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An Analysis of Intelligible Species in the Doctrine of Knowledge in a Manuscript
Attributed to Antonius Andreas

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by

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Antonius Andreas

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Intelligible species were enshrined in the cognitive theories of medieval thinkers as part of the narrative which explained the genesis of an act of understanding. However these thinkers did not all regard intelligible species in the same way. While some, like St. Thomas Aquinas, stressed the need for these species to serve as the means to an act of understanding, others such as Henry of Ghent rejected the need for them on those grounds.

This historical setting serves as the backdrop of the dissertation which is a commentary of Aristotle's *De Anima* which is attributed to Antonius Andreas; the commentary, we are told, was copied in the early part of the fall semester in 1448 at the University of Prague by the scribe who copied it, Hilary of Lithonicum. Antonius Andreas was a Franciscan friar from the Kingdom of Aragon who studied at the University of Paris at the same time that Blessed John Duns Scotus was teaching there. The influence of the *Doctor Subtilis* on Antonius is manifest primarily in his own commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in which he espouses Scotus's signature teaching on common nature and *haecceitas*.

Antonius Andreas discusses the role of intelligible species in cognition in this commentary and in his *Scriptum Artem Veterem Aristotelis*. The anonymous author also discusses the role of intelligible species in his commentary on the *De Anima*. The main focus of this dissertation is to examine whether the doctrine of intelligible species of the anonymous author is consistent with the doctrine Antonius Andreas. In the background of this discussion is

how faithful both Antonius Andreas and this anonymous author are to the doctrine of Duns Scotus, and whether the appellation of *Scotellus* correctly belongs to Antonius Andreas as well as to this anonymous author.

This dissertation by Paul L. Dudzinski fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., as Director, and Kevin White, Ph.D., and Gregory Doolan, Ph.D., as Readers.

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In Memory of My Parents, Louis and Josephine

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a work in which I combined a historical approach with a doctrinal analysis of the medieval philosophical issue of intelligible species in knowledge, particularly with the main topic of this work on an analysis of intelligible species and the cognitional theory maintained in a commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* which is attributed to Antonius Andreas. The study is a fascinating study of late thirteenth and early fourteenth century cognitional theories, examining different theories and relating them to the theory of knowledge on intelligible species contained in the cognitional theory contained within the pages of this manuscript. What I hope will be clear in my analysis is the distinction between different theories of cognition in which authors take the extreme position of either vindicating the necessity for intelligible species or rejecting the need in viewing such species as superfluous to the mind's ability to think. What I hope will also be clear is my analysis of the different nuanced views of intelligible species of those who adopted them in their epistemological narrative.

Chapter One is about Antonius Andreas, specifically who he is as a man, his teaching and writing, and the environment that helped to shape and influence his thinking. We take a look at thirteenth and early fourteenth educational methodologies within the Franciscan order, the establishment of various *studia* in their local settings as well as those located near major universities such as Paris, and the type of candidates in the order who studied at either location of the center of study. I also provide a listing of the different editions and manuscripts that are either accurately identified or attributed to Antonius Andreas

Chapter Two is an analysis of the historical development of the teaching on intelligible species. In this chapter I focus on the cognitional doctrine of five main late Thirteenth Century authors: St. Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry of Ghent, and Blessed John Duns Scotus. I begin the chapter with a small introduction, beginning with a brief excursus through ancient Greece that includes brief looks at Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and the various traditions of their respective theories of species, as well as a an analysis of Arabic thought, especially of Avicenna and Averroes, that had a profound impact on late thirteenth century thought.

Chapter Three is the opening of the examination on the text in this manuscript that is a commentary of Aristotle's *De Anima* which is attributed to Antonius Andreas. I proceed by referring to this author as the Antonine author. In this chapter I compare the respective teachings on intuitive and abstractive cognition taught by Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author.

Chapter Four is an examination of the teaching on intelligible species in the respective cognitional theories of Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author. I begin with an analysis of the role played by the agent intellect enunciated by both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author, with the special role the phantasm and possible intellect have in the mechanics of the cognitive act. Lastly I focus on the specific role intelligible species play in their respective cognitional theories.

In the Conclusion I answer the main question of this dissertation project; namely, whether the teaching of the Antonine author in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* is consistent

with the doctrine articulated and taught by Antonius Andreas. Then I briefly relate their cognitional theories with that of Blessed John Duns Scotus.

Chapter 1: Antonius Andreas: The Man, His World, and His Work

I. Antonius Andreas: The Man

Antonius Andreas was a Franciscan friar in the Kingdom of Aragon who was born around the year 1280. There is very little information on his early life, but he was known as *Scotellus*, the little Scotist, or faithful disciple of Duns Scotus.¹ He was born in Tauste, in the province of Zaragoza. He entered the Franciscan order and spent some time being formed in the Franciscan way of life. Going on the information of his birthdate in 1280, Antonius would have been an adolescent or even younger when he entered the order. When St. Francis founded his order the members consisted of adult men. The pre-Narbonne constitutions (1239) stipulated that new postulants entering the order should be clerics competent in grammar, logic, law or medicine. Clerics or lay men who did not have this background could join if this edified the populace.² The 1260 constitutions of Narbonne established eighteen years as the minimum age for entrance into the order; this stipulation was repeated in 1279 and 1292. It is only with the general constitution of 1316 that the required age for entrance was lowered to fourteen.³ The age of eighteen would have been the age requirement at the end of the thirteenth century and this would have affected the life of young Antonius. However there are accounts that from the middle of the thirteenth century young boys were already being admitted entrance into the order in a few of the religious convents. This led to a growing number of mendicant convents accepting young boys into their religious orders. Thus it would be safe to assume that Antonius

¹ Cf. *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, ed. by Josef Höfer and Karl Rahner (Friburg: Herder, 1957), 671.

² Cf. Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210 - 1517)*, (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 2000), 238 - 239.

³ Cf. *Ibid.*, 240.

could have entered the Order as a novice at the age of fourteen. Franciscan rules required their novices to spend one year to be initiated in the basics of the Franciscan way of life.¹ During this time Antonius would have attended lessons on the life of St. Francis and the charisms of the Franciscan order. This could have taken place along with receiving some preparatory education in grammar and logic and the other arts; depending on whether he entered any earlier than the age of fourteen. Nonetheless Antonius and other young postulants would still need significant additional guidance, which would turn the novitiate into a quintessential period of religious instruction.²

What we find is that Antonius was selected to attend the *studium generale* of the Order at Lérida in 1296. There is no information if Lérida was Antonius's home *studium*, or was sent here from another Franciscan convent. Nevertheless Antonius would have entered the *studium* at the normally required age (sixteen). However, as we shall see later, not every friar student would be selected to attend this school, but only those selected by the Order. The Franciscan order would have selected Antonius because he possessed intellectual gifts along with a pleasant personality and the impeccable morals needed to take on the rigorous education at the *studium*.³ He continued his courses of study in the arts at this *studium* for three years, which fulfilled the requirements of the Franciscans, which would mean he would finish his education in 1299. What we find next is that Antonius was sent by the Franciscans to Paris in 1300 to enter into the *studium generale* there, which would have been Cordeliers. This reflects Antonius's outstanding

¹ Cf. Ibid., 236.

² Cf. Ibid., 239.

³ Cf. Ibid., 89.

qualities which were a sign to his Franciscan superiors that he was worthy of this honor. One of his fellow countrymen who taught at Paris at this time was Gonsolvo of Spain. Since 1297 Gonsolvo was regent master and occupied the chair of theology reserved for the Franciscans at the University of Paris. During the time when he was regent master Gonsolvo would become personally acquainted with and profoundly impressed with the mature wisdom of Duns Scotus, who would be one of his students. He also would be well acquainted with Antonius who would also reside at Cordeliers. Antonius's time of arrival at Paris in 1300 then somewhat coincided with Scotus's arrival to Paris from Oxford in 1302. At this time Antonius would become connected with Duns Scotus when Scotus taught there from 1302 ó 1303, and 1304 ó 1307.⁴ It could have been that Gonsolvo may have been the one to introduce Antonius and Duns Scotus to each other, recognizing the intellectual gifts Antonius had as well as impressing him with the wisdom of Scotus. However when Gonsolvo became the Minister General of the Franciscan Order in 1304 he also sent other friars of outstanding morals and intellectual acumen to Paris to learn under the tutelage of Scotus who was then still only a bachelor of theology.⁵ The reason for the hiatus indicated above within the year 1303 is attributable to a serious conflict between Phillip the Fair and Pope Boniface VIII. Phillip ordered his officials to go to the different convents of the mendicant orders and to write the names of those who supported the king on one list, and those who opposed him on another. The names of both Scotus and Andreas appear on

⁴ Jorge Ayala Martinez, *Pensadores Aragoneses: Historia de las ideas filosóficas en Aragón* (Zaragoza: Institucion Fernando el Catolico, 2001), 163.

⁵ Joaquin Carreras y Artau, "Notas Sobre el Escotismo Medieval en la Provincia Franciscana de Aragón," *Antonianum*, vol. 40 (1965): 469. According to Carreras y Artau, it was in his role as the major general that Gonsolvo wrote a letter to the guardian of the Franciscan convent in Paris shortly after his election in 1304 to have Scotus presented for a licentiate in theology.

the list of those who opposed the king, and consequently had to temporarily leave France, retuning only after the death of Pope Boniface.⁶ After his tutelage under the Subtle Doctor, Antonius (about 1312) went back to the Kingdom of Aragon to teach in the Franciscan convent school in Monzón and the *studium generale* in Lérida.⁷ There is however no definitive year assigned to Antonius's death. On the one hand, P. Martí de Barcelona does not think it unreasonable to fix the date of his death in 1350, following the lead of Pierre Pauwels, who estimates Andreas's death to have taken place after the deaths of Giles of Rome (1318) and Peter Aureol (1345),⁸ although recent scholarship has calculated the deaths of Giles of Rome to have occurred in 1316 and Peter Auriol in 1322.⁹ On the other, the general assessment is that Antonius died between 1320 and 1325, though one of Antonius's disciples who copied his works, Salvador de Tarradis, maintains that he died in 1333.¹⁰

Camille Bérubé has provided us with a glimpse of the premier Scotists, those who were classmates under the tutelage of the Subtle Doctor in Paris. They were: Antonius Andreas, Francis Mayronis, John Occam, Walter Burley, another Walter, John Scorps, and John the

⁶ Cf. William J. Courtenay, 'The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1301', *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 53 (1993): 167 ó 173, especially 170 ó 171. It was a temporary leave, for Pope Boniface died in 1303, ending the standoff with King Phillip. After this the King allowed all those whom he dispersed to return.

⁷ Cf. Jorge Ayala Martinez, *Pensadores Aragoneses.*, 163.

⁸ P. Martí de Barcelona, 'Fra Antoni Andreu, O.F.M., "Doctor Dulcifluus"', *Criterion*, vol. 5 (1929): 22.

⁹ For Giles of Rome, cf. Roberto Lambertini, 'Giles of Rome', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed December 23, 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/giles/>. For Peter Auriol cf. Russell L. Friedman, 'Peter Auriol', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed February 9, 2015, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/auriol/>.

¹⁰ Jorge Ayala Martinez, *Pensadores Aragoneses.*, 163. Also see Marek Gensler, 'Antonius Andreae ó The Faithful Pupil? Antonius Andreae's Doctrine of Individuation', *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum*, vol. 31 (1992): 23 ó 24.

Canon. However, as Bérubé admits, it is difficult for actual historians to identify some of the names in this list. Nevertheless it is clear that the Antonius Andreas in this listing is the one of this present study, along with Francis Mayronis and Walter Burley.¹¹ According to Mariano of Florence, Antonius is named *Doctor Dulcissimus* due to his outstanding defense of the doctrine of his master Duns Scotus, writing on all the books of Aristotle, especially his logic, according to the mind of Scotus.¹² Bérubé is convinced that Francis of Mayronis, by contrast, was more of an independent Scotist. Francis served as a theologian for the papal court in Avignon. He followed the teaching of the Subtle Doctor on the absolute predestination of Christ, the Immaculate Conception, and on both the evangelical and eschatological significance of Franciscan poverty. His independence is evident in how he fused the teaching of his master with the previous thought of St. Bonaventure. In this way Francis was able to write and preach in defense of the teachings of the Church, as well as in defense of the Franciscan way of life and Scotistic doctrine. His teaching even attracted disciples who would later be called Maronists.¹³

While the innovations of Francis of Mayronis have been noted, there is still a question about the Scotism of Antonius Andreas. Even though in his writings he professes himself to be a faithful disciple of Scotus, there are yet areas in his work in which he differs from his master's teaching. Later in chapters three and four, along with the Antonine author, we will examine Antonius's work on the metaphysics and physics of Aristotle, and we shall see how his own

¹¹ Cf. Camille Bérubé, *La Première Ecole Scotiste, Preuve et Raisons à l'Université de Paris. Logique, Ontologie et Théologie au XIV^e Siècle*. (Paris: Vrin, 1984), 12 et 13.

¹² Mariano of Florentia, *Compendium chronicarum Fratrum minorum*, *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, vol. 2 (1909): 632. Also cf. Bérubé, *La Première Ecole Scotiste*, 13.

¹³ Bérubé, *La Première Ecole Scotiste*, 13 et 15.

teaching on intelligible species in his cognitional theory compares with that of the Subtle Doctor and the Antonine author who is the author of the commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*.

II. Antonius Andreas: His World

When we look into and examine the world of Antonius Andreas we can find some factors that undoubtedly shaped and formed his teaching and writing. What we will do is examine a few developments which had an impact upon Antonius. One such trend that had a direct impact on molding and shaping his thought was the Scholastic educational system of the liberal arts. There are other things that undoubtedly had an indirect influence on the development of his philosophic thought, such as things he experienced living the Franciscan life in both his home *studium*, Lérida and at Paris. The medieval world of Antonius Andreas was an important time in the development science of physics and mathematics. Antonius himself cultivated his interests in natural philosophy. Hence my focus here is the immediate academic environment surrounding Antonius and how the scholastic educational environment would have been a factor in the development of his thought. This overview of the context for Antonius's work should provide a basic outline of the way of life Antonius must have followed at perhaps his local *studium* where he entered the Franciscan order, the *studium generale* at Lérida, and later at Paris.

Having an acquaintance with events in the early stage of Antonius's life we can better understand the educational background that shaped and formed him and other friars at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries. In the early days of the Franciscan order those friars who joined as clerics or literate men were expected to already have fulfilled the necessary requirements in education in a preparatory setting. Non-literate friars were not

allowed to engage into further learning. However as the order grew and younger men were attracted to join the need arose to initiate a plan to care for the educational needs of these friars, some of them still in their adolescent years. Thus a plan began to be formed that would lead to the establishment of custodial or provincial schools (*studium particulare*) and the development of the *studium generale*. Hence students in the different religious orders coursed through their studies in their convent schools or provincial *studium* in natural philosophy, logic and some theology, before going to Paris to begin their studies in the bachelor program with a view to obtaining the masters in theology.¹⁴ But rather than a streamlined process by which students in the mendicant orders became masters, there is evidence that there were quite a few who did not acquire the masters; they received the level of education their respective orders deemed necessary for them to fulfill their teaching function within their religious communities. Thus it appears that the educational system in use by the mendicant orders followed two separate tracks: the lectorate program, an educational program that took place in a *studium generale* of each province, initially only at Paris, but eventually spreading to Oxford, Cambridge, and many other cities; and the bachelor and master degrees through a university program which had its own statutes and regulations that governed all students that attended, both the seculars and religious orders.¹⁵ For example some of the decisions reached at chapter meetings in the middle to late thirteenth century stipulated that students going to Paris have a sufficient background in learning,

¹⁴ Cf. Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education*, 65 - 81. Cf. also Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. by F. M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, 2nd edition, 3rd reprint, Vol.1 (London: Low and Brydone, 1958), 471 ó 486.

¹⁵ See William Courtenay, 'The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century', *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and The Religious Life. Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff*, ed. by Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), 80 ó 84.

and should be trained in a *studium* in their home province or neighboring province for three years for this purpose. However before 1250, when a standardized program of preparatory studies was still being developed, the training at the local *studium* could well exceed this three year period.¹⁶ During the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries the constant growth and development of religious orders brought about a further refinement to the educational program of the friars of these orders that led to a connection between a *studium generale* and university which followed their own respective educational tracks. According to the rulings from the different chapter meetings, there are many students in the mendicant orders who were not permitted beyond the lectorate program to enter the university program at Paris. And for those friars who were allowed entrance, their admittance did not come before years of study and teaching.¹⁷ Moreover the *studium generale* of the mendicant orders (for the Franciscans, the expression *studium generale* appears for the first time in the Constitutions of Narbonne in 1260) possessed the right to issue a license to teach within their own educational systems.¹⁸ Nevertheless Paris was recognized as the intellectual center, not only for the teaching of the arts, but especially for the teaching of theology. This was not only due to the prestige of the University, but also to the lack of neighboring universities nearer to the provinces that had could teach theology at the graduate level.¹⁹ Also, one of the criteria for determining an existing educational institution as a *studium*

¹⁶ Cf. Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education*, 87 - 88.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Cf. Neslihan Şenocak, "The Franciscan Studium Generale: A New Interpretation", *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, ed. by Kent Emery, Jr, et al. (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, 2012), 222.

¹⁹ Laurie Beaumont-Maillet, *Le Grand Couvent des Cordeliers de Paris. Etude historique et archéologique du XIII^e siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1975), 20 - 21.

generale was the presence of masters of theology, bachelors, and Parisian-educated lectors.²⁰ Hence each of the mendicant orders had *studium generale* located in Paris. But just because students from one Franciscan province would be sent to Paris does not mean that they would automatically incept into bachelor and master programs of the University, since they could receive their licenses to teach as lectors from their own, i.e. Franciscan *studium*. Both the Franciscans and Dominicans ran two different but related programs of theology in their respective Paris convents.²¹ For the Franciscans, among the students they would send to Paris would be those who were not there to earn a license (since many of them already had their licenses), but merely to further their knowledge and experience by pursuing the study of higher theology for two years.²²

It is important to stress here that with the current educational system, not all friars qualified for entrance into the lectorate program, and even fewer friars were permitted beyond this to incept into the bachelor and masters program. Most of the student friars chosen for study in the lectorate program of the order completed their course of study at a *studium generale* in order to teach, subsequently, within the province's *studium particulare* or *generale*, or at the local convent school. The few who would be selected to enter into the bachelor and masters

²⁰ Cf. enocak, "The Franciscan Studium Generale", 227.

²¹ Cf. Heinrich Denifle, O.P. and Franz Ehrle, S.J., *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, Vol. 6 (Freiburg: Herder, 1892), 34, "Generalis vult, quod minister provincialis non committat alicui receptionem Fratrum extra suam provinciam nisi in studiis generalibus." Cf. also Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme", 81.

²² Cf. enocak, op cit., 234 - 235.

program would incept into the program offered by the University.²³ Those who came to Paris to enter the lectorate program did not necessarily continue to the university. Once they attained the lectorate, they returned to their province to begin teaching. Courtenay estimates that students in the lectorate program were in their mid-twenties and studied under a regent master in the *studium generale* of the order in Paris; for the Franciscans this was Cordeliers.²⁴ However, the period between lectorate and the masters could be several years that would involve much teaching and study. Also attendance for a friar at the *studium generale* of Paris was not automatic. It was only after the many years of preparatory work in philosophy and theology when the more accomplished students would be chosen to finish at least the lectorate program by permission of the provincial general, with the consent of the provincial chapter.²⁵ However student friars of mendicant orders from outlying provinces that were chosen to study in Paris in the lectorate program received certification upon completion of the program. Such conferral however would not have anything necessarily to do with a conferral of a degree from a university.²⁶

²³ Beaumont-Maillet, *Le Grand Couvent des Cordeliers de Paris*, 25. The students chosen to study in Paris were selected by the minister general and his choices ratified by a decision of the provincial chapter.

²⁴ Cf. Courtenay, "Instructional Programme", 82.

²⁵ *Capitulum Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. by Heinrich Denifle, O.P., Charles Samaran, et al., Vol. 2, reprint (Charleston, SC: Bibliobazaar II, LLC, 2012), 57: "Item mittendi Parisius ad studium generale primo exerceantur tribus vel duobus annis post novitiatum in aliquo studio provincie sue vel vicine, nisi adeo litterali fuerint quod post novitiatum continuo possint mitti. Non mittantur tamen nisi de auctoritate ministri cum consilio et assensu Capituli provincialis. Idem dicimus de his qui ad alia studia generalia quocumque titulo transmittuntur." Cf. also Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme", 81-82.

²⁶ Cf. Beaumont-Maillet, *Le Grand Couvent des Cordeliers de Paris*, 25. A term of study for student sent to their Paris convents was 4 years; but if one showed great promise in his studies and made rapid progress, he may be authorized to return back to the province of origin, undoubtedly to utilize his talents for other students in the provincial *studium generale*. Cf. also Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme", 82.

The masters program, essentially our equivalent of the doctorate, consisted in a two-step phase: the baccalaureate and doctorate. At the bachelor phase the student would read (and comment upon) the *Sentences*, under the supervision of the regent master of the religious order.²⁷ This period would last between 2 to 3 years. Once completed, one would enter the doctoral phase by reading (and commenting upon) the different books of Sacred Scripture. Here at this level the essential part of the course of study was the opportunity to engage in issues of speculative theology and to apply the techniques of argumentation and dialectics learned in logic to the tradition of theological questions.²⁸ This level of study also took about 2 to 3 years; after which time the candidate was examined and licenses were conferred on or about All Saints Day in every alternate year, which was also called the Jubilee.²⁹

Medieval pedagogy offered a rigorous curriculum to its students where the study of the arts along with philosophy - natural philosophy, moral philosophy, metaphysics, and theology - was the norm. Already at the young age of 14 or 15 many of these students were trained in the grammar of Latin since this was the common language of the religious house and the classroom. This formative education was carried out at the provincial school, the *studium particulare*, or the

²⁷ Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme", 80 mentions that it was standard practice for the Franciscan student to begin a partial reading of the *Sentences* at his provincial *studium generale* before entrance into the university program. What Courtenay mentions here would apply for Scotus as well in the reading of the *Sentences* in Oxford before his entrance into the doctorate program at the University of Paris.

²⁸ Cf. Courtenay, "Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century", in *Manuels, Programmes de Cours et Techniques d'Enseignement dans les Universités Médiévales. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve, 9 – 11 septembre 1993*, ed. by Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain-La-Neuve, 1994), 333.

²⁹ Cf. also Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, vol. 1, 480. Rashdall is the one who noted the date of the conferral of licenses.

local convent school.³⁰ Depending on the legislation of the different chapters, five to eight years were spent in this preparatory schooling where the students were immersed in courses on logic and philosophy.³¹ The teaching method practiced was predicated upon repetition.³² The students would then listen in order to learn the lessons by memorizing them. The lectures of the teachers were from books of the original authors as they were translated into Latin. This was the case especially with the works of Aristotle and the works of his commentators.³³ This rigorous method of education was followed at the local convent schools, the *studium particulare* of a province, and the *studium generale*, which trained the friar student for the lectorate. It was at the convent school which was a preparatory school, in which students were immersed in courses on logic and philosophy that would last from five to eight years. Depending on the needs of the Franciscan order, friars who completed the coursework requirements at the local convent school could teach student friars logic at the provincial *studium particulare* for a few years while at the same time receive further education in elementary theology, and participate as a respondent at a provincial chapter, which served as the mechanism of the order to select the friars whom they would send to the *studium generale* for the lectorate program. Such was the case of Francesco

³⁰ Cf. Noone, "Duns Scotus and the Franciscan Educational Model," *Archa Verbi. Subsidia 3. John Duns Scotus, Philosopher. Proceedings of the "The Quadruple Congress" on John Duns Scotus, Part 1*, eds. Mary Beth Ingham and Oleg Bychkov (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag GmbH & Co. KG/ St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications), 132.

³¹ Cf. Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education*, 90 - 91.

³² Cf. James A. Weisheipl, O.P., "The Structure of the Arts Faculty in the Medieval University," *British Journal of Educational Studies*, vol. 19, no. 3 (October, 1971): 268. Accessed March 30, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3120440>.

³³ Cf. *Ibid*, 264.

della Rovere.³⁴ Once a friar had completed the coursework requirements at the local convent school or the provincial *studium particulare*, he would begin to teach student friars at the local convent school or at the provincial *studium particulare*, or at a non-degree *studium generale* (one not attached to a university). After this period of teaching of approximately two years he could be selected to enter the lectorate program at one of the order's *studium generale*. This is the time he could be sent to Paris to study at Cordeliers, which was open to friar students from all provinces. After the requirements for the lectorate were completed and he was licensed to teach, this friar could teach for a couple of years at the local convent school before being selected to pursue a bachelor's degree in theology, and even go further to obtain the licentiate and the *magisterium* in theology.³⁵ However most lectors never moved beyond the lectorate program and after serving one or more terms as a lector at the local convent school could be assigned other duties within the order in addition to their teaching duties.³⁶

Regarding the academic year of 1302 ó 1303 we have a listing of the Franciscan community at Cordeliers at the time of Phillip the Fair's conflict with Pope Boniface VIII. Of those whose names appear on the king's letter of adhesion, there were 173 friars total, twenty-five to thirty-five of whom were at the convent for reasons other than study. The Cordeliers was their home convent. Forty-five to fifty of them came from the province of France, of which Cordeliers was their home *studium generale*. Eighty to ninety came from the provinces outside of Paris and France, who were sent there to study theology. Finally, eight to ten friars who were

³⁴ Cf. Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education*, 91.

³⁵ Cf. Ibid., 92 - 96.

³⁶ Cf. Ibid., 95 - 96. Cf. also Noone, *St. Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscan Educational Model*, 133

present and currently enrolled in the baccalaureate or doctorate program at the University.³⁷ This is evidence, at least in part, that not all friars who dwelled in the Paris *studium* necessarily went on to the graduate theology program of the university.

Thus both Scotus and Andreas were part of this scholastic educational landscape that existed at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries, and would have followed the requirements set forth by the Franciscan order regarding the lectorate and masters program. Antonius Andreas was sent to Paris to enter the *studium generale* there in 1300, and Scotus would arrive in 1302 as a bachelor in theology and would not receive his license in theology until at least 1304. This means that Scotus was yet a bachelor, undoubtedly a very highly regarded bachelor. As a bachelor he would have been reading the *Sentences* under the supervision of the regent master, and Antonius would have been one of the friars who attended his lectures. These lectures undoubtedly took place at the *studium generale* at Cordeliers, though Antonius and the other student friars would have been welcome to attend lectures at the University. Hence there would have been an ample opportunity for Antonius to have come into contact with Scotus, sat in his lectures, and learned the nuances of his doctrine.³⁸

While the Franciscans considered their *studium generale* in Paris to be the best in terms of quality, there were doubts about the educational quality of other *studia generalia*. The Provincial Constitutions of Tuscany in 1292 stated that those who returned from *studia generalia* outside the province were not to be assigned as lectors to teach theology unless they had spent

³⁷ Cf. Courtenay, "Instructional Programme", 86. Also see his "The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1301", 170–173.

³⁸ Cf. Marek Gensler, "Antonius Andreae: Scotism's best supporting author", *Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia*, Vol. 8 (1996), 59. Cf. also Charles Lohr, "Medieval Aristotle Commentaries", *Traditio*, vol. 37 (1967): 365.

one more year back in the *studium generale* of the province to prove themselves capable of lecturing. Those students who came back from Paris were exempted from this extra year. This lack of confidence in another *studium generale* to provide the education to prepare a student for a lectorate not only points to the varying levels of the quality of education in the *studia* of the different Franciscan provinces, but raises the issue of what constitutes a *studium generale*.³⁹ With this need for the proper training and education for preaching and teaching, great stress was laid upon the quality of this education. One important point that cannot be overlooked is that the primary purpose for the *studium generale*, as in Paris, was to train the students for the lectorate, which enabled these friars to teach to their own brother friars. This was the normal course of procedure for most of the students who entered the *studium*, who would have attained this level of education and then began their teaching career within their own *studia generalia*.⁴⁰ It is possible that other *studia* were founded for more specific purposes in education, such as *studia particularia*, *studia grammaticalia*, or even the *studia artium* in the province of Aragon. Also there are traces of evidence that there were such *studia* in Calatayud, Murviedro, Tarrogon, among the other provinces on the Iberian Peninsula. It is considered however that such *studia* were perhaps linked with the neighboring secular university.⁴¹ Perhaps this was the case in Lérida between the Franciscans and the secular university; for at its founding the university maintained two chairs in canon law, two in civil law, one in philosophy, one in medicine, and

³⁹ Cf. enocak, "The Franciscan Studium Generale", 225.

⁴⁰ Cf. Timothy Noone, "Duns Scotus and the Franciscan Educational Model", 133.

⁴¹ Cf. Christopher Schabel and Garret Smith, "The Franciscan *Studium* in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century", *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, 366.

one in grammar.⁴² The Franciscans had a strong presence in the city and could have supplied teachers for teaching in these different fields of study, helping the university to attain its excellent status. In the capital city of Barcelona there is evidence that a *scolas grammatica* was established in 1301 and a *studium* for logic and grammar in 1314. However later in the fourteenth century when King Martin the Humane desired to establish a *studium generale* in the capital city of Barcelona he mentions opposition from a delegation from Lérida.⁴³

Since Antonius is closely associated with Lérida, both as a student and a teacher, it is important to take a closer look the city. Lérida was already a bustling mercantile city in the 1220s, and the Franciscan convent within the city was the first to be established, thanks largely due to the generosity of a local merchant, Ramon de Barriac.⁴⁴ The *studium generale* of the Franciscans in Lérida was established much later; we do not have a precise date of its establishment, nor of its relationship with a *studium generale* which was founded by royal decree.⁴⁵ The *studium* founded by royal decree would refer to the first Catalan university which was established in Lérida by King James II in 1300, and modeled on the educational system in place in the University of Toulouse. Lérida was centered geographically in the Kingdom of Aragon, and since it offered a liberal arts education, subjects of the realm were forbidden to travel anywhere else for study. The university in Lérida did not offer degrees in theology until

⁴² Cf. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Age*, 95.

⁴³ Cf. Christopher Schabel and Garret Smith, "The Franciscan *Studium* in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century", 366 - 367, 391 - 392.

⁴⁴ Jill R. Webster, *Els Menorets. The Franciscans in the Realms of Aragon From St. Francis to the Black Death* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), 115 ó 116.

⁴⁵ Cf. Christopher Schabel and Garret Smith, "The Franciscan *Studium* in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century", 364 - 365.

1430. In 1313, however, King James removed the University from the authority of the bishop and Cathedral Chapter and put it under the aegis of the local municipal authorities in the city. Lérida's central geographical location was undoubtedly the reason why Barcelona, the capital city of Aragon, did not receive a university till much later.⁴⁶ Besides Lérida, the Franciscans of the Aragonese province maintained *studia generalia* in Valencia, Mallorca, and Zaragoza during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In Lérida the Franciscans maintained their own *studium generale* separately and independently of the royal *studium*. Nevertheless they did support the royal *studium* by supplying the royal university with lectors. In 1474 the city and canons of Lérida awarded the only chair of theology to the Franciscans, and in time this increased to two chairs, under the reforms of Pope Eugenius IV.⁴⁷ Even though there is no basis to the claim that Andreas, or even the likes of Peter Auriol, taught at the *studium generale* in Barcelona, there is solid evidence that the Franciscans that did teach there were Poncius Carbonell, Aufredo Goteri Brito, Peter of Navarre, Petrus Thomae, and William of Rubio. All of them were disciples of Duns Scotus.⁴⁸ However, by virtue of the geographical centrality of Lérida, and the stellar reputation of the *studium* as an educational institution, the city as well as the *studium* had an appeal which attracted scholars from afar.⁴⁹

Based on Jorge Ayala's account, Antonius would begin his education with the Franciscans around 1297, and after his return to the kingdom of Aragon would teach the arts at

⁴⁶ Cf. Ibid., 363 - 364. Both Smith and Schabel report that the records for the existence of a Franciscan *studium generale* in Barcelona are scarce, which itself should be a cause for a more thorough investigation.

⁴⁷ Cf. Ibid., 365 - 366.

⁴⁸ Cf. Ibid., 367 - 389.

⁴⁹ Cf. Webster, *Els Menorets*, 117.

Lérida in the *studium*. According to records, the Franciscan students lived as a distinct group, similar to the tradesmen and other denizens. The statutes of the Franciscan *studium generale* were considered unique in that it provided for a measure of democracy not found in the Crown of Aragon in other educational institutions in the early fourteenth century. Undoubtedly the geographical location of Lérida would have played a main role in attracting the Franciscans to begin a *studium generale* there.⁵⁰ The statutes of the university in Lérida were modeled on those of the University of Bologna, and allowed students some liberties and domination over professors.⁵¹ However, these statutes and practices would have applied to the university properly as the royal *studium*. Undoubtedly the Franciscan *studium* operated in a different manner when it was founded. Nevertheless in their educational system, some of the convents had established within their course of study of the arts lectures on philosophy to go along with the study of Latin grammar, though the essential form of education within the Franciscan order was theological. It is important to stress that the study of Latin was essential for the student. It was necessary for each student friar to be able to communicate with each other, and all the lectures were delivered in Latin. Latin was the language of the *studium generale* and the university.⁵²

Franciscan places of study were opened to the laity as these served as places that offered the first primary education for students, as well as a preparation for the aspiring male students who wanted to join the religious order. In this regard the convent schools contributed to the

⁵⁰ Cf. Webster, *Ibid.*, 116.

⁵¹ Cf. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 93 - 94.

⁵² Cf. Noone, *õDuns Scotus and the Franciscan Educational Model*, 132.

cultural fabric of the Aragonese society through its places of study.⁵³ This shows that the convent schools and the provincial *studia particolare* were the more important educational centers in the Franciscan order. Both of these schools were closest to the lives of the laity who came to learn or sent their children to acquire their primary education. Undoubtedly these schools became the place where young boys, being trained by Franciscan lectors, were slowly but gradually attracted to enter the Franciscan community, and perhaps was one of the important sources of growth for the Order. With the convent school and provincial *studium particolare* we begin to see the reason for the lectorate program. With the demands for preachers and other friars to offer the sacraments of the Church, and for the purpose of evangelization, we can understand the need to have a system in place in order to train the teachers who would teach in these schools. While it is true that a student friar who had completed his period of study in philosophy and logic in his local convent school and could in turn teach his fellow friars, it would be the lectors who serve as supervisors of the teaching of these friars. They would also be engaged in teaching these friars as well as all the rest of the student friars in the religious community. Roest mentions that the convent school, along with the custodial or provincial school, served a central and crucial role in the educational needs of its resident friars. Nearly all adult friars attended straightforward lectures on dogmatic and moral theology at these schools. They would hear countless sermons and would receive additional training in forensic skills on a daily basis. Both the convent school and the custodial *studium particolare* provided the most important context for regulated education of the friars, most of whom would never leave their

⁵³ Jorge Ayala Martinez, *Pensadores Aragoneses*, 156.

province for higher studies in a *studium generale*.⁵⁴ From this vantage point we can see how both the lectorate program and the *magisterium* licentiate fit within the plan of the Franciscan order. Most of the friars would never leave their home province, much less their local convent. The lectorate program then was for a few friars that stood out from their fellow friars by their intellectual potential whom the Order recognized could serve the educational needs of their convent or custodial *studium particulare* as teachers. Such ones were selected for higher study in the lectorate program in the *studium generale*. There were however those among these friars who had the capacity to take on the rigors and requirements of the masters degree program. These were the few who were chosen to become bachelors or masters in theology because of a specific need each of these friars could meet for the good of the Order. The Franciscan educational model, practiced in convent schools, provincial schools, and *studium generale*, reflected the ongoing concern for the continuity and quality of the lectures that would be attended by both young and adult friars.⁵⁵

It was within this educational milieu that Antonius was trained by the Franciscans in the arts, in preparation for going to the *studium generale* in Paris in 1300. This training in the arts would leave a deep impression on Antonius, as he would devote much of his writings to the natural sciences and logic. This would also be the case if Antonius did attain the level of the baccalaureate.⁵⁶ In this regard it is noted that in 1304 Antonius was recognized as a *õmasterö* in

⁵⁴ Cf. Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education*, 86 - 87.

⁵⁵ Cf. Roest, *Ibid.*, 87.

⁵⁶ See Gensler, *õAntonius Andreae Scotismø Best Supporting Auctorö*, 59. According to Gensler this would explain for the abrupt departure from Paris in 1307, along with Scotus; which was due to the policies of Phillip the Fair that still persisted in the realm, even though religious from other countries would have been allowed to return to Paris in 1304 after the death of Pope Boniface VIII.

Paris.⁵⁷ It would be highly unlikely that he would have already received his license as a master in theology, but it probably refers to Antonius being a master of studies at the Franciscan *studium* there, teaching philosophy to his fellow student friars. It also could have been an acknowledgment of his intellectual skills, his likable nature, and his impeccable morals, one who was a living example for the rest of the religious community. Also, there is no mention of Antonius's name in the listing of Parisian masters who had passed the university requirement for obtaining the masters degree in theology before 1314. Rather, we find Antonius back in the Aragon kingdom in 1312 teaching the philosophy of nature. Apparently, for whatever reason, his own academic career in Paris was abruptly ended before he would have finished his theological studies.⁵⁸ Or it could be, for whatever reason, that the Franciscan order would have considered his attaining the lectorate as sufficient to take up the position of teaching his students of fellow student friars.⁵⁹

As we now know, Antonius Andreas was one of these lectors who went back to teach at the convent school in Monzón or at the *studium generale* in Lérida. As we will see shortly in the next section Antonius left behind copious evidence of his work as lector and teacher, which is seen in the number of manuscripts ascribed to him. How effective he was as a teacher we discover from the number of libraries in which his manuscripts are preserved, which point to how popular Antonius was to his students and readers. He earned his title *Doctor Dulcifluus* by the use of his gift of writing summaries of his mentor Duns Scotus's work. And the fact of the

⁵⁷ Cf. Charles Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," 365.

⁵⁸ Cf. Gensler, "Antonius Andreae Scotism's Best Supporting Auctor," 59.

⁵⁹ Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme," 83–85.

number of these manuscripts points out how popular Antonius was as a teacher and writer. His writings would become textbooks on Scotistic doctrine where students for the next several generations could become acquainted with Scotistic doctrine. This will become clear as we study his cognitional theory in chapters three and four. And we will see how accurately Antonius interpreted Scotus as well as how he developed Scotus's cognitional doctrine. We will also see how the title *Scotellus* applies to him.

III. Antonius Andreas: His Work

This section of the chapter deals with the listing of all the known works of Antonius Andreas. As Charles Lohr points out, the use of the works of Aristotle as basic texts for teaching and instruction contributed to a rise in a vast amount of exegetical material from which a great array of different literary forms evolved.⁶⁰ As we shall see, Antonius wrote different commentaries on the writings of Aristotle. However he also wrote works on some of the older medieval works, such as a commentary on the old logic and the three principles of natural things by Gilbert of Poitiers.⁶¹ We do find that Antonius's works were very popular as is evidenced to the wide readership of his works: his works were published to the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁶² What follows is a compilation of all the known works of Antonius Andreas.⁶³

⁶⁰ See Charles Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries", 313.

⁶¹ For more information on Gilbert of Poitiers, see Luisa Valente, "Gilbert of Poitiers", *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund, vol. 1 (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2011), 409 - 417.

⁶² See Bert Roest and Maarten van der Heijden, *Franciscan Authors, 13TH - 18TH Century: A Catalogue in Progress*, Accessed November 1, 2015, <http://users.bart.nl/~v-roestb/franciscan/>

A. Manuscripts

1. *Quaestiones super XII Libros super Metaphysicae Aristotelis/Expositio in Metaphysicam*. Manuscript: Aix-en-Provence, Bibl. Méjanes 1433 (an. 1475); Padua, Bibl. Univ, 839 and 1580; Padua, Anton. 377; Vat. Lat. 3130 ff. 37ra - 47ra (Books 1 - 2 are incomplete); Naples, Naz. VIII.C.116 ff. 1v - 148v; Madrid, Nac. 4233 ff. 1 - 128v [Castro, *Madrid*, no. 246]; Assisi, Com. 668 ff. 1r - 97r; Bologna, Bibl. del Archiginnasio 962 ff. 1r - 92r; Bologna Univ. Libr. 159 ff. 1r - 98r; Cambridge, Gonville and Gaius Colleges 335 (724) ff. 1r - 112r and 369 (591) and Peterhouse 239 ff. 1 - 89; Edinburg, Univ. Libr. 124 ff. 57 - 190; Florence, Naz. Conv. Suppr. J.V. 17 ff. 1r - 123; Kraków, Jagell. 2061 ff. 98v - 193v; Kraków, jagell. 2524 ff. 2 - 103; Oxford, Balliol 93 ff. 195 - 251 and Balliol 127 [fragment]; Milan, Ambros, A. 69 (an. 1427) ff. 41a - 131d; Oxford, All Souls, unnumbered (an. 1427) ff. 85 - 292; Escorial G.III.25 ff. 1 - 201; Turin, Naz. E.III.3 (14th century) ff. 1 - 201; Turino, Naz. H.II.39 ff. 1 - 42; Oxford, new College 239 ff. 1-123; Oxford, Oriel College 26 ff. 11a - 1 - 2b; Oxford, Oriel College 65 (15th century) ff. 3 - 224 [= *Expositio in Metaphysicam*]; Padua, Anton. 377 ff. 2 - 21; Padua Univ. iibr. 839 ff. 1 - 119; Venice, Marc, 2674 (CI. VI. n. 166) ff. 17a - 57d; Lüneburg Ratsbücherei, Theol. 2^o 45 ff. 11ra - 105rb; Munich, Nazionalmuseum 935; Fribourg, Cordelier 71 ff. 1 - 179v; Einsiedeln Stiftsbibliothek 625 n. 1 (msc 292, ad. 1470) ff. 1 - 93v (inc: Gyrum caeli circuivi sola...). The full introduction to the prologue of the *Quaestiones* is: Gyrum caeli circuivi sol, Eccl. 24. Secundum doctrinam Aristotelis et communiter eum sequentium

⁶³ For most of my bibliographical information I am relying on Bert Roestø listings for Antonius Andreas under ðAö in *Franciscan Authors, 13TH- 18TH Century: A Catalogue in Progress*, While Roestø listings will be the main basis of my compilation, I will mention any other bibliographical sources in my text as it is warranted.

scientia metaphysicae quae theologia philosophorum et sapientia nominator versatur circa totum ens.... The first question begins: Omnes homines - Quaeritur: Utrum dicta prima propositio sit vera? The second question begins: Utrum inter omnes sensus visio faciat nos magis scire? The last question, question 5, is in Book 12: Utrum principatui et regno universi praesit tantum unus princeps qui est deus benedictus?⁶⁴ Sebastian Garcia Navarro says that, while he has no problem in ascribing authorship of the *Quaestiones* to Antonius Andreas, he finds more difficult problems the authenticity of the *Expositio*.⁶⁵

2. *De Tribus Principiis Naturae*. Manuscript: Nazionalmuseum 935; Assisi Com. 539 (an. 1458), ff. 1a - 57a; Assisi Com. 668 (15th century) ff. 101b - 155; Berlin, SBPK 975 ff. 194 - 244; Bologna, Bibl. de Archiginnasio A. 962 (15th century) ff. 109a - 120c; Edinburgh, Univ. Libr. 124(an. 1432) ff. 1a - 56b; Oxford, Corpus Christi 227 (an. 1419) ff. 46 - 120; Pavia, Univ. Libr. A. 478 (an. 1471) ff. 80b - 130c; Pamplona, Bibl. del Archiv. de la Catedral 6 (14th century) ff. 37a - 59b; Vat. Lat. 6768 (14th century) f. 161r [fragment].

3. *Notabilia Quaedam*. Manuscript: Vat. Lat. 4269 (15th century) ff. 120r - 123r.

4. *Quaestiones in Boethii de Divisionibus*. Manuscript: Pavia Univ. Libr. 478 (an. 1471) ff. 74r - 76r.

5. *Quaestiones in Porphyrii Isagogen*. Manuscript: Gdąnsk, Staatsbibl. 2370 (an. 1480) ff. 1r - 37r; Cambridge, Peterhouse 240 (15th century) ff. 1 - 26; Turin, Naz. H.VI. 28 (15th century) ff. 4ra - 18v; Pamplona Bibl. del Archiv de la Catedral 6 (14th century) ff. 59 - 71; Pavia, Univ. Libr. 478 (an. 1471) ff. 1ra - 18ra.

⁶⁴ See Lohr, *Medieval Aristotle Commentaries*, 364.

⁶⁵ See Sebastian García Navarro, *Antonio De Andrés (S. XIV). Estudio Bibliográfico-Crítico*, *Revista española de filosofía medieval*, vol. 3 (1996): 98.

6. *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta*. Manuscript: Gdansk 2370 (an. 1480) ff. 38r - 108d; Turin, Naz. H.VI. 28 ff. 19r - 49v; Pamplona Bibl de la Catedral 6 (14th century) ff. 71r - 87v; Pavia Univ. Libr. 478 ff. 18r - 45r.

7. *Scriptum super Artem Veterm*. Manuscript: Fribourg Cordelier 39 ff. 95r - 123r (inc. Omne debitum tibi quoniam rogasti me...). Navarro also points out that this work of logic has always been considered to be the authentic work of Antonius Andreas and that there is no reason to doubt it.⁶⁶ Lohr mentions that the authentic authorship of Antonius Andreas regarding the manuscript *in novam logicam* is doubtful. He adds that it could have been a work that Antonius began but never finished.⁶⁷

8. *Scriptum in Perihermeneias*. Manuscript: Pavia, Univ. Libr. 478 (an. 1471) ff. 56 - 74; Pamplona Bibl. del Arhiv. de la Catedral 6 (14th century) ff. 2 r - 20r.

9. *Quaestiones de Sex Principiis*. Manuscript: Pamplona Bibl. de. Archiv. de la Catedral 6 (14th century) ff. 20v - 36v; Pavia, Univ. Libr. 478 (an. 1471) ff. 46r - 56v. At 20c it is written òExplicit sententia libri Sex principiorum edita a Antonio Andreae...et scripsit eum fr. Salvator de Terradis...de provintia Aragoniae et de custodia Maioricarum, dun erat conventualis in conventu Inchaë. Anno 1333...ò⁶⁸

10. *Commentaria in Physicam* [Pseudo?]. Manuscript: Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 368 ff. 1 - 121. Marek Gensler mentions that an analysis of the initial question shows that this work is modeled in many ways on the initial question of Antonius Andreas's *De*

⁶⁶ Cf. Sebastian García Navarro, òAntonio de Andresö., 86.

⁶⁷ Cf. Charles Lohr, òMedieval Aristotle Commentariesö., 365.

⁶⁸ Cf. Sebastian García Navarro, òAntonio de Andresö., 87.

tribus principiis naturae. Other questions contain evidence as well to show that this author must have been familiar with some of Antonius's other works, especially the questions in the *Metaphysics*. However there is no name appended to the text even though the author makes mention of a number of other Franciscan authors who were active in the first half of the fourteenth century: Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, Landulf of Caracciolo, Gerald of Odo and William of Ockham. Based on these references an approximate date for this manuscript's composition could not have been written any earlier than 1325. If Antonius lived until 1333 it would not be impossible for him to be the author of this commentary. Nevertheless it is doubtful if Antonius would have been the author, because it is doubtful he would have been familiar with some of these Franciscans, who served as Masters of Theology in Paris. Thus it is more likely that this work was written a younger Franciscan brother who was familiar with the *Studium Generale* in Paris in the second quarter of the fourteenth century.⁶⁹

11. *Quaestiones De Anima* [Pseudo?]. There are actually two texts that are associated with Antonius Andreas's name and concerned with Aristotle's *De Anima*. The first is actually Duns Scotus's *De Anima* and is preserved in the following manuscript: Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 335 ff. 115 - 139; this equals ms. C of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁰ München, S.B. Clm. 8717, 102ff (15th century), this is ms. Z#2 of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷¹ Oxford, All Souls

⁶⁹ See Marek Gensler, Adam Gogacz, Raafal Kepa, Robert Podkoński, "The Doctrine of Place in a Commentary on the 'Physics' Attributed to Antonius Andreas." *Early Science and Medicine*, vol. 4, no. 4 (1999): 330 - 331. Accessed January 2, 2012 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4130145>.

⁷⁰ See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, vol. V, eds.. T. Noone, C. Bazán, R. Green, et al. Opera Philosophica 5 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press; St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2006), 31* - 33*.

⁷¹ Cf. Ibid., 51* - 52*.

College 87, ff. 184r - 225v (15th century), this is ms. G of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷² Balliol College 117, ff. 170 - 190v (15th century), this is ms. H of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷³ Corpus Christi College 227, ff. 1 - 48 (15th century), this is ms. L of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁴ Magdalen College 16, ff. 59 - 96 (15th century), this is ms. M of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁵ 80, ff. 171 - 197 (15th century), this is ms. N of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁶ Oriel College 35, ff. 44r - 60v (15th century), this is ms. O of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁷ Padova, B. Anton. 173, this is ms. P of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁸ Rome, B. Angelica 1304, ff. 1 - 31; this is ms. R of Scotus's *De Anima*;⁷⁹

The second work on Aristotle's *De Anima* associated with Antonius is preserved in Prague, Kapit. K. L 51, ff. 85r - 113r (1448) and M 89, ff. 237r - 261r (approximately 1449), this is the Antonine *De Anima*. These manuscripts contain the Antonine *De Anima* which is the text of the investigation in the research of the present dissertation. Strakonice, Okr. archiv. MS Vodňany 11, ff. 149v - 152r (15th century, but incomplete) may also be related to the Antonine *De Anima*. Gensler had noted that the Cambridge manuscript Caius 335 contains ten questions regarding the problem of cognition that do not appear elsewhere, and the Prague manuscript

⁷² Cf. Ibid., 35* - 37*.

⁷³ Cf. Ibid., 2* - 4*.

⁷⁴ Cf. Ibid., 8* - 9*.

⁷⁵ Cf. Ibid., 9* - 13*.

⁷⁶ Cf. Ibid., 13* - 16*.

⁷⁷ Cf. Ibid., 16* - 17*.

⁷⁸ Cf. Ibid., 40* - 42*.

⁷⁹ Cf. Ibid., 44*.

contains a completely different set of questions.⁸⁰ Lohr has added that this work has been ascribed to Scotus and could have possibly been compiled and published by Antonius Andreas.⁸¹ However based on the information above, both of these opinions are now outdated.

12. *Commentarium in IV libros Sententiarum* [Pseudo?]. Manuscript: Prague Statni Knihovna K. D. 8 (an. 1449) ff. 1 - 314v. Gensler adds that this manuscript is also located at Oxford, Balliol College 197, ff. 1 - 129 (15th century); Magdalen College 107, ff. 1 - 139 (15th century); Merton College 87, ff. 147r - 259v (15th century); Timothy Noone has shown that this manuscript is the same as a recently discovered manuscript in Figeac;⁸² New College 115, ff. 1 - 183 (15th century); Oriel College 70, ff. 1 - 164 (15th century); Pittsburgh, U.L. (ascribed to Rogerius Angelicus); Tours, Archiv. de la Catedral 359 (books I - III are ascribed to Theobaldus de Neraina); Vienna, Nat. B. 1590 (book 1); Prague, Kapit. K. D 8, ff. 1 - 310 (1459). He adds one of the title variants is *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti*. Also, only the Prague 1459 manuscript names Antonius Andreas as the author, and the Pittsburgh manuscript contains an abbreviated version.⁸³

13. *Tractatus super Tria Principia*. Gensler lists this manuscript as *Quaestiones de tribus principiis rerum naturalium (materia, forma et privatio)*.⁸⁴ Manuscript: Cordelier 39 ff. 200r - 267v. Gensler also adds that this manuscript is located at Assisi, B. Conv. 559, ff. 1 - 57

⁸⁰ Cf. Marek Gensler, "Catalogue of Works by or Ascribed to Antonius Andreas", *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum*, vol. 31 (1992): 151.

⁸¹ Cf. Charles Lohr, op cit., 365.

⁸² See Timothy Noone, "A Newly-Discovered Manuscript of a Commentary on the Sentences by Duns Scotus (Figeac, Musée Champollon, numéro inventaire 03-091, non coté)", *Bulletin De Philosophie Médiévale*, vol. 48 (2006): 136 - 137.

⁸³ Cf. Marek Gensler, "Catalogue of Works", 154.

⁸⁴ Cf. Gensler, Ibid, 150.

(15th century), 970, ff. 101b - 150a (15th century); Berlin, Staatsb. 975 (theological question 32), ff. 149v - (1426); Edinburgh, Univ. 124 (Laing 144), ff. 1 - 56 (1452); Erfurt, BU. Amplon. H.S.F 359, ff. 336 - 374 (1437, 11 questions); Oxford, Corpus Christi College 227, ff. 46 - 117 (15th century); Padova, Univ. 1580, ff. 114d - 147d (15th century, ascribed to Thomas of Catalonia); Pamplona, Bibl. de. Archiv. de la Catedral 6, ff. 40 - 59 rb (1333- 1335); Prague, Kapit. K. L 38, ff. 1ra - 44ra (15th century), L 51, ff. 115ra - 145rb (1448), M 89, ff. 111r - 154v (1448); Rome, B. Angelica 127, ff. 215r - 251r (1458), 831, 49 ff. (14th century), 1004, 77 ff. (15th century), 1034, ff. 37 - 91 (15th century); Wrocław, B.U. IV. F. 6b, ff. 6a - 31b (15th century). Other title variants are *Conclusiones (Tractatus) de tribus principiis*, *Tria principia secundum doctrinam Scoti*, *Quaestiones de philosophia naturalis*.⁸⁵

14. *Tractatus de Syllogismo Demonstrativo et Topico*. Manuscript: Pamplona Bibl. del Archiv. de la Catedral 6 (14th century) ff >>, Pavia, Univ. Libr. 478 (an. 1471) ff. 76 - 79. Gensler lists this manuscript among those of dubious authorship ascribed to Antonius Andreas.⁸⁶

15. *De Formalitatibus*. Manuscript: Frankfurt a.M. Dominikaterkloster 124 ff. 109r - 119v.

B. Editions

1. *In I - IV Sententiarum*, edited by Cardinal Sarnanus. The editions are Vienna 1572, 1578, and 1628 and Venice 1578 and 1628. Navarro says that the 1578 Vienna edition of Cardinal Constantino Sarnanus contains this commentary that is attributed to Antonius Andreas:

⁸⁵ Cf. Gensler, Ibid, 150. Cf. also Sebastian García Navarro, ðAntonio de Andresö, 89 - 90.

⁸⁶ Gensler, Ibid, 152.

õAntonius Andreas conventualis franciscanus ex aragonia provincia...In quattor libros Sententiarumö. This comment was contained in the Prague manuscript (K. D. 8) and coincides in that edition, also by Cardinal Sarnanus.⁸⁷

2. *Compendium Principium in Libros Sententiarum.* The beginning words of the prologue are õGyrum coeli circuivi sola, Eccl. 24. Quam sit libri Sententiarum inaccessibilis celisituto...ö⁸⁸ The editions are Strasbourg 1495 and Padua 1495. Gensler adds a few more editions, Venice 1504 and Rome 1584.⁸⁹ Roest mentions that this edition was included in the *opera omnia* of St. Bonaventure: õSancti Bonaventurae (...) Opera, Sixti V Pontificis max iusu diligentissime emendata (Rome, 1588 - 1596). Both Gensler and Navarro say that this work had previously been ascribed to St. Bonaventure. However Gensler notes that this work seemed to form a *prooemium* to a commentary on the Sentences.⁹⁰

3. *Quaestiones de Anima.* This work is to be found in editions of Scotus and normally attributed to Scotus. Gensler notes that one edition is Lyon 1639 and is included by Wadding in *Opera Scoti*, III.⁹¹

4. *Tractatus Formalitatum ad Mentem Scoti*, edited in *Quaestiones Famosissimi Doctoris Antonii Andree de Tribus Principiis rerum Naturalium et Formalitates*, edited by T. Penceth in the edition Padua (1475).

⁸⁷ Cf. Sebastian García Navarro, õAntonio de Andresö, 99.

⁸⁸ Cf. Gensler, õCatalogue of Worksö, 152.

⁸⁹ Cf. Ibid, 153.

⁹⁰ Cf. Ibid, 153. Also cf. Sebastian García Navarro, õAntonio de Andresö, 99.

⁹¹ Cf. Ibid, 151.

5. *Quaestiones de Tribus Principiis Rerum Naturalium*, edited in *Quaestiones Famosissimi Doctoris Antonii Andree de Tribus Principiis rerum Naturalium et Formalitates*, edited by T. Penceth in the edition Padua 1475, Vicenza 1477, and Vienna 1489.

6. *Scriptum Antonii Andree in Arte veteri et in Divisionibus Boetii cum Quaestionibus Eiusdem*, edited by B. Locatellus in editions Venice, 1492 and 1508, and Bologna, 1481. Gensler adds editions Vicenza 1477, Venice 1480, Verulamii (St. Albans) 1483, Venice 1492, 1496, 1508, 1509, 1513, 1514, 1517, and Lucae 1517 (Vacant).⁹² Vicente Rodriguez mentions that the Venice 1509 edition is also preserved at the College Library of St. Francis operated by the Capuchins of Salamanca. He offers us a glimpse into this edition, giving a detail of the columnar structure of each page, and that the content of each page is handwritten Latin in which the medieval scribe used abbreviations which were common for texts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He also mentions that the main focus of his research is Antonius Andreas's treatment of the problem of signification.⁹³

7. *Quaestiones super XII Libros Metaphysicae*, edited by L. de Subereto in editions Venice, 1495, and Naples, 1475. Lohr also adds a few more editions of this manuscript. His list of editions, besides the ones mentioned here by Roest are [Bologna, 1471]; Venice, approximately 1475; Vicenza 1477; London, 1480; Venice 1481, 1482, 1487; [Strasburg, approximately 1490]; Venice 1491, [?1493], 1494; [Poitiers] 1495; Paris 1495; [Leipzig 1495 -

⁹² Cf. Ibid, 148.

⁹³ Vicente Muñiz Rodriguez, ñAntonio Andres. Edicion de su Logica Vetusö, *Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía*, vol. 6 (1979): 276 - 277.

1496]; Venice 1500, 1501, 1513, 1514, 1514; Paris 1520; Venice 1523. This edition is found the Wadding edition, V 440 - 725, VI 1 - 600.⁹⁴

8. *Quaestiones super Physicam*. An edition is Venice 1516. Gensler has added a few more editions of this work: Bologna 1480; Venice 1509; Lucae 1517 (with other logical works by Antonius - Vacant). He also lists this commentary as a work of questionable authenticity.⁹⁵ Navarro states that there is a completely identical commentary (Venice 1487) that is by B. Locatellus and edited by L. de Subereto with the title, *ŏJohannis Canonici doctoris clarissima Ordinis minorum super octo libros Physicorum quaestionesö*. The agreement between this literary work with the commentary on the Physics increases the chances that Antonius Andreas was not the author.⁹⁶

IV. The Focus of this Dissertation

We now enter into the doctrinal phase of this dissertation in treating the different cognitional theories and the doctrines of intelligible species of the different medieval authors in Chapter Two. On the outset I want to remind the reader that my dissertation is focused upon determining the doctrine of intelligible species in the thought of Antonius Andreas as this is presented in his known works among those listed above in the bibliography. From this I will

⁹⁴ Cf. Lohr, *ŏMedieval Aristotle Commentariesö*, 365.

⁹⁵ Gensler, *ŏCatalogue of Worksö*, 151.

⁹⁶ Cf. Sebastian García Navarro, *ŏAntonio de Andresö*, 99.

further assess whether, in light of this teaching, the work attributed to him in the form of the Antoine commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* presents a similar doctrine.

Chapter 2: A Historical Sketch of the Doctrine of Intelligible Species in Late Thirteenth Century Medieval Teaching

I. Introduction

In this chapter my plan is to give a brief account of the origin of the teaching on intelligible species along with the inclusion of secondary literature on this period of history. I also plan to provide an analysis of the contributions of Arabic/Islamic thought to the development of this theory. Finally I will provide an extensive overview of the teaching of five late thirteenth and early fourteenth century thinkers: St. Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and Blessed John Duns Scotus. In this overview I plan to also show the influence of Arabic/Islamic thought in their theories, along with observations on how these thinkers influenced each other, particularly in the cases of Aquinas on Giles of Rome, and Henry of Ghent on Duns Scotus.

II. The Origins of the Species Doctrine

Katherine Tachau begins her treatment of the species doctrine in the thirteenth century with Roger Bacon. Indeed, species became a common term among medieval authors. Tachau also notes the strong influence of St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius on Bacon,¹ yet the roots upon which Bacon built his own multiplication of species theory go much deeper than either Augustine or the pseudo-Dionysius. Leen Spruit believes that the medieval doctrine of species has its roots in the Stoic doctrine of cognitive impressions along and with the

¹ Cf. Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham* (Leiden/New York/Kobenhavn/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1988), 467.

accompanying critique of their doctrine by the Skeptics.² David Lindberg sees this influence extend back to Alhazen, and even to ancient Greece.³

Ancient Greek thinkers presented various theories of knowledge. Parmenides and Empedocles presented theories of perception and knowledge, Parmenides holding that thinking and cognizing were independent from the physical object, and Empedocles holding to the claim that perception was part of the physical world.⁴ Democritus's atomism is evident in his doctrine on sensation in which he posits a medium that has the role of a vehicle through which strings of atoms emitted from the sensible thing that represent it could travel to the sense organ. This representation was called *eidola* or images.⁵ It is precisely this theory of *eidola* that resonates in the Scholastic theory of species.⁶ The *eidola* that are emitted by the visible thing are closely related to the form as their likenesses.⁷ Later on Lucretius will call these *eidola*/images *simulacra*.⁸

² Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis From Perception to Knowledge*, vol. 1, *Classical Roots and Medieval Discussion* (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995), 28.

³ David Lindberg, "Alhazen's Theory of Vision and Its Reception in the West," *Isis*, vol. 58, no. 3 (Autumn, 1967): 322 - 330, accessed December 16, 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/227990>.

⁴ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis From Perception to Knowledge*, 30 & 33.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁷ Cf. C.C.W Taylor, *The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments*, a text, translation, and commentary by C.C.W. Taylor, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 120. Here Taylor presents a text by Alexander's Commentary *On Sense* in which he asserts Democritus taught that seeing is the reception of the image from the thing seen.

⁸ Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, text with translation by W.H.D. House, reprinted with revisions, (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 296. For more information on Democritus's cognitional theory, cf. Helene Weiss, "Democritus's Theory of Cognition: (A Discussion of Two Aristotelian Passages concerning Democritus)," *The Classical Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 1 (Jan., 1938): 50, accessed February 8, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/636539>. Also cf. Robert B. English, "Democritus's Theory of Sense Perception," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol. 46 (1915): 220 & 221, accessed February 8, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/282943>. See also C.C.W. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge, and Sensation in Democritus," *Phronesis*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1967): 19, accessed February 8, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181790>.

In Plato's theory of forms, the forms are a central feature in his epistemological schema. It is yet uncertain what the forms are, either as a feature of the mind as a concept; or they could refer to mental categories of thought or eternal realities prior to sensible things.⁹ Plato's *Theaetetus*, one of his later dialogues, is the *locus* where there is seen a convergence between the Forms and perception, though his doctrine of forms is not present in this dialogue.¹⁰ Some see the reality Plato refers to as the object of knowledge are the Forms and none other.¹¹ In contrast to Plato's realm of Forms was Aristotle's hylomorphic theory in which form has a central place in his theory of knowledge.¹² Form is the starting point for Aristotle in epistemological doctrine.¹³ The form of the sensible thing is the knowable feature of its essence.¹⁴ Forms of things are the means by which things can be received immaterially.¹⁵ In cognition the soul

⁹ Gregory Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, Second Edition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 73-75. Cf. also D.K. Modrak, 'Perception and Judgment in the *Theaetetus*', *Phronesis*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1981): 40-50, accessed December 20, 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182109>. D.H.J. Warner, 'Form and Concept', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (October, 1965): 160-162, accessed February 4, 2011 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v003/3.2warner.html>.

¹⁰ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 151 e-f. *The Collected Dialogues*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns trans. F. M. Cornford, 14th printing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 856. Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 33-34; cf. also John M. Cooper, 'Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowledge (Theaetetus 184-186)', *Phronesis*, vol. 15, no. 2 (1970): 124-126, accessed January 1, 2011 <http://jstor.org/stable/4181847>. See also Edward O'Toole, 'Forms and Knowledge in the *Theaetetus*', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 19 (1970): 105-107. Cf. also Allan Silverman, 'Plato on Perception and Commonsense', *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, vol. 40, no. 1 (1990): 158-163, accessed January 1, 2011 <http://jstor.org/stable/639316>.

¹¹ G.M.A. Grube, *Plato's Thought*, Reprint, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 38.

¹² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z, 11, 1037a28-30.

¹³ Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 37, n. 28, sees a difficulty in assessing Aristotle's cognitional theory as epistemological. He would rather emphasize what he sees as the psychological dynamics present in the Stagirite's explication of sensation and perception. However, as will be presented in this short exposé, Aristotle's doctrine of form is part of his metaphysical doctrine; and since there is, as he claims, some link between knower and the known in cognition, that the proper approach to be employed here would be epistemological, and not merely psychological. This is not to deny Spruit's claim; it is just that there is more present in Aristotle's doctrine than the psychological aspect to perception.

¹⁴ Joseph Owens, 'Form and Cognition in Aristotle', *Ancient Philosophy*, 1 (1980): 18. See also Owens, 'The Grounds of Universality in Aristotle', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 2 (April, 1966): 165.

¹⁵ *De Anima*, II, 12, 424a 18-19.

becomes the thing perceived and known.¹⁶ The reception of the form is the intellect's act of thinking in a manner most fundamental and foundational.¹⁷ Reception by the intellect of the forms of things is its primary intellectual act of cognition of those things.¹⁸ Thus the intellect is the 'place of forms'.¹⁹ Form is the cause of the unity of things within themselves, and also the cause for the intellect's ability to achieve the unity in propositional knowledge.²⁰ Form in the intellect is the cause of being that is truth. Form thus has a teleological character in Aristotle's epistemological doctrine; it is the driving force behind further advances in intellectual activity.²¹ The intellect's possession of the forms of other things equips it to think about its own act of intellection as well as about things outside the mind.²² *Eidos* is also part of Aristotle's terminology for form, which is also used to signify species in which form and species are synonymous.²³

¹⁶ Ibid., III, 8, 431b 20–28.

¹⁷ Cf. Michael Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 163.

¹⁸ Kurt Pritzl, O.P., 'The Place of Intellect in Aristotle', *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Vol. 80 (2007): 60.

¹⁹ *De Anima* 3, 4, 429a 27–29. Aristotle's term here is *topos eidon*.

²⁰ *Metaphysics* 8, 6, 1045a 8–28.

²¹ Cf. Pritzl, 'The Place of the Intellect', 68.

²² Cf. Owens, 'A Note on Aristotle, "de Anima" 3, 4, 429b9', *Phoenix*, vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer, 1976): 114.

²³ Cf. John Elov Boodin, 'The Discovery of Form', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 4, no. 2 (April, 1943): 186, accessed January 13, 2011 <http://jstor.org/stable/2707323>. Unfortunately, Boodin uses the occasion to level a blatant bromide against the Catholic Church in the medieval period. See also Michael Woods, 'Form, Species, and Predication in Aristotle', *Synthese*, vol. 96, no. 3, Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle and Early Modern Philosophy (September, 1993): 401–407, accessed January 12, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117820>. However Joseph Owens cautions one not to read too much into the form/species translation of *eidos*. See his Owens, 'The Grounds for Universality', 166–169. For a dissenting view on the centrality of form in Aristotle's cognitional theory, see Walter Leszl, 'Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the Particular in Aristotle', *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 26, no. 2 (December, 1972), 305–310, accessed January 4, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126209>.

In the post-Aristotelian world, philosophers developed an eclecticism in which schools of philosophy borrowed each other's ideas, mixing and matching teachings on form from older philosophic traditions, which led to a further penetration of the meaning of form and species.²⁴ We especially see a development in the thinking on form and species in the writings of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Plotinus. Epicurus developed his atomistic thought with what he borrowed from Democritus. Stoicism developed as a response to skepticism.²⁵ Plotinus based his teaching on the doctrines of Plato.²⁶ It was the Neoplatonic tradition that shaped the vision of St. Augustine on the Divine Ideas, the seminal reasons, and provided him the foundation for his theory of divine illumination in his cognitional theory.²⁷ St Augustine's thought profoundly influenced the scholastic tradition.

²⁴ Cf. Karl, Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, Vol. 1 of *Grundriss Der Geschichte*, ed. by Friedrich Ueberweg (Basel/Stuttgart: Benno Schabe & Co., 1957), 32ff.

²⁵ Cf. A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, Second Edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 34. For a further discussion on Stoic cognitional theories see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, vol. 2, ninth reprint, (Cambridge, MA/London, England: Harvard University Press, 2005), X, 46-49; Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, 2, 434. Cf. also Julia Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), and Henrich von Staden, 'The Stoic Theory of Perception and Its Platonic Critics', in *Studies in Perception*, edited by Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978).

²⁶ For elements of Plotinus's noetic, cf. *Enneads*, translated by Stephen MacKenna, abridged edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), I, 1, 7; III, 6, 2, 32-37; IV, 5, 1-4; IV, 7, 8, 2; VI, 5, 11, 35-38. See also H.J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). Cf. also Steven K. Strange, 'Plotinus's Account of Participation in Ennead VI. 4-5', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 30, no. 4 (October, 1992): 479-496, accessed January 4, 2011 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v030/30.4strange.html>. See also Gordon Clark, 'Plotinus's Theory of Sensation', *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 51, no. 4 (July, 1942): 357-382, accessed January 18, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181118>. See also E. W. Warren, 'Imagination in Plotinus', *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, vol. 16, no. 2 (November, 1966): 277-285, accessed January 18, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/637473>.

²⁷ For elements of St. Augustine's cognitional theory, cf. *De Genesi ad Litteram*, PL 8.20; *De Trinitate*, PL 10.5, 7; PL 42. 977; *De Civitate Dei*, PL 10.30; *De Quantitate Animae*, PL 23.41; PL 32.; *De Musica*, PL 6.2-6.9; PL 32, 1163-1177; *Soliloquiorum*, PL 1.8, 15; *Confessionum*, PL 10. 6. Accessed January 31, 2011 http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/20_40_0354-0430-_Augustinus_Sanctus.html. See also Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 3rd reprint (London: Sheed and Ward, 1985), 75-76. For his metaphysical thought on creation and cognition see William A. Christian, 'Augustine on the Creation of the World', *The Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 46, no. 1 (January, 1953): 1-25. Accessed March 16, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508839>; Sister Rita Marie Bushman, 'St. Augustine's Metaphysics and Stoic Doctrine', *The New Scholasticism*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1952): 283-304; Jules M. Brady, 'St. Augustine's Theory of Seminal

III. Development of the Species Theory and the Arab/Islamic Influence in Early Thirteenth Century Cognitive Doctrine

Roger Bacon is usually identified as the central figure of the perspectivist teaching and the chief spokesman of the multiplication of species theory.²⁸ But Bacon was influenced by Robert Grosseteste who, as a theologian writing out of the background of the Augustinian tradition, learned the theory of knowledge of Aristotle in order to free himself from Platonism.²⁹ And also, before Bacon, Grosseteste taught the necessity of applying mathematics to physics; this application is the science of optics in which he studied the effects of light.³⁰ In effect, Bacon had at his disposal everything of importance that had been written by the Greeks and Arabic/Islamic sources besides those of his teachers to shape his own teaching on optics. Bacon drew the essentials of his theory of vision from Alhazen.³¹ It has been shown that there is a clear line of influence between Bacon and Pecham, and in all probability running through Witelo.³² In Witelo we find someone who not only was an early pioneer in the perspectivist field, but also

Reasonsö, *The New Scholasticism*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1964): 141 - 158. Robert Jordan, "Time and Contingency in St. Augustine," *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 8, no. 3 (March, 1955): 397 - 417. Accessed March 15, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123450>; and Margaret Miles, "Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's 'De Trinitate' and 'Confessions'," *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 63, no. 2, (April, 1983): 125 - 142. Accessed March 17, 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1202858>. For a treatment of his theory of divine illumination, see Ronald Nash, "Some Philosophic Sources of Augustine's Illumination Theory," *Augustinian Studies*, vol. 2 (1971): 47 - 66. For Augustine's place in medieval thought, see M.W.F. Stone, "Augustine and medieval philosophy," *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 253 - 266.

²⁸ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 4.

²⁹ James McEvoy, *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 320.

³⁰ Cf. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 263.

³¹ Cf. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision From Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 109.

³² Cf. Lindberg, "Lines of Influence in Thirteenth-Century Optics: Bacon, Witelo, and Pecham," *Speculum*, vol. 46 (1971): 66 - 83.

someone would craft his own cognitional theory based on his findings. In his theory it appears that Witelo tended to limit species to the cognitive sense image in the phantasm. However the active power which is the principle or *quo* of a cognitive act is a habit in the intellect. Hence Witelo views species and *intentio* as synonymous, both terms signifying the cognitive sense image. In an act of understanding the cognitive habit lets the species of the thing shine in the phantasm.³³

. The concept of species, as it regards optics, had its foundation rooted in the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation. Grosseteste integrated the emanation of the species of light into his theory of the multiplication of species in his teaching on optics. Bacon and Pecham were to do the same.³⁴ With Bacon one has to understand his thinking on species by associating it with his teaching on matter. According to him, matter was not merely an active potency that could, under the action of an external agent, actuate itself into form (which Bacon accused his contemporaries of holding), but rather what Augustine called the seed of the seminal reasons. Being akin to a seed, matter strives for completion. Within this context he posits that there is spiritual matter as well as physical matter, the forms that educe these different types of matter to act are themselves either spiritual or physical.³⁵ As usual, Bacon dismisses those who see matter as merely of one kind in all things.³⁶ But the form that actuates the material principle is manifold. Thus Bacon held that there was a multiplication of forms, and even with many forms, the superior substantial

³³ Cf. Clemens Baeumker, *Witelo, Ein Philosoph Und Naturforscher Des XIII Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1908), 475 - 479.

³⁴ Lindberg, *Alhazen's Theory of Vision and Its Reception in the West*, 335 ó 338.

³⁵ Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 297 ó 299.

³⁶ Roger Bacon, *Opus Tertium* XXXVIII (Brewer edition, 120 ó 122).

form in effect holds all the inferior ones in a compact unity.³⁷ Form, according to his thinking, was not Aristotle's view as the *totum* of substance.³⁸ Bacon, though, did see species and form, along with other terms, as being synonymous.³⁹ Hence, the multiplication of species in his doctrine of the propagation of species becomes the propagation of *spot-forms*.⁴⁰ These *spot-forms* are the species of the thing which multiplies as it travels in the medium to a sense power, such as the eye. Species then are similarities or resemblances of the active form of the thing from which they emanate. In this sense species are manifestations of the active form of a thing.⁴¹

In a general sense for Bacon, there is a multiplication of species which emanate from things which cause a chain reaction through the various media leading to the sense organ, and continues to the inner senses (the common sense, memory, and imagination). Hence for Bacon, there is not only a multiplication of species which emanate from things which cause a chain reaction through the various media leading to the sense organ, but that this process also continues within the inner senses as well.⁴² For Bacon species is synonymous with *intentio*, as a likeness of the thing from which it emanates.⁴³ Regarding the relationship between the species and the mind, Bacon claims that part of the soul's intellectual power is active, and its objects are the intelligible models of reality. The other part is in potency, and depends upon the phantasms of

³⁷ Cf. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 298.

³⁸ Cf. Bacon, *Opus Tertium*, XXXVIII (Brewer edition, 123). To see the contrast in Bacon's teaching with Aristotle see his *Metaphysics* Delta, 8, 1017a25. See also Joseph Owens, "The Grounds for Universality," 166 - 169.

³⁹ Roger Bacon, *De Multitudine Specierum*, II, i, lines 3 - 24.

⁴⁰ Cf. A. Mark Smith, "Getting the Big Picture in Perspectivist Optics," *Isis*, vol. 72, no. 4 (December, 1981): 580. Accessed December 31, 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/231249>.

⁴¹ Cf. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 301.

⁴² Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 8.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 11 - 12.

sense knowledge. The active intellect illumines the phantasm to purify the species of material conditions so that it can be imprinted on the possible intellect. In his earlier teaching Bacon infers that this agent intellect is a power of the soul.⁴⁴ However in his later teaching Bacon maintains that this active intellect, the *agens intellectus*, is not a part of man. Its source is divine. It is God, who acts as the cause of all knowledge.⁴⁵ It certainly is possible to hypothesize that Bacon held that this species imprinted on the possible intellect was the intelligible species.⁴⁶ However it is unmistakably clear that if an intelligible species is imprinted, that it is due to divine illumination. Thus we find in Bacon the blending of Augustinian doctrine of *ratio superior/inferior* with the Aristotelian teaching *intellectus agens/possibilis*.⁴⁷

What we see with the perspectivist's theory of species is an attempt to explain the dynamics of sight and how an object of sight may exist in the eyes. The species theory they invoked was the explanatory method they employed to account for their observations. Yet we find here a Neoplatonic basis to the theory of propagation of species, based upon the neo-Platonic theory of emanation. Thus what we find in the perspectivist account of these early pioneers is the attempt to take a tradition that was in its basic form Augustinian and combine it with elements of Aristotelian doctrine.

Arab/Islamic philosophic thought helped to shape and form the thought of these early perspectivists; the predominant source for their outlook on the multiplication of species was Alhazen. But Alhazen was a theorist in optics; the major Islamic philosophers made their mark

⁴⁴ Cf. Bacon, *Questiones Supra Libros Octo Physicorum Aristotelis*, ed. Ferdinand M. Delorme, O.F.M. (Oxford, 1935), 9 [18 - 29].

⁴⁵ *Opus Tertium*, XXIII (Brewer edition, 74 ó 75).

⁴⁶ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 11.

⁴⁷ Cf. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 304.

upon thirteenth century thinkers through their commentaries on Aristotle. What we find in the latter part of the thirteenth century was that the teaching on species and cognitional thought was made immensely more fertile by these Arab/Islamic commentators. The writings of al-Farabi, and Avicenna, and Averroes were very influential.

Avicenna's interpretation of the Aristotelian agent intellect was that it was a transcendental entity that existed apart from the human intellect. Both Avicenna and Averroes posited an agent intellect which was separate, according to their interpretation of Aristotle's teaching in Book 3 of *De Anima*. However, for Avicenna, the agent intellect was a metaphysical entity which operated as the *dator formarum*.⁴⁸ The agent intellect operates as the catalyst for bringing intelligibles that are in potency into actuality in the human intellect. The agent intellect is the intellective power that by its abstractive power strips forms taken from things of place, and all other accidents. Thus the *esse* of the form in the agent intellect is distinct from the *esse* of the sensed thing from which its form had been taken.⁴⁹ In this way Avicenna identifies the agent intellect as 'intellect in act'; drawing a comparison between it and the human soul by making a comparison between the light of the sun and our power of sight. Just as the sun by its light enables human vision to see its object, so the light of the agent intellect disposes the human intellect to receive the abstracted forms which it imprints on the mind by means of emanation.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Cf. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, 'Avicenna's "Giver of Forms" in Latin Philosophy, Especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus', *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2012), 225.

⁴⁹ Avicenna, *Avicenna Latinus. Liber De Anima seu Sextus De Naturalibus*, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1972), 5, 2, 89: '...[V]irtus intellectiva abstrahit intelligibilia a quantitate designata et ab ubi et a situ et a ceteris omnibus quae praediximus. Debemus autem considerare essentiam huius formae denudatae a situ, quomodo est nuda ab eo, scilicet si hoc sit comparatione rei a qua sumpta est, aut comparatione eius rei quae assumpsit, videlicet, esse huius formae intellectae denudatae a situ, si est ita in esse extrinseco aut est ita in esse formantis in substantia agentis.'

⁵⁰ Ibid., V, 5, 127: 'Cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectum, et videtur luce ipsius in effectum quod non videbatur in effectum, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantum ad nostras animas. Virtus enim rationalis cum considerat singulas quae sunt in imaginatione

Thus in Avicenna's view, the agent intellect, being ontologically separate from the human mind, takes the images the mind forms from things perceived by sense and abstracts intelligible forms from them, stripping them of their accidental features, and then through emanation, imprints these intelligible forms on the human mind. In this way the images in the human mind are potentially intelligible, but the agent intellect makes them intelligible in act. In this process the agent intellect raises the human mind to a higher rank, making the human mind an acquired intellect in which through repeated actualizations of intelligibles, unites the human intellect with itself, even though it is merely a material intellect.⁵¹ Although the agent intellect was separate from the human intellect, Avicenna maintained that the material or possible intellect was located in each human intellect. Then for Avicenna, what was the chief characteristic of the human persons is to form universal intelligible intentions which are totally abstracted or separate from matter.⁵² However this characteristic comes with the proviso that the abstraction of universal intelligible intentions comes from the emanating power of the agent intellect which joins the human intellect with itself, and thus makes what is potentially intelligible that which is intelligible in act.⁵³

et illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos quam praediximus, fiunt nuda a materia et ab eius appendicitis et imprimuntur in anima rationali, non quasi ipsa mutantur de imaginatione ab intellectu nostrum, nec quia intentio pendens ex multis (cum ipsa in se sit nuda considerata per se), faciat simile sibi, sed quia ex consideratione eorum aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentis agente abstractio. See also Richard Taylor, "Aquinas and the Arabs," *Aquinas's First Critical Encounter with the Doctrines of Avicenna and Averroes on the Intellect in 2 Sent. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 10*, *Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century*, eds. Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp (Paris, Vrin, 2013), 145.

⁵¹ *Avicenna Liber de Anima*, 5, 5, 128: "Imaginabilia vero sunt intelligibilia in potentia et fiunt intelligibilia in potentia et fiunt intelligibilia in effectum, non ipsa eadem sed quae excipiuntur ex illis; immo sicut operatio quae apparet ex formis sensibilibus, mediante luce, non est ipsae formae sed aliud quod habet comparisonem ad illas, quod fit mediante luce in receptibili recte opposito, sic anima rationalis cum coniungitur formis aliquo modo coniunctionis, aptatur ut contingant in ea ex luce intelligentiae agentis ipsae formae nuda ab omni permixtione."

⁵² *Ibid.*, 5, 1, 76: "Quae autem est magis propria ex proprietatibus hominis, haec est scilicet formare intentiones universales omnino abstractas a materia..."

⁵³ Cf. Taylor, "Aquinas and the Arabs," 157 - 158.

Alfarabi was chronologically prior to Avicenna, but the cognitional theory which he presents in many ways parallels the main doctrinal points of Avicenna's thought. Also Alfarabi's thought was well-known in medieval circles in the late thirteenth century, and his teaching on the theory on abstraction, along with Averroes's teaching, had a definitive influence on medieval thinking regarding human cognition.⁵⁴ In his abstraction theory Alfarabi, like Avicenna, maintains that there is an ontological distinction between intelligibles that are in actuality and those that exist materially in things. Alfarabi explains this distinction by pointing out that the predicamental features ensconced in material things, such as quantity, place, time, position, are stripped from the intelligible in potency, the consequence being that the existence they have as an intelligible form in the mind is different from their existence in its material composite. In this way the meanings of these categories or predicaments that were accidental properties of forms in their material composites are understood in another way.⁵⁵ The reason for the change in meaning of these properties is that once these forms come to be actualized as intelligibles in the intellect, they share an intentional or formal identity with their source in the material composites, while at the same time having an ontological status that is much different from what they have in matter.⁵⁶ According to Alfarabi, when one attains intelligibles in act one has risen to the level of an actualized intellect that thinks its intelligible forms or essences of those things as they exist in matter.⁵⁷ When one human mind continues to acquire one

⁵⁴ Cf. Taylor, "Abstraction in al-Farabi", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 80 (2007): 152.

⁵⁵ Cf. Alfarabi, *The Letter Concerning the Intellect*, in *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, eds. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh. Trans. by Hyman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1973), 216.

⁵⁶ Cf. Taylor, "Abstraction in al-Farabi", 153.

⁵⁷ Cf. Alfarabi, *The Letter Concerning the Intellect*, 216.

intelligible after another so that his intellect possesses all intelligibles abstracted from the world, such a mind has ascended to a new ontological level and has attained the acquired intellect. For Alfarabi, this ascent takes the human intellect to “the first stage of existing things that are immaterial”, which is the stage of the agent intellect.⁵⁸ Alfarabi makes a distinction between the agent and material intellect. The agent intellect is necessary for the abstractive process by which potential intelligibles are made intelligible in act. And this abstractive process does not have any hint of the emanation which was the case with Avicenna. Rather this abstractive work is a process that takes place within the human soul even though the source of this power is extrinsic to the soul, which is the agent intellect.⁵⁹ This power for actualizing potential intelligibles does not reside in the human soul, but resides solely in the agent intellect.⁶⁰ Like Avicenna, he uses the light simile to explain the agent intellect’s abstracting work. On the one hand, this abstractive work raises the rank of the human intellect to the level of acquired intellect in which it takes on a likeness of the agent; and on the other hand Alfarabi describes this abstractive work in terms of a transfer from one order to another. By nature the human intellect does not have the power to convert potential intelligibles into actuality; it needs that which can transfer it from one state to another, from the stage of potentiality to the complete stage of actuality. The agent that brings this transfer about is the agent intellect, which is a separate existing essence that is immaterial. This agent’s effect upon the human intellect is like a light; just as sight needs the light of the sun, so the human intellect, the “material intellect”, needs the agent intellect.⁶¹ This light arises in the human intellect from the agent intellect, and intelligibles arise at the same time

⁵⁸ Ibid., 218; Cf. also Taylor, “Abstraction in al-Farabi”, 153.

⁵⁹ Alfarabi, *The Letter Concerning the Intellect*, 218. Also see Taylor, “Abstraction in al-Farabi”, 156 - 157.

⁶⁰ Cf. Taylor, “Abstraction in al-Farabi”, 157.

⁶¹ Alfarabi, *On the Perfect State*, trans. Richard Walzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 201.

from the sensibles which are preserved in the faculty of memory.⁶² This faculty of memory occupies a central place in Alfarabi's theory of abstraction.⁶³ The place of memory in his noetic is an adumbration of the doctrine of the phantasm that will be a part of thirteenth century noetics; the role of memory for Alfarabi is to retain the imprints of the sensibles in the soul when they are no longer present. By means of this storage of these imprinted images the human intellect can compose and divide by means of comparing the connections or disconnections of images retained in the memory.⁶⁴

Averroes will present a cognitional theory that will be highly critical of the doctrine he received from both Avicenna and Alfarabi, and yet there are elements of their thought that will find a place in his noetic. He retains the three main features of agent intellect, material intellect, and abstraction in his cognitional theory. However Averroes has a different interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of agent intellect, different from the accounts of both Avicenna and Alfarabi. While he does share the view of his predecessors that the agent intellect is common, separate, and distinct from the human intellect, he has a different account of how the human intellect is joined to this agent of understanding which actualizes its potential intelligibles. One problem he finds with Alfarabi's account of the agent intellect is that, according to Averroes, Alfarabi maintained that it was only an extrinsic cause in the genesis of understanding. He claims that Alfarabi received this teaching from Alexander of Aphrodisias and that he expresses this view in his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁶⁵ The project of Averroes in this phase of

⁶² Ibid., 203.

⁶³ Cf. Taylor, "Abstraction in al-Farabi", 156.

⁶⁴ Alfarabi, *The Perfect State*, 165.

⁶⁵ Averroes, *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), 485 [180 - 184]: "Ed ideo videmus Alfarbium in postremo, cum credidit opinionem Alexandri esse veram in generatione intellectus materialis, quod fuit necesse

his noetics is to locate the agent intellect as a separate source of intellect *within* the human mind. The agent intellect is no longer seen as an extrinsic cause in an act of understanding, but the catalyst that operates within the human mind. Thus in his critique of Alfarabi, the agent intellect may act as a cause of human understanding, and thus stand as an extraneous cause in relation to human thought, but it will not be in relation to form.⁶⁶ In other words, as merely an outside source of human understanding, the agent intellect cannot be the formal cause of an act of understanding. Even if we assume that Alfarabi maintains that the human intellect in its act of understanding by being joined to the agent intellect becomes an acquired intellect, this act of understanding cannot be termed a human act in this way, because the principle of understanding is clearly outside the mind. Also, if the agent intellect is as such only as an outside cause of intellection then it cannot be understood how such an agent could be joined to a human intellect.⁶⁷ This is the gist of Averroes's emphasis that the agent intellect is a *form for us*. Hence Averroes locates the agent intellect's activity within the human mind, as a perfecting, formal cause of its act of understanding. Thus this agent cause must be a form for us and in us, operating within the mind. Averroes lays stress on the necessity of such an agent as an internal formal principle for an act of human understanding. This is so that as an internal principle in an act of the human intellect, the human intellect may properly carry out an intellectual act that is properly its own act, disposed as such to forms of the imagination.⁶⁸ Hence the agent intellect

apud ipsum secundum hanc opinionem opinari quod intelligentia agens non est nisi causa agens nos tantum; et hoc manifeste dixit in Nichomachia. See also Richard Taylor, 'The Agent Intellect as *form for us* and Averroes's Critique of al-Farabi', *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*, vol. 5 (2005): 27 - 28.

⁶⁶ Averroes, *Ibid.*, 502 [608 - 609]: 'Et secundum hunc modum respectus eius ad hominem non erit nisi respectus agentis ad hominem, non respectus forme...'.

⁶⁷ Cf. Taylor, 'The Agent Intellect as *form for us*', 29.

⁶⁸ Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 499 [586 - 588] -500 [589 - 590, 611 - 616]: 'Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem est forma, nos autem agimus per intellectum

is for Averroes a formal principle of human intellection, even though it is an entity that is separate from and not a part of the human mind.

The greatest difference between Averroes and his predecessors Avicenna and Alfarabi regards his views about the material intellect. Whereas Avicenna and Alfarabi maintained that the material and human intellect were identical, Averroes did not. Rather, he not only held that the agent intellect was a formal principle commonly shared by all human minds, but that there was also only one, separate material intellect that is shared by all human intellects. Some regard Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle's noetics in the *De Anima* to be such as to transform the material intellect into something that was wholly un-Aristotelian and as a hybrid entity that Aristotle himself would have found particularly strange and alien to his own doctrine.⁶⁹ Nevertheless Averroes's stance on the common and separate material intellect has to be considered within the context of his whole cognitional theory. The reason for this development is the claim that the material intellect in itself is not material and remains unmixed with matter. So from his vantage point, to explain what the signification 'material' means in intellect, Averroes asserts that 'material' refers to the nature of this intellect as potentiality. Thus the material intellect is the possibility of receiving intellectual material forms. Hence the definition of material intellect is an intellect that is in potency to all intentional, universal, material forms,

agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut intellectus agens sit forma in nobis...necesse est ut homo intelligat per intellectum sibi proprium omnia entia, et ut agat actionem sibi propriam in omnibus entibus, sicut intelligit per intellectum qui est in habitu, quando fuerit continuatus cum formis ymaginabilibus, omnia entia intellectione propria. See also Taylor, 'The Agent Intellect as -form for us', 30. See also John Shannon Hendrix, 'Philosophy of Intellect in the Long Commentary of the *De anima* of Averroes', *School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Papers*, Paper 26, 1 - 22. Accessed June 22, 2015 http://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fr.

⁶⁹ Cf. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Their cosmologies, theories of the active intellect, and theories of human intellect*. (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 354 - 356.

and is not an actualized intellect before it understands.⁷⁰ By establishing this definition Averroes is able to distinguish between the activity of sense and intellect. While concept formation in the intellect is similar to sense perception as apprehensive, it differs from sense perception in that its conceptualizations involve a pure receptivity that is open to all intelligibles, whereas receptivity in sense perception is limited to a particular object of the sense organ and involves change. However, the intellect has no body and undergoes no change.⁷¹ Averroes traces the genesis of the intellectualization of intelligibles back to sensation, where, according to his interpretation, Aristotle establishes the proper objects of sensation and intellection. Averroes locates intentionality within the cogitative power of the brain. For Averroes, what the senses perceive of a sensible thing is an intention or image of the thing. The cogitative power separates intentions from forms and strips them of their common and proper sensibles and then stores the purified intentions in the memory. This purified intention which resides in the faculty of memory is comprehended in the memory as still connected to its sensibles, though its comprehension of these sensible intentions is more spiritual.⁷² His view of intentions is different from that proposed by Avicenna in that, for Averroes, intentions are restricted to sense and as such have to be abstracted by a distinct human power that is under the aegis of the rational power, that being

⁷⁰ Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 387 [7 - 11, 23 - 26]: ð...[Q]uod intellectus materialis non habet aliquam formam materialium...quoniam non habet naturam secundum hoc nisi naturam possibilitatis ad recipiendum formas intellectas materiales...[D]iffinitio igitur intellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum materialium universalium, et non est in actu aliquod entium antequam intelligat ipsumö

⁷¹ Cf. Richard Taylor, ðSeparate Material Intellect in AverroesøMature Philosophyö, *Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea*, eds. R. Arnzen and J. Thielmann (Leuven, Belgium/Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004), 298 - 300.

⁷² Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 225 [53] - 226 [60]: ðEt ista intentio individualis est illa quam distinguit virtus cogitativa a forma ymaginata, et expoliat eam ab eis que fuerunt adiuncta cum ea ex istis sensibilibus communibus et propriis, et repoint ea in rememorativa. Et hec eadem est illa quam comprehendit ymaginativa, sed ymaginativa comprehendit eam coniunctam istis sensibilibus, licet eius comprehensio sit magis spiritualis...ö Cf. Richard Taylor, ðIntelligibles in Act in Averroesö, *Averroes et les Averroïsmes Juif et Latin*, ed. J.-B. Brenet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 111 - 140.

the cogitative faculty.⁷³ Once the cogitative power has purified the sense intentions they are prepared to be abstracted by the agent intellect. Averroes explains the abstraction process of the agent intellect in terms of light. The relation of the material forms to the agent intellect is like the relation of color to transparency. Just as light is the perfection of the transparent, so the agent intellect is the perfection of the material intellect. Just as the transparent medium is neither moved nor receives color except when there is light, so the material intellect does not receive the intelligibles by which it understands except according to the agent intellect which perfects and illuminates it. Just as light makes potential color actual color so that it can move the transparent medium, so the agent intellect actualizes potential intentional intelligibles so that the material intellect can receive them. This is how to understand the relation between the agent and material intellect.⁷⁴ For Averroes the process of abstraction does not rely on an emanation from agent intellect to the material intellect. Rather it is a process that is wholly experienced within the human knower. The source of the light from the agent intellect is not coming from some entirely separate entity but works within the human mind. This light is the capacity of the agent intellect to actualize the intelligibles which are in potency and to impress these on the material intellect as actualized intelligibles. The last observation on this summary of Averroes's cognitional theory is that, even though both agent and material intellect are separate entities in the sense that they may

⁷³ See Deborah L. Black, "Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations", *Topoi*, vol. 19 (2000): 62.

⁷⁴ Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 410 [690] - 411 [702]: "¶...[R]espectus formarum materialium ad ipsum est respectus coloris ad diaffonum. Quemadmodum enim lux est perfectio diaffoni, sic intellectus agens est perfectio materialis. Et quemadmodum diaffonum non movetur a colore neque recipit eum nisi quando lucet, ita iste intellectus non recipit intellecta que sunt hic nisi secundum quod perficitur per illum intellectum et illuminatur per ipsum. Et quemadmodum lux facit colorem in potentia esse in actu ita quod possit movere diaffonum, ita intellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas in actu ita quod recipit eas intellectus materialis. Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum de intellectu materiali et agenti.ö"

exist apart from human intellects, both operate within the human mind. The activities of both intellects take place within the human mind.⁷⁵

What we discover in this summary of these three great Islamic philosophers is the rich concepts and insights into Aristotelian thought which would be trolled by medieval philosophers and theologians to help guide them in reading and understanding the Stagirite. The teachings of these Islamic thinkers would also be a catalyst for new breakthroughs into new insights for developing new cognitive theories that would take their key concepts of the agent intellect, abstraction, and intentionality and further refine them and use them in their own explanatory models or thought experiments.

IV. The Place of Intelligible Species in Late Thirteenth Century Cognitional Theories

A. St. Thomas Aquinas

The terms *species* and *intelligibilis* were prolifically employed by St. Thomas throughout all his works. Evidence of this is found in the *Index Thomisticus*. The term *species* registered 15,882 places in his writings, and the word *intelligibilis* revealed 3,388 instances. This totals a whopping 19,270 places where these words appear, either separately or together in the Aquinas's works. Indeed, it is a Herculean task to proceed to catalogue each of the places in which these terms are found. Yet what one finds in perusing the *Index* for these words is a treasure trove of instances where St. Thomas links *species* to form and *esse*, as well as to the second intention universals with genus and difference. One discovers the different and varied ways he uses the word *intelligibilis*, not only in relation to the intellectual operation with the agent intellect, but

⁷⁵ Cf. Taylor, "Separate Material Intellect in Averroes's Mature Philosophy," 300 - 304.

one also finds the word in his discussion on issues within the context of participation, with regards to the Divine Ideas as well as comparisons and contrasts of the human intellect with angelic intelligence.

As we begin to analyze his theory of knowledge, it is also important to note that St. Thomas was deeply influenced by a couple of sources that would prove monumental in his own work of developing his epistemological theory. One such source was St. Albert the Great and the other source was Islamic/Arabian Philosophy. Albert was not only Thomas's teacher, but also an influential mentor. Even after he attained the masters in theology and assumed one of the magisterial chairs at the University of Paris, Thomas still kept track on what his mentor was publishing. He had Albert's commentary on the *Ethics* put on note cards in order to have easier access to them. It is reported that as a student of Albert's Thomas copied his notes for transmission on Albert's courses on Dionysius's *Divine Names* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* that were taught at the *studium* at Cologne. He also recopied Albert's work *De caelesti hierarchia* as a young novice at Paris before his sojourn with Albert to Cologne. As a result Thomas was not merely Albert's student, but was also his assistant.⁷⁶ So there is no doubt that Aquinas had a unique scholarly devotion to Albert; and this is particularly evident in his theory on human knowledge. In 1245 Albert had crafted his work on human intellection, *De Homine* in Paris, and undoubtedly took this work to Cologne, along with Aquinas. There is no doubt that Aquinas would not have had a more thorough knowledge of Albert's teaching in this work than he did with Albert's course teaching on Dionysius's *Divine Names*. This intimate knowledge of Albert's doctrine enshrined in *De Homine* would be utilized by Thomas throughout his career,

⁷⁶ Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: His Person and His Work*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 24 - 27.

and is especially evident at the beginning when he was writing his own commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.⁷⁷

The Arab/Islamic philosophers' commentaries on Aristotle's works were another source that profoundly influenced both minds of teacher and student. The Arab/Islamic tradition extends back approximately 500 years before Albert and Thomas and this tradition contained Christian, Jewish, and Moslem philosophers who wrote commentaries on Aristotle as well as engaged in dialogue with each other. This not only had the effect of deepening their own philosophical reflections but also contributed to the medieval scholastics' understanding of the works of Aristotle. This as well as provided the means for their own thought experiments. Such was the case for both Albert and Thomas.⁷⁸ One way of explaining St. Thomas's receptivity to this philosophic tradition is in part due to the teaching of St. Albert. However, it has been noted that in the geographical area in Sicily in which Aquinas was reared there was already a confluence of Muslim, Jewish, and Latin peoples that lived and worked together.⁷⁹ Yet it has been mentioned that Thomas had only a general knowledge of the thought of the Islamic philosophers like Averroes and Avicenna, among others, and that his own interpretation of them was influenced by evangelical concerns.⁸⁰ There were specific elements drawn particularly from the writings of Avicenna, al-Farabi, and Averroes on the agent intellect, possible intellect, and intellectual abstraction that greatly influenced both Albert and Thomas.

⁷⁷ Cf. Richard Taylor, "A Common Negotiation: The Abrahamic Traditions and Philosophy in the Middle Ages", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 86 (2013): 8 - 11.

⁷⁸ Cf. Ibid, 2 - 4.

⁷⁹ Cf. David B. Burrell, C.S.C., "Thomas Aquinas and Islam", *Modern Theology*, vol. 20, no. 1 (January, 2004): 72.

⁸⁰ Louis Gardet, "La connaissance que Thomas D'Aquin peut avoir du monde islamique", *Aquinas and Problems of His Time*, eds. G. Verbeke and D. Verhelst (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1976), 139 - 149.

1. The Nature of the Human Intellect

One area St. Thomas's cognitional theory is found is in his discussion on the hierarchy of intelligibility. As there is a gradation in the communication of being, so there is a gradation of this sort in intelligibility. From the primary source of being, i.e., God also flows intelligibility.⁸¹ Aquinas addresses this hierarchical grading of intelligibility in his comparison and contrast between different modes of knowing between God, the angelic intellect, and the human intellect. For example, in his early Commentary on the *Sentences*, he makes reference to this hierarchy within the context of the various modes of participation in the light of the divine mind. The human intellect is the lowest grade of the intellectual substances which has received the lowest grade (*debilius*) of light from God which is least like the light of the divine intellect, and thus must go through a complex process of receiving the species of things from which it acquires knowledge. By contrast, the angelic intellect participates more fully in the influx of divine light and thus can simply know singulars, without the labors of the incarnate human intellect.⁸² St. Thomas returns to this theme in his discussions on how the human intellect knows the singular.⁸³

⁸¹ *In Librum de Causis*, Lc. 10 [Busa ed., 513].

⁸² *In II Sententiarum.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 3, ad. 1 [Busa ed., 137]: ð...[Q]uod intellectus humanus est ultimus in gradu substantiarum intellectualium; et ideo est in eo maxima possibilitas respectu aliarum substantiarum intellectualium; et propter hoc recipit lumen intelligibile a Deo debilius, et minus simile lumini divini intellectus; unde lumen intellectuale in eo receptum, non est sufficiens ad determinandum propriam rei cognitionem nisi per species a rebus receptas, quas oportet in ipso recipi formaliter secundum modum suum; et ideo ex eis singularia non cognoscuntur, quae individuuntur per materiam, nisi per reflexionem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem et sensum.....sed in angelo ex ipso lumine determinantur species quibus fit propria rerum cognitio, sine aliquo alio accepto; et ideo cum illud lumen sit similitudo totius rei in quantum est exemplariter a Deo traductum, per huiusmodi species propria singularium cognitio haberi potest: et ita patet quod secundum gradum naturae intellectualis, est etiam diversus intelligendi modus.ö

⁸³ Cf. *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 5 [Leonine ed., 22-1, 63: 286 - 296]; q. 2, a. 6 [Leonine ed., 22-1, 65: 45 - 62]; q. 10, a. 5 [Leonine ed., 22-1, 308 - 309: 42 - 53]; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 1, Ch. 65 [Editio Leonina Manualis, 61]; Bk. 2, Ch. 16 [Editio Leonina Manualis, 102]; *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 86, a. 1, ad. 4 [Ottawa ed., 536a 26 - 32]; *In De Anima*, Bk. 3, Ch. 2 [Leonine ed., 45-1, 211 - 212: 182 - 195]; *Quaestiones De Anima*, q. 20 [Leonine ed., 24-1, 172: 307 - 309]; *Quodlibetalis* 7, q. 1, a. 3 [Leonine ed., 42-1, 15: 79 - 147; 16: 148 - 154]. Cf. also Gregory Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Cause* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 2008), 99ff, where he discusses Thomas's treatment of the doctrine of participation within the context of the Divine Ideas.

That Aquinas would view the incarnate human intellect on a lower grade than the angels shows how he conceives human intellection within his hierarchical arrangement of intelligibility.

For St. Thomas the difference between the angel as an intellectual substance and the human soul as an intellectual substance is the latter's incarnate state; the metaphysical status of the human soul as the form of its body. Due to this embodiment the senses have a central role in the intellect's reception of the form of the thing sensed. Indeed, the senses are integral to the definition of man as *rational* animal, body and soul composite.⁸⁴ But how does St. Thomas explain the link between the sensible object and the intellect? How can a sensible object be received immaterially into the intellect?

2. The Cogitative Power in an Act of Understanding

Some recent scholarly research has focused on Aquinas's teaching on the cogitative powers, the *vis cogitativa*, as the possible bridge between the thing in the real world and the intellect that grasps it. John Haldane, for example, has declared that the mission of researching Aquinas's doctrine on the cogitative powers as "one of our tasks for the next century."⁸⁵ Anthony Lisska believes that this focus on Aquinas's teaching on the scope of the cogitative powers in the inner senses can lead to situating Thomistic thought within the realms of modern meta-philosophy.⁸⁶ Indeed, St. Thomas teaches that the cogitative power plays a role in

⁸⁴ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 442b 27 - 52]. Cf. also Paul Hoffman, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 99, no. 1 (January, 1990), 77. For another view of how Thomas tackles the problem of knowing singulars, see Bernice Josephine Novogrodzka, "The Problem of Intuition in Saint Thomas Aquinas," MA Thesis, (1948, Loyola University), Paper 78. Accessed November 15, 2014 http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses788.

⁸⁵ John Haldane, "Insight, Inference, and Intellection," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 73, (1999): 43.

⁸⁶ Cf. Anthony J. Lisska, "A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, vol. 80 (2006), 9 ó 12. Also see Daniel De Haan, "Perception and the

preparing the phantasm for the work of the agent intellect. And its act is vital to our ability to understand things.⁸⁷ There is a natural progression from the grasp of the singular and individual in sensation to the grasp of the universal in understanding,⁸⁸ and in the powers of the soul the sensitive is ordered to the intellectual.⁸⁹ Within this context the cogitative power serves as the estimative power that collates individual *intentiones* of what sensation has received in its activity,⁹⁰ which is why this power is also called particular reason (which St. Thomas says is located in a definite corporeal organ located in the middle of the head).⁹¹

Regarding the cogitative power, Thomas draws a comparison between the estimative powers of brute animals and the cognitive powers of the human person.⁹² The question that he

Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 88, no. 3 (2014): 397 - 437, and his "Linguistic Apprehension as Incidental Sensation" in Thomas Aquinas, *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 84 (2011): 179 - 196. In his latter article De Haan attempts to show how Aquinas sees the link between the cogitative power and the formation of words. In his former article De Haan offers a classification of different types of perception while showing how Aquinas's account fits with a phenomenological interpretation.

⁸⁷ *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 2, Ch. 76. Cf. Martin Honecker, "Der Lichtbegriff in der Abstraktionslehre des Thomas von Aquin," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, Vol. 48 (1935), 277 - 278; in viewing abstraction in a two-fold stage, one positive and the other negative, he places the work of the cogitative power in the positive.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 77, a. 7 [Ottawa ed., 470a 26 - 52]; *In I Sent.* d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 [Busa ed., 14].

⁸⁹ *Quaestiones De Anima*, q. 13, ad. 7 [Leonine ed., 24-1, 121: 407 - 411].

⁹⁰ Benedict Ashley, OP argues that St. Thomas was following Averroes in identifying animals' estimative power as the cogitative power in humans, as well as rejecting Avicenna's and Albert's distinction of the phantasm from the compositive imagination. See Benedict Ashley, OP, "Anthropology: Albert the Great on the Cogitative Power," *A Companion to Albert the Great*, ed. Irven M. Resnick (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), 316 - 319.

⁹¹ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 478a 46 - 478b 5]: "Homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones advenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis; est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium." The Franciscan Jean de La Rochelle also held a similar view of the biological location of the cogitative power. See his *Summa De Anima*, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol, OFM (Paris: Vrin, 1995), Ch. 101 [248: 2 - 4]: "Est autem estimativa, sicut dicit Avicenna, vis ordinata in summo concavitate medie cerebri, apprehendens intentiones sensibilium..." See also István P. Bejczy, "John of La Rochelle," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer, 2011), 529 - 631. See also Gérard Sondag, "Jean de la Rochelle," *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, eds. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 334 - 335.

⁹² Cf. *Ibid.*, q. 78, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 477b 28 - 478a 20].

answers in this comparison is how do animals such as a sheep or a bird know not only how to pursue what is good and pleasing to them, but also know how to pursue things useful to them, (the bird finding straw useful for building its nest) or shun what is hurtful to them (sheep recognizing the wolf as its enemy)? Based upon Avicenna's account, Thomas observes that while animals are able to take in the forms of things they are also able to perceive *intentiones* in their estimative powers that their outer senses cannot.⁹³ While humans have the apprehension of sensible forms through sensation in common with animals they differ with them in that besides the estimative power they have the cogitative power that compares individual intentions just as the intellective reason compares universal intentions.⁹⁴ This whole discussion is framed by the reception of form; albeit sensible form. But sensible form that is sensed becomes *intentiones* not only in the senses, but more importantly, in the intellect. Aquinas explains that forms, accordingly as they are more immaterial, approach a kind of infinity. But it is this immateriality of the thing that is the reason that it can be known, albeit according to the mode of the knower. He also states that while the sense is cognitive because it can receive species without matter, the intellect is more cognitive because it is more separated from matter and unmixed.⁹⁵ Based upon his metaphysical principle that whatever is received is received according to the mode of the

⁹³ Thomas's discussion on the estimative power is undoubtedly based upon Avicenna's account in his *De Anima*. See Avicenna, *Avicenna Latinus. Liber De Anima seu Sextus De Naturalibus*, 59 [21] - 67 [75]

⁹⁴ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, [Ottawa ed., 478b 3 - 5]: *...[E]nim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium.* Cf. also Robbie Moser, "Thomas Aquinas, *Esse Intentionale*, and the Cognitive as Such", *The Review of Metaphysics* 64 (June, 2011): 763 - 788.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 14, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 92a 2 - 14]: *...[Q]uod formae, secundum quod sunt magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis...Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia, et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et immixtus...* On the usefulness of Thomas's doctrine of sense perception today, see John Haldane, "Aquinas on Sense-Perception", *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 92, no. 2 (April, 1983): 233 - 239, accessed April 8, 2011 <http://jstor.org/stable/2184927>.

receiver, he states that the mode of the knower in a cognitive mode of being is the being in a cognitive power.⁹⁶ Thomas also links species and form with *intentiones*. The sense powers and intellect receive *intentiones* in the sense that they receive forms; and in receiving forms the intellect receives species. He says that the *esse* of the form in the imagination that is without matter but not without its material conditions is the medium between the *esse* of the form that is in matter and the *esse* of the form in the intellect, by virtue of its abstracting the form from matter and its conditions.⁹⁷ He also posits the existence of *esse intentionale*, which he seems to compare and contrast with *esse naturale*.⁹⁸ This is a point where Thomas shows the influence of his teacher, as we shall see.

What Aquinas suggests is that there is a parallel activity with sensation and intellection. Sensation knows the singular. However the intellect in an act of understanding knows the universal.⁹⁹ The cogitative power does have an affinity with universal reason; an affinity that gives it eminence among the sense powers.¹⁰⁰ Another name for the cogitative power is experience.¹⁰¹ Yet it is a power of sensation; it is not enumerated among the chief intellectual

⁹⁶ Ibid., ad. 2 [Ottawa ed., 92a 32 - 34]. Cf. also John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom 'What is Received is Received According to the Mode of the Receiver,'" *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 113 ó 122.

⁹⁷ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 55, a. 2, ad. 2 [Ottawa ed., 339a 40 - 46]: "Esse autem formae in imaginatione, quod est quidem sine materia, non tamen sine materialibus conditionibus, medium est inter esse formae quae est in materia, et esse formae quae est in intellectu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus materialibus." Since the cogitative powers prepare the phantasm for the agent intellect by its collation of *intentiones*, I submit that *intentiones* are tied to *esse*.

⁹⁸ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, Bk. 2, Lc. 24 [Leonine ed., 45-1, 169: 52 - 56]. In this passage St. Thomas is explicating on the distinction between the agent and receiver of form, in which he adheres to the dictum that whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. Thomas continues: "Sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu, et in re sensibili, nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale siue spirituale."

⁹⁹ Ibid., q. 78, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 473a 12 - 37].

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., q. 78, a. 4, ad. 5 [Ottawa ed., 479a 8 - 22].

¹⁰¹ Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., "The Unifying Sense: Which?" *The New Scholasticism*, vol. 57 (1983): 13 ó 14.

powers. Perhaps there is a place for the cogitative power as particular reason in St. Thomas's consideration on the distinction between the speculative and practical intellects.¹⁰² More research on St. Thomas's teaching on the cogitative power has been conducted recently, undoubtedly in answer to Haldane's challenge.¹⁰³ Unfortunately, none of the recent contributions to this topic has given an account for Aquinas's teaching on the immateriality of the form received in sensation. Indeed, none of these studies particularly elaborate on his doctrine of the role of form in sensation or intellection.¹⁰⁴ There is a close affinity between the form in things and the intelligible species grasped in the intellect's act of understanding.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 11 [Ottawa ed., 490a 20 - 490b 2]. Aquinas mentions that the difference between the speculative and practical is not on the grounds of being separate powers, but that they have different ends. The speculative considers what has been apprehended for its truth value; the practical directs what has been apprehended to action. Perhaps there is a place in Aquinas's thought for the cogitative powers within his treatment of the practical intellect; however, one would also have to study any links between the *intentiones* which the cogitative powers collate and the natural appetites which pertain vis-à-vis between the senses and things and vis-à-vis the thing and the senses. Cf. *Ibid.*, q. 78, a. 1, ad. 3 [Ottawa ed., 437b 3 - 24].

¹⁰³ Cf. Lisska, "A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas"; cf. also A. Leo White, "Why the Cogitative Power?" *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Vol. 72 (1998): 213 - 227; see also his "Instinct and Custom," *The Thomist*, vol. 66, no. 4 (October, 2002): 577 - 605; Siobhan Nash-Marshall, "The Intellect, Receptivity, and Material Singulars in Aquinas: *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 42, issue 167 (September 2002): 371 - 388. See also Stephen Pimentel, "Formal Identity as Isomorphism in Thomistic Philosophy of Mind," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 80 (2007): 115 - 126.

¹⁰⁴ There are a couple of passages from Aquinas in which he states that the role of the cognitive power compares particular forms. Cf. *In III Sententiarum*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2a, ad. 3 [Busa ed., 343]: "C[og]itativa, est in confinio sensitivae et intellectivae parties, ubi pars sensitive intellectivam attingit. Habet enim aliquid a parte sensitive, scilicet quod consideret formas particulares; et habet aliquid ab intellective, scilicet quod conferat..." Cf. also *De Veritate*, q. 15, a. 1 [Leonine ed., 22-2, 480: 399 - 404]: "Unde ratio proprie accepta nullo potest esse alia potential ab intellectu in nobis; sed interdum ipsa vis cogitativa quae est potential animae sensitivae, ratio dicitur, quia confert inter formas individuales, sicut ratio proprie dicta inter formas universals. Cf. also Schmidt, "The Underlying Sense," 15 - 17.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Three Quests in Philosophy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 59 - 74.

3. The Agent Intellect

St. Thomas consistently maintained the intellect's passivity in its reception of the form of things.¹⁰⁶ The primary role of the agent intellect is to abstract forms from the phantasm; the possible intellect is the receiver of the abstracted intelligible species.¹⁰⁷ Thus the possible intellect is passive in comparison to the activity of the agent intellect. However, this passivity of the intellect is neither passive in a strict sense nor in a secondary sense. In the strict sense, Thomas refers to the way a patient is related to an agent, when the patient is acted upon and changed by either having something introduced into its nature or taken from it; here he offers stock examples of heated water or illness or sadness overcoming a person. In a secondary sense of passivity Aquinas refers to the case when the agent acts upon its patient in such a way as to take from it something either accruing or not accruing to its nature; here he offers the example of a person's change from sickness to health, from sadness to joy. St. Thomas points to a third way of countenancing this passivity by generally speaking of how something in potency is not a receiver in which something is taken away but a passivity understood as a potentiality that could be perfected or actuated.¹⁰⁸ His doctrine on the passivity of the human intellect is what can be called the intellect's active potentiality.¹⁰⁹ However, given this overall general passivity of the human intellect, it would seem incongruous to posit an innate agent intellect that is the active

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 2 [Ottawa ed., 481a 1 - 29]; q. 85, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 524b 17 - 42]; q. 12, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 103b 39 - 104a 8]; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 2, Ch. 77 [Editio Leonina Manualis, 185]; *In Libros Metaphysicorum*, Bk. 2, Lect. 1 [Busa ed., 406].

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 2 [Ottawa ed., 514a 8 - 18]; *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 8 [Leonine ed., 22-1, 246: 102 - 112]; q. 10, a. 6 [Leonine 22-1, 313: 208 - 214].

¹⁰⁸ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 2 [Leonine ed., 481a 1 - 9]; cf. also *De Veritate*, q. 16, a. 1, ad. 13 [Leonine ed., 22-2, 506: 393 - 404], *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, Bk. 3, Ch. 3 [Leonine ed., 45-1, 216: 87 - 99]. Cf. also Michael E. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition." (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 2005), 21 ó 23, accessed October 14, 2010, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 170.

power that abstracts and produces *species intelligibilis* which it imprints upon the possible intellect. How can an innate agent intellect be an active power within the confines of an active potentiality?

St. Thomas, influenced by Albert, always maintained that the agent intellect was no separate intelligence but was a power within the human soul. His position on this point was in response to the teaching of Avicenna who, in neo-platonizing the meaning of Aristotle's agent intellect as separate, made it a totally separate substance which itself emanates from the First Principle and through emanation imprints abstract forms on the human intellect.¹¹⁰ In this account by Avicenna there is no causal link between the formal likeness of sensible things and that which is apprehended by the intellect. The result is a form of epistemological occasionalism.¹¹¹ However, in rejecting Avicenna's and Averroes's doctrine of separate agent intellect and Averroes's separate material intellect, Aquinas shows early on that he in theory accepted their principles of agent and material intellect. But he placed them within the human soul and replaced the term 'material' with 'possible' intellect. He did this relying on Averroes's *Long Commentary* and the Latin translation of Avicenna's *De Anima* as his sources.¹¹² For St. Thomas, the agent intellect works within the human soul. The chief work of the agent intellect is to abstract forms from the phantasm and make them intelligible species that once imprinted upon the possible intellect actualizes the act of understanding.¹¹³ While the cogitative power is in an

¹¹⁰ Cf. Patrick Lee, 'St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Agent Intellect', *The Thomist*, Vol. 45, no. 1 (January, 1981): 41-61.

¹¹¹ Richard C. Taylor and Max Herrera, 'Aquinas's Naturalized Epistemology', *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Vol. 79 (2006), 89.

¹¹² See Richard Taylor, 'The Arabs' Aquinas's First Critical Encounter with The Doctrines of Avicenna and Averroes on the Intellect', In *Sent. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 10*, 142 - 174.

¹¹³ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 524b 25 - 29]; In *Libros Metaphysicorum*, Bk. 2, Lect. 1 [Busa ed., 406]; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 2, Ch. 77 [Editio Leonina Manualis, 185].

organ and is instrumental in cognizing the individual thing abstracted by the senses, the agent intellect does not subsist in an organ but is a power that is derived from the soul itself as the form of the body.¹¹⁴

4. Aquinas's Theory of Abstraction

How the agent intellect acts as an active power within the confines of the active potentiality of the intellect is partially explained by its illuminating light. By its light it illuminates and abstracts forms from the phantasm.¹¹⁵ According to Thomas abstraction purifies and strips individuating conditions from the form in the phantasm.¹¹⁶ This is what abstraction is as a *lumen*. By this light of the agent intellect the species abstracted from sensible things are made actualized intelligibles which serve a mediatorial role in the possible intellect's act of understanding.¹¹⁷ Thomas explains the role of this light from the perspective of *illuminare* and *lucere*. One light is illumination (*illuminare*) which passes from an agent to something outside

¹¹⁴ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 423b 17 - 21].

¹¹⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 430a10 ó 17; *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, Bk. 3, Ch. 4 [Leonine ed., 45-1, 219: 36 - 53].

¹¹⁶ Cf. *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 5 [Leonine 22-1 63: 293 - 296]: ð...[U]nde similitudo rei quae imprimitur in sensum nostrum, et per quosdam gradus depurata, usque ad intellectum pertingit est tantum similitudo formae.ö Cf. also q. 8, a. 9 [Leonine 22-1, 249: 126 - 130]: ð[C]onveniunt siquidem cum formis intelligibilibus in quantum sunt formae sine materia, cum materialibus vero formis, in quantum nondum sunt a conditionibus materiae denudatae....ö Cf. Honecker, ðDer Lichtbegriff in der Abstraktionslehre des Thomas von Aquinö, 282, who points to the influence of Avicenna in Aquinas's use of the term *denudatio*. In this vein cf. *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad. 2 [Leonine 22-2, 313: 236 - 238]: ð...[I]ntellectus vero pervenit ad nudam quidditatem rei, secernendo eam ab omnibus materialibus dispositionibus....ö

¹¹⁷ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 87, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 540b: 25 - 34]: ðSed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat...consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intelligit intellectus possibilis...ö The main point Aquinas discussed here is whether the intellectual soul understands itself through its essence. St. Thomas's point is clear that in this life the way the intellect understands itself is by looking at material and sensible things. The *lumen* of the agent intellect has the key role of abstracting these forms, but by making them actual, they in turn mediate the possible intellect's act of understanding.

itself. This type of light is properly called an action. Another type of light is to shine (*lucere*), which remains within the agent as a perfection, and is called an operation. The type of action in the appetitive, sense, or intellective powers remains in the agent as its perfection and is thus as an operation. In an act of understanding it is not necessary that by understanding something that the one who understands acts as the agent and what it understood is passive; but the knower and known together are one effect, which is an actualized act of understanding. Both make up one principle which results in an act understanding. Both are made *ōsomething oneō* (*et dico ex eis effici unum quid*) inasmuch as what is known is joined to the knower by means of his essence or as a likeness. Thus the knower is not related as active or passive except accidentally, inasmuch as some action or passion is required for an intelligible to be united to the intellect. The type of action required is the agent intellect making species to be intelligible in act. The type of passivity required is the possible intellect receiving intelligible species, and the senses receiving sensible species. However the active and passive components in an act of understanding are ordered as effect to cause. So the intellect understands all actualized intelligibles within itself in the way a luminous body sheds light when this light is actualized within itself.¹¹⁸ Thomas thus holds that this light of the agent intellect serves as an efficient cause; this is because it hones in

¹¹⁸ *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 6 [Leonine ed., 22 - 1, 238: 104 - 111, 116 - 142]: *ōDicendum quod duplex est actio: una quae procedit ab agente in rem externam quam transmutat, et haec est sicut illuminare, quae etiam proprie actio nominatur; alia vero actio est quae non procedit in rem externam sed stat in ipso agente ut perfectio ipsius, et haec proprie dicitur operatio, est sicut lucere...Actio autem appetitus et sensus et intellectus non est sicut actio progrediens in materiam externam sed sicut actio consistens in ipso agente ut perfectio eius; et ideo oportet quidem quod intelligens secundum quod intelligit sit actu, non autem oportet quod in intelligendo intelligens sit ut agens et intellectum ut passum, sed intelligens et intellectum, prout ex eis est effectum unum quid quod est intellectus in actu, sunt unum principium huius actus quod est intelligere; et dico ex eis effici unum quid, in quantum intellectum coniungitur intelligenti sive per essentiam suam sive et similitudinem. Unde intelligens non se habet ut agens vel ut patiens nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet ad hoc quod intelligibile uniatur intellectui requiritur aliqua actio vel passio: actio quidem, secundum quod intellectus agens facit species esse intelligibiles actu; passio autem, secundum quod intellectus possibilis recipit species intelligibiles, et sensus species sensibiles. Sed hoc quod est intelligere consequitur ad hanc passionem vel actionem sicut effectus ad causam. Sicut ergo corpus lucidum lucet quando est lux actu in ipso, ita intellectus intelligit omne illud quod est actu intelligibile in ipso.ō*

and illuminates the form received in the phantasm, making it intelligible for the possible intellect.¹¹⁹

In a question on whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things through abstraction from phantasms, St. Thomas makes a distinction between the angelic and human intellect. The angelic intellect is a cognitive power which is neither an act of an organic body nor is it conjoined in some way to a material body. The object of the angelic intellect is the form without subsisting in matter. However, although they know forms that are situated in matter, they do not know them except by intuiting them in an immaterial way, either in themselves or in God. The human intellect is in a middle state. It is not a cognitive power which is the act of a bodily organ, nor is it identical to an angel's intellect. Rather it is a certain power of the soul as the form of the body. Therefore its proper function is to know the form in matter existing individually in a body but not as it is according to the matter itself. Rather to know what exists in individualized matter is to abstract the form from individualized matter which the phantasms represent. And thus our intellect understands material things by abstracting from phantasms. Our intellect can acquire some knowledge of immaterial things through material things thus considered. This is in contradistinction to the angelic intellect that knows material things through what is immaterial, ie, in their own immaterial substance or in God.¹²⁰ In this distinction

¹¹⁹ Cf. Siobhan Nash-Marshall, "The Intellect, Receptivity, and Material Singulars in Aquinas," 383.

¹²⁰ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 1 [Ottawa 524b 9 - 35]: "Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens; etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, vel in seipsis, vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet; non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis...Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus, et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt..."

between the angelic and human intellect Thomas outlines the proper role that abstraction has in an act of understanding in the human intellect.

Aquinas's account of the abstractive light of the agent intellect reflects the view of his teacher St. Albert. Albert writes that Alfarabi and others missed the mark when they posited that the possible intellect abstracts forms. But it is not a power that equally abstracts forms and receives what is abstracted in any mode, i.e., in the mode of matter or the mode of place. What Albert means is that the agent intellect is in no way determined by the species it abstracts. Rather it is the agent intellect whose work is to abstract, in whose light *esse* is abstracted. Just as a generating cause in nature by bestowing a form confers those things which follow upon that form, i.e., motion or movement and place, so a generating cause working completely and formally in corporeal things bestows the *esse* of its own light and confers also what follows upon it, which are motion or movement to the possible intellect as well as place, which is the possible intellect. In this manner Albert calls the possible intellect the intellect *in effectum*.¹²¹ In this way Albert contrasts the difference between the agent intellect that is the causing power of intelligible species by its abstractive work and the possible intellect which is the receiving power, whose imprinted intelligible species is the effect. He says further that there is a *communicatio* or sharing between the agent intellect, the form, and the possible intellect. The form remaining completely in the light of the universally active agent is itself an agent which properly causes a

¹²¹ Albertus Magnus, *De Intellectu et Intelligibili* [Borgnet, 512], Bk. 1, Ch. 4: "Et hoc videtur peccare Alfarabius et quidam alii dicentes intellectum possibilem abstrahere formas: non enim aequae potentiae est abstrahere formas, et abstractas recipere quocumque modo recipiantur, sive per modum materiae, sive per modum loci: sed potius agentis per se est abstrahere, in cuius lumine est esse abstrahi: et sicut generans in natura conferendo formam dat ea quae formam sequuntur, quae praecipue sunt motus et locus: ita generans omnino formaliter in corporalibus dando esse sui luminis, dat consequentia id; quae sunt motus ad intellectum possibilem et locum qui est intellectus possibilis...Sic igitur est de intellectu in effectum."

change in the possible intellect.¹²² The root of his interpretation of Aristotle is his reliance on Avicenna. However one difference between master and student is that Albert follows Avicenna in defining the human soul as a *perfectio*, whereas Thomas will define the soul as the form of the body.¹²³

St. Thomas maintains that the agent intellect as a power of the soul can, by its own natural power of abstraction, actualize the possible intellect by means of the intelligible species. The human intellect itself is weak and infirm in the order of intellects, greatly remote from the perfection of the divine intellect, and is in potency with respect to the intelligibles.¹²⁴ But this is due to its ranking within the hierarchy of intelligibility that follows upon the hierarchy of being. The human soul is the lowest grade of intellectual spiritual substances. This is because, for Aquinas *esse* follows upon its form, and as the human soul is the act of its body the *esse* in which the composite shares is delimited through the nature of its form.¹²⁵ Thus the difference between the *lumen* of the angelic intelligence and the *lumen* of the agent intellect is that the human mind is *ex debilitate*.¹²⁶ And while the light of the agent intellect through its illuminating abstraction

¹²² Albertus Magnus, Ibid., [508]: *õPatet etiam ex hoc quod cum inter omne agens et patiens debet esse communicatio, quae communicatio est inter agentem et formam et possibilem intellectum. Et quod ipsa forma stans universaliter in lumine universaliter agentis, est agens quod proprie habet inferre passionem intellectui possibili.õ*

¹²³ See Herbert Johnston, *õIntellectual Abstraction in St. Albert the Greatõ*, *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 10 (October, 1960): 207, 211. See also Lawrence Dewan, O.P., *õSt. Albert, the Sensibles, and Spiritual Beingõ*, *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, ed. by James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), 291 - 320.

¹²⁴ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 2 [Ottawa 481a 41 - 45]: *õIntellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium...õ* Cf. also *De Veritate*, q. 16, a. 1, ad. 13 [Leonine ed., 22-2, 506: 393 - 399].

¹²⁵ *Quaestio Disputata De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 1 [Leonine ed., 24-2, 13: 376 - 378, 386 - 389]: *õOmne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur: et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que participat esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum.....In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam: forma enim adueniens materiae facit ipsam esse actu sicut anima corpori.õ*

¹²⁶ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 58, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 352b49 - 353a 5]. In this article Aquinas is discussing the nature of angelic intelligence and makes a distinction between angelic intelligence and the human soul in that intellectuality is

does its work of disrobing (*denudatio*) or purifying the species of the phantasm as it *facit intelligibilia in actu*, the species in the phantasm caused by sense cognition also plays a role. Thomas says that even though the species in the phantasm is not the total and perfect cause of intellectual cognition, it acts in a certain way as a material cause.¹²⁷ The agent intellect's light as a participation in the divine light is not powerful enough to produce its knowledge. This is why in addition to its light the intellect, in order to have knowledge of material things, needs intelligible species taken from these things.¹²⁸ The example from Aristotle Aquinas uses regarding light and colors is illustrative of the capacity as well as the limitation of the *lumen* of the agent intellect. The purpose of light is not merely to illuminate colors of a thing, but to illuminate the area around the colored thing.¹²⁹ Hence in the act of understanding both the agent intellect and the intelligible species must collaborate in their distinctive modes, with the intelligible species as the *quo* of understanding. The agent intellect by means of its light acts as the efficient cause and the intelligible species acts as the material cause. Thus both the agent

the very nature of each angel, whereas the human soul is rational in its nature. The difference maker that St. Thomas identifies is the kind of *lumen* in the intellectual activity of the human soul, which is *ex debilitate*. If the human soul's *lumen* is *ex debilitate*, by extension, so is its agent intellect.

¹²⁷ Ibid., q. 84, a. 6 [Ottawa ed., 520b 11 - 19]: "Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae." Cf. Nash-Marshall, "The Intellect, Receptivity, and Material Singulars in Aquinas," 92-93; Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 164; Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 138-139.

¹²⁸ Cf. Ibid., I., q. 84, a. 5 [Ottawa ed., 518b 48 - 519a 3]. "Quia tamen praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis exiguntur species intelligibiles a rebus acceptae ad scientiam rebus materialibus habendam..."

¹²⁹ Cf. Ibid., q. 79, a. 3, ad. 2 [Ottawa ed., 482b 31 - 35]. St. Thomas rehearses two opinions on the reason for light; what I refer to is the second of those opinions in which St. Thomas states that light is not only to bring colors to light, sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum. I take *medium* here to refer to the area surrounding color and things colored. This can be applied to any example of light, e.g., to light up a room in a house, making visible to one its contents of furniture, trinkets, etc.

intellect and the phantasm contribute to the genesis of the intelligible species, which is the catalyst for the actualization of the possible intellect.

Thomas believes that human intelligence shares or participates in God's knowledge, and that the agent intellect participates in the divine light.¹³⁰ The human intellect then is an image of God sharing in the lowest rung of intellectual creatures. By virtue of the place it occupies within the hierarchy of participated *esse* the human agent intellect shares in a lower grade of divine intelligence than the angels who are pure intellectual spiritual substances. Thus it follows that the angels exercise their intellective powers in a much more simplified fashion than the embodied human intellect. Its natural intellective act is fully actualized with no admixture of potentiality as is the case within human discursive reason.¹³¹ Its knowing power is such due to its proximity to divine wisdom and goodness and the source of all being.¹³² God, as the creator of all things, is the efficient, conserving cause of the human person, and this also includes his intellectual power. He also created the human soul not only as the act of its body but more precisely as an inherent form that, through its participative *esse*, is also an intellectual light.¹³³

This is the significance of the human agent intellect, to have its power flow from the soul as the

¹³⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 484a18 - 45]: *¶Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam posit phantasmata illustrare...Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator anima, et in quo solo beatificatur....Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi 4, 7: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.¶* Cf. also *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, Bk. 3, Ch. 4 [Leonine ed., 45-1, 221: 155 - 166] where Thomas, in his treatment of Aristotle's discussion on the agent intellect as separable, speaks of the agent intellect participating in the intellectual light of separated substances.

¹³¹ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 58, a. 3 [Ottawa ed., 352b 38 - 49]; cf. also *De Veritate*, q. 8, a.15 [Leonine ed., 22-1, 268 - 269: 108 - 118].

¹³² Cf. *Liber de Causis*, Lc. 10 [Busa ed., 513].

¹³³ Cf. Matthew Cuddeback, *¶Light and Form in St. Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of the Knower¶*. (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 1998), 5 - 118, accessed April 19, 2011, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

actuating, formal principle of the human body.¹³⁴ Since the agent intellect derives its abstractive power from the soul itself the scope of its power can be better appreciated as a power that is illuminating. Its abstractive power produces a piercingly penetrating gaze upon the species in the phantasm.¹³⁵ In addition to this scope of its abstractive powers, the human intellect is also endowed with principles of knowledge. From the very nature of the soul as intellectual a habit arises within it by which one knows a whole and its parts. However this is a habit that flows from the nature of the intellectual soul and is set in place so that we may have immediate recognition of what is whole and what is a part only through sense knowledge.¹³⁶ What Thomas indicates here is that these principles as habits come from, or ðleap forthö naturally from the soul.¹³⁷ Yet as he also makes abundantly clear, our intellect only can actually know a whole from its parts through the intelligible species received from the phantasm.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 517b 5 - 18].

¹³⁵ Klaus Hedwig, *Sphaera Lucis, Studien zur Intelligibilität des Seienden im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation* (München: Aschendorff, 1980), 206 ó 207. On this penetrating abstractive power of the agent intellect cf. also J. Guillet, O.P., ðLa lumière intellectuelle d'après S. Thomasö, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age*, vol. 2 (1927), 85.

¹³⁶ *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 51, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 978b 17 - 34]: In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidam naturam speciei, ex parte ipsius animae: sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis, convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte: et simile est in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatis acceptas. Et propter hoc Philosophus, in fine Posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu.

¹³⁷ Cf. Cuddeback, ðLight and Form in St. Thomas Aquinasö *Metaphysics of the Knowerö*, 189 ó 190.

¹³⁸ Cf. Houston Smit, ðAquinasö Abstractionismö, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, Vol. 10 (2001): 112 ó 118. Smit also concurs that St. Thomas maintained a doctrine of divine illumination. However, he confuses the first principles of knowledge with the first intelligibles ó being, unity, truth, goodness. Due to this misreading, he claims that Aquinasö notion of intellect is such that being, unity, truth, and goodness as concepts pre-exist in the mind, and thus the agent intellect abstracts from the phantasm in order to clarify what already exists through its light. The problem is that such a reading presents a dualism in St. Thomasö teaching that is simply not there.

5. The Role of the Phantasm in an Act of Understanding

Aquinas stresses the necessity of the agent intellect to turn to phantasms in his cognitive theory; a necessity that does not cease even with the death of the body.¹³⁹ Thus the intellect needs to turn to the phantasm. It is absolutely necessary that in this present state in which our intellect is joined to its body that it cannot actually understand *nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata*.¹⁴⁰ The contents of the phantasm (if we keep in mind the various *intentiones* collated by the cogitative power in its preparation of the phantasm for the agent intellect's abstractive illumination), contain what the intellect turns itself toward. In this sense the phantasm serves as an instrumental cause of intellection. As an instrumental cause it participates in the action of the agent intellect by contributing something proper in itself to the effect of the abstractive work of the agent intellect.¹⁴¹ Consequently for Aquinas the phantasm also has a vital part to play in the intellect's abstractive operation. He says that the species of things taken from the phantasm are related to the phantasm as an instrumental or secondary agent. The agent intellect is the primary and principle agent.¹⁴² The agent intellect is the primary agent, due to its precise illuminating abstractive capacity. But the phantasm is nobler than the possible intellect

¹³⁹ For more information on this aspect of Aquinas's teaching, see *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 1 [Ottawa ed., 550b 3 - 16]. Also see Anton Pegis, "Between Immortality and Death: Some Further Reflections on the *Summa Contra Gentiles*", *The Monist*, vol. 58, no. 1 (1974), 12 ó 15.

¹⁴⁰ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 7 [Ottawa ed., 521b 4 - 8].

¹⁴¹ Ibid., q. 45, a. 5 [Ottawa ed., 288a 45 - 49]: "Causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi in quantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositiva operatur ad effectum principalis agentis." This principle regarding the dispositive influence that an instrumental cause has on the principal or superior cause that he discusses in his treatment on creation, Aquinas applies also to the effect the phantasm has as an instrumental cause on the agent intellect. The term *dispositiva operatur* implies a contribution which the phantasm makes to the intellect's act of understanding, a solely unique contribution which only the phantasm can offer. Cf. also John Frederick Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism* (New York: Bookman Associates, Inc., 1952), 126 ó 128.

¹⁴² Cf. *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad. 7 [Leonine ed., 22-2, 314: 276 - 283]. "In receptione qua intellectus possibilis species rerum accipit a phantasmatibus se habent phantasmata ut agens instrumentale vel secundarium; intellectus vero agens ut agens principale et primum."

because what it bears is also the instrumental agent providing the catalyst for the agent intellect to do its work. Thomas says that in a certain way there is nothing to prohibit the phantasm from being nobler than the possible intellect because the image in the phantasm is an actualized likeness of such a thing that does not belong to the possible intellect because of its potentiality. But this image or species will become the possible intellect's possession by means of the light of the agent intellect.¹⁴³ Consonant with this thought is that the agent intellect can do nothing without the phantasm. The phantasm cannot sufficiently change the possible intellect but it is necessary for it to be made intelligible in act by the agent intellect. One cannot say that sense knowledge is the whole and total cause of cognition. So it is in this view that the phantasm is the material cause of intellection.¹⁴⁴ Therese Scarpelli Cory suggests that St. Thomas's account of the causative role of the phantasm affects the way we should regard his theory of abstraction. We should regard his teaching on this not merely in a psychological vein but in a metaphysical one. She also shows how Aquinas inherited this view from Averroes.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5, ad. 8 [Leonine ed. 22-2, 314: 295 - 298]: *õ...[Q]uamvis intellectus possibilis sit simpliciter nobilior quam phantasma, tamen secundum quid nihil prohibet phantasma nobilius esse, in quantum scilicet phantasma est actu similitudo talis rei quod intellectui possibili non convenit nisi in potentia; et sic quodam modo potest agere in intellectum possibilem virtute luminis intellectus agentis...õ*

¹⁴⁴ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 6 [Ottawa ed., 520b 11 - 19]: *õSed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibila actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.õ* This is the only place within the corpus of St. Thomas's writings that he specifically designates the phantasm as the matter of the cause. See Rombeiro, *op cit.*, 36 ó 38. Here I believe that Aquinas is distinguishing between the phantasm as the storehouse, so to speak, of its images and the sensory form/species that it contains. In this schema the phantasm would be linked to the cogitative power and thus serve as the material cause of intellection. The instrumental cause is the form/species that is the object of the abstractive focus of the agent intellect. This reading differs from the one offered by John Peifer who speaks of the role of the agent intellect to elevate the phantasm. If Peifer is referring to the scope of the agent intellect's abstraction, what it *õelevatesõ* is the form/species, and not the matter of the phantasm. See his *The Concept in Thomism*, 128

¹⁴⁵ Therese Scarpelli Cory, *õAverroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect's Causation of the Intelligibleõ*, *Researches De Theologie et Philosophie Medievale*, vol. 82 (2015), 35 - 60.

6. Aquinas's Doctrine of Intelligible Species

Thomas inherited his stance of the intelligible species as the *quo* or catalyst in an act of understanding through the instruction of his teacher St. Albert the Great. For Albert it is a consideration of the *quo* that is the catalyst for the speculative intellect in an act of understanding. In his question on what is known in the speculative intellect Albert makes his case for intelligible species as the *quo* of understanding by stating that intelligible species in the speculative intellect is the principle of actualization of the speculative intellect. He says all intelligibles are stripped from all matter and all properties of matter, and that on account of this the speculative intellect is the species of all the intelligibles and identical with them in act. However the act has a twofold relation; one is to the thing of which it is the act, and the other relation is to that which abides in the intellect. In the first relation the act is the intelligibility or understanding of the thing and its quiddity. As such the species in the soul is then the principle of intelligibility of the whole thing and its reality. Hence this principle of understanding is knowledge of the cognized thing in act, and is as such the speculative intellect speculating in act. The second relation is not a principle of understanding but has the likeness of an accident. This is because the form that functions as the principle of understanding is an accidental form taken by the intellect as its subject and thus has accidental *esse*. But the natural form of the thing in reality has *esse naturale*.¹⁴⁶ Within this schema Albert also located both the agent and possible

¹⁴⁶ Albert the Great, *De Homine*, eds. Henryk Anzulewicz and Joachim R. Söder (Monasterii Westfalarum in Aedibus Aschendorff, 2008), [435: 47 - 69]: *ōSolutio: Dicendum quod omnia intelligibilia denudata sunt a materia et appendicitis materiae vel nuda per seipsa, et propter hoc intellectus speculativus species est omnium intelligibilium et idem actu cum omnibus. Sed actus duplicem habet comparisonem. Unam ad rem cuius est actus, et sic est ratio rei et quidditas nullam habens differentiam ab ipsa. Si enim haberet differentiam secundum illud in quo differet, non cognosceretur per ipsum res scita; et ideo species quae est in anima, quae est principium intelligendi totam rem et totum esse rei, omnino accipitur ut actus rei totius, et cum sic sit in intellectu, eo quod principium sic sit intelligendi, est scientia res scita in actu, et intellectus speculativus speculatum in actu. Aliam habet comparisonem ad id in quo est ut in subiecto, et sic non est principium intelligendi, sed principium esse; et quia in intellectu est similitudo accidentalis, causat in ipso esse accidentale; quia vero in re est forma naturalis, facit in ipsa esse naturale...ō*

intellect within the human intellect and did not follow the extrincism of Avicenna with his separate agent intellect; nor did he follow Averroes with his separate material (possible) intellect.¹⁴⁷ Of course Albert's method of interiorizing both intellectual powers does not mean that he necessarily understood both Arabic thinkers.¹⁴⁸ It also does not mean one can conclude that both Albert and Thomas, although they are in one accord in viewing intelligible species primarily as the *quo* of understanding, were in accord on other points in their respective theories of knowledge.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless this does show in part how St. Thomas regarded the intelligible species as the catalyst in an act of intellectual understanding. But how is the intelligible species as the *quo* integrated in Thomas's noetic? It is here where he reveals the influence of Albert. Aquinas remarks that the *esse* of a form in the imagination, dematerialized and yet not without its material conditions, is the medium between the *esse* of form that is in matter and the *esse* of form that is in the intellect by means of its abstraction from matter and its material conditions.¹⁵⁰ What he is referring to here of course is the *modus essendi* of form. Form can exist in various modes;

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Eduoard-Henri Wéber, O.P., *La Personne Humaine Au XIII^e Siècle. L'Avènement chez les Maîtres Parisiens de L'Acception Moderne de L'Homme* (Paris: Vrin, 1991), 354 - 359. Cf. also Martin Tracey, "Albert the Great on Possible Intellect as locus intelligibilium," *Raum und Raumvorstellungen in Mittelalter*, eds. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 287 - 290.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Richard Taylor, "Albert the Great's Account of Human Knowledge in His *De homine*: A Concoction Formed From the Writings of Avicenna and Averroes," *Translation and Transformation in Philosophy: Albert, between Aquinas and the Arabs*, Institute of Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 4 -5 June, 2012, 9 - 11 (my pagination).

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Knowledge," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 70, no. 1 (January, 1996): 121 - 135.

¹⁵⁰ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 55, a. 2, ad. 2 [Ottawa ed., 339a 40 - 46] "Esse autem formae in imaginatione, quod est quidem sine materia, non tamen sine materialibus conditionibus, medium est inter esse formae quae est in materia, et esse formae quae est in intellectu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus materialibus."

nevertheless it is the same form, whatever its mode of being.¹⁵¹ This is the distinctive feature Thomas added to his account which differs from Albert's: the feature of *esse per formam*. Form and *esse* are inextricably linked together as a metaphysical principle that Thomas also applies to his cognitive theory. From this we can gather that Thomas teaches that when the agent intellect abstracts the form from the phantasm that this form acts as the catalyst in an act of understanding. This is how Thomas can assert that the intelligible species is *quo*, the means by which the intellect understands.¹⁵² Thus Albert's teaching on accidental *esse*/natural *esse* means, for St. Thomas, that in the *modus essendi* of form, the form that is in the natural body and that form as it is in the mind is the same form albeit in a different mode of existing.

St. Thomas goes further to explain how the possible intellect, under the influence of the agent intellect, goes into another operation by which it comes to know its own act of understanding vis-à-vis the intelligible species after the initial operation of abstracting the species from the phantasm and rendering the abstracted species intelligible *in actu*. In this sense the species is known as the *quod*, that which is known. And yet even as that which is understood, Thomas maintains that what the intellect actually understands is the thing whose

¹⁵¹ St. Thomas maintains that the same form is received in the sense power as is in the sensible thing; the only difference being that the form has an immaterial mode of *esse* as opposed to its *esse naturale* in the sensible thing. Cf. *Sentencia De Anima*, 45, 1, 169, lines 29 - 36: *ō.[I]deo forma recipitur in paciente sine materia in quantum paciens assimilatur agenti secundum formam et non secundum materiam; et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili: nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale sive spiritualeō. In *Metaphysical Themes II*, Wippel observes (114) that for Aquinas the form has a twofold mode of existing; in the sensible thing, and in the sense. The change in the mode of *esse* then in the form is in its transition from a material mode of existence to an immaterial one, a transition which is proper to form as the bearer of *esse*. Hence Thomas's metaphysical doctrine *esse per formam* follows through in his epistemology, which greatly contrasts with the doctrine of Giles of Rome, as well as the other authors in this chapter. See Yves Simon, *An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Knowledge*, trans. Vukan Kuic and Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990), 91 - 107. See also Sandro D'Onofrio, *ōAquinas as Representationalist: The Ontology of the Species Intelligibilisō* (PhD diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2008), accessed April 29, 2014, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. D'Onofrio presents Aquinas's teaching on intelligible species in a different way, referring to the species as the intelligible structure in an act of understanding.*

¹⁵² Cf. *Ibid.*, q. 84, a. 2 [Ottawa ed., 514a 3 - 15]; cf. also *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 9 [Leonine ed., 22-1, 328: 197 - 209].

intelligible species is its likeness or similitude.¹⁵³ Nevertheless as this concerns how the human intellect knows the truth of things, Thomas again stresses the *quo* feature of intelligible species. He says that in an intellect knowing truth, the truth of a thing is not caused by its truth but rather it is caused by the *esse* of the thing in the mind. The *esse* of the thing in the mind is the cause of truth in the mind in an act of judgment.¹⁵⁴ This has led some to regard this act of understanding or knowledge as the mind's direct grasp of the existence to things.¹⁵⁵

One last item we must consider as we conclude this section on St. Thomas is his consideration of what similitude as a representation of the thing known in the intellect means. Is the term "representation" an apt term that applies to St. Thomas's teaching on similitude? This term engenders an understanding of similitude as a copy or imitation. Aquinas may allow this way of understanding what intelligible species as similitude means. In essence then we are asking whether form can serve as such a representative of its thing in the intellect. As noted above, Thomas does distinguish between the intelligible species as the *quo* by which the intellect understands, and the *quod* as that which is understood by the intellect. He makes this distinction by positing a twofold action of form. One action remains in the agent, as to live and understand, and the other is an action that passes into an exterior thing, as to heat or dry. Both happen according to some form. As this applies to an act of understanding Thomas says that the likeness of the thing, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. However he

¹⁵³ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 2 [Ottawa ed., 527a 41 - 47]: "Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundatio est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo."

¹⁵⁴ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 1, ad. 3 [Ottawa, ed., 114b 44 - 45]: "...Dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis...[E]sse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus."

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Joseph Owens, *Cognition. An Epistemological Inquiry*, (Dallas, TX: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1982), pp. 168 & 178. Cf. also Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 154 & 189.

adds a proviso saying when the intellect reflects upon itself that by this reflective act the intellect understands its own act of understanding from the species by which it understands. In this way the intelligible species is secondarily that which is understood. However what is first understood is the thing whose intelligible species is its likeness. However he also adds that what is understood primarily is the thing whose intelligible species is the likeness.¹⁵⁶ Thus far we can see that for Thomas, however we identify the intelligible species in the intellect, what is understood is not the species, but the thing itself. Why he posits the intelligible species as a *quod* is because of the intellect's own activity of reflection upon its act. In this reflective act it looks upon the species as a *quod* merely as the way to distinguish the species from its own act of intellection. In other words, St. Thomas views the role of the intelligible species first and foremost as the *quo*, the means by which the intellect can attain understanding and the catalyst by which the mind comes to know what it knows. Thus for him *species intelligibilis* is primarily a *quo* because that is the role of form, not only in the order of being, but also in the order of knowledge. However for some the intellect's act of reflecting on its own act is an act that is beyond the apprehension of a thing and involves composing and dividing. This is also an act of judgment in which what is known is partly the thing known and partly the mind's own intellectual act. Thus in this reflective act as an act of judgment is where one knows the existence of a thing because in this act it knows that the thing is knowable as such as it has apprehended

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 2 [Ottawa ed., 527a 23 - 30, 36 - 47]: *Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio...una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, et altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam...et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. - Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundo est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo.*

it.¹⁵⁷ There is a need for more research on this issue. Nevertheless the intelligible species for Aquinas is primarily the *quo* or catalyst in an act of understanding. Perhaps it could be said that similitude as representation for St. Thomas could be understood in his secondary sense of intelligible species as the *quod*. For how could one say that the intelligible species as the *quo* is the representative copy of the thing? This is indeed an interesting question on which more research is needed.

B. Henry of Ghent

Henry was one of the theologians that served on the commission set up by Archbishop Tempier and thus is linked to the condemnations of 1277. Henry also was a staunch defender of the rights of the secular clergy vis-à-vis the rights and privileges granted to the mendicant religious orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans.¹⁵⁸ He also was also an archdeacon of Tournai, a protonotary apostolic of the Church, and a member of the Sorbonne.¹⁵⁹ Perhaps these aspects were behind his being called *Doctor Sollemnis*; he is the Solemn Doctor, one representing the established order.¹⁶⁰ Yet even in his opposition to Giles of Rome's teaching on the real distinction between *esse* and essence, he and Giles were deeply influenced by the Neoplatonic heritage of Augustinianism that shaped and formed both their metaphysical doctrines of

¹⁵⁷ For an example of a representative of this position, see Patrick Lee, "Aquinas on Knowledge of Truth and Existence," *New Scholasticism*, vol. 60 (1986), 46-71.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Pasquale Porro, "An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent," *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death*, ed. by W. Vanhamel (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1996), 379-388.

¹⁵⁹ Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris: Vrin, 1938), XIII.

¹⁶⁰ Jerome Brown, "Divine Illumination in Henry of Ghent," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, vol. 41 (1974), 180. The "established order" refers to move back to the older version of Augustinianism.

hierarchical grading of descent from the Divine Ideas downward.¹⁶¹ However, Henry of Ghent added his own nuances to the scheme. Both Giles and Godfrey emphasize the distance between God and creation. Yet Henry goes further to emphasize a chasm between God and creatures. In doing so he presents a doctrine of participation that greatly differs from that of St. Thomas.¹⁶² However Henry, even more than Giles and Godfrey, reworked this aspect of the hierarchical schema in order to modify the actual contingent order of the universe known to Aristotle and earlier scholastics and to fit it within an order that is under the direct and immediate sway of divine omnipotence that in itself would be limited solely by the principle of contradiction.¹⁶³

1. The Active and Passive Nature of Cognition

Intentiones have a part to play in Henry of Ghent's teaching on the reception of species in the sense organ from the medium. Henry situates sense perception in its proper place by reminding us that in the perfect cognition of a thing in which its truth is known or cognized, this type of cognition or judgment entirely exceeds the cognition and judgment of sense, and that such kind of intellectual cognition can cognize a thing in ways which sense cannot. This is what Henry says at the beginning of his *Summa*, that cognition and understanding of the intellect entirely exceeds that of the senses.¹⁶⁴ However it is in his teaching on sensation that *intentiones*

¹⁶¹ Cf. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers," *Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York: Fordham University Press), 175.

¹⁶² Armand Maurer, "Henry of Ghent and the Unity of Man," *Mediaeval Studies*, vol. 10 (1948), 3ff. In these pages Maurer presents Henry's divide from St. Thomas in his a priori proof of the human soul as substantially the form of the body.

¹⁶³ Jean Paulus, *Henri d'Gand*, 213.

¹⁶⁴ Henry, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum Theologiae*, ed. by G.A. Wilson (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 2005), a. 1, q. 2 [39: 212 - 217]: "In cognitione autem secunda qua scitur sive cognoscitur veritas ipsius rei, sine qua non est hominis cognito perfecta de re, cognitio et iudicium intellectus omnino excedunt cognitionem et iudicium sensus....et ideo talis intellectus potest cognoscere de re quod non potest cognoscere sensus."

and *species* have a central part. Henry claims that the senses do not take in the form of things but that intentions come about from these forms that pass through the medium and interact with the external senses. An *intentio* is the sensible thing that in some measure bears the truth and perfection of the external sensible thing.¹⁶⁵ The sensible species is not identified with the intention; rather the sense power discovers its possession of species once it has been determined by the intention.¹⁶⁶ Henry makes it plain that *intentio* is not merely a logical term or fictional concept. It refers in a real way to the very essence of things.¹⁶⁷ It is a principle that is really constitutive of simple essence and conceived independently of all other principles that comprise the same essence, but is not capable of existing independently.¹⁶⁸ In contrast to Henry, St. Thomas maintains that it is the form of things which are received in the senses from which arise its various *intentiones* that the cogitative power collates.¹⁶⁹ Form and *esse* are abstracted together by the senses and the intellect.¹⁷⁰ One may even consider form and *intentiones* as related to each other. Henry rather disallows intentions from being linked to form. Whereas for

¹⁶⁵ Henry, *Quodlibet* V, q. 15 (Badius 1518), fol. 176, M: *Ad speciem sensibilis sensus est in potentia, quia recipiendo eius intentionem fit non ipsum sensible vel tale aliquid secundum veritatem et perfectionem talis formae quails est in sensibili extra, sed fit ut sensible recipiendo intentionem qua quodammodo est illud. Quae tamen forma aliquid rei est, et fit secundum aliquam realem alterationem quae etiam fit in ipso medio, quod ob hoc solum non potest immutare ad actum sentiendi, quia non est in ipso vis formalis sensitiva. Quo enim sentimus est id in quo est potentia huiusmodi ut dicit philosophus.*

¹⁶⁶ Jerome Brown, *Sensation in Henry of Ghent: A late medieval Aristotelian-Augustinian synthesis*, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 53 (1971): 253.

¹⁶⁷ Henry, *Quodlibet* V, q. 12, fol. 171 Y: *Unde et intentio non dicitur esse aliquid in re ut est extra, sed solum ut cadit in actuali intellectus; consideratione considerantis unum in re ut duo intentione, quod vere non fictitie duo est intentione. Quia in natura illius rei ut in fundamento et quasi in radice est utraque intentio educenda de ea opera intellectus tamquam res rationis et intellectus...* Cf. also Ibid., q. 6, fol. 161 L: *Sed appellatur hic intentio aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentia alicuius...* Cf. also Jerome Brown, *Sensation in Henry of Ghent*, 253 ó 254.

¹⁶⁸ Mauer, *Henry of Ghent and the Unity of Man*, 13, footnote 24. Cf. also Paulus, *Henri d' Gand*, 220 ó 221.

¹⁶⁹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4 [Ottawa ed., 484a 23 - 29].

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., q. 55, a. 3 [Ottawa ed., 339a 40 - 46].

Thomas *esse* comes to the composite through its form, Henry only asserts that *intentiones*, not forms, are what are rooted in the depths of an essence. The link of *intentiones* with actual *esse existentiae* by which they participate in divine being demonstrates that they are completely dependent upon the divine intellect and will.¹⁷¹

For Henry then the sensible species are distinct from the *intentiones* of the external sensible thing. However it seems somewhat confusing that on the one hand Henry says that *intentiones* come forth from the form of the sensible thing and pass through the medium they alter before passing into the sense power. Yet on the other hand he claims that the sense power only discovers its possession of the species. It may be that for Henry, while *intentiones* refer to the very truth and perfection of the essence of the sensible thing, species refer to its accidental characteristics. As an example Henry speaks of the sense of sight and its species of color. Color requires light as it passes through the medium of air in order for the power of vision to see it. But the color of the sensible thing is what is particular to the thing, that which is external to the thing, that particular feature which as species becomes the object of vision.¹⁷² Species then is related to the particular characteristics of the external sensible thing while *intentiones* are related to the thing's universal nature. Thus for Henry universals do exist in things. However they are

¹⁷¹ Henry, *Quodlibet* III, q. 9 (Badius 1518), fol. 61, O: ð...[T]ale esse non convenit alicui nisi cuius ratio exemplaris est in intellectu divino, per quam natum est fieri in rebus extra, ita quod sicut ex relatione et respectu ad ipsam ut ad causam efficientem habet quod sit ens in effectu, sic ex relatione quadam et respectu ad ipsam ut ad formam extra rem, habet quod sit ens aliquod per essentiam.ö See also Juan Carlos Flores, ðIntellect and Will as Natural Principlesö, in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. by Guy Guldenstops and Carlos Steel (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 2003), 277 ö 305.

¹⁷² Henry, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 21, fol. 136, G: ð...[N]otandum circa progressum hunc notitae, quod sensible, puta color, primo esse naturale habet in obiecto suo, et est in potentia activa ut intentionaliter sibi simile generet in medio et a medio in organo visus, secundum tamen actum luminis; quod requiritur propter duo. Et propter medium, ut fiat materia quae est necessitas ad susceptionem intentionis, quam nisi mediante luminis informatione non est natum recipere, et propter ipsum colorem qui non agit sese generando in medio nisi cum virtute luminis quo praesente color facit speciem impressam in medio sibi contiguo, quae continue generator et diffunditur in directum per totum medium usque ad organum visus, in quo species recipit ab aere sibi contiguo, et formatur per ipsam visio idest actio videndi, quae percipit virtus visiva sensible particulare obiectum extra praesens; et ab hinc generatur in vi memorativa quae est specierum retentiva, et ab illa in vi imaginativa...post hanc apprehensionem sequitur apprehensio intellectiva...ö

present in things albeit potentially due to the universal aspects of its *intentiones*.¹⁷³ The *intentio* needs the continued presence of its agent.¹⁷⁴ Viewed from this perspective one could contend that Henry maintained that first intentions were in the things themselves and second intentions in the mind.¹⁷⁵

Tachau claims that Henry and his teaching fit within the whole perspectivist tradition. One of the marks of this tradition is the multiplication of species and Henry subscribed to this.¹⁷⁶ Species of the external thing ó here Henry again speaks of color ó travels through a process in which the species multiplies itself through the medium all the way to being elicited by the sense power of sight. Regarding how the eye sees color, Henry says that a species of color is abstracted from color by means of a quasi-certain real separation and generation which leads to its multiplication in the whole medium that is between the real thing and the soul that is the seeing power in the eye (that sees the eye being formed by the species of color), either in the medium outside or inside the eye. The medium does not observe its being formed by the species of color but carries the visible species to a point on the interior nerve which runs to the nerves of the two eyes where the seeing power receives the change in accordance with an act that is in the sight of vision. The stages (*progressus*) in an act of sight are these: first, light shines on the particular material color existing on the outside; second, the light acts upon the medium by

¹⁷³ Cf. Paulus, *Henri d'Gand*, 221 ó 222.

¹⁷⁴ Henry, *Quodlibet* III, q. 12, fol. 65, F: "Quaedam vero est quae requirit continue praesentiam generantis ut si ad momentum subtrahatur statim evanescat...Illa vero...sunt intentiones..."

¹⁷⁵ Jerome Brown, "Sensation in Henry of Ghent," 255, footnote 55. Tachau, in *Vision and Certitude*, 29 ó 31, 33, disagrees with Brown's interpretation of intentionality, in that he attributes Henry's teaching to Avicenna, Averroes and St. Augustine and makes no reference to any perspectivists, to the detriment of the whole perspectivist tradition. However, in her account, Tachau also fails to distinguish between *species* and *intentio*, and also infers that *intentio* is merely a mental concept.

¹⁷⁶ Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 31 ó 33.

abstracting the species of color to be without matter and informs the medium by that species; third, the medium elicits an act of vision by means of that species.¹⁷⁷ Henry describes the multiplication process in the perspectivist mindset, tracing this multiplication of the species of color all the way from the colored thing in the medium to the organ of sight that is the eye as well as the corresponding part of the brain. However what is noteworthy about this account of sense cognition is the mention of the soul. Henry speaks of the soul as the seeing power that sees the organ of the eye being affected by the species of color. This is reminiscent of St. Augustine's account of the active sensation. What Henry has done is join together an element of the perspectivist tradition with Augustinian teaching. Henry makes a distinction between the impression of a species on a sense organ and the operation of the sense power.¹⁷⁸ He says that the sense power existing in an organ cannot elicit such an operation except when it is aroused, inclined, and determined to act with respect to the determined object. However the species existing in the organ acts by its power to proceed to the sense power. The power of the species (as the object) extends to the sense power.¹⁷⁹ Thus under the aegis of Augustinian teaching Henry says that this excitation or arousal of the sense power has to follow the impression of a

¹⁷⁷ Henry, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum Theologiae*, a. 58, q. 2, (Badius ed., 1520), fol. 130, G ó H: ð...[I]bi aliud est re color et species coloris, et quod ipsa species coloris abstrahitur a colore per quasi quaedam separationem realem et generationem sive multiplicationem ipsius in totum medium quod est inter rem visam et id oculi in quo viget vis animae visiva ipsum informando, sive medium fuerit exterius extra oculum, sive interius in oculo. A quo medio sic informato non vidente sed deferente speciem visibilis, punctus nervi interioris est in quo concurrunt duo nervi duorum oculorum, et in quo vis visiva est recipiens immutationem secundum actum qui est visio.....Est igitur progressus in actu visionis talis. Primo lux materialis super colorem particularem materiale existentem extra irradiat. Secundo coloris speciem abstrahendo sine materia in medium agit, et ipsum informat illa specie. Tertio medium specie illa actum visionis elicit.ö

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Sensation in Henry of Ghent," 262.

¹⁷⁹ Henry, *Quodlibetum* XI, q. 5 [451rV]: ð...[Q]uia talem operationem virtus sensitiva in organo existens non elicit nisi excitata et inclinata et determinata ad actum respectu determinati obiecti, quam species existens in organo agit per virtutem eius a quo processit in vim sensitivam...ö The Latin text is taken from Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition," 140.

sensible species, otherwise there would be no awareness.¹⁸⁰ The most important thing Henry has to say about an operation is that there is no operation which remains at the end of it. Operation is the end and perfection of that whose operation it is.¹⁸¹ Regarding the ending or termination of the operation with regard to the sense power, Henry says that when the inclination of the sense power is completed, the whole composite of organ and species and the sense power [i.e., power of sight] at once elicits its operation, not as some successive motion, nor as a change that passes to the outside, but as a simple action which remains within the composite.¹⁸² Neither change nor alteration has any relation to an operation. When the sense power is aroused or stimulated by means of the different alterations brought about by the sensible species and whatever else is involved in producing the necessary dispositions, it turns itself towards these movements and takes notice of them. However for Henry sensation is distinct from intellection in that the senses merely grasp something through its species. They do not grasp the very innards of the thing.¹⁸³ Henry says that a created intellect of anything existing in this state (in the body) was designed (*natus*) to understand without species from the phantasm; the simple presence of the intelligible suffices for an act of understanding without the need for any species being involved.¹⁸⁴ For Henry the change that occurs in sensation with the intentional reception of species is merely a

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition", 140.

¹⁸¹ Jerome Brown, "Sensation in Henry of Ghent", 262 - 263.

¹⁸² Henry, *Quodlibetum* IX, q. 5 [451rV]: "Illa enim inclinatione completa, totum compositum ex organo et specie et visiva vi, statim operationem suam elicit, non ut motum aliquem successivum, neque ut mutationem transeuntem extra, sed ut simplicem actionem manentem intra." Latin text is taken from Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition", 141.

¹⁸³ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Sensation in Henry of Ghent", 263.

¹⁸⁴ Henry, *Quodlibetum* IV, q. 7, fol. 93, T: "Unde intellectui creato cuiuscumque existenti in statu tali quo natus est intelligere absque speciebus a phantasmatis; dicamus quod sufficit interior presentia intelligibilis, scilicet ut intelligitur absque omni alia specie determinante." Cf. also Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 206.

natural change and thus not cognitive.¹⁸⁵ There is no need for a phantasm with its species which the agent intellect would make intelligible in act.¹⁸⁶ Henry claims that allowing species which impress the sense powers and perceptual faculties to enter into an act of understanding would compromise the immateriality of the intellect and its actualization. The rational soul needs no impressed species of anything in order to prop up its capacity to understand. Rather the intellect thinks on *intentiones* that are in the imaginative power just as sense considers sensibles that come to it from outside in the medium.¹⁸⁷

Henry did allow that there could be impressed species in intellectual cognition, but only on the grounds that these species would be the same as the cognitional contents in the intellect.¹⁸⁸ In the main however Henry would only admit species and their multiplication within the realm of sensation. Impressed species would have nothing to do with the intellect's operation as a catalyst in actualizing its potential knowledge. Impressed intelligible species are not needed to play any intermediary role to reduce the possible intellect to intellect in act.¹⁸⁹ Hence Henry, following

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition", 132.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 32.

¹⁸⁷ Henry, *Quodlibetum* IV, q. 21, fol. 136, H: "Et ideo anima rationalis, quia nihil sibi habet de rebus per sensus impressam, cuius indigeat adminiculo sensuum intelligere; debet considerare intentiones que sunt in virtute imaginativa, sicut sensu inspicere sensibilia extra."

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 206.

¹⁸⁹ Henry, *Quodlibetum* V, q. 14, fol. 174, V: "In dissolutione huius questionis non est difficultas alia quam illa que tacta est in argumento, quo scilicet agente intellectus de potentia intelligente fiat actu intelligens. Et propter fugam huius difficultatis, non propter notitiam alicuius causalitatis quam species sive similitudo rei intellectui impressa operaretur in intellectu ad actum intelligendi; introducta est opinio de ipsis speciebus intelligibilibus impressivis. Unde ostendendum est que huiusmodi species si ponantur non operantur ad eliciendum actum intelligendi, ut propter ipsum non oporteat eas ponere, immo etiam ipsis positus oportet ponere aliud motivum ad eliciendum actum intelligendi; quod etiam sine ipsis aequaliter natum est ipsum elicere et cum ipsis. Quo investigato patebit que omnino frustra et otiosum sit ponere illas et esse similliter si sunt. Quare cum non sit ponere aliquid esse frustra in fundamento naturae et creaturae, nullo igitur modo ponendum est in virtute intellectiva esse aliquas huiusmodi species." Cf. also Ibid, fol. 175, G: "Et ut ostensum est, hoc non potest esse species intelligibilis impressa intellectui; aliquid ergo aliud intellectum oportet ponere." Cf. also Tachau, *op cit.*, 32.

Augustinian thought, denies impressed species any causative role in an act of understanding.¹⁹⁰ Rather, Henry, like Godfrey, posits in the intellect a *habitus scientialis*.¹⁹¹ It is interesting to note how Henry calls the intelligible species *impressa*. Henry is defending at all costs his interpretation of the Augustinian tradition, using a straw man of convoluted and quite inaccurate reading of St. Thomas's teaching on intelligible species, attacking Thomas's position as he views it, as a doctrine of intelligible species that is directly impressed (as Spruit observes, exclusively *accepta a rebus*).¹⁹²

2. The Agent Intellect and Phantasm and Expressive Species

Henry claims that the *ratio intelligendi* of the intellect is the intellect itself; its own bare essence suffices for its own act of understanding and knowledge.¹⁹³ The agent intellect enables the phantasm to move the possible intellect by its abstracting and sequestering or separating light to purify and retrieve the object from the phantasm which can move the possible intellect. Henry also says that the species and likenesses that concern bringing the possible intellect to an act of understanding are not so much the phantasms of particular things than the universal phantasms of those same things.¹⁹⁴ By its light the agent intellect separates the universal from the particular.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition*, 135.

¹⁹¹ *Quodlibetum* V, q. 14, fol. 175, G: *Planum est igitur quod necesse habemus ponere quod illud sit habitus scientialis intellectui....* Cf. also Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 206 ó 207.

¹⁹² Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 207. Cf. also Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition*, 135 ó 137.

¹⁹³ Henry, *Quodlibetum* V, q. 14, fol. 175, D: *...[D]iximus iam quod intellectus quicumque etiam creatus seipso est ratio intelligendi quicumque intelligit, id est quod essentia sua nuda est ratio intelligendi quicumque intelligit, qua procedit ab ipsa active actus intelligendi; ita quod plus non requiritur ex parte intellectivi in quantum intellectivum est in actu intelligens.* Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 209; Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition*, 137 ó 138.

¹⁹⁴ Henry, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum Theologiae*, a. 58, q. 2, fol. 130, G ó H: *Hic vero phantasmata particularia sunt existentia in phantasia, circa quae operatur lux agentis, separando ea a conditionibus particularibus,*

Here the phantasm serves as the means of imaging the sensible object.¹⁹⁵ What serves as the bridge, so to speak, or the medium between the thing known in the intellect and as it is in the external world are its *intentiones* that are in the imagination. Henry reminds us of this in what he says about singular things and their *intentiones*. He says that the sense of sight comprehends this singular thing existing outside as present and the imagination comprehends the same thing as absent but as present in its intention in the imagination. It is this intention in the imagination which the intellective power directly looks upon in a way other than it was in the sense of sight that comprehended it. But the intellect does this simply by conceiving it apart from the conditions of the singular thing.¹⁹⁶ As we observed earlier, an *intentio* is constitutive of a simple essence. As such, *intentiones* are principles that exist, though not independently of its essence. For Henry the *intentiones* are potentially universal in the essence but actually universal in the intellect.¹⁹⁷ Brown maintains that for Henry *intentiones* are the truth and perfection of the essence in things in the external world and also of the universal-in-potency that become universal-in-act within the intellect.¹⁹⁸ *Intentiones* are not merely constructs of the human intellect, the logical universals; they are grounded in the very essence itself of the sensible

et sequestrando illas ab eis, quod est abstrahere ab eis species quae sunt phantasmata universalia. Species et similitudines dico non tam ipsorum phantasmatum particularium quae sunt species rerum particularium extra, quam rerum universalium illarum rerum particularium. Ipsa enim phantasmata particularia circa quae operatur lux agentis sic ad immutandum intellectum possibilem actu intellectionis...ö

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Henry of Ghent on Internal Sensation," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 10 (1972): 26, accessed October 22, 2014 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v019/10.1brown.html>.

¹⁹⁶ Henry, *Quodlibetum* IV, q. 21, fol. 137, Epilogus, N: "Dico ergo quasi dicta recolligendo, quod illud quod comprehendit visus ut hoc singulare praesens extra, hoc idem comprehendit imaginatio ut absens re, sed ut praesens intra in sua imaginaria intentione; et hoc idem apprehendit intellectiva directo aspectu sicut imaginativa praeterquam quod non comprehendit ut hoc, sed ut simpliciter concipiendo praeter condiciones quae sunt huius ut est hoc."ö

¹⁹⁷ Henry, *Quodlibetum* V, q. 6, fol. 161, L: "Intentio autem hic appellatur, non id quod dicitur intentio secunda, qualia sunt illa, individuum, genus, species, propriam, accidens, definitio, definitum, et talia quae dicuntur intentiones non nisi quia opus intellectus sunt...Sed appellatur hic intentio aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentiae alicuius

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Henry of Ghent on Internal Sensation," 26, footnote 43.

thing.¹⁹⁹ *Intus tentio* then explains the status of *intentiones* in the essence of sensible things. Species which project forth from things and are multiplied in the medium as it approaches the sense power only provide the senses the accidental features of the sensible thing, like color is to sight, using Henry's example. However, species of themselves do not carry within themselves the truth and perfection of its essence as do the *intentiones*. The *intentio* is related to the *ratio intelligendi* in the human intellect; even though *intentio* is the truth of the essence, the *ratio* is the intellect's own independent mode of knowing.²⁰⁰ This shows that Henry sees a distinction between the species of sense and *intentiones*, and *intentiones* are the objects of the phantasm. *Intentiones* then bear the universal of a sensed thing and are objects of the intellect.²⁰¹

Henry has a place in his noetic for the activity of the possible intellect in an act of cognition. In this he is guided in principle by St. Augustine who himself asserts that whatever we know is generated within us, that knowledge is brought forth both from the knower and the thing known. Hence in knowledge the mind knows itself and is the sole parent or principle of its knowledge, both in the mind and the thing it knows.²⁰² Hence in its knowledge the human intellect has no need of a catalyst or "trigger" to enable the cognitive process.²⁰³ Henry states that the intelligible present in the intellect under the *ratio* of a universal, either in the phantasm or

¹⁹⁹ Henry, *Quodlibetum* V, q. 6, fol. 161, L: "Unde dicitur intentio quasi intus tentio; eo quod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua determinate tendit..."

²⁰⁰ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Abstraction and the object of the human intellect according to Henry of Ghent," *Vivarium*, Vol. 11 (1973), 85. Brown explains that for Henry the *intentio* serves as the midway point between the species and *ratio intelligendi*. He adds this thought in footnote 1.

²⁰¹ We will see Henry's influence of his theory of expressed species on Duns Scotus's thinking of *esse diminutum* in the next section.

²⁰² St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book IX, Ch. 12: "Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnia res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitiam paritur, a cognoscente et cognito. Itaque mens cum se ipsam cognoscit, sola parens est notitiae suae: et cognitum enim et cognitor ipsa est."

²⁰³ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition," 142.

in a habit, immediately moves the intellect by its active power, inclining the intellect to perceive itself through its act of understanding. And by that disposition by which the intellect is so inclined it is disposed ultimately to elicit an intellectual act as its proper operation.²⁰⁴ The possible intellect is passive in its reception of the universal object from the phantasm but only insofar as it is moved or inclined to its act. The intellect thus remains the sole principle of its knowledge. But then what is the role of the object in the phantasm if it has no role to play in the genesis of an act of intellection? For Henry the answer lies in viewing the object of intellection as an expressive species. He states that the possible (material) intellect receives no impressed species from the object but only expressive species. It is by these expressive species that what is potentially understood can be made understanding in act. In this way Henry sees a parallel between sense and intellect; just as sense is related to the sensible, so is the intellect related to what is intelligible.²⁰⁵ It is these expressive species that Henry calls *intentiones*; the agent intellect makes *intentiones* understood in potency to be understanding in act so that the possible (material) intellect may receive them objectively and be moved by them.²⁰⁶ Henry would have us understand that in this way the possible intellect's reception of its expressive species is an active reception. Because its power is maximally immaterial in its capacity to be moved, the intellect acts in a most perfect manner through a cognitive act by turning itself to its object. The

²⁰⁴ *Quodlibetum* XI, q. 5, folio 452 D: ð...[I]n intellectu intelligibile praesens sub ratione universalis vel in phantasmate, vel in habitu, immediate immutat vi sua activa ipsum intellectum inclinando ipsum ad se percipiendum per actum intellectionis: et dispositione illa qua sic est inclinatus, est dispositus ultimate ad eliciendum intellectionem tanquam suam propriam operationem...ö

²⁰⁵ *Quodlibetum* IV, q. 21, folio 136H: ðIntellectus vero materialis ab obiecto nullam recipit speciem impressivam: sed solum expressivam: qua de potentia intelligente fit actu intelligens; oportet enim quod secundum aliquam similitudinem sicut sensus se habet ad sensibilia, sic intellectus se habeat ad intelligibilia.ö

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, ð...[I]ntellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas actu: ita quod recipiat eas obiective intellectus materialis et moveatur ab eis.ö That Henry calls the possible intellect the material intellect makes manifest the influence of Averroes's doctrine. For Averroes, see *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 87 [1] - 91 [67].

intellect does this not only by perceiving what truth is by being moved to it (as in sense apprehension) but by perceiving truth itself, which is the very quiddity of the thing understood. For the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is.²⁰⁷ The possible intellect is active in its initial grasp of the intelligible content of a thing (*id quod verum est*) and in its proper act of understanding. This initial activity leads to a full grasp of the quiddity of a thing (*quod quid est*).²⁰⁸ The possible intellect is passive with respect to *simplex notitia* which is the universal object that is present in the intellect which inclines it to its act of intellection.²⁰⁹ One may perhaps use Henry's treatment of the different meanings of *notitia* as a way to place his theory of divine illumination in the context of his theory of human cognition that combines it with abstraction.²¹⁰ But the important thing to note in this treatment of Henry's cognitional theory is the utter superfluity of impressed intelligible species.²¹¹ Nevertheless it is in his teaching on divine illumination that Henry declares the intellect is ensured of its grasp of truth by divine

²⁰⁷ *Quodlibetum* II (R. Wielockx, ed.), q. 6 [32: 56 - 61]: *Demum similiter dicendum est de intellectu quod, quia virtus est maxime immaterialis, in patiendi maxime agit et perfectissime per cognitionem convertit se super suum obiectum, non solum precipiendo id quod verum est, a quo movetur (sicut etiam apprehendit et sensus), sed ipsam veritatem, quae est ipsa quidditas rei intellecta. Proprium enim obiectum intellectus est quod quid est.*

²⁰⁸ Cf. Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition*, 145 - 147.

²⁰⁹ For the various meaning of *notitia* in Henry's cognitive doctrine, see Jerome Brown, *The Meaning of Notitia in Henry of Ghent*, *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, vol. 13, no. 2 (Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1981): 992 - 998. Cf. also, Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition*, 147 - 150.

²¹⁰ See Jerome Brown, *Divine Illumination in Henry of Ghent*, 181 - 199, who presents Henry's doctrine of divine illumination, showing that Henry maintained a general illumination in which God assists in our natural knowledge, and a special illumination that enables the human intellect to grasp the *prima veritas* of created things. In a related article, see Stephen Brown, *Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being*, *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 25, (1965): 120 - 123. He makes the case of Henry maturing in his thought in such a way that it altered his thinking on divine illumination as he drew nearer to Aristotle's notion of being.

²¹¹ For more information on Henry's arguments for the utter futility of impressed intelligible species, see Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition*, 150 - 178.

light; and to defend this Henry raises the specter of skepticism of the mind bereft of this illumination from above.²¹²

3. The Redundancy of Intelligible Species

Hence in Henry of Ghent's noetic we find no intelligible species that serve as the catalyst for an act of understanding. Undoubtedly his opposition to Aquinas was primarily based on how he interpreted the teaching of the Angelic Doctor and the copies of the manuscripts he had contributed to this.²¹³ There was, however, a deeper motivation Henry had in his rejection of intelligible species. His rejection was primarily motivated by his strict adherence to Augustinian teaching on human knowledge. Augustine's thesis, as Henry interpreted it, was that no corporal things can impress themselves on the intellect through the senses.²¹⁴ As an alternative to the account of intelligible species he introduced his doctrine of *intentiones*. For Henry the form which is received by the sense power and the agent intellect abstracted from phantasm was an *intentio*. This *intentio* is related somehow to the phantasm from which it arises and to the intellect by which it arises. For Henry this *intentio* is an expressed species.²¹⁵ The separation of the sensible species and its *intentio* would be the way Henry could preserve the object of the phantasm and intellect from being tied to corporal things. Thus Henry combined elements from the perspectivistic tradition with his Augustinianism to create a unique and novel cognitive theory. What Henry ushered in with his cognitive theory was a cleavage between things in the

²¹² Cf. Charles Bolyard, "Medieval Skepticism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2013 Edition), <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/skepticism-medieval/>>.

²¹³ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 210 & 211.

²¹⁴ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition," 135.

²¹⁵ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Abstraction and the object of the human intellect according to Henry of Ghent," 88 - 89.

external world and the mind that knows them. Henry refused to allow any influence of sense knowledge on intellectual knowledge. Thus sensation for Henry did play an important role in our cognizing things; the senses serve as the door through which the thing can be known. They are, however, only the door.²¹⁶ Yet even at this door species cannot pass through; what pass through are only *intentiones* that are the truth and perfection of the essence of the thing sensed. Moreover, even with *intentiones*, the human intellect still needs divine light in order to not only know the nature of the essence it has sensed; it also needs divine light to know the essence as a *similitudo* or likeness of its eternal exemplar in which it participates, to know it as God knows it. And this can occur only because God wills it.²¹⁷

One aspect of Henry's thought that will influence Duns Scotus, Antonius Andreas and the Antoine author of the commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* will be his theory of sense perception and his theory of expressed species as the object of the intellect. This will be clear in the presentation to follow in this chapter as well as in Chapter Four.

C. Godfrey of Fontaines

Godfrey was a Regent Master in Theology at the University of Paris in the last two decades of the Thirteenth Century. He was a contemporary of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent. In Godfrey we have one who also like Giles sought to protect and defend the unity of the divine essence and illustrated this by upholding the chasm between the divine infinitude and creatural finitude.²¹⁸ Godfrey also introduces the comparison of species to number in his

²¹⁶ Cf. Jerome Brown, "Sensation in Henry of Ghent," 264 ó 266.

²¹⁷ See Jerome Brown, "Divine Illumination in Henry of Ghent," 186 ó 197.

²¹⁸ Cf. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being," 177.

treatment of the ascent and descent of creation from God. Like Giles he also likens this ascent and descent to the distance that accrues between numbers as they recede away from or approach the numeral one. And as the numbers recede from the One (God) species must multiply the further they recede from the divine unity. However unlike Giles Godfrey refuses to have God merely at the top of the grading scale as the One. Rather he places God outside the order of the different hierarchical grades of being. After all God is infinite and creatures are finite beings. In Godfrey's estimation God in the unity and simplicity of his divine essence is the basis (*ratio*) and measure (*mensura*) of each creature according to its receding away (*recessus*) from divine unity and approaching (*accessus*) multiplicity.²¹⁹ Each creature imitates the whole of the divine essence; nevertheless creatures in their different grades of perfection do not signify the different perfections in God.²²⁰ Thus within his hierarchical schema Godfrey illustrates the distance between the simple unity of God in His divine essence and creatures; the chasm deepens between God who is Pure Act and First Cause and the created reality that is his caused effects in various grades of actuality. Hence the potentiality in creatures is considered by Godfrey as an innate defect in things, according to its stature in his metaphysical plan.

This will have a major influence on his cognitional theory. This is already seen in his account of the distinction between essence and existence. Godfrey questions whether we can actually distinguish between the essence and *esse* within a creature. He questions whether one can distinguish a real relation as such between a thing's essence and its *esse*. He concludes that *esse* itself is presupposed in essence; by the word essence one also understands *esse*. It boils

²¹⁹ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les Philosophes Belges*, Vol. 2, *Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets*, ed. by M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer (Louvain: 1904), *Quodlibet* IV, q. 3, 247: "Unde per exclusionem omnis multitudinis et compositionis est divina essentia secundum suam simplicitatem et unitatem mensura et propria ratio uniuscuiusque secundum recessum ab hac unitate et accessum ad dictam multitudinem." Further references from this volume will simply cite the quodlibet, question, edition, and page number.

²²⁰ Cf. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being", 178.

down to a logical distinction between essence and *esse* where the distinction obtains in the modes of their proper signification. Thus it involves a relation between a subject and its verb. He provides an example of different modes of signification in the verb *ōto runō* in its present participle form (*currens*), its perfect form (*cursus*), or in the mode of present infinitive (*currere*): to demonstrate that the one who is running, who ran, or who is to run, all signify the same one who does the running.²²¹ For Godfrey, the distinction between essence and *esse* is a virtual one and such a distinction would not be noticed in created essences.

1. Godfrey's Act/Potency Axiom in his cognitional theory

Godfrey applies his stance on the relationship between *esse* and essence to his act-potency axiom in his metaphysical doctrine. His discussion of act and potency in created things follows along the lines of his consideration of the relation between *esse* and essence. This applies to angels no less than to humans. Angels have an admixture of potency and actuality. However, because they are simple substances and incorruptible they must be distinguished from the potency and actuality that is within corruptible substances. The latter corruptible substances fall under a real or natural genus; the former have to fall under a logical genus.²²² Siger of

²²¹ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* III, q. 1 [II, 164]: *ōAd declarandum sciendum est enim quod omnia ista, ens, entitas, essentia idem significant realiter, differentia solum in modo significandi in abstractione vel concretione vel huiusmodi, et hoc apparet per simile in omnibus aliis sic acceptis, puta currens, cursus, currere. Nec valet si dicatur quod est ens nomen et ens participium, et aliud significat esse secundum quod descendit a nomine et a participio, quia uno modo significat esse essentiae, alio modo esse actualis existentiae.ō Cf. also John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 85 ó 89.*

²²² Ibid., *Quodlibet* VII, q. 7 [III, 355 - 356] : *ōSciendum est igitur quod, quia ratio generis semper sumitur a ratione potencialitatis, in quantum dicit naturam rei sub ratione indeterminati ut per aliquam actualitatem determinabilis, propter quod oportet quod illud in quo potest accipit ratio generis sit tale quod non sit actus purus respectu nullius, aliquam potentialitatem et defectibilitatem habens ut per aliquam determinatam actualitatem determinabilis, - unde in Deo nulla ratio generis potest accipit ó ne ista ratio sit cassa, oportet quod in re sit unde talis modus potencialitatis accipit potest. Etsi quidam sit res talis quod realiter sit ibi potentialitas realiter distincta ab actu intra essentiam, in illo potest accipi ratio generis realis vel naturalis, ut patet in corruptibilibus. Si autem in una essentia simplici oportet utraque accipi, est ibi ratio generis logici, ut ex iam dictis patet.ō*

Brabant seems to be Godfrey's likely source for his notion of the 'composition' between act and potency in angels.²²³ Since Siger was one of Godfrey's teachers and Godfrey's explication of the metaphysical status of angels involves a logical composition of act and potency, this perhaps provides a reflection of the influence of the master on his pupil. It is also an insight into the teaching that was already current in the Arts faculty in the time of Thomas and Bonaventure when they were in Paris teaching as Masters in Theology. For both master and pupil came under the influence of Aristotle through Averroes and the Neoplatonism of Proclus.²²⁴

Godfrey also applies the act-potency axiom to cognition. Except for God this axiom applies and nothing else is excluded from it according to Godfrey. He was insistent that this axiom applied to all created things, for there was absolutely no single thing that could reduce itself from potency to act.²²⁵ He was steadfast and earnest in his application of this axiom. Nothing created, either corporal or spiritual, was exempt from this principle. If there were exceptions this would undermine the whole axiom.²²⁶ How cognition fits within Godfrey's act-potency schema is revealed in his doctrine on the passivity of the human intellect.

²²³ Cf. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 94 & 99.

²²⁴ Cf. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 389 & 399.

²²⁵ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 7, [III, 170]: '...[E]t ideo quia ex metaphysica hoc scire debemus quod unum et idem non potest esse in actu et potentia et quod illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid non potest se reducere ad actum secundum illud et hoc pertinet ad metaphysicam, quia est commune omni enti, ideo hoc debemus supponere circa angelos et circa animam et, hoc suppositio, alia quae ad ipsam animam specialiter pertinent investigare, nec propter ignorantiam vel dubitationem circa posteriora debemus certissima et prima negare.' Cf. Wippel, 'The Role of the Phantasm in Godfrey of Fontaines' Theory of Intellection', *L'Homme et son univers au moyen âge, Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale* (30 août & 4 septembre 1982), ed. Ch. Wenin (Louvain-la Neuve: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1986), 574.

²²⁶ Cf. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 179

2. The Passive Nature of Human Cognition

According to this axiom intellection is completely passive; the intellect cannot bring itself into act. There can be no admixture of actuality and potentiality in the intellect nor an intermediary between things made present in the mind by their intelligible species. For Godfrey only the object and the object alone is the cause of knowledge. Thus in cognition it is not the intellect which proceeds toward an external object; rather the object moves to the intellect, for to understand is a motion of a thing to the soul.²²⁷ According to Godfrey this inward motion of the object is what perfects the intellect that is in potency to this object until it comes to exist in the intellect. Hence there is some other type of agency involved here; it cannot come from the intellect because in the schema of the act-potency axiom the intellect cannot bring itself into act. The agency comes from the object alone.²²⁸ What is significant here is that this axiom indicates a line of causality that must be in place for intellection. Underlying his act-potency axiom is a line of efficient causality. Thus act and potency for Godfrey is synonymous with cause and effect. This is the basis for his account of how an act of cognition takes place.²²⁹

The intelligible object as cause moves the possible intellect to its act of intellection. This object has the character of a mover or agent with respect to the possible intellect, bringing it from potency to an act of intellection. Neither the agent intellect nor the possible intellect are said to bring about this effect in itself.²³⁰ Therefore the object is the immediate efficient cause of the act

²²⁷ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 19, [IV, 272]: *...[E]st enim intelligere motus rei ad animam.*

²²⁸ Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition*, 183 ó 184.

²²⁹ For an exposition on Godfrey's line of causality behind his act-potency axiom cf. Antoine Côté, *L'objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines*, *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* vol. 54, no. 3 (2007): 407 ó 429.

²³⁰ Godfrey of Fontaine, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 19, [IV, 276]: *...Obiectum ergo intelligibile habet rationem moventis et agentis respectu intellectus possibilis educens ipsum de potentia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum illud, et sic intellectus nec ut agens nec ut possibilis posset dici efficere actum intelligendi in se ipso.*

of understanding.²³¹ The possible intellect simply (*simpliciter*) has the nature of being passive and receptive. Therefore to understand (*intelligere*) cannot be called an act with respect to the possible intellect as the agent or moving power. Rather it is an action that is attributed to the object.²³² Godfrey consistently maintained that the object causes knowledge in the intellect and not the converse. However this is the consequence of the strict application of the act/potency axiom. Within an act of understanding the possible intellect cannot generate its own knowledge but is entirely passive in reference to the object of knowledge. But it all depends upon how we use the term *intelligere*.²³³ Hence all knowledge is passive from the standpoint of the intellect's capacity to understand. Thus Godfrey shows that the object is the efficient principle of an act of understanding, remains in the intellect, and is the terminus of that action.²³⁴

3. The "Contact" Between the Phantasm and Agent Intellect

In *Quodlibet* 5, q. 9 Godfrey teaches that the agent intellect is a certain light and that its light has a twofold operation. One operation regards its cognizable things and the other is directed at the possible intellect which it reduces from potency to act in its understanding of those cognizable things. The agent intellect in some way illuminates the phantasm or the material things represented in it and makes it (*informat*) that the phantasm has the power to move the possible intellect so that through this power the possible intellect can come (*fieri*) to an act of

²³¹ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition", 185.

²³² Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 19, [IV, 276]: "¶[I]ntellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passive et receptivi. Sic ergo intelligere non potest dici actio respectu intellectus possibilis sic quod habeat esse ab intellectu possibili ut ab agente et movente; immo potius sic est actio respectu obiecti."¶

²³³ Cf. *Ibid.*, 276 ó 277.

²³⁴ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition", 185 ó 186.

understanding. Godfrey continues by saying that the agent intellect also illuminates the possible intellect and in some way informs (*informat*) it so that it may be receptive of intelligible species present in the phantasm. Hence the agent intellect is said to be a certain habit as a light, a habit existing in the soul as a certain elevating and disposing light for the possible intellect to be receptive of intelligible species. Then Godfrey gives an example of how this light of the agent intellect works that is reminiscent of Giles of Rome. Godfrey speaks about the relationship between the light and the diaphanous transparency of air. He says that if illuminated air in the diaphanous transparency as diaphaneity itself could be called a seeing power then its light which is a certain habit or form would have a twofold operation. One of its operations would be with respect to color by placing it in the diaphanous transparency because color cannot on its own make its intentional species in the diaphanous transparency except by the power of the present light. The second operation of the illuminated air is in respect to the diaphanous transparency by disposing (*ponendo*) it to be seen because such intentions could not be seen in it except by the illumination of this light. Some suppose it is necessary that the pupil of the eye has to be illumined by some light. This is because the object of sight is not only the medium or color but the illuminating light by which sight in potency may be made into actualized seeing.²³⁵

²³⁵ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* V, q. 9 [III, 33 - 34]: "Sed tamen quantum ad actum qui est respectu cognoscibilium materialium, intellectus agens qui est lumen quoddam, suo lumine habet duplicem operationem. Unam scilicet respectu ipsorum cognoscibilium, et aliam respectu ipsius intellectus possibilis qui reducitur in actum cognitionis illorum. Quia et phantasmata, sive res materiales ut in phantasmate repraesentantur, aliquo modo illustrat et informat ad hoc quod habeant vim movendi intellectum possibilem sic quod ipse intellectus possibilis possit secundum speciem intelligibilem per illa fieri actu intelligens...Et etiam ipsum intellectum possibilem illustrat et aliquo modo informat ad hoc quod sit susceptivus speciei intelligibilis praesentibus phantasmatibus. Unde dicitur esse quidam habitus ut lux, habitus quidem in anima existens ut lumen quoddam, ipsum ad receptionem specierum intelligibilium elevans et disponens; - sicut si diceretur de aere diaphano illuminato, quod si ipsa *diaphaneitas* esset virtus visiva, lux ejus quae est quasi quidam habitus et forma, duplicem operationem haberet, unam respectu coloris ponendo quod color non posset facere suam speciem intentionalem in diaphano nisi virtute praesentiae lucis, et aliam respectu ipsius diaphani ponendo quod non esset susceptivum talis intentionis secundum quam fieret actu videns nisi illustratum huiusmodi luce; et sicut etiam modo ponitur secundum aliquos quod oportet pupillam esse aliqua luce illustratam, non solum medium vel colorem, ad hoc quod potentia visiva fiat actu videns." See also Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition", 198.

Godfrey's discussion appears to be a replica of Giles's explanation in his quodlibetal question. There Giles also spoke of the twofold operation of the agent intellect's light in which this light was directed at the phantasm as an organ and diaphanous medium and at the possible intellect as the matter which it forms. Giles was explaining the contact between the phantasm and the agent intellect. However there is a decided difference between Godfrey and Giles on the exact type of contact between the agent intellect and the phantasm.

For Godfrey the answer rests in his act/potency axiom. His account of cognition like Giles's revolves around the relationship between the agent intellect and the phantasm and the type of "contact" that the agent intellect has with it. Like Giles's it also revolves around the relationship between the possible intellect and phantasm and how an object in the phantasm becomes actually intelligible in it. However one significant difference between Godfrey and Giles is that in his doctrine of cognition Godfrey assigns no causative role to intelligible species for an act of understanding. In his account of cognition the intelligible species cannot be distinguished from the act of the intellect. This is a consequence of his act-potency axiom. There is no trace of any type of species as a catalyst in an act of understanding in his account.²³⁶ Godfrey maintains that conditions of such kind (of reducing the possible intellect from potency to act) are suitable for a form or species. Thus even an act of understanding itself can be called species or form. This act of understanding does not consist in the reception of another species really different from itself. It does consist in the reception of species as long as the act of understanding is itself a formal perfection. Thus species is understood as perfecting, informing, and assimilating the thing understood.²³⁷ The term "species" then must be interpreted as

²³⁶ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 212.

²³⁷ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 19, [IV, 275]: "Et quia huiusmodi condiciones conveniunt formae et speciei, ipsum intelligere etiam potest dici species sive forma. Etsi intelligere non consistit in receptione alterius

intelligere itself. If there is no intermediary intelligible species that actualizes the possible intellect then what is the factor or catalyst which actualizes the possible intellect? What precisely is the role of the phantasm in such a cognitional schema? Godfrey's response raises a conundrum. He says that since the phantasm cannot by itself move the possible intellect except by the light of the agent intellect, it would seem that the light of the agent intellect may bring about some disposition upon the phantasm itself; for the same thing remains the same that arises in the phantasm which produces the same. Therefore if in the present light of the agent intellect the phantasm or what is represented in the phantasm is made intelligible in act and moves the possible intellect to act, it would seem that something was made in it that was not there before. Then the difficulties about the role of the phantasm return. For every possible disposition is in the phantasm or in what is represented in the phantasm and is singular and in the mode of singularity. But since a disposition of such kind in the phantasm can move the intellect, it may be said that an action or operation in such kind of agent intellect is not a positive one that would make some positive or formal disposition subjectively in the phantasm. But such kind of action or operation occurs by means of a certain mode of removal, abstraction, or sequestration or isolation of one thing from another, not according to the thing in the phantasm but according to a rule of change or transformation.

He offers an example of what he means by his notion of a rule of change or transformation. If it could be assumed that since whiteness and sweetness are at the same time in milk, milk by itself cannot without the presence of light make manifest in the medium the

speciei a se ipso realiter differentis, consistit tamen in receptione speciei pro tanto quod ipsum intelligere est quaedam formalis perfectio et sic quaedam species intellectum perficiens et informans et rei intellectae assimilans. This "assimilating" work by the intellect of the object to itself indicates that for Godfrey the potentiality of the intellect is not so much as a receiver, but more as an apprehender. Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 212.

species of color or whiteness without also manifesting the species of sweetness. But in the presence of light the species of whiteness can be grasped without the species of sweetness; and so abstraction of whiteness from sweetness is said to take place not according to the nature of the essence of milk but according to a rule of change or transformation. Since there is a material substance, like a stone which in its object is singular and sensible and is apprehended through its species as singular in the phantasm, it would be in the phantasm in another order according to the quiddity of the thing itself. And this other order is a specification brought about by individuating accidental dispositions. For this order of quiddity that is specified in this stone in its substantial nature, even though it is particular and individual nevertheless pertains to what is not individuated and not defined.²³⁸

4. Godfrey's Theory of Abstraction

Hence in relation to the phantasm the agent intellect does not initiate a positive or formal disposition or abstraction. Rather it acts by way of withdrawing (*remotionis*), or abstracting (*abstractionis*), or segregating (*sequestrationis*) one feature from another, not really (*non quidam*

²³⁸ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* V, q. 10, [III, 37 - 38]: Cum phantasma secundum se non possit movere intellectum possibilem nisi illustratum lumine intellectus agentis, videtur quod illustratio intellectus agentis aliquam dispositionem efficiat circa ipsum phantasma, quia idem manens idem natum est facere idem. Ergo si praesente illustratione intellectus agentis, phantasma sive id quod in phantasmate repraesentatur fit intelligibile actu et movens intellectum possibilem actu, videtur aliquid esse factum in ipso quod prius erat; et tunc redit difficultas supra dicta: quia omnis dispositio possibilis esse in phantasmate vel in phantastico est singulare et modum singularis habens, cum tali autem dispositione non potest phantasma movere intellectum, ideo videtur dicendum quod huiusmodi actio vel operatio intellectus agentis non est positive sic quod faciat aliquam dispositionem positivam et formalem subiective in phantasmate; sed est huiusmodi operatio vel actio per modum cuiusdam remotionis et abstractionis vel sequestrationis unius ab altero, non quidem secundum rem, sed secundum immutandi rationem

Sicut enim si poneretur quod, cum albedo et dulcedo lactis simul sunt quod lac, per seipsum absque praesentia luminis non posset se facere in medio secundum speciem coloris vel albi quin faceret se secundum speciem dulcis, sed lumine praesente facere posset se secundum speciem albi absque specie dulcis, et sic diceretur fieri abstractio albi a dulci non secundum rationem essendi sed secundum rationem immutandi; ita etiam cum in obiecto sensibili et singulari quod est aliqua substantia materialis puta hic lapis, apprehenso per speciem phantasmatis singulariter, aliud sit secundum rem ipsa quidditas, et aliud est designatio per accidentales dispositiones individuantes; nam illud quod est in hoc lapide ad naturam suam substantialem pertinens etsi sit particulatum et individuum, tamen ipsum quod est sic designatum et individuum secundum se est quid non individuum et indesignatum. .ö Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 213.

secundum rem) but as a way to render what has been abstracted to be capable to move the possible intellect (*sed secundum immutandi rationem*). In this manner Godfrey posits two distinct orders: one order pertains to the singular sensible thing represented by its species in the phantasm and the other order is the abstractive work of the agent intellect in isolating the quiddity that can move the possible intellect into act.²³⁹ In this way Godfrey introduces the primary role of the agent in sequestering the intelligible feature of a thing from the phantasm as he hones in on the nature of the precise interaction between both agent and phantasm. He does it this way. He says that if a quiddity could exist beyond such kind of individuation it would seem to be a certain intelligible *per se*. No abstraction or sequestration of the agent intellect would seem to be necessary for that quiddity to be understood. Thus the quiddity that exists as particularized, and exists as such represented in the phantasm, only impedes the mind from understanding it. Thus if the quiddity itself would really be separated, cut off, or removed from such kind of conditions, the agent intellect would make what is potentially intelligible to be intelligible in act without effecting some formal disposition in the substantial quiddity itself. But the agent intellect would remove what prevented it from being understood in a certain mode. So the agent intellect, in separating the quiddity in the order of consideration, or in making this stone what it is in its substantial quiddity without the aforementioned conditions, changes something potential by bringing it from potentially intelligible to being intelligible in act. Nevertheless this change occurs in a certain spiritual or virtual contact of the phantasm with the light of the agent intellect. For one must consider that this is the nature of the agent intellect. Thus in extending its operation to the singular object or phantasm it touches the phantasm by its light in a certain way solely by its power insofar as it pertains to what the object is in its

²³⁹ Cf. Wippel, "The Role of the Phantasm in Godfrey of Fontaines", 576 - 577.

substantial quiddity in the phantasm. And this quiddity is the nature of such kind of singular object; namely that it is a precise touch. The agent intellect by the power of its light touches it in the order of that precision as regards the quiddity of such an object that can move the possible intellect. Godfrey agrees with the teaching of Averroes that what is maintained here is in accord with what the Commentator says in his commentary on the third book of the *De Anima*, that the intentions of the imagination by themselves cannot move the possible intellect drawing it from potency to act. For if intentions could move the possible intellect there would be no difference between the universal and the individual and the intellect would be a kind of power of the imagination.²⁴⁰ Godfrey's mention of Averroes's teaching in his Great Commentary is a direct quote of what he himself wrote in his notebook concerning intentions of the imagination.²⁴¹ Godfrey's concern with being able to differentiate between the universal and individual nature in cognition reflects the struggle he had in its discussion in his metaphysical schema.²⁴² Thus according to Godfrey's noetic, the illuminating light of the agent intellect is not able to

²⁴⁰ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* V, q. 10, [III, 38]: *¶ Et si secundum se, praeter huiusmodi individuantia, existeret id ipsum quod sic est individuatum videretur esse quoddam intelligibile per se: nec ad hoc quod intelligeretur videretur esse aliqua abstractio vel sequestratio necessaria. Ergo ipsam sic existentem particulatam impedit intelligi hoc solum, quod sic existit et sic in phantasmate repraesentatur. Sicut ergo qui ipsam realiter ab huiusmodi conditionibus separaret, sive qui illa realiter excluderet et amoveret, potentia intelligibile faceret actu intelligibile, absque hoc quod aliquam dispositionem formalem in ipsa quidditate substantiali efficeret, sed prohibens quodam modo removeret: ita etiam separans ipsam sic secundum considerationem, sive faciens quod id quod est in hoc lapide suae quidditatis substantialis absque conditionibus praedictis immutat aliquam potentiam, facit ipsam de potentia intelligibili actu intelligibilem. Hoc autem fit quodam contactu spiritali et virtuali luminis intellectus agentis, nam supponendum est quod haec est natura intellectus agentis quod sua applicatione ad objectum singulare vel phantasma quodam modo contingat illud sua virtute solum quantum ad id quod pertinet dicto modo ad eius quidditatem substantialem; et hoc est in natura talis obiecti singularis scilicet quod sit praecise tactum sive quod virtute intellectus agentis suo lumine ipsum contingens, secundum illud praecise scilicet secundum huiusmodi suam quidditatem, sic possit movere ipsum intellectum possibilem. Et ista videntur concordare his quae communiter dicuntur et his quae dixit Commentator in hac materia, tertio de Anima, dicens quod intentiones imaginatae non sunt solae moventes intellectum possibilem extrahentes eum de potentia in actum. Ita enim non esset differentia inter universale et individuum, et intellectus esset de genere virtutis imaginativae. ¶ Cf. also Wippel, *¶ The Role of the Phantasmö*, 577 ó 578; Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 214.*

²⁴¹ Cf. Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 438 [46 - 51].

²⁴² Cf. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, 349 - 369.

illuminate the object of the phantasm in its singularity as such since such singularity or individuality in the object is unable to move the intellect. Rather, the agent intellect is able to virtually touch the object in the phantasm in such a way with precision (*praecise tactum*) regarding what pertains to the substantial quiddity of that object. On the basis of this touch of precision by the agent intellect the quiddity of the object can move the possible intellect. Thus for Godfrey the agent intellect acts on the phantasm and through the agency of its light the phantasm can act on the possible intellect.²⁴³ In this sense Godfrey like Averroes could postulate an agent sense.²⁴⁴ The fact that Godfrey regards the intellect as passive even with the agent intellect's illuminating power is that he sees the powers of both the agent and possible intellect as one, powers that are always conjoined.²⁴⁵ However in his account Godfrey has the intellect maintain an independence from the senses; the agent intellect, by virtue of its spiritual contact with the phantasm, removes or takes the intelligible object from it that will actualize the possible intellect in its act of understanding. It does so in such a way that its *intellectio* or intelligible species of such a cognizable thing are virtually contained in the agent intellect's light (*in lumine intellectus agentis continetur virtualiter*).²⁴⁶ Although Godfrey calls the cognizable thing intelligible species, this has to be understood by his calling such cognizable feature the *intellectio* of the agent intellect itself, which is his primary designation for this cognizable quality.

²⁴³ Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 2 [IV, 32].

²⁴⁴ Cf. Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 221 [51 - 57]. cf. also Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, 194 - 195.

²⁴⁵ Cf. Benoit Martel, *La Psychologie de Gonsalve d'Espagne*, (Montreal-Paris: Vrin, 1968), 131.

²⁴⁶ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* V, q. 10, [III, 40]: "Et non dicitur quod se habeat ad phantasmata sicut ars, quia proprie loquendo actione intellectus agentis non fit aliqua dispositio formalis in ipsis phantasmatis quasi in materia sed solum fit dicta sequestratio vel arbitratio vel remotio prohibentium et huiusmodi, quo facto virtute ipsius intellectus agentis et in eius lumine fit informatio intellectus possibilis ab ipsa intellectione talis cognoscibilis sive a specie intelligibili quae aliquo modo in lumine intellectus agentis continetur virtualiter."

Hence we can see the difference between Godfrey and Giles on the efficaciousness of the agent intellect's light. But one point of agreement for both regards the abstractive work of the agent intellect. Neither Godfrey nor Giles have any account of the abstractive work of the agent intellect as we would find in Aquinas's theory of knowledge. Nevertheless in his account Godfrey does not give a more detailed explanation of what he means by this virtual or spiritual contact between the agent intellect and the phantasm or in what it consists. It remains a mystery in which semantics and modes of signification fall far short. This is why there are some present day scholars who see an underlying innatistic tendency in his account of intellection.²⁴⁷ Even though the agent intellect is unable to have any positive disposition towards the object in the phantasm the cognitive act nonetheless depends upon its perceptual acts necessary to trigger intellection.²⁴⁸ Hence in Godfrey's noetic there would be no need for intelligibile species to serve a mediatorial role in actualizing the possible intellect.²⁴⁹ The rationale Godfrey uses to justify his position shows that this is where he parts with Giles. Giles maintains that the light of the agent intellect has real contact with the phantasm as a physiological and psychological organ. Godfrey stresses the spiritual contact between the agent intellect and the phantasm precisely because of the organic nature of the phantasm. As an organ it is incapable of moving a purely spiritual power which knows in a universal fashion. Thus the agent intellect's contact is only spiritual; this is what Godfrey gives us to understand of this contact as a movement that is

²⁴⁷ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 214-6-215. This is what Spruit writes: "The keen concern for the independence of the human intellect from alleged intrusions of the senses reveals an underlying innatistic tendency in Godfrey's thought." In this vein he sees some similarities between Godfrey's thought and some of the Neoplatonic Renaissance philosophers.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 215.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intelligible Species", *Intellect et Imagination Dans La Philosophie Médiévale*, vol. 2, ed. Maria Cândida Pacheco and José Francisco Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 1131 - 1141.

abstractive, withdrawing, and segregating. For Godfrey this insures that the abstracted quiddity as an intelligible object is really the efficient cause of the possible intellect's act of understanding in the same way an object is the efficient cause of a sense power's actual perception of the object. This is because of his act/potency axiom.²⁵⁰ We will see in Chapter Four that the anonymous Antoine author in his commentary on Book Three of his commentary on the *De Anima* will revisit Godfrey's account of the relationship between the phantasm and agent intellect and claim that we are still left with the conundrum of what we cognize, whether it is particular or universal.

D. Giles of Rome

Giles was an Augustinian monk and a student under St. Thomas in his last years at Paris (1269 ó 1274). Gilson remarks that he was numbered as one who furthered his teacher's doctrine. There are many ways Giles follows Thomas in his own cognitional theory. He like Thomas view knowledge as the union of the knower with the known. He also maintains all knowledge begins with the senses and ends in the intellect through the agent intellect's work of abstraction. He also stresses the need for intelligible species to account for the mind's cognitive act of understanding. He also follows the Aristotelian doctrine on the passivity of human cognition.²⁵¹ Perhaps the first cracks in the opinion that Giles was a disciple of St. Thomas was Giles's work in reconciling Aristotelian thought with Augustinian philosophical doctrine without radically twisting Peripatetic thought. This earned him the ire of English Dominicans such as Thomas of Sutton and Robert of Oxford even though Giles defended the doctrine of intelligible

²⁵⁰ Cf. John Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter, 2010 Edition), accessed September 24, 2011 <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/godfrey/>>.

²⁵¹ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition," 216.

species against Henry of Ghent.²⁵² It is also apparent that Giles did follow Thomas in the broad confines of his metaphysical teaching, though he parted from Thomas somewhat in maintaining a real distinction between essence and existence. In fact his metaphysical vision of *res* reveals how Giles distanced himself from his teacher. This point of his doctrine had a profound effect on his view of the human person whose nature he maintained was distant from God who is *Ipsum Esse*.

1. The Nature of the Human Intellect

Within a hierarchical grading Giles ranked human nature according to its *esse actuale*. The human mode of understanding parallels its *esse actuale* as a supposit also within this format.²⁵³ Human understanding viewed from this perspective is limited to knowing something particular in its *actuale esse* or completed essence. Or this understanding can come to a universal knowledge of the *esse* of its cause or its quiddity (*cognoscere particulare ut particulare est ipsum cognoscere secundum suum actuale esse, cognoscere autem ipsum universaliter est ipsum scire solum secundum esse quod habet in suis causis vel secundum suam rationem quidditatis*). The human person can know the essence or *esse* of a singular thing and can understand its universal application to all things of its kind. But this knowledge only leads to knowledge that the singular thing is caused and as a quiddity it exists as something caused. Giles views essence and *esse* as two things really distinct. He views essence as matter and form; *esse*

²⁵² Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 193 - 194.

²⁵³ Cf. Peter Nash, "Giles of Rome, Auditor and Critic of St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, vol. 28 (November, 1950): 10-11.

is that actuality or completive element that is superadded to it to give it its nature.²⁵⁴ This is an indication of how much Giles departed from Aquinas. Regarding the epistemological capabilities of the human intellect Giles says that our intellect is conceived to be a point in a genus between what is intelligible and what is sensible. This is comparatively the same status within the genus of being of prime matter, between that of being nothing and being something. Taking his inspiration from Averroes, he reasons that if the intellect is the meeting point between the intelligible and the sensible, then the soul is understood as being indivisible in its species due to its placement on the metaphysical scale of descent. The soul is ontologically prior to the body for which it serves as one of its substantial forms.²⁵⁵ What this means for Giles is that the human person is not the substantial whole as taught by Aquinas. Being an aggregate whole, consisting in parts (*res*), with the radical distinction between matter and form, the soul, as an atom, is perched on this scale as a superior to an inferior (body), because of the radical distinction between the soul and its body.²⁵⁶ Matter and form are distinct *res* and being conjoined in creation does not change this distinction. Since then this makes the soul merely a *donec* in its species, it cannot be a whole because of its distance from the superior unity of the divine

²⁵⁴ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de Esse et Essentia*, ed. Edgar Hocedez, S.J. (Louvain: 1930), 20, 11 ó 15: *“Nam esse est quaedam actualitas et quaedam perfectio essentiae, sicut forma est quaedam actualitas et perfectio materiae, et sicut realiter differt materia a forma, sic realiter differt essentia ab esse.”* Cf. also Hocedez’s remarks in footnote 2.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, *In II Sententiarum.*, pars. 2, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3 [Venice 1521], 471, B-C: *“...[P]robare possumus omnes animas esse eiusdem speciei, prout comparantur ad sua superiora. Ait enim Commentator in 3 De anima quod intellectus noster in genere intelligibilium se habet sicut materia prima in genere entium: Cum ergo ratio materiae primae consistat in puncto, quia est media inter ens et nihil: propter quod si ascenderet, esset ens in actu, et si descenderet est nihil, sic ratio animae intellectivae consistit in puncto quantum ad speciem, quia est media inter intelligibilia et sensibilia, et est potentia pura in genere intelligibilium. Propter quod si plus ascenderet, esset in genere intelligibilium non ut potentia pura, sed ut aliquid in actu; et si aliquo modo descenderet, desineret esse in genere intelligibilium, et esset in genere sensibilem. Ratio ergo animae intellectivae, quantum ad speciem, est in atomo; et in esse punctali: et ex hoc cogimur ponere omnes tales animas esse eiusdem speciei.”*

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, D: *“Cum ergo maximum sit superlativum, maxima distantia non potest esse nisi unius ab uno: sic quia infimum est superlativum, anima humana, quae propter coniunctionem ad corpus tenet infimum gradum in genere substantiarum spiritualium non potest esse nisi una, non una numero, sed una specie. Animae ergo humanae omnes sunt eiusdem speciei, ut comparantur ad sua inferiora, idest, ad sua corpora.”*

essence. This is the reason for the embodiment of the human soul. Hence the soul's intellectual powers will also be distinct from the sense powers of the body. Giles may agree with Thomas that knowledge begins with sensation but what rises to the intellect for its act of understanding will be somewhat different from Aquinas's account. Most importantly he shows how much he follows Augustine on the relation of the soul to the body. St. Augustine envisioned the soul to be over the body. Perhaps one of the most famous statements made by Augustine is that the soul or mind is a certain substance that participates in reason and is adapted to the ruling of the body.²⁵⁷ Since the soul rules over the body Augustine identifies the wise person as the one who employs useful creatures properly, avoids harmful ones, and gives up those that are excessive. As one grows to adulthood he leaves the captivity of the judgment of the senses and subjects all activity to the rule of reason.²⁵⁸ Following Augustine, Giles states that the human person experiences divisions within himself between body and soul which was the original metaphysical division after the Fall.²⁵⁹ Form is superior to matter. In the composite nature of man the intellect is superior to sense. Sense appetite participates in the rational nature because it is naturally ordained to obey reason and to be under reason's sway.²⁶⁰ In this way sense is ordered and subject to the intellect as part of Giles's conception of rational human nature just as it was for Augustine. For Giles soul and body are distinct *res* and as such their interrelationship has to be

²⁵⁷ St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, 13 [PL: 1048]: "Nam mihi videtur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps regendo corpori accommodata." Cf. Terry L. Miethe, "Augustine's Theory of Sense Knowledge," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*, vol. 22, no. 3 (September, 1979): 260.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., *De Genesi ad contra Manichaeos*, I, 20 [Migne, PL]: 34, 185, 188. Cf. also Sister Mary Ann Ida Gannon, B.V.M., "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine," *The New Scholasticism*, vol. 30 (1956): 158. See Miethe, *op cit.*, 155.

²⁵⁹ Cf. McAleer, "Sensuality: An Avenue into the Political and Metaphysical Thought of Giles of Rome," *Gregorianum*, vol. 82 (2001), 131- 134.

²⁶⁰ Giles, *In II Sententiarum.*, 2 pars, d. 21, q. 1, dub. 1 *lateralis*, p. 183, C: "Ipsa enim sensualitas, cuius est concupiscere, vel ipse appetitus sensitivus, quamvis non sit rationalis per essentiam, est tantum rationalis per participationem, quia est aptus natus obedire rationi, et esse sub regimine rationis..."

viewed as between ruler and ruled. This also accords with Augustine's thought. However Giles pushes the divisions between body and soul further by saying that this interrelationship is not an amicable one but one of violence. This is the result of the rebellion of the appetitive senses against reason's rule and the purpose reason applies coercive force to reign in the sensitive appetites.²⁶¹

2. The Passive Nature of Human Cognition

Giles claims that our knowledge begins with sensation. From this vantage point of the human act of understanding, the intellect is passive to receive the species of things. However his teaching on sensation reveals his devotion to St. Augustine along with a desire to forge a union between him and the teachings of Aristotle. In his metaphysical schema, outside of the divine essence species is the formal expression of an essence. This is the case on the level of the angelic intellect. It is even more so with human intellection. Giles also states that only God can know all things through his essence because his essence is the likeness of all things. However no creature of itself can through its essence be the formal expression of things.²⁶² The gradual purification of the species as *intentiones* in sensation, from external senses to internal senses to phantasm, prepares the species for contact with the agent intellect.²⁶³ This notion of species as expression of an essence is a crucial point in Giles's teaching on sensation. For Giles the

²⁶¹ Ibid., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, p. 275, rD; d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, p. 456, rA. Cf. also McAleer, "Sensuality," 134 ó 143.

²⁶² Ibid., *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, (Venice, 1503), q. 2, fol.79r: "S[ol]us enim Deus hoc habet quod cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, quia sua essentia est similitudo omnium. Nulla autem creatura hoc habere possit quod ipsa per essentiam suam sit formalis expressio rerum...."

²⁶³ For an extensive presentation on sensation in human knowledge vis-à-vis angelic knowledge cf. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et Langage des Anges selon Thomas d'Aquin et Gilles de Rome* (Paris, Vrin, 2002), 82 ó 84.

principle of cognition is not material being but is rather the formal expression of *res*.²⁶⁴ This notion of the formal expression of *res* is seen by Giles as an instrumental power outside the essence or form of things that causes the immaterial or spiritual multiplication of its species that ultimately cause sensation. However whatever the source is of that instrumentality, it does not involve a sense organ.²⁶⁵ This explains how objects are enabled to pass on its species (or *intentiones*) that are in potency to the medium where they become species (*intentiones*) in act.²⁶⁶ For Giles, the species itself is received in the senses from a sensible thing and he calls this sensation itself or the act itself of sensing.²⁶⁷ Regarding the cause of sensation not involving a sense organ, he teaches that the exterior sense is nothing else than an impression made by the presence of an exterior sensible thing.²⁶⁸

Giles believes his teaching on sensation is in accord with Augustine as well as Aristotle on these points.²⁶⁹ What Giles is doing is melding Augustinian doctrine and Aristotelian thought as he works out his position on the role of species in sensation. St. Augustine defines sensation as the soul's being aware of the body's experience.²⁷⁰ Augustine also maintains the soul's

²⁶⁴ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition", 217.

²⁶⁵ Cf. Giles, *Quodlibetum V*, ed. by Pierre Damase de Connick (Lovain, 1646), q. 21, 330. All other references from Giles's quodlibetal question will be taken from this edition.

²⁶⁶ Carey Leonard, C.M., "A Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect", *The New Scholasticism*, vol. 37, no. 3 (July, 1963): 341.

²⁶⁷ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, q. 1, folio 76v: "Ipsa species recepta in sensu a sensibili est ipsa sensatio sive est ipse actus sentiendi..."

²⁶⁸ Ibid., fol. 76v: "Actus ergo sensus exterior nihil est aliud quam impressio facta sensui a praesentia exterioris sensibilis."

²⁶⁹ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition", 224 - 226.

²⁷⁰ St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, 24, 45, PL, 1061 - 1062.

complete superiority over the body.²⁷¹ Augustine writes that sensation is every passion of the body that is not hidden from the soul.²⁷² Although bodily sense organs undergo change during perception, perception is not something undergone by the soul.²⁷³ What this shows is that Augustine maintained that the soul was active in the act of sensation. An act of sensation is the act of the soul using the body as its instrument in which it directs itself throughout the body in each of the exterior senses and judges the different objects of each sense.²⁷⁴ Sensation for Augustine boils down to awareness the soul has at the presence of a sensed thing. The soul is aware when some form of a body impresses itself on the senses. The soul's response is to create an image of the sensed thing. Hence Augustine may speak of knowledge of sensible things but his knowledge of sensibles is not Aristotle's. This is because for Augustine there is no sense knowledge as there is for Aristotle.²⁷⁵ Sensation can lead to knowledge by which temporal things are directed to a rational end. Based on sensations one can form judgments based on eternal principles and rise higher to a contemplation of these principles. This is wisdom.²⁷⁶

As he works out his theory of sensation Giles blends Augustine's account of sensation with Aristotle's by his application of species in his version of sense perception. The exterior senses are passive to the impression of the species of things. Giles provides an example of how

²⁷¹ Cf. Miethe, "Augustine's Theory of Sense Knowledge", 258.

²⁷² St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, 25, 48, PL, 1063: "Sensus est certe omnis passio corporis non latens animam." See also Miethe, "Augustine's Theory of Sense Knowledge", 260.

²⁷³ See also Gareth B. Matthews, "Knowledge and Illumination", *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge/New York/Port Melbourne/Madrid/Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 175.

²⁷⁴ See Sister Mary Ann Ida Gannon, "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine", 174.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

²⁷⁶ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XII, 15, 25 [Migne, PL]: 1012. See also Sister Mary Ann Ida Gannon, "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine", 167.

species moves the senses with this example of the movement of air. He says that it is necessary that air is moved in the same way you are moved and yet this air does not sense that movement. Hence that motion in the air will be the impression of species in such a way that it will not be a sensation; but in the sense of touch that impression of species informing the sense will be the sensation itself of the sense.²⁷⁷ St. Augustine also used air to speak about the senses; however for him air pertains to the ears especially for the sense of sound. This does not affect Augustine's theory of the soul as the agent of sensation.²⁷⁸

Another mark of Giles's species theory is that he identified species with number. In this account, as created things scaled further down the hierarchy of *res* and further away from divine unity the more they are disposed to multiply and divide. Undoubtedly Giles also inherited this notion from Augustine who links form with number. St. Augustine says that one should look at the sky, earth, and the sea and at whatever in them shines above or crawls, flies, or swims below. They have forms because they have numbers.²⁷⁹ Number connotes order and Giles's hierarchical vision reflects this. There is a gradation in the descent from perfect to imperfect as well in the ascent from imperfect to perfect. Giles says that this can be imagined as a going forth (*processum*) of things from a first principle that is God. God is a certain unity in simplicity, and creatures are related to him by means of an ordering, as numbers to unity or oneness. Therefore all creatures that differ in species are related according to their distance on the line. Here Giles

²⁷⁷ Giles of Rome, *De Cognitione Angelorum*, qu. 1 [77v]: *„Oportet igitur quod aer eodem modo immutetur sicut immutatur tu, et tamen aer ille non sentit immutationem illam. Immutatio ergo illa in aere sic erit impressio speciei quod non erit sensatio aliqua, sed in tactu ipsa impressio speciei informans sensum erit ipsa sensatio sensus.“* Cf. also Rombeiro, *„Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition“*, 227.

²⁷⁸ St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, III, 4, 6 - 7 [Migne, PL]: 281 - 282. Cf. also Miethe, *„Augustine's Theory of Sense Knowledge“*, 261.

²⁷⁹ St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, II, 16, 42 [Migne, PL]: *„Intuere coelum et terram et mare, et quaecumque in eis vel desuper fulgent, vel deorsum repunt vel volant vel natant, formas habent quia numeros habent.“*

uses the image of a number line to illustrate how creatures of different species are more or less distant from God in his unique simplicity. The difference between species is determined by their distance from the source of unity or oneness, such as how numbers are distant in a linear order from this oneness, having their modes of being from God.²⁸⁰ This also applies to the different grades of the hierarchy of created intellectual beings. Giles says that God alone by knowing his own essence can know all things, because his essence is a likeness of all things. However no creature can through its own essence be a formal expression of things. Thus no angel of any kind can know things through its essence.²⁸¹ A created thing (*res*) cannot through its formal expression be represented through another thing. Thus the essence of an angel can be representative of itself, but cannot sufficiently represent anything else.²⁸² If one thing represents or is the formal expression of some other thing, then it must be a likeness of that thing.²⁸³ It would seem that Giles sees a link between number, species, and formal expression. Giles illustrates how a thing's formal representation works within the parameters of sense perception and intellection in the human intellect. Giles holds that species as they exist in things are not capable of moving the senses, except by emanating from the form of the thing and passing through the medium such as air to the skin at an exterior sense. However since these species

²⁸⁰ Giles of Rome, *In Secundum Librum Sententiarum* (Venice, 1581), q. 3, a. 3, fol. 40 C, 41 A: *ōSic ergo imaginabimur processum rerum a primo, quod Deus sit quaedam unitas simplicissima et creaturae se habebat per ordinem, sicut numeri ad unitatem. Omnes ergo creaturae differentes specie, se habebunt secundum distantiam linealem, ita quod semper una plus distabit, quam alia...Differentia autem secundum speciem distant adeo secundum ordinem linealem, ita quod semper unum plus distat, quam aliud, et habent se hoc modo entia ad Deo...ō* Cf. also Edward Mahoney, *ōMetaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Beingō*, 176 - 177. Cf. also Peter Nash, *ōGiles of Rome on Boethius diversum est esse et id quod estō*, *Mediaeval Studies*, vol. 12 (1950): 81 - 84.

²⁸¹ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, q. 2 fol. 79r: *ō...[Q]uod talia non potest angelus cognoscere per essentiam suam. Solus enim Deus hoc habet quod cognoscendum essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, quia sua essentia est similitudo omnium. Nulla autem creatura hoc habere possit quod ipsa per essentiam suam sit formalis expressio rerum...ō*

²⁸² Ibid: *ōRes igitur non per alias res sed per suam expressionem suam formalem repraesentari potest. Essentia igitur angeli suiipsius potest esse repraesentativa, sed nullam aliam rem sufficienter repraesentare poterit...ō*

²⁸³ Cf. Rombeiro, *ōIntelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognitionō*, 239.

emanate from the thing's form, it passes through the medium with deficient being, as what passes through the medium has intentional being as it reaches contact with the senses, to be received in an act of sensation. Giles says that color and sound are secondary qualities that are the objects respectively of visual and auditory perception. However, the sense of touch has as its object primary qualities of cold and hot, wet and dry. Giles says that if secondary qualities, such as color or flavor, which derive from primary qualities, are greatly deficient by their actions that it is due to the fact that to change intentionally is to change in a defective mode. Nevertheless secondary qualities, by being defectives inasmuch as such change derives from primary qualities, can at least change something intentionally. Such change is in a defective manner. For example, color is a secondary quality, and because of this it causes in the medium not real color, but intentional color. Color is not generated in accord with either proper or real *esse*, but in accord with an intentional *esse* that is extrinsic to color in this mode. In this way it is said that the eye and also the medium are without color. This is because neither the eye nor the medium properly have color, and as a consequence neither of them are the proper subject of colors. They have color improperly and according to intentional *esse*.²⁸⁴ On the other hand, the sense of touch perceives the primary qualities of cold and hot, wet and dry and such qualities bring about real change. But the proper mode of the sense of touch is flesh, which is not simply stripped of such qualities, as in the case of the eyes with color. Also the organ of the sense of touch, which is composed of certain nerves that extend throughout the whole body, cannot be entirely stripped

²⁸⁴ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibetum* 5, q. 21, (Peter de Connick), 327 - 328: *...[S]i sunt talia quae sunt qualitates secundae, sicut colores vel sapes qui derivantur a qualitatibus primis, multum deficiunt ab actionibus qualitatem primatum; et quid immutare intentionaliter est immutare modo defectivo...[Q]ualitates tamen secundae deficientes, quantum ad talem immutationem a qualitatibus primis, saltem immutant intentionaliter; quod est immutare defectibiliter, ut color, qui est qualitas secunda, causat in medio non colorem realem, sed intentionalem...[I]deo in eis color non generatur secundum esse proprium sive secundum esse reale, sed secundum esse extraneum intentionale; unde et pupilla dicitur esse abs color, et etiam medium; quia talia de se nullam habent colorem proprium: unde et consequens est, quod nec ipsa sint proprium subjectum colorum: Habent enim colorem improprium, et secundum esse intentionale...ö*

from these primary qualities. This is because nothing mixed is completely stripped from these qualities. In the sense of touch both the medium and the organ of sense are means proportioned to tangibles and are stripped from the prominent part of these tangible sensibles, because both the medium and organ of sense can be both really and intentionally changed by prominent sensibles.²⁸⁵ What Giles seems to be saying here is that the wetness or heat of an object in the sense of touch, since these are primary qualities, would really and immediately affect the medium of the flesh as well as the organ of sense, but intentionally alter the sense power. The main feature of his theory on sense perception is the intentional change or alteration brought about in the sense power.²⁸⁶ Giles associates this intentionality with the reception of species without matter. He says that the particular senses are made actual because they are brought into act by being informed by the sensible species. The sensible species can bring about a change to a sense in potency, and thus brings about a change in a sense that receives the species without matter, or in accord with receiving the species intentionally.²⁸⁷ Giles then shows the link between species and formal expression. He says that when the human soul in its act of understanding is compared with the divine or angelic act of understanding, it can neither generate its own act of understanding or that of another, nor can it be the formal expression in other intellects. It is only naturally fitted to receive such expressions, and is naturally fitted to

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 328: ð...[T]actus, qui est perceptivus frigidatis et calidatis, humiditatis, et siccitatis, quae sunt qualitates primae, quarum est immutare etiam realiter. Rursus, modum proprium in tali sensu cuiusmodi est carne, non est simpliciter denudatum a talibus qualitatibus, sicut pupilla secundum se denudata a coloribus; unum etiam organum sensus tactus, quod dicitur esse nervus quidam extensus per totum corpus, non potest omnino denudatum esse a talibus qualitatibus; quia nullam mixtum est omnino denudatum a qualitatibus praedictis...[I]n sensu tactus medium et organum sensus sunt media proportionata tangibilium, et sunt denudata ob huiusmodi excellentius propter quod possunt ab excellentibus sensibilibus realiter et etiam intentionaliter immutare.ð

²⁸⁶ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 196.

²⁸⁷ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibetum*, q. 21 [329]: ð...Igitur quia sensus particularis exterior factus est actualis, quia actu informatus est specie sensibiles; ideo potest immutare id, quod est potentia tale; poterit itaque ab immutatione facta in sensu, secundum quod est susceptivus specierum sine materia, vel secundum quod suscipit species intentionaliter...ð

cognize through them by its own act of understanding both the expressions themselves and also the things of which they are expressions. This is because the human soul is pure potency in the genus of intelligibles. Therefore no act can proceed from this in such a genus, since its own act of understanding can neither cognize itself nor others. Nor is it naturally fitted to be cognized by another through itself. But it is only naturally fitted to receive the formal expression of other things through its act of understanding; which, by receiving these expressions, can cognize both them and the things of which they are expressions.²⁸⁸ For Giles, however, the soul's pure potency does not refer to its own continual act of understanding, nor to the intellect's passivity regarding its act of understanding, but that no act of understanding can proceed from it without receiving the formal expressions of things. Giles's sense of pure potency is the same which St. Thomas attributes to the human intellect.²⁸⁹ Thus for Giles a multiplication of species is needed because the *esse actuale* that is part of the form and matter composite does not make the composite intelligible. Intelligibility comes by means of some other different *esse* than what is in the thing itself that flows from a primary agent.²⁹⁰ This is why the *esse actuale* of composite *res* adds nothing to the notion of quiddity that can be grasped in an act of understanding.²⁹¹ In this way Giles maintains with Augustine that the sensible thing itself is not sensed. The sensed

²⁸⁸ Ibid., q. 16 [405]: "Anima vero sic ad suum intellectum comparatur, quod nec suiipsius, nec aliorum, nec in aliis intellectibus possit esse formalis expressio: sed solum est apta nata suscipere tales expressiones, per quas et seipsum, et ipsas expressiones, et res etiam, quorum sunt expressiones, est apta nata cognoscere. Est enim anima nostra potentia pura in genere intelligibilium: ideo nullus actus potest progredi ab ea in huiusmodi genere; cum nec seipsas, nec alia possit per seipsam cognoscere. Nec etiam ab aliis est apta nata cognosci per seipsam: sed solum est apta nata suscipere expressiones formales aliorum per suum intellectum: quas suscipiendo, et ipsas expressiones, et ea quorum sunt expressiones, cognoscit."

²⁸⁹ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition", 223.

²⁹⁰ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata De Esse et Essentia*, 18 ó 23 [58]: "Omnes immateriales substantiae quoniam sunt formae per se existentes et a materia sunt abstractae seipsis sunt intelligibiles, sed actu nullo modo existere possunt nisi a primo agente eis influatur esse aliquod differens a natura."

²⁹¹ Cf. Carey J. Leonard, "A Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect: Giles of Rome", 336.

thing is not sensed in an act of sensation. What is sensed of this thing is its formal expression in its species.

Thus Giles regarded species as representations of the object from which they come that make the object present in sense and intellect. Like St. Thomas Giles seems to see a connection between species and form in his account of form as that part which is the actuality of essence and that part which is its quiddity.²⁹² Yet, Giles views the role of form differently than Thomas. For Aquinas the form or species abstracted from the phantasm is potential to the possible intellect before being made in act by the agent intellect. For Giles the species that is received into the senses and then in the intellect has to attain another mode of actuality, another different mode of *esse*, since the *esse actuale* it possesses is limited to the essence's sensible existence. This is due to the incommunicability of a thing ensconced in its *esse actuale*. The species as the presence of the object is a distant representation of the object.²⁹³ For Thomas the likeness of the thing that is in the intellect through form is the nature of the thing. For Giles the *intentio* that is the likeness is contained only 'virtually' in the senses. He also maintains that the presence of substance at the level of the senses is also virtual, but that the presence of such a substance is made actual by the activity of the agent intellect. Thus there is some evidence that Giles was an adherent of a version of the *species substantiae* theory because his focus is to give an account of how the

²⁹² Giles of Rome, *Theoremata De Esse et Essentia*, 4 ó 7, 60: 'õ...[S]ic materiales non possunt ab intellectu intellegi nisi per formam quia sine forma nihil possunt in intellectum imprimere. Requiritur ergo forma ut res materiales intellegantur ab intellectu.õ'

²⁹³ Ibid., *Quodlibet V*, q. 21 [329 - 330]. Cf. also Edward P. Mahoney, 'Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers', 177. And yet Giles claims that the intellect can know the essence of things and the senses can only know their accidental features. Cf. *Quaestiones de Cognitione Angelorum*, q. 3, fol. 81va-b.

likeness of a substance of a thing comes about through the joint effort of the agent intellect and the phantasm.²⁹⁴

3. Giles on the Phantasm and Production of Intelligible Species

Spruit makes the observation that the difference between St. Thomas and Giles in their respective theories of abstraction is that Thomas focuses on the operation of the agent intellect and Giles focuses on the phantasm's acquired capability of moving the possible intellect by imprinting their likenesses.²⁹⁵ What we find is that in one place in his writings Giles maintains that the phantasm acts as a medium under the light of the agent intellect and is the means by which a likeness or species 'arises' in the possible intellect; it is then that the intellect begins to understand.²⁹⁶ What this shows us is that the phantasm has the role of a medium in an act of understanding and that its species or image acts as the catalyst in the actualization of the possible intellect. Although this is somewhat different from Thomas's account of how the intelligible species impress the possible intellect, it would at first glance seem that Giles is merely developing the thought of his teacher. However in another place Giles speaks about the phantasm touching or contacting the possible intellect. He gives an account of the phantasm within an act of knowledge. He does this by speaking of grades of species as they pass from the exterior senses to the phantasm and situating the phantasm in this context. He states that the phantasm is related to the agent intellect as an organ inasmuch as it acts on the possible intellect.

²⁹⁴ Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 197. Cf. also Timothy Noone, 'The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion From Eustachius of Arras to Vital du Four', *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages*, ed. by Kent Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman, and Andreas Speer (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 65, 75.

²⁹⁵ Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 197.

²⁹⁶ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, q. 14, 116vb: '...[F]acto autem tali fantasmate in fantasia mediante lumine intellectus agentis fieri similitudo et species talis corporis in intellectu possibili et inciperet intellectus intelligere...' Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 197.

In this vein Giles asks how the phantasm can change the possible intellect. The answer lies in viewing the phantasm as an organ that has contact with the possible intellect acting under the aegis of a higher powered agent. So the phantasm has contact with the possible intellect, but the possible intellect is present to the phantasm and the phantasm is present to the possible intellect. This is due to the fact that bodily organs and intellect are rooted in the essence of the soul which is in any part of the body. Giles also writes that the phantasm has contact with the possible intellect, because it acts by the power of the agent intellect, and therefore can change the possible intellect. But the possible intellect is present to the other powers of the organs of sense because it is located in the very essence of the soul which is in every part of the body and present in any sense organ; and nevertheless it cannot be changed except by the phantasm. Giles believes that it is necessary to posit grades among the sense powers to trace the multiplication of species from sensible things all the way from the particular senses, to the common sense, and finally to the phantasm. In this grading arrangement the species undergo a dematerialization as they pass from the particular senses to the phantasm. In this way the phantasm has preeminence in respect to the other sense powers, either because every species in memory is in a more actual mode or a more spiritual mode than in the sense powers. The reason for this preeminence is that the phantasm, depending upon the light of the agent intellect, can make an impression upon the possible intellect of which the other sense powers are incapable. The need for the light of the agent intellect upon the phantasm can be viewed from the perspective of causality, on the principles of causes and their effects. In this way it is argued that the agent is prior to what it acts upon. In this way we can say that the phantasm operates, not by its own power, but by the power of the agent intellect. While the phantasm cannot make species intelligible outside the scope of the

agent intellect's light, the phantasm by this light forms species in the possible intellect.²⁹⁷ By using the principles of grading powers and the priority of cause to its effect, Giles demonstrates how the phantasm, depending upon the light of the agent intellect, serves as an instrumental cause in an act of understanding. In associating the phantasm with the possible intellect Giles is only following the teaching of St. Augustine in maintaining that both organ and intellect are rooted in the essence of the soul.²⁹⁸ However Giles also pushes this mediatorial role of the phantasm even further by speaking of the phantasm from standpoint of a transparent medium. Just as light from the sun or any other light needs transparency or rarity in the medium to transmit its rays, so is the relationship between the agent intellect and the phantasm. Such a quality as transparency or rarity is the perfection of air. Giles uses this example of the transparency of air to show the role the phantasm has in connection with the agent intellect. Hence the agent intellect can achieve its work of imprinting the likeness of the phantasm on the passive intellect. The agent intellect assumes the dual role of being the light and disposing actuality by which its light shines upon the possible intellect through the transparency or rarity

²⁹⁷ Ibid., *Quodlibetum* V, q. 21, 330 - 331vb: "Fantasia ergo se habebat sicut organum intellectus agentis prout agit in intellectum possibilem. Propter quod cum quaeritur quomodo fantasia potest immutare intellectum possibilem? Dicemus, quod ut organum attingit passum, et agit in virtute superioris agentis ideo potest agere in rem quae sit ultra suam speciem: sic fantasia quia attingit intellectum possibilem: eo quod intellectus possibilis sit praesens fantasiae quia radicanitur in essentia animae, quae est praesens fantasia, et cuiuslibet parti corporis: rursus quia fantasia sic attingit intellectum possibilem, quia agit in virtute intellectus agentis, ideo possit intellectum possibilem immutare. Est quidem praesens intellectus possibilis alijs virtutibus organicis, quia est in ipsa essentia animae, quae est in qualibet parte corporis, et cuiuslibet organo praesens: non tamen immutari potest intellectus possibilis nisi a fantasia: quia et in ipsis virtutibus sensitivis oportet dare gradus; ut si species multiplicantur a sensibilibus per medium usque ad sensus particulares: et a sensibus particularibus ad sensum communem, et fantasia; erunt species spiritualiori modo in medio, quam in objecto: et in sensibus particularibus quam in medio: et in sensu communi quam in sensibus particularibus: et in fantasia, quam in sensu communi; ita quod fantasia habeat quandam principalitatem respectu aliarum potentiarum sensitivarum, vel quia actualiori modo sunt ibi species omnia memoria: vel quia spiritualiori modo, quam in virtutibus alijs: rationi autem huiusmodi principalitatis innixa cum lumine intellectus agentis potest fantasia impressionem facere in intellecta possibili, quod non possunt aliae virtutes sensitivae. Quod autem arguebatur ulterius, quod sensus non posset immutare fantasmam, quia agens debet esse praestantius patiente...dicimus quod fantasia non in virtute propria, se in virtute lumine intellectus agentis. non quidem immutat speciem intelligibilem ab extra: sed faciat intellectum possibilem potentia informatum specie, actu informatum"

²⁹⁸ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in Some Late Thirteenth Century Theories of Cognition", 240 - 241.

that is the phantasm. Just as rarity disposes the air to receive in the medium the actuality of light from the sun, so the agent intellect has this type of disposition of actuality with regards to the phantasm as the transparent medium in order to complete its operation to impress its likeness upon the possible intellect. Giles is able to separate the transparent or rare quality from the perfective disposition the phantasm is said to have as the medium because he considers the relationship between it and agent intellect to be such that the phantasm could not move the possible intellect to an act of understanding without the light of the agent intellect. In other words the role of the phantasm as the medium would make no sense without the light of the agent intellect. Thus it is by the power of the agent intellect alone that the possible intellect is perfected in its reception of the intelligible species from the phantasm.²⁹⁹ A thing in its material existence does not have the same actuality in the intellect. But another actuality is conferred upon it by the agent intellect.³⁰⁰ And this is achieved through the transparency of the phantasm.

4. The Light of the Agent Intellect

In treating of the role of the agent intellect Giles stresses its illuminating power over its abstractive capacity. It seems that he is rather reluctant to speak of the agent intellect's abstractive work. It could possibly be due to the milieu of the times with the melding of eclectic

²⁹⁹ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 24, 431 - 433: "Dicimus ergo quod fantasmata non possent imprimere similitudinem suam nisi per intellectum agentem; sicut nec aer posset recipere lumen, quod est similitudo lucis solaris, vel lucis alterius, nisi mediante raritate, quae est perfectio aeris: attamen plus habet intellectus agens respectu fantasmatum, ut possit suas similitudines imprimere in intellectu; quare habet raritas respectu lucis, ex eo quod possit causare lumen in aere; quia raritas solum disponit aerem ad susceptionem luminis; ita quod in hoc solum videantur dispositio perfective respectu aeris; non activa respectu lucis; cum dicatur actu ens respectu lucis; cum dicatur actu ens respectu lucis. Sed intellectus agens utrumque habet, et perficit intellectum possibilem, ut possit suscipere similitudinem fantasmatum; et etiam habet quandam actualitatem respectu fantasmatum, ut in virtute eius possint movere intellectum possibilem. Perficit igitur per seipsam intellectus agens intellectum possibilem, et nihilominus est ratio, quare huiusmodi intellectus perficiatur per similitudines receptas a fantasmatibus." Cf. also Leonard, "A Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect: Giles of Rome", 354-6358.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., *Theoremata De Esse et Essentia*, 60, 12-615: "Aliqua ergo alia actualitas requiritur praeter actualitatem formae et huiusmodi actualitas non confertur rebus materialibus ex esse, sed ex intellectu agente."

Aristotelianism with Neoplatonic tendencies.³⁰¹ Perhaps Giles gave up this project of using abstraction in his epistemological account because of his own tendency to interpret the abstractive process too materially.³⁰² Hocedez has also commented on Giles's tendency towards realism in the way he comprehends the seminal reasons.³⁰³ This does provide us a way on how to view his teaching on the agent intellect regarding its abstractive light.

The light of the agent intellect is not merely a metaphor for Giles. It really is a spiritual light that illuminates the phantasm and that by which the potential intelligible species are made intelligible in act.³⁰⁴ The phantasm is only potentially intelligible but needs an addition of some actuality by which it is made actually intelligible. This actuality is the light of the agent intellect.³⁰⁵ In the process of knowledge the phantasm has 'contact' with the possible intellect and is able to imprint its intelligible species upon it, and this is done by the light of the agent intellect.³⁰⁶ The phantasms themselves cannot move or change the possible intellect without the illuminating action of the agent intellect. And yet Giles also maintains that the primary focus of the agent intellect's illumination is not the intelligible species but the possible intellect.³⁰⁷ It is true he claims in an earlier quodlibetal question that both phantasm and the intellect are part of the soul.³⁰⁸ However he also asserts that the agent intellect's chief illuminating work is on the

³⁰¹ Cf. Leonard, 'A Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect: Giles of Rome', 349.

³⁰² Leonard, *Ibid.*

³⁰³ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Theoremata De Esse et Essentia*, 81.

³⁰⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, q. 23, a. 14, fol. 116vb.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, *Expositio super Libros De Anima* (Venice, 1496), fol. 69va.

³⁰⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 24, par. 1, a. 2, fol. 259a '...[Q]uod phantasmata in virtute intellectus agentis imprimunt species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili....'

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 24, 343.

³⁰⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*, *Quodlibet V* q. 21, 329.

possible intellect and in this way acts upon it as an efficient cause.³⁰⁹ Nevertheless in an earlier quodlibetal question he places both the phantasm and the possible intellect under the sway of the illumination of the agent intellect.³¹⁰ Yet Giles pushes the imagery of light further by speaking of the agent intellect as the form and perfection of the possible intellect. Since the possible intellect is passive with regard to its receptivity of intelligible species, the agent intellect is the power that is its form and perfection. This is because the agent intellect is the habit which perfects it.³¹¹ What Giles presents us with here then is an agent and possible intellect that are both rooted in the soul. And yet the agent is the form of the possible intellect in the context of how form actuates matter. Since the possible intellect is associated with passivity and receptivity as a passive faculty, the agent intellect is associated with light and habit as the active principle in making the species intelligible in act.³¹² However his formulation of the relationship between agent and possible intellect is somewhat confusing. Does Giles see his principle of *res* entering into the very action of knowledge? Does he view both the agent intellect and the possible intellect as *parts* of a whole? He seems to suggest this when he speaks of the need of the possible intellect for the light of the agent intellect, not for its very existence (since it is rooted in the soul), but for its cognitive capacity. He does this by introducing an analogy of light and color. On the one hand, just as light is to color, with light being the *form* of color, so is the relationship between the agent and possible intellect. The agent intellect has the role of form and

³⁰⁹ Cf. Leonard, *On Thirteenth Century Notion of the Agent Intellect: Giles of Rome*, 352.

³¹⁰ Giles, *Quodlibet II*, q. 22, 107.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, q. 23, 110.

³¹² Giles, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 24, 431 - 433.

the possible intellect has the passive and receptive capacity.³¹³ Giles account here is reminiscent of Averroes's description of the agent intellect as *ōform for usō*.³¹⁴ It is interesting that Giles would portray the cognitive process within the intellect as an analogy of light with the need of the transparency or rarity that the medium of air provides. However there is no mention of the stripping or disrobing abstraction activity of the agent intellect as we find in Aquinas's noetics. In fact there is no mention of abstraction in his cognitional theory at all. Giles would give us to understand that agent intellect's light would only cast its beam on the transparency of the phantasm. This is how intelligible species are actualized in the possible intellect for an act of understanding. And yet with all Giles maintained regarding the mediatorial role of the phantasm it would seem that the illuminative rays of the agent intellect are beamed upon the possible intellect.

In this analysis of Giles of Rome it is evident how he was influenced by the thought of St. Augustine with his own notion of the incommunicability of a sensible thing. However for Augustine this would be due to the activity of the soul which notices what the body experiences. Giles also accepted the passivity of human cognition as presented by Aristotle. In many ways his *res* theory is evidence of his forging both theories into his own cognitional theory. However even though Giles maintains that both agent and possible intellect flow from the soul he seems to treat them as parts; the agent intellect is the habit of knowledge, the possible intellect the *locus specierum*. This could mean that the possible intellect has *ōcontactō* with the phantasm because

³¹³ Ibid., 431: *ō[S]i unum sit principalius alio, illud erit forma alterius; ut si lux et color sint in dyaphano; quia lux est perfectior colore, dicitur esse forma coloris. Secundum hoc ergo videmus sufficienter haberi intantum; ut quia intellectus possibilis habet rationem passivi, intellectus autem agens rationem activi...ut in anima, unum se habebit quasi forma alterius: et quia agens semper est praestantius patiente, intellectus agens se habebit quasi forma intellectus possibilis.ō* In this section of his argument in q. 24 Giles is disproving the notion that cognition requires a third element to complete the process between the agent and possible intellect; so Giles proceeds to accord the agent intellect as assuming the role of form, the active principle, and the possible intellect as the passive principle.

³¹⁴ See particularly Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 499 [586] - 500 [590].

of its proximity in the chain of gradations. However, if the habit of knowledge remains in the agent intellect, Giles also seems to uphold a dichotomy between body and soul, with the agent and possible intellect being a *part* of the soul but yet separate from the senses. However one may interpret the ramifications of Giles's teaching on the agent intellect, one can readily see that his views on this point are rather puzzling.³¹⁵

E. John Duns Scotus

The plan of this chapter is to present a historical survey of the cognitional theories of these medieval figures. Thus far this chapter has been just that - a brief and concise analysis of each of these authors. However we enter into special territory as I treat the thought of Blessed John Duns Scotus. Scotus was perhaps the most original thinker among the group treated in this chapter.³¹⁶ One author has suggested that one original contribution made by Scotus is to emphasize the logical/chronological priority of intelligible species with respect to the causally related cognitive act of understanding and to render a chronological account of the different *moments* in the intellectual process.³¹⁷ This shows how Scotus was influenced by the previous generation of thinkers, particularly Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent, and the part they played in the formation of Scotus's thinking. And the influence they had was not necessarily only negative. There are instances that show how Henry of Ghent had a big influence on Scotus even though he was a main target of Scotus's criticism. This is seen especially in the

³¹⁵ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 198.

³¹⁶ Cf. Mahoney, *Hierarchy of Being*, 179f.

³¹⁷ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 265 & 266.

formulation of Scotus's doctrine of the concept of being.³¹⁸ Perhaps Godfrey's and Henry's influence is seen more in how Scotus explained the necessity and activity of intelligible species and its interaction with the possible intellect in the cognitive act.³¹⁹ In this sense then we can see how Scotus's contribution to the teaching of intelligible species is a continuing development of the doctrine of those who had preceded him. One aspect which he inherited from the previous generation of authors was the theological doctrine of divine omnipotence. It was a doctrine that became prominent in the last quarter of the thirteenth century that states unequivocally that God can do anything and all things that do not involve a logical contradiction (*potentia absoluta*), or do anything in the order of nature which he chooses according to his laws that he has established in accordance with his justice and wisdom (*potentia ordinata*).³²⁰

1. The Nature of Human Cognition and Intentionality

Since Scotus maintains that being is a univocal concept in the mind and that the universality of natures is the property which natures have in the mind, how does this account for the veridicality of things cognized by the human intellect? In one sense Scotus answers these questions against the backdrop of his criticism of Henry of Ghent's proposed hypothetical skepticism. Against Henry's attempt to base his defense of divine illumination on the apparent

³¹⁸ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 62 ó 64, where Henry had a part to play in Scotus's treatment of the distinction of first and second intentions in laying down the basis of the correspondence of the mental *conceptus* and extramental real sensible things in acts of cognition. See also Steven Marrone, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being," *Speculum*, vol. 63, no. 1 (January, 1988), 22 ó 57.

³¹⁹ Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), 223 ó 242. See also Douglas Langston, "Scotus's Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition," *Synthese*, vol. 96, no. 1, Studies in Early Fourteenth-Century Philosophy (July, 1993): 15 ó 20, accessed January 4, 2011 <http://jstor.org/stable/20126209>. See also Dominique Demange, "Objet premier d' conclusion virtuell: Introduction a la théorie de la science de Jean Duns Scot," *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302 - 2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002*. Eds. O. Boulnois, E Karger, J. -L. Solère, G. Sondag (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 89 - 116.

³²⁰ Cf. Olga Larre, "El Conocimiento De La Naturaleza En El Comentario A Las Sentencias De Juan Duns Escoto," *Anuario Filosófico*, vol. 41, no. 1 (2008): 122.

inability of the human mind to know the truth of things, Scotus counters with four types of knowledge of which we have necessary certainty: (1) things simply knowable (*scibilibus simpliciter*), (2) things knowable through experience (*scibilibus per experientiam*), (3) things known from our actions (*de actibus nostris*), and (4) things known through our senses in the present ñowö (*de cognitis a nobis ut nunc per sensus*). Scotus asserts that the first and the third types of cognition only need the senses on occasion because, even if our senses erred on occasion there would yet still be certitude. But the second and fourth types of cognition hold by means of this proposition, that what happens frequently by something that is a determined cause (ie, not free) has this thing as its natural öper seö cause.³²¹ What follows in his account of how the human intellect has certitude of truth in these four classifications of knowledge is an attempt by Scotus to establish the mind as the one constant that is assured of the truth in its propositional knowledge. Here are a few examples. In reference to the first type of knowledge, the knowledge of first principles, Scotus poses a question whether the intellect can be err in the knowledge of these first principles and conclusions if the senses are deceived about the terms of a proposition. Scotus replies that the senses are not the cause of this knowledge but merely an occasion for the mind having this knowledge. This is because the mind cannot have any knowledge of these terms unless they have been taken from the senses. Nevertheless once the mind has them it can by its own power form the proposition with these terms. If a proposition is true because of the terms involved, the intellect by its own power will assent to this proposition by virtue of the

³²¹ John Duns Scotus, *Duns Scotus Philosophical Writings*, ed. Allan Wolter, O.F.M. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 105 ö 106. ö As Fr. Wolter explains in his Preface, the selections of Scotus's writings here are taken from his *Ordinatio*. Thus any further references to this work will be given the designation *Philosophical Writings*, with the pertinent page number.

terms and not because of the senses. The overriding focus here is on the overarching power of the intellect to overcome even deceitful senses.³²²

Concerning the knowledge from experience, Scotus states that even if we have experiences of many things that do not all happen at the same time, one can still infallibly and indubitably know that things are such a way and obtain in all cases. Undoubtedly Scotus is referring to any range of possible and contingent events that we can experience, like the sun rising or setting, and even persons whom we know that change physically over a period of time. In these cases one knows infallibly and indubitably by means of this proposition within us: "Whatever happens in many instances by a determined cause (ie, cause that is not free) is the natural effect of that cause." Scotus goes on to maintain that this proposition is known in the mind even if its terms come from erring senses because such a cause that is determined (ie, not free) cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it was ordained to produce by its form.³²³ Concerning knowledge from our acts, Scotus has in mind actions of sense organs; for instance our sense organ for sight. Thus if we see something that may be an illusion there is no doubt that one still sees what would be the case however the eyes are

³²² *Ibid.*, 108: "Sed numquid in ista notitia principiorum et conclusionum non errabit intellectus si sensus omnes decipiantur circa terminos? Respondeo quantum ad istam notitiam, quod intellectus non habet sensus pro causa, sed tantum pro occasione, quia intellectus non potest habere notitiam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus. Illa tamen accepta virtute sua potest simul componere simplicia, et si ex ratione talium simplicium sit complexio evidenter vera, intellectus virtute propria et terminorum assentiet illi complexione non virtute sensus a quo accipit terminos exterius...intellectus virtute sui et istorum terminorum assentiet indubitanter..."

³²³ *Ibid.*, 109: "[D]ico quod licet experientia non habeatur de omnibus singularibus, sed de pluribus, neque quod semper, sed quod pluries, tamen expertus infallibiliter novit quia ita est et semper et in omnibus, et hoc per istam propositionem qui est quiescentem in anima: Quidquid evenit ut in pluribus ab aliqua causa non libera, est effectus naturalis illius causae, quae propositio nota est intellectui licet accepisset terminos ejus a sensu errante. Quia causa non libera non potest producere ut in pluribus effectum non libere ad cujus oppositum ordinatur, vel ad quem ex sua forma non ordinatur."

affected. Even in the case of after-images of fire that one sees when one closes his eyes, the image which represents fire is still a true image and cannot be changed into a false one.³²⁴

It is however in his analysis of the certitude of knowledge from the senses that reveals what Scotus considers the role of sensation in his overall strategy of criticizing Henry's proposed skepticism. In his noetic Scotus remarks how the sense of sight may be deceived in seeing one end of a stick seemingly bent in water, or how one may see an object that is larger or smaller depending on the distance, and uses this as a way to point to the source of error in the senses. What provides certitude in such matters are propositions which the intellect puts forward that correct it regarding what is true and false in regard to the perception of the senses. There are propositions that are not caused by the senses but in which the senses are merely the occasion for this propositional knowledge in the mind.³²⁵ When one sees a stick "broken" in the water the mind judges the truth of the situation with a judgment more certain than any of the acts of the senses. Even though the terms of propositional knowledge may come from erring senses the intellect has the power to see the thing in equal measure and put right that in which the senses erred. There are thus two types of knowledge in an intellect that judges the senses to err: one type of knowledge in the intellect is that which requires the senses only as an occasion for its intellectual act, and the other is the knowledge the intellect acquires from the senses in order to know what is true by means of its propositions.³²⁶

³²⁴ Ibid., 112 ó 113.

³²⁵ Ibid., 114: "Si autem diversi sensus habeant diversa iudicia de aliquo viso extra, puta visus dicit baculum esse fractum cujus pars est in aqua et pars est in aere, visus semper dicit solem esse minoris quantitatis quam est, et omne visum a remotis esse minus quam sit, in talibus est certitudo quid verum sit et quis sensus erret per propositionem quiescentem in anima certiore omni iudicio sensus, et per actus plurium sensuum concurrentes, ita quod semper aliqua propositio rectificat mentem vel intellectum de actibus sensus quis sit verus et quis falsus, in qua propositione intellectus non dependet a sensu, sicut a causa, sed sicut ab occasione."

³²⁶ Ibid., 115: Sequitur, ergo baculum non est fractus sicut sensus iudicat ipsum fractum, et ita quis sensus erret et quis non circa fractionem baculi, intellectus iudicat per certius omni actu sensus. Similiter, ex alia parte quod

Scotus demonstrated for us the independence the intellect has from the senses. While Scotus asserts that the primal concept of the mind is being yet our knowledge of things is not knowledge of what kind of thing something is; but what kind of being it has. In this sense the being the mind grasps is open ended and can be determined by any of the modes of being. We only know that something exists. How we come about knowing the being of the things is through an act of the mind; an act of predication in which the *esse existere* of the thing is predicated denominatively of the object. In this case the being we predicate of the object is a concept that belongs to some determined genus. In this way one arrives at the knowledge of essence.³²⁷ That we come to know the quiddity of the thing but not the thing itself is reflective of the state of the scope of our intellectual power, a power that is tied to species of things which shine or glisten in the phantasm (*relucent in phantasmate*). Scotus attributes this condition to the consequence of original sin, to the state of our intellective power in this life as a wayfarer or on account of a natural concord of the powers of the soul in its operation. We see according to this that the superior power has its operation with the same thing which the inferior power has, if both have a perfect operation. The fact is that whatever universal we understand in our minds,

quantum applicatum quanto omnino est aequale sibi, hoc est notum intellectui quantumcumque notitia terminorum accipitur a sensu errante...et ita ubicumque ratio iudicat sensum errare, hoc iudicat non per aliquam notitiam praecise acquisitam a sensibus ut causa, sed per aliquam notitiam occasionatam a sensu in qua non fallitur etiam si omnes sensus fallantur, et per aliquam aliam notitiam acquisitam a sensu vel a sensibus ut in pluribus quae sciuntur esse vera quae sciuntur esse vera per propositionem...ö For further reading on Scotus's teaching on the relationship of the mind to its object of sense see Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts", *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 66 (2008), 281 ö 315.

³²⁷ B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Questiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri I – V*, eds. B. Andrew, G. Etzkorn, G. Gal, T. Noone, et al. Opera Philosophica 5 (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), Bk. 4, q. 1 [319:17 ö 320:7]: öAd tertium dico quod contingit cognoscere de aliquo quod ipsum existit, non cognoscendo si in se existit vel in alio. Sed illud esse existere non est quid, sed praedicatur denominative de eo sicut accidens, et illud ponitur de genere actionis, et est eiusdem rationis in omnibus rebus, ut denominans illa. De ente autem quod praedicatur in quid de omnibus non potest unus conceptus concipi nisi in aliquo genere determinato. Contra; si contingit concipere hoc æesseöconcipio hoc esse æquidö quia non cognoscitur esse nisi quia cognoscitur habere aliquam essentiam, et ita aliquod æquidö

its singular is imaged in the phantasm.³²⁸ In its grasp of its first object our intellect is adequated by its natural power only to what is most common. So on account of the existential status of our intellect, what is adequated to it in its cognitive act is the quiddity of the sensible thing which moves it. In this state our intellect in its first movement can only understand what is contained in the object. The mind can presently only know things in this way.³²⁹ According to this perspective the senses can impede the intellectual powers. However, that he maintains that the power of sight is a sense superior to the other senses; will be significant in his doctrine on intuitive cognition. It is in this way Scotus demarcates the role for the *sensus communis*. The sense of sight has higher capabilities and its object, *lux*, is the basic existential phenomenon on which the other senses depend for their own specific objects.³³⁰

However whether it is light which the eye sees or whatever the sensible object of each of the senses is, Scotus links species with *intentio*. *Intentio* is neither spiritual, corporeal, nor material. It is not even a substantial form.³³¹ Scotus does not consider species to be in sensible things and also does not see a metaphysical nexus between form and species, as St. Thomas formerly had. Rather he distinguishes between the species and its object by asserting that the

³²⁸ Duns Scotus, *I Ordinatio*, d. 3, (Vat. 3, 187): "Sed, quae est ratio huius status? Respondeo: "Status non videtur esse nisi "stabilis permanentia" firmata legibus divinae sapientiae. Firmatum est autem illis legibus, quod intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu isto nisi illa quorum species relucet in phantasmate, et hoc sive propter poenam peccati originalis, sive propter naturalem concordiam potentialium animae in operando, secundum quod videmus quod potentia superior operatur circa idem circa quod inferior, si utraque habebit operationum perfectam. Et de facto ita est in nobis, quod quodcumque universale intelligimus eius singulae actu phantasiamur."ö

³²⁹ Ibid., d. 3 (Vat. 3, 186): "Nunc autem, ut probatum est prius - contra primam opinionem de primo obiecto intellectus, hoc est adequato, quae ponit quidditatem rei materialis primum obiectum - nihil potest adaequari intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae in ratione primi obiecti nisi communissimum; tamen ei pro statu isto ei adaequatur in ratione motivi quidditas rei sensibilis, et ideo pro isto statu non naturaliter intelliget alia quae non continentur sub isto primo motivo."ö Cf. also Basil Heiser, O.F.M. Conv., "The Metaphysics of Duns Scotus", *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 2 (1942): 387.

³³⁰ Edward R. McCarthy, "Medieval Light Theory and Optics, and Duns Scotus' Treatment of Light in D. 13 of Book II of his Commentary on the Sentences" (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1976), 86 ó 87, accessed November 22, 2011, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

³³¹ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 58.

species of sensible quality is also the intention of sensible quality. Hence *intentio* serves the role of being the sign of the thing, and Scotus makes clear in his distinction between a sign and its thing that the *intentio* is the sign. One can postulate that the *intentio* is the thing and the sensible form into which the sense tends. But the *intentio* is not only the thing into which the sense tends but also has the nature (*ratio*) of the similitude tending in the thing. By invoking the authority of St. Augustine Scotus reveals his connection with the tradition within his own Franciscan order; not only in the writings of Roger Bacon,³³² but also in the semiotics of St. Bonaventure.³³³ The term *intentio* has many different meanings and thus can be used in an ambiguous manner. But one meaning of *intentio* which has the same meaning of species is the one which states that *intentio* is called the *ratio* for tending toward an object as a likeness and is called the *ratio* for this purpose. In this manner the sensible species is properly speaking an intention and functions as a sign to its object.³³⁴ Within this schema the *intentio* or species then is only a property of the intellect and as such is only a likeness or image of the thing. In this way the difference between first and second intentions is that a first intention is a concept immediately made by the thing (*obiectum*) but a second intention is that notion which belongs to the operation of the intellect in

³³² Cf. Ibid., 62.

³³³ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 13, q. un., in Edward McCarthy, *Medieval Light Theory and Optics and Duns Scotus*, 26: *¶Cum autem genus qualitatis quantum ad tertiam speciem distinguatur in qualitatem sensibilem et in qualitatem quae est species sive intentio qualitatis sensibilis, notandum est quod huiusmodi nomen intentio est equivocum. Uno modo dicitur actus voluntatis intentio. Alio modo: ratio formalis in re. Sed intentio rei a qua accipitur genus differt ab intentione a qua accipitur differentia. Tertio modo, dicitur communiter. Quarto modo, dicitur ratio tendendi in obiectum; sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est. Notandum est quod intentio non dicitur hic quod intendit sensus quia hoc modo ipsum obiectum esset intentio. Sed intentio dicitur hic illud per quod tamquam per principium formale in obiectum tendit sensus. ¶ Et sicut quidquid est signum, est res, secundum Augustinum De Trinitate et De Doctrina Christiana, licet non e converso; et ideo in distinctione rei et signi res accipitur pro illa re quae non est signum, licet illa quae est signum sit etiam res, ita in distinctione rei et intentionis, licet intentio sit res, et forma sensibilis, in quam possit sensus tendere, tamen illa dicitur intentio quae non est tantum res in quam sensus tendit, sed est ratio tendendi in alterum, cuius est propria similitudo.*

³³⁴ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, pp. 62 ó 63. See also Olivier Boulnois, *Réelles intentions: nature commune et universaux selon Duns Scot*, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 97e Année, no. 1 (Janvier - mars, 1992): 3 - 33.. Accessed November 25, 2011 <http://jstor.org/stable/40903806>.

predication.³³⁵ But why does Scotus state here that these first intention concepts that are solely the work of the *obiectum* and not the intellect are positive *and* negative notions? Perhaps he was attempting to explain how the mind can distinguish individual objects from each other, one's singularity or non-instantiability from another's. Nevertheless this explanation does not remove the question as well as the puzzlement.³³⁶ This development regarding Scotus's doctrine on individuation is profound, because first intention concepts of the *species specialissima*, *genera intermedia*, and *genera generalissima*, are the primary concepts upon which the foundation of concept formation rests.³³⁷

2. Human Cognition of Universals

Scotus maintains then that being is the first object of the human intellect because there is a two-fold primacy in being that is specifically of commonness and virtuality. Being thus enjoys a primacy with respect to the other categorical transcendentals. The transcendentals are co-extensive with being. All things that are intelligible *per se* are either essentially included under a notion or concept (*rationem*) of being or are contained virtually or are contained essentially by being included in this notion or concept. For every genus and species and individuating difference and all essential parts of the genus as well as uncreated being are included in a quidditative concept of being. All differences are essentially included in any of

³³⁵ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio I*, d. 23, q. un. (Vat. 5, 352, 360): "Omnis intentio secunda est relatio rationis, non quaecumque, sed pertinens ad extremum vel actus intellectus componentis vel dividensis, vel saltem conferentis unum ad alterum; (hoc patet, quia intentio secunda - secundum omnes - causatur per actum intellectus negotiantis circa rem primae intentionis, qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem rationis vel relationes rationis...omnis enim conceptus est intentionis primae qui natus est fieri immediate a re, sine opera vel actu intellectus negotiantis, qualis est conceptus non tantum positivus, sed etiam negativus."

³³⁶ Cf. Timothy Noone, "Individuation in Scotus", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 69, no. 4 (1995): 533; cf. also Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, pp. 63 ó 64.

³³⁷ Cf. Basil Heiser, "The Primum Cognitum According to Duns Scotus", *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 2 (1942), p. 197.

these concepts. All attributes (*passiones*) of being are included in this concept of being and all lower attributes are included virtually.³³⁸ Being is thus the highest common predicate of all that can be called a being and virtually contains within itself all differences that are not predicable of its quiddity. Hence being is common or virtual in each and everything that exists. In its state as *viator* the human intellect does not have a direct cognition of substance but can only directly know material accidents. It follows that we can have no quidditative concept of substance except such as could be abstracted from a concept of accidents. But there can be no such quidditative concept abstracted from accidents except the concept of being.³³⁹ Scotus then asks if neither matter nor substantial form can move the intellect to an act of understanding, what simple concept the mind can have from matter and form. If an objector says that there is a concept related to partial features of substance or a concept of an accident related to some related properties of matter, Scotus asks what is the quidditative concept that is attributed to an accident or related feature of substance. He responds that if the intellect can have no quidditative concept (then there will be no quidditative concept that can be attributed to accidents) except accidents that are impressed or abstracted from what moves the intellect, then this concept will be a concept of being. And so nothing can be cognized regarding the essential features of substance unless being is univocal and common to the substance and to its accidents.³⁴⁰ Although Scotus is

³³⁸ Duns Scotus, *Duns Scotus Philosophical Writings*, 4: ð...[D]ico quod primum objectum intellectus nostri est ens, quia in ipso concurrunt duplex primitas, scilicet communitatis et virtualitatis. Nam omne per se intelligibile aut includit essentialiter rationem entis, vel continetur virtualiter, vel essentialiter in includente essentialiter rationem entis. Omnia enim genera et species et individua et omnes partes essentielles generum et ens increatum includunt ens quidditative. Omnes autem differentiae ultimate includuntur in aliquibus istorum essentialiter. Omnes autem passionem entis includuntur in ente et in suis inferioribus virtualiter

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5: ð...[C]um enim substantia non immutat intellectum nostrum ad aliquam intellectionem sui, sed tantum accidens sensible, sequitur quod nullum conceptum quidditativum poterimus habere de ea nisi aliquis talis possit abstrahi a conceptu accidentis. Sed nullis talis quidditativus, abstrahibilis a conceptu accidentis est nisi conceptus entis.ö

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 6: ðSi enim materia non immutat intellectum ad actum circa ipsam, nec forma substantialis, quaero quis conceptus simplex in intellectu habebitur de materia vel forma? Si dicas quod aliquis conceptus relativus, puta

convinced that we have a concept of being, this only demonstrates the weakness of the human intellect and a weakness that accrued to it since the fall in original sin.³⁴¹

Scotus continues this discussion on this simple concept with a discussion on the relation between common nature and universals. He says that Avicenna stated that ὁhorse-ness is only horse-ness, that it is neither in itself one nor plural, and neither universal nor particular. Scotus understands this to mean that this unity in itself is not a numerical unity, nor is this plurality a plurality in opposition to this unity. Neither is it a ὁuniversal in act, specifically as something universal that is an object of the intellect, nor is it particular or singular in itself.³⁴² Scotus makes it quite clear that this ὁhorse-ness in its unity is neither the universal that is the precise object of the intellect, nor that which is in the thing in its real concrete existence.³⁴³ Scotus continues by saying that although ὁhorse-ness is not really without either a numerical unity or a plurality, yet of itself it is naturally prior to all of these, according to a natural priority that is the essence (*quod quid est*), as the per se object of the intellect. And considered from a metaphysical perspective we express this in the forms of a definitions and propositions that are ὁtrue in the first mode, true by the nature of the quiddity so received. This is because nothing is called ὁper se in the first mode of a quiddity unless this includes what is essentially in it, inasmuch as it is abstracted

partis, vel conceptus per accidens, puta alicujus proprietatis materiae vel formae, quaero quis est conceptus quidditativus, cui iste per accidens vel relativus attribuitur? Et si nullus quidditativus [habetur, nihil erit, cui attribuitur iste conceptus per accidens, nullus autem quidditativus] potest haberi nisi impressus vel abstractus ab illo quod movet intellectum, puta ab accidente, et ille erit conceptus entis. Et ita nihil cognoscitur de partibus essentialibus substantiae, nisi ens sit commune univocum eis et accidentibus.ö

³⁴¹ Cf. Basil Heiser, O.F.M. Conv., ὁThe Metaphysics of Duns Scotusö, 386 ö 387.

³⁴² Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio II*, d. 3 [Vat. ed., 31: 402 - 403]: ὁQualiter autem hoc debeat intelligi, potest aliquantulum videri per dictum Avicennae V Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod ὁequitas sit tantum equitas, - nec est de se una nec plures, nec universalis nec particularisö Intelligo: non est ὁex se una unitate numerali, nec ὁplures pluralitate opposita illi unitati; nec ὁuniversalis actu est (eo modo scilicet quo aliquid est universale ut est obiectum intellectus), nec est ὁparticularis de se.ö

³⁴³ Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1996), 427.

from all numerical unities and pluralities which naturally come after this.³⁴⁴ Regarding this prior unity and the universal, Scotus seems to say that there is a real non-numerical unity in a thing, and that the universal that is the object of the intellect has no relation with a concrete real thing.³⁴⁵ At the same time however Scotus like Avicenna thinks that this unity as a nature never exists apart from concrete things outside or in the mind, and that this unity concomitant with a nature has a natural priority manifested in this nature either inside or outside the human intellect.³⁴⁶ Scotus continues by saying that not only is this nature of itself indifferent to existence in the intellect and in the singular thing and indifferent to existence in a universal and in a particular or singular thing, but that also the existence this nature has in the intellect does not derive principally from the universal. For although this nature is understood in the intellect under the aegis of the universal as its mode of understanding, this universal is nevertheless not a part of its primary concept. This is because this concept is not metaphysical, but logical; for logic considers second intentions that are applied to first intentions. Therefore the first act of understanding is *ōnatureō*, not as it is understood in some mode; nor is it the object in the intellect or what is outside the intellect; although what is understood in its mode of understanding is the universal. But this mode of understanding the universal is not the mode of

³⁴⁴ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio II*, d. 3 [Vat. ed., 32: 403]: *ōLicet enim numquam sit realiter sine aliquo istorum, de se tamen non est aliquod istorum, sed est prius naturaliter omnibus istis, - et secundum prioritatem naturalem est -quod quid estōper se obiectum intellectus, et per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimatur per definitionem; et propositiones -verae primo modoōsunt verae ratione quiditatis sic acceptae, quia nihil dicitur -per se primo modoō de quiditate nisi quod includitur in ea essentialiter, in quantum ipsa abstrahitur ab omnibus istis, quae sunt posteriora naturaliter ipsa.ō*

³⁴⁵ Cf. Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux*, 427 - 428.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Timothy Noone, *ōUniversals and Individuationō*, *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. by Thomas Williams (Cambridge/New York/Port Melbourne/Madrid/Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 109. See also Peter King, *ōDuns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentiaō*, *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 20, vol. 2 (Fall, 1992): 50 - 76.

the intellect.³⁴⁷ This is where Scotus develops his own position on this nature in contradistinction to Avicenna. For Scotus this nature so lacks determination to singularity that of itself it is capable of joining with a principle of singularity other than a given one.³⁴⁸

Scotus continues by saying that just as the existence of the nature itself is not the universal so that the universal accrues (*accidit*) to this nature as to its first cause (*primam rationem eius*) as the object in the intellect, so it is also the case also outside with this nature in a singular thing. However this nature is not of itself determinate to singularity, for it is naturally prior to the cause (*ratione*) contracting it to singularity. And inasmuch as it is naturally prior to this contracting cause, it is not repugnant for it to be without it. Just as the object in the intellect in its first presence as universality truly has intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*), so the nature in the thing as that entity has true real being (*esse reale*) outside the soul. And accordingly this entity has a unity proportional to itself that is indifferent to singularity, so that it is not repugnant to be placed with any unity of singularity. This is the way Scotus understands this nature; a nature having a real unity, though less than a numerical unity.³⁴⁹ Thus for Scotus there is a

³⁴⁷ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio II*, d. 3 [33: 403 - 404]: "Non solum autem ipsa natura de se est indifferens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse universale et particulare (sive singulare), - sed etiam ipsa, habens esse in intellectu, non habet primo ex se universalitatem. Licet enim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitatem ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars eius conceptus primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici (logicus enim considerat secundas intentiones, applicatas primis secundum ipsum). Prima ergo intellectio est naturae ut non cointelligitur aliquis modus, neque qui est eius in intellectu, neque qui est eius extra intellectui licet illius intellecti modus intelligendi sit universalitas, sed non modus intellectus!"

³⁴⁸ Cf. Timothy Noone, "Universals and Individuation", 109. Also cf. Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux*, 428.

³⁴⁹ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio II*, d. 3 [Vat. ed., 34: 404]: "Et sicut secundum illud esse non est natura de se universalis, sed universalitas accidit illi naturae secundum primam rationem eius, secundum quam est obiectum, - ita etiam in re extra, ubi natura est cum singularitate, non est illa natura de se determinate ad singularitatem, sed est prior naturaliter ipsa ratione contrahente ipsam ad singularitatem illam, et in quantum est prior naturaliter illo contrahente, non repugnat sibi esse sine illo contrahente. Et sicut obiectum in intellectu secundum illam primitatem eius et universalitatem habuit vere esse intelligibile, ita etiam in re natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum esse reale extra animam, - et secundum illam entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionalem, quae indifferens est ad singularitatem, ita quod non repugnat illi unitati de se quod cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur (hoc igitur modo intelligo naturam habere unitatem realem, minorem unitate numerali)..."

commonality between substances in the world of the same kind. It is this commonness between things that Scotus identifies as common nature. However the universal in the intellect is how one formally understands.³⁵⁰ However, as we observed above, Scotus believes there is a relation between common nature and universality in the intellect. He makes a distinction between the universal which is the object of the intellect and its active principle. The agent intellect, along with the nature itself in some indeterminate mode, is the integral productive cause of the being of the object in the possible intellect, in accord with the complete indetermination of the universal. Thus this nature is a remote power for the determination of singularity and the indetermination of the universal; and as from a productive principle it is conjoined with singularity, this nature acts from the thing and is at the same time conjoined by the agent intellect with universality.³⁵¹ Thus the common nature has three different modes: one is that it exists in a thing outside the soul as individuated by this-ness or haecceity; secondly, it exists in the phantasm not individuated by this-ness but under a mode of particularity and singularity; thirdly, it exists in the intellect neither as individuated nor under a mode of particularity, but under a mode of universality that is effected by the agent intellect. This common nature as the quiddity in the universal is transferred by the agent intellect to the possible intellect in which it becomes intelligible species.³⁵² As we

³⁵⁰ Cf. Noone, "Universals and Individuation", 110 - 111. For an interesting analysis of the logical status of universals, see Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Signification and Logic: Scotus on Universals from a Logical Point of View", *Vivarium*, vol. 8 (1980): 81 - 111.

³⁵¹ Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Bk. 7, q. 18 [351: 7 - 9, 10 - 13, 15 - 19]: "Ergo cum experiamur quod est aliquis intellectus in nobis quo est universale fieri, hoc est, cui insit aliquid per quod obiectum est praesens ut universale, necesse est aliquid esse activum illius...Intellectus igitur agens, concurrens cum natura aliquo modo indeterminata ex se, est causa integra factiva obiecti in intellectu possibili secundum esse primum, et hoc secundum completam indeterminationem universalis...Est ergo natura in potentia remota ad determinationem singularitatis et ad indeterminationem universalis; et sicut a producente coniungitur singularitati, ita a re agente et simul ab intellectu agente coniungitur universalitati."

³⁵² Cf. Richard Dumont, "The Role of the Phantasm in the Psychology of Duns Scotus", *The Monist*, vol. 49, no. 4, Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, in Commemoration of the 700th Anniversary of His Birth (October, 1965): 617 - 633, particularly 624 - 631. Accessed January 19, 2016 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27901615>. See also Dónal McGinley, "Duns Scotus's Theory of Common Natures", *Filosofia Unisinos*, vol. 9, no. 1 (January/April, 2008): 65 - 83.

shall see, both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author of the *De Anima* reflect Scotus's view of the link between a thing's common nature and the intelligible species in the possible intellect.

3. Abstractive Cognition and Intelligible Species

Despite the perplexity of Scotus's stand on individuation, he still views intelligible species as the catalyst to the intellect's capability for abstractive cognition. Undoubtedly he found the reason to defend this doctrine due to his analysis of angelic cognition. According to Scotus the scope of their capacity to know (and remember) was so much more pervasive than the human intellect in this state as *viator* (which reveals the link of the influence of the angelic doctrines of Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaine, and Henry of Ghent on Scotus).³⁵³ Scotus also accepted in principle the Thomistic account of the intelligible species as formal principles of knowledge. However, being influenced by the criticisms of Henry and others regarding the naturalism implied in Thomas's species theory, Scotus agreed that knowledge of concrete sensible things in the world founded on intelligible species is reached through an inferential process.³⁵⁴

Concerning abstractive cognition, Scotus's theory maintains that the phantasm is the *locus* of species which plays its part in its collaborative action with the agent intellect. However it is not the phantasm with which the agent intellect interacts; its primary focus is its species. Also the abstractive process of the agent intellect has no active element as stripping or

³⁵³ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 60–61.

³⁵⁴ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 259. We will find this discussion of inference in a cognitive act also by the author of the *De Anima* commentary, in Chapter Four.

sequestration of the content in the phantasm.³⁵⁵ Indeed the intellect is the superior power in this operation; and as such even the possible intellect can also have an influence in the act of intellection that is greater than that of the intelligible species.³⁵⁶ Yet Scotus explains that every real act has some real term. However there is no real term in the phantasm because the agent intellect does not cause anything in the phantasm; it does not transfer the object from one order to another.³⁵⁷ In discussing the active power of the agent intellect Scotus provides a disquisition on the word *de* and how it applies to the operating power this agent has in an act of intellection. According to the authority of Aristotle and Averroes, the agent intellect makes a universal from what is not universal, and makes an intellect in act from an intellect in potency. The universal as universal does not exist except only in something that is represented under this notion. The word *de* is not understood except when the agent intellect makes something represented in a universal *de* that which had been represented in singular. However one understands this word *de*, either from the viewpoint of what is material or virtual, this action of the agent intellect is a real action (*actio realis*) that terminates in making a representation of the object in the possible intellect in the character (*ratione*) of a universal. Thus the real action of the agent intellect terminates at some real existing form that formally represents the universal as the universal. Otherwise the intellect cannot terminate its action to

³⁵⁵ Cf. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, 536. See also Dominique Demange, *Jean Duns Scot La Théorie du Savior* (Paris, J. Vrin, 2007).

³⁵⁶ Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 265.

³⁵⁷ Duns Scotus, *I Ordinatio*, (Vat. 3, 216 - 317): *“Omnis actio realis habet aliquem unum terminum realem. Ille autem terminus realis non recipitur in phantasmate, quia illud receptum esset extensum, et ita intellectus agens non transferret obiectum ab ordine in ordinem...”* Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 262, notes that the reference of *de* to *order* is a notion found in Averroes’s *In De Anima*.

the universal.³⁵⁸ Hence the universal is not the product of the intellect but is based upon a real existing form of which the universal is its representation. While the object of the phantasm is the real existing material form, it stands in the phantasm as a representative of the universal which is impressed upon the possible intellect. Scotus gives us to understand that the relation between the phantasm and agent intellect is akin to the relation between father and mother in producing a child. In this schema the phantasm has the same role in the production of the object as the mother has in her role in the production of a child. However the roles performed by the phantasm and agent intellect, like those performed by father and mother, are partial causes that are ordered to each other. Thus even though the agent intellect is the more perfect cause as the father in this production; yet the phantasm, like the mother, does not receives its active causal power from the agent intellect. This is because the phantasm also contributes something to the act of intellection; so much so that a more perfect effect can come from a combined effort of the more perfect and imperfect causes than come from only a more perfect cause.³⁵⁹

Scotus views the intelligible species as a likeness of the object within the phantasm and as the catalyst in an act of intellection. While Scotus identifies the *obiectum* in the phantasm as the real material form, by means of the light of the agent intellect the intelligible species made

³⁵⁸ Ibid., I *Ordinatio* (Vat. 3, 260): ðEt confirmatur ratio, quia ponitur intellectum agentem facere -de non-universali universale-vel -de intellecto in potentia intellectum in actu- sicut dicunt auctoritates Philosophi et Commentatoris. Cum universale ut universale, nihil sit in existentia, sed tantum sit in aliquo ut repraesentante ipsum sub tali ratione, ista verba nullum intellectum habebunt, nisi quia intellectus agens facit aliquid repraesentativum universalis de eo quod fuit repraesentativum singularis, quantumcumque illud -de- intelligitur, materialiter vel virtualiter; actio realis non terminatur nisi ad repraesentativum obiecti sub ratione universalis; ergo realis actio intellectus agentis terminatur ad formam aliquam realem, in existentia, quae formaliter repraesentat universale ut universale, quia aliter non posset terminari actio eius ad universale sub ratione universalis.ö See also Richard Cross, ðPhilosophy of Mindö, *Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne/Madrid/Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 263 - 283.

³⁵⁹ Cf. Ibid., I *Ordinatio* (Vat. 3, 496): ðSi mater ponitur habere virtutem activam in generatione proles, illa et potentia activa patris concurrunt ut duae causae partiales, ordinatae quidem, quia altera perfectior reliqua; non tamen imperfectior recipit suam causalitatem a causa perfectiore, nec tota illa causalitas est eminenter in causa perfectiore, sed aliquid addit causa imperfectior, in tantum quod effectus potest esse perfectior a causa perfectiore et imperfectiore quam a sola perfectiore.ö

within the possible intellect is the *quo* in an act of understanding. Thus judgment about the existence of objects cognized is solely an act of the intellect. Scotus underscores this by stating that the intellect's composition and division activity centers around the thing (not the species) not as existing but as understood. It is also within this intellectual activity that the truth of the thing is known.³⁶⁰ Nevertheless the object as known in the intellect has *esse diminutum* in contrast to concrete sensibly existing things that have *esse simpliciter et reale*.³⁶¹ The *esse diminutum* of the object of the intellect could be an *esse* that is participative. Such *esse* is primarily present in God's mind and only secondarily in the human mind.³⁶² The intelligible species is the cognitive device, the means by which a thing is known and not the object itself, except by intellectual reflection.³⁶³ In the debate between Scotus and Henry recent research has shown that Scotus's argument with Henry was not on his insistence that a sensible species in a sense organ was incapable of representing an object as universal, but how the intelligible species was situated in the phantasm.³⁶⁴ Thus just as expressive species was for Henry the cognitive object that was perceived by the active sense power and constituted what he would call the universal phantasm, so Scotus in response would speak about the meaning of presence and how this relates to natural

³⁶⁰ B. Ioannis Scoti, *Quaestiones In Libros Perihermenias Aristotelis*, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, et al. Opera Philosophica 2 (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 2994), q. 2 [56:19 - 57:1]: "Ad illud de compositione et divisione dico quod compositio non est ipsorum specierum se rerum non tamen ut exsistunt sed ut intelliguntur. Et ideo dicitur esse veritas et falsitas circa causatur ab intellectu et est in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente, non autem ut accidens in subiecto."

³⁶¹ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 1, q. 1, n. 21 [taken from C.K. Brampton, "Scotus, Ockham, and the Theory of Intuitive Cognition", *Antonianum*, vol. 40 (1965), 453, footnote 4: "[O]biectum cognitum habet esse diminutum; obiectum autem extra habet esse simpliciter et reale."

³⁶² Cf. Dominik Perler, "What are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists", *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, 210 - 211.

³⁶³ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 65. Cf. also Perler, "What are Intentional Objects?", 209.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in the Mature Thought of Henry of Ghent", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 49, no. 2 (April, 2011): 207 - 211, accessed August 25, 2014 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v049/49.2rombeiro.html>.

and intentional change. Scotus says that the cognitive object is related in potency to the first presence of the real thing; namely that such an object as an approximation could generate such species in the intellect which is the formal *ratio* of understanding. Scotus also maintains that it is through this generated species that the image is produced and is the object present under the *ratio* of cognizable or represented being and is the secondary presence of the real thing. The first presence naturally precedes the second because it precedes the impression of the species by which it is formally present secondarily. Scotus says it is wrong to think that the species in the intellect is not the cause of the presence of the object under the *ratio* of cognizable being, at least with regards to abstractive understanding to which he is referring. It can be shown that the object has a prior presence to the species. This is true regarding the presence of the real thing as the agent present to the patient. The first natural sign then is the object in itself or in the phantasm that is present to the agent intellect. The second natural sign is that these objects are present to the possible intellect as the agent present to the patient. The species is generated in the possible intellect and then, by means of the species, the object is present under the *ratio* of cognizable being.³⁶⁵ Scotus also elaborated a later version of this type of presence in his account in his Parisian lectures in which this object is *öcognizably presentö* in the intelligible species,

³⁶⁵ Scotus, *I Ordinatio*, q. 3, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, 382 (Vat. 232 - 233): *öAd secundum, de praesentia, respondeo quod obiectum respectu potentiae primo habet praesentiam realem, videlicet approximationem talem ut possit gignere talem speciem in intellectu, quae est ratio formalis intellectionis; secundo, per illam speciem genitam, quae est imago gignentis, est obiectum praesens sub ratione cognoscibilis seu repraesentati. Prima praesentia praecedit naturaliter secundam, quia praecedit impressionem speciei per quam est formaliter secunda praesentia. Quando ergo accipitur quod ðspecies in intellectu non est causa praesentiae obiectið dico quod falsum est de praesentia sub ratione cognoscibilis, saltem intellectione abstractiva, de qua modo loquamur; et cum probatur quod ðprius est obiectum praesens quam speciesð illud verum est de praesentia reali, qua agens est praesens passo. Et intelligo sic, quod in primo signo naturae est obiectum in se vel in phantasmate praesens intellectui agenti, in secundo signo naturae - in quo ista sunt praesentia intellectui possibili, ut agentis passo - gignitur species in intellectu possibili, et tunc per speciem est obiectum praesens sub ratione cognoscibilis.ö*

contained in the species as its sole and manifest content.³⁶⁶ He is the first to speak of the status of this object in the intelligible species as *esse obiectivum*, coining a new vocabulary. *Esse obiectivum* distinguishes the real feature present in the intellect as subjective and present in the intellect as in a subject.³⁶⁷ The object however has *esse diminutum*; it cannot be the terminus of a real operation of the agent intellect.³⁶⁸ In his later Parisian lectures he identifies this object as the universal, saying that the universal object under the *ratio* of universal has *esse diminutum* that is *esse cognitum*, just as Hercules in his representation in a statue has *esse diminutum*. The terminus of a real action is not the object having *esse diminutum* as cognized or represented but something real. It follows that the real action of the agent intellect terminates in a real form formally existing in the possible intellect and as something representing the universal as universal. This real form is concomitant with an intentional terminus, an object as a universal having representative *esse* in the species.³⁶⁹ Consequently that object having *esse diminutum* in the intelligible species is not a real type of being. It does not have being independently. It exists only through the real form on which it depends.³⁷⁰ So even though Scotus argues against Henry on the need to posit intelligible species as an inhering form in the intellect, he also upholds a

³⁶⁶ Cf. Peter King, 'Duns Scotus on Mental Content', *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302 - 2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002*, vol. 26 of *Textes et Études du Moyen Âge*, ed. by O. Boulnois et al., (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 75.

³⁶⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, 79, n. 25.

³⁶⁸ Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 17, 13 [162: 5 - 7]: 'Esse splendens vel cognitum tantum est esse diminutum, non reale; igitur non potest esse terminus operationis realis intellectus agentis.'

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, *Reportatio Paris*, 1-A d. 3, q. 4 (text taken from King, 'Duns Scotus on Mental Content', 81): 'Universale obiectum sub ratione universalis non habet nisi esse diminutum, ut esse cognitum (quemadmodum Hercules in statua non habet esse nisi diminutum, quia repraesentatum in imagine)...Ergo cum terminus actionis realis non sit obiectum habens esse diminutum ut esse cognitum vel repraesentatum, sed aliquid reale, sequitur quod realis actio intellectus agentis terminatur ad realem formam, in existentia, qua formaliter repraesentat universale ut universale, quam formam realem concomitatur terminus intentionalis, ut obiectum universale secundum esse repraesentativum quod habet in specie.'

³⁷⁰ Cf. King, 'Duns Scotus on Mental Content', 85.

distinction between the intelligible species in a cognitive act and its objective content.³⁷¹ This shows that Henry's discussion on expressed species as the *obiectum* of the intellect had an impact on the thought of the Subtle Doctor.

4. Intuitive Cognition and Direct Cognition of a Singular Thing

Abstractive cognition considers of the nature of its object whether it is present or absent, existing or not existing. However intuitive cognition concerns the nature of the object only as being present and existing, or not being present and existing. Another contrast between the two orders of cognition is that intuitive cognition has no need of a species which abstractive cognition needs to complete its activity.³⁷² Scotus posits that there can be some cognition as the intellect abstracts from all actual existence and there can be some cognition according to what exists and what is present in some actual existing mode. He gives us to understand that he uses the terms *abstractive* and *intuitive* to connote two different intellectual activities. He calls *abstractive* that type of cognition in which the intellect abstracts the quiddity of a thing from its actual existence or non-existence. He calls *intuitive understanding* that cognition of a quiddity of a thing according to its actual existence or that which is the presence of the thing according to such existence. Scotus does not wish to use the term *intuitive understanding* in a distinction from discursive thinking because in this sense some cognition that is abstractive is intuitive. Rather he uses the term *intuition* in a simple manner, in the way it is said that one looks

³⁷¹ Cf. Rombeiro, *Intelligible Species in the Mature Thought of Henry of Ghent*: 211.

³⁷² Cf. Brampton, *Scotus, Ockham and the Theory of Intuitive Cognition*, 454 ó 455. Cf. also Sebastian Day, OFM, *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1947), 49 ó 52. See also Stephen Dumont, *John Duns Scotus, A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, eds. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 353 - 369.

(*intueri*) at the thing as it is in itself.³⁷³ He along with other medieval theologians engaged in discussions on the status of the human soul separated from its body after death and the quality of knowledge that such a soul would enjoy. While these theologians accepted a premise from the Catholic faith that God would infuse a superabundance of the influx of his light upon all beatified souls, the issue arose regarding the relevance of our mode of knowing and how it relates to the next life. Scotus invokes intuitive cognition to demonstrate that the human intellect in the life of the *beati* will know by cognizing intuitively. They will no longer need their senses or have any recourse to their phantasms to know God, the angels, and the other blessed souls of that life.³⁷⁴ What is evident at this juncture in our analysis of Scotus's cognitional theory is that he attempted to reconcile strands of Aristotle's epistemic doctrine with the favored Platonic (Avicennian) teaching in accord with the Augustinian tradition.³⁷⁵

³⁷³ Duns Scotus, *II Ordinatio*, d. 3, q. 9 (Vat. 7: 316, 319): "¶[P]otest enim aliqua esse cognito obiecti secundum quod abstrahit ab omni existentia actuali, et potest esse aliqua eius secundum quod existens et secundum quod praesens in aliqua existentia actuali...Et ut brevibus utar verbis, primam voco 'abstractivam' quae est ipsius quiditatis secundum quod abstrahit ab actuali existentia et non existentia. Secundum, scilicet quae est quiditatis rei secundum eius existentiam actualem (vel quae est rei praesentis secundum talem existentiam), voco 'intellectionem intuitivam' non prout intuitiva distinguitur contra discursivam, (sic enim aliqua 'abstractiva' est intuitiva), sed simpliciter 'intuitivam' eo modo quo dicimur intueri rem sicut est in se." Also cf. Day, *Intuitive Cognition*, 72. For the Augustinian roots to the theory of intuitive cognition see Joël Biard, "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 1, 568.

³⁷⁴ Cf. B. Carlos Bazan, "Conceptions on the Agent Intellect and the Limits of Metaphysics" in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia: Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, Vol. 28 (Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 178–189. Cf. also, Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., "Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory and Our Knowledge of Individuals," *History in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday*, ed. by Linus J. Thro, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 81–104. I treat this topic in Chapter Three, as it relates to a question the anonymous author treated on abstractive and intuitive cognition. Nevertheless, a distinction can be observed between Aquinas on Scotus on this issue. For Aquinas, the fact that the separated soul's reliance upon influx of divine light and not upon its phantasm is primarily negative, whereas Scotus's presentation, and his teaching on intuitive cognition, is a positive presentation on the status of such a human soul separated from its body in its earthly existence.

³⁷⁵ Cf. Stephen D. Dumont, "Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," *Speculum*, vol. 64 (1989), 579–599. Accessed April 2, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2854184>. Cf. also Thomas P. McTighe, "Scotus, Plato, and the Ontology of the Bare X," *The Monist*, vol. 49 (1965): 588–616.

According to Scotus abstractive cognition is limited to knowledge of a thing's quiddity, and as such the quiddity's universal. The problem that he attempts to solve is how we come to know singulars. The previous medieval figures posited theories in which the singular thing is known indirectly. Henry of Ghent utilized his teaching on divine illumination to establish the mind's knowledge of singulars. However, Scotus posited intuitive cognition because on his own account abstractive cognition was limited to quiddities and universals. Intuitive cognition provides the way for the human intellect to have a direct, unmediated grasp of the actual existence of a thing as present. Thus according to his perspective on certitude, intuitive cognition is properly called "intellectual" and the intellect as such can have some certitude of any object having some existence. However this certitude is not obtained through the object's species as present, because its species represents the thing as indifferent to existence or non-existence.³⁷⁶ But as we shall see, Scotus is probably referring to species that are the basis for abstractive cognition. Nonetheless Scotus formed his conviction about intuitive cognition on a myriad of logical proofs that demonstrate the insuperable certainty of the *fact* that we possess this type of knowledge.³⁷⁷ He states that abstractive cognition of any object is not more perfect than intuitive cognition because in abstractive cognition it is through its species that the intellect can have knowledge of a thing that is non-existent and not present. However abstractive cognition is not more perfect because this type of cognition cannot reach the thing itself actually existent and present. All abstractive understanding is not intuitive and thus less perfect in its mode. But intuitive cognition is about the object as it is present in its actual existence, in itself or

³⁷⁶ Duns Scotus, *Oxoniensia* IV (taken from Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 75, footnote 77), d.45, q. 2: "Talis autem cognito, quae dicitur intuitiva, potest esse intellectiva, alioquin intellectus non esset certus de aliqua existentia alicuius obiecti. Sed nec ista intuito intellectiva, vel intellectio intuitiva haberi potest per speciem praesentem, quia illa repraesentat rem indifferenter existentem vel non-existentm."

³⁷⁷ Cf. Day, *Intuitive Cognition*, 83-89.

in its whole entity being contained more eminently in another way. Finally he states that any cognition that is only of a likeness or a universal is not the most perfect cognition as would be in the mind's intuitive grasp of the thing itself.³⁷⁸ Thus he asserts the fact that based upon our experiences, we have intuitive cognition that gives us certain knowledge based on the actually existent thing. Thus intuitive cognition is more perfect than abstractive cognition that is limited to knowledge of only a thing's quiddity and universal.

A main issue for Scotus is how to make sense of contingent reality. Abstractive cognition with its intellectual object provides the universal principles for science. However abstractive cognition is an insufficient rationale for our cognition and propositions of contingent reality. A different type of cognition has to ground our capability to form and know the meaning of contingent propositions.³⁷⁹ There are some that have the opinion that Scotus did not appear to go any further to establish the presence of such an intuitive power within the human soul. They claim that he did not go beyond his attempts to establish the *fact* of intuitive cognition, to establish arguments for the existence of such a power within us based on the proofs of scientific and necessary propositions (which are based on abstractive knowledge) that enable us to form contingent propositions.³⁸⁰ Hence it follows that such silence from Scotus leaves his position

³⁷⁸ Cf. Duns Scotus, *II Ordinatio*, d. 9, q. 2 (Vat. 8, 65): ð...([N]ulla autem cognitio abstractiva alicuius obiecti perfectior est cognitione intuitiva; quia cognitio abstractiva per speciem potest esse de re non existente nec in se praesentialiter, et ita non perfectissime cognoscit, nec attingit).ö Cf. also *I Ordinatio*, d. 2 (Vat. 2, 394): ð...[O]mnis intellectio abstractiva et non intuitiva est aliquo modo imperfecta. Cognitio autem intuitiva est obiecti ut obiectum est praesens in existentia actuali, et hoc in se vel in alio continente eminenter totam entitatem ipsius...ö Cf. also *I Ordinatio* d. 2 (Vat. 2, 167): ð...[C]ognitio alicuius in simili tantum et in universali non est cognitio perfectissime et intuitiva ipsius rei...ö

³⁷⁹ Cf. James B. South, ðScotus and the Knowledge of the Singular Revisitedö, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 2 (April, 2002): 125 - 130. Accessed June 12, 2004 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744914>.

³⁸⁰ Cf. Day, *Intuitive Cognition*, 85 ö 87.

with a problem of *petitio principii*.³⁸¹ However others see this interpretation as a gross misreading of Scotus's actual position on intuitive cognition.³⁸²

Even with the claim that intuitive cognition enables us to know contingent propositions and what they signify in things outside the soul, Scotus maintains that intuitive cognition also gets us no nearer to knowing the haecceity of anything in its singularity in this life. Such is the case of the human *viator*.³⁸³ But intuitive cognition is distinguished by both Scotus and Antonius Andreas as an act of intellection that is more proximate to the object of sensation. An act of the intellect is superior and more perfect than sensation. By virtue of its act the intellect can intuitively grasp an object in its reality where its power of grasping the object is not cheapened or compromised by the imperfection of the object. Hence the object of intuitive cognition is grasped in its present real existence as an object that is nobler or on par with the intellect.³⁸⁴ However what the intellect intuitively cognizes is not the singular this-ness of a sensible thing *extra animam*. Rather what the intellect cognizes is the fact that the senses perceive an object.³⁸⁵ Scotus discusses intuitive cognition in his treatment on intellectual memory. The fact is

³⁸¹ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 80.

³⁸² Cf. South, 'Scotus and the Knowledge of the Singular', 138.

³⁸³ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri VI - IX*, q. 13, 65 [241:2 - 14]. See also South, 'Scotus and the Knowledge of the Singular', 134. Also see Allan Wolter, O.F.M. and Marilyn McCord Adams, 'Memory and Intuition: A Focal Debate in Fourteenth Century Cognitive Psychology', *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 53, 1993, 179. Accessed June 21, 2014 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/frc/summary/v053/53.adams.html>.

³⁸⁴ Cf. Ibid., *Cuestiones Cuodlibetales*, q. 13, a. 2, no. 29, *Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto*, ed. by Felix Alluntis, O.F.M. (Madrid: Biblioteca De Autores Cristianos, 1968), 456: 'Quia quidquid est perfectionis in cognitione, magis potest competere cognitioni intellectivae quam sensitivae; nunc autem, posse attingere obiectum in se realiter perfectionis est, ubi non vilesceret potentia attingentis propter imperfectionem obiecti; ergo intellectus potest habere actum quo sic attingat obiectum in sua reali existentia, saltem illud obiectum quod est nobilior tali intellectu vel aequale nobile. Et si concedatur de intellectu nostro, ipsum scilicet posse habere talem actum cognitionis quo attingit rem ut existentem in se, pari ratione potest hoc concedere de quocumque obiecto, quia intellectus noster est potentialis respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis.' See also Scotus, *God and Creatures*, ed. and trans. by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. and Felix Alluntis, O.F.M. reprint of ed. published by Princeton University Press (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1975), 291.

³⁸⁵ Cf. South, 'Scotus and the Knowledge of the Singular', 138.

presupposed that the intellect not only cognizes universals of science which are the fruit of abstractive cognition but that it also intuitively cognizes what the senses know based on the principle that a more perfect and superior power also knows the activity of inferior powers. And it is in this way the intellect intuitively cognizes its sensations. Both abstractive and intuitive cognition are proved from the fact that the intellect cognizes the truth of contingent propositions and forms syllogisms from these. Hence the ability to form syllogisms is proper to the intellect. However the truth of these contingent propositions is known intuitively under the specific existence by which these objects are cognized by the senses. Thus it follows from what is presupposed about abstractive and intuitive cognition that all the conditions that pertain to memory are found in the intellect. This is because the intellect can perceive time and have an act of intellection after a lapse of time.³⁸⁶ The ability to remember past events and past objects of sensation is by means of a species impressed by the intellect's awareness of the act of sensation that is the result of intuitive cognition which does not involve any activity of the agent intellect.³⁸⁷ However this species that had somehow faded in the sense memory is recovered by collating it with the intelligible species; and then the object remembered is cognized as something that had been previously stored in memory.³⁸⁸ However Scotus is unclear regarding

³⁸⁶ Duns Scotus, *IV Ordinatio*, d. 45, q. 3, §A Treatise on Memory and Intuition from Codex Aö in §Memory and Intuition, in Wolter and Adams, §Memory and Intuition, 205: §Supposito enim quod intellectus non tantum cognoscat universalia (quod quidem est verum de intellectione abstractiva, de qua loquitur Philosophus, quia sola illa est scientifica), sed etiam intuitive cognoscat illa quae sensus cognoscit (quia perfectior et superior cognoscitiva in eodem cognoscit illud quod inferior), et etiam quod cognoscat sensationes (et utrumque probatur per hoc quod cognoscit propositiones contingenter veras et ex eis syllogizat; formare autem propositiones et syllogizare proprium est intellectui; illarum autem veritas est de obiectis ut intuitive cognititis, sub ratione scilicet existentiae sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu), sequitur quod in intellectu possunt inveniri omnes conditiones prius dictae pertinentes ad recordari. Potest enim percipere tempus, et habere actum post tempus, et sic de caeteris.ö

³⁸⁷ Cf. Scott, §Scotus and the Knowledge of the Singular, 138 - 139.

³⁸⁸ Duns Scotus, *IV Ordinatio* (Wolter and Adams), d. 45, q. 3, no. 16, 204 - 205: §Ergo probabile est quod illud sit species in intellectu manens perfecte, et sic recuperata specie in memoria sensitiva, quae aliquantulum decidit, per collationem ad speciem intelligibilem manentem cognoscitur istud obiectum recordatum esse illud quod prius fuit memoriter notum.ö

the source of this species in the sense memory, on whether it is due to the productive work of the possible or agent intellect.³⁸⁹

What Scotus is clear about in his stance on intuitive cognition is that what the intellect cognizes in occurrent acts of sensing are occurrent states-of-affairs as they obtain in the world by means of the senses. The point about intuitive cognition that Scotus is insistent about is that in this life the intellect only has a mediate grasp of the thing. This is because such cognition is not directly caused by the singular thing's intelligibility. As wayfarers in this state of the conjoined union of body and soul we can in no way immediately cognize the singular. In this life we do not have any intellectual acquisition of the *haecceitas* of things. Only in the state of life of the blessed and saints will we be able to intuitively grasp the singular.³⁹⁰ Then what precisely is the object which is intuitively cognized by the intellect? This object is the singular thing present in its actual existence. Such knowledge is cognition of a thing is in its contingent existence. Such condition will not obtain in the life of the blessed. Thus in the final analysis, Scotus presents us with an intriguing presentation on abstractive and intuitive cognition. His teaching on abstractive and intuitive cognition, as well as his doctrine of univocity of the doctrine of being, will resonate in the teaching of his student, Antonius Andreas.

As we commence with our treatment of the manuscript of the Antonine author in the next chapter what I hope to show is a close likeness of thought shared between Duns Scotus and Antonius Andreas. At the very least what we will find in the next two chapters is a doctrine that is accurately Scotistic, both in its teaching as well as in the Antonine author's treatment of competing cognitional theories. We shall see in what way Antonius Andreas demonstrates that

³⁸⁹ Cf. Scott, "Scotus and the Knowledge of the Singular", 139 - 140.

³⁹⁰ Cf. Steven Dumont, "Theology as a Science", 579 - 599.

he is rightly called *Scotellus* in his cognitional thought; and whether our Antonine author could also share this appellation, based on his teaching on intelligible species.

CHAPTER 3: A Comparison between the Cognitive Theories of Antonius Andreas and the Antonine Author of the Commentary on the *De Anima*

Introduction

At the end of this commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle, the student-scribe Hilary of Lithonicum wrote that the questions on the books of the *De Anima* were composed by Brother Antonius of the Orders Minor, a great philosopher, and copied by Hillary of Lithonicum in the early fall semester in the year of Christ 1448, in Prague.¹ In that year as Hilary penned these words, Prague and her university were experiencing interesting times. It had been approximately thirty five years since the burning of Jan Hus at the stake in Constance. Even at this time Hussites had gained control of the faculty of liberal arts in the University. However September of 1448, perhaps within the same time-frame that Hilary had finished his copy of this manuscript King Jiri, or George, a Hussite, occupied Prague and reinstated a Hussite, Jan of Rokycany as head of the Hussite priests. His name appeared a year later on the Dean's manual at the University. So Hussites and Catholics were able to coexist at the University and both lecture and teach without incident.² The Franciscans were an abiding presence in the city already since the late fourteenth century whose school of the Friars Minor was incorporated into the University in

¹ *Quaestiones libri De anima*, transcript T. Noone ex codicibus: Prague, Knihovna Metropolitni Kapituli, Cod. I.51, 84r - 113rb (Prague, Knihovna Metropolitni Kapituli, Cod. M.89, 237r - 261t), 46: *Explicit: Expliciunt quaestiones Libri /2De anima/1 fratris Antonii Ordinis Minorum, magni philosophi, scriptae per Hilarium de Lithonicum, anno Christi 1448 infra dies caniculares in Collegio Recethurionis <deest M 89>*

² Cf. Otakar Odložilík, *Prague and Cracow Scholars in the Fifteenth Century: TEMA CON VARIAZIONI*, *The Polish Review*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring, 1964): 28. Accessed August 2, 2015 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25776546>.

1383.³ No doubt the presence of the writings of Blessed John Duns Scotus and his disciples proved to be a balance between the extremes of the nominalists and Hussites.⁴ Thus the copying of this manuscript by Hilary would be welcomed into the studies and lecture halls of the University. One important purpose for copying this manuscript in the first place was to provide textbooks for students. Having these textbooks authored by Duns Scotus and his disciples would assist in spreading the Scotist tradition far and wide throughout Europe. This is an important point to keep in mind as we begin our analysis of the cognitive theory of Antonius Andreas and that of the Antonine author of this manuscript.

A. Antonius Andreas and the Antonine Author on Intuitive Cognition

For Antonius Andreas, abstractive cognition concerns a cognitive act that can occur in the absence of an object. In this way, according to Andreas, abstractive cognition regards a species of the object in its absence. With regards to intuitive cognition, Antonius states that in the order of sense cognition, intuitive cognition regards the object as present. However in the order of intellectual cognition Andreas maintains that no person in this state of existence can have this type of knowledge, which is the vision of the object as present in its existence. This is only for the blessed and the angels.⁵ The Antonine author also concurs with Andreas regarding

³ Cf. John Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988), 365.

⁴ Cf. Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, vol. 2 second ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 226 - 234.

⁵ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam* (Venice, 1495), Bk. 2, q. 3, f. 12vb: *Notandum est...Prima cognitio est intuitiva quae respicit obiectum ut presens est; secunda est abstractiva quae, scilicet est per speciem non intuitivam, sic potest esse in absentia obiecti...Similiter...cognitionis intellectivae. Prima cognitio est intuitiva quae dicitur notitia visionis quae est de obiecto presenti, ut presens est in sua existentia; secundo cognitio est abstractiva qua est obiecti presentis in sua specie genita ab obiecto quod potest esse absens in sua*

abstractive cognition, that it regards the species of the object in its absence. He says that the phantasm is indifferent to representing the thing as present or absent, as existing or not existing. Similarly in the mode of abstractive cognition, the intellect only understands the object through the intelligible species, which is translated from one order to another by the power of the agent intellect. In this way the species do not contain the object as present.⁶ The Antonine author here is accommodating a teaching by Averroes who remarks that abstraction is nothing other than to make intentions that are in potency in the imagination to be understood in act; and to understand is nothing else than to receive these intentions. Averroes explains that we find the same intentions in the imagination transferred in their *esse* from one order to another.⁷ We will see below how Antonius Andreas treats intuitive cognition within his grading system of this type of cognition with abstractive cognition.

Nevertheless here the Antonine author discusses issues regarding abstractive and intuitive cognition in his first question in his commentary on the first book of the *De Anima*. His primary interest concerns the mechanics of sense cognition. In the first question, the Antonine author states that the object of intuitive knowledge centers upon something existing *in actu* which

existentia.....Exemplum primi, cognitio beatorum in patria et illa cognitio visionis est nobis forte impossibilis pro stato isto, de quo alius.....ö Antonius here is describing the corresponding grades of sense and intellectual cognition. I will cover his hierarchical grading of these types of cognition when comparing it to the grading provided by the Antonine author in his commentary.

⁶ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, 1.1.12: ö...[P]hantasma indifferenter repraesent rem praesentem et absentem, existentem vel non existentem. Item quia non intelligit nisi per speciem intelligibilem virtute intellectus agentis translatum de ordine in ordinem; praedicta autem species non continent obiectum praesens...ö

⁷ Averroes, *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 439, [78 - 81]: öCum enim invenimus idem transferri in suo esse de ordine in ordinem, scilicet intentiones ymaginatas, diximus quod necesse est ut hoc sit a causa agentis est efficiensö. See also Richard Taylor, öThe Agent Intellect as -form for usö and Averroesö Critique of al-Farabiö, 39 - 40.

terminates in an act of existence that is the *existentia actutualis* of the thing *extra* or existing outside the mind. This actual existence is in effect the *res* which is the formal principle of knowledge in the intellect.⁸ He submits an example of what he means by *existentia actualis*. Color is what one sees existing in an object because that is what is known about the object. This occurs even though existence is not differentiated from other natures and intentions which the intellect is able to make or produce of itself.⁹ In the order of sense cognition, Antonius Andreas also uses the example of directly seeing color to illustrate the range of intuitive cognition.¹⁰ Thus for Andreas, intuitively cognizing an object in its *existentia actualis* is cognizing the presence of an object which pertains to sense; and in this manner the object is intuitively cognized.

Both Antonius Andreas and this Antonine author maintain that intuitive cognition is allied with sensation. In a question on his commentary on the second book of the *De Anima*, the Antonine author inquires whether there is such a thing as an agent sense, a sense power that is the motive or moving power behind the action of the particular senses. He says that the sense of sight does not terminate in an external object as a genus, or as a kind of act that terminates in what is produced. However sight has a relation to something that is terminated in its object as something *measured to the measure* (*mensuratum ad mensuram*) even though sight remains in

⁸ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De anima*, 1, 1, 2: "Dico igitur quod notitia intuitiva est illa cuius obiectum est actu existens et terminat ipsam ut actu existens ita quod existentia actualis in re extra et in effectu sit ratio formalis cognita in obiecto." The citation for each passage will follow the same format: book, question, and paragraph.

⁹ Ibid: "Unde et visus existentiam obiecti visionis, puta, coloris, cognoscit in obiecto, licet ipsam non distinguat ab aliis rationibus et intentionibus, sicut potest facere intellectus."

¹⁰ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 2, q. 3, f. 12vb: "Exemplum primi [cognitio intuitiva], visus videt colorem."

the organ of the eye. Aristotle discusses this in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*.¹¹ The Antonine author concludes here by asserting that there is an active power in sense that is a partial cause of sensation along with the partial cause of the object; it is a relationship between an agent and its effect in an act of sensation. He says that Aristotle demonstrated that the sense power of sight is not a total active power and this is why. There is no proportion between an agent and an active principle in which the action of the agent corresponds to an active principle in a ratio of nobler to nobler or most noble to most noble. This is because such a ratio or order would destroy both the agent and the action. In this manner, then, the action of sense is nobler than the vegetative because it corresponds to the nobility of its active power. Hence there is no single object that is unfitting for the sense power; every object is suitable. The Antonine author adds that in its range of power the sensible by itself cannot act on a substance; nor can it act in the power of a subject due to its being merely a sensible power. Revealing the influence of St. Augustine the Antonine author says that the sense is able to act together with the soul by the soul's power as an animated substance. This is how we are to understand that the sensible is a vital operative power and is formally from a principle of vital activity. He reasons that if the soul's only range of power was the sensitive then it would have no operation except in sense. Hence in this respect it would be an active power as a less noble form with regard to its own operation, for example with color.¹² The Antonine author thus maintains that the animated soul

¹¹ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, 11.4.9: ð...[V]isio non terminatur ad obiectum extrinsecum, sicut actio de genere actionis terminatur ad productum, sed sicut relativum ad aliquid. Ergo nihil valet, quia licet visio maneat et sit in oculo, tamen habet relationem aliquam quae terminatur ad obiectum ut mensuratum ad mensuram VII Metaphysicae.ö

¹² Ibid., II.4.21: ðSed teneo quod in sensu est virtus activa, immo ipse sensus est vis activa partialis concurrens cum obiecto etiam partialiter agente ad efficiendum actum sensationis. Probatum est enim supra secundum Aristotelem quod non est totalis; modo probo quod virtus activa et per consequens partialis. Tum quia nihilominus actioni

itself, combined with sense, is the agent mover in an act of sensation. In the conclusion of his first question on book one of his commentary he states that the soul has a twofold knowledge of itself. One type is of a different knowledge it has of itself. The second type is twofold: one is abstractive or inferential which takes place when the soul sometimes infers or concludes and recognizes itself distinct from something else. The other is intuitive, as when the soul intuitively its own act and experiences its own act intuitively.¹³ The first type of knowledge could refer to Antonius Andreas's grading of the different grades of intellectual cognition. In the second category the Antonine author evinces a close alliance between sense perception and intuitive cognition. Whereas in abstractive cognition the soul focuses on the universal quiddity of what is sensed, the soul has a direct and unmediated grasp of the thing sensed intuitively. As we shall see the teaching of the Antonine author also accords with the place Antonius Andreas assigns intuitive cognition within his classification in sense cognition.

Antonius himself is concerned with another issue regarding sensation and understanding. It concerns what is an object of sense, and what is the object of intellection. Such an object is distinct from the individuality of the sensed thing. Antonius explains it this way: he states that

secundum proportionem corresponderet nobile principium activum et agens, et nobiliori nobilius, et nobilissimo nobilissimum, alias periret ordo rerum et agentium et actionem -- cum ergo actio sensitiva sit nobilior quam vegetativa, sibi correspondet nobile activum, non ergo obiectum solum quod est ignobile, sed sensus conveniet. Tum quia sensible in virtute propria agere non potest in substantiam nec in virtute subiecti, quia non est sensible; [M, fol. 242r] ergo in virtute substantiae animatae et sensus, id est, concurrente ipso, agit. Tum quia sensible est operatio vitalis, ergo a principio formaliter vitali; quare, etc. Item si tantum anima poneretur sensitiva, non haberet operationem nisi sentire; ergo respectu illius esset activa, sicut minus nobilis forma respectu propriae operationis, puta, color. ö

¹³ Ibid., 1.1.42: ö "[Q]uod anima habet duplicem notitiam de se ipsa: unam quia est et aliam quid ipsa est. Secunda est illative et abstractiva, et prima vero aliquando est abstractiva et illativa quando infert et concludit se ipsam esse ex aliquo alio; aliquando est intuitiva quando intuetur actum suum et experitur actum suum intuitive et se ipsam consequenter. Sic patet ad quaestionem.ö

our intellect in this state of existence cannot understand per se the singular under its proper *ratio* of singularity. Such is the case, not only for our intellect, but for our senses as well. Antonius is quite insistent on this point, adding that the cognitive power in us does not cognize a thing's whole intelligibility as it is manifested in itself but can only cognize as a moving power, since our cognitive power in this state of existence is moved by objects.¹⁴ In another place he says that the unity which the senses cognize from their proper objects is not the unity in number, that is, the singular, but a minor real unity. This is especially true with the sense of sight regarding its vision of color, that its object is not a numerical unity; otherwise only numerically one color could be seen and understood. There is some other real unity which precedes every act of understanding. It is a type of unity that what is predicated is included in the subject. In every genus there is a oneness or unity that is first which is the measure of everything else included in its genus, and this unity that is first and measure of all else in its genus is this real unity. Adapting some of the teaching of Scotus, Antonius asserts that this real unity is the object of sense, and as its object, this real unity is a unity as an object that precedes any act of sensation and understanding, and according to its primal real unity precedes every intellectual action. Thus neither the senses cognize nor the intellect understands a sensible thing in its singular numeric unity; rather a thing is cognized by another real unity. He adds that in every genus there is one primary item which is the measure of everything else in that genus. But the object of the sense

¹⁴ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 7, q. 14, f. 38ra: ð...[I]ntellectus noster pro statu isto non per se intelligit singulare sub ratione propria singularitatis, nec sensus sentiet...sed nec intellectus noster nec sensus est huiusmodi respectu singularis; ergo nec intellectus noster nec sensus intelligit singulare sub ratione propria singularitatis...quia potentia cognitiva in nobis cognoscit rem non secundum suam absolutam cognoscibilitatem, inquantum sic in se est manifesta, sed solum inquantum est motiva potentiae; quia potentia cognitiva pro isto statu movetur ab objectis...ö This passage forms a part of the argument Andreas makes to account how our inability to cognize the primitive singularity of a thing, as we shall see in the following pages.

and intellect is not one in number but is another real minor unity. In this case no singular in its genus is a measure for anything else in this genus, since the singular itself cannot be measured.¹⁵

The Antonine author shares Antonius's view regarding the object of sense and intellect by stating that the form which the sense receives in an act of sensation is consimilar to the species of the sensible thing and is a type of form (*rationem formam*) that is consimilar with the sensible form. However the sense does not receive the form in the same way which the sensible thing has it in itself. Thus sense has the sensible form intentionally albeit in a real and material way.¹⁶

Thus Antonius Andreas's way of explaining the incapacity of the human intellect to grasp the inherent singularity of a thing and the Antonine author's way of explaining it as a lack of proportion between the sensible thing and the power of sight shows that both are essentially making the same case regarding the object of sensation and intellection.

Why can the senses and the intellect not grasp the singular and what is their respective object that is one in unity that is a unity less than a numerical unity? To answer this it is

¹⁵ *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 7, q. 16, f. 40rb: "Sed potentia sensitiva, puta visus est una potentia. Ergo habet unum obiectum non unum numero, quia tunc non posset videre nisi unum colorem numero nec unum per intellectum. Quia precedit actum intellectus sicut et sensus. Ergo est unum aliquot alia unitate reali, quia sicut obiectum sensus in quantum obiectum precedit intellectum, ita etiam secundum suam unitatem realem precedit omnem actum intellectus...Sed non secundum unitatem numeralem. Ergo secundum aliam unitatem realem que non est numeralis; probatio minoris, quia potentia cognoscens obiectum secundum aliquam unitatem distinguit ipsum ab omni alio quod non est hac unitate unum. Praedicatum includitur in subiecto. Ergo sensus non cognoscit obiectum secundum unitatem numeralem; ergo secundum alienam...ö Also f. 40va: "Sensus ergo non cognoscit obiectum secundum unitatem numeralem, ergo secundum aliam unitatem realem...[S]ensus ergo non cognoscit obiectum secundum unitatem numeralem, ergo secundum aliam unitatem realem; ita quia esset unius actus sensus non est unum obiectum secundum unitatem numeralem...in omni genere est unum primum quod est mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis...et illa unitas est realis, alioquin non esset mensura nisi secundum considerationem rationis...Sed illud tale non est unum numero, tum quia nullum singulare alicuius generis est mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere...ö Also cf. Bérubé, *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Quaestiones De Anima*, II.28: "Talis est ut dicunt immutatio sensus a sensibili secundum speciem vel operationem sensibilem ita quod sensus recipit consimilem formam secundum rationem formae cum forma sensibilis, non tamen eodem modo recipit, sicut sensibile habet ipsam. Sed sensus habet formam sensibilis intentionaliter, sensibile vero materialiter et realiter. [L, fol. 98ra]ö

necessary to take a brief excursion into Antonius Andreas's metaphysical treatment of univocity. In his explanation of being as being as the subject matter of metaphysics, he discusses the different meanings of univocity; specifically the differences between metaphysical, physical, and logical univocities. Physical univocity refers to a natural unity within species irregardless of any cognitive awareness of a thing. Logical univocity refers to the intellectual operation of mixing and combining concepts such as genus and difference and concepts that are second intentions. Metaphysical univocity, however, refers to being at its most general and basic level, a level at which being can be predicated of everything. Andreas stresses the point that these three orders of univocity involve reality; but the physical and metaphysical refer to real features of things. The difference between physical and metaphysical univocity is that nature in its physical state has its own inherent unity in species but differs from one thing to another. However the metaphysical unity of being can be abstracted by the intellect as a first intention from a myriad of really distinct things. The difference then between metaphysical and physical univocity lies in attribution; only within metaphysical univocity can the intellect attribute being univocally to all things.¹⁷ Thus for Antonius, as for Scotus, the doctrine of univocity applies to the intrinsic unity that obtains within things in their natures. Individuals and species possess their own real unities; the unity of species that is the unity of identity has its origin in nature, which is reflected in the concept of the essence or *quidditas* of species.¹⁸ In following his teacher, Antonius also conceives this primordial unity within nature as being indifferent to singularity or universality

¹⁷ Antonius Andreas, *Quaestiones super duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, ff. 3ra - 7ra, 31vb - 32ra.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 16rb.

but in such a manner that this unity is less than numerical.¹⁹ This is what Antonius calls common nature, a doctrine taught by Scotus. Common nature then is the object of the senses and the intellect. This common nature is what is grasped by the senses in sense perception and is the quiddity or the universal that is produced by the agent intellect.

The common nature of a thing is that unity that is a minor unity and less than its numerical unity as a given substance. The reason why Antonius maintains that the singularity of a sensible thing cannot be cognized is that this individuality marks the primitive uniqueness of its singularity, which cannot be cognized in this life. This is the Scotistic doctrine of *haecceitas*, or *“this-ness”* that is the principle of individuality and basis for uniqueness in substances. Antonius argues that neither our intellect nor senses in this state of existence can understand the singular under its proper nature (*ratio*) of singularity. The reason for this is that every cognizing power cognizes the particular aspect (*ratio*) of some object which is distinguishable from another object, and in cognizing its object under some unity, it can distinguish it from any other object that does not have such a unity. However, our intellect cannot cognize its object in its singularity. The intellect has a distinct cognition of a singular in some intention that it cognizes. A proof of this is that the intellect cannot distinguish between one intention of a singular thing and another of the same intention and species. Antonius illustrates this in an example of two white objects placed side by side together. Each one is cognized by the intellect as a *“this”* or a *“that”*, but apart from this, each one’s unique singularity cannot be cognized. Neither in the intellect nor in the senses can two things seemingly identical in magnitude and figure and color

¹⁹ Ibid: *“...[U]nivocatio ista solum est in specie specialissima qua vere dicitur unam nam unitate reali, minore tamen quam sit unitas numerali...”* Also cf. Marek Gensler, *“Antonius Andreae’s Opus Magnum: The Metaphysics Commentary”*, *Anuari de la Socetatat Catalana de Filosofia*, vol. 9 (1997): 47.

be in the same place at the same time. The intellect more than the senses judges a unity or commonality these things share. For example, the senses cannot distinguish between the individual rays of the sun. So also the cognitive power in us does not cognize a thing in its absolute knowability insofar as it is made manifest to the intellect, but only insofar as it is the moving power. The reason for this is that in this state of existence, the intellect is moved by its object. However the singular does not move the intellect according to its grade of singularity, because the singular in this grade is not the principle of the moving action but rather of the limiting of this action. If one would argue against this by asserting that one can directly cognize the singular, Antonius replies that if something is understood in its nature, the singular nevertheless is not the cause of seeing color only in quantity. Thus the intellect and senses cognize the singular according to a unity in nature which is a minor numerical unity that is prior to the unity in a universal.²⁰ The universal taken in the second mode is specific real unity less

²⁰ Ibid., Bk. 7, q. 14, f. 38ra-b: *ō...Intellectus noster pro statu isto non per se intelligit singulare sub ratione propria singularitatis; nec sensus sentiet. Hoc probatur sic. Omnis potentia cognoscens aliquid obiectum sub propria ratione, puta illud cognoscere et ab aliis distinguere omni alio circumscripto ipso solo manente; sic nec intellectus noster nec sensus est huiusmodi respectum singularis. Ergo nec intellectus noster nec sensus intelligit singulare sub ratione propria singularitatis...Quia omnis potentia cognoscens suum obiectum secundum aliquam unitatem potest illud distinguere ab omni alio quod non est unum tali unitate; sed intellectus noster non potest hoc respectum singularis...Quia distinctissima cognitio singularis videtur esset alicuius intentionis quam intellectus distincte cognoscit...non videtur quod intellectus sciat distinguere si ostenditur sibi a quaecumque alia re eiusdem intentionis et eiusdem speciei. Ergo intellectus non cognoscit singulare secundum rationem seu unitatem singularitatis...quia si hec albedo ponitur in eodem loco cum hac albedine: manet quidem hec hec, et illa illa. Quia hec non est hec nec distinguitur ab illa per esse in loco; numquam tamen sensus discernit duas esse numero has albedines si sint eque intense. Similiter non distinguat intellectus inter duo singularia circumscripto distinctione accidentali que est per locum: magnitudinem et figuram et huiusmodi; puta si erent simul tempore et haberent eandem figuram et magnitudinem et eiusdem colorem. Alia enim tam intellectus quam sensus iudicaret esse unum. Patet est quia sensus non discernit diversitatem radiorum solarium licet...quia potentia cognitiva in nobis cognoscit rem non secundum absolutum cognoscibilitatem, in quantum sic in se est manifesta. Sed solum in quantum est motiva potentie, quia potentia cognitiva pro isto statu movetur ab obiectis. Sed natura singularis non movet secundum gradum singularitatis. Tum quia ille gradus non est principium actionis sed limitativus principiorum actionis...Si arguas contra, quia actiones sunt primo singularium; respondeo sicut dicentem fuit in primo huius, quia si intelligitur de principio quo quod illud est natura, non tamen sine singularitate, ita quod singularitas concurret sicut causa sine quo non eo modo color non videtur nisi quantitate. Ergo intellectus et sensus cognoscunt singulare secundum*

than a numerical unity. For example, a sense power such as sight does not have as its object something that is a numerical unity, because it would only then see one color in a numerical unity, and the same in the intellect. Thus both the sense power and intellect grasp an object that is some other real unity. Just as an object of sense precedes an act of the intellect, so this object's real numeric unity, its primitive singularity, precedes every act of the intellect.²¹

The Antonine author concurs with Antonius's assessment of the inability of the human intellect to cognize a thing's primitive and unique singularity by saying that every material nature is individuated accidentally by means of something outside its genus because in this nature is found a complex of accidents in it that are in one individual that are not found in another, according to Boethius. Thus it is necessary that this "something" itself renders what is essential which is individuated in its proper genus. Even nature would not remain if this element were taken away nor would it remain individuated. This is the *ratio* or difference *per se* of the individual, as in its mode of specific difference it contracts genus to species. Thus it contracts species to what is individual and is not distinguishable in reality. Then nature is separable from nature or nature from that "something"; at least by divine power. It is this *ratio* or specific difference that is formally and positively distinguished and is indivisible and can be multiplied, the *ratio* itself by which something is a "something this", which again is Scotus's doctrine of

unitatem naturae, que unitas est minor unitate numerali prior tamen unitate universali, est probatum fuit supra; non tamen sine singularitate.ö

²¹ Cf. Ibid., Bk. 7, q. 17, f. 40rb: ö...[U]niversale sumptum secundo modo est unum unitate aliquo reali minori tamen unitate numerali...sed potentia sensitiva, puta visus est una potentia. Ergo habet unum obiectum non unum numero, quia tunc non posset videre nisi unum colorem numero nec unum per intellectum; quia precedit actum intellectus sicut et sensus. Ergo est unum aliquo alia unitate reali, quia sicut obiectum sensus inquantum obiectum precedit intellectum, ita etiam secundum suam unitatem realem precedit omnem actum intellectus.ö

haecceity.²² The Antonine author remarks that it seems that that this haecceity by which nature is formally individuated and singularized cannot be cognized by us in this life, neither by sense nor by intellect. The reason for this is that this *ratio* or specific difference cannot alter or change the senses or the intellect since it is not the *ratio* of assimilation; it is only the *ratio* of distinguishing. And so this principle is not the *ratio* of cognition itself nor is it from something else because all cognition happens through assimilation.²³

The doctrine of intuitive cognition maintained by Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author appears to be development of the teaching of Scotus. The point of development in their doctrine is precisely creating a niche for the intuitive grasp of things in sense perception. As we recall, Antonius Andreas had that twofold classification for intuitive cognition based upon both sense and intellectual knowledge. The Antonine author maintains this classification, and we find his teaching in the last of the four arguments that discussed the inutility and purposelessness of intuitive cognition in his first question in the first book of his commentary. Here we find the objectors holding the position that the soul in this state of existence cannot have a natural intuitive knowledge of itself or of any other object; this is only possible through abstractive

²² Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.5.4: *Secundo dico quod omnis natura materialis individuatur accidentaliter per aliquid extra genus suum, quia in eo invenitur complexio accidentium ut stat in uno individuo quae non invenitur in alio individuo, secundum dictum Boethii. Et individuatio accidentaliter est qua subtracta adhuc natura maneret individuata nec esset idea Platonis. Ex quo patet quod oportet aliquid dare sibi consubstantiale et proprii generis quo individuatur. Illo etiam subtracto [M, fol. 257r] non remaneret natura nec remaneret individua, et haec est ratio vel differentia per se individualis, sicut suo modo differentia specifica contrahens genus ad speciem. Ita ista contrahit speciem ad individuum et non distinguitur realiter, a natura tunc esset separabilis a natura vel natura ab ipsa saltem virtute divina. Sed distinguitur formaliter et positive et est indivisibilis et multiplicabilis et ex se haec - immo ratio ipsa qua aliquid est hoc aliquid.*

²³ Ibid., III.5.5: *Tertio dico quod illud quo natura formaliter individuatur et quo singulare formaliter est singulare non est cognoscibile a nobis in via, nec a sensu nec ab intellectu. Non enim illa ratio potest immutare sensum et intellectum, cum non sit ratio assimilandi; sed tantum per se ipsam distinguendi. Et ita non est ratio cognoscendi se ipsam nec aliquid aliud, ut videtur; omnis enim cognitio fit per assimilationem.*

cognition. These objectors claim that the soul only has knowledge through the phantasm. It is necessary for the soul in this state of existence to look at the phantasm in order to understand. They point to the authority of Aristotle and his teaching in the *De Anima*. The phantasm indifferently represents a thing present or absent or existing or not existing. Moreover the intellect only understands through intelligible species that are produced by the agent intellect which transfers the species from the one order it has in the phantasm to the other order in the possible intellect. However by the objectors establishing the dependence of the soul upon the phantasm, the Antonine author wryly observes that the species in this established setting does not contain the object as present, which makes their claim here contradictory.²⁴ On the one hand, the Antonine author accepts the objectors' claim of the intellect's dependence upon the phantasm as a necessary condition for abstractive cognition. On the other hand, this type of knowledge does not account for how the intellect knows the object as present, as is the case in intuitive cognition.

The Antonine author identifies both Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus (*doctor noster*) as supporters of this argument regarding the condition of cognition in this life. At first glance it seems somewhat odd that the Antonine author would associate Scotus with Henry, since Scotus was a chief critic of Henry's noetics. Nevertheless he claims that Henry (and Scotus) emphasize the necessity of abstractive cognition and makes it clear that this cognition is the only one type of knowledge possible for the soul in its embodied existence. The Antonine author contends that

²⁴ Antonine author, *Quaestiones de Anima*, 1.1.12: "Quarta conclusio est quod anima pro statu coniunctionis suae cum corpore corruptibili nullam habet nec habere potest notitiam naturaliter de se ipsa vel de quocumque alio obiecto nisi abstractivam ita quod non intuitivam. Quod probant quia nullam habet notitiam nisi dependeat de phantasmate quia intelligentem necesse est [circa] phantasmata speculari III/2De anima/1; phantasma indifferenter repraesentat rem praesentem et absentem, existentem vel non-existentem. Item quia non intelligit nisi per speciem intelligibilem virtute intellectus agentis translatus de ordine in ordinem; praedicta autem species non continet obiectum praesens; quare etc."

Henry claims that experimental knowledge which the soul experiences in itself and its acts is known exclusively through abstractive cognition. According to Henry the object grasped simply and indistinctly in abstractive cognition is known directly according to its reflection in the phantasm. Hence the mind cognizes a stone by means of abstractive and not intuitive cognition. We have observed in the previous chapter how Henry posited the agent intellect as possessing its own unique habit of understanding that needs no assistance in its operation from any intermediary intelligible species.²⁵ Scotus maintains that cognizing this stone experientially as present is through intuitive cognition, though it could also be cognized indirectly through abstractive cognition. However the Antonine author argues that Henry claims that abstractive cognition is the exclusive type of intellectual cognition. In Henry's noetic there is no intuitive cognition by the intellect. The Antonine author disagrees with Henry's assessment of abstractive cognition and claims that this is false.²⁶ He criticizes as completely erroneous Henry's position that abstractive cognition can handle the object that would be in the purview of intuitive cognition. If Henry's assumptions were correct then all knowledge which the soul has of itself and its own acts would presuppose an abstractive knowledge which essentially depends upon some object, as in the cognition of a first object. In Henry's noetic it is necessary that the soul

²⁵ Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibetum* V, q. 14, fol. 174, G. See also fol. 174, O: "Intellectus autem possibilis speciem impressum nullam recipit a phantasmate; sed actione agentis facientis phantasmate quantum est de se solum in potentia moventia intellectum esse actu moventia et existentia in eo ut in cognoscente solum."

²⁶ Antonine author, *Quaestiones de Anima*, 1.1.13: "Hoc tenet magister Henricus et doctor noster in 1 suo. Ex quo patet quod secundum viam istam dicendum est ad quaestionem, scilicet, quod anima coniuncta pro statu isto non habet notitiam intuitivam de se ipsa nec de aliquo suo obiecto, sed tantum abstractivam ita quod experimentalis notitia illa qua se ipsam et <lin. Cod. L 51> actum suum certitudinaliter scit esse experitur <??> non est intuitiva sed abstractiva. Tum quia eodem actu simplici et indistincto cognoscitur obiectum directe et actus ipse secundum reflexionem; alias in intellectu essent simul plures actus (quod est falsum), scilicet, actus ipse quo anima primo cognoscit aliquod obiectum phantasiatum, ut lapidem est notitia abstractiva et non intuitiva, ergo et actus quo se ipsam et actus suos, sicut alia cognoscit ibi."

itself experiences and understands something at least prior to the order of its nature of understanding it. The Antonine author remarks that this would mean that intuitive cognition would necessarily and formally depend upon abstractive cognition for its operation, but this is impossibile. The reason for this is that intuitive cognition in its proper place within the whole genera of the different types of cognition is nobler than abstractive cognition. Thus in Henry's noetic any knowledge that the soul has of itself and its acts is confused and indistinct. But intuitive cognition is not like this because its knowledge is clear and distinct.²⁷ Thus the Antonine author dismisses Henry's claims of an act of cognition as both abstractive and intuitive by showing that: intuitive cognition in an intellectual act presupposes a distinct act of abstractive cognition in order for the soul to cognize itself, and that every act of intellectual knowledge is confused; but intuitive cognition should be distinct. By claiming that an act of intuitive cognition presupposes an act of abstractive cognition, the Antonine author is committed to saying that in this state of existence we also can have an intuitive cognition of a prior act of abstractive cognition while it is taking place.

However it is somewhat puzzling why the Antonine author mentioned Scotus along with Henry at the beginning of this argument against intuitive cognition. Scotus maintained that the source of the mind's intuitive cognition was its own direct grasp of a present object and as such is the cognition of the angels and blessed in heaven, which was precisely the point that Henry

²⁷ Ibid., 1.1.14: *ōDices quod eadem notitia erit abstractiva et intuitiva, quod falsum est. Tum quia omnis notitia quam habet anima de se ipsa et actu suo praesupponit notitiam abstractivam de aliquo obiecto a qua essentialiter dependet sicut ab obiecto, puta cognitionem primam obiecti; necessarium est enim /85vb/ ad hoc ut anima experiatur et sciat se intelligere quod prius saltem ordine naturae aliquid intelligat; impossibile est autem quod notitia intuitiva a notitia abstractiva dependeat necessario et formaliter quia intuitiva secundum totum genus suum nobilior est abstractiva. Tum quia omnis notitia quam habet anima de se vel de actibus suis confusa est et indistincta ut experitur quaelibet {Subintellige: anima.} in se ipsa; nulla autem talis est intuitiva clara est et distincta; quare, etc.ō*

claimed was the object of abstractive cognition. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics* Antonius Andreas presents six grades of both sense and intellectual cognition. As we observed above, regarding intuitive cognition, one type was the unmediated grasp of the intellect which only the blessed in heaven possess. The other type of intuitive cognition was the direct grasp of a thing sensed as present. The upshot then is that the Antonine author at the outset mentions Scotus with Henry as a position that may appear similar to that offered by Henry, but in the final analysis is completely different. Hence Andreas, the Antonine author, and Scotus share the view on the distinction between the intellectual acts of abstractive and intuitive cognition; an abstractive cognitive act is prior to an intuitive act, but an abstractive act that is intuitively cognized.

Another similarity between the Antonine author and Antonius Andreas is their respective presentations on the different grades or modes of cognition. Antonius Andreas begins, as was mentioned above, with six grades of sense cognition which correspond with six grades of intellectual cognition. The distinction in grades fall under the two major types of cognition which Antonius features: intuitive and abstractive cognition. The first grades of sensitive and intellectual cognition are intuitive cognition. The second grades of each are abstractive cognition. In the order of sense cognition, intuitive cognition regards the object as present. Abstractive cognition deals with a species of the object which may represent the object of sense cognition in its absence, or perhaps in its presence, for intellectual cognition. In the intellectual mode, the first grade is intuitive cognition of seeing an extramental object as present in its existence; however this type of cognition cannot be had on this side of the grave. It is a mode of cognition which the blessed in heaven possess. The second grade in this intellectual mode is abstractive cognition which regards the present object in species produced from the object which

can represent the object when it is absent.²⁸ The succeeding modes in both categories of cognition are variations based upon the presence or absence of the object, or images in the imagination based upon an absent object, or an aggregate of different concepts produced to represent an object. Antonius provides this explanation as part of his answer to the question on the possibility of knowing the quiddity of separate substance in this life by the *viator*. According to Bérubé, this demonstrates that Antonius did not accept Scotus's doctrine on intellectual intuition. However Bérubé says nothing about Andreas's position on sensitive intuition. However it is true that in relegating intellectual intuition to the afterlife that Antonius did drop discussion on the topic.²⁹ Nevertheless what he provides here for us in these first couple books of questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is not a rejection but a development of Duns Scotus's teaching on intuitive cognition.

The Antonine author also offers his own grading of the internal sense powers as well as a grading of six types of cognition with six different cognitive powers. Beginning with the

²⁸ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 2, q. 3, f. 12vb: "Notandum est que sex sunt gradus cognitionis sensitive quibus concordat alii sex gradus cognitione intellective. Prima cognitio est intuitiva quae respicit obiectum ut presens est; secunda est abstractiva quae, scilicet est per speciem non intuitivam, sed potest esse in absentia obiecti; tertia est per accidens correspondens primae cognitioni, scilicet, per privationum per se cognoscibilis puta cognitio obiecti praesentis oppositi primo modo; quarta est cognitio per accidens scilicet per privationum cognoscibilis per se secundo modo, puta cognitio alicuius obiecti oppositi obiecto secundae cognitionis, quod in eius absentia cognoscitur per speciem tamen genitam ab obiecto <opposito>; quinta est cognitio per compositionem specierum diversarum sensibilium; sexta est cognitio alicuius per accidens, puta alicuius cui accidit obiectum per se...Similiter etiam correspondente dicuntur sex gradus cognitionis intellectivae. Prima cognitio est intuitiva quae dicitur notitia visionis quae est de obiecto presenti, ut presens est in sua existentia; secundo cognitio est abstractiva quae est obiecti praesentis in sua specie genita ab obiecto quod potest esse absens in sua existentia; tertia est cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto primi modi; quarta est cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto secundi modi; quinta est cognitio alicuius ex conceptibus aggregatis; sexta est per accidens cum aliquid cognoscitur per speciem illius quod sibi accidit. Exemplum primi, cognitio beatorum in patria et illa cognitio visionis est nobis forte impossibilis pro stato isto, de quo alias...." This text parallels in part Scotus's treatment on intuitive cognition. See Scotus's *Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Bk. 2, q. 3 [80 -85].

²⁹ Cf. Camille Bérubé, *La Connaissance de L'Individuel au Moyen Age* (Montreal: Presses de l'Université Montréal, 1964), 249 ó 250.

ordering of the internal sense powers he says that the common sense organ and its operation is the first of the interior sense powers. The second is the phantasm or imagination. The Antonine author says that the principles of imagining and perceiving remain in the absence of sensible objects. This happens through the species of things that are retained in the imagination. Such perception does not take place through the senses but through the imagination and is necessary for the perfection of animals. But the common sense only acts in respect to the object as present; it participates in some way in an aspect of the particular senses. This is because the immediate object of the common sense is an operation on a particular sense which only has a relation to an object as present. Its organ is continuous with the organs of the other particular senses but is not changed except for the change that occurs in the senses relative to its particular object. But the imaginative power retains its species. Thus the author says that because the state of the object is different for each power - its presence with respect to the common sense and its absence with respect to the imagination - this seems to suffice for showing the distinction between common sense and imagination as well as the distinction among the constricted powers of the particular senses and their organs.³⁰ This also shows us the division between intuitive and abstractive cognition vis-à-vis the presence or absence of the object. The Antonine author adds that

³⁰ Antonine author, *Questiones De Anima*, II.34.8: ðNota consequenter de viribus interioribus apprehensivis quod prima ipsorum est sensus communis de qua et eius organo et operationibus dictum est supra. Secunda est imaginatio vel phantasia. Percipimus enim quod absentibus sensibilibus manent principia imaginandi et praesentandi vel percipiendi ipsa, et hoc est per species ipsorum retentas in imaginatione; ita quod talis perceptio non est per sensum sed per imaginationem et est necessaria animalibus perfectis... [S]ensus autem communis numquam habet actum suum nisi respectu obiecti praesentis, quod patet. Tum quia participat aliquo modo rationem sensuum particularium...Tum quia immediatum obiectum sensus communis est operatio sensus particularis, quae non est nisi respectu obiecti praesentis. Tum quia organum eius continuatur cum aliis organis sensuum particularium et non immutatur nisi ad immutationem ipsorum...imaginativa vero bene est retentiva specierum...Tum quia alia est condicio obiecti utriusque potentiae, puta praesentia respectu sensus communis et absentia respectu imaginationis; quae videtur sufficere ad distinctionem sensus communis ab imaginatione et distinctionem inter potentias artatas vel in potentis artatis...ð

imagination does not immediately receive an act of sense but the common sense and the particular senses receive the species of a sensible object in the duration of its presence to the senses. But in the absence of the sensible object the prior species received from an object that was present can be actualized through the species being retained. Therefore this should not properly be called memory because it retains and conserves the species in the absence of the object. This type of absence has no relation with what passes in time or is past as in the case of sensitive memory. But this imaginative power in the phantasm cannot be classified as an intermediate power that is between the particular senses and the common sense. Nor can it be placed as a medium between an object as present or absent.³¹ The Antonine author implies here that this imaginative power does not have a mediatorial role in the presence or absence of an object. This issue of a medium by our Antonine author is an adumbration of his teaching on intelligible species, as we shall see in the next chapter. However here he seems to have intuitive cognition in the background in describing these inner sense powers based on an object's presence or absence. The third power which in contrast to common sense and imagination is the estimative power that apprehends an intention that is not sensed, but is an intention of other present things sensed that in some measure does not pertain to its power. He offers stock examples of the bird's ability to choose straw and not wood to build its nest and the sheep which feeds its young with its milk and flees the wolf on account of an intention of the wolf as harmful or as something that can inflict pain. Nevertheless prior to sensing a figure or some other

³¹ Ibid., II.34.9: *Unde et imaginatio non recipit sensum et actum simul sed sensus communis vel particularis in praesentia sensibilis simul duratione speciei et actum recipient, sed absente sensibili, specie prius recepta cum esset praesens, habet et habere potest actum suum per speciem retentam. Nec ideo debet dici memoria proprie, quia speciem retinet et conservat in absentia obiecti, quia non est respectu praeteriti ut praeteritum est, sicut est memoria sensitiva, ut dicetur infra. Non potest autem poni alia potentia immediata inter instam et sensum communem, sicut nec inter obiectum praesens et non praesens medium aliquod potest poni.*

intention of a wolf, the sheep does not properly perceive the nature (*rationem*) of the quiddity of the wolf as evil and so it cannot properly interpret the wolf as a threat as we can do in an act of understanding. But the sheep through its intention of the wolf only perceives it as a thing to be feared.³² However the imaginative power in the human person is joined to the will and reason and is something more of a power than in other animals. This is because this power compares species that are not part of sensation. Thus the imaginative power based on its union with the will remains one in its rational power by which it can compose or unite movable species of sense that were or were not partly from the nature of things. While the particular senses are nearest the point of contact with sensible forms, the common sense is where the species of the particular senses are collated and compared. More particularly intriguing is the Antonine author's grading of six different kinds of cognition and six cognitive powers. His ordering is as follows. The first power is the exterior senses. The second power is the common sense. The author concludes with Aristotle that its location is around the heart. The third power is the imagination and its organ is in the base of the brain. The fourth power is the estimative power and its organ is located right above the imagination. The fifth power is the memory of sensations and its organ is located in the back of the brain, and its organ does not originate in the nervous system but in the heart. The sixth is the intellective power which has no need of an organ.³³ The Antonine author's

³² Ibid., II.34.10: *δ*Tertia est potentia interior quae vocatur aestimativa quae est apprehensiva intentionum non sensatarum, praesentis tamen sensationibus aliarum intentionum aliquantulum [L, fol. 101rb] non pertinentibus ad ipsam. Unde et videmus quod avis accipit paleam et non lignum quia palea utilis est ad nidificandum et ovis ministrat lac suo fetui et fugit lupum propter intentionem nocentis vel nocenti quam percipit in ipso; prius tamen sensata figura vel aliqua alia intentione lupi, nec percipit proprie rationem quidditativam nocenti, sicut intellectus, sed rem...δ

³³ Ibid., II.35.8: *δ*Dico ergo secundum Commentatorem et Aristotelem quod non est ponendo illa quinta interior media inter imaginativam et aestimativam; sed sicut imaginativa quia in homine coniungitur cum voluntate et ratione habet aliquid amplius quam in aliis animalibus, quia est collativa specierum non sensatarum et dicitur ratio

enumeration of the internal sense powers and his grading of the kinds of cognition bears a striking resemblance to Antonius Andreas's cognitive grading. The resemblance is more in the Antonine author's penchant for ordering and classification. The Antonine author did not classify the grades of cognition as Antonius did in his work due in part that this place in his commentary he is chiefly discussing different questions on sensation. What is striking though is that in his summarizing of the internal sense powers, his division is based on the object sensed as present or absent. A case could be made that this Antonine author had the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition in mind as he worked through his classifications. So it could be said that the Antonine author's great attention to detail regarding the internal sense powers is also bound up with his effort to solidify his claim on intuitive cognition that is tied to the presence of objects sensed. Undoubtedly this only contributes to what Antonius Andreas himself maintained regarding intuitive cognition.

B. Antonius Andreas and the Antonine Author on Abstractive Cognition

As was mentioned at the beginning of the first section, both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author maintain that intuitive cognition has as its object something that is present.

particularis, in aliis autem animalibus est perceptiva solum et memorativa et sensitiva fertur super actum suum aliquo modo et dicitur reminiscitiva secundum quandam distinctionem et collationem quod non habet in aliis, ita et imaginativa ex coniunctione sui cum voluntate a qua mobilis species sensitivas potest simul componere, manens una in ratione potentiae sive quia ita fuerint in parte ex rerum natura sive non. Quod non potest in aliis animalibus et sic dicitur phantasia vel formativa, ita quod non sunt nisi sex genera cognitionem et secundum hoc sex vires cognitionem. Prima est sensu exterior. Secunda est sensus communis quae habet organum suum circa cor...Tertia imaginativa et habet organum in prima parte cerebri. Quarta aestimativa et habet organum in secunda parte. Quinta memorativa sensitiva et illa est in posteriori parte cerebri nec oriuntur inde nervi motivi sed corde. Sexta est potentia intellectiva et motiva et ista organo non indiget...ö

Abstractive cognition's object is absent, and thus the intellect has the need for intelligible species in its abstractive cognitive act. I will leave discussion of their respective teachings on intelligible species for the next chapter and focus primarily on what both Antonius and the Antonine author have to say about abstractive cognition. Not surprisingly, as we saw above, Antonius Andreas's teaching on abstractive cognition is nestled within his discussion in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. There we saw that for Antonius the object of the intellect is a thing's common nature which is abstracted as the quiddity of the thing thus cognized, the form of the thing. At one point in his discussion on common nature and its relation to the universal, Antonius brings in Avicenna regarding his teaching of common nature as that horse-ness which is only horse-ness and is neither one nor many, nor particular. According to Antonius, Avicenna does not associate the common nature with the universal. Rather, it is the medium between the universal and the singular; this nature which is obtained through abstraction as quiddity is neither one nor the other.³⁴ In terms of human knowledge the universal or singular is an object of sense, having a species of unity that is suitable to the capacity of its power. The intellect has a species of unity that is appropriate to its power, for every common nature such as horse-ness is a unity that is proper to itself.³⁵ What this points to is how the original concept of being in the intellect

³⁴ Antonius's claim of the common nature of a thing as a medium will have a central place in his doctrine on intelligible species. Thus I simply state what Antonius maintained here and will explicate its role as medium in an act of intellection in the next chapter.

³⁵ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam.*, Bk. 1, q. 8, f. 8vb - 9ra: "Secundum Avicennam.....quod equinitas tantum est equinitas, nec est una nec plures; nec est universalis nec particulare, etc. Sic abstrahit a quacumque tali conditione, et immo est medium inter universale et particulare per abnegationem utriusque. Notandum tamen quod Avicenna non negat unitatem simpliciter de quidditate, cum ait quod non est una neque plures, sic negat unitatem numeralem et multitudinem sibi oppositam, ad quam quidditas est de se indifferens et de se ad neutrum determinatur nec ad universale nec ad singulare, et ut sic in se considerandum sive utroque illorum est obiectum sensus. Habet tamen species unitatem sibi competentem potentem; nam omne unum est unum unitate sibi propriam." That Antonius identifies common nature as the medium between the universal and singular

is abstracted as a quiddity from an object of sense. The quiddity abstracted by the intellect as a unity that is itself indifferent to being universal or singular is *ens*, which is the primary concept of the intellect. Thus according to Antonius metaphysics is principally and primarily first philosophy because its subject matter is *ens simpliciter*. By *ens simpliciter* he means what is simply and usefully understood as abstract being, according to which being is considered as what is most common and absolute insofar as it comes under its proper concept which is abstracted from any aspect of being. This concept of being can then be commonly predicated of God and creatures.³⁶ For Antonius then the doctrine of univocity applies to the intrinsic unity that obtains within things in their individual natures. Individuals and species possess their own real unities; the unity of species, that is the unity of identity, has its origin in nature, which is reflected in the concept of the essence or *quidditas* of species.³⁷ Just like his teacher Scotus, Antonius views this primordial unity within nature as being indifferent to singularity or universality, but where this unity is less than numerical.³⁸ This is the quiddity which is the object of the intellect in abstractive cognition.

The Antonine author also discusses abstractive cognition in a question in his commentary on book 3 of the *De Anima* regarding whether the singular adds something above or beyond

will have important implications for the role of intelligible species, as we shall see in the next chapter on his teaching of intelligible species.

³⁶ Ibid., Bk. 1, q. 2, f. 2va: ð....[E]ns simpliciter; per ly simpliciter intelligo utiliter et abstracte, secundum quod ens consideratur comunissime et precise inquantum ens et sub precise propria ratione entitatis abstrahentes a quacumque ratione entis specialis. Secundo ponit commune de Deo et creature.ð Cf. also, Ibid., 3rb-3va: ð....[E]ns commune Deo et creature est subiectum primum metaphysice scientieð.

³⁷ Cf. Ibid., Bk. 4, q. 1, f. 16ra- 16va.

³⁸ Ibid. Also cf. Gensler, ðAntonius Andreaeðs Opus Magnumð, 47.

nature. In what appears as a setup to distinguish between abstractive and intuitive cognition he asks in his second article whether the quiddity and its singular require distinct cognitive powers.³⁹ He states that an organic and complex power does not abstract the singular from quality, quantity, and dimension. But this is not the case with nature and quiddity which require a non-organic abstractive power.⁴⁰ He mentions that nature considered in itself has an infinite and immense capacity to be instantiated; nor is nature itself in principle repugnant to being repeated in an infinite number of individuals. Therefore the intellect abstracts nature that itself corresponds to this abstractive power that is non-organic.⁴¹ The singular and nature have one or other unity because the nature, when expressed in an intelligible species, has a unity that is abstracted and it is as if this is in the mode of separate substances. The singular has another unity and another *ratio* and the power corresponding to it is of another *ratio* as well. Therefore the power corresponding to it is from another principle (*rationis*). Thus since one or other power are cognized as if they were the same, Aristotle says that they are yet in one mode or another.⁴² This reflects what Antonius Andreas mentioned above regarding the object for the appropriate

³⁹ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.5: <Articulus secundus: An quidditas et suum singulare necessario requirant distinctas potentias cognitivas> Secundo videndum est principaliter an quidditas et suum singulare necessario requirant distinctas potentias cognitivas.ö

⁴⁰ Ibid., III.5.9: <Et dico quod sic quia unam potentiam organicam et complexionatam sicut singulare quod non abstrahit a qualitate et quantitate et dimesnione. Non sic autem est de natura vel quidditate, et ideo requirit potentiam absractam et non-organicam.ö

⁴¹ Ibid., III.5.10: <Item, natura secundum se habet infinitatem quamdam in individuís et immensitatem nec sibi repugnat immensitas aliquo modo, ut videtur. Ergo abstrahit et per consequens sibi correspondet potentia abstracta non-organica.ö

⁴² Ibid., III.5.11: <Item, singulare et natura habent aliam et aliam unitatem, quia natura in esse intelligibili habet unitatem abstractam et quasi ad modum substantiarum separatarum; singulare habet aliam unitatem et alterius rationis - et ideo sibi correspondet potentia alterius rationis; quare, etc. Et ideo cum cognoscitur alia et alia potentia ac si eadem, tamen alio et alio modo sicut dicit Philosophus.ö

intellectual power. Here the Antonine author is simply making the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. In abstractive cognition the quiddity, universal, or nature - whatever name one uses to denote this object, has the same meaning as the first object of the intellect but not of the senses. Thus nature in itself is not signate nature. Also because sense itself perceives the singular, the universal itself is attained by another power. This power that abstracts the universal resides in the intellect itself.⁴³

At this point the Antonine author introduces his third article in the discussion, asking whether or how our intellect joined to the body understands the singular.⁴⁴ The quandary he has in view is an intellect that for many has as its sole operation the abstraction of the universal from the object. In this mode of cognition the intellect only has an indirect knowledge of the singular. As the author remarks, some hold that the intellect understands the singular either directly or from the attention directly focused on it. But this claim is opposed to what Aristotle teaches; it is the quiddity or the essence that is the object of the intellect and not the singular.⁴⁵

The Antonine author introduces a discussion about a couple of different types of cognition. The first alternative model of cognition pertains to the intellect's fittingness to be able to know the singular. In one way the intellect knows the singular not in itself but according to the way that it uses the sense organ as an instrument. This makes for one cognitive power and it

⁴³ Ibid., III.5.12: *ö...[Q]uod quidditas vel universale seu natura, quod idem est, est primum obiectum intellectus, non autem sensus. Tum quia natura secundum se non est signata. Tum quia sensus secundum se percipit singulare, igitur alia potentia ipsum universale, ut videtur; hoc non est nisi ipse intellectus.ö*

⁴⁴ Ibid., III.5: *ö<Articulus tertius: an intellectus noster coniunctus singulare intelligat et quomodo> Ultimo videndum est si intelligat singulare et quomodo.ö*

⁴⁵ Ibid., III.5.13: *öDe hoc autem dicunt aliqui quod intellectus per se et directe seu de recto aspectu intelligit singulare. Sed iam probatum est oppositum per Philosophum quia quidditas vel quod quid est obiectum intellectus, non igitur singulare.ö*

seems that another is not needed, although a superior power does well with what is nobler and more perfect in its mode than an inferior power. According to this mode of cognition the sense itself perceives the singular but at no time is this operation attributed to the intellect; there is no superior power that perceives the singular except by being united to the sense power. The intellect does not distinguish the particular from the universal except inasmuch as it is joined to the phantasm or common sense in its cognition of the singular. As a consequence it judges from the universal which it directly knows.⁴⁶ It seems that perhaps the author is presenting here a mode of cognition whose source is Henry of Ghent. Henry maintained that the agent intellect by its light is able to separate the singular from the universal in the species. The phantasm itself serves as the medium between the mind and the external world. Of course for Henry, divine illumination is necessary to know the truth of things. The author here makes no note of it; perhaps because he has rejected this thesis of Henry just as had Scotus.⁴⁷ However the main focus of the author is upon Peter John Olivi who maintained that the mind needs only one power and that there is no need for a multiplication of species as were held by Bacon and other perspectivists. Instead perception occurs from an *aspectus* or attention that is part of the soul's powers.⁴⁸ In his own arguments against the perspectivists Olivi demonstrates how *aspectus* fits

⁴⁶ Ibid., III.5.14: *Modus autem ponendi est quod intellectus cognoscit singulare, non quidem secundum se ipsum, sed secundum quod utitur sensitivum organo et instrumento. Illud enim quod facit una potentia secundum cognitionem ut videtur, non facit alia, licet potentia superior bene faciat quid nobilius vel perfectiori modo quam potentia inferior, quia ibi videt quod sensus secundum se percipit singulare numquam hoc attribuit intellectui secundum se, ita quod nulla potentia superior percipit singulare nisi secundum quod utitur sensu et coniungitur sibi, ita quod intellectus non distinguit particulare ab univesali nisi pro quanto coniungitur phantasie vel sensui communi in cognoscendo singulare et discendendo per consequens ab univesali quod secundum se ipsum directe cognoscit.*

⁴⁷ Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibetum* IV, q. 7, fol. 93, T; q. 21, fol. 136, H.

⁴⁸ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 41. For a biography and doctoral analysis of Olivi's life and work, see Carter Partee, O.F.M., *Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study*, *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 20 (1960): 215 - 260.

in with the soul's powers. He says that the seeing power, insofar that it has existing in its corporeal organ a virtual attention (*aspectum virtualem*) that it can have what he calls virtual rays (*radium virtualem*). But the ray in the eye is really nothing else than its attention that is construed as a virtual extending to the object of sight. This attention is understood to be a certain spiritual mode that is proportioned to the pupil of the eye; and this ray extends to as many points or parts as there are in the pupil of the eye. There can be so many rays placed in the pupil of the eye. This is because a ray is virtually measured in equal proportion to all the parts of the pupil of the eye.⁴⁹ Olivi rendered an account purporting to show the necessity of *aspectus* as a way to explain the various changes in the particular senses, and also to show how *aspectus* is present in the common or interior sense.⁵⁰ Olivi maintains that acts of perception are not brought about by the presence of the sense object and its effect on the senses. But by employing his theory of *aspectus* he attempts to demonstrate the priority of the activity of the soul.⁵¹ Tachau among others have shown that the source of Olivi's thesis is rooted in both the teaching of St Augustine and in the Arabic philosopher Alfarabi; this itself shows how much Arabic thought had melded

⁴⁹ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, ed. Bernard Jansen, v. 2 (Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924), q. 58 [490]: ð...[D]icunt quod virtus visiva, secundum hoc quod habet aspectum virtualem in organo corporeo existente, secundum hoc potest dici habere radium virtualem. Qui radius non est aliud quam ipse aspectus sic virtualiter protensus, et pro quanto ipse aspectus quodam spirituali modo commetitur se pupillae ipsius oculi et quod sunt puncta seu partes in pupilla, tot possunt poni radii, non quod per essentiam sint plures, sed per quandam virtualem aequivalentiam et per quandam proportionalem commensurationem et applicationem seu inhaerentiam et assistentiam sui ad omnes partes pupillae...ð

⁵⁰ Ibid., [97 - 98]: ðOstenso igitur quod necessarium est praedictos aspectus et eorum varias mutationes ponere in sensibus particularibus, sequitur hoc idem ostendere in sensu communi seu interiori.ð

⁵¹ Cf. José Filipe Silva, ðMedieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overviewð, Active Perception in the History of Philosophy From Plato to Modern Philosophy, eds. José Filipe Silva, Mikko Yrjösuuri, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind*, vol. 14 (Cham/Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London: Springer, 2014), 133. See also Hans Thomas Adriaenssen, ðPeter John Olivi on Perceptual Representationð, *Vivarium*, vol. 49 (2011): 324 - 352.

with Augustinian thought.⁵² However by his emphasis upon this virtual attention of the soul on its object, Olivi not only rejects the need for the multiplication of sensible species in the medium to the particular senses but also eliminates the need for intelligible species. Olivi unequivocally states that it is impossible for species to have real or natural *esse* and only intentional *esse*; and that species naturally flow from a natural corporeal form that really informs a natural body such as the air and the eye.⁵³ Hence Olivi also dispenses with the way that species themselves are viewed as intentional or spiritual.⁵⁴

But the Antonine author finds this model of cognition maintained by Olivi unsatisfactory. Granted that the intellect itself distinguishes between the singular and universal, yet it would seem that neither the singular nor the universal can be known through sense. Thus it follows that the intellect itself both understands the particular and also cognizes the object. For the Antonine author this way of explaining the dynamics of cognition is fraught with confusing difficulties based upon conditions that pertain neither to the intellect nor to its operation.⁵⁵

In a second type of cognition the Antonine author analyzes the intellect's understanding of the singular through reflection which would yield only an indirect knowledge of the singular. In this model the universal is the first object of the intellect. In this mode it is said that the

⁵² Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 41. Cf. also James McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste*, 78.

⁵³ Olivi, *Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, q. 58 [87 - 88]: "Secundum impossibile est quod una harum specierum non habeat esse reale seu naturale, sed tantum intentionale, et tamen quod vere et naturaliter fluat a forma naturali et corporali et vere ac realiter informet corpus naturale, puta, aerem et oculum."

⁵⁴ Cf. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition*, 69.

⁵⁵ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.5.15: "Contra: non videtur quod hoc sufficiat quia cum intellectus secundum se ipsum distnguat inter singulare et universale - quia in hoc non potest aliquis sensus, sicut nec universale potest cognoscere -, sequitur quod secundum se ipsum particulare intellegat, sicut etiam sensus communis quia inter obiecta sensuum particularium distinguit secundum se ipsum. Hinc est quod etiam secundum se ipsum obiecta illa cognoscit..."

singular adds nothing to the universal except by a twofold negation. Thus as a consequence the singular can only be understood through the universal as the negation of an affirmation. This is summed up as a three-stage process. The first stage is that the object is first in the phantasm; in the second stage the agent intellect emits an abstractive light upon the phantasm. In the third stage the phantasm directly moves the intellect to cognition of the quiddity or the universal. This terminates the intellect's first operation. The intellect by its power then turns to reflect upon the universal itself, not as the universal but as it was produced in the phantasm. Only in this way it knows the singular which is the same in the phantasm. The universal and singular thus known terminates the intellect's second operation which was a reflection on what it attained in its first operation. The Antonine author disagrees with this model and dismisses it outright because of its glaring inconsistencies and does not even bother to comment further upon it.⁵⁶ Even if the author does not identify the source of this account of cognition it could be that the one he is referring to is St. Thomas. Aquinas holds that one can have knowledge of the singular through a certain reflection of the intellect which yields at best an indirect knowledge. Nevertheless St. Thomas also makes a distinction between cognition and an understanding of the singular. He writes that the object of any sense power is the form as it exists in the material body. Since such kind of matter is the principle of individuation each particular sense power can only have a

⁵⁶Ibid., III.5.16: "Secundus modus [L, fol. 107va] dicendi est quod intellectus intelligit singulare per reflexionem. Hoc autem declarando supponitur quod universale est primum obiectum intellectus. Similiter dicitur quod singulare nihil addit super universale nisi negationem duplicem et per consequens intelligi potest per ipsum universale, sicut negatio per affirmationem. Tunc dicit quod obiectum primo phantasiatur secundo quod phantasma lumen intellectus agentis irradiatur, tertio quod hoc facto phantasma movet directe ad cognitionem quidditatis vel universalis et in hoc prima linea terminatur. Sed intellectus vi sua conversiva reflectit super se universale, non quidem universale et in se, sed ut phantasiatum et in phantasmate. Et tantum cum hoc scit singulare cuius est idem phantasma et illud universale et singulari sic cognito terminatur linea secunda quasi reflexa in qua est terminus illius quod in prima fuit principium. Sed in istis dictis sunt multa dubia quae dimitto."

cognitive grasp (*cognoscitiva*) of its particular object. Therefore the intellect's proper operation is to cognize (*cognoscere*) the form in matter existing individually in a body, but not as it is in such matter. For to cognize (*cognoscere*) what is individuated in matter, and not as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from individuated matter that is represented in the phantasm. And therefore it is necessary to say that our intellect understands (*intelligit*) matter abstracted from phantasms and then obtains some cognitive knowledge (*cognitionem*) of a material thing considered immaterially.⁵⁷ For Aquinas there is no problem about knowledge of singulars for it is the singular, sensible thing that is precisely grasped and known by the sense powers.⁵⁸ Aquinas also treated the issue of cognizing and understanding material things in his *Sentences* commentary.⁵⁹ Hence Thomas says that within the human person there are two ordered powers

⁵⁷ St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* 1, q. 85, a. 1 [Ottawa ed.: 524b: 3 - 9, 21 - 33]: *Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum...Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant in phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligi materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus, et per materialis sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus...ö*

⁵⁸ Cf. Paul DeHart, *Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy. A Critical Inquiry* (New York/London: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2012), 108.

⁵⁹ Cf. *In I Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 4, a.5 [Busa ed. 14]. In his discussion St. Thomas is commenting on Augustine's distinction between *cogitare*, *discernere*, and *intelligere*. Discernment is a cognition in that the intellect cognizes differences between things. Cognition considers the parts and properties of a thing. However *intelligere* here is nothing else than a simple intuitive understanding of an intelligible thing present to it (*ösimplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est praesens intelligibileö*). He says that soul has neither God nor itself as the object of its cognition and discernment, because no one would be able to naturally know the whole nature of his soul, which is most difficult to do, even with a great effort. Thus the presence of the object is any mode does not suffice for such cognition. But it is necessary that there be something in the object that requires the attention of the cognizer. According to this to understand is said to be nothing else than intuition, which is nothing else than an intelligible present to the intellect in some mode (*öSed oportet ut sit ibi in ratione objecti, et exigitur intentio cognoscentis. Sed secundum quod intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo...ö*). Thomas's treatment in his *Summa* question shows a development in his thinking. However, it would seem that his discussion does not rise to the level of the topic as discussed in later thirteenth and early fourteenth philosophy, which is indicated in the rejection of this view by both Scotus and the Antonine author.

of knowledge; through one power we can know (*cognoscimus*) universals and immaterial things and through the other we can know the singular and material.⁶⁰ Thus the sense powers and intellect have their own respective objects. The sense powers directly cognize the material singular; the intellect understands immaterially the universal of the thing cognized in the senses and indirectly understands the cognized singular. For Thomas this indirect knowledge occurs when the intellect composes and divides by applying intelligibles to the thing previously abstracted.⁶¹ This composing and dividing activity is associated with the intellect's activity of reflection which is the intellectual operation of judgment.⁶² However such a theory of cognition does not suit our author because this theory lends itself to merely an indirect cognition of the singular. This certainly is Scotus's own criticism of Aquinas on this point.⁶³

In a third type of cognition analyzed by the Antonine author, he maintains that the quiddity is the first object of the intellect. In this mode the intellect only understands by means of the *ratio* of some kind of subject; as a consequence it cannot understand the singular except through its quiddity or *ratio* of quiddity. Its relation to a *ratio* of agreement includes the quiddity, or a *ratio* of disagreement, to the extent that this *ratio* is added to it and is called a kind

⁶⁰ St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* 1, q. 14, a. 11 [Ottawa ed.,: 102a 40 - 43]: "Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscimus universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia..." ad. 1 [Ottawa ed., 103a 3 - 9]: "Dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a principiis individuantes; unde species intelligibilis nostri intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit."

⁶¹ Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 2, Ch. 96 [Editio Leonina Manualis: 220] "Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta ad rem..."

⁶² John Knasas, *Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 122.

⁶³ Cf. Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 22, 10 - 16 [229 - 231].

of reflexive cognition.⁶⁴ This variant of a cognitional theory described by the Antonine author is also treated by Scotus in his *De Anima* commentary. The one whom Scotus criticizes is again Aquinas who maintains that the quiddity of things is the first object of the intellect.⁶⁵ The Antonine author disagrees with this account of cognition, namely because intellectual cognition that bases its operation on a comparison and division of things presupposes their knowledge according to an absolute. And as such this account of cognition does not really answer the question of how the intellect knows the singular.⁶⁶

In the last type of cognition discussed by the Antonine author he regards the phantasm and its quiddities and all singulars as being in the same supposit or individual substance. By the power of the agent intellect the phantasm first moves the intellect to an understanding of quidditative substance and afterwards to cognition of any accidental quiddity. In this mode the intellect by its power retains all things being cognized so that it has knowledge of all singulars that it has collected within itself. What the intellect properly has as its quidditative object is a distinct and determinate knowledge of the individual and its quiddity according to its mode of cognition.⁶⁷ Such a view described by the Antonine author resembles the thinking of Giles of

⁶⁴ Antonine author, *Questiones De Anima*, III.5.17: ðAlius est modus dicendi quod quidditas est primum obiectum intellectus et ideo nihil intelligit intellectus nisi per rationem talis obiecti nec per consequens intelligit singulare nisi per ipsam quidditatem, vel rationem quidditatis et in habitudine ad ipsam secundum rationem convenientiae, pro quanto includit quidditatem; vel disconvenientiam, pro quanto distinguitur ab ea et addit super ipsam et dicitur talis cognitio reflexa...ö

⁶⁵ Cf. Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 19, 5 - 17 [186 - 190].

⁶⁶ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.5.18: ðContra istum modum est quia cognito comperativa aliquorum secundum convenientiam vel disconvenientiam praesupponit notitiam illorum secundum se absolutam, igitur adhuc restat difficultas quomodo singulare ipsum ab intellectu cognoscitur.ö

⁶⁷ Ibid., III.5.19: ðIdeo, est alius modus dicendi quod in phantasia omnia sunt phantasmata omnes quidditates, vel potius omnia singularia quecumque sunt in eodem supposito [M. fol. 257v] vel individuo substantiae, sed virtute intellectus agentis phantasma primo movet ad intellectionem quidditatis substantialis, postea ad notitiam cuiuslibet

Rome who emphasized the light of the agent intellect on the possible intellect and the agent intellect as a habit. He also posited that the phantasm in potency needs the light of the agent intellect to imprint the intelligible species on the possible intellect.⁶⁸ In his theory of knowing the singular, Giles could be claiming that the particular senses only perceive the accidental features of a thing while the intellect can know the substance of things as its primary object. Giles makes this point by illustrating how we know fire when we see it.⁶⁹ The agent intellect has a twofold determination of both intentional accidents and substantial form and by its power produces intelligible species by which the intellect knows substance.⁷⁰ Thus in his noetic Giles is committed to a version of intelligible species that is primarily a species of the substance of a thing.⁷¹ But the Antonine author points out the difficulty with this position by showing that it is necessary that something is first known confusedly like the particular that Giles claims is known distinctly and quidditatively.⁷² Also the Antonine author adds that others say that the intellect is moved by the phantasm and that the intellect perceives itself to be moved by something. It then

accidentalis quidditatis; et tunc intellectus virtute sua retinet omnia simul illa in esse cognito, ut habet notitiam singularis aggregantis in se ipso omnia ista. Et est notitia quidditativa quae pertinet ad ipsum intellectum et cognoscit individuum distincte et determinate et quidditatem secundum suum modum cognoscendi.ö

⁶⁸ Cf. Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum.*, d. 24, par. 1, a. 2, fol. 259a.

⁶⁹ Cf. Giles, *De cognitione angelorum*, 81va-b.

⁷⁰ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 197 - 198.

⁷¹ Cf. Timothy Noone, "The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion From Eustachius of Arras to Vital Du Fourö, 74 - 75.

⁷² Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.5.20: "Contra: quia oportet necessario quod prius cognoscatur aliquid confuse, puta ipsum particulare, quam cognoscitur distincte et quidditative...ö

has a confused and simple concept of the singular and yet even with this the intellect understands the singular.⁷³

The Antonine author responds to these four different types or models of cognition by offering his own solution: a twofold way of cognizing something *per accidens*. One way is that of a superior power which knows an object that is more common to an inferior power. However an inferior power does not immediately cognize its own object but only insofar as this superior power is united to it. And this is the mode of cognition which is an intellection or understanding of the particular. This would undoubtedly apply to intuitive cognition, since in this mode the intellect would intuit the accidental features of a thing by cognizing the external sense act. Another mode of cognition *per accidens* differs from the first way of cognition because in this mode the particular is not first known *per se*, and in another mode the particular is not cognized at the same time. Regarding the first way of cognizing something *per accidens*, the author points out that there are still two other ways of cognizing something. One way of cognizing is that what is cognized makes some impression on a cognizing power such as quantity with the sense of sight. The other mode is that there is no impression made on the cognizing power in sensation, like a privation in matter that does not make an impression. However this can be cognized *per se* by virtue of the intellectual habit of cognition. And yet in this instance the particular is still not the first cognized. But this mode in which something as such not cognized first or at the same time with what is first cognized in the intellect is a conclusion that is

⁷³ Ibid., III.5.2: *õIdeo dicunt alii quod oportet quod a phantasmate intellectus moveatur et percipiat se ab aliquo moveri; et tunc habet conceptum confusum singularem et simplicem et sic intelligit singulare.õ*

cognized from inference.⁷⁴ The Antonine author therefore says that the singular is cognized by the intellect accidentally because it is not in itself the intellect's first object but is cognized by differentiating it from the universal. Here he does what he labored to do in the first book of his commentary, showing the difference between intuitive and abstractive cognition. In abstractive cognition the first object of the intellect is *ens* or a thing's common nature. The Antonine author says that there is a distinction in operations between intellectual cognition and sense perception which senses quantity; there is such a difference between the two orders of cognizing that the singular cannot make its proper imprint on the intellect, as was said previously. Privation in matter cannot be cognized either, because privation does not leave an impression to be cognized. Thus there is only one other way remaining that can explain the way the intellect cognizes the singular and it is the last way the author entertained, the way of inference. By way of inference the singular itself can be the first cognizable object in the intellect; not however as the quiddity or universal that is contained in the phantasm and is the primary object of the intellect. It cannot be argued that the singular is not understood in the intellect because it would be the object of sense and as such is the object of sense. Therefore it is not the object of the intellect.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Ibid., III.5.22: *ōDico ergo de hoc quod duplex est modus cognoscendi aliquid per accidens: unus secundum communiorem quo potentia superior cognoscit obiectum inferioris, non quidem secundum se ipsam, sed in quantum [L, fol. 107vb] unitur cum illa - et ille modus probatus est supra quantum ad intellectionem particularis; alius est modus cognoscendi per accidens eo modo quo per accidens distinguitur contra primo quia cognoscitur non primo per se; alio modo quod non simul duratione. De primo modo adhuc dupliciter. Uno modo contingit quod simul cognoscitur cum illo quod primo cognoscitur adhuc dupliciter. Uno modo, quia sicut cognoscitur illud quod facit aliquam impressionem in potentia cognoscente, sicut quantitas in visu, alio modo sic quod non facit impressionem, sicut privatio in materia non facit impressionem licet per se cognoscatur quia per se distinguitur ab habitu; nec tamen primo cognoscitur. Modus autem quo aliquid cognoscitur per se non primo nec simul cum primo cognito est sicut conclusio cognoscitur ex principio illative.ō*

⁷⁵ Ibid., III.5.23: *ōDico igitur quod singulare cognoscitur per accidens ab intellectu quia non primo sed per se quia distinguitur ab universali, sed non cognoscitur sicut quantitas sentitur, sic quod faciat propriam impressionem in intellectu, sicut dictum est prius, nec sicut privatio quia non est privatio. Relinquitur ergo solus modus ultimus quod illative per ipsum primo cognoscibile cognoscitur et non solum tamquam illud in quo continetur ipsa quidditas vel*

The Antonine author maintains that it is by inference that cognizable things are first cognized and not just through the quiddity or the universal contained in the phantasm, even though this quiddity is the first object understood by the intellect. For him abstractive cognition involves simple apprehension, composition and division, and discursiveness. Intuitive cognition is related in the present to the direct cognition of the object of sense as present in the sense. These are two points with which he is in accord with Antonius Andreas. Nonetheless the Antonine author further qualifies this inferential mode of cognition by associating it with experience. He stresses that to understand the singular is necessary because of faith and experience.⁷⁶ The Antonine author adds though that this inferential mode of cognition is not what is properly called science although it is some kind of act or habit. Scientific knowledge requires the finiteness in a material object for the universality that is the proper object of the intellect.⁷⁷ Regarding the relation between experience and inference, the Antonine author implies that they are not one in the same thing; rather inference is based upon experience. In a second act of inference one can infer the first one of experience. This what Antonius Andreas himself maintained when he discussed that there are two modes conjoined in the intellect as to its operation. One mode is

universale quod intelligitur primo et ipsa per se intelligitur. Nec valet quod arguitur quod non intelligitur quia singulare est dum sentitur et est per se obiectum sensus, non ergo obiectum intellectus...ö

⁷⁶ Ibid., III.5.24: öDico ergo quod oportet quod singularia intelligamus quia singularia per fidem credimus et amamus etiam, et non solum sic sed naturaliter sicut quilibet experitur.ö

⁷⁷ Ibid., III.5.27: ö...[Q]uod non est proprie scientia licet sit actus vel habitus aliquis, quia scientia requirit finitatem in obiecto materiali ad universalitatem.ö

subjective, and the other mode is objective. The objective mode has two modes; one is habitual and the other actual. The actual mode infers the first or habitual mode.⁷⁸

The Antonine author links inference to abstractive cognition later on in his commentary on book three of the *De Anima*. In question seven he inquires whether our intellect understands all things inferentially.⁷⁹ His first topic concerns the primary object of the intellect. He says this can be understood in different ways. One way is in terms of a primacy of adequation in which setting there is a proper adequation outside of which a power is not extended. He offers examples of vision which extends exclusively to sight and of an adequation of the sensible to sense. The second way is seen in the way we speak of what is proper to a power, that what is the proper object of one power cannot be a proper object to another power (e.g., sight and color). The third way is what first naturally occurs to a power in act. The fourth way is how we speak of an object when such an object is first in attribution to which another is attributed. This fourth mode of understanding differs sometimes from what is said about the third way of understanding when what is first in attribution is the last to occur or what is first to occur is last in attribution. The Antonine author then states that the material quiddity of a thing is the first object of the intellect on account of the embodied soul in this state of existence. But this is not in the first mode of adequation, because in this mode the intellect would cognize nothing through any power. He says that the first object of the intellect is the third mode of adequation. This is

⁷⁸ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 7, q. 17, f. 40rb: ð...[E]sse in intellectum coniugit dupliciter, uno modo subiective...Alio modo obiective...et hoc modo potest esse dupliciter uno modo habitualiter sive in actu prio...alio modo actualiter sive in actu secundo...Secundus modus infert primum et non e converso...ö We will come back to this passage in the next chapter because this passage also contains very significant information on Antonius Andreas's theory of intelligible species.

⁷⁹ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*., III.7: ð<Quaestio 7: Utrum intellectus noster omnia intelligat illative> Nota ad videndum utrum intellectus noster omnia intelligat illative.ö

because what naturally occurs first to the intellect in this state of existence is the quiddity which is properly and as such related to the phantasm. In the fourth mode of adequation the first object is called substantial quiddity, which is the first object because first substance is first in attribution. For all accidents are attributed to it.⁸⁰ Scotus asks a similar question as the Antonine author in his commentary on the *De Anima*. In his account Scotus expounds the different ways of cognizing the first object of the intellect but couches this in terms of our knowledge of God and how this applies to both abstractive and intuitive cognition. He says that the first way something is cognized is by a comparing it to something else, as a human being is cognized as the most perfect of animals; however it is necessary that another that is absolute precedes such kind of cognition. The second way is cognizing something through its accidents as in the case of the human person's risibility. And this type of cognition cannot be first because it is necessary that if one cognizes a disposition then one cognizes the subject of its substrate, at least in a confused manner. Something can be cognized in a third way specifically through a concept that is in common with other ones cognized, as to cognize a concept of a human being by means of a concept of an animal. And so to cognize God is to cognize him imperfectly, specifically through this concept that is common with others. This cognition we have of God is more imperfect than

⁸⁰ Ibid., III.7.1: ð...Obiectum autem primum potest intelligi multipliciter. Uno modo primitate adaequationis extra quod non extenditur potentia, sicut visibile visus vel sensibile sensus. Secundo modo dicitur obiectum primum quia proprium potentiae, non quia non possit in aliud sed quia alia potentia non potest in tale obiectum, sicut color est primum obiectum visus comparando [L, f. 108vb] ipsum ad alios sensus particulares. Tertio modo dicitur primum obiectum illud quod primo naturaliter occurrit potentiae in actu. Quarto modo dicitur primum attributione cui alia attribuuntur et differt ille modus a praedicto tertio aliquando, quod est primum attributione ultimo occurrit et quod primo occurrit est ultimum attributione. Hoc praemisso, dicitur quod quidditas rei materialis est primum obiectum intellectus pro statu suae coniunctionis, non primo modo primitatis, quod est adaequationis, quia tunc non posset intellectus cognoscere aliquid immateriale per quamcumque potentiam, quod est falsum... Sed tertio modo quia primo naturaliter occurrit intellectui pro statu suae coniunctionis, quia ipsa est quidditas quae propriae et per se habet phantasma. Quarto modo dicitur quod quidditas substantialis est primum obiectum quia substantia primum in attributione. Sibi enim attribuuntur omnia accidentia...ð

the cognition we have of a stone which we can cognize distinctly. We can cognize a stone distinctly because through this common concept God cannot be cognized more than another thing. Therefore our knowledge of God does not derive its nobility from such type of cognition. Something is cognized in a fourth way by a quidditative concept in a twofold manner. One concept is primarily first that is specifically not dissolved again (*resolubilis*) into other concepts in which a thing is cognized intuitively as such a nature. And we cannot have such a concept of God in this life, and neither can we have such a concept of our soul nor of some spiritual substance. The reason for this is that we can only cognize God naturally in this life through creatures. But no creature, not even all of them together, can sufficiently quidditatively represent the divine essence as *“this nature”* or *“this essence”*. But there are other quidditative concepts of a thing which is neither entirely simple nor primary but is dissolved again into other concepts, as a definition of a thing composed from different concepts. We can have such a quidditative concept of our soul naturally specifically by considering which certain beings are beings in potency and in act. This being in act (*ens actu*) has two integral parts: one is the act, and so we apprehend what is act. We proceed in this way at last by dividing which act is first and which act is second, and afterwards apprehend what is the first act. After this we divide what is more actual. And by comparing these concepts together we then get a quidditative concept of our soul. But this concept is proper to the soul and does not belong with any other spiritual substance. However even in this way no one can cognize his own soul either intuitively in itself or especially its essence, since this cannot be seen.⁸¹ Scotus’s illustration fills out and complements

⁸¹ Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 19, 20 - 24 [191: 15 - 193: 9]: *“Dicendum quod aliquid potest cognosci quadrupliciter: Uno modo per comparisonem ad aliud, ut cognoscitur hominem esse perfectissimum animalium; talem autem cognitionem necessario praecedit alia absoluta. Secundo modo potest*

the treatment of the Antonine author. His use of the terms for composition and division and a term that points to concepts that are resolute, e.g., that can be dissolved, collapsed or reduced into other concepts that are common to each other. Of course this precisely describes abstractive cognition and as such captures the essence of the Antonine author's discussion.

Antonius Andreas states that the material quiddity of a substance is the proper object for our possible intellect and that nothing can be understood as such by us except as a material quiddity, nor are separate substances cognizable through such a quiddity. This is because such substances are neither adequated nor proportionate to our intellectual power. Such power is adequated and proportionate with what exists in matter and does not function through the mediation of an organ. This object then will exist in matter, but is not considered insofar as it is in matter, for such quiddity of material substance is abstracted by the agent intellect.⁸²

aliquid cognosci per accidens suum, ut homo per risibile; et haec non potest esse prima, quia necessarium est, si cognoscamus dispositionem, quod cognoscamus subiectum sibi substratum, saltem confuse. Tertio modo potest aliquid cognosci per conceptum communem sibi et aliis, ut cognosci hominem per animal. Et sic cognoscere Deum est imperfecte cognoscere, scilicet per conceptum communem sibi et aliis; hoc enim imperfectus est quam cognoscere lapidem distincte; quia per illum conceptum communem non magis cognoscitur Deus quam aliud, et ideo non sortitur nobilitatem ex Deo talis cognitio. Quarto modo cognoscitur aliquid conceptu quidditativo, sed ille est duplex: unus est primo primus, qui scilicet non est in alios conceptus resolubilis, quo scilicet res cognoscitur intuitive in se ut est talis natura, et talem conceptum non possumus habere de Deo in via, immo nec de anima nostra nec de aliqua spirituali substantia. Cuius ratio est, quia de Deo nullam habemus cognitionem naturaliter nisi per creaturas; nulla autem creatura, nec etiam omnes simul, possunt sufficienter divinam essentiam repraesentare quidditative, id est, ut natura haec vel essentia. Alios autem conceptus quidditativus rei nec est omnino simplex nec primus, sed resolubilis in alios, ut est definitio rei composita ex diversis conceptibus. Talem autem conceptum possumus habere naturaliter de anima nostra, scilicet considerando quod entium quaedam sunt entia in potentia, quaedam in actu; et illud ens actu habet duas partes integrales, quarum una est actus, et sic apprehendimus quod est actus. Ulterius procedimus, dividendo, quod actuum quidam primus, quidam secundus, et sic apprehendimus postea quod est actus primus. Postea dividimus illa quae actuator. Et sic, illa componendo ad invicem, habemus conceptum quidditativum animae nostrae. Hic autem conceptus est animae proprius ita quod nulli alii substantiae spirituali convenit, sed per hoc non cognosci animam meam vel in se intuitive et in speciali ut haec anima est, sicut nec illud quod nunquam vidi.ö

⁸² Antonius Andreas, *Quaestiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 2, q. 3, 12rb: ö...[Q]uod quia quidditas substantie materialis est proprium obiectum intellectus nostri possibilis, ergo nihil potest per se intelligi a nobis, quod nec est materialis quidditas, nec cognosibilile per talem quidditatem, scilicet substantie separate sunt huiusmodi...primum manifestum est de quidditate, substantiarum immaterialium, secundum probatur ut prius per non adequationem et improportionem; maior ostendit, quia obiectum proportionatur potentie cuius est intellectus autem set potentia existens in materia; non tamen operatur mediante organo. Ergo obiectum eius erit existens in

The Antonine author reflects Antonius Andreas's thinking in two articles appended to his question. The first article inquires whether a substantial quiddity or an accidental quiddity from the nature of a thing occurs first in the intellect.⁸³ This article parallels a question in Scotus's *De Anima*: Whether what is more universal is understood by us prior to what is less universal.⁸⁴ The primary purpose of this article is to analyze what exactly would be the first object of our intellect, with a primary consideration of whether we can directly cognize substances. The Antonine author examines different opinions which support either the thesis that what the mind knows is accidental quiddity or that it knows substantial quiddity. Those who support the former position maintain that accidents of things are received through the senses so that what is the first object in sense and the phantasm regards accidents. Substance thus is known only indirectly through these accidents.⁸⁵ The Antonine author remarks that accidents would then lead to no cognition of substances.⁸⁶ He adds this would happen because otherwise the distinction between sense and intellect could be easily perceived from what is first known, e.g., from substance and accident, which does not seem so easily cognized.⁸⁷ Another opinion is that what is first

materia; non autem considerat in quantum existens in materia; talis autem est quidditas substantie materialis abstracta per intellectum agentem...ö We will pick up this discussion later in chapter four in examining Antonius Andreas's teaching on the agent intellect.

⁸³ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.7: ö<Articulus primus: An quidditas substantialis primo occurat intellectui vel quidditas accidentalis ex natura rei>ö

⁸⁴ Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 16 [145: 4-5]: öUtrum magis universale prius intelligatur a nobis quam minus universale.ö

⁸⁵ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.7.3 [27]: öEt dicunt aliqui quod quidditas accidentalis. Tum quia accidens primo est sensatum et phantasiatum, et per se; substantia autem non nisi per accidens.ö

⁸⁶ Ibid., III.7.5: öTum quia accidentia ducunt in cognitionem substantiae 1/2De anima/1.ö

⁸⁷ Ibid., III.7.6: öTum quia alias de facili perciperetur distinctio inter sensum et intellectum ex primis cognitis, puta ex substantia et accidente, quod non videtur ita facile.ö

generated in the intellect from the species in the phantasm is the same species which is an accident and is known in a confused way. Then the intellect with its power implicitly treats whatever is represented in this accidental species and cognizes the substance. Later it turns back completely and perfectly to cognize the accident itself.⁸⁸ Those who advocate the latter position maintain that substance is the first thing understood although accidents of the thing are first sensed as such. Thus a thing's material substance is the first object understood prior to its accidents in the same way one understands being prior to accidents. Aristotle says as much in his *Metaphysics*. Therefore the intellect would perceive the substance prior to being moved. So it is necessary to assign an act to the human intellect in this state of life with a prior capacity to be moved with a certain passivity. Otherwise both agent and possible intellect would be indistinct in nature and the active power would be without purpose.⁸⁹ Also if accidents are cognized in the intellect then being is cognized in another, just as the intellect in its cognizing a substance would cognize being in itself. Thus it is necessary that it cognizes this being, but this does not take place unless substance is cognized. Thus the intellect first abstracts the quiddity of substance from the accidents perceived by sense since sense serves the intellect in this. From sensation the intellect by its movement abstracts the intention of an animal. This was supposedly the thinking of Aristotle, that the intellect begins to understand the substance underlying the

⁸⁸ Ibid., III.7.7: "Dicunt ergo quod a specie accidentis in phantasia gignitur primo species eiusdem in intellectu et cognoscitur accidens incomplete et cognitione confusa; et tunc intellectus vi sua quasi foedit quidquid est in illa specie accidentis implicite repraesentantis et cognoscit substantiam et tandem revertitur super accidens cognoscendum ipsum complete et perfecte."

⁸⁹ Ibid., III.7.8: "Alii dicunt quod substantia primo intelligitur, licet accidens per se primo sentiatur. Tum quia substantia ipsa materialis ex natura rei est primum intelligibile et priusquam accidens, sicut et prius ens VII/2 *Metaphysicae*/1. Ergo est prius motiva ergo perceptiva. Ad istum actum oportet dare intellectum coniunctum prius mobilem et passione; alias esset indistinctus in natura et potentia activa frustra."

accidents because the senses of themselves are unable to reach this level.⁹⁰ Regarding the first position concerning the priority of cognizing accidents, the Antonine author says that this is not necessary. Although an accident may be what is first in the phantasm, the intellect nevertheless preserves the original quiddity by its act of understanding.⁹¹ He also comments that they say it is not true that a species of substance could be virtually contained in a phantasm of accidents under the aegis of the agent intellect, and that implicitly through a mode of a particular cause a species of substance could be generated and be understood as substance as such.⁹² He says that they hold that cognizing accidents lead to a cognition of substance that is not at first cognized by an intellective power, that this would lead to inference, and that in this case a sense power would serve the intellect.⁹³ However the Antonine author himself replies that it is not easy to know what is first understood.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, treating the views of others, he claims that the position that upholds the priority of cognizing substance maintains that an idol or image is generated in the phantasm and the species representing the singular is the first thing understood. Though this singularity in its species represents the whole being in a certain way, this singularity is covered

⁹⁰ Ibid., III.7.9: *¶Tum quia si cognoscitur accidens cognoscitur ens in alio, sicut cognoscendo substantiam cognoscitur ens in se. Ergo oportet quod cognoscatur illud aliud; hoc non est nisi substantia [L, 109ra] ita quod ex accidentibus perceptis sensu intellectus primo abstrahit quidditatem substantiae, cum sensus in hoc deservit intellectui. Sed ex sensatione, motus, intellectus abstrahit intentionem animalis. Et haec fuit intentio Aristotelis, ut dicunt, ut ibi et in illo inciperet intellectus ad quod non potest pertingere sensus eius quia substantia.ö*

⁹¹ Ibid., III.7.10: *¶[M, f. 258v] Ad primum aliorum dico non oportet. Licet enim accidens primo phantasietur, tamen intellectus originem servat intelligendo.ö*

⁹² Ibid., III.7.11: *¶Ad secundum dicunt quod non est verum si primo virtute intellectus agentis cum ipso phantasmate accidentis continente virtualiter speciem substantiae et implicite per modum particularis causae gignitur species substantiae et intelligitur substantia per se.*

⁹³ Ibid., III.7.12: *¶Ad tertium dicunt quod accidens ducit in cognitionem substantiae non sicut primo cognitum a potentia intellectiva, quia tunc duceret illative, sed potentia sensitiva subserviente intellectui.ö*

⁹⁴ Ibid., III.7.13: *¶Ad quartum dico quod non est facile illud quod nec est facile scire quod primum intelligatur.ö*

and confused and is cognized neither as a substance nor as an accident. Then the intellect begins to understand the intentions discovered in its search; so that for example the intellect begins to understand entity and other things following this intention. Because the intention of entity is the first discovered in substance rather than accident, then in this process substance is understood prior to the understanding of accident.⁹⁵

At this point the Antonine author introduces a second article appended to this question, asking how many acts the intellect has regarding its object.⁹⁶ He states that Aristotle posits two such acts. One act concerns the understanding of simples or indivisibles. The other act concerns the composition and division of simples to each other which we experience in us by attributing something to it or by removing something from it. From this it is shown that even in its first act the intellect cannot compose and divide those things it has not previously cognized. Therefore it is necessary that the terms and their qualities be previously understood in act which is called the understanding of simples in which there is no discursive act simply speaking, but only a simple understanding from the assistance or service of the senses. Also this is where a definition is understood or where a quiddity itself is defined. All other intentions are understood without any discursive activity just as the first intention is. Thus the understanding of the definition is the understanding of simples.⁹⁷ The Antonine author remarks that the second act of composition

⁹⁵ Ibid., III.7.14: *“Alii ponunt quod in phantasia generatur idolum et species singulariter repraesentans et singulare quantum ad quale unum totum ens in quodam esse involuto et confuso et sic primo intelligitur, ita quod nec primo intelligitur substantia nec accidens. Sed illud totum deinde intellectus incipit intelligens intentiones in illo repertas, puta entitatem et alias consequenter. Et quia intentio entitatis prius reperitur in substantia quam accidente dicunt quod in processu isto prius intelligitur substantia quam accidens.”*

⁹⁶ Ibid., III.7: *“Articulus secundus: quot actus habeat intellectus circa suum obiectum”*

⁹⁷ Ibid., III.7.15: *“...Philosophus autem quod duos: unus est simplicium intelligentia vel indivisibilium; secundus est compositio et divisio simplicium ad invicem quam experimur in nobis attribuendo aliquid alteri vel removendo ab*

and division concerns the composition and division of simples. Because of this the act does not concern another object. Thus it is necessary for some composition or division to be made on the object itself, and this is due to nature. On account of this Aristotle said that this act does not concern separate substances because the human intellect cannot grasp them by its composing and dividing activity. This composing and dividing activity of the intellect also does not concern quiddity or species in which the quiddity is from the nature of a thing, though it would fall under an understanding of a part of the definition. Secondly what is required for this composition and division in the intellect is the command exercised by the will on the intellect to turn at once to the simple terms which it apprehended in its first act and to compose and divide only these objects.⁹⁸ In its third act the intellect discursively reasons from proposition to proposition which presupposes both the first and second act. This discursive act is a certain kind of composition of what was understood from the second act, which also requires the motion of the will moving the intellect to employ other mediating propositions in order to make known what was unknown.⁹⁹ The Antonine author remarks that from this it is clear that not every act of the intellect is

ipso. Ex quo probatur etiam primus actus quia non possunt componi vel dividi ea quae non sunt prius cognita, ut videtur. Oportet ergo quod termini vel quidditates ipsorum prius intelligantur actu illo qui dicitur simplicium intelligentia, in quo quidem actu nullus est discursus simpliciter loquendo, sed sola intellectio simplex ex adminiculo vel ministerio sensus. Etiam intellectione qua intelligitur definitio vel quidditas ipsa definitive. Sicut enim primo intentio sola sine discursu aliquo, ita omnes aliae; et ideo intellectio definitionis est simplicium intelligentia.ö

⁹⁸ Ibid., III.7.16: öSecundus actus est compositio et divisio simplicium. Ad hoc autem ut actus ille possit cadere circa aliud obiectum, ex natura oportet ex parte obiecti ipsius fieri compositio vel divisio aliqua. Propter quod dicit Aristoteles quod non cadit circa substantias separatas quia secundum ipsum nulla est ista compositio. Similiter nec circa quidditatem vel speciem cuius est quidditas ex natura rei, licet circa illa possit cadere ex parte intellectus diffinientis. Secundo requiritur ad istum actum ex parte sui quod fiat cum [L, f. 109rb] quadam motione exercitio vel imperio voluntatis applicantis intellectum ad convertendum simul terminos simplices apprehensos cuius est solum componere et dividere.ö

⁹⁹ Ibid., III.7.17: öTertius actus est discursus a propositione in propositionem qui praesupponit ambos praedictos quia est quaedam compositio actus secundi praedicti, sicut secundum primi; et requirit etiam motionem voluntatis et applicationem et cum hoc etiam mediationem aliquando alterius propositiones ut notificetur ignota.ö

discursive nor is everything cognized discursively.¹⁰⁰ He says that no one can argue against this because whatever the intellect understands is sensed and in the imagination. This is because it understands every material quiddity from its operation or from some later operation. The intellect's rational power extends to all things and therefore understands all things by reasoning and discursiveness even as the separate intellect understands all things with simple intuition.¹⁰¹

The Antonine author replies to what was originally considered in this article regarding the first, second, and third acts of the intellect and says that the rational power is not always discursive, nor does it reason in all its acts. However it can reason in some of its acts.¹⁰² The composing and dividing activity in the intellect's second act is carried over into its third act which moves from composition of predicates to the composition of propositions. However the Antonine author asserts that truth and falsity are within the second act, the act of composition and division by means of predication. He says that the intellect's object in its composing and dividing activity does not regard every aspect of a thing's nature but only its variables and components that are true or false. This is because there is no error in the apprehension of simple being. However others say that truth and falsity regard every material object because every object can either be conformed or distorted in another act of composition and division around the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., III.7.18: *Ex his ergo patet quod non omnis actus intellectus est discursivus nec cognoscit omnia discursive.*

¹⁰¹ Ibid., III.7.19: *Nec valet quod argueretur contra. Tum quia quicquid intelligit, hoc est sensatis et imaginatis. Tum quia omnem quidditatem materiale intelligit ex sua operatione vel aliquo posteriori. Tum quia potentia rationalis per omnia, igitur intelligit omnia ratiocinando et discurrendo, sicut etiam intellectus separatus intelligit omnia simplici intuitu. <intuitui L51>*

¹⁰² Ibid., III.7.20: *Dico enim ad primum sicut dictum est in corpore quaestionis. Et etiam ad secundum et tertium dico quod est potentia rationalis non quia discurrat vel ratiocinetur in omni actu suo sed quia hoc potest secundum aliquem actum.*

object. But formally the intellect only considers the components and variables in its composing and dividing activity. This is because the intellect perceives truth and falsity and nothing else.¹⁰³

The Antonine author shares Scotus's view regarding inferential knowledge of substance, who said that what is more universal is cognized by us in a distinct cognition prior to what is less universal.¹⁰⁴ Scotus writes that what was previously cognized distinctly enters into the definition of another by which something else is cognized distinctly. But being which is most universal enters into the definition of all things since the concept of being is included in any concept; but one cannot have a concept of this unless it is distinct because this concept of being cannot be had in what can be cognized in a confused and indistinct manner. This is similar for other universals because as something is more universal it can enter into the definition of many things and be distinctly cognized accordingly as it would have fewer concepts above it which would be cognized in a confused manner. He introduces Avicenna's thought on the order of the sciences, who maintains that metaphysics is prior to the other sciences in the order of a distinct cognition that is more universal. But Avicenna contradicts himself by reversing the order in which the sciences are learned. He does this because in the order in which they are learned we proceed from what is cognized in a more confused manner to what is cognized distinctly. In a way then, prior to the order of learning, the principles of the other sciences are known by us from a confused concept of the terms. This is the case of the student studying geometry who proceeds

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, III.7.21: "Et predictis etiam patet aliquantulum quod cum veritas et falsitas sint in compositione et divisione non habent esse circa omne obiectum ex natura rei sed solum circa variabilia et componentia ex natura rei; ambo dico, scilicet veritas vel falsitas, quia in simplicibus non est error. Dicunt tamen alicui quod circa omne obiectum materialiter est veritas vel falsitas, quia omne obiectum potest esse conforme vel difforme alteri actui composito vel diviso circa ipsum. Formaliter autem solum sunt illa in actu composito vel diviso intellectus, quia hic solum percipitur veritas vel falsitas et nulla alia."

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 265.

from a confused concept of lines and points to the cognition of its definition and its variability. Metaphysics is later in the order of learning. But its principles are distinctly cognized. However Scotus offers a corrective to Avicenna's viewpoint by stating that metaphysics is an acquired science and its principles are more distinctly cognized by turning to the other sciences. So metaphysics as a science has a previously distinct cognition of its principles and is prior in the order of a distinct cognition. Thus species previously cognized indistinctly, is cognized specifically in its name or in its universal. But cognition of the universal is distinct. Then by dividing and composing (*contractionem*) and through the addition of differences, it returns to a distinct cognition of the species.¹⁰⁵

Thus it is evident that our Antonine author agrees with both Antonius Andreas Scotus on abstractive cognition with a place carved out for inference. And what the Antonine author alludes to as what is known by inference is different from what can be accessed through the first three acts of the intellect. However inference utilizes the intellectual activity of composing and dividing concepts for the formation of definitions. The Antonine author agrees with both

¹⁰⁵ Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 16, 18 - 19 [150: 18 - 152: 6]: "Secundo, dico quod prius cognoscitur magis universale a nobis cognitione distincta. Probatio: prius distincte illud cognoscitur quod intrat definitionem alterius per quod aliud distincte cognoscitur; sed ens quod est universalissimum intrat definitionem omnium, cum conceptus entis includatur in conceptu cuiuslibet - ipsum autem non habet conceptum nisi distinctum, quia non habet in quo possit confuse et indistincte cognosci; igitur, etc. Simile autem est de aliis universalibus: quanto enim aliquid est universalius, tanto potest plurimum definitionem intrare; et distinctius cognosci, quanto pauciora superiora habeat, in quibus cognoscatur confuse. Item secundum Avicennam, metaphysica est prior secundum ordinem cognoscendi distincte, quae tamen est universalius; igitur, etc. Nec tamen contradicit sibi Avicenna dicens quod est postrema ordine doctrinae, quia ordine doctrinae procedimus a cognitione confusa ad distinctam. Modo ita est quod principia aliarum scientiarum prius ordine doctrinae sunt nobis nota ex confuso conceptu terminorum, sicut geometer ex confuso conceptu lineae et puncti procedit ad cognoscendum eius definitionem et passionem. Et ideo metaphysica est posterior ordine doctrinae, cuius tamen principia sunt distincte cognita. Sed scientia metaphysicae acquisita, revertendo ad alias scientias, magis distincte cognoscuntur earum principia, scientia metaphysicae prius distincte cognita; et sic est prius ordine distinctae cognitionis. Sic in proposito: species prius cognoscitur indistincte - scilicet in cognoscendo quid dicitur per nomen vel in suo universali; sed cognitio universali distincte, tunc per eius divisionem et contractionem - per additionem differentiae - fit reditus ad cognoscendum speciem distincte."ö

Antonius Andreas and Scotus that *ens* is the first concept of the intellect that is cognized distinctly prior to any other concepts. In this manner what the mind grasps in grasping *ens* is a rich concept that at once is univocal and transcendental. As we observed in his discussion of Giles of Rome's thesis of knowability of substance, the Antonine author maintains that, though the human intellect cannot have a direct knowledge of substance, it can nevertheless have knowledge of a substance through inference.¹⁰⁶ The Antonine author agrees also with Scotus that inference is an act of the intellect. Indeed if intelligible species operate, in Spruit's terms, as veils between the soul and the world, then such a priori intermediate presence of an intelligible species in the intellect which represents an object would undoubtedly involve some inference on the part of the intellect. But in effect this would also suggest that the mind in such acts of inference lacks all direct contact with the world.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Timothy Noone, "The Problem of the Knowability of Substance," 63 - 89.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 266.

CHAPTER 4: The Teaching on Intelligible Species of Antonius Andreas and the Antonine Author

Introduction

In the last chapter I presented the general contours of the respective epistemologies of Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author regarding cognition. In this chapter I plan on presenting their respective psychologies regarding the work of the agent intellect in the act of abstraction and its role, if any, in the production of intelligible species. Lastly, I will examine their respective views on the cognitive status of intelligible species, focusing on their view vis-à-vis Duns Scotus; but comparing their doctrines with each other to show the degree, if any, of agreement between them. In the final analysis my intention is to ascertain whether the doctrine of intelligible species of the Antonine author is consistent with that of Antonius Andreas.

A. The Agent Intellect and Abstraction

In his section in which he discusses the identity and activity of the agent intellect, the Antonine author focuses on the agency of the intellect and the principle of its movement, whether it remains within the agent or extends outward.¹ One of the consequences of identifying the soul as an intellective substance is the difficulty of positing what is active and what is passive and how action and passion are related to each other in an act of cognition if the soul is all one power. This is evident in the Antonine author's early discussions on this issue. On the one hand understanding is taken to mean an extrinsic or outside action that is not distinct from an agent.

¹ Antonine author, *Quaestiones de anima*, III.6: <Quaestio sexta: Utrum actio intellectus agentis sit intus manens, an extra transiens> Nota de intellectu agente ad videndum utrum actio eius sit intus manens vel extra transiens.>

On the other hand understanding is viewed as a concept that is formally acquired or produced through a kind of action that is characterized as some operation, e.g., an act of understanding or willing. However the Antonine author states that neither an act of understanding nor the will can be located in the genus of action but rather in the genus of quality.² In placing this twofold operation of understanding and will in the genus of quality he follows Antonius Andreas who did likewise, because he like Antonius sees quality on par with substance and not as one of the predicamental accidents. This is one way to safeguard the doctrine of the soul as an intellectual substance and its twofold power of understanding and will. The Antonine author then launches into an analysis of the active and passive features in an act of understanding, specifically he focuses on the meaning of the *ōagentō* in the agent intellect and what would be its relation to what is passive. This is necessary because we speak of action and passion in the same intellect. He says that action in the first sense is said to be always formally in the agent. Then the active power is limited to what in reality is referred to the passive. However there is no action except through a predication of this action in relation to what is formally intrinsic and existing in it as its subject, as what is passive is in the patient. Thus in this sense action means that there is no relation that is identical with its term. Since the terminus of action is the basis for the passive, the action is not as such in the passive, which functions as the term of action.³ The Antonine

² Ibid., III.6.1: *ōIntelligendum est primo quod actio uno modo accipitur pro respectu extrinseco qui ab agente non distinguitur, II/2De anima/1; alio modo accipitur pro termino formali acquisito vel producto per talem actionem cuiusmodi est operatio aliqua, puta, intelligere vel velle, quae non sunt de genere actionis, sed de genere qualitatis, ut dicitur actio acta.ō*

³ Ibid., III.6.2: *ōDe [L, fol. 108ra] prima actione dicitur quod semper est in agente formaliter. Tum quia activum limitatum secundum quod huiusmodi realiter defertur ad passivum. Hoc autem non est nisi per praedictum respectum sibi intrinsecum formaliter et existentem in ipso sicut in subiecto, sicut et passio est in passo. Tum quia per se loquendo numquam respectus aliquis est in suo termino; cum ergo terminus actionis sit passivum et*

author does not think that such movement in action and passion would qualify as change, because change itself cannot be a principle of what is changed. However he says that action itself is a change because the active potency is the principle of change and this cannot be unless it is an action.⁴ In his *Physics* Aristotle says regarding this that action is centered on what is acted upon. The reason for this is that if this action would be in the agent then we would have an absurd condition of the mover that would be moved. However it is not unreasonable for the agent to act on something either as an efficient cause (*a quo*) or be in something as a formal cause (*in quo*).⁵ Its *ratio* has no concept in opposite except with regards to a relation between what is mutual and opposite. In this context the Antonine author mentions the stock example of paternity. However action and passion are neither in a mutual nor in an opposite relation to each other. The reason for this is that they would then be of the same proximate genus. But this cannot be because action and passion are of the most general genera.⁶ If there would be action or movement in the agent, it would be like an entity that did not previously exist; nevertheless all

fundamentum eius sit activa potentia, numquam actio per se et in passo, licet aliquando per accidens - quando idem est activum et passivum; sed non est in ipso, ut passivum, sed ut activum et universaliter tale

⁴ Ibid., III.6.3: ðContra: quia transmutatio per se, non est in transmutante; tunc enim transmutans per se transmutaretur per esse transmutatum, quod est falsum. Sed actio per se est transmutatio IX *Metaphysicae*, quia potentia activa est principium transmutationis; illa autem non est nisi actio; quare, etc.ð

⁵ Ibid., III.6.4: ðItem, III Physicorum respondet expresse Aristoteles quod actio est in passo; si enim esset in agente, tunc movens moveretur, quod est falsum et inconveniens. Non est autem inconveniens quod actus alicuius, ut a quo, sit in aliquo ut in quo.ð

⁶ Ibid., III.6.5: ðItem ratio illa ad oppositum non habet locum nisi de respectibus mutuis et oppositis. Talium enim numquam aliquis est per se in termino suo, sicut patet de paternitate et omnibus relationibus de quarto genere. Sed actio et passio non sunt respectus mutui nec oppositi, quia tunc essent eiusdem generis proximi, quod est falsum quia sunt duo genera generalissima.ð

such entity is subject to change.⁷ The Antonine author replies to the first objection by saying that it does not follow at all that the agent is changed or transformed; this is because there is no such transformative change that would affect an agent by its own act. Thus there is no true transformative change within the agent, but only its action. The Antonine author calls this change but not as change which the agent would undergo within itself. And if there was action in passion, this would be called change.⁸ The Antonine author speaks against the second objection (which holds that every mover is initially moved before it begins its movement) by saying that Aristotle maintains that something as a mover is not moved but is rather in motion; therefore there is no necessity for an initial movement. The terminus of relation in passive motion is in the patient which undergoes change. However action is something that acts like motion or form.⁹ To the third objection he replies that action and passion are mutual and opposite in relation to each other and it is not necessary that they belong to the same proximate genus. The reason for this is that they have another mode of opposite relations. In this sense action and passion then are understood as distinct categories that are mutually opposed, but not in the proper category of relation understood in the usual sense.¹⁰ To the fourth objection the

⁷ Ibid., III.6.6: *Item, si agenti in esset actio, puta entitas quae prius non erat; sed omne tale mutuatur; quare, etc.*

⁸ Ibid., III.6.7: *Ad primum dico quod non sequitur agens mutari nec omne transmutatur, quia in ipso non ponitur transmutatio, sed actio, et ideo dicitur transmutans, non autem transmutatum sicut passum. Et dico quod si in passo esset actio ipsum diceretur transmutans.*

⁹ Ibid., III.6.8: *Ad secundum dico quod Aristoteles dicit, contra illos qui ponebant omne movens moveri se ipso antequam moveretur, aliud quasi movens non est in movente, sed in moto et ideo non oportet moveri. Respectus motionis passive est in patiente; sed respectus actionis numquam quia non descinditur ab agente, sicut dicit ibidem. Si autem aliqua sit in moto, non est actio de genere actionis, sed est actio acta, puta motus vel huiusmodi sicut forma.*

Antonine author replies that the agent is altered in some way in that it comes to be something new. However undergoing movement is not properly called change in the order of passion which is the mode of receiving but is called the *terminus* of passion, which is the form or something like it.¹¹

In another article appended to his question the Antonine author inquires whether an act performed by the agent intellect is immanent or transient.¹² He takes up a discussion regarding whether the activity of the agent intellect is directed within or outside of the intellect. An immanent activity is an activity performed within the intellect in which the effect produced would remain within the agent. Considered from this angle the agent intellect's operation would be within the agent intellect itself. A transient activity would be one where the agent intellect's operation would produce an effect outside itself. What is at stake in this discussion is establishing the relationship between the agent intellect and the phantasm which will establish the parameters of the agent intellect's abstractive act. Up to this point in his discussion the Antonine author would seem to favor this view of the immanent activity of the agent intellect. Antonius Andreas himself discussed this topic in his *Metaphysics* commentary.

¹⁰ Ibid., III.6.9: ðAd tertium dico quod actio et passio sunt respectus mutui et oppositi nec oportet quod sint eiusdem generis promixi quia habent alium modum oppositionis aliorum respectum quia habent terminum medium sibi extrinsecum formam, scilicet acquisitam per ultimum contrariae <contra (dub. could be quare) L51> duae formae viae in ipsum, ita quod in eis est oppositio et mutuitas alterius rationis.ö

¹¹ Ibid., III.6.10: ðAd quartum dico quod agens aliquo modo large accipiendo mutari mutatur quia advenit sibi aliquid novum. Sed passum non dicitur proprie mutari in [L, f. 108rb] ordine ad passionem [M, 258r] quam recipit; sed ad terminum passionis qui est forma vel huiusmodi.ö

¹² Ibid., III.6: ð<Articulus secundus: An actio acta intellectus agentis sit immanens an transiens> De actione igitur acta intellectus agentis est dubium si actio intellectus agentis sit immanens vel transiens.ö

The Antonine author begins his discussion by asserting that Aristotle's doctrine of the agent intellect is necessary for two reasons. One reason is that there is a proper passivity found in every corporeal or spiritual nature that accords with a distinctive *ratio* and a proper act. According to Aristotle there is a necessary mutual correspondence they have to each other. Nevertheless in intelligible nature we find that the possible intellect is passive. Therefore the agent intellect ought to be viewed as active and its activity classified as art. The second reason is that for Aristotle every active total cause should be nobler in nature than its effect. This is not only in regards to its activity but also to its nature on which this activity is founded. Viewed from this perspective the material quiddity is simply less noble than the possible intellect. In this regard the material quiddity then cannot be the total active cause. Hence it is necessary to posit an agent intellect that is simply nobler than the possible intellect.¹³ This opinion resembles Averroes's view who teaches that if the quiddities of material things are abstracted as Plato suggested, then one does not need Aristotle's agent intellect. Because of this it is necessary that the agent intellect makes material quiddities intelligible which have a kind of intelligible *esse* so that the agent intellect can abstract its imaged intentions. This is this kind of intelligible *esse* that

¹³Ibid., III.6.11: "Et primo videndum est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem apud Aristotelem. Necessitas autem fuit duplex. Primo, quia in omni natura, sive corporale sive spirituali, ubi invenitur proprium passivum secundum rationem distinctam et proprium actum, secundum Aristotelem invenitur et hoc ex mutua et necessaria correspondentia illorum. In natura autem intelligibili invenitur intellectus possibilis qui est passivum in natura. Igitur debet inveniri intellectus agens qui est sicut activum et ars. Secunda necessitas fuit quia omnem causam activam totalem oportet esse nobiliorem in natura sua passivo, ut dictum est in II, non solum quantum ad respectum activatum ad naturam in qua fundatur; quidditas materialis simpliciter ignobilior est intellectu possibili. Igitur non potest esse causa activa totalis respectu eius. Oportet igitur cum ipso ponere intellectum agentem qui simpliciter est nobilior intellectu possibili."

Plato designated as real *esse*.¹⁴ Thus the Antonine author maintains that the agent intellect has an operation that is immanent within the mind, and its activity revolves primarily around the work of abstraction that has as its product the intentions arising from the imagination. However it seems that he is also criticizing Averroes's version of the agent intellect as *ōform for usō*. The reason is that, even though Averroes's model of the agent intellect in his cognitive theory would work within the human mind, the reality is that this agent intellect is one and separate. The fact that Averroes called the agent intellect *ōformō* would not be agreeable to our Antonine author either. Simply speaking, if the agent intellect was a form it would also be a habit of understanding. This is a point in Averroistic noetics with which the Antonine author strongly disagrees.

At this point we find that Antonius Andreas shares the view of the Antonine author on the active dimension of the agent intellect. He offers an account in which he considers two types of movement, one in which a transient action which passes from an agent into a patient, as in the case of a builder who as agent shapes and molds materials into his construction, and one that is immanent with the agent itself, such as the act of understanding. In other words this is a twofold action which considers an act from the standpoint of something acted upon, and the other, the source of the action or agent. The former description of action refers to the status between a changer and that which it changes; the latter describes the very action itself as the motion or form which terminates movement within the patient or thing thus moved. Both types of actions exist

¹⁴ Ibid., III.6.12: *ōAd istam appropinquat necessitas illa quam assignat Commentator quod si quidditates rerum materialium essent abstractae, sicut posuit Plato, non indigeret Aristoteles intellectu agente. Ad hoc ergo ponit intellectu agentem necessarium, ut faciat quidditates materiales intelligibiles et tales in esse intelligibili, quales ponebat Plato in esse reali, ut sic abstrahit intentiones imaginarias.ō*

in rebus extra, as Antonius asserts, and not as considered by the intellect. This is because the act of the universal is considered by the intellect looking upon the universal object as an inferior act. He concludes with the example of the stone that exists one way in the outside world, and the stone as understood by the intellect to show how the aforementioned acts are in the subject of the stone itself, but not in the object of the intellect, which is universal.¹⁵ Like the Antonine author, Antonius Andreas sees the action of the agent intellect as an immanent act.

At this point the Antonine author introduces another article regarding the central feature of the agent's operational activity, its abstractive work. He asks whether the agent intellect has some activity which when acting as an efficient cause, elicits an act on the part of the possible intellect.¹⁶ What is significant here is that the Antonine author focusses on the agent intellect's relationship with the possible intellect and not the phantasm.

Regarding the preliminary objections the Antonine author remarks that the agent intellect is said by some not to be a subject that is distinct from the possible intellect because its operation

¹⁵ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 1, q. 6, f. 8va: *¶Duplex est actus vel operatio, una transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut edificare alia est manens in agente, sicut intelligere vel velle...Primum dictum est, quod propositio philosophi est intelligenda de actu transeunte in materiam extra; secundo dictum est quod propositio non est intelligenda de actu immanente...Respondeo duplex est actio, actio respectus, et actio acta prima utique est in agente; qua non dicti aliud quod respectum quamdam agentis ad passum, ut transmutantis ad transmutatum. Secunda actio est ipse motus vel forma qua terminat motum et producitur per motum, et ita est in passu, sicut et motus in mobili...Dixi autem existunt in rebus extra, et non secundum quod considerantur ab intellectu, quia actus universalis et consideratus ab intellectu respicit obiectum universale ut inferius dicitur; quicumque sit actus ille. Secundum dictum probatur per oppositum, nam actu immanens existit in generate sicut in subiecto, et non in obiecto, sicut intellectio lapidis est subiective in intellectu, non in lapide. Et ideo talis actus est singularis, quia existit in subiecto singulari, sicut patet de intelligere, licet obiectum circa quod est sit per se univesale...¶*

¹⁶ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.6: *¶Articulus tertius: An intellectus agens habeat aliquam actionem elicivam effective in intellectum possibilem> Ulterius videndum est si intellectus agens habeat aliquam actionem elicivam effective in ipsum intellectum possibilem.¶*

is under our will and so does not act on itself.¹⁷ A second objection to the view of the agent intellect acting as an efficient cause upon the possible intellect is the claim that the agent intellect functions just like an illuminating light and as an ordered disposition. But it works as a light to what it illuminates and as a disposition to what it disposes. But light does not have some eliciting operation in its illuminating activity. Its only effect is by way of a formal and not an efficient cause, and it is a natural light that is caused.¹⁸ The objector here claims then that light in general, as light in a medium, does not function as an efficient cause because light that is received in a medium is received as a perfection. The first opinion maintains that the agent and possible intellect are the same. However the problem with this view is that the source of the agent's activity is the will. Hence it would seem absurd to claim that the agent would have any operation on the possible intellect since then the intellect cannot act on itself.

The Antonine author states that these two opinions go counter to the mind of Aristotle in two ways. One is that in every nature in which matter is found there is an agent that is also present. The same applies to the intellect. In the second point the Antonine author refers to the opinion of Averroes. His claim was that the agent intellect functions as an efficient cause in making imaged intentions actualized intelligibles which actualizes an act of understanding. The

¹⁷ Ibid., III.6.13: *“Et dicitur ab aliquibus quod non. Tum quia non est distinctus subiecto ab intellectu possibili quia operatio eius sub est voluntati nostrae et ita non agit in ipsum.”*

¹⁸ Ibid., III.6.14: *“Tum quia operatur ad ipsum sicut lux ad lucidum et sicut dispositio dispositum. Lux autem non habet aliquam operationem elicita in lucido, sed solum effectum per modum causae formalis non efficientis et est lux naturalis data a causante.”*

Antonine author responds that this would only be the case if there is an effect on an act of understanding or if there would be something necessarily previous to its act such as species.¹⁹

He now replies to the first opinion that maintains that the agent and possible intellect are identical. The Antonine author says that the argument being made here is based upon false principles. He says that philosophers who hold this opinion would claim that the agent intellect is distinct from the possible intellect as a separate substance that only operates under our will accidentally on account of its connection to the phantasm.²⁰ However the Antonine author thinks that such a claim is erroneous. But we have to keep in mind also how he will argue his own position, i.e., that both agent and possible intellect are distinct powers in the soul but not separate substances. Regarding the second opinion on the formal causality of the agent intellect's light, the Antonine author replies that they say that it is not entirely likely that the spiritual light of the agent intellect is much more eminent than the possible intellect, and it is also not likely that this agent can virtually contain some causable effect on the possible intellect. But if it has some effect on the phantasm then they claim that it is not that the agent intellect has no effective or efficient power on the phantasm, but that the phantasm is connected to its light. Thus from the presence and existence of such kind of light the phantasm is illuminated and then there is a certain separation or segregation of the quiddity from its conditions. This light of the agent

¹⁹ Ibid., III.6.15: *õSed ista sunt contra Aristotelem. Primo, quia in omnia natura in qua est materia ibi est agens; hoc patet in intellectu. Secundo, est contra Commentatorem quia intellectus agens facit intentiones imaginatas actu intelligibiles vel intellectas; hoc non est nisi effectum actu intelligendi vel aliquid necessarium praeivium ad ipsum, puta speciem vel aliquid tale.õ*

²⁰ Ibid., III.6.16: *õAd primum dico quod illud principium est falsum super quod innititur; et forte dicerent philosophi ad minorem immo quod intellectus agens distinctus est a possibili sicut quaedam substantia separata, nec operatio eius subset voluntati nostrae nisi per accidens propter copulationem ad phantasmata.õ*

intellect is not primarily and properly what can be called an action but more an action from privation. They say that this abstractive light of the agent intellect is not a positive action but at least one that is privation and separation. And according to this claim then the quiddity itself shining forth from the phantasm is the total effective cause of intellection. The Antonine author replies that he does not know if something is drawn out or effectively caused in the phantasm by the agent intellect. Nevertheless according to them it would seem probable that the passive is itself immediately subordinated to the active in the human person as a whole.²¹ Thus according to this claim then the agent intellect does not act on the phantasm. This claim of the objectors summarizes the noetics of Godfrey of Fontaines and his thesis of the mysterious *contactus* between the agent intellect and the phantasm. While it has been shown that in Godfrey's cognitional theory the agent intellect carries out an abstraction that is primarily sequestration or separation, one must also not forget that Godfrey is also attempting to keep the agent intellect within his act/potency axiom. This means that the abstractive work of the agent intellect is *virtualis*. However the Antonine author declares that this opinion is *fictio* and that there is no basis to their claim that there is only a privative or separating power in the agent intellect's abstractive work. If what this opinion claims was true then the agent intellect itself would not be

²¹ Ibid., III.6.17: *Ad secundum dico quod non est omnino simile quia lux ista spiritualis est multo eminentior quam sic et potest contineri virtualiter aliquem effectum causabilem in intellectu possibili; [L, f. 108va] si autem habet aliquem effectum in phantasia dicunt quod non ita quod nihil effective influatur phantasmati ab intellectu agente, sed phantasma continuatur cum lumine intellectus agentis et ex praesentia vel exsistentia talis luminis illustratur phantasma et sic segregatio quaedam quidditatis a condicionibus, quae non est actio prima proprie sed magis privatio actionis - vel saltem non est actio positiva sed privativa et separativa sicut dicunt. Et cum istis concurrentibus quidditas ipsa relucens phantasmate est totalis causa effectiva intellectionis. Nescio de hoc si aliquid deducitur vel causetur effective in phantasia ab intellectu agente, tamen probabile videtur quod sicut ab activo in passivum sibi subordinatum immediate in homine sicut in quodam universo.*

the cause of an act of understanding, but would only be a *per accidens* cause as in removing an obstacle. And yet it would still have the nature of some type of action in the phantasm. Because of this the Antonine author says that it is a false claim that regards the material quiddity as the total cause of intellection. The reason for this is that the material quiddity is a more inferior grade and more inferior perfection. He says that a substantial quiddity itself would at any rate be more inferior to an act of the intellect, and that any material quiddity would be more inferior to what is passive and more inferior to the possible intellect.²²

The Antonine author concludes here with his solution. He says that the agent intellect has a real and true action on the phantasm as a light whose illuminating light is of itself an effective cause. But the Antonine author points to the role of the phantasm in this action by saying that the nature of such irradiating light is attributed to what is held in the phantasm which the phantasm primarily represents; or at the bare minimum there would be some quiddity that is represented in its individual conditions in the phantasm. Secondly the action the agent intellect has with the phantasm is that irradiation that causes an intelligible species which is the object present in the character of a universal. Thirdly in its action of the agent intellect with the intelligible species is to reduce the intellect itself from potency to an act of understanding. But this action of reducing from potency to act is performed by the intellect itself, and neither the

²² Ibid., III.6.18: "Quantum vero ad illud de actione privativa vel separativa, dico quod fictio est et nihil. Tunc enim intellectus agens non esset per se causa intellectionis nec per se faceret ad ipsam sed per accidens solum sicut removens prohibens; et tamen si sic adhuc haberet naturam actionis in phantasmate aliquo. Quantum ad alium falsum est quod quidditas materialis sit totalis causa intellectionis quia est inferioris gradus et perfectionis, saltem quidditas substantialis quam sit intellectio ipsa et etiam quaelibet materialis quam sit passivum ipsum et intellectus possibilis."

species nor the phantasm suffices for this.²³ The Antonine author adds that from all this it is clear that the first operation of the agent intellect is transient. Yet he also shows that in another way the action of the agent intellect is not transient (and is immanent) because the agent and possible intellect are of the same substance and the agent and possible intellect are one power that is not distinct from the soul. From what the Antonine author referred to earlier, it is clear how one can compare the one (the agent intellect) and the other (the possible intellect) as art to matter.²⁴

Thus for the Antonine author the abstractive work in an act of understanding is an action which the agent intellect shares with the phantasm, and the intelligible species is brought about by their shared contribution. Antonius Andreas himself expresses the need the agent intellect has for the phantasm in its abstractive work. Regarding the quidditative object Antonius says that this object exists in matter. However it not considered as it exists in matter; it is considered as the quiddity of a material substance that is abstracted by the agent intellect. This shows that unless the material quiddity would be the object of the possible intellect it would not seem necessary to posit an action of the agent intellect regarding an object of the possible intellect. He mentions this in his own debate with the Averroistic thesis of the one separate material

²³ Ibid., III.6.19: *ōDico ergo quod intellectus agens habet actionem realem et veram in phantasmate causativam luminis et illustrativam ipsorum effective. Natura autem talis irradiationis est quod ipsa habita phantasma primo repraesentat saltem per aliud aliquid repraesentatur in phantasmate quidditas et ex consequenti condiciones individuales. Secunda actio eius est quod cum phantasmate sic irradiato causa speciem intelligibilem qua obiectum sit praesens in ratione universalis. Tertia eius actio est quod reducit cum specie intelligibili ipsum intellectum de potentia ad actum intelligendi efficiendo ipsum, nec ad hoc sufficit species nec phantasma.ō*

²⁴ Ibid., III.6.20: *Ex quibus patet quod prima operatio intellectus agentis transiens est; aliae viae non quia agens intellectus et possibilis idem sunt secundum substantiam. Ex praedictis etiam patet quomodo comparatur sic ars ad materiam.ō*

intellect.²⁵ Hence for both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author the agent intellect, by means of the intelligible species, actuates an act of understanding within the possible intellect. This discussion sets up our Antonine author's consideration of intelligible species as the cognitive device that serves as the catalyst in an act of understanding. How intelligible species function will be seen in the next section in the discussion on the role intelligible species play in an act of understanding. It will also be shown that the Antonine author's view accords with that of Antonius Andreas.

B. The Doctrine of Intelligible Species of Antonius Andreas and the Antonine Author

Both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author follow the teaching of Duns Scotus in their respective presentations on intuitive and abstractive cognition. In this section we will see how similar their views are regarding the cognitional status of intelligible species.. The Antonine author begins his discussion by asking whether intelligible species have the character of a habit.²⁶ He also asks whether intelligible species remain in our intellect after the end of an act of understanding.²⁷ He begins by a consideration of Avicenna's view regarding intellection. Avicenna claims that intelligible species do not remain in our intellect. One reason is that our intellect receives species but does not retain them. According to him receptivity and

²⁵ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 2, q. 3, f. 12rb: "Ergo obiectum eius erit existens in materia; non autem considerat in quantum existens in materia. Talis autem est quidditas substantie materialis abstracta per intellectum agentem. Confirmat quia nisi quidditas materialis esset obiectum intellectus possibilis non videretur necesse ponere actionem intellectus agentis circa obiectum intellectus possibilis."

²⁶ Ibid., III.4 [15]: "<Quaestio 4: An species intelligibilis habeat rationem habitus vel sit habitus> Nota ad videndum an species intelligibilis habeat rationem habitus vel sit habitus."

²⁷ The author's first article is parallel to what is found in Scotus's *De Anima* commentary. See *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 14 [1 - 2]: "Utrum species maneant in intellectu, cessante actu intelligendi."

retentiveness are opposite notions. As long as a form maintains its operation the species would remain is an act of understanding; that is if it does remain. However the common sense does not retain the sensation of the particular sensibles when it senses. So the only time the intellect retains its species in the imagination is when it is in an act of understanding. Otherwise if the species did remain, our intellect would always be in an act of understanding. The reason for this that the intellect would be sufficiently disposed in its present natural states of activity and passivity to eliminate an impediment to its act that of necessity follows its own action. The Antonine author here points out the difficulty with this position: either our intellect can understand with recourse to the phantasm, or it can understand without recourse to the phantasm. He says that the latter position is false. If it was true that the intellect has no need for recourse to the phantasm, it would then follow that it would be useless for the species to remain in potency. This is because the intellect would be continually turning to the phantasm and would be able to generate new species as well a new act.²⁸ What this position maintains is that the intellect would require new species in every act of understanding because the species in a previous act of understanding would cease with its intellectual act. Avicenna in his own commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* maintains that the intellect receives an intention from a sense image of some form represented in its imagination. If afterwards the imagination brought back another

²⁸ Antonine author, *Quaestiones de anima*, III.4.1: "Videndum est primo an maneat in intellectu nostro coniuncto, cessante actu. De hoc dicit Avicenna V *Naturalium* parte 5 capitulo 6 quod non manet. Tum quia intellectus noster est receptivus, ergo non retentivus quia illae sunt oppositae rationes. Tum quia manente forma manet operatio eius et ita manet operatio specie quae est intelligere si ipsa maneret. Tum quia sensus communis non retinet sensus sensibilium particularium dum sentit, ergo nec intellectus retinet species imaginabilium nisi dum intelligit. Tum quia intellectus noster semper intelligeret quia, praesente activo naturali et passivo sufficienter disposito et cessante impedimento, necessario sequitur actio. Tum quia intellectus noster aut potest intelligere sine recursum ad phantasmata, quod est falsum; aut non potest et tunc frustra in potentia remaneret [L, fol. 106ra] species, quia continue per novum recursum ad phantasma potest generari nova species, sicut et novus actus."

form of the same species, the intellect would not receive any other form from it, except in an accidental mode. In this way the intellect sometimes would receive nothing and at other times it would receive that form accidentally.²⁹ The Antonine author claims that Averroes maintains that if abstracted species remain in the intellect, the agent intellect would cease its operation of abstraction from the influx of an indefinite number of other species. But the Antonine author says that this is false.³⁰ The Antonine author also raises a counterpoint to Averroes's position by saying that if there is a before and after in the intellect's potency to learn something, this then can only happen through a reception and retention of some object in the phantasm that would be a substantial and not merely habitual act. However the individual human intellect is in potency essentially and not accidentally (as Averroes postulated) before the initial act of the agent intellect and the species. Species that are retained are only in potency *simpliciter* to an act of the intellect. It is therefore necessary that the species remain. Otherwise the species would always be in potency essentially and accidentally, just as at the beginning of an act of understanding.³¹

Also since retained species pertains to the perfection of a lower power such as the imagination,

²⁹ Avicenna, *Liber De Anima*, V [Van Riet ed., 129]: "Cum autem aliquam formam repraesentat sensus imaginationi et imaginatio intellectui, et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem, si postea repraesentaverit ei aliam formam eiusdem speciei quae non est alia nisi numero, iam non excipient intellectus ex ea aliam formam praeter quam acceperat ullo modo, nisi secundum accidens quod est illius proprium ex hoc quod est illud accidens, ita ut aliquando accipiat illam nudam, aliquando cum illo accidente..." See also Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 14, 13 [14 - 16].

³⁰ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.4.2: "Hoc etiam diceret Commentator, quia si species abstractae manent in intellectu, tunc ab aliis infinitis cessabit operatio intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere speciem secundum ipsum; hoc est falsum; quare, etc."

³¹ Ibid., III.4.3: "Contra: quia si intellectus aliter est in potentia ante addiscere et post, hoc autem non videtur nisi per receptionem vel retentionem alicuius phantasmatis ad substantiam actus, cuius non est habitus - intellectus autem est in potentia essentiali non accidentali ante primum actum--, hoc autem non est nisi ad speciem et actum; sed habita specie, tunc solum est in potentia ad actum simpliciter, oportet ergo quod maneat species - aliter semper esset in potentia essentiali et accidentali, sicut in principio."

this is due to its object being present. Hence such perfection ought not to be denied or repugnant to a higher power as the intellect.³²

In his replies the Antonine author first addresses Avicenna's position and says that species are not retained corporeally or materially, but spiritually by means of a more eminent principle (*rationem*) and nature.³³ He then addresses Averroes's position and says that these essential elements, (i.e., the intellect and species) are united in a superior nature, that nature being the soul.³⁴ In his commentary we find Averroes responding to the positions of Alfarabi and Ibn B jja regarding the abstractive activity in the agent intellect. Averroes says that if it has not been conceded to us that this quiddity is simple and that its being is the same as the intelligible, then what occurred at first will occur with regards to this, that it still would have a quiddity that has come to be. Then it is necessary either that this proceed to infinity or that the intellect would stop there. But since it is impossible for this to proceed to infinity (because it would make infinite quiddities and intellects infinitely diverse in species to exist, as some of them are more freed from matter than others), it is necessary that the intellect should stop.³⁵

³² Ibid., III.4.4: "Item, quia in potentia inferiori puta in imaginativa invenitur retentio specie et pertinet ad perfectionem potentiae, quia ex hoc habet obiectum sibi praesens; ergo non debet hoc negare a potentia superiori, quae est intellectus, nec sibi repugnat."

³³ Ibid., III.4.5 [15]: "Ad primam, dico non retinetur corporaliter vel materialiter...sed spiritualiter per rationem et naturam eminentiorem."

³⁴ Ibid., III.4.6 [15]: "Ad secundum, per idem quia illae rationes uniuntur in natura superiori."

³⁵ Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 36 [492: 363 - 371]: "Et si non fuerit concessum nobis quod ista quidditas est simplex et quod ens ex ea est idem cum intellectu, continget in ea quod contingit in prima, et est quod etiam habeat quidditatem factam. Et necesse est tunc aut ut hoc procedat in infinitum, aut ut intellectus secetur ibi. Sed quia impossibile est hoc procedure in infinitum (quia faceret quidditates et intellectus infinitos diversos in specie esse, scilicet secundum quod quidam eorum sunt magis liberati a materia quam quidam), necesse est ut intellectus secetur."

Duns Scotus disagrees with Averroes and asserts that species can remain after ceasing in act. He says that the intelligible species is a prior but not a necessary cause to an act of understanding. The reason for this is that what is the formal principle of understanding and the means by which (*quo*) an act of understanding is elicited, whether it be an act of understanding or species, is freed through participation by its causality which produces an effect. Thus intelligible species is not a necessary cause producing an effect.³⁶ Scotus here is making the case for the role intelligible species plays as a disposition to further cognitive acts. Although for Scotus intelligible species may not be a necessary cause for an act of understanding, he also maintains that the intellect and species are two perfect agents in the causality of an act of understanding and concur in this act of understanding. He also states that the object moves the intellect through the coordinated activity of the phantasm with the agent intellect, and that this motion causes a species in the intellect. But the species does not move the intellect because this would then proceed to infinity. But species and the agent intellect concur in one act of understanding.³⁷ In this sense the intelligible species can be described as jointly resulting from an interaction between the singular object of the phantasm and the agent intellect.³⁸

³⁶ Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima*, q. 14, 16 [125: 1, 3 - 9] ðRespondeo quod species potest manere, cessante actu...sed species intelligibilis est causa prior actu intelligendi nec est causa necessaria - quia quod est formale principium intelligendi quo elicitor actus intelligendi, sive sit intelligere sive species, est liberum per participationem a sua causalitate, ut scilicet producat effectum; igitur non est causa necessaria producendi effectum...ö

³⁷ Scotus, *Lectura II*, d. 3, part 2, q. 1, 251, 252 [Vat. ed., 308: 22 - 24, 309: 2 - 7]: ðSed ego pono quod intellectus et species, ut duo agentia perfecta in sua causalitatem, concurrunt ad actum intelligendi...dicendum quod obiectum movet intellectum, ut phantasma cum intellectu agente, et ista motione causat speciem in intellectu; sed ultra, species non movet intellectum (tunc enim esset processus in infinitum), sed ut duo agentis concurrunt ad unum actum intelligendi.ö

³⁸ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 263.

The Antonine author agrees with Scotus and says that it is not necessary for the operation of the remaining form (i.e., intelligible species) to remain in act.³⁹ However at this juncture in his discussion of this question the Antonine author is not so much considering the role of intelligible species as a cognitive device in an act of understanding as looking at intelligible species as a disposition to further cognitive acts. We see this in his next reply. The Antonine author says that there is a similarity between the common sense and intellect only with regards to what he calls the "terminating or changing operation"; the common sense is not altered by its species without its act, and neither is the intellect. At this point the Antonine author is highlighting sensible and intelligible species as the cognitive factor that changes or completes an act of sense or intellect. However regarding the retention of species, he says that the common sense and intellect are not similar because the intellect is much more perfect and nobler than the imaginative power. The imaginative power may retain its sensible species; but the scope of the intellect in its power exceeds the common sense in this.⁴⁰ Hence the intelligible species of the intellect are superior to the sensible species of the imagination. The Antonine author touches on the dispositional character of intelligible species in his next point saying that an impediment may occur when the will interrupts the intellect's turn to the species from its preoccupation with other things.⁴¹ The Antonine author points here to the "durability" of intelligible species as habits that

³⁹ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.4.7: "Ad tertium, quod non oportet quod manente forma maneat operatio in actu."

⁴⁰ Ibid, III.4.8: "Ad quartum, dico non est simile nisi quantum ad operationem terminantem vel immutativam quia sicut non immutatur sensus communis ad speciem sine actu, ita nec intellectus. Tum quantum ad retentionem non est simile quia intellectus est multum perfectior et nobilior quam imaginativa quae retinet species sensibiles, excedens in hoc sensum communem."

⁴¹ Ibid., III.4.9: "Ad aliud, dico quod intervenit impedimentum conversionis intellectus super speciem ab ipsa voluntate ex occupatione circa alia."

remain even when we choose to focus on other things. He follows this line of thought in his counterpoint, saying that the senses have the same power as long as the species remain as in the beginning of its act. But when the species are imprinted it is necessary that the act of sense be concomitant with it. Therefore species remain.⁴² Such is the dispositional character even of sensible species as habits. The Antonine author then concludes his treatment of the first article regarding species as a habit by laying out the conditions under which intelligible species function as habitual dispositions. He first says that the argument that maintains an equality between intellective and sense memory is false. Then regarding intelligible species as dispositional habits, he says that if the intellect is not continually engaged with a remaining species that this can be explained in part by the fact of human choice; we choose (i.e., an impediment created by the will) to turn our mind to another consideration. A second impediment to intelligible species disposing the intellect to a further act of understanding sometimes occurs when the intellect does not explicitly employ a retained species. There is no reception of species in the intellect in any of these modes, simply because in both these cases there are no new acts of understanding. Hence for intelligible species to dispose the intellect to a further cognitive act there is a concomitant act between the intellect and species. However if the intellect is not concomitantly engaged with its intelligible species, it would yet perfectly retain it from the first impression (when the intelligible species collaborated with the agent intellect in bringing about an act of understanding). This is especially true if this impression was robust (*vehemens*) or happened by

⁴² Ibid., III.4.10: *Contra: quia eadem virtutem habent sensus quamdiu manet sicut in principio, sed cum imprimitur necessario concomitatur actus eum; ergo manet.*

chance from many impressions.⁴³ The Antonine author seems to refer here to the fact of perfecting a cognitive habit which takes repeated engagements of the mind with its intelligible species which further disposes the mind to new acts of knowledge. However he adds that it is necessary that the intellect's recourse to the phantasm not be useless. He concludes by saying that not even a remaining species as a dispositional habit is able to move the intellect unless it stands in the imagination and is moved to its act by the will; that is of course, if there is no impediment. But as he observes, this is difficult to see.⁴⁴

The Antonine author continues the discussions of objections to intelligible species as a habit later in his treatment of this question. Here the first opinion states that all say that species concur in an act of understanding as a disposition that provides and prepares for the ultimate perfection which is the act itself. This is the same way that matter has dispositions for its chief perfective forms. However species is not required as an agent and is neither required as a co-agent acting as a partial agent, nor as the principle of the act (*ratio agenda*). But they say that this would mean that the same subject of the act can move itself, which is false.⁴⁵ Averroes adds

⁴³ Ibid., III.4.11: "Solutio...si argumentum valet in memoria intellectiva, valet etiam in sensitiva, quod est evidenter falsum. Dico ergo quod ne sit actus, semper manente specie, unum impedimentum est positum quando voluntas convertit intellectum ad aliud considerandum. Secundum impedimentum aliquando est privatum, quando scilicet non applicat intellectum ad speciem retentam. Modo neutrum illorum est in receptione speciei et ideo tunc concomitatur actus; non oportet tamen quod semper concomitetur, licet perfecte retinetur ex prima impressione, si sit vehemens vel forte ex pluribus impressionibus."

⁴⁴ Ibid., III.4.12: "Ad ultimum dico quod oportet recurrere ad phantasmata non frustra, sicut dictum est supra, nec species etiam quantumcumque maneat potest movere nisi imaginatione stante in actu suo et voluntate movente, vel non impediante, licet illud difficile sit videre."

⁴⁵ Ibid., III.4.28: "Alii dicunt quod species concurrat ad actum intelligendi sicut dispositio praeibit et praeparativa ad ulteriorem perfectionem quae est actus ipse, sicut etiam in materia requiruntur dispositiones ad formas perfectas ?praecipue? non autem requiritur secundum ipsos ut agat vel co-agat ad actum tamquam partiali agens nec tamquam ratio agendi; tunc enim idem subiecto moveret se ipsum, quod est falsum, ut dicunt."

to this by saying that a habit is that by which we act when we will it.⁴⁶ However our Antonine author says that this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle who places art among the efficient causes. Therefore the art of syllogizing in the intellect is an effect of the act of syllogizing and as such moves the intellect, although this argument is not valid for material things except by virtue of being simply in potency to something, as matter is to form.⁴⁷

At this point the Antonine author proffers his view regarding intelligible species as a habit. He says that species cannot be called a habit, if one means by habit what is commonly accepted, as a certain quality that is left in the intellect and is caused from acts. This is because species naturally precedes an act of understanding. But species can most probably be called a habit when it is rooted and formed (*radicata et formata*) in the intellect. Hence as much as species is called a likeness of its object, it can also be called a habit as in terms of a disposition to further acts of understanding. But species is also called a *ratio* or principle inasmuch as it leads to the object.⁴⁸ In this way intelligible species as a likeness of things cognized is also associated with a concept which serves as a sign of things known. The concept serves as an artificial sign generated by the intellect in its moment of reflection, and the intelligible species serve as natural

⁴⁶ Cf. Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum In Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, 18 [437 - 438]. Cf. also Barry S. Kogan, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1985), 139 - 142.

⁴⁷ Antonine author, *Quaestiones de anima*, III.4.29: „Hoc est contra Commentatorem III De anima qui dicit quod habitus est quo operamur cum volumus, ut videtur. Item, contra Aristotelem II Physicorum et V *Metaphysicae* qui reponit artem inter causas effectivas, igitur ars syllogizandi in intellectu est effectiva actus syllogizandi et ita est motiva intellectus, licet eodem modo scilicet subjective argumentum nihil valet nisi ex virtute pure in potentia ad aliquid, sicut materia ad formas.“

⁴⁸ Ibid., III.4.33: „Ultimo autem dico quod accipiendo habitum sicut accipitur communiter pro qualitate quadam derelicta et causata ex actibus, dico quod species non dicitur nec est habitus quia species praecedit actum natura, sed accipiendo habitum pro qualitate permansiva et intellectiva ad actum, sic species habitus dici potest; potissime quando est radicata et formata. Dicitur ergo species pro quanto est similitudo obiecti, sed dicitur habitus modo praedicto; sed dicitur ratio pro quanto est ductiva in obiectum et sic patet de specie intelligibili quid sit dicendum.“

signs of these things. Hence intelligible species is associated with semantics.⁴⁹ However the species cannot dispose the mind if one chooses not to engage in a cognitive act with it. Nevertheless the Antonine author, along with Scotus, views intelligible species as habits which dispose the mind to new acts of understanding. The Antonine author also agrees with Scotus that many intelligible species are robust enough to serve as habits, and that intelligible species that in their capacity serve as a cognitive device for ðacquiring mental contentð, are distinct from the role they play in disposing the mind in its ðacquisition of a cognitive habitð.⁵⁰

In his next article the Antonine author asks whether species remain in the separated soul.⁵¹ He reveals here a concern that he shares with the interest of the previous generation of theologians and philosophers. This concern is how to account for human knowledge after the death of the body. The theological doctrine stressed that at death the soul separated from the body. Hence there was a need to give an account of how human knowledge survives the death of the body. From a theological point of view the doctrine of the plurality of forms was germane to account for the numerical identity of Christ from the moment of his death on the Cross through his Resurrection from the dead. But while the plurality of forms fits snugly within their Christological account, the explanation of how human knowledge was affected by death of the body was another challenge. This Antonine author inherited these concerns and makes an attempt to offer a coherent account to explain how the separated soul can still have knowledge after the death of its body. So this question is not only of philosophical value but is a key point

⁴⁹ Cf. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 65 - 66.

⁵⁰ Cf. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, 94 - 95.

⁵¹ Antonine author, *Quaestiones de anima*, III.4 [15]: ð<Articulus secundus: An species maneat in anima separata> Secundo videndo est an species maneat in anima separata.ð

of theological doctrine. The key question investigated by our Antonine author concerns the status of intelligible species in the separated soul.

The introductory opinions all take the negative position that intelligible species do not survive after death of the body. One opinion states that the species corrupt with the death of the body; even if these species did survive, the separated soul would not understand them. The reason for this is that intelligible species is a feature of knowledge acquired in this state of existence which will not remain after death. After death the separated soul has a clarity of both intellectual and experiential knowledge (*scientiam et notitiam*) of those things it cognizes. It does not have this temporally acquired knowledge concurrent with the knowledge of glory because this acquired knowledge is obscure and imperfect.⁵² The next opinion adds that God infuses the separated souls of children with species; thus the species of previously acquired knowledge in this life neither remain nor need to remain. The reason of this is that two species of the same object and nature cannot stand simultaneously together.⁵³ Another opinion regards the role of the phantasm in knowledge. Assuming the position that maintains that species remain, an objection proposes that after death they cannot be understood. The reason given here is that these species have a determined relation to the object of the phantasm, as the natural mode of knowledge. But after death there is no object of the phantasm. Faith does not even remain in the coming vision of heaven. So neither acquired knowledge nor species remain in the separated

⁵² Ibid., III.4.13: ðOpinio autem quaedam est quod vel species corrumpunt corruptione corporis vel quod per illas anima separata nihil intelligit, ita quod scientia acquisita etiam in vita nostra, non manet post mortem. Tum quia post mortem anima separata habet scientiam vel notitiam claram eorum quae cognoscit, ergo non habet simul hic scientiam acquisitam quia est obscura et imperfecta.ð

⁵³ Ibid., III.4.14: ðTum quia animae separatae parvuli Deus infundit species, ergo in aliis non manent priores acquisitae, quia duae species eiusdem obiecti cum sint eiusdem rationis non stant simul.

soul after death.⁵⁴ These opinions state that they dignify the soul by holding this position because God infuses in these separated souls with a nobler species and knowledge than they had acquired here in this life.⁵⁵ However the Antonine author raises a counterpoint to this claim. He says that if this is the case then it would seem that no one needs to studiously engage in study in this life. Since the habit of the will is not corrupted in the death of the body, the same holds for perfections in the intellect.⁵⁶

The Antonine author concludes that intelligible species do remain in the separated soul after death. He states that species can remain in the separated soul because species are merely spiritual and knowledge is a spiritual act. That species do remain means that there is no necessity required for the body in the soul's cognitive act. This is because the soul is intellectual in its nature, immortal, and remains a substance after the death of its body. There is nothing objectionable with another species being infused; there is no repugnance in having this species and the soul's species together. Nor is this impossible, just as it is not repugnant to have both the moral and acquired virtues together. It does not even seem necessary to postulate that a new species has to be infused. This is because the soul now sufficiently has the species of the object in a nobler light so that through this light, which is the light of glory, the soul can more perfectly understand the species. There is nothing objectionable with the view that there is no longer any

⁵⁴ Ibid., III.4.15: *“Tum quia dato quod haberent species et manerent adhuc non intelligerent intelligeret per eas quia habent determinatam habitudinem ad obiectum phantasticum si per eas deberet aliquid intelligi; obiectum autem phantasticum non est; sicut igitur fides non manet in patria adveniente visione, ita nec scientia hic acquisita nec species manet in anima separata...”*

⁵⁵ Ibid., III.4.16: *“Dicunt etiam quod ipsi dignificant animam quia ponunt quod Deus influit sibi nobiliorem speciem et scientiam quam hic habuit acquisitam.”*

⁵⁶ Ibid., III.4.17: *“Contra: quia tunc nullus deberet in studio laborare ut videtur. Item, quia habitus voluntatis non corrumpitur, ergo nec perfectiones intellectus.”*

relation or order between species and the phantasm which was needed for this temporal state of existence. Hence there is no necessary link between species and the phantasm; since the phantasm will no longer be needed in the life of glory.⁵⁷ He thus asserts that no remaining acquired knowledge is repugnant to a clearer and more glorious (*clariori*) knowledge that resides in the soul if this previously acquired knowledge is infused with a clearer and more glorious light and not infused with another new light.⁵⁸ He also adds that the relation of the species or its object to the object of the phantasm is *per accidens*. However the role of species as the representation for its object in the phantasm is only in this state of earthly existence.⁵⁹ Thus the Antonine author concludes with Scotus that intelligible species do remain in our intellect after the separation of the soul from its body after death.

The term *per accidens* which the Antonine author assigns to the status between the phantasm and intelligible species can have a twofold meaning. One meaning involves the distinction between the object of the intellect and intelligible species, which is related to the Antonine author's distinction between the object of sense and the sensible thing. William of Alnwick, Scotus's secretary, also maintained this position *secundum mentem Scoti*. He says that

⁵⁷ Ibid., III.4.18: *ōDico ergo quod species manere potest, cum enim sit mere spiritualis et etiam scientia ipsa. Ad hoc ut remaneat non requiritur necessario coniunctio animae cum corpore, sicut nec ad hoc quod remaneat substantia. Nec obstat quod alia species infunditur quia nulla species speciei repugnat vel est impossibilis, sicut et habitus morales infusus et acquisitus non repugnat. Nec videtur etiam necessitas ponendi quod species de novo infundatur; ex quo enim iam habet speciem obiecti sufficienter in nobiliori lumine ut per illam perfectius intelligat. Nec obstat quod non est ibi ordo in ordine ad phantasmata quia ille ordo non est necessarius nisi pro statu viae et coniunctione animae cum corpore...ō*

⁵⁸ Ibid., III.4.19: *ōAd primum, dico quod scientia manet nec repugnat scientiae clariori si clarior infundatur vel quod manet sed clarior efficitur ex alio lumine nec alia nova infunditur.ō*

⁵⁹ Ibid., III.4.20: *ōAd secundum, dico quod habitudo speciei vel obiecti ad obiectum phantasticum est per accidens, sed per se est ad obiectum cuius est repraesentativum, licet concurrat repraesentatio [M, fol. 256v] per phantasmata pro statu isto eiudem obiecti [L, fol. 106va].ō*

the agent intellect only makes intelligible species or an act of understanding because whatever it would be supposed to do in the imaginative power or the phantasm would be material and would be extended to the power of a corporeal or material organ. Therefore the intelligible *esse* of the object is the same in reality with the representing or cognized intelligible species. But the *esse* of the intelligible object represented by means of its species is not the species' subjective *esse*, meaning that the intelligible species is distinct from its object. Thus the represented *esse* is the same in reality with the representing form.⁶⁰ For William, as for Scotus, the objective being of the object in the intelligible species has no ontological standing on its own, but is dependent upon the intelligible species that exists 'subjectively' in the intellect as in a subject.⁶¹ Thus one meaning of *per accidens* refers not only to the accidental feature of the intelligible species but doubly to the universal object within the species. We will see that Antonius Andreas also maintains this distinction between the object and intelligible species.

The other meaning of *per accidens* in reference to cognition is due to the dominance of the volitional aspect of the intellective soul. The intellect can carry on its abstraction of intelligible species except when the will intervenes to turn the attention of the intellect to another object. While the intellect completes its operation with an act of judgment the proper inclination of the will is to rule over the intellect. But the Antonine author reminds us that he is not

⁶⁰ William of Alnwick, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Esse Intelligibili et De Quodlibet*, ed. P. Athanasius Ledoux, O.F.M. (Firenze/Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1937), q. 1 [10]: 'Sed intellectus agens non facit nisi speciem intelligibilem sive actum intelligendi, quia quidquid poneretur facere in virtute imaginativa sive phantastica esset materiale et extensum ad extensionem organi virtutis materialis vel corporalis; igitur esse intelligibile obiecti est idem realiter cum specie intelligibili repraesentante sive cum cognitione; esse autem repraesentatum per speciem sive per cognitionem si ponatur est esse intelligibile obiectum et non eius esse subiectivum; igitur esse repraesentatum est idem realiter cum forma repraesentante.'

⁶¹ Cf. King, 'Duns Scotus on Mental Content', 84 - 85.

referring to intellect and will as two separate powers in the soul, but that the cause of both of them is form (the soul), each one having its proper inclination which corresponds to each other.⁶² The will rules over all the actions of the intellect but not as one power over the other. Rather both intellect and will are manifestations of the soul as intellective and substantial form. Hence the relation of species to the phantasm as accidental in this sense is due to the spiritual status of the species. Since the inclination which the intellect has towards its object is intrinsic to itself (as with the will) and since an act of cognition is actually a movement of the soul, the relationship between the intellect and its object is therefore accidental. However he maintains that the intellect primarily knows or cognizes substantial quiddity and affirms that although accidents are the first features of the object present in the phantasm, what is originally in the intellect is preserved in its act of understanding.⁶³ But he also conjectures that it is not easy to know what is first understood in the intellect.⁶⁴

In a third article in this question the Antonine author now inquires how species are related to an act of understanding.⁶⁵ He begins by analyzing and critiquing the opinions of other authorities. One opinion states that intelligible species are related to the object as what is first and immediately known, which is the nature or principle (*ratio*) of cognizing the object in the

⁶² Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.11.21: ð...[Q]uod velle vel voluntas non est inclinatio intrinseca, sed tam intellectus quam voluntas utrumque est forma habens propriam inclinationem sibi correspondentem; quarum una est ad iudicium, alia ad imperium...ö

⁶³ Cf. Ibid., III.7.9 [27].

⁶⁴ Cf. Ibid., III.7.13 [28].

⁶⁵ Ibid., III.4.21: ð<Article tertius: Quomodo se habeat species ad actum intelligendi> Tertio circa hoc videndum est quomodo se habeat species ad actum intelligendi.ö

phantasm. Then the species in the intellect takes the place and presence of the object.⁶⁶ Another opinion maintains that what is immediately cognized is present. But nothing is present except species. The sense power focuses primarily and immediately upon the species as in a mirror and at last focuses upon the thing which is sensed. So in this instance the species and the object are said to be the same in the intellect, and thus in this mode the object is abstractively cognized. If intelligible species is not the cognized object but only a principle (*ratio*) of cognition then intuitive knowledge would not be annulled because of the presence of species.⁶⁷ This last objection raises the issue of the relation of intelligible species to intuitive cognition. It would seem that the Antonine author may have one of the early Scotists in mind here. Peter of Navarre maintains in a passage from his commentary on the *Sentences* that there are three conditions required for intuitive cognition. The first condition is that its object exists in the thing outside and as present in its proper actual existence in the nature of the object. The second condition is that the object is present in its proper actual existence to the cognitive power and is not some representation of the thing. The third condition is that this object is present in its proper actual existence to the cognitive power as an object immediately and clearly cognized. But Peter lays emphasis on these last two conditions as vital to an act of intuitive cognition. The reason for this is that the mind can intuitively cognize what has represented *esse* as represented *esse*, provided

⁶⁶ Ibid., III.4.22: ðEt dicunt aliqui quod se habet ad obiectum primo et immediate cognitum quod est ratio cognoscendi obiectum phantasmatum. Tum quia species apud intellectum supplet vicem et praesentiam obiecti.ö

⁶⁷ Ibid., III.4.23: ðTum quia oportet immediate cognitum esse praesens; nihil autem praesens est nisi species ita quod sicut sensus primo et immediate fertur super speciem in speculo et ultimo super rem cuius est species, ita in proposito in intellectu et specie et obiecto idem dicunt et illo modo obiectum abstractive cognoscitur. Si enim species non esset obiectum cognitum, sed solum ratio cognoscendi numquam per speciem tolleretur notitia intuitiva, sicut patet de specie in visu ut dicunt.ö

that the one who cognizes it does not cognize it as present in its proper actual existence, and provided that the thing is not present to cognition in its real and proper actual existence. Peter thus makes it clear that the object of intuitive knowledge can have represented *esse*. There is nothing repugnant in this. The object intuitively cognized could be cognized by a knowledge other than intuitive cognition. Nevertheless the two conditions mentioned above are annexed and necessarily required on the part of the object so that if one of them is missing, it is not intuitive knowledge.⁶⁸ Thus Peter maintains that the object of intuitive cognition could be the object of abstractive cognition which has represented *esse*. What this means is that intelligible species could also be present in an act of intuitive cognition. As we observed in the section on chapter two on Scotus, there modern scholarship that maintains that Scotus has a place for intelligible species in an act of intuitive cognition, especially in an act of memory.⁶⁹

Nevertheless the Antonine author challenges this assertion by turning to semantics. He says that if it were the case that one would intuitively cognize intelligible species in its object, it would follow that whatever is predicated or negated or conceived or known would be primarily

⁶⁸ Peter of Navarre, *Et Maestro Pedro de Navarra, O.F.M. (+1347) "Doctor Fundatus" Y Su Comentario Sobre El Libro I De Las Sentencias*, ed. Pio Sagües Azcona, O.F.M (Madrid, 1966), q. 1 [3: 39 - 43, 55 -71]: ö...{D}ico primo quod notitia intuitiva est quae respicit suum per se et primum obiectum ut exsistens in re extra et ut praesens in propria actuali exsistentia in ratione obiecti. Est ergo prima conditio intuitivae notitiae quod respicit suum per se et primum obiectum... Secunda conditio intuitivae est quod illud primum et per se obiectum habeat esse actualis exsistentiae realiter extra in se, non in aliquo repraesentante, ut cognito. Tertia conditio est ut illud obiectum sit praesens in propria exsistentia actuali ipsi potentiae cognitivae ut obiectum immediate et clare cognitum. Sed istae duae conditiones non sunt de intrinseca formali ratione obiecti notitiae intuitivae, quia alias non posset intellegi sine illis (quod falsum est), quia quod potest habere esse repraesentatum, potest in illo esse repraesentato cognosci, dato quod non sit praesens realiter in propria actuali exsistentia ipsi cognoscenti etiam dato quod non habeat esse actualis exsistentiae in re extra. Constat autem quod illud quod est obiectum notitiae intuitivae, potest habere esse repraesentatum, quod non repugnat sibi; ergo obiectum notitiae intuitivae potest cognosci alia notitia quam intuitiva. Sunt tamen istae conditiones annexae et necessario requisitae ex parte obiecti, ita quod, si aliqua deficiat, non est notitia intuitiva.ö

⁶⁹ Cf. James B. South, *öScotus and the Knowledge of the Singular Revisitedö*, 133 - 143.

predicated of the species, and prior to the object. According to this mindset one could say that *ōman* is an *animalō* and in such a proposition the species of the subject *ōmanō* is logically identical with the species of the predicate *ōanimalō*. At least in this example the species is the word *ōanimalō* and the first thing known would be the species of things and not the things themselves. However this is false.⁷⁰ In his solution to this question the Antonine author states that the species in the first act of the intellect is not the nature (*rationem*) of the object known but only the representative nature or principle (*rationem*) of the object. He reminds us that even the species in the sense power is not at first cognized in the phantasm but is the representative of the object.⁷¹ The reason for this is that the object of the sense power is the common nature of a thing. That the Antonine author calls intelligible species representations of the object reflects Antonius Andreas's view, as we shall see shortly. According to Andreas, the way we should understand species is their role to re-present the object in the phantasm. The object in the phantasm is the common nature of the thing. The universal itself is the fruit of the co-active work of the agent intellect and intelligible species and is also a re-presentation of the object in the phantasm.⁷² For the Antonine author, this is why in the first act of the intellect, prior to abstractive cognition, the mind neither cognizes nor has an intellectual grasp of the species of the object. The mind knows the species through its abstractive work in which the intelligible species

⁷⁰ Antonine author, *Quaestiones De Anima*, III.4.24 [17 - 18]: *ōContra: quia tunc sequeretur quod quidquid praedicaretur vel negaretur vel conciperetur vel scieretur de aliquo obiecto praedicaretur primo de specie et prius quam de illo obiecto. Sic dicendo ōhomo est animalō esset primus sensus quod species hominis esset animal vel saltem species animalis et esset primo scientia de speciebus rerum et non de rebus. Quae sunt falsa.ō*

⁷¹ Ibid., III.4.25: *ōDico ergo quod species in actu primo non habet rationem obiecti cogniti sed et rationem tantum repraesentativam obiecti, sicut etiam species in sensu non est primo cognita nec etiam in phantasia, licet sit ibi repraesentativa obiecti.ō*

⁷² Cf. Jorge Ayala, *Pensadores Argoneses*, 168.

has its role as a co-active principle. The reason why the mind does not cognize species is due to the role they play as a cognitive device; species only serve as a means to an act of understanding. The Antonine author touches on this co-active feature of intelligible species by saying that cognized species does not yet take the place of the object, but that the species is a partial or moving agent with the intellect in its act of understanding the object. The species is a likeness drawn from the object but without its being understood.⁷³ While he claims that intelligible species are co-active principles with the intellect, the Antonine author reiterates that such species are mediating cognitive devices that merely serve as the means, as the *quo* to an act of understanding. Such species, however, are not primarily the content of what is understood. Hence he asserts again that the species is a partial agent in an act of understanding and serves as the catalyst or the *quo* in the intellect's act of knowledge. He states that it suffices that what is abstracted is produced through a representative medium which is the species, although the species (as the *quo*) is not cognized or known.⁷⁴

Further on in this question the Antonine author looks at opinions that consider intelligible species as the *ratio* or principle of cognition. One opinion states that intelligible species is precisely the formal principle of action that elicits and draws out its act. The reason for this is that, according to this opinion, the intellect by itself is only in a passive potency but is actuated through the species of the object as its first act. And so the intellect acts through the species

⁷³ The Antonine author, *Quaestiones de anima*, III.4.26: „[D]ico quod species cognita adhuc non supplet vicem obiecti quod sit obiectum cognitum, sed quia loco obiecti est partiale agens, vel movens, cum ipso intellectu ad intellectionem obiecti, tamquam similitudo obiecti ductiva in ipsum absque hoc quod intelligitur.“

⁷⁴ Ibid., III.4.27: „Ad secundum dico quod ad abstractivam sufficit quod fiat per medium repraesentativum quod est species, licet non cognoscatur.“

because each acts according to what is in act.⁷⁵ However against this notion is the opinion that the species can do more than the object if it would be present. But even providing the presence of the object, this does not make species the principle of action (*ratio agendi*) in the intellect, nor does it make it the cause of an act of understanding; because the species then would be the total cause and would be a more inferior grade and less of a perfection than the act itself. This is clear with the way one cognizes a stone.⁷⁶

The Antonine author, in his response to these opinions, says that species is related to and concurs with an act of understanding as a partial active cause, with the intellect also having its proper action and activity. This is the stated purpose of the role of species: that it informs the intellect. Hence even if it would be separated from or present to the intellect, it would have the same function. From this it is clear that species are not the principle of action (*ratio agendi*) in the intellect as its necessary formal cause. For the intellect in the heavenly fatherland has the divine essence and has no need to be informed by species. However in this state of existence, species are what informs the intellect, but he does not see how species could be called or would itself be an intellectual power.⁷⁷ What the Antonine author is saying here is simply that the role the intelligible species plays in an act of understanding is as an efficient cause.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Ibid., III.4.30: ðAlii ponunt quod est praecise ratio agendi qua intellectus sicut principio formali activo agit et ellicit actum suum quia intellectus secundum se non est nisi in potentia passiva; actuator autem per speciem obiecti tamquam per actum [L, fol. 106vb] primum et ita agit per eam quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est in actu.ö

⁷⁶ Ibid., III.4.31: ðContra: quia plus potest facere species quam obiectum si esset praesens. Obiectum autem dato quod esset praesens non posset esse ratio agendi intellectui nec causare actum intelligendi, sicut causa totalis quia esset inferioris gradus et perfectionis quam actus ipse, ut patet de lapide; quare, etc.ö

⁷⁷ Ibid., III.4.32: ðDico ergo quod species se habet et concurrit ad actum intelligendi sicut causa partialis activa, habens activitatem et actionem propriam intellectus etiam suam, et accidit speciei quantum ad hoc quod informet. Unde etsi esset separata et praesens intellectui idem faceret. Ex quo patet quod nullo modo est ipsi intellectui ratio agendi tamquam causa formalis per quam necessario intellectus activetur ut possit agere; intellectus enim in patria

This Antonine author thus regards the intelligible species as a representative medium and co-active cause in an act of understanding. This is precisely the view Antonius Andreas holds in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In one place Antonius makes the distinction between habitual and actual knowledge. For our purposes here, Antonius speaks of the habitual mode of knowledge and the object known. I made reference in the last chapter to Antonius's position on the twofold mode of the intellect in its relation to its object, namely the habitual and actual modes. Nevertheless what is important to note here is that it is in the intellect's habitual or first act that intelligible species remain in the intellect as the moving medium (*medians motivum*) in the act of understanding.⁷⁹ Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author would agree that intelligible species serve as the *quo* in an act of understanding, and do this by having a mediatorial role between the phantasm and the agent intellect. Andreas's mention of intelligible species in this manner is not an isolated event. In his examination of the principles of common nature and haecceity in an earlier part of his *Metaphysics* commentary, he discusses the intellect's abstractive cognition of the universal by emphasizing (*immo*) that the common nature serves as the medium between the universal and the particular in the phantasm.⁸⁰ Antonius thus

habet pro se essentiam divinam etiam secundum alios quae nullo modo informat ipsum, ut patet. Accidit ergo speciei quod informat; alias enim non video quin species diceretur et esset potentia intellectiva, quod est falsum

⁷⁸ Cf. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 263.

⁷⁹ Antonius Andreas, *Questiones duodecim libros Metaphysicam*, Bk. 7. q. 16, f. 40rb: ð...Et hoc modo potest esse dupliciter, uno modo habitualiter sive in actu primo, quando scilicet est ibi per speciem manentem in intellectu ut medians motivum ad intellectionem.ö Here I fill in what I purposely left out in my citation of this source in the last chapter. I did this so that Antonius Andreas's position can be viewed more clearly vis-à-vis the position of the Antonine author.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Bk. 1, q. 6, f. 8rb: ð...Sic abstrahit a quaecumque tali conditione, et immo est medium inter universale et particulare...ö

identifies the common nature with intelligible species. What he means by this is simply what Scotus meant: that the common nature is the object within the intelligible species that shines forth in the abstractive work of the agent intellect. In another place Antonius Andreas says that species, such as the species of a human person, is made suitable (*adaequat*) for an act of understanding so that the whole species of the human person could be understood.⁸¹ In another place within this question he states that any intelligible species come from the singular and not from the agent intellect; thus intelligible species as such represent the singular itself.⁸² How can the intelligible species serve as the representative medium that carries the common nature as its object and also represent the singular? The answer to this question goes back to Scotus and the role memory plays in a cognitive act, as we shall see shortly. Nevertheless we can see a few points of contact between Antonius Andreas and one of his fellow Franciscans from the early Scotistic school, Francis Mayronis, who also transmitted Scotus's views, but recast them to fit the current debate. However he did emphasize the need for intelligible species in an act of understanding in abstractive cognition.⁸³

We can also see the similarities between Antonius Andreas and this Antonine author regarding the relationship between intelligible species and predication. Antonius Andreas maintains that names signify things. He discusses how a name signifies things and what role

⁸¹ Ibid., Bk. 7, q. 14, f. 37vb: *õ...Similiter autem est de intellectu cum intelligitur species puta homo ipsa species tota intelligitur et adequat intellectionem...õ*

⁸² Ibid., f. 38ra: *õPreterea, species per se representat illud a quo gignitur. Sed quodlibet species intelligibilis gignitur a singulari; patet quia non ab intellectu agente, quia tunc esset eius species et principium intelligendi ipsum intellectum agentem. Ergo per se representat ipsum singulare...õ*

⁸³ Cf. Francis Mayronis, *In Libros Sententiarum* (Venice, 1520), d. 3, q. 10. See also Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 331. For his position on the presence of intelligible species in an act of intuitive cognition, see Bérubé, *õLa Première Ecole Scotisteõ*, 14.

intelligible species play in the mode of signification. First Antonius makes a distinction between the intelligible species and the *res* cognized. While the *res* is what is primarily known, he states that intelligible species are part of the intellectual act of *reflexio* on the first object of cognition. In this case, only the name that is imposed signifies the thing. Just as the Antonine author, Antonius maintains that intelligible species are not directly involved in signification, and are not what are signified in the name.⁸⁴ He also says that the designation of the thing itself, apart from its existence and non-existence, could designate the intelligible species before the *reflexio* of the intellect though, the Antonine author would say, it would not be immediately recognized by the intellect.⁸⁵ Even in the intellectual operation of composition and division, the object of this operation is only *res*. And the mind composes and divides *res*. However this composition is caused by the intellect and is in the intellect as that which is known in the knower. Thus truth or falsity regards *res* and not species. This does not mean that species do not have a role to play in intellectual activity, but that in this simple act of understanding, Antonius states that this relation is between knower and known, and this pertains to *res* and not species.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ I am using this question as it has been transcribed by Angel d'Ors in an article entitled, *Utrum Nomen Significet Rem Vel Passionem in Anima* (Antonio Andrés Y Juan Duns Escoto), *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, Vol. 62 (1995): 33: *Res* primo intelligitur, species autem per reflexionem; ergo in illo priori potest intellectus ei nomen imponere, quod nomen tantum rem significat; ergo non est necesse omne nomen significare speciem.

⁸⁵ Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum super librum Periermenias*, (Venice, 1508), f. 66ra: *Utrum* [Q]uaeritur, utrum nomen significet rem vel speciem....Est una opinio, quod species intelligibilis immediate significetur per vocem...Secunda opinio est, quod res primo significetur, non tamen secundum quod existit, quia nec sic per se intelligitur, sed secundum quod per se concipitur ab intellectu...Dico, quod res intelligitur primo, species autem per reflexionem...Illud, quod proprie significetur per vocem, est res, non res ut intelligitur, non res ut existens nec ut non existens, sed res absolute, ut abstrahit ab istis est extraneum illi quodlibet illorum...*Utrum*

⁸⁶ *Utrum Nomen Significet Rem Vel Passionem in Anima* (Angel d'Ors), 34: *Ad* secundum de compositione et divisione intellectus, dico quod compositio est istarum rerum, non tamen ut existunt, sed ut intelliguntur; quia illa compositio ab intellectu causatur et est in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente (non autem ut accidens in subiecto);

Regarding the relationship of the universal to an act of understanding, Antonius Andreas states that the universal corresponds as a catalyst to what moves the intellect, and is the cause of the understanding of such intention. Andreas agrees with Boethius that this specifically is the species which is a likeness of the singular.⁸⁷ Through the role intelligible species plays as the catalyst and the medium between the universal and the particular, the intellect produces its universal that is a re-presentation, a double mode of being, in the cognized thing and in the mind.⁸⁸ Antonius discussed the universal as the proper object of first and second intentionality. Antonius says that there are occurrences of causal relations between the universal and the two orders of knowledge. However even though there are causal relations, the universal in the two orders is distinct.⁸⁹ Here he repeats Scotus's teaching that universals are the product of the intellect.⁹⁰ The distinction that obtains between the relationship of the universal in the two orders of intellectual operations has to do with the designation of the word and the object of singularity. He allies truth with the intellectual act of judgment; and what occurs in judgment is

et ita concede de partibus compositionis; quae sunt in intellectu simplici ut cognitum est in cognoscente; et illo modo sunt res in intellectu, non species solae.ö

⁸⁷ Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum Artem Veterem Aristotelis*, (Venice, 1508) q. 1, f. 3vb: ö...[U]niversali autem correspondet aliquid a qua movetur intellectus ad causandum tale intentionem. Unde secundum Boethium species est tenuis similitudo singularis...ö

⁸⁸ Cf. Jorge Ayala, *Pensadores Aragoneses*, 168.

⁸⁹ Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum in artem veterem Aristotelis*, (Venice, 1508), f. 6ra: öEsse in rebus primae intentionis id exercet, quod praedicari signat in secundis intentionibus; differentia autem est inter actum signatum et exercitum in multis...ö

⁹⁰ Ibid., f. 4vb: öIntellectus est, qui facit universalitatem in rebus...[U]niversale autem denominat rem, non intellectum, ergo est in re subiective, in intellectu autem ut in efficiente...ö

the conformity of the intellect with the objective existence of its object; yet the intelligible species as such belongs to the formal moments of the phantasm-image.⁹¹

In this study we find many similarities between Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author regarding the doctrine of intelligible species. One area of similarity is that both agree that intelligible species are the cognitive devices or the *quo* which enable an act of understanding in the intellect. Another point of agreement is that intelligible species serves as the medium between the universal and the particular object in the phantasm. They both also maintain that intelligible species are not the primary object in an act of understanding. The way both Andreas and the Antonine author demonstrate this is by resorting to semantics. The Antonine author demonstrated through predication to prove that species are not the primary object of intuitive cognition. Antonius Andreas showed through predication that a name signifies a thing and not its species. Hence both maintain that intelligible species are co-principles of an act of understanding; the species' representative function serves as the medium between the universal and the particular as a co-cause in an act of understanding. The crucial point is that, regarding the doctrine of intelligible species, the Antonine author's teaching is consistent with the teaching of Antonius Andreas.

One last issue to be examined is the stance of Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author on intuitive cognition vis-à-vis Scotus's theory of intelligible species in memory. We observed that both Antonius and the Antonine author made a distinction between intellectual and sense intuitive cognition. However both authors see no need for intelligible species in an intuitive

⁹¹ Cf. Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum super librum Periermenias*, Bk. 1, f. 68vb. Cf. also Carl Prantl, *Geschichte Der Logik Im Abendlande*, Vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1867), 279 - 280.

cognitive act. Yet both authors posed a conundrum on how intelligible species could serve as the medium and *quo* of understanding and yet represent the singular in the phantasm. The answer perhaps to this conundrum rests on Scotus's teaching on the role of intelligible species in intellectual memory. Scotus says that in the intellectual part there is memory and the act of remembering properly speaking. The intellect not only cognizes the universal that is the object of abstractive cognition and is the type of cognition that Aristotle calls scientific, but also cognizes intuitively those things the sense cognizes. This is based on the principle that a cognitive power that is more perfect and superior cognizes what is had in an inferior power. That the intellect also cognizes sensations is proved by this, that the intellect cognizes contingently true propositions, and from these propositions that it syllogizes. But forming propositions and syllogizing is proper to the intellect. However propositional truth concerns objects intuitively cognized specifically in the existential nature under which they are cognized by sense. Thus it follows that in the intellect there are found all the conditions that pertain to remembering. For the intellect can perceive time and has an act after a lapse of time, and so on. He also adds that to remember any object whose sense memory can be recalled is because that act which is the proximate object can be cognized intuitively when it is remembered later.⁹²

⁹² Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio IV*, d. 45, q. 3, from *ōA Treatise on Memory and Intuition* from Codex A of *Ordinatio IV*, *Distinctio 45*, Question 3, ed. Wolter and McAdams, *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 53 (1993): 205: *ōDico ergo...quod in intellectiva est memoria et actus recordandi proprie dictus. Supposito enim quod intellectus non tantum cognoscat universalia (quod quidem est verum de intellectione abstractiva, de qua loquitur Philosophus, quia sola illa est scientifica), sed etiam intuitive cognoscat illa quae sensus cognoscit (quia perfectior et superior cognoscitiva in eodem cognoscit illud quod inferior), et etiam quod cognoscat sensationes (et utrumque probatur per hoc quod cognoscit propositiones contingenter veras et ex eis syllogizat; formare autem propositiones et syllogizare proprium est intellectui; illarum autem veritas est de obiectis ut intuitive cognitae, sub ratione scilicet existentiae sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu), sequitur quod in intellectu possunt inveniri omnes conditiones prius dictae pertinentes ad recordari. Potest enim percipere tempus, et habere actum post tempus, et sic de caeteris. Et potest breviter recordari*

It would seem that the answer to the conundrum involves intuitive cognition. Thus to cognize the singular in the phantasm is before the abstractive act of the agent intellect, which transfers the species in the phantasm from one order to another. In this mode the intellect would intuitively cognize the singular in its preliminary moments in the phantasm. According to Scotus, such sensible species then become part of the intellect's memory which can be recalled and intuitively cognized again by the intellect. We observed how Peter of Navarre did not find the relation of intelligible species with intuitive cognition repugnant. It is true for him that these two conditions must be present for intuitive cognition: the thing actually existing outside the soul and its presence in its proper actual existence. These are the normal conditions for this cognition to occur. Nevertheless Peter also holds that the object of intuitive cognition can be an object with represented *esse* which is brought about by intelligible species. The Antonine author's attempt to clear up the conundrum by resorting to predication gives us pause to consider how intelligible species that are catalysts for an act of intellectual understanding can also be cognized intuitively as singulars. The Antonine author's point in his lesson on the predication of man as animal was to demonstrate how the intellect knows things but not species, which was the exact point Antonius Andreas made, that we name things and not species. The upshot of this is that the object represented in the intellect through its intelligible species is known through abstractive cognition in its universal existence. How then can the same represented *esse* that is a universal also be cognized in its singular existence?

cuiuscumque obiecti cuius potest memoria sensitiva recordari, quia potest illum actum, qui est proximum obiectum, intuitive cognoscere quando est in ita recordari postquam fuit...ö

I think that the answer to this problem rests in what both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author held regarding intuitive cognition. While Duns Scotus would maintain that such species are associated with being cognized intuitively, both authors would stress that such species in the phantasm are not yet intelligible and as such are still part of sense cognition. Thus while such species can represent the singular in the phantasm, they also become the representative medium, carrying the common nature of the thing as its object, which in turn becomes the quidditative universal cognized by the intellect. In the final analysis this shows how both authors maintained the mind of Duns Scotus in their respective cognitive theories but at the same time fine-tuned his teaching on intuitive cognition of sense to eliminate any hint of intelligible species in such a cognitive act. This, along with their distinction between intellectual and sense intuitive cognition, would be one example of how both Antonius Andreas and the Antonine author maintained Scotistic doctrine while at the same time developed one area of his thought that Scotus himself was deprived of developing by his early premature death.

C. Antonius Andreas and the Antonine Author as *Scotellus*

Antonius Andreas is called *Scotellus*, because of his fidelity to all the doctrines of his teacher, Duns Scotus. Antonius himself attests to this at the end of his treatment on his questions in *De Tribus Principiis Naturae* that he bids the reader to pay close attention to what he is reading. If anything is beneficial from these questions, it comes from the doctrine of Scotus, whose footsteps he followed as far as he could. He attributes to his ignorance anything that might be found in his presentation that is an outright lie, and that is repugnant, or contrary to the teaching of Scotus. But if something is contained therein as contrary, he revokes it as something

he taught out of ignorance; supposing that he was ignorant of the mind of Scotus.⁹³ This testimony reveals a man who viewed himself as a close and ardent disciple of Duns Scotus but yet humble and modest enough to realize and acknowledge that there is a difference between the teaching of his master and his own work. This being said, it did not hinder Antonius Andreas from employing some ingenuity and originality in his presentation of the Scotistic doctrines of the univocity of being and how matter can be considered the principle of individuation. This is especially evident in his questions on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. In this major work Antonius utilized the exposition modeled on the text of St. Thomas, but overwriting that text and infusing the ideas of Scotus taken from various sources.⁹⁴ Scotus's own questions on the *Metaphysics* covered only the first nine books. Antonius Andreas used the material he had from Scotus's texts to treat the first nine books of his own production, and then culled material from Scotus's quodlibetal question as well as passages from his *Ordinatio*.⁹⁵ The purpose of his revision work was didactic. Scotus's own texts were too subtle and inadequate for teaching purposes. Also, Scotus's own premature death prevented him from developing or revising places in his writings where he held contradictory positions, especially regarding the univocal concept of being, and the subject matter of metaphysics. All in all Antonius Andreas's approach to using the text of his

⁹³ Antonius Andreas, *Quaestiones de tribus principiis rerum naturalium*, (Padua, 1475), f. 54va: "Attende igitur lector qui legis quod siquid benedictum est in quaestionibus supra dictis ab arte doctrine Scotice processit cuius vestigia quantum potui et quantum ipsum capio sum secutus. Si autem aliquid maledictum vel doctrine dicte contrarium reperias, vel repugnans, mee imperitiae ascribatur. Quod si vero aliquid tale ibi continetur nunc pro tunc revoco tam quam dictum fuerit ignoranter puta quia ignoraveram mentem Scoti." See also Marek Gensler, "Antonius Andreae Scotism's Best Supporting Auctor," *Anuari De La Societat Catalana De Filosofia*, vol. 8 (1996): 62.

⁹⁴ See Giorgio Pini, "Scotistic Aristotelianism: Antonio Andreas's 'Expositio' and 'Quaestiones' on the *Metaphysics*," in *Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale*, Roma, 1993 (Rome, 1995), 379 - 390.

⁹⁵ Cf. Camille Berube, "Antoine André, témoin et interprète de Scot," *Antonianum*, Volume 54 (1979): 395 - 396.

teacher and mentor was varied, on the one hand copying his teacher's questions and on the other hand creating new ones based on other material he had of his master, especially his quodlibet and the *Ordinatio*.⁹⁶

In Antonius Andreas's cognitive theory on intelligible species that was contained in his discussion in the *Metaphysics* commentary and his *Scriptum in Artem Veterem Aristotelis*, he makes manifest a mind that was a kindred spirit with the mind of Scotus. He shows his fidelity to Scotus's noetic by stressing the mediatory role of intelligible species in an act of understanding, a co-active cause with the agent intellect as the catalyst in abstractive cognition. Admittedly there were scant instances of his discussion of intelligible species, but what can be taken from this is that this teaching was for Antonius settled doctrine. The role of intelligible species was strictly reserved for abstractive cognition, in which these species represented the singular object as absent. The one place that Antonius did further develop Scotus's thought was on intuitive cognition, establishing a distinct classification of intuitive sense cognition (as opposed to the intellectual); and since there was direct knowledge of an object as present, there was no need for intelligible species.

The Antonine author of this commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle also followed Antonius Andreas's thinking in his own development of intuitive and abstractive cognition in Book One. There he also associated intuitive cognition with the direct presence of a sensed object. He reflected Antonius Andreas's interest in natural philosophy in his commentary on

⁹⁶ Cf. Marek Gensler, "Antonius Andreae's Opus Magnum: The *Metaphysics* Commentary," 42 - 43; Cf. also Pini, "Scotistic Aristotelianism," 382 - 384.

Book Two, and he also maintained a teaching on the role of intelligible species that is a carbon copy of Antonius Andreas in Book Three. What we observed, and what I attempted to illustrate, was how close this Antonine author was to Antonius Andreas. One could say that this author, besides following in the footsteps of the great Blessed John Duns Scotus, walked also in the very same footprints of Antonius Andreas.

In the final analysis I hope that we witnessed history in medieval philosophy taking place: the development and promotion of the teachings of Blessed John Duns Scotus. What Scotus ultimately had produced was a cognitional theory that was not only subtle, but a theory in which he spared no effort to generously communicate his mind to his students who sat before him listening to his lectures. These students, like Antonius Andreas, among others, internalized his thought so that they made his thought their own. Therefore such devoted learning from the master would enable these students to make further contributions to their master's thought. In this way they would bring to a better precision the Scotism that would be the *raison d'être* of their cognitional theories. Such was the beginning and the progress of the 'early Scotistic school', as Bérubé called it, which had a profound effect on philosophical discussion not only in the fourteenth century, but even into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as others would read Scotus's works and the works of his disciples with great profit.

However the development of Scotism that began and was nurtured in this early school, continued in an environment of vibrant and lively discussion that revealed that, while these disciples attempted to follow in the footsteps of the Blessed John Duns Scotus, it did not mean there would be no differences in outlook in their interpretation of the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor. We can see a prime example of this in sixteenth century Kraków where the Scotists

Michał Tworóg z Biestrzyków and Jan z Stobnicy were pioneers in establishing the Scotist tradition at Jagiellonian University. Michał Tworóg even possessed a copy of Antonius Andreas's *Metaphysics* commentary and agreed with his teaching. However his student Jan z Stobnicy was no admirer of Andreas.⁹⁷ Nevertheless in the manuscript of this current study we not only have a fine reflection of the issues in cognition discussed in the early Scotist school, but we see this Antonine author as one who was faithful in transcribing and explaining the teachings of the Subtle Doctor, and hence one who, along with Antonius Andreas, can also be called a *Scotellus*.

⁹⁷ Cf. Konstanty Michalski, "Michał z Bystrzykowa i Jan ze Stobnicy Jako Przedstawiciele Skotyzmu w Polsce", *Archiwum Komisji do Badania Historji Filozofji w Polsce*, vol. 1 (1915), 63. See also Gensler, "Antonius Andreae Scotism's Best Supporting Auctor": 79.

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