e.g. form) are really identical and only conceptually distinct.\textsuperscript{103}

When Averroes remarks that logic and philosophy (metaphysics) differ in the mode of science (\textit{modum scientiae}), he means that they approach the same subject-genus according to different perspectives. This real identity in subject-genus satisfies the Aristotelian requirement,

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\textsuperscript{100} Armand Maurer notes that Siger of Brabant parts ways with Averroes on this exclusion of matter, yet many other Latins accept the Averroistic view (the early St. Albert, Adam of Buckfield, and Thomas of York). See Maurer, “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas,” \textit{Mediaeval Studies} 13 (1951), 168. For Aristotle’s view on essence, see Owens’s discussion of what-\textit{IS}-Being (\textit{to ti en einai}) in \textit{The Doctrine of Being}, 181-188.

\textsuperscript{101} For Thomas’s description of Averroes’s position on essence and form, \textit{In VII Met.} lect. 9, no. 1467: “Quidam enim dicunt quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius, quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam et facit eam esse in actu; forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per eam in specie collocatur. . . . Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorundam sequentium eum” (Marietti ed., 358). See also \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2. According to Di Giovanni, Thomas offers here the “clearest characterisation” of Averroes’s doctrine that substantial form and species are identical \textit{secundum rem}. See his “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 66.

\textsuperscript{102} See Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics} V.8.1017b10-16. Concerning this interpretation of Averroes, see the discussion in Galluzzo’s \textit{The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta}, 199-208.

\textsuperscript{103} See Di Giovanni, “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 68-70. “[F]orm is to extramental being what species is to mental being. . . . In this sense, real identity and logical distinction between form and species come down to real identity and logical distinction between extramental being, i.e., between the subject-matter of metaphysics, on one side, and the subject-matter of logic, on the other” (68).
\end{quote}
stated in *Posterior Analytics* I.7 and I.9, that a science only take premises that are appropriate to it. The only premises that are appropriate for demonstrative argumentation, according to Aristotle, are those premises that come within the same subject-genus or from a superior science. Since metaphysics and logic have the same subject-genus for Averroes, metaphysics demonstratively employs logical propositions in its inquiry concerning being as being.

1.6 *13th Century Latins*

1.6.1 *Brief Overview of the Status of Topics*

Before turning to Thomas, mention should be made of his intellectual milieu. By the 13th century, commonplace arguments or topics (Lat. “locri”) were referred to as a relation between terms (*habitudo terminorum*), not a relation between terms insofar as they are terms, but a relation between the things that the terms represent. Some 12th century schoolmen also held that the topics confirm arguments by means of relations, and by the 13th century the consensus was to call these topics “relations.”

Topics also became known as “second intentions” (*secunda

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intentio). First intentions are notions that our mind forms about things, and second intentions are conceptual relations between those first intentions. Through this clarification, the 13th century Latins were able to distinguish dialectic from demonstrative science because they expressed the derivative nature and plausible character of the topics.

These second intentions, it should be noted, signify in the concrete. From the first extant Latin commentary on Aristotle’s Topics (written by a “Robert”), second intentions were expressed as genus, species, and definition, not as generality, speciality, and definability. This reliance on the concrete over the abstract is significant. As Kilwardby remarks in On the Origin of the Sciences (ca. 1250), logic does not establish the method used by other sciences simply by considering concepts (rationes), but rather by taking those concepts in concrete form (rationes concretae). In this way, logic creates a method in all the sciences.

1.6.2 Logica Docens/Utens: Lambert and Robert of Kilwardby

The 13th Century Latins broadly distinguished between Aristotle’s Topics and Boethius’s On Topical Differentiae by stating that, whereas Aristotle discusses the use of the topics, Boethius explains the substance and nature of the topics. The reason for that broad appellation was that most of Aristotle’s Topics, Books II-VIII, covered the use of dialectic and its application.

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105 See Green-Pedersen, Tradition of the Topics, 223-240, esp. 234. Green-Pedersen mentions that a “Robert” whose manuscript is kept in Lisbon, the first extant Latin commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, wavers between the general and the concrete mode of signifying these intentions. Later authors did not waver.


107 Ibid., 107.
to problems. Despite this general distinction, they also recognized Bk I of Aristotle’s *Topics* as treating the nature of the topics. This is to say that these authors were recognizing divisions between and within the logical works of Aristotle and Boethius according to the nature of logic (*logica docens*) and the use of logic (*logica utens*).108

Although Aristotle’s *Analytics* and *Topics* were translated by the mid 12th century, appreciation for “new logic” (*logica nova*) came only later in the 13th century in the form of lectures and commentaries.109 Many masters discussed the difference between a doctrinal logic (*logica docens*) and an applied logic (*logica utens*), a distinction that was “widespread among the scholastics” according to Stump.110 As we will see below, in order to explain the logical method in metaphysics, Thomas himself relies on this critical distinction. We turn now to the writings of Thomas’s contemporaries, especially Lambert (ca. 1250) and Robert of Kilwardby (ca 1215-

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108 Ibid., 15: “we find [Kilwardby] saying that in book I dialectic has been determined ‘ut est scientia’, and there the dialectical syllogism is subject. The following books are about ‘usum dialectici syllogismi . . . ut est ars . . . et instrumentum applicatum ad opus’. Even if we do not find the words docens/utens used here it is, I think, sufficiently clear that the distinction he makes between I and II-VIII is the same as that between docens-utens. Nor does any other of the other commentators explicitly say that I is docens while II-VIII are utens, but Adenulph, Boethius, Henricus, Simon, and Angelo state that book I has the dial.yll. as subject and that it treats of its *principia* or *constitutio*, while the remaining books are about the ‘usus’ of dial. yll. or its ‘applicatio ad probelmata’. Abelard in his *Super Topica* (Boethii) glossae explains the same distinction, only he does not say docens, but *tractans*.”

109 “It seems likely that the ‘logica nova’ and the new Aristotle were being lectured on in Oxford and Paris in the first decade of the thirteenth century. . . . [B]y 1255 Aristotle was firmly established at Paris, as he was indeed at Oxford, where documentation about commentaries and lectures becomes abundant as early as the 1240s.” See Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 43-79, esp. 70ff.

110 See Stump, *Dialectic and its Place*, 137 no. 10: “There is a sense in which dialectic is a science. Dialectic can be thought of as the use of Topics to construct and evaluate probable arguments (this is *dialectica utens*), or it can be thought of as a reflection on and analysis of such use of Topics (*dialectica docens*). *Dialectica utens* is only an art, not a science; its arguments are Topical and its conclusions only probable. *Dialectica docens* may be thought of as the study of *dialectica utens*. It uses demonstrative arguments about *dialectica utens*; it produces knowledge, rather than opinion; and it is a science.” Stump then lists nine sources for this distinction. Reprinted from Stump’s “Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg, and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 281.
1279), who both recognized this distinction and offered some explanation.

The *Summa Lamberti* or *Logica* of Lambert, who was a French master of arts, figures as one of the main textbooks of logic in the mid 13th century alongside other well-known textbooks such as William of Sherwood’s *Introduction in Logic* and Peter of Spain’s *Tractatus*. In its first chapter entitled “On Propositions,” Lambert gives a traditional definition and etymology of logic: “Logic is the science of discerning the true from the false by means of argumentation. Logic gets its name from ‘logos’, which means discourse, and ‘icos’, which means science, as it were, the science of discourse.”  

Logic is also “the art of arts and the science of the sciences.” The reason for the eminent status of logic is that the other arts and sciences “derive their method from logic.”

After discussing the etymology of “dialectic” (from *dia* meaning two and *lexis* meaning reason or discourse), Lambert explains the difference between logic and dialectic: “Only dialectic argues on the grounds of probability.” Dialectic is a subset of logic, that is, and it works with what is probable. Lambert explains why logic is superior to dialectic both as a science and as an art by relying on the distinction between “teaching” and “using” (*logica docens/logica utens*): as a science, logic teaches every kind of syllogism, but dialectic teaches

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112 Ibid., 4.35-37, “Logica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum qua aperta omnes aperiuntur et qua clausa omnes alie clauduntur, sine qua nulla, cum qua quelibet.”

113 Ibid., 4.37–5.1: “Alia ratione dici potest quod est dignior alis, quia alie modum procedendi quem habent sumunt a logica: modus enim scientificus, id est modus procedendi in scientiis, est diffinire, dividere, et colligere seu conferre, id est probare et improbare. Nulla autem scientia alia a logica docet diffinire et dividere et colligere, sed sola logica hoc facit et ita alias dirigit et rettificat in suo modo procedendi.”

114 Ibid., 5.7-9: “Dyalectica est ars artium ad principia omnium methodorum viam habens. Sola enim dyalectica probabiliter, disputatui de principiis omnium artium.”
only the dialectical syllogism; as an art, logic uses every kind of syllogism, but dialectic uses only the dialectical syllogism.\textsuperscript{115}

Lambert directly distinguishes between a science and an art, as would be expected, by again relying on the doctrinal role of logic as a science and the instrumental role of logic as an art:

Science gives a name without qualification to what it treats, whereas art involves a relation to a task. Hence, dialectic is called a science inasmuch as it teaches one how to construct a dialectical syllogism on the basis of its own principles; it is called an art to the extent that it employs dialectical syllogism to arrive at a conclusion. Dialectical syllogism is the subject of dialectic and the instrument of dialectic.\textsuperscript{116}

Accordingly, the difference between \textit{logica docens} and \textit{logica utens} appears quite basic: \textit{logica docens} is a science that teaches and constructs the syllogism, and \textit{logica utens} is an art that uses syllogisms and arrives at their conclusion. Lambert uses an analogy of a craftsman to make this point clearer:

[A] hammer can be a subject and an instrument in the craftsman’s art. A hammer is called a subject when the craftsman fashions it using his own principles, but it is called an instrument when, once the hammer is made, it is used to make other things. Similarly, dialectical syllogism is called the subject of dialectic when dialectic teaches one how to construct a dialectical syllogism, but it is called an instrument when, once constructed, dialectic employs [it] to arrive at a conclusion. And dialectic is called a science when it takes dialectical syllogism as its subject, [whereas] it is called an art when it uses the same thing for its instrument.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 5.18-23: “Tunc queritur que sit differenza inter logicam et dyalecticam. Ad hoc dicendum est quod logica secundum quod est ars et secundum quod est scientia superior est ad dyalepticam. Logica enim scientia est de omni silogismo docens, dyalectica de silogismo dyalectic vel apparenti dyalectic. Similiter logica ars omni silogismo utilur, dyalectica vero dyalectic solum vel apparenti dyalectic.”

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 5.28-35: “Et scienendum quod scientia et ars differunt. Scientia enim illud quod dicit nominat absolute; ars vero dicit relationem ad opus. Unde dyalectica dicitur scientia secundum quod docet silogismum dyalecticum construere ex suis principiis; dicitur autem ars secundum quod utitur silogismo dyalectic ad aliquam conclusionem terminandam. Est enim silogismus dyalecticus subjectum dyalectice et instrumentum dyalectice.”

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 5.34–6.2: “Quod potest videri in simili: martellus potest esse subiectum in arte fabrili et instrumentum. Subiectum dicitur martellus quando eundem construit faber ex suis principiis; dicitur autem instrumentum quando ilio martello facto utitur ad alia fabricanda. Similiter silogismus dyalecticus dicitur subiectum dyalectice quando dyalectica docet construere silogismum dyalecticum; dicitur autem instrumentum quando ipso
In effect, the logician is the craftsman of discourse. When the logician *constructs* the syllogism out of spoken words, he is forming a science of discourse; when the logician *applies* the syllogism out of spoken words, he is using an art of discourse. The same occurs for the dialectician in the formation and employment of the dialectical syllogism.

I would like to conclude our discussion of the distinction between *logica docens* and *logica utens* by briefly considering statements on the roles of logic made by Robert of Kilwardby. Kilwardby was a regent-master of arts at the University of Paris from 1235 to 1245 during which time he wrote an extensive amount on logic, including commentaries on Aristotle’s *Prior analytics, Posterior analytics, Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*. The importance of logic as chief of the linguistic arts, according to Kilwardby, lies in the fact that it has a “method of investigating truth in the other sciences.” The “other” in that statement indicates that Kilwardby takes logic to be a science. The way that logic determines the method in the other sciences is for it to determine both the nature and method of discourse. According to Paul Thom, such statements mean that logic is a *science* insofar as it determines a theory, but they also mean that logic is an *art* insofar as it determines a method of discourse.

Kilwardby is clearer about these two types of logic in his *Writings on the Topics of Aristotle*. There he answers a question about whether logic is a science or not. He reminds the

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119 Ibid., Prooemium: “logica rationem et modum disserendi debet determinare.”

reader of a criterion for the unity of a science as presented in the *Posterior Analytics*. That work states that a science is one when it considers the parts and properties of one genus. When we apply that criterion to logic (or “dialectic”), then in some sense, logic is not a science because dialectic considers all and not just one determinate genus. Kilwardby raises a possible objection in the form of an exception: metaphysics would seem not to be a science as well because it treats of the whole of being. He responds that metaphysics nevertheless considers its objects insofar as they are reduced to one being, that is, to the first cause which is an uncaused cause, so metaphysics is one science. In contrast to metaphysics, however, logic is concerned in an equal manner about accidents and substance, so it does not consider just one genus.\(^{121}\)

Kilwardby concludes his answer to the question about whether logic is one science by evoking a twofold type of logic:

[I]t must be said that logic is twofold: (it is) instrumental [*utens*], and this logic is about all objects, and such a logic is not one science, but one based on the unity of the end, for art is called ‘one’ based on the unity of end and not of subject; or as logic is doctrinal [*docens*], and such a logic is one based on the unity of subject, for its subject is the dialectical syllogism.\(^{122}\)

There are two senses of logic, one that does not meet the criterion for a science as laid in the

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\(^{121}\) See Robert Kilwardby, *Scriptum super libro Topicorum*, f. 182va, prooemium: “Circa secundum (utrum sit una scientia vel non) sic: Ut habetur in Posterioribus, una est scientia, quae est unius generis partes et passionis considerans. Igitur cum dialectica sit de omnibus et non unius generis determinati, ut habetur in Posterioribus et in Elenchis, ipsa non erit scientia una. Et non potest responderi sicut de metaphysica - quod quamvis sit de toto ente, quia tamen est de his in quantum ad unum ens reducuntur, scilicet ad primam causam quae est causa non causata, ideo est una scientia - quia aequaliter est logici de accidentibus et de substantiis.” Text taken from N.J. Green-Pedersen, “On the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Topics in 13th century,” in *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age grec et latin* 9 (1973), 1-46, esp. 29.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.: “Et ideo dicendum quod duplex est logica: utens, et hoc est circa omnia, et sic logica non est una scientia, sed una ars ab unitate finis, quia ars dicitur una ab unitate finis et non subjecti, Vel secundum quod est docens, et sic est una ab unitate subjecti, quia sic est de dialectico syllogismo.” For the unedited text, see Green-Pedersen, “On the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Topics,” 29. Kilwardby “says that dialectica docens has one subject, namely the dialectical syllogism, and so it is ‘una scientia’. Dialectica utens however is ‘circa omnia’, and so it is not ‘una scientia, sed una ars’” (14).
Posterior Analytics and one that does meet this criterion. Instrumental logic (logica utens) does not meet this criterion because it considers being in general as a final cause in an indeterminate way; doctrinal logic (logica docens) does meet this criterion because it considers the syllogism as its subject. Logic as science studies being in a determinate way in the form of a syllogism (or in the case of dialectic, the dialectical syllogism), and this logic can teach us many things because its subject-matter, including the syllogism and other modes of reasoning, bespeaks the reality upon which it is ontologically grounded.

This medieval discussion about the different types of logic did not, of course, end with Lambert and Robert of Kilwardby. Indeed, Albert the Great, Adenulph of Anagni, and Angelo of Camerino differentiate logica docens and logica utens in the same vein as Kilwardby. We find a slightly different presentation, however, in Simon of Faversham who states that dialectic is a habit of the soul existing in the speculative intellect as its subject. The same habit is doctrinal (docens) with reference to the causes and principles by which it is produced and instrumental (utens) with reference to its application to the scientific objects of the other sciences. This

123 Contrast Kilwardby’s Writings on the Topics with his much later work in De ortu scientiarum, 578. In the later more independent work, Kilwardby lays out three different subjects of logic: rational discourse (sermone ratiocinativo), discursive reasoning (ratiocinatione sermoctinata), and reasonable being (ens ratiocinabile). See also Paul Thom, Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby (Boston: Brill, 2007), 73.

124 “Logic is concerned not only with speech and reasoning, but also with reality itself. However, the logician’s treatment of reality is not that of the metaphysician, since the latter studies the categories as parts of being; the former, on the contrary, studies them in regard to their function as predicates or subjects in sentences. Thus, logic is intended to be the theory of mental discourse concerning being and is therefore ontologically grounded in a correspondence between the structural connections in thought and the framework of reality.” See Alessandro D. Conti, “Semantics and Ontology in Robert Kilwardby’s Commentaries on the Logica Vetus” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Robert Kilwardby, ed. Paul Thom and Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2013): 65-130, esp. 69-70.

125 See Simon of Faversham, Commentary on Peter of Spain’s Summule Logicales: “Notandum est ulterius quod ‘loyca’ sive ‘dyalectica’ duobus modis accipitur. Uno modo ut est docens, alio modo ut est uten. Et cum dyaletica sive loyca est habitus intellectualis, talis habitus intellectualis potest applicari ad duo. Uno modo talis habitus potest comparari ad suas causas sive ad principia per que docetur. Et hoc modo ‘loyca’ accipitur ut est
interpretation and others were debated for several centuries up until even John of St. Thomas (1589-1644).126

2. Exposition of Thomas Aquinas’s Method of Predication

In the 13th century, the translations and works of philosophers from the Islamic empire found their way into Christendom and enlivened the medieval universities. While at the University of Paris, for instance, Thomas Aquinas wrote a Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1) that references the Aristotelian commentator, Averroes. There, Thomas acknowledges Averroes’s presentation of types of logic that provide a scientific procedure (logica docens, logica utens).127 In his Commentary on Boethius’s terse prose concerning the knowledge of the divine (qq. 1 thru 3), the cause of plurality (q. 4), and the division (q. 5) and methods (q. 6) of the speculative sciences, Thomas offers his classic treatment of scientific method (q. 6, a. 1).

2.1 Commentary on the De Trinitate

The first article concerning the method of the speculative sciences (q. 6, a. 1) evaluates Boethius’s summary statement about how to proceed in each of the three speculative sciences:

docens. Alio modo accipitur talis habitus per comparationem ad alia scientias secundum usum sui subiecti. Et hoco modo accipitur ut est utens.” This passage is taken from L. M. De Rijk, “On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain’s Summule logicales,” Vivarium 6 (1968), 69-101, esp. 81. For the view that several authors such as Albert the Great give “virtually” the same explanation for the distinction between logica docens and utens, see Green-Pedersen, “On the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Topics,” 14

126 See John of St. Thomas (Poinsot), The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, 47-58. John of St. Thomas discusses logica docens and logica utens, and he outlines many different interpretations from the 15th and 16th centuries about the distinction (52-53).

“Must we proceed according to the mode of reason [rationabiliter] in natural science, according to the mode of learning [disciplinabiliter] in mathematics, and according to the mode of intellect [intellectualiter] in divine science?”128 Treating each mode in a separate section, Thomas affirms that the 1) mode of reason, 2) learning, and 3) intellect is characteristic to natural science, mathematics, and divine science respectively.

The final and third section concerning the method appropriate to divine science (metaphysics) has received much attention.129 In that exposition, Thomas delineates the way in which metaphysics proceeds in the intellectual mode: on the one hand either according to the ways of resolution (via resolutionis) or of composition (via compositionis); on the other hand, either according to the orders of extrinsic causes (secundum rem) or of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem).130 Authors usually turn to this third section concerning how metaphysics proceeds intellectually (intellectualiter), and only a handful of disparate authors consider the first section, which concerns how metaphysics proceeds rationally (rationabiliter).131 Thomas holds

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130 For a comparable passage about metaphysics as proceeding intellectually, see Thomas’s Proemium to his Commentary on the Metaphysics: “Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia” (Marietti ed., 18.2).
that metaphysics mainly proceeds in an intellectual mode insofar as the objects of metaphysics are most intellectual, that is intelligible, yet it must also perforce proceed in a rational mode. Insight (intellectus) bookends reasoning (ratio). In the first section of the Commentary on De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1, Thomas presents a certain mode appropriate to metaphysics that proceeds according to the mode of reason, that is to say, according to a rational method.

Interpreters may have generally overlooked Thomas’s statements about a rational method for metaphysics because of their placement in a section in which Thomas is responding to a general question regarding natural science. Thomas buries his treatment of a metaphysical method, that is, within an overall treatment of a physical method. Responding to the general question of a rational method in natural science, he outlines three different ways a method (processus) can be called rational (rationabiliter). In order to best discuss the first way, I shall...
treat these three ways in reverse order: the third way points to a meaning of the term “rational” appropriate to natural science; the second way points to a meaning of the term “rational” appropriate to moral science; and the first way points to meaning of the term “rational” appropriate to both rational science (logic) and divine science (metaphysics).\(^\text{135}\)

In the third way that a method is called rational, Thomas states that natural science uses a rational method in the sense that it imitates reason \((\text{ratio})\). This method imitates the way that the rational powers operate.\(^\text{136}\) In natural science, as Thomas tells us in other passages, this way consists of reasoning from what is more known relative to us (sensible) toward what is less known relative to us (intelligible). By proceeding from what is more known relative to us, Thomas means that man first encounters universals in a confused way through sensation. One first knows ‘body’ confusedly before distinctly knowing body as ‘animal,’ and one first knows ‘animal’ confusedly before distinctly knowing animal as ‘man.’\(^\text{137}\) In its quest to understand the nature of physical substances, natural science moves from what is more known to us through

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\(^\text{135}\) In VIII Phys., lect. 19, no. 1129: “Et primo ostendit hoc per proprias rationes; secundo per rationes logicas et communes, ibi: Rationabiliter autem accidit” (Leon. 2.437). See “rationabiliter” in Ludwig Schütz, Thomas-Lexikon: Sammlung, Übersetzung und Erklärung der in sämtlichen Werken des h. Thomas von Aquin vorkommenden Kunstausdrücke und wissenschaftlichen Aussprüche (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1895; Reprint. New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1948), 691. Depending on the context, the term can also be translated as “reasonable.”

\(^\text{136}\) In I Phys., lect. 1: “Quod autem universalia sint confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in se suas species in potentia, et qui scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte; tunc autem distinguuit eiusmod cognitione, quando unumquodque eorum quae continentur potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur: qui enim scit animal, non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu: secundum igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal quam hominem” (Leon. 2.5). See also ST I, q. 85, a. 3 where Thomas states that the “more universal” is first in our cognition.
sensation to what is less known to us through intellection.\textsuperscript{138}

Thomas suggests that another characteristic of human thinking is that it discovers things by reasoning from one thing to another. As an example, he states that it is through signs and effects that one discovers causes.\textsuperscript{139} Unlike the angels who immediately intuit, man first needs to reason to the fact of some thing (\textit{quia}), as opposed to the cause of some thing (\textit{propter quid}).\textsuperscript{140}

For instance, one might think that, because the planets do not twinkle, they must be near. The syllogism in this type of reasoning would state, “Whatever does not twinkle is near, but the planets do not twinkle; therefore, they are near.” Rather than prove that the planets are near by definition (\textit{propter quid}), one proves that the planets are near from an effect or from a sign (\textit{quia}). Natural science proceeds in this type of rational method which demonstrates facts (e.g. nearness) based on signs or effects (e.g. not twinkling). The point of these remarks is not to state that \textit{quia} demonstrations and arguments from sensible things to intelligible causes belong to

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{In IX Meta}. lect. 1, no. 1771: “Et hic est ordo conveniens, cum sensibilia quae sunt in motu sint nobis magis manifesta. Et ideo per ea devenimus in cognitionem substantiarum rerum immobilem” (Marietti ed., 18.424). See also \textit{ST} I, q. 88, a. 2. Such a procedure parallels the historical account of philosophy starting from the study of sensible bodies and ending with the study of being as being (\textit{ens inquantum est ens}), \textit{ST} I, q. 44, a. 2. For an interpretation that \textit{ens} in the latter passage should be understood as \textit{habens esse}, see John F. X. Knasas, \textit{The Preface to Thomistic Metaphysics: A Contribution to the Neo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics} (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1990), esp. 71-89. Knasas also argues that one attains a confused knowledge of separate substances through a negated and analogous notion of \textit{esse commune} (pp. 95-113).

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{De Trinitate} q. 6, a. 1a: “Secundo quia cum rationis sit de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc maxime in scientia naturali obseruratur, ubi ex cognitione unius rei in cognitionem alterius duenitus, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem cause” (Leon. 50.160:175-179). \textit{Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Pariensis} Bk 1, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4 ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux 1929), 403: “Unde cum naturale sit nobis procedere ex sensibus ad intelligibilia, ex effectibus in causas, ex posterioribus in priora, secundum statum vitae, quia in pria multis modus erit intelligenti; ideo est quod potentias animae et habitus non possimus cognoscere nisi per actus, et actus per objecta” (henceforth \textit{In I Sent}. d. 17, q. 1, a. 4 [Mandonnet ed., 1.403]. \textit{ST} I, q. 84, a. 6. See Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics,” 417-18.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{ST} I, q. 2, a. 2; \textit{SCG} I, c. 12; \textit{In I Post. an.}, lect. 23. Natural science is distinguished from the procedure in mathematics because mathematics proves something, not through some other really distinct thing (quia), but through the proper causes of a thing (\textit{propter quid}). Thomas offers a similar account when he responds to the question, “whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive?” in \textit{ST} I, q. 58, a. 3: “Sic igitur et inferiores intellectus, scilicet hominum, per quendam motum et discursum intellectualis operationis perfectionem in cognitione veritatis adipiscuntur; dum scilicet ex uno cognito in aliud cognitum procedunt” (Leon. 5.83).
natural science alone, but rather that proceeding in this way approximates the human (rational) mode of knowing.\textsuperscript{141}

Whereas the third way is called rational because it proceeds in a way proper to the rational soul, the first and second way are called rational because they proceed in a way proper to a rational science, namely logic.\textsuperscript{142} The first two rational methods are not, however, called rational for entirely the same reason. The first method is called rational because of the logical way it begins; the second method is called rational because of the logical way it ends. A method can either begin with premises derived from logic and be rational in the first way, or it can end with logically inconclusive solutions and be rational in the second way.

Continuing in reverse order, we can now consider the second way a method is called rational, that is, insofar as its logical procedure ends inconclusively with multiple possible solutions. This procedure does not achieve an intellectual insight into principles, nor a resolution of one’s judgments, but stops in the course of inquiry. The term “rational” in this case is contrary to “demonstrative” because in demonstration one achieves understanding (intellectus), which completes reasoning (ratio).\textsuperscript{143} This second method, however, does not end with understanding. It ends only with discursive reasoning.

\textsuperscript{141} Indeed, metaphysics proves the existence of God through a quia demonstration from sensible datum of motion. \textit{De Trinitate} q. 6, a. 1: “Attribuitur ergo rationabili procedere scientie naturali, non quod ei soli conueniat, set quia ei precipue competit” (Leon. 50:160.197-199). “It is simply a question of greater emphasis on one or the other phase of human knowledge.” See Maurer, \textit{The Division and Methods of the Sciences}, xxxviii. See also Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 346-48. Aertsen bridges Thomas’s discussion of this rational method according to human powers with the intellectual method of divine science in his “Method and Metaphysics,” 409-12.

\textsuperscript{142} Despite the fact that logic is the art of arts, logic is also a rational science or rational philosophy. For instance, \textit{De Trinitate} q. 5, a. 1 ad 2; \textit{In I Post an.}, lect. 1, no. 2; \textit{In I Eth.} lect. 1, no. 2: “Ordo quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam” (Leon. 47.4:32-33).

\textsuperscript{143} To be clear, not all rational methods described in \textit{De Trinitate} (q. 6, a. 1) are opposed to demonstration. Of the three senses of “rational” under discussion, Thomas only describes the second one as non-demonstrative.
The opposition between the terms intellectus and ratio here plays a key role in Thomas’s account of the second way a method is called rational, and their meaning provide backdrops to the entire discussion about method. As two different operations of the possible intellect, “intellectus” (intellectual insight) and “ratio” (discursive reasoning) distinguish different manners of knowing (modi cognoscendi): we know by intellectus through a simple intuition, and we know by ratio through discursion from one to another. The second way a method is rational, according to Thomas, is because of its discursive operation regarding a puzzling object.

Thomas makes an important point about the role of logic in this second way. Such a use of logic is denominated “rational” (rationabiliter) because logic sometimes paves the way for necessary proofs through probable arguments. Notwithstanding the fact that some premises may be uncertain and hence produce uncertain conclusions, logic directs the acts of reasoning methodically, easily, and “without error” and for this reason is called the “art of arts.” Logic here serves as a technique or instrument (utens), and it is this instrumental type of logic that

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144 ST I, q. 59, a. 1 ad 1; De veritate q. 15, a. 1 ad 7.
145 De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1b ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod a potentis anime sumitur modus scientiarum propter modum quem habent potentie anime in agendo; unde modi scientiarum non respondent potentis anime set modis quibus potentie anime procedere possunt, qui non solum diversificantur penes potentias tantum, set etiam penes objecta” (Leon. 50.162:312-319). Thomas makes this distinction in earlier and later works. Aside from the above citation, In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 5; De veritate q. 16., a. 1; ST I, q. 79, a. 8. See Jules Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d’Aquin (Ottowa: Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1936). François-Xavier Putallaz, Le sens de la réflexion en Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1991). Bernard Lonergan provides a list of meanings for ratio: “concept, reason, intelligibility, essence, meaning, the what, nature, form, formality, formal property, object of thought, idea.” See his Verbum, 17, no. 23.
146 In I Post. an., lect. 1: “et ideo videtur esse ars artium, quia in actu rationis nos dirigit, a quo omnes artes procedunt” (Leon. 1*/2.2:29-31). A litany of authors from Ammonius (in Gk.) to Peter of Spain used the phrase “ars artium.” See the note in the Leonine edition.
147 “Et hoc modo rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet scientia, ut ex probabilibus paretur via ad necessarias probationes; et hic est alius modus quo logica utimur in scientiis demonstratuis, non quidem ut est docens, set ut est utens” (Leon. 50.159:150-155). For an instance of rationabiliter used as equivalent to logicōs, In
constructs sound arguments with needed tools such as definitions, propositions, and syllogisms. Logic understood in this instrumental sense (utens) is practical.

Whereas the second way is called rational because it depends upon logic as an instrument (utens), the first way is called rational because it depends upon doctrinal logic (docens) for starting with necessary premises. This important distinction differentiates the first and second way a method is called rational. It is true that the first two ways are denominated rational because they rely upon a rational science, but they depend on two different considerations of rational science. The second way relies on a logic that implements right reasoning (utens); the first way relies on a logic that theorizes on right reasoning (docens).

III Phys., lect. 8, n. 2.

148 De Trinitate q. 5, a. 1, ad 2; In I Met., 1, nos. 32-33; ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1 ad 2. Pierre Michaud-Quantin offers a fascinating historical overview of these terms logica and dialectica in the middle ages. See his “L’Emploi des Termes Logica et Dialectica au Moyen Âge,” in Arts Libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Age, Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale (Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1969), 855-62. The practical sense of logic seems to be dominant. For instance, “Lambert d’Auxerre reste traditionel quand, avant de répéter l’éloge fait (de la dialectique, n’oublions pas par Augustin), il dit que la logica est ‘la science qui distingue le vrai du faux grâce à l’argumentation’” (860).


150 Besides Averroes, Albert the Great also wrote on logica docens. See Super Anal. post. tr. 3 c. 4 (ed. Borgnet, 77): “Dialectica autem docens determinati generis subjecti est, et syllogismus dialecticus determinatum subjectum ejus est, cujus demonstrat determinatas passiones et differentias. Si enim dialectica utens habet determinatum subiectum et determinatas passiones, ipsa non esset interrogativa, neque interrogaret secundum quod interrogerare est inter duo opposita contentum in alterum rogare.” See also Leon. 50.159:152-154. For a good overview on the logic of Albert the Great, see Michael W. Tkacz, “Albert the Great on Logic, Knowledge, and Science,” in A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick (Boston: Brill, 2013), 507-540. Tkacz does not mention doctrinal logic (logica docens), but he does give a wide survey of Albert’s logical views, including the method of division, inventive logic, and judicative logic. According to Tkacz, Albert’s judicative logic can consist in arguments from division that turn into quia demonstrations (523-28). “In scientific investigation, quia demonstrations provide a bridge betwen the strictly dialectical methods of the inventive stage of research and the attainment of causal explanation through propter quid demonstration” (525).

151 Isaac uses contrasting imagery to explain logica docens and utens. Whereas logica utens directs reason as a prudential guide; logica docens directs reason as a lawgiving map. “[Logica docens] laisse à chaque science le soin de mettre en application ses directives, non utens. Elle dirige certes, mais non pas comme un pilote, uniquement comme une carte. Elle permet sans doute à la raison de s’ordonner dans son activité; mais elle est une ‘ordonnance de raison’ directrice de nos actes à la façon d’une loi et non pas d’une prudence.” See his “La Notion de Dialectique chez Saint Thomas,” 490. Isaac extends Thomas’s political imagery of logica docens as ”judicative” by describing logica utens as “executive.”
This distinction between *docens* and *utens* emerges one other time in Thomas’s writings when discussing dialectic as a science.\(^{152}\) Dialectic can be a science when considered doctrinally. When viewed as *doctrinal (docens)*, dialectic establishes the method by which one proceeds from the concepts it studies to demonstrate with probability the conclusions of the particular sciences. Insofar as it establishes this method demonstratively, Thomas concludes, it is a science.\(^{153}\) Albeit dialectic finds its ultimate expression in the practice of arguing to probable conclusions in the special sciences, the teaching of dialectic about the way in which concepts function as a method for the other sciences is scientific. As a delimited body of instruction (*docens*), its conclusions are certain and necessary.\(^{154}\)

In its three acts of the mind (simple apprehension, composition and division, and reasoning), logic orders its concepts according to a variety of relations including genus, species,

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\(^{153}\) In *IV Meta*, lect. 4, no. 576: “Licet autem dicatur, quod Philosophia est scientia, non autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc removetur quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae. Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de ipsis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis probabiliter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. . . .” (Marietti ed., 18.161). The relationship between logica docens and logica utens and their relationship to dialectic and demonstration comes up again in chapter three. For an extended discussion of these relationships see Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, 32-48.

\(^{154}\) “Logic, considered simply as the intellectual discipline which is the scientific grasp of second intentions, can be spoken of as doctrinal logic. Doctrinal logic, as we have seen, looks beyond itself to the other sciences for its end. Thus, we can say that doctrinal logic is virtually useful. It becomes actually useful when it is put to the use of reason.” Edward D. Simmons, *The Scientific Art of Logic: An Introduction to the Principles of Formal and Material Logic*, in *Modern Writings on Thomism* (1961; repr., Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004), 320. “Generally speaking, when logic is employed as an instrument by the real sciences, it formally ceases to be logic, and is automatically integrated into the real science which employs it. This is because logic as such is not a science of real being, but of intentional beings or beings of reason only. Yet there is a branch of logic, commonly termed ‘dialectics,’ which can be applied to real being without losing the essential characteristics of a rational or logical science.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 353-54.
opposite, subject, predicate, definition, proposition, syllogism, enunciation, predication, and
contradiction. These intentions later came to be called second intentions. Insofar as nouns,
verbs, and speech immediately signify concepts (conceptionibus), which are the apprehended
natures of things, logic concerns itself with the signification of speech about the common nature
of things. It studies them in the order which reason makes in its own acts.

When viewed as instrumental (utens), as opposed to doctrinal, dialectic implements this
method of arguing in order to reach some probable conclusions in the particular sciences. In this
regard, it falls short of the mode of science (modo scientiae). Particular or special sciences
may use this dialectical method of arguing from common intentions to arrive at belief or opinion
about natural philosophy for instance. Natural philosophy employs certain logical and common
notions (quasdam logicas et communes rationes), common to all the sciences, to argue that

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155 ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1 ad 2; In I Post. an. lect. 20, no. 5; In V De Div. Nom. lect. 2, no. 655. In these texts,
Thomas distinguishes the second intentions according to each act of the mind. In Joseph Bobik’s summary:
“Apropos of the first operation of the intellect: to be a universal, a predicatable, a category, a definition. For the
second operation of the intellect: to be a proposition, a subject, a predicate, a copula, a contradictory, a contrary; to
be true, false, implied. For the third operation of the intellect: to be a deduction, an induction, a syllogism, a
necessary syllogism, a middle term, a major term, a minor term, a fallacy, the subject of a science.” See his Aquinas
on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965),
19-20. I discuss the role of the acts of the mind with regard to the method of predication in chapter two.

156 De potentia q. 7, a. 9: “Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus
intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim
secundo intellectus intelligit inquantum reflectitur super seipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit”

157 In I Eth., lect. 1, no. 1: “Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur.: est enim quidam ordo
quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium; alius autem est ordo, quem ratio
considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adivincem et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces
significativa; tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis; quartus autem est
ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quorum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo” (Leon.

158 In IV Meta., lect. 4, no. 576: “Utens vero est secundum quod modo adiunctur utitur ad concluendum
aliquid probabiliter in singulis scientiis; et sic recedit a modo scientiae” (Marietti ed., 18.161). When arguing within
the special sciences, dialectic does not proceed in the mode of science, yet it still remains a science. See also ST II-
II, q. 51, a. 2 ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in speculativis alia rationalis scientia est dialectica, quae
ordinatur ad inquisitionem inventivam; et alia scientia demonstrativa, quae est veritatis determinativa.”
circular motion is continuous and first. These common notions are opposed to proper or appropriate notions to the science in question.\textsuperscript{159}

Whereas the application of dialectic (utens) is probable, the teaching of logic (docens) is necessary.\textsuperscript{160} A particular science cannot use dialectic in a way proper to its particular inquiries. Such a procedure would simply not be scientific. A particular science cannot rely on doctrinal logic because it cannot consider the universal scope of logic, and when it relies on applied logic its arguments are dialectical. The reason is that common notions are outside of a particular science’s scope or extension. By contrast, in a universal science such as metaphysics, the reliance on doctrinal logic seems feasible because the scope of logic and metaphysics are co-extensive.

2.2 The First Rational Method

Continuing in reverse order, now we come to the first section of \textit{De Trinitate} q. 6, a. 1 regarding the first rational method, which offers a glimpse into a unique role that logic plays in metaphysics. Thomas identifies a method as rational when it depends on the teachings of logic. Thomas states that this “method [processus] will be called rational when in a science we use the propositions taught in logic; namely, when we use logic as having a teaching [docens] function in the other sciences.”\textsuperscript{161} Logic has a teaching function insofar as it teaches how the intellect orders

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\textsuperscript{159} In \textit{VIII Phys.}, lect. 8, no. 1136: “Postquam philosophus ostendit per proprias rationes, quod motus circularis est continuus et primus; hic ostendit idem per quasdam logicas et communes rationes. Et ponit tres rationes.
\textsuperscript{160} “Pure or theoretical logic studies logical intentions and the relations in which they stand to each other; applied logic makes use of the principles of theoretical logic in actually conducting mental operations.” See Schmidt, \textit{The Domain of Logic}, 36.
\textsuperscript{161} De \textit{Trinitate} (q. 6, a. 1), sol. 1: “. . . et sic dicetur aliquis processus esse rationabilis quando aliquis
concepts. When the intellect reflects upon its own acts of thinking, it forms concepts about these reflections. These (second order) concepts are relations of reason between other (first order) concepts. Thomas calls these relations, “rationate beings” (*entis rationis*), and these beings constitute the subject-genus of logic.\(^{162}\)

In Thomas’s metaphysics, being can be taken either as mind-independent, *i.e.*, real, being (*ens naturae*) or as mind-dependent, *i.e.*, rationate, being (*ens rationis*).\(^{163}\) The mind discovers or devises (*adinvenit*) rationate being to express the way that it conceives a relation between concepts of real being. As Rudi Te Velde explains, in considering an object, “reason becomes reflectively aware of the way it considers that object and, in reflection on its own act [of] reason, comes to know the intention according to which it considers the object.”\(^{164}\) What results are relations indicating an order between concepts—accidents of reason’s consideration of real beings. Rationate beings accurately present the mind’s mode of considering real being because they are remotely founded upon real being; they are what Thomas terms “true being” (*ens verum*).\(^{165}\) When a method begins from these beings that are inherently rational, *i.e.* rationate

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\(^{162}\) See Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, 174: “This, then, is the proper subject of the science of logic: the rationate relations of concepts (whether simple or complex) to external things or to other concepts, which reason elaborates consequently upon its consideration of real things and attributes to the natures which it has conceived from these real things, but in view of the state which these natures have from being in the intellect and being known.”


beings, then that method is called rational in the first way.

In a broad sense, for Thomas, logic provides a method for all the sciences because one needs logic to proceed in the sciences with formally correct procedures, so one should learn logic first to avoid learning it along with the sciences since that would interrupt the learning process.\footnote{In II Meta., lect. 5, no. 335: “Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis (Marietti ed., 18.93).” In VI Ethic., lect. 7: “Erit ergo hic congruus ordo addiscendi, ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae (Leon. 47/2.358:202-359:204).” De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1) ad 3: “Et hoc etiam consonat verbis philosophi qui dicit in II Metaphysice quod modus scientiae debet queri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam, quae docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias scientias, ad quam pertinet trium” (Leon. 50.139:216-221; De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1)b ad 3: “Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incepta, non quia ipsa sit facillim ceteris scientiis, — habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, — sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis; oportet autem primo scire modum scientiae quam scientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II Metaphysice” (Leon 50.161:303-162:311). See James A. Weisheipl, “The Evolution of Scientific Method” in The Logic of Science, ed. Vincent Edward Smith (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1964): 63.} The end of logic taken broadly is to provide sound discourse. Each science implements the rules of logic (utens) to that end.\footnote{See Simmons, “The Nature and Limits of Logic,” 56-7; Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 25ff. Michaud-Quantin describes the medieval development of the term logica: “Si dans les Fontes quaeestionum d’Alfarabi on trouve dialectica pour ‘Ibn al-Mantiq, les traités d’Algazel et d’Avicenne sont intitulés ‘Logique’ et dans son De divisione philosophiae, Gundissalvi transpose les formules précédemment appliquées à la dialectica dans le monde latin: la logica est la ratio disserendi diligens, ‘l’instrument de la philosophie grâce auquel on prouve le vérité de tous les autres.’” See his “L’Emploi des Termes Logica et Dialectica au Moyen Âge,” 859.} The doctrinal statements concerning rationate being are expressed in logical rules, and the implementation of these rules achieves sound discourse. In a strict sense, however, logic provides a systematic body of knowledge. Logic conceives definite relations between concepts, concepts that express the way that the mind understands reality. Metaphysics can employ logic in this strict sense. Logic’s reflexive awareness of the manner in which concepts relate to other concepts constitutes a doctrine, a guide concerning how being and its

consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis « genus » non est similitudo aliquae rei extra anima existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit” (Mandonnet ed., 1.67). See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 82-89.

properties display themselves in predication. A rational method taken in the first sense that Thomas identifies employs logic in this strict sense.

To return to De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1, Thomas states that a method (processus) of proceeding in the sciences is called rational in the first way because of “the principles from which it begins, as when one proceeds to prove something from the works of reason (ex operibus rationis), such as genus, species, opposite, and concepts (intentiones) of this sort which the logicians study.” Metaphysics can regard logic in its teaching function, and it can borrow the intentions of logic as significative for its own consideration of mind-independent, or real, being. Metaphysics can appropriate the teachings of logic by subjecting being as known within its investigation of being as being. The reason that rationate being offers insights into mind-independent being is that rationate being is co-extensive (aequiparatur) with real being, which is to say that rationate being extends to everything that is predicated of real being. The ten predicaments, for instance,

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168 Simmons calls this reflexive body of knowledge a general methodology as opposed to either a method or a special methodology: “The end of the logical construct requires certain determinate rules according to which the objects known are to be ordered in knowledge in reference to one another. Thus, there are definite rules of procedure which constrain the intellect in its discursive progress. These can be said to constitute a method, and the reflexive investigation of them can be spoken of as a methodology. It should be clear that this is not method in the manner of Cartesian method, nor is it methodology in the manner of epistemological critique” (140-41). See his “Demonstration and Self-Evidence,” The Thomist 24 (1961), 137-62.
170 “[T]he logician, when he makes use of predication, considers merely the mode of predication without averting to what is ultimately signified, whereas the metaphysician considers not merely the mode of predication, but at the same time considers the significative determination of the mode as it refers to the real order of things.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 371.
171 “He is saying that a scientific process is rational, according to the first meaning of that term, when a real science is capable of assimilating the doctrinal canons of logic whole and entire, and of thus employing them integrally in the pursuit of a fuller knowledge of its own proper subject.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 354-55.
172 In IV Meta., 4, n. 574: “Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo
are genera that are predicated of every being.

It might be helpful in this regard to briefly differentiate logic from psychology for Aquinas. It is true that logic and psychology both consider the acts of the mind and that both consider intentions reflexively. They consider these objects, however, in different ways. One may distinguish an act of cognition either in relation to the subject of knowing or in relation to the thing known. On the one hand, psychology regards intentions in relation to the subject of knowing (the intellect). It regards them as accidents or qualities inhering (inessse) in the intellect. On the other hand, logic regards intentions in relation to the thing known. The whole intelligible character of an intention is to be a likeness, and logic regards these intentions as implying a relation of one thing to another. Ultimately, these intentions signify an external thing.

Metaphysics can appropriate the teachings of logic because logic is ordered to obtaining a knowledge of these external things. Logic classifies ‘man’ as a species based on the apprehended nature of man as common to all individual men. The fact that ‘man’ is a species

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173 Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 4: “Notitia . . . dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum quod comparatur ad cognoscendem, et sic inest cognoscenti sicut accidens in subiecto . . . ; vel secundum quod comparatur ad cognoscibile: et ex hac parte non habet quod insit sed quod ad aliud sit” (Marietti ed., 12.138).

174 In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: “Unde intentio in ratione sua ordinem quendam unius ad alterum importat. Ordo autem unius ad alterum, non est nisi per intellectum, cuius est ordinare” (Mandonnet ed., 2.975). De veritate, q. 10, a. 4; q. 2, a. 5 ad 17; In I Ethic., lect. 1, no. 1-2. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 124-26; Frisch, “Extension and Comprehension in Logic,” 130-132. Frisch explains how psychology can work with simply one concept but that logic must work with at least two concepts in relation to each other with reference to things: “In fact logic demands a multiplicity of concepts because one must be able to say something of inferiors before science can prove any conclusions” (132).

175 In I Peri. Herm. lect. 2, no. 3: “Set, quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio uocum, que est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius, significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, set magis ad considerationem grammatici; et ideo, exponens ordinem significacionum, non incipit a litteris, set a uocibus” (Leon. 1*/1.10:49-56). Italics mine.
signifies that it is predicable of many things that differ in number (e.g. John, Socrates), for that which is a species indistinctly signifies everything that is essentially in the individual.\footnote{De ente et essentia, c. 2: “Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei: inde est quod, sicut id quod est genus, prout predicabatur de specie implicabat in sua significatione, quamuis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod predicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte” (Leon. 43.373:243-252).}

“Second’ substance signifies the generic nature in itself absolutely,” Thomas states, “while ‘first’ substance signifies that nature as individually subsistent. Hence, the division is analogous rather than specific.”\footnote{De potentia q. 9, a. 2 ad 6: “Ad sextum dicendum quod, cum dividitur substantia in primam et secundam, non est divisio generis in species,—cum nihil contineatur sub secunda substantia quod non sit in prima,—sed est divisio generis secundum diversos modos essendi. Nam secunda substantia significat naturam generis secundum se absolutam; prima vero substantia significat eam ut individualiter subsistentem. Unde magis est divisio analogi quam generis” (Marietti ed., 11.228). Thomas here is responding to an objection, which states that “person” should not defined as substance because person would in that case be a species of the genus substance along with other species of that genus substance. Thomas responds that the division between first and second substance refers to a division into analogous modes of being, rather than that of a genus into its species.} This analogous division explains how everything contained in second substance is also contained in first substance. Although both ‘man’ and ‘Socrates’ are intentions, the species ‘man’ is analogously related to the individual ‘Socrates’.

Thomas is not hereby importing the conclusions of logic or grammar to the conclusions of metaphysics. The sciences are autonomous with regard to their conclusions. Unlike some eleventh and twelfth century theologians who freely apply dialectic to the speculative sciences,\footnote{See Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics, 163ff; Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century (New York: Brill, 1996); David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London: Longmans, 1965), 134; Irène Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications d’une distinction médiévale” in Philosophisch-logische Sprachbetrachtung, vol. 2 (Tubingen: Narr, 1995), 135-68.} Thomas does not immediately draw positive metaphysical conclusions from logical ones. Nor can one call Thomas a speculative grammarian (Modist). It is true that Thomas and the Modists follow the Aristotelian dictum that words signify things through concepts (\textit{De Interpr.} 1.16a3-9) insofar as the mode of signifying (\textit{modus significandi}) expresses a mode of being
(modus essendi) through a mode understanding (modus intelligendi). Yet for Thomas the mediation of the mode of understanding precludes any parallelism between the mode of signifying and the mode of being. Second intentions follow upon a mode of understanding, that is to say, second intentions are formed according to the way that a thing is apprehended in the intellect.180

In what way, then, is Thomas not a Modist? The Modists view the mode of understanding as mediating the other two modes (like Thomas), but they do not view this mediation as necessarily constricting the parallel correspondence (unlike Thomas). The mode of understanding for Modists impartially reflects the mode of being.181 The modes of signifying, which are the principles of grammar, are founded in reality and mirror different modes of being (modi essendi), and the modes of being are conceptualized by the intellect in corresponding modes of understanding (modi intelligendi). For these authors, grammar is a science because its universal principles (modi significandi) express the same idea in different ways, so the modes of

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180 In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; d. 30, q. 1, a. 3; De potentia q. 1, a. 1 ad 10; ST I q. 76, a. 3 ad 4; In IV Meta. lect. 4, no. 574; Paul Symington, On Determining What There Is.

signification necessarily and universally reflect the modes of being.

Martin of Dacia (c. 1250-1288) figures as the first of these modists and, in contrast to many other modists, adopts a “strict derivative connection” between the three modes. Martin considers the three modes as really identical. He argues for this view by comparing the extra-mental thing, the understood, and the signified with the modes of being, understanding, and signifying. Since the extra-mental thing, the understood, and the signified identify the same thing, the modes of being, understanding, and signifying also identify the same thing. They differ only in accident. Just as numerically one and the same Socrates is now in a seat, now in a chorus, and now in a market, the modes are also numerically the same and differ only in the accident of place.

Another example of modism can be found in Simon of Faversham (c. 1260-1306). Simon knows Thomas’s writings and agrees with him that logical intentions arise from a mode of understanding, yet he disagrees with him by holding that the intellect is moved to attribute second intentions (e.g. species, genus) from real properties appearing in the extramental thing. Simon posits a direct correspondence between rationate and real being. By contrast, Thomas attributes these intentions solely to the intellect’s reflexion upon its own act of knowing, so

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182 See Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste, Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500 (New York: Springer, 2011), s.v. “Boethius of Dacia.” In the same reference, see also Lidia Lanza’s article under “Martin of Dacia.”

rationate being directly corresponds only to the thing understood (res intellecta), not to the extramental thing. To conclude this brief contrast, whereas modists such as Martin of Dacia and Simon of Faversham diminish the mediating role played by the intellect in second intentions, Thomas accentuates the intellect’s mediating role. Let us emphasize this point: The only immediate origin for second intentions, in Thomas’s metaphysics of knowledge, is the intellect’s mode of understanding first intentions.

Logical notions consist of either negations or relations. Whether as negations (such as ‘one’) or as relations (such as ‘good’ and ‘true’), concepts do not themselves add a positive being in reality, so they cannot directly yield a positive claim. Thomas respects this division between the mode of understanding and the mode of being in this way: one first arrives at a negative conclusion about real being from rationate being before arriving at any positive conclusion. The intellect’s mediating role directly permits only negative determinations about reality.

We started talking about modes of understanding because Thomas identifies a method whereby metaphysics begins from the “works of reason, such as genus, species, opposite, and concepts of this sort,” and we showed why and how such conceptual insights directly and immediately show only a mode of understanding. We can now state more about this “logical”

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184 For Thomas’s views, De potentia q. 7, aa. 6 & 9. See also Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 114ff. For Simon’s views, see Super Porph., q. 2: “Cum autem intellectus causat tales intenciones, et movetur ab apparentibus in re: et propter hoc intellectus diversas intenciones logicales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates. . . . Ideo tota logica accipitur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset figmentum intellectus, quod non dicimus” (ed. Mazzarella, 19). See Giorgio Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century (Boston: Brill, 2002), 54-61, 75-82.

185 De veritate q. 21, a. 1: “Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex, scilicet negatio et aliqua relatio. Omnis enim absoluta in re sui sequitur. Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dictur enim unum quasi ens indivisum” (Leon. 22/3.593:153-160). De veritate q. 1, a. 5 ad 16: “relatio scibilis ad scientiam non sit aliquid in rerum natura” (Leon. 22/1.21:462-463). See also In I Sent. d. 20, q. 1, a. 1.
method. This method follows a primarily negative form of argumentation: one immediately arrives at a negative conclusion from rationate being, and through a reduction of a mutually exclusive disjunction one mediately arrives at a positive conclusion about the mode of being.\(^{186}\)

The first part of the proof is entirely conceptual. One proves the conceptual impossibility of some claim based on a concept’s existence in the mind in the predicative order, and one then affirms the other side of the mutually exclusive disjunct. The second part of the proof is ultimately ontological. One proves the ontological impossibility of some claim based on its logical impossibility, that is, in the intrinsic \((\text{secundum se})\) unintelligibility of that claim.\(^{187}\)

If one can again show that this ontological impossibility is itself one half of an exclusive disjunction, then one thereby proves the reality of the other side of the disjunct.

Clearly, this type of negative proof is not limited to the method of predication. For example, in a case where the method of predication is not implemented, we may posit a real distinction between essence and existence through a negation. That is to say, in metaphysics, we may resolve the real impossibility of a plurality of beings whose essence is existence to the reality that, in the self-evident multiplicity of the created order, every other being’s essence is really distinct from its existence. Either the essence of things is really identical to its existence

\(^{186}\) In a similar fashion, R. E. Houser suggests that Avicenna and Thomas negatively argue for the distinction between \(esse\) and essence through a \textit{reductio ad absurdum}, a form of \textit{modus tollens} in the \textit{intellectus essentia} argumentation. See Houser’s “The Real Distinction,” 86-90, 99-101. By setting Thomas’s arguments alongside Avicenna’s, Houser argues that Thomas proceeds dialectically in his arguments for the real distinction between essence and esse in the \textit{De ente et essentia}.

\(^{187}\) \textit{De potentia} q. 3, a. 14: “E contrario vero impossibile, quando sibi invicem repugnant; ut simul esse affirmationem et negationem impossibile dicitur, non quia sit impossibile alicui agenti vel patienti, sed quia est secundum se impossibile, utpote sibi ipsi repugnans” (Marietti ed., 11.80). Thomas proceeds in this manner, for instance, when he argues that essence is really other than existence in \textit{De ente} c. 4. He argues there from the logical impossibility of more than one being whose essence is its existence, that is, from the conceptual incoherence of such a view, to the \textit{real} impossibility of more than one being whose essence is its existence. See John F. Wippel, “Essence and Existence in the \textit{De Ente}, ch. 4” in \textit{Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas} (Washington D.C: CUA Press, 1984), 125-27.
(p), or the essence of things is really different from its existence (q). Since it is a logical impossibility (and hence also a real impossibility) that more than one thing’s essence is its existence (~ p), we may affirm or posit that every other thing’s essence is not its existence (q), that is, in light of the fact that the plurality of beings is self-evident.\textsuperscript{188}

Real being immediately founds the intellect’s first intention (nature absolutely considered) and thereby mediately founds the intellect’s second intention (rationate being).\textsuperscript{189} When metaphysics scans the derivative state of these second intentions, it can judge what is not the case in its ultimate foundation, which is real being. It determines what cannot be the remote cause (\textit{ens naturae}) of that effect (\textit{ens rationis}). This process happens when the intellect denies one side of a mutually exclusive disjunct and, in doing so, affirms the other side of the disjunct. In sum, the argument follows this general schema: 1) logical negation, 2) real negation, and 3) real position.

If this interpretation of the method of predication is correct, then the method arrives at a knowledge of real being through negative judgment, such as “x is not y,” “x is other than y,” and “x need not be y.” In these negative judgments, one knows something about x in a proper fashion. Albeit affirmations are higher (\textit{dignior}) than negations, and albeit negations do not allow us to know the what (\textit{quid}) of some thing, one can nevertheless reach a proper knowledge of a thing through negation.\textsuperscript{190} Metaphysics enriches its notion of being, for example, through

\textsuperscript{188} See Wippel, \textit{The Metaphysical Thought}, 150-57
\textsuperscript{189} For Thomas’s description of a term as belonging to a first intention (\textit{primae intentionis}) or to a second intention (\textit{secundae intentionis}), \textit{In I Sent.} d. 23, q. 1, a. 3; \textit{In I Sent.} d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3; and \textit{In III Sent.} d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1. See Schmidt, \textit{The Domain of Logic}, 123.
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{In I Post. an.}, lect. 38: “Ergo dignior est affirmativa quam negativa” (Leon. 1*/2.141-144). Thomas repeats five arguments that end with this type of conclusion. For Thomas’s teaching that one can properly know something through its negation, SCG III, 39: “Ad propriam autem alicuius rei cognitionem pervenitur non solum per
negative judgment or what is called “separatio”.\footnote{ST I, q. 44, a. 2, Thomas schematically outlines the history of philosophy in a manner that culminates in the discovery of being as being. For an account of separatio, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 48-49.}

When one negates a predicate of a subject, one distinguishes or differentiates the predicate from the subject, namely from the intelligible content (ratio) of the subject. In affirmative differentiations, one distinguishes something such as ‘man’ apart from a genus. By contrast, in negative differentiations, one distinguishes something either in privation (e.g. man is a featherless biped) or merely absent (e.g. one is the negation of the division of being). In this way, one thoroughly differentiates a given predicate from a subject.\footnote{SCG I, 14: “Sed quia in consideratione substantiae divinae non possim accipere quid, quasi genus; nec distinctionem eius ab aliis rebus per affirmativas differentias accipere possumus, oportet eam accipere per differentias negativas. Sicut autem in affirmativas differentiis una aliam contrahit, et magis ad completam designationem rei approinquat secundum quod a pluribus differe facit; ita una differentia negativa per aliam contrahitur, quae a pluribus differe facit. Sicut, si dicamus Deum non esse accidens, per hoc ab omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; deinde si addamus ipsum non esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter ipsum, per negationes huiusmodi distinguetur” (Leon. 13.40). I am grateful to Brian T. Carl for this reference. See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 515.}

Nothing outside the subject of differentiation is considered.

In terms of the metaphysical investigation of being as being, the method of predication adds negative differences rather than affirmative differences, for the term “being” (ens) expresses all of its intelligible content in such a way that no affirmative differences can be made about it.

Being is not a genus.\footnote{V Meta., lect. 9, no. 889; ST I, q. 3, a. 5; Compendium theologiae I, 13: “Omne genus differentiis aliquibus diuiditur. Ipsius autem esse non est accipere aliquas differentias; differentie enim non participant genus nisi per accidens, in quantum species constitue per differentias genus participant. Non potest autem esse aliqua differentia que non participat esse, quia non ens nullius est differentia” (Leon. 42.86:7-15). See Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 115-18.}
it, being cannot be so distinguished because there is nothing apart from it, so the intellect grasps everything as undifferentiated when it grasps being. The *per se* attributes of being (such as ‘one’), for instance, are contained within being. Being, for instance, need not be quantified.

When metaphysics applies this negative judgment or *separatio* to real being based on evidence from rationate being, it is employing the so-called first rational method outlined in Thomas’s Commentary on the *De Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 1). In this method, reasoning proceeds from conceptual insights about being to real insights about being through negative differentiation.

3. The Relation between Logic and Metaphysics

In proceeding in this rational mode within metaphysics, Thomas does not blur the lines between the subject-genera of logic and of metaphysics. Although logic and metaphysics are co-extensive in their horizon of objects, their intensions differ, and this formal difference constitutes the subject-genus of each science. Logic “considers the mode of predication and not the existence of the thing.” For example, the quiddity (“what it was to be,” *quod quid erat esse*) signified by the definition of a house as something that shelters us from heat and cold is made from logic’s point of view, but the first philosopher regards this definition as only an extrinsic or

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final cause of the house. The logical definition is only partly accurate. Logic examines the
relation of objects to each other in the intellect and so considers a thing according to formal
principles that may exclude intrinsic principles (of form and matter).

This formal consideration of logic does not mean, however, that logic disregards the real
entirely, for logic considers the formal principles of the thing (res). The thing is “that about
which” logic studies. Logic does not study things themselves, of course, but it studies formal
principles with a foundation in things themselves, and since all things agree in being (ente) logic
also studies in a remote way being and the properties of being. Logic is concerned, for
instance, with the way in which being signifies the true, and it studies truth as it is expressed
(cum dicitur) in judgments and propositions. It studies the formal principles of being as
expressed by the mind.

By formal principle, Thomas means the form of the whole (forma totius) that is
abstracted from its inferior (e.g. ‘man’ abstracted from ‘Socrates’), as opposed to the form of the

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195 In I De an. lect. 2, nn. 24-27; In VII Meta. lect. 17, no. 1658: “Sed philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse. Unde si dicamus, domus est aliquid prohibens a frigore et caumate, logice loquendo significatur quod quid erat esse, non autem secundum considerationem philosophi. Et ideo dicit quod hoc quod quaeitur ut causa formae in materia, est quod quid erat esse, ut est dicere logice” (Marietti ed., 18.396). See also Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 68.

196 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1. The “metaphysician considers the forms of things not absolutely, as does the logician, but concretely as they subsist in an act of existence intrinsic to the singular thing and extrinsic to and independent of the activity of created intellect. Conversely, the logician considers forms absolutely, that is, as they exist in intellect apart from all material conditions.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 361.

197 De potentia q. 6, a. 1 ad 11: “Ad decimumprimum dicendum, quod quod lucus et mathematicus considerant tantum res secundum principia formalia; unde nihil est impossibile in logicos vel mathematicos, nisi quod est contra rei formalem rationem” (Marietti ed., 2.161). See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 47. The search for a definition of substance through a universal and logical definition turns out unsatisfactory for this same reason: Only some common condition is given, not the principles of a thing. In VII Meta. lectio. 2, no. 1280.

198 In IV Meta. lect. 4, no. 573: “Cum igitur omnes res non conveniant nisi in ente, manifestum est quod dialecticae materia est ens, et ea quae sunt entis, de quibus etiam philosophus considerat. Similiter etiam sophistica habet quamdam similitudinem philosophiate” (Marietti ed., 18.160).

199 In VI Meta. lect. 4, no. 1233; See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 59-64.

part (forma partis) that is abstracted from its matter (e.g. soul). The material consideration (i.e. the consideration of ‘that about which’) of a composite comprehends form and matter. Logic includes these parts only potentially and indeterminately, however, since it considers the composite and universal whole only insofar as the apprehended nature acquires a rationate relation (habitudo), an intention of universality, that follows upon an intellectual mode of consideration. The human species, for instance, really differs from the human form (forma totius) because the species does not determinately express the real principles of soul and body. Species expresses a predicative relation of greater comprehension.

The logical principles of genus, species, and difference are “related proportionately” to the natural principles of matter, form, and composite respectively. Genus is, of course, not sensible matter. Nevertheless, the genus (e.g. animal) is taken from such matter and indeterminately signifies the universal whole by expressing what is material in the composite (e.g. sensitive nature), even though the matter itself (e.g. human body) signifies only a part of the whole. The genus and the matter share similar intelligible content (ratio). Genus signifies the material aspect of the composite in a proportional way, as a universal intention with a remote

201 ST I, q. 40, a. 3; ST q. 85, a. 1 ad 1.  
202 In I Perierm. lect. 10, no. 9. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 185-94. “When the intellect compares this [apprehended] nature to the real external things, it forms a relation, and this relation is the intention of universality” (172). For the distinction between a universal whole and an integral whole, In V Meta. lect. 21, nos. 1099–1101. Logic treats the parts of a universal whole univocally, and metaphysics treats the parts of a universal whole analogously. In II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 3; De malo q. 7, a. 1 ad 1; In III Phys. lect. 5, no. 322.  
203 De ente et essentia, c. 2: “Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamuis non sint idem quod illa: quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum; neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum” (Leon. 43.372:195-201). See also In V Meta., lect. 22, no. 1123: “Licet enim genus praedicabile non sit materia, sumitur tamen a materia, sicut differentia a forma. Dicitur enim aliquid animal ex eo quod habet naturam sensitivam. Rationale vero ex eo, quod habet rationalem naturam, quae se habet ad sensitivam sicut forma ad materiam” (Marietti ed., 18.288).
foundation upon real being. Logic considers concepts alone (intentiones tantum). Logic disregards significant aspects of reality such as those principles that belong exclusively to the individual because the concepts that make up the subject of logic are positive rationate beings, namely relations between concepts, and these relations represent the way that those concepts “exist” in the mind, not the way that they represent real being. Indeed, for Thomas there is an analogy between rationate and real being.

Since rationate beings are identified and employed through predication, Thomas names the first rational method he identifies in his Commentary on De Trinitate, the “method of predication.” As previously noted, De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1 states that this method is properly and fittingly employed in metaphysics. In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Thomas states that a “logical method” (modus logice) is “proper to the science” of metaphysics (huic scientiae proprius est) and that metaphysics “fittingly begins from it” (et ab eo convenienter incipit).

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204 In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; In VII Meta., lect. 9, no. 1473: “Sciendum tamen est, quod nulla materia, nec communis, nec individuata secundum se se habet ad speciem pro prout sumitur pro forma. Sed secundum quod species sumitur pro universali, sicut hominem dicimus esse speciem, sic materia communis per se pertinet ad speciem, non autem materia individualis in qua natura speciei accipitur” (Marietti ed., 18.359). See Lonergan, Verbum, 29 n. 64.


206 This view of the analogous subject-matters of logic and metaphysics differentiates Thomas from Averroes: “Contrary to Averroes, Aquinas maintains that similarity means not ‘identity’ but, rather, ‘analogy’ (aequiparatio) between the subject-matter of the two disciplines. In [Thomas’s] view, the subject-matter of logic is somehow similar to, and somehow different from, the subject-matter of metaphysics. It is similar insofar as both subject-matters embrace the totality of what exists (ad omnia se extendit) and are universal in scope (propter utriusque communatem); but, contrary to Averroes, Aquinas believes that the subject-matter of logic is literally ‘other’ than that of metaphysics.” See Di Giovanni, “Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics,” 71. I elaborate on this proportional or analogous relationship below.

207 The context is the metaphysical inquiry into essence. In VII Meta., lect. 3, 1308: “Sicut enim supra dictum est, haec scientia habet quandam affinitatem cum Logica propter utriusque communatem. Et ideo modus logicus huic scientiae proprius est, et ab eo convenienter incipit. Magis autem logice dicit se de eo quid est dicturum, inquantum investigat quid sit quod erat esse ex modo praedicandi. Hoc enim ad logicum proprium pertinent” (Marietti ed., 18.327). I find that Te Velde undertranslates the term “convenienter” by stating that metaphysics “conveniently” starts from the logical point of view. See his “Dialectics and the Modus Logicus,” 25.
Metaphysics can properly and fittingly begin from logic, not insofar as logic gives metaphysics its subject-matter, but insofar as logic’s teaching about predication can serve as both a dialectical and a deductive tool for an investigation into real being.\textsuperscript{208}

Metaphysics examines real being by fittingly beginning from what logic teaches about predication because of the “affinity” (affinitas) between the two sciences in their study of what is common to all things (communia).\textsuperscript{209} This commonality becomes manifest through predication. Thomas gives the example of form (forma) as something common in predication in this way: form is common to all forms because it is predicated of all. Substantial, accidental, material, and immaterial forms are all called “forms.” To take a different example from medicine, both the doctor and the artisan (artifex) are efficient causes of health, yet health is said of the artisan in a prior and universal way. ‘Artisan’ is common through predication.\textsuperscript{210} These objects (e.g. form, artisan) are not common because they cause many or more things; rather, they are common because they are predicated of many. They are understood as common.\textsuperscript{211}

These objects can only be properly understood by sciences that are themselves common,

\textsuperscript{208} “For Thomas’s very non-Kantian theory of knowledge . . . the order of thought is based upon the order of reality and reflects it. Because words in turn reflect thoughts, by attending to distinctive modes of predication we may ultimately discern different modes of being.” See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 216.

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{In I Post. an.,} 20, n. 5: “Sciendum tamen est quod alia ratione dyalctica est de communibus et logica et philosophia prima” (Leon. 1*/2.75:111-113); \textit{In VII Meta.,} lect. 3: “Sicut enim supra dictum est, haec scientia habet quandam affinityatem cum logica propter utriusque communitatem. Et ideo modus logicus huic scientiae proprius est, et ab eo convenienter incipit” (Marietti ed., 18.327). See Reichman, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 356-64.

\textsuperscript{210} Likewise in music, both the proportion of the double and multiplicity are formal causes of the octave, yet the octave is said of multiplicity in a prior and universal way. Multiplicity is common by predication. \textit{De Trinitate V.4; In II Phys.} lect. 6, no. 189.

\textsuperscript{211} Thomas does not mean, of course, that commonality in itself exists. Rather, it constitutes the metaphysical fabric of finite being. “Just as there are certain common principles of any determinate genus, so too there are principles of all things insofar as all things agree in being (secundum quod in ente communicant). Such principles are therefore common (communia) to all beings.” See Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendantals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Brill, 1996), 119.
such as logic and metaphysics. Common sciences surpass particular sciences in this way. In his Commentary on De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1, Thomas refers to the unique prerogative that a common science has with regard to the method of predication: “But this method [modus] of proceeding cannot belong properly to any particular science, which falls into error unless it proceeds from its own proper principles. Logic and metaphysics may properly and aptly (proprie et conuenienter) use this method, however, because both sciences are common (scientia communis) and in some way (quodammodo) treat of the same subject.”

Although metaphysics and logic do not have the same subject-genus, the universal scope of their subject-genus separates them from the particular sciences and identifies their subject-genus in some way. Particular sciences irrevocably cut off a part of being such as number (the science of arithmetic), motion (physics), quantity (mathematics), and health (medicine). If these particular sciences were to proceed from common principles, they would be arrogating what belongs to a universal field of inquiry. These particular sciences proceed adequately only from their proper principles. They cannot appropriately use the method of predication to make conclusions in their science because to proceed in this way would be to proceed from premises outside of their expertise. It would result in “pure” or “mere” dialectic.

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212 De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1), sol. 1: “Set hic modus procedendi non potest proprie competere alicui particulari scientie, in quibus peccatum accidit nisi ex propriis procedatur: contingit autem hoc proprie et conuenienter fieri in logica et metaphisica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subjectum quodammodo” (Leon. 50.159:130-136). See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 348-50. I contrast Thomas’s view of the relation between metaphysics and logic from that of Averroes below.

213 In XI Meta. lect. 4, no. 2208; In XI Meta. lect. 7, no. 2248. These sciences do not consider particular beings as being. In VI Meta. lect. 6, no. 1147.


215 “No such affinity can be found between logic and any of the particular sciences. For these latter are concerned with questions about what is proper to a particular type of being, such as quantified being as such, or
The example of such a common principle given by Thomas and taken from Aristotle (Top. 2.7.113a33-b6) is that contraries belong to the same genus. As the argument goes, since love belongs to the concupiscible appetite, hatred must belong as well because contraries belong to the same subject. By arguing from the topic or the common principle of contrariety, this argument about the (particular) science of psychology attempts to show that hatred is a concupiscible passion of the soul because love is one, too.  

This argument ends with opinion rather than knowledge because it begins from premises that are not proper to a particular science. Psychology cannot adequately articulate the teaching that contraries belong to the same subject, so the argument only yields a tentative insight within dialectic. A particular science cannot adequately grasp the general notion of the contrary; only a common science (scientia communis) that considers all beings can demonstratively employ common principles. Common notions and principles (communia) properly belong to a common science.

To be sure, the common sciences do not consider every aspect of all beings, for particular aspects are proper to the particular sciences. Rather, the common sciences study the general notions of all beings.  

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216 Flynn, "On the First Meaning of Rational Process," 184. This consanguinity between logic and metaphysics lies in this shared consideration of the communia. I take the phrase, “pure dialectic,” from Terence Irwin who uses it to describe Aristotle’s dialectic in the particular sciences. 

217 In I Post. an., lect. 20, n. 5. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 33; Stump, Dialectic and Its Place, 22. James A. Weisheipl states that both Albert the Great and Thomas recognize that each science has autonomy within its own field. This view differs from the predominant view (e.g. Alfarabi, Gundissalinus, Grosseteste, Kilwardby, Bacon, and pseudo-Grosseteste) that each science corresponds to a hierarchy of natural forms. See James A. Weisheipl, “Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought,” Mediaeval Studies XXVII (1965), 85. See also Tkacz, “Albert the Great on Logic,” 535-39. For Thomas’s view, In IVMeta., lect. 1, no. 547: “Hoc autem dicit, quia non oportet quod una scientia consideret de omnibus speciebus unius generis secundum proprias rationes singularum specierum, sed secundum quod conveniunt in genere” (Marietti ed.,18.153).
different, whole and part, equal and unequal, being (*ens*) and non-being, the one, the true, and the good. Being (*ens*), the one, and the good are the highest common conceptions.\(^{218}\) Common sciences also consider common principles that are collected from such notions such as the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of excluded middle.\(^{219}\)

Kilwardby explains that dialectical arguments proceed with what is common in this way:

[We reason] on the basis of common considerations, I maintain, when the argumentation is drawn from things that occur commonly in the things belonging to every science and that can be suited to all sciences, and not only to the conclusions but to the principles of all of them. Logic indeed provides a way to the principles of all the scientific methods. Common considerations of this sort are reasons belonging to whole and part, to a contrary, to a similar, and to an associated accident and things of that sort, from which dialectical Topics can be drawn.\(^{220}\)

The fact that these common principles (or topics of agreement) belong to every science means that they transcend every particular science. In fact, for metaphysics and logic, common notions and principles are actually proper notions and principles.

Thomas explains why the inquiry into common principles belongs to first philosophy:

\(^{218}\) For references to the one, true, and good as communia, see *Sup. Boet. de ebd. 2; In De div. nomin.*, Prooemium; *ST* I, q. 17, a. 4 ad 2: “Et hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et convertuntur cum ente . . .” (Leon. 4.223).

\(^{219}\) *ST* I q. 2, a. 1; *ST* I-II, q. 29, a. 5; *In III Meta.* lect. 5, no. 392; *In IV Meta.* lect. 1, no. 534; *In XI Meta.* lect. 4, no. 2210. For a reference to the ”seemal reasons,” *De veritate*, q. 11, a. 2: “Quando autem alicui acquiritur scientia per principium intrinsecum illud quod est causa agens scientiae, non habet scientiam communia; et ideo ex tali causaliate non potest trahi nomen doctoris vel magistri, propriie loquendo” (Marietti ed., 10.106). For Thomas’s rejection of the Augustinian theory of *rationes seminales* as inchoate principles of prime matter, *In II Sent.* d. 18, q. 1, a. 2. See also *ST* I, q. 115, a. 2; *De veritate* q. 5, a. 9 ad 8; ad 9.

“since all first self-evident propositions are those of which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, then in order that propositions may be self-evident to all, it is necessary that their subjects and predicates should be known to all.”

These principles are self-evident and indemonstrable because they naturally spring from the knowledge of terms based on sensible things, memory, and experience. They nevertheless need articulation by a common science. First philosophy determines what these principles are by “treating the meaning of their terms” (rationes terminorum tradendo). It treats the meaning of, for instance, a whole and its part. First philosophy does not simply use first principles and make conclusions from them such as other sciences; it also makes judgments on them and justifies them against those who would deny them.

In determining the facticity (an est) and manifesting the quiddity (quid est) of the common principles, metaphysics employs a certain method of examining one’s concepts. First philosophy treats these common principles by analyzing self-evident propositions, that is, by manifesting the way in which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject. Notions

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221 *In XI Meta.*, lect. 4, no. 2210: “Quod autem huiusmodi principia communia pertineant ad considerationem primae philosophiae, huius ratio est quia cum omnes primae propositiones per se sint, quorum praedicata sunt de ratione subjiciendorum; ad hoc quod sint per se notae quantum ad omnes, oportet quod subjiciet et praedicata sint nota omnibus” (Marietti ed., 18.523).

222 *In IV Met.*, lect. 5, no. 595: “Huiusmodi autem sunt communia eo quod nostra cognitio a communibus ad propria pervenit, ut dicitur in primo *Physicorum*. Et ideo istae propositionibus sunt prima demonstrationum principia, quae compunguntur ex terminis communibus sicut totum et pars, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte; et sicut aequale et inequale, ut, quae uni et eidem sunt aequalia, sibi sunt aequalia. Et eadem ratio est de similibus. . . . Determinat autem ea philosophus non demonstrando, sed rationes terminorum tradendo, ut quid totum et quid pars et sic de aliis. Hoc autem cognito, veritas praedictorum principiorum manifesta relinquitur” (Marietti ed., 18.165); *In IV Met.* lect. 6, no. 607: “Est enim ineruditio, quod homo nesciat quorum oportet quaerere demonstrationem, et quorum non: non enim possunt omnia demonstrari” (Marietti ed., 18.168); see also *ST* I-II, q. 66, a. 5 ad 4: “veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabili dependet ex ratione terminorum: cognitio enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, at aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam: quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utilitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, conclusendo de eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes.” (Leon. 6.436). See Lonergan, *Verbum*, 82.
such as being and non-being (**ut ens et non ens**), whole and part, equal and unequal, same and different fall into everyone’s purview, but they are not adequately expressed except by first philosophy.

Mathematics, 223 physics, 224 and geometry 225 presuppose the communia. Particular sciences suppose the existence and the meaning of common principles and notions from first philosophy, and each science employs them in proportion to its subject-genus. 226 Just as they suppose or presume their subject-genus, particular sciences suppose the quiddity of what they study from sensible accidents (by means of the senses and local motion) and from first philosophy. 227 First philosophy first establishes the meaning of a quiddity (e.g. the contrary). It manifests what the quiddity is (**quid est**), and it uses this quiddity as the middle term (**ut medium**) in determining whether there is in fact such a quiddity (**an est**). 228

223 Mathematics supposes the existence of unity and magnitude when it demonstrates that a triangle is equilateral. **In I Post an.** lect. 10, no.10.

224 Natural science supposes the principle of sameness when it demonstrates that the same being happens to cure (as a doctor) and be cured (as a patient); **In I Post. an.** lect. 18; **In II Phys.** lect. 1, no. 145. Thomas comments that Aristotle shows what the first philosopher must consider through common reasons (**per rationes communes**), **In IV Meta.** lect. 4, nos. 570.

225 Geometry supposes the whatness (**quid est**) of contrary and completion. **In IV Meta.**, lect. 4, no. 586: “Sed si consideret, hoc erit «ex conditione», idest ex suppositione, quasi supponens ab aliquo priori philosopho, a quo sumit quantum est necessarium ad suam materiam. Et hoc quod dicitur de geometria, similiter est intelligendum in qualibet alia particulari scientia” (Marietti ed., 18.162). First philosophy manifests for geometry what continuous quantity is—thereby determining its factual existence, **In VI Meta.**, lect. 1, no. 1149.

226 In **I Post. an.** lect. 18, no. 6. See Weisheipl, Aristotelian Methodology, 19.

227 In **XI Meta.**, lect. 7, no. 2249: “unaquaeque praedictarum scientiarum particularium supponit aliquilalter quod quid est, in quocumque genere consideretur. Unde et in primo Posteriorum dictum est, quod de subiecto oportet supponere, et quia est, et quid est” (Marietti ed.,18.255); **In VI Meta.** lect. 1, no. 1148-1149: “Et, quia eiusdem est considerare de ente inquantum est ens, et de eo quod est, idest de quidditate rei, quia unumquodque habet esse per suam quidditatem” (Marietti ed., 18.296); **In XI Meta.** lect. 7, no. 2250: “Quaedam vero sumunt quod quid est, supponentes ab alis scientis, sicut particulares ab universalibus” (Marietti ed., 18.535).

228 In **VI Meta.**, lect. 1, no. 1151: “Et siccut nulla scientia particularis determinat quod quid est, ita etiam nulla earum dicit de genere subiecto, circa quod versatur, est, aut non est. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit; quia eiusdem scientiae est determinare quaestionem an est, et manifestare quid est. Oportare enim quod quid est accipere ut medium ad ostendendum an est. Et utraque est consideratio philosophi, qui considerat ens inquantum ens” (Marietti ed., 18.296). Thomas uses different verbs here: **an est** is determined, but **quid est** is manifested. **De Trinitate** q. 6, a. 3: “Et tamen sciemt quod de nulla re potest sciri an est, nisi quoquo modo sciatur de ea quid est vel cognitione
Besides the intellectual grasp of first principles and notions, metaphysics requires a rational method that consists in analyzing conceptual insights for what they express about properties of being, and it can adopt such a rational method from logic. Logic’s intentions are properties of being. Logic articulates how common principles exist in the intellect as certain accidents of being, namely as intentions such as genus and species, so it directly treats the same objects as metaphysics. Thomas explains the scope of logic in this way,

For first philosophy is concerned with common principles [de communibus] because its consideration is focused on those common things [res communes], namely, on being [ens] and on the parts and attributes [passiones] of being. But because reason occupies itself with all things that are, and logic studies the operations of reason, logic will also be about those principles that are common to all [communia sunt omnibus], i.e., about reason’s intentions with regard to all things [omnes res], but not in such a way that logic has these common things [rebus communibus] as its subject--for logic considers as its subject the syllogism, enunciation, predication, or something of that type.

The subject-genus of logic and metaphysics are not the same, but insofar as they have the same

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229 “These principles precisely as common and not as proper predicates of being belong to the domain of dialectic, which is co-extensive with metaphysics. The importance of these common principles should not be underestimated; for while they do not enter into a propter quid demonstration of a “scientia particularis”, their truth makes scientific knowledge possible by illuminating and confirming every valid demonstration.” See Weisheipl, Aristotelian Methodology, 19.


231 In I Post. an. lect. 20, no. 5. “Philosophia enim prima est de communibus, quia eius consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet circa ens et partes et passiones entis. -- Et, quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his, quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de intentionibus rationis, que ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subjectis: considerat enim logica, sicut subjecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Pars autem logici que demonstratia est, etsi circa communes intentiones uestetur docendo, tamen usus demonstrativi scientie non est in procedendo ex hiis communibus intentionibus ad aliquid ostendendum de rebus, quae sunt subjecta aliarum scienciarum. -- Set hoc dyalectica facit, quia ex communibus intentionibus procedit arguendo dyalecticus ad ea que sunt aliarum scienciarum, siue sint propria siue communia, maxime tamen ad communia; est ergo dyaletica de communibus non solum quia pertractat intentiones <communes> rationis, quod est commune toti logice, set etiam quia circa communia rerum argumentatur” (Leon. 1*/2.75:113-133).
material objects they are not entirely different. The object includes the subject.232

Metaphysics (or first philosophy) shares the status of a universal or common science with
dialectic and their proper notions and principles are the same.233 They both properly proceed
from the same communia. The necessary treatment of communia falls to first philosophy,
however, for these communia follow upon being in general (ens commune), the subject of
metaphysics.234 When several sciences are ordained to one thing, it is necessary that one of these
sciences be the ruler (rectrix) and that this science treat the most intelligible objects, which are
being (ens) and that which accompanies being such as the one and the many, potency and act.235

The material object of the universal sciences (communia) includes within the same
extension both the subject-genus of metaphysics (ens commune) and of logic (ens rationis). The
subject-genus of each is considered within the same plane of universal principles (communia)

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232 See Charles DeKoninck, “Abstraction from Matter: Notes on St. Thomas’s Prologue to the Physics,”
Laval théologique et philosophique 13 (1957), 145. For the distinction between subject and object, ST I, q. 1, aa. 3 &
7; ST II-II, q. 1, a. 1. I am grateful to John G. Brungardt for these references. Something similar can be said about
astronomy and natural science. Both sciences prove the roundness of the earth (material object) in different ways:
either through the eclipse of the sun (formal object of astronomy) or through the motion
of heavy objects towards
the center (formal object of natural science). Each is distinct by the way (formal object) it arrives at the same
conclusion (material object). In I Post. an. lect. 41 (Leon. 1*2.156:364-73).

233 In IV Meta. lect. 4, no. 573: “Cum igitur omnes res non conveniant nisi in ente, manifestum est quod
The reason given for this co-extensiveness in scope is that everything agrees in being (ens). Although dialectic
cannot comprehend the communia as real, it can comprehend them insofar as they are understood. In IV Meta. lect.
4, no. 574; In XI Meta. lect. 3, no. 2204.

234 In XI Meta. lect. 1, no. 2146. The argument for why first philosophy treats communia is an argument
taken from common reasons (rationes communes). The reason given is that only the first philosopher can properly
make that judgment based on general or common notions, so no other science treats communia adequately.

235 See Proemium to the Commentary on the Metaphysics: “Unde restat quod in una communi scientia
huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix” (Marietti ed., 18.1). Metaphysics is
called “first philosophy” because it gives other sciences these first principles. De Trinitate V.1: “dicitur etiam
philosophia prima, in quantum alie omnes scientie ab ea sua principia accipientes, cam consequuntur” (Leon.
50.138:165-167). See also SCG III, 25; In I Post. an. lect 17, no. 4. See Wippel, “The Title ‘First Philosophy’
according to Thomas Aquinas;” 585-600; Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, 55-67. For principles of
demonstration, In III Meta. lect. 5, no. 387.
under different intensions. Metaphysics considers these universal principles according to the modes of being, and logic considers them according to the modes of predication. Yet metaphysics can treat what is common by predication in a metaphysical fashion without being demonstrative.

4. Demonstration or Dialectic?

I would like to end by comparing and contrasting the views of Averroes and of Thomas on the relationship of metaphysics and logic in order to help us understand Thomas’s “logical mode” in metaphysics. Their different views on this relationship offer different interpretations on the way metaphysics can use logical principles or axioms. According to Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, the principles of demonstration must be appropriate (*oikeios*) to the subject-genus, and this appropriateness means either that the genus of each science should be absolutely the same or it must be to some extent the same for a subordinate science (e.g. the use of geometrical demonstration in optics). We cannot, that is, pass from the genus of one science to the genus of another in a demonstration.

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236 “[T]he subject of the science of logic is as wide as the horizon of metaphysics itself. Whatever metaphysics considers it regards from the aspect of being, and logic, because of its common nature, is competent keep apace.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 358-59. Speaking of Thomas’s view of the unity of a science, Maurer explains: “Materially considered, its objects are many, but the scientific *habitus* regards all of them from one formal perspective (*ratio*). In other words, each science has its own formal object whose unity gives unity to the science. . . . Each science has thus a formal unity owing to the formal unity of its object, and in virtue of this unity it is formally distinct from the other sciences. As the habit of an intellect, it also enjoys numerical unity: it is an individual ability or facility of insight and demonstration perfecting the individual intellect of its possessor” (272). See Armand A. Maurer, “The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists,” in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies), 269-291.

237 “[W]e cannot in demonstrating pass from one genus to another. We cannot, for instance, prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. For there are three elements in demonstration: (1) what is proved, the conclusion—an attribute inhering essentially in a genus; (2) the axioms, i.e. axioms which are premisses of demonstration; (3) the subject-genus whose attributes, i.e. essential properties, are revealed by demonstration. The axioms which are
Averroes and Thomas interpret in different ways this strict requirement for a
demonstration because of their attitude to the relationship between the subject matter of logic and
metaphysics. Averroes distinguishes between rationate and real being, to be sure, but this
distinction is only one of reason. Real and rationate being, for Averroes, are the same in reality.
Each refers to numerically the same subject under different perspectives. This merely
perspectival difference between rationate being and real being explains why Averroes can state,
“the subject of both sciences is the same, namely absolute being.” For Averroes, although
metaphysics studies real principles and logic studies rationate principles, these different
considerations of absolute being do not constitute a formal difference, so metaphysics can use the
principles of logic because their subject matters are absolutely the same, namely absolute being.
For Averroes, logic is subalternated to metaphysics.

For Thomas, the absence of the act of being renders rationate being really different from
real being. Rationate beings are relations that the intellect conceives upon its mode of
understanding, and these mental beings immediately depend upon the mode of understanding,

premises of demonstration may be identical in two or more sciences: but in the case of two different genera such as
arithmetic and geometry you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitude unless the
magnitudes in question are numbers. . . . But, as things are, demonstration is not transferable to another genus, with
such exception as we have mentioned of the application of geometrical demonstration to theorems in mechanics or
optics, or of arithmetical demonstrations to those of harmonics” (An. Post. 1.7.74a37-75b8, 1.9.76a23-25).
Translation by G. R. G. Mure in Richard Mckeon’s The Basic Works of Aristotle. See also Thomas’s Commentary
In I Post. an. lect. 15.

238 In III Meta., c. 1, fol. 36vm- 37ra: “Subiectum enim utriusque scientiae est idem, scilicet ens simpliciter.”

239 “The ‘movement of unification’ of sciences is particularly emphasised in the Arabic translation of
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics available to Averroes. Probably under the influence of Themistius, metaphysics is
portrayed as an overarching science with a universal scope that somehow includes all the subfields of philosophy.”

240 In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3: “Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis
extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam” (Mandonnet ed.,
1.67).
not upon the mode of being. Logic disregards the distinct \textit{esse} of each thing.\textsuperscript{241} This real difference between rationate and real being explains why Thomas holds that metaphysics and logic have analogous subject-matters: being in general (\textit{ens commune}) and rationate being (\textit{ens rationis}) respectively. Logic considers being in general apart from the act of being and the difference that entails in things.

The upshot is that Thomas’s metaphysics, following Aristotle’s requirements for a demonstration, does not use the “logical method” of predication in affirmative demonstrations because the principles of logic, which fall under the subject of logic (“its genus”), really differ from those of metaphysics. Rather, he proceeds in a negative manner as we discussed. Thomas’s metaphysics does employ this “logical method” to arrive at principles of metaphysics, a demonstrative science, and it also offers negative demonstration for some conclusions within metaphysics. Both metaphysics and logic have numerically the same (material) objects: being and its necessary properties, so the two sciences are about the same subject in some way (\textit{circa idem subiectum quodammodo}) insofar as finite being can be grasped in common concepts and insofar as both sciences directly consider these common concepts.\textsuperscript{242}

Metaphysics studies what is common in all things (themselves) according to their mode

\textsuperscript{241} Metaphysics for Thomas must see each thing as distinct because of their individual mode of being. \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 4: “esse est diversum in diversis” (Leon. 43.37.20-21). Metaphysics also considers possible real being even though possible real being lacks an act of being just as rationate being does. The difference is that possible real being \textit{can} have an act of being and that rationate being \textit{cannot} have an act of being. See John F. Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles according to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” \textit{Review of Metaphysics} 34 (1981), 729-58. According to Wippel’s interpretation, possible real being is really identical with (and only conceptually distinct from) the divine idea (743). For a different emphasis, see Norris W. Clarke, “What is Really Real?” in \textit{Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart}, J. A. McWilliams, ed (Milwaukee, 1955): 61-90.

\textsuperscript{242} In \textit{I Post. an.}, lect. 35; \textit{ST} II-II, q. 51, a. 4 ad 2; “Unde etiam in speculativis dialectica, quae est inquisitiva, procedit ex communibus [principiis]; demonstrativa autem, quae est iudicativa, procedit ex propriis” (Leon. 8.382). “In dialectical reasoning the middle term is taken from outside the subject and its definition; in demonstration it is proper to the subject.” See Schmidt, \textit{The Domain of Logic}, 33-34.
of being, and logic studies what is common in all things according to the intentions that reason forms about them. The subject-genus (formal object) of logic is thus analogically related to the subject of metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysics can treat univocal notions as analogical in being (secundum esse, non secundum intentionem). Because of this relationship, metaphysics can resolve univocal and logical notions into analogical and metaphysical terms. Metaphysics accomplishes this type of resolution when it manifests and determines the principles of metaphysics, such as being and its properties, and when it demonstrates in a negative manner some metaphysical conclusions such as the reality of prime matter and the unicity of substantial form.

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We shall see these concrete examples in chapter four.
CHAPTER TWO: THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF THOMAS’S METHOD OF PREDICATION

The method of predication presupposes, for Thomas, some type of “cognitive realism.” We should understand this realism to mean that real things are the cause of truth and falsity in the mind: “the truth and falsity found in speech and in thought must be traced to a thing’s disposition as their cause,” according to Thomas.¹ If you were standing, and now sit, the statement “You are standing” was true, and then became false. The statement itself does not change, but the respect in which it is said to change (its “truth-value”) does change because the things themselves change. Thomas does not call this dynamic a mere matter of correspondence. The statement “Socrates is white” requires that Socrates be white, but Thomas also thinks that the whiteness in Socrates is somehow also the cause of truth in the proposition. Things cause their likeness in the intellect. We shall have occasion to develop this point.

The point is significant because the method of predication directly depends on truth found in speech (“the truth of a proposition”), so truth found in speech must directly and causally depend on things in order for the method of predication to succeed in asserting metaphysical claims about them.² No judgment made through predication would have real import unless predicates formally signified something “outside” of man’s soul, some thing that man grasps prior to the formation of judgments. This is to say that predication depends on pre-predicative acts, namely concept formation. Likewise, concepts would have no real import unless they

¹ In IX Meta. lect. 11, no. 1898: “Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam” (Marietti ed., 18.456).
² De veritate q. 3, a. 2: “ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu per talem formam operari iam potest formando quiditates rerum et componendo et dividendo, unde ipsa quiditas formata in intellectu, vel etiam compositio et divisio, est quoddam operatum ipsius, per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris, et sic est quasi secundum quo intelligitur” (Leon. 22/1.104:176-183). See also Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 5-8. Irwin appeals to realism to justify Aristotle’s dialectical appeal to first principles.
formally signified some thing grasped prior to the formation of concepts. This is to say that concepts depend on pre-conceptual acts. According to Thomas, prior to the formation of concepts, man’s external senses receive sensory data relayed to the interior senses that produce and manipulate an image from which the intellect abstracts universals and establishes principles of all the sciences. The intellect thereby inserts itself by clarifying the intelligibility of sense-data with its own light.

In other words, we can make arguments that rely on concepts and relations between these same concepts because our concepts (intellectuum) signify things; we can move from intellect (intellectus) and end with things (ab anima ad res) because of cognitive realism. Cognitive realism requires, however, some articulation. The rational method (or “method of predication”) that consists in arguing based on concepts presumes that the concepts from which predications are made re-present reality, and it further presumes that judgments made through these concepts also re-present reality. The method of predication entails the motion from the intellect to things (ab anima ad res), but this motion presumes a prior movement of things to reason (a rebus ad animam). In this chapter, we shall articulate both this movement of things to intellect in the sense and intellectual powers, leading to the formation of simple concepts, and we shall also articulate the cognition of things that takes place in composition and division, leading to the formation of judgments.

3 Thomas describes the motion from thing to intellect (ab rebus ad animam) to explain the human way of knowing things. He describes the motion from intellect to thing (ab anima ad res) to describe both the human way of willing things and remembering things. In II Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3; QDdA a. 13; De potentia q. 9, a. 9.
1. The Sense-Powers

The weakness of man’s intellectual light requires a discursive process to achieve science. Both the sense and intellectual powers must in different ways gradually “dematerialize” sensible forms to discover intelligible forms and, furthermore, compose and divide simples to discover more complex intelligible forms. One might call the process of reasoning an “organic chain” (with Gilson) and a “dialectical interplay” (with Lonergan) between the sense powers and the intellectual powers ending in an act of judgment. Thomas himself describes the intellect as having a continuity (continuatio) with imagination and an overflow (refluentiam) into memory and the cogitative sense. The human soul and body share the task of thinking (intellectus). In other words, despite its immateriality, the human intellect differs remarkably from the simplicity...
of the angelic intellect, for it is a power of a soul that is the first act of a body potential with life. The intellect emanates from the substantial form of a body.9

It also goes without saying that, even though I shall state by way of synecdoche that the intellect or the sense knows, properly speaking (proprie loquendo), it is man that knows through these powers.10 It is the whole composite that acts. In his role of determining what is outside the soul, even with regard to determining metaphysical objects, man must understand what is outside the soul through the conditions of a bodily nature, that is, through sense and intellectual powers.11 We should dwell on the basics of cognition for Thomas because they show us how cognitive realism succeeds. After briefly discussing the external sense-powers, we discuss the internal sense powers, focusing especially on the cogitative sense, which homes in on the individual as such thereby allowing the intellect to see a common nature.

Thomas explains that man originally understands what is outside the soul through sense-powers.12 Powers are proximate principles of the soul’s operation, and five external sense-powers (touch, taste, hearing, smell, and sight) and their organs are the original point of contact of the soul’s operation with what is outside the soul, namely the proper sensibles (tangible, flavor, sound, odor, color), which naturally and primarily affect the senses and their organs. Thomas presents the external sense-powers as passive powers naturally immuted by external sensibles.

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9 In II De anima, lect. 1, no. 229; SCG II, 61; ST I, q. 76, a. 1; q. 85, a. 1. See Péghaire, Intellectus et Ratio, 186.
10 De veritate q. 2, a. 6.
11 In VII Meta., lect. 1, no. 1245: “incipit determinare de ente per se, quod est extra animam, de quo est principalis consideratio huius scientiae” (Marietti ed., 18.315-316).
12 De veritate q. 1, a. 11: “Dicendum quod cognitio nostra quae a rebus initium sumit, hoc ordine progreditur, ut primo incipiatur in sensu, et secundo perficiatur in intellectu; ut sic sensus inveniatur quodammodo medius inter intellectum et res” (Leon. 22/1.34:43-48).
These proper senses do not function as isolated powers. The power of sight receives a manifold of sensible forms of color, for instance, but it does not sense anything except through a central power that coordinates and unifies these particular sensations (sense-data). The common sense itself senses by means of sight, hearing, and other proper senses. The soul receives sensible forms through an interior sense, that is, the common sense (sensus communis), and it distinguishes and judges the different qualities of objects that exist independently of any sentient being. The common sense is the “common root and principle of the external senses.”

The common sense thus organizes an array of sense-data under determinate dimensions (determinatis dimensionibus). It can contextualize qualities in this way because qualities always inhere in some quantity, so the common sense discriminates through qualitative sensoria the proximate quantitative subjects of size, number, shape, motion, and rest, which the external senses only incidentally sense. These common sensibles are spatio-temporal quantities and are the common sense’s essential (per se) objects. Though the common sense has these essential objects, it does not itself have a proper object (propria) because it is a common power that is not specified by the immutations of the senses. It receives its per se objects by means of the external

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13 De sensu et sensato, lect. 19; ST. q. 87, a. 3 ad 3.
14 Distinct lines of external sense-data (acquired through the proper senses) converge onto their foundational and central meeting point to modify the common sense. ST I, q. 78, a. 4 ad 1: “sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum” (Leon. 5.256). For a discussion on how the proper and common senses judge, see Benoit Garceau, Judicium: Vocabulaire, Sources, Doctrine de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1968), 241-251.
15 The common sense evaluates the fragrance and colors of some object as belonging to a complex arrangement such as the shape-of-a-flower-bed or the motion-of-a-fisherman’s-skiff. De veritate q. 10, a. 5: “sed directe cognoscitur a nobis singulare per virtutes sensitivas quae recipiunt formas a rebus in organo corporali, et sic recipiunt eas sub determinatis dimensionibus et secundum quod ducunt in cognitionem materiae singularis” (Leon. 22/1.309:58-63).
16 Only touch and sight incidentally sense (perciipient) all five common sensibles. In II De anima, lect. 13, no 386.
senses. The common sense also attains a likeness of the individual (e.g. flower-bed of Diaries, my old man’s skiff), but unlike the estimative power the individual is not its proper object.

Imagination and memory presuppose the acts of the common and proper senses. The impressions (immutationem) incurred by the common and proper senses move the imagination and the memory, which are affections (passiones); the senses move these powers insofar as the motion made on the senses by a sensible object impresses “something like a sensible figure” in the imagination. To conclude, the inner and outer senses powers receive the same generic form, the sensible form of individuals, but what we are most interested in is how Thomas accounts for our grasp of common natures, which are the main components of predication. To that end we must turn to another internal sense-power.

The key to Thomas’s decidedly realist account of cognition lies in the principle of similitude: every agent makes something similar to itself (omne agens agit sibi simile). This causal theory means that any thing acts in such a way that some passive power can receive the likeness (similitudo) of its form: The thing formally causes the sensible form of itself in the inner

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17 Much more can be said of course. For instance, the common sense perceives the modification of a proper sense as a modification, so the common sense can judge the resultant data provided by the eye, for instance, as untrustworthy because of whatever circumstance. Also, Thomas states that we perceive our own life through the common sense insofar as the common sense perceives motion. *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4 ad 2; In II De anima, lect. 13, no. 390-396. See also Robert Edward Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophic Analysis of the Nature of Man* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), 121-125.

18 I shall explain below that the individual is an essential object for the cogitative power.

19 *De memoria et reminiscencia*, lect. 1, no. 322.

20 *De memoria et reminiscencia*, lect. 1, no. 328: “Et ideo subiungit quod motus qui fit a sensibili in sensum, imprimit in phantasia quasi quandam figuram sensibilem, quae manet sensibili abeunte, ad modum, quo illi qui sigillant cum annulis imprimit figum quandam in cera, quae remanet etiam sigillo vel annulo remoto” (Leon. 45/2.103:1-106:198). *SCG* II, 60; *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 3.

21 *QDdA*, q. 4 ad 1; ad 5.
senses. Although each of these powers are impressed by a causal activity on the part of the external thing, none perceives this thing as its essential object.\textsuperscript{22}

Thomas calls the per se object of the cogitative sense an “individual intention.” It is an “intention” because the estimative power in animals, or what fulfills the same function in man, the cogitative power, grasps the significance of a thing in relation to the perceiver. In this case, the significance is either something harmful, harmless, or congenial.\textsuperscript{23} The individual intention is furthermore “individual” because these intentions are marked as singular by the likeness of the singular’s determinate dimensions, that is, by the individuating conditions received by the proper and common senses and retained and expressed by the imaginative and memorative powers. The animal here shares somewhat in reason.\textsuperscript{24} The cogitative power is the highest (superiora) and most noble (dignior) among the sense-powers because it grasps a universal to some extent, that is, accidentally.\textsuperscript{25} The cogitative power shares somewhat in reason because only the intellect and its corollary (reason) can essentially grasp universals.

\textsuperscript{22} In other words, the common sense essentially senses the accidental characteristics of an individual kiwi, but the individual kiwi is not its proper object. Although sense apprehension is essentially of the individual, the common sense is too caught up as it were in the reception of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the sensible form to sense it as individuated. The individual is only an incidental object to the common sense. The common sense perceives number (i.e. an object as one), but it does not perceive numerical distinction (i.e. an object as this among many). Nor is it enough for the imagination to produce an image of the thing. The imagination only forms an image of the proper and common sensibles, and the proper and common sensibles can only bear the likeness of accidental differences within a thing, not essential differences. Imagination merely expresses the species given by the sense-data of the common sense. See, for instance, ST I, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2; ST I, q. 86, a. 1. See also Alfred Leo White, “The Picture Theory of the Phantasm,” Topicos 29 (2005), 140.

\textsuperscript{23} See Daniel D. DeHaan, “Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2014), 397-437.


\textsuperscript{25} De veritate q. 25, a. 2: “Patet igitur ex dictis quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt diversae potentiae, et quid est obiectum utriusque, et quomodo irascibilis iuvat concupiscibilem, et est superior et dignior ea, sicut
There is this difference between man’s cogitative power and the brute animal’s estimative power. Man’s cogitative power grasps the individual as this individual, as one among many. The intellectual appetite abets the sense-power at this point since, though it tends to individual things that are outside the soul, it “tends to them as standing under a universal as when it desires something because it is good.” The cogitative power apprehends the individual insofar as it is this individuated thing. To say that the cogitative power grasps a universal is to say that it apprehends the individual thing “as existing under a common nature” (ut existens sub natura communi) as something concrete in which a nature is realized. “Sensing is properly and per se of the singular, yet sense is somehow also of the universal,” Thomas states. The cogitative power considers the individual in a per se manner because it also perceives universals in a per accidens manner.

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26 ST I, q. 80, a. 2 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem” (Leon. 5.284). Italics mine. See White, “The Picture Theory of the Phantasm,” 149-150.

27 By “universal,” in other words, Thomas does not mean the universal that exists in the mind since the incidental object of the senses is something that is indifferent to this or that existence. In II De anima, lect. 13, no. 398: “Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitatiua et estimatiua: nam cogitatiua apprehendit individuum ut existentem sub natura communi, quod contingit ei in quantum unitur intellectiue in eodem subiecto, unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum; estimatiua autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum secundum quod est sub natura communi, . . .” (Leon. 25/1.122:205-214). Italics mine. The Leonine editors note how this passage and previous passages follow a long tradition set by figures such as Avicenna and Averroes. They do not discuss the capacity of sense perceiving universals. See Julien Péghaire, “A Forgotten Sense: The Cogitative, according to St. Thomas Aquinas,” The Modern Schoolman 20 (1943) 123-40; 211-29.

28 In II Post. an. lect. 20, no. 595: “Manifestum est enim quod singularis sentitur, propriet per se, set tamen sensus est quodam modo etiam ipsius universalis: cognoscit enim Calliam non solum in quantum est Callias, set etiam in quantum est hic homo, et similiter Sortem in quantum est hic homo. Et exinde est quod, tali acceptione sensus preexistente, anima intellectiua potest considerare hominem in utroque” (Leon. 1*2.246:258-266).

29 See DeHann, “Perception and the Vis Cogitativa,” 428: “To perceive a morass of sensibles and perceptibles as a stable continuous unit is to identify by perception a particular thing as a dynamic nucleus of sensibility and perceptibility; it is to notice perceptually a primary substance; it is to target and register a hoc aliquid.”
The reason why the cogitative power accidentally knows the universal, Thomas explains, is that it is “united to the intellect in one and the same subject.”\(^{30}\) It knows this man insofar as it is this man and this wood insofar as it is this wood because the cogitative power operates under the shadow of the intellect’s capacity for universals.\(^{31}\) Insofar as it operates in conjunction with the intellect, Thomas calls the cogitative power a “passive intellect” (\textit{intellectus passivus}). Insofar as the term of the cogitative power’s operation is the object of the agent intellect’s operation, Thomas calls the cogitative power a “particular reason” (\textit{ratio particularis}).\(^{32}\) The cogitative power prepares phantasms for the intellect by collecting particular intentions that it forms about those phantasms,\(^{33}\) by comparing the individual intentions to a universal,\(^{34}\) and by composing them (e.g. this man and this horse), and dividing them (e.g. this man, not this tree) in tandem operation with the possible intellect overflowing into it.\(^{35}\)

The retentive habit of the cogitative power is called experience (\textit{experimentum}).\(^{36}\) Prior to abstraction, the cogitative power collates many memories into an experience, infers (\textit{confertur})

\(^{30}\) \textit{In II De anima}, lect. 13, no. 398: “nam cogitatiua apprehendit indiuiduum ut existentem sub natura communi, quod contingit ei in quantum unitur intellectuei in eodem subiecto” (Leon. 25/1.122:205-209). See full citation above.

\(^{31}\) \textit{ST} I, q. 81, a. 3; \textit{SCG} II, 60; \textit{De veritate} q. 10, a. 5 ad 2; \textit{QDdA}, q. 13; \textit{In II De anima}, lect. 13. Lonergan, \textit{Verbum}, 43; Putallaz, \textit{Le sens de la Réflexion}, 59-64; Deely, “Animal Intelligence and Concept Formation,” 55; Péghaire, “A Forgotten Sense: The Cogitative,” 138-40.

\(^{32}\) \textit{In IV Sent.} d. 49, q. 2, a. 2; \textit{In IV Sent.} d. 50, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3; \textit{De veritate} q. 1, a. 11; q. 2, a. 6; q. 10, a. 5; q. 14, a. 1 ad 9; q. 15, a. 1 (ad 9); \textit{In VI Ethic} lects. 7, 9; \textit{ST} I, q. 78, a. 4; q. 79, a. 2; q. 81, a. 2 ad 2; q. 81, a. 3; \textit{ST} I-II, q. 30, a. 3 ad 3; q. 51, a. 3; \textit{SCG} II, 60; 73; 76; \textit{In II De anima} lect. 13; \textit{QDdA}, q. 13; \textit{De spiritualis creaturis} a. 9. DeHaan, “Perception and the \textit{Vis Cogitativa},” 403, 409.

\(^{33}\) \textit{ST} I, q. 78, a. 4; \textit{SCG} II, 73.

\(^{34}\) \textit{In II Sent.} d. 19. q. 1, a. 1.

\(^{35}\) \textit{SCG} II, 73: “Quia, cum virtus cogitativa habeat operationem solum circa particularia, quorum intentiones dividit et componit, et habeat organum corporale per quod agit, non transcendit genus animae sensitivae” (Leon. 13.460). Here again man differs from nonrational animals. Some animals sense, some remember sense-impressions, and some unify memories into some diminished experience, but only man properly compares intentions in the memory to understand how different means of action relate to the same end.

\(^{36}\) \textit{In II Post. Anal.} lect. 20: Et concludit ex premissis quod \textit{ex sensu fit memoria}, in illis scilicet animalibus in quibus remanet impressio sensibilis, sicut supra dictum est, \textit{ex memoria autem multociens facta} circa tandem rem,
intentions of past attempts as successful or not, and finally pinpoints a common aspect, a first universal (primum universale). The soul discovers something indivisible.\textsuperscript{37} When the cogitative power perceives many sensibles that can or cannot be divided from one another, through many attempts of joining individual intentions (e.g. “this inanimate thing” with “this act of laughter”), then the intellect abstracts from these singular experiences to form universal principles of art and science (e.g. “inanimate things do not laugh,” “animate things laugh”). The per accidens object of sense becomes a per se object of the intellect.\textsuperscript{38}

2. Intellectual Cognition in General

Thomas rejects cognitive theories that claim that the soul knows entirely through either an external cause (separated Forms, Agent intellect) or that it knows entirely through an internal cause (recollection, idealism).\textsuperscript{39} Human knowledge originates, according to Thomas, from both internal and external causes.\textsuperscript{40} Thomas describes one of the internalist positions (idealism) as one where the “soul itself is the cause of its science” as if the soul were to form in itself the likeness in diuersis tamen singularibus, fit experimentum, quia experimentum nichil aliud esse uidetur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in memoria retentis.” (Leon. 1*/2.244:144-151). See Therese Scarpelli Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 72-73; White, “The Picture Theory of the Phantasm,” 150-151.

\textsuperscript{37} In II Post. an. lect. 19: “sic enim, scilicet per uiam inductionis, sensus facit universale intus in anima, in quantum considerantur omnia singularia” (Leon. 1*/2246:285-287) . See also Mark Barker, “Experience and Experimentation: The Meaning of Experimentum in Aquinas,” The Thomist 76 (2012), 37-71, esp. 38, 57-63. For a

\textsuperscript{38} In II Post. an. lect. 20; In I Meta. lect. 1, no. 15; ST I, q. 54, a. 5; ST I-II, q. 50, a. 3; ST I, q. 51, a. 3.

\textsuperscript{39} De veritate q. 10, a. 6: “Sexto quaeritur utrum mens humana cognitionem accipiat a sensibilibus. . . . Quidam enim posuerunt ortum scientiae nostrae totaliter a causa exteriori quae est a materia separata. . . . Alia autem opinio fuit ponentium nostrae scientiae originem totaliter a causa interiori esse” (Leon. 22.1.310:1-2; 311:98-100; 312:143-145). The question of the article is whether human cognition originates from sensible things. For another text in which Thomas rejects recollection, ST I, q. 84, aa. 3 & 6.

\textsuperscript{40} “[H]uman knowledge has a twofold origin - an extrinsic origin in sensitive impressions, and an intrinsic origin in intellectual light in which virtually the whole of science is precontained.” See Lonergan, Verbum, 76.
of sensible things through the mere occasion of these things. In idealism, things play no active role in the determination of concepts. I have shown in the previous section, however, that Thomas explains how sensible things do play an active role, at least in the production of an image readied for intellectual abstraction. Sensible things determine the potentiality of the sense-powers, and they inform the intellect with a likeness of the individual thing. In this section, I would like to show that this likeness extends to concepts through an account of the (first) two operations of the intellect.

2.1 The Intellectual Turn toward the Phantasm

The “thing outside the soul is altogether outside the intelligible genus,” Thomas cautions, because “the thing itself outside the soul is not touched” by the soul’s intelligible act. What is immediately and potentially intelligible is the phantasm. The intellectual grasp of essences, for Thomas, entails the patiency and agency of the imagination, memory, and the cogitative power coordinating to produce a phantasm, and the phantasm bears the likeness of the individual thing in such a way that the agent intellect can make it actually intelligible and perfective of the possible intellect through an intelligible species. The cogitative power ultimately prepares this

41 Thomas does not use the term “idealism.” De veritate q. 10, a. 6: “Alii vero dixerunt, quod anima sibi ipsi est scientiae causa: non enim a sensibilibus scientiam accipit quasi per actionem sensibilibum aliquo modo similitudines rerum ad animam perveniant; sed ipsa anima ad praesentiam sensibilibum in se similitudines sensibilium format” (Leon. 22.1.312:169-175). The Leonine editors suggest that the view of others (“alii”) can be found in Adam Pulcher-Mulieris, Liber de Intelligentis xxx, xxxi et xxxxii (ed. Baeumker, pp. 37-29). Nathalie Gorochov suggests that Adam Pulcher-Mulieris was a Master in Theology. See Gorochov’s “Les maîtres parisiens et la genèse de l’Université,” Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes 18 (2009), 53-73; Étienne Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 259, 661. Thomas cites the same work in several other instances, see for instance De veritate q. 2, a. 1 s.c. 3, Quodl. VI, q. 11 ad s.c.,

42 De potentia q. 7, a. 10: “Ipsa vero res quae est extra animam, omnino non attingitur a tali actu, cum actus intellectus non sit transiens in exteriorem materiam mutandam; unde et ipsa res quae est extra animam, omnino est extra genus intelligibile” (Marietti ed., 11.64). See also SCG II, 73, nos. 14-16.
phantasm. This highest sense-power prepares the phantasm to subject it to an inquiring agent as something-to-be-understood, as something potentially intelligible prompted by the simple question, “what is that?” These amalgams and judgments readied by the sense powers and attained through experience (experimentum) enable the agent intellect to induce a universal principle based on this inquiring activity.43

Although it is the possible intellect that thinks and understands, the possible intellect is merely a “blank slate” (tabula rasa), a pure potency for intelligibles (species), until the agent intellect metaphysically illuminates the complex of images that bears a likeness of the individual thing.44 Again, Thomas’s realism presupposes a principle of similitude (agit sibi simile). Both the agent intellect and the phantasm cause the intelligible likeness (species) in the possible intellect: the agent intellect causes its immaterial and intelligible mode of being, and the phantasm causes its determinacy as this or that intelligible species with a definite resemblance to the thing. As a result, the intelligible is like both of its causes.45

In contrast to the activity of the agent intellect, the possible intellect’s own turn (conversio) to the phantasm is not a dynamic event. It is a “natural orientation” (Lonergan) and a “static relation of origin or dependence” (Cory) between the intelligible (species) and the

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43 ST I, q. 89, a. 5; q. 85, a. 7; ST I-II, q. 51, a. 3; De veritate q. 18, a. 8 ad 5. See White, “The Picture Theory of the Phantasm,” 134; Peifer, The Concept in Thomism, 101-109. Thomas seems to use the term “phantasia” generically for any or all of these three powers because they together produce a phantasm. For Thomas’s assignment of judging to the common sense, ST I, q. 78, a. 4 ad 2; ST I, q. 84, a. 8 ad 2; De veritate q. 1, a. 11; In III De anima lect. 3, no. 15.
44 For Thomas’s references to Aristotle’s “blank slate,” ST I, q. 79, a. 2; ST I, q. 101, a. 1 s.c., QDdA a. 8. For abstraction of a species from a phantasm, ST I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 3; De veritate q. 2, a. 6. See also Cornelio Fabro, “Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelico-Thomistic Psychology” New Scholasticism 12 (1938), 337-365.
45 For texts and discussion on Thomas’s use of the similitude principle (agit sibi simile) to explain the intelligible species, see Therese Scarpelli Cory, “Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect’s Causation of the Intelligible,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 82 (2015), 1-60, esp. 41ff.
phantasm. 46 Thomas describes it as a vision or gaze (aspectum) upon the phantasm informing the possible intellect through the intelligible species. This turn to the phantasm is a necessary and primary condition of human cognition. The possible intellect receives an actually intelligible likeness through an intelligible species abstracted by the agent intellect’s illuminative, dematerializing activity, and it receives this likeness as re-presentative of a thing through the phantasm. 47 The intellect is to the phantasm as sight is to color. 48 The formal object of man’s intellect is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens), and the possible intellect’s natural orientation, its material object, is the phantasm since the likeness of the phantasm determines that in which the intellect beholds the quiddity. 49

2.2 The Two Abstractive Operations of the Intellect

For the possible intellect to know a quiddity, however, it is not enough for the agent intellect to abstract an intelligible species. The intellect must also consider its proper (formal) object in distinctively human ways. In one passage, Thomas explains two ways the intellect considers its object. 1) One way is by simple and absolute consideration, as when we understand one thing without considering another. Thomas includes here the way that the intellect receives

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46 QDdA, q. 16. See also Lonergan, Verbum, 168-172: “the conversion of possible intellect to phantasm is described by Aquinas neither as an activity nor as a shift in activity but as a natural orientation of human intellect in this life: it results from the perfection of the conjunction of soul to body; it consists in human intellect having its gaze (aspectus) turned to phantasms and to inferior things” (171); Cory, “What is an Intellectual Turn,” 134, 159; Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Normann Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 142.

47 De veritate q. 2, aa. 4 & 6; q. 10, a. 2. See also Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 119-131.

48 De veritate q. 10, a. 2 ad 7.

49 ST I, q. 84, a. 7.
the quiddity without any individuating principles, and it is in this way that the (agent) intellect abstracts a universal from the particular or the intelligible species from the phantasm. 2) Another way is by composition and division, as when we understand that something is not in another thing. Thomas includes here the way that the intellect joins together or separates these notions acquired from the phantasm. This second operation is also abstractive because the intellect must separate one notion from another even though they may be joined in reality. These abstractive modes are distinctively human modes of knowing because the human intellect cannot comprehend essences in a single flash of insight. Following Aristotle (*De anima* 3.6.430a26), Thomas classifies the operations of the intellect into 1) the understanding of a quiddity and 2) composition and division of quiddities. I shall introduce in this section what Thomas generally means by these two operations.

In one of his earliest remarks about the “understanding of indivisibles” (*intelligentia indivisibilium*), Thomas states in his Commentary on Bk I of the Sentences: “[T]here are two operations of intellect, one of which some call the ‘imagination’ of the intellect, which the Philosopher calls the understanding of indivisibles, which consists in the apprehension of a simple quiddity, which by another name is called ‘formation,’ the other of which is what they

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51 There is also a third operation, that of reasoning. *In I Perierm*. proemium; *In Post. an*. proemium; *De veritate* q. 9, a. 5.
call faith, which consists in the composition or division made in a proposition.” In later texts, Thomas attributes the phrase, “imagination of the intellect,” to Averroes, and that expression means the same as his own, “possible intellect.” It is the possible intellect that forms simple concepts. It forms such concepts by understanding the whatness or nature (quod quid est, naturam) of a whole thing or a part of a thing with varying degrees of actuality in a hierarchy of beings.

Thomas uses the same Averroist expression of the “imaginative” intellect several distinctions earlier in the Commentary in reference to the grasp of being: “That which falls first in the imagination of the intellect--without which nothing can be apprehended by the intellect--is being (ens).” Thomas elsewhere reiterates this same point in different terms: What falls first in the intellect (in intellectu), in the conception of the intellect (conceptione intellectus), or in the apprehension of the intellect (apprehensione intellectus) is being. “Being falls in the

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*52 In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7: “cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam philosophus . . . nominat intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius” (Mandonnet ed., 1.489). See also De veritate q. 1, a. 3; q. 4, a. 2; ST I, q. 17, a. 3.

*53 De spiritualibus creaturis a. 9 ad 6; In Post. an., proemium; De veritate q. 14, a. 1.

*54 I am not referring here to the sense power of imagination, of course, which Thomas explicitly differentiates from the possible intellect. In II Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; SCG 2, 67. Averroes equates the meaning of the phrases “imaginative intellect,” “possible intellect,” and “material intellect.” See Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the De Anima, trans. Richard C. Taylor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 78, 364.

*55 In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 qc. 1; De Trinitate q. 5, a. 3; De veritate, q. 14, a. 1; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 6; In I Perierm., proemium; lect. 5; In I Post. an. lect. 1; In IV Meta., lect. 6, no. 605; In VI Meta. lect. 4, no. 1232. See Lonergan, Verbum, 78.

*56 In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; “Primum enim quod cadit in imaginacione intellectus, est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu” (Mandonnet ed., 1.200).

*57 ST I-II, q. 55, a. 4 ad 1; De potentia q. 9, a. 7 ad 15; In X Meta. lect. 4, no. 15; In I Meta. lect. 2, no. 46.

*58 ST I, q. 5, a. 2; ST I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 4; De potentia q. 9, a. 7.

*59 In I Sent. d. 24, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2; De veritate q. 21, a. 4 ad 4; ST I-II, q. 94 a. 2.
intellect” means that the intellect *acquires* or *conceives* being.\(^{60}\) Being is first known, Thomas explains, because “what is more universal according to simple apprehension (*simplicem apprehensionem*) is first known,”\(^{61}\) and since being in general (*ens commune*) is most universal according to simple apprehension, one primarily conceives being no matter what one apprehends.

I would like to explore what this noetic primacy of being means. For Thomas (and unlike for Scotus), one first apprehends being in a confused, indistinct way.\(^{62}\) Thomas explains that knowledge of the more common precedes knowledge of the less common in both sense (e.g. perceiving animal prior to a bear) and intellect (e.g. knowing ‘animal’ prior to knowing ‘man’ or ‘lion’) because both sense and intellect proceed from 1) a state of potentiality, 2) through a state of imperfect actuality, 3) to a state of perfect actuality. In the order of nature and generation, the less determinate precedes the more determinate. Prior to seeing an animal for the first time, one only has a potency for seeing an animal, and once one sees the whole animal, one then imperfectly knows ‘animal.’ The only remedy for this incomplete and confused state, for this halfway house in cognition as it were, is to make distinctions about what one apprehends. The

\(^{60}\) *De ente et essentia* proemium: “ens autem et essentia sunt que primo intellectu concipiuntur” (Leon. 43.369:3-4). I do not see a real difference, for Thomas, between the act of simple apprehension and the act of forming a concept.


\(^{62}\) Pasnau calls the content of this first apprehension “utterly trivial,” calling it an “idea” rather than a “concept.” See his *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 327. Although utterly rudimentary, in no way is ‘being’ utterly trivial since it sparks off the wonder, which is the beginning of wisdom. See also Cory, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge*, 77-83; O’Callaghan, *Thomist Realism*, 222-24.
intellect can distinguish ‘animal’ either as rational or irrational, for instance, or the sense can mark a distant body, not only as an animal, but as this snub-nosed Socrates.63

In this first operation, one looks on the quiddity of a thing.64 Whatever content one grasps within simple apprehension, within the intellect’s first operation, does not inform the intellect of the existence or non-existence of a thing because the quiddity or whatness of a thing relates what is merely formal. Being still falls first in the intellect despite this restriction to quiddity alone. The reason why being (ens) is primary in the first act of the mind, even though the first act regards quiddity and not existence (esse), is that quiddity names what the definition signifies, and the intellect first grasps being as a definable whole.65 One understands being indistinctly and formally. The intellect attributes this formal notion of being to whatever concept it grasps, so that one can even state “essence is being (ens)” because whatever essence the intellect grasps is of some being, that is, of some being absolutely considered.66 “Everything (quaelibet natura) is essentially a being.”67 This universal predicability of being also applies to general (e.g.

63 ST I, q. 85, a. 3; ad 1. In this passage, Thomas’s tries to how being can be both the eventual source of registering our distinct cognitions and yet confusedly known at least initially. Cajetan argues that this passage (from ST I, q. 85, a. 3) does not apply to being as first known. The reason he gives is that, according to him, Thomas does not refer to what is first known confusedly in this passage. He refers to what is first known distinctly. In his terminology, to know a universal (actually and) confusedly is to know it as a definable whole without penetration, that is, without having the formal notion (ratio) clarified and resolved. For example, to know man as man. To know a universal (actually and) distinctly is to know it as a definable whole with penetration, that is, by resolving it according to its definable parts. For example, to know man as rational. See his Commentary on Being and Essence, trans. Lottie Kendzierski and Francis Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), 42-49. I find Cajetan’s interpretation of ST I, q. 85, a. 3 unconvincing because sense and intellect proceed from more to less common precisely in order to move from the indistinct to the distinct. In I Phys. lect. 1.

64 In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7: “cum sit duplex operatio intellectus . . . prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.” See note above for the full citation.

65 De ente et essentia, c. 1: “quiditatis uero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse” (Leon. 43.370:49-52).

66 ST I-II, q. 55, a. 4 ad 1; De veritate q. 21, a. 4 ad 4; De veritate q. 21, a. 1 ad 1.

67 De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens” (Leon. 22/1.5:108-109). Wippel thinks that this discovery of the primitive notion of being (ens), “that which is,” is complex, so he concludes that the primitive notion of being requires two different operations of the intellect. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 39. I am
goodness) and special (e.g. whiteness) forms of being. One does not need to know being as composed of potency and act, for instance, in order either to confusedly grasp or predicate being.

This confused notion of being is necessary to initiate the science of metaphysics. Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* (2.1.89b23) requires that any science answer two non-complex questions belonging to the first operation of the intellect: the question concerning whether there is a middle term of demonstration (*si est*; e.g. are there centaurs?) and then the question concerning *what is* the middle term of demonstration (*quid est*; e.g. what is man?). Both these questions, however, presuppose that one know the meaning of the terms (e.g. “centaurs,” “man”), and this meaning need not be clear and distinct. Thomas’s Commentary on *De Trinitate* develops this theme of nominal definitions:

It should be noticed, however, that we cannot know *that* a thing is without knowing in some way *what* it is, either perfectly or at least confusedly, as the Philosopher says we know things defined before we know the parts of their definition. For if a person knows that man exists and wants to find out what man is by definition, he must know the meaning of the term “man.” And this is possible only if he somehow conceives of what he knows to exist, even though he does not know its definition. That is to say, he forms a concept of man by knowing a proximate or remote genus and accidental characteristics which reveal him externally. For our knowledge of definitions, like that of demonstrations, must begin with some previous knowledge.\(^68\)
Thomas here addresses the problem raised in the *Meno* (80e) concerning the possibility of acquiring knowledge, and his solution is that concepts need not be fully defined to begin science.\(^69\) One conceives the notion of a stone through a process of reasoning (*ratiocinando*) and thinking (*cogitatio*),\(^70\) so that definitions emerge at the end of a process of thoughtful inquiry, but one must still have some meaning for the term, “stone,” during the process of thinking about it. Some interim concept (such as ‘thing’) provides provisional intelligible content for ‘stone.’ ‘Thing’ is prior to ‘stone’ in both reality and in knowledge, so one can provisionally inquire about stone as some thing because ‘thing’ is more universal. ‘Thing’ is remotely included in the definition of stone. One can inquire into “stone” without the *ratio* of stone because “stone” remotely signifies ‘thing,’ so ‘thing’ acts as a placeholder. This scenario would be the same if one first thought ‘substance’ with the more general notion ‘being’ (*ens*).\(^71\) One can think this way about stone or substance without even knowing whether there is a stone or substance.

Indeed, before answering scientific questions such as *whether it is* and *what it is*, one should at least have a partial account of a thing’s essence (i.e., proximate genus) or even accidental features of a thing’s essence (i.e., remote genus) that can be used to form a nominal definition (e.g., man is an animal; thunder is a sound in the clouds). To find a nominal definition

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\(^69\) One aspect of the problem briefly stated is that knowledge presupposes knowledge, but if one already has some knowledge then one cannot be said to learn. One may be simply remembering.

\(^70\) *Super Ioanlem*, c. 1, lect. 1, no. 26: “cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur. . . . Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis” (Marietti ed. 26.8). See Lonergan, *Verbum*, 45.

\(^71\) *SCG* I, 34, no. 2; *In V Meta*. lect. 1, no. 751. For an approach to definitions through the essential features of a thing, see Michael Gorman, “The Essential and the Accidental,” *Ratio* 18 (2005), 276-89, esp. 288.
one must think, and to think is to consider “things according to their parts and properties.” The metaphysician first knows that the name “God” signifies certain negative properties, for instance, before proving that God is and what God is. With regard to the search for being, the intellect can make explicit what is implicit in the confused notion of being, acquired through experience (experimentum), by analyzing through various means the properties of being, including general and special forms of being (the transcendental, the ten predicaments). One knows being distinctly, for example, when one knows being as divisible into substance and accident.

Making distinctions entails, however, forming propositions in the second act of the intellect. The intellect joins and divides simple apprehensions, Thomas states, regarding some thing’s existence or act of being (esse). Using the Arabic language related to faith, Thomas compares this discovery of being to the discovery of the axioms by the assenting intellect: “just as what falls first in the intellect that assents (credulitate intellectus) are the axioms, and chief among these axioms is that contradictories cannot be true at the same time.” This discovery of the principle of noncontradiction immediately springs from the understanding of being (entis), namely that it is impossible for something to be (esse) and not to be (non esse) at the same time.

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72 In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 5: “Discernere est cognoscere rem per differentiam sui ab aliis. Cogitare est considerare rem secundum partes et proprietates suas, unde dicitur quasi co-agitare” (Mandonnet ed., 1.122) See Péghaire, Ratio et Intellectus, 86.

73 ST I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 2. See also Gabriele Galluzzo, “To Grasp Something of the Thing Itself. Aquinas on Nominal and Real Definition,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 20 (2009), 265-291, esp. 281.

74 In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3: “... sicut primum quod cadit in credulitate intellectus, sunt dignitates, et praecipue ista, contradictoria non esse simul vera: unde omnia alia includuntur quoddammodo in ente unite et indistincte, sicut in principio” (Mandonnet ed., 1.181); De veritate q. 14, a. 1: “Non autem inventur credere in prima operatione, sed solum in secunda: credimus enim vero, et discredimus falsum. Unde etiam et apud Arabes prima intellectus operatio vocatur imaginatio intellectus, secunda autem vocatur fides, ut patet ex verbis Commentatoris in III de anima” (Leon. 22.2.436:76-82). Avicenna describes the first operation in terms of imagination or conception and the second operation in terms of credulity or assent. See for instance, Liber de philosophia prima I, 5.
time. Implicit also in the understanding of being is the negation of being. That is to say, one must tease out what is virtually contained in a thing’s quiddity by comparing and contrasting, affirming and denying what does and does not belong to a thing. The point is to answer complex scientific questions formulated in terms of whether S is P (quia) and what is the proper reason for S is P (propter quid).

3. First Operation of the Intellect: Formation of Simple Quiddities

3.1 The Analogy of Intellect to Fire

It might be helpful to focus briefly on how Thomas describes the intellect because it is through the intellect that man knows real things. For Thomas, the intellect in man is like a small fire (igniculus). The analogy to fire, from which light proceeds, succeeds in medieval physics insofar as both fire and intellect do not shine of their own power. Both radiate from the first light (the sun/God) because their efficacy depends on the original. The analogy further succeeds in the context of the medieval theory of the four natural elements: The intellect (like fire) can turn the quality of an object into its contrary. Fire is naturally hot, and it turns that which is naturally cold (water) into something hot. In a similar way, the intellect is naturally intelligible (perfectly

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75 In IV Meta, lect. 6, no. 605: “Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis” (Marietti ed., 18.168).
76 ST I, q. 85, a. 5; De Trinitate q. 5, a. 3. This process requires reasoning as well, of course, which Thomas call the third operation the intellect.
77 De veritate q.2, a. 2; De Trinitate, preface; QDdA, q. 15.
78 In II Sent. d. 13 q. 1 a. 3; In II sent. d. 28, q. 1, a. 5 ad 4; De Trinitate q. 1, a. 3; De Trinitate q. 4, a. 3 ad 4; QDdA, a. 4 ad 7; De veritate q. 11, a. 1 ad 13.
so in angels), and it turns that which is naturally unintelligible (material things) into something intelligible.\textsuperscript{79}

Both processes also result in something imperfect. The action of the intellect and of fire alter accidents that belong to the natural being (esse) of sensible things and water respectively, so the intellect like fire weakens what belongs to its object properly and in itself (proprie et per se). Like fire, the intellect causes a contrary quality and a lack of perfection in real being.\textsuperscript{80} This stone, for example, does not exist intelligibly of itself because in its natural being (esse naturale) it is not actually intelligible. Thomas agrees with Averroes on this point: “material things are actually intelligible only because we make them so.”\textsuperscript{81} The agent intellect is active in regard to an object in potency, making what is intelligible in potency outside the soul to be intelligible in act, and the possible intellect is potential in regard to an object in act, receiving the form of abstract sensible things made actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{82}

The disanalogy of the intellect to fire also explains Thomas’s realist account. One way that the analogy between intellect and fire fails is that natural bodies such as fire receive forms in their natural and material being (esse naturale et materiale) in such a way that they have contrariety in them. This conflicting order means that they cannot receive contrary forms at the

\textsuperscript{79} De Trinitate q. 1, a. 3; In II Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; De sensu et sensato, c. 9. See Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 167-82.

\textsuperscript{80} Stephen L. Brock, “Intentional Being, Natural Being, and The First-Person Perspective in Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 77 (2013), 103-33, esp. 111. “Aquinas calls this transitory and dependent mode of inherence ‘spiritual’ or ‘intentional’ or ‘incomplete,’ as compared to a mode of inherence that is ‘settled and firm in nature,’ ‘abiding,’ or ‘complete.’” See Cory, “Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect,” 49.

\textsuperscript{81} De veritate q. 2, a. 2: “Res enim materiales, ut Commentator dicit, non sunt intelligibles, nisi quia nos facimus eas intelligibles: sunt enim intelligibiles in potentia tantum” (Leon. 22/1.45.172-176). The agreement only goes so far, of course, in light of their disagreement of the role of the agent intellect for each individual.

\textsuperscript{82} In III De anima, lect. 10, no 732.
same time: forms collide in the natural mode of being. By contrast, sense and intellect receive
forms of things spiritually and immaterially according to intentional being (esse quoddam
intentionale) in such a way that their forms have no contrariety. This cohesive order means that
they can receive contrary forms at the same time: forms coalesce in the intentional mode of
being.\textsuperscript{83} The reason for these differences is that whatever is received is received in the mode of
the receiver, and the diaphanous medium, the senses, and the intellect receive the species of the
thing according to an intentional and spiritual mode.\textsuperscript{84} The natural mode of being is rigid, but the
intentional mode of being is elastic.

Another reason that the analogy between the intellect and fire falters is that, as Thomas
often repeats, the operations of knowing and heating fall under different types. There is an
operation that passes from the operator into something extrinsic, as heating passes from fire into
wood, which operation does not perfect the operator because it does not remain in the operator.
The substance that fire changes is separate from the fire itself (e.g. wood). There is also another
type of operation, one that that perfects the operator and that does “not pass into something
outside but remains in the operator, such as understanding, sensation, willing and so on.”\textsuperscript{85}
Through an immanent operation, the agent intellect’s light “inheres” in the phantasm.\textsuperscript{86} Whereas

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{De sensu et sensato}, c. 18. See also Sheldon M. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{ST} I, q. 12, a. 4. For treatments of the modus principle, see John Tomarchio, “The Modus Principle in the
Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas” (Ph.D. dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1995) and his “Four
Indices for the Thomistic Principle Quod recipitur in aliquo est in eo per modum recipientis,” \textit{Medieval Studies} 60
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{De potentia} q. 10, a. 1.
\textsuperscript{86} For the expression that the intellectual light “inheres” in the phantasm for Thomas, see Cory, “Averroes
and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect,” 51: “Presumably [Thomas] does not mean that images are transformed into
immaterial, intelligible entities but rather merely that the soul’s intelligibilizing light inheres in them incompletely,
intentionally, or quasi-formally, enabling them to perform an act beyond their own natural powers without any
fire acts transitively, the intellect operates immanently. The term of each action differs: The knower does not so much illuminate some thing outside of himself (as a lighthouse), but rather engulfs himself with light through a likeness of something outside himself. The agent and possible intellects “flash” at their actual union with the known thing (intellectus in actu); the knower and the known are but one principle of understanding (intelligere).

One should add an important caveat to this disanalogy between intellect and fire. Understanding does not remain entirely enclosed within itself: In contrast to another immanent operation, which does not have anything proceeding from it except in the manner of an operation (e.g. love), the intellect proceeds in the act of understanding not only in the manner of an operation, but also in the manner of a thing that is the term of an operation, which is an inner word. That inner word (“concept”) is something really distinct from the intellect itself.

3.2 Words: Inner and Outer

Our account has proceeded from external things to the intellect (a rebus ad animam).

What we need to understand now is how a method of predication depends upon concepts, namely inner words expressed by the intellect. We can start by stating that the intellect can proceed from insights about concepts to make judgments about reality because the relation that the intellect

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metaphysical transformation. Quasi-formed by this immaterializing power, images are intelligible merely in the sense that they can perform the proper act of actually intelligible entities, without being intelligible entities.”

87 De veritate q. 8, a. 6: “Sed intelligens et intellectum, prout ex eis est effectum unum quid, quod est intellectus in actu, sunt unum principium huius actus quod est intelligere” (Leon. 22/2.238:123-6). See also SCG I, 45, 73; ST I q. 18, a. 3 ad 1; ST I q. 54, a. 1; ST I q. 56, a. 1; De potentia q. 3, a. 15. See also Joseph de Finance, Etre et agir dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin, 1945), 210; Brock, “Intentional Being,” 106; Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963; Reprint. Houston, TX: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), 193-95.

88 De veritate q. 4, a. 2 ad 7. See Lonergan, Verbum, 132.
forms about concepts has a *mediate* foundation in reality through concepts that themselves have an *immediate* foundation in reality. A concept has an immediate foundation in reality when what the intellect conceives is a likeness of the existing thing outside the soul, as that which is conceived by the term “man.” “Man” signifies a concept with an immediate foundation in reality because the term expresses what we primarily understand by the external thing, man. This concept has an immediate foundation in things insofar as the thing that is in conformity with the intellect makes the intellect true and insofar as that term signifying that which is understood is properly said of the thing. The thing (*res*) is properly expressed by a term through a concept. Indeed, the signification of a term (*nominis*) does not immediately refer to the external thing understood (*rem intellectam*), for the term signifies a thing only through the mediation of the intellect. It immediately re-presents the soul’s conceptions. The term signifies primarily (*per prius*) the conception of the intellect, a work of reason, rather than the thing understood.

The quiddity of the thing outside the soul makes the intellect true (e.g. a stone), and the intellectual understanding of this quiddity is expressed interiorly as an inner word (e.g. ‘stone’), which the intellect expresses externally through an utterance bearing the signification of the inner word (e.g. “stone”). This is to say, utterances without meaning (*balbutiae*) are not even

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89 *In I Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a. 3; *In I Sent.* d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.
90 *De potentia* q. 7, a. 6: “significatio nominis non immediate refertur ad rem, sed mediante intellectu: sunt enim voces notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum, et ipsae intellectus conceptiones sunt rerum similitudines” (Marietti ed., 11.201); *In I Perierm.* lect. 2, no 5; *ST* I, q. 13, a. 1. See Gyula Klíma, “The Semantic Principles underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 87-141, esp. 90-91. Klíma distinguishes between immediate and ultimate signification (98). For a “Thomistic-Aristotelian” engagement regarding the semantic triangle (words, thoughts, things) with contemporary modes of thought (e.g. Kretzmann, Putnam, Fodor), see John P. O’Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). I disagree with O’Callaghan’s interpretation of Thomas’s inner word as simply metaphorical or theological.
91 *In III De anima,* lect. 11, no. 751; *ST* I, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3; q. 79, a. 3 ad 3; *QDdA,* q. 4; ad 1; SCG I, 35.
external words. They take shape as words only when the likeness of thing impresses itself upon
the knower and understanding takes place, and that understanding is incomplete until an inner
word emanates from the intellect “by way of manifestation.”92 The intellect expresses an
understood intention (intentio intellecta).93 In sum, three literal (proprie) meanings of “word” are
at play:94 In an unfolding locution, the intellect conceives of an interior word (interior mentis
conceptum) manifesting the understood intention, and the imagination forms a pictorial medium
for the voice (imaginatio vocis) through which an external word (vox exterior) is spoken in
language. The external word immediately signifies the inner word.95

To put it differently, the possible intellect conceives the quiddity of the thing and
produces an inner word, and that inner word has an immediate foundation in reality because it
immaterially re-presents the thing understood. Later tradition would call the inner word “a

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92 In I Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1: “unde verbum nihil aliud dicit quam quodam emanationem ab intellectu per
modum manifectantis” (Mandonnet ed., 1.655). For discussion on the “word of the heart” or the “inner word,” see
Jacques Maritain, Distinguer Pour Unir; ou Les Degrés du Savoir (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1946), 769-819;
O’Callaghan’s “Verbum Mentis: Philosophical or Theological Doctrine in Aquinas?,” American Catholic
Philosophical Association 74 (2001), 103-119; James C. Doig, “O’Callaghan on Verbum Mentis in Aquinas,”
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2003), 233-55; O’Callaghan, “More Words on the Verbum: A
Response to James Doig,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2003), 257-68.
93 SCG I, 53. See also John F. Peifer, The Concept in Thomism (1961; repr., Bristol: Thoemmes
Continuum, 2004), 141ff.
94 In I Perierr. lect. 2, no. 6; De potentia q. 8, a. 1: “Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie
verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum,
neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem”
(Marietti ed., 11.215). See also De potentia q. 9, a. 5; In I Perierr., lect. 10, no. 2; ST I, q. 13, a. 1; q. 34, a. 1; In VI
Meta. lect. 4, no. 1224; De veritate q. 9, a. 4. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 106.
95 The term, “word,” is primarily and principally said of the inner word. ST I, q. 34, a. 1: “Ex hoc ergo
dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior
mentis conceptus verbum dicitur: secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa: terto vero, ipsa
imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur” (Leon. 4.366); In I Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1: “invenitur triplex verbum; scilicet cordis,
et vocis, et quod habet imaginem vocis” (Mandonnet ed., 1.654). See also De sensu et sensato, c. 1. See Lonergan,
Verbum, 14.
formal concept.”96 In a concomitant act, the inner word finds expression in the external word by materially representing the soul’s conceptions about the thing understood. The external word is a physical utterance. The inner word (truth-bearer) really depends upon reality (truth-maker) for its intelligibility, and it further maintains that identity as word, as a bearer of an understood intention, when it accurately expresses the thing understood through speech. “Speech is properly a work of reason.”97 When a man forms a concept, he simultaneously forms an inner word and begins to speak, and to speak (dicere) is nothing other than to display the word of the heart.98 One forms concepts to speak.99

Most concepts that we are familiar with are concepts with an immediate foundation in reality, such as ‘dog’ or ‘animal.’ These concepts are the first intentions we discussed in chapter two. There is another type of intention, which we discussed, that has no immediate foundation in things. These “second intentions” follow upon a mode of understanding a thing outside the soul. Thomas describes the origin of this term as having “a remote foundation in the thing itself because the proximate foundation is not in the thing but in the intellect.”100 The terms that signify these intentions explain our way of understanding first intentions. The intention of genus,

97 ST I, q. 91, a. 3 ad 3: “Locutio est proprium opus rationis” (Leon. 5.394). See Gregory Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 169. One might say the same of the concept. It is also a work of reason.
98 ST I, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3; SCG IV, 11; ST I, q. 63, a. 8 ad 1; In I De anima lect. 10, no. 160. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 107.
99 De veritate q. 9, a. 5: “Locutio igitur proprie est qua aliquis ducitur in cognitionem ignoti, per hoc quod fit sibi praesens quod alias erat ei absens; sicut apud nos patet dum unus alteri refert aliqua quae ille non vidit, et sic facit ei quodammodo praesentia per loquelam” (Leon. 22/2.291:62-67); In II De anima lect. 18, no. 473; ST III, q. 6, a. 6 ad 3. See also O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism, 13; Josef Pieper, “The Meaning of ‘God Speaks,’ “The New Scholasticism 43 (1969): 205-228.
100 In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3: “et huiusmodi intentionis, licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa” (Mandonnet ed., 1.67).
for example, helps one understand ‘animal’ as predicable of many; the common nature of animal itself is that which belongs to a genus.

The concept ‘animal’, however, is not the same concept as ‘genus’. When we say, “‘animal’ is a genus,” we mean that the nature as apprehended (‘animal’) has a certain relation to other apprehended natures (those that have the rationate relation ‘species’ or ‘individual’) such that it is essentially predicable of them (‘man,’ ‘dog’). We do not mean that ‘animal’ is a rationate (or logical) relation. The concept of animal rather expresses the nature of animals. As a concept, ‘genus’ is a rationate relation between other concepts that expresses the broader comprehension that one concept (e.g. ‘animal’) has over others with less comprehension (e.g. ‘man’). In this way, even rationate relations (the subject of the science of logic) has a remote (or mediate) foundation in reality because the nature that belongs to that genus (animal) has a proximate (or immediate) foundation in reality. The abstractive act of the intellect, in other words, founds the logical intentions.101

3.3 Threefold Essence

Before we discuss the foundation that the second act of the mind has on reality, according to Thomas, we should make some important clarifications about essences. The reason is that through the method of predication Thomas hopes to manifest the essences of things, but

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101 See Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 18-19: “One must notice the difference between (a) what it is to be a genus and (b) that which is a genus. The former is a second intention; the latter, a first intention. To be a genus is to have a relation of a certain sort (genericity) to other meanings. Animal has such a relation to man and dog. And it is because of this relation that animal is called a genus.” Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 191: “Because the logical intention follows upon the manner of understanding, and the manner of understanding with which the intention of universality is concerned is abstraction, the abstractive act of the intellect might in a true sense be called its foundation.”
“essence” means many things. In his *On Being and Essence*, Thomas shows special concern for the relationship between logical intentions (genus, species, and difference) and being and essence. That is where he first elaborates on the meaning of “essence.”

In composite substances, Thomas states, “essence” can be signified as a form of a whole, including both form and matter (*forma totius*), in two different ways: either as a whole that *does not* expressly exclude (*non praecidit*) designated matter such as ‘man’, or as a whole that *does* expressly exclude (*praecidit*) designated matter such as ‘humanity.’ In both ways, essence includes form and matter. Yet only “essence” signified without precision (e.g. ‘man’) can be predicated of an individual because it includes the whole implicitly and indeterminately. It might help us to look at Thomas’s own explanation here:

This is why the word that signifies that from which the nature of the genus is taken, with precision (or with “cutting off”) from the determinate form which perfects the species, must signify a material part of the whole, just as body is a material part of man. But a word that signifies that from which the nature of the species is taken, with precision from designated matter, signifies a formal part. And therefore humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is called the form of the whole, not indeed as something added to the essential parts, namely to form and matter, as the form of a house is added to its integral parts; rather, it is a form which is a whole, that is, a form which includes both form and matter, but with precision from those things by reason of which matter can be designated. It is clear, therefore, that the word “man” and the word “humanity” signify the essence of man, but in diverse ways, as we have said. For the word “man” signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it does not exclude (“cut off”) designation by matter, but contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as we have said before that the genus contains the difference. And this is why the word “man” is predicated of individuals. But the word “humanity” signifies it as a part because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man as man, and it excludes (“cuts off”) all designation by matter. Hence, it is not predicated of individual men.

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102 *De ente et essentia*, proemium.
103 *De ente et essentia*, c. 2: “ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id unde sumitur natura speciei, cum praecisione materie designate, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius; non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet forme et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus.
The term “man” stands for the whole of a supposit (man) having a part of nature (humanity). To consider ‘humanity’ presupposes a consideration of ‘man’ because the mind cuts off, so to speak, whatever individual aspects that implicitly belong to ‘man’ to consider ‘humanity.’ Precise abstraction (e.g. ‘humanity’) presupposes non-precise abstraction (e.g. ‘man’). As we shall see in chapter four, the point is important because the method of predication relies on the predication of a concrete whole, not an abstract part.

Following Avicenna, Thomas further distinguishes essence signified as a whole (‘man’) in two ways: (1) according to its proper notion (rationem propriam) and (2) according as it exists in this or in that (in hoc vel in illo). In the first way (1) one knows the essence as such, that is, the nature, notion, or formal character of the species. In the second way one knows the essence as existing (2a) either outside the soul through things in nature (2b) or inside the soul through intentions. These three distinct considerations help clear away some immediate difficulties. It clarifies the truth that the thing outside the soul, for example, does not exist in the intellect according to its natural, individual existence. Different conditions apply in intentional and

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integralibus eius: sed magis est forma, que est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praeccisione eorum, per que nata est materia designari. Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diuersimode, ut dictum est: quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non precidit designationem materie, sed implicite, continent eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continent differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continent in significatione sua nisi id quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et precidit omenm designationem; unde de individuis hominis non predicatur” (Leon. 43.373:277-304). See also In I Perierm lect. 2, no. 10.

104 Lectura super Ioannem 1, lect. 1. ‘Humanity’ does not include in its signification individual matter, so individuals cannot be predicated of it. See Gabriele Galluzzo, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 71 (2004), 131-71, esp. 147; Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 63, 132-133. I shall explain below how logical intentions are founded on essence considered as a whole.

105 See Knasas, Being and Some, 45.
natural being. In the case of intentional being, the intellect receives a similitude of the thing understood: The stone is not in the soul, but the likeness (species) of a stone.\footnote{De veritate q. 23, a. 1: “non quidem secundum esse proprium . . . sed secundum propriam rationem: ‘non enim lapis est in anima, sed species lapidis, sive ratio eius’” (Leon. ed. 22/3.652:116-653:121). See also SCG I, 53; IV, 11; De malo q. 16, a. 8 ad 10.}

1) Essence according to its proper notion is essence considered absolutely.\footnote{Quodl. VIII, q. 1, a. 1: “Unde uniuscuisque naturae create prima consideratio est secundum quod est in intellectu divino; secunda vero consideratio est ipsius naturae absolute; tercia secundum quod habet esse in rebus ipsius, vel in mente angelica; quarta secundum esse quod habet in intellectu humano” (Leon. 25.1.52:87-92). For some literature on this threefold division of essence, see Joseph Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), 1-14; Frederick Wilhelmsen, “A Note: The Absolute Consideration of Nature in Quaestiones Quodlibetales, VIII,” The New Scholasticism 57 (1983), 352-61; Deborah L. Black, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999), 45-63; Gabriele Galluzzo, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 71 (2004), 131-171. Some argue that Thomas drifted away from essence considered absolutely (Wilhelmsen, Black), and some argue that he held onto the Avicennian distinction (Owens, Galluzzo). I think he held onto it.} This is what the mind grasps through the first act of the intellect. When the intellect receives the form of the thing, it receives that form according to that form’s proper notion.\footnote{ST I, q. 12, a. 4.} That the intellect receives the form in this way is due to the intellect’s immateriality. The intellectual soul is immaterial, so it receives immaterially.\footnote{In I Periem. lect. 3, no. 10; In II De anima, lect. 24, nos. 552; De veritate, q. 2, a. 2: “oportet in intellectu cognoscente recipi aliquid immaterialiter” (Leon. 22/1.44:161-163). See also De veritate q. 10, a. 6 ad 1; SCG II, 50; ST I, q. 14, a. 1 ad 3.; q. 14, a. 1; q. 84, a. 2; ST III, q. 75, a. 6; De unitate intellectus c. 5, no. 111. “What is strictly essential to cognition is immateriality. Thomas holds that cognition is quite directly in function of immateriality.” See Brock, “Intentional Being,” 123.} It receives the form shorn of material, individuating conditions:

“Through the intellect,” Thomas states, “the soul knows bodies through a knowledge that is immaterial, universal, and necessary.”\footnote{ST I, q. 84, a. 2: “Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria” (Leon. 5.190).} When the intellect receives the phantasm’s likeness of an individual essence, the (agent) intellect immaterializes that individual likeness by abstracting from it an intelligible species by which the (possible) intellect knows that essence as common.\footnote{ST I, q. 55, a. 2 ad 2.}
The nature thus loses the condition of numerical distinctiveness present in the phantasm. When an intellectual soul (directly) cognizes a stone, for instance, it knows the stone insofar as it is stone, and it considers only what belongs to a stone’s proper formal notion. The intellect knows a stone as stone, not as this particular stone.112

2. In order to finish our treatment of essences, we should now turn our attention to the way that essence can exist. This essence or nature can exist in either of two ways, and it has different accidents depending upon them: a) Either it can have existence outside the soul as a singular, or b) it can have existence inside the soul as a universal. This modal difference results from a difference in recipient.113

2a) On the one hand, whenever it exists in an individual (e.g. an animal, a man), the nature exists according to an individual mode (e.g. as Socrates). Such a mode of existing requires a principle. The principle for such a mode of existing is a determinate principle of individuation that causes this mode of existing, and the intellect cannot grasp this principle because the principle of individuation is distinct in each individual whereas the intellect grasps the common or universal aspect of things.114 For composites of matter and form, the principle of individuation is designated matter. The reception of the form or essence by designated matter means that each individual (e.g. “Socrates”) cannot include anything common or definable, but rather each

112 De ente et essentia, c. 3; De potentia q. 9, a. 1; ST I, q. 75, a. 5.  
113 De ente et essentia, c. 3. See Lonergan, Verbum, 162.  
114 In III De anima lect. 13, no. 713.
individual includes something beside essence. An individual composite includes an individuated essence with individuating material conditions.\footnote{De potentia q. 9, a. 2 ad 1. See also Lawrence Dewan, “The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 63 (1999), 403-24.}

2b) On the other hand, whenever it exists in the soul (e.g. ‘animal,’ ‘man’), the nature exists according to a universal mode (e.g. genus, species).\footnote{De veritate q. 8, a. 11 ad 7: “universale habeat esse in intellectu” (Leon. 22/2.257:292-295).} To speak in this way is not to speak of the content of the intellect’s concept: that content is the nature absolutely considered, described just above. Here, we are instead concerned with the concept itself as something inhering in the intellect. This concept, an existent form in the mind, can be considered under an intention of universality (intentioni universalitatis).\footnote{In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2.}

By reflecting on an apprehended common nature, the intellect knows how that nature is known, namely as a likeness of many things, just as animal is known as a likeness of man, mouse, and whale.\footnote{ST I-II q. 29, a. 6; ST I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2; In II De anima., lect. 12, no. 378; In I Perierm. lect. 10, no. 9.} Such a reflection constitutes an intention of universality. The intellect refers or relates the apprehended nature to things existing outside the soul, and by comparison the intellect understands the apprehended nature under a certain universal intention (e.g. genus). The intellect apprehends as one (ut unum) that in which all singulars or subclasses (inferiora) agree.\footnote{In X Meta. lect. 1, no. 1930: “Sed intellectus apprehendit ut unum id in quo omnia inferiora conveniant. Et sic in apprehensione intellectus, species fit indivisibilis, quae realiter est diversa in diversis individuis” (Marietti ed., 18.462). The phrase “intention of universality” (intentionem universalitatis) is Thomas’s own. See for instance In I Sent. d. 39, q. 2, a. 2; ST I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2; ST I, q. 85, a. 3 ad 1 & 4; ST I-II, q. 29, a. 6; In VII Meta. lect. 13, no. 1570. “When the intellect compares this nature to the real external things, it forms a relation, and this relation is the intention of universality which it attributes to the nature as known.” See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 172. Schmidt explains the notion on pp. 177-201. Schmidt also distinguishes between a formal and a material universal:}

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immaterialized and abstract, but it is only the essence existing in the intellect that is formally a universal because the mind considers it as such through the intention of universality.\textsuperscript{120}

Thomas makes use of this meaning of (formal) universal to counter Averroes’s argument for a separate and unique intellect in all men. According to Thomas’s rendition, Averroes argues that the universality of the apprehended form shows that there is one unique intellect for all knowers. Thomas argues against this view by stating that the “intellectually grasped form (of the whole) has its universality not according to the existence that it has in the intellect, but according as it is related to real things as a likeness of them.”\textsuperscript{121} Universality springs from the recognition that one is common to many. The intellect forms intentions (e.g. ‘universal,’ ‘species’) about the understood nature by collating that nature to things outside the soul, so one attributes universality to the nature, ‘feline,’ because of the likeness of that nature to real things such as cats, bobcats, and leopards. The apprehended nature is then, because of this universality, able to be predicated of many things.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{120} Thomas does recognize that the common nature or essence considered absolutely can in some sense be called “universal,” but that point is not at issue here. \textit{In \textit{VII Meta. lect. 13, no. 1570}}: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. \textit{Uno modo} pro ipsa natura, cui intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis: et sic universalia, ut genera et species, substantias rerum significant, ut praedicantur in quid. Animal enim significat substantiam eius, de quo praedicatur, et homo similiter. \textit{Alio modo} potest accipi universale inquantum est universale, et secundum quod natura praedicta subest intentioni universalitatis: idest secundum quod consideratur animal vel homo, ut unum in multis. Et sic posuerunt Platonici animal et hominem in sua universalitate esse substantias” (Marietti ed., 18.378). See also \textit{ST I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2}; \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2; \textit{De potentia} q. 5, a. 9 ad 16; \textit{ST I, q. 79, a. 6}; \textit{In \textit{VII Meta. lect. 7, no. 1428}; Quodl. 8, q. 1, a. 1}. The \textit{De potentia} article lists three senses of universal, one of which is in the respect in which it is in the individual.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 3, no. 61: “Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris in III de anima, qui uoluit ex uniueralitate formae intellecte unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere; quia non est uniuersalitas illius forme secundum hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum” (Leon. 43.375:107-113). See also \textit{ST I, q. 79, a. 5 ad 2}.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{In \textit{Periern}} lect. 10, no. 9.
The intellect first grasps the common nature upon abstraction of the intelligible species from the phantasm, and so it is in this apprehended nature that one knows the real external thing. For Thomas, this apprehended nature has an immediate foundation in the real. When the intellect considers this same nature as an intention, then by its very function as an intention (intentio) the nature points to something else, namely either to the phantasm or to the mode of abstraction. Either the intellect reflects upon the phantasm (from which the nature came) and thereby knows the singular in which the nature is really found, or the intellect reflects upon the abstractive mode of knowing in which case the intellect knows the nature as applicable to many. The latter reflection yields logical intentions. To know ‘animal’ as a genus, for instance, means to know ‘animal’ in relation to the mind’s abstractive mode of knowing ‘animal’ as one in many types of animals. Genus is a predicate describing the mental order of things such as between man and animal.

These logical intentions somehow correspond (respondet) to real things. Something real corresponds immediately when one conceives the notion of a thing existing outside the intellect (e.g. man, stone) as a first intention, and some thing real corresponds medially when one conceives the idea of a thing upon reflection of the intellect’s own mode of knowing as a second intention. Logical intentions fall under the latter type of correspondence. To use Thomas’s own example: “the intellect understands animal nature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and

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123 In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.
124 SCG II, 96. I shall discuss this topic in terms of first and second act of the mind below. “The composing of the intellect’s second operation is its reflective reintegration of its knowledge of a commonality with its knowledge of an instance from which it drew the commonality.” See Knasas, Being and Some, 122.
consequently it understands that nature as a genus.”¹²⁵ It takes experience to be able to reflect upon a mode of understanding a concept because one must have many similar concepts of real things. In this example of animal nature, for instance, many species of animals are collected by the intellect. The intellect must move from one apprehended thing to another in a discursive process (e.g. ‘canine nature’; ‘human nature’; ‘equine nature’) to consider them under a common nature (e.g. ‘animal nature’), yet the intellect must further reflect upon this process of comparison in order to be able to consider the relation that this first intention or common nature (genus) has to less common natures (species). It must realize or discover the relation between these concepts.

Second intentions originate from this reflection upon first intentions. The first intention (apprehended nature) exists in the intellect abstracted from all that individuates, so it has a uniform notion toward all individuals outside the soul. For instance, human nature is a uniform notion insofar as it is equally a likeness of all individual men and insofar as it leads to a knowledge of all men as men. The intellect can reflect upon this fact. It reflects upon such a rationate relation to all individuals and discovers (adinvenit) and attributes the notion of species to the apprehended nature because of it. Once the intellect sees the relation that the first intention has with other first intentions, then it devises an understanding through a second intention (the

¹²⁵ De potentia q. 1, a. 1 ad 10: “Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo mediate, quando videlicet alicuius sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum considerat illud. Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, id est mediante intelligentia rei: verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis alis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit eam ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res” (Marietti ed., 11.10).
intention of universality) of that rationate relation as a formal universal. In sum, this universal has an immediate foundation in the apprehended nature.\textsuperscript{126}

4. Knowing through Composition and Division

4.1 Essence and Predication

These two types of universals, the common nature and the logical intention, have an important role to play in predication. On the one hand, the common nature is the substance of a thing and is predicated quidditatively. On the other hand, the concept taken insofar as it is universal represents the nature predicated of a thing as it falls under the intention of universality.\textsuperscript{127}

Predicability belongs to the universal as universal. It belongs to the notion of a universal to be predicable, of course, because the intellect considers a certain nature such as man without regard for how it is in this individual mode of being (e.g. Socrates). The formal universal, i.e., the universal as the concept in the mind, is one outside of many.\textsuperscript{128} Against the Platonists, one might state that a universal cannot be a substance because a universal is common to individuals: “something is called a universal when it belongs by nature to be in \textit{inesse} many things and to be predicated of \textit{praedicari} many things.”\textsuperscript{129} I wish to explain what Thomas means by stating that which is a genus belongs by nature to exist in and be said of many.

\textsuperscript{126} De veritate, q.10, a. 5; q. 2, a. 6; De potentia q. 1, a. 1 ad 10. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 185-194.

\textsuperscript{127} In VII Met., 13, no. 1570.

\textsuperscript{128} De ente et essentia, c. 3, no. 64; In II Post. an., lect. 20, no. 11.

\textsuperscript{129} In VII Meta. lect. 13, no. 1572; In I Perierm. lect. 10, no. 7.
Formal universals are predicable by definition, and a formal universal can be a species, but from that it does not follow that one can say, for example, “Socrates is a species.” I think it is important to understand why, because the explanation shows the way in which Thomas’s theory of predication is a realistic theory, one that is based on apprehended (common) natures. To that end we turn to Thomas’s most clear statement:

[B]ecause it belongs to human nature absolutely considered to be predicated of Socrates, and because the notion of the species does not belong to it absolutely considered, but is rather among the accidents that follow upon it according to the being (esse) it has in the intellect, one can see why the word “species” is not predicated of Socrates, that is, why it is not said that “Socrates is a species.” This would of necessity be said if the notion of the species belonged to man according to the existence that man has in Socrates; or, if the notion of the species belonged to man absolutely considered, that is, to man as man, for whatever belongs to man as man is predicated of Socrates.130

What does this citation mean for us? Strictly speaking, predicate-terms are predicated of subject-terms. We shall follow Thomas’s language, which takes “what is predicated” to mean that which the predicate-term signifies. What (quod) is predicated of a designated singular is not the notion of the genus; rather, what is predicated of a designated singular is that to which the notion of genus belongs (convenit ratio generis), namely that which is a genus—the common nature. That to which the notion of a universal belongs, Thomas states, is the essence in itself (or common nature). 131 In other words, what the predicate-term signifies is the common nature.

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130 De ente et essentia, c. 3: “Et quia nature humane secundum suam absolutam considerationem conuenit quod praedicetur de Sorte, et ratio speciei non conuenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem sed est de accidentibus que consequuntur eam secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non predicatur de Sorte ut dicatur: Socrates est species: quod de necessitate accideret si ratio speciei conueniret homini secundum esse, quod habet in Sorte, uel secundum suam considerationem absolutam, scilicet in quantum est homo; quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo predicatur de Sorte” (Leon. 43.375:120-132).

131 I am stating the resolution to the problem in the simplest of terms. For an exposition, see Gyula Klima, “Socrates est species”: Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Treatment of a Paralogism” in Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Brill: Leiden, 1993), 489-504.
Another way of putting Thomas’s explanation of predication is that to say “genus is a predicable” is to say that to which genus belongs is what is predicable because the genus is an intention of universality formed by the mind’s consideration of a common nature (essence in itself). The genus is the common nature considered in its mode of being in the mind. In the proposition, “Socrates is an animal,” “animal” signifies that to which the notion of genus belongs. One can predicate ‘that which is a genus’ (first intention, material universal) of an individual, but one cannot predicate ‘what it is to be a genus’ (second intention, formal universal). This factor is important because, as we shall see in chapter four, concretive predications of an individual necessarily entail an essence with an immediate foundation in reality, namely a common nature. They cannot be about what is in the mind alone.

Furthermore, second or logical intentions belong to essence in itself taken as a whole (e.g. ‘man’), not to essence in itself taken as a part (e.g. ‘humanity’). They do not expressly exclude anything that belongs to the whole; they express the whole under a universal aspect. Genus expresses the whole nature that belongs to, for instance, an animal as something comprising many. The essence that signifies as a part cannot be a genus (or a species, or a specific difference) because logical intentions belong to that which is predicable of an individual and only the essence that signifies as a whole is predicable of an individual. Socrates is an animal, but he is not animality. Unlike the concept of animal, animality expressly excludes individual matter in abstraction with precision, so it is not a genus, but a principle of a genus. For the same reason, rationality is not a difference, but a principle of a difference. In corporeal

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132 De ente et essentia, c. 3. See Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 18-19, 128.
133 Ibid.
substances, rationality belongs to an essence that explicitly excludes designated matter, and the specific difference belongs to an essence that does not explicitly exclude designated matter. Whereas rationality belongs to the essence taken as a part, specific difference (e.g. ‘rational’) belongs to the essence taken as a whole.\textsuperscript{134}

What is predicated of an individual is the common nature or essence in itself taken as a whole. Nothing outside of essence in itself, that is, nothing outside of the notion of essence, is predicated of an individual. To predicate anything outside the notion of essence, outside the immediate signification of the predicate, would be to predicate something extraneous to the individual. It does not belong to essence of man to be white or black, one or many, or inside or outside time. If it belonged to the notion of essence to be many, for instance, one might predicate ‘many’ of Socrates.\textsuperscript{135} These attributes (e.g. white/black, one/many, in time/out of time) can be predicated of the individual, of course, but they cannot be predicated (of finite beings) in an essential way because those attributes do not belong to the essence as such. Man is called white because whiteness or white happens (\textit{accidit}) to him, not because he is the essence of white or whiteness.\textsuperscript{136} In this accidental mode of predication, the accident is predicated \textit{of a subject}. In the proposition “Socrates is musical,” the musical befalls (\textit{accidit}) Socrates, so it is predicated of him accidentally.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.: “et ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed differentie principium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species nec animalitas genus” (Leon. 43.374:10-13).

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.: “Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Sorte” (Leon. 43.374:41-43). For a similar account of abstraction considering the form of the whole taken as a part (e.g. ‘humanity’), \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2. For the view that time does not belong to human existence \textit{per se}, \textit{ST} I-II, q. 31, a. 2.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{In IV Meta}. lect. 7, no. 628.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{In IV Meta}. lect. 7, no. 630; \textit{In V Meta}. lect. 9 no. 886. Thomas states that accidents are said of (that is, predicated of) substance denominatively. \textit{In VII Meta}. lect. 2, no. 1288; \textit{In IX Meta}. lect. 6, no. 1839-1843.
Something is predicated of another accidentally when essence is considered according to the existence it has in this or in that: the reason why man is white is found in Socrates’s individual mode of existence. To be white does not belong to man as man. When one predicates ‘white’ of Socrates, one immediately signifies that the essence of the predicate (whiteness) inheres in the supposit of the subject. The essence in itself that is predicated neither actually exists nor actually inheres in a subject, of course, because everything in Socrates is actually individuated. Nevertheless, in the metaphysics of Thomas, that which is immediately individuated and predicated is the essence in itself, the common nature. In predication, external words (e.g. “stone”) signify the understood thing (e.g. stone) through the medium of an inner word (e.g. ‘stone’). The inner word or understood intention (intentio intellecta) is the term or final product of the intellectual act because it proceeds as an expressed species from the intellect actually understanding. The inner word manifests the common nature. One predicates immediately what is signified by the expressed species and mediately what that signification entails concerning the thing understood.

One cannot predicate of one individual, though, the essence as it exists individually in another thing in an essential manner, for one would then predicate of Socrates the same essence that belongs to Plato. The singular thing cannot be predicated of many. That Socrates is an individual does not mean that the predicate in “Socrates is a man” immediately signifies

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138 De ente et essentia, c. 3, no. 55. See Gyula Klima, “Aquinas’s Theory of the Copula and the Analogy of Being,” Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 5 (2002), 62: “So although we may say that the copula, insofar as it signifies existence, expresses the inherence of the individualized forms ultimately signified by the predicate in the supposita of the subject, . . . nevertheless, it does so by joining the nature immediately signified by the predicate, in abstraction from its individuating conditions.”

139 In X Meta, lect. 1, no. 1930: “Numero quidem indivisibile est ipsum singulare, quod non potest praedicari de multis” (Marietti ed., 18.462).
something individual regarding the essence in Socrates because the essence in itself does not make a substance individual. ‘Essence’ in itself (e.g. ‘man’), which is predicated of Socrates, expresses only what belongs to that essence considered absolutely, and that essence considered absolutely abstracts from every being (\textit{a quolibet esse}) whether individual or notional.\footnote{De ente et essentia, c. 3: “Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum” (Leon. 43.374:68-70).} In “Socrates is an animal,” the intellect grasps something in nature that is common to other things in nature, so “animal” signifies some common nature without any existence but with a foundation in reality.

\section*{4.2 Realism and Predication}

The predicate signifies something, then, with an immediate foundation in the real thing. Predication is “something achieved by the combining and dividing activity of the intellect, and which,” Thomas states, “has for its foundation in the real thing the union of those things, one of which is said of another.”\footnote{De ente et essentia, c. 2: “Predicatio enim est quiddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et diuidentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur” (Leon. 43.375:134-138).} In the first operation of the intellect, the intellect understands man and animal as they are in themselves, as two distinct objects. It understands them successively by two simple conceptions without forming an affirmation or a negation from them. In the second operation, the intellect combines or separates these simple conceptions. It understands them both as one thing (or as separate things), meaning that the intellect understands the whole and its parts as composed in a single entity (or divided into separate entities), just as one might take the modern notions of ‘society,’ ‘resources,’ and ‘scarcity’ together to understand the complex
notion of economics as meaning the way society exists among scarce resources. It is not that two or three concepts become one. It is rather that the intelligibilities contained in each concept merge through a “coalescence of insights” and form one object of understanding through the composition of concepts, namely through the composition of predicates that make up a “quasi-formal” part of a proposition and a subject that makes up a material part of a proposition. The predicate determines the subject. The predicate and a subject are understood together insofar as they are included in one judgment, that is, the intellect holds a complex concept made up of subject and predicate, and the intellect simultaneously recognizes the unity realized in the foundation of the composition or division insofar as the intelligibility signified by the predicate inheres in the intelligibility signified by the subject.

Composition in things includes compositions such as form in matter (e.g. soul in body) and accident in substance (e.g. white in Socrates), and composition in the mind includes a judgment that such a composition in things is true or not true (e.g. “Socrates is white” is true, “Socrates is not white” is false). The former is the cause of the latter. The real composition of white in Socrates does not exist because one judges ‘Socrates is white,’ but rather one correctly judges that ‘Socrates is white’ because of the real composition of white in Socrates. The disposition of the thing is the ultimate cause of truth. This causation is not immediate, however, for truth follows being as mediated by the external senses, the inner senses, and the

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142 In I In Perierm, lect. 10: “predicatum est quasi pars formalis enunciationis, subjectum autem est pars materialis ipsius” (Leon. 1*/1.55:433-435). See also In III De anima, lect. 11, no. 749. The expression, “coalescence of insights,” is Lonergan’s. See his Verbum, 65.

143 In VI Meta., lect. 4, no. 1229; SCG I, 36. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 231.

intellectual operations of insight into phantasms and reasoning toward simple apprehension.

When the intellect arrives at the definition of a thing in the first act of simple apprehension (e.g. mortal rational animal), the intellect is still incomplete because the definition may not be true. We must join this definition of the subject in the intellect’s second act (e.g. man is a mortal rational animal), and then we must judge whether this composition in the mind conforms with the real thing.\textsuperscript{145}

It is here that a type of reflexion on the singular thing takes place. Among intellectual operations, man can only consider the singular thing in the second act of the mind because the principle of singularity, designated matter, adds to quiddity to make a quiddity-in-an-individual, and that is a complex concept.\textsuperscript{146} The possible intellect reflexively turns back onto the individual likeness re-presented by the phantasm’s determinate dimensions to mark some common nature as individuated, and it must compose (or divide) the apprehended quiddity as belonging (or not belonging) to this or that likeness of an individual. This activity results in a judgment such as “Socrates is a man.” Sometimes to be (\textit{esse}) is the same as the act of being (\textit{actus entis}), and sometimes it signifies the composition of a proposition, and this latter way signifies the act of an intellect.\textsuperscript{147} The “to be” that signifies the truth of “Socrates is man” is a copula.\textsuperscript{148} One can state with Thomas, then, that the second act regards the \textit{esse} of the thing insofar as the mind

\begin{footnotesize}\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{145}] \textit{In VI Meta}, lect. 6, no. 1236; \textit{In Perierrm}, lect. 3, no. 9. See Lonergan, \textit{Verbum}, 63. Garceau notes that this passage is the only one that describes this judgment as a reflexive act. He finds the description of the structure of judgment by way of composition most aptly stated in \textit{SCG I}, 59. See Garceau, \textit{Judicium}, 274. For truth as conformity of intellect with thing, \textit{De veritate} q. 1, a. 1; \textit{ST} I, q. 16, a. 1.
\item[\textsuperscript{147}] \textit{Quodl.} XII, q. 1 ad 1.
\item[\textsuperscript{148}] \textit{In I Sent.} d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1; \textit{In III Sent.} d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; \textit{Quodl.} XII, q. 2, a. 2.
\end{enumerate}\end{footnotesize}
(re)composes or reintegrates the abstracted intelligibility (e.g. human nature) with an individual thing (e.g. Socrates) through a copula.\textsuperscript{149}

In sum, in this chapter, we discussed how “truth and falsity found in speech and in thought must be traced to a thing’s disposition as their cause.”\textsuperscript{150} We started with the thing’s disposition, including its determinate dimensions, as causing a likeness upon our passive sense-powers, which form an image or phantasm. This phantasm expresses the thing’s likeness. The phantasm and the agent intellect themselves cause an intelligible likeness (“species”) of things so that man (with his possible intellect) apprehends it intellectually through a common nature and forms propositions by predicating that common nature. We have seen, in other words, the cognitive framework for predication. What we should do now is consider the proportional likeness between this cognitive framework (the human mode of knowing) and the mode of being. To that end, we turn to the metaphysical framework for predication.

\textsuperscript{149} ST I. q. 86, a. 1; SCG II, 96. See also Putallaz, \textit{Le sens de la réflexion}, 118-123; Klubertanz, “St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular,” 133-166.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{In IX Meta}. lect. 11, no. 1898: “Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam” (Marietti ed., 18.456).
In this chapter, I investigate how Thomas views the real foundation that rationate beings have in things. The “whole of logic” seems to be about being signified as true and non-being signified as false, and truth and falsity are primarily and principally in the mind formed by a mental combination and separation. Yet knowledge of this sense of being and non-being in the mind results from the likeness of thing known in the knower.¹ The subject of logic, that is, arises from the subject of metaphysics. With rationate being (ens rationis) as its proper subject, logic studies intentions that are equal in extension to the proper subject of metaphysics (ens commune), which is being outside the soul (ens naturae).

In short, for Thomas, the mode of predicating that logic studies “flows” (consequitur) from the mode of being that metaphysics studies.² To make sense of this proportional relationship, for Thomas, I discuss the primary division of being into essential and accidental being, and their discovery by the metaphysician through per se and per accidens predication. I then discuss two modes of essential being (ens per se) identified by Thomas and their relationship to one another: 1) being as divided by the ten categories and 2) being as signified in the composition of a proposition.³ I finish with a discussion of several types of predication, including predication by essence (per essentiam), by participation (per participationem) and by

¹ In VI Meta, lect. 4, nos. 1233-1234.
² In V Meta, lect. 9, no. 890: “Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia “quoties ens dicitur,” idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse” (Marietti ed., 18.238). See also In III Phys. lect. 5, no. 322.
³ Thomas also identifies a third mode of per se being as divided into act and potency. ST I, q. 77, a. 1; DV q. 8, a. 9; In V Meta, lect. 9, no. 897.
denomination (denominative). This discussion will prepare us for analyzing in chapter four specific cases where Thomas employs the method of predication.

1.0 Essential and Accidental Being

In Bk V of Thomas’s Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Thomas begins his discussion of the term “being” (ens) by stating that the Philosopher first distinguishes being into essential being (ens per se) and accidental being (ens per accidens). Thomas clarifies that this division is not the same as the division of essential being into substance and accident:

Being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense; for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental being, in the sense in which it is taken here, must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; and this comparison is signified by the term “is” when, for example, it is said that “the man is white.” Hence this whole “the man is white” is an accidental being.

Thomas’s point is that the division of being into essential being and accidental being, that is, between what is essential to being and what is accidental to it, logically precedes the division of essential being’s ten predicaments (substance, quantity, quality, etc.).

We can recognize this division between the *per se* (essential) and *per accidens* (accidental) being, Thomas explains, on account of the fact that we predicate one thing of another either *per se* (on account of itself) or *per accidens* (not on account of itself). In the order

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4 *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 885: “Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidentis, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidentis prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus, est ens per accidentis” (Marietti ed., 18.234-237).

5 *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 885: “Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidentis, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidentis. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidentis attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens” (Marietti ed., 18.237-238).
of discovery, according to Thomas, as the philosopher aspires to know about his at first confused notion of being, he comes upon the division of being into essential and accidental being, and he finds this initial division through the way he speaks about things, that is to say, on account of one thing being predicated of another either through itself (*per se*) or not through itself (*per accidens*).⁶

If we explore the reasons for this methodology, namely that the way we predicate derives from the way things are, then we will better grasp what Thomas means when he states that “logic is ordered to obtaining a knowledge about things.”⁷ Thomas expands upon the distinction between the essential and accidental in two passages, Bk V (lect. 19) of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and Bk I (lect. 10) of the Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*. We shall focus on the latter, more complete account and point to some major differences in the former account.⁸

1.1 *Per Se* Predication

The word “*per*” here in *per se* predication, as Thomas explains in his Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, indicates a causal relationship or order between the predicate and the subject. What we are after, then, in following his methodology is identifying the order between

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⁶ *In I Post. an.*, lect. 13, no. 2; *De potentia* q. 7, a. 8 arg. 6; *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 886: “Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens” (Marietti ed., 238). Essential and accidental predication will show up again (in chapter four) where Thomas defends the unicity of the substantial form. Thomas will argue there that if one defends a plurality of substantial forms, then we would have to predicate differently.

⁷ *In I Peri. erm.*, lect. 2, no. 3: “Sed quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius” (Leon. 1°/1.10:49-52).

⁸ For the discussion on the three modes of *per se* predication, I am relying on *In I Post. an.*, lect. 10 and *In V Meta.* lect. 19, no. 1054-1057.
subject and predicate. In *per se* predication, that ordering signifies a universal cause, so
everything that is predicated *per se* is predicated universally. The essential predicate can be made
about anything included within the notion signified by the subject-term, and it can be made about
the subject-term at any given time. That is why for Thomas “we say that man is animal
essentially, not accidentally, since this is always the case.”

Thomas tells us that the preposition “on account of” (*per*) designates three different
essential causal relationships between what is signified by a subject and its predicate, namely 1)
a formal relationship (e.g. the body lives on account of the soul), 2) a material relationship (e.g.
the body is colored on account of its surface), and 3) an efficient causal relationship (e.g. water is
made hot on account of fire). These three causal relationships are signified with three different
modes of *per se* predication. With Thomas, we shall only call the first mode of *per se*
predication “essential predication” because its predicates are essential-substantial, whereas the
others are accidental.

Thomas explains the first mode of *per se* predication (“*primo modo*”) in this way, “the
first way of saying something *per se* is when that which is attributed to a subject pertains to its

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9 *In VI Meta.*, lect. 2, no. 1185: “Hominem vero per se dicimus esse animal, non per accidens, quia hoc est
semper” (Marietti ed., 18.302-303); *In I Post. an.*, lect. 9: “Nam omne quod per se praedicatur, etiam universaliter
praedicatur” (Leon. 1*/2.37:47-48). For what it means for something to be predicated universally, see the entire
*lectio* 9 in Thomas’s Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*.

10 *In I Post. an.* lect. 10: “Causae autem habitudinem designat, aliquando quidem formalis; sicut cum
dicitur quod corpus vivit per animam. Quandoque autem habitudinem causae materialis; sicut cum dicitur quod
corpus est coloratum per superficiem: quia scilicet proprium subiectum coloris est superficies. Designat etiam
habitudinem causae extrinsecae et praecipue efficientis; sicut cum dicitur quod aqua calescit per ignem” (Leon.
1*/2.38:11-39:19).

11 *In V Meta.* lect. 7 no. 847; *In I Post. an.* lect. 31 no. 13; *In I Peri. erm.* lect. 5, no. 9.
form.”¹² According to the first mode of per se predication, which signifies according to formal causality, the predicate signifies something that is either all of a subject’s definition or just part of the subject’s definition. Thomas’s example is the concept of a line in the definition of triangle. If we define triangle as “a plane figure with three straight lines and three angles,” then “has a line” in “the triangle has a line” signifies something that is part of the definition of the subject because it is causally related to the subject in a formal way. Thomas adds that this element signifies what is in the subject obliquely as opposed to directly (in recto). We might add, as another example, “man is a body” or “man is a soul.” For Thomas, man is neither merely his body, nor is man merely his soul, but both soul and body are formal determinations of man and signify, however obliquely, a part of man’s definition.

To use another example that Thomas gives in the Commentary on the Metaphysics, one cannot understand Callias insofar as he is a man without understanding animal. In “Callias is an animal,” “animal” signifies something in the definition of the subject, and it is causally related to the subject in a formal way because “is an animal” signifies the essence of the subject. We might add here that when the predicate signifies the definition of the subject, what is signified is not an integral part (e.g. finger), nor a subjective part (e.g. Callias), but it is rather a universal whole (e.g. animal) of the subject (e.g. Callias). This universal whole can either be signified as a genus (e.g. animal), the specific difference (e.g. rational), or it can be signified as both the genus and

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¹² In I Post. an. lect. 10: “Primus ergo modus dicendi per se est, quando id, quod attribuitur alicui, pertinet ad formam eius. Et quia definitio significat formam et essenciam rei, primus modus eius quod est per se est, quando predicatur de aliquo diffinitio uel aliqua in diffinitione positum” (Leon. 1 */2.39:25-30).
the specific difference (e.g. rational animal).  

In the second mode of *per se* predication (“secundo modo”), which signifies according to material causality, the subject-term signifies something that is entirely or partly in the definition of the predicate as “its proper matter and subject” (*propria materia et proprium*), that is, “when the subject is mentioned in the definition of the predicate, which is a proper accident of the subject (*proprium accidens*).” The subject’s definition can be *entirely* in the definition of the predicate in these examples that Thomas gives: “number” in the statement “number is odd” signifies something that is wholly in the definition of odd, and “line” in the statement “the line is curved” signifies something that is wholly in the definition of curved. Thomas does not mean that all numbers are odd nor that all lines are curved. Rather, the signification of each predicate (“is odd” and “is curved”) is attributed to something that is its proper matter and its proper subject (number and line). We shall explore this question below.

In the second *per se* mode of predication, the subject’s definition can instead be *partly* in the definition of the predicate. One example Thomas gives in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is “man is alive.” In this second mode of *per se* predication, the subject of the accident of life (namely the soul) is some part of the subject of the predication (man), for the soul

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13 In his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Thomas states that the first *per se* mode of predication outlined in the Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* corresponds to the first sense of *per se* in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (*In V Meta*. lect. 19, no. 1054) where he gives a different example: “sicut Callias est animal secundum se. Animal enim inest in ratione Calliae. Nam Callias est quoddam animal; et ponetur in eius definitione, si singularem definitionem habere possent. . . . Est enim hic primus modus per se, qui ponitur in libro posteriorum” (Marietti ed. 18.274). For Thomas’s division of wholes and parts into universal, integral, and potential, *In III Sent*. d. 33, q. 3, a. 1 qc. 1.

14 In *I Post. an*. lect. 10: “Secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando haec praepositio ‘per’ designat habitudinem causae materialis, prout scilicet id, cui aliquid attribuitur, est propria materia et proprium subjectum ipsius. . . . Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando subjectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius” (Leon. 1*/2.39:51-67). I shall explain below what Thomas means by “proper accident” in this context.
is an integral part of man: “a man is said to be alive in himself because part of him, namely, the soul, is the first subject of life.”

By “to be alive” (vivens), we should read Thomas as referring to an activity of the soul rather than something belonging to the definition of man. Another example Thomas might give is “man is risibile.” In this second mode of per se predication, the subject of the accident of risibility (namely reason) is some part of the subject of the predication (man), for the human power of reason is an integral part of man.

At this point, we might question Thomas’s description of the second mode of per se predication. Thomas describes what is signified by the predicate in the second mode of per se predication as a proper accident (proprium accidens) of the subject, but the examples he gives are not always proper accidents of the subject. Risibility and life are proper accidents of man, but odd and curved are not proper accidents of number and line respectively. At the end of the same lectio of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Thomas seems to resolve this apparent discrepancy. He states that the predication of a proper accident of its subject can happen in two ways:

Sometimes (this predication of a proper accident of a subject) is pure and simple, as when the accident is interchangeable with its subject, such as “having three angles equal to two right angles” is convertible with triangle, and “risible” with man. Sometimes, two opposites stated disjunctively are of necessity in the subject, such as “straight or oblique” in line, and “odd or even” in number. He shows that the reason for this is the fact that

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15 In V Meta. lect. 19, no. 1055: “Secundus modus est, quando aliquid ostenditur esse in aliquo, sicut in primo subiecto, cum inest ei per se. . . . Vel etiam aliqua pars eius; sicut homo dicitur vivens secundum se, quia aliqua pars eius est primum subiectum vitae, scilicet anima. Et hic est secundus modus dicendi per se in posterioribus positus, quando scilicet subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Subiectum enim primum et proprium, ponitur in definitione accidentis proprii” (Marietti ed., 18.274).

16 We shall discuss below under the topic of accidental predication the question of other predicates that signify accidents such as musical and grammatical.
contrariety, privation and contradiction are in the same genus.\(^{17}\)

There can be a predication that is pure and simple (\textit{simpliciter}) when the predicate signifies a proper accident of the subject, and there can be a predication when the predicate signifies an accident that is not a proper accident except in a qualified sense, that is, by implication. That is to say, in the qualified case, the opposite disjunct is sometimes implied. When “is odd” is predicated of “number,” for example, “is odd” implies the negation of “is even,” and so “number is odd” falls under the second mode of \textit{per se} predication because the predicate implies a disjunct that is a proper accident of the subject.

Thomas explains this “in-between” status of \textit{per se} or proper accidents elsewhere when considering the powers of the soul. He tells us that a property is like a substantial predicate (and unlike an accidental predicate) insofar as a property is caused by the essential principles of a species, but it is like an accidental predicate (and unlike an essential predicate) insofar as it is something outside of the essence itself.\(^{18}\) Risibility, for example, is a substantial predicate. On the one hand, the predicate “is risible” in “man is risible” is caused by the essential principles of the species (man): “just as a man is from nature, so also are his proper accidents, such as

\(^{17}\) \textit{In I Post. an.} lect. 10: “Et consequenter ostendit quod huiusmodi scibilia sunt necessaria: quia \textit{non contingit} quin proprium incidens predicetur de subiecto, set hoc est duobus modis: quandoque quidem \textit{simpliciter}, sicut cum unum accidens conuertitur cum subiecto, ut habere tres cum triangulo, et risibile cum homine: quandoque autem duo \textit{opposita} sub disiunctione accepta ex necessitate subiecto insunt, \textit{ut linee aut rectum aut oblicum}, et \textit{numero par aut impar}. Cuius rationem ostendit, quia \textit{contrarium, privatio et contradictio} sunt \textit{in eodem genere} (nam priuatio nihil aliud est quam negatio in subiecto determinato), quandoque etiam \textit{contrarium} equiparatur negationi in aliquo genere, sicut \textit{in numeris} idem est \textit{impar et non par} secundum consequenciam. Sicut ergo \textit{necesse est afirmare uel negare}, \textit{ita necesse est alterum eorum, que per se insunt, proprio subiecto inesse}” (Leon. 1\(^{st}\)/2.41:155-172).

\(^{18}\) \textit{De spiritualibus creaturis}, a. 11: “Quod quidem conuenit cum substantiali predicato, in quantum causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei: et ideo per diffinitionem significantem essentiam demonstratur proprietas de subiecto. Cum accidental uero predicato conuenit in hoc quod nec est essentia rei, nec pars essentiae, set aliquid praeter ipsum; differt autem ab accidentali predicato, quia accidentalis prediciatum non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei, set accidunt individuo sicut proprium speciei, quandoque tamen separabiliter, quandoque inseparabiliter” (Leon. 24/2.120:275-286).
risibility.”¹⁹ On the other hand, the predicate “is risible” in “man is risibile” signifies something “outside the essence of man” (praeter essentiam hominis).²⁰ The property belongs to the thing essentially, not as the essence of the thing, but by way of the definition of the thing. Although property is an essential (per se) predicate logically considered, it is nevertheless also predicated accidentally (accidentaliter) because the predicate is said to inhere in the subject. In this case, something is said to be in the subject rather than of the subject. The existence of the accident depends on its subject as its material cause, so the definition of a proper accident includes its subject.²¹

The third mode that Thomas lists in his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics is not completely relevant to the modes of per se predication because, as Thomas states, the third mode of that which is per se is not a mode of predication but rather a mode of being. We shall nevertheless consider it briefly for the sake of completeness. In this third mode, any term that signifies something particular in the genus of substance (a “this something,” hoc aliquid) and that is not predicated of any subject is said to be existing in itself. For example, “Socrates” or “Plato.” Thomas contrasts this per se mode of being to the mode of being of universals and

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¹⁹ See In VI Meta, lect. 3, no. 1219: “Sed sciemus quid, quod ex eadem causa dependet effectus, et omnia quae sunt per se accidentia illius effectus. Sicut enim homo est a natura, ita et omnia eius per se accidentia, ut risibile, et mentis disciplina susceptibile” (Marietti ed., 18.308). Thomas discusses risibility as a per se accident in these texts, In I Sent, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1; ST I, q. 3, a. 6; ST I-II, q. 2, a. 6; ST III, q. 16 a. 5.

²⁰ De veritate q. 21, a. 1 ad 11: “Ad undecimum dicendum, quod risibile quamvis convertatur cum homine, tamen addit aliquam naturam extraneam super hominem, quae est praeter essentiam hominis; sic autem nihil potest addi super ens, ut dictum est” (Leon. 22/3.595:304-308).

accidents, which can both be predicated of a subject. In his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Thomas states that this mode of being is reduced to the sense in which something is said to be in itself (*per se*) because it belongs to it exclusively as something separate, as a man is said to be by himself (*secundum se*) when he is alone.\(^{22}\)

As to the fourth *per se* mode of predication ("quarto modo"), Thomas explains in his Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* that the preposition "per" signifies a relationship between predicate and subject that is according to extrinsic causality, especially that of efficient causality, as something essentially related yet extrinsic to the subject. Thomas’s example is "the slaughtered thing died." Thomas repeats the same cryptic example later in the same Commentary while discussing the (first figure of the) syllogism where he states that, in this mode of *per se* predication (*unus modus dicendi per se*), the subject is the cause of the predicate.\(^{23}\)

The fact that the subject is the cause of the predicate helps us to understand Thomas’s example: the slaughtering (signified by the subject) causes the death of the animal (signified by the predicate). The relationship between subject and predicate is no mere coincidence but rather

\(^{22}\) *In I Post. an. lect. 10*: "[P]onit alium modum eius, quod est ‘per se’, prout ‘per se’ significat aliquid solitarium: sic enim dicitur ‘per se’ esse aliquid particulare quod est in genere substance quod *non* praedicatur de aliquo subiecto . . . iste modus non est modus predicandi, set modus existendii" (Leon. 1*/2.40:99-119). Thomas reduces the third *per se* mode (of being) in the *Analytics* Commentary to the fourth sense of "in itself" in the *Metaphysics* Commentary: "Quartus modus est, prout illa dicuntur secundum se inesse alicui, quae ei soli inquantum soli insunt. . . . Hic autem secundum se dicitur ratione solitudinis. Nam hoc quod dico secundum se, significat aliquid separatum; sicut dicitur homo secundum se esse, quando solus est. Et ad hunc reducit tertius modus in posterioribus positus" (Marietti ed. 18.275). Incidentally, it seems to me that Thomas’s explanation should be reversed. My reason is that the exclusiveness ("by itselfness") of a particular thing (the fourth sense of the *Metaphysics* Commentary) follows rather from the mode of being of a particular thing (the third sense of the *Analytics* Commentary).

\(^{23}\) *In I Post. an. lect. 26*: "et unus modus dicendi per se est quando subiectum est causa praedicati, ut: ‘Interfectum interiit’, sicut supra dictum est; et hoc competit prime figure, in qua medium subicitur maiori extremitati, ut dictum est" (Leon. 1*/2.94:33-38).
essential, namely as an efficient cause. Thomas opposes that example of *per se* predication with an example of accidental (*per accidens*) predication: “while he was walking, the dawn came.” Whereas the walking subject is not a cause of the sky’s becoming filled with light, the act of slaughtering something is a cause of that same thing’s death, and that is an efficient (agent) cause of its death.

Thomas gives a somewhat clearer variation of the example in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*: “the slain man perished by slaying” (*interfectus interiit propter interfectionem*) and “the cooled thing was made cold or cooled by cooling” (*infrigidatum infriguit vel refriguit propter refrigerium*). In each case the effect is predicated of the cause: the slaughtering is the immediate cause for why the animal died, and the cooling is the immediate cause for why the cooled thing was made cold. In his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Thomas reduces such predications (when an effect is predicated of its cause) to identity statements, “man is man,” presumably because the predicate signifies an effect (slaughtered thing, cooled thing) that is immediate to the cause (slaughtering, cooling). By “reduction” to identity statements, Thomas

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24 *In I Post. an.* lect. 10: “[P]onit quartum modum, secundum quod hce prepositio ‘per’ designat habituidinem cause efficientis ut cuiuscunque alterius <extrinsece>. Et ideo dicit quod quidquid *inest unicuique propter seipsum, per se* dicitur de eo . . . Si vero quod predicatur insit subiecto *propter ipsum, per se* inest, *ut si* dicamus quod *interfectum interiit*: manifestum est enim quod *propter id quod interfecit est*, interiit, et non est accidens quod interfecit interierit” (Leon. 1*/2.40:122-135).

25 *In I Post. an.* lect. 10: “Et ideo dicit quod quidquid *inest unicuique propter se ipsum, per se* dicitur de eo; *quod uero non propter se ipsum* inest alicui, *per accidens* dicitur, sicut cum dico: ‘Hoc ambulante coruscat’ : *Non enim propter id quod ambulat, coruscavit; set hoc dicitur secundum accidens*” (Leon. 1*/2.40:125-131).

26 *In V Meta.* lect. 19, no. 1056: “Et ad hunc modum reductur quartus modus dicendi per se in *Posterioribus* positus, quando effectus praedicatur de causa; ut cum dicitur interfecit interiit propter interfecitionem, vel infrigidatum infriguit vel refriguit propter refrigerium. Unde, licet homo habeat multas causas, sicut animal et bipes, quae sunt causae formales eius; tamen huius propositionis, homo est homo, cum sit immediata, nihil est causa; et propter hoc homo est homo secundum se. Et ad hunc modum reductur quartus modus dicendi per se in posterioribus positus, quando effectus praedicatur de causa” (Marietti ed., 18.275).
must mean that the fourth mode of *per se* predications are not analytical propositions, since the subject and predicate are two different concepts, but rather are based on analytical propositions.

We might wonder whether this fourth essential mode of predication, which designates the relationship to an extrinsic cause, also signifies the relationship of final causality. In his description, Thomas states that according to this mode of the preposition, *per* designates not only a relationship of efficient cause but adds “or of any other” (*vel cuiuscunque alterius*) without an explanation of what “any other” means. We have no immediate indication of what Thomas thinks except that he does state in another context that “the final cause does not cause separately from the agent, for the end is a cause only insofar as it influences the agent.”

Although the context in that passage is not entirely the same (i.e. extrinsic denomination), we might infer from that statement that the role of final causality as an extrinsic cause within the fourth mode (*quarto modo*) of predication is minimal because final causality causes insofar as it influences the agent. The order that the word “*per*” designates in the signification of predicates entailing final causality can be reduced to efficient causality.

1.2 *Per accidens* Predication

Before we explain *per accidens* predication, we should have some understanding of what Thomas thinks of *per accidens* (accidental) being. In contrast to essential being (*ens per se*), which the sciences study, Thomas holds the standard Aristotelian view that no science studies accidental being (*ens per accidens*); rather, this sort of being belongs to the art of the sophist.

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27 *In III Phys.* lect. 3, no. 322: “Causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, inquantum movet agentem. Remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori” (Leon. 2.108).
The reason the sciences do not study accidental being is that (1) accidental being is not truly being, (2) it is only in contingent matters and only in a sporadic way, and (3) it is without (proper) cause and generation. Accidental being is being in name only. The sciences study that which is always the case, and accidental being is only sometimes the case depending on individual circumstances. For example, only sometimes does the pianist practice carpentry and the construction worker heal the sick. This just happens to that.

The discovery of the reality of accidental being takes place on account of one thing being predicated of another accidentally (per accidens). We find Thomas’s most succinct description of per accidens predication in his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. After discussing the first two modes of per se predication, Thomas states,

In each of these subjects that have been mentioned, I say that its accident is in it per se. But those predicates which are neutral, that is, of such a nature as not to be mentioned in the definition of their subjects, nor the subjects in their definition, are accidents, that is, are predicated per accidens: for example, “musician” and “white” are predicated per accidens of animal.

In per se predication, predication regards the proper or specific notion signified by the subject either in such a way that the definition of the predicate is in the subject’s definition (1st mode of

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28 In VI Meta., lect. 2, no. 1179; In VI Meta., lect. 2, no. 1182; In VI Meta., lect. 2, no. 1184; In VI Meta., lect. 3, no. 1201; In VI Meta., lect. 3, no. 1185; In XI Meta., lect. 11; In I Peri. erm., lect. 14.

29 In VI Meta., lect. 2, no. 1177: “Dicit ergo, quod propter hoc quod ens per accidens quodammodo est ens solo nomine” (Marietti ed., 301). In the latter passage, Thomas comments that Aristotle agrees with Plato in assigning the domain of accidental being to sophistry. I am calling that agreement a standard view.

30 In V Meta., lect. 9, no. 887: “constat enim quod hoc esse hoc, idest musicum aedificare, nihil alium significat quam hoc accidere huic, ita est etiam in praedicis modis entis per accidentes” (Marietti ed., 238); De spiritualibus creaturis a. 11: “accidentale praedicatum non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei, sed accidit individuo sicut proprium speciei” (Leon. 24/2.120:282-284).

31 Et ideo subiungit quod, subiecta quae insunt omnibus praemissis accidentibus in ratione dicente quid est, idest in definitione, sicut alicui praedictorum accidentium inest linea, alicui vero numerus, et similliter in alis, unicuique, inquam, ipsorum subiectorum, per se inesse dico suum accidens. Quae vero praedicata neutraliter insunt, idest neque ita quod ponatur in definitione subiectorum, neque subiecta in definitione eorum, sunt accidentia, idest per accidens praedicantur, sicut musicum et album praedicantur de animali per accidens.
per se predicate) or in such a way that the definition of the subject is in the predicate’s definition (2nd mode of per se predicate). Per accidens predicate is the opposite: neither the definition of the accident that is predicated belongs to the subject’s definition, nor does the definition of the subject belong to the predicate’s definition.

For example, the togetherness of musician and Socrates, which is the whole that is musician-Socrates, is accidental being, and we know that this togetherness is accidental because predicating musician of Socrates is per accidens.32 In other words, the definition of the predicate does not belong to the subject’s definition, nor does a part of the definition of the subject belong to the predicate’s definition. In Bk V of his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Thomas describes three different modes of per accidens predicate: 1) an accident is predicated of an accident as the “is” in “the just is musical”; 2) an accident is predicated of a subject as the “is” in “the man is musical”; and 3) a subject is predicated of an accident as the “is” in “the musical is a man.” The happenstance being in each case is a result of a happenstance cause. In other words, in each of these cases of per accidens predicate, the predicate does not belong to the nature of its subject: 1) the just man is not musical insofar as he is just; 2) a man is not musical insofar as he is a man; 3) nor is a musician a man insofar as he is a musician.33

32 In I Peri. erm., lect 14, no. 13: “id quod est per accidens reducitur ad per se, in quantum accidit ei quod est per se, sicut musicum accidit Socrati, et omne accidens alio subiecto per se existenti” (Leon. 1*/1.75.258-261). McInerny, “Notes on Being and Predication,” 247-48.
33 In V Meta., lect. 9, no. 886-888. For further discussion on accidental predicate see the next section below. “Man is a musician” (homo est musicum) and “man is grammatical” (homo est grammaticum) are examples of accidental (per accidens) predicate because the definition of the subject and predicate do not entail one another. I think Thomas considers “musicum” and “grammaticum” as second potencies, that is, as immediate capacities to play music and speak grammatically after instruction in music and grammar. If “musicum” and “grammaticum” were first potencies, that is, the latent capacity at birth for learning music and learning grammar, then I think Thomas would consider these accidents as per se accidents. That is to say, he would consider the predication of those accidents of the subject, man, as falling under the second mode of per se predicate. I am not sure that he would make that case, however, because predicating the ability to learn music and grammar signifies something
In his Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, Thomas outlines just two ways in which something is predicated *per accidens*, and he compares these two types of *per accidens* predications. One is more removed, or more accidental, than the other. He states that something is predicated of another *per accidens* either when an accident is predicated of a subject (e.g. man is white) or when a subject is predicated of an accident (e.g. white is man). In the former type of predication (“man is white”), the predicate signified by “white” does not belong to the specific nature of the subject. The latter type of predication (“white is man”) also includes terms whose definitions do not contain the other, but it also involves a subject term that is itself an accident.\(^34\) The latter type of predication, Thomas states, is even further removed from *per se* predication than the former type.\(^35\)

The reason why the predication of a subject-term (of a metaphysical accident such as “white is man”) is further removed is that the subject-term cannot function on its own. It is predicated by reason of another subject.\(^36\) The subject-term “white” presupposes, for example, another subject-term, such as “Socrates.” The case of the predication of an accident of another accident (“white is musical”) pushes this mode of predication even further away from *per se* predication because even the predicate does not immediately supposit for what might be the...

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\(^{34}\) The word “term” is used technically for any part of speech that may be subjected to the predicate or predicated of the subject in an ordinary categorical proposition. Terms are categorematic words. See Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 188.

\(^{35}\) *In I Post. an.* lect. 31. See also McInerny, “Notes on Being and Predication,” 240.

\(^{36}\) *In I Post. an.* lect. 33.
subject term. To predicate an accident of an accident, in other words, is the focal meaning (*pros hen* equivocal) of *per accidens* predication.

1.3 Complete Being and True Being

We must now turn our attention to two different types of essential being. First, although “man is white” is a case of *per accidens* predication, each of its terms—“man” and “white”—signifies essential being, namely the predicaments substance and quality respectively. According to this type of essential being, “being” signifies ten different predicaments, which Thomas sometimes calls complete being (*ens perfectum*). This type of essential being is real, that is, mind-independent. Second, assuming “man is white” is a true proposition, the copula “is” another type of essential being, namely the truth of a proposition. According to this type of essential being, “being” signifies what Thomas sometimes calls “true being” (*ens verum*). This type of essential being is mental, that is, mind-dependent.\(^\text{37}\) We should explore these two divisions of being, true being (*ens verum*) and complete being (*ens perfectum*), to better grasp Thomas’s insight into the relationship between mind and reality. The proposition, “man is white,” provides us a point of departure.

1) One way of taking the proposition, “man is white,” is to take the predicate as something determining a subject. When we predicate something of a subject as being or inhering

\(^{37}\) *De ente et essentia*, c.1: “Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V Metaphysicae Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem generis, et alter modo quod significat propositionum veritatem” (Leon. 43,369:1-5); *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 889: “Primo distinguat ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum” (Marietti ed., 18,238); *In VI Meta.*, lect. 4, no. 1241: “Deinde cum dicit *quoniam autem* excludit ens verum et ens per accidens a principalis consideracione huius doctrinae; dicens, quod compositio et divisio, in quibus est verum et falsum, est in mente, et non in rebus” (Marietti ed., 18,311). Thomas seems to treat true being (*ens verum*) as equivalent to that which signifies the truth of a proposition (*quod significat propositionum veritatem*).
(inest) in man, and when we predicate it as something flowing from man’s form, then the predicate is a quality of man. The predicate, “is white,” signifies being, and it is essential being insofar as it determines the subject, man. The same can be said of any predicate: insofar as the predicate determinates a subject, the predicate signifies essential being (*ens per se*). I shall elaborate in chapter four how ten different predicaments are derived from being through this method of predication. Suffice it to say that whereas the whole, man is white, is accidental being because of the accidental relationship of the terms, the subject and the predicate taken individually signify complete natures, that is, each is an essential being (substance, quality). In other words, each part of the proposition signifies a mode of being.

2) Another sense of *per se* being appears when we take the “is” in “man is white” as signifying a true composition (e.g. the conception, ‘man is white’), which the intellect makes when it combines and separates a subject with a predicate. Being (*esse*) here signifies the copula, that is, true being. The soul can join a predicate to a subject resulting in some being in the mind (*in mente*) that signifies the truth of a proposition, in contrast to some being or principle of being outside the mind such as the act of an essence (*actum essendi*) or things of nature (*rerum natura*). Although true being is essential being (*ens per se*), it is not essential being in the unqualified sense that is in things (*non circa ens simpliciter per se quod est in rebus*). Thomas explains that complete being is essential being in the proper sense, and he adds that true being is

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38 *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 890: “Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis” (Marietti ed., 18.238).
39 *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 895: “Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod esse et est, significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei” (Marietti ed., 18.239); *In VI Meta.*, lect. 4, no. 1241: “compositio et divisio, in quibus est verum et falsum, est in mente, et non in rebus” (Marietti ed., 18.311). See also *In I Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1; *In I Sent.* d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1; *De potentia* q. 7, a. 2 ad 1; *ST I*, q. 3, a. 4 ad 2; *In VI Meta.*, lect. 4, no. 1231; *ST I* q. 3, a. 4 ad 2.
essential being in only a secondary or derivative sense. The being that falls under the ten predicaments causes truth in the mind through the medium of sense and intellectual powers, and true being derives from the real being that is found in the ten predicaments as an effect derives from its cause.40

Truths of a proposition cover a wide spectrum of beings. Whatever can be called being in the first mode (the ten predicaments) can be according to the second mode (truth of a proposition), and whatever has natural existence in things can be signified by an affirmative proposition. “Color is,” for example, expresses true being, that is, a true thought about color.41 Affirmations and negations express these truths in a proposition: an affirmation expresses true being when it signifies the existence of that which is; a negation expresses true being when it signifies the non-existence of that which is not.42 We can say “it is” or “it is not” regarding anything at all for which we have a categorematic word (noun, adjective, or verb). Some beings, such as negations (e.g. ‘the blackbird is not blue’) and privations (e.g. ‘the bird is blind’), only exist in the mind insofar as the mind forms true propositions about a positive thing.43

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40 In V Meta., lect. 9, no. 896: “Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione” (Marietti ed., 18.239). In VI Meta., lect. 4, no. 1233; In VI Meta., lect. 4, no. 1243: “Et alia ratio est, quia utrumque, scilicet ens verum et ens per accidens, sunt circa aliquid genus entis, non circa ens simpliciter per se quod est in rebus; et non ostendunt aliquam aliam naturam entis existentem extra per se entia” (Marietti ed., 18.311); In VI Meta., lect. 4, no. 1277: “Et ideo illud, quod est ita ens sicut verum in tali compositione consistens, est alterum ab his quae proprie sunt entia, quae sunt res extra animam, quorum unaquaeque est aut quod quid est, idest substantia, aut quale, aut quantum, aut aliquid incomplexum, quod mens copulat vel dividit” (Marietti ed., 18.321). See also De veritate, q. 1, a. 2. See Ralph McInerny, “Notes on Being and Predication,” 251.

41 In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1: “Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum: quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus, potest significari per propositionem affirmativam esse; ut cum dicitur: color est, vel homo est” (Mandonnet ed., 2.872). See Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation, 37.

42 In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; ST I, q. 48, a. 2 ad 2; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2.

43 Regarding the being of futures, De veritate q. 1, a. 5; ST I-II, q. 8, a. 1 ad 3. For Thomas, syncategorematic words (e.g. all, none, with) cannot be true being without categorematic words (e.g. dog, white,
Despite the wide latitude of true being, true being has a foundation in the existence of a thing and cannot add anything apart from positive being, so the scope between true being and the ten predicaments are the same. In Thomas’s own explanation, “the true does not have a wider extension than being,” so “whenever some thing changes, the truth of a proposition changes.” Thomas offers the same explanation in other texts stating that the truth of a proposition changes because properly speaking truth consists in conformity of the mind to the thing understood (res intellecta). This identity of truth does not depend so much on the identity of the thing, but on the identity of the intellect as conformed to the thing.

The cat is one thing in nature, which is substance, but one can say many true things of the cat (animal, living, not black, with fleas). In other words, true being is only limited in its intension by falsity and the principle of non-contradiction. As Thomas states it, the truth of a proposition consists in anything about which one can form a true proposition even if it posits nothing in reality, so it suffices to a truth of a proposition that the whole predicate belong to the

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44 De veritate q. 1, a. 1 ad 7: “quod verum non est in plus quam ens” (Leon. 22/1.7:258-259); In I Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1: “Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod est dictur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae” (Marietti ed., 1.766).

45 In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 3 ad 5: “quando mutatur res, mutatur veritas enuntiationis” (Mandonnet ed., 1.498).

46 In VI Meta., lect. 4, no. 1242: “Illius vero, scilicet entis veri, causa est aliqua passio mentis, idest operatio intellectus componentis et dividentis” (Marietti ed., 18.311) ; De veritate q. 1, a. 6 ad 6: “Ad sextum dicendum, quod identitas veritatis non tantum dependet ex identitate rei, sed ex identitate intellectus, sicut et identitas effectus dependet ex identitate agentis et patientis” (Leon. 22.1.25:208-212). See also In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 3 ad 5; De veritate q. 1, a. 6; ad 2; ST I, q. 16, a. 7 ad 4; ST I, q. 16, a. 8 ad 3. I discuss the issue of truth of a proposition in light of accidental beings below.
subject. Propositions about accidental being can also signify true being. To take an example given by Thomas, the “white is musical” is an accidental being and as such signifies no defined thing. It has no unity of itself because the relation of musical to white is coincidental, not essential, yet the intellect forms one enunciation by composing white and musical (‘white is musical’).

To recapitulate, then, the ten predicaments classify all of being in general, yet that classification as such does not account for the blending of these predicaments. Some composition or blending made by the mind is necessary to know things. When that blending is essential, what is signified is something essential. When that blending is accidental, what is signified is something accidental. In both cases, what is signified is primarily extramental. We must predicate in order to understand accidental being because our mode of understanding requires it. The intellect has to compose or join a predicate and a subject in the mind in order to understand composition in things.

1.4 Mental Being and Extra-Mental Being

In this section, I would like to examine whether there are any rationate beings that are

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47 In III Sent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ad 6: “quia ad veritatem propositionis sufficit quod praedicatum conveniat subjecto. . . . ad veritatem propositionis exigitur quod totum quod est in praedicato, conveniat subjecto” (Mandonnet ed., 3.379); De ente et essentia c. 1: “Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat” (Leon. 43.369:5-8). For three necessary conditions of a contradiction, In I Peri. erm., lect. 9, no. 8.

48 In I Peri. erm., lect. 8, no. 11: “non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem prolationis servari in his, quae non sunt simpliciter unum, sed per accident; ut si dicam, homo albus musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utroque, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subjectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter” (Leon. 1*/1.41:167-42:179).
also accidental beings. To that end, I discuss nonbeing’s foundation in reality, which will help us to understand how Thomas thinks that truths of a proposition about accidental nonbeings remain essential beings (1.4.1). I shall then show how Thomas would most likely state that falsehoods are not only rationate beings but accidental beings as well (1.4.2).

1.4.1 The Truth of Propositions about Nonbeing

Thomas makes two different claims about nonbeing. In his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, he states that nonbeings such as privations and negations exist only in reason (*tantum in ratione*). In *De veritate*, however, Thomas states that nonbeing is “outside the soul” (*extra animam*). How can Thomas hold nonbeing to be both outside the soul and yet only in reason? Thomas must mean by *real* nonbeing in *De veritate* that, although nonbeing does not *exist* outside the soul, there is a foundation for nonbeing outside the soul. Nonbeings are mind-dependent being (*esse*), but the mind depends on things outside the soul to understand nonbeing. Thomas even states that nonbeing affects the intellect in this way: The foundation for these nonbeings causes the intellect to form propositions about nonbeing as an extrinsic formal cause, that is, as a “quasi-exemplary cause.”

49 In IV Meta., lect. 1, no. 540: Scieendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci. Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negotiatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid” (Marietti ed., 18.152); In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1: “nec tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura” (Mandonnet ed., 2.872).

50 De veritate q. 1, a. 5 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod extra animam duo invenimus, scilicet rem ipsam, et negationes et privationes rei” (Leon. 22.1.19:269-271); De veritate q. 1, a. 8: “Sed negationes vel privationes existentes extra animam non habent aliquam formam per quam vel imitentur exemplar artis divinae vel ingerant sui notitiam in intellectu humano” (Leon. 22.1.27:115-119).

51 For Thomas’s statement that nonbeing is an exemplary cause of the truth of a proposition, De veritate q. 1, a. 8 ad 6: “Ad sextum dicendum, quod non esse non est causa veritatis propositionum negativarum quasi faciens eas in intellectu; sed ipsa anima hoc facit conformans se non enti, quod est extra animam; unde non esse extra animam existens, non est causa efficiens veritatis in anima, sed quasi exemplaris” (Leon. 22.1.28:195-202). As
To understand the derivative nature of nonbeing or the fact that nonbeing has a foundation in things, we might turn to Thomas’s focused treatment of evil. To the question regarding whether evil exists, Thomas responds that both experience and argument show that “we can absolutely say that evil exists in the universe.” Evil exists as something signified by the truth of a proposition; something real corresponds to the mind’s grasp of evil’s existence. In an objection to his own view that evil exists, Thomas prepares an answer that helps explain the foundation of evil. Thomas formulates the objection this way:

\[E\]verything that is said to be \[esse\] must be either rationate being \[ens rationis\] or real being \[ens naturae\], and everything that is a rationate being must either be existing or non-existing. Therefore, that which is neither existing nor non-existing can in no way be said to be. But evil is far removed from an existing thing and even more far removed from a non-existing thing, as Dionysius states. Therefore in no way can evil be said to be.\textsuperscript{53}

Thomas responds to the objection in this way:

Dionysius understands non existence as that which in no way is, and evil is certainly more distant from this than from an existing thing. The reason is that \textit{evil is nevertheless in the subject of an existing thing}, albeit evil itself is not existing. From a non-existing thing, however, evil is even more removed, for absolutely speaking non-existence cannot be the privation of a subject, nor can that same privation be non-existing absolutely, but \textit{it is non-existing in this, for privation is a negation in a subject. . . .} Blindness is nothing

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Ralph McInerny notes, “non-being extra animam founds the truth of a proposition.” See his “Notes on Being and Predication,” 250, no. 2. For detailed discussion, see Gloria Wasserman, “Thomas Aquinas on Truths about Nonbeings,” \textit{Proceedings of the ACPA} 80 (2007), 101-113, esp. 106-107. Schmidt summarizes the point this way: “real non-being becomes rationate being by being thought, deriving its existence and its actual intelligibility from the operation of the intellect.” See his \textit{The Domain of Logic}, 79. God is the cause of \textit{esse rationis} of privations insofar as God causes all \textit{esse} (\textit{In II Sent. d. 37, q.1, a. 2, ad 3}), yet there are no divine ideas of privation except insofar as privation is the negation of a definite subject (\textit{De veritate} q. 3, a. 4 ad 7). See also Gregory T. Doolan, \textit{Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes} (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington DC, 2008), 137.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1}: “Sic ergo accipiendo ens secundo modo dictum, prout quaestio quaerebat, simpliciter dicimus mala esse in universo. Hoc enim et experientia docet, et ratio ostendit” (Mandonnet ed., 2.872).

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 arg. 2}: “Praeterea, omne quod esse dicitur, vel est ens rationis, vel est ens naturae. Omne autem quod est ens rationis, vel est existens, vel non existens. Ergo quod non est existens neque non existens, nullo modo potest dici esse. Sed malum distat ab existente, et adhuc plus distat a non existente, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo nullo modo potest dici malum esse” (Mandonnet ed., 2.871).
other than the negation of vision in that which is apt to see.\footnote{Italics mine. \textit{In II Sent.} d. 34, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod Dionysius accipit non existens illud quod nullo modo est; et ab hoc quidem magis distat malum quam etiam ab existente: quia in existente malum est tamquam in subjecto, quamvis ipsum malum in se non sit existens; sed a non existente magis absistit, quia simpliciter non existens non potest privationis subjectum esse; nec etiam ipsa privatio est absolute non existens, sed est non existens in hoc, quia privatio est negatio in subjecto, ut in 4 Metaphys. dicitur: caecitas enim nihil aliud est quam negatio visionis in eo quod natum est videre” (Mandonnet ed., 2.873).}

Here, we have a Dionysian explanation of how a privation is somewhat real: privation is closer to existence than to non-existence because it is the negation of a definite subject.\footnote{SCG I, 71: “Privatio autem negatio quaedam est in subiecto determinato” (Leon. 13.206); \textit{In II Sent.} d. 12 q. 1 a. 5; \textit{In I Post. an.} lect. 5.} The accidental being of a privation with its subject is sufficiently real to efficiently cause (as a “quasi-exemplar”) the intellect to form a proposition about it. Though what is signified by “blindness is” is something conceived by a true mind, which conception is only in the mind (\textit{ens rationis}), the accidental union between an individual thing’s vision and blindness is extra-mental being (\textit{ens naturae}). As Thomas states, “no privation entirely takes away the being of the thing” because privation always negates some subject that has being, so we can speak of a subject and its attendant privation or negation as long as the supposition (i.e. what the subject term stands for) is understood to be in a qualified manner.\footnote{ST I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 1: “nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse, quia privatio est negatio in subiecto” (Leon. 4.110). For supposition theory in Terminist logic, Sten Ebbesen, “The Dead Man is Alive,” \textit{Synthese} 40 (1979): 43-70, esp. 45-46.} Metaphysics studies privation and negation because they belong to unity (the privation of the division of being), and it studies evil because evil is in things insofar as it is a privation in them.\footnote{De malo, q. 1, a. 1 ad 20: “Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod malum quidem est in rebus, sed ut privatio, non autem ut aliquid reale, sed in rationis et non rei” (Leon. 23.8:478-9:485). We can state both that evil is in \textit{things} as a privation and that evil is a \textit{thing} of reason (\textit{res rationis}), but we should keep in mind that two meanings of “thing” are at work. \textit{In II Sent.} d. 37 q. 1 a. 1.}

The proposition, “man is an animal,” signifies a conception (‘man is an animal’) regarding a real \textit{essential} being (e.g. animal-man). Another proposition, “man is blind,” signifies
another conception (‘man is blind’) regarding a real accidental being (e.g. blind-man). Even though a conception such as ‘man is blind’ contains a product of the mind’s operation, a rationate being (ens rationis), what is signified by ‘man is blind’ is not a product of the mind’s operation. What is signified (significatum) by the rationate being is a real accidental being.

Similar to white-man, blind-man is an accidental being that is outside the soul with accidental unity. The truth of a proposition requires that there be union or inherence of blindness in man since for every true predicate of a thing there is some property inhering in the thing. True propositions can be made about a privation because a privation is, as Thomas states, a negation inhering in a subject.58 We have then a clearer understanding for why Thomas states that privations and negations exist outside the soul: since the accidental unity of nonbeing with its determinate subject exists outside the soul, we can say that the accidental being of nonbeing with its determinate subject exists outside the soul as well.59

In sum, how can nonbeing exist only in the mind (tantum in ratione) and yet be outside the mind (extra animam)? To be sure, blindness is not some real thing. Blindness is a privation, and a privation is a mind-dependent being, not a real being, so the term “blindness” cannot signify a real being. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of accidental being (ens per accidens) and essential being (ens per se) helps us to resolve these paradoxical statements by Thomas because the accidental composite signified by “man is blind” is a real being. Blindness has a foundation in things, namely a foundation in the accidental and composite being of things (blind-man), so

58 De potentia q. 3, a. 6 ad 7; De malo q. 1. a. 1; q. 1, a. 3. See also Gyula Klima, “The Changing Role of ‘Entia Rationis’,” Synthese 1 (1996), 25-59, esp. 30.
59 To be clear, the truth signified by “negations are,” “privations are,” and “Stevie Wonder is blind” are essential beings in the soul (tantum in ratione). I am claiming that Thomas would nevertheless state that the accidental being even regarding a nonbeing is outside the soul. In IV Meta., lect. 3, no. 565.
that accidental being explains how nonbeing exists only in the mind as a thing of reason and yet “outside the mind” as a foundation for thought.⁶⁰

In the truth of a proposition about privations, the copula signifies the inherence of a privation in a subject. Blindness (or evil) can only exist by being affirmed or negated by the mind forming a truth of a proposition, and what is signified by “man is blind” is the conception of this complex reality. Moreover, the reality of blind-man is accidental for the same reason that all accidental beings are accidental: the comparison between what is signified by the subject’s definition and the predicate’s definition do not entail one another. Yet the conformity of the intellect to things (‘Socrates is white’), whether concerning the thing itself (white-Socrates) or a merely mental consideration of that thing (‘blind-Socrates’), is an essential being because this truth signified by a proposition formally expresses the conformity of the mind with things. The mind’s conformity with real being as expressed in a rationate being is essential because of its immediate and mediate foundation in things.

1.4.2 Falsehood: Accidental Rationate Being

Rationate being and true being are mental complements to complete (real) being, but Thomas does not clarify how rationate and true being are related to each other. I would suggest here that rationate being encompasses true being and falsehoods because both the things signified by the truth expressed in “man is an animal” and the thing signified by the falsehood expressed in “man is an ass” are conceptual beings (ens rationis). Nevertheless, rationate being is equivalent to true being because falsehood expresses nothing other than the distortion of what

⁶⁰ De veritate q. 1, a. 5 ad 2; In IV Meta., lect. 1, no. 540. See full citation above.
true being expresses. False being reduces to true being.\textsuperscript{61}

We have seen so far two types of extramental being, namely essential and accidental being, but we have only seen one type of mental being, namely truths of a proposition. Another type of mental being is falsehood. Both truth and falsehood are complex conceptions, products of the second act of the intellect signified by propositions, and they are either true or false based on the comparison or relation that is made between the thing denoted by the subject-term and the form signified by the predicate-term. As a rationate being (\textit{ens rationis}), as something signified by a proposition, falsehood is plainly not nothing. We can state, “the blackbird is white” or “man is an ass,” and both statements would express the existence of a nonbeing, namely a rationate being. Nevertheless, the objects of these false conceptions or falsehoods “are nonbeings in every way,” Thomas states, “for the statement is said to be false when what is signified by the statement is nonexistent.”\textsuperscript{62} Just like truth of a proposition, falsehood is primarily found through the intellect’s composition and division, but unlike truths of a proposition, falsehoods express nothing in reality. A sign is false when it does not correspond to the thing signified.\textsuperscript{63} The intellect discovers (\textit{invenitur}) falsehoods, properly speaking, through the combination of subject and predicate terms that do not belong to each other. If what is signified by the combination of

\textsuperscript{61} For instances of the \textit{ens naturae / ens rationis} disjunct, \textit{De veritate} q. 21, a. 2 ad 7; \textit{De potentia} q. 7, a. 9; \textit{De malo} q. 1, a. 1 arg. 20; \textit{In IV Meta.}, lect. 2, no. 560, 574; \textit{ST} I, q. 8, a. 1 ad 3. For instances of the \textit{ens naturae / ens verum} disjunct, \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; \textit{In II Sent.} d. 34, q. 1, a. 1: \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 1; \textit{De potentia} q. 7, a. 2 ad 1; \textit{ST} I, q. 48, a. 2 ad 2; \textit{SCG} III, 9. For an instance of \textit{ens extra animam / ens in anima}, \textit{SCG} I, 68.

\textsuperscript{62} In \textit{V Meta.}, lect. 22, no. 1128: “Sic igitur falsa dicitur, quae omnino sunt non entia. Nam oratio tunc esse falsa dicitur, quando non est id quod oratione significatur” (Marietti ed., 289). Regarding falsehood, see also \textit{De veritate} q. 1, a. 12; \textit{ST} I, q. 17, a. 1; \textit{In VI Meta.}, lect. 6, no. 1223-1226. See also Vargas Della Casa’s dissertation cited above, “Thomas Aquinas on the Apprehension of Being,” 66.

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{ST} III, q. 68, a. 4: “Est autem signum falsum cui res significata non respondet” (Leon. 12.96).
subject and predicate within a statement is nonexistent, then the statement is said to be false.\textsuperscript{64}

We find falsehood properly speaking in three different ways according to Thomas. We find it in a contingent proposition: for example, “you are sitting while you are standing” is false because the predicate “are sitting while you are standing” cannot attach to the subject. We also find it in impossible propositions as when the intellect joins the definition of one thing to another thing (e.g. ass is a mortal rational animal; triangle is a plane figure contained by one line). Finally, we find it in impossible propositions in which the intellect joins together parts of definitions that cannot be joined at all (e.g. an ass is an irrational immortal animal; void is a place in which there is no body; the diagonal of a square is commensurable with one of its sides). In false statements, the subject and predicate are not essentially related. Although Thomas does not make this point explicitly, we can infer from this fact—namely from the fact that falsehoods consist in a subject and predicate that are accidentally related—that Thomas would also say that falsehoods are accidental beings as well. Whereas true being is a mind-dependent essential being with a foundation in real things, falsehoods are mind-dependent accidental beings with no foundation in real things.\textsuperscript{65}

One final note about being taken as true and false: The human intellect forms a proposition (an enunciation), which is either internal or external (e.g. speech), through the intellect’s second operation of composing and dividing, and this enunciation concerns that which

\textsuperscript{64} In I Peri. erm., lect. 9, no. 4: “res significata per praedicatum insit vel non insit rei significatae per subiectum. Nam cum dicitur, corvus est albus, significatur quod non est, esse, quamvis ipse corvus sit res existens” (Leon. 1*1.47:66-70). See also De veritate q. 1, a. 11; De veritate q. 1, a. 12; ST I, q. 17, a. 1; In IX Meta., lect. 11, no. 1896. The only way that we can say that falsity is in things is when the intellect mistakes something for another such as in false cognates, false advertising, and false gold.

\textsuperscript{65} I base my interpretation that falsehoods are accidental beings (\textit{ens secundum accidentem}) on these texts: In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 7; De veritate q. 1, a. 12; In V Meta., lect. 22, nos. 1128-1129; De Spiritualibus Creaturis a. 11 ad 7.
can be put into an enunciation. The object of an enunciation (enunciatio) is an enunciable (enuntiabile). Whereas the enunciation is complex (“dogs bark”), the enunciable can be either complex or non-complex (incomplexa). The upshot is that even non-complex concepts (‘dog’) fall under true being because that non-complex concept is what is being immediately spoken about. “The dog is scruffy,” for example, is concerned with the enunciable, a being in the soul that is ‘dog’.66

1.4.3 General Schema of Finite Being

Based on the divisions of the modes of being we have seen so far in Thomas’s writings, we can form a generalized table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I. Being outside the soul (ens extra animam / ens reale)</th>
<th>II. Being in the Soul (ens tantum in anima / ens rationis / enuntiabile)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Essential being (ens secundum se)</td>
<td>I-a. Real essential being - Complete being (ens perfectum /ens naturae / ens simpliciter quod est in rebus), - Ten Predicaments e.g. Socrates (substance), white (quality)</td>
<td>II-a. True being (ens verum) II-a-1. Complex (e.g. ‘A man is an animal,’ ‘A man is not an ass,’ ‘Evil is,’) II-a-2. Non-complex (‘genus,’ ‘species,’ ‘dog,’ ‘scruffiness’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Accidental being (ens secundum accidentes / magis non-ens)</td>
<td>I-b. Real accidental being e.g. white-rook, blind-man</td>
<td>II-b. Falsehood - Incomplete being (ens incompletum) e.g. ‘non-sensitive animal,’ ‘A man is an ass’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Schematic Division of Finite Being67

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66 Although this reality can be known by God in a simple way through the divine essence, the human intellect must know about Socrates only by composing the terms of the enunciation. In I Sent. d. 41 q. 1 a. 5; De veritate q. 2, a. 7; De veritate, q. 2 a. 13 ad 7; ST I, q. 14 a. 15 ad 3; Quodl. IV q. 9 a. 2. See also Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 223; Klima, The Changing Role of Entia Rationis, 31-32. Klima notes that Thomas is “not very explicit about the significate of propositions,” so he cites a remarkable passage by an anonymous author from the 12th century regarding enunciables.

67 Thomas himself does not combine these divisions together of two modes of being outside the soul and two modes of being in the soul. My interpretation follows upon the previously discussed texts regarding accidental
This chart sidesteps some important divisions of being, of course, such as the division between potential and actual being and between finite and infinite being, but we are not as concerned with these divisions because they are more universal (communius) divisions that do not immediately explain the proportional relationship between rationate being and being outside the soul (ens naturae).

We should note one important factor regarding the generalized table above because real and rationate being do not constitute two kinds of being, nor do true being and falsehood constitute two kinds of being. They are analogous senses of “being.” Each mode of finite being, each quadrant in the figure above, ultimately refers back to substance as its primary and principal mode of being: (II-b) false or incomplete being is founded on (II-a) true being; (II-a) true being is founded on (I) being outside the soul; and within being outside the soul, (I-b) real accidental being is founded on (I-a) real essential being. Within the latter quadrant, the nine accidents (e.g. quantity) are founded on substance. Indeed, Thomas states that once metaphysics “sufficiently determines the class of being contained in the ten predicaments, then accidental being and true

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being and these texts referring to the distinction between essential and accidental being (In V Meta., lect. 9; In XI Meta., lect. 11), between real and rationate being (De veritate q. 21, a. 2 ad 7 and In IV Meta., lect. 4), between complete being and real accidental being (In V Meta., lect. 9), and between true being and incomplete being (In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2 ad 1; In IV Meta., lect. 1, nos. 539-547; In IX Meta., lect. 11, no. 1895). For the latter distinction In V Meta., lect. 22, no. 1128: "Deinde cum dicit falsum dicit hic distinguit nomina, quae significant defectum entis, vel ens incompletum. Et primo hoc nomen falsum" (Marietti ed., 18.289).

68 In V Meta. lect. 9, no. 889: “Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum, ibi, amplius esse significat et ens” (Marietti ed., 18.238). For references to Thomas’s division of being into potency and act, ST I, q. 77, a. 1, DV q. 8, a. 9, In V Meta., lect. 9, no. 897. We are also omitting the trifold division of the signification of names, including those names denoting fictions that have no foundation in being (e.g. “chimera”), discussed briefly in chapter two. In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1. Names denoting fictions do have signification of themselves because the terms ultimately signify a res in the mode of a form, a res which is that by which something is denominated. In De potentia q. 7, a. 10 ad 8, Thomas explains, “illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficient quod significetur per modum formae, grammatico loquendo” (Marietti ed., 211). See Vargas Della Casa, “Thomas Aquinas on the Apprehension of Being,” 60-61.
1.5 Truth of a Proposition: Essential Being and Accidental Predicate

Thomas thinks that truth of a proposition is an essential, albeit derivative sense of being: he calls true being “ens per se” in On Being and Essence, and “ens secundum se” in Bk V of his Commentary on the Metaphysics. Despite these declarations, Thomas also calls the truth of a proposition an “accidental predicate” (praedicatum accidentale). For instance, in Bk II of his Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas states regarding both modes of essential being (the ten predicaments, true being): “Being however according to both modes is predicated in diverse ways since according to the first way it is a substantial predicate and belongs to the question what is it? [quid est], but according to the second way it is an accidental predicate, just as the Commentator says, and belongs to the question whether it is? [an est].” Similarly, in Bk III of his Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas states: “I respond that, according to the Philosopher

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69 In VI Meta., lect. 4, no. 1244: “Unde si determinetur sufficienter illud genus entis quod continetur sub praedicamento, manifestum erit de ente per accidentis, et de ente vero. Et propter hoc huiusmodi entia praetermittuntur” (Marietti ed., 18.312). Regarding the fact that these divisions are not different types of being, see Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Thomas’s Metaphysics of Being,” 94. In IV Meta., lect. 1, no. 543; In I Peri. eerm., lect. 14, no. 13; ST I, q. 90, a. 2.

70 De ente et essentia, c. 1: “Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significalit propositionum veritatem” (Leon. 43.369:1-5).

71 In V Meta., lect. 9, no. 889, 895: Deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguat modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguist ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod esse est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius autem et esse significat. Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. . . . Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod esse est, significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut alia translatio melius habet quod esse significat quia aliquod dictum est verum” (Marietti ed., 18.238-239).

72 In II Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1: “Ens autem secundum utrumque istorum modorum diversimodo praedicatur: quia secundum primum modum acceptum, est praedicatum substantiale, et pertinet ad quaestionem quid est: sed quantum ad secundum modum, est praedicatum accidentale, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, et pertinet ad quaestionem an est” (Mandonnet ed., 2.872).
in Bk V of the Metaphysics, being [*esse*] is said in two ways. In one way, it signifies the truth of a proposition, as with the copula, and such a being [*ens*] is an accidental predicate as the Commentator says.”

Thomas makes similar statements in his *Quodlibet II* and in Bk V of his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

We started the discussion about essential and accidental being by stating that, according to Thomas, the division between essential and accidental being takes place (*attenditur*) on account of one thing being predicated of another either *per se* or *per accidens*. The meaning of this statement requires some further clarification since, as the texts just cited show, the truth of a proposition belongs to essential being (*ens per se*) and yet is an accidental predicate (*praedicatum accidentale*). My question is this one: how can something that is an accidental predicate fall under essential being if the division between essential and accidental being takes place on account of predication? It would seem, one might argue, that the truth of a proposition should fall under accidental being since it is an accidental predicate. Thomas does not explain this apparent discrepancy himself, but a closer look at what the truth of a proposition entails will show why Thomas thinks that being as true is an essential being and yet is an accidental

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73 *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: “Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum philosophum 5 Metaph. esse duobus modis dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, ens est praedicatum accidentale; et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente, quae conjungit praedicatum cum subjecto” (Mandonnet ed., 3.238).

74 *Quodl.* II, q. 2 a. 1: “Unde, cum omne quod est præter essentiam rei, dicatur accidens; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est, est accidens. Et ideo Commentator dicit in V Metaphysic. quod ista propositio, Socrates est, est de accidentali praedicato, secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis” (Leon. 25/2.215:60-66); *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 896: ”Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal ad hominem. Si autem accipiatur secundo modo, est de praedicato accidentalii” (Marietti ed., 239). These texts will show up in our discussion of participation and predication.

75 *In V Meta.*, lect. 9, no. 886: “Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquod praedicatur de alioquo per se vel per accidens” (Marietti ed., 18.238).

76 *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: “Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum philosophum 5 Metaph. esse duobus modis dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, ens est praedicatum accidentale” (Mandonnet ed., 3.238).
While discussing the different types of essential being in his *lectio* on the notion of being, among them the truth of a proposition, Thomas himself states the reason why truth of a proposition is an accidental predicate.

Now it is accidental to a thing that an attribute should be affirmed of it truly in thought or in word, for reality is not referred to knowledge but the reverse. But the act of being which each thing has in its own nature is substantial; and therefore when it is said that “Socrates is,” if the “is” is taken in the first way, it belongs to the class of substantial predicates; for being is a higher predicate with reference to any particular being, as animal with reference to man. But if it is taken in the second way [inasmuch as the terms “being” and “is” signify the composition of a proposition], it belongs to the class of accidental predicates.\(^77\)

I would like to explore this accidental relation between things and thought. In the simplest terms, things do not depend on predications made of them. If there were no human intellects, then things would still remain essentially the same. Whereas “the relation in things to a divine intellect is essential” because the divine intellect is their essential cause, the “relation of things to a human intellect is accidental” because the human intellect is not their cause.\(^78\)

Thought is really related to things because it depends on them, but things are only logically related to thought because things do not depend on thought. This same type of relation between being as true (thought) and real being (things) can be seen in the non-mutual relation between knowledge (*scientia*) and the knowable (*scibile*). Similarly, the relation between true

\(^{77}\) *In V Meta.,* lect. 9, no. 896: “Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid de ipsa vere affirmetur intellectu vel voce. Nam res non refertur ad scientiam, sed e converso. Esse vero quod in sui natura unaquaque res habet, est substantialis. Et idem, cum dicitur, Socrates est, si ille est primo modo accipiatur, est de praedicato substantiali. Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal ad hominem. Si autem accipiatur secundo modo, est de praedicato accidentalis.” (Marietti ed., 18.239).

\(^{78}\) *De veritate* q. 1, a. 10: “comparatio rei ad intellectum divinum est ei essentialis, et secundum eam per se dicitur vera; sed comparatio ad intellectum humanum est ei accidentalis, secundum quam non dicitur absolute vera sed quasi secundum quid et in potentia” (Leon. 22/1.31:128-133). See also *De veritate* q. 1, a. 4; *De veritate* q. 21, a. 1.
being that is signified by propositions and real being is not mutual. The relation of true being to the thing is real whereas the relation of the thing to true being is only logical: true being depends on real being, but real being does not depend on true being. This comparison of true being to knowledge is especially apt because knowledge is an intellectual habit regarding true being, especially as found in enunciations.\textsuperscript{79}

To put it differently, truth is not a predicate of itself. The truth of a proposition is an accidental predicate only if we look at a truth of a proposition in relation to things. As McInerny explains, “\emph{Is}, then, as the sign of a mental composition signifies a being which is accidental to being \textit{extra animam}.\textsuperscript{80} If we were to relate the really existing thing upon which a conception is founded (e.g. Socrates-man) to the whole conception affirmed by the mind in the copula (e.g. ‘Socrates is a man’), then that conception will be seen as accidental relative to the reality. A thing (Socrates-man) happens to be a thing understood (‘Socrates is a man’). It is not as though we were comparing the definition of one and examining whether it includes the definition of the other. We are not looking for the definition of Socrates-man. It is rather that we look at the conception formed by the mind and see that, though there is real relation between that conception and the thing, there is not a real relation between the thing and that conception.

The accidental predication of true being and real being is similar to the case in which we

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{De veritate} q. 1, a. 5 ad 15: “quando unum relativorum pendet ab aliter, et non e converso, sicut scientia dependet a scibili, et non e converso; unde relatio scientiae ad scibile est aliquid in rerum natura, non autem relatio scibilis ad scientiam, sed in ratione tantum” (Leon. 22/1.21:438-442); \textit{De veritate} q. 12, a. 11 ad 6: “veritas propositionis sequitur conditionem rei, quando scientia veritatem proponentis ex rebus oritur” (Leon. 22/2.404:163-165); \textit{In II Post. an.} lect. 1: “cum scientia non sit nisi veri, verum autem significetur solum per enunciationem, oportet solam enunciationem esse scibilem” (Leon. 1*/2.174:53-56). See also \textit{In III Sent.} d. 1 q. 1 a. 2; \textit{ST} I, q. 14, pr. For this type of non-mutual relations, \textit{In I Sent.} d. 26, q. 2, a. 1; \textit{In I Sent.} d. 30, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3; \textit{In IV Sent.} d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 1 ad 3; \textit{De potentia} q. 7, a. 11; \textit{SCG} II, 12, no. 3; \textit{SCG} IV, 14, no. 11; \textit{ST} I, q. 28, a. 8 ad 4; \textit{ST} III, q. 52, a. 5 ad 3; \textit{In V Meta.}, lect. 17, no. 1028.

\textsuperscript{80} See McInerny, “Notes on Being and Predication,” 251; “Being and Predication,” 204.
predicate an individual of a universal. An individual of itself is not a predicate, but if we were to predicate Socrates of man (e.g. “man is Socrates”), Socrates would be an accidental predicate because it just so happens that man is Socrates. This thing just happens to be that thing.

Likewise, if we predicate true being of real being (e.g. that-Socrates-is-white is true), true being would be an accidental predicate because it just so happens that this state-of-affairs (that-Socrates-is-white) is true. The verbal copula is an accidental predicate no matter what it signifies. Whether the copula expresses real being (e.g. “Socrates is white”) or whether it expresses merely rationate being (e.g. “Socrates is blind”), the being that joins the subject and predicate together in the mind is accidentally related to the supposit.

In his discussion on the nature of unity in his Commentary on Bk X of the Metaphysics, Thomas offers a further reason why the truth of a composition is an accidental predicate: “Now being which signifies the composition of a proposition is an accidental predicate, for the composition is made by the intellect according to a determinate time. But to be at this or that time is an accidental predicate.” The reasoning Thomas offers here agrees with Bk V of his Commentary on the Metaphysics, namely that the truth of a composition is an accidental predicate because the intellect’s consideration of a thing is accidental to the thing. Thomas nevertheless adds yet another reason for this accidental relation. The intellect considers things in

\[81\text{ In I Sent. d. 4 q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3: “Item, superius per se praedicatur de suo inferiori, sicut homo de Socrate; sed Socrates accidentalis praedicatone praedicatur de homine; accidit enim homini esse Socratem . . . .” (Mandonnet ed., 1.140). Thomas implicitly agrees with this portion of the argument when responding that in the divine there is nothing accidental. Nothing is said of God per accidens.}

\[82\text{ In X Meta., lect. 3, no. 1982: “Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale, quia compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinantem tempus. Esse autem in hoc tempore vel in illo, est accidentale praedicatum” (Marietti ed., 18.472). See also In I Sent. d. 8, q. 2, a. 3; In III Sent. d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, q. 2 ad 4; ST I, q. 85, a. 5 ad 2. See Peter Thomas Geach, “Subject and Predicate,” Mind 59 (1950), 461-482, esp. 464-5.}
a determinate time, so the act of being that the intellect recognizes cannot belong to the essence of a thing *per se* because the essence of a thing does not vary in time. Even when the intellect composes the being of a thing in its essence and act of being, it can only do so in the vagaries of time. It captures the act of being in time $t_1$, yet the essence persists with its act of being in time $t_2$.

When Thomas states that the division between essential and accidental being takes place (*attenditur*) on account of one thing being predicated of another either *per se* or *per accidens*, it is clear that in this account he is referring only to a division between the subject and predicate term of a composition. In other words, he is referring to the terms within the division of real essential being and real accidental being. Essential being in the order of nature can be distinguished from accidental being in the order of nature because of the way we predicate essential and accidental being. If either the subject or the predicate includes the definition of the other (or part of that definition), then the predication is *per se*. If neither the subject nor the predicate does so, then the predication is an accidental predication.

The being that signifies the truth of a proposition is an accidental predicate because of its relation to extramental being, but in itself it is essential being because the predicate of a true proposition inheres to the subject. In the truth of a proposition, we consider what is signified by “is” in a proposition as a copula that joins terms together in the mind. The subject and predicate in a proposition are seen only through the copula, which signifies their composition (“is”) or division (“is not”), shedding light on what is or is not the case. As long as the combination of subject and predicate is not contradictory, the mind can consider the true and the false. If “Socrates is white” is taken as a falsehood, as something in the mind that is dissonant with real things, then what is ultimately signified is an accidental being because the predicate does not
inhere in the subject. If “Socrates is white” is taken as signifying the truth of a proposition, as something in the mind that is consonant with real things, then what is ultimately signified is an essential though derivative being (a copula) because the predicate inheres in the subject. Although it is an effect and a sign of real being, true being does not immediately depend on real being, but primarily depends on the intellect’s composition.

2.0 Predication, Participation, Denomination

In our search for the way in which predication has its foundation in the real, we continuously return to the real composition of finite beings. Although the mode of understanding differs from the mode of being, it is also true that things cause understanding, and they cause understanding through their disposition: “the truth and falsity found in speech and in thought must be traced to a thing’s disposition as their cause.” What are dynamics of this composition? As we have seen in chapter two, when the intellect receives two concepts, one of these concepts is related to the other as a form and the other concept is received as matter, which is to say that the predicate is a quasi-formal part of an enunciation and the subject is its material part. If the thing is the cause of the intellect’s operation according to formal and material parts, then the combination of matter and form and the combination of subject and accident in finite beings

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83 \textit{In I Sent.} d. 19, q. 5, a. 3 ad 5: “enuntiatio potest dupliciter considerare: vel ut res quaedam . . . vel ut signum tali rei, et sic veritas ejus est per adaequationem ad rem illam” (Mandonnet ed., 1.498).

84 \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 3: “Praedicatio enim est quiddam, quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur” (Leon. 43.375:134-138).

85 \textit{In IX Meta.}, lect. 11, no. 1898: “Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem intellectus compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenetur formaliter” (Marietti ed., 18.456).

86 \textit{In III Sent.} d. 6 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3 & ad 7; \textit{In I Peri. erm.}, lect. 10, no. 23; \textit{In IX Meta.}, lect. 11, no. 1898.
must serve as the foundation and cause of these combinations.

Thomas explains with examples the foundation and cause of this combination:

[W]hen I say, “Socrates is a man,” the truth of this enunciation is caused by combining the form of man [formae humanae] with the individual matter by means of which Socrates is this man; and when I say, “Man is white,” the cause of the truth of this enunciation is the combining of whiteness with the subject. It is similar in other cases. And the same thing is evident in the case of separation.  

Thomas explains here that composition entails the duality of form and matter, such as the form of man joining with its individual matter and the form of whiteness joining its subject. So much is clear. Yet it is not so clear how this composition comes about. How does form join with matter?

The metaphysics of composition takes place for Thomas through different modes participation, and the way we predicate reflects these modes of participation. One minor contribution to this discussion of the role of participation for predication is in a brief article entitled, “Predication and Participation,” by Keith Buersmeyer. In that article, Buersmeyer argues that participation is “the central concept of Aquinas’s theory of predication.” It is the central concept, Buersmeyer claims, because the predicate term signifies an act in which the subject participates. The signification of the predicate “is a man” is founded on the participation by a particular in a universal, namely the participation of a particular designated by the subject term (e.g. Socrates) in a universal designated by the predicate term. The only reason why we can

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87 In IX Meta., lect. 11, no. 1899: “Sicut cum dico, Socrates est homo, veritas huius enunciationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hic homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad subiectum: et similiter est in aliis. Et idem patet in divisione” (Marietti ed., 18.456).

predicate an act of an individual is that the individual participates in that act. Without entirely agreeing with Buersmeyer’s article, I would like to expand on his theme in Thomas’s thought of participation as a metaphysical framework for predication.

Basing ourselves off of two closely aligned texts of Thomas, *Quodlibet* II (q. 2, a. 1) and the Commentary on Boethius’s *De hebdomadibus*, c.2, we shall see that for Thomas modes of predication show us a division of being in general (*ens commune*) that is even more fundamental than *per se* being or *per accidens* being and even more fundamental than potential being and actual being. Predication by essence (*per essentiam*) corresponds to a mode of being, and predication by participation (*per participationem*) corresponds to many modes of having. We shall finish our discussion by considering yet another type of predication called denominative or concretive predication.

2.1 Predication by Essence, Predication by Participation

In a quodlibetal discussion concerning separate substances (angels), Thomas answers the question whether angels are by their substance both essence and existence. This question is important for our discussion because the composition and division that we make in predication

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89 Ibid., 38-39, 44.
90 See Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et Causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Publications Universitaires, 1961), 597: “L’exposé de l’article nous offre un resumé essentiel, mais complet, de toute la métaphysique thomiste de la participation. En voici le schéma: le mode de la prédication correspond au mode d’être ou d’avoir; pour chaque acte ou forme il y a deux modes d’être, être par essence ou être par participation, par suite il y aura deux modes de prédication; l’être par participation à son tour est double: dans l’ordre prédicamental des espèces et des genres, et dans l’ordre de l’esse et de ses attributs transcendentaux, avec les perfections pures.” Fabro earlier (p. 267) describes this division of being by participation and being by essence as a division of “ENS COMMUNE.” In a later article, Fabro includes predication as a necessary “moment” in the truth of participation: “There are therefore three moments in the grounding of the truth of being upon the notion of participation, and they are all linked together: composition, causality, predication. All three are founded upon and related to esse, which binds them together as universal act.” See his and B. M. Bonansea’s “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974), 449-491, esp. 486.
depend upon the composition on the part of a thing’s substance. Does existence belong to angels substantially, that is, essentially? If that were the case, then an angel’s essence would include its own existence. As we shall see at some length, Thomas argues against that view, and he does so by inserting into his discussion different ways of predicating:

I answer: it must be said that something is predicated of something in two ways — in the manner of an essence or in the manner of participation. “Light” is predicated of an illumined body in the manner of participation, but if there were some separated light then it would be predicated of it in the manner of an essence. Therefore, we must say that “being” [ens] is predicated in the manner of an essence of God alone, inasmuch as a divine being [esse] is subsistent and absolute being. However, it is predicated of any creature in the manner of participation, for no creature is its being but rather is something which has being. So also we call God “good” in the manner of an essence because he is goodness itself, we call creatures “good” in the manner of participation because they have goodness. . . . whenever something is predicated of another in the manner of participation, it is necessary that there be something in the latter besides that in which it participates.91

The way we know the difference between to be and to have, Thomas states, is by the way we predicate to be and to have. The stated premise is that if things were otherwise than they were, “if there were a separated light,” then we would necessarily predicate otherwise than we do, yet we do not predicate that way. We can deduce something about being, then, based on the way we predicate being of things.

Linguistic or dialectical evidence shows, then, that we predicate being (ens) essentially of

91 Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1: “Respondeo. Dicendum, quod dupliciter aliquid de aliquo praedicatur: uno modo essentialiter, alio modo per participationem. Lux enim praedicatur de corpore illuminato participative; sed si esset aliqua lux separata, praedicaretur de ea essentialiter. Secundum ergo hoc dicendum est, quod ens praedicatur de solo Deo essentialiter, eo quod esse divinum est esse subsistens et absolutum; de qualibet autem creatura praedicatur per participationem: nulla enim creatura est suum esse, sed est habens esse. Sic et Deus dicitur bonus essentialiter, quia est ipsa bonitas; creaturae autem dicuntur bonae per participationem, quia habent bonitatem: unumquodque enim, in quantum est, bonum est, secundum illud Augustini in I de doctrina Christiana, quod in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicatur de altero per participationem, oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur. Et ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse, et ipsum esse eius; et hoc est quod Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad., quod in omni eo quod est crita primum, aliud est esse et quod est” (Leon. 25/2.214:28-50).
nothing other than God. That is to say, being is predicated of God in the manner of essence 
(modo essentialiter), and being is predicated of creatures in the manner of participation (modo 
per participationem). Thomas makes a deduction from this observation: the manner that we 
predicate originates from the way things are in reality, so since finite being is said to have 
existence (ens dicitur quasi esse habens), we can state that finite being is not existence. Thomas 
is here referring to substance.92 Only subsisting individuals have their act of being, so accidents 
such as quantity) are not called “beings,” but are rather more properly called “of a being.”93 The 
distinctive characteristic of finite being, especially substance, is that it participates in the act of 
being: “Everything that is, has esse. Therefore in every being other than the first, there is present 
both [1] esse itself as the act and [2] the substance of the thing possessing esse as the receptive 
potency of this act that is esse.”94 We shall have another occasion to discuss this potency-act 
structure. But for now, let us consider what Thomas says next in this text.

Thomas goes on to state in Quodlibet II (q. 2, a. 1) that there are two different ways that 
being (esse) is participated. Either being is participated as though belonging to the substance of 
the thing participating (e.g. species participates in a genus), or it is participated in by a creature 
as something not belonging to the thing’s essence. Thomas dismisses the first mode of 
participation in being because being (esse) is not a genus. In other words, whereas we could state

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92 In XII Meta., lect. 1, no. 2419: “Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae 
subsistit” (Marietti ed., 18.567). We should not interpret this argument as a demonstration. It is rather a 
metaphysician’s proper use of logical or general reasons to make insights (not conclusions) about being as being, 
and it opens up a space for Thomas to delineate a metaphysics of participation.

93 De veritate, q. 27, a. 1 ad 8: “Similiter accidentia, quia non subsistunt, non est eorum proprie esse; sed 
subiectum est aliquae secundum ea; unde proprie dicuntur magis entis quam entia” (Leon. 22.3.792:236-239).

94 De substantiis separatis, c. 8: “Omne autem quod est esse habet ; est igitur in quocumque praeter primum 
et ipsum esse tamquam actus, et substantia rei habens esse tamquam potentia receptiva huius actus quod est esse” 
(Leon. 40.D55:183-87). See also De potentia q. 7, a. 2 ad 8.
that man participates in animal because animal is included in the definition of man, man is
something having animality, we cannot state in the same way that man participates in being
because being does not fall in the definition of any creature. We should rather state that being is
that which is to be divided into different modes of being. We are left by elimination, then, to a
non-essential participation in being by creatures. Somehow, a creature participates in being as
something that belongs outside of its essence.⁹⁵

2.2. The Grammar of Participation

Before further considering Quodlibet II (q. 2, a. 1), we should consider how Thomas
understands participation. We find Thomas’s clearest explanation of participation in his
Commentary on Boethius’s De hebdomadibus, lect. 2, where a discussion turns on Boethius’s
axiom: being (esse) and that-which-is (id quod est) are diverse. The discussion especially
concerns esse taken absolutely, as neither particular or universal. Thomas states that being in
itself (ipsum esse) is considered as something common and indeterminate. One way of seeing
this determination, according to Thomas, is to look at the subject and predicate. Looking at the
terms of predication shows that being is determined in one of either two ways: 1) either by the
subject which possesses being, 2) or by the predicate which qualifies being. 1) The subject
signified in “Socrates is” determines being insofar as Socrates takes on or possesses being. Being

⁹⁵ Quodl II, q. 2, a. 1: “Sed sciemur est, quod aliquid participatur dupliciter. Uno modo quasi existens de
substantia participantis, sicut genus participatur a specie. Hoc autem modo esse non participatur a creatura. Id enim
est de substantia rei quod cadit in eius definitione. Ens autem non ponitur in definitione creaturae, quia nec est genus
ecc differentia. Unde participatur sicut aliquid non existens de essentia rei” (Leon. 25/2.214:51-215:59). See also ST
I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3: “Non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter communicantium in forma secundum
eandem rationem generis et speciei: sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et
alia per participationem” (Leon. 4.54)
is no longer common when received by an individual. 2) Another determination of being takes place by the predicate. In “Socrates is white,” the predicate “is white” signifies the qualification of “is” as such and such. Being is no longer common when it is received by an accidental or substantial form.96

Thomas explains the first type of determination of being (esse), namely in the subject which possesses being, by noting with Boethius the grammatical difference between the notions or intentions (rationes seu intentiones) of being or to be (esse) and that-which-is. “To be” and “that-which-is” signify something different. Thomas explains the different modes of signification between to be (esse) and that-which-is (ens) by analogy: “to run,” “whiteness” (albedo), and “to be” are signified in the abstract, but “running thing” (currens), “white thing” (album), and “that-which-is” (ens) are signified in the concrete. When we state, “a runner runs,” “a white thing is white,” or “a being is,” then we are predicating something that is signified abstractly of something that is signified concretely. The concrete subject has the act of running, the form of whiteness, or the act of being. The opposite type of predication, the predication of something signified concretely of something signified abstractly, cannot be made of special forms (e.g. “whiteness is white”).97

96 In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2: “Circa ens autem consideratur ipsum esse quasi quidam commune et indeterminatum, quod quidem dupliciter determinatur, uno modo ex parte subiecti quod esse habet, alio modo ex parte predicati utpote cum dicimus de homine uel de quacumque alia re, non quidem quod sit simpliciter, set quod sit aliquid puta album uel nigrum” (Leon. 50.270:19-26).
97 In I Sent. d. 22, q. 1, a. 4, expos.: “concretum de abstracto non praedicatur, ut album de albedine” (Mandonnet ed., 1.544). For similar statements, ST III, q. 16, a. 1 ad 3; De virtutibus q. 1, a. 2 arg. 8. We can predicate something concretely of something signified abstractly only for general forms (e.g. “goodness is good”). De veritate q. 21, a. 4 ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliter se habet in formis generalibus, et aliter in formis specialibus. In formis enim specialibus non recipitur praedicatio concreti de abstracto, ut dicatur: albedo est alba; vel: calor est calidus. . . . Sed in formis generalibus huiusmodi praedicatio recipitur; dicimus enim quod essentia est ens, et bonitas bona, et unitas una, et sic de aliis” (Leon. 22/4.603:252-261).
This grammatical difference between concrete and abstract nouns prepares the way for Thomas to offer a metaphysical distinction between being (esse) and that-which-is. As he explains, the reason we can make the predication “he runs” of that which runs (or of one running) is that the one running participates in running. Likewise, the reason we can make the predication “that-which-is is,” is that the being indicated by “that which is” participates in esse. In other words, what is signified by “to be” or “to run” does not itself exist or run. The abstract mode of signification indicates that an act of being or running requires a subject of being or running, something that has or participates in the act of being or running. Far from a logical sidenote, Thomas’s insertion of the role of participation in predication signals a distinct turn to the use of predication as a metaphysical tool.

2.3 The Modes of Participation

Thomas’s initial definition of participation is etymological: “to participate is as though to grasp a part (partem capere).” This quasi-definition of participation is quickly followed by a more precise definition of participation: something is said to participate in something else when something receives in a particular way (particulariter) that which belongs to something else in a universal way (universaliter). The surface meaning here is not complicated. “I am racing” means that I am receiving in a particular way that which belongs to racing in a universal way; “many people are racing” means that many people are receiving in a particular way that which belongs to racing in a universal way.

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98 In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2: “et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit siue de currente quod currat in quantum subicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod ens siue id quod est in quantum participat actum essendi” (Leon. 50.271:54-59).
99 Ibid.: “Est autem participare quasi partem capere” (Leon. 50.271:70-71).
100 Ibid.: “et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet, universaliter dicitur participare illud: . . .” (Leon. 50.271:71-73).
belongs to racing in a universal way. Racing is not exhausted by its instantiations. We might wonder, however, what it means for something to belong to something else in a universal way and what it means for something to receive in a particular way. To this end, Thomas offers a series of examples of modes of participation.

Thomas’s first example of participation is that of man in relation to animal: “Man is said to participate in animal because man does not possess the intelligible content [rationem] of animal according to its total commonality.”

For the same reason, the same can be said of Socrates in relation to man: Socrates is said to participate in man because Socrates does not possess the nature of man according to its total commonality. This first mode of participation entails the participation of two intelligible contents wherein a less extended intelligibility participates in one that is more extended. The standard interpretation of this passage (offered by Geiger, Fabro, Te Velde, and Wippel) is that Thomas is referring to the participation of a species (i.e. ‘man’) in a genus (i.e. ‘animal’) and to the participation of an individual (i.e. ‘Socrates’) in a species (i.e. ‘man’).

Although Thomas does not mention the intentions of individual, species, and genus in

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101 Ibid.:”... sicut homo dicitur participare animal, quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Socrates participat hominem” (Leon. 50.271:71-77).

102 See Cornelio Fabro, Participation et Causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquin, (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1961), 272; Louis-Bertrand Geiger La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin 1942), 48-49; Rudi Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (New York: Brill, 1995), 11-13, 76-82; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 97, 129. Geiger thinks that one should emphasize one type of participation over another depending on each mode of participation (Ibid., 54). It seems to me that participation by formal similitude logically follows participation by composition, even for the first mode of participation. I think that Geiger is trying to avoid a pseudo-problem. He sets up an impossible viewpoint that, if participation by composition were primary, the participated would have to pre-exist. Accidental forms would have to pre-exist prior to their composition with matter, which is impossible. Geiger therefore concludes to the primacy of participation by limitation. See, for example, La Participation, 51-52. The conclusion is not necessary, however, because participant and participated need not pre-exist prior to composition. God creates principles together, and they function simultaneously according to reciprocal lines of causality.
this passage, he does state in this same *lectio* that this type of participation entails the participation of a particular in a universal. The example he gives is the participation of whiteness (*albedo*) with color.\textsuperscript{103} We should understand that by “universal” here Thomas means a common nature, for that is what a particular is, namely something that participates in a common nature.\textsuperscript{104} A closely parallel passage concerning univocal predication in the *Summa contra Gentiles* shows that Thomas is considering a logical participation as opposed to a strictly metaphysical participation: “Everything, likewise, that is predicated univocally of many things belongs through participation to each of the things of which it is predicated; for the species is said to participate in the genus and the individual in the species.”\textsuperscript{105} The genus has more universal intelligible content than the species, so the species receives from the genus that which the genus has completely. Similarly, the species has more universal intelligible content than the individual, so the individual receives from the species that which the genus has completely.

The first mode of participation entails the participation of a notion in relation to another notion, that is, an essence absolutely considered. We are considering ‘Socrates’ in relation to ‘man’ and ‘man’ in relation to ‘animal.’ When we predicate ‘man’ of ‘Socrates,’ we are stating that Socrates is something having humanity. Subordinate notions within the tree of Porphyry participate in superior ones. Socrates receives in a particular way what belongs to man, animal,

\textsuperscript{103} *In De Hebdomadibus*, lect. 2: “Similiter autem nec potest aliquid participare per modum quo particulare participat uniuaera; sic enim ea que in abstracto dicuntur participare aliquid possunt sicut albedo colorem” (Leon. 50.271:91-94). See Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 97. The translation for *albedo* by Janice Schultz is ‘white’ with single quote implying that Thomas is talking about a concept.

\textsuperscript{104} *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 3 ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod, proprie loquendo, in divinis non est particulare, quia particulare dicitur eo quod particulatur in ipso natura communis” (Mandonnet ed., 1.560).

\textsuperscript{105} *SCG* I, 32 no. 6: “Amplius. Omne quod de pluribus praedicatur univoce, secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et individuum speciem” (Leon. 13.97). I take it that even where Thomas states that this individual participates in a nature, he is referring to a logical participation. *ST* I, q. 45, a. 5 ad 1.
life, body, and substance in a universal way, and man participates in a particular way that which belongs to animal, life, body, and substance in a universal way. It is a question of the participation of less universal and more universal wholes.

By “individual,” Thomas means the supposit taken in its relation to its species. The difference between the notions of Socrates and man can be explained by the further conceptual differentiation of ‘Socrates’ from ‘man’ just as the notion of man includes a further conceptual differentiation from that of animal. Man is an animal having rationality. The difference between the apprehended nature of Socrates and the apprehended nature of man is the difference between the designated and the undesignated. Although the individual cannot be further designated, the relationship is similar to the way in which the difference between the nature of a species and the nature of a genus is the difference between the designated and the undesignated. Thomas explains this further determination of intelligible content in this way in On Being and Essence:

“The designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference taken from the form of the thing.”

We should clarify here at least one point about the logical and real orders. This logical reception of natures is not fictive; it is based on a real participation. Logical participation is still

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106 De ente et essentia, c. 1, no. 25: “Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobiique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur” (Leon. 43.371:90-96). The distinction between the intention of an individual and its common nature is logical. The designation of the individual as something distinct from its nature (as something distinct from that to which the notion of species belongs) comes down to the intellectual grasp of determinate dimensions. Thomas states that if Socrates could be defined, then we would include in the definition Socrates’ determinate dimensions (e.g. this flesh). See also In III Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 3: “ideo homo, cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate, et dicitur habens humanitatem” (Mandonnet ed., 3.196); See also In I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3; De Unione Verbi a. 3 ad 5; SCG I, 32, no. 7.
actual because of its foundation. Although what this participation immediately signifies is the way in which we understand and talk about Socrates’s relation to human nature, namely the logical reception of one broader notion within another, nevertheless, this understanding is founded upon the real composition within Socrates, namely of his human form and matter. That is to say, the first (logical) mode of participation depends upon the second (real) mode of participation, to which we now turn.

Thomas’s second example of participation is the material reception of form: “And similarly, too, a subject participates in accident, and matter in form, because a substantial form, or an accidental one, which is common by virtue of its own intelligible structure, is determined to this or that subject.” In both cases, one part of a whole receives another part that is really distinct from it. The part that receives the other receives in a particular way that which belongs to the other in a universal or common way, and, even though substantial and accidental forms do not exist of their own, they are real constituents or principles of being. That is why this second mode of participation is real: each term of participation are real co-principles. In the predication, “man is white,” what we mean is that man is something having whiteness, that the substance that is man receives the accidental form of white such that the subject of man is the same as that which has whiteness.108 This mode of participation will come up again in our discussion of denominative, or concretive, predication.

Thomas’s third example of participation is the effect’s reception of a cause: “And

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107 In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2: “similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens, et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel ad illud subiectum” (Leon. 50.271:77-80).
108 ST I q. 85, a. 5 ad 3.
similarly, too, an effect is said ‘to participate’ in its own cause, and principally when it is not
equal to the power of its cause, as for example, if we should say that ‘air participates in the light
of the sun’ because it does not receive that light with the brilliance it has in the sun.” ¹⁰⁹ In
Thomas’s view of physics, air receives in a particular way that which the sun has in a more
universal way. Other examples of the participation of an effect with its cause include the way
that exterior actions share in interior actions, the way the appetite shares in right reason of
prudence, and the way intelligent operations share in the soul.¹¹⁰ “When pleasure is called an
operation,” Thomas states, “it is not a predication by essence, but a predication by cause.”¹¹¹ In
all these cases, something receives in a particular way that which belongs to another in a
universal way: the effect only partially manifests the cause.

2.4 The Confluence of the Modes of Predication and Participation

From what we have seen so far in Thomas’s Commentary on the De hebdomadibus and
his Quodlibet II (q. 2, a. 1), Thomas’s formulation of the modes of predication and participation
can be outlined and divided in this way:

¹⁰⁹ In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2: “et similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et praeципue quando
non adataequant virtutem suae causae; puta, si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis, quia non recipit eam in ea
claritate qua est in sole.” (Leon. 50:271:80-83).
¹¹⁰ In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 2 ad 5; In II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4 ad 5; In III Sent., d. 26 q. 1 a. 4 ad 5; SCG II,
35, no. 8; De virtutibus, q. 1 a. 12 ad 16.
¹¹¹ ST I-II, q. 31, a. 1 ad 1: “Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est praedicatio per
essentiam, sed per causam.” For other examples of this type of participation, although named differently, see
Geiger, La Participation, 149 no. 1.
In addition to integrating Thomas’s statements regarding predication by way of essence and by way of participation (De hebdomadibus lect. 2, Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 1), we can also integrate these thoughts with Thomas’s treatment of the per se (and per accidens) modes of predication (In I Post. an., lect. 10; In V Meta. lect. 9). I would suggest that predication by way of essence (1.0) and predication as though belonging to the thing’s essence (2.1) fall under the first per se mode of predication (wherein the predicate signifies something that is in the subject’s definition). According to the first per se mode of predication, to say “God is being” or to say that “man is an animal” is different in one sense, insofar as “God is being” is predicated by way of essence and “man is an animal” is predicated by way of participation. These statements are similar, however, insofar as they both belong to that type of predication where the subject is related to the predicate as its formal cause. Being is in the essence of God, and animal is in the essence of man.

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112 For a slightly different schema, see Geiger, La Participation, 129. Geiger also includes concrete predication in his table, which he classifies as an accidental type of predication. We shall discuss this question in our section on concrete predication.
The other modes of predication entail the predication of something as not belonging to its essence (2.2). The predication as a subject participating in an accident or matter participating in form (2.2.1) falls under the second mode of *per se* predication (wherein the subject signifies something that is in the definition of the predicate). This second *per se* mode of predication does not, however, encompass all that Thomas means by the second mode of participation. The reason is that, in the second mode of participation, Thomas implies that the subject participates in all the accidental forms, whereas the second *per se* mode of predication applies only to necessary accidents. Notwithstanding this difference in scope, according to the second *per se* mode of predication, to say “the man is grammatical,” is not only to say that man has grammar, but also to say that man is related to grammar as its material cause. Likewise, in this second *per se* mode of predication, we can state that “the body is animated” to mean not only that the body has a soul, but also to say that the body is related to the soul as its material cause.

Finally, the predication as an effect participates in its own cause (2.2.2) and thus falls under the third mode of *per se* predication that we discussed above, the one that is fourth on Thomas’s own list, namely the one according to which the predicate signifies something essentially related yet extrinsic to the subject. In Thomas’s example of the third *per se* mode of predication (or *quarto modo*), “the slaughtered thing died,” the slaughtering is an efficient cause of the death, or “the cooled thing cooled by being cooled,” the cooling is the efficient cause of the cooled thing. If we were to state, “the air conditioning cooled the room,” the cooling of the room is something essentially related to the air conditioning. It is not happenstance. Rather, the
air conditioning efficiently caused a room to become cool. Likewise, in the “runner is running,” the running is an essential effect and manifestation of a runner.\textsuperscript{113}

We should include a necessary caveat to this discussion of predication and participation. When the predicate is not essentially related to the subject in any of these three \textit{per se} modes of predication, then the predicate is accidentally related to the subject. For example in the sentence, “the man is running,” what is signified by “is running” does not belong to the essence of man. In that case, there is still a participation (e.g. man participates in the act of running), and it falls under the second mode of participation wherein a subject participates in an accident. As another example of accidental predication, in the sentence, “the musician is building,” what is signified by “is building” does not belong to the essence of a musician. There is nevertheless still a participation (e.g. musician participates in the act of building), which falls under the second mode of participation.

2.5 \textit{Existence: Substantial and Accidental Predicate}

For a fuller picture of predication and its foundation in being, we should return to \textit{Quodlibet} II (q. 2, a. 1) where Thomas distinguishes two types of predication by participation, 1) one way as though belonging to the thing’s essence and 2) another way as something not belonging to the thing’s essence. There is one way to participate in something as belonging to the essence of the thing and answering the question, “what is it?” of that thing. For example, man participates in animal, which belongs to the essence of man and answers the question, “what is

\textsuperscript{113} In some sense, I think “a being (\textit{ens}) is (\textit{est})” is an example of this essential mode of predication for Thomas insofar as “is,” a substantial being, signifies the act of an essence, a principle of being. I discuss this issue below.
man?” There is another way to participate in something as not belonging to the essence of the thing and as answering the question, “is it?” of that thing. For example, man participates in being (esse), which does not belong to the essence of man and yet answers the question, “is there man?” or “does man exist?”

After disqualifying the first way of participating in being (as belonging to its essence), Thomas explains the significance of creatures participating in being in the second way (as not belonging to its essence).

**Text 1:** So, since all that is outside a thing’s essence may be called an accident, being which pertains to the question “is it?” is an accident. Therefore, the Commentator says on *Metaphysica* that this proposition, “Socrates is,” is an accidental predicate inasmuch as it signifies either a thing’s being or the truth of a proposition.**114**

In Text 1, Thomas states that “Socrates is” is an accidental predicate when that proposition signifies either a thing’s being or a truth of a proposition (*secundum quod importat entitatem rei vel veritatem propositionis*). We have seen why Thomas thinks that the being which signifies the truth of a proposition is an accidental predicate, namely because the being signified in a proposition is accidentally related to things, yet Thomas here further states that the “is” that signifies a thing’s real being is an accidental predicate, too. This claim that being (esse), which signifies the real being of things, is an accidental predicate would seem to conflict in other texts where Thomas labels being a substantial predicate:

**Text 2:** Being (*ens*) is predicated differently according to each of these two modes since taken in the first way [as divided into the ten genera or predicaments] it is a substantial

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**114 Quodl.** II, q. 2, a. 1: “Unde participatur sicut aliquod non existens de essentia rei; et ideo alia quaestio est an est et quid est. Unde, cum omne quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicatur accidentis; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est, est accidentalis. Et ideo Commentator dicit in V Metaphysic., quod ista propositionis, Socrates est, est de accidentalis praedicato, secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis” (Leon. 25/2:215:58-66).
predicate and pertains to the question, “what is it?” but according to the second way [as signifying the truth of a proposition] it is an accidental predicate, as the Commentator says there and pertains to the question “is it?”

Text 1 seems to disagree with Text 2 insofar as Text 1 states that being (esse) is an accidental predicate whereas Text 2 states that being (esse) is a substantial predicate. In the proposition, “Socrates is,” the principal predicate in this expression is the verb itself, “is,” signifying that Socrates exists in reality. Yet how can the “is” in this statement be both a substantial and an accidental predicate? The solution to this difficulty lies in how “is” is signified. Being is said in many ways, of course, but there are also many modes of signifying being.

We should first know what Thomas considers to be the “thing signified” (res significata) by the term “being” (ens). We might mistakenly think that “being” signifies the existence of a thing, but in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Thomas states that neither a verb nor the term “being” signifies that a thing exists or not. That is why we can state, “it is nothing,” because the verb does not signify that something exists. We can especially see this point with “being”: “Being (ens) is nothing other than that which is (quod est), and thus we see that it signifies both a thing (res), when I say “that which,” (quod) and existence (esse) when I say “is”.

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115 In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1: “Respondeo dicendum, quod philosophus ostendit quod ens multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur ens quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens; sive sit substantia, ut homo; sive accidentis, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur, quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens adinvenit. . . . Ens autem secundum utrumque istorum modorum diversimode praedicatur: quia secundum primum modum acceptum, est praedicatum substantiale, et pertinet ad quaestionem quid est: sed quantum ad secundum modum, est praedicatum accidentale, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, et pertinet ad quaestionem an est” (Mandonnet ed., 2.872). We have seen this text before in our discussion of evil.

116 In II Peri. erm., lect. 2, no. 2: “Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod hoc verbum est quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est; per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura” (Leon. 1*1.88.36-52). Even when “is” is predicated as a third term in an enunciation, that is, with another term such as “white,” then the “is” is predicated as added to the principal predicate of “white” so that “is white” functions together as a predicate: “Socrates is white” does not mean that Socrates exists, but that Socrates has whiteness.
(est).”117 We should avoid the interpretation of that-which-is, then, as signifying existence because the word ‘being’ (ens) does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying “is” [est]; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence.118 I would add here that the being in the proposition “it is nothing” (nihil est) is strictly the signification of a verbal copula because what is signified by “it” is a rationate being, so what we are seeing here is that both types of being signify that-which-is: the being that is divided into the ten predicaments and the being signified by the verbal copula.

Thomas makes his point clearer in other passages. In his Commentary on Boethius’s De hebdomadibus, lectio 2, Thomas emphasizes numerous times that “being” (ens) signifies that-which-is (id quod est).119 The point of this Boethian passage, of course, is to distinguish that-which-is from existence (esse), and the way that Thomas shows the difference is by pointing to their modes of signifying. Regarding names and signification, Thomas often distinguishes between that by which (id a quo) a term is imposed to signify a thing and that which (id quod) a term is imposed to signify. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas explains that names sometimes denote the essence itself, as when the word “body” is imposed to signify a substance that

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117 In I Peri. erm., lect. 5, no. 20: “Et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non significat aliquid esse. Etenim hoc maxime videbatur de hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam quod est. Et sic videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico est.” For other passages where Thomas considers the signification of being as that which is or that which has esse, In XI Meta., lect. 3, no. 2197: “Nam ens simpliciter, dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia” (Marietti ed., 18.519); In IX Meta., lect. 11; In I Phys. lect. 3 no. 21. See McInerny, Being and Predication, 220: “the ratio entis can be viewed in different ways while always being quod est, habens esse or id quod habet esse.”

118 Ibid. For other passages where Thomas calls considers the signification of being as that which is or that which has esse, In XI Meta., lect. 3, no. 2197: “Nam ens simpliciter, dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia” (Marietti ed., 18.519); In I Phys. lect. 3, no. 21.

119 In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2: “Sed id quod est, sive ens, quamvis sit communissimum, tamen concretive dicitur. . . . Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod id quod est, scilicet ens, participare aliquo potest; sed ipsum esse nullo modo participat aliquo” (Leon. 50.270: 97-98, 102-104).
possesses three dimensions or when the word “life” is imposed to signify a substance that possesses the natural capacity for self-movement. According to Thomas, “life” and “body” signified in this way are substantial predicates. Sometimes, however, these names are imposed to signify some accident (or some action, or some effect) of the essence, as when the word “body” is imposed to signify the dimensions themselves, or when the word “life” is imposed to signify self-movement itself. According to Thomas, “life” and “body” signified in this way are accidental predicates. 120

This distinction helps us to discern the difference the signification of “being,” namely between that by which “being” (ens) is imposed to signify and that which “being” is imposed to signify. As Thomas explains, “this very name ‘being,’ is imposed from the act of being” 121 because the verb “is” signifies “that which first falls into the intellect in the mode of actuality absolutely.” 122 In this mode of signifying being, when we state an existential proposition, such as

120 ST I, q. 18, a. 2: “Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. . . Unde vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen vitae assumitur” (Leon. 4.226). The entire article is about whether life is an operation. The answer is that life is an operation only insofar as one thinks of life in terms of its properties. Properly speaking, life does not signify an operation, but a substance with the natural capacity for self-movement. Thomas’s entire response is noteworthy. In most other texts, Thomas uses the rudimentary example of “lapis” (stone), a term imposed from the conjunction of laedere (to hurt) and pedem (foot), which clearly does not signify its unhappy effect, namely to hurt-a-foot. This example comes from Isidore of Seville, Isidori Hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive originum libri 20, ed. Wallace Martin Lindsay (Oxford: 1962), 16.3.1 In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1; De potentia, q. 9 a. 3 ad 1; ST I, q. 13, a. 2 ad 2; ST I-II, q. 92, a. 1 ad 2; De veritate q. 4, a. 1 ad 8. See also E. J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying, 47-50.

121 See IV Meta., lect. 2, no. 553: “hoc vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi” (Marietti ed., 18.155); SCG I, 25: “nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse” (Leon. 13.77:13-14); In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1: “nomen entis ab esse imponitur” (Mandonnet ed., 1.486). See also De veritate, q. 1 a. 1 ad s.c. 3. By contrast, the name “thing” is imposed from the quiddity. See, for example, In I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 4 ad 1. See also McInerny, Being and Predication, 219; Fabro, Participation et Causalité, 266ff.

122 In I Peri. erm., lect. 5: “hoc verbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter dictum significat esse actu, et ideo significat per modum verbi” (Leon. 1*/1.31: 391-97).
“Socrates is,” the “is” can signify for Thomas that by which being is imposed to signify that-which-is, namely “nothing other than that Socrates exists in reality.” In that case, being (ens) is predicated of Socrates as that by which “being” is imposed to signify, namely the act of being (actus essendi) determining the subject term without qualification.

From these observations, we can make some conclusions regarding our problem texts. What we find in text (1) is that, whenever the “is” in “Socrates is” signifies that by which being (ens) is, being signified in this manner is an accidental predicate because existence is not that which is primarily signified by the subject. To-exist is not the primary aspect of Socrates as a being (ens). Indeed, Socrates needs an extrinsic efficient cause (God) in order to exist. The point is that to-exist is not part of Socrates as a being (ens) because his to-exist (esse) is really distinct from his essence. In terms of participation, this type of predication by participation belongs to the third type of participation because an effect (finite being) manifests in a diminished way that which belongs to a cause in a perfect way (subsisting being via common being).

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123 In II Peri. erm., lect. 2: “[H]oc verbum ‘est’ quandoque in enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil aliud intendimus significare quam quod Sortes sit in rerum natura” (Leon. 1*/1.88:36-52.).

124 This extrinsic efficient cause (God) that is primary and most universal produces the act of all acts and the perfections of all perfections. No other cause could produce an act that directs as a final cause every other finite principle. SCG III, 66, no. 4; ST I, q. 45, a 5; De potentia q. 7, a. 2. See McInerny, Being and Predication, 226: “Ens is not an accidental predicate insofar as what is denominated by the term is the subject of existence. Ens is an accidental predicate insofar as that from which the name is imposed to signify is praeter essentiam in the case of creatures. Since the creature is not that from which he is denominated ens, he is said to participate in it.”

125 For an intricate discussion on Thomas’s view of the participation of an individual in being (i.e. esse subsistens via esse commune), see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 110-122. We might stress here Wippel’s central point that esse commune cannot be identified with esse subsistens. Rather, finite creatures participate in esse commune (common being) because they ultimately participate in esse subsistens (God).
In text (2), Thomas speaks of existence (esse) as a substantial predicate insofar as it is the existence of a substance (esse substantiale), is the existence that is formally given by the substantial form, 126 and “results from matter and form when they are composed,” 127 and as such is the act of an essence. 128 We conclude that both text (1) and (2) signify the same thing by “existence,” but both passages signify existence with different modes of significations. Text (1) signifies existence as something that is the proper effect of God, something caused by an extrinsic agent, and text (2) signifies existence as something resulting from essence, the act of an essence. ‘Being’ is an accidental predicate when looked upon as perfecting essence, and ‘being’ is a substantial predicate when looked upon as determined by essence. The esse of a thing is simultaneously the proper effect of God and the “actuality of a some existing form.” 129


127 De ente et entitatis c. 6, no. 101: “ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale, quando componuntur” (Leon. 43.380:10-11).

128 De potentia q. 5 a. 4 ad 3; In I Sent. d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1. Cornelio Fabro speaks of this type of existence as the existence of an essence (esse essentiae) or as formal existence (esse formale). See his Participation et Causalité: “L’esse essentiae est la réalité formelle de l’essence en sa structure logico-métaphysique considérée en elle-même, c’est-à-dire comme faisant abstraction tant de l’esse logique (comme espèce) que de l’esse réel (comme substance singulière): on pourrait l’appeler l’esse formale” (262). Fabro thinks we can clarify some of Thomas’s language by distinguishing between the existence of an essence and the act of being: “Il y a donc l’esse essentiae et l’esse qui est l’actus essendi; dans la sphère de l’esse essentiae se dessine la distinction entre l’ens (esse) substantiale et l’ens (accidentale), nous l’avons dit: mais l’esse actualisant, l’actus essendi, n’est pas divisible parce qu’il désigne la qualification absolue de l’acte qui opère la première discrimination du réel et du premier fondement de la vérité.” (267).

129 Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod esse est accidentis, non quasi per accidentes se habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae; unde ipse Deus, qui est sua actualitas, est suum esse” (Leon. 25/2.215.88-91). See also Quodl. XII, q. 5, a. 1. For further discussion, Stephen L. Broc, “Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas and the De hebdomadibus,” Nova et Vétera 5 (2007), 465-494.
2.6 Denominative Predication

We have seen Thomas’s insistence on the composite mode of human knowing. We acquire indivisible notions through a collage of impressed species informed by sensate experiences, and we hit truth by composing or separating these indivisible notions into propositions. This structure of predication reflects the structure of participation. The structure of participant and participated, between something that receives and something that is received, is the reason why “creatures are said in the concrete.”\footnote{In III Sent. d. 11, q. 1, a. 3 ad 4: “Creatura autem in concretione dicitur, quia omne creatum est creatura” (Mandonnet ed., 3.368).} Moreover, since “everything which participates in something is related to that which is participated as potency to act,”\footnote{SCG II, 53: “Omne participans aliquid comparatur ad ipsum quod participatur ut potentia ad actum” (Leon. ed., 13.391). See also ST I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4. See Bernard Montagnes, Doctrine de l’analogie de l’être, 54-56.} predication reflects that dual structure accordingly: propositions consist in a quasi-material and receptive subject and a quasi-formal and determining predicate, and each term signifies the same thing in different ways.\footnote{ST q. 13, a. 12; In I Peri. erm., lect. 8, n. 9.}

In material things, we find this structure within the double helix of composition and predication.\footnote{Geiger speaks of composition and predication by participation as a necessary link. “Cette liaison nécessaire entre la composition d’un être et l’attribution par participation marque, et l’intime connexion, et la diversité partielle des deux thèmes de la composition et de la participation.” See his La Participation, 167, no. 3.} There is a logical composition whereby the universal whole is predicated of its subjective part (e.g. Socrates is a man; man is a rational animal). This type of predication entails a potency-act relationship according to the first mode of participation, whereby the less universal whole participates in a more universal whole. There is additionally a real composition of accident with its subject whereby an accident is predicated of its subject (e.g. man is white;
Socrates is in Piraeus).\textsuperscript{134} This type of predication entails a potency-act relationship according to the second mode of participation, whereby a material subject receives a determining form. In the second mode of participation, that which is ultimately signified materially receives that which is ultimately signified formally. This latter mode of predicating is especially important because, unlike the first mode of predication, it reveals a real difference in the essence of things. Indeed, whereas the essence of Socrates and the essence of man are the same, the essence of Socrates and the essence of white are not the same.

This is why denominative predication, which manifests real differences, is so important for the method of predication. Wary of mistaking the real and the logical orders, which would conflate the first two modes of participation, Thomas cautions the construction of arguments according to the first mode of participation:

Now it must be noted that what has been said here cannot be understood to apply to the univocal predication in which genera are predicated of the species in whose definitions they are given because man and animal do not differ essentially. Rather, this (discussion) must be understood to belong to denominative predication, as when white is predicated of man, for the quiddity of white differs from that of man. Hence he adds that the other genera are predicated of substance in this way, that is, denominatively, and that substance is predicated of matter denominatively.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{134} ST I, q. 85, a. 5 ad 3: “Intellectus enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae sub sensu et imaginacione cadit. Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particolare vero a materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus” (Leon. 5.341).

\textsuperscript{135} In VII Meta., lect. 2, no. 1288: “Sciendum autem est, quod id, quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative” (Marietti ed., 18.323). Geiger interprets this passage as a critique of Aristotle’s logic: “Il est remarquable de voir S. Thomas critiquer, au nom de cette distinction, le raisonnement logique par lequel Aristote entend établir la nature exacte de la matière première. . . . La diversité des structures et des relations ontologiques est requise pour faire échec à
Thomas disqualifies the first mode of *per se* predication and thereby the first mode of participation in arguments for the reality of prime matter and in arguments for the reality of the nine accidents (“the other genera”). Instead, we manifest these realities according to denominative predication: “Concrete or denominative predication shows that, just as substance differs essentially from accidents, in a similar fashion matter differs essentially from substantial forms.”

Unlike univocal predication in the first *per se* mode of predication (e.g. genus of species), denominative predication shows something whose quiddity does not belong in another.

How, then, is denominative predication different from the first mode of *per se* predication? The first thing to notice is that denominative predication always involves predicating an accident: denominative predication occurs when “accidents are predicated of substance” for Thomas. By contrast, as we have seen, the first mode of *per se* predication involves predicating essential terms.

The second thing to notice is that while denominative predication is concrete, the first *per se* mode can be abstract. In other words, in the first mode of *per se* predication the predicate is signified as something abstract, and in the denominative mode of predication, the predicate is signified as something concrete. Concrete accidental terms (e.g. “white”) primarily signify

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136 *In VII Meta.*, lect. 2, no. 1289: “Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est aliquid per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliquid est materia a formis substantialibus” (Marietti ed., 18.323).

137 *In VII Meta.*, lect. 2, no. 1289: “Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur” (Marietti ed., 18.323).

138 *Esse* cannot be signified in the second mode of participation because *esse* is signified in the abstract. We may assume that in the second mode of predication, then, the predicate is always signified in the concrete. In the
accidents, yet they do not signify the accident exclusively. If they did signify the accident exclusively, then they would be abstract accidental terms (e.g. “whiteness”). For Thomas, accidents signified in the concrete do not belong to a predicament except by reduction; they belong to a predicament only when signified in the abstract.139 Nevertheless, Thomas will not go as far as (his interpretation of) Avicenna. Concrete accidental terms signify accidents primarily and substance by implication:

Now the term white implies a subject inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the manner of an accident, so that it must by implication [ex consequenti] include the subject in its notion because the being of an accident consists in being in something. For even though whiteness signifies an accident, it still does not signify this after the manner of an accident but after that of a substance. Hence it implies a subject in no way.140

Whatever is an accident must inhere or be in (inessa) a subject, so whatever is predicated in the mode of an accident must imply a subject, but whatever is predicated in the mode of a substance does not imply a subject. Concrete accidental terms (e.g. white) imply a subject because they signify in the manner of an accident, but abstract accidental terms (e.g. whiteness) do not imply a subject because they signify in the manner of a substance.141

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139 De ente et essentia, c. 5: “Unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica” (Leon. 43.381:123-128).


141 See Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying,” 57-58.
We can see the difference in predicating according to the first mode of *per se* predication and according to a concretive mode of predication even as we predicate accidents themselves. Thomas states that an accident can be taken in two ways: “First, it can be taken in the abstract. In this way, it is considered according to its proper nature [*propriam rationem*], a genus and species are given it, and its subject is not placed in its definition as a genus but rather as a specific difference.”\(^{142}\) For example, in the abstract predication, “snubness is a curvature of the nose,” the definition (curvature of the nose) consists in a genus (curvature) and a specific difference that is the subject (nose). This way of predicating flows from the first mode of participation whereby a lesser universal participates in a higher universal, as participating in something signified in the abstract. In this way, snubness participates in its definition.

The other way that accident can be taken is in the concrete: “In this way, it is considered according as it has an accidental unity with its subject. Hence, neither a genus nor a species is assigned to it. Here it is true that the subject is put in the place of the genus in the definition of an accident.”\(^{143}\) For example, in the concrete predication, “a snub nose is a curved nose,” the definition (a curved nose) consists in a genus that is the subject (nose) and in a specific difference (curved). This way of predicating flows from the second mode of participation whereby substance participates in an accidental form and whereby matter participates in a substantial form, as participating in something signified in the concrete. In this way, the snub

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\(^{142}\) *De veritate* q. 3, a. 7 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subjectum non ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: simitas est curvitas nasi . . . .” (Leon. 22/1.114:105-112).

\(^{143}\) *De veritate* q. 3, a. 7 ad 2: “. . . Alio modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subjecto; unde sic non assignantur eiusmod genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subjectum ponitur ut genus in definitione accidentis” (Leon. 22/1.114:112-117).
nose participates in the accidental form of curvature. Whereas the subject is placed in the specific difference in the abstract mode of predicating a definition, the subject is placed in the genus in the concretive mode of predicating a definition. What we are also seeing is that the denominative mode of predication includes the accidental (per accidens) mode of predication, which mode of predication flows from the second mode of participation.

It is by now clear that, for Thomas, the denominative mode of predication cannot be predicated in the abstract. We must further distinguish the denominative mode of predication from the first mode of per se predication, however, since the first mode of per se predication can also be concrete (“man is an animal”). The concrete mode of signifying does not sufficiently distinguish the denominative mode of predication.

The difference is as follows. In denominative predication, the predicate directly regards the supposit ultimately signified by the subject: “white” directly regards the supposit ultimately signified by “Socrates” in “Socrates is white,” and “wooden” directly regards the supposit ultimately signified by “the chest” in “the chest is wooden.” To speak more precisely, the predicate is a concrete term ultimately signifying a form, but a form inheres in the supposit of the concrete subject: In “Socrates is white,” “white” signifies a form that is in a concrete subject and a supposit (Socrates); in “chest is wooden,” “wooden” signifies a form that is in a concrete subject and a supposit (a chest). Denominative predication is opposed to the first per se mode of predication because, in the first per se mode of predication, the predicate does not in-form the subject since the predicate is already the formal cause of the subject.

Thomas is not as clear about the second per se mode of predication. In the second mode of per se predication, the predicate is a proper accident of the subject, one of Porphyry’s four
For some indication of what Thomas may have thought about the second mode of *per se* predication and denominative predication, we may turn to Thomas’s own teacher, Albert of Cologne. Albert argues that property is not predicated denominatively. The reason he gives is that property flows from essential principles whereas denominative terms derive from another nature and exist in the subject due to an external cause. I think that Thomas would follow Albert’s interpretation. When we predicate “risible” of “man,” then I interpret him to consider “risible” as not predicated denominatively of man because risibility concerns the specific nature of man rather than the supposit. The property of risibility principally flows out of man’s *ratio* and only man’s *ratio*. Although we predicate “is walking” of Socrates insofar as he is Socrates (denominative predication), we predicate “risible” of Socrates insofar as he is man (not denominative predication).

In this chapter, we saw the way Thomas views essential being (*per se*) and accidental being (*per accidens*) by considering the many different ways something is predicated based on

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144 “Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando subjectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius” (*In I Post. an. lect. 10*).

145 “For although these four universals (genus, species, differentia, and property) are signified concretely, that does not make them denominative. And although they are words for the whole existence that provides the word and the idea for the things they are predicated of, that does not make them denominative either. For they are either essential to the things they are predicated of, or they flow from such essential principles. Denominative words, on the other hand, are formed from another nature, which exists in the subject thanks to an external cause, not an essential one. And therefore they can be predicated denominatively, not essentially. Such is the case, for instance, when we say a human being is white or black or the like.” “Quamvis enim sic quatuor universalia quae sunt genus et species, differentia et proprium, concretionis modo significari habeant, non tamen propter hoc sunt denominativa, sed sunt totius esse nomina nomen et rationem dantis ei de quo praedicantur : quod non faciunt denominativa, quia ista non sunt nisi vel essentialia ejus /116b/ de quo praedicantur, vel ex essentialibus principiis manantia : denominativa autem formantur ab aliena natura, quae per causam non essentialem, sed infinitam esse habent in subjecto, et ideo non essentialiter, sed denominative possunt prae dicar i : sicut cum dicitur, homo est albus vel niger vel aliquid hujusmodi. Haec autem in doctrina praedicamentorum habent determinari. Talis ergo est intentio proprii apud logicos, et talis est divisio ipsius. De proprio ergo haec dicta sufficiunt” (*Super Porphyrium De V universalibus*, ed. Borgnet, 1890, tract. 6, cap. 2, p. 116a).
the essential or accidental causal relationship a predicate has toward its subject. That focus on
this subject-predicate relationship helps us to understand why truths of propositions (“true
being”) even regarding nonbeings and accidental beings are at the same time accidental
predicates (due to the coincidental relationship of being with the mind) and essential beings (due
to the unifying role of the copula). We also considered the analogous relationship between truth
of a proposition with complete being (ten predicaments), which is the primary sense of essential
being that is the cause and foundation of the other.

We expanded on further types of predication, including predication by essence and
predication by participation, and focused on the need for a concrete type of participation. We
explained how the modes of predication, for Thomas, flow from the mode of being, including the
mode of participation. We finished with a discussion of denominative predication that allows us
to predicate of concrete supposits in a way that attends to the analogous and individual mode of
being. As we shall see in the next chapter, these modes of predication will turn up in our
discussion of Thomas’s application of the method of predication in an explicit way: Thomas
relies on the denominative mode of predication to divide being into ten predicaments and to
prove the reality of prime matter, and he relies on the essential modes of predication to prove the
unicity of the substantial form.
CHAPTER FOUR: THOMAS ON THE USE OF THE METHOD OF PREDICATION

In this chapter, I shall consider Thomas’s application of the method of predication to various noteworthy metaphysical issues. Before examining his applications of the method of predication, I examine Thomas’s claim that earlier authors misused this way of proceeding rationally in treating different metaphysical issues. Then, I examine some examples of Thomas’s own positive application of this rational method in different contexts. Thomas uses it in order to divide being into general and special modes of being, the transcendentals and predicaments respectively, and he uses it in order to prove the reality of prime matter in a properly metaphysical fashion and the unicity of substantial form. I shall analyze Thomas’s arguments for their soundness and consider alternative interpretations from some of Thomas’s near contemporaries and from modern interpreters.

1.0 Thomas’s Critique of the Improper Use of the Method of Predication

Throughout his writings, Thomas often presents ways to avoid possible mistakes in the appropriation of the modes of signifying and understanding. For example, by considering the mode of understanding we can avoid mistaking angelic power of knowing for the angelic essence, divine being for common being (esse commune), and the virtues as though they were subsisting virtues.¹ These few examples are enough to show that Thomas thinks that arguments

¹ For the reference to angelic essence, ST I, q. 54, a. 1 ad 3. For the reference to common being, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1 ad 1; De potentia q. 7, a. 2 ad 6; ST I, q. 3, a. 4 ad 1. For the reference to subsisting virtues, QDdVirt q. 1, a. 11. See Keith Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the ‘Modi Significandi,’” The Modern Schoolman 64 (1987), 73-95, esp. 81. Buersmeyer’s article emphasizes Thomas’s “critical approach to language” and the “refracting” role of the mode of understanding (83ff.). By the “refracting” role of the human mode of understanding, Buersmeyer means that knowing the mode of signifying things is insufficient to attaining the truth. We must also be aware of the
should not just rely on the human mode of understanding because the human mode of understanding does not entirely reflect the mode of being.

Indeed, Thomas accuses many authors of relying on the mode of understanding without sufficiently reflecting upon its limits. We turn now to his most wide-ranging criticism of authors who rely on arguments based on concepts (ex intentionibus intellectis) for their metaphysics. In Bk II of Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences (d. 17, q. 1, a. 1), Thomas responds to a question about whether the human soul is made of the divine essence. Although not accusing them of pantheism, Thomas turns to a number of authors (Parmenides, Melissus, Pythagoras, Plato, and Avicebron) criticizing them for holding onto a “principle” and “foundation” that could lead to pantheistic thinking:

Of all these errors and many more like them, there is one principle and foundation (fundamentum), which when destroyed, leaves nothing probable. Many authors of antiquity wished to make a judgment about things in nature based on concepts (ex intentionibus intellectis) hence whenever objects were found to agree in some one concept, these authors wanted those objects to agree in one [real] thing (in una re).²

To these authors, Thomas ascribes a “fundamental operative principle,” a basic starting point that governs the whole argument or one that evinces a given philosophical approach, of directly

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² In II Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 1: “Horum autem omnium errorum et similium unum videtur esse principium et fundamentum, quo destructo, nihil probabilis remanet. Plures enim antiquorum ex intentionibus intellectis judicium rerum naturalium sumere volunt: unde quaecumque inveniuntur convenire in aliqua intentione intellecta, voluerunt quod communicarent in una re” (Mandonnet ed., 2.413). The term “pantheism” is not used, but the idea that God is of the essence of substances is a pantheistic view. “In the Sentences St. Thomas explicitly associates exaggerated realism and univocal predication with the naturalism of the ancient philosophers and the pantheism of David of Dinant. Universal hylomorphism, then, stems from the same sort of reasoning which fostered the foolish error of identifying God and the material universe.” See Francis Collins, The Thomistic Philosophy of the Angels (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1947), 56. For a reference to Albert the Great’s grouping of Avicebron and David of Dinant, see pp. 61-62.
making claims about reality based on concepts. If we refute this fundamental operative principle, Thomas states, then we also refute the position of the author. As we shall see, Thomas does not entirely “destroy” the foundation and principle of using reason and reason’s modes and insights. In order to better evaluate Thomas’s own use of a rational method in metaphysics, we shall briefly look at some specific mistakes Thomas thinks other authors have made in using this fundamental operative principle.

1.1 Mistaken Argument for the Absolute Unity of Being

According to Thomas’s statements in Bk II of his Commentary on the *Sentences* (d. 17, q. 1, a. 1), the error of conflating the logical and the real orders in metaphysical arguments begins with Parmenides and Melissus. These authors saw that “being [*ens*] was predicated of all things,” so “they spoke of being (*ens*) as of just one thing, indicating being to be one and not many.”

In Bk I of his Commentary on the *Physics*, Thomas also notes that Parmenides and Melissus make the logical inference from the absolute unity of being by not distinguishing the many uses of the term ‘one,’ so when they predicated ‘one’ of ‘being,’ they rejected any multiplicity within being. They regarded being as absolutely one. By directly correlating the way of predication to

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3 I am borrowing the phrase, “fundamental operative principle,” from R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956) 297-98, 301, 307. Henle’s elaboration of the *via-positio* distinction/technique is instructive. In briefest terms, the *via* (the reason given for a position) determines the *positio* (the opinion held)(421). For Henle’s interpretation of *In II Sent*. d. 17 (q. 1, a. 1) cited above, see 375-376.

4 *In II Sent*. d. 17, q. 1, a. 1: “et inde ortus est erro Parmenidis et Melissi, qui videntes ens praedicare de omnibus, locuti sunt de ente sicut de una quadam re, ostendentes ens esse unum et non multa, ut eorum rationes indicant in I *Physicor*. rectitae” (Mandonnet ed., 2.413).

the way of being, the views of Parmenides and Melissus would seem to represent for Thomas the first case of logicism in the history of philosophy.

We shall pass over what Thomas identifies as Melissus’ “more primitive” argument and consider what he views as Parmenides’ “more insightful” argument for why being is one in Bk I of Thomas’s Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Thomas summarizes Parmenides’ argument this way: “Whatever is besides being (ens) is non-being (non ens), and whatever is non-being is deemed to be nothing, that is [Parmenides] considered non-being to be nothing. Hence, he thought that it necessarily followed that being is one, and that whatever is other than being is nothing.”

Thomas clarifies that this argument considers being, not according to the senses (secundum sensum), but according to the notion of being (secundum rationem entis). That is an important qualifier because it shows the rational mode of argumentation: Parmenides is not arguing based on knowledge gained from his senses, which admittedly report “many things,” but rather he is arguing that “all things are one according to reason.”

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7 *In I Meta*. lect. 9, no. 138: “In quo patet quod considerabat ipsam rationem essendi quae videtur esse una, quia non potest intelligi quod ad rationem entis aliquid superveniat per quod diversificetur” (Marietti ed.,18.41); *In I Phys*. lect. 6, no. 37: “Ex ipsis autem eorum rationibus patet quod Parmenides considerabat ens secundum rationem entis, et ideo ponebat ens esse unum et finitum” (Marietti ed.,14.24).

8 *In I Meta*. lect. 9, no. 143: “Licet autem Parmenides ista ratione cogatur ad ponendum omnia esse unum; tamen quia sensui apparebat multitudinem esse in rebus, coactus sequi ea quae apparent, voluit in sua positione utrique satisfacere, et apparentiae sensus et rationi. Unde dixit quod omnia sunt unum secundum rationem, sed sunt plura secundum sensum” (Marietti ed.,18.42); *In I Phys*. lect. 10, no. 76: “Quorum Parmenides dixit quod omnia sunt unum secundum rationem, sed sunt plura secundum sensum” (Marietti ed.,14.42). See also *In I Meta*. lect. 5, nos. 95, 101.
This rationalism is the source of Parmenides’ mistake. Parmenides takes a logical notion of being, namely that being is a genus, and he transposes that notion into the real order. Treating ‘being’ as a genus is problematic because a genus requires a specific difference to be diversified. For example, the genus ‘animal’ is diversified by the differences of ‘rational’ (e.g. man) and ‘non-rational’ (e.g. dog), and these specific differences of ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ are not themselves taken from the genus ‘animal.’ These difference are taken from something outside the genus; ‘rational’ is not included in ‘animal’. If we were to assume that ‘being’ were a genus, then we would have no specific differences because there is nothing apart from ‘being;’ no intelligible content falls outside of the notion of being. Hence, nothing apart from being can diversify being. Parmenides mistakenly thinks that this logical necessity shows being to be absolutely one.9

It is most interesting to note that Thomas calls Parmenides’ argument “sophistical.” One reason he gives is that Parmenides assumes false propositions, namely that “‘being signifies one only” and also that “being is univocal.” It is not possible to argue demonstratively against this view because it ignores an immediately known and indemonstrable first principle, namely that that-which-is or being is said in many ways. Parmenides ignores the analogy of being. This false assumption sets up Parmenides’ argument for failure because, whereas being cannot be restricted to a univocal notion, Parmenides argues about being as though it were merely a univocal notion.

9 In I Phys. lect. 3, no. 21: “Dicit ergo primo: quod id quod maxime accipiendum est pro principio ad disputandum contra positionem praedictam, est quod id quod est, idest ens, dicitur multipliciter” (Marietti ed., 14.14); In I Phys. lect. 6, no. 39: “Dicit ergo primo quod Parmenides assumit propositiones falsas, quia accipit quod est, idest ens, dici simpliciter, idest uno modo, cum tamen dicatur multipliciter” (Marietti ed., 14.24); In I Phys. lect. 6, no. 42: “sed supponitur a Parmenide quod ens significat unum tantum” (Marietti ed., 14.25).
He thereby entirely does away with distinctions between things.\(^{10}\) While Thomas may have agreed with the claim that “being” and “one” signify the same thing, since one is a transcendental property of being, he cannot agree that being is only one in the realm of nature because the senses show otherwise.\(^{11}\)

In addition to criticizing Parmenides for mistaking being as univocal, Thomas also thinks that Parmenides’ argument is sophistical because Parmenides syllogizes incorrectly. By that claim, we should understand Thomas to mean that Parmenides neglects relative nonbeing. By that I mean, Parmenides can state that “being is not nonbeing,” and he can also state that in a certain way, “nonbeing is nothing.” In the second use of “nonbeing,” “nonbeing” signifies absolute nonbeing (absolute nothingness), but in the first use of “nonbeing,” “nonbeing” can signify either absolute nonbeing or relative nonbeing (nonbeing in a qualified sense). Parmenides does not allow a distinction between these two senses of nonbeing.\(^{12}\)

### 1.2 Mistaken Argument for Separate Abstract Essences

Thomas often joins Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato, yet he also appropriates in his own way some of Plato’s metaphysical views. Thomas respects some Platonic (and Augustinian)

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\(^{10}\) *In I Meta.* lect. 9, no. 139: “Sed in hoc decipiebantur, quia utebantur ente quasi una ratione et una natura sicut est natura alicuius generis; hoc enim est impossibile. Ens enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur de diversis. Et ideo in primo *Physicorum* dicitur quod haec est falsa, Ens est unum: non enim habet unam naturam sicut unum genus vel una species” (Marietti ed., 18.41-42) See also *In X Meta.* lect. 12, no. 2651.

\(^{11}\) *In I Phys.* lect. 2, no. 17: “Hoc autem quod sint sophisticae, habent utraeque rationes et Melissi et Parmenidis: peccant enim in materia, unde dicit quod falsa recipiunt, isted falsas propositiones assumunt; et peccant in forma, unde dicit quod non syllogizantes sunt” (Marietti ed., 14.10). See also *In I Meta.* lect. 9, no. 134; *In I Phys.* lect. 5, no. 30. Aristotle labels Parmenides’s argument as “contentious” (*lógon èristikón, Phys.* 1.2.185a13).

\(^{12}\) I am stating that, although he does not state so explicitly in any of his extant writings, Thomas views Parmenides’s argument as committing the fallacy of equivocation. *De Trinitate,* q. 4, a. 1. See also Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought,* 72, 178. For the difference between sophistry and dialectic, *In IV Meta.* lect. 4, no. 573. Relative nonbeing (nonbeing in a qualified sense) includes being that is not its own cause. The effect of any cause lacks something with respect to its cause.
metaphysical positions, and he also respects the Platonic method for arriving at those positions to a certain extent. Thomas nevertheless rejects Plato’s “dialectical” or “logical” (logice) mode of argumentation,\textsuperscript{13} not because it is dialectical or logical, but because it is not critical enough. Thomas summarily explains why he disagrees with Plato in Bk I of his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (lect. 10): “Now to one who carefully examines Plato’s arguments, it is evident that Plato’s position was false because he believed that the mode of a thing that is understood is, in its very being (esse), the same as the mode of understanding the thing.”\textsuperscript{14} Although the mode of understanding flows from the mode of being, for Thomas, Plato mistakenly identifies the modes of understanding and being.

According to Thomas, Plato’s fundamental error is the belief that “whatever is abstract in the intellect is abstract in reality.”\textsuperscript{15} Plato applied to the mode of things the principle of similitude, namely that everything produces something similar to itself, because the mode of things produces in the intellect something like itself. In doing so, Plato inverts the reasoning of the naturalists. Whereas the naturalists hold that we know the soul to be material because things are material, Plato stated that the things we know are in reality immaterial because that is how they are in the soul. That is to say, Plato concluded to an immaterial mode of being based on the

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\textsuperscript{13} *In XII Meta*. lect. 1, no. 2423; *In I De Gen et Cor*. lect. 3, no. 25. We are concerned with Thomas’s views of Plato and the Platonists, not a consideration of Plato, which was briefly attempted in chapter one.


\textsuperscript{15} *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3: “Existimavit etiam quod quidquid est abstractum in intellectu, sit abstractum in re: alias uidetur et quod intellectus abstrahens esset falsus aut uanus, si nulla res abstracta ei responderet; propter quod etiam crediderunt mathematica esse abstracta a sensibilibus, quia sine eis intelliguntur” (Leon. 24.2.40:287-293); *De veritate* q. 21, a. 4: “Plato ea quae possunt separari secundum intellectum, ponebat etiam secundum esse separata” (Leon. 22/3.601:151-152). See Henle, *Thomas and Platonism*, 333.
immaterial mode of knowing.\textsuperscript{16} Because our intellect knows by abstracting universals from
singles and by abstracting mathematical objects from sensible objects, he posited that each
process of abstraction corresponds to an abstract essence. He thereby posited separately
subsisting mathematical objects and Forms.\textsuperscript{17}

To this Platonic way of reasoning, Thomas retorts: it is “not necessary that everything
that is a principle of knowledge be a principle of existence.”\textsuperscript{18} Thomas accepts the principle of
similitude, but he disagrees with Plato’s position because, in addition to the principle of
similitude, he believes in the \textit{modus} principle. The \textit{modus} principle states that everything that
exists in something else exists there according to the mode of the recipient. Thomas applies this
axiom to distinguish the mode of understanding and being:

Therefore, considering the nature of the intellect, which is other than the nature of the
thing known, the mode of understanding, by which the intellect understands, must be one
kind of mode, and the mode of being, by which things exist, must be another. For
although the object which the intellect understands must exist in reality, it does not exist
[in the intellect] according to the same mode.\textsuperscript{19}

Thomas agrees with Plato’s position that the intellect understands by becoming assimilated to
some thing through that thing’s form--in other words, the \textit{intellect} becomes like the thing known-

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{ST} I, q. 84, a. 1. See Henle, \textit{Thomas and Platonism}, 326.
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{In 1 Meta}. lect. 10, no. 158: “Et ideo quia invenit intellectum nostrum dupliciter abstracta intelligere, uno
modo sicut universalia intelligimus abstracta a singularibus, alio modo sicut mathematica abstracta a sensibilibus,
utrique abstractioni intellectus posuit respondere abstractionem in essentiis rerum: unde posuit et mathematica esse
separata et species” (Marietti ed.,18.47).
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 3 ad 4: “Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est principium cognoscendi, sit
principium essendi, ut Plato existimavit” (Leon. 5.337).
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{In 1 Meta}. lect. 10, no. 158: “Hoc autem non est necessarium. Nam intellectus etsi intelligat res per hoc,
quod similis est eis quantum ad speciem intelligibilem, per quam fit in actu; non tamen oportet quod modo illo sit
species illa in intellectu quo in re intellecta: nam omne quod est in aliquo, est per modum eius in quo est. Et ideo ex
natura intellectus, quae est alia a natura rei intellectae, necessarium est quod alius sit modus intelligendi quo
intellectus intelligit, et alius sit modus essendi quo res existit. Licet enim id in re esse oporteat quod intellectus
intelligit, non tamen eodem modo” (Marietti ed.,18.47); \textit{ST} I, q. 84, a. 1. For a fine examination of the “modus
principle” in Thomas Aquinas’s writings, see John Tomarchio’s dissertation (cited above in ch. 2).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
-yet he disagrees with Plato’s position that the *mode* of our intellect’s knowing must be the same as the mode of the thing’s being. Though there may be a formal likeness between the existing thing and the understood thing, there is not a formal likeness between the *mode* of the existing thing and the mode of the understood thing. Thus, material things exist in a material way in reality but can be present in the intellect in an immaterial way according to the intellect’s own mode.

In addition to overlooking the *modus* principle, Plato’s theory of human knowing also lacked two important noetic elements, and overlooking these elements prevented Plato from seeing the refractive nature of thought, that the mode of understanding does not parallel the mode of being. One factor that Plato’s doctrine omits is the agent intellect. The absence of an agent intellect in Plato’s theory of knowledge presents severe problems because, without affirming a power that dematerializes the individuating principles of phantasms, Plato had to consider the presence of universals in the mind as evidence of universals in reality. Plato was forced (*coactus fuit*) to posit universals as existing separate from matter and from any individuating principle because he thought there was no intellect to abstract or to separate mathematical objects and universals from matter. According to Plato, these objects of the intellect must already exist separate from matter; they must be actually intelligible in themselves.20

Another even more important element that Plato omits in his theory of abstraction, according to Thomas, is the distinction between the first act of the intellect knowing indivisibles

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20 *In III De Anima*, lect. 12, no. 784: “Et quia hunc modum abstractionis Plato non consideravit, coactus fuit ponere mathematica et species separatas, loco cuius ad praedictam abstractionem faciendam Aristoteles posuit intellectum agentem” (Leon. 45/1.234:300-304). See also *In XII Meta*, lect. 2, no. 2426; *ST* I, q. 44, a. 3 ad 3; *In I De Anima*, lect. 4, no. 48. In the latter Commentary on the *De Anima*, Thomas explains that Aristotle first thought of an agent intellect to avoid the problems associated with Plato’s theory of abstract essences.
and the second act of the intellect composing and dividing indivisibles. Plato treats these two acts of the intellect as functionally the same.\textsuperscript{21} This confusion means that in the “very conception and understanding of abstract essences,” as R. J. Henle explains, “Plato thought he was already in contact with subsisting realities, \textit{although what he was really understanding was only abstract essences}.”\textsuperscript{22} The result of this error leads to “the wholesale transposition of abstractions and distinctions from the intellect into reality.”\textsuperscript{23} Without a distinct theory of joining and separating indivisible essences as they are assimilated into the intellect, he must assert the existence of all indivisible essences. Every intelligible must exist as such for Plato.

The distinction between the first two acts of the mind is important because in the first act of the mind we can understand something under so many varied aspects without having to assert existence. We can consider something \textit{otherwise} than it is. In the first act of the mind (by way of simple and absolute consideration), we understand one thing without considering the other. In this type of abstraction, “if we consider color and its properties without considering the colored apple, or if we express in a word what we understand (by the term, “color”),” according to Thomas, “then there is no error in such an opinion or assertion because an apple is not in the notion of color.”\textsuperscript{24} In the second act of the mind (by way of composition and division), we do

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\item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 2: “Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem” (Leon. 5.331).
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Henle, \textit{Thomas and Platonism}, 372. Italics in original.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 335.
\item \textsuperscript{24} In II \textit{De Anima}, lect. 12, no. 379; \textit{ST} I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 1: “Si enim intelligamus vel dicamus colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in opinione vel in oratione. Si vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius, nihil considerantes de pomo colorato; vel quod sic intelligimus, etiam voce exprimamus; erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis. Pomum enim non est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibit colorem intelligi, nihil intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. . . . Non est autem verum quod proponitur, si aliter accipiatur ex parte
understand something as existing or not existing in another. In the second act, we reintegrate varied insights about a thing back to the thing itself, and we thereby assert whether and how the thing exists.

This difference in theories of human understanding shows how Thomas can use a logical method. In Thomas’s own employment of the logical method, the metaphysician attends to differences in the mode of understanding and being, so he modifies the discoveries in predication in accordance with the limits of the order of understanding. In the second act of the mind, we not only grasp natures, but also assert the existence of a thing upon which that truth is founded. The mode of being is always kept in mind by the metaphysician. We compose or divide by reintegrating the manifold of abstracted intelligibles, including the individuating properties and even the act of the essence, into the singular thing. We then express this discovery in an act of predication.

It has been said that “Thomas’s evaluation of Platonism is mixed.” One of the reasons for that mixed estimation is that, whereas Thomas considers the logical method as valid, he thinks that Plato did not apply this method correctly. Unlike Plato’s own rational method, Thomas’s logical method follows the exigencies of attending to real things in a way that is made possible only through the mind’s reflection upon the modes of understanding, signifying, and

intelligentis. Est enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo” (Leon. 5.331). See Henle, Thomas and Platonism, 334.

25 Henle takes the opportunity to emphasize the “existentialism” of Thomas and the “essentialism” of Plato: “There is, therefore, a surplus of intelligibility -- of a different kind indeed -- in the compositio et divisio -- over and above the intelligibility which can be extracted from reality in the simple apprehension. This surplus is a dynamic grasp of the act of existence not abstractly taken but as exercised in reality. It is for this reason that the second operation is and must be assertive” (372).

26 SCG 96, no. 10. See also Knasas, Being and Some, 190-191.

27 See Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, 265. For the full reference, see below.
predicating. The contrast is clear. Whereas Plato’s *via abstractionis* fails because it disregards the distinct mode of human understanding, Thomas’s *via praedicationis* (presumably) succeeds because it entails an “explicit reflective awareness” of both acts of the mind while attending to the mode of understanding.\(^{28}\) Through this method, metaphysics can make definitions and draw insights about reality from logic while still distinguishing the logical from the real.

1.3 Mistaken Arguments for Spiritual Matter

Subsequent to the defense of spiritual matter (universal hylomorphism) by Alexander of Hales (1185-1245) and Bonaventure (1221-1274), the theory that there is a material as well as a formal component in spiritual creatures blossomed in the writings of Franciscans.\(^{29}\) Thomas does not explicitly aim his remarks at any of these authors, but following the example of Albert the Great (1200-1280), he names an indirect non-Latin source for this view of spiritual matter to a Jewish-Spaniard named Avicebron (Avempace, Ibn Gabirol).\(^{30}\) In our introduction to this

\(^{28}\) See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 358. For Thomas’s label of *via abstractionis* to Plato’s mode of argumentation, *De Malo* q. 16, a. 1: “Plato autem per viam abstractionis, ponens bonum et unum, quae sine ratione corporis intelligi possunt, subsistere in primo principio sine corpore” (Leon. 23.282:260-263). The Leonine editors suggest Proclus’s *Elementatio theologica* (prop. 12 and 13) as Thomas’s source for the latter view.

\(^{29}\) These authors include Roger Bacon (1214-1292), John Pecham (1230-1292), William de la Mare (d. 1298), Matthew of Aquasparta (1240-1302), and Gonsalvus of Spain (1255-1313)

\(^{30}\) The more direct intellectual source for the Franciscan theory of spiritual matter seems to be Augustine. See Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité Des Formes* (Louvain, Editions de l’Institute Supérieur de Philosophie, 1951): “En ce qui concerne la composition hylémorphique de tous les êtres crées, l’influence d’Avicebron est incontestable, mais elle n’est ni exclusive, ni même prépondérante; celle de saint Augustin -- nous le verrons dans le cas de Thomas d’York -- semble plus directe et plus décisive que celle d’Avicebron” (422). See also John Francis Quinn, *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure’s Philosophy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973); Michael B. Sullivan, *The Debate over Spiritual Matter in the Late Thirteenth Century: Gonsalvus Hispanus and the Franciscan Tradition from Bonaventure to Scotus* (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 2010). In the latter dissertation, Sullivan repeats some of the logical arguments made by the Franciscan masters, including the earlier writings of Duns Scotus, but Sullivan does not focus on them even though logical arguments for spiritual matter were “commonplace” (413). Sullivan instead focuses more on Gonsalvus of Spain who, he reports, did not make any logical arguments for spiritual matter.
chapter, we saw Thomas include Avicebron among many authors such as Parmenides and Plato who made false judgments about things in nature based on concepts. In this very same discussion in Bk II of Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences (d. 17, q. 1, a. 1), Thomas singles out Avicebron:

> From this (line of thought) came the many arguments in the book The Fount of Life by Avicebron, who always arrived at the unity of matter based on an equal community of predication. Out of this (position) came the opinion that states there to be one generic essence in all species of things, not just according to reason. However, this fundamental principle [fundamentum] is very weak. Indeed, it is not necessary that, if this is man and that is man, that numerically the same humanity be in both, just as in two white things there is not numerically the same whiteness, but rather this (man) resembles that (man) in this (respect), namely that it has humanity just as the other. Hence when the intellect takes humanity not as it is of this (man), but as it is humanity, it forms a common intention of all. And so it is not necessary that, if there is an intellectual nature both in the soul and in God, that there be the same intellectuality in both by essence, by which the same essence of both are called “being” [ens].

The overall question that is being answered, let us recall, is whether the human soul is of the divine essence. Thomas’s general response is to criticize those who take understood intentions or concepts (intentiones intellectae) as replicas of the created order. Here, Thomas criticizes Avicebron for claiming a unity of matter in things based on its unity in the mind. It is because of their difference in matter, Thomas would say, that individuals (e.g. this and that man) belonging

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According to Sullivan, besides Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome (both secular masters) reject these logical arguments for spiritual matter as well (219, 255).

31 In II Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 1: “Ex hoc etiam procedunt plures rationes Avicebronis in libro fontis vitae, qui semper unitatem materiae venatur ex aequali communitate praedicationis. Ex hoc etiam derivatur opinio quae dicit, unam essentiam generis esse in omnibus speciebus re, non tantum secundum rationem. Sed hoc fundamentum est valde debile: non enim oportet, si hoc est homo et illud homo, quod eadem sit humanitas numero utriusque, sicut in duobus albis non est eadem albedo numero; sed quod hoc similet illi in hoc quod habet humanitatem sicut illud: unde intellectus accipens humanitatem non secundum quod est hujus, sed ut est humanitas, format intentionem communem omnibus: et ita etiam non est necessarium quod si in anima est natura intellectualis et in Deo, quod sit eadem intellectualitas utriusque per essentiam, per quam eamdem essentia utrumque dicatur ens” (Mandonnet ed., 2.414).
to the same species do not share numerically the same nature. Rather, they resemble one another in their shared participation of a specific nature. By this example, we should understand Thomas to be stating that the real divergence between individuals due to matter shows that just because two beings share the same nature in thought, whether it be an intellectual nature or the nature of being, they do not necessarily share the same nature in reality.

We should note that Thomas thinks that Avicebron was mistaken because he arrived at the unity of matter “based on an equal community of predication” (*aequali communitate praedicationis*). According to Thomas, Avicebron thought that matter is predicated equally of everything just as a genus is predicated equally of species. The problem is that even though a genus is predicated equally of species with regard to intention, it is not always equally predicated with regard to existence. For example, figure and number are predicated unequally in things.

In other words, we may go beyond the text here and interpret Thomas as stating that whereas Avicebron considers logical intentions as univocal even when considered according to things, Thomas is considering these same intentions as analogous when applied to things. According to things (*secundum rem*), that is, there may be an unequal or analogical predication of logical intentions. These intentions are predicated analogically according to *esse* alone, and this analogy of genus enables metaphysics to judiciously and correctly reduce logical intentions to metaphysical realities.32

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1.3.1 Argument for Spiritual Matter from Participation in a Genus

The first type of logical argument for spiritual matter that we shall consider is an argument from the participation in a genus. In Bk II of his Commentary on the Sentences (d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 arg. 1), Thomas relays the mistaken logical argument for why an angel is composed of both matter and form this way: everything that is in some genus participates in the notion of that genus, but the notion of substance is that which is composed of matter and form. Since an angel is in the predicament of substance, it is clear that an angel is composed of matter and form.

This argument proceeds from the notion of genus: We know that an angel is composed of matter and form, in other words, because anything within the genus of substance participates in matter and form.

for his entire metaphysical effort to clarify the notion of being and to make it central in Christian philosophy. To achieve this purpose meant subjecting such common notions as essence and existence, potency and act, to searching criticism and revision. This is the larger import of the critique of universal matter.” See Collins, Thomistic Philosophy of Angels, 57.

33 John Pecham offers this type of argument. See John Pecham, Johannis Pechami Quaestiones tractantes de anima, ed. P.H. Spetmann, O.F.M., Monasterii Guestfalorum (Aschendorff, 1918), 187, excerpta ex Commentario in I Sent. q. 27: “Praeterea cum genus substantiae dividatur per spirituales et corporales substantias et de ipsis univoce praedicetur, cum in omnibus, quae secundum rectam lineam sunt in genere, sit res generis cum aliquo addito, si genus est compositum ex prims principiis, scilicet materia et forma, ut dicit Boethius, Super Praedicamenta, manifestum est omnem substantiam, quae est in genere, esse compositam et materia et forma.” See also Sullivan, The Debate over Spiritual Matter, 143.

34 In II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 arg. 1: “Videtur quod Angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Quidquid enim est in genere aliquo, participat rationem illius generis. Sed ratio substantiae, secundum quod est praedicamentum, est quod sit composita ex materia et forma. Boetius enim dicit in Comment. Praedicamentorum, in Expos. praedic. substantiae, lib. I, col. 184, t. II, quod Aristoteles, relictis extremis, scilicet materia et forma, agit de medio, ister de composito, cum de substantia determinat. Cum ergo Angelus sit in praedicamento substantiae, videtur quod ex materia et forma componatur” (Mandonnet ed., 2.85). For the dating of Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences, see Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 332. About fifteen years later, Thomas repeats the same argument in On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1 arg. 23. Thomas’s reply to the objection in On Spiritual Creatures turns on a matter of interpretation of a work by Boethius, so I shall not belabor it here. Thomas’s interpretation is that Boethius does not think that the genus of substance includes both matter and form, which are principally the concern of natural philosophy.
It is well known that Thomas disagrees with the conclusion of this argument, but his rejection of the argument is not a rejection in the method of argumentation, which proceeds from the notion of genus. His reply to this argument turns on what is included in the genus, substance:

[T]he notion of substance is that which subsists as a being in itself \textit{(quasi per se ens)}, and therefore form and matter, which are parts of a composite, since they do not subsist, are not in the predicament of substance as a species, but only as principles. That this subsisting thing has a composite quiddity is not because of the notion of substance, so it is not necessary that what is in the predicament substance have a composite quiddity.\footnote{\textit{In II Sent.} \textit{d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1:} \textit{“Ad primum ergo dicendum est, quod de ratione substantiae est quod subsistit quasi per se ens; et ideo forma et materia, quae sunt pars compositi, cum non subsistant, non sunt in praedicamento substantiae sicut species, sed solum sicut principia. Quod autem hoc subsistens habeat quidditatem compositam, non est de ratione substantiae: unde non oportet illud quod est in praedicamento substantia, habere quidditatem compositam; sed oportet quod habeat compositionem quidditatis et esse: omne enim quod est in genere, sua quidditatis non est suum esse, ut Avicenna dicit” (Mandonnet ed., 2.88).}}

In refutation of this argument for spiritual matter, Thomas offers the reader a positive contribution to what is included in the notion of a substance, stating that what is included in the notion of substance is that which subsists, yet form and matter do not subsist because they are principles of substance. Whatever is a substance does not necessarily include matter because matter is not necessary to the notion of substance.

1.3.2 Argument for Spiritual Matter from Genus and Difference

The next argument for spiritual matter that we shall consider is an argument from definition, namely that we can posit matter and form in spiritual things because their definition includes a genus and difference. In \textit{On Separate Substances}, c. 5, the basic argument is that, since a species is composed of genus and difference, there is likewise a composition in things themselves. In the case of each thing existing in a genus, this composition means that the genus
is matter and the difference is form. Thomas does not directly respond to this view here in On Separate Substances, but he elsewhere gives the reason why it is incorrect. In Bk II of his Commentary on the Sentences (d. 3, q. 1, a. 5), for instance, Thomas explains that genus cannot be matter and that difference cannot be form because genus and difference are predicated of the whole and that matter and form are predicated of the part. Matter and form refer to a part, but genus and specific difference refer to a whole.

Although Thomas sometimes attributes the argument to Avicebron, it is similar to one of the more common logical arguments marshaled by Franciscans such as Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Matthew of Aquasparta. In On Spiritual Creatures a. 1 (arg. 24), we find a nuanced version of this argument from definition: “[E]verything which is in a genus is composed of genus and difference. Now difference is obtained from form, whereas genus is obtained from the matter. . . . Since, then, a spiritual substance is in a genus, it seems that it is composed of

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36 De substantiis separatis c. 5, no. 19: “Primo quidem, quia aestimavit quod secundum intelligibilem compositionem, quae in rerum generibus inventur, prout scilicet ex genere et differentia constituitur species, esset etiam in rebus ipsis compositio realis intelligenda: ut scilicet uniuscuiusque rei in genere existentis genus sit materia, differentia vero forma.” I shall be focusing on this first aspect of Avicebron’s argument. The second aspect that Thomas names is that Avicebron (and some Augustinians) were deceived by thinking that to be in potency, to be a subject, and to be a recipient would be said according to one notion (secundum unam rationem) in all cases.

37 In II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 5: “non autem ita quod materia sit genus, aut forma differentia, cum utrumque sit pars, et neutrum praedicitur; sed quia materia est materia totius, non solum formae; et forma perfectio totius, non solum materia; ideo totum potest assignari ex materia et forma et ex utroque. Nomen autem designans totum ex materia est nomen generis; et nomen designans totum ex forma, est nomen differentia; et nomen designans totum ex utroque, est nomen speciei” (Mandonnet ed., 2.100). See also In VIII Meta. lect. 2, no. 1697; In X Meta. lect. 10, no. 2116; De ente et essentia, c. 1.

38 See Bonaventure In II Sent. d. 3, a. 1, q. 1 (QR 90): “Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam essentialis compositionis. Angelus enim definitur, et ita participat naturam generis et differentiae: naturam in qua convenit cum alis, et naturam, in qua differt. Ergo cum necesse sit, totam veritatem definitionis realiter inveniri in quolibet Angelo, necesse est in eo ponere naturarum diversitatem. Sed impossibile est, plures naturas concurre ad constitutionem tertii, quin altera habeat rationem possibilis, altera rationem actualis; quia ex duobus entibus in potentia nihil fit, similem nec ex duobus entibus in actu: ergo necesse est etc.” See Matthew of Aquasparta, Q. disputatae de anima X, 164. The Leonine editors explain that this argument is also repeated by Avicebron, Fons Vitae, tr. III, cap. 18 (BK 118) and Alexander of Hales ST I-II, no. 106 (QR II, 135). See Sullivan, The Debate over Spiritual Matter, 152.
matter and form.” Rather than a blunt identification of logical beings with real beings, this version of the argument states that everything that has a definition will be composed of both matter and form because genus is taken from matter and the specific difference is taken from form. 

Thomas would agree that “genus is taken from matter” and “difference is taken from form” because “genus flows from matter... and difference (flows) from form” insofar as genus and difference are “related proportionately” to matter and form. Why does Thomas not think that this definition show a real composition? Let us consider how Thomas directly handles this relation in Bk VIII of his Commentary on the Metaphysics (lect. 2):

But we speak in this manner because a thing’s genus is derived from its material principle, and its difference from its formal principle. The genus of man, for example, is ‘animal’ because it signifies something having a sensory nature, which is related as matter to intellectual nature from which ‘rational,’ the difference of man, is taken. But ‘rational’ signifies something having an intellectual nature. It is for this reason that a

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39 De spiritualibus creaturis a. 1 arg. 24: “Praeterea, omne quod est in genere componitur ex genere et differentia. Differentia autem sumitur a forma, genus autem a materia, ut patet in VIII Metaphys. Cum ergo substantia spiritualis sit in genere, videtur quod sit composita ex materia et forma” (Leon. 24/2.7:195-8:200). The Leonine editors refer us to Alexander of Hales’s Summa Fratris Alexandri Bk. II part 1, inq. ii, tract. 2. We shall consider below Thomas’s remarks in Bk VIII of his Commentary on the Metaphysics.

40 In I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2: “In simplicibus autem, et praecipue in Deo, compositio quae est in definitione, non reductur in aliquam compositionem rei: sed solum secundum rationem quae fundatur in veritate rei; sicut si aliquid definiens Deum diceret, quod est substantia intellectualis divina, vel aliquid hujusmodi” (Mandonnet ed., 1.603). The original argument was that the Boethian definition of person (an individual substance of a rational nature) cannot stand because the definition is composed whereas God is simple. In I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 arg. 2: “sicut definitio se habet ad rem, ita partes definitionis ad partes rei. Sed definitio significat rem definitam. Ergo et partes definitionis significant partes rei. Sed in divinis persona est simplex, non habens partes. Ergo talis definitio sibi non competit” (Mandonnet ed., 1.600). Thomas responds by stating that there are two ways to consider a definition: either according to that which is signed (id quod significatur per definitionem) or according to the intention of the definition (intentionem definitum). The definition of person should be considered in the latter way.

41 In I Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2: “Sed verum est quod in compositis genus et differentia, quamvis non sint partes, tamen a partibus rei fluunt: quia genus fluit a materia, quamvis non sit materia: et differentia a forma, quamvis forma non sit differentia, sed forma sit principium illius; et sic definitio composita ostendit realem compositionem” (Mandonnet ed., 1.103); De ente et essentia, c. 1: “genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia summum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum” (Leon. 43.372:195-201).
genus contains its differences potentially, and that genus and difference are proportionate to matter and form, as Porphyry says.\textsuperscript{42}

The reason why genus is taken from matter is that genus is related to difference just as matter is related to form, and the reason why difference is taken from form is that difference is related to genus just as form is related to matter. The relation of difference to genus is proportional to the relation of form to matter (difference:genus :: form:matter). Genus signifies the potential aspect of a definition just as matter signifies the potential aspect of a composite thing, and difference signifies the actual aspect of a definition just as form signifies the actual aspect of a composite. Each signifies either the potential or actual aspect of a whole.

With this understanding of proportionality in mind (i.e. difference to genus as form to matter), let us return to Thomas’s reply in \textit{On Spiritual Creatures} a. 1 (ad 24) where Thomas begins a lengthy counter-argument:

[I]t must be said that in the case of objects composed of matter and form, the genus is obtained from the matter and the difference from the form, yet in such a way that by “matter” is not understood prime matter, but matter according as it receives through the form a certain being [esse], imperfect and material in comparison with specific being [esse]. For instance, the being [esse] of “animal” is imperfect and material in comparison with “man.”\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{In VIII Meta.} lect. 2, no. 1697: “Sicut enim in genere substantiae, differentia, quae praedicatur de genere, et advenit ei ad constitutionem speciei, comparatur ad ipsum ut actus et forma, ita etiam in aliis definitionibus. Non enim est intelligendum, quod differentia sit forma, aut genus sit materia, cum genus et differentiae praedicentur de specie, materia autem et forma non praedicentur de composito: sed hoc dicitur, quia genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale. Sicut genus hominis est animal, quia significat aliquid habens naturam sensitivam; quae quidem materialiter se habet ad naturam intellectivam, a qua sumitur rationale, quae est differentia hominis. Rationale vero significat aliquid habens naturam intellectivam. Et inde est quod genus habet differentias potestate, et quod genus et differentia proportionantur materiae et formae, ut Porphyrius dicit. Et propter hoc etiam hic dicitur quod actus, idest differentia, praedicatur “de materia”, idest de genere; et similiter est in aliis generibus” (Marietti ed., 18.407).

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{De spiritualibus creaturis} a. 1 ad 24: “Ad uicesimum quartum dicendum quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, genus sumitur a materia et differentia a forma, ita tamen quod per materiam non intelligatur materia prima, sed secundum quod per formam recipit quoddam esse imperfectum et materiale respectu esse
It is clear that by “matter” in the statement, “genus is taken from the matter,” Thomas does not mean the correlative principle to form. We must take this giving and receiving of esse in this context, not in the line of efficient causality, but in the line of formal causality. 44 “Matter” signifies something broader than prime matter, 45 something that has imperfect formal esse compared to that thing signified by “form,” which has specific esse.

At the end of his counter-argument in On Spiritual Creatures a. 1 (ad 24), Thomas clarifies that only one substantial form gives this esse, and he clarifies that to have the same common nature does not entail numerical sameness. After making these remarks, he concludes in this way:

Once matter is taken away, therefore, from spiritual substances, the genus and the difference will remain in them, not in consequence of matter and form, but in consequence of considering in a spiritual substance both something that is common to itself and to less perfect substances, and also something that is proper to itself. 46

We find the notion of a genus, then, by regarding the material aspect of a thing, and we find the material aspect of a thing by considering something that is “common to itself and to less perfect substances.” In man, that is the common ratio of animal. Similarly, we obtain the notion of a difference by regarding the formal aspect of a thing, and we find the formal aspect of a thing by

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44 See ST I, q. 76, a. 1 ad 5. See also Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 201.
45 Although Thomas excludes prime matter in his consideration here, he seems to include it in his consideration in other contexts. QDdA a. 9.
46 De spiritualibus creaturis a. 1 ad 24: “. . . Tamen illud duplex esse non est secundum aliam et aliam formam, set secundum unam formam, que homini dat non solum hoc quod est esse animal, set hoc quod est esse hominem: anima autem alterius animalis dat ei solum esse animal: unde animal commune non est unum numero set ratione tantum, quia non ab una et eadem forma homo est animal et asinus. Substructa ergo materia a substantii spiritualibus remanebit ibi genus et differentia non secundum materiam et formam, set secundum quod consideratur in substantia spirituali tam id quod est commune sibi et imperfectionibus substantii quam etiam id quod est sibi proprium” (Leon. 24/2.19:656-670).
considering something that is “proper to itself.” In man, that is the common ratio of rational. We cannot conclude to a matter-form distinction based on the logical notions of genus and difference because these logical notions are material and formal only according to their relationship to each other.\textsuperscript{47} The argument does not point to something in reality. It is moreover the task of metaphysics as a real science to show the limitations of logical intentions in notifying us about the nature of things; only another speculative and universal science can separate logic’s consideration about being in general and the reality upon which these logical considerations are founded.

2.0 Thomas’s Contribution to the Method of Predication in Metaphysics

Thomas’s prooemium or prologue to his Commentary on the Metaphysics describes the characteristics of a ruling science by analogy to the characteristics of a good ruler: just as men with a vigorous intellect are naturally the rulers and lords of others, Thomas states, in a similar way “that science which is most intellectual should be ruler of the others.”\textsuperscript{48} Thomas’s prooemium outlines three ways the science of wisdom is most intellectual insofar it treats the most intelligible objects, namely the first causes, the highest universal principles, and the most

\textsuperscript{47} For another text about lower and higher grades of perfection, see Thomas’s Compendium of Theology, c. 92: “Quia igitur forma superioris gradus habet in se omnes perfectiones inferioris gradus, non est alia forma secundum rem a qua sumitur genus, et a qua sumitur differentia, sed ab eadem forma, secundum quod habet inferioris gradus perfectionem, sumitur genus; secundum vero quod habet perfectionem superioris gradus, sumitur ab ea differentia.” Thomas frequently writes against the plurality of substantial forms with vigor. In the interest of space, I omit discussion of ST I, q. 50, a. 2 ad 1; ST I, q. 76, a. 3 (ad 4); In VII Phys. lect. 8, no. 947; QDdA a. 7 (ad 17). See also Collins, Thomistic Philosophy of Angels, 42-75, esp. 70-71.

\textsuperscript{48} In Meta., prooemium: “Quae autem sit haec scientia, et circa qualia, considerari potest, si diligenter respiciatur quomodo est aliquis idoneus ad regendum. Sicut enim, ut in libro praedicto philosophus dicit, homines intellectu vigentes, naturaliter aliorum rectores et domini sunt: homines vero qui sunt robusti corpore, intellectu vero deficientes, sunt naturaliter servi: ita scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime intellectualis est. Haec autem est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia versatur.”
abstract from matter. Thomas then consolidates these three types of objects. Some objects that are abstract from matter are also the highest causes such as the separate substances, and some objects that are abstract from matter are also the highest universal principles such as being (ens).

For Thomas, the science of wisdom is called “metaphysics” because it considers the highest universal principles, “being (ens) and those things that naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality, potency and act.”\(^{49}\) In this section, we shall look at the way in which Thomas determines some of these most intelligible objects through the method of predication. First, we shall consider how Thomas divides being into the transcendentals (2.1.1, the general modes of being), and then we shall consider how he divides being into substance and accidents (2.1.2, the special modes of being). Thomas states that these objects require some determination, not only for their own sake, but also because “without them complete knowledge of the principles that are proper to any genus or species cannot be had.”\(^{50}\) In other words, it is also the task of the science of wisdom or first philosophy to give first notions and principles “to all the other sciences.”\(^{51}\) To that end, we shall also consider how Thomas determines the principles of

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\(^{49}\) Ibid.: “Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus. Huiusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa cognitione de his, quae sunt propria aliquid generi vel speciei, haberi non possit.” We shall not specifically treat how Thomas derives the notions of plurality, potency, and act.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.: “Huiusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa cognitione de his, quae sunt propria aliquid generi vel speciei, haberi non possit.”

\(^{51}\) De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1(c): “Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largit tur principia omnibus aliis scientis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia” (Leon. 50.163:387-390). In his discussion of metaphysics inquiring into principles of the other sciences, Thomas continues the tradition inspired by Avicenna’s own metaphysics. See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima I, 2 15.77-79: “Contingit igitur ut in hac scientia monstratur principia singularium scientiarum quae inquirunt dispositiones uniuscuiusque esse.” For some passages on the reduction of matter and form to substance, In I Sent. d. 28, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3; De ente et essentia c. 5, no. 109; ST I, q. 3, a. 5.
substance, namely prime matter (2.2), substantial form (2.3), and the real distinction between essence and existence (2.4).

2.1 Division of ‘Being’

Thomas uses the method of predication in metaphysics to manifest the quiddity of things (quid est) and determine their reality (an est). This type of indemonstrable knowledge is crucial because, although metaphysics does not thereby make (scientific) conclusions, it does make insights into first principles and first notions that would be otherwise impossible to achieve. Indeed, in De veritate (q. 1, a. 1), Thomas resorts to the method of predication to manifest what truth is. The first question concerns the definition of truth, “what is truth?” (quid est veritas), and Thomas prepares his answer by comparing the two tasks of metaphysics: to engage in demonstrable proofs of propositions and to investigate that which is indemonstrable, namely a thing’s quiddity (what-is):

Just as in demonstrable propositions one should reduce premises to some principle that is known of itself, in the same way, (one should also reduce to that which is known of itself) in investigating the what-is of anything. Otherwise, both demonstrable knowledge and non-demonstrable knowledge will fall into an infinite regress, and all science and knowledge of things will perish.\(^{52}\)

We must reduce demonstrable propositions to some proposition that is known of itself in order to have science (scientia) of things, and we must also reduce indemonstrable definitions to some concept that is known of itself in order to have knowledge (cognitio) of things. We know that

\(^{52}\)De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “Dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utroboque in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum” (Leon. 22/1.4:95-100). As a resource, the Leonine editors simply refer the reader to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I, c. 35 where Aristotle discusses the impossibility of predicating infinitely in a demonstrative science.
demonstrations should reduce to the principle of non-contradiction, but to what should we reduce definitions? The question is relevant to the first question of *De veritate* because that question investigates the definition of truth.

Thomas immediately presents something that is of itself most knowable: “that which the intellect first conceives as if it were most knowable [*quasi notissimum*] and that in which all its conceptions resolve is being [*ens*].” The priority of ‘being’ means that, whereas we can know ‘being’ apart from other notions, we cannot understand other notions apart from being. Thomas repeats the same point about resolving our notions to being even more clearly in his Commentary on *De Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 4):

In the speculative sciences, we always proceed from something previously known, both in demonstrating propositions and also in discovering definitions. . . . So inquiry in all the speculative sciences works back to something first given, which one does not have to learn or discover, otherwise one would have to go on to infinity, but which one knows naturally. Such are the indemonstrable principles of demonstration . . . to which all demonstrations in the sciences are reducible, and even the first conceptions of the intellect such as ‘being,’ ‘one,’ and the like to which all definitions in the sciences must be reduced. 

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53 *In IV Meta*. lect. 4, no. 604: “in hanc reducunt demonstrantes omnia, sicut in ultimum resolvendo” (Marietti ed., 18.167). See also *In IV Meta*. lect. 4, no. 607; *De Trinitate* q. 6, a. 4 cited below.

54 *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1: “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae” (Leon. 22/1.5:100-103).

55 *In I Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 2: “Sive ita quod quandocumque intelligitur unum, intelligatur alterum; sicut quicumque intelligit hominem intelligit animal. Et hoc modo esse potest intelligi sine vero, sed non e converso: quia verum non est in ratione entis, sed ens in ratione veri; sicut potest aliquis intelligere ens, et tamen non intelligit aliquid de ratione intelligibilitatis; sed nunquam potest intelligi intelligibile, secundum hanc rationem, nisi intelligatur ens. Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio intellectus” (Mandonnet ed., 1.488).

56 *De Trinitate* q. 6, a. 4: “Dicendum quod in scientiis speculativis semper ex aliquo prius noto proceditur tam in demonstrationibus propositionum quam etiam in inventionibus diffinitionum. Sicut enim ex propositionibus praecognitis aliquis devenit in cognitionem conclusionis, ita ex conceptione generis et differentiae et causarum rei aliquis devenit in cognitionem speciei. Hic autem non est possibile in infinitum procedere, quia sic omnis scientia periret et quantum ad demonstrationes et quantum ad diffinitiones, cum infinita non sit pertransire. Unde omnis consideratio scientiarum speculativarum reductur in aliquam prima, quae quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire, ne oporteat in infinitum procedere, sed eorum notitiam naturaliter habet. Et huiusmodi sunt principia demonstrationum indemonstrabilia, ut omne totum est maius sua parte et similia, in quae omnes demonstrationes
In light of the question being answered, “what is truth?,” it is clear that Thomas wants us to resolve or reduce the notion of truth to that of being, the most knowable notion there is. If we cannot reduce ‘truth’ to ‘being,’ then we have no knowledge of ‘truth.’

In De veritate (q. 1, a. 1), Thomas broadens the question of truth by explaining how, since all concepts resolve or reduce to being, “all other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being.” What this all-encompassing universality of being means, however, is that we cannot add to being from outside of it. Normally, we find definitions by adding a specific difference to a genus, but we cannot add a specific difference to ‘being’ because there is nothing outside of being. “Every nature is essentially being,” as Thomas states. The way out of Parmenidean monism--the way to determine something indefinable--is to instead recognize the multivocity of being: “some things are said to add to being whenever they express a mode of being that the term “being” does not express.” What we shall be looking for, in things that are said, are modes of being that add to the concept of being.

scientiarum reducuntur, et etiam primae conceptiones intellectus, ut entis et unius et huiusmodi, in quae oportet reducere omnes diffinitiones scientiarum praedictarum” (Leon. 50.170:96-118).

57 The method of resolution, or analysing wholes into their component parts, was also a practice of Bonaventure among others. “[F]or Bonaventure Thomas’ resolutio stops too early: the Franciscan master distinguishes two successive stages in the process of the intellectus resolvens. The intellect can resolve completely and halfway (semiplene) or perfectly and completely (plene). The incomplete resolution terminates in the transcendental determinations that are implicitly conceived in every concept. In the complete resolution, however, things are considered in their relation to the divine cause.” See Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental: From Philip the Chancellor to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 155-56. Aertsen also considers Albert the Great’s view of the resolutive method. Albert “distinguishes between two kinds of resolution. One is the Dionysian reduction of what is caused to the first cause; the other is the Avicennian reduction of something to its most universal predicate that constitutes it in an intrinsic way” (207, 668). The monograph as a whole clearly shows how the study of transcendentals were not limited to a few thinkers but captured the attention of medieval scholasticism generally.

58 De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens” (Leon. 22/1.5:104-105).

59 De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens” (Leon. 22/1.5:108-109).

60 De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super [var. supra] ens, in quantum exprimitur modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur”(Leon. 22/1.5:111-112). See Stanislas Breton,
In sum, metaphysics follows a traditional method of division and definition when it investigates the definitions of things by reducing common conception (e.g. ‘truth’) to being, the most knowable notion of all. Metaphysics does so by examining the way some predicates are said to add to the notion of being and thereby express a mode of being. What I hope to present in this section is the way in which, for Thomas, metaphysics can manifest the many attributes of ‘being’ by finding additions to being in things that are said. We shall look into the dual way something is said to add to being, both in the general modes of being (in the transcendentals) and in the special modes of being (in the predicaments).
2.1.1 General Mode of Being: Five Transcendentals

2.1.1.1 Exposition

In *De veritate* (q. 21, a. 1), Thomas describes what ‘good’ adds to ‘being.’ There, he outlines three different ways that something is said to add to another. 1) Something adds to another by adding to the reality outside of the essence (e.g. ‘white’ adds something to ‘body’). This way cannot add to universal being, however, because there is nothing outside the essence of being. 2) Another way something can add to another is by limiting or contracting it (e.g. ‘man’ adds something to ‘animal’). This way adds to ‘being’ a determinate mode of being, namely the ten predicaments of substance and accidents. Finally, 3) something adds to another in concept by expanding on it. The transcendentals such as ‘good’ add to ‘being’ in this third way, that is, by expanding the intension of ‘being’.

The transcendentals do not (positively) add something real to ‘being.’ On the one hand, they make a conceptual distinction in ‘being.’ Thomas explains this type of addition by stating that something adds to being when the mode expressed is something “common and consequent upon every being [ens].” As the proper attributes of being (*passiones entis*), these

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64 For the differences and similarities between the derivation of the transcendentals found in *De veritate* (q. 1, a. 1) and (q. 21, a. 1), see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 101-103. Two related differences deserve mention: *De veritate* (q. 21, a. 1) does not remark on the (Avicennian) transcendental, ‘thing,’ and it divides the transcendentals in terms of negation and relation. I agree with Aertsen that (q. 21, a. 1) does not represent a development. For the term, “transcendental,” see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 91.

65 We cannot add ‘good’ to universal being in the first way because there is no reality outside the essence of being in general. We can add to being in the second way, but we can only do so by narrowing being down through the ten predicaments. ‘Good’ does not add being in this second way because it does not add something positive in reality. Transcendentals such as ‘good,’ Thomas concludes, either add to being in concept only, which is the third way, or they add nothing to being. Thomas rejects the view that ‘good’ adds nothing to being because it is not trivial to say that a being is good (*non nugatorie dicatur ens bonum*).

66 *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1: “Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest” (Leon. 22/1.5:124-125).
transcendentals are predicated of being insofar as being is both placed in their “definition” and is their proximate cause. On the other hand, the conceptual distinction at work cannot be of the same sort as that between the defined term and the definition, i.e., a distinction that is produced by the activity of reason. Rather, it seems as though the distinction between being and unity or between being and good is something that the intellect discovers in things (*rem*).

In his *De veritate* (q. 1, a. 1), Thomas defines these proper attributes of being. If we consider what follows upon ‘being’ in itself (*ens in se*), in an affirmative way, then we find that which expresses the quiddity or essence of being, namely ‘thing.’ Thing is being considered in itself affirming its essence. If we consider what follows upon every being in itself in a negative way, then we find the undividedness of being, namely ‘one.’ One is being-in-itself negating its division. In many other texts besides *De veritate*, Thomas includes a discussion of the division of being into one and many.

In one illuminating passage, *De Trinitate* (q. 4, a. 1), Thomas investigates the cause of plurality, especially in primary and simple objects. By “primary” and “simple” objects, Thomas seems to be considering being and its properties as he considers being in itself (*secundum se*) stating that

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67 *In I Post. an.* lect. 10: “ cum scientia proprie sit conclusionum, intellectus autem principiorum, proprie scibili dicuntur conclusiones demonstrationis, in quibus passiones praedicantur de propriis subjectis. Propria autem subjecta non solum ponuntur in definitione accidentium, sed etiam sunt causae eorum” (Leon. 1*/2.40:138-144). The Leonine editors refer us to *In I Post. an.* lect. 7 where Thomas explains the necessity of immediate (indemonstrable) objects of science.

68 See *ST* I, q. 11, a. 1. For the clarification that ‘one’ is not a principle of number, but something that is interchangeable with being, see the response to the first objection (ad 1). See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 208. At the same time, Thomas states elsewhere that “many” is a property of being, for example *SCG* I, 50, no. 6, *In Meta.* proemium. The proemium references potency and act as following upon being.

69 *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3; *De Trinitate* q. 4, a. 1; *In III Phys.* lect. 12, no. 394; *In III Meta.* lect. 3, no. 361; *ST* I, q. 11, a. 1 ad 2; *ST* I, q. 30, a. 3.
it cannot be that being is divided from being inasmuch as it is being, for nothing is divided from being except non-being. Likewise also from this-being, this-being is not divided, unless in this-being there is included negation of the same being. . . . Hence, just as after being, inasmuch as it is undivided, one is immediately recognized, so after division of being and non-being there is immediate recognition of the plurality of prior simple beings.  

We first start with being considered in itself since it is the first intelligible. We then intellectually negate being in order to consider non-being. Based on these two immediate terms, being and non-being, we immediately know the principle of non-contradiction and thereby affirm two properties of being: being is one because being is not divided from being, and being is many because being is not non-being. The predicative acts of affirmation and negation are, then, at the root of the division of being into one and many.  

Returning now to De veritate (q. 1, a. 1), if we consider what follows upon ‘being,’ not in itself, but in relation to another (ens in ordine ad aliud), then we find a distinction between one and another (unius ab altero). The concept ‘something’ expresses this mode of being. Even the word “something” (aliquid) implies “some other thing” (quasi aliud quid), and we define something as being considered in relation to another as other. We have, then, three concepts that add to being through division: being is called “one” insofar as it undivided in itself, being is

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70 De Trinitate q. 4, a. 1: “Et ideo pluralitatis vel divisionis primorum et simplicium oportet alio modo causam assignare. Sunt enim huiusmodi secundum se ipsa divisa. Non potest autem hoc esse, quod ens dividatur ab ente in quantum est ens; nihil autem dividitur ab ente nisi non ens. Unde et ab hoc ente non dividitur hoc ens <nisi> per hoc quod in hoc ente includitur negatio illius entis. Unde in primis terminis propositiones negativae sunt immediatae, quasi negatio unius sit in intellectu alterius. Primum etiam creatum in hoc facit pluralitatem cum sua causa, quod non attingit ad eam. . . . Unde sicut post ens, in quantum est indivisum, statim inventitur unum, ita post divisionem entis et non entis statim inventitur pluralitas priorum simplicium. Hanc autem pluralitatem consequitur ratio diversitatis” (Leon. 50.120:93-127).

71 See also Wippel’s analyses in Metaphysical Thought, 176ff; “Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: A Dialectic between Being and Nonbeing,” Review of Metaphysics 38 (1985), 563-90, esp. 565.

72 In IV Meta. lect. 4, no. 566: “Sed unum quod cum ente convertitur importat privationem divisionis formalis quae fit per opposita, cuius prima radix est oppositionis et negationis” (Marietti ed., 18.158).
called “many” insofar as it is divided from non-being, and being is called “something” insofar as it is divided from others.

While still looking at the relation of being to another, rather than the otherness between one and another, we can consider the agreement between being and another. This type of agreement is only possible in relation to something that can be in agreement with being such as the two powers of the human soul: a cognitive power and an appetitive power. The term “true” expresses this agreement of being to the intellect (convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum), and the term “good” expresses this agreement of being to the appetite (convenientiam entis ad appetitum). True and good are each considered in relation to another in conformity with the intellect and the appetite respectively.73

To recapitulate, in this passage of De veritate (q. 1, a. 1), Thomas defines the proper attributes of being by composing their definition, which includes being, and by resolving their formal structure or ratio into the notion of being. The method of predication is at play because, in order to divide being into these common conceptions, metaphysics sometimes relies on what is merely conceptual, such as negations and logical relations.74 It is a division of being through (mental) speech. The relation of something to itself defines ‘thing’ and ‘one,’ and the relation of some concept to another defines ‘something,’ ‘good,’ and ‘true.’ Affirmation and negation

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73 We might note here—in advance of our discussion on the predicaments—that the structure of the transcendentals parallels that of the ten accidents within the predicamental division of being: a given accident has substance placed within its definition (though not vice-versa) and the substance is the cause of the accident at least in the sense of providing the ground (matter) for that accident.

74 In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3: “bonum, verum et unum, addunt super ens, non quidem naturam aliquam, sed rationem: sed unum addit rationem indivisionis; et propter hoc est propinquissimum ad ens, quia addit tantum negationem: verum autem et bonum addunt relationem quamquam; sed bonum relationem ad finem, verum relationem ad formam exemplarem” (Mandonnet ed., 1.200); In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 3: “Nullum tamen eorum addit aliquam differentiam contrahentem ens, sed rationem quae consequitur onne ens; sicut unum addit rationem indivisionis, et bonum rationem finis, et verum rationem ordinis ad cognitionem” (Mandonnet ed., 1.488).
further define ‘thing,’ ‘one,’ and ‘many’ respectively. Finally, the relation of otherness further defines ‘something,’ and the relation of conformity further defines ‘good’ and ‘true.’

2.1.1.2 Evaluation

Although Thomas does not state outright that he uses a logical method to divide being into common conceptions, there are a few reasons to think he is using such a method. First, Thomas derives the transcendentals through a method that is secundum rationem, which entails the analysis of concepts (rationem), including negations and logical relations. I expand this point further below. Second, Thomas divides being into common conceptions according to their formal notion (in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur), that is according to a formal division of opposite or diverse forms, and to search for definitions in this way is a logical method (modus logicus).

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75 De veritate q. 21, a. 1: “Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum philosophum in V Metaph., invenitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur, sed e converso” (Leon 22/3.593:160-166). In a similar way, De Trinitate (q. 4, a. 1) resolves the problem of Parmenides through a negation of being. See Wippel, “Being and Non-Being: Dialectic of the Many and the One,” 563-590, esp. 566. Hermann Weidemann offers other examples where negative propositions are based immediately on primitive terms because the negation of one is included in the other, such as those based on the “one” and the “other,” or the “one” and the “many,” or the “same” and the “diverse.” See his Metaphysik und Sprache. Eine sprachphilosophische Untersuchung zu Thomas von Aquin un Arsistoteles (Symposion: Freiburg-Munich, 1975), 52-53.

76 De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet; quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur” (Leon. 22/1.5-6:166-170); De veritate q. 1, a. 1 ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod definitio illa Augustini datur De veritate secundum quod habet fundamentum in re, et non secundum id quod ratio veri completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum” (Leon. 22/1.6:201-205); In III Phys. lect. 12, no. 394: “Est autem duplex divisio: una formalis, quae est per opposita; et alia secundum quantitatem. Prima autem divisio causat multituidinem, quae est de transcendentibus, secundum quod ens dividitur per unum et multa” (Marietti ed., 14.193).; ST I q. 30, a. 3: “Alia est divisio formalis, quae fit per oppositas vel diversas formas, et hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo quae non est in alio genere, sed est de transcendentibus, secundum quod ens dividitur per unum et multa” (Leon. 5.339).

77 In VIII Meta., lect. 1, no. 1681: “Postquam determinavit Philosophus in septimo de substantia modo logico, considerando scilicet definitionem et partes definitionis, et alia huiausmodi, quae secundum rationem considerantur” (Marietti ed., 18.402).; ST I-II, q. 90, a. 1 ad 2: “in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiausmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secundo, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio” (Leon. 7.149); In II Meta. lect. 4, no. 324: “Sed quia formalis divisio non solum est secundum quod genus dividitur per differentias,
Finally, in *De veritate* (q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, a. 1) Thomas combines the search for transcendentals and the search for the ten predicaments under the same umbrella of dividing being absolutely considered into the general and special modes of being. Both investigations entail the composition and resolution of concepts.78

Thomas begins *De veritate* (q. 1, a. 1) by referring to the need to resolve all concepts to ‘being.’ The proemium to Thomas’s Commentary on the *Metaphysics* repeats this need for resolution by stating that those attributes that “naturally accompany being” are “discovered by way of resolution, as the more universal is discovered after the less universal.”79 These statements have led Aertsen, a leading scholar on transcendentals in medieval philosophy, to call the method of resolution as the “method that dominates [Thomas’s] approach to the transcendentals.”80 We should note, however, that Thomas describes two methods in his treatment on a method in metaphysics in *De Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 1):

[R]eason advances from one item to another according to reason (*secundum rationem*) as when we proceed according to intrinsic causes [1] by composition when we go from the most universal forms to the more particular ones, and [2] by resolution when we proceed conversely because what is more universal is more simple. Now that which is most universal is common to all beings, and so the ultimate end of analysis in this process is the consideration of being and the properties of being as being.81

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78 *In II Post. an.* lect. 17, no. 2.
79 *In Meta.* proemium: “Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia.”
80 See his *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 234. Aertsen does not confine the dominance of the method of resolution to just Thomas: “the transcendental way of thought in the Middle Ages reduces our concepts to a first that is the condition for human knowing.” See his earlier, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 242.
81 *De Trinitate* q. 6, a. 1(c): “Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis...
Thomas speaks here about a twofold process in metaphysics: composing concepts from the most universal (such as ‘being’) to the more particular (such as ‘good’), and reducing these more particular concepts back to the most universal. Thomas’s many other statements about the way of resolution and composition are consistent with this description: The way of composition and discovery proceeds from rest to motion, from insight to reasoning, from one aspect to many, from what is simple to what is complex as from the center of a circle to its circumference. The way of resolution proceeds in the reverse.\footnote{De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1(c); ST I, q. 79, a. 8; ST I-II, q. 14, a. 5; De veritate q. 10, a. 8, ad 10; De veritate q. 14, a. 1; De veritate q. 15, a. 1; In II Meta. lect. 1, no. 278; In I NE lect. 3, no. 4; In Meta. prooemium. See See Jan Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics: The via resolutionis in Thomas Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 63 (1989), 405-418, esp. 416; Wippel, “The Title “First Philosophy” According to Thomas Aquinas and His Different Justifications for the Same,” The Review of Metaphysics 27 (1874), 585-600, esp. 591-594.}

How does Thomas use these two methods in the division of being into common conceptions? Thomas starts with what is first conceived and most notable (notissimum), namely being. This indistinct awareness of ‘being’ and other first conceptions such as ‘one’ happen “immediately” (statim) through the intelligible species that is “abstracted from sensible things” by the agent intellect;\footnote{De veritate q. 11, a. 1: “similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae acquisitione; quod praexistent in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscentur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit” (Leon. 22/2.350:264-272); In I Post. an. lect. 5: “Sed quaerendum propositionum termini sunt tales, quod sunt in notitia omnium, sicut ens, et unum, et alia quae sunt entis, in quantum ens: nam ens est prima conceptio intellectus” (Leon. 1/2*.25:120-123); In I Post. an. lect. 19: “Sed communis animi conceptio non est ad exterius rationem, quia non potest probari per aliquam argumentationem, sed est ad eam quae est in anima, quia lumine naturalis rationis statim fit nota” (Leon. 1*/2.71:33-37).} the light of the agent intellect manifests ‘being,’ ‘one,’ and the like by making actually intelligible the phantasms taken from the senses.\footnote{De Trinitate q. 6, a. 4: “Huiusmodi autem naturaliter cognita homini manifestatur ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, quod est homini naturale, quo quidem lumine nihil manifestatur nobis, nisi in quantum per ipsum} Yet these conceptions are
The intellect must also see that ‘being,’ which falls first in the intellect, is something predicative of many, a universal that is logically first. In order to explicitly know being, in other words, the intellect must analyze or resolve the components of being and see being as being, that is being as the first thing knowable just as “sound is the first thing audible.” To know ‘being,’ then, we need only the logical method of resolution, not the method of composition.

In order to resolve other transcendentals that are already implicitly known, however, we must compose with ‘being’ before resolving back to ‘being.’ Unlike angels, we must arrive at their ratio by reasoning. For example, in the case of ‘thing,’ reason elaborates on this original

phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu. Hic enim est actus intellectus agentis, ut dicitur in III De anima. Phantasmata autem a sensu accipiunt; unde praeipuum cognitionis praeipuum est ex sensu et memoria.” (Leon. 50.170:122-131).

De veritate q. 1, a. 1 cited above. For confused knowledge and the need for resolution, In I Phys. lect. 1, no. 7: “Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum; sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem praeipuum et elementorum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta” (Marietti ed., 14.5). See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 199.

For ‘being’ as predicative of many, In IV Meta. lect. 1, no. 534: “Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce, sed analogice de his praedicetur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem: sed ens hoc modo praeipicatur de omnibus entibus: ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens inquantum est ens, scilicet tam substantias quam accidenta” (Marietti ed., 18.151). See also In III Meta. lect. 8, no. 432. For ‘being’ and ‘one’ as first conceptions, see ST I, q. 5 a. 2: “Primo autem in conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus, et sic est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile” (Leon. 4.58). “Being is ‘the first known.’ But this ‘first’ becomes explicit, as the beginning of De veritate (q. 1, a. 1) makes clear, only on the basis of resolution.” See Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics,” 416. By contrast to primacy secundum rationem, Thomas frequently states that God is the first intelligible secundum rem. See for instance, In XII Meta., lect. 8, no. 2543; SCG 1.62, no. 5.

Thomas sometimes calls the transcendentals the most common concepts. In De hebdomadibus lect. 2: “ea autem que in intellectu omnium cadunt sunt maxime communia, que sunt ens, unum, et bonum.” In Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Aertsen briefly mentions the need for composition: “After having followed the way of analysis, the resolutio, he now takes the opposite direction, that of “synthesis” (84).

In Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1, no. 26: “nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis, quae a nobis intelliguntur, nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur” (Marietti ed., 26.8). See McGovern, “The Logic of the First Operation,” 64: “[e]very definition is formed by a certain composition of concepts.” See Lonergan, Verbum, 45. These “first principles” that require no reasoning are ‘being’ and the principle of non-contradiction. If the notion of being requires no reasoning, then we might wonder why there is a need to resolve it. How would we move from ratio to intellectus without a process of reasoning? I think the answer is that this resolution (of the first
insight of ‘being’ by considering ‘being’ as ‘in itself’ and then by affirming ‘being in itself.’

Reason runs through each of these considerations through a “series of disjunctions” between what is considered in itself and to another, between affirmation and negation, and between division and agreement. These disjunctions constitute the way of composition (compositio).

Lastly, the intellect settles the panoply of thought into an added and final resolution (resolutio) into being, “thing is the quiddity or essence of being.” Whereas we started with a resolution of some first notion of being, we then predicated or composed ‘being’ with various disjunctive logical relations, including affirmations and negations, and then finally we reduced these notions back into being in order to define the attributes or properties of being.

Thomas’s division of being into interchangeable common conceptions is not a purely logical deduction. It is not based exclusively on the “logical functions of reason.” The division of good and truth as an agreement with the will and the intellect, for example, indicates the experiential or a posteriori aspect of the derivation of the transcendentals. Moreover, Thomas is clear that being immediately falls (cadit) into the intellect through intelligible species that are known) does not require reasoning on the part of the possible intellect. The cogitative power alone can consider individual being as such, as something implicitly belonging to a universal, and the possible intellect can take this particular “reasoning” and see the universality of being, as something predicable. It is a resolution from inquiring or reasoning about individual being to an insight about universal being.

See Mark D. Jordan, “The Grammar of Esse: Re-reading Thomas on the Transcendentals,” The Thomist (1980): 1-26. Thomas “derives the transcendental modes of ens by a series of disjunctions. The first of them separates the general modes which accrue to ens in se from those which accrue to it in ordine ad aliud. The second disjunction divides the modes of ens in se into affirmative and negative. The affirmative mode of ens in itself is res. The negative mode is unum. The third disjunction divides ens in relation to another: ens can be distinguished from the other (divisio) or fitted to it (convenientia). The mode of ens as distinguished is aliquid. The mode of ens as fitness is in turn divided by a fourth disjunction. Fitness can be with respect to appetite or to intellect. The mode of ens as fit for appetite is bonum. The mode of ens as fit for the intellect is verum” (7).

“Thomas’s account never claims that the necessity of the series of first concepts can be shown exclusively on the basis of the logical functions of reason.” See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 97. He notes the same in Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, 219. The clarification is directed at Breton who seems too ready to liken Thomas’s derivation to Kant’s deduction in his “L’idée de transcendental,” 57.
abstracted from sensible things. Finally, Thomas is dividing being into modes.\footnote{1} This is to say that Thomas’s procedure in \textit{De veritate} (q. 1, a. 1) belongs to metaphysics because its formal object is being as being and the properties of being (one, true, good).

Thomas nevertheless resorts to logical notions to divide being and define its properties. He relies on a logical method to resolve and compose being by adopting logical notions and relations in order to analyze and expand upon the concept of being and also to define the most common conceptions that accompany ‘being.’ We might even call this resolutive method \textit{secundum rationem} an instance of “conceptual analysis.” Aertsen however rejects calling the resolutive method \textit{secundum rationem} a “conceptual analysis” because, as he states, it would question the “the ontological status of such a resolution,” especially in light of \textit{De Trinitate} (q. 6, a. 1), which refers to a resolution from the more particular forms to the “most universal forms.”\footnote{2}

Although Aertsen rightly avoids calling the resolution \textit{secundum rationem} in \textit{De veritate} (q. 1, a. 1) a method belonging to dialectics,\footnote{3} Thomas makes clear in \textit{De Trinitate} (q. 6, a. 1a) that metaphysics can “appropriately and fittingly” use logical notions in its approach to being.\footnote{4} An analysis \textit{secundum rationem} is not analysis of \textit{mere} concepts because concepts express the intrinsic causes of things. Concepts express their \textit{ratio} or intelligible structure. If we add the

\footnote{1} “The Thomist derivation of the transcendentals is not meant to be like the Kantian deduction of the categories. It is, rather, a perspicuous arrangement of features discovered in beings.” See Jordan, “The Grammar of \textit{Esse},” 13.

\footnote{2} I side with Aertsen in his dispute with Oeing-Hanhoff except on this (almost terminological) point regarding “conceptual analysis” (\textit{die Begriffsanalyse}). See Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics,” 412. Interestingly, his first monograph continues to reject the phrase, “conceptual analysis,” despite the fact that “transcendentals explicate conceptually what being is.” See his \textit{Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals}, 97. For his continued disagreement with Oeing-Hanhoff, see \textit{Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals}, 133ff.

\footnote{3} Aertsen expresses this concern about “dialectics” in his \textit{Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals}, 106.

\footnote{4} Aertsen does not note the significance of \textit{De Trinitate} q. 6, a. 1 (a) for the relationship between metaphysics and a rational or logical method. One indication that he does not note its significance is his actual reading of \textit{De Trinitate} q. 6, a. 1 (a). See his “Method and Metaphysics,” 407.
concept ‘undivided’ to ‘being,’ and if we resolve (or analyze) those concepts into the definition of ‘one,’ then we express a general mode of being. This conceptual analysis shows something about being as being.

The particular and “most universal forms” in De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1), to which Aertsen refers, are objects of the cogitative intellect and the possible intellect, respectively.95 “Form” is admittedly an ambiguous term. It can mean substantial and accidental form, or it can mean an abstraction of the cogitative or possible intellect. In a method secundum rationem, the form refers to abstractions. To resolve a particular into a universal means resolving complex notions into a simple concept. We also cannot ignore that, in very many other contexts, Thomas’s frequent distinctions between secundum rationem and secundum rem are a distinction based on reason and on things, respectively.96

Finally, Thomas’s Commentary on the Physics also supports the view that resolution and composition secundum rationem entail a conceptual analysis,97 but Aertsen reads the

**Commentary on the Physics differently:**

Thomas acknowledges a resolution in the sense of an analysis of concepts when the constitution of a definition is at issue. But this analysis proceeds from whole to the parts,

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95 See ST I, q. 79, a. 4: “Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia” (Leon. 5.267); De veritate q. 15, a. 1: “Sed interdum ipsa vis cogitativa, quae est potentia animae sensitivae, ratio dicitur, quia confert inter formas individuales, sicut ratio proprie dicta inter formas universales” (Leon. 22/1.480:401-404). See also De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 3 ad 17: CT I, 79.

96 For just one instance of the distinction secundum rationem and secundum rem, In I Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 1: “Secundo modo quando relatio non habet aliquam realem diversitatatem inter extrema, sicut relatio identitatis: et ideo hoc nihil ponit secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem” (Mandonnet ed., 1.631).

from the still vague universal to what is distinct and specific. The resolution in the
Commentary on *De trinitate*, however, goes in the opposite direction, namely, from that
which is particular to that which is more universal.98

Pace Aertsen, *De Trinitate* and the Commentary on the *Physics* are in agreement. Where the
*Physics* Commentary (*In I Phys*. lect. 1, no. 6) discusses resolution as proceeding from confused
universal to distinct universal, *De Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 1c) describes it as proceeding from the
complex to the simple. We resolve confused notions into distinct ones. Both of these passages
refer to what is less knowable (confused) and more knowable (distinct) with regard to us (*quoad
nos*): just as ‘animal’ is less knowable to us until we know it as rational, so too ‘good’ is less
knowable to us until we know it as being. *De Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 1c) seems to identify these
procedures when it states “that which is more universal is more simple.” Moreover, where the
*Physics* Commentary (*In III Phys*. lect. 1, no. 277) discusses resolution as proceeding from
whole to parts, *De Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 1c) simply does not describe it that way. Thomas does
describe the way of resolution as proceeding from whole to parts in his Commentary on the
*Metaphysics* even as he refers to the *Physics* Commentary.99

I would like to end this evaluation by schematizing the way of resolution according to
notion (*secundum rationem*) under two different tables. In light of Thomas’s discussion in *De
Trinitate* (q. 6, a. 1c) and *In III Phys*. (lect. 1, no. 277), Table 3 contrasts the way of resolution to
the way of composition, and it also contrasts the way of proceeding according to notion and

99 *In II Meta*. lect. 1, no. 278: “Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis. Una quidem *per
modum resolutionis, secundum quam procedimus a compositis ad simplicia, et a toto ad partem, sicut dicitur in
primo Physicorum, quod confusa sunt prius nobis nota*. Et in hac via perficitur cognitio veritatis, quando pervenitur
ad singulas partes distincte cognoscendas. Alia est via compositionis, per quam procedimus a simplicibus ad
composita, qua perficitur cognitio veritatis cum pervenitur ad totum. Sic igitur hoc ipsum, quod homo non potest in
rebus perfecte totum et partem cognoscere, ostendit difficultatem considerandae veritatis secundum utramque viam”
(Marietti ed.,18.81). Italics mine.
according to thing (secundum rem). Thomas’s discussion of the properties of being primarily falls under the upper left corner (resolutionem secundum rationem) and secondarily on the bottom left of Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECUNDUM RATIONEM</th>
<th>RESOLUTIONEM</th>
<th>SECUNDUM REM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being, Properties of Being</td>
<td>God</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intrinsic effect</td>
<td>intrinsic cause</td>
<td>extrinsic cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complex</td>
<td>simple</td>
<td>simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whole</td>
<td>part</td>
<td>unchangeable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more particular</td>
<td>more universal</td>
<td>constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Ways of Resolution and Composition\textsuperscript{100}

In light of Thomas’s discussion of resolution in other passages, \textit{In I Phys.} (lect. 1, nos. 6-8) and \textit{De veritate} (q. 1, a. 1), Table 4 shows the way of resolution secundum rationem in the context of the confused and the distinct, especially in the different senses of the confused and the distinct based on something with regard to us (quoad nos: sense, apprehension, judgment) or simply in itself. The upshot is that proceeding from that which is less knowable to us to that which is more knowable to us in our apprehension (from A2 to B2) characterizes the determination of the transcendentals by way of resolution secundum rationem (upper left corner of Table 3). In \textit{De veritate}, Thomas compares this type of resolution to the resolution of a proposition into its principles (from A3 to B3):

\textsuperscript{100} Table 3 schematizes the discussion of resolution and composition in Thomas’s \textit{De Trinitate} (q. 6, a. 1c) and \textit{In III Phys.} lect. 1, no. 277.
2.1.2 Special Mode of Being: The Ten Predicaments

In *De veritate* (q. 1, a. 1), Thomas begins his discussion of the division of being into general and special modes of being by stating, “something is said to add to being insofar as it expresses a mode of being that the term ‘being’ does not express.” The implication is that we are to compare two notions in the mind through a subject and predicate. When ‘in itself’ (*per se*) is added to ‘being,’ “being in itself,” then the predicate expresses a “certain special mode of being” (*aliquis specialis modus entis*), namely “substance,” and we can assert this insight into being because we know that the modes of predication flow from the modes of being:

There are different grades of being according to the way diverse modes of existence are taken, and according to those modes (of existence) diverse genera of things are taken. So substance does not add a difference to being by signifying some reality added to it, but substance simply expresses a special manner of existing, namely, as a being in itself (*per se ens*). The same is true of the other classes of existents.

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101 Table 4 schematizes this discussion of resolution in light of Thomas’s discussion in *In I Phys*. lect. 1 nos. 6-8 and *De Veritate* q. 1, a. 1.

102 *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1: “aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum expriment modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur” (Leon. 22/1.5:112-114); *In I Sent*. d. 8, q. 4, a. 1 ad 1.

103 Ibid.: “Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus” (Leon. 22/1.4:114-123).
Thomas explains this causal dependency of the mode of predication upon the mode of being by starting with the order of nature, or reality (“there are different grades of being”). He then moves to the order of understanding (“according to the way diverse modes of existence are taken”), and then he finishes with the order of predication (“according to those modes of existence diverse genera are taken”). We classify modes of predication based on how we take the modes of existence, and the way we take the modes of existence is based upon the modes of being.

Thomas singles out substance here as a special mode of being. ‘Substance’ does not add some specific difference to ‘being,’ yet it signifies ‘being in itself,’ which expresses a mode of being opposed to ‘being in another.’ Thomas does not further develop the special modes of being in De veritate. It is only later in his career (1269-1272), when writing the Commentary on the Metaphysics and the Commentary on the Physics, that Thomas expounds on these special modes of being, which are otherwise known as ten predicaments. We shall turn our attention now to these two commentaries.104

2.1.2.1 Exposition

Thomas begins his division of being into the ten predicaments with the absolute consideration of being: “being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense,” he explains, so “a thing is in its own nature either a substance or an

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accident."\(^{105}\) This absolute or in-itself (\textit{secundum/per se}) consideration of being is opposed to an accidental or coincidental (\textit{secundum/per accidens}) consideration of being:\(^{106}\) ‘white-man’ flows from a coincidental consideration of being, and ‘man’ flows from an absolute consideration of being. Thomas is here concerned with an absolute or in-itself consideration of being. Just as whiteness (\textit{albedo}) considered in itself is an accident, and just as man considered in itself is a substance, so too being considered in itself is either substance or accident. There is essentially nothing else. Between a substance and an accident there cannot be anything intermediate because “substance and accident are divisions of being by way of affirmation and denial.”\(^{107}\) We state that it is proper to a substance not to be in a subject (negation), and we state that it is proper to an accident to be in a subject (affirmation). The key to dividing being along the lines of this primary division of essential being through a predication by negation (substance) and through a predication by affirmation (accident) is to recognize “a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication,” for “in just as many ways as being is predicated, in just as many ways something is said to be.”\(^{108}\) Through this method of predication, metaphysics determines ten classes of complete being.

\(^{105}\) \textit{In V Meta}, lect. 9, no 885: “Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. . . . Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens” (Marietti ed., 18.237-238).

\(^{106}\) We have considered the question of accidental or coincidental being in chapter one. \textit{In V Meta}, lect. 9, no. 886-888. See Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being,” 1-40.

\(^{107}\) \textit{De spiritualibus creaturis}, a. 11: “Non enim inter substantiam et accidens potest esse aliquid medium, cum substantia et accidens diuidant ens per affirmationem et negationem; cum proprium substantiae sit non esse in subiecto, accidentis uero sit in subiecto esse” (Leon. 24/2.119:248-253).

\(^{108}\) \textit{In V Meta}, lect. 9, no. 890-891: “Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. . . . Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse” (Marietti ed., 18.238). “If it is not a physical approach, neither is it a purely logical approach. It is metaphysical, i.e.
These classes are called “predicaments” because they are distinguished on the basis of three different ways a predicate is related to the subject. In order to divide being, Thomas articulates an outward procedure from what is intrinsic to what is extrinsic to the subject. When the predicate relates to the subject as something intrinsic, then we have substance; when the predicate relates to the subject as both intrinsic and extrinsic to the subject, then we have quantity, quality, and relation; and when the predicate relates to the subject as something extrinsic, then we have passion, action, when, where, position, and habit. Thomas lays out this division of being in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and in his Commentary on the *Physics*.

In the first way that a predicate is related to a subject, the predicate states that which is the subject (*id quod est*), as when we say “Socrates is an animal,” for Socrates is that which is an animal. This predicate is said to signify first substance (1), that is, a particular substance of which all attributes are predicated (*de qua omnia praedicantur*). Accordingly, we can examine the rationate relation between the predicate and the subject, the foundation and the term of a
proposition respectively, in order to posit within the science of being as being a real predicament that is substance. Whenever the predicate is related to the subject as expressing that which is the subject, then the “is” signifies substance.

The second way that a predicate is related to the subject is as being in the subject (inest subiecto). If the predicate expresses something in the subject essentially and absolutely as flowing from its matter, then the “is” signifies quantity (2). If the predicate expresses something in the subject essentially and absolutely as flowing from its form, then the “is” signifies quality (3). If it expresses something in the subject, not essentially and absolutely but rather in reference to something else, then the “is” signifies relation (4).112 By “relation” Thomas means a real relation, an order between real things (rei), as opposed to a rationate relation, an order between thoughts (intellectuum). Through the method of predication, then, Thomas metaphysically determines the reality of a real relation through the rationate relation of a predicate signifying something in the subject with reference to something else.113

The third way that a predicate is related to the subject is as something outside the subject. In one way, that predicate may be related as something altogether outside the subject, in which case the “is” signifies four different predicaments (5-8). If the predicate is not the extrinsic measure of the subject, then the “is” expresses habit, such as “Socrates is clothed” or “horse is

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112 In V Meta, lect. 9, no. 892: “Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid” (Marietti ed., 18.238-239). For a related statement about quantity, quality, and relation in terms of essential inherence and non-essential inherence, De potentia q. 7, a. 9; ST I, q. 28, a. 1.
113 In I Sent, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1; De potentia q. 7, a. 11 ad 3.
saddled” (5). Habit is a special predicament for the sake of mankind because through reason he can equip himself or other things with tools and instruments for a number of projects.\textsuperscript{114}

If the predicate is an extrinsic measure of the subject with reference to time, then the “is” expresses when (6). If the predicate is an extrinsic measure of the subject with reference to place (\textit{loco}), which Thomas elsewhere defines as an unmoving boundary or container, then the copula can signify two predicaments depending on the consideration of the order of parts in place. If the predicate does not consider the order of parts in place, then the copula expresses some-where (\textit{ubi}) (7), but if the predicate does consider the order of parts in place, then the copula expresses position (\textit{situs}) (8).\textsuperscript{115}

This third way, in which a predicate is related to the subject as something outside the subject, can also be taken in yet another way. It can be considered as not altogether outside the subject and so predicated in the subject in some way. If the predicate is related to the subject insofar as the subject is a principle of acting, then the “is” expresses action (9). If the predicate is related to the subject insofar as the subject is the terminus or end of an action, then the “is” expresses passion (10).\textsuperscript{116} In other passages, Thomas distinguishes action and passion as two


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{In V Meta.} lect. 9, no. 892: “Si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinsecus sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato ordine partium in loco, quo considerato erit situs” (Marietti ed., 18.239). For Thomas’s definition of “\textit{locus},” \textit{In IV Phys.} lect. 6; \textit{De veritate} q. 1, a. 6. For a similar statement about position (“\textit{situs}”) being the order of parts in place, \textit{In IV Phys.} lect. 7, no. 475.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{In V Meta.} lect. 9, no. 892: “Alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur. Et si quidem secundum principium, sic praedicatur ut agere. Nam actionis principium
aspects of the same motion, “action implies reference as of something from which (a quo) there is motion in the thing moved, but passion implies reference as of something which is from another (ab alio).”\\footnote{ST I, q. 28, a. 3 ad 1: “in actione importatur respectus ut a quo est motus in mobili, in passione vero ut qui est ab alio” (Leon. 5.324). For discussion on action and passion, \textit{In III Phys}., lect. 5. It is also the case the real relation, as the most weak being, is founded upon two accidents that Thomas states have an order to something else, discrete quantity (number) and action. \textit{In III Phys.}, lect. 1, no. 280.}

Motion provides a kind of kaleidoscope to the predicaments. Since it is defined even more universally than the highest genera (the predicaments), as the act of what is potential insofar as it is potential, motion can be divided across all ten predicaments. Motion is primarily in the predicament of quantity (increase/decrease), quality (alteration), and place (locomotion), but all the predicaments “move” insofar as something actualizes their potentiality.\\footnote{In \textit{III Phys.} lect. 1, no. 282: “motus dividitur sicut genera rerum. . . . quot modis dividitur ens, tot modis dividitur motus” (Marietti ed., 14.141). In \textit{III Phys.} lect. 2, no. 285: “Unde convenientissime philosophus definit motum, dicens quod motus est \textit{entelechia}, idest \textit{actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi}” (Marietti ed., 14.145). In \textit{V Phys.} lect. 6, no. 696: “Dicit ergo primo quod motus dicitur \textit{ unus} multipliciter, secundum quod et ipsum unum in communi acceptum multipliciter dicitur, scilicet genere et specie et numero. Dicitur autem motus \textit{ unus} genere, secundum figuras praedicamenti. Omnes enim qui sunt in una coordinatione praedicamenti, possunt dici unus motus genere: sicut omnis loci mutatio est unus motus genere, quia est in uno praedicamento \textit{ ubi}; differt autem genere ab alteratione, quae est in praedicamento \textit{qualitatis}, ut supra dictum est” (Marietti ed., 14.345).} Even the numerically same motion can be divided into two predicaments of action or passion. The fact that action and passion are two aspects of the same motion does not deter Thomas from placing them into diverse predicaments because, as he states, “the same thing belongs to diverse predicaments inasmuch as it is predicated in diverse ways of diverse things.”\\footnote{In \textit{XI Meta.} lect. 9, no. 2313: “Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sint diversa praedicamenta. Sed scienendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet” (Marietti ed., 18.547).} When motion is predicated of the subject \textit{in} which it is (“Tom is learning from Bob”), that motion constitutes the
predicament passion; when motion is predicated of the subject by which it is, that motion constitutes the predicament action ("Bob is teaching Tom").

2.1.2.2 Evaluation

About thirty years after Thomas’s Commentary, John Duns Scotus took inspiration from Thomas’s Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in writing his own *Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, and he made numerous objections to the division of being into the ten predicaments. We shall afford ourselves one simple objection by Scotus. In one of his objections based on the number of modes of predication, Scotus assumes that distinguishing the predicaments requires a distinct mode of predication for each predicament, and he concludes that the modes of predication are insufficient to distinguish the predicaments from each other because there are fewer modes of predication than there are predicaments. Scotus refers as an example to the three *per se* modes of predication found in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* I, 9-10.

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120 Thomas gives another example regarding place (*locus*). Place belongs to the genus quantity inasmuch as it is predicated regarding what locates (*de locante*), but inasmuch as it is predicated denominatively of what is located (*de locato*), it establishes the predicament of where (*ubi*). *In XI Meta*. lect. 9, no. 2313: “Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi. Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subjecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis” (Marietti ed., 18.547). I reverse the order of examples in my restatement.

121 See John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, ed. Robert Andrews et al., Opera philosophica, Vols. 3, 4 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1997): “Contra hoc secundum: primi modi praedicandi simpliciter non sunt nisi duo simpliciter: ‘in quid’, et ‘in quale’. Item, non sunt nisi quattuor praedicata, nec nisi quinque universalia; ergo penes modum praedicandi non possunt praedicamenta distinguiri si sint decem” (5.5-6, no. 61). For an account of Scotus’s objections to a method of dividing being into ten predicaments and for Thomistic responses to those objections, see Paul Symington, *On Determining What There Is: The Identity of Ontological Categories in Aquinas, Scotus, and Lowe* (Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, 2010). For this specific objection based on the number of modes of predication, see pp. 78, 124-125. Unfortunately, Symington argues that Thomas relies merely on *per se* modes of predication to divide being, and his interpretation takes no notice of Thomas’s use of “denominative” predication in Bk III of the *Commentary on the Physics* (lect. 5). For one reviewer’s opinion: “[Symington] tells us that the derivation of the full list of categories is beyond the scope of his investigation (p. 122). This is a striking admission, given that Aquinas’s method is supposed to be a viable way of individuating all
For Thomas, the method of predication does not depend upon the three *per se* modes of predication in order to derive the ten predicaments, and his determination of the highest genera are not limited to simply a few predetermined modes of predication. Rather, Thomas relies on a denominative mode of predication. As he states in Bk VII of his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (lect. 2), “concreative or denominative predication shows that substance differs essentially from accidents.” Concrete accidental terms (“white”) signify accidents primarily and substance by implication because they signify after the manner of an accident. Unlike “whiteness,” the predicate “white” implies its subject, man. This fact that concrete terms imply a subject in their mode of signification means that the denominative mode of predication necessarily entails a subject that essentially differs from the predicate through the in-formation of the supposit. We cannot predicate denominatively without implying two distinct essences. Through denominative predication, each of the predicaments have their own proper mode of predication because each of these predicates signifies a specific form that inheres in the supposit of the subject.

In other words, we cannot divide being through *per se* predication because, in *per se* predications, the predicate primarily regards the proper or specific notion signified by the subject. “Man is an animal” (*primo modo*), “number is odd” (*secundo modo*), and “the slaughtered thing died” (*quarto modo*) are *per se* predications either because the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject or because the subject belongs to the essence of the ten categories.” See Andrew W. Arlig, Review of *On Determining What There Is*, by Paul Symington, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (online), March 30, 2011. http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=23169.

122 *In VII Meta.*, lect. 2, no. 1289: “Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est alid per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam alid est materia a formis substantialibus” (Marietti ed., 18.323). This passage will come up in our discussion about the proof of the reality of prime matter through denominative predication.
predicate. But being is involved in every notion, so it must be predicated analogically. By attending to the modes of predication, Thomas’s metaphysics notices the different ways that a predicate is related to a subject, not in universal or univocal terms, but insofar as “we say that this is that” (hoc esse illud) regarding a supposit, and such predicates are analogous (secundum intentionem, secundum esse), “just as being is predicated of substance and accident.”123 It is accidental and denominative predicates that signify diverse modes of being.

2.2 Determination of the Reality of Prime Matter

Unlike for some Franciscans (e.g. Bonaventure, John Pecham, Richard of Mediavilla), for Thomas prime matter has no actuality.124 Prime matter is a co-principle co-created with substantial form, posterior to form in actuality, and known only in its relation to form.125 For this reason, Thomas can only show the reality of prime matter indirectly. He must prove that such matter exists by showing that it differs from substantial form. In Bk VII of his Commentary on the Metaphysics, before he offers his only metaphysical proof for the reality of prime matter,

123 In I Sent. d. 22, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2: “cum ens praedicetur analogice de decem generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos modos. Unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus praedicandi” (Mandonnet ed., 1.538); ST II-II, q. 120, a. 2: “quandoque autem praedicatur secundum prius et posterius, sicut ens praedicatur de substantia et accidente” (Leon. 9.470); In III Phys. lect. 5, no. 322: “Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de alium altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta” (Marietti ed., 14.158); De potentia q. 7, a. 7: “diversus tamen modus existendi impediet univocam praedicacionem”; In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1: “aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter . . . vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente” (Mandonnet ed., 1.492).


125 In VII Meta. lect. 2, no. 1278-1279; In VII Meta. lect. 7, no. 1423.
Thomas summarizes the natural philosopher’s own proof.\textsuperscript{126} He states that something must persist in change. Otherwise, there would be no change. If X were to change to Y, then the change must be fixed by a principle that belongs to both X and to Y. There must be an internal principle that is both constant and undetermined, a pure potency for X and for Y.\textsuperscript{127} Insofar as both sciences rely on something actual to prove something potential, this argument based on change (\textit{viam motus}) for the reality of prime matter in the philosophy of nature is mirrored in first philosophy by the argument based on predication (\textit{viam praedicationis}).\textsuperscript{128}

Thomas nevertheless reminds us that natural philosophy and metaphysics proceed to prove the reality of prime matter very differently: “The Philosopher does not use motion to prove that matter differs from all forms, for this proof belongs to the philosophy of nature. Rather, he uses the method of predication, which is proper to dialectics (\textit{propria logicae}) and is closely allied with this science.”\textsuperscript{129} Two sciences use two different ways to prove the same conclusion. Like an art that crafts products with specific tools appropriate to its task, each science must argue to conclusions with principles appropriate to its scope: natural philosophy uses the way of motion, and first philosophy uses the way of predication.\textsuperscript{130}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[126]{\textit{In VII Meta.} lect. 2, no. 1286-1287.}
\footnotetext[127]{\textit{In VII Meta.} lect. 2, no. 1288; \textit{In VIII Meta.} lect. 1, no. 1688-1689. See Matthew Alexander Kent, \textit{Prime Matter According to St. Thomas Aquinas} (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 2010). Kent reconstructs Thomas’s argument in the philosophy of nature for the reality of matter (86-211), and he reconstructs Thomas’s logical argument in metaphysics for the reality of prime matter (53-85). Kent mentions that the logical argument for the reality of prime matter is “less demonstrative” (56).
\footnotetext[129]{\textit{In VII Meta.} lect. 2, no. 1287: “Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis Philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae” (Marietti ed., 18.323).
\footnotetext[130]{See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 377. The philosophy of nature studies material things, which includes motion in its definition, so the principle of motion belongs to the philosophy of nature because the definition of its subject includes motion. By contrast, metaphysics studies things that do not}
Although metaphysics studies objects whose definitions positively exclude matter or motion such as God and angels, metaphysics also studies objects whose definitions neither include nor exclude matter (so-called “neutrally immaterial” objects), and insofar as it gives these objects or notions to other sciences metaphysics is called “first philosophy.” First philosophy looks upon matter’s participation in common being (ens commune). It must prove the reality of prime matter as a principle of being, and it determines the reality of prime matter by examining the way prime matter appears to us through a science that shares first philosophy’s universal concern for being, that is through an instrumental science that also studies objects that do not need matter or motion to exist or to be understood. That science is logic. Metaphysics adopts a logical point of view when it proves prime matter based on the way that we understand and predicate substance because logic studies the arrangements of concepts in the medium of understanding and predicating.

According to Thomas’s summary statements, the sweeping search for substance in Bk VII of his Commentary on the Metaphysics employs a “logical mode” (modo logico) by “examining the definition and its parts and other things of this kind which are considered according to reason (secundum rationem).” Bk VII outlines the various logical horizons of

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131 De Trinitate q. 5, a. 1. For the interpretation of this passage as referring to “positively” and “neutrally immaterial” objects, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 8-10, 44-54.

132 De potentia q. 3, a. 1 ad 12; De Trinitate q. 5, a. 4 ad 6. See also Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 377.

133 In I NE, proemium, nos. 1-2: “Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae. . . . Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones.”

134 In VIII Meta. lect. 1, no. 1681: “Postquam determinavit philosophus in septimo de substantia modo logico, considerando scilicet definitionem et partes definitionis, et alia huiusmodi quae secundum rationem
substance.\textsuperscript{135} These logical horizons show up in the way we talk or in the way we predicate (\textit{modo loquendi sive praedicandi}). We know that substance is the primary kind of being because other kinds of being refer back to substance: terms signifying substance express what a thing is in an unqualified sense (\textit{dicunt quid est aliquid absolute}), whereas those signifying quality or quantity express what sort of thing it is (\textit{quale quid}).\textsuperscript{136} Thomas’s proof for prime matter takes place within this logical investigation.

\subsection*{2.2.1 Exposition}

There are many candidates for what answers the question, “what is it?,” one of which is matter, and Thomas decides to prove the reality of prime matter in Bk VII of his Commentary on the \textit{Metaphysics}. The core argument is very brief: “There must be something of which all predicates are predicated, yet in such a way that the being of that subject of which they are predicated is diverse in being [\textit{esse}] from each of those things that ‘are predicated of it.’ In other words, they have a diverse quiddity and essence.”\textsuperscript{137} There must be some being or subject of

\textsuperscript{135} According to Thomas, Bk VIII applies these logical outlines to existing things. \textit{In VIII Meta}. lect. 1, no. 1681: “Dicet ergo primo quod, cum multa dicta sint in septimo logica consideratione circa substantiam, oportet syllogizare ex his quae dicta sunt, ut applicentur quae secundum considerationem logicae dicta sunt, ad res naturales existentes” (Marietti ed., 18.402).

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{In VII Meta}. lect. 1, no. 1250: “Ex quo patet quod illa quae significant substantiam, dicunt quid est aliquid absolute. Quae autem praedican qualitatem, non dicunt quid est illud de quo praedicatur absolute, sed quale quid” (Marietti ed., 18.316).

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{In VII Meta}. lect. 2, no. 1287: “Dicet ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicta praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicantur, et unicuique eorum quae de ‘ipso praedicantur’, idest diversa quidditas et essentia” (Marietti ed., 18.323).
which all terms are predicated, Thomas would say, and we cannot proceed to predicate *ad infinitum*. There must then be one ultimate subject for all predications.

Before we elaborate on this argument, we should note that Thomas twice warns us of a possible logicism: “Now it must be noted that what has been said here cannot be understood to apply to univocal predication, according to which genera are predicated of the species in whose definitions they are given, because man and animal do not differ essentially.”138 We cannot accept the view that the subject of just any predication differs essentially from its predicate because the first mode of predication, which flows from the first mode of participation, entails two terms that signify the same essence. The subject of ‘man,’ for instance, does not differ essentially from the predicate ‘animal.’

Thomas turns our attention to another mode of predication that notifies the philosopher of different essences, one that falls under *per accidens* predication. Indeed, in short order, Thomas emphasizes that the type of predication that we use to prove the reality of prime matter cannot be essential but must be denominative.139 We might naturally wonder how it is that denominative predication, the predication of two concrete terms concerning a supposit, helps first philosophy to distinguish between matter and form. Thomas cues us through an example that we have

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138 *In VII Meta. lect. 2, no. 1288*: “Sciendum autem est, quod id, quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quorum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo” (Marietti ed., 18.323). What this surface-level hesitation shows us is that the first philosopher must use the instrument of rational philosophy with some discretion. Thomas himself qualifies that the first philosopher can use the logical method only while recognizing the limits of logic’s tendency to see things univocally.

139 *In VII Meta. lect. 2, no. 1288*: “Sciendum autem est, quod id, quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quorum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative” (Marietti ed., 18.323).
already seen in the derivation of the predicaments. We say that “a man is white,” not that “a man is whiteness,” because “the quiddity of a white thing differs from that of a man.” Denominative predication shows an essential distinction between man and white because the predicate does not belong to the notion of the subject. Whiteness is not included in the notion of man. First philosophy thereby notices the real differences between what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and it thereby recognizes that genera such as quality differ from substance.

In Thomas’s more focused example of denominative or concretive predication regarding first matter, “this material thing is a man,” we notice that “man” and “this material thing” have the same supposit, yet the subject, “this material thing,” implies a subject logically prior to “man.” “This material thing” functions as an indeterminate principle for just about any predicate, such as “is a man” or “is a pig.” The composite structure of this proposition reflects the composite structure of reality, namely that the subject signifies something material in the supposit and the predicate something formal, but Thomas does not jump to the conclusion that this potency-act structure directly signifies a matter-form composite. Rather, what this logical structure means is that indeterminacy is necessarily included in concrete language about material things.

140 In VII Meta. lect. 2, no. 1288: “sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis” (Marietti ed., 18.323).
141 “Thus, the assumption which is really in play in the argument is that in all cases of accidental predication, the subject and the predicate are different in nature.” See Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 253.
142 ST I, q. 16, a. 2.
143 “[T]he ultimate or primordial subject of denominative predication must be free from all formal determination, for, if it possessed such determination, it in turn could be predicated of some other subject less determined than itself, and so on ad infinitum, until a formless subject were reached.” See Reichmann, “Logic and
First philosophy looks at speech in the light of substance asking, what does the expression “this material thing” imply regarding substance? “This material thing” signifies a first substance or supposit, the subject of all predication, and it also signifies an indeterminate aspect of a substance. This indeterminate aspect indicates a receptivity to diverse corporeal forms such as “is a man” or “is a pig.” Unlike the term, “matter,” “this material thing” presupposes a principle of substance different from a substantial form because the concrete subject of predication implies a subject absolutely receptive to various bodily forms. Similar to the way “white” implies a substance really distinct from the accident, “this material thing” implies an ultimate subject really distinct from a bodily form.144

According to Thomas, first philosophy posits a purely indeterminate principle based on denominative predication because “this material thing” presupposes a principle of substance in the line of potentiality. If there were no ultimate subject to support the indeterminacy signified by the subject, no thoroughgoing potentiality, then at least one act of predication would entail an act-act structure, and that structure would contradict the potency-act structure of predication regarding material things. We can say “is a man” or “is a pig” of “this material thing” because “this material thing” ultimately implies a first or prime matter receptive to the form of man or

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144 “[T]he predication contained in the sentence [“this material thing is a man”] counts as a case of accidental predication because being a man is not built into the nature of this material object qua material object, just as being pale as opposed to being tanned is not built into the nature of a man qua man. A material object can be many other things and not only a man. This shows that matter is different in essence not only from accidental properties but also from the substantial form it is capable of taking on.” See Galluzzo, The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta, 254.
pig. The potentiality that is prime matter enables concrete speech about the actuality of bodily things.\textsuperscript{145}

For Thomas, first philosophy takes from logic the view that “substance is predicated of matter denominatively”\textsuperscript{146} because it is “that of which other things are predicated.”\textsuperscript{147} With this “subject” criterion established by logic, and exercised in the act of denominative predication, first philosophy examines the first sense of substance as that principle which is necessary for an individual to receive the actuality of a corporeal form and exist as a material thing.\textsuperscript{148} Matter is called substance because a particular substance is “individuated in the world of material things only by means of matter.”\textsuperscript{149} As a principle of being, matter sustains concrete speech about existing material things.

\textsuperscript{145} “[T]he ratio itself of denominative predication demands an absolutely first subject, for the very condition of the possibility of such predication rests on the assumption that the form signified by the predicate and the subject are distinct.” See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method,” 379-380.

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{In VII Meta.} lect. 2, no. 1288: “Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative” (Marietti ed., 18.323). In chapter one, we indicated that Aristotle searches for substance logically by examining what we say about substance, namely that it is that of which all things are predicated. Thomas adopts this method here. Thomas takes from Aristotle the view that matter is substance, but what Thomas adds to the view is that substance is predicated of matter denominatively. Aristotle does not make it clear that he thinks substance is predicated denominatively, or as Aristotle puts it, paronomously.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{In VII Meta.}, lect. 2, no. 1280: “idest dictum est solum in universalii, quod substantia est illud, quod non dicitur de subiecto, sed de quo dicitur alia” (Marietti ed., 18.322).

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{In VII Meta.} lect. 3, no. 1308; \textit{In VII Meta.} lect. 17, no. 1658. James C. Doig calls the type of logic used in the proof of prime matter, “material logic,” because Thomas is interested not only in the “form of his thought, but in the \textit{validity} of its content as well” (280). Doig opposes this use of logic to the use of “formal logic” by Avicebron and Thomas in their argument over universal hylomorphism. See his \textit{Aquinas on Metaphysics}, 280, no. 1.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{In V Meta.}, lect. 10, no. 905: “Materiam vero, quae substantia dicitur, praetermittit, quia non est substantia in actu. Includitur tamen in primo modo, quia substantia particularis non habet quod sit substantia et quod sit individua in rebus materialibus, nisi ex materia” (Marietti ed., 18.242). The context of the last passage is the lexical reference to ‘substance.’ Thomas is stating that in his own discussion Aristotle omits matter (\textit{materiam}), which is called substance, because it is not substance actually. The reason why matter should be included in the first sense of substance is that a particular substance is a substance and is individuated only by means of matter. See also \textit{In VII Meta.}, lect. 2, no. 1289. First philosophy does not conclude that matter is substance actually, for form and the composite of matter and form most approximate what substance is.
2.2.2 Evaluation

Before evaluating Thomas’s argument for the proof of prime matter, we should first note that Thomas does not take this proof from Aristotle. The view that “matter is substance” even seems a strange interlude in Aristotle’s own work because Aristotle abruptly ends with the impossibility that matter is substance because matter neither has ‘thisness’ nor ‘separability.’ Doig suggests that, since he may have viewed this interlude as a way to show the pre-Socratics that substance is not only matter, Thomas conscientiously developed the proof for prime matter in order to uncover Aristotle’s intention, namely that in some sense, matter is substance. The result is a unique proof through denominative predication of prime matter that is, however brief and elliptical, both sound and demonstrative.

It is a sound argument because it takes into consideration how material things exert their mode of being upon our mode of predicating. Logic indicates a potency-act structure in two-term concrete propositions signifying the same thing in intention (secundum rationem), but first philosophy recognizes that this potency-act structure in concrete things necessarily entails distinct things signified in reality (secundum rem). In other words, first philosophy recognizes that the denominative mode of predication flows from the accidental mode of participation, which entails the participation of different essences. First philosophy rightly concludes that, in order for denominative predication to be possible, there must be at least one ultimate subject of

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151 See Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics, 316-323. Wippel refers to Doig’s point about Aristotle’s intention in The Metaphysical Thought, 303 no. 28.

predication that is without determination to sustain every potency-act predication of material things.

It is also a negative demonstration in metaphysics. ‘Matter’ and ‘form’ are abstract concepts, so we need speculative sciences to distinguish them. Natural philosophy proves that ‘matter’ has an immediate foundation in reality through motion, a principle of nature “most evident” to us, but first philosophy also proves that matter has an immediate foundation in reality through denominative predication, a principle of material logic that is evident to first philosophy. Denominative predication is not as evident as motion because predication requires a reflective stance, but first philosophy can develop its first notions and primary principles through this reflective viewpoint. Contrary to the suggestion that this logical way of proceeding is not “strictly metaphysical,”153 we can gather from Thomas’s statements in De Trinitate VI.1 that metaphysics “properly and suitably” uses logic by co-opting and reflecting upon the way we concretely predicate material things.154

153 Wippel correctly thinks that the analysis of predication by denomination takes place within metaphysics, but he implies that it is not “strictly metaphysical” in comparison to arguments based on participation. See his The Metaphysical Thought, 303. See also Kent’s dissertation, Prime Matter according to St. Thomas Aquinas, 83-85. Kent’s dissertation focuses on the physical proof for matter, but he devotes a specific section on establishing the reality of matter “via logic and language” (pp. 53-85).

154 De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1(a): “contingit autem hoc proprie et convenienter fieri in logica et metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subjectum quodammodo” (Leon. 50.159:133-136). For an argument against the proof for prime matter through logic and language, see Milton Fisk’s “Primary Matter and Unqualified Change” in The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 218-241, esp. 220-222. Fisk’s arguments are not aimed at Thomas, yet Kent’s dissertation (referenced above) redirects them to Thomas: “If Fisk is right, then St. Thomas’s example fails to indicate anything about the nature of physical reality, since it reduces to a mere assertion about how to use a particular language” (72). One of Kent’s counter-arguments to Fisk (and Bertrand Russell) is that they “err when they assume that we can speak only of what we can directly perceive as a discrete physical object” (77). In effect, Fisk and Russell commit the same errors as the pre-Socratics who do not transcend their imagination to “grasp the idea of a noun that stands for a non-sensible aspect” of the physical world (79).
Thomas argues that if there were no real absolute principle of indetermination called “prime matter,” then we could not speak in a concrete way about material things. It is in a way like Aristotle’s argument against Heraclitus. On the one hand, Thomas’s proof resembles Aristotle’s *reductio ad absurdum* of those who seem to deny the principle of non-contradiction because they are like plants who cannot defend their supposed view with speech (*logos*). Thomas’s argument also leaves those who disagree speechless (about material things). On the other hand, Thomas’s proof is not a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is rather a negative demonstration because it not only refutes the opposing view but also leads to a positive conclusion based on premisses that are more knowable to us. We can positively conclude to an indeterminate principle of material being based on the nature of predication.  

2.3 Determination of the Unicity of Substantial Form

Due to its deep-reaching philosophical and theological implications, the question concerning whether there is one or many substantial forms in a material substance was vigorously debated in the late 13th century. The unity of the soul was not in question. Rather, the question concerned the issue of different forms. For example, might there be one substantial form in man that makes him rational (an intellectual form) and another that makes him bodily (a bodily form)? Although a few scholars suggest that Thomas hesitated about this question early, 

\[\text{\textsuperscript{155} In IV Meta, lect. 6, no. 608: “Sed solum si ille qui ex aliqua dubitatione negat illud principium, “dicit aliquid” idest aliquid nomine significat. Si vero nihil dicit, derisible est quaequere aliquam rationem ad illum qui nulla utitur ratione loquendo. Talis enim in hac disputatione, qui nihil significat, similis erit plantae. Animalia enim bruta etiam significant aliquid per talia signa” (Marietti ed., 18.168); In I Post. an. lect. 40.}

\[\text{\textsuperscript{156} “Granted that a substance receives its essence and being from an intrinsic principle called a substantial form, is it possible for a single substance to have more than one principle of this kind?” See Armand Maurer,} \textit{Medieval Philosophy}, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982), 213.\]
in his career,¹⁵⁷ there is no doubt that Thomas came to be a preeminent opponent to the theory of a plurality of substantial forms. We might even call him an intellectual “giant” on this issue.¹⁵⁸

Although arguments for the plurality of substantial forms and arguments for the reality of spiritual matter are distinct arguments, many of the proponents for the plurality of substantial forms in a single substance also held to the reality of spiritual matter (universal hylomorphism). I would suggest that the theory of the plurality of substantial forms parallels the theory of spiritual matter. In the theory of spiritual matter, proponents argue that, because the logical subject of every proposition indicates an indeterminate or material principle of a thing, each finite thing must have prime matter. In the theory of the plurality of substantial forms, proponents might argue that, because the predicate in propositions indicates a determinate or formal principle of a thing, each finite thing must have various substantial forms. Even if not actually linked by their proponents, these two theories are at least “conceptually linked.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ “Dans le commentaire sur le 1er livre des Sentences, saint Thomas semble admettre une forme de corporéité qu’il n’est pas facile de distinguer de celle qui est propre à la thèse pluraliste, car, d’après cet ouvrage, il faut qu’une première forme substantielle perfectionne toute la matière; or cette première forme reçue par la matière, c’est précisément la forme de corporéité, dont elle n’est jamais dépourvue.” See Zavalloni, Controverse sur la Pluralité Des Formes, 263. For discussion, see Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 334-351. Wippel concludes that Thomas’s ambiguous formulations need not be taken “as implying that other substantial forms might also be present in the same body at the same time in addition to corporeity” (348). See Bk 1 of Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences (d. 8, q. 5, a. 2). See also Collins, Thomistic Philosophy of Angels, 59 no. 22.

¹⁵⁸ For Zavalloni’s reference to Thomas as a “géant” among partisans for the unit of substantial form, see his Controverse sur la Pluralité Des Formes, 497.

¹⁵⁹ See Paul Vincent Spade, “Binarium Famosissimum”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/binarium/>. Spade explains that, excepting Avicebron, the proponents of the theory of the plurality of substantial forms did not argue in the same way for spiritual matter: “some of the arguments cited above in favor of plurality of forms show that at least that half of the “pair” was sometimes held for entirely different reasons.” Zavalloni would agree. He denies the reliance on logical arguments among the Latins for the plurality of substantial forms: “Tandis que, chez le philosophe juif, ce sont des distinctions logiques qui amènent à poser des distinctions réelles, chez les scolastiques, c’est l’expérience physique qui est à la base de la conception pluraliste. Pour ce motif, nous croyons devoir nier le parallélisme rigoureux entre l’ordre logique et l’ordre réel qu’on prétend découvrir dans la doctrine de la pluralité des formes; il faut y souligner plutôt le parallélisme entre l’ordre physique et l’ordre métaphysique” (498-499).
2.3.1 Exposition

In considering the unicity of substantial form in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 58, Thomas’s first argument employs the method of predication. There, he neatly distinguishes two *modus tollens* inferences. In the first *modus tollens*, Thomas rejects the plurality of substantial forms in the soul because these forms would each be predicated in the accidental mode of predication:

Things attributed to the same thing according to diverse forms are predicated of one another by accident [*per accidens*]; a white thing is said to be musical by accident because whiteness and musicality are accidental to Socrates. Accordingly, if in us the intellective, sensitive, and nutritive soul are diverse powers or forms, then the things that belong to us according to those forms will be predicated of one another by accident. Now, it is with respect to the intellective soul that we are said to be men; to the sensitive soul, animals; to the nutritive soul, living beings. It follows that the predication, man is an animal, or an animal is a living thing, will be by accident. But this predication is essential [*per se*], since man, as such, is an animal, and animal, as such, is a living thing. It is by the same principle, therefore, that one is a man, an animal, and a living thing.  

The *modus tollens* argument proceeds this way: if the intellective, sensitive, and nutritive soul were diverse forms (a plurality of substantial forms), then we would predicate them of each other according to the accidental mode of predication. We know, however, that it is not accidental but rather *per se* that, for example, man is an animal.

In other words, to have a plurality of substantial forms in a substance would mean that, since the intellective, sensitive, and nutritive soul are the formal causes of man, animal, and

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160 SCG 2.58, no. 1344: “Quae attribuuntur alicui eidem secundum diversas formas, praedicantur de invicem per accidens: album enim dicitur esse musicum per accidens, quia Socrati accidit albedo et musica. Si igitur anima intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva sunt diversae virtutes aut formae in nobis, ea quae secundum has formas nobis conveniunt, de invicem praedicabuntur per accidens. Sed secundum animam intellectivam dicimur homines, secundum sensitivam animalia, secundum nutritivam viventia. Erit igitur haec predicatio per accidens, homo est animal; vel, animal est vivum. Est autem per se: nam homo secundum quod est homo, animal est; et animal secundum quod est animal, vivum est. Est igitur aliquis ab eodem principio homo, animal et vivum” (Marietti ed., 5.184).
living thing respectively, “man is an animal” and “animal is a living thing” would be predicated according to an accidental mode of predication. We would have to say that man just happens to be an animal, and animal just happens to be a living thing. Logic attests to the truth, however, that the concepts of man and animal and the concepts of animal and living thing are essentially related (per se). Indeed, once we know the meaning of the terms “man,” “animal,” and “living thing,” it is known through itself (per se nota) that each is predicated essentially of the other because we understand the nature of each.

The proponent of the plurality of substantial forms can easily respond, however, by stating that the plurality of substantial forms can do without the accidental mode of predication. He can hold that these forms are still essentially predicated of each other because they overlap in a logical hierarchy of being. Thomas meets this possible retort with a reductio ad absurdum:

Now, it may be said that even if the aforesaid souls are diverse, it does not follow that the predications in question will be by accident because these souls have an ordering to one another. But this, again, is ruled out. For the order of the sensitive to the intellective and the nutritive to the sensitive is as potency to act. Indeed, in the order of generation, the intellective comes after the sensitive and the sensitive after the nutritive; thus, animal is prior to man in that line. Therefore, if this order makes the above mentioned predications essential (per se), then they will be so, not in that essential (per se) mode of predication.

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161 “La prédication essentielle manifeste l’unité de la définition qui découle logiquement de l’unité de l’être. C’est précisément par cette unité que la différence dernière contient toute l’essence formelle du composé: les parties de la définition forment une unité par le fait qu’elles expriment une seule nature et un seul acte; ce qui est compromis dans la doctrine de la pluralité des formes.” See Zavalloni, Controverse sur la Pluralité Des Formes, 258.

162 In VII Meta., lect. 3, no. 1326: “Talia vero, scilicet prima, sunt quaecumque praedicantur per se, et non quia aliud de alio dicitur; sicut album praedicatur de homine non per se, quasi sit idem quod album et quod homo; sed praedicatur de se invicem per accidens. Animal vero praedicatur de homine per se, et similiter rationale de animali” (Marietti ed., 18.329). For the way in which propositions are known of themselves (per se nota), De veritate q. 10, a. 12. See also Reichmann, “Logic and the Method,” 383, no. 114.

163 We might make the proponent’s defense stronger. To the defender of dimorphism, Thomas’s argument begs the question because Thomas assumes that there is no order among the forms, that is, that the intellective soul does not contain in some sense the sensitive and that the latter is not related to the former as a preparatory and subordinated perfection. Thomas’s inference fails, therefore, because it fails to create an adequate parallelism between its principle and the target of its criticism. I thank Timothy Noone for this formulation.
predication which arises from the form [the first mode of *per se* predication], but in that mode which arises from the matter and the subject [the second mode of *per se* predication]; as a surface, for example, is said to be colored. But this is impossible.  

In the second essential mode of predication, “that mode which arises from the matter and the subject,” the subject signifies something that is in the definition of the predicate such as “number is odd”: ‘number’ is included in the definition of odd. One substantial form would be predicated of another essentially in this second mode because of the order of generation. Each form supervenes upon a genetically prior subject: the intellective soul follows upon the sensitive soul, and the sensitive soul follows upon the nutritive soul. Hence, for the proponents of a plurality of substantial forms, the subject is included in the definition of the predicate: ‘man’ is included in the definition of animal and ‘animal’ is included in the definition of a living thing.

In conclusion to his argument, Thomas explains why it is impossible to predicate man of animal in the second mode of essential predication:

> [In] this essential (*per se*) mode of predication that which is formal is predicated essentially of the subject, as when we say: The surface is white or the number is even. Again, in this kind of essential predication the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate, as number in the definition of even. *In the previous case, however, the contrary is true;* for man is not predicated essentially of animal, but vice versa; nor is the subject placed in the definition of the predicate, but vice versa. Therefore, such things are not predicated essentially because of said order.  

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164 *SCG* 2.58, no. 1345: “Si autem dicatur quod, etiam praedictis animabus diversis existentibus, non sequitur praedictae praedicationes fore per accidens, eo quod animae illae ad invicem ordinem habent: hoc iterum removetur. Nam ordo sensitivum ad intellectivum, et nutritivum ad sensitivum, est sicut ordo potentiae ad actum: nam intellectivum sensitivo, et sensitivum nutritivo posterius secundum generationem est; prius enim in generatione fit animal quam homo. Si igitur iste ordo factit praedicationes praedictas esse per se, hoc non erit secundum illum modum dicendi per se qui accipitur secundum formam, sed secundum illum qui accipitur secundum materiam et subiectum, sicut dicitur superficies colorata. Hoc autem est impossibile” (Marietti ed., 5.184).

165 *SCG* 2.58, no. 1345: “Quia in isto modo dicendi per se, id quod est formale praedicatur per se de subiecto: ut cum dicimus, superificies est alba, vel, numerus est par. Et iterum in hoc modo dicendi per se subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati: sicut numerus in definitione paris. Ibi autem e contrario accidit. Non enim homo per se praedicatur de animali, sed e converso: et iterum non ponitur subiectum in definitione praedicati, sed e
Man is not predicated essentially of animal; it is not in the definition of animal. Logic teaches the contrary, namely that animal is in the definition of man: ‘animal’ signifies the formal cause of ‘man.’ In sum, Thomas proposes in *Summa contra Gentiles* II (c. 58) as his first proof against the plurality of substantial forms in the soul a two-fold *modus tollens* argument whereby first philosophy rejects the plurality of substantial forms because of the impossible mode of predication such a plurality would entail.

After this negative refutation, first philosophy can resort to a positive conclusion through the principle of excluded middle. The implication for first philosophy is that, since there is not a plurality of substantial forms due to its impossibility in logic and speech, then there must be a unique substantial form in any individual substance. Thomas takes that positive approach a few years later in *Summa Theologiae* I (q. 76, a. 3). After a lucid explanation of the two modes of predication that the plurality of substantial forms would require (*per accidens* predication, *per se* predication in the second mode), Thomas concludes,

> both of these consequences are clearly false: because “animal” is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore, it must be that a thing is animal and man by the same form; otherwise, man would not really be that which is an animal, in the way that animal is

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166 *ST* I, q. 76, a. 3: “Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod album est dulce, vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se, in secundo modo dicendi *per se*, quia subjectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Sicut superficies praeambula est ad colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, erit secundus modus praedicationis *per se*. Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula” (Leon. 5.221).
After we deny that an individual substance is both animal and man through different substantial forms, first philosophy can conclude that an individual substance is both animal and man through the same substantial form. In conclusion, we can describe Thomas’s argument for the unicity of substantial form in a singular substance as a negative demonstration rather than a reductio ad absurdum because, even though it is based on the refutation of the opposing view, its premisses deduce a positive conclusion from premisses that are more known to us. The essential relation between ‘man’ and ‘animal’ is more known to us than the conclusion that there is only one substantial form in a substance.

2.3.2 Evaluation

Thomas’s logical argument for the unicity of substantial form was repeated by several authors, such as Giles of Rome (d. 1316) and also by Richard of Mediavilla, Doctor Solidus (d. 1308) in one of his four “logical arguments” against the plurality of forms. We shall look into

\[167\] ST I, q. 76, a. 3: “Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur” (Leon. 5.221); In I Post. an. lect. 40.

\[168\] Besides ST I, q. 76, a. 3 and SCG II, 57-58, see similar lines of argument in QdDA a. 11 and CT I, ch. 90. See also Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 74.

\[169\] See Giles of Rome’s Contra Gradus III, c. 5 (fol. 214b); Contra Gradus III, c. 7 (fol. 215d); Correctorium “Quare”, a. 31 (p. 141); Correctorum “Circa”, a. 30 (p. 184); Tractatus de formis, q. 18 (fol. 88b, 91c). Richard of Middleton reproduces it in De Gradu Formarum (37:44-38:55): “Item, tertia arguo sic ad principiae: Si una forma praedicatur de alia ratione suppositi, est praedicatio per accidens, sive sint non ordinatae, ut cum dicitur: album est musicum, sive ordinatae, ut cum dicitur: coloratum est superficiatum; sed, sicut dicitur I Posteriorum, praedicatio generis de specie est per se; ergo genus non praedicatur de specie ratione suppositi. Sed alio modo non potest praedicari de specie, nisi sit una forma a qua sumatur intentione generis et speciei; hoc autem non esset, si essent in composito plures formae; ergo in qualibet composito est tantum una forma substantialis, et sic per illud argumentum probatur principale intentum et improbatur iterum illa solutio quam ad secundam rationem
Richard’s response to Thomas’s argument. By examining Richard’s contemporaneous (c. 1286) response, we shall be able to better evaluate Thomas’s reasoning. There is one difference in Richard’s formulation of the objection, however, and that difference is that Richard speaks of predicating a genus of a species “from the notion of the supposit” (*ratione suppositi*) because it is through the supposit that various substantial forms determine the material substance, but Richard does not think that the notion of supposit suffices: “I say that we are not predicating just the notion of a supposit in the predication of a genus of a species, but it is the predication of the same with the same . . . [since] the whole by which the species signifies in a determinate manner is signified by the genus in an indeterminate manner.”

We have seen this view of predication before. In “man is an animal,” “animal” signifies in an indeterminate manner that which “man” signifies in a determinate manner. Both terms signify the same thing signified. To understand how Richard reconciles the way both terms signify the same thing according to the first type of essential predication despite the plurality of substantial forms, we should return to an earlier statement by the *Doctor Solidus*: “the reason why ‘body’ is imposed to signify the whole quiddity of a thing in which there is the form of corporeity is that the final form [*forma completiva*] completes the whole thing with regard to.

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posueras.” The edited text for *De Gradu Formarum* is found in Zavalloni’s work, *Controverse sur la Pluralité Des Formes*.  

170 See Richard of Mediavilla, *De Gradu Formarum* (135:34-135:42): “dico quod in praedicatione generis de specie, non est praedicatio ratione suppositi tantum, sed est praedicatio eiusdum de eodem, sicut visum est in praecedenti solutione, quia, sicut visum est ibi, totum quo significat species modo determinato significat genus modo indeterminato, et ideo argumentum non valet.” For Zavalloni’s dates of this work, see *Controverse sur la Pluralité Des Formes*, 21-24, 506.
whichever grade of being; hence, even if man is a substance through a form other than the intellective form, nevertheless through the intellective form he is a complete substance.”

As I understand Richard’s argument, we still predicate animal of man in the first per se mode of predication because the nature of the individual is still predicated essentially in the first mode. ‘Human nature’ signifies the same thing whether in an indeterminate way through its genus (bodily nature) or in a determinate way through its species (rational nature). It does not alter the essential ordering between the nature of a genus (‘body’) and the nature of a species (‘human’) when a form of corporeity determines human nature to be bodily and when an intellective form determines the human nature to be rational. The reason is that ‘body’ and ‘human’ both signify the completed nature.

Richard’s counter-argument shows that the objection to the plurality of substantial forms, which Thomas proposes, lacks a necessary connection between the physics of different forms successively determining a single nature (‘human nature’) and the logic of different natures (‘human,’ ‘animal’) predicated of one another. Even though the nature of animal is determined by a unique form, what is signified by “animal” in “man is an animal” is the same as the essence that is signified by “man.” Successive forms need not affect the relation between the natures of the same thing because the ultimate form completes the determination of the entire nature. The intellective form completes the determination of man, so the physical overlaying of substantial forms does not change the essential ordering of each nature.

171 See Richard of Mediavilla, De Gradu Formarum (134:21-134:27): “... Ratio autem quare corpus imponitur ad significandam totam quidditatem rei in qua est forma corporeitatis, est quia forma completiva complet totum quantum ad quenlibet gradum essendi; unde, etsi homo per aliam formam ab intellectiva sit substantia, tamen per intellectivam est completa substantia; et similiter, quamvis homo per aliam formam ab intellectiva sit corpus, tamen per intellectivam est completum corpus. . . .”
This counter-objection takes the logical succession of natures in any individual, which Thomas accepts (e.g. “matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence before it is understood as corporeal”\textsuperscript{172}), as indicative of the determination of successive forms in the same nature. According to the theory of a plurality of substantial forms, diverse forms can determine different aspects of a nature, and these different aspects of a nature can be predicated of each other according to the first \textit{per se} mode of predication because the last or ultimate substantial form actually completes the nature. Although Thomas’s argument for the unicity of substantial form through the method of predication is a metaphysical argument because it considers how the mode of predication flows from the substantial mode of being,\textsuperscript{173} Thomas does not conclusively justify why a different mode of predication would flow from a successive number of substantial forms determining the same nature.

2.4 \textit{Determination of the Real Distinction between Essence and Esse}

Essence and existence (\textit{esse}) are, for Thomas, the most basic metaphysical principles. They are so basic that Thomas even characterizes each in terms of the other: essence is “that through which and in which a being (\textit{ens}) has existence,” and “existence is the actuality” of essence.\textsuperscript{174} Their intimate relationship may make us question whether we can distinguish them.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{ST} q. 76, a. 6 ad 1: “Sicut ergo materia praetintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praetintelliguntur accidentia quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem” (Leon. 5.229).


\textsuperscript{174} \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 1: “Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse” (Leon. 43.370:50-52); \textit{ST} I, q. 54, a. 1: “esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae” (Leon. 5.39).
In his *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, for example, Gilson doubts any demonstration for a distinction between essence and existence (*esse*): “But no one has ever been able to demonstrate the conclusion that, in a caused substance, existence is a distinct element, other than essence, and its act.”175 In response, Sweeney collects many of Thomas’s philosophical arguments for this distinction.176 Nevertheless, Gilson states elsewhere that Thomas achieves some “dialectical argument” or a “metaphysical analysis of finite being” that show a composition in things of essence and existence.177

What is at stake here is the question of a real, or mind-independent, distinction between two principles that constitute the entirety of a finite being. Unsurprisingly, for such an important issue, interpreters have written an ample amount on showing how Thomas proves such a distinction, and they claim to find such proofs through a variety of arguments: *e.g.*, through the existence of a (divine) being whose essence is its existence; through the participated character of finite being; and through a consideration of the very notion of essence itself (*intellectus essentiae*) to name just a few. We are more interested in whether Thomas attempts to prove such

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175 See Etienne Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 128. “Give up the philosophical way—from creatures to God—and try the theological way—from God to creatures. Thomas Aquinas may well have first conceived the notion of an act of being (*esse*) in connection with God and then, starting from God, made use of it in his analysis of the metaphysical structure of composite substances” (131).


177 “Saint Thomas nous offre donc deux voies pour atteindre la composition d’essence et d’existence: celle de la Somme théologique, qui la rejoint à partir des preuves de l’existence de Dieu et de sa parfaite simplicité; celle de l’opusculaire philosophique De ente et essentia, qui la découvre au terme d’une analyse métaphysique de l’être fini, dont l’essence n’inclut jamais l’existence dans sa définition. Les deux voies sont également légitimes.” See Etienne Gilson, “La preuve du De ente et essentia,” in *Acta III congressus thomistici internationalis*, in *Doctor Communis* 3 (1950), 257-60, esp. 258-59. “It is one thing to say that the essence of a finite does not contain the cause of its being, which is all the dialectical argument of Avicenna, taken up by William of Auvergne and St. Thomas, proves.” See Etienne Gilson, *Christian Philosophy: An Introduction*, trans. Armand Maurer (Torronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1993), 57-58. By contrast, see Germain Grisez’s review of Gilson’s interpretation in *The Thomist* 23 (1960): “Further, although this argument is in a way very similar to dialectical argumentation, I do not think it is dialectical; rather, it is an example of the metaphysical method which Aquinas himself explicitly describes and distinguishes from dialectic, (*In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1)” (469).
a real distinction through the method of predication, that is, through a logical mode in
metaphysics. Although Thomas does not explicitly state that he does so, there are at least two
metaphysical arguments given by him that can be interpreted as employing this method. We shall
consider each in turn. They include the so-called *intellectus essentiae* argument and the so-called
genus argument.

2.4.1 *The Intellectus Essentiae Argument*

2.4.1.1 *Exposition*

Let us focus on the most well-known version of this argument based on the notion, or
understanding, of essence in Thomas’s *On Being and Essence*. Thomas states that his intention
regarding the argument is to show the composition in separate substances: “Substances of this
kind, though pure forms without matter, are not absolutely simple; they are not pure act but have
a mixture of potentiality. The following consideration makes this evident (*Et hoc sic patet*).”

The overall context is that Thomas is facing the objection that if one denies the real distinction
between matter and form in angels, then one is conflating angels with God. The overall intention
here, in other words, is to show that angels are “not pure act” and are “not absolutely simple,”
unlike God who is pure act and absolutely simple.

The context also makes clear that the specific intent is to establish a real distinction, that
is an extra-mental distinction immediately in things. The reason that this intention is clear is that
the first chapter of *On Being and Essence* already sets out the conceptual distinction between

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**178 De ente et essentia**, c. 4: “Huiusmodi ergo substantie, quamuis sint forme tantum sine materia, non
tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentie; et hoc sic patet”
(Leon. 43.376:90-93).
essence and *esse* (essence is that through which and in which a being has *esse*), so essence must differ at least notionally from *esse* because each explains a different aspect of a being (e.g. Socrates). I take it that this conceptual distinction is, then, already stated and therefore assumed by Thomas in subsequent chapters.

Indeed, the question in chapter four is not about defining essence. It is rather about whether these two conceptions in angels point to something really distinct in them, in a way that is similar to the real distinction between matter and form in material things. If essence and *esse* were merely conceptually distinct, then the two terms would present merely two different aspects of the same thing. It is abundantly clear, then, that Thomas wants to show that even though angels are not composed of the really distinct (natural) principles of matter and form, they nevertheless are still composed of other (metaphysical) principles that are really distinct. Let us now consider the argument:

Everything that does not belong to the understanding (*intellectus*) of an essence or quiddity comes to it from outside and enters into composition with the essence because no essence can be understood without its parts. Now, every (*omnis*) essence or quiddity can be understood without knowing anything about its existence (*esse*). I can know, for instance, what a man or a phoenix is and still not know (*ignorare*) whether it has existence in reality (*an esse habeat in rerum natura*). From this it is clear that existence is other than essence or quiddity (*Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate*).179

If *esse* were understood in the grasp of essence, then *esse* would not be really distinct from essence. For example, in essential predications of man such as “man is an animal,” everything

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179 *De ente et essentia*, c. 4: “Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentie uel quiditatis, hoc est adueniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine hiis, que sunt partes essentie intelligi potest. Omnis atuem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo yel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate” (Leon. 43.376:94-103).
included in the notion of the predicate is included in the notion of the subject because the
species, ‘man,’ determines the genus, ‘animal,’ with a specific difference. Just as one knows that
animal is not really distinct from man if the grasp of animal is understood in the concept of man,
so too one would know that esse is not really distinct from essence if the grasp of esse were
understood in the concept of essence. But that is not Thomas’s view.

Thomas tells us rather that esse is not understood in the concept of essence. We cannot
know whether something signified by a subject-term has esse based on the knowledge of its
essence or any of its essential properties expressed by per se predicates. For example, in “man is
an animal,” “phoenix is a bird,” or “an eclipse is the overshadowing of the moon” we have no
way of knowing whether man, phoenix, or an eclipse are existent, that is, we have no way of
answering the scientific question, is it? (an est), based on the answer to another scientific
question, what is it? (quid est).\textsuperscript{180} No essential predicate can notify us about whether the supposit
signified by the subject term of the predication exists.

\textbf{2.4.1.2 Evaluation}

Before we consider some of the literature on this argument, we should first address
whether the argument itself is an application of the method of predication. Is Gilson correct in
calling it “dialectical”? The difficulty for the reader is that Thomas is summarizing in
abbreviated form the arguments of previous thinkers who used predications in their claims.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{180} In II Sent. II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 3, exp.; In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2; In II Sent., d. 3, q.
1, a. 1.

\textsuperscript{181} See Houser, “The Real Distinction and the Principles of Metaphysics,” 94ff. Houser cites Avicenna and
Al-Ghazali as providing direct models for Thomas’s argumentation.
Nevertheless, we can easily paraphrase Thomas’s *intellectus essentiae* argument in this way: We attain a real composition (distinction) between two items when one item is accidentally related to the other. We know through denominative predication in “Socrates is white,” for example, that white really differs from Socrates because white is accidentally related to the being of Socrates. In the same way, we know through denominative predication in “Socrates is,” for example, that existence really differs from Socrates because existence is accidentally related to the being of Socrates. If that is the type of argument Thomas is making, and I think it is, then he is applying the method of predication in metaphysics to this question.182

But does this argument succeed? Any proof for the real distinction between essence and *esse* requires that our understanding of essence preclude the understanding of *esse*, and many interpreters think it sufficient to show a real distinction between the two principles. For example, Reichmann thinks that, by “reflecting on the modes of predication,” we realize that we “do not predicate necessary existence of any of the quiddities” in experience;183 Bobik thinks that, since what the intellect conceives about a (physical) substance belongs to the nature of that substance absolutely considered, we realize that existence is not included in the intelligibility of that

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182 Reichmann and Doig correctly claim that Thomas is applying the method of predication to this question, but I do not think the argument is “apodictic” as Reichmann states in “Logic and the Method” (386). Yet it is not merely a logical argument as others state. See Isaac, “La notion de dialectique,” 4; Cornelio Fabro, “Un itinéraire de saint Thomas. L’établissement de la distinction réelle entre essence et existence,” in *Esegesi tomistica* (Rome: Libreria ed. della Pontificia Università lateranense, 1969): 89-108, esp. 94. Houser offers the best explanation for the *intellectus essentiae* argument in “The Real Distinction and the Principles of Metaphysics,” 92-98. “Aquinas tries to let his reader know that insight (*intellectus*) into the essences of creatures never entails insight into their existence. This fact about the cognitive order that is contained in Aquinas’s premisses functions as a sign of the relation between existence and existence in the order of reality that is contained in his conclusion. But it could never *demonstrate* that conclusion. Insight into the real otherness that existence has in relation to essence can never be deduced, it can only be ‘seen’ in the way all principles are seen” (97).

substance;\textsuperscript{184} Patt gives the strongest version of the \textit{intellectus essentiae} argument by stating that, although the argument entails a conceptual distinction, it is primarily a difference “between that which is conceptual (essence) and that which is non-conceptual (\textit{esse} as existence).”\textsuperscript{185} All three authors emphasize Thomas’s trust in the ability of human reason to understand things based on what is not included in the grasp of essence.

That our understanding of essence does not include existence cannot be, however, a sufficient requirement to proving a real distinction because our understanding of essence may be limited and incomplete. Our understanding may not be entirely aware of the reality of essence, especially that of a separate substance. If one’s \textit{intellectus} or understanding of essence fails, if for example the conception of \textit{esse} takes place in a different act of the mind, then the argument fails along with it. In other words, there is an assumption on the part of proponents for the argument that “one has a direct and immediate perception of the essence as a reality complete and rounded-off in itself . . . and a similar perception of existence as a distinct reality.”\textsuperscript{186}

Realizing perhaps this weakness in the argument, we find Thomas adding a necessary qualification immediately after the passage cited above: “From this it is clear that being (\textit{esse}) is other than essence or quiddity unless perhaps there is something (\textit{ nisi forte sit aliqua res}) whose quiddity is its being.”\textsuperscript{187} That exception strikes a blow to one’s understanding of essence as a sufficient requirement for a real distinction. For all that we know it may be that every essence is

\textsuperscript{184} See Bobik, \textit{On Being and Essence}, 168.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{De ente et essentia}, c. 4: “. . . ergo patet quod esse est alius ab essentia uel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse” (Leon. 43.376:102-104).
identical to its *esse*, in which case essence would not be really distinct to *esse*. The *intellectus essentiae* argument prepares its readers, such as Thomas’s young confreres, for an argument to distinguish between essence and *esse* in a more comprehensive manner by proving the impossibility of there being more than one being whose essence is its existence, which he does in the second stage of this argument in the *De ente*.  

2.4.2 The “Genus” Argument

2.4.2.1 Exposition

In his edition and translation of Thomas’s Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, Maurer briefly notes that an example of the “*modus logicus*” (as found in q. 6, a. 1a) can be found in the “genus argument.” As he puts it, “the metaphysician can use the logical notions of genus and species to prove the distinction between essence and existence.” Many years later, Maurer developed this topic of the “*modus logicus*” in an article, “Dialectic in the *De ente et essentia* of

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188 For the rather brilliant exchange between Owens and Wippel concerning the “second” stage of the *De ente* proof, the stage relying on the impossibility of more than subsistent *esse*, see (in chronological order) Owens, “Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas Aquinas,” *Mediaeval Studies* 27 (1965), 1-22; Wippel, “Aquinas’s Route to the Real Distinction,” *The Thomist* 43 (1979), 279-95; Owens, “Stages and Distinction in *De ente*,” *The Thomist* 45 (1981), 99-123; Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*: 120-32; Owens, “Aquinas’ Distinction at *De ente et essentia* 4.119-123,” *Mediaeval Studies* 48 (1986), 264-87. In summary, Wipple interprets Thomas as stating that, since Thomas proves that it is impossible that there be more than one being whose essences is its existence, and since it is self-evident for Thomas that a multiplicity exists in the world, then we must conclude that everything besides the one hypothetical subsistent being must have an existence that really differs from its essence. Owens likens Wippel’s interpretation of the argument to Anselm’s ontological argument. In *The Thomist* rejoinder, Owens indicates his expectation that “something has to be found existing before the reasoning can start” to avoid any hypothetical conditions (116). I think Wippel successfully responds to this objection. He finds in Thomas a proof from the logical impossibility (of more than one being whose essence is its existence) to a real impossibility (of more than being whose essence is its existence). That real impossibility of more than one subsistent *esse* entails a real actuality of things whose essence must differ from their existence. See especially Wippel’s specific reply in *Metaphysical Themes*, 120-132.

189 See Armand Maurer, *Aquinas on Being and Essence*, 63.
St. Thomas Aquinas.”190 There he argues that *On Being and Essence (De ente et essentia)* is “in the main a dialectical treatise,” “a metaphysical work using a dialectical method,”191 and he cites a series of procedures from the work showing how each is “dialectical” culminating in the most clear example of metaphysics using logic with the so called genus argument.

In that passage, Thomas proves that God is not in a genus, and while doing so he formulates an argument for the distinction between essence and existence in its briefest form:

> Everything in a genus must have a quiddity that is other than existence. This is because the quiddity or nature of a genus or species does not differ, as regards the notion of the nature, in the individuals in the genus or species, whereas *esse* is diverse in different individuals.192

Thomas makes this argument primarily in order to show that God does not fall in a genus, yet the argument for the real distinction can stand alone. As Maurer explains this passage, Thomas proves the real otherness between essence and existence for everything in a genus or species because “different things in the same genus or species (e.g. animal, man) have the same nature, but each has its own existence.”193 Likewise in the *Summa theologiae* (q. 3, a. 5), Thomas states that everything in a genus must agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus, which is predicated of them essentially (*in quod quid est*), but they differ in their *esse*. For the *esse* of man and of horse is not the same; nor is the *esse* of this man and that man the same, so in every member of a

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191 See Maurer, “Dialectic in the De Ente,” 581, 583.
192 *De ente et essentia* c. 5: “Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis, quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis” (Leon. 43.378:9-14).
193 See Maurer, “Dialectic in the De Ente,” 582-83. “The argument is dialectical, for it is based on the logical notions of genus and species -- a common source of dialectical reasoning” (583).
genus, *esse* and quiddity, that is essence, must differ.\textsuperscript{194} The reason they must differ is that, whereas each individual has its own *esse*, each individual’s nature belongs to the same genus.

The argument is perhaps stated in its clearest form in Bk I of Thomas’s Commentary on the *Sentences*:

Everything in a genus has a quiddity that differs from its *esse*. In man, for example, humanity does not owe its actual being (*esse in actu*) by the fact that it is humanity. One can think of human nature and nevertheless not know whether some man exists. And the reason for this is that the common factor which is predicated of those things that are in genera is predicated according to quiddity, for genus and species are predicated of anything in terms of their quiddity. The act of being (*esse*) does not belong to a quiddity except insofar as it is received in this or in that individual. And therefore the quiddity of a genus or a species is not shared according to one act of being in all, but only according to one general notion. Hence it follows that the *esse* of such a thing is not its quiddity.\textsuperscript{195}

In effect, this “genus” argument explains and completes the *intellectus essentiae* argument.

Thomas explains the reason why we can think of humanity and not know whether humanity exists is that something common (*commune*) is predicated essentially and yet the act of being is not predicated essentially because the act of being belongs to this or to that individual.


\textsuperscript{195} *In I Sent.* d. 8, q. 4, a. 2: “Tertia ratio subtilior est Avicennae. Omne quod est in genere, habet quidditatem differentem ab esse, sicut homo; humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit. Et ratio hujus est, quia commune, quod praedicatur de his quae sunt in genere, praedicat quidditatem, cum genus et species praedicentur in eo quod quid est. Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo. Et ideo quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem. Unde constat quod esse suum non est quidditas sua” (Mandonnet ed., 1.222).
2.4.2.2 Evaluation

Does the “genus” argument belong to the method of predication in metaphysics? Is Maurer correct in thinking of it as an example of metaphysics employing a logical mode? Some authors like Knasas think that Maurer is wrong:

By mentioning “the nature of a genus” Aquinas is not talking about what a genus is. Rather, he is referring to the absolutely considered nature that when given an esse in anima can be either a genus or a species. This “notion of the nature” is what is the same in individuals that are in the genus or species. Aquinas’ description of absolute consideration of a nature has the nature existing not only in the soul but also in singularibus. Though Maurer’s cited text is talking about something in logic, specifically, things in a genus or species, the text is not speaking about these things based on “logical” terms.¹⁹⁶

Knasas correctly points out that Thomas is relying on essence absolutely considered, which can be in the soul or in the individual, so the argument is not an exercise in logic. Maurer’s point, however, is that Thomas is using the teaching of logic (logica docens) about things, and the teaching of logic about things is that things that fall under a genus are predicated essentially.

It is using, in other words, the topic from a genus. In his Commentary on Cicero’s Topics, Boethius explains how to avoid exactly the type of error that Knasas accuses Maurer of making:

[I]t is most important to notice that if something is used in arguments, it is not to be called a Topic for those arguments unless it not only is in the arguments but the arguments also arise from it. An example will make my point clearer. If there is an argument in which genus or species is used, that argument is not immediately said to be drawn from genus or from species unless the nature of a genus or of a species supplies the force for that argument. . . . An argument of the following sort might contain a genus, for the Topic would be from genus if the idea of the argument were drawn from the genus animal or of living. For example, if an argument were to arise in this way: for an animal, being is a substance; living, however, is not a substance, although it enters into a substance; therefore, for an animal, living is not the same as being. So the argument is

¹⁹⁶ See Knasas, Being and Some, 236.
drawn from a substance, that is, from the genus of animal, and hence this argument both contains a genus and is drawn from a genus.\textsuperscript{197}

As Knasas rightly points out, an argument is not based on genus just because it mentions genus. Rather, the argument must draw its force from the nature of genus. Boethius’s example of a topical/logical argument derives its force from a genus (substance): if the being of an animal (\textit{animali esse}) is substance, but the living of an animal (\textit{ipsum vivere}) is not substance, then the being of an animal and the living of animal differ. The reason is that, whereas the being of animal is the whole thing falling under the genus, the living of animal is only a part of a thing falling under the genus of substance.

We see Thomas using the topical/logical “force” of the genus in his argument. Things that fall under a genus agree in some common aspect. For example a horse and a man have the same nature of animal, and this man and that man have the same nature of man. The genus ‘animal’ and the species ‘man’ are predicated of each in terms of quiddity. Logic helps metaphysics by classifying that man and horse are under the same predicate, so it groups these types of things as univocal. Metaphysics recognizes that this classification is founded in reality, but it also recognizes that each thing differs in some way that only metaphysics can see, that is through their \textit{esse}. The being of man and the being of animal differ, and the being of Socrates

\textsuperscript{197} See Boethius, \textit{In Ciceronis Topicis} (PL 64:1090A14-D1): “Praeter omnia enim quae superius dicta sunt, illud animadvertendum maxime est, quia non si quid in argumentis fuerit sumptum, illud eorum argumentorum locus dicendis est, nisi solum insit argumentis, verum etiam ab eo argumenta nascentur. Id quod dico, planiore liquebit exemplo. Si quod enim fuerit argumentum in quo sumatur genus vel species, non statim illud argumentum ex genere vel specie tractum esse dicitur, nisi ei argumento vires generis vel speciei qualitas subministret. . . ; tunc enim locus esset a genere, si ab animalis vel a vivendi genere argumenti ratio traheretur, velut si ita fierit argumentum: animali esse, substantiae est esse; ipsum vero vivere substantia non est, sed in substantiam venit. Non est igitur idem vivere quod animali esse. A substantia igitur tractum est argumentum, a genere videlicet animalis. Hoc igitur argumentum, et genus continet, ex ex genere ductum est.” The translation is taken from Stump. I have not seen anyone else interpret Thomas’s application of the “logical method” in light of topical arguments, which we discuss in chapter one.
and the being of Plato differ. Metaphysics concludes from this fact that their esse must differ from their nature because the esse of each individual within the same nature differs. Thomas seems to be arguing, yet again, through a negative demonstration: based on the nature of a genus, esse cannot belong to a quiddity, so it really differs from the quiddity.

Before concluding, we should briefly ascertain the validity of Thomas’s genus argument. In doing so, we will better understand whether—and, if so, how—Thomas’s application of method of predication avoids the logicisms outlined at the beginning of this chapter. In this regard, both Wippel and Owens voice strong doubts about whether Thomas’s argument for the real distinction between essence and esse succeeds. Owens emphasizes in Thomas’s argument the distinction between universal and particular:

Though the distinction between the universal and particular is conceptual only, this reasoning is called upon to substantiate real diversity between existence and quiddity in anything that is located in a genus. But it gives no express mention of how or where the difference is recognized as real. The notion that existence is accidental to the quiddity and therefore acquired from something else would however seem, by its position, to be what caps the whole argument.\(^{198}\)

Owens’s explication here is that Thomas’s argument depends upon the universal/particular distinction and that the discussion of the non-essential character of esse is almost an afterthought for Thomas. That description seems unfair because what Thomas is stating is that esse does not take a part in the universal and particular dynamic between natures precisely because esse as the act of being belongs only to individuals. It must be really other than nature.

For his part, Wippel shows some concern about the ambiguity of the term, “esse.” The argument cannot assume that “esse” signifies an act of being at the outset because that would be

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\(^{198}\) See Owens, “De ente et essentia 4.1119-123,” 268. See also his “Quiddity and Real Distinction,” 9-10.
a *petitio principii*. If the argument does not already assume that “esse” signifies the act of being, then according to Wippel the term “esse” at the beginning of the argument may signify something that is the same as essence:

> [It] may signify nothing more than a particular actually existing member of a generic or specific class, that is, a particular concrete existent. . . . [T]he contrast rather seems to be between a general or universal quidditative content which is shared in by all members of the class, on the one hand, and actually existing particular instantiations of the same, on the other hand.\(^{199}\)

Wippel echoes Owens’s point of view as he explains,

> Thomas himself would not allow for real distinction between a universal intelligible content and a particular instantiation of the same. Nor would he allow for real distinction between a genus and the various species which share in it. . . . Merely conceptual or logical distinctions obtain in these cases. But if this is so, it is difficult to see how Thomas can so readily conclude to real composition and distinction of an essence principle and an *esse* principle within each existing substance within a genus (or species).\(^{200}\)

The problem with that starting-point, according to Wippel and Owens’s interpretation, is that Thomas considers the distinction between the nature considered absolutely (e.g. ‘man’) and the particular existent (‘Socrates’) as merely conceptual or logical, presumably because the notion of the individual is an abstract consideration that only differs from its universal as the determinate differs from the indeterminate. Wippel concludes with Owens that such a leap from concept to thing is invalid.

> I think we have seen the solution to this problem already. In chapter three, we presented a question about what “esse” means. It can signify in either of two modes of signification: either

1) as a substantial being and as the actuality of an essence, “esse” is a substantial predicate


\(^{200}\) Ibid., 161.
signifying that which (quod) “being” (ens) is imposed to signify, or 2) as an act of being (actus essendi), “esse” is an accidental predicate signifying that by which (quo) “being” (ens) is imposed to signify. Both senses signify the same thing (res significata) but in different modes of signification (modi significandī). Thomas begins the argument with the first signification of “esse” as a substantial predicate, that is the actuality of an essence, and he ends with the insight that even such an esse must really differ from essence because the thing signified is also an act of being (actus essendi).

Thomas uses the argument from genus to show that, whereas individuals can have the same natures (essentia) because they fall under the same genus, individuals cannot have univocally the same being (esse) because they do not fall under the same genus. Thomas does not assume a real distinction from the outset. Rather, he states that the essence of each individual is determined by the genus to which it belongs and that the act of an essence (esse) is not so determined. The reason for that indeterminacy is that it is logically impossible for esse to be the same as essence based on another sense of esse as the act of an individual being (Socrates). The ratio of essence is common because it falls under a genus, but the ratio of esse does not fall under a genus. Contrary to Owens and Wippel’s suggestion that the argument relies on a conceptual distinction between a universal and a particular, the metaphysical argument takes its force from the nature of genus as something common: the nature of animal is common, but the

201 Normally we speak of individuals in reference to a species (and only be extension in reference to genus), but my point is independent of whether we think of ‘genus’ or ‘species.’

202 For Thomas, the ratio or notion of existence (esse) is not acquired by simple apprehension. It is acquired by composition and division, which we stated in chapter two. In its judgment on the act of being, the mind recomposes or reintegrates the abstracted intelligibility (e.g. human nature) with an individual thing (e.g. Socrates).
existence of animal is not common; therefore, the nature of animal and the existence of animal must differ.

In terms of predication, whereas we predicate the nature belonging to the genus essentially, we predicate the act of being accidentally. In “Socrates is a man” and “Plato is a man,” man is predicated essentially of the subject-terms Socrates and Plato, but the existences of Socrates and Plato are predicated accidentally of either subject-terms. What metaphysics learns from the mode of predication is that essence and esse have different features and from this knowledge negatively judges (through separatio) that the individual act of being really differs from its essence or nature.203

Conclusion

We have covered much material in this chapter. We started by examining Thomas’s critique of the misuse of a method of predication (a “logical method”) in metaphysics by considering the mistaken argument for the absolute unity of being by Parmenides, the mistaken argument for separate abstract essences by Plato, and the mistaken arguments for spiritual matter by Avicebron. In none of these criticisms does Thomas criticize the reliance on intentions or concepts as such to draw metaphysical conclusions. Rather, Thomas identifies in these author’s arguments a “fundamental operative principle” that is much more specific than the method of

203 See Brock, “On Whether Aquinas’s Ipsum Esse Is Platonism,” 289, no. 62. “But on the interpretation that I am proposing, what esse signifies in the argument is simply the actuality of a thing’s essence. A certain property of it is then isolated, namely, that its ratio contains nothing univocally common. From this it is concluded that in a thing belonging to a genus, esse and essence cannot be identical, since the ratio of the essence does contain something univocally common.”
predication simply speaking, namely that they transpose their notions uncritically without correctly considering what the human manner of knowing adds to human knowledge.

We then examined Thomas’s own contribution to the method of predication in metaphysics with the manifestation of ‘being’ through a division of being into the general modes of being (five transcendentals) and into the special modes of being (ten predicaments). Thomas divides being differently in either case. In the derivation of the five transcendentals, he divides being through logical relations such as affirmation and negation, and then he resolves or reduces these composite notions back into being. What results is a list of modes of being with less and less universality (from ‘being’ to ‘good’) that are not really distinct from one another.

In the derivation of the ten predicaments, Thomas divides being through the modes of predication. He arrives at substance through a mode of *per se* predication since substance is being *per se*, and he arrives at the accidents through through the denominative mode of predication relating the predicate to the subject through either external/internal or measures/causes. What results is a list of modes of being further and further extrinsic to the subject (from ‘five feet tall’ to ‘armed’) that are really distinct from one another.

After examining how Thomas identifies the special and common modes of being, we considered how he determines the intrinsic principles of being through negative demonstrations. Thomas determines the reality of prime matter through a denominative mode of predication. Matter is a necessary principle for the dynamic act of predication, founded as it is upon the potency-act composition of real things, because predication needs a potential principle to metaphysically sustain the role of the subject-term of predication. Otherwise, there would be no speech about material things. Thomas also determines the unicity of substantial form based on
the *per se* mode of predicating essential natures of things, and he achieves this determination by showing how any other mode of predicating beside the first *per se* mode of predicating would be impossible. We found this argument insightful but inconclusive.

Finally, we considered Thomas’s treatment of the real otherness between essence and *esse*. We considered the argument based on the understanding of being (*intellectus essentiae* argument), and we concluded that such an argument belongs to the method of predication, but that it is an incomplete argument complemented by other arguments such as the impossibility of there being more than one being whose essence is its existence or the argument based on natures belonging to a genus (the “genus” argument).

The latter argument, we found, is also an example of the method of predication in metaphysics, and despite some objections we found it valid. Metaphysics relies on the notion of the genus to clarify the common aspect of the essence or nature belonging to that genus as some feature that does not belong to *esse* (in the sense of the act of an essence). After noticing that such a feature does not belong to *esse*, metaphysics judiciously reduces *esse* in the sense act of an essence into another sense of *esse*, that of the act of a being (Socrates). Metaphysics further notices that, in this sense of the act of being, *esse* is an accidental predicate. We can distinguish essence from *esse* because, whereas the nature of animal is predicated essentially of man in “man is animal,” the existence of man is predicated accidentally of man in “man is.” That conclusion is clear based on how we predicate being of individuals.

In sum, in our sampled case studies of the method of predication, we see two clear distinct usages of this “logical method” in Thomas’s metaphysics. We see it in the division of being. Logic studies the properties of being, the common concepts (*communia*), insofar as they
relate to other notions in the mind, and so metaphysics can divide being through conceptual
analysis with such logical relations as affirmation/negation, division/indivision, and in itself
versus through another (per se/per aliud) (e.g. being per se). Metaphysics can also divide being
through the denominative mode of predicating. Insofar as the predicate names something
concrete in the subject, and insofar as that relationship to the subject is analogous, metaphysics
manifests the accidental relationship of predicates to a being (e.g. Socrates is white). In this
division of being into general and special modes of being, metaphysics uses the method of
predication to establish indemonstrable knowledge or insights (intellectus) that are the first
principles of metaphysics.

We also see that Thomas uses the method of predication to establish demonstrable
knowledge or science (scientia) that are the conclusions of metaphysics. He cannot do so through
affirmative demonstration because, although the modes of predicating flow from the modes of
being, the modes of predicating refract the mode of being through the mode of understanding.
The mode of understanding does not let us make direct, positive conclusions in metaphysics.
Similar to Aristotle’s elenchic rejection of those who would deny the principle of non-
contradiction, Thomas refutes those who would deny the unicity of substantial form and the
reality of prime matter by rendering us speechless otherwise, but he also negatively demonstrates
a positive conclusion through the principle of excluded middle. If not many substantial forms in
a substance, for example, then just one substantial form in a substance. We argued that he uses
the same type of proof in his distinction between essence and existence (esse). By arguing from
the topical argument, from a genus, Thomas reasons that--unless we reject the way that we
denominatively think and speak about being--we must conclude that essence is diverse from existence.
I would like to formulate a brief objection regarding metaphysics’s reliance on the teaching of logic for a method. One might object that a science of the real should not rely on a rational science for insights or conclusions about real objects because the science of logic would compromise metaphysics. As Gilson states, “the more we rid it of logic the closer we are to metaphysics.”¹ Logic seems void of objectivity, so if metaphysics employed its method it would seem to arrive at merely subjective conclusions, thereby constructing a rational science rather than a real one. One might object that proceeding from thought to thing follows an idealist method resulting in idealism.²

This method would indeed be an idealism if it were to start from Descartes’s Cogito or Kant’s “pure reason,” that is to say, if it were to start from thought alone without an immediate assent to being that is empirically given. Yet Thomas would never share Descartes’s project of proving the external world.³ This mode of thinking is alien to Thomas’s knower because,

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¹ See Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 198. Gilson’s antipathy toward logic as a philosophical primer is also evident in The Unity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1964). The monograph’s first chapter is entitled, “Logicism and Philosophy,” and it recounts Peter of Abelard’s intellectual downfall. The imprudent application of dialectic toward philosophy ensures his ruin: “The upshot of Abailard’s experiment is that philosophy cannot be obtained from pure logic” (23). Gilson carries this thought through to the end of his work: “The most tempting of all the false first principles is: that thought, not being, is involved in all my representations. Here lies the initial option between idealism and realism, which will settle once and for all the future course of our philosophy, and make it a failure or a success” (255).

² Alternatively, for a contemporary and non-Aristotelian and negative critique of an approach to metaphysics through logic and language, see Irving M. Copi’s reprint of “Language Analysis and Metaphysical Inquiry” in The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method with Two Retrospective Essays, ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 127-131: “to gain metaphysical knowledge through investigating language, one must first construct an ‘ideal’ or ‘logically perfect language’ to investigate. The nature of such an ‘ideal’ language has never been completely specified” (128). See also Gustav Bergmann’s response (“Two Criteria for an Ideal Language”) and Copi’s counter-response (“Reply to Professor Bergmann”) in the same monograph.

³ See Étienne Gilson’s Réalisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance (Paris: Vrin, 1986): “Aller de la pensée aux choses, en quelque sens que ce soit, est suivre une méthode idéaliste. C’est donc se condamner, soit à l’idéalisme, soit à la contradiction” (49). Although Gilson condemns proceeding from thought to things, the context
although he must “reflect” upon its adequation and conformity to being in order to know truth, Thomas’s knower immediately and unreflectively grasps being as first known from the senses.\(^4\) Thomas speaks of the intellect’s assimilation to real being. Though it is a procedure from reason to things, the method of predication presupposes a cognitive and metaphysical realism through a causally ordered assimilation process from things to reason, and metaphysics employs this method to express the numerous attributes of our originally confused concept of being. Thomas presupposes a conformity of intellect with the real.\(^5\)

There is no doubt for Thomas that the being from which metaphysics starts is real. After Thomas divides being (\textit{ens}) into essential (\textit{per se}) and accidental (\textit{per accidens}) being,\(^6\) he states that it is the task of metaphysics to determine essential being (\textit{per se}), which is “outside the soul” in the latter work is not the method of predication. Here, Gilson deconstructs arguments made in favor of detecting in Thomas a “critical realism.” He takes apart the view, for instance, that Thomas starts with an internal dialectic to show the existence of the external world. For a “modified” version of Gilson’s critique, see Gaven Kerr, “Aquinas, Lonergan, and the Isomorphism between Intellect and Reality,” \textit{International Philosophical Quarterly} 54 (2014), 43-57.

\(^4\) \textit{In VI Meta.}, lect. 4, no. 1236; \textit{ST} I, q. 16, a. 2; \textit{De veritate} q. 1, a. 9. “La connaissance précède la réflexion comme la nature précède la connaissance. Pas plus que la connaissance de la nature, la réflexion critique ne cessera de grandir.” See Jacques Maritain, \textit{Distinguer Pour Unir ou Les Degrés de Savoir}, 4th ed. (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1946), 161.

\(^5\) The being from which Thomas derives the ten predicaments, for instance, is not from “pure reason.” It is given by an empirical determination. By contrast, Kant rejects any empirical determination for the categories. In his first critique, he states, “Now there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible [Thomas’s position] or these concepts make the experience possible [Kant’s position]. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with pure sensible intuition); for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of \textit{generatio aequivoca}). Consequently only the second way remains (as it were a system of the epigenesis of pure reason): namely that the categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding” (B166-B167). See Immanuel Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, trans. and eds. Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 264-65.

This determination takes place through the method of predication, for instance, in the derivation of the ten predicaments, in the articulation of sensible substances, in defense of the unicity of substantial form, and in proof for the reality of prime matter.

The primary content of one’s apprehensions consists in what is most evident, which is being (ens). This super-generic notion (ratio entis) expresses both the richest of notions (because it implicitly contains everything) and the poorest of notions (because it explicitly contains no thing). In the intellect’s first act of simple apprehension, being both overwhelms the intellect with that-which-is (quod quid est) and underwhelms it with nothing in particular. Yet nothing else can be conceived unless being is understood.

To begin to discover the richness of being, one can negatively judge ‘being’ (ens), “being is not,” and this negation results in another notion, ‘non-being’ (non-ens). In grasping ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ through some experience (experimentum) one immediately grasps the first principle of demonstration, the principle of non-contradiction. This principle directly depends upon the understanding of ‘being.’ It also depends on understanding ‘non-being,’ yet first philosophy

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7 In VII Meta. lect. 1, no. 1245: “incipit determinare de ente per se, quod est extra animam, de quo est consideratio huius scientiae” (Marietti ed., 18.315-316).
9 Thomas views Bk. VII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an attempt to discover sensible substances through a rational method. The Marietti edition summarizes this part of the commentary in this way: “De essentia substantiarum sensibilium per rationes logicas et communes disseritur” (18.313).
10 For the use of the method of predication regarding the unicity of substantial form, see Q. D. de Anima a. 11; SCG II, 58; ST I, q. 76, a. 3 ad 4. See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 381-86; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 341.
12 “Though strictly neither genus nor difference, it functions in this manner as a sort of super-generic predicate. Just as a man is an animal or a body, so also is he a being.” See Joseph Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in The Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 7. See also Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics, 184.
cannot explain ‘non-being’ without a conceptual analysis of being. First philosophy cannot resort to real being to explain non-being. It is only once ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ are both understood that one judges without fail that something cannot both be and not be. Whereas ‘being’ falls logically first in the intellect’s first operation in grasping many sensible particulars, the principle of non-contradiction falls logically first in the intellect’s second operation in composing ‘being’ and ‘non-being.’

In forming a science of being as being, metaphysics employs the method of predication to articulate insights about being, and it accomplishes this goal by means of common principles. Being (the subject-genus), the common principles of being (the dignities or axioms), and the proper attributes of being (the conclusion) constitute the science of metaphysics. The common principles are in fact proper principles of first philosophy. They are known immediately

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13 ST I, q. 16, a. 3 ad 2: “Non entis non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud intelligibile” (Leon. 4:210); De veritate, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2: “unde quod intellectui cuicumque aequetur, non est ex ipso non ente sed ex ipso intellectu qui rationem non entis accepit in se ipso” (Leon. 22/1.19.281-284); De veritate q. 1, a. 8: “sed negationes vel privationes existentes extra animam non habent aliquam formam per quam vel imitantur exemplar artis divinae vel ineraut sui notitiam in intellectu humano; sed quod adaquantur intellectui est ex parte intellectus qui earum rationes apprehendit” (Leon. 22/1.27.115-121). See also De Potentia, q. 9, a. 7 ad 6 & 15. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic, 77-81.


15 In IV Meta. lect. 6, no. 605: “Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto” (Marietti ed., 18.168). See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 41-2. I say “logically first” because I think that for Thomas we first discover being and the principle of non-contradiction through insights and judgments that do not explicitly invoke being and the principle of non-contradiction.

16 In I Post. An. lect. 15, no. 7: “Primo, praemittit quae sint necessaria ad demonstracionem, dicens quod in demonstrationibus tria sunt. Unum est quod demonstratur, scilicet conclusio, que quidem continet in se id quod per se inest alicui generi; per demonstracionem enim concluditur propria passio de proprio subiecto. Aliud autem sunt dignitates, ex quibus demonstratio procedit. Tercium autem est genus subiectum, cuius proprias passiones et per se accidencia demonstratio ostendit” (Leon. 1*/2.57:34-31). See also In I Post. An., lect. 17, no. 4: “similiter prima philosophia, quae considerat omnia principia, habet pro subiecto ens, quod est commune ad omnia; et ideo
(statim),\(^{17}\) without comparison,\(^{18}\) without examination,\(^{19}\) and without investigation\(^{20}\) through a simple intuition\(^{21}\) because the ratio of the subject term immediately belongs to the predicate, that is without the necessity of a third term. Yet the ignorant still might not understand.\(^{22}\) In other words, despite the fact that these propositions are self-evident in themselves (secundum se), first philosophy must nevertheless rely on “strong dialectic” to make these principles self-evident to us (quoad nos) by articulating the way that the predicate belongs to the subject and by treating of the meaning of terms.\(^{23}\) First philosophy determines and manifests such notions and principles through the method of predication. This dissertation expounds on the justifications and the procedures for this method.

In chapter one, we outlined various precursors to Thomas’s “logical method” in metaphysics. In Thomas’s immediate intellectual context, we found frequent expressions from various Latin authors of logic as both an art for the sciences to use (utens) and a science that teaches other sciences (docens). We stated that the use of the science of logic (“dialectic”) as a teaching tool in metaphysics is nothing new to Thomas, but rather appears frequently throughout history with Plato’s investigation into the Good, Aristotle’s investigation into the definition of considerat ea, quae sunt propria entis, quae sunt omnibus communia, tanquam propria sibi” (Leon. 1*/2.65:109-114). See Weisheipl, Aristotelian Methodology, 19.

\(^{17}\) In IV Meta., lect. 5, no. 595.

\(^{18}\) ST I, q. 83, a. 4; De veritate, q. 14, a. 1; In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

\(^{19}\) In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2; In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, ad 2; In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2; In II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 1; De veritate., q. 16, a. 1.

\(^{20}\) ST I, q. 79, a. 12.

\(^{21}\) In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a, 5; In III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2; De veritate, q. 2, a.,3, ad 5; De veritate, q. 8, a, 15; ST I, q. 59, a, 1 ad 1; ST II-II, q. 180, a. 6 ad 2. The preceding citations describing the manner of knowing self-evident propositions are taken from Dougherty, “Thomas Aquinas,” 619-20.

\(^{22}\) ST I-I, q. 94, a. 2.

\(^{23}\) In IV Met. lect. 5, no. 595. See citation above. Thomas’s natural theology, of course, uses this distinction quite readily. The difference is that the definition of God is not possible through natural means. See for instance, De veritate, q. 10, a. 12. See Dougherty, “Thomas Aquinas,” 624-28.
substance, Avicenna’s investigation into the synonyms of being, and Averroes’s investigation into the predicaments of being. Averroes outlines both senses of logic that Burnyeat calls “logical” method, in the sense of the teaching of logic (Andronicus’s sense) or in the sense of generally accepted statements (Simplicius’s sense).  

We contrasted Averroes’s and Thomas’s view of the relation between the subject-matters of metaphysics and logic, which influences their discussion of the use of logic in metaphysics. Whereas Averroes can view the “logical method” as demonstrative because the subject of metaphysics and logic are the same, in our interpretation, Thomas cannot view the “logical method” as making affirmative demonstrations because the subject of metaphysics and logic are not the same, but really different. Thomas’s logical method rather resembles Aristotle’s “strong” dialectic. On the one hand, when the special or particular sciences look upon the teaching of logic, their arguments no longer belong in the science but become merely dialectical or probable inquiries into things. On the other hand, when metaphysics looks upon the teaching of logic, its arguments remain metaphysical. When dividing being into the general and special modes of being, Thomas uses the method of predication to dialectically manifest insights into the science of being as being; when determining the principles of being such as prime matter, substantial form, and essence/esse, Thomas uses the method of predication to negatively demonstrate conclusions in the science of being as being.

These types of arguments remain in the science of metaphysics because, as Thomas states in his Commentary on *De Trinitate*, it is “proper” and “fitting” for metaphysics to employ logical

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principles: “Logic and metaphysics may properly and aptly (proprie et conuenienter) use this method, however, because both sciences are common (scientia communis) and in some way (quodammodo) treat of the same subject.” These statements about this close relationship between metaphysics and logic are not limited to Thomas’s Commentary on De Trinitate. We find expressions in Thomas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics as well about the “affinity” between metaphysics and logic, and we found that there is this affinity because metaphysics and logic both look upon communia, that is, the common concepts that flow from being in general.

We distinguished the way that Thomas’s metaphysics and logic consider these common concepts. Metaphysics looks upon such concepts in their mode of being, that is, by considering through first intentions the individual mode of being (‘Socrates,’ ‘man’), that includes principles such as essence and existence; logic looks upon such concepts in their mode of predication, that is by considering through second intentions the relations among the first intentions (‘man’ as predicable, ‘animal’ as predicable), which include principles such as genus and species. These logical principles are dialectical and deductive tools in metaphysics. In other words, metaphysics may assume the science of being as known into its own science of being as being by looking upon logical principles as analogous to metaphysical principles, by looking upon rationate being

26 De Trinitate (q. 6, a. 1), sol. 1: “Set hic modus procedendi non potest proprae competere alicui particulari scientie, in quibus peccatum accidit nisi ex proprae procedatur: contingit autem hoc proprae et conuenienter fieri in logica et metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subiectum quodammodo” (Leon. 50.159:130-136). See Reichmann, “Logic and the Method of Metaphysics,” 348-50. I contrast Thomas’s view of the relation between metaphysics and logic from that of Averroes below.

27 In VII Meta., lect. 3: “Sicut enim supra dictum est, haec scientia habet quandam affinitatem cum logica propter utriusque communitatem. Et ideo modus logicus huic scientiae proprius est, et ab eo convenienter incipit” (Marietti ed., 18.327).
as proportional to real being. That is how we understand Thomas’s statement that the “modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating.”

In chapters two and three, we attempted to justify Thomas’s “logical method,” which moves from reason to things because it starts from rational principles (rationate beings), and we wanted to justify such a procedure by arguing that it is founded upon the movement of things to reason. This method is founded upon real beings. In chapter two, we discussed the cognitive movement of things to reason starting with the external and internal sense powers. That discussion showed that, for Thomas, we know things through assimilation of knower to thing known, and that happens through the principle of similitude whereby the thing known causes its formal likeness in the knower’s passive sense-powers, which produce a phantasm. Then the intellectual power known as the agent intellect immaterializes this phantasm to form a likeness of the thing (“intelligible species”) through which the possible intellect can know things themselves.

We also extended this discussion into how the likeness of the thing extends to concepts through an account of the (first) two operations of the intellect of simple apprehension and composition and division. The quiddity of the thing outside the soul makes the intellect true (e.g. a stone), and the intellectual understanding of this quiddity is expressed interiorily as an inner word (e.g. ‘stone’), which the intellect expresses externally through an utterance bearing the signification of the inner word (e.g. “stone”). Metaphysics may look upon things with precise

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abstraction (‘humanity’) or with non-precise abstraction (‘man’), but in predication what is predicated is the whole that does not exclude the individual aspects of the thing (‘man’).

Thomas states that it belongs to human nature absolutely considered to be predicated of Socrates, so, while what is predicated is the nature that neither exists in the mind nor in things, the predicate signifies something with an immediate foundation in the real thing because that which is individuated is the common nature, which in itself is existentially neutral. The likeness of the thing finds its way into the mind’s predications. That explains why Thomas states that predication is “something achieved by the combining and dividing activity of the intellect, and which has for its foundation in the real thing the union of those things, one of which is said of another.”

What is unique about metaphysics is that, even though science is about universals, its concern and expressions about the nature of things are also a concern for the mode of being of individual things.

In chapter three, we discussed the “metaphysical realism” of Thomas. The mode of predicking that logic studies “flows” (consequitur) from the mode of being that metaphysics studies. We made sense of this proportional relationship by discussing the primary division of being into essential and accidental being, and their discovery by the metaphysician through three different modes of per se predication and also through per accidens predication, which includes denominative predication, a concrete mode of predicking this of that. Each of these ways of

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29 De ente et essentia, c. 2: “Predicatio enim est quiddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et diuidentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur” (Leon. 43.375:134-138).
30 In V Meta., lect. 9, no. 890: “Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia “quoties ens dicitur,” idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse” (Marietti ed., 18.238). See also In III Phys. lect. 5, no. 322.
predicating are founded upon the ways things are. That foundation does not mean that the modes of predicating mirror the way things are, because the mode of understanding refracts or mediates between the mode of signifying and the mode of being.\textsuperscript{31} Yet the modes of predicating are analogously related to the modes of being.

We find one of these types of analogous relationship in the two modes of essential being (\textit{ens per se}): being as signified in the composition of a proposition (\textit{ens verum}) is founded upon being as divided by the ten predicaments,\textsuperscript{32} but this propositional being (\textit{ens verum}) also primarily depends on the intellect’s composition. To that end, we endeavored to understand different types of composition through predication, including predication by essence (\textit{per essentiam}), by participation (\textit{per participationem}), and denominatively (denominative). Each of these modes of predication flow from either an essential (\textit{per se}) or an accidental (\textit{per accidens}) mode of being. That discussion helped us understand how the mode of signifying “existence,” for Thomas, can be either a substantial or an accidental predicate.

In chapter four, we considered Thomas’s criticism of the “logical” or “rational” approach of Parmenides, Plato, and Avicebron who analyze their concepts to arrive at their conclusions. We concluded that Thomas does not criticize that approach as such. Rather, he criticizes the lack of a reflective awareness about how those concepts arise in the mind: what causes the univocal, immaterial, and universal nature of these concepts is the mind’s mode of understanding. This

\textsuperscript{31} “Thomas takes up two related issues: the division of the speculative ‘sciences’ and their methodological differences. Both the distinctions and the differences point to a hierarchy in the approaches to the knowable. The entire treatment is animated by that sense of the refractions in human understanding which also lay behind the treatment of the \textit{modi significandi}. Thomas seems certain that a naive approach to being is not philosophically justified. One must have constant reference to the mode of one’s approach, since it is this which conditions what is known.” See Jordan, \textit{Ordering Wisdom}, 77.

\textsuperscript{32} Thomas also identifies a third mode of \textit{per se} being as divided into act and potency. \textit{ST} I, q. 77, a. 1; \textit{DV} q. 8, a. 9; \textit{In V Meta.}, lect. 9, no. 897.
type of criticism confirms our efforts in chapters two and three to show both how metaphysics comes to know things and how it can judiciously reflect upon them.

We ended with a lengthy examination of Thomas’s application of the “logical method” in the manifestation of the general and special modes of being and in the determination of the principles of being. Although we found some arguments incomplete and, so, unconvincing, the overwhelming indication is that the method of predication proceeds successfully in Thomas’s metaphysics. Thomas successfully divides being into five conceptually distinct transcendentals (general modes of being) and ten really distinct predicaments (special modes of being) by making necessary insights into what being is. Thomas also successfully determines some of the principles of being, including the real distinction between prime matter and substantial form, the unicity of substantial form in substances, and the real distinction between essence and existence.

By articulating the way in which Thomas uses the method of predication in metaphysics, we started to clarify how he applies the general, “intellectual” method of resolution, which he calls the method most suited to metaphysics in his Commentary on De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1.33 The method of predication in fact belongs to this general method of conceptual analysis. It is the discursive element (ratio) of an intellectual process (intellectus). The method of predication looks upon how to resolve one’s concepts into being by considering how those concepts naturally relate to one another in the intellect, through such logical notions as affirmation/negation, division/indivision, and in itself versus through another (per se/per aliud)

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33 In Meta. proemium: “Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia” (Marietti ed., 18.2); De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1c ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectualiter procedere non attribuitur scientie diuine quasi ipsa non ratiocinetur procedendo de principiis ad conclusiones, set quia eius ratiocinatio est intellectuali considerationi propinquissima, et conclusiones eius principiis” (Leon. 50.163:396-401).
in the manifestation of being, through logical notions such as genus, definition, and the modes of predications for the resolution of the real distinction between matter/substantial form and essence/esse as intrinsic principles of being.

It is because rationate being is analogically ordered to real being that Thomas can state the “modes of being are proportional to the modes of predicating.” This order means that metaphysics can make judgments regarding the modes of predicating as indicative of the modes of being. In realizing this unique proportion, metaphysics regards the teachings of logic on rationate beings as ultimately significative of real being. Such arguments belong to metaphysics as a demonstrative science because their premises (e.g. intentions and the notion of genus and species) are not something altogether outside its subject-genus. Our case studies show that in Thomas’s division of being into general and special modes of being, metaphysics uses the method of predication to establish indemonstrable knowledge or insights (intellectus) that are the first principles of metaphysics (general and special modes of being); and in his determination of the science of being as being, Thomas uses the method of predication to establish demonstrable truths of knowledge or science (scientia) that are the conclusions of metaphysics (reality of prime matter, unicity of substantial form, real distinction between essence and existence).

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34 In III Phys., lect. 5, no. 322: “Ad horum igitur evidentiam sc Brend est quid ens dividiit in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta” (Leon. 2.114).

35 In XI Meta. lect. 3, no. 2204.

36 Further accounts of the method of predication, for example, could show how metaphysics determines what substance is, especially in Bk VII of Thomas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics. Additionally, the method for the discovery of the subject of metaphysics might be included as well. For a similar attempt to interpret the same use of logic by metaphysics in Aristotle’s works see Irwin’s Aristotle’s First Principles. “If Aristotle is to convince us that his second thoughts on philosophy represent an advance rather than a retreat, he needs to show how his alleged universal science works. It must have some plausible method for selecting the ‘appropriate’ subset of common
short, Thomas uses the method of predication to provide a proper and fitting path for metaphysics to investigate and prove the attributes and principles of being.
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