Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis
Hervaeus Natalis’s De secundis intentionibus represents the crystalization of an important philosophical tradition concerning the nature of logic. As the 14th century opened, thinkers focused on the nature of logic vis-à-vis the inherited Aristotelian schema of sciences and ontology. Hervaeus’s treatise considers in detail the metaphysical claims necessary for maintaining that second intentions—i.e. notions such as genus, species, enunciation, syllogism, and others—are relationes rationis that are a kind of “non-being” in comparison with the ten categories. The De secundis intentionibus shows itself to be a generally conservative attempt to explain the nature of logic from a broadly Peripatetic perspective. This dissertation articulates this interpretation of the treatise.The first chapter frames the De secundis intentionibus from the perspective of Aristotle’s remarks in the Metaphysics regarding “being as the true and the false” and Avicenna’s brief remarks regarding second intentions at the beginning of his Liber de prima philosophia. Then, two emblematic 13th century figures are considered, namely Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas.The second chapter focuses on the advances and ambiguities found in the thought of John Duns Scotus, who is presented as an important proximate source for Hervaeus’s treatise. The chapter emphasizes Scotus’s use of the distinction between subjective and objective existence in explaining his views concerning logic and second intentions. This distinction is important for Hervaeus, and its likely Scotistic provenance is not given adequate attention in the scholarly literature. The chapter also discusses the ambiguities found in Scotus’s remarks regarding the relationship between the various acts of intellection and the formation of second intentions. It advocates a broader interpretation of Scotus’s position than is sometimes advanced in the scholarly literature on this topic.The third chapter presents the overall view of Hervaeus’s intentionality doctrine. The doctrine is presented as being part of medieval discussions concerning Aristotle’s “being as the true and the false.” This dissertation challenges the reigning hermeneutic applied to the treatise, a hermeneutic that tends to emphasize questions pertaining to cognition and “realism.” This chapter explains Hervaeus’s position that second intentions are relationes rationis formed by all three acts of the intellect. It focuses on the fact that for Hervaeus “intentionality” indicates a non-real relation from the known thing to the knower. The consequences of this view are discussed at length.The fourth chapter considers the final question of the De secundis intentionibus in detail. It explains Hervaeus’s defense of the possibility of a science of second intentional being. The chapter also discusses Hervaeus’s distinction between second intentions and other kinds of entia rationis, emphasizing how the treatise greatly expands the inherited Peripatetic domain of “being as the true and the false.” The chapter closes by defending the claim that the De secundis intentionibus is primarily a work of metaphysics, not logic or epistemology.By reading the De secundis intentionibus in light of the broader medieval question concerning the nature of logic and the Aristotelian division of “being as the true and the false,” it is clear that Hervaeus’s treatise aims to present the philosophical distinctions necessary for delineating a robust, broadly Peripatetic metaphysics of logic.
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