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Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as Perfective of the Human Person

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By

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Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as Perfective of the Human Person

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Even though a number of major studies have addressed self-love as fundamental to Thomas’s accounts of friendship and human happiness, they do not address how “self,” as both the one who loves and the one who is loved, is perfected through self-love. This dissertation offers insight into this neglected aspect of Thomas’s thought, and shows the importance of his account for resolving contemporary misconceptions about self-love.

Thomas uses various sources in his texts concerning self-love; thus, the dissertation begins by looking in chronological order at the historical and textual sources for his theory of self-love. The reflexive nature of the “self,” which for Thomas is the intellectual soul, allows the intellect and will to interact, through knowledge and love, so that self is enabled to act through itself.

Self-love is the ground of human action, where the conscious choice to love self transforms self-love into self-friendship – a point which Thomas makes through a distinction between love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae). This movement toward self-perfection is hindered by improper self-love (amor sui inordinatus).
The question concerning whether one can naturally love God over self highlights a deeper question of the extent to which one can naturally will the good for oneself. Thomas gives significant consideration to this question in his arguments for a person’s ability to love God more than self in the state of original justice and in the state of nature, assigning a “medicinal” role to charity as perfective of self-love.

In regard to friendship with others, Thomas argues that friendship with oneself is the basis for friendship with others. At the same time, this movement outward ultimately returns to oneself.

The examination of self-friendship leads to a discussion of how, for Thomas, human beings are self-lovers by participation and, in participating the likeness of God’s act of self-love, become *like* God.
This dissertation by Sister Mary Julian Ekman, R.S.M. fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in the School of Philosophy approved by Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D., as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D., and Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., as Readers.

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Gregory T. Doolan, Ph.D., Director

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Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader

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Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., Reader
To my Religious Community,

the Religious Sisters of Mercy of Alma, Michigan
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ABBREVIATIONS

Augustine

De civ. dei De civitate dei
De Trin. De Trinitate
Conf. Confessiones
DDC De doctrina Cristiana

Thomas Aquinas

Comp. theol. Compendium theologiae
De ente De ente et essentia
De malo Quaestiones disputatae de malo
De pot. Quaestiones disputatae De potentia
De prin. nat. De principiis naturae
De spir. creat. Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis
De ver. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
De virt. in comm. De virtutibus in communi
De caritate Quaestiones disputatae De virtutibus De caritate
In De an. Sentencia libri De anima
In De caelo In libros Aristotelis De caelo
In De div. nom. In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio
In De hebd. Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus
In Boet. De Trin. Super Boetium De Trinitate
In Ethic. Sententia Libri Ethicorum
In Hebr. Super Epistolam S. Pauli Apostoli ad Hebraeos
In Lib. de caus. Super Librum de causis expositio
In Met. In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria
In Phys. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis
In Post. an. Expositio Libri Posteriorum
In Sent. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum In
Eph. Super Epistolam ad Ephesios lectura
In Cor. Super Epistolam ad Corinthos lectura
In Rom. Super Epistolam ad Romanos
Lect. super Ioann. Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura
In Gal. Super Epistolam ad Galati lectura
Quaes. Disp. de an. Quaestiones disputatae de anima
Quod. Quaestiones de quolibet
In Iob In Librum Beati Job Expositio
De unit. int. De unitate intellectus
SCG Summa Contra Gentiles
ST Summa theologiae
## EDITIONS

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<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCSL</td>
<td><em>Corpus Christianorum series latina.</em> Turnholt: Brepols, 1953–.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marietti</td>
<td><em>Opera omnia.</em> Turin/Rome: Marietti (various dates).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parma</td>
<td><em>Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Doctoris Angelici, Ordinis Praedicatorum Opera omnia.</em> Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1852–1873.</td>
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Introduction

Throughout the ages, philosophers, theologians, and psychologists¹ have addressed the topic of human self-love, in its healthy and aberrant forms.² It is not a novel topic. Indeed, the role of self-love within any account of human action is so fundamental that it can be easily taken for granted.

This work will address human self-love as a principle of perfection according to Thomas Aquinas. There is no full-length study to date that addresses his theory of proper self-love (amor sui ordinatus) as perfective of the human person. Even though a number of major studies have addressed self-love as fundamental to Thomas’s accounts of friendship and human happiness,³


² How “self” is defined is fundamental in determining the nature of self-love. Plato, for example, regarded the soul as the “most divine” part of a person (Phaedo 80a, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Hackett: Cambridge, 1997), 70. He regarded excessive self-love as a preference of oneself over truth: “It is truer to say that the cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves, a love which blinds us to the faults of the beloved and makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice, because we believe we should honour our own ego rather than the truth.” See Plato, Laws V 731e-732a, trans. Trevor J. Saunders, ed. John M. Cooper (Hackett: Cambridge, 1997), 1414. Much later, there is Pascal who calls the self (“le moi”) “detestable” (“haïssable”)—no doubt out of his Jansenist sympathies. See Pensées 457 (Paris: Laffont, 1960), 215. On the other hand, Søren Kierkegaard argues that a healthy self-love is inseparable from a relationship with God. He asks whether can really “lose” our self, something he argues would be “the greatest hazard of all,” and, furthermore, in what sense should we “lose” it. See Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, translated by H.V. Hong & E.H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 32–33. For the various ways in which the notion of “self” has developed in psychology, see Paul C. Vitz and Susan M. Felch (Eds), The Self: Beyond the Postmodern Crisis (ISI Books: Delaware, 2006). In essay of this volume, David Holley notes: “Therapeutic versions of self-love are best seen as correctives to problems arising from an obsessive moralism or inordinate self-criticism. . . The problem with therapeutic versions of self-love is a tendency to direct love to the wrong self.” David M. Holley, “Finding a Self to Love: An Evaluation of Therapeutic Self-Love,” in The Self: Beyond the Postmodern Crisis, 88; 89. See also, in the same edition, Paul C. Vitz, “The Embodied Self: Evidence from Cognitive Psychology and Neuropsychology,” 113–127.

they do not address how “self,” as both the one who loves and the one who is loved, is perfected through self-love. Moreover, the inter-relationship of self-knowledge and self-love, while admittedly not explicit in Thomas’s writings, does not appear to have received much attention from scholars. Yet, as Robert Johann, S.J. remarks, “If any philosophy can provide the real metaphysical framework in which to insert the growing interest of our age in the role and nature of subjectivity, it would seem to be that of the Angelic Doctor.”

Proper self-love, as understood by Thomas, is a principle of self-perfection in a philosophical account of how man, as imago Dei, becomes more perfect by loving self. Thomas’s account of self-love provides a more complete alternative to certain modern individualistic psychologies that focus exclusively on the emotional aspect of self-love, using terms such as “self-esteem,” “self-worth,” “self-actualization,” and “self-image.” At the same time, Thomas’s account does not neglect the emotional aspect of self-love. This study will highlight the importance of Thomas’s argument that proper self-love perfects the soul by making it more like God, who knows and loves himself by his very essence. In presenting an analysis of Thomas’s theory of self-love as self-perfective, I intend to offer insight into this neglected aspect

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of Thomas’s thought, as well as to show the importance of his account for resolving contemporary misconceptions about self-love.\textsuperscript{5}

There are no \textit{ex professo} treatments of self-love (\textit{amor sui} and \textit{dilectio sui}) as self-perfective in Thomas’s works. Nevertheless, we will look at all references to self-love (\textit{amor sui} and \textit{dilectio sui}) in the Thomistic corpus. Particular attention will be given to passages in \textit{Scriptum super libros Sententiarum} (III, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1; d. 28, q. 1, a. 7, ad 4; d. 29, q. 1, a. 5; and d. 37, q. 1, a. 2), \textit{Sententia libri Ethicorum} (IX, lect. 4, 8, 9), \textit{Summa theologiae} (Ia, q. 60; IaIIae, q. 29, a. 4, q. 77, a. 4, and q. 100, a. 5, ad 1; and IIaIIae, qq. 24–26, and q. 44), and \textit{Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus} (q. 2, aa. 9–12), texts in which Thomas specifically addresses proper self-love.

The dissertation will consist of six chapters. The first chapter will look in chronological order at the historical and textual sources for Thomas’s theory of self-love, considering self-love as presented in Holy Scripture as well as in the works of Aristotle, Augustine, and Pseudo-Dionysius, the texts Thomas most frequently cites on this topic.

The second chapter will address in detail what the “self” is for Thomas, which will first require looking at scholarly discussions as to whether he has a notion of the “self” and self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{6} We will then look at his metaphysical account of person, from which he derives his

\textsuperscript{5} There is an unhealthy misconception of self as something to be effaced. An example of this perspective of self can be seen in a passage from Simone Weil’s \textit{Gravity and Grace}: “Je ne puis pas concevoir la nécessité que Dieu m’aime, alors que je sens si clairement que, même chez les êtres que le hasard met sur ma route et qu’il aime . . . Je ne désire nullement que ce monde créé ne me soit plus sensible, mais que ce ne soit plus à moi qu’il soit sensible . . . Quand je suis quelque part, je souille le silence du ciel et de la terre par ma respiration et le battement de mon coeur.” Simone Weil, \textit{La Pesanteur et la Grace} (Paris: Librairie PLON, 1948), 49–50.

\textsuperscript{6} I do not intend to discuss Thomas’s theory of self-knowledge in detail in this dissertation, but only insofar as it is relevant to my purposes. For Thomas’s theory of self-knowledge see: Richard Lambert, \textit{Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor on the Soul’s Knowledge of Itself} (Indiana: Author House, 2007); Therese
psychological account of “self” as the intellective soul. The reflexive nature of the intellective soul will be explored in light of the way in which intellect and will, through knowledge and love, interact so that self is enabled to act through itself.

The third chapter will focus on self-love as the ground of human action, beginning with some basic distinctions within Thomas’s general theory of love. We will then look at the structure of human love, which comprises natural love (amor naturalis), sensitive love (amor sensitivus), and rational love (amor intellectivus seu rationalis). The conscious choice to love self, which transforms self-love into self-friendship, will be examined in light of Thomas’s distinction between love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae). Lastly, in light of this distinction, we will look at improper self-love (amor sui inordinatus) and how it hinders one’s performance of a properly human (moral) act and thus hinders one’s movement toward self-perfection.

In order to explore the relationship between self-love and love of God, the fourth chapter will begin with a presentation of scholarly debate concerning whether one can naturally love God over self. This debate is relevant to my purposes because it highlights the critical question of the extent to which one can naturally will the good for oneself. Two meanings of nature involved in the debate will be taken into consideration in addressing this question, namely, nature viewed (1) as a principle of movement (natural vs. rational active powers) and (2) as what man can accomplish by his own efforts (nature vs. grace). The positions of Henri de Lubac, Denis

Bradley, Stephen Long, Lawrence Feingold, and Thomas Osborne will be evaluated in light of Thomas’s arguments for man’s ability to love God more than self in the state of original justice and in the state of fallen nature. We will also look at the role Thomas assigns to charity as the “medicine” that transforms and perfects self-love, allowing one to love God more than self, and neighbor as oneself.

Having addressed the natural and supernatural forms of self-love, we come to the fifth chapter which will address the way in which friendship with oneself is the basis for friendship with others, which in turn is perfective of oneself. We will see that Thomas, following Pseudo-Dionysius, argues that friendship binds self to others and that, through extasis, self extends itself out to others. This movement outward occurs in wishing another’s good (benevolentia) and in acting to achieve that good for the sake of the other (beneficentia), but ultimately returns to oneself. We will also address David Gallagher’s point that the “union of wills” in friendship can be a form of self-gift and self-perfection.

Our examination of friendship will bring us to the final chapter which offers a philosophical account of how human beings are self-lovers by participation, whereas God is a self-lover by his very essence. Thomas’s original contribution to participation theory is his clear development of the distinction between real and logical participation which allows him to account for how creatures participate the likeness of God’s act of self-love and by doing so, to become like him.

The six major areas addressed in this work, show the important role of self-love within Thomas’s philosophical account of human perfection in this life. My hope is that this
presentation of Thomas’s theory highlights his significant contribution in providing a more complete alternative to many modern interpretations of self-love.
Chapter One:

An Historical Background to Thomas Aquinas’s Theory of Self-Love

The purpose of this chapter is to trace, in chronological order, the influence of the most significant of Thomas’s predecessors who helped to shape his theory of self-love: Aristotle, St. Paul, Augustine, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Each author makes an important contribution to the development of Thomas’s thought. Aristotle’s insights into human friendship form an integral part of Thomas’s account of human love and his own distinction between the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence, a distinction that lies at the very core of Thomas’s theory of self-love. St. Paul informs much of Thomas’s thought on self-love, as seen in Thomas’s scriptural commentaries on the writings of Paul. Moreover, in the words of Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Sacred Scripture intimately penetrates Thomas’s work,”1 and his theory of self-love is no exception. Augustine is no less influential, but he offers a much more complex account of human self-love that is inseparably bound to his theology. Augustine’s treatment of self-love poses questions concerning the possible forms of self-love, and how these forms operate in nature and in grace. Thomas finds these questions important to address in formulating his own position. Although he does not focus explicitly on human self-love, Pseudo-Dionysius offers a metaphysical account of divine self-love that Thomas incorporates into his own metaphysics of participation to explain how human beings return to God through self-love as self-friendship. The chapter will be divided

into four sections. Following a discussion each author’s position on self-love, their influence on Thomas’s own theory of self-love will be addressed.

1. Aristotle

For Aristotle, self-love is “a feeling implanted by nature” and is not given in vain. Although Aristotle has no precise term for “self,” he does have an implicit notion of self that denotes the whole individual, and he identifies different senses of self-love. His most explicit treatment of self-love (philautia), occurs in the *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.8. In this text, Aristotle states that “a good man must be a friend to himself (philautos),” although some scholars also translate

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3 Joseph Owens argues that, properly speaking, Aristotle has no noun for “self”. Owens states that “the intensive autos occurs at Nicomachean Ethics 8.12.1161b28–29 . . . and at 9.4.1166a31–32, to state that a friend is an allos autos . . . but these instances hardly mark it off as a noun for a philosophically rounded out conception of self.” According to Aristotle, Owens notes, one cannot have direct self-knowledge (knowledge of what one is), although one does have “immediate factual awareness of oneself as a unitary cognitive and moral agent.” For Aristotle, it is the whole individual who thinks and loves, as he states in the *De Anima* I.4.408b11-15: “thinking, loving and hating, are affections not of the mind, but rather of the individual which possesses the mind.” In regard to Aristotle’s statement that the intellect “is man” (Nic. Ethic. X.7.1177b27–1178a7), Owens argues that in identifying man with the intellectual part of the soul, Aristotle “seems to mean that the self as guide is set up in focal reference as the primary instance of self in its proper nature.” See Joseph Owens, “The Self in Aristotle” in *Review of Metaphysics* 41 (1988): 707–8; 715. Anne Marie Dziob also notes that Aristotle’s use of the term “self” (autos) is rare, occurring only in his ethical works, specifically when he treats of friendship. See Anne Marie Dziob, “Aristotelian Friendship: Self-Love and Moral Rivalry” in *Review of Metaphysics* 46 (1993): 782.

philautos as “lover of self.” In *Rhetoric* II.4, Aristotle defines love, sometimes translated as “to be a friend to” (philein), as “to will to someone what one thinks is good.” In order to determine what constitutes love of self according to Aristotle, we must first determine what constitutes “friendship” or philia.

Aristotle presents three kinds of friendship, where the relation between the friends is determined by how the beloved is perceived and loved. The three types of friendship he outlines

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5 *Nic. Ethic.*, IX.8 1169a12 (translation is that of Dr. Kevin White). The translation given by Barnes reads “the good man should be a lover of self” (Barnes, 1847). David Konstan points out that the Greek word philein can mean to love or to be a friend to, further remarking that: “Aristotle employs the term philia to designate the reciprocal affection between friends, but he occasionally uses it in the simple sense of love, irrespective of mutuality. In this, he is in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, which did not employ two distinct terms for what we call “love” and “friendship,” but left the precise sense to be inferred from the context (Latin, which had available amor and amicita, was more precise in this respect).” See David Konstan, “Aristotle on Love and Friendship,” ΣΧΟΛΗ: II.2 (2008): 211. Konstan further notes that for Aristotle, love arises from the perception that a thing or person is loveable, as seen in *Nic. Ethic.*, VIII.2, 1155b18–19: “Not everything is loved [passive form of philein], but just what is philēton, and this is the good or the pleasing or the useful (Konstan’s translation, Ibid., 210). A person has “affection” for inanimate objects, not friendship, since the latter requires reciprocity, as Aristotle states in *Nic Ethic.*, VIII.2 1155b27: “in the case of affection [philēsis] for inanimate things, one does not speak of philia: for there is no reciprocal affection [antiphilēsis] nor wish for their good... But they say that one must wish good things for a friend [philos]for his sake. They call those who wish good things in this way ‘well-disposed’ [eunous], if the same wish does not occur on the other person’s part as well. For they say that goodwill in people who experience it mutually [en antipepontos] is philia (Konstan’s translation Ibid., 210). Konstan notes that Aristotle employs the term eunous, “well-disposed” or “bearing goodwill” to describe the relation toward someone which is friendly but not reciprocated.

6 *Rhetoric* II.4 1380b36–1381a1 (translation is that of Dr. Kevin White). It is worth noting here that in *Nic. Ethic.* VIII.2 1155b27–34, Aristotle further distinguishes between being “well-disposed” [eunous] to another person without reciprocation of that goodwill and having goodwill for another which is reciprocated [en antipepontos], and is called friendship (philia). See Konstan, “Aristotle on Love and Friendship,” 209.

7 *Philia*, or friendship, is a Greek term that “has a very wide extension,” as noted by Michael Pakaluk, *Other Selves*, 28.

8 Aristotle does discuss friendships which are not explicitly dependent on good character. One example is the friendship between brothers which is based in likeness, “for brothers love each other as being born of the same parents... They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though in separate individuals” (*Nic. Ethic.* VIII.12, 1161b30, 33 [Barnes, 1836]). Another example of philia is maternal love, where a mother loves her children despite their non-reciprocity of the mother’s love (*Nic. Ethic.*, VIII.8, 1159a31–32 [Barnes, 1832]). Both kinds of philia, brotherly and maternal, surpass friendships of use and pleasure, yet differ from perfect friendships based on virtue.
are friendships of utility, friendships of pleasure, and friendships between virtuous individuals, or perfect friendships. In each case, as soon as the motive for the friendship ceases to exist, so too does the friendship.⁹

In friendships for the sake of utility, persons do not love each other on account of themselves, “but in virtue of some good which they get from each other.”¹⁰ In this kind of friendship, neither person needs to even like the other.¹¹

Those who love another on account of pleasure, do not love the other for who he is, but rather in order to fulfill a desire for pleasure. Such individuals, says Aristotle:

are fond of witty people not for being of a certain sort [ou gar tōi poious tinas einai agapōs], but because they are pleasing to themselves . . . those who love based on pleasure have a liking based on what is pleasant for themselves, and the other person is not loved for what he is [ouch hēı], but insofar as he is . . . pleasant. Hence these friendships are of an incidental kind, since the beloved is not loved as being the very one that he is [ou gar hēı estin hosper estin ho philoumenos, tautēi phileitai], but insofar as he provides . . . pleasure.¹²

Perfect friendship, however:

is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves [kath’ hautous]. Now those who wish for goods to their friends for their friends’ own sakes [ekeiōn heneka] are friends most of all; for they are that way themselves [di’ hautous], not incidentally.¹³


⁹ Nic. Ethic., VIII.3. 1156a23 (Barnes, 1827).

¹⁰ Ibid., 1156a11–12 (Barnes, 1827).

¹¹ Ibid., 1156a28 (Barnes, 1828).

¹² Ibid., 1156a12–19 (translation is John Tutuska’s, “Friendship and Virtue,” 353).

¹³ Ibid., 1156b7–11 (translation is that of Tutuska, 353).
Perfect friendships directly relate to the person of the friend, not simply to what belongs to him. As one author notes:

friends love di’haitous, or on account of which they themselves are and for what they are, kath’haitous, or in themselves. Aristotle also speaks of this at times as loving the other individual “for his own sake.” This idea of friends loving di’ haitous is opposed by Aristotle to the incidental or kata sumbebekos relation. Friendships of use and pleasure are not related to the self of a friend because they are incidental and thus incomplete friendships.14

The virtuous character of a friend constitutes his lovability and, it seems, is the most essential part of him. We read in Nicomachean Ethics IX.3:

If one accepts another man as good, and he becomes bad and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good.15

For Aristotle, once a friend has lost his virtue he also seems to have lost his reason to be loved.16 As will be seen, this is also the case for love of self.

In chapter eight of this same Book, Aristotle looks at various opinions regarding the meaning of “self-lover” and isolates a blameworthy and a praiseworthy sense of self-love according to whether one primarily focusses on fulfilling the desires of one’s lower or higher faculties. As a term of reproach, “self-lover” denotes someone who hoards external goods for himself, such as wealth, honour, and bodily pleasures. Those who regard these goods as the


16 Tutuska adds, however, that “Aristotle does not limit the connection between virtue and genuine friendship to the side of a friend who loves. In fact, what seems even more important to him is something on the side of a friend who is loved. To stress the need for virtue on the part of a friend who loves can create the false impression that virtue is something like a mere condition of possibility for complete friendship, whereas in fact it is the ratio of it. In Aristotle’s presentation of complete philia . . . virtue forms the heart of friendship rather than some necessary condition for it (NE VII.3.1156b7–8, VIII.4 1157b3). The connection that Aristotle wishes to make between true friendship and virtue, then, is not primarily that only virtuous individuals can love others for what they are, but that only virtuous individuals can be loved for what they are.” Tutuska, ‘Friendship and Virtue,” 355.
highest turn them into sources of competition and are subsequently called the “grasping types,” ruled by the irrational part of their soul. Most human beings are like this, says Aristotle, and thus deserve to be called self-lovers in this sense.\textsuperscript{17} The exception is the wicked person who, having nothing lovable in himself, has no love for himself. Aristotle writes:

\begin{quote}
such men do not rejoice or grieve with themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad men are laden with regrets.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Such an individual is not a friend to himself because there is nothing in him to love. The person, however, who desires the noblest goods for himself prefers to gratify his intellect and is thus called a lover of self in the praiseworthy sense.\textsuperscript{19} Being first his “own best friend” such a man is able to be a friend for others.\textsuperscript{20} Such a man regards the attainment of virtue as his highest good:

\begin{quote}
a man is said to have or not have self-control according as his intellect has or has not the control, on the assumption that this is the man himself; and the things men have done from reason are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Nic. Ethic.}, IX.8.1169b2–3 (Barnes, 1848).

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., IX.4.1166b17–24 (Barnes, 1844). Emphasis in text.

\textsuperscript{19} Julia Annas interprets Aristotle to be saying that praiseworthy self-lovers should pursue spiritual goods for themselves as much as they can, since, as spiritual, these goods cannot be sources of competition with others. See Julia Annas “Self-Love in Aristotle” in \textit{The Southern Journal of Philosophy} 27 (1988): 1–18.

\textsuperscript{20} In a discussion about whether one should love oneself or another more, Aristotle says: “For men say that one ought to love one’s best friend, and a man’s best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are to be found most of all in a man’s attitude toward himself, and so are all the other attributes by which a friend is defined; for, as we have said, it is from this relation that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to others . . . he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best.” \textit{Nic. Ethic.} IX.8.1168b2–4 (Barnes, 1846–7). As Julia Annas states: “what matters is liking X for X’s sake, and that while we can do this in the case of others we can only be guaranteed to do it in our own case.” Annas, “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship,” 544.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Nic. Ethic.}, IX.8.1168b34–1169a3 (Barnes, 1847).
The good man should be a lover of self, for in obeying his intellect and acting for the sake of his friends and his country, he profits himself and others.\(^{22}\) Thus, Aristotelian proper self-love takes on an important social dimension. The highest activity of human beings cannot be achieved in isolation. Self-perfection requires self-knowledge, which in turn requires friendship. The friend is “another self” (\textit{allos autos})\(^{23}\) and thus reflects the individual back to himself:

If, then, when one looked upon a friend one could see the nature and attributes of the friend . . . such as to be a second self, at least if you make a very great friend . . . now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves . . . as when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having some one else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) Thomas agrees with Aristotle that the small-souled individual is more blameworthy than the vainglorious one, but for a different reason. Thomas argues that the small-souled individual possesses a certain laziness, a lethargy of the will, in engaging what is proper to his dignity. Furthermore, the ignorance of one’s self-worth, which is the lot of the small-souled individual, damages one’s goodness in two ways: first, virtuous works and the pursuit of speculative truths are abandoned, both being actions needed by man to grow in virtue—failure to do these works makes one a worse human being and; second, such individuals reject good works that are crucial to do virtuous acts. See \textit{Sententia libri Ethicorum} IV, lectio 11 [Leon. 47]. Unless noted otherwise, all citations of Thomas’s texts are from the Leonine text, \textit{Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia} (Rome, 1882— ). All translations into English are my own, unless indicated otherwise.

\(^{23}\) \textit{Nic. Ethic.}, IX.3.1156a11, b10 (Barnes, 1827); IX.4.1157b3 (Barnes, 1829). Nancy Sherman points out that as well as saying a friend is “another self,” Aristotle notes the friend is “equally ‘a separate self’ (\textit{autos diarietos}) \textit{(Eudemian Ethics} 1245a30, a35; \textit{Nic. Ethic.} 1170b7, \textit{Magna Moralia} 1213a13, a24).” Sherman continues “This entails that such friends promote each other’s good in a privileged way (as only another self can), but in a way that is nonetheless mindful of the mature rational agency of each . . . within this extended and interwoven life, the individuals nonetheless retain their separateness.” To further emphasize the shared aspect of selfhood in friendship, we also note that just as my friend is “another self” to me, so I am “another self” to my friend. See Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life” in \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} 47 (1987): 607.

How exactly is the good man a friend to himself according to Aristotle? His answer points first to the harmony within the soul of a good man who has an ordinate love of every aspect of himself, including his passions which he integrates in such a way that they are harmonious with reason:

Since then the parts of the soul are more than one, then only will the soul be one, when the reason and the passions are in accord with one another (for so it will be one): so that when it has become one there will be friendship towards oneself. And this friendship towards oneself will exist in the good man; for in him alone the parts of the soul are in proper relation to one another owing to their not being at variance, since the bad man is never a friend to himself, for he is always at odds with himself.25

The good man loves himself by wishing to himself what is good; he finds contentment in living with himself.26 He takes pleasure in this harmony because he recognizes why he acts the way he acts27 and looks upon his non-rational desires as something to train rather than eliminate.28

John Lippitt notes: “The mirror can be a symbol of narcissism as much as of self-revelation.” While Aristotle does not seem to address this problem, I will argue in a later chapter that Thomas does.

25 *Mag. Mor.*, II. 11. 1211a33–39 (Barnes, 1917). Aristotle argues that the life of reason constitutes the highest life for human beings, whose most godlike function is contemplation. Aristotle does not ignore the sensitive functions of the human soul but, rather, centres all man’s activities around his rational activities. For more on this point see T. Irwin, *Aristotle’s First Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 364: “In confining the human function to a life of action of the rational part, Aristotle does not exclude all animal or vegetative activities. He assumes only that rational activity is the distinctive and essential feature of the human soul . . . The life of action will include other activities besides the activity of reasoning; but in a human being they are essentially guided by reasoning.”

26 *Nic. Ethic.*, IX.4.1166a15; 1166a24 (Barnes, 1843). In regard to this text, Charles H. Kahn notes that Aristotle’s intention is not to “extend the notion of *philia* to self-love . . . but to render friendship itself intelligible by showing that if we take self-love as primary and self-explanatory, the structural parallels permit us to see the love of another as rational too. . .” Kahn adds that “to love oneself as *nous* is to love, honour and obey the principle that is the source and the guarantee of one’s own personal happiness or ‘flourishing.’” See Charles H. Kahn “Aristotle and Altruism” in *Mind* 90 (1981): 29–30.

27 *Nic. Ethic.*, II.4.1105a31–32 (Barnes, 1746).

28 See Anne Marie Dziob who points out the following passage in *Magna Moralia* I.6.1186a1–3 (Barnes, 1875): “‘Character’ derives from ‘custom’; for it is called moral excellence because it is the result of accustomed. Whereby it is evident that no one of the excellences of the irrational part springs up in us by nature. For nothing that is by nature becomes other by custom.”
Indeed, for Aristotle part of being fully human includes being brought to perfection “by habits of feeling,” or trained non-rational desires.

Aristotle’s discussion of self-love also appears in *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.3 when he discusses the magnanimous man. The magnanimous man, says Aristotle, correctly loves and esteems himself as worthy of great things because his estimation matches the facts. He is himself the middle between the two extremes of vanity and pusillanimity. The vain man is not worthy of great things but thinks he is, whereas the small-souled man is worthy of great things but thinks he is not so.

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29 Ibid., 1103a26 (Barnes, 1743).

30 The Greek word for such a person, μεγαλοψωφία, has been translated as “great-souled man”, “high-minded man”, or “magnanimous man.” See Dirk D. Held, “Μεγαλοψωφία in Nicomachean Ethics iv” in *Ancient Philosophy* 13 (1993): 95–108. Held comments that although “magnanimity” may appear to the modern reader to be a form of egoism, there are two features that differentiate the modern understanding of virtue from the Greek: “first, the fact that the modern locus of virtue has shifted away from the arena of public life, where virtue is a manifestly social phenomenon, to the ‘inner’ commitments of an autonomous will; and, second, that the ancient world’s honor-shame ethos has been largely replaced for us by an ethos of individualism and personalized choice . . . in terms of shaping moral identity, the respect and honor that derive from public recognition have been superseded for the private self of modern experience by dignity attained through personal authenticity.” Ibid., 102. Having noted this, however, even this picture of magnanimitas is thin without a referral of oneself to the Absolute. As Johann observes: “so long as a man is not explicitly and in his conscious life equal to his basic orientation, eros will be restricted to egoism. Loving merely himself, deeming that ipseity alone worthy of direct love which subsists within the limits of his proper nature, he reckons himself, practically speaking, as Absolute, center of the universe, and his only insufficiency as that of the nature in which he subsists. Every other being is treated simply as an object, a thing existing solely to satisfy his needs.” Robert O. Johann, S.J., *The Meaning of Love: An Essay towards a Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity* (Maryland: Newman Press, 1959), 66. For a remarkable work on the virtue of magnanimity, see René-Antoine Gauthier, *Magnanimité: L’idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie patienne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951).

but thinks he is worthy of less. Both types of characters incur blame due to an inaccurate estimation of their own worth.\textsuperscript{32}

Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, Aristotle attributes less blame to the vain man than to the small-souled man. The latter, says Aristotle, is worse because he fails even to try to achieve the good of which he is capable:

As for the person who thinks himself worthy of less than he is, he is little-souled, whether he is worthy of great things or moderate ones, or whether, when he actually is worthy of small things, he thinks himself worthy of even smaller ones. The most little-souled would seem to be the one worthy of great things; for what would he do if he were not worthy of so much? The great-souled person, then, is at the extreme in

\textsuperscript{32} There are several references to how the magnanimous man cuts an arrogant figure. Some examples are his indifference to others who do not match up to his standard (\textit{Nic. Ethic.}, IV.3.1123b26 [Barnes, 1773]); his expectation that honours he receives be the greatest, and that they be given to him by the best men (\textit{Nic. Ethic.}, IV.3.1124a10 [Barnes, 1774]) and; his contempt if denied honour, and ruled by one “undeserving” (Aristotle, \textit{Eud. Ethics}, III.5.1232b10, trans. J. Solomon, in \textit{The Complete Works of Aristotle}, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). Furthermore, in the \textit{Eudemian Ethics}, Aristotle lists four types of men: 1) a man “worthy of great goods and [who] think[s] himself worthy of them”; 2) a man worthy of small goods and think[s] himself worthy of them; 3) a man worthy of small goods who thinks himself worthy of great ones and; 4) a man “worthy of great but thinking himself worthy only of small.” See Aristotle, \textit{Eud. Ethics}, III.5.1232b31-36 (Barnes, 1952). David Horner proposes that what is offensive about Aristotle’s magnanimous man is not his awareness of his own worth, since this is necessary for his achievement of great challenges, but rather “the absence of sufficient balancing factors of moderating humility and positive concern for others. It is these factors which most significantly distinguish Aquinas’s account of magnanimity from Aristotle’s.” See David A. Horner “What It Takes To Be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on Magnanimity” in \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 15 (1998): 427. For an argument that compares Aristotle and Aquinas’s account of the virtue of magnanimity in light of the vice of small -souledness see Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, “Aquinas’s Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence: A New Measure of Greatness” in \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 21 (2004): 214–23. Making a distinction between the magnanimity and presumption, Etienne Gilson aptly comments that: “greatness of soul is mighty rare because it supposes a difficult victory—the maintaining of the mean in greatness itself. To presume too much on its strength, to undertake more than one can accomplish is not real greatness of soul but presumption. The presumptuous man is not necessarily one who aims higher than the magnanimous man. He is one who merely aims too high for himself. The excess that vitiates his attitude lies in the disproportion between the end and the means at his disposal to attain it. . . . The disorder most fatal to greatness of soul is the vain longing for great things merely to make oneself great . . . As St. Thomas conceives him, the magnanimous man knows his greatness but knows too that he owes it to God.” See Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas}, trans. L.K. Shook (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 1957), 293. For a concise account of how Thomas reconciles the Aristotelian ideal of magnanimity with the virtue of humility see Tobias Hoffmann, “Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Magnanimity” in \textit{Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500}, ed. István P. Béjczy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008), 126–127.
terms of scale, but in terms of being as one should he is intermediate; for he values himself as his actual worth, whereas the other types are excessive and deficient.\textsuperscript{33} 

The small-souled man is deficient because he shirks away from the greatness he could achieve. This makes him sink lower even in the estimation of others:

The unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he deserves, and seems to have something bad about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such an estimate, however, seems actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds to its worth, and these people stand back even from noble actions and undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less.\textsuperscript{34}

Not only does such a person rob himself of what he deserves, he also robs the community of any potential contributions that would have come from his gifts. Aristotle observes that the vice of small-souledness is more common and more opposed to magnanimity than vanity,\textsuperscript{35} although the small-souled person should not be thought of as wicked but only mistaken.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Nic. Ethic.}, IV.3.1123b10–1123b14 (Barnes, 1773).

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 1125a19–27 (Barnes, 1775).

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 1125a32–33.

\textsuperscript{36} It may come as a surprise that, coming from a Christian perspective, Thomas does not see the need to recast the magnanimous man in a humbler light. Rather, Thomas defines magnanimity as a “stretching forth of the mind to great things” (“magnanimitas ex suo nomine importat quandam extensionem animi ad magna” [emphasis in text]) where the mind sets itself on the performance of a great act. Thomas adds that honour, the matter of magnanimity, “is offered to God and to the best,” therefore adding a distinctly Christian dimension to the great-souled individual. See \textit{ST} IIaIIae, q. 129, a.1, co. (Leon. 10.55). Tobias Hoffmann observes, however, that for Thomas, greatness, not honour, is the goal of magnanimity and thus, “Thomas accounts for the status of magnanimity as a special virtue and for the magnanimous person’s indifference to actually being honored.” He notes further: “Yet the insistence on doing something great when acting virtuously leads Thomas to bend somewhat the nature of Aristotle’s magnanimity. For Aristotle, magnanimity is a mean with regard to the self-perception of worthy people. Thomas’s gloss shifts the attention from self-esteem tout court to the self-recognition of one’s abilities.” Tobias Hoffmann, “Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Magnanimity,” 120–121.
Aristotle’s good self-lover is the virtuous man. He is a practically wise man (phronimos) who, through the intellectual virtue of phronesis, discerns the right means to his end of good moral action:

the function of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral excellence; for excellence makes the aim right, and practical wisdom the things leading to it.\textsuperscript{37}

The wise man, the true lover of self, chooses external goods for the sake of the soul, “and not the soul for the sake of them.”\textsuperscript{38}

The influence of Aristotle on Thomas’s theory of self-love is notable. In his Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics IX.8, Thomas agrees with Aristotle that a good man should love himself “because by doing good he will help himself as well as others.”\textsuperscript{39} Thomas accepts Aristotle’s definition of love as “to will to someone what one thinks is good,” where love has a twofold object: the good that is willed and the person (oneself or another) for whom that good is

\textsuperscript{37} Nic. Ethic., VI, 12, 1144a7–8 (Barnes, 1807): “the function of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral excellence; for excellence makes the aim right, and practical wisdom the things leading to it.”

\textsuperscript{38} Aristotle, Politics VII. 1323b11–17 (Barnes, 2100–1): “No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the natures of which we say that these very states are states; so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions and our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are desirable at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul and not the soul for the sake of them.”

\textsuperscript{39} The Latin translation of Nic. Ethic., IX.8, 1169a11–12 that was available to Thomas, that simply transliterates Aristotle’s term for self-lover, reads: “Quare bonum quidem oportet philautem esse.” (Leon. 47. 530). Thomas paraphrases the text as follows: “oportunum esse quod bonus amet se ipsum, quia bonum agendo et se alios iuvabit.” (Leon. 47.532: 119–121).
willed. Thomas, however, articulates this twofold object of the one act of love as *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscientiae*: the person loved and the goods willed for the beloved, where the person loved can be oneself or another. They are not two kinds of love, but rather two elements within the one act of human love. That is, these two loves are two basic goods: persons, and accidents that perfect persons. Thomas calls the love directed to the person “love of friendship” (*amor amicitiae*), and the love directed to the good desired for that person “love of concupiscence” (*amor concupiscientiae*). 

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Thomas makes a point in *ST IaIIae*, q. 23, a.1 and q. 27, a.2 to distinguish friendship (*amicitia*) from benevolence (*benevolentia*). See Michael Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 149, n. 5.

*ST IaIIae*, q. 26, a.4 co (Leon. 6.190): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric, *amare est velle alicui bonum*. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi, vel aliis; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscientiae: ad illud autem cui aliquid vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.” Thomas articulates this twofold object into *amor concupiscientiae* and *amor amicitiae*. The Latin text available to Thomas reads: “sit amare velle aliquid que putat bona.” Although the term “amare” is ambiguous, it is clear from the context that love of friends, and not romantic love, is intended here. We also note that Thomas is using the term “concupiscence” in a non-perjorative sense.

*In De div. nom.*, c. 4 lect 9 (Parma, 313–4): “Sic igitur bonum dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo quasi aliquid in bonitate subsistens: alio modo quasi bonitas alterius, quo scilicet alcuini bene sit. Sic igitur dupliciter aliquid amat. Uno modo sub ratione subsistentis boni; et hoc vere et proprae amat, cum scilicet volumus bonum esse: et hic amor a multis vocatur amor benevolentiae vel amicitiae. Alio modo per modum bonitatis inhaerentis, secundum quo aliquid dicitur amari, non inquantum volumus quo edonum sit, sed inquantum volumus quo ad alcuini bonum sit, sicut dicimus amare scientiam vel sanitatem. Nec est inconveniens si hoc etiam modo amemus aliqua quae per se subsistunt, non quidem ratione substantiae eorum, sed ratione alcuujus perfectionis quam ex eis consequimur; sicut dicimus amare vinum, non propter substantiam vini, ut bene sit eis, sed ut per vinum bene sit nobis, vel inquantum delectamur ejus sapore, vel inquantum sustentamur ejus humore. Omne autem quod est per accidentes, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Sic igitur hoc ipsum aliquid amamus ut edo alcuini bene sit, includitur in amore illius quod amamus ut edo alcuini. Non est enim alcuini aliquid diligendum per id quod est per accidentes, sed per id quod est per se.”

David Gallagher comments aptly on the importance of this distinction: “[*amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscientiae*] never occur separately, as if a person had to choose between the one sort of love and the other. To say that I love a person but am wholly indifferent as to whether that person has what is good for him is obviously incorrect. So too, to love something that is not a person without reference to persons is also disordered.” Gallagher, “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” 56. See also Guy Mansini “*Duplex amor* and the Structure of Love in
Thomas also expands on Aristotle’s distinction in *Topics* II.3 between love for accidental goods and love for subsisting goods by making a formal distinction between the objects of love of friendship and love of concupiscence. *Amor amicitiae* is directed to persons, whereas *amor concupiscentiae* is directed to accidental goods.\(^{44}\) The love of friendship is the principle of love of concupiscence since it is on account of one’s love of friendship for the beloved that one wishes goods to the beloved with love of concupiscence.\(^{45}\) Only rational beings can be the object

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\(^{44}\) See *In III Sent.*, d. 28, a. 2 co (Moos, 906): “Dicendum quod ad res irrationales non potest esse amicitia eisdem rationibus quibus nec ad accidentia. Quamvis enim esse habeant in quo subsistant et operationes aliquid habeant, non tamen nobiscum in vita communicant humana *neque* quantum ad esse *neque* quantum ad operationes vitae; *et ideo non est ad ea benevolentia*, secundum quam volumus amicum esse et habere bona: quod irrationalibus non volumus, nisi secundum quod ad hominem referentur; *neque concordia*, secundum quod eadem volumus et agimus amicus: quod ad irrationalia esse non potest, cum nobiscum in eisdem operibus non possunt communicare. Et ideo non possunt diligi ex caritate, sicut ad quae caritas terminatur.” Thomas makes implicit reference to Aristotle who, in *Topics* II.3.111a3–4 (Barnes, 184) observes that it is possible for us to desire something only accidentally, such as wine. We read in Aristotle’s text: “For the desire for something may be the desire for it as an end (e.g. the desire for health) or as a means to an end (e.g. the desire for being doctored), or as a thing desired accidentally, as, in the case of wine, the sweet-toothed person desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet. For he desires the sweet for itself, and the wine only accidentally; for if it is dry, he no longer desires it.” As noted by Guy Mansini, Aristotle also uses this example of wine in *Nic. Ethic.*, VIII., 2.1155b28–32 (Barnes, 1826), to argue how we cannot be friends with inanimate objects: “of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word ‘friendship’; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself.’”) See Mansini, “Duplex Amor,” 163, n. 59.

\(^{45}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 26, a.4 co. (Leon. 6.190): “Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amor amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur: quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio: its bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem: quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.”
of dillection, since irrational beings lack control over their acts and, subsequently, over their goods.46

Following Aristotle, Thomas argues that man is primarily his spiritual nature, his soul, and should therefore primarily will spiritual goods for himself:

“love of oneself” (*dilectio sui ipsius*) is understood with respect to those things that pertain to the soul; and therefore “love of one’s body” (*dilectio corporis*) is distinguished from “love of oneself” not as a part is distinguished from a whole, but as a part from another part.47

Thomas also refers to Aristotle’s distinction between love of one’s soul and love of one’s body in the *Summa Theologiae* when he examines true self-love. Thomas draws from Aristotle’s five characteristics of friendship as presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to demonstrate that only virtuous individuals truly know and love themselves. In virtuous friendships, a friend wishes his friend “to be and to live,” desires “good things” for him, does good things to him, takes pleasure in his company, and is of one mind with him “rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things.” The good are said to love themselves in the same way “as to the inward man.”48

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46 *ST IIaIIae*, q. 25, a.3co (Leon. 8.199-200): “Primo ergo modo [*amor amicitiae*] nulla creatura irrationalis potest ex caritate amari . . . Primo quidem, quia amicitia ad eum habetur cui volumus bonum. Non autem proprie possum bonum velle creaturae irrationali: quia non est eius proprie habere bonum, sed solum creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono quod habet per liberum arbitrium.” See Gallagher, “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” 58.

47 *In III Sent.*, d. 28, q.1, a.7, ad 4 (Moos, 916): “dicendum quod ununquisque homo proprie dicitur esse id quod est nobilissimum in eo, ut dicit Philosophus in IX Ethic . . . Unde dilectio sui ipsius intelligitur quantum ad ea animam pertinent; et ideo dilectio corporis dividitur contra dilectionem sui ipsius, non sicut pars contra toturn, sed sicut pars contra partem.”

48 “Mali autem aestimant principic in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporalem, scilicet exteriorem hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt id quod seipsos esse
In the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas devotes nineteen articles to Aristotelian *magnanimitas*, the virtue that Aristotle most closely associates with proper self-love. Thomas states:

There is, however, in everything a natural inclination to accomplish action that is commensurate with its power... just as presumption leads a man to exceed his capability by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimitiy causes a man to fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate to it. Therefore, just as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity.  

Thomas agrees with Aristotle that innaccurate self-knowledge is at the root of improper self-love, as well as a willed refusal to love ordinarily. Thomas attributes the individual’s ignorance as to what he can do to “laziness in considering one’s own ability” or in doing what is in one’s

reputant. Boni autem, vere cognoscentes seipsos, vere seipsos diligunt. Et hoc probat Philosophus, in IX Ethic., per quinque quae sunt amicitiae pròpria. Unusquisque enim amicus primo quidem vult suum amicum esse et vivere; secundo, vult ei bona; tertio, operatur bona ad ipsum; quarto, convivit ei delectabiliter; quinto, concordat cum ipso, quasi in iisdem delectatus et contristatus. Et secundum hoc boni diligunt seipsos quantum ad interiorem hominem: quia etiam volunt ipsum servari in sua integritate; et optant ei bona eius, quae sunt bona spiritualia; et etiam ad assequenda operam impendunt; et delectabiliter ad cor proprium redeunt, quia ibi inveniunt et bonas cogitationes in praesenti, et memoriam bonorum praeteritorum, et speram futurorum bonorum, ex quibus delectatio causatur; similiter etiam non patiuntur in seipsis voluntatis dissensionem, quia tota anima eorum tendit in unum. E contrario autem mali non volunt conservari integritatem interioris hominis; neque appetunt spiritualia eius bona; neque ad hoc operantur; neque delectabile est eis secum convivere redeundo ad cor, quia inveniunt ibi mala et praesentia et praeterita et futura, quae abhorrent; neque etiam siti ipsis concordant, propter conscientiam remordentem . . . Et per eadem probari potest quod mali amant seipsos secundum corruptionem exterioris hominis. Sic autem boni non amant seipsos.” *ST IaIae*, q. 25, a.7 co. (Leon. 8.203).

49 *ST IaIae*, q. 133, a.1 (Leon. 10.86): “Inest autem unicuique rei naturalis inclinatio ad exequendum actionem commensuratam suae potentiae: . . . Sicut autem per praesumptionem aliquis excedit proportionem suae potentiae, dum nititur ad maiora quam possit; ita etiam pussilanimus deficit a proportione suae potentiae, dum recusat in id tendere quod est suae potentiae commensuratum. . . . Et ideo, sicut praesumptio est peccatum, ita est pussilanimus.”

50 *ST IaIae*, q. 133, a.2co (Leon. 10.87): “pusillanimitas potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum seipsam. Et sic manifestum est quod secundum propria rationem opponitur magnanimitati, a qua differt secundum differentiam magnitudinis et parvitatis circa idem: nam sicut magnanimus ex animi magnitudine tendit ad magna, ita pussilanimus ex animi parvitate se retrahit a magnis. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte suae causae: quae ex parte intellectus, est ignorantia propriae conditionis; ex parte appetitus, est timor deficiendi in quae falso aestimat excedere suam facultatem. Terio modo potest considerari quantum ad effectum, qui est retrahere se a magnis quibus est dignus” (my italics).
power. Thomas considers this shrinking away from doing the good one can to be a more serious moral failure than presumption. Small-souledness is therefore a moral failure because it is a failure to live up to one’s potential.

Going beyond Aristotle, but still employing Aristotelian distinctions, Thomas argues that the highest kind of friendship is charity (caritas). Moral action, therefore, becomes subject to the order of charity, an order which “depends on two relations: the closeness of a person to oneself and the nearness of a person to God.” Thomas describes this friendship with God as follows:

it is clear that friendship . . . is the most perfect among things pertaining to love. And for this reason charity, which is a friendship between man and God, by which man loves God and God loves man, brings about an association of man with God.

He also explains how self-love can co-exist with charity:

51 ST IIaIIae, q. 133, a.2, ad 1 (Leon. 10.87): “ratio illa procedit de pusillanimitate ex parte causae quam habet in intellectu. Et tamen non proprie potest dici quod opponatur prudentiae etiam secundum causam suam; quia talis ignorantia non procedit ex insipientia, sed magis ex pigritia considerandi suam facultatem, ut dicitur in IV Eth., vel exequendi quod suae subiacet potestati.”

52 ST IIaIIae, q. 133, a.2, ad 4 (Leon. 10.87): “pusillanimitas est gravius peccatum, secundum propriam speciem, quam praeumption: quia per ipsum recedit homo a bonis, quod est pessimum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.” For a good discussion on this point see David Horner, “What it Takes to Be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on Magnanimity” in Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998): 423.

Yet, in upholding charity as the highest form of friendship, Thomas still emphasizes the importance of natural love: “in amicitia charitatis movetur animus ad amandum Deum ex similitudine gratiae; sed in dilectione naturali ex ipso bono naturae, quod etiam est similitudo summae bonitatis.” In II Sent., d.3, q.4, ad 1 (Mandonnet, 127).

54 Pakaluk, Other Selves, 148.

55 In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.1 co. (Moos, 875): “Sic ergo patet quod amicitia est perfectissimum inter ea quae ad amorem pertinent . . . Unde in genere hujusmodi ponenda est caritas, quae est quaedam amicitia hominis ad Deum per quam homo Deum diliget et Deus hominem; et sic efficitur quaedam associatio hominis ad Deum . . .”
Self-love can relate to charity in three distinct ways. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is distinct from charity, but is not contrary to it, as when a man loves himself on account of his own good, however, not so as to place his end in his own good: even as one may have another special love for one’s neighbor, besides the love of charity, which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is referable to charity.56

Yet, for Thomas, the love of charity does not eradicate natural self-love: one never ceases loving oneself. Natural self-love remains, and co-exists, with charity.

2. Paul

St. Paul (ca. AD 5–67)57 is the scriptural writer whom Thomas cites most frequently in his discussions on self-love.58 Although the terms “self” and “self-love” are not used by Paul, the

56 ST IlIæ, q. 19, a. 6co (Leon. 8.143): “Amor autem sui tripliicit se potest habere ad caritatem. Unde hoc modo timor poenae potest stare cum caritate sicut et amor sui: eiusdem enim rationis est quod homo cupiat bonum suum et quod timeat eo privari. Amor autem sui tripliicit se potest habere ad caritatem. Unum enim modo contrariatur caritati: secundum scilicet quod aliquis in amore proprii boni finem constituit. Alio vero modo in caritate includitur, secundum quod homo se propter Deum, et in Deo diligit. Terio modo a caritate quidem distinguitur, sed caritati non contrariatur: puta cum aliquis diligit quidem seipsum secundum rationem proprii boni, ita tamen quod in hoc proprio bono non constituat finem: sicut etiam et ad proximum potest esse aliqua alia specialis dileictio praeter dilectionem caritatis, quae fundatur in Deo, dum proximus diligitur vel ratione consanguinitatis vel aluciuia alterius conditionis humanae, quae tamen referibilis sit ad caritatem.”


58 In general, Thomas quotes Paul’s epistles more frequently than all the four Gospels together. On this point, and for a discussion on the nature of Thomas’s exegesis on Paul’s writings see Otto Hermann Pesch, “Paul as Professor of Theology: The Image of the Apostle in St. Thomas’s Theology,” The Thomist 38 (1974), 5. Other references to self-love in sacred scripture cited by Thomas are the command to love another as oneself (Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:39); Jesus’ commandment to “love one another as I love you” (Jn 13:34-35); the lover of sin hates his own soul (Psalm 10:6); no one really hates himself (Ephesians 5:29); “he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life” (Jn 12:25). Jesus Himself exhorts us to lay down our lives for our friends (Jn 3:16). These references, however, appear in the context of Thomas’s discussion on love and friendship in general and therefore lie outside the narrower scope of the present section which focusses specifically on love of oneself. Examples of how Thomas uses Paul’s writings in his own theory of self-love is in Summa theologicae IlIæ, q. 25, a. 4 on whether one should love oneself out of charity. As Matthew Levering notes, Thomas consults 1 Corinthians 13:4 in formulating the following objection: If charity is not a form of sinful self-love, which 1 Cor 13:4 argues it is not—then how can one be said to love oneself out of charity (ie: what is the distinction between this self-love and sinful self-love?). Levering states: “Aquinas answers by distinguishing between the love of self that desires the
notion of self-love features prominently in his writings. For Paul, true self-love is the orientation of one’s whole being to God, whereas sinful self-love is to orient oneself towards the world and a life of “fleshliness.” Paul often opposes the life of the “soul” (psychēanima) with that of the “flesh” (sarka/carnis) in speaking about man’s virtuous and sinful desires respectively, characterising sin as a life turned in on itself and the source of alienation from others.

goods of one’s bodily nature and the love of self that desires the goods of one’s rational nature. The former is blameworthy whereas the latter is praiseworthy and belongs to charity.” Thomas also refers twice to 1 Cor. 16:14 in showing that charity is concerned with the ultimate end of union with God.” See Matthew Levering “Aquinas” in The Blackwell Companion to Paul, Ed. Stephen Westerholm (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 364, 366.

I will use the terms “true” and “proper” interchangeably to denote Paul’s notion of ordered self-love, and the terms “improper” or “sinful” to denote his sense of disordered self-love. Troels Engberg-Pedersen states that Paul’s notion of the self and “the initial I-perspective” is not ‘individualistic’ in the modern sense. Rather, “the overarching theory to be found in Paul about how the self should see its relationship with God, Christ, the world and the others is more about a move from an I-perspective to a totally shared one.” He goes on to say that Paul’s idea of conversion as “a change in self-understanding” consists in “a move away from an identification of the self with itself as a bodily, individual being, via an identification with something outside the self, and to a perspective shared with and also directed towards others, a perspective that will then also issue immediately in practice.” Engberg-Pedersen does add, however, that while we should be cautious not to give an individualistic reading of Paul’s references to the ‘self,’ we cannot deny that “Paul is in fact doing philosophy about the self (the ‘I’) and its relation to God, Christ the world, and the others to exactly the same extent as a similar philosophy (of self and others) was being done in antiquity by the philosophers who make up the ancient ethical tradition.” See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 7, 10, 13.

Troels Engberg-Pedersen points out that for Paul “flesh is not coextensive with the body, but covers any feature—bodily or non-bodily—that belongs to the individual (who is also a bodily being) and is singled out as having a normative role to play. Thus, if one took oneself to have some special non-bodily quality which one would consider important—like being blameless with respect to righteousness in accordance with the Jewish law!—that quality too would be part of one’s ‘flesh’ precisely in so far as one would take it to be part of one’s own essence and ascribe value to it.” He goes on to note that although Paul lists distinct bodily vices (“acts of the flesh”) in Gal. 5:19-21, there is another type of vice that is “fleshly” but “which has no special basis in the body: enmities, strife, emulation, fits of anger, selfish intrigues, etc. What characterizes this type is only that it is generally based on selfishness no matter what feature of the self may serve as its basis. Here any individual feature will do—as long as it is taken to be specifically one’s own and to have value.” See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 153.

Paul uses the term psychē 13 times; four of these occurrences are in Romans. See James Dunn, The Theology of St. Paul the Apostle (Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans’ Press, 1998), 76. I deliberately pass over scholarly discussions of Paul’s “soul-spirit-mind” trichotomy since my focus is on how he presents self-love in terms of one’s orientation to or away from God. For a discussion on the significance of Paul’s trichotomy see Alexey R. Fokin, “The Relationship Between Soul and Spirit in Greek and Latin Patristic Thought” in Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 600–9. The term sarka occurs 91 times; 26 of these occurrences are found in Romans. Dunn
A key passage in which Paul contrasts true self-love with sinful self-love is Romans 1:20-29. In this passage, Paul juxtaposes man turned toward the transcendent Other, God, with man turned toward sameness, to himself.\textsuperscript{62} Paul writes:

Ever since the creation of the world his [God’s] invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles.\textsuperscript{63}

Paul begins the passage by stating that God’s invisible nature is clearly seen in creation. He then asks what occurred to darken man’s mind to the obvious presence of the Creator. First, he continues, men turned away from worshipping and thanking God, their minds became “futile” and consequently made them “fools.” Such men exchanged the worship of their Creator for the worship of themselves, with the result that God abandoned them to their disordered desires:

God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonouring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator . . .\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{62} This notion of sinful self-love as one’s orientation towards “self-sameness” is that of Dr. Robert H. Tilley (The Catholic Institute of Sydney).

Paul then shows how sinful human beings, having turned from an other-directed life to a life of sameness, began to indulge in unnatural relations with each other. Although they are relating to others, they are not in true relationship:

For this reason God gave them up to dishonourable passions. Their women exchanged natural relations for unnatural, and men likewise gave up natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one another...\textsuperscript{65}

Man’s choice to be “freed” from God “disqualifies” his mind,\textsuperscript{66} thus morally depraved, and deeming God as “unfit” for worship, such individuals are in turn given up by the Creator to a

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Rns} 1:24–25: “Propter quod tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis eorum, in inmunditiam: ut contumeliously adficient corpora sua in semet ipsis: qui conmutauerunt ureritatem Dei in mendacio, et coluerunt et seruerunt creaturae potius quam Creatori...”

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Rns} 1:26–27: “Proptererea tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae. Nam feminae eorum inmutauerunt naturalum usum in eum usum qui est contra naturam. Similiter autem et masculi, relictio naturali usu feminae, exarserunt in desiderii suis in iniuriam, masculi in masculos turpitudinem operantes, et mercedem quam oportuit erroris sui in semet ipsis recipientes.” Troels Engberg-Pedersen argues that Paul emphasizes the danger of behaviour that is solely “self-directed,” noting that “It is probably because he aims to identify this [self-directed behaviour] that Paul chooses same-sex relations as examples of the kind of immoral behaviour he has in mind... What lies behind and explains both the mistaken relationship with God on the part of the gentiles and their concomitant mistakes in ‘ethical’ practice is a single thing: taking as the basis of one’s normative understanding oneself as a bodily individual... every social vice was seen to be derived from concern of the individual for him- or herself alone to the exclusion of others for whom one might also be concerned. And this kind of self-concern was seen as an extension of concern for one’s own body. Material gains for oneself were gains in what was quite literally bodily goods or at least goods ministering to the body.” He goes on to note that Paul sees this self-directedness as the stumbling-block of the gentiles, which is at base, selfishness (ervative), a failure to ultimately direct oneself to God. Essentially, Paul emphasizes that self-orientated behaviour is anti-social, for even when such individuals are in relationship with others, they are still directed toward themselves. See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, \textit{Paul and the Stoics}, 210-12: 258. See also Daniel Harrington, S.J., and James F. Keenan, S.J., \textit{Paul and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology} (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010); “Paul views the pagans’ failure to recognize and honour God in creation as their primary sin. According to Paul, from this primary sin they fell into idolatry, then into homosexuality, and finally all kinds of evil conduct listed in [Romans] 1:29-31.” Op. cit., 200.

\textsuperscript{66} Thomas notes that man’s subjection of his mind to God through faith is a matter of justice, “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.” \textit{In Gal.}, cap. 31.3 (Marietti, 18): “Et ideo primum in iustitia hominis est, quod mens hominis Deo subdatur, et hoc per fidem.”
base mind that is “unfit” for knowing. Paul intimates that sinful human beings do not see God because their deliberate orientation to sameness, to themselves, obscures their intellectual vision. Paul presents the results of this condition:

All manner of wickedness, evil, covetousness, malice. Full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, malignity, they are gossips, slanderers, haters of God, insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil, disobedient to parents, foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless.

Paul also makes a distinction between the “outer” (foris) and the “inner” (intus) man, referring to man’s outer nature as disposed to corruption and his inner nature as the seat of renewal. Elsewhere he berates the Galatians for turning away from God, calling their behaviour

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67 Rns 1.28. James Dunn notes the interesting wordplay here: “they did not think fit (edokimasan) to keep God in mind [so] God handed them over to a disqualified (adokimon) mind.” Troels Engberg-Pedersen states that according to Paul, “self-directedness will only be completely overcome in a person who has acquired a certain inner state of mind, one that ensures that he actually does what he knows needs doing because he (now) wishes to do it for himself.” Engberg-Pedersen adds that Paul regards the other side of the failure to direct oneself to God as the Jew who has “so much self-directedness that he wishes to use his ‘having’ the law as a springboard for pride in relation to others. He turns outward in misplaced self-assertion. This attitude prevents him from coming to will the law for itself and for himself, that is, from internalizing it.” See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 215.


69 II Cor. 4.16: “foris est noster homo corrupitur; tamen is qui intus est renouatur de die in diem.” Interestingly, Thomas turns to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in commenting on this Pauline text. He states: “Unde, ad intellectum huius verbi, sciemund est quod etiam secundum Philosophum in Ethic. [Lib. IX, lect. 9, n. 1869], et secundum consuetudinem loquendi, unumquodque dicitur esse illud quod est principalius in ipso, puta, quia in civitate principalius est potestas et concilium, dicitur tota civitas facere. Principalius autem in homine potest aliquid iudicari et secundum veritatem et secundum apparentiam. Secundum veritatem quidem principalius in homine est ipsa mens, unde secundum iudicium spiritualium vironi mens dicitur homo interior. Secundum apparentiam vero principalius in homine est corpus extremus cum sensibus suis; unde secundum iudicium illorum, qui tantum corporalia et sensibilia considerant et terrae sapient, quorum Deus venter est, corpus cum sensibus dicitur homo exterior.” See In Cor., IV, lecto v, v. 16, n. 146 (Marietti, 1.471), and “. . . tamen is homo, qui intus est, scilicet mens, seu ratio munita spe futuri praemii et firmata munimine fidei renovatur. Quod sic intelligendum est: Vetustas enim est via ad corruptionem . . . qui intus est homo, scilicet anima, renovatur” (Ibid., n. 147).
“foolish” (stultus) since they exchange the life of the mind, which is made for conformity with Christ, for the life of the flesh.

The love of one’s body (sōma) is a neutral desire in itself although it is prone to excess, yet the love of one’s body as “fleshly” (sax) is for the most part self-destructive and opposes the Spirit of God. A life lived “according to the flesh” is not the life of a Christian, for the flesh (sarx) yields corruption. It is thus not the body (sōma) per se that is responsible for sin; rather,

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70 Gal., 3.3: “Sic stulti estis, ut cum spiritu coeperitis, nunc carne consummamini?”

71 Paul often presents sin as provoking the desires (concupiscientia) of the body and stirring up covetousness. Man’s corrupt self, with its destructive desires, enslaves him to passion, transforming neutral desire (desideria) into “lust.” See Rns 6.12: “non ergo regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore, ut oboediatis concupiscentiis eius”; Rns 7. 7–8: “nam concupiscientiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupiscis. Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscientiam; sine lege enim peccatum mortuum erat.” [my emphasis in text]; Eph. 4.22: “ueterem hominem corruptit secundum desideria erroris” and; Tit. 3.3: “Eramus enim et nos aliquando insipientes, increduli, errantes, serulientes, desideriis et uoluptatibus uaruis, in malitia et inuidia agentes, odibiles, odientes inuicem.” See Dunn, Theology of Paul, 120–1.

72 Rns 8. 4–13: “ut justificatio legis impleteretur in nobis, qui non secundum caruem ambulamus, sed secundum spiritum. Qui enim secundum caruem sunt, quae caruem sunt sapient; qui vero secundum spiritum, quae sunt spiritus sentiunt. Nam prudentia caruem, mors est: prudentia autem spiritus, vita et pax. Quoniam sapientia caruem inimicitia est in Deum, enim Dei non subicitur: nec enim potest. Qui autem in carne sunt, Deo placere non possunt. Uos autem in caruem non estis, sed in spiritu; si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis. Si quis autem Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Si autem Christus in uobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus vero vita propter justificationem. Quod si Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, uiitificabit et mortalia corpora uestra, propter inhabitantem Spiritum eius in uobis. Ergo, fratri, debitores sumus non caruem, ut secundum caruem uiuamus.”

73 Gal., 6.8: “Quae enim seminauerit homo, haec et metet: quoniam qui seminat in carne sua, de carne et metet corruptionem . . .” Dunn presents the following list of what sax can denote: physical weakness and mortality (2 Cor. 4.11); exclusion from God’s Kingdom (1 Cor. 15:50); fleshly weakness (Gal. 4.13–14); inferiority to the life of the Spirit (Gal. 1.16); opposition to a life with Christ (Phil.1.22–23); moral weakness (Rns 8.3); the cause of one’s inability to see God (Rns 7.5, 7.25; 8.3); opposition to the Spirit (Rns 8.6, Gal. 5.16–17; Gal. 5.19–23); the source of corruption and contempt of God (Rns. 8.7, Gal. 5.24, Gal. 6.8). In his Commentary on Galatians 5:16–17, Thomas argues that it is not the flesh lusting per se but, rather, the spirit lusting because of the pull of the flesh “[caro dicitur concupiscere inquantum anima secundum ipsam caruem concupiscit . . . Sic ergo anima per caruem concupiscit, quando ea, quae delectabilia sunt, secundum caruem appetit].” In Gal., v.16, n. 311. See Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 62–72. Matthew Levering also notes Thomas’s reference to Paul’s Letter to the Corinthians in defending the goodness of human bodilyness per se. Levering writes: “Humans experience bodiliness as a negative reality for two reasons, says Aquinas: the bodily suffering or corruption that focuses our attention on
the attitude of “fleshliness” towards one body leaves it open to the seduction of sin.74 Good judgment of the mind is obstructed by fleshliness (sax)75 where the combination of sin, law, and flesh impairs the will to achieve its goal.76 Directing one’s love to the life of the Spirit is the remedy to purifying life enslaved by the desires of the flesh:

our own pain and sorrow and hinders our ability to love God and neighbour; and the concupiscence that threatens to displace charity with the movements of gluttony, greed, and lust. Corruption and concupiscence, however, characterize disordered bodilyness, not bodilyness per se—as we know when our bodies are healthy and our passions are virtuously ordered. While good in itself, the human body needs healing and renewal. Aquinas finds both aspects expressed by Paul in 2 Corinthians 5:4: “not that we would be unclad, but that we would be further clad.” See Levering, “Aquinas,” 366–67.

74 Eph., 5:29: “Nemo enim unquam carmen suam odio habuit, sed nutrit et fouet eam.” In his commentary on this passage, Thomas adds that the flesh per se is not held in contempt, but is an obstacle to the human will. Thus, incidentally (per accidens), the flesh can be detested in a certain way. Man naturally desires his fulfillment and well-being, which cannot be had in a state of fleshliness. Man therefore wills not to discard it as an evil but as a good loved less than the greater good it impedes. See Super Epistolam ad Ephesios lectura V, lectio 9 (Marietti, 2.75).

75 Rns 7.20: “non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum.”

76 Rns 7.23: “uideo autem alien legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati, qua est in membris meis.” In commenting on the theme of Rns 7.7–25 as the “conscious acknowledgment and recognition of human sinfulness”, Troels Engberg-Pedersen notes the “schizophrenic” aspect of weakness of will (akrasia) depicted by Paul in this passage. Engberg-Pedersen’s apt comment is worth quoting in full. Referring to Rns 7.14ff, he states: “His [Paul’s] theme is the recognition of the kind of inner disassociation which occurs in akrasia. The occurrence of this phenomenon shows, so Paul claims (7.14), that the ‘I’ is a fleshly being, sold under sin. Here the ‘I’ stands for the whole human being, which Paul then goes on to divide into different parts. This ‘I-whole’ of the person living under the law is the I with which Paul is basically concerned. And the problem he is analysing is a problem of the I-whole, one that has to do with a conflict within that I. This comes out whenever Paul speaks of the various psychic parts as parts of the I, e.g. ‘sin living in me’ (7.17), and also when he states that ‘I do what I hate’ (7.15). It is . . . this I-whole he is talking about in his concluding exclamation (7.24): ‘Wretched human that I am! Who will save me from this body of death?’ . . . Looking now at these parts, we see that there are two with a different relationship with the I-whole. One, the good one, is itself spoken of as an ‘I’. This ‘I-part’ is the I that wills the good and does not will what the I-whole (from time to time) finds himself doing. The I-part agrees with the law that it is good (7.16) and declares that it is not this I which brings about what it hates (7.17). It finds joy in God’s law and is identical with the ‘inner man’ (7.22) and the ‘mind’ (nous, 7.23, 25) as contrasted with the ‘limbs’ (melê, 7.23) and the ‘flesh’ (sax, 7.25) . . . Basically, what accounts for the sinning on the part of the person living under the law is a perspective, the I-perspective.” Engberg-Pedersen goes on to say that “the I-whole ‘rejoices in God’s law in the ‘inner man’’” the inner man, that is, the I-part, is in itself directed ‘upwards’ towards God’s law (X), and so is the I-whole too. Both the I-part and the I-whole in principle identify themselves with God’s holy, just, and good law (I→X). But nevertheless the non I-part drags the I-whole down to the I-pole. Its uncontrolled and uncontrollable existence as an ineliminable part of the I-whole means that the I→X movement can never be fulfilled. . . . the law does not remove sin, indeed cannot remove it. Quite to the contrary it makes sin stand out. Sin is . . . a ‘part’ of the bodily self taken as a whole and no matter how much the I-whole may, in part, also identify
I tell you, walk by the Spirit and you will not satisfy the desire of the flesh. For the flesh desires against the Spirit, and the Spirit desires against the flesh; for these are opposed to one another, to prevent you from doing those things you want to do.\(^7\)

Thomas, like Paul, will argue that a life of fleshliness and sin is foreign both to man’s natural desire for good as well as to the knowledge which God planted within human nature and furnished with the gifts of grace.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Gal. 5.16-17: “Dico autem: Spiritu ambulate, et desiderium carnis non perficietis. Caro enim concupiscit adversus Spiritum, Spiritus autem adversus carnem: haec enim inuicem adversantur: ut non quaecumque uultis, illa faciatis.” In his Commentary on Galatians, Thomas equates “fleshly” living with living according to oneself. “Fleshy” (carnis), says Thomas, refers to the whole man in his sinful state, so that what follows from sinful self-love (amor sui inordinatus) is called a work of the flesh. A sin is “of the flesh” in two ways, says Thomas: “with respect to fulfillment, and in this sense only those are sins of the flesh that are fulfilled in the pleasure of the flesh, namely, lust and gluttony; or with respect to their root, and in this sense all sins are called sins of the flesh, inasmuch as the soul is so weighed down by the weakness of the flesh (as is written in Wisdom 9:15) that the enfeebled intellect can be easily misled and hindered from operating perfectly. As a consequence, certain vices follow therefrom, namely, heresies, sects and the like. In this way it is said that the “fomes” is the source of all sins.” See Super Epistolam ad Galati lectio 5, n. 320;“Dicendum est, secundum Augustinìnum lib. XIV De Civ. Dei, c.11, quod secundum carinem vivit quicunque vivit secundum seipsum. Unde caro hic accipitur pro toto homine. Quidquid ergo provenit ex inordinato amore sui, dictitur opus carnis. Vel dicendum est, quod aliquod peccatum potest dici carnale dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad consummationem: et sic dicturum carnalia illa tantum quae consummanitur in delectatione carnis, scilicet luxuria et gula; et quantum ad radicem: et sic omnia peccata dicuntur carnalia, inquantum ex corruptione carnis anima aggravatur, ut dictur Sap. IX, 15, ex quo intellectus debilitatus facilius decipi potest, et impedirit a sua perfecta operatione. Unde et ex hoc sequuntur vitia. Et hoc modo dicitur quod fomes est principium omnium peccatorum.” The “fomes,” or “tinder,” of sin are emotional imbalances within human beings; the “fomes” seem not to be sinful in themselves, but provide a challenge to the individual’s task of moral transformation.

\(^8\) As Levering notes, Thomas refers to Paul’s Second Letter to Timothy in presenting an objection to the question: Whether one should love oneself out of charity? since 2 Tim.3:1–2 states “et erunt homines se ipsos amantes, cupidì, elati, superbi . . .” See Levering, “Aquinas,” 370.
Paul emphasizes that human beings were created to live as other-oriented, for God and for their community, where “none of us lives to himself and none of us dies to himself.”\(^79\) Those who cause division and unrest within the Christian community are not serving God but their own appetites instead.\(^80\) Paul calls these people the heretics and schismatics whose minds, dulled by self-serving habits, are set on severing others from “Other-orientedness.” The Christian community, the Church, is the means by which an individual is drawn to others, where any spiritual gift given to one individual is meant for the good of all.\(^81\)

Thus, for Paul true self-love is the orientation of one’s whole being, one’s soul and body, to God, the transcendent Other and source of perfection, whereas improper self-love is the orientation away from “otherness” towards “self-sameness.”\(^82\) Only those who live “according to the Spirit” and open their whole being to renewal in nature and grace within the context of community can achieve self-perfection.

In what way, then, did Paul influence Thomas’s theory of self-love? The most obvious way is Thomas’s use of Paul’s distinction between ordered and sinful self-love based on one’s orientation to God or to “fleshliness.” Following Paul, Thomas refers to man’s “interior” nature (\textit{natura rationis}) as the “inner man” and to his “exterior” nature (\textit{natura sensualis}) as the “outer man,” arguing that love for the goods of the former should outweigh love of goods for the

\(^79\) \textit{Rns} 14:7: “Nemo enim nostrum sibi uiuit, et nemo sibi moritur.”

\(^80\) \textit{Rns} 16:18: “Huiusmodi enim Christo Domino nostro non seruiunt, sed suo uentri.”

\(^81\) \textit{I Cor} 12.7: “Unique autem datur manifestatio Spiritus ad utilitatem.”

\(^82\) I am using the terms “true” and “proper” love interchangeably to refer to the same reality.
latter. The works of virtue are the primary goods of one’s interior nature, and should be chosen for oneself even before bestowing these on others. Thomas reiterates Paul’s theme that only when man’s love is directed toward God will his love toward himself be ordered.

3. Augustine

Love of God and self-love are inextricable for Augustine. In his book on Augustine’s theory of self-love, Oliver O’Donovan states that “Augustine has no place either for a virtue of self-love independent of the love of God or for the love of God without self-love.” Self-love as a virtue is rather clear in Augustine’s account, but what is more ambiguous is his explanation of

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83 *In III Sent.* d. 29, q. 1, a.5co (Moos, 934): “Sed sciemquod quod, cum in homine sit, duplex natura scilicet interior, videlicet rationis quae dictur homo interior; et exterior, scilicet natura sensus quae dictur homo exterior; plus homo debet diligere se quantum ad naturam interiorem quam quantum ad naturam exteriorem. Et ideo ea quae sunt bona naturae interioris, plus debet optare quam ea sunt bona sibi secundum naturam exteriorem.” See also ST IIaHae, q. 25, a. 7 co (Leon. 8.203); “Principale enim in homine est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura sensitiva et corporalis: quorum primum Apostolus nominat interiorem hominem, secundum exteriorem, ut patet II ad Cor. IV.”

84 “Omnia autem opera virtutis sunt sibi bona secundum interiorem naturam, inter quae etiam sunt illa quae quis ad amicum operatur; et ideo plura bona exteriora sunt impendendo amicos quam nobis ipsiss, inquantum consistit in hoc bonum virtutis quod est nostrum maximum bonum; sed de bonis spiritualibus semper plus nobis quam amicos impendere debemus et velle . . .” *In III Sent.* d. 29, q. 1, a.5 co (Moos, 934).

85 This is not to say, however, that Thomas holds disordered self-love to be the sole cause of sin. Rather, “disordered knowledge” is also a consideration in sin. As Michael Sherwin states: “Fragmentary knowledge and disordered love form the co-principles of sinful action. This implies that in order to overcome our sins we need both integral knowledge and ordered affection.” See Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., *By Knowledge & By Love: Charity and Knowledge In the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 106. The interaction of self-knowledge and self-love will be explored in chapter two of this dissertation.

how natural self-love is the tendency of all creatures towards God.\textsuperscript{87} This problem shall become more apparent throughout this section, which will examine major works of Augustine in thematic order.

The closest term for “self” in the Augustinian sense is “soul” \textit{(animus)} or “mind” \textit{(mens)}.\textsuperscript{88} “Self” taken as “mind” \textit{(animus)} denotes the highest “part” of the human soul as rational and spiritual.\textsuperscript{89} Reminiscent of St. Paul, Augustine refers to the \textit{interior homo}, or “inner self,” with true self-awareness being the awareness of one’s mind as “image” of God.\textsuperscript{90} When discussing human love, Augustine employs the terms \textit{amor}, \textit{dilectio}, and \textit{caritas},\textsuperscript{91} but, with the exception

\textsuperscript{87} Michael Sherwin discusses this in context of the problem that arose in the twelfth century when scholars began to question the extent to which charity is man’s desire for God as beatitude: “at stake was the danger of defining charity in terms of self-love, and thus reducing God to a means toward our own fulfillment. Moreover, if charity is desire for God, in what sense can God be said to love us from charity, and how are we able to love our neighbour from charity?” See Sherwin, “Aquinas, Augustine, and the Medieval Scholastic Crisis Concerning Charity” in \textit{Aquinas the Augustinian}, ed., Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 183. Anders Nygren in his work entitled \textit{Eros and Agape}, argues that Augustine’s account of self-love is contradictory because his theory of love is problematic, where love is the desire of a good to be possessed. Nygren sees Augustine’s portrayal of self-love as sinful on the one hand yet natural on the other (as the image of God) as irreconcilable with the result that true self-love and false self-love are egocentric. See Nygren, \textit{Eros and Agape II}, trans. by Phillip S. Watson. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

\textsuperscript{88} Robert Innes, “Integrating the Self through the Desire of God” in \textit{Augustinian Studies} 28 (1997): 67–109; op.cit., 69. For an interesting critique on Augustine’s notion of the self as “inner world” see Phillip Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Cary argues that Augustine made up the notion of inwardness or “private inner space” as a way of conceptualising an “inner self.” Cary states: “this concept did not arise directly out of experience, as if it was the expression of some deeper, inarticulate feeling. Rather, it is the product of highly articulate philosophical inquiry, arising in a quite definite theological context in order to solve quite specific conceptual problems.” Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 3.

\textsuperscript{89} Innes, “Integrating the Self through the Desire of God,” 70.

\textsuperscript{90} Augustine, \textit{Confessions}, X.6.8 (CCSL, Vol. 27. 159): “Quid autem amo, cum te amo? . . . lucem, uocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei.”

\textsuperscript{91} Innes, “Integrating the Self through the Desire of God,” 72.
of *caritas*, Augustine does not use these terms to strictly denote neutral or disordered love.\(^\text{92}\) Moreover, he links love to the will: “A right will is therefore good love and a perverted will is bad love.”\(^\text{93}\)

Augustine’s *De Doctrina Cristiana* raises some interesting questions concerning human self-love. In the first Book of this work, Augustine makes a distinction between things that human beings may enjoy (*fruī*) and those that they may use (*uti*). He states that only “eternal and unchangeable things” are to be enjoyed whereas all other things are to be used. Human beings themselves are included in the latter category, classified by Augustine as special kinds of things having been made in the image and likeness of God.\(^\text{94}\) He asks whether human beings should use

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\(^{92}\) On the flexibility of Augustine’s terminology across his different texts see Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, translated by L.E.M Lynch (New York: Random House, 1988), 311, n. 40. Gilson states: “according to Augustine himself, *amor* is the most suitable term for designating the love of good as well as that of evil. Although the term *dilectio* can be applied to disordered love if things are taken in the strict sense, it designates, rather, a love of the good . . . The same is true of charity.” Gilson argues that for Augustine, there are only two proper meanings of “charity”: “licit love of man for man, love of man for God or of God for man. . . . Augustine has spoken of illicit charities only in exceptional instances.” Ibid. T.J. Bavel argues that there is no significant difference between Augustine’s use of the terms *amor, dilectio*, and *caritas*. He seems to use the terms interchangably. See T.J. Bavel, “Love” in *Augustine Through the Ages*, ed., Allen D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 509: “Augustine does not make an essential difference between the three Latin words *amor, caritas,* and *dilectio*. All three can be good or evil according to the object loved. The opinion of some authors who thought there was a distinction between them, and especially that *dilectio* had a positive meaning and *amor* a negative one, is rejected by Augustine (civ. Dei 14.7).”

\(^{93}\) Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XIV.7.2.

\(^{94}\) Augustine, *De Doctrina Cristiana* I.XX.20, ed. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 29: “In his ititur omnibus rebus illae tantum sunt quibus fruendum est, quas aeternas atque incommutabiles commemoravimus; ceteris autem utendum est ut ad illarum perfusionem pervenire possimus. Nos itaque qui fruimur et utimur aliiis rebus, res aliqua sumus. Magna enim quaedam res est homo, *factus ad imaginem et similiitudinem dei . . .*” Augustine’s conception of man created in the divine image (where the image is in the human soul, or more specifically, the intellect [*mens*]), as well as the re-created image as one of renewal of the lost image is complex. As will become apparent, Augustine is unclear in explaining the actual effect original sin has on the divine image in man. He seems to say that the divine image was lost by Adam with original sin, but what this implies for the human ability to love self and God is not clear. For an insightful discussion of this problem see John O’Sullivan, O.P. *The Image of God: The Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence* (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1963),
or enjoy one another, or both. Since enjoyment of another implies that this other constitutes happiness for us (*constituitur beata vita*), and since no one can do this except God, others are therefore to be used and not enjoyed. Augustine then applies this reasoning to human self-love: no one should love himself on his own account but only on account of God, who is the only one to be enjoyed. To love self to the exclusion of God ultimately means to turn away from God to what is mutable:

But neither should a person enjoy himself, if you think closely about this, because he should not love himself on his own account, but on account of the one who is to be enjoyed. A man is at his best when for his whole life he strives towards the unchangeable form of life and holds fast to it wholeheartedly. If, however, he loves himself on his own account, he does not relate himself to God, but turns to himself and not to something unchangeable. And for this reason he enjoys himself insufficiently, because he is better when he holds fast to and is controlled by the unchangeable good than when his attention leaves it, even if it turns to himself.95

Human self-love is both a natural tendency that man has in common with the animals96 and also a tendency that needs transformation since it can become perverse. How Augustine

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95 *DDC*, I.20.21.41: “Sed nec se ipso quisquam frui debet, si liquide adverter, quia nec se ipsum debet propter se ipsum diligere, sed propter illum quo fruendum est. Tunc est quippe optimus homo, cum tota vita sue pergit in incommutabili vitam et toto affectu inhaeret illi. Si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad deum, sed ad se ipsum reversus non ad incommutabile aliquid convertitur. Et propterea iam cum defectu aliquo se fruitur, quia melior est cum totus haeret atque constringitur incommutabilis bono quam cum inde vel ad se ipsum relaxatur.”

William Mann points out two examples in the *Confessions* where Augustine employs his *utilfrui* distinction: “Pleasure generally accompanies the nourishment necessary to sustain one’s body, but desiring to eat and drink solely for gustatory relish rather than sustenance is sinful (*Confessions* 10.31.44). When it brings us closer to God, we use sacred music properly; when we delight more in the singing than in what is being sung about, we do not (*Confessions* 10.33.49–50).” See William Mann “Inner-Life Ethics” in *The Augustinian Tradition* ed., Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 149. Other examples are in William Mann “The Theft of the Pears,” *Apeiron* 12 (1978): 52–3. All translations of Augustine’s works are my own, unless otherwise stated.

96 *DDC*, I.23.22–26.27. See also: *De Trinitate* X.8.11, XIV.6.9, 10.13, 14.18; and especially *De civ. dei*, XIX.4 (CSSL, Vol. 48.668): “Magna uis est in eis malis, quae cogunt hominem secundum ipsos etiam sapientiem sibimet auferre quod homo est; cum dicant, maximam uocem ut homo concilietur sibi et propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, ita sibi amicus, ut esse se animal et in hac conjunctione corporis atque animae uiuere uelit uhementer atque appetat.”
accounts for self-love as a natural tendency which can at the same time go astray is unclear. In *De Doctrina Cristiana*, for example, he argues that no matter how wayward an individual may be, he still loves his mind and his body. Yet having just said this, he immediately casts what seems to be natural self-love in a negative light:

There are four things that are to be loved—(1) that which is above us; (2) that which we are; (3) that which is close to us; (4) that which is beneath us. No commandments need to be given about the second and the fourth of these. For however much a man may fall from the truth, he still loves himself and loves his own body. The mind (*animus*) which flies away from the unchangeable light, the ruler of all, does so that it may rule over itself and over its own body, and so it cannot but love both itself and its body.97

We love “that which we are” (*quod nos sumus*), that is, one’s whole self, which includes one’s body, and “that which is beneath us” (*quod infra nos est*), that is, external things. Augustine argues that we should use external goods for the sake of the body and use our body for the sake of our soul. Thus, no one should hate his own body, but rather, one’s self-love should prefer the soul if one’s love is to be ordered. The soul, however, is not the ultimate end toward which we order all our desires, and is therefore also to be used and not enjoyed.98 In the passage just presented, a corrupt mind is located as the source of self-love, but elsewhere Augustine refers to this kind of self-love as “hatred” in that it seeks to be served by others and not to serve.99 Properly speaking, then, this love is a form of self-hatred.

97 *DDC*, I.23.22: “Cum ergo quattuor sint diligenda, unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod luxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est, de secundo et quarto nulla praeccepta danda erant. Quantumlibet enim homo excidat a veritate, remanet illi dilectio sui et dilectio corporis sui. Fugax enim animus ab incommutabili lumine omnium regnatorum id agit ut ipse sibi regnet et corpori suo, et ideo non potest nisi et se et corpus suum diligere.”

98 See Gilson, *Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, 167. Gilson also notes: “there being nothing between the soul and God, the man who uses his body in view of his soul should, in turn, use his soul for the sake of enjoying God.” Ibid. For Augustine see n. 87.

99 Ibid., I.23.23.
In another passage of *De Doctrina Cristiana*, Augustine presents the human “spirit” and “flesh” in a war against each other, where the spirit, in love, seeks to discipline the body:

The spirit fights back not out of hatred, but to establish its primacy, because it wants the body it loves to be subservient to something better; nor does the flesh fight back out of hatred, but because of the stranglehold of these habits which, after establishing themselves in the stock of our ancestors, have become naturally ingained. The spirit’s aim in subduing the flesh is to break the perverse contracts (so to speak) of these evil habits and establish the peace brought by good habits.\(^{100}\)

Human beings have to be taught how to love themselves, which includes properly loving their own bodies, if they are to do themselves good.\(^{101}\)

O’Donovan explains that, for Augustine, ordered self-love is love that “regards self as a means to the proper end of love,” whereas disordered self-love “regards self as the end.”\(^{102}\)

One can see how the latter description may suffice for a definition of disordered self-love, but it is not so clear how regarding oneself as a *means* “to the proper end of love” constitutes ordered self-love. In what sense can regarding oneself as *useful* (as implied by “means”) be considered ordered? Moreover, is Augustine arguing that natural self-love in man is neutral but subject to peversion by sin, or is it rather that there are two meanings of self-love, one neutral and the other perverse? It is unclear in this text how Augustine answers these questions. Nevertheless, if we turn to another of his major works, the *Confessions*, which offers an introspective account of self-love, we gain more insight into the problem.

In this work, Augustine holds sin responsible for the fragmentation of man’s relation to

\(^{100}\) *DDC*, I. 24.25.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., I.25.26: “modus ergo diligendi praeципиendus est homini, id est quomodo se diligat ut prosit sibi.”

himself, to others, and to God:

Men either corrupt or pervert their own nature, which you made and ordered . . . or they brazenly delight in the collapse of the restraints of human society, and in private caucuses and splits, indulging their personal likes and dislikes.  

Using the part/whole analogy, Augustine states that through pride a “false unity is loved in the part;” the whole is lost sight of in craving the part. Man becomes less himself when, as part, he moves away from union with God, the whole. Augustine echoes Plotinus who argues that beings are beings in virtue of unity, and “deprived of unity, [they] cease to be what [they] are called.”

Augustine also looks at the three forms of pride as presented in 1 John 2:16: the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. It is the last form of cupiditas that Augustine admits is responsible for his failure to love God and, therefore, himself.

In addressing weakness of will, Augustine draws a detailed sketch of how the mind, memory, and will interact in response to sinful acts. The dwelling of the mind on images stored in the memory can escape the control of the will. Augustine presents a situation in which he recalls in his dreams certain images from his sinful past. He knows that the acts done in his sleep in response to these images are not voluntary, yet begins to question how he can be the same

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103 Conf., III.viii.16 (CCSL, Vol. 27.35–6): “siue corrupiendo ac pervertendo naturam suam, quam tu fecisti et ordinasti . . . aut cum diu ruptis limitibus humanae societatis, laentur, audaces priuatis conciliationibus aut diremptionibus, prout quidque delectauerit aut offenderit.” Phillip Cary notes that, unlike Plotinus, “the inner space of the Augustinian soul is not divine but is beneath God, so that turning into the inside is not all there is to finding God. We must not only turn inward, but also look upward, because God is not only within the soul but also above it. In the interval between the turning in and looking up one finds oneself in a new place, never before conceived: an inner space proper to the soul, different from the intelligible world in the Mind of God.” Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 39.

104 Henry Chadwick, Confessions, 47; Plotinus, Enneads, VI.ix.1.

105 Conf., VIII.x.22 (CCSL, Vol. 27.127): “nec plene uolebam nec plene nolebam. Ideo mecum contendebam . . . nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae.”
“self” when awake and asleep, since his disordered desires “split” the unity of his will. He portrays how weakness of will, when habituated, compels him to sin further:

The consequence of a perverse will is passion (libido). By servitude to passion, habit is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as it were, connected one to another, a harsh bondage held me under restraint.

This state of self-dissatisfaction is precisely what moves him toward God, the source of unity. In the Confessions, true self-love is based in love of God which “is at the same time a call to self-fulfillment.”

In De Civitate Dei XIV.28, Augustine famously states that “two loves made two cities. Self-love (amor sui) to despise God made the earthly city, love of God to despise self the heavenly.” Here, self-love is opposed to well-ordered love, which Augustine equates with love

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106 Conf., X.xxx.41 (CCSL, Vol. 27.176): “lubes certe, ut contineam a concupiscientia carnis et concupiscientia oculorum et ambitione saeculi . . . Sed adhuc iuuent in memoria mea, de qua multa locutus sum, talium rerum imaginum, quas ibi consuetudo mea fixit; et occurruntur mihi vigilanti quidem carentes viribus, in somnis autem non solum usque ad delectationem sed etiam usque ad consensionem factumque simillimum. Et tantum ualet imaginis illius inslusio in anima mea in carne mea, ut dormienti falsa uisa persuadeant quod uigilanti uera non possunt. Numquid tunc ego non sum, domine deus meus? Et tamen tantum interest inter me ipsum et me ipsum intra momentum, quo hinc ad soporem transeo uel huc retranseo!”

107 Ibid., VIII.v [Loeb, 424]: “quippe voluntate perversa facta est libido, et dum servitur libidi ni, facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas. Quibus quasi anulus siblimet innexis—unde catenam appellavi—tenebat me obstrictum dura servitus.”


109 De civ. dei, XIV.28 (CCSL 48. 451): “Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui.”
for God and love for neighbour as oneself.\textsuperscript{110} Pride turns self from the communal good to the personal good in perverse self-love.\textsuperscript{111}

In Book IX of this work, Augustine calls the \textit{mens} the superior part of the soul (\textit{pars superior animi}) and contrasts it sharply against the inferior parts of the soul; by the light of their \textit{mens}, human beings exercise control over the lower parts of the soul.\textsuperscript{112} Augustine also uses \textit{mens} to denote a habitual mindset. For example, despairing of the immoral behaviour of the Romans, he cries out, “O mentes amentes!” on which one author comments aptly:

To be a-\textit{mens} is to have employed one’s capacity for ranking goods in an erroneous way; and in addressing people as “mentes”, he shows that \textit{mens} refers to this habitual mindset. Thus a \textit{mens} that is a-\textit{mens} is a moral character constituted by disordered priorities.\textsuperscript{113}

When man loves himself to the exclusion of God, he cuts himself off from himself. Specifically, a “dis-oriented” will leads the individual to abandon his mind to his passions:

It was in secret that the first human beings began to be evil; and the result was that they slipped into open disobedience. For they would not have arrived at the evil act if an evil will had not preceded it. Now could anything but pride have been the start of the evil will? For ‘pride is the start of every kind of sin’. And what is pride except a longing for a perverse kind of exaltation to abandon the basis on which the mind should be firmly fixed, and to become, as it were, based on oneself, and so remain . . . And so, to abandon God and to

\textsuperscript{110} De civ. dei, XIV.7 (CCSL, Vol. 48, 421): “Nam cuius propositum est amare Deum et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum, sicut etiam se ipsum.”

\textsuperscript{111} John Rist makes a helpful comment here concerning the significance of the private versus the common in Augustine: “Augustine later persists with the distinction between what is properly one’s own (\textit{proprium}) and what is properly common (\textit{commune}) when he comes to talk of the ‘two loves,’ the depraved and the holy; they are ‘private’ and ‘social’ respectively. It is part of the right attitude to God to have a right attitude to what is good, and it is perverse self-love to identify what is common for all with the private and therefore divisive: ad privatam partem.” See John M. Rist, Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 155.

\textsuperscript{112} De civ. dei, IX. 4.

\textsuperscript{113} Sara Byers, “Augustine on the ‘Divided Self’: Platonist or Stoic?” in Augustinian Studies 38:1 (2007): 105–118; op. cit., 113. In De civ. Dei, XIV.2, Augustine notes that ‘flesh’ (‘caro’) in sacred scripture also denotes the faults of the mind, such as jealousy and envy, as well as those of the flesh. The direction of the will determines a person’s morality. See Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 154–5.
exist in oneself, that is to please oneself, is not immediately to lose all being; but it is to come nearer to nothingness.\textsuperscript{114}

Disordered love, manifested most gravely in contempt of God, directly opposes love of God. The willful assertion of oneself over God (\textit{superbia}) is at the heart of disordered self-love and constitutes the source of one’s own interior fragmentation. The will’s order or disorder determines the order or disorder of the emotions.\textsuperscript{115} The proper self-lover knows and loves the good, and this love acts as an efficacious weight for the soul: “for a body is carried by its weight, just as a soul is by love, in the direction in which it is carried.”\textsuperscript{116}

We turn now to the \textit{De Trinitate} in which Augustine centres his discussion of self-love as the love of the human mind, “an activity of man’s self-consciousness belonging with self-understanding and self-awareness.”\textsuperscript{117} To know oneself is to see oneself as the image of God, that is, to perceive memory, intellect, and will as image of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Here, the rational self is “unified through its relation to God.”\textsuperscript{118} The human mind, says Augustine, is made such that it always remembers, understands, and loves itself; \textit{mens}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item De civ. dei, XIV.13 (CCLS, Vol. 48.434–5): “In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inobodientiam laberentur. Non enim ad malum opus perueniretur, nisi praeecessisset uoluntas mala. Porro malae uolontatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia? \textit{Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est.} Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae celsitudinis appetitus? Peruersa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet . . . Relicto itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam hihil esse est, sed nihil propinquare.”

\item De civ. dei, XIV.6 (CCLS, Vol. 48.421) “Interest autem qualis sit uoluntas hominis; quia si peruersa est, peruersos habet hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, uerum etiam laudabiles erunt.”

\item De civ. dei, XI.28. O’Daly explains: “the metaphor is derived from the principle of ancient physics that the weight of bodies determines their appropriate place in the universe”. O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 144 n.16.

\item O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, 48.

\item Innes, “Integrating the Self through the Desire of God,” 67, 70.
\end{enumerate}
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permanently possesses its memory, intelligence and self-love. Augustine’s psychological theory of self-knowledge and self-love as presented in this work is complex as well as primarily theological. The following analysis, therefore, shall be confined to only the major points within his theory of self-love.

In Book XV, Augustine addresses how man’s rational mind is made in the image of God:

we have now arrived at the image of God in man, in that wherein he excels the other animals, that is by reason or understanding, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul (anima) that pertains to what is called the mens or animus. For by this name some writers . . . distinguish that which excels in man, and is not in the beast, from the soul (anima) which is in the beast as well.

Human beings, although unequal to God, approach God by a sort of likeness and withdraw from him by unlikeness. Since the human mind was made to know and love God, an individual’s failure to love God over self has negative psychological consequences:

If the mind’s self-love is less than the being of its object merits, as, for example, if the mind of man were to accord itself that amount of love that is appropriate to the human body when in fact it is worth more than the body, this is a sin, and such love is not perfect. Again, if the mind accords itself love greater than its being merits, let us say to an extent that would be appropriate to God though in fact it is incomparably inferior to God, this too is a gross sin, and this self-love is not perfect. But even greater the perversity and iniquity when the body is accorded that amount of love which is appropriate to God!

\[119\] De Trin., XIV.19: “Non tamen in his tantis infirmitatibus et erroris malis amittere potuit naturalem memoriam, intellectum, et amorem sui.” On the influence of Augustine on Thomas’s doctrine of the Imago Dei see John P. O’Callaghan, “Imago Dei: A Test Case for St. Thomas’s Augustinianism” in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed., Michael Dauphinais, Barry Davis and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 100–44. O’Callaghan highlights Thomas’s distinct formulation that the image of God is “according to the mind” rather than the mind itself as Augustine argues. Thomas expands on Augustine’s insight that the Imago Dei is in man because of man’s rational nature.

\[120\] De Trin., XV.1.1 (CCL, Vol. 50.460): “Volentes in rebus quae factus sunt ad cognoscendum eum a quo factae sunt exercere lectore, iam peruenimus ad eius imaginem quod est homo in eo quo ceteris animalibus antecellit, id est ratione uel intelligentia, et quidquid aliud de anima rationali uel intellectuali dici potest quod pertineat ad eam rem quae mens uocatur uel animus. Quo nomine non-nullu auctores . . . id quod excellit in homine et non est in pecore ab anima quae inest et pecori suo quodam loquendi more distinguunt.”
The deformation of the divine image in man, which occurs through sin, can only be renewed when the individual is in right relationship with God. For Augustine, man’s desire for God, or true self-love, is fulfilled only when it becomes charity (caritas), contemplatio rather than striving, “fixed in a perfectly ordered state of dependence upon God.” Love is the fundamental principle in the process of man’s inner renewal. Augustine writes:

“Though our outer man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day” (2 Cor 4:16). And it is renewed in the knowledge of God, that is, in righteousness and in the holiness of truth, as the testimonies of the apostle cited before say. He, then, who is day by day renewed by making progress in the knowledge of God, and in righteousness and holiness, transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual; and diligently perseveres in checking and lessening his desire for the former, and in binding himself to the latter by charity. But he does this to the degree that he is helped by God.

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121 De Trin., IX.4.4 (CCL, Vol.48.297): “Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se nouit. Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt.] Si enim minus se amat quam est ut urbi gratia tantum se amet hominis mens quantum amandum est corpus hominis, cum plus sit ipsa quam corpus peccat et non perfectus amor eius. Item si amplius se amet quam est uelut si tantum se amet quantum amandum est deus comparabiler minus sit ipsa quam deus, etiam sic nimio peccat et non perfectum habet amorum sui. Maiorem autem peruersitate et iniquitate peccat cum corpus tantum amat quantum amandum est deus.” Lewis Ayres comments on this passage that “Mens, notitia, and amor thus function as analogical site both by drawing us to recognize that this would be an important likeness when perfected, and by stimulating us to reflect on how our knowing now fails to image the divine rest.” Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 287.

122 John E. Sullivan notes, the steady “re-forming of the divine image in man” and “dynamic ‘return’ to its exemplar-principle” comes about through the individual’s “ascent” to God. See John Edward Sullivan, The Image of God: The Doctrine of Augustine and Its Influence (Dubuque, IA: Priory Press, 1963), 58.


124 De Trin., XIV 17.23 (CCL, Vol. 48.454): “De qua re apostolus apertissime locutus est dicens: Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renouatur de die in diem. Renouatur autem in agnitione dei, hoc est in iustitia et sanctitate ueritatis, sicut se habent apostolica testimonia quae paulo ante memorauit. In agnitione igitur dei iustitiaeque et sanctitate ueritatis qui de die in diem proficiendo renouatur transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a visibilibus ad intellegibili, a carnalibus ad spiritualia, atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere illisque se caritate alligare diligenter insistit. Tantum autem facit quantum diuinitus adiuuat.”
Self-love’s conversion begins in the mind’s conversion from attachment to mutable goods “via an intergration with itself”\textsuperscript{125} to contemplation of God. It seems that for Augustine, conversion to God is not rooted in natural love, since this can be perverse, but rather in a willed act of love.

Augustine’s dualistic notion of natural self-love is problematic: he calls human self-love “natural” if the individual loves God, but “self-hatred” if God is not loved. The problem is presented but not answered by Augustine in the following passage:

And the human mind is so constructed that it can never forget itself, never not understand or love itself . . . . with good reason the mind of man may be said to hate itself when it is harmful to itself . . . Therefore he who knows how to love himself, loves God: while he who does not love God, even if he loves himself— which belongs to his nature—may yet and not improperly be said to hate himself, when he does that which is opposed to his own good, and attacks himself as his own enemy.\textsuperscript{126}

To restate the problem: how can self-love, as a neutral tendency, be perverse and also the source of an individual’s love of God? Augustine does not offer a solution to this question. Rather, it remains for Thomas to provide us with the answer to this difficulty.\textsuperscript{127}

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\textsuperscript{125} O’Donovan, \textit{The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine}, 67.
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\textsuperscript{126} \textit{De Trin.}, XIV 14.18 (CCSL, Vol. 48.445–6): “Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut numquam sui non meminerit, numquam se non intelleget, numquam se non diligat . . . non immerito et mens hominis, quando sibi nocet odisse se dicitur. . . . Qui ergo se diligere nouit deum diligat; qui uero non diliget deum etiam si se diligat, quod ei naturaliter inditum est, tamen non inconuenienter odisse se dicitur cum id agit quod sibi aduersatur et se ipsum tamquam suus inimicus insequitur.”
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\textsuperscript{127} O’Donovan criticizes Thomas’s answer to this difficulty, with the latter’s distinction between natural and rational self-love. O’Donovan argues that Thomas’s equation of natural self-love with one’s desire for beatitude is implausible. O’Donovan states: “Nowhere in Augustine’s page do we find the classic ‘psychological egoist’ argument since the very notion of appetition implies the desire to possess, all appetite is self-referential. Plus, perverse self-love is never treated by Augustine simply as a special case of the natural tendency. The wrong choice of the Fall, which could be interpreted from the Thomist point of view as an inherent risk in created nature, is for Augustine an absurdity. Although it is true for him, as well as for St Thomas, that self-love in its corrupt sense belongs to a diminished and ontologically false concept of the self (amor rei privatae), it is not the case that right self-love is simply the same impulse with the misconception corrected. Corrupt self-love is to be classed as either “rational” or “cosmic”; true self-love is a matter of love as benevolence. And, where St Thomas understands the equation of self-love and the love-of-God in terms of the analogy of being, for Augustine it is a datum of revelation.” In the coming chapters, I will argue that Thomas neither presents sinful self-love “as a special case of
Augustine has a considerable influence on Thomas’s theory of self-love. Like Augustine, Thomas links proper self-love with love of God; unlike Augustine, however, Thomas insists that natural self-love can never be perverse but is, in fact, the principle of all forms of human self-love. Moreover, for Thomas, rational love is not reducible to desire, but is the principle of both desire and enjoyment. Concerning the latter point, Thomas argues that all acts come from “deliberated desire” All acts, he says, whether they are sinful or virtuous, come from a decision (electio), which is a “deliberated desire” (appetitus preconsiliati). Deliberation (consilium), he clarifies, “is a kind of enquiry” (est quedam inquisitio) so that in every good and bad act there is “an argument in syllogistic form.” The virtuous person syllogizes one way, the intemperate (self-indulgent) another; and the controlled person (continens) one way, the uncontrolled person (incontinens) another.”

For Thomas, natural self-love is a natural inclination to happiness that is rooted in the will; it is not voluntarily willed, but rather grounds all willed acts. As an unchosen end of fulfilment, natural self-love is prior to any chosen good.

Unlike Augustine, who is imprecise in his use of terms for “love,” Thomas uses the term amor when referring to love in both the sensitive and the rational appetites; however, he only

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the natural tendency” nor presents true self-love as “simply the same impulse with the misconception corrected.” See O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, 147.

128 *De malo*, q. 3, a.9, ad 7 (Leon. 23.87).

129 *ST* IaIae, q. 1, a. 5 co (Leon. 6.13): “sicut in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur.”

130 *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* 22.5, (Leon.22.624). See also *ST* I, q.60, a.2; Ia, q. 82, a.1.
uses the term *dilectio* for rational love, since this love includes choice.\(^{131}\) For Thomas, love as a passion (*amor*) is the source of man’s appetite towards his good or perfection, whereas rational love (*dilectio*) is voluntary and follows upon knowledge of the end. As a passion, love (*amor*) has greater extension than rational love (*dilectio*) since every dilection is love involving a choice (*electio*) but not every love is dilection.\(^{132}\)

Following Augustine, Thomas argues that improper self-love is contempt of God.\(^{133}\) Thomas, however, goes beyond Augustine in specifying how self-love (*amor sui*) is in one way common to all men, but in another way, particular to the good and to the bad in different ways. Self-love is common to all human beings, he says, in that each person loves “what he thinks himself to be.”\(^{134}\) Thomas further explains that what a man “is” can be taken in two senses: as one’s soul and body, in which case he says everyone knows what they are and; what is most important in a man, and in this sense not every person sees themselves to be what they really

\(^{131}\) “sicut appetitus invenitur in parte sensitiva et intellectiva, ita et amor . . . Et ideo, amor in utroque appetitu invenitur. Et secundum quod invenitur in appetitu sensitivo, proprie dicitur amor eo quod passionem importat; secundum autem quod invenitur in intellectiva parte, dicitur *dilectio* quae electionem includit quae ad appetitum intellectivum pertinet.” Moreover, in *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a.2, Thomas distinguishes five kinds of appetite: voluntary only (in God alone); voluntary with the natural (in angels); voluntary with the sensitive and natural (in man); sensitive with the natural (brute animals) and; natural only (in “other things”, presumably non-knowing objects).

\(^{132}\) See *De malo*, q. 3, a.9, ad 7 (Leon. 23.87).

\(^{133}\) “amor sui qui est principium peccati, est ille qui est proprius malorum, perveniens *usque ad contemptum Dei*, ut ibi dicitur; quia mali sic etiam cupiunt exteriorm bona quod spiritualia conemunt” *ST* IIIIae, q. 25, a. 7, ad 1 (Leon. 8.203). The reference is to Augustine’s *De civ. dei*, XIV. 28.

\(^{134}\) “amare seipsum uno modo commune est omnibus; alio modo proprium est honorum; tertio modo proprium est malorum. Quod enim alius amet id quod seipsum esse aestimat, hoc commune est omnibus.” *ST* IIIIae, q. 25, a. 7, co. (Leon. 8.203).
are.  To the extent that the wicked think themselves good they have self-love; but it is only apparent, not true, self-love. Thomas adds that there are some who are so wicked that they don’t have even apparent self-love.  

Thomas departs from Augustine in how he answers the question whether there is any true virtue without charity. Whereas Augustine would answer in the negative, Thomas responds with a qualified affirmative. He makes a distinction between perfect virtue and imperfect virtue, drawing upon principles from Aristotle to do so. Imperfect virtue conforms to the good of

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135 “Homo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam substantiam et naturam. Et secundum hoc omnes aestimant bonum commune se esse id quod sunt, scilicet ex anima et corpore compositos. Et sic etiam omnes homines, boni et mali, diligunt seipsson, inquantum diligunt sui ipsorum conservationem. Alio modo dicitur esse homo aliquid secundum principalitem: sicut princeps civitatis dicitur esse civitas; unde quod principes faciunt, dicitur civitas facere. Sic autem non omnes aestimant se esse id quod sunt.” Ibid.

136 “mali, inquantum aestimant se bonos, sic aliquid participant de amore sui. Nec tamen ista est vera sui dilectio, sed apparens. Quae etiam non est possibilis in his qui valde sunt mali.” Ibid., ad 3 (Leon. 8.204).

137 See ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 7.

138 ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 7 co (Leon. 8.171); “Ultimum quidem et principale bonum hominis est Dei frui et ad hoc ordinatur homo per caritatem. Bonum autem secundarium et quasi particulae hominis potest esse duplex: unum quidem quod est vere bonum, utpote ordinabile, quantum est in se, ad principale bonum, quod est ultimus finis; alius autem est bonum apparens et non verum, quia abducta a finali bono. Sic igitur patet quod virtus vera simpliciter est illa quae ordinat ad principale bonum hominis: sicut etiam Philosophus, in VII Physic., dicit quod virtus est dispositio perfecta ad optimum. Et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine caritate. Sed si accipiat virtus secundum quod est in ordine ad aliquem finem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine caritate, inquantum ordinatur ad alioquod particulae bonum. Sed si illud particulae bonum non sit verum bonum, sed apparens, virtus etiam quae est in ordine ad hoc bonum non erit vera virtus, sed falsa similitudo virtutis . . . Si vero il lud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid huismodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine caritate esse non potest.” For a comparison of Aquinas’s theory of virtue with that of Aristotle and Augustine, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). On Aquinas and virtue in general see Ralph McInerny Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 184ff. There is considerable scholarly debate concerning how Thomas regards the link between perfect and imperfect virtues. For a general presentation of Thomas’s texts on this topic see Fridolino M. Utz, De connectione virtutum moralium inter se secundum doctrinam St. Thomae Aquinatis (Oldenberg: Albertus Magnus, 1937), 97-126. For different views of his account see Angela McKay, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue," The Thomist 69 (2005): 535–55; Thomas M. Osbourne, Jr., “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” The Thomist (71) 2007: 39–64.
reason but is not done out of charity. Such virtue lacks perfection because it is only by charity that we are in union with God; charity, says Thomas, “extends to all the activities of human life by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.” Thomas’s theory of charity as friendship with God also highlights how human beings, had they not sinned, would still naturally seek to return to God: that is, man would still seek his own perfection, desirous to be like what is in the mind of the Creator.

4. Pseudo-Dionysius

Pseudo-Dionysius is the author of several works once thought to be written by St. Paul’s first Athenian convert, Dionysius the Areopagite. Thomas devoted a whole Commentary to the longest of Pseudo-Dionysius’s treatises, The Divine Names. The fourth chapter of this work looks at how the names “Good,” “Love,” “Ecstasy,” “Light,” “Beautiful,” and “Zeal” especially

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139 ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 4, ad 2 (Leon. 8.169): “caritas habet pro obiecto ultimum finem humanae vitae, scilicet beatitudinem aeternam, ideo extendit se ad actus totius humanae vitam per modum imperii, non quasi immediate eliciens omnes actus virtutem.”


apply to God as the origin and end of creation. Pseudo-Dionysius’s account of divine self-love
strongly influences Thomas’s metaphysics of participation which accounts for how man, through
self-friendship in charity, returns to God.142

For Pseudo-Dionysius, God’s self-love is the principle that draws all creation in love to
return to Himself as its end.143 God’s self-love is so intense that he goes out of himself in
creating the universe. Man is to imitate his creator by “stepping out of himself” and thereby
effect his return to God, as one author has described:

With ecstasy, the soul is taken out of itself—just as God leaves himself for love of creation, so man must
mimic God’s mode of creation while he returns to God. Namely, an overwhelming love of God forces the
soul out of itself. . 144

142 For example John Burnaby states: “St. Thomas’s doctrine of love, both natural and supernatural, is
governed by the idea of unity. From Pseudo-Denis he took the maxim that love is a ‘unitive power,’ and reconciled
it with the egoism of the Aristotelian theory that self-love is the ‘form and root of friendship,’ by the argument that
the unity of the individual must be the principle of union—the less complete unity realisable between one individual
and another.” While I disagree that Aristotle’s view of self-love is egoistic (that is, egotistical), Thomas is bridging
the thought of his predecessors. See John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), 269.

143 As Fran O’Rourke states: “In God alone is there fully perfect love; given, as it were, on loan by God and
reflected throughout creation in the love which beings have for each other, it is returned through the native desire
which all things have for total fulfillment.” I read O’Rourke’s reference to “native desire” as the creature’s desire for
beatitude, or self-love. See O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 225.

144 Wear, Dionysius the Areopagite, 128. William Riordan, commenting on Pseudo-Dionysius’s point that
within ecstasy, a person is “necessarily leaving himself behind,” poses that we could also say there is an “en-stasy,”
where the individual enters “more deeply into his truest identity.” William Riordan, Divine Light: The Theology of
Denys the Areopagite (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 33. Eric Perl offers an interesting consideration of
Pseudo-Dionysius’s account of ecstasy in terms of selfhood: “in every being . . . there is an element of ‘interiority,’
of selfhood, an active share in its own being what it is and so in its own being. At the level of rational beings this
interiority takes the form of self-consciousness, of personhood and freedom.” Eric Perl, Theophany: The
Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite (New York: University of New York Press, 2007), 42.
Created being has an erotic desire for God, that is, a “reception of God as its being, as its self, so that it may be.”

Pseudo-Dionysius refers to Paul as an example of being possessed by the love of God and possessing love for God:

This is why the great Paul, swept along by his yearning for God and seized of its ecstatic power, had this inspired word to say: “It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.” Paul was truly a lover and, as he says, he was beside himself for God, possessing not his own life but the life of the One for whom he yearned, as exceptionally beloved.

We note here the influence of Proclus’ doctrine of reversion, where the being of created things is their desire for or reversion to God. In the above example, to possess God is at the same time to abandon oneself to him, to be possessed by him.

All being derives from, exists in, and is returned toward the Beautiful and the Good... All things look to it. All things are moved by it. All things are preserved by it... And so it is that all things must desire, must yearn for, must love, the Beautiful and the Good... the Cause of all things loves all things in the superabundance of his goodness, that because of his goodness he makes all things, brings all things to perfection, holds all things together, returns all things. The divine longing is Good seeking good for the sake of the Good.

145 Perl, Theophany, 47.

146 DN IV, 13, 712A (Luibheid, 82).

147 Commenting on this passage, Eric Perl states: “the ‘agapic’ self-abandonment to God is the ‘erotic’ acquisition of God whereby a being is. He further notes that the usual polarising of “eros” and “agape” is misplaced when applied to Neoplatonism, for the distinction “depends on a dualistic vision of God and the creature as two beings set over against one another, so that there is an opposition between “selfish” desire for the other and “selfless” giving to the other. But where, as in Neoplatonism, the being is nothing but the manifestation or presentation of God, where its very being is nothing other but God-in-it, and God is not a self-contained self or being but the self, the being of all things, there can be no opposition. Rather, the very life of the world consists in the erotic exchange or interchange between beings and God, which is at once and on both sides a giving and a receiving.” Perl, Theophany, 48.

148 DN 4, 10, 705D–708B (Luibheid, 79–80). Pseudo-Dionysius argues that every being comes from the Beautiful and the Good, in the Beautiful and the Good, and is reverted to the Beautiful and Good. Eric Perl argues that for Dionysius, Plotinus, and Proclus, “intellect is not the first principle, but is dependent and produced, while God, the One or Good, is beyond intellect and being.” See Eric Perl, “‘Every Life is a Thought’: The Analogy of Personhood in Neoplatonism,” Philosophy and Theology 18 (2009): 158. Concerning the exitus-reditus movement of creatures in relation to God, William Riordan notes: “The hidden God “exits” out of Himself; He “immanentizes” Himself in His creation. Denys’ term for this is... (proodos), meaning “a going forth, advancing”. In Latin, the
The reversion of created things to their cause is, as one author states, the creature’s “performing the act-of-existing in its proper way . . . the participation of the determined effect in its causal determination, considered as an activity of the participant.”149 For Pseudo-Dionysius, the highest act of goodness is divine self-love. God himself is at one and the same time beloved and lover; moved (i.e. goes out toward all creation) and mover (i.e. brings all things toward himself):

So they call him the beloved and the yearned-for since he is beautiful and good, and, again, they call him yearning and love because he is the power moving and lifting all things up to himself, for in the end what is he if not Beauty and Goodness, the One who of himself reveals himself, the good procession of his own transcendent unity? He is yearning on the move, simple, self-moving, self-acting, preexistent in the Good, flowing out from the Good onto all that is and returning once again to the Good. In this divine yearning shows especially its unbeginning and unending nature travelling in an endless circle through the Good, from the Good, in the Good and to the Good, unerringly turning, ever on the same center, ever in the same direction, always proceeding, always remaining, always restored to itself.150

According to Pseudo-Dionysius, love is the movement of procession and reversion.

Through self-love, God creates and instills a love for himself within creation. Although he is absolutely self-sufficient, in his outpouring of self-love God calls creatures into a communion of

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word is exitus. . . . In a singularly dynamic way, He remains . . . within Himself and He lovingly sustains all creatures in Himself. By the attraction of His goodness, He draws all, in love, back to Himself. The Dionysian term here is . . . (epistrophe), meaning ‘a turning back.’ The Latin equivalent is reditum. This divine respiration, all coming forth from God and returning to Him, takes place within God. While the going forth in no way involves any spatial distancing of the creature from the Creator, the infinite difference between the creatures and Creator persists. The going forth (proodos, exitus) is the creature’s arising into being while remaining (monē) within Him; its return (epistrophe, reditus) is its increasing resemblance to its Creator.” See Riordan, Divine Light, 43–4. Riordan also notes that unlike Plotinus, who sees the cosmos as “issuing out of necessity . . . and indirectly, via a chain of emanations,” Pseudo-Dionysius argues that the creation is brought forth in love, where creatures have a personal relation with the One. Ibid., 89, 107.

149 Perl, Theophany, 40. Perl adds: “Participation . . . is at once a giving, a “going forth” of the cause to the effect and of the effect from the cause (procession), and a receiving, a “turning back” of the effect to the cause (reversion) . . . The reversion of effects to their cause, in turn, forms the basis for Dionysius’ account of the ontological love or desire of all things for God . . . The very existence of all things depends on, or rather consists in, their desire for, or reversion to, God, the Good.” Ibid, 41.

150 DN IV.14, 712C–713A (Luibheid, 82–3).
love with himself. Pseudo-Dionysius describes this causal and generative generosity of God as follows:

That yearning which creates all the goodness of the world preexisted superabundantly within the Good and did not allow it to remain without issue. It stirred him to use the abundance of his powers in the production of the world.151

The love a creature has for God constitutes that creature’s very being, such that no creature can exist without desiring God:

The Good . . . produced everything and it is the ultimately perfect Cause. In it “all things hold together” and are maintained and preserved as if in some almighty receptacle. All things are returned to it as their own goal. All things desire it.152

Thus, within the very being of every creature there is a yearning for God since God causes creatures through love and moves them to return to him:

the very cause of the universe in the beautiful, good, superabundance of his benign yearning for all is also carried outside of himself in the loving care he has for everything . . . That is why those possessed of spiritual insight describe him as “zealous” because his good yearning for all things is so great and because he stirs in men a deep yearning desire for zeal. In this way he proves himself to be zealous because zeal is always felt for what is desired and because he is zealous for the creatures for whom he provides. In short, both the yearning and the object of that yearning belong to the Beautiful and the Good. They preexist in it, and because of it they exist and come to be.153

151 DN 4, 10, 708B (Luibheid, 79–80).

152 DN 4, 4, 700A–B (Luibheid, 75).

153 DN 4, 13, 712A–712B (Luibheid, 82). John Rist argues that Pseudo-Dionysius “is the first person to combine the Neoplatonic ideas about God as Eros with the notion of God’s ‘ecstasy’ . . . Dionysius has in fact adapted Eros to the Christian demand that God love all things, and he is the first person to do so.” Moreover, “to call God an Eros which is a providential outgoing from the self is a new synthesis in Dionysius, for which Origen, Plotinus, and Proclus had paved the way but which none of them had attained.” See John M. Rist, “A Note on Eros and Agape in Pseudo-Dionysius” Vigiliae Christianae 20 (1966): 239, 240. On this passage, Eric Perl remarks: “there is no difference between the causes’s reverting the effect to itself and the effect’s reverting to the cause: both formulations express the same ontological motion of effect to cause. Hence, God’s erotic love for the being, his moving or reverting it to himself, is the being’s reversion to or erotic love for God. This motion, which is the proper activity by which the being is what it is, is God’s ‘providential’ presence in the being as its interiority, its selfhood, its being. For this reason, the being’s active participation in its own being produced does not contribute anything additional to what it receives from God: the being’s reversion to God, which is its constitutive, identifying activity, is God himself present and active in it . . . This is why for Dionysius, there can be no distinction whatever between
Since man is an intellectual creature, he is closer to the Good than are other creatures and thus participates in it in an eminent way, receiving from it more and greater gifts.\textsuperscript{154}

Man’s wrong choices lead him to fall away from God, causing evil, as a deficiency of good, to inhere in his soul as a lack (deprivation) of perfection.\textsuperscript{155} Pseudo-Dionysius explains sin as a deficiency in the intellect and in the will, a “weakness, impotence, a deficiency of knowledge, of ceaseless knowledge, of belief, of desire, and of activity of the Good,”\textsuperscript{156} which directs one away from one’s true pursuit to be taken “out of [oneself] and become wholly of God.”\textsuperscript{157}

Ecstasy moves in the opposite direction to sin, away from self, and imitates divine love that is by nature ecstatic.\textsuperscript{158} In the act of creation, God goes out of himself, providing for all

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\ldots love as acquisitive desire and love as beneficent giving (\textit{DN IV}.11–12, 708C–709D). God’s “agapic” procession to all things is his “erotic” moving all things to himself, and the “agapic” self-abandonment of all things to God is their “erotic” acquisition of him. As Dionysius explains, ‘The divine love is ecstatic . . . not allowing lovers to belong to themselves, but to those beloved’ (\textit{DN IV}.13, 712A). . . . Because there is no real distinction between procession and reversion, there is no distinction between giving to the other and taking the other to oneself.” Procession and reversion are, therefore, “the same metaphysical motion.” Perl, \textit{Theophany}, 46–7, 48.
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{DN} 5, 3, 817B (Luibheid 97–8).

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{DN} 4, 24, 728A (Luibheid, 91–2): “We say that the surrounding air turns dark because of a deficiency, an absence of light. But light itself is always light and illumines the darkness. So too with evil. It is neither in demons nor in us \textit{qua} evil. What it is actually is a deficiency and a lack of perfection of the inherent virtues.” I think that Perl’s comment on the Plotinian theme of self-isolation caused by moral evil (see \textit{Enneads IV}.8.4.10-28), is also applicable to Pseudo-Dionysius’s position: “self-isolation, as a defection from the intellectual possession of and communion with the whole of being, is therefore a lessening of the self.” Perl, \textit{Theophany}, 55.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{DN} 4, 33, 733B (Luibheid, 95).

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{DN} 4, 1, 865D–868A (Luibheid, 106).

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{DN} 4, 13, 712B (Luibheid, 82): “This divine yearning brings ecstasy so that the lover belongs not to self but to the beloved.” O’Rourke notes the following: “God in a sense emerges from his transcendence and enters with his presence into all things . . . Without affecting his transcendence, God’s diffusion guarantees his providential presence in the universe . . . God who has no need for creatures but is in himself fully perfect, goes beyond his self-
existing things though his goodness, love, and affection. God is present in creation through the effects of his goodness.\textsuperscript{159}

Moreover, God’s love is poured out into creatures as “emanations,” where the latter are in God as exemplars or divine ideas:

We give the name of “exemplar” to those principles which preexist as a unity in God and which produce the essences of things. Theology calls them predefining, divine and good acts of will which determine and create things and in accordance with which the Transcendent One pre-defined and brought into being everything that is.”\textsuperscript{160}

According to Pseudo-Dionysius, creatures are likenesses of the divine ideas, where each individual is a likeness to divine goodness. In desiring to be, creatures desire a likeness to God and God Himself. This fundamental desire in creatures to exist is self-love, for in desiring to return to God as final cause, creatures desire their own fulfillment or perfection. God desires


\textsuperscript{160} \textit{DN}, 4, 8, 824C (Luibheid, 102). Jones remarks that when Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the processions of God \textit{into} creatures, he is making reference to the procession of creatures \textit{from} God. Aquinas, he continues, allows for “a procession of God into creatures only in the sense of exemplary causality: the divine essence, which is the likeness of all creatures, is communicated to creatures through a created likeness.” See John Jones, “An Absolutely Simple God?,” 399: for Aquinas, see \textit{In De div. nom.}, II. 3 (Marietti, 157.51): “divina Essentia non communicatur creaturis procedentibus, sed remaneat incommunicata seu imparticipata; sed similitudo eius, per ea quae dat creaturis propagatur et multiplicatur et sic quodammodo Divinitas per sui similitudinem non per essentiam, in creaturis procedit et in eis quodammodo multiplicatur, ut sic ipsa creaturarum processio possit dici divina discretio, si respectus ad divinam similitudinem habeatur, non autem si respiciatur divina Essentia.”
creatures to imitate his goodness according to his similitude, so in loving God, creatures love “that for the sake of which” they exist. Love is precisely the movement that draws creatures back to God, since all things proceed from God into being and are also ordered to God as to their end. In striving to attain goodness or perfection, therefore, man becomes like God: and man, because he can know and love God, has a capacity for beatitude. The Neoplatonic motif of emanation and return within creation (exitus and redivus) clearly informs the metaphysics of Pseudo-Dionysius, where creatures naturally seek God as their origin, through desire. As one author states:

There are within creatures two ‘strains’ or tendencies of being: being from God and being towards God. Placed within existence by God, who establishes them from within as totally distinct from himself, they bear within themselves a profound need of their origin.

For Pseudo-Dionysius, creatures are like God in that they “bear” or “carry in” themselves

161 Thomas states in SCG III, c.24 (Leon. 14.63): “Secundum vero quod tendit ad hoc quod sit bonum, tendit in divinam similitudinem: Deo enim assimilatur aliquid inquantum bonum est. Bonum autem hoc vel illud particulare habet quod sit appetibile inquantum est similitudo primae bonitatis. Propter hoc igitur tendit in proprium bonum, quia tendit in divinam similitudinem, et non e converso. Unde patet quod omnia appetunt divinam similitudinem quasi ultimum finem.” Preference for oneself over God is disordered since it is to prefer the image over the Exemplar.

162 De ver., 20.4. Each being, in diffusing the goodness it possesses causes something similar to itself, which indicates its perfection. As Fran O’Rourke comments: “Each creature intends to acquire its own perfection which is the likeness of divine perfection and goodness.” O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 249, 268. Moreover, Dionysius argues that “the Good, as scripture testifies, produced everything and it is the ultimately perfect Cause . . . All things are returned to it as their own goal. All things desire it: Everything with mind and reason seeks to know it, everything sentient yearns to perceive it, everything lacking perception has a living and instinctive longing for it, and everything lifeless and merely existent turns, it its own fashion, for a share of it.” DN, 4, 4, 700A–B (Luibheid, 75). See In De. div. nom. V, ii, 660: “Ipsum esse creatum est quaedam participatio Dei et similutudo Ipsi.”

163 Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 234. O’Rourke further notes that: “Man has an infinite capacity for truth and goodness; this need for infinity is shown both by the intellect and also by the will. Man has need for total happiness: to know and enjoy infinite goodness itself: it is only in discovering his infinite origin and goal that man ultimately discovers himself . . .” Ibid., 268. For Pseudo-Dionysius see DN IV, ii, 688.
a resemblance of God; as their “transcendent cause” and “destiny,” God is “carried in” His creatures.\textsuperscript{164} In the following passage, Pseudo-Dionysius denies that creatures fully resemble God while affirming that He is “carried in” them:

In reality there is no exact likeness between caused and cause, for the caused carry within themselves only such images of their originating sources as are possible for them, whereas the causes themselves are located in a realm transcending the caused . . . The fire which warms and burns is never said itself to be burnt and warmed.\textsuperscript{165}

Pseudo-Dionysius also argues that in our acts of knowing, sensible and intelligible objects change us, they \textit{in}-form us with their very being. “We come to participate in a real way in their being whose cause is God.”\textsuperscript{166}

The influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Thomas’s general thought is especially evident in the structure of the \textit{Prima pars} and \textit{Secunda Secundae} of the \textit{Summa theologiae}. Here, Thomas presents the virtues, expressed by one author, as “divine perfections that are in some way participable by man (who is in the image of God).”\textsuperscript{167} For Thomas, the meaning of “image” in

\textsuperscript{164} Pseudo-Dionysius is not a pantheist: creatures’ mode of being is not the same as that of God. God is “carried in” His creatures because, he states: “he is all . . . he is rightly nameless and yet has the names of everything that is. Truly he has dominion over all and all things revolve around him, for he is their cause, their source, and their destiny. He is ‘all in all’ as scripture affirms.” \textit{DN} I, 596C (Luibheid, 56). Pseudo-Dionysius here quotes St. Paul in \textit{1 Cor.} 1:28. In another text, he writes: “Every being and all the ages derive their existence from the Preexistent. All eternity and time are from Him. The Preexistent is the source and is the cause of all eternity, of time and of every kind of being. Everything participates in him and none among beings falls away. ‘He is before all things and in him all things hold together.’” \textit{DN} V, 820A (Luibheid, 98–9). See Riordan, \textit{Divine Light}, 37–8, 44.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{DN} II, 645C (Luibheid, 64). As noted by Riordan, in this passage the term used for “likeness” (\textit{emphereia}) derives from the verb \textit{empherō} “to carry in,” which literally means “to bear” or “to carry in.”

\textsuperscript{166} William Riordan, \textit{Divine Light}, 189.

\textsuperscript{167} Riordan, \textit{Divine Light}, 63–4. Riordan adds that in the \textit{Tertia pars} of the \textit{Summa}, we see “the self-communicating of the good God (especially \textit{ST} III, 1, in comparison with the erotic-kenotic descent of God in \textit{DN} 712A–713A) through the Incarnation, in order to redeem men, restoring them to their place in the hierarchy both in this life and more fully in the parousia, when God will be all in all.” Ibid.
human beings involves likeness to another, where “that to the likeness of which anything proceeds is properly speaking called the exemplar.”

The image is in the *mens*, the intellect and will.

Thomas incorporates into his own work the Neoplatonic notions of emanation and Diffusion that he finds in the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. Each created thing desires its own perfection, where the cause of that perfection is a likeness to its origin, since every agent produces an effect similar to itself (*omne agens agit sibi simile*). This desire to be like its cause is itself a likeness to divine goodness (*ipsum esse est similitudo divinae bonitatis*). As we will see in a later chapter, love is the cause of all activity. The love by which God loves his own

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168 *ST* Ia, q. 35, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 4.372): “imago proprie dicitur quod procedit ad similitudinem alterius. Illud autem ad cuius similitudinem aliquid procedit, proprie dicitur *exemplar* . . .”

169 *ST* Ia, q. 93, a.6 (Leon. 5.407): “in homine inventur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem.”

170 *De ver.,* q. 10, a.1 (Leon. 22/2.297:140–141): “mens in anima anima nostra dicit quod est altissimum in virtute ipsius.”

171 This point will be discussed in the final chapter of this work.

172 *ST* Ia, q. 5, a.2, ad 1. See O’Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas*, 89. On Thomas’s frequent use of this axiom see John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas On Our Knowledge of God and the Axiom that Every Agent Produces Something Like Itself,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 74 (2001): 82. Wippel notes how the principle “every effect must be like its cause in some way” follows from the axiom that “every agent produces something like itself”: “If a perfection such as goodness or being may be predicated of creatures and God with any positive content when it is applied to God, this can only be because there is some similarity or likeness between that perfection as it is present in creatures and viewed as an effect and that perfection as realized in God, its uncaused cause. Often enough Thomas establishes this likeness by appealing to the principle that every agent produces something like itself. Because of this, one may reason from the presence of that perfection in a creature to its presence in some way in God, its First Cause.”

173 *De ver.,* 22.2, ad. 2.
goodness, however, is the cause of the creation of things.\textsuperscript{174} As Gilles Emery, O.P., notes, for Thomas, the likeness of human beings to God specifically consists in \textit{knowing} and \textit{loving} God:

What makes a human being an image of God is thus that he has a likeness to the characteristics proper to the Triune God, and that he receives this likeness from God himself. When he [Thomas] presses deeper into what this resemblance consists in, Thomas promptly goes for what is really characteristic of God: not just existence, but life and intellectuality or spirituality, that is, wisdom and love.\textsuperscript{175}

The resemblance to God in human beings involves “moving into participation in God’s spiritual action, that is, the knowledge and the love in God.”\textsuperscript{176} Thomas follows Dionysius in arguing that love is the origin of desire in things, where the very origin of love is God himself, who loves himself for the sake of his own goodness.\textsuperscript{177}

Having looked at four major historical influences on Thomas’s theory of self-love, the question of what the “self” is for Thomas still remains. The next chapter will begin by presenting scholarly discussions over whether he has a notion of the “self” and self-knowledge. Thomas’s metaphysical account of person, from which he derives his psychological account of “self” as the intellective soul, will then be presented. The reflexive nature of the intellective soul will be explored in light of the way in which intellect and will, through knowledge and love, interact with one another in a dynamism that enables self to act through itself.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{SCG} IV, c.20 (Leon. 13.79): “bonitas Dei et eius ratio volendi quod alia sint et per suam voluntatem res in esse producit. Amor igitur quo suam bonitatem amat, est causa creationis rerum . . . et Dionysius dicit, iv cap. \textit{De Div. Nom.}, quod \textit{divinus amor non permissit ipsum sine germine esse.”

\textsuperscript{175} Gilles Emery, O.P., \textit{The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 397.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid. Emery further notes that “The image is an analogical thing, whose development follows the rhythm of the economy of creation and grace.”

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{In De div. nom.}, IV, ix, n. 409 (Marietti, 135): “amor divinus est bonus et est boni, idest Dei quasi amantis et est propter bonum sicut propter obiectum; Deus enim nihil amat nisi propter suam bonitatem.”
Chapter Two:

Aquinas on Self-Knowledge and Self-Love

Having looked at the major influences on Thomas’s theory of self-love, we will now address what exactly the “self” is for Thomas. In order to explore Thomas’s account of selfhood, the chapter will be divided into three sections: (i) Thomas’s metaphysical account of the human person which, it will be argued, is also his account of subjectivity; (ii) his theory of human self-knowledge, specifically self-awareness, which provides a psychological account of “selfhood;” and (iii) the reflexive nature of the human intellective soul, which allows self to act through itself. The many complexities within Thomas’s theory of self-knowledge will not be addressed in this chapter, since such a discussion lies outside the narrow scope of my thesis.¹

I

Subjectivity and “Personhood”

Following Augustine, Thomas argues that “no one can love what he does not know.”² Given that our topic is human self-love, the most appropriate starting-point for this chapter is to examine what “self” is according to Thomas and how he argues that we can know ourselves. The

¹ For such studies on human self-knowledge see Richard Lambert, Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor on the Soul’s Knowledge of Itself (Indiana: Author House, 2007), and, more recently, Therese Scarpelli Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

² *ST* IaIae, q. 27, a. 2 (Leon. 6:193): “ille qui quaerit scientiam, non omnino ignorat eam; sed secundum aliquid eam praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel in aliquo eius affectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sic autem eam cognoscere eam perfectae.” For Augustine see *De Trin.*, 10.1 (CC 312:29-30): “Nam quod quisque prorsus ignorant amare nullo pacto potest.”
term “self” might seem to be problematic given the modern psychological senses of self which tend to connote some kind of disembodied Cartesian ego. Furthermore, the existence of a “self” is a question even among contemporary philosophers. In the first section of this chapter,

3 Joseph de Finance notes that modern philosophy tends to consider the human person simply from a psychological viewpoint: “L’intérêt s’est déplacé de l’objet vers le sujet et la notion de substance, atteinte par le dépérissement du sens de l’être, apparait de moins en moins apte à définir ce que manifeste la conscience de soi. La personne sera indentifiée à la conscience ou à la memoire, ou du moins caractérisée par elles.” Joseph de Finance, Connaissance de l’être: Traité d’Ontologie (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1966), 479.

4 Miles Burnyeat argues that “it was Descartes who put subjective knowledge at the center of epistemology.” M. Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed” in G. Vesey (ed.), Idealism Past and Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 44. Richard Sorabji notes: “The Platonist tradition may in turn have encouraged some of the later conceptions of self as disembodied and undetectable that have made the idea suspect among many modern philosophers.” See Richard Sorabji, “Soul and Self in Ancient Philosophy,” in From Soul to Self, ed., James C. Crabbe (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 5. Alain de Libera offers a different perspective: “the modern idea of the subject was not Descartes’s child . . . Descartes would not be the one who introduced the subject in dealing with thought, will, or desire, but only the one who restricted subjectivity to the mental, ‘the human mind becoming the only, the exclusive subject.’” Rather, for de Libera, the modern notion of the subject “emerged through the combination of two conflicting models of subjectivity (Subiectitât [a reference to what Heidegger calls “subjectness”]) that had been steadily proposé, opposed, and eventually combined in late scholasticism: the Aristotelian (“peripatetic”) conception of subjecthood, based on the hypokeimenon-accidents relationship; and the Augustinian perichoretic conception, based on the ousia-hypostases relationship, the mutual indwelling of the three hypostases, their mutual immanence, and the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ. . . Descartes did not bring about a comprehensive concept unifying subjecthood, personality, identity, egoity, agency and causality under the single word ‘subject.’ Such a concept had been delineated in the Middle Ages. My guess is that it was formulated in full-fledged form by Bayle’s most talented opponent: Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz.” Leibniz, states de Libera, “elevated the principle ‘actions belong to the subjects’ to a prominent, unexpected rank.” See de Libera, “When Did the Modern Subject Emerge?” 203; 216. There was no term for self for the Medievals, rather, only pronoun forms denoting emphasis or reflexive nouns (autos-e-on in Greek and ipse-a-um in Latin). See Lambert, Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas, 71. Phillip Cary argues that Augustine was the first to introduce the notion of a “self,” where he defines self as a notion of “private inner space.” See Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. Likewise, Charles Taylor argues that Augustine is the first to give us an account of the self as reflexive, turning inward: “it was Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought.” See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 131. For a discussion on whether Augustine regarded the human soul as “subject” see Alain de Libera, Archéologie du Sujet: Naissance du Sujet (Paris: Vrin, 2010), 60–63. Jerrold Seigel comments: “We should not suppose that ancient and modern approaches to the self were wholly different, however. Many notions we may think of as characteristically modern were already present in ancient thinking, and this makes the task of specifying the differences more subtle and demanding—but no less important.” Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45.

however, I will argue that these concerns are quite easily dispelled by looking closely at Thomas’s account of the human subject, or “person.” His account of human personhood comprises a twofold notion of “subj ecthood” and “selfhood:” the former is a metaphysical account of the human person; the latter is a psychological account. In order to carry out this aim, I will first explore Thomas’s theory of the human person, using the terms “subject” and “person” particularly expressive on this issue: “the belief that each of us has a self is a piece of philosopher’s nonsense. I and myself are one; myself is what I am, not a self which I have. If it were, then what in heaven’s name is the I who has the self . . . The belief in a self which is different from the human being whose self it is is a grammatical illusion generated by the reflexive pronoun . . . It is a philosophical muddle to allow the space which differentiates “my self” from “myself” to generate the illusion of a mysterious metaphysical entity distinct from, but obscurely linked to, the human being who is talking to you.” I agree with Kenny’s point that “I” and “self” are not two separate entities, but I do not think that the distinction is merely grammatical: that is, I think it is legitimate to use two different terms to emphasize two logically distinct, but not separate, dimensions of the human being.

I agree with John Crosby that the terms “selfhood” and “subjectivity” are not interchangeable; they are logically distinct: “we have to distinguish between a) the ontological selfhood of the person and b) the subjective actuality of personal selfhood . . . Instead of using the terms, selfhood and subjectivity, interchangeably, as we have up to now, we should perhaps distinguish them, letting selfhood express a), and subjectivity express b).” See John Crosby, “The Dialectic of Selfhood and Relationality in the Human Person,” in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 66 (1992): 186. I will argue that in Thomas’s account of the human person, the terms “subject” and “self” denote, respectively, the entire composite (the soul and the body) and the reflexive intellectual soul. Kenneth Schmitz adds that Thomas’s notion of subjectivity is of “a concrete totality,” where subjectivity “comes home out of the otherness, not only of the object and into an enlarged self [reditus in se ipsum], but beyond that, out of the created being of its objects and itself [reditus in deum], . . . such a homcoming . . . is the integration of creaturehood in its recognition of its absolute dependence upon its source: the being of the creature is its being towards God [adesse]. The return is the conversion to the Other as to that which is never to be equivalent to self, no matter how enlarged or transformed the self is.” See Kenneth Schmitz, “Transcendental and Empirical Pressures in Human Subjectivity,” in Thought 56 (1981): 283; 284–85.

According to Alain de Libera, medieval thought greatly influenced the development of subjectivity. He argues: “[S]ubjectivity, understood as the idea of some ‘thing’ that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology . . .” See Alain de Libera, “When Did the Modern Subject Emerge?” 181–185.
interchangeably. Second, I will look at his account of “selfhood” as it appears in his arguments for reflexivity of the intellectual human soul.\(^8\)

II.

A Thomistic Account of Subjectivity

What constitutes the human subject according to Thomas? We must first rule out the soul, since Thomas’s account of the human being as a unity of body and soul precludes such a reading.\(^9\) Man is not his soul alone; indeed, the body is essential for the action of the intellect.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) For this second point, I will be following Therese Scarpelli Cory’s recent work on Thomas’s theory of self-knowledge, specifically self-awareness, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), chapter eight, especially, pp. 202–205.

\(^9\) *ST* Ia, q. 75, a.4 co (Leon. 6:201): “... manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.” The soul is the form of the body, as Thomas argues in *ST* Ia, q. 76, a.8, ad 2 (Leon. 5:233): “Animam est actus corporis organici, sicut prii et proportionati perfectibilis.” *In De an.*, q.2co (Marietti, 288): “Cum enim anima humanasit quaedam forma unita corpori, ita tamen quod non sit a corpore totaliter comprehensa quasi ei immersa, sicut aliae formae materiales, sed excedat capaciatem totius materiae corporalis, quantum ad hoc in quo excedit materiam corporalem, inest ei potentia ad intelligibiliam, quod pertinet ad intellectum possibilem; secundum vero quod unitur corpori, habet operationes et vires in quibus communicat ei corpus; sicut sunt vires partis nutritivae et sensitivae.” Also see: Ibid., q.19co (Marietti, 353): “Manifestum est igitur quod nulla operatio partis sensitivae potest esse animae tantum ut operetur; sed est compositi per animam, sicut calefacto est calidi per calorem. Compositum igitur est videns et audiens, et omnia sentiens, sed per animam; unde etiam compositum est potens videre et audire et sentire, sed per animam. Manifestum est ergo quod potentiae partis sensitivae sunt in composito sicut in subjecto; sed sunt ab anima sicut a principio. Destructo igitur corpore, destruuntur potentiae sensitivae, sed remanent in anima sicut in principio. Et hoc est quod alia opinio dicit, quod potentiae sensitivae manent in anima separata solum sicut in radice;” and ibid., ad 1 (Marietti, 353): “potentiae sensitivae non sunt de essentia animae, sed sunt proprietates naturales: compositi quidem ut subjecti, animae vero et principii.” For a discussion on the problems faced by the Medievals in defining the soul see Anton C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983). This classic work traces the development of the definition of the soul; for Thomas’s metaphysical synthesis of the problem see pp. 180ff of this work. For a discussion on ancient views of self, see Richard Sorabji, “Soul and Self in Ancient Philosophy,” 14–26.

\(^10\) *ST* Ia, q. 75, a. 2, ad 3 (Leon. 5:197): “corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione objecti: phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem: aliquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indiget exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.” Also, *ST* Ia, q.77, a.5 (Leon.5:244–5): “illud est subjectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari, *omne enim accidentes denominat proprium subjectum.* Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde opportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subjecti cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia. Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum
The body is essential for vegetative and sensitive functions and, although the intellect has no corresponding corporal organ, the body is still essential for intellectual thought. The human soul is not only intellective; it is also vegetative and sensitive since human beings perform the operations of vegetative and sensitive life as well as intellective. The power of the soul enables, for example, the eye to see. As will be shown presently, Thomas’s view of the human being “combines the notions of subsistence, individuality, and rationality in such a way that fulfills the notion of subjectivity.”

The human subject for Thomas is the human “person.” Thomas adopts Boethius’s definition of person as “an individual substance of a rational nature,” but what Thomas means

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11 “These operations are ordered to each other in such a way that the vegetative powers serve the sensitive by nourishing the organs of sense, and the senses in turn serve the intellect. When one operation is intense, it impedes or prevents other operations, and so I know the unity of my life and being from the manner in which I operate.” William Kane, O.P., “Self-Knowledge: True and False,” 196.

12 See de Libera, “When Did the Modern Subject Emerge?” 210: “every substance is a suppositum, every suppositum is an individual (an individual substance), but it is not the case that every individual (individual substance) which is a suppositum is a person: only the supposita having dominion over their own actions, which can act of themselves (that is, rational individuals) are persons.” As noted by de Libera (ibid.), for Thomas see ST IIIa, q. 7, a. 13co. (Leon. 11:125): “actiones sunt suppositorum et individuorum”; ST Ia, q. 39, a.5, ad 1 (Leon. 5:405): “actus sunt suppositorum”; ST IIIa, q. 20, a.1, ad 2: “actus sunt suppositorum et singularium.” Also, De ver., q. 16, a. 2, arg. 2; In II Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a.2.

13 While “person” can refer to different levels of being (human, angelic, and divine), the focus of this section will be limited to Thomas’s understanding of the human person. As Robert Spaemann notes, for Thomas, ‘person’ “is not a nomen intentionis but a nomen rei. That means, not a concept, but a name, a name for an indeterminate individual (individuum vagum). . . The word ‘person’ refers to a man in the aspect of one who bears a personal name . . . the noun ‘person,’ on the other hand, is not used to refer to an individual in the aspect of its nature, but to a thing which subsists in that nature.” See Robert Spaemann, Persons: The Difference Between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 32. For Thomas see ST Ia, q. 30, a.4 (Leon. 4: 341): “Hoc tamen interest, quod aliquis homo, significat naturam, vel individuum ex parte naturae, cum modo
by substance requires some explanation. Thomas presents two modes of substance in his Commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* V: first substance or the individual subject (supposit) which is not predicated of something else and; the essence or quiddity of a thing (nature). He

[14] In *I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a.1 (Mandonnet, 600–1): “[Utrum definitio personae posita a Boetio sit competens]

. . . . Respondeo dicendum, quod, ut supra dictum est, hoc nomen ‘persona’ secundum suam communiaetatem acceptum, non est nomen intentionis, sicut hoc nomen ‘singulare,’ vel ‘generis’ et ‘speciei’: sed est nomen rei, cui accidit aliqua intentio particularis; et in natura determinata, scilicet intellectual vel rationali. Et ideo in definitione personae ponuntur tria: scilicet genus illius rei, quod significatur nomine personae, dum dicitur ‘substantia’: et differentia per quam contrahitur ad naturam determinatam, in qua ponitur res, quae est persona, in quid pertinens ad intentionem illam, sub qua significat nomen personae rem suam; non enim significat substantiam rationalem absolute, sed secundum quod subintelligitur intentio particularis: et ideo additur ‘individua.’” See also *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 3 (Leon. 4.331): “Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.” See also *ST* IIIa, q.16, a.12, ad 3 (Leon. 11.218): “dicendum quod, sicut *persona* significat quid completum et per se subsistens in natura rationali, ita *hypostasis, suppositum*, et *res naturae* in genere substantia significat quidam per se subsistens. Unde, sicut humana natura non est per se seorsum a persona Filii, ita etiam non est per se hypostasis vel suppositum vel res naturae. Et ideo in sensu in quo negatur ista, Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, oportet etiam negari omnes alias.” The term “individual,” argues Thomas, belongs to the category of substance in a special way since it is individual by itself, whereas accidents “are individual through their subject, which is a substance.” See *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 1 (Leon. 4.327): “Dicendum quod, licet universale et particulare inveniatur in omnibus generibus, tamen speciali quodam modo individuum invenitur in genere substantiae. Substantia enim individuatur per seipsum, sed accidentia individuuntur per subjectum, quod est substantia: dicitur enim haec albedo, inquantum est in hoc subjecto. Unde convenientur individua substantiae habent aliquod speciale nomen prae alios: dicuntur enim *hypostases vel prima substantiae.*” Thomas goes beyond Boethius’s definition of person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” in emphasizing the aspect of subsistence, existing in itself (in the mode of substance) with its own act of existence. See Norris Clarke, *Person and Being* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993), 29. See also *ST* I, q. 29, a.3 (Leon. 4.331): “persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.”

[15] In *Met.* V.10, nos. 903–4 (Marietti, 242): ‘Reducit dictos modos substantiae ad duos; dicens, quod ex praedictis modis considerari potest, quod substantia duobus modis dicitur’ quorum unus est secundum quod substantiae dicitur id quod ultimo subiicitur in propositionibus, ita quod de alio non praedicetur, sicut substantia prima. Et hoc est, quod est hoc aliquid, quasi per se subsistens, et quod est separabile, quia est ab omnibus distinctum et non communicabile multis. . . . Sed etiam forma et species uniuscuiusque rei, dicitur tale, idest substantia. In quo includit et secundum et quartum modum. Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est. Sed forma referetur ad materiam, quam facit esse in actu; quidditas autem referetur ad suppositum, quod significatur ut habens talam essentiam. Unde sub uno comprehendentur ‘forma et species,’ idest sub essentia rei.” The text of Aristotle used by Thomas reads: “Accidit itaque seccundum duos modos substantiae dicii: subjectum ultimum, quod non adhuc de alio dicitur: et quodcumque hoc aliquid ens, et separabile fuerit. Tale vero uniuscuiusque forma et species” (Marietti, 241). John F. Wippel notes that there are two ways that the term “substance” can be interpreted: 1) in the Aristotelian sense, substance can refer
calls first substance a “this-something” (hoc aliquid) which subsists in itself, is separate, is
distinct from all things, and is incommunicable.\textsuperscript{16} He refers to the second mode of substance as
“that by which [something] is what it is” which denotes the essence of a thing, including “the
form and species of each thing.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus Thomas argues for a real distinction between supposit
and nature in material beings.\textsuperscript{18} A human person, and thus a supposit (or subject), is distinct,

to the quiddity (essence), or “whatness” of a thing as signified by its definition and; 2) a subject that belongs to the
genus of substance, that is, a substance or supposit. See John Wippel The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas:
From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press), 203. As
Wippel notes (ibid), for references to Thomas see ST I, q. 29, a. 2 (Leon. 4.330): “... dicendum quod, secundum
Philosophum in V Metaphys., substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam
significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei: quam quidem substantiam
Græci usiam vacant, quod nos essentiam dicere possmus.—Alio modo dicitur substantia subjectum vel suppositum
quod subsistit in genere substantiae”; likewise, for Aristotle see Metaphysics V, c.8 (1017b23–26). In ST IIIa, q. 17,
a.1, ad 7 (Leon. 11.220), Thomas states that substance is said not only of nature but of the subject (supposition), as
stated in Metaphysics V: “substantia autem dictur non solum natura, sed etiam supposition, ut dicitur in V
Metaphys.” In De pot., q. 9, a.1 (Parm. 177), Thomas addresses the relationship between person and between
essence, subsistence, and hypostasis. Thomas first refers to Aristotle’s distinction between two ways the term
“substance” is used: (i) as an individual within the genus substance; (ii) as the form or nature of a subject:
“dicendum quod Philosophus . . . ponit substantiam dupliciter dici; dicitur enim uno modo substantia ipsum
subjectum ultimum, quod non praedicatur de alio; et hoc est particolare in genere substantiae; alio modo dicitur
substantia forma vel natura subiecti.” See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 205. See also
Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas on Substance as a Metaphysical Genus.” In The Science of Being as Being:
2011.

\textsuperscript{16} In Met. V.10, nos. 903–4 (Marietti, 242): “substantia duobus modis dicitur: quorum unus est secundum
quod substantia dicitur id quod ultimo subjectum in propositionibus, ita quod de alio non praedicetur, sicut substantia
prima. Et hoc est, quod est hoc aliquid, quasi per se subsistens, et quod est separabile, quia est ab omnibus
distinctum et non communicabile multis. . . . Sed etiam forma et species uniuscuiusque rei, ‘dicitur tale,’ idest
substantia. In quo includit et secundum et quartum modum. Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod
secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est.”

\textsuperscript{17} See In III Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2 (Moos, 200): “. . . triplex incommunicabilitas est de ratione
personae: scilicet partis, secundum quod est completum; et universalis, secundum quod est subsistens; et
assumptibilis, secundum quod id quod assumitur transit in personalitatem alterioris et non habet personalitatem
propriam.” For a in-depth treatment of the distinction between supposit and nature, see Wippel, Metaphysical
Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 238–53. Thomas argues that not every particular substance is a hypostasis or person,
but rather, only those of which an intellectual nature may be properly predicated; see ST Ia, q.75, a. 4, ad 2 (Leon.
5.201): “non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona: sed quae habet completam naturam speciei.
Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.”

\textsuperscript{18} For Thomas, in simple beings which lack matter the simple being is identical with its quiddity [De ente c.
4 (Leon. 43.376:77–79)], but the quiddity of a composite being is not identical with that composite being; that is,
subsists in itself, and includes all that is found in a thing, whereas the person’s essence (nature) includes only the essential principles, thus “insofar as we consider the essential principles of such a thing, we may speak of its nature; insofar as we think of it as subsisting, we may describe it as a person, and hence as a supposit.” Since human beings are composed of matter and form, nature and supposit differ. This distinction between supposit and nature is brought out nicely by two distinct questions: “Who am I?” (denoting person or suppos) and “What am I?”

“humanity” cannot be identified with a human being since the meaning of humanity (or quiddity or nature) includes only the principles essential to human being taken as human being [see In III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3 (Moos, 196): “Et ideo, quia humanitas non includit in sua significacione totum quod est in re subsistente in natura, cum sit quasi pars, non praedicatur; et quia non subsistit nisi quod est compositum, et pars a suo toto habetur, ideo humanitas non subsistit, sed Socrates, et ipse est habens humanitatem”]. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 241. Here humanity (quiddity) cannot denote the subsisting whole, for humanity is only a part which belongs to its whole (humanity is not self-subsistent), whereas an individual human being subsists as that which has humanity. Thus ‘human being’ “signifies the essential characteristics in a determined fashion, and the individuating notes in an undetermined fashion, whether they are these or those.” Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 241. See In III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a.3 (Moos, 196): “Homo autem significat utrumque, et essentialia et individuantia, sed diversimode; quia essentialia significat determinate, individuantia vero indeterminate, vel haec vel illa. Et ideo homo, cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate et dicitur habens humanitatem.” For a detailed analysis of the real distinction as outlined in De ente, c. 4, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 138ff.

19 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 240–242. Substance taken as subject/supposit has no extrinsic foundation to support it (subsists), and also serves as the foundation for accidents. Wippel notes that “insofar as we wish to emphasize the first characteristic, substance may be described as substentia; insofar as we wish to describe the second characteristic, substance may be called first substance (prima substantia or hypostasis in Greek).” Ibid.

20 In SCG IV, c. 55, Thomas states explicitly that in man, nature and person differ, since man is composed of matter and form: “quia in homine alius est natura et persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositus . . .” Thomas states in In III Sent. d. 5, a. 1, ad 3 that supposit (“that which subsists in the order of being”) can be taken in two ways: i) that which subsists in the category of substance and is incommunicable and; (ii) “that which is,” a concrete entity that includes its act of being (esse) as well as its essence/nature. See (Moos, 200); “dicendum quod persona divina non soppontitur humanae naturae quasi sub ea posita, sicut forma sub materia; sed quasi subsistens in ea, inquantum habet eam sibi unitam; unde non habet similitudinem materiae.”
(denoting nature).21 A person is a supposit which subsists in the category of substance, and is incommunicable, having his or her own act of being (esse).22

According to Thomas, a human person is an embodied spirit. Although the human soul can subsist in itself, the soul does not have the complete nature of being human.23 This is because the human person is a substantial union of soul and body.24 The soul is united to the body by its

21 See Norris Clarke, Person and Being, 27. Thomas goes beyond Boethius’s definition of person as “an individual substance of a rational nature,” emphasizing the aspect of subsistence, existing in itself (in the mode of substance) with its own act of existence.

22 Thus Thomas calls a person a distinct subsistent in a rational nature (subsistens distinctum in natura rationali. See ST IA, q. 29, a.3 (Leon. 4.331): “persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.” See also ad 2 (ibid.): “Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinent. Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona, ut dictum est.” For context, the question Thomas is answering is whether the name “person” can be said of God.

23 As Cory notes, Thomas does call the human soul a hoc aliquid, but there are two senses of hoc aliquid: 1) as subsisting and 2) as a supposit, as set out in ST IA, q.75, a.2, ad 1 (Leon. 5.196): “hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente; alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis: secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo: sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.” Yet when Thomas describes the soul as a hoc aliquid/subsisting, he intends the first sense, as seen in SCG II, c.68 (Leon. 13.440): “Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est, esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae.” When he denies that the soul subsists, he does so in the second sense (i.e., as a supposit), as seen in SCG IV, c.26. See Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 201, n. 6. As argued already, for Thomas, the soul is not the complete nature of a human being (ST IA, q.75, a.4); to argue otherwise would mean the union of the body and soul remains unaccounted for. See Anton Pegis, St Thomas and the Problem of the Soul, 185.

24 For Thomas, substantial form gives existence (esse) to matter as in De principiis naturae, c.1 (Leon. 34.39:20–44): “. . . quod vero est in potentiad esse substantiale dicitur proprie materia . . . Unde, simpliciter loquendo forma dat esse materiae . . . Et qui a forma facit esse in actu, ideo forma dicitur esse actus; quod autem facit actu esse substantiale est forma substantialis. . .” As Wippel notes, Thomas uses the argument forma dat esse repeatedly in his works, where esse can denote existence as well as the act of being, as in De ente, c. 2 (Leon. 43.30:31–35); c.4 (p. 376:45–47); c. 6 (p. 380:64); In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a.1 (Mandonnet, 555): “Similiter dico, quod cum esse consequitur compositionem materiae et formae, quamvis forma sit principium esse, non tamen denominatur aliquod ens a forma, sed a toto . . .”; De ver., q. 28, a.7 (Leon. 22.3.840:146–150): “. . . similiter materia est causa formae aliquo modo in quantum sustinet formam, et forma est aliquo modo causa materiae in quantum dat materiae esse actu.” See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 327–8, n. 124.
essence, even though the mode in which the human soul is united to the body is not one of total
dependence.\(^{25}\) As one author notes:

The Thomistic understanding of human nature as embodied spirit, or even rational animal, does not imply a
static structure, rigidly determined in all its details, but rather a dynamic center of free, self-conscious
action on two levels (material and spiritual), whose outside limits of development are set a priori only as
those of a spirit united to a material body.\(^{26}\)

As rational, human beings can master their own acts and, “not only act, as other things do, but act
through themselves.”\(^{27}\) Reason is able to reflect back upon itself and order its own act.\(^{28}\) As will
be seen in the third section of this chapter, as a “dynamic center of free self-conscious action” a
human being is able to reflect upon his or her own acts, and, if those acts are seen as something
good for oneself, intellectually present them to the will as an object of desire. As we will next
examine, this self-reflexive act is due to the nature of the intellective soul which has the capacity
to reflect upon itself and act through itself.\(^{29}\)

\(^{25}\) *De ver.*, q. 13, a. 4 (Leon. 22.2.428:109–429:121): “anima corpori uniatur ut forma, non requiritur aliqua
intentio cum haec unio non dependeat ex voluntate animae sed magis ex natura. Similiter etiam ex tali unione puritas
intellectus directe non inquinatur: anima enim non unitur corpori ut forma mediantibus suis potentiss sed per
essentiam suam cum nihil sit medium inter formam et materiam . . . nec tamen essentia animae ita corpori
condicionem sequatur, sicut aliae formae materiales quae sunt omnino in materia quasi submersae in tantum quod
nulla virtus aut actio ex eis prodire potest nisi materialis.”

\(^{26}\) Clarke, *Person and Being*, 40.

\(^{27}\) *ST* Ia, q. 29, a.1 (Leon. 4.327): “Sed adhuc quodam specialiori et perfectiori modo inventitur particulare
et individuum in substantiis rationalibus, quae habent dominium sui actus, et non solum aguntur, sicut alia, sed
per se agunt: actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Et ideo etiam inter ceteras substantias quoddam speciale
nomen habent singularia rationalis naturae. Et hoc nomen est persona.”

\(^{28}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 17, a. 6co (Leon. 6:122): “quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur sicut ordinat de actibus
aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu suo.”

\(^{29}\) William Kane notes, referring to Thomas’s *In De an.*, I, lect. I, 6: “there is a sense in which each man is a
privileged observer of natural things and processes, because by his consciousness and by his ability to reflect upon
his own activities and upon himself, he knows his nature not only from without but also from within, that is, both
objectively and subjectively, directly and reflexively. Each of us has inside knowledge of the self such as we do not
have of anything else. By his own consciousness each man is aware that he has in himself a principle and cause of
his own vital activities, which we call the soul, and that through this principle he is alive, or a living being. In this
peculiar way of consciousness the living self is better known than the non-self or the non-living, and so the science
III.

Self-Knowledge and Selfhood

Human selfhood pertains to the intellective soul, but is grounded in the existence and activity proper to the whole supposit (person), or subject. Selfhood denotes the individual’s experience of himself or herself within the world as “I,” where “I” denotes the intellective, immaterial soul insofar as it is reflexive. Selfhood, not personhood, is grounded in the soul for the soul is a


30 For in-depth analyses on Thomas’s theory of self-knowledge see Richard Lambert (op. cit., n. 3) and Cory (op. cit., n. 8). We note that Thomas often interchanges the terms “soul,” “intellect,” and “mind” in addressing knowledge of one’s soul. For examples of “soul” as meaning essence of the soul, see ST Ia, q. 76, a. 1 and a. 5; for “soul” used interchangeably with “intellect” or “mind,” see ST Ia, q. 75, a. 2. See Lambert, Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas, 73. Jacques Maritain seems more cautious to include the whole person, not just the soul, when speaking of a notion of “self” in Thomas’s philosophy: “St. Thomas explains that in spontaneous reflection, which is a prerogative of the life of the intellect, each of us knows (by a kind of knowledge that is not scientific but experimental and incommunicable) that his soul exists, knows the singular existence of this subjectivity that perceives, suffers, loves, thinks.” Jacques Maritain, Existence and Existent (New York: Belgrave Press, 1949), 69.

31 See Thomas ST Ia, q. 76, a. 1 (Leon. 5.209): “Ipse idem homo est qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire.” Karol Wojtyla notes that the human suppositum appears as “self” to itself because of consciousness, not in the sense that the human self is reducible to consciousness, but rather, that the self “is constituted through the mediation of consciousness in the suppositum humanum within the context of the whole existence (esse) and activity (operari) proper to this suppositum.” See Karol Wojtyla, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, trans., Theresa Sandok (Lublin: Peter Lang, 1993), 227.

32 Clarke, Person and Being, 44.

33 “Human nature implies selfhood at the appropriate stage of development (barring trauma to the brain), and selfhood belongs to the human being precisely because one of the constitutents of human nature, the rational soul, is immaterial and therefore reflexive.” Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 201, n. 7. Because the intellective soul is immaterial, it can return to itself completely: “Each part of a body can turn back another part (as when I touch my head), but not upon itself, since matter is extended and has parts outside of parts Only an indivisible and incorporeal being can be made wholly present to itself since it has no parts that get in the way of each other. What is immaterial can be placed in contact, so to speak, with the whole of itself.” Ibid., 206. Richard Lambert notes that there is no one term consistently used by Thomas which denotes the subject of self-awareness: Thomas uses “soul,” “intellect,” and “mind,” to refer to the whole person “and other constructions appear, often in free substitution for one another.” Lambert, Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas, 79.

34 Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 200–201.
subsisting, substantial form—incorruptible, immaterial, and intellective and only shares its spiritual existence with the body. Yet the soul does not define personhood because the soul is incomplete when separated from the body. As one author notes:

To determine the nature of man we must proceed in general as we do when we determine the nature of anything else. From the accidents and properties of things which appear to sense we determine the essential natures and causes of these things in a human or rational way. . . the conscious activities and other vital functions are activities of the composite of soul and body, not of the soul alone. It is not the soul which, properly speaking, is joyful or sad, or which thinks or wills, nor is it the brain or any other part, but the man who does these things . . . The activities of man are activities of the whole, not of the part, and the man is that which performs the activities of man. Therefore, the definition of any vital activity or vital power in terms of the soul alone, or a definition of the soul itself without the body, or without relation to the body, is incomplete and merely dialectical, not scientific or demonstrative.

What follows is a consideration of Thomas’s theory of self-knowledge as it pertains to human selfhood, that is, to his account of the soul’s awareness of itself. We bear in mind,

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35 De pot., q. 3, a.9, ad 20: “creans dat esse animae in corpore, et generans disponit corpus ad hoc huius esse sit particeps per animam sibi unitam.” Also, In De an., a. 14; De ente c. 5; SCG II, c.58.

36 SCG II.81 (Leon. 13.505): “Formam igitur et materiam semper oportet esse ad invicem proportionata et quasi naturaliter coaptata: quia proprius actus in propria materia fit . . . non tamen ista diversitas [animarum separatuum] procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secundum diversam rationem animae; sed est secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad corpora; haec enim anima est commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem ali, et sic de omnibus. Huiusmodi autem commensurationes remanent in animabus etiam pereuntibus corporibus: sicut et ipsae earum substantiae manent, quasi a corporibus secundum esse non dependentes. Sunt enim animae secundum substantias suas formae corporum: alias accidentaliter corpori unirentur, et sic ex anima et corpore non fient unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Inquantum autem formae sunt, oportet eas esse corporibus commensuratas”; ST 1a, 29.1, ad 5 (Leon. 4.328): “[A]nimae est pars humanae speciei, et ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel substantia prima; sicut nec manus, nec quacumque alia partium hominis. Et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae, neque nomen.” See Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 201.

37 Kane, “Self-Knowledge,” 192. He gives the passion of anger as an example: defining anger as simply a desire for revenge without mentioning the bodily element is an insufficient definition of anger, as set forth by Thomas in In De anima I, lect., 2, 24.

38 Cory distinguishes within Thomas’s theory of knowledge, as presented primarily in De ver., 10.8, a fourfold doctrine of self-knowledge. The major division is between 1) self-awareness and 2) quiddiative self-knowledge, where 1) is further divided into a) actual self-awareness and b) habitual self-awareness and 2) a further distinction is made between c) simple apprehension (of the soul’s essence) and d) judgment (affirming that the apprehended essence really exists). See Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 63–64. Since my aim in this section is to look at Thomas’s theory of selfhood, I am deliberately limiting myself to Thomas’s presentation of self-awareness, specifically the relation between habitual self-awareness (the soul’s disposition to be known) and actual self-awareness (the perception of one’s existing soul in one’s acts).
however, that as “an individual substance of a rational nature,” it is more appropriate to say that
the whole composite, the person knows, not just the intellectual faculties.\(^{39}\) Nevertheless, strictly
speaking, the “knower” is clearly the intellectual reflexive human soul.

For Thomas, the human intellect is undetermined by any forms; it is like a *tabula rasa*
that does not pre-contain forms and is in pure potency to the objects of knowledge.\(^{40}\) Thomas
addresses human self-knowledge in his *Commentary on the Liber de causis*,\(^{41}\) where
Proposition 15 of this work states that “every knower knows its essence and therefore reverts

\(^{39}\) *De ver.* q.2, a.6, ad 3 (Leon. 22.1.66:131–67:132): “non enim proprie loquendo sensus aut intellectus
cognoscunt sed homo per utrumque”; *ST* Ia, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2 (Leon. 5:197): “potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit,
sicut oculus videt: sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam.” The soul as presented by Thomas is
not a purely spiritual element since it is the form of the body: “to know one’s soul is to at least indirectly know one’s

\(^{40}\) *De ver.*, q. 18, a.7 (Leon. 22.2.556:110–124): “... ideo secundum opinionem Aristotelis alii dicunt,
quod intellectus humanus est ultimus in ordine intelligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium: et sicut
materia secundum suam essentiam considerata nullam formam habet, ita intellectus humanus in sui principio est
sicut tabula in qua nihil scriptum est, sed postmodum in eo scientia per sensus acquiritur virtute intellectus agentis.
Sic igitur principium naturale humanae cognitionis esse quidem in potentia ad omnia cognoscibili, non habere
autem a principio notitiam nisi eorum quae statim per lumen intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, sicut principia
universalis.” The object of the human intellect is the essence of material things. See *ST* Ia, q. 84, a.7 (Leon. 5:325):
“Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia
corporali existens.” Thus, the intellect must first turn to phantasms to have any knowledge at all: (Ibid): “Et ideo
necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata.”
Thomas argues that the direct object of the intellect is essence which is found in concrete individual objects; thus the
bodily senses and imagination are indispensable to human knowledge. See Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the
Soul*, 196. Brian Shanley notes: “Because the substantial form of intellectual beings is characterised by an
immaterial intellect capable of grasping the entire range of being, their striving for self-perfection is not restricted in
its range to only certain kinds of actions regarding certain kinds of objects. They are able to engage through
knowing any object that is possibly perfective or good and desire it in a conscious way.” Brian Shanley, “Thomas
Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 73.

\(^{41}\) In *Lib. de caus.*, prop. 15 (Marietti, 89): “His igitur visis, considerandum est quod in hoc libro tria
ponuntur. Quorum primum est quod anima sciat essentiam suam; de anima enim est intelligendum quod hic dicitur.
Secundum est quod ex hoc concluditur, quod readeat ad essentiam suam reditio completa. . . . Ex hoc autem quod
secundum suam operationem redit ad essentiam suam, concludit ulterior quod etiam secundum substantiam suam
est rediens ad essentiam suam; et ita fit reditio completa secundum operationem et substantiam. . . . Et hoc potest
to its essence with a complete reversion.” In commenting upon this proposition, Thomas states explicitly that the soul is “the knower,” the intellectual substance that can know itself and thus “turn to itself.” Thomas clearly grounds self-knowledge in the soul’s reflexive capacity to turn to itself, for this turn to self denotes the soul’s turn to its essence through its intellectual activity “by understanding it” since such activity is from itself. Thomas comments that “the return is made complete according to activity and substance,” meaning that, as an intellectual substance, the soul subsists through itself. Because the soul is

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42 In Lib. de caus., (Marietti 124, 88): “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est reidiens ad essentiam suam reditione completa” (italics in text). John Crosby notes: “It is remarkable how St. Thomas Aquinas ascribes substantiality to the person in such a way as to avoid insinuating anything like substantiality incompatible with personal subjectivity. He thinks of the reflexivity that we see in all the forms of subjective life, such as in self-presence and self-determination, as being already established in the substantial being of the person. That is why he recognises in the soul not only a certain conversio or reditus ad seipsam, or bending of the soul back upon itself when it knows itself, but also a purely ontological bending of the soul back upon itself, as we can see from his distinction between a bending back upon itself secundum substantiam (in its substance) and secundum operationem (in its acting), and also from his statement that the conversio ad seipsam in acting is possible only if the acting being has this conversio in its very substance. In other words, when we think about the substantial being of the person, we have to think of it as in some sense already having (before it is subjectively actualized) those structures that show themselves in subjectivity.” John Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 139.

43 In Lib. de caus., prop 15 (Marietti 308, 89): “anima sciat essentiam suam. De anima enim est intelligendum quod hic dicitur.”

44 Ibid., (Marietti, 397, 89): “Anima cognoscit seipsam ergo convertitur ad seipsam omniquaque.”

45 Ibid., (Marietti, 310, 89): “quia cum dico quod sciens scit essentiam suam, ipsum scire significat operationem suam intelligibilem ad essentiam suam, intelligendo scilicet eam.”

46 Ibid., “rediens ad essentiam suam et ita fit reditio completa secundum opertationem et substantiam.”

47 Ibid., (Marietti, 311, 89): “Et hoc ideo convenit animae et unicuique scienti seipsam, quia omne tale est substantia simplex sufficiens sibi per seipsam, quasi non indigens materiali sustenamento.” Scarpelli-Cory notes: “This return is not operational, a going forth towards and returning from the senses in knowledge and self-knowledge; rather it is ontological, defining the soul as a self-subisting being, a substance.” Scarpelli-Cory, “Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge,” 341.
complete (but not in the sense of a supposit)\textsuperscript{48} it enjoys “fixity;” that is, it does not turn upon anything else that sustains it, as accidents do\textsuperscript{49} which have their being through their subject, not through themselves. Thomas notes here the Dionysian image of self-awareness as being conveyed by a circular return, whereby the human soul “goes back to itself and, through itself, returns to knowledge of its divine source.”\textsuperscript{50}

The soul’s ability to reflect upon itself/return to itself accounts for an individual’s ability to perceive that he or she has a soul.\textsuperscript{51} Self-awareness is the most certain type of knowledge, says Thomas,\textsuperscript{52} for the intellect knows itself in knowing its object\textsuperscript{53} and, precisely

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\textsuperscript{48} As the substantial form of the human body, the soul is commensurate to its body; it is not a supposit as Thomas states in \textit{ST} Ia, q. 75, a. 2 (Leon. 5.196): “necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dictum animam hominim esse quoddam principii incorporeum et subsistens.” The soul, however, is the formal source of the \textit{esse} of the entire composite because \textit{forma dat esse} (\textit{De ente}, c.2 [Leon.43.39:20–44; ibid., 370:31–35] and is thus its life-principle as seen in \textit{De unit. Int.} I (Leon. 43.298:648–9): “compositum est per esse eius.” See Scarpelli-Cory, “Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge,” 342, n. 27. We note that for Thomas, only God enjoys complete self-subsistence. See \textit{ST} Ia, q. 14, a.2, ad 1 (Leon. 4.169): “Per se autem subsistere maxime convenit Deo.” Scarpelli-Cory, “Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge,” 350.

\textsuperscript{49} In \textit{Lib. de caus.}, (Marietti, 311, 89): “Et exponit consequenter quid sit redire secundum substantiam ad essentiam suam: illa enim dicuntur secundum substantiam ad seipsa converti quae subsistunt per seipsa habentia fixionem ita quod non convertuntur ad aliquid aliud sustentans ipsa, sicut est conversio accidentium ad substantiam.” But as Thomas adds in \textit{ST} I, q 84, a.6, unlike intelligences or angels which have knowledge only from their essences, human knowledge depends upon the external and internal senses, since human beings are substances composed of body and soul. See also \textit{In Ethic.} I.10 (Leon. 47/1.35: 80–84): “forma autem hominis est anima cuitus actus dicitur vivere; non quidem secundum quod vivere est esse viventis, sed secundum quod vivere dicitur aliquod opus vitae, puta intelligere vel sentire.”


\textsuperscript{51} \textit{De ver.}, q. 1. a. 9\textit{c}o (Leon. 22/1.29.23: “intellectus reflectitur super actum suum…”

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., q. 10, a. 8, ad 2 (Leon. 22/2.323:335–39): “nullus unquam erravit in hoc quod non perciperet se
in knowing its object, becomes intelligible to itself.\textsuperscript{54} The soul’s awareness of itself occurs in an act of knowing another object. Yet, as embodied spirits whose cognition begins in sense,\textsuperscript{55} human beings only move from “latent to explicit self-awareness,” unlike God and angels “whose self-awareness begins in act and is immediate.”\textsuperscript{56} Since the human intellect is naturally

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\textsuperscript{53} In De. an. III. 3 (Leon. 45/1.216:68–71; 75-78): “Quod probat ex hoc quod intellectum in actu et intelligens in actu sunt unum, sicut et supra dixit quod sensibile in actu et sensus in actu sunt unum. . . . et ideo hic dicit quod in hiis que sunt sine materia, id est si accipiamus intelligibilia actu, idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur, sicut idem est senciens in actu et quod sentitur in actu.”

\textsuperscript{54} Anton Pegis states that, insofar as its operation is concerned, “the soul is helpless until there is something for it to grasp, an object to perfect and fulfill its capacities. It is not sufficient to say that the soul is joined to the body for the good of the body, because no form is joined to matter for the sake of the matter. It is the exact opposite that is true. The soul is joined to the body for the sake of the soul. Man exists for the sake of the soul, but man is more important than the soul for the simple and decisive reason that the soul can do what it is its nature to do only as the form of the body.” Pegis, \textit{St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul}, 200. For Thomas see \textit{ST} Ia, q. 84, a.4 co (Leon. 5:320): “Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio assignari non posset quare anima nostra corpori uniretur. Non enim potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellectivae ad eius propriam operationem, quae est intelligere: quia secundum esse suum corpore non dependant.” Cory notes, the intellectual soul is naturally present to itself and does not need the intelligible species to make itself present to itself (“\textit{in self-awareness the species does not play a presencing role as the imported ‘similitude’ or ‘likeness’ of my mind}”). The intelligible species, e.g., cat-species, “whereby I perceive myself thinking about cats, then, plays only a perfected role in my act of self-awareness.” Cory, \textit{Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge}, 110–111. \textit{ST} Ia, q. 14, a.2 (Leon. 4.168): “Unde dicitur in libro \textit{de Anima}, quod sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod intellectus noster vel sensus informatn in actu per speciem sensibilis vel intelligibilis.”

\textsuperscript{55} De ver., q.1, a.10 (Leon. 22/1.31.105–8: “Res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterioris apparent, quia cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit cui per se objectum sunt sensibles qualitates.”

\textsuperscript{56} Clarke, \textit{Person and Being}, 45. \textit{See De ver.}, q 1. a. 9co (Leon. 22/2:29.43–55): “perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales, redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa: in hoc enim quod cognoscunt aliquid extra se positum, quodam modo extra se procedunt; secundum vero quod cognoscunt se cognoscere, iam ad se redire incipiant quia actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum; sed reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt essentias proprias, unde dicitur in libro De causis quod ‘omnis sciens essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa.’” Gregory Reichberg notes that in \textit{ST} Ia, q. 87, a.1, Thomas presents two modes of self-awareness, one as particular and the other as universal: “The former mode arises from the obscurely felt presence of the self (\textit{mens}) to itself throughout all its individual acts of cognition. In contrast, the latter mode is a conceptually articulated enquiry into the nature of knowledge as a determinate act of of the rational soul. In the first
in potency to knowledge and requires actualisation from an outside object,\(^{57}\) human self-knowledge also requires actualization from outside by a phantasm.\(^{58}\) Once the phantasm is actualized, however, the soul operates through itself.\(^{59}\)

In various places, Thomas presents human self-knowledge as twofold: knowing \textit{that} I am and knowing \textit{what} I am.\(^{60}\) In the \textit{Quaestiones disputatae de veritate} q. 10, a.8, Thomas argues that each person can have this twofold knowledge of the soul:

One is that knowledge by which the soul of each man knows itself only with respect to that which is proper to it; the other is that by which the soul is known with respect to that which is common to all souls. The latter, which concerns every soul commonly, is that by which the nature of the soul is known; the


\(^{57}\) \textit{De ver.} 10.8; \textit{SCG} 3.46; \textit{ST} Ia, 87.1; \textit{In De an.}, III, 3.

\(^{58}\) \textit{ST} Ia, q. 87, a. 1 (Leon. 5.355–56): “consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis.” \textit{De ver.} 10.8, ad 1 (Leon. 22/2.322–323: 319–321): “intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere antequam aphantasmatis abstrahat.” Thomas goes on to say that although the essences of other things are not innate in the intellect, its own essence is innate in it, so that it does not have to obtain it from phantasms.

\(^{59}\) \textit{De ver.} 10.8 (Leon. 22/2.322:250–55): “cum mens humana speciali aut generali cognitione diffinitur, sic iterum distinguendum videtur: ad cognitionem enim duo concurrere oportet, scilicet apprehensionem et iudicium de re apprehensa; et ideo cognitio qua natura animae cognoscat potest considerari et quantum ad apprehensionem et quantum ad iudicium.” He also states here that the human intellect comes to a knowledge of itself through apprehension of other things, in ibid., (Leon. 22/2.322:270–273): “Unde mens nostra non potest se intelligere ita quod se ipsam immediate apprehendat, sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia devenit in suam cognitionem.”

\(^{60}\) \textit{In III Sent.}, d. 23, q.1, a. 2, ad 3 (Moos, 703): “animam reflecti per cognitionem supra seipsam, vel supra ea quae ipsius sunt, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit naturam sui, vel eorum quae in ipsa sunt; et hoc est tantum intellectus cuius est quidditates rerum cognoscere . . . alio modo anima reflectitur super actus suos cognosendo illos actus esse;” \textit{De ver.} 10.8 (Leon. 22/2.321: 186–199): “Dicendum quod, cum quaeinit urturn aliquid per suam essentiam cognoscatur, quaestio ista dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ut hoc quod dicitur per essentiam referatur ad ipsam rem cognitam, ut illud intelligatur per essentiam cognosci cuius essentia cognoscit, illud autem non cuius essentia non cognoscit sed accidentia quaedam eius; alio modo ut referatur ad id quo aliquid cognoscitur, ut sic intelligatur aliquid per suam essentiam cognoscit quia ipsa essentia est quo cognoscit, et hoc modo ad praesens quaeritur urturn anima per suam essentiam intelligat se.” See also \textit{SCG} 3.46; \textit{ST} Ia, q. 87, a.1.
knowledge which someone has of the soul, however, insofar as it is proper to himself, is the knowledge of the soul as it exists in this individual. Thus it is through this knowledge that one knows that the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a soul. Through the other type of knowledge, however, one knows what the soul is and what its proper per se accidents are.\(^{61}\)

Thomas makes a further distinction within self-awareness, adding that one can know a thing either \textit{actually} or \textit{habitually}.\(^{62}\) Actual self-awareness is the perception that one has a soul, whereby the soul knows itself through its acts;\(^{63}\) an individual “perceives that he has a soul and lives and is, because he perceives that he senses and understands and exercises other vital operations of this kind.”\(^{64}\) Habitual self-awareness belongs to the soul’s essence; it is self-knowledge in which “the soul sees itself through its essence; that is, the soul has the power to go forward into an actual cognition of itself from the fact that its essence is present to itself.”\(^{65}\) As Therese Cory argues,

\(^{61}\) \textit{De ver.}, 10.8 (Leon. 22/2.321:200–216): “de anima duplex cognition haberi potest ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in IX De Trinitate: una quidem qua cuiusque anima se tantum cognoscit quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, alia qua cognoscit anima quantum ad id quod est omnibus animabus commune. Ila igitur cognition quae communiter de omni anima habetur, est qua cognoscit animae natura; cognition vero quam quis habet de anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitione de animae secundum quod esse habet in tali individuo. Unde per hanc cognitionem cognoscitur an est anima, sicut cum aliquis percipit se animam habere; per aliam vero cognitionem scitur quid est anima et quae sunt per se accidentia eius.” The soul, as the form of the body, is the principle of the body’s activities: “to know one’s soul is therefore (at least indirectly) to know one’s body and entire person.” Lambert, \textit{Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas}, 3.

\(^{62}\) Ibid. (Leon. 22/2.321:217–219): “Quantum igitur ad primam cognitionem pertinet, distinguendum est quia cognoscere aliquid est habitu et actu.”


\(^{64}\) Ibid. (Leon. 22/2.321:222–25): “in hoc enim aliquis se percipit animam habere et vivere et esse quod percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia huiusmodi vitae opera exercere.” Also \textit{De ver.}, 10.8 (Leon. 22/2.321:229–33): “Nullus autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit, quia prius est intelligere aliquid quam intelligere se intelligere; et ideo anima pervenit ad actualiter perciendum se esse per illud quod intelligit, vel sentit.” On habitual self-awareness see Cory, \textit{Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge}, ch.5.

\(^{65}\) Ibid. (Leon. 22/2.321:235–38, 322:311–14): “anima per essentiam suam se videt, id est, ex hoc ipso quod essentia sua est sibi praeens, est potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius . . . Sic ergo patet quod mens nostra cognoscit se ipsam quodam modo per essentiam suam, ut Augustinus dicit.” Scarpelli-Cory argues that “because the human soul is intellectual, its ontological self-identity is a cognitive self-presence (a habitual self-awareness). In other words, insofar as the human intellectual soul is ontologically self-identical, it is ‘equipped’ or ‘ordered’ toward actual self-awareness... . . what it is to be an intellectual soul includes being ordered to self-
habitual self-awareness is a disposition, “an ordering towards operation,” that involves two levels: the soul’s perception that it exists and, 2) the soul’s attentiveness to the movements within itself.\textsuperscript{66}

Through an act of explicit self-awareness, the intellect is able to reflect on itself, as seen in the example of the virtuous person who takes delight in being self-aware:

And thus it is evident that because to live is choice-worthy—above all to those good men to whom it is good and delightful to exist—also it is delightful to them to perceive that they sense and understand; because together with this they feel in themselves that which in itself is good for them, namely existing and living; and in this they delight.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} Cory, noting Aquinas’s distinction between implicit and explicit self-awareness in various texts, adds that “the same implicit/explicit distinction, with similar language, appears in connection with volition: Love directed toward the beloved also encompasses itself ‘as the principle of loving’ (ut ratio diligendis), while some acts of love explicitly turn back upon themselves as objects (ut objectum). For Thomas see In 1 Sent., q. 17, a. 1, d. 5, ad 4 (Mand. 407): “Quia vel dilectio fertur in actum dilectionis proprium, sicut in rationem dilectionis tantum; et sic constat quod eodem actu numero diligitur diligens et actus ejus; et sic idem actus diligitur per actum qui est ipse. Vel diligitur ut objectum dilectionis, et sic est alius actus dilectionis numero qui diligitur et quo diligitur; sicut patet planius in actu intellectus.” See Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 144; 145 and ibid., n 30.

\textsuperscript{67} In IX Ethic., ii (Leon. 47/2.540:109–113): “quod autem aliquis sentiat bonum esse in se ipso est delectabile. Et sic patet quod cum vivere sit eligibile et maxime bonis quibus est bonum esse et delectabile, quod etiam percipere se sentire et intelligere est eis delectabile, quia simul cum hoc sentiunt id quod est eis secundum se bonum, scilicet esse et vivere, et in hoc delectantur.” Kierkegaard offers insight into the person who is not at peace with himself because he rejects his call to greatness (akin to Aristotle’s pusillanimous man). Kierkegaard notes that the person one becomes is the fruit of his own will, even if this fact is something he wishes to hide from himself. He states: “there is not a single living human being who does not despair a little, who does not secretly harbour an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an anxiety about some possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself. . . .” Kierkegaard The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition For Upbuilding and Awakening Part One, section B, ed. and trans. H. Hong and E.H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 22. John Crosby notes: “the temptation to rebellion need not come from the sight of my weakness and metaphysical limitations; it can as well come—surprising as this sounds on first hearing—from the sight of my dignity, my greatness, the seriousness of my responsibility. I can experience it as too great a ‘weight of glory’ to have to exist as a free and responsible person. I can resent my destiny and run away from it.” John Crosby, “The Selfhood of the Human Person,” 93.
The soul perceives itself to act and perceives that it exists; it follows that in acting through itself, therefore, the soul knows through itself that it exists.\(^{68}\) The soul knows itself through its acts as their principle.\(^{69}\)

In knowing self through one’s acts, consciously choosing to act or not, the human being determines himself or herself: “as it is proper to an individual substance to exist \textit{per se}, so too it is proper to it to act \textit{per se}: for nothing acts except a being-in-act.”\(^{70}\) To act \textit{per se}, says Thomas, is most appropriate for persons, since only persons have mastery over their own acts, “insofar as in them there is acting and not-acting; whereas other substances are more acted upon than they act.”\(^{71}\)

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\(^{68}\) \textit{SCG} III, c. 46 (Leon. 14.123): “Sicut autem de anima scimus quia est per seipsam, inquantum eius actus percipimus; quid autem sit, inquirimus ex actibus et obiectis per principia scientiarum speculativarum: ita etiam de his quae sunt in anima nostra, scilicet potentiis et habitibus, scimus quidem quia sunt, inquantum actus percipimus; quid vero sint, ex ipsorum actuum qualitate invenimus.”

\(^{69}\) \textit{ST} Ia, q. 87, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 5.356): “mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actuum.” Thomas also discusses quidditative self-knowledge in his Commentary on the \textit{Liber de causis}, but since this kind of self-knowledge does not directly pertain to selfhood it shall not be considered here. See Cory, \textit{Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge}, ch. 7.

\(^{70}\) \textit{De pot.}, 9.1, ad 3 (Marietti, 226): “sicut substantia individua proprium habet quod per se existat, ita proprium habet quod per se agat.” As Kane notes: “Gradually we experience the self abiding in different passing states of pleasure, pain, and emotion. Then, through the exercise of self-control and choice we become more distinctly aware of the self acting, and by intellect we are able to distinguish between the self as a substantial being and an abiding unit . . .” and; “I am aware of many activities and parts which pertain to myself: all are mine. In my deliberate acts I am in control of myself as agent, and know myself as agent. I make my own choice and I know that my choice is mine, and that I am responsible for it . . . As a thing acts, so it is, because operation follows being, and being is manifested by operation . . . In knowing myself as agent I am aware of my self-activity, or life, and the principle of my life, called the soul. It is impossible for me to doubt that I am alive, or think that I am not alive, or to doubt that I have a principle of life, or soul.” William Kane, “Self-Knowledge: True and False,” 195; 196.

\(^{71}\) \textit{De pot.}, 9.1, ad 3 (Marietti, 226): “Hoc autem quod est per se agere, excellentiori modo convenit substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis. Nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et non agere; aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agant.”
We can express this mastery over one’s acts with the term “self-possession,”72 although Thomas does not use this term. Self-possession can be seen in his account at two levels: at the level of “self-awareness” in the order of knowledge and at the level of “self-determination” in the order of will and action.73 At the level of self-awareness, a person can meaningfully say “I,” and in the order of action, one can claim that “I” am responsible for this action.74 I will adopt the terms, “self-awareness” and “self-possession” to denote self-mastery at the level of intellect and at the level of will respectively. We can say, therefore, that for Thomas the human person expresses himself or herself through knowledge and through action from the interior starting-point of relation:

to have (or to be) an ‘intrinsic existence’ means ‘to be able to relate’ and ‘to be the sustaining subject at the center of a field of reference.’ Only in reference to an inside can there be an outside. Without a self-contained ‘subject’ there can be no ‘object.’ Relating-to, conforming-with, being-oriented toward—all these notions presuppose an inside starting-point . . . The higher the form of intrinsic existence, the more developed becomes the relatedness to reality, also the more profound and comprehensive becomes the sphere of this relatedness: namely, the world. And the deeper such relations penetrate the world of reality, the more intrinsic becomes the subject’s existence.75

72 Clarke, Person and Being, 27–8.

73 Ibid. Shanley remarks: “Aquinas offers an analysis of choice as involving an essential unity in mutual interpenetration of the practical judgement of reason and the election of the will. . . . Like Aristotle before him, Aquinas thinks reason and will are so closely intertwined in the act of choice that it is hard to decide whether it is better described as desiderative thinking or intellectual desiring.” Brian Shanley, “Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom,” 77.

74 Ibid., 43. Also: “In acting consciously, the human being determines himself and this self-determination fully discloses the person as a subjective structure of self-governance and self-possession . . . The whole “turning toward itself” that consciousness and self-consciousness work to bring about is ultimately a source of the most expansive openness of the subject toward reality.” Wojtyla, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 230.

An individual who knows that he is self-possessed at these two levels, knows himself as subject “by consciousness and reflexivity.” Yet, while I know that I am alive, I may not be conscious that my soul is the life-principle by which I “perceive, suffer, love, and think.” The reflexive immaterial soul acts through itself because it possesses intellect and will. I cannot, however, know my subjectivity; it is “known or rather felt in virtue of a formless and diffuse knowledge, which, in relation to reflective consciousness, we may call unconscious or pre-conscious knowledge.” We will now explore how the soul acts through itself in a unique relationship of reflexivity between its immaterial powers of intellect and will.

IV. 

Self Acting Through Itself

Reason can direct its own act, says Thomas, because “it is proper to the intellectual part that it is reflected back upon itself: for the intellect understands itself, and similarly reason can

76 Maritain, *Existence and Existent*, 68–9; 83. Also, “because his spirit makes man cross the threshold of independence properly so-called, and of self-inwardness, the subjectivity of the person demands as its most intimate privilege communications proper to love and intelligence. . . .” Ibid., 82.

77 Maritain, *Existence and Existent*, 69. Maritain continues: “When a man is awake to the intuition of being he is awake at the same time to the intuition of subjectivity . . . we know that which we are by our phenomena, our operations, our flow of consciousness.” Ibid.

78 *De virt. in comm.*, 1.1 (Marietti, 709): “Potentiae vero illae sunt agentes et actae quae ita moventur a suis activis, quod tamen per eas non determinantur ad unum; sed in eis est agere, sicut vires aliquo modo rationales.”

79 Maritain, *Existence and Existent*, 70. He continues later: “With regard to my subjectivity in act, I am the centre of the world . . . There is me, and there are all the others . . . These two images—of myself and of my situation in respect of other subjects—can positively not be superposed. These two perspectives cannot be made to coincide. I oscillate rather miserably between them. If I abandon myself to the perspective of subjectivity, I absorb everything into myself . . . I am riveted to the absolute of selfishness and pride. If I abandon myself to the perspective of objectivity, I am absorbed into everything, and, dissolving into the world, I am false to ‘my uniqueness and resign my destiny.’ Ibid., 75.
reason about its own act.”80 Such self-awareness “occurs to some degree in every action over which the agent has control.”81 As the immaterial, reflexive powers of the soul, the intellect and will can reflect upon themselves and upon each other: “for the intellect understands itself and the will and the essence of the soul and all the soul’s powers. Similarly, the will wills that it will, that the intellect understand, that the soul exist, and so of the other powers.”82 Human free choice for Thomas includes intellect and will working actively together.83 Thomas states:

The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things ordered to the object of the will, are also comprised those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable but not that it is prior absolutely.84

80 In Post. an., I.1 (Leon. 1/2.3:12–17): “Ratio autem non solum dirigere potest inferiorum partium actus, sed etiam actus sui directiva est. Hoc enim est primum intellectivae partis, ut in seipsam reflectatur: nam intellectus intellegit seipsum et simili terminat potest.”


84 ST Ia, q. 16, a.4, ad 1 (Leon. 4:211): “voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt: nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e contrario. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut universale, et verum ut particulare: in ordine autem intelligibilium est e contrario. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam bonum,
The mutual inclusiveness of the intellect and will also pertains to their acts “for the acts of the will and of reason are brought to bear on one another, insofar as reason reasons about willing and the will wills to reason.”\textsuperscript{85} The acts of the intellect and will denote “an ontological order of inclusiveness and dependency.”\textsuperscript{86} Because an act of the will is intelligible (the good is true), the intellect is able to perceive the act when present;\textsuperscript{87} likewise, since the true is good, and thus desirable, the objects of the intellect can fall under the will, and become an appetible end to be pursued.\textsuperscript{88} Because the intellect and will are grounded in the same substance of the sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium: non autem quod sit prius simpliciter.” See Reichberg, “Moral Responsibility in Knowing,” 67.

\textsuperscript{85} ST 1aIae, q. 17, a. 1 (Leon. 6:118) “. . . actus voluntatis et rationis supra se invincem possunt ferri, prout scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult ratiocinari . . .” Reichberg comments: “a truthful speculative judgment will entail an implicit self-awareness of the agent’s cognitive act (knowing my conformity to the object), allied with a desire for perfective achievement by engaging in that act. In other words, the self-reflection concomitant to the act of judgment, which Thomas emphasizes in his definition of truth, includes an awareness of oneself as an appetitive cognitive agent. In knowing truth, the self becomes aware of itself as both knowing being and desiring being, or more precisely as desiring to know being. Thomas makes this point when he writes that “the intellect first (per prius) apprehends being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being, and thirdly it apprehends that it desires being.” Reichberg, “Aquinas on Moral Responsibility,” 69. For Thomas see ST 1a, q. 16, a.4, ad 2: “Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et terto apprehendit se appetere ens.” Gallagher also notes: “On Thomas’s view, all actions which spring from cognition involve some sort of judgment about the object of the act. In order for an act of this sort to be in the control of an agent, the agent must control the judgment which governs the act, and required for such control is the capacity to reflect on one’s own judgment;” Gallagher notes that the term “judgment” here refers to judgment as it functions in action, not simply as one of the three acts of the intellect. See Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will,” 669.

\textsuperscript{86} Reichberg “Aquinas on Moral Responsibility,” 69. Also, knowledge is “distinct from but not independent of love. Their influence on one another is reciprocal.” Johann, The Meaning of Love, 68.

\textsuperscript{87} See ST, In. 87, a.4 (Leon. 5.363): “Unde inclinatio naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio subiecto. . . . Quod autem intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur. Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum aliquid percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquid cognoscit naturam huius actus . . .”

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., ad 2: “bonum et verum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, differunt quidem ratione, veruntamen unum eorum continetur sub ali . . . nam verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub voluntate.” Reichberg comments that the phrase “truth is the good of the intellect,” expresses how “truthful knowing can and should become an object of care and attachment for the epistemic agent, precisely because the agent’s whole self is intimately engaged in the act which terminates in conformity with reality. In its formal signification, truth is a
soul, and “since one is in a certain way the principle of the other” whatever is in the will is, in a way, also in the intellect.  

The human will is a *rational* appetite and works with the intellect as the principle of human action; thus both share a “unique interrelationship of reflexivity.” In a human act, as mentioned, a good is first intellectually grasped and then presented to the will which, if it desires this good as “fitting,” moves itself by exercising an act of willing. Human beings therefore exercise control over their judgments because they can reflect upon them. Thomas states:

perfective of a personal intellect. Conversely, falsity is a state of deprivation for the intellect, and hence is described by Thomas as its evil, *malum intellectus*. This intrinsic link of truth with the achievement of the self, absent in Averroistic monopsychism, is also missing in contemporary philosophies inspired by the so-called semantic turn.” Reichberg, “Aquinas on Moral Responsibility,” 71. For Thomas see, *ST* IaIae, q. 57, a.2, ad.3 (Leon. 6:366): “Bonum autem intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum.”

See *ST*, Ia, q. 87, a.4, ad 1 (Leon. 5:363): “ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, sicut sint diversae potentiae, ita etiam subiecto different: sic enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ad intellectu. Nunc autem, cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in voluntate, sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu.” Shanely aptly notes, therefore, that “exercise and specification [of the human act] are not two distinct acts or two distinct moments in an act, but rather are united in a single act of choice seen as originating in the reciprocal causality of two powers. . . . [I]n talking about the freedom of human action, it is necessary to distinguish between the exercise of the act and the specification of the act.” Shanley, “Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom,” 79.

In *De Malo*, 6 co (Leon. 23.147–150), Thomas argues that the principle of action in human beings is properly the intellect and will.

Lambert, *Self-Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas*, 180. As will be made clear in the next chapter, Thomas makes a distinction between sense and intellectual cognition upon which he bases a further distinction between sense and rational appetites (*SCG* II, c.47; *ST* Ia, q. 19, a.1; *ST* Ia, q. 60, a. 1). See Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will,” 563.

In *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (Moos, 704): “Intelectus autem cum sit potentia non utens organo corporali, potest cognoscere actum suum, secundum quod patitur quodammodo ab objecto et inforrnatur per speciem objecti; sed actum voluntatis percipit per redundantiam motus voluntatis in intellectum ex hoc quod colligantur in una essentia animae et secundum quod voluntas quodammodo movet intellectum, dum intelligo quia volo; et intellectus voluntatem, dum volo aliquid quia intelligo illud esse bonum. Et ita in hoc quod cognoscit intellectus actum voluntatis, potest cognoscere habitum in voluntate existentem.”

A judgment is in the power of the one judging insofar as he is able to judge concerning his own judgment, for we are able to judge concerning that which is in our own power. To judge its own judgment pertains only to reason, which reflects on its own act and knows the relationship, of the things about which it judges and of those by which it judges. Hence the root of all freedom is founded in reason.  

The will, however, is not determined by whatever the intellect presents to it since, if the good proposed by the intellect is apprehended as good but not “fitting,” it will not move the will.  

The will can direct the intellect to consider other goods. Thomas states:

When the intellect understands that the will wills, it receives within itself the form of willing; when the will is brought to bear upon the other powers of the soul, it is directed to them as to things to which motion and operation belong, and it inclines each to its own operation. Thus the will moves in the manner of an efficient cause not only external things but also the very powers of the soul.

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94 De ver., q. 24, a.2 (22/3:685–6): “Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare; de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate possimus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis quae super actum suum reflectur, et quae cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat et per quas iudicat; unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliud se habet ad rationem sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium.”


97 See De malo 6 (Leon. 23.149:339–81): “Si ergo consideremus motum potentiarum anime ex parte obiecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu: hoc enim modo bonum intellectum mouet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum anime ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate. . . . Quantum ergo ad exercitium actus, primo quidem manifestum est quod voluntas movetur a se ipsa: sicut enim mouet alias potentias, ita et se ipsam movet. . . . sicut enim homo secundum intellectum in uia inuentionis mouet se ipsum ad scientiam, in quantum ex uno noto in actu ueniit in aliquid ignorant quod erat solum in potentia notum, ita per hoc quod homo aliquid uult in actu, movet se ad volendum aliquid aliud in actu. . . . Cum ergo voluntas se consilio moveat, consilium autem est inquisitio quedam non demonstratia set ad opposita uiam habens, non ex necessitate voluntas siipsam mouet.”

98 De ver., q. 22, a.12co. (Leon. 22/3:642: 109–117): “sicut intellectus cum intelligit voluntatem velle, accipit in se ipso rationem volendi; unde et ipsa voluntas, cum fertur super potentias animae, fertur in eas ut in res quasdam quibus conventit motus et operatio, et inclinat unamquamque in propriam operationem; et sic non solum res exteriores movet voluntas per modum causae agentis sed etiam ipsas animae vires.”
Human beings are able to self-reflect concerning moral matters precisely because the will can move the intellect to consider its acts:

For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion is to think of himself, to whom other things are ordered as to an end.99

And elsewhere:

It is not the place of the subject to pass judgment on the command in itself in its own wisdom and goodness, but it is his responsibility to pass judgment on his own fulfilling of the command here and now. For every person is bound to examine his own actions according to the knowledge which he himself has from God, whether natural or acquired, or infused from above; for every man is obliged to act according to reason.100

We bear in mind that, in performing a human act, “I not only have to do with the good or bad thing to which I am directed; I also have to do with myself.”101 For Thomas, every person necessarily acts for an end102 through knowledge and through love, where love precedes knowledge as a principle of movement and knowledge precedes love in acting.103 A human, or

99 ST IaIae, q. 89, a. 6, ad 3 co (Leon. 7:146): “Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad finem.”

100 De ver., q. 17, a.5, ad 4 (Leon. 22/2.528:100–106): “subditus non habet iudicare de praeccepto praelati sed de impletione praecpti quae ad ipsum spectat; unusquisque enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad scientiam quam a Deo habet sive sit naturalis sive acquista sive infusa: omnis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere.”

Charles Taylor comments that self-identity involves not simply knowing “what I am” but also “what I stand for,” adding that selfhood and morality are inseparable. Concerning the question of identity, Taylor states: “the question [of identity] is often spontaneously phrased by people in the form: Who am I? . . . To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.” See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 27.

101 John Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person, 82.

102 ST IaIae, q. 1, a. 2co (Leon. 6:6): “omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.”

103 ST IaIae, q. 3, a.4, ad 4 (Leon. 6:29): “finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas: tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate.”
moral, act is specified by the end\(^\text{104}\) and requires knowledge,\(^\text{105}\) although one’s character or disposition also influences how one perceives the end.\(^\text{106}\) An act of the will is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle of knowledge,\(^\text{107}\) since the will is a rational appetite and thus follows the apprehension of reason.\(^\text{108}\) The moral goodness of the will (ultimately, of the person), depends upon knowledge, since the will’s object is an apprehended good.\(^\text{109}\) If the object were completely unknown it would not be desired.\(^\text{110}\) Thomas states:

\[\text{104} \text{ST IaIae, q.1, a.3co (Leon. 6:10): “actus humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur.”}\]

\[\text{105} \text{ST IaIae, q. 6, a.1 (Leon. 6:56): “Ad hoc autem quod fiat aliquid propter finem, requiritur cognitio finis alicialis.”}\]

\[\text{106} \text{In De malo 6co. (Marietti, 560), Thomas cites Aristotle (Nic. Ethics III, 5 [1114a32–b1]: “according to the character of a man so does the end appear to him.” Thomas demonstrates this point via an example of the will of an angry man and the will of a calm man as being moved differently in regard to something: “secundum Philosophum, qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur et. Unde aliter movetur ad aliquid voluntas irati et voluntas quieta, quia non idem est conveniens utrique; sicut etiam aliter acceptatur cibus a sano et aegro.”}\]

\[\text{107} \text{ST IaIae, q.6, a.4 (Leon. 6:59): “actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente: sicut appetitus naturalis est quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione.”}\]

\[\text{108} \text{In II Sent., 24, 3, 1.}\]

\[\text{109} \text{De ver., q. 22, a. 9, ad 6 (Leon. 22/3. 634: 188–89): “Obiectum enim voluntatis est bonum apprehensionum”; ST IIaIae, q. 98, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 9:341): “actus morales procedunt a voluntate, cuius objectum est bonum apprehensionem, et ideo si faslum”; In III Sent., d. 26, 1.2 (Moos, 816): “proprium autem motivum appetitivae virtutis est bonum apprehensionem; unde oportet quod secundum diversas virtutes apprehendentes sint etiam diversi appetitus: scilicet appetitus rationis, qui est de bono apprehenso secundum rationem vel intellectum, unde est de bono apprehenso simpliciter et in universali.” See Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 20–1. Also, Gallagher states: “In moral choices, one looks not only to the suitable but also to the good. In such choices an action is chosen precisely as good or better than some other.” David Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will,” 581.}\]

\[\text{110} \text{The will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended by reason. In I Sent 6.1.3. Also in ST IaIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 1 (Leon. 6:144): “voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio modo movet voluntatem, ex parte scilicet obiecti . . .”}\]
For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.\textsuperscript{111}

The form of an object, when received in the intellect, “imparts an affective proportion in the appetitive powers”\textsuperscript{112} at the same time. For Thomas, all appetitive principles of action presuppose knowledge.\textsuperscript{113} In the case of the human will, however, it is not just the object known that causes love to arise in the appetite; love is also the result of the lover’s free choice.\textsuperscript{114}

Love causes whatever the person does;\textsuperscript{115} love involves both appetite and cognition. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next chapter, love depends on the form of the beloved existing in the intellect. As the principle of action, love in the will is also the principle of the intellect’s action on the level of exercise: the intellect apprehends the end before the will does, but motion toward the end begins in the will.\textsuperscript{116}

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\textsuperscript{111} ST IaIIae, q. 3, a.4co (Leon. 6:29): “Nam a principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit prae sens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata con quiescit in fine iam adepto.”
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\textsuperscript{112} Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 71.
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\textsuperscript{113} ST IaIIae, q. 27, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 6:193): “amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit . . .” See Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 72. How the different appetites relate to cognition will be discussed in the following chapter.
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\textsuperscript{114} ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.1co (Leon. 6:188): “Unde secundum differentiam appetitus, est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius: et huiusmodi dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem instituentis naturam . . . Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in bruitis: qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas.” (Italics in text).
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\textsuperscript{115} ST IaIIae, 28.6 (Leon. 6:202): “omne agens quodcumque sit, agit quacumque actionem ex aliquo amore.”
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\textsuperscript{116} ST IaIIae, q. 3, a. 4, ad 3 (Leon. 6:29): “quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas: tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate.” See also ST IaIIae, q.4, a.4, ad 2 (Leon. 6:41): “omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo acti intellectus; aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actua intellectus.”
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The object of love in the will, therefore, is good *as known* and is the result of one’s free choice:

For this reason the Philosopher says that bodily sight is the beg inning of sensitive love. In like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly, knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.\(^\text{117}\)

Thomas thus endorses Augustine’s insight that “‘no one can love what he does not know.’”\(^\text{118}\) “Love’s dependence on knowledge . . . has profound implications for Aquinas’s entire theory of action. It means that for Aquinas, love, and thus also human action, presupposes a voluntary receptivity to reality.”\(^\text{119}\) Thomas remarks that “contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Hence knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which cannot be loved unless it be known.”\(^\text{120}\)

Thomas also emphasises the interdependence of knowledge and love in the mutual indwelling between lover and beloved, a topic that shall be disussed in more detail in the next chapter. For Thomas, the interdependence of knowledge and love is implied in mutual

\(^{117}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 27, a.2 (Leon. 6:193): “Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit, IX *Ethic.*, quod visio corporalis est principium amoris sensiti. Et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum.”

\(^{118}\) See footnote 2. *ST* IaIIae, q. 3, a.4, ad 4 (Leon. 6.29): “dilectio praeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed cognitione praeiént est dilectióni in attingendo: *non enim diligítur nisi cognitum*, ut dicit Augustinus in *X de Trin.*” See Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love*, 73.

\(^{119}\) Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love*, 95.

\(^{120}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 27, a.2co (Leon.6.193): “contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum.”
indwelling as an “effect of love”¹²¹ where the beloved is said to dwell in the lover insofar as the beloved is apprehended cognitively and appetitively by the lover.¹²²

Although Thomas explicitly treats only love’s dependence on knowledge,¹²³ he does look at the dependence of knowledge on love in his account of ecstasy.¹²⁴ The experience of ecstasy, says Thomas, is one of being “placed outside oneself” and is experienced by both the intellect and the will.¹²⁵ Cognitive ecstasy arises when a person acquires knowledge beyond the knowledge normally proper to him; it is caused by love “dispositively,” because “love makes the lover meditate on the beloved . . . and intense meditation on one thing draws the mind away from other things.”¹²⁶ Appetitive ecstasy is caused by love directly:

¹²¹ ST IaIae, q. 28, a.2 (Leon. 6:198): “Respondeo dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam.”

¹²² Ibid: “Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis . . . Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem, inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nittur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur.” See Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 79.

¹²³ ST IaIae, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3 (Leon. 6: 199): “rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris. Et ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintran in amatum . . .”

¹²⁴ ST IaIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 6: 199): “extasim pati alius dicitur, cum extra se ponitur. Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum vim appetitivam.” See Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 79.

¹²⁵ ST IaIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 6: 199–200): “Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam alius dicitur extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriae: vel quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendinga aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalam apprehensionem rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum alius in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur alius extasim pati, quando appetitus alcius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.”

¹²⁶ ST IaIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 6: 200): “Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato . . . intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis.”
simply in love of friendship, and in a qualified sense in love of concupiscence. Thomas states:

Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; insofar, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this affection remains finally within him. On the other hand, in love of friendship, a man’s affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does good to his friend by caring and providing for his friend for his sake.

What exactly Thomas means by “love of concupiscence” and “love of friendship,” particularly in relation to oneself, will be considered in the next chapter. Thus far, we have seen that Thomas’s account of the human person provides the metaphysical ground for his theory of human subjectivity where both the body and soul are integral to human personhood. Selfhood, however, pertains to the intellectual reflexive soul which, properly speaking, is the “knower” and the seat of human selfhood. Because the intellectual soul has the capacity to understand itself and to reflect upon its acts, human beings are agents of their own freedom.

Having looked at human self-knowledge, we must ask how Thomas accounts for human self-love. The notion of love of one’s body in its ordered and disordered forms seems straightforward enough, but love of one’s soul is not as easy to conceptualise. Thomas consistently reminds us of the principle that love follows upon knowledge: disordered (partial) knowledge and disordered love form, as one author states, are “the co-principles of

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127 Ibid: “secundum extasim facit amor directe: simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem concupiscientiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid.”

128 Ibid: “Nam in amore concupiscientiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra se ipsum: inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quae in quod aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud ext rinsucem bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se: quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.”
sinful action” and “this implies that in order to overcome our sins, we need both integral knowledge and ordered affection."\textsuperscript{129} We could reformulate this to say that human self-perfection requires self-knowledge and ordered self-love.

\textsuperscript{129} Sherwin, \textit{By Knowledge and By Love}, 106.
Chapter Three:

Self-love as a Principle of Human Action

Having examined Thomas’s notion of self, we now turn to his account of self-love and how it operates as the principle of human action. Thomas does not oppose self-love to love of others, but rather distinguishes between proper self-love (amor sui ordinatus) and improper self-love (amor sui inordinatus). In this chapter, we will look first at Thomas’s general theory of love, outlining the different kinds of love that arise in the three different appetites. The various types of self-love will then be addressed, with a focus on the relationship between proper self-love and self-knowledge. Finally, we will explore how the conscious choice to love self, by means of a virtuous life, is perfective of a person. The ways in which improper self-love hinders one’s perfection will be examined at the end of the chapter.

I

Some Preliminary Distinctions:
“Love”, “Desire” “Appetite”

Thomas uses many different terms for love, the most general term being amor.¹ Love is an analogical notion for Thomas.² All creatures incline toward the good. In one text, Thomas

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<tr>
<th>NATURAL LOVE</th>
<th>SENSITIVE LOVE</th>
<th>RATIONAL LOVE</th>
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<td>amor naturalis</td>
<td>amor sensitivus</td>
<td>amor intellectivus; amor rationalis; dilectio naturalis; voluntas ut natura; voluntas ut ratio; naturali dilectione; dilectio electiva; dilectio gratuita</td>
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calls love (*amor*) a “certain inclination to what is desirable;”\(^3\) in another text “a principle of motion (*principium motus*) which tends to the end loved”.\(^4\) Love is thus more general than desire: it is the principle of the appetite, whereas desire is the movement, the inclination, toward an appetible object. The good arouses desire, which seeks the good in order to possess it. Once the good is possessed, the desire rests, with the movement ending at the same point at which it began.\(^5\) Thus, Thomas also calls love (*amor*) “a certain *resting* of appetite,”\(^6\) characterising love as both a “seeking” and a “possessing” of the good.

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\(^2\) Thomas applies the term “love” (*amor*) in a flexible manner to several different subjects, where the meaning of love is partly the same and partly different: a stone *loves*, an animal *loves*, a human being *loves*, God *loves*. The activities of each are different. As Norris Clarke notes on the subject of analogy: “The analogous term thus signifies a similar type of activity going on in each, but carried out by each agent-subject in its own distinctive way, according to the structure and capacities proper to its own essence or nature. Hence the meaning of the analogous term is partly the same, partly different in each application, shifting internally to fit the distinctive mode of exercising the activity proper to each subject, or analogate, but without breaking the bond of authentic similarity justifying expression by one and the same meaningful term.” See Norris Clarke, *The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 47. Christopher Malloy notes that Thomas, in his earlier writings, often gives priority to desire over love, whereas in his later writings he argues that love precedes desire. Moreover, in his later writings Thomas looks at love in terms of the good as present or absent. Malloy writes “in his *ex professo* treatment, Thomas indeed maintains the priority of love in generation . . .”; “love is not a motion *qua* ‘motion towards’ but rather *qua* operation or *qua* the principle of ‘motion towards’ or, finally, *qua* the information of the appetite by some apprehended good.” Christopher J. Malloy “Thomas on the Order of Love and Desire: A Development of Doctrine,” *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 65; 69; 84; 83. For Thomas see ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.2, ad 3.

\(^3\) *De malo*, q. 16, a.2co (Leon. 23.370:261–62): “appetitus nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quidam in appetibile.” See also *De virt. in comm.*, q. 2, a.1: “inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus appetitus nominatur.”

\(^4\) *ST IaIIae*, q. 26, a.1 (Leon: 6.188): “amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum.”

\(^5\) This circular movement as found in sensitive love (*amor*) (*ST IaIIae*, q. 26, a.2):
“Appetite” (*appetitus*) denotes the inclination of a creature towards its own good,\(^7\) where the good is the origin and end of the appetite.\(^8\) The good only arouses desire within a creature

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\(^6\) *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a.1 co (Moos, 874): “amor est quaedam appetitus quietatio.” Thomas uses the term “appetite” in two senses: 1) the actual desire for good and 2) that faculty of the soul in which desires arise following upon cognition. See ST Ia, q. 19, a.1 ad. 2 (Leon. 5.231): “voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem: quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et delectetur in illo.” As David Gallagher notes, context indicates which sense Thomas means. See David Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas,” in *Mediaeval Studies* 58 (1996), 9, n. 21.

\(^7\) *In I Ethic.*, lect.1.11: “Quod omnia appetunt, non est intelligendum solum de habentibus cognitionem, quae apprehendunt bonum . . . Ipsum tendere in bonum, est appetere bonum. Unde et omnia dixit appetere bonum, inquantum tendunt ad bonum.” See Aersten, *Nature and Creature*, 342: “Thus ‘appetite’—a term that suggests conscious, psychic activity—must be taken here in a broad, ontological sense.”

\(^8\) In order for a creature to reach its end, Thomas argues that three elements are required: a nature (*natura*) proportionate to that end (*proportionata ad finem illum*), an inclination (*inclinatio*) which is a natural appetite (*naturalis appetitus*) for that end, and a movement (*motus*) towards the end. *De ver.*, q.27, a.2 (Leon. 22/3.794:115–121): “Sic ut patet quod in terra est natura quaedam per quam sibi competit esse in medio, et hanc naturam sequitur inclinatio in locum medium secundum quam appetit naturaliter talem locum, etiam cum extra ipsum per violentiam detinetur; et ideo remoto prohibente per deorsum movetur.”
when this good is proportionate to the creature. In different kinds of creatures there are different kinds of appetites, and thus different kinds of love. As we will see, there are various ways in which appetite is present within creatures. We will focus on the particularly complex case of human beings who have all three kinds identified by Thomas.

II

Natural, Sensitive, and Rational Appetite

As previously mentioned, appetite is an inclination within a creature toward an object that is both similar (simile) and suited (conveniens) to the creature. Appetite is the principle in creatures that directs them towards their completion in being, since as finite beings they are by nature ontologically incomplete. Since every inclination follows upon form, creatures naturally incline toward that which perfects their form. The incompleteness of a creature’s

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9 ST IaIIae, q. 27, a.1 (Leon. 6:192): “Unicumque autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum.”

10 ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.1co (Leon. 6.188): “Amor est aliquid appetitum pertinentium: cum utriusque objectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus, est differentia amoris.”


12 ST IaIIae, q. 8, a.1 (Leon. 6.68): “Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclination appetentis in aliquid. Nihil autem inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens.”

13 ST Ia, q. 80, a. 1co (Leon. 5.282); ibid., IaIIae, q. 8, a.1co (Leon. 6.68). As will be seen, form enjoys a more perfect existence in creatures that have knowledge, thus the rational appetite surpasses both the natural and sense appetites, inclining the creature towards unqualified and unlimited goodness, not simply towards sensible goods. See ST Ia, q. 80, a.1co (Leon. 5.282). Ibid., ad 2. See Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 5. Also, as Russell Hittinger notes, “there is an important sense in which the appetite is directly related to the very existence of extramental realities and is oriented to a community with things not by way of possessing them, but rather in a way
being causes it to “want” its perfection by seeking the desirable or good.\textsuperscript{14} Since a thing is desirable insofar as it is perfect,\textsuperscript{15} the extent to which a creature “has” goodness, is the extent to which it is complete or perfect, as Robert Miner notes:

what causes a creature to have an appetite is nothing less than the fact of creaturehood itself. Within anything that contains a distinction between what it is (its \textit{essentia}) and the grounding act by which it is (its \textit{esse}), there is some difference between potency and act. In its most fundamental sense, \textit{appetitus} denotes the disposition of the creature’s potency toward actualization.\textsuperscript{16}

Appetitive powers are passive; that is, they are moved by their objects. This means that they are to be distinguished according to those objects.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, these objects are apprehended in different ways.

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that tends to being possessed by the ‘other.’” Russell Hittinger, “When It Is More Excellent To Love Than To Know,” \textit{American Catholic Philosophical Association} 57 (1983): 171. Natural appetite follows from a natural form, and sensitive and rational appetite follow from an apprehended form (\textit{ST} IaIae, q. 8, a.1co [Leon. 6.68]).
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\textsuperscript{14} \textit{SCG} II, c. 82 (Leon. 13.513): “In qualibet re quae potest pertingere ad aliquam perfectionem, inventitur naturalis appetitus illius perfectionis: \textit{bonum enim est quod omnia appetunt}, ita tamen quod \textit{unumquodque proprium bonum}. In brutis autem non inventitur aliquis appetitus ad esse perpetuum, nisi ut perpetuatur secundum speciem, inquantum in eis inventitur appetitus generationis, per quam species perpetuatur, qui quidem inventur et in plantis et in rebus inanimatis: non autem quantum ad proprium appetitum animalis inquantum est animal, qui est appetitus apprehensionem consequens. Nam, cum anima sensitiva non apprehendat nisi hic et nunc, impossibile est quod apprehendat esse perpetuum. Neque ergo appetit appetitu animali. Non est igitur anima bruti capax perpetui esse.”

\textsuperscript{15} And something is perfect insofar as it is in act. Thus Thomas argues in \textit{ST} Ia. q.5, a.1co (Leon. 4.56), that being and good are interchangeable: “quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei . . . Unde manifestum est quod bonum est ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.”

\textsuperscript{16} Robert Miner, \textit{Thomas Aquinas on the Passions}, 16.

\textsuperscript{17} See \textit{SCG} II, 7 for Thomas’s position on the meaning of “passive power.” As Gallagher notes, for Thomas, a passive power “denotes a faculty which is moved by its object (e.g., the power of sight) as opposed to an active power which effects some change in an object outside itself (e.g., the power of digestion). See “The Will as Rational Appetite,” 562, n. 9.
The distinction between the different kinds of appetites rests upon the various degrees of cognition within creatures, since appetite always follows cognition. In the case of non-cognising natural things, appetite follows cognition from the creature’s Author, namely God; by contrast, in cognitive beings appetite follows from the creature’s own sensitive or intellectual cognition. Human beings present a particularly fascinating case of having all three appetites and can thus be inclined toward mutually incompatible goods.

A. Natural appetite

In each appetite, there must be some “connaturality” (connaturalitas), that is, suitability or proportion, between the inclining creature and the object towards which it inclines, where the suitability causes the creature to be drawn to the object. Connaturalility

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20 *ST* IaIIae, q.26, a.1co (Leon. 6.188): “In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis.” Thomas uses the term “connaturality” here to denote the natural suitability of an object to the creature, so that the creature is naturally drawn to that object. Thomas also uses “connaturality” to denote a moral habit, or “second nature” within a human being, a second mode of existence. This latter sense of the term shall be explored toward the end of this chapter. See T. Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowing and Connaturality in Aquinas” in *Theological Studies* 66 (1): 49–68. Peter Kwasniewski outlines several other terms that Thomas uses to denote the suitability of an object to the appetite: *coaptatio*, the “adaptation of the appetite to its object;” *consonantia*, the “harmony” between the object and the
(connaturalitas) is thus the source of the inclination towards the good. The connaturality of a heavy body, for example, is its gravitas or “weight,” which Thomas also calls its natural love (amor naturalis).\textsuperscript{21} Also, fire has the natural inclination to rise.\textsuperscript{22} Such objects tend toward good by their own natural inclination as determined by their natural form.\textsuperscript{23} The form of heaviness, for example, is the inner principle of movement which inclines the heavy body to its natural place. The inclination is “natural” because it arises from the nature of that which inclines. The connaturality precedes the inclination to motion due to an apprehension that is in the Author of the thing’s nature,\textsuperscript{24} and is the source of the inclination and rest in the good.

agent; convenientia, the suitability of that good for the agent; complaeciencia, a “well-pleasedness” with the good; and immutatiol informatio, the appetite undergoing a change in receiving the form of the object. In each case, however, love itself transforms the appetite. See Peter Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas.” The Catholic University of America: Dissertation (2002), 120;121.

\textsuperscript{21} ST IaIae, q.26, a.1co (Leon. 6.188): “sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis.” Also, ST IaIae, q.26, a.2 (Leon.6.189): “Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens: nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsum. Et ipsa gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis.”

\textsuperscript{22} ST Ia, q. 60, a.4 (Leon. 5.103): “ignis naturalem inclinationem habet ut communicet alteri suam formam, quod est bonum eius: sicut naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod quaerat bonum suum, ut esse sursum.”

\textsuperscript{23} ST Ia, q.59, a.1co (Leon. 5.92): “Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.”

\textsuperscript{24} ST IaIae, q.26, a.1co (Leon. 6.188): “Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius: et huiusmodi dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt, quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, sed per apprehensionem institutentis naturam . . .” See also: In II Sent., d.38, q.1, a.3, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 975): “naturalia quamvis non habeant voluntatem, tamen intendunt aliquid per appetitum naturalem, secundum quod diriguntur in finem suum ab intellectu divino naturae attribuente inclinationem in finem, quae inclination appetitus naturalis dicitur; et ideo non est ita proprii intentio in eis sicut in agentibus a proposito.” Also, In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a.2co; SCG II, c.47; ibid., c.55; Thomas frequently uses as an example of natural appetite an arrow that moves toward its target by the
B. Sensitive appetite

For both Aristotle\textsuperscript{25} and Thomas,\textsuperscript{26} organisms that are able to sense have a capacity for desiring. This capacity depends upon the power of apprehension.\textsuperscript{27} The sensitive appetite is related to sensitive apprehension as moved is related to mover: in order to be in act it must be acted upon. Beings with cognition must also have some connaturality or proportion to the object of their inclination. Unlike natural appetite, sensitive appetite is only present in beings with sensation and is caused by and dependent upon the apprehensive powers of the creature.\textsuperscript{28} In both brute animals and human beings, the sensitive appetite has two powers: the irascible power and the concupiscible power.\textsuperscript{29} The objects of both powers are the same (sensible goods or evils), but each power considers these objects differently: the concupiscible power considers sensible apprehension of the archer: \textit{ST} Ia, q. 2, a. 3co (Leon.4.32): “Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante.” Also \textit{ST} IaIIae, q.1, a.2co.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{In De an.} II, 1(412a28).

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{ST} Ia, q.78, a.1co (Leon. 5.250–251).

\textsuperscript{27} As Kevin White notes: “Sense-appetite has a complex role in human action, to which it contributes both its own actuation (passio) and a bodily performance (executio) of passion. Its actuation, in keeping with the rule that appetite follows apprehension, is directed by the universal apprehension of reason acting through the intermediary of the ‘cogitative’ power or ‘particular reason,’ an inner sense power that apprehends and compare s invisible intentiones or ‘values,’ such as danger, in the objects of the outer senses. This mediation allows universal premises to produce particular conclusions that modify passion, as when anger or fear is aroused or diminished by the application of general considerations.” White, “The Passions of the Soul,” 105.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 26, a.1 (Leon. 6.188): “Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetitis, sed ex necessitate, non ex judicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis.” This appetite stands “midway” between the natural and rational appetites: \textit{De ver.}, q. 25, a.1co (Leon22/3.728): “Hic autem appetitus sensibilis medius est inter appetitum naturalem et appetitum superiorem rationalem.”

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{De ver.}, q. 25, a.2 (Leon. 22/3.732); \textit{ST} Ia, q.81, a. 2co (Leon. 5.289).
goods and evils simply, whereas the irascible power considers these same objects under the aspect of the arduous, or difficult. The irascible power enables a creature to resist those things that hinder the acquisition of what is suitable and produces harm. Thomas gives the example in brute animals where this inclination is moved by the estimative power: a sheep, becoming afraid at seeing a wolf, flees from it because it has no counteracting appetite. Human beings, however, are not moved immediately; we can control our inclinations because we possess reason, which allows us to judge relationships between objects and decide whether to fight or flee in a given situation.

“Sensuality” (sensualitas) is another name for the sense appetite. Sensuality denotes the sensual movement that follows upon sensitive apprehension where the bodily senses incline the

30 ST IaIIae, q. 23, a.1 (Leon. 6.173).

31 ST Ia, q. 81, a.2co and ad 1 (Leon. 5.289). As Gallagher notes, “control presupposes a rational grasp of the means/end relationship” thus, “a rational agent is not determined to a single course of action because deliberation implies different possible actions.” Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” 567; 569. For Thomas see ST Ia, q. 81, a.3co (Leon. 5: 290–91).

32 ST Ia, q. 81, a.1co (Leon. 5.288): “Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus: nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perfectur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivii.” Also ST III, q.18, a.2co (Leon.11.232): “sensualitas, sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedienti rationi, dicitur rationale per participationem.” Thomas, however, also uses the term sensualitas to denote an inclination to sin. See De ver., q. 16, a. 1, ad 7 (Leon. 22/2.505: 313–318): “sensualitas inclinat semper ad malum habet ex corruptione fomitis, quae quidem corruptio inest ei per modum cuiusdam habitus: et sic etiam synnderesis ex habitu aliquo naturali habet quod semper ad bonum inclinet.” Also, ibid., q. 24, a.5 (Leon. 22/3.693:45–48): “Invenitur autem una potentia in homine quae semper tendit in bonum, scilicet synnderesis, et alia quasi huic opposita quae semper inclinat in malum, scilicet sensualitas.”
creature toward the apprehended object. In creatures that have cognition, the connatural
between the creature and the loved object arises through the interaction of the cognitive and
appetitive faculties of the soul. When a pleasing object is apprehended, the appetitive faculty
undergoes a change by which it becomes suitable to that particular object and a source of striving
toward it. In other words, the desired object gives the appetite a certain adaptation to itself via a
complacentia, a “well-pleasedness,” in that object; the appetite then moves toward that object,
a movement that necessarily arises from an apprehension within the subject of the appetite.

Following Aristotle, Thomas describes a circular movement within the sensitive appetite:
the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself into the creature’s intention, informing
it and moving it to act; the appetite then moves toward the appetible object so that the movement
ends where it began. Thus, Thomas aptly calls the sensitive appetite a “moved mover” (movens

33 ST Ia, q. 81, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 5.288): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per hoc quod dicit Augustinus
quod sensualis animae motus intenditur in corporis sensus, non datur intelligi quod corporis sensus sub sensualitate
comprehenduntur: sed magis quod motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet
appetitus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur. Et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi
praebambii.”

34 ST Ia, q. 59, a.1co (Leon. 5.92): “Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinatur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem
sic quod cognoscent ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscent aliquod bonum particular; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit
dulce et album et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus.” Italics
in text.


36 De ver., q. 25, a.1 (Leon. 22/3.729). As Kevin White observes, in human beings sense-appetite “can get
ahead of reason because, together, with its subordination to reason through the cogitative power, it has ‘something
of its own’ inasmuch as it can be moved by imagination and external senses, and so can resist reason by submitting
to a sensing or imagining that dwells on something pleasant vetoed by reason or something unpleasant commanded
by it.” White, “Passions of the Soul,” 106.
motum), inclining the creature toward a particular good that is desirable. 38 Whereas appetite moves us toward an object itself, apprehension “brings the thing to us” via its sensible or intelligible species, rendering love more unitive than cognition. 39 Thomas states:

The fulfillment of any motion is in the term of the motion, since the term of the motion of a cognitive power is the soul, the known must be in the knower according to the mode of the knower. But the motion of an appetitive power terminates in things. Thus, the Philosopher speaks of a sort of circle in the acts of the soul: for a thing outside the soul moves the intellect, and the known thing moves the appetite, and the appetite tends to reach those things from which the motion originated. And since good names an order of being (ens) to appetite, whereas true names an order to the intellect, the Philosopher says that good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind. 40

37 ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.2co (Leon. 6,189): “Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de Anima: appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium.”

38 See ST Ia, q. 80, a. 2co (Leon. 5,284): “necesse est dicere appetitum intellectivum esse aliam potentiam a sensitivo. Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso: unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum, ut dicitur in III de Anima [(3,10, 433b16], et XII Metaphys [(12,7, 1072a26)]. Passiva autem et mobilia distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum: quia oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo: et ipsa potentia passiva propria rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum. Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo.”

39 See Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 15. Kevin White notes that “a loved good is something known to, if only to the extent of having been seen by, one who loves it (IaIIae, q. 27, aa. 2–3). Resemblance is oneness between lover and loved that precedes love; oneness of resemblance causes the “affective” oneness that is love itself; and love’s first effect is to lead the lover to ‘real’ oneness with the known, loved good (IaIIae, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2). Union of resemblance anticipates love; the union that is love anticipates the terminus of passion, ‘delight’ and ‘real’ union coincides with delight.” White, “The Passions of the Soul,” 108.

40 De ver., q. 1. a.2 (Leon. 22/1.9:60–79); “Motus autem cognitivae virtutis terminatur ad animam, —oportet enim quod cognitum sit in cognoscendo per modum cognoscentis—, sed motus appetitivae terminatur ad res: inde est quod Philosophus ponit circulum quendam in actibus animae, secundum scilicet quod res quae est extra animam movet intellectum, et res intellecta movet appetitum, et appetitus tendit ad hoc ut perveniat ad rem a qua motus incepit; et quia bonum ... dicit ordinem entis ad appetitum, verum autem dicit ordinem ad intellectum, inde est quod Philosophus dicit ... quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum autem et falsum sunt in mente.” As Russell Hittinger notes: “Because the movement of the affectus terminates at things as they are in themselves, it can engage in community with things beyond the range of “likeness” that is required by knowledge.” He further states that where the relation of “likeness” ends, the priority of love commences, thus: “when we are related to things whose existence is inferior to our own, it is the intellect that shepherds the community, and ennobles that union. When we are related to that which is existentially superior to ourselves, it is the heart that follows the lead of God, who mysteriously enables our very being.” Russell Hittinger, “When It Is More Excellent To Love Than To Know,” 175; 177.
Thomas calls the affective motions in sense cognition and sense appetite, *passions*. The term “passion” (*passio*) denotes receptivity, the passive act of being acted upon by an outside object; once stirred by the object, the appetite is drawn to it.\(^1\) In human beings, passions cause bodily change (*transmutatio corporalis*) to take place,\(^2\) inclining the subject towards the external stimulus.

\(^{1}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 22, a.2 co (Leon. 6.169): “in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis.” On the different meanings of the term “passion” see Kevin White, “The Passions of the Soul (IaIIae, qq. 22–48),” in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, Ed., Stephen Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 103–115. White notes: “More properly, *pati* means reception accompanied by elimination; what is eliminated may be either unsuitable, as when a body gets rid of sickness in being healed, or suitable, as when a body loses health in becoming sick. The latter corresponds to the most proper sense of *passio*, because *pati* connotes a “being pulled” (*trahi*), and it seems to be the violence caused by “pulling” (“yanking” or “jerking” may be better here) that suggests a thing’s being taken away from what is suitable to it; *pati* in this most proper sense signifies a worsening, a production (*generatio*) of the worse out of the better that is, more precisely, a destruction (*corruptio*). Passion as a mere reception occurs in the soul when it senses or understands; passion as reception with elimination occurs in the composite of soul and body when it is “affected” (*patitur*), and so only incidentally in the soul itself. Since change for the worse more properly has the nature (*ratio*) of passion than does change for the better, pain is more properly called a passion than is joy (IaIIae, q. 22, a.1).” Ibid.,104.

\(^{2}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 22, a.3co. (Leon. 6.171); *ST* IaIIae, q. 22, a.2co. (Leon. 6.169). We note, however, that there is a distinction between passions of the body and passions of the soul. The passions of the body begin in the body and end in the soul; the passions of the soul begin in the soul and end in the body. See *De ver.*, q. 26, a.2co (Leon. 22/3.752): “proprie accipiendo passionem impossibile est aliquod incorporeum pati . . . illud ergo quod per se patitur passione proprii accepta corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidentes.” Thomas calls the sensitive appetite a material power because it is grounded in a bodily organ. *ST* IaIIae, q. 77, a.1, ad 3 (Leon.6.272): “proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis organisum corporale, qui fit cum aliqua transmutatone corporali.” In human beings, however, the movements of the sensitive appetite, the passions, “are themselves ‘intellectual’—present on account of intellect—in the human soul.” White, “The Passions of the Soul,” 105.
The passions are distinguished according to the different intentional objects. Thomas identifies eleven fundamental passions based on eleven different kinds of intentional objects:

In the concupiscible are three ordered pairs of passions, viz. love and hate, desire and aversion, joy and sorrow. Similarly in the irascible are three groups, viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger, to which no passion is opposed. Therefore all the passions differing in species are eleven in number, six in the concupiscible and five in the irascible, under which all the passions of the soul are contained.

Although the passions are not completely subject to reason in humanity’s fallen condition, these affective motions still obey reason to some extent. A passion of the sensitive

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43 Lombardo summarises the passions in Thomas’s treatise as follows:

**The concupiscible passions:**
- Absent good → desire (concupiscientia)
  - Cognition of good object → love (amor)
  - Present good → pleasure (delectatio)
- Cognition of evil object → hatred (odium)
  - Absent evil → aversion (fuga) or repulsion (abominatio)
  - Present evil → sorrow (tristitia) or pain (dolor)

**The irascible passions:**
- Cognition of arduous future evil
  - Seems possible to overcome → daring (audacia)
  - Seems impossible to overcome → fear (timor)


44*ST IaIae, q. 23, a.4 co (Leon. 6.176–177): “Sic igitur patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum: scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga, gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres: scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passiones continentur.” Lombardo comments that a passion has two objects: the object that evokes the passion, and the object that it moves toward or away from. See Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 43. Additionally, Robert Miner notes, “despite its central importance, the notion of formal object does not exhaust the question of what activates a passion. . . If I ask another person, ‘What set off that attack of concupiscence?’ I may not want a general description that corresponds to concupiscence’s formal object. I may be looking for the material specification of the formal object—a concrete singular designated by a proper name. . . Similarly, when Aquinas gives an account of the ‘cause of love’ . . . he does not simply reiterate that the formal object of love is an object apprehended as good. Rather, he isolates and describes the forces (‘knowledge’ and ‘likeness’) that typically dispose a person to see things under the aspect of good.” Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 64–65.

45 Thomas uses Aristotle’s metaphor in *Politics* to illustrate the intellect’s control of the passions. The intellect is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible powers by “political” rule, because the sensitive appetite has something of its own whereby it can resist the rule of reason. In addition to the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) — as
appetite, however, can change a person’s disposition to be amenable to something that would usually seem unfitting to him (or vice versa), such as when an angered person is pleased by some good when he is angry, but not when he is calm. More 46 Moreover, the repetition of angry acts may give rise to a habit of anger. Nevertheless, Thomas argues against the position that the passions are “diseases or disturbances of the soul,” but rather upholds their integrity when they are moderated by reason. For although the passions can hinder the use of reason, they can also sharpen it, since the pleasure that follows the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason. 49

opposed to the vis aestimativa in animals (In De an., II.13) — the sensitive appetite is moved by the imagination and sense. Thus the irascible and concupiscible powers can resist reason, but resistance should not be taken for disobedience. ST Ia, q. 81, a.3, ad 2 (Leon.5.291). See Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 25. On the functions of the cogitative power see ST Ia, q. 78, a.4co. We simply note here that the cogitative sense (as opposed to the estimative sense/instinct in animals) is aware of an individual thing as existing in a common nature — e.g., it is aware of man as this man and of a tree as this tree. See In De an., II, 13.

46 ST IaIae, q. 9, a.2 (Leon. 6.77); ST Ia, q.81, a.3, ad 2 (Leon. 5.291). As Kevin White notes: “Of itself, as a movement of sense-appetite, passion is morally neither good nor evil, although there is something like moral goodness in the passion of brute animals inasmuch as it is directed by the knowledge and will of the Creator (IaIae, q. 24, a.1; IaIae, q. 24, a.3, ad 3). But as subject to the command of reason and will in human beings, passion is voluntary, being either commanded or not forbidden by the will, and is morally good or evil to an even greater extent than is bodily movement, for sense-appetite is more “inward,” “closer” to the will, than are bodily members (IaIa, q. 24, a.1).” White, “Passions of the Soul,” 106.

47 Thomas argues against this view of the Stoics who regarded the passions as evil. The error of the Stoics, says Thomas, was the failure to distinguish between the sensitive appetite and the will, thus confusing the passions of the soul with the will’s movements. See ST IaIae, q.24, a.2co (Leon. 6.180): “Stoici enim non discernebant inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant passionibus animae a motibus voluntatis, secundum hoc quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum progradientem extra limites rationis.”

48 ST IaIae, q. 24, a.3 (Leon. 6.181): “Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae homini conveniunt, derivari potest.” Moreover, Thomas argues that the proper matter of moral virtue is the passions. If moral virtue could exist without the passions, it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite entirely idle (ST IaIae, q. 59. a.5 [Leon. 6.383]). For the importance of the passions to moral virtue see also ST
C. Rational appetite or Will

There is a third appetite called the rational appetite or will. The tendency of the rational appetite is to pursue a good following upon the apprehensions of the intellect. The will is an appetite, a “rational wanting,” that requires knowledge in order for it to act. When the intellect perceives a good, the will is moved. When the will is moved towards the end absolutely, this act of willing precedes other acts of the will in time. For example, a man first wills to be healthy, and then afterwards, “deliberating over the means by which he can be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.” In the first instance, the will is moved to the end absolutely and in itself (to be healthy); in the second instance, the will is moved to the end as the reason for willing the means (sends for the doctor).

IaIIae, q.59, a.2 co (Leon. 6.381) and ST IaIIae, q.59, a.5, ad 1 (Leon. 6.384). Also, Lombardo remarks: “Without the passions, we would not respond to sensible objects, and without this first step toward engaging the world, human flourishing would not be possible. The function of the passions is not to decide upon a course of action; the function of the passions is to respond to stimuli and prompt the human person to act according to the face value of those stimuli. Then the passions defer to the judgment of reason, because only the rational appetite can command human action . . .” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 41. Although the sensitive appetite partially resists reason, due to sin, “its partial self-possession is an essential, spiritual aspect of human nature as it was in the beginning.” White, “The Passions of the Soul,” 105.

49 In ST IaIIae, q. 58, a.3, ad 2 (Leon. 6.374): “Unde si appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit perfectua, actio consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit virtus.” Thus, passion is not just checked by virtue: ordinate passion actually helps reason to execute its command, positively contributing to virtuous action. See ST IaIIae, q. 59, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 6.382): “passio praeveniens judicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et judicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis.”

50 ST IaIIae, q. 8, a.3 co (Leon. 6.72): “Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea qua sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quo fertur in ipsum finem absolute. Et quandoque praecedet tempore: sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.”
Thomas makes a distinction within the rational appetite between what is willed naturally (voluntas ut natura)\textsuperscript{51} and what is deliberately chosen (voluntas ut ratio).\textsuperscript{52} The natural appetite of the will (voluntas ut natura) is the principle of all deliberate acts,\textsuperscript{53} since nature is always the principle of everything else. Thomas calls the basic act of willing “natural desire.”\textsuperscript{54} The principle of the will has to be that which is desired naturally (naturaliter desideratur).\textsuperscript{55}

The sensitive appetite inclines a person towards sensible goods for the pleasure they produce, such as the pleasure in eating food: once I am satisfied (or have overeaten), I lose my desire for the pleasure of eating. The rational appetite, however, is not attracted to an object

\textsuperscript{51} For references to voluntas ut natura (“will as nature”) to denote this natural inclination in the will, see: In II Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; In III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad 1; ibid., a. 2, qc. 1co and qc. 3 co; ST III, q. 18, a. 4co; ST III, q. 18, a. 5co.

\textsuperscript{52} For references to voluntas ut ratio (“will as reason”), see: In III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a.1, qc.3, ad 1; ibid., a.2, qc. 1co and qc.3co; ibid., a. 3, qc.4, ad 2; ST III, q. 18, a.3co; ibid., q. 18 a. 4 co.

\textsuperscript{53} De caritate, q.1, a.1 : “Omnes actus voluntatis reducuntur, sicut in primam radicem, in id quod ho mo naturaliter vult, quod est ultimus finis.” Also De ver., q. 22, a.5; ST 1a, q. 60, a.2; q. 82, a.1.

\textsuperscript{54} ST IaIIae, q. 1, a.5 (Leon. 6:13): “in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est voluntas, opporpet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur.” Aertsen notes: “Nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is primo and per se. This addition effects that nature has always to be related to the subject, of which it is primarily the principle of motion… that which comes first is always preserved in that which comes later. Nature is the immovable foundation and principle of all other processes. This definition of nature is determinative for the correct understanding of the ‘natural appetite,’ since nature is the root of this appetite. ‘Natural’ is what belongs ‘per se, i.e., ‘by nature’ to it. Therefore, ‘the appetible that is strived for by nature is the principle and foundation of all else that is appetible.’” Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 344. Lawrence Feingold’s scholarly work, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Naples, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2010), is an in-depth study on “natural desire” in Thomas’s thought. Since Feingold’s interpretation of “natural love” according to Thomas will be discussed in the next chapter, we simply note here that an understanding of what exactly Thomas means by “natural” is pivotal in the discussion of our ability to naturally love God.

simply in terms of the pleasure generated by that object; rather, the will is drawn to an object under the aspect of goodness (*sub ratione boni*). Thus, I judge an object as good in terms of whether it is *good for me*, not simply for the pleasure it provides. For example, if I discover that I am allergic to gluten, I would judge foods I once found pleasurable to eat (e.g. potatoes and pasta) in terms of whether they are healthy or harmful *for me*. Thus, as rational agents, human beings can control the inclinations which arise from the good perceived in an object.

The inclination of rational agents follows freely from an apprehension within the appetites. Sometimes our inclinations resist our rational judgment of what is good and we act against that judgment. In these situations, Thomas explains that “the appetite and the knowledge are not judged from the same point of view”; the appetite is concerned with a particular object,

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56 For Thomas’s distinction between the sensitive and the rational appetite see *ST* Ia, q.80, a.2 (Leon. 5.284): “potentia enim appetiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso.”

57 See Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 12. “At the sense level, there is no affirmation of the goodness of the other in itself; all objects are good only in reference to the individual pleasure of the lover and neither as goods in themselves nor for their own sake. In order to love objects as goods in themselves, i.e., to have complaisance in another being for the good that is in itself, an appetite is required that is directed to the good as such. This is the rational appetite whose object is the *bonum in communi.*” Ibid., 13.

whereas the judgment of reason can be concerned with something universal, which is at times contrary to our appetite. Thomas adds, however, that a judgment about a particular object of operation here and now can never be contrary to our appetite. He gives the example of a man who wishes to fornicate: although he knows in general that fornication is evil, he judges the present act of fornication to be good for him and chooses it under the aspect of good; inclination follows judgment.

Since the intellect can compare several things together, the will, as the intellectual appetite, may be moved by several things. Thomas calls the will the “mistress of its act” because although many particular goods fall under the object of the will (the good in general), the will is not determined to any particular one of them. This is because the will tends directly

\[\text{footnote 59} \ De ver., q. 24, a.2co (Leon. 22/3.685:81–86): “Qui enim vult fornicari, quamvis sciat in universalis fornicationem malum esse, tamen iudicat sibi ut tunc bonum esse hunc fornicationis actum et sub specie boni ipsum eligat. Nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit.” Also, ST IaIae, q. 8, a.1co (Leon. 6.68): “appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.” Also, see Gallagher “Aquinas on the Will,” 571.

\[\text{footnote 60} \ ST Ia, q. 82, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 5.296–7): “vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa pluriurum: et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.” See also SCG II, c. 23 (Leon. 13.325): “Voluntas habet pro objecto bonum secundum rationem boni: natura autem non attingit ad communem boni rationem, sed ad hoc bonum quod est sua perfectio. Cum igitur omne agens agat secundum quod ad bonum intendit, quia finis movet agentem; oportet quod agens per voluntatem ad agens per necessitatem naturae comparetur sicut agens universale ad agens particular.”

\[\text{footnote 61} \ ST IaIae, q. 10, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 6.83): “alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus . . .” For other references to the will’s freedom see De ver., q. 24, a.1 (Leon. 22/3.680); ST IaIae, q.6, a.2, ad 2 (Leon. 6.58).

\[\text{footnote 62} \ ST IaIae, q. 10, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 6.84); ST Ia, q. 82, a.2, ad 1 (Leon. 5.296); In I Sent., d.17, q. 1, a.5, ad 3 (Mandonnet, 406). Thus, rational love (dilectio) differs from sensitive love in the following ways: 1) sensitive
to the *reason* for the object’s appetibility; that is, it tends primarily to goodness itself (or pleasure or utility), and only secondarily to the appetible thing. Thus, we choose a particular object *because* we perceive it as good.63 In the case of virtuous action, when someone chooses to do a good action, the primary object of his act is the goodness found in the action.64 “The will as an agent, moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.”65 The will moves the irascible and

love is a passion and thus includes a bodily element, whereas *dilectio*, as an act of a spiritual faculty does not include a bodily element; 2) the sensitive appetite in brute animals is not free, whereas human beings can choose to love another person or good; 3) on the sensitive level, one is attracted to sensible goods insofar as they produce sensible pleasure, whereas rational appetite is attracted to an object under the aspect of good. For these distinctions see Gallagher, “Desire for Bentitude.” 11–12. Gallagher states: “At the sense level, there is no affirmation of the goodness of the other in itself; all objects are good only in reference to the individual pleasure of the lover and neither as goods in themselves nor for their own sake. In order to love objects as good in themselves . . . an appetite is required that is directed to the good as such. This is the rational appetite whose object is the *bonum in communi.*” Ibid.

63 Thomas argues this is the case because the capacity of a rational nature is too great to be inclined only to one determinate thing. *De ver.*, q. 25, a.1 (Leon. 22/3.729); *ST* IaIIae, q. 10, a 2co. Sertillanges describes a human free act as a “mixed act”: “it is an act of *willed judgement*, or an act of *judged willing*; intelligence and will being joined there in the manner of a single power; form and matter making only one composite, one compound . . . This act which has two parts, satisfies the necessity of making all our human actions intellectual, inasmuch as it is a judgment; inasmuch as it is willed, it comes to the rescue of the inevitable determination of the intelligence in practical matters.” A.D. Sertillanges, *La Philosophie Morale de Saint Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1916), 263.

64 This is because, as Gallagher notes, to see an object “as an instance of some generality is fundamental to the notion of rationality. So in a way there is a double object. There is the individual object and at the same time the formality under which it is grasped. Of course these are not separate, nor is there any need to ask how they come together, since the formality is precisely the formality of the object. Nevertheless, they can be kept distinct such that the formality can be viewed in a general fashion and the individual object can be taken as an instance of the general formality. This, Thomas would say, happens to some extent whenever something is willed. An agent knows what he wills and at the same time why he wills it.” By contrast, the desire of brute animals is directed solely to the object; the formality does not become an object of its desire. Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” 577.

65 *ST* Ia, q.82, a.4 (Leon. 5.303): “voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, prater vires naturales vegetatiae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.” See also *ST* Ia, q. 81, a.3.
concupiscible powers, not in a “despotic” manner, but rather by a “royal and politic sovereignty,” as free men are ruled by their governor, yet can still act contrary to his commands. Experience tells us, that our sense desires are spontaneous and can immediately direct us to the object that stirred the desire. When I smell the aroma of freshly ground coffee, for example, I experience the desire to drink coffee; but I can also choose to not act upon this desire. Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, it does have the power not to consent to it. So, while we can and do sometimes experience a conflict of desires between our appetites, our reason always remains free. Thomas states the following:

There is in man a twofold nature: intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of the reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.

66 ST IaIIae, q. 9, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 6.77): “voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despoticum principatum, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatui regali seu politicis, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.”

67 Thomas understanding of the will is in harmony of that of Aristotle which regards choice as “deliberative desire.” See Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” 583.

68 ST IaIIae, q. 10, a.3, ad 1 (Leon. 6.88) : “voluntas non possit facere quin motus concupiscientiae insurgat [de quo Apostolus dicit Rom. VII. Quod odi malum, illud factio, idest concupisco:] tamen, potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire. Et sic non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscientiae motum.” As an example of his balanced realism, Thomas argues that we cannot be “cured” of our sensuality in this life, except by a miracle. De ver., q.25, a.7co. (Leon. 22/3.743:54–55): “sensualitas in hac vita curari non potest nisi per miraculum.” Also ST Ia, q. 81, a.3 (Leon. 5.291): “In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primito movens: unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus superior consentiat. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in III de Anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitus inferioriorem, sicut spheara superior inferioriorem. — Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur.”

69 ST IaIIae, q. 10, a. 3, ad 2 (Leon. 6.88): “in homine duae sint naturae, intellectualis scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliquid uniformiter secundum totam animam: quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva totaliter
We note that the power of the will is always actually present to itself. The act of the will, however, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will: it is by such an act that the will moves itself. Since any act of deliberation requires the individual to reflect on which decision will govern his actions, a degree of self-awareness informs every voluntary action. In order to fully understand this point, however, we must turn to examine that principle of movement within the appetite, which is love.

III.

Love

There is in each appetite a corresponding love—natural love (amor naturalis), sensitive love (amor sensitivus), or rational love (dilectio electiva)—which is the principle of

70 ST IaIIae, q. 9, a.3, ad 2 (Leon. 6.78): “potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens: sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam.” We note that the principle of these voluntary movements is the good in general, naturally willed. See ST IaIIae, q. 10, a.1co (Leon.6.83); “principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi.”

71 ST IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4, ad 1 (Leon. 6.78–79): de ratione volunarii est quod principium eius sit intra; sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio.” See Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” 574. Also ST IaIIae, q.6, a.2co (Leon. 6.58): “Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam: prout scilicet, apprehenso fine, aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri.”

72 We note here that Thomas uses the term “amor” to describe natural love in all creatures, including human beings. More often than not, however, he uses the term dilectio naturalis when discussing natural love in the will. So, while Thomas uses the term “amor” also describe human natural love, he never uses “dilectio” to describe love.
movement towards the end loved, and from which every creature acts (amans agat omnia ex amore). Love implies a connaturalness or complacency of the creature for “a good which is akin and proportionate to it.” In order to be conformed to the object and move towards it, the creature has to first apprehend the good. As we have seen in the case of appetite, how this occurs depends on the form of the creature.

A. Natural love (amor naturalis).

Natural love is the principle of movement in the natural appetite of all creatures; it is the

in any other creature than a rational one. For references to dilectio naturalis see ST Ia, q. 60 a. 1co and ad 3; ibid., a. 2co; ibid., a. 4 ad 2 and ad 3; ibid., a. 5co; ST Ia, q. 62 a. 7co and ad 3; De ver., q. 8, a. 6, ad 10; Quaestiones de quolibet I, q. 4, a. 3co; Comp. theol., lib. 1, cap. 174co. Less frequently, Thomas also uses the terms amor intellectivus (ST IaIae, q. 26, a.1co) and naturali dilectione (ST Ia, q.60, a.5co) to denote natural love in the will.

73 See ST IaIae, q. 26 a. 1co (Leon. 6.188): “Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivus; as passion of amor: ST IaIae, q. 26, a.2 (Leon.6.189): “cum amor consistat in quadam immutacione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor est passio: propri quidem secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.”

74 For references to dilectio electiva, deliberate chosen love in the will, see ST Ia, q. 60, a. 2co (Leon. 5. 100): “Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, ets dilectio naturalis: dilectio autem ad hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva”; and ibid., ad 1 (Leon. 5.101): “non omnis dilectio electiva est amor rationalis, secundum quod rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem. Dicitur enim sic amor rationalis, qui sequitur cognitionem racioniavam, non omnis autem electio consequitur discursum rationis . . . cum de libero arbitrio ageretur: sed solum electio hominis.”

75 ST IaIae, q. 28, a.6 (Leon. 6.202): IaIae, q. 28, a.6co (Leon. 6.202): “omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quacumque actionem ex aliquo amore.” Johann remarks: “Loving is not simply an actuation of the will, but the giving of being to being, the dynamic adhesion of Being to itself.” Johann, The Wisdom of Love, 77. Henri Renard would agree: “The will does not receive a ‘push’ from the intellect. Rather, it is enticed, attracted, drawn by what the intellect proposes.” Henri Renard, “The Function of the Intellect and Will in the Act of Free Choice,” The Modern Schoolman XXIV (1947), 86.

76 ST IaIae, q. 27, a.1co (Leon. 6.192): “amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicumque autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa amoris.”
creature’s connaturalness with the thing toward which it tends.\textsuperscript{77} The good is lovable to all creatures since “anything whatever has a \textit{connaturalitas} toward that which is suitable to itself (\textit{sibi conveniens}) according to its nature.”\textsuperscript{78} Thus, inanimate objects are also said to have a natural love,\textsuperscript{79} such as the heavy body which has a natural love for its proper place of rest.\textsuperscript{80}

In human beings there are different natural loves. There is natural love \textit{qua} body as well as for each power. Of all the actions performed by human beings, only those that require deliberation are properly called \textit{human}. All other actions found in human beings (e.g. walking, sitting) are \textit{actions of a human being}, since they are not proper to \textit{man as man}.\textsuperscript{81} A person who trips and falls down the stairs, for example, falls \textit{qua} body, not \textit{qua} man: the force of gravity, not deliberation, causes the person to fall downwards, just as it causes the coffee mug to fall to the

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\item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{ST} IaIae, q. 26, a.1 (Leon. 6.188): “\textit{In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis: sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis.”
\item \textsuperscript{78} \textit{ST} IaIae, q. 26, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 6.188): “\textit{amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetative, sed in omnibus potentii animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis et universaliter in omnibus rebus; quia, ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. \textit{de Div. Nom.}: \textit{Omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.”}
\item \textsuperscript{79} \textit{In III Sent.}, d. 27, q. 1, a.2co: (Moos, 862): “\textit{amor naturalis est in omnibus potentii et omnibus rebus}.” (Italics in original).
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{ST} IaIae, q.26, a.1co (Leon. 6.188): “\textit{In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis.”
\item \textsuperscript{81} See \textit{ST} IaIae, q. 1, a.1 co (Leon. 6. 6): “\textit{Iiiae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini convenient, possunt dici quidem \textit{hominis} actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.”
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ground after being knocked over, or the deer to return to the ground after it bounds upward. The force of gravity that attracts a body to fall to the earth is the natural love of that body for its place of rest qua body.

Each power of the human soul also has a natural love. Thomas identifies the powers of the soul as the vegetative, the sentient, the appetitive, the motive, and the intellective powers. By its natural appetite, each power desires something suitable for itself (unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens). Sight, for example, desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act (seeing); the locomotive power desires naturally to move in order to obtain the necessities of life. The powers flow from the soul’s essence as their principle. The object is a principle and moving cause to the act of the power, just as colour is the principle of vision inasmuch as it moves the sight. The animal, by the appetitive power, desires the thing seen, in order to see it, but also for other reasons.

In human beings, there is also a natural appetite of the will. Love as an activity of the natural appetite of the will (dilectio naturalis) is a natural rational love. For Thomas, all the will’s acts are grounded in the will’s natural inclination to happiness. Happiness (ultimi finis sui

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82 ST Ia, q. 78, a. 1 (Leon. 5. 250).
83 ST Ia, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3 (Leon. 5. 250).
84 ST Ia, q. 78, a.1 co (Leon. 5. 251).
85 ST Ia, q. 77, a. 3 (Leon. 5. 241).
86 “The willing of the last end, happiness, is at least habitually present in all willing and in every action.” Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 6.
in communi or felicitatem in generali)\textsuperscript{87} is the perfection sought by our natural desire of the will; the good which will perfect us and bring all our desires to rest. Thomas uses the terms \textit{dilectio naturalis} and \textit{dilectio electiva} to distinguish between a natural (necessitated) love in the will and a free (chosen) explicit love.\textsuperscript{88} We could denote these distinct but related notions by calling the former a “preconscious natural love” and the latter a “chosen, explicit love.” The former involves an implicit determination of the will, a determination that I do not explicitly consider, but which is present in my willed choice.\textsuperscript{89} Happiness is an example of natural love in the will (\textit{dilectio naturalis}), for in every willed act, the willing of the final end of happiness is habitually present.

\textsuperscript{87}De ver., q. 22, a.7\textsuperscript{89} (Leon. 22/3.630:54–60): “sed homini inditus est appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetat naturaliter se esse completum in bonitate. Sed in quo ista completio consistat, utrum in virtutibus vel scientiis vel delectationibus vel huiusmodi aliis, non est ei determinatum a natura”; ibid., q. 24, a.8\textsuperscript{90} (Leon. 22/3.700:111–113): “voluntas naturaliter appetit bonum quod est finis, scilicet felicitatem in generali”. See Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 5.

\textsuperscript{88}Lawrence Feingold, in his scholarly work, \textit{The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interepreters} (Naples, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2010), argues for a further distinction within human natural desire (which Feingold also equates with natural love), a distinction between natural \textit{innate} desire and natural \textit{elicited} desire, though he admits that this distinction is not explicit in Thomas’s texts. In fact, Feingold relies heavily on Cajetan and Suarez to support his position (“Natural Desire to See God,” 15). He argues that, for Thomas, the terms “natural will”, “natural willing”, “non-deliberated will”, \textit{voluntas ut natura}, natural love, \textit{simplex voluntas}, and natural desire all denote natural movements of the will. Furthermore, he argues that the term “natural” has a broader scope than the term “innate” since “natural” applies both to the innate inclination of the will (natural appetite) and to elicited acts of the will (those acts which naturally arise before deliberation). The strengths and weaknesses of Feingold’s argument on this point will be discussed in the next chapter. We simply note here that according to his texts on human love, Thomas’s only explicit distinction between a natural (necessitated) love and a chosen (free) explicit love is between \textit{dilectio naturalis} and \textit{dilectio electiva}. For Feingold see \textit{The Natural Desire to See God}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{89}Thomas argues that the determination of the first intention which was made in respect of the final end, remains in every desire directed to an object, even if one’s thoughts are not actually fixed on that final end. Thomas gives the example of a person walking along the road who is not necessarily thinking of the final end with every step. See \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 1, a.6, ad 3 (Leon. 6.14); “non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitetur de ultimo fine, quandoquemque aliquid appetit vel operatur: sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cujuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitetur de fine.”
Dilectio electiva, however, involves an explicit consideration of the goods willed: my actual inclination and choice to pursue a particular good stems from my free choice. Thomas notes:

The first good is willed essentially (per se) and the will essentially and naturally (per se et naturaliter) wills it. Nevertheless, it does not always actually will it (vult in actu); it is not necessary that the things that are naturally suitable (convenientia) to the soul are always actually in the soul, just as principles that are naturally known are not always actually considered.\(^9\)

**B. Sensitive love**

Properly speaking, love (amor) denotes a passion insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite;\(^9\) it is the “inner source” of a creature’s inclination toward its perfection.\(^9\) Love arises through cognition insofar as it is experienced as complaisance with the object. That is, love is the movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object so that it has complacency in that object. The object gives the appetite an adaptation (coaptatio) to itself which consists in a “well-pleasedness” (complantia) in that object.\(^9\) From this complacency there follows a


\(^9\) *ST IaHae*, q. 26, a.3, ad 4 (Leon. 6.190): “amor importat quandam passionem, praeципue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo.”


\(^9\) *ST IaHae*, q. 26, a.2 (Leon. 6.189): “Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complantia appetibilis.” Also, *ST IaHae*, q. 26, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 6.189): “amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab appetibili, ut ei appetibile complacet.”
movement toward the object called desire (desiderium), and ultimately rest in it, called joy (gaudium). Thomas vividly describes the effects of love as an “adaptation” to the loved object:

Love denotes a certain adaptation of the sensitive appetite to some good. . . . four proximate effects may be attributed to love: namely, melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervour. Of these, the first is melting, which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover . . . Consequently, the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition repugnant to love. But melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved.

All creatures act from love of some kind. A person thus stands in relation to what he loves “as though it were himself or part of himself.”

C. Rational Love

As a free human act, rational love follows deliberation. Thomas says that “love” (amor), “dilection” (dilectio), “charity” (caritas), and “friendship” (amicitia) belong in a certain way to the same thing (ad idem quodammodo pertinentia). The difference is that love and dilection are expressed by act or passion, whereas friendship is like a habit, and charity “can be

94 ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.2 (Leon. 6.189): “et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.”

95 ST IaIIae, q. 28, a.5co (Leon. 6.201): “amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum . . . dicendum quod amoris attributi possunt quatuor effectus proximi: scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintractionem alterius pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante . . . Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio repugnans amor. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret.”

96 ST IaIIae, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2 (Leon. 6.189): “unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet, quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem.”

97 McGinnis, Wisdom of Love, 45.
taken either way.”

Thomas uses the term *amor* when referring to love in both the sensitive and the rational appetites, but he never uses the term *dilectio* to denote any other kind of love than rational love. Sensitive love, or love as a passion (*amor*), is the source of man’s appetite towards his good or perfection, but rational love (*dilectio*) is voluntary and follows upon knowledge of the end. Every dilection is love that involves a choice (*electio*), but not every love is dilection.

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98 *ST* IaIae, q. 26, a.3 co (Leon. 6.189–90): “quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinenta: scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum Philosophum in VIII Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipit potest.”

99 *ST* IaIae, q. 26, a.3 co (Leon. 6.190): “Addit enim *dilectio* supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat.” According to Miner, Thomas distinguishes five kinds of appetite [*In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a.2, ad 1 (Moos, 862)]: 1) voluntary only (in God alone); 2) voluntary with the natural (in angels); 3) voluntary with the sensitive and natural (in man); 4) sensitive with the natural (brute animals) and; 5) natural only (in “other things,” presumably non-knowing objects. Furthermore, while *caritas* and *dilectio* perfect sensitive *amor*, Thomas is not arguing that *amor* must be negatively “neutralised” by reason; rather, “love in its most proper sense is sensitive love, because sensitive love is most passive. Allowing oneself to be passively helped by God is the precondition of *dilectio*, of inclining oneself toward God by rational means. *Amor sensitivus* turns out to be the seed out of which the highest *amor rationalis* grows.” See Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 121. See *ST* IaIae, q.26, a.3, ad 4 (Leon. 6.190): “ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinium nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praepoportunit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum prorsa ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis. . . . Et propter hoc, divinum est amor quam dilectio.”

100 *In III Sent.*, d.27, q.1, a.1 (Moos, 855): “quando *affectus* vel *appetitus* omnino imbuitur forma boni quod est sibi objectum, complacet sibi in illo et adhaeret ei quasi fixum in ipso; et tunc dicitur amare ipsum. Unde *amor nihil alius est quam quaedam transformatio affectus in rem amatum*. Et quia omn quod efficitur forma alicujus, efficitur unum cum illo; ideo per amorem amans fit unum cum amato, quod est factum forma amantis” (italics in original).

101 *ST* IaIae, q. 26, a.3co (Leon. 6.189–90): “omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso.”
will see, this is because the essence of rational love consists in wishing good to someone (*amare est velle bonum alicui*),\(^{102}\) whether to oneself or another.

Thomas presents rational love as twofold, comprising love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscientiae*). The twofold tendency within rational love is towards a good which a man wishes to a *person*, whether to himself or to another, and towards a *good* willed for that person.\(^{103}\) For example, if my friend becomes gravely ill, and I want her to have medicine, I have a love of friendship for my friend and a love of concupiscence for the medicine I want her to take. Yet I could also love a person (the doctor) with a love of concupiscence for the sake of my sick friend.\(^{104}\) Thomas is clear that love itself is not divided into friendship and concupiscence but rather into love of friendship and love of concupiscence.\(^{105}\)

\(^{102}\) *SCG* I, c.91 (Leon. 13.250): “*amor autem, proprie et per se sumptus, in duo fertur obiecta; amare enim est velle bonum alicui, et sic fertur in eum cui volumus bonum, et in bonum quod illi volumus.*”

\(^{103}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 26, a. 4co (Leon. 6.190): “*sicut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric, amare est velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi, vel aliis; et in illud cui vult bonum.* Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscientiae: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.” Thomas accepts Aristotle’s definition of love as benevolence—wishing good to another for his own sake. Benevolence, however, has a twofold object: the good which is willed and the person (oneself or another) for whom that good is willed. Thomas articulates this twofold object as *amor concupiscientiae* and *amor amicitiae*.

\(^{104}\) See *In III Sent.*, d. 28, a.2co (Moos, 906): “... sicut amicus amat et possesiones et alia amici sui, non tamen ad ea amicitiam habet.” See *ST* IaIIae, q. 26, q. 4 (Leon. 6.190): “*sicut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi veli ali; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscientiae: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.*”

\(^{105}\) *ST* IaIIae, q. 26, a.4, ad 1 (Leon. 6.190–1): “*amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus; illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.*”
These two loves are for two basic goods: persons and accidents that perfect persons. Thus, in the act of rational love we may say that there are three elements involved: the lover (subject); the good that is willed (object); and the person for whom the good is willed (term). The union of the appetite with the object is love and this union is constitutive of amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae; the union in each kind of love, however, differs in accordance with the different kind of complaisance taken in the object.

We pause here to clarify the terms “friendship” and “concupiscence.” Friendship (amicitia) denotes a relationship with another person, whereas concupiscence (concupiscentia) denotes “self-directed desire.” Amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae, however, denote the

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106 In De div. nom. ch 4, lect 9 (Parma, 313–4): “Sic igitur bonum dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo quasi aliquid in bonitate subsistens: alio modo quasi bonitas alterius, quo scilicet alciu bene sit. Sic igitur dupliciter aliquid amat. Uno modo sub ratione subsistentis boni; et hoc vere et propriam amat, cum scilicet volumus bonum esse ei: et hic amor a multis vocatur amor benevolentiae vel amicitiae. Alio modo per modum bonitatis inhaerentis, secundum quod aliquid dicitur amari, non inquantum volumus quod ei bonum sit, sed inquantum volumus quod eo alicui bonum sit, sicut dicimus amare scientiam vel sanitatem. Nec est inconveniens si hoc etiam modo amemus alqua quae per se subsistunt, non quidem ratione substantiae eorum, sed ratione alicujus perfectionis quam ex eis consequimur; sicut dicimus amare vinum, non propter substantiam vini, ut bene sit ei, sed ut per vinum bene sit nobis, vel inquantum delectatur ejus sapore, vel inquantum sustentatam ejus humorem. Omne autem quod est per accidens, reductur ad id quod est per se. Sic igitur hoc ipsum quod aliquid amamus ut eo alicui bene sit, includitur in amore illius quod amamus ut ei bene sit. Non est enim alicui aliquid diligendum per id quod est per accidens, sed per id quod est per se.”

107 McGinnis, “Wisdom of Love,” 103. As we will see, rational self-love is a special case, having only two terms.


109 In ST IaIIae, q. 30, a.3co, Thomas notes that concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good, where the good can be pleasurable in two ways: naturally and non-naturally. Naturally pleasurable goods are food, drink etc.; non-natural pleasurable goods are those which are apprehended as good and suitable to the animal. Concupiscences of the first kind are are suitable and pleasurable according to nature, whereas the second kind of concupiscences are proper to human beings “to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable beyond
two fundamental types of love within an act of rational love. Thus the terms *amor amicitiae* and *amicitia* are not interchangeable, nor are the terms *amor concupiscientiae* and *concupiscientia*. Rather, *amor amicitiae* means love of a person for that person’s sake and includes a man’s love for himself when he wills good to himself, whereas *amicitia* denotes the mutual love of friendship between *two* persons.\(^{110}\) *Amor concupiscientiae* is love directed to a good desired for a person. *Amor amicitiae* may be expressed as “the sort of love one has towards a friend,” as contrasted with “the sort of love one has toward an instrument of a friend’s good.”\(^ {111}\) We further note that concupiscence does not simply refer here to sensual goods since spiritual goods can also be objects of love of concupiscence.\(^ {112}\) Moreover, one can love a person with love of

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\(^{110}\) Thus, *amor amicitiae* is an act belonging to one subject, whereas *amicitia* belongs to two. It is noteworthy that Thomas never wrote a treatise on friendship. He discusses the theme of friendship, however, throughout his works. Daniel Schwartz comments: “For Aquinas, friendship is the paradigm ideal for the relationships that rational beings should cultivate. The set of potential friends includes besides fellow human beings, also angels and God.” Daniel Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 1. For Thomas see *In III Sent.*, d.28, a.6 (Moos, 913): “Et quamvis nomen amicitiae imponatur proprie secundum quod amor ad alios se diffundit, tamen etiam amor quem quis habet ad seipsum amicitia et caritas potest dici, inquantum amor quem quis habet ad alterum, procedit a similitudine amor quo quis diligit seipsum, est forma radix amicitiae.” Also *ST* IaIIae, q. 26 a.4co (Leon. 6.190): “Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatam amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur: quod autem amatam amore concupiscientiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.”

\(^{111}\) *Kwasniewski, Ecstasy of Love*, 73.

\(^{112}\) *ST* IaIIae, q.30, a.1co (Leon. 6.209): “sicut Philosophus dicit . . . *concupiscientia est appetitus* *delectabilis*. Est autem duplex delectatio . . . una quae est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est
concupiscence, such as the love one may have for the aforementioned doctor who is instrumental in bringing about the health of one’s friend. Since the twofold structure of rational love holds central place in Thomas’s theory of human love, we will now examine these two kinds of love in more detail.

IV.

A Closer Look at Amor Amicitiae and Amor Concupiscientiae.\(^{113}\)

As Gallagher notes, “amor amicitiae and amor concupiscientiae are two inseparable elements of one single act.”\(^{114}\) The structure of dilectio involves a person (the beloved), whether


\(^{114}\) David Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love for Others,” Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Università della Santa Croce 8 (1999), 27. Thomas himself observes that this twofold structure is peculiar to the act of love, where one and the same act has two objects, one in relation to the other.” In discussing this same point, Kwasniewski notes that “[t]he former target is absolute, in that the will terminates in it (it is an ‘end’) – the latter target is relative, in that the will passes through it, so to speak, by ordering it to something else (it is a ‘means’). In the language of in De divinis nominibus the former is willed “as a substance,” the latter “as an accident.” Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 71, fn 51. Thomas is consistent in his characterisation of the two loves, for example, In III Sent., d.29, a.3 (Moos, 928): “objectum amoris sit bonum, dupliciter aliquis tendere potest in bonum aliquum rei. Uno modo, ita quod bonum illius rei ad alterum referat, sicut quod bonum unius rei optet alteri, si non habet; vel complacat sibi, si habet; sicut amat quis vinum in quantum dulcedinem vini peroptat, et in hoc gaudent quod eo fruatur, non quod vinum ipsum habeat; et hic amor vocatur a quibusdam amor concupiscientiae. Amor autem iste non terminatur ad rem quae dicitur amari, sed reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonn illius rei. Alio modo amor fertur in bonum aliquus rei ita quod ad rem ipsam terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei; et hic est amor benevolentiae qui est principium amicitiae ut dicit Philosophus in IX Eth. . .” and ST Ia, q.20, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 4.253): “actus amoris semper tendit in
oneself or another, loved for his own sake, and a good, whether material or spiritual, loved for that person. As Gallagher notes: “no moral evaluation is passed on either love as such, until it is concretely seen what goods, in what order, and for which persons, are being loved”

on hearing a book described, I can begin to have complaisance in it and to see it as a good for me. This is a love of concupiscence. I take complaisance in the book, but I do so precisely as in that by which I individually will be [sic. “to be”] somehow better. The book is a means to my perfection and so loved with a love of concupiscence. The object enters into my affection causing the union that is love, but does so as that which is ordered to my perfection. In amor amicitiae, the object which enters into or informs the affections is another person. And there the other person is not taken as some formal perfection of me (or of another person) nor as a means to such a perfection . . . In love of friendship I take complaisance in the other person as my good, not as a perfection of me nor as contributing to my perfection as an individual subsisting person, but rather as a good for which I desire and seek other, perfective goods. I take the other as one for whom I wish goods, in the same way that I wish goods for myself. This means that I take complaisance in the other in a way that is like the way I take complaisance in myself. To so love a person, says Thomas, is to take the other as another self.

Since friendship is the theme of chapter five, it suffices here to say that in amor amicitiae I consider the friend the same as myself insofar as I regard the goods and evils that come to him as my own. Thomas call this inherence, “mutual indwelling:”

This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring to both the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Phil. i.7, For that I have you in my heart. The lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his interior . . . As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish

\[\text{duo: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem. Velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliiquis amat se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaserit sibi unire, inquantum potest.}\]


good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover’s heart. For this reason we speak of love as being intimate; and of the bowels of charity.\textsuperscript{117}

We further note that the difference between \textit{amor amicitiae} and \textit{amor concupiscientiae} is not determined by the object’s mode of being, whether it is a substance or an accident, but on “whether love is tending toward something as towards a substantial good or an accidental good.”\textsuperscript{118} In \textit{amor amicitiae}, the lover takes complaisance in the very existence of the beloved, whose qualities are loved precisely because they are the qualities and perfections of \textit{this person}.\textsuperscript{119} Thomas states:

> It also happens, at times, that we love certain subsisting goods with this second mode of love because we do not love them for themselves but for some one of their accidents, just as we love wine, wishing to drink

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{ST} IaIae, q. 28, a.2co (Leon. 6.198): “effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud Philipp. 1, eo quod habeam vos in corde. Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem, inquantum amans non est contentus superficia apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquire, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur. . . Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu: ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscientiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid alius; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur \textit{intimus}; et dicuntur \textit{viscera caritatis}.”

\textsuperscript{118} Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 69. Kwasniewski further notes: “Love tends toward something as a substantial good when that thing is recognised and loved as good in itself, as a \textit{point of arrival} for goods, deserving good will and good works for its own sake. When I love a person viewed under the aspect of “good in himself,” I want what is good for him, for his own sake—I desire that he may flourish. (on \textit{amor amicitiae} see \textit{ST} Ia, q.60, aa. 3&4; IaIae, q.28, aa. 1-3; DDN 4.9 nos 404-405). When, in contrast, love tends towards something as a \textit{bonum accidentale} this means the lover sees in the object of desire something beneficial to him or to another and he wants it for that reason, that is, as a means or as an instrument. The lover does not want \textit{it} to be good or want things to go well for it, but rather, that by it he or someone he loves may be perfected (understanding ‘perfected’ in the broadest sense, which may include something as simple as being delighted with the taste of a glass of wine). This love is called \textit{amor concupiscientiae}.” Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 71.

\textsuperscript{119} Gallagher, “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” 60.
it on account of its sweetness. And similarly, when a man is loved for the sake of pleasure or utility, he is not loved for himself, but per accidens.\textsuperscript{120}

When a person is loved for the sake of pleasure or usefulness, he is loved \textit{per accidens}, not for his own sake.\textsuperscript{121} When we love a person \textit{as} useful, however, it is the person himself who is the agent of his own usefulness, such as the mechanic who chooses to be useful to his customers. Yet, when \textit{we} use someone, \textit{we} are the agents of the person’s usefulness; we impose utility on them.\textsuperscript{122}

Having looked at Thomas’s general theory of love, with a focus on the structure of rational love, we will now look at his theory of self-love. After looking at the structure of self-love, we will then explore the relationship between self-knowledge and self-love, as well as improper self-love.

\textbf{V.}

\textsuperscript{120} In \textit{De div. nom.}, (Marietti, 142): “Contingit autem, quandoque, quod etiam aliqua bona subsistentia amamus hoc secundo modo amoris, quia non amamus ipsa secundum se, sed secundum aliquid eorum accidens; sicut amamus vinum, volentes potiri dulcedine eius; et similiter, cum homo propter delectationem vel utilitatem amatur, non ipse secundum se, sed per accidens.” Gallagher notes that \textit{dilectio} intends to be unending, because the object of \textit{dilectio} is a person; the \textit{dilectio} persists as long as the person exists. See Gallagher, “Person and Ethics,” 61.

\textsuperscript{121} See Kwasniewski, who notes that the other person “is treated not qua person or even qua substance, but qua source or repository of a good that accrues to me.” Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 76.

\textsuperscript{122} Steven J. Jensen, \textit{Good and Evil Actions: A Journey Through Saint Thomas Aquinas} (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 140–141. In making this distinction between using someone and merely loving someone as useful, Jensen further notes: “When we use other human beings, we bring about some change in them for the sake of some desired result, as the soldier kills the child in order to save others. When we merely desire them as useful, on the other hand, we do not bring about a useful change in them.” Ibid. He further notes that for Thomas, use follows choice: \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 16, a.4co. (Leon. 6.116): “manifestum est quod usus sequitur electionem: si tamen accipiatur usus, secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia movendo ipsam. Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo'rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus praecedit electionem.”
Thomas’s Terms for Self-Love

Thomas uses many different terms for self-love, as well as specific terms for certain kinds of self-love. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the actual Latin terms used by Thomas will be used in the following discussion.

Thomas almost always uses the term *amor sui* within the context of discussions on sin, where, following Augustine, he calls *amor sui* “the root of sin” (*radix peccato*). In the few places where Thomas uses “amor sui” to denote a different meaning, context makes his meaning clear. In other texts, Thomas distinguishes between proper self-love (*amor sui ordinatus*) and improper self-love (*amor sui inordinatus*), where the former is “due and natural” (*debitus et naturalis*) and the latter belongs only to rational creatures. Thomas argues that *amor sui ordinatus* is natural to all creatures, since it is natural for each thing to seek a suitable good for itself (*velit sibi bonum quod congruit*). *Amor sui inordinatus*, however, is not natural: rather, it

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123 See *In II Sent.*, d. 42, q. 2, a.1co (Mandonnet, 1069): “amor sui ponitur ab Agostino radixe peccati; vel secundum inclinationem appetitus in ea quae propter hunc finem quaeruntur”; *ST IaIae*, q. 73, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 7.26): “amor sui disgregat affectum hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona temporalia”; *ST IIaIae*, q.25, a.7, ad 1 (Leon. 8.203): “amor sui qui est principium peccati, est ille qui est proprius malorum, perveniens *usque ad contemptum Dei*”; *ST IIaIae*, q.153, a.5co (Leon.10.212): “amor sui, quantum scilicet ad delectationem quam inordinate appetit; et per oppositum ponitur *odium Dei*” (italics in original).

124 *ST IaIae*, q. 77, a.4, ad 1 (Leon. 7.66): “amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita scilicet quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa peccati secundum Augustinum”; *De malo*, q.8, a.1, ad 19 (Leon. 23.197:520–526): “amare est uelle bonum alicui. In hoc ergo quod homo appetit sibi quaecumque bona, uidetur amare seipsum; et ideo amor sui ipsius non punitur seorsum uel radix peccati, uel etiam uitium capitale, quia omnes radices et capita uitiorum includunt inordinatum sui amorem.”
belongs to the realm of human freedom in which apparent goods can be chosen for oneself. This point shall be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

Another term Thomas uses for self-love is *dilectio sui*. He never uses this term to denote self-love in creatures other than rational ones, although he does sometimes use *amor sui* when speaking generally about self-love in rational beings.

More specifically, Thomas uses the terms *dilectio naturalis* and *dilectio electiva* when describing natural self-love and chosen self-love in the will. At times, I will express this distinction within rational self-love using the terms “natural (necessitated) implicit love of self” and “chosen (free) explicit love of self” respectively, in order to emphasize the role of self-knowledge within self-love.

Generally speaking, Thomas identifies three kinds of self-love: natural self-love (*amor sui naturalis*), which is common to all creatures; sensitive self-love (*amor sui*); and rational self-love (*amor sui* and, more specifically, *dilectio sui*). We will now look at each kind of self-love as presented by Thomas, and specifically how all three kinds are present in human beings.

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125 See *In III Sent.*, d.28, q.1, a.7, ad 4; ibid., d. 37, q.1, a.2, qc.2, ad 5; *ST* IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, ad 1; *ST* II-II, q. 25, a.7, ad 3; ibid., q. 44, a. 3, ad 1 and a. 8, ad 2; *De virt. in comm.* q. 2 a. 7, ad 10. For occurrences of *diliget se*, see *In I Sent*, d. 3, q. 3; ibid., d. 32, q.1, a.2, ad 4; *In III Sent*, d 32, q.1, a.4, sc 1; *ST* Ia, q.37, a.2, ad 3; *ST* Ia, q.60, a.3, ad 1. *SCG* III, c. 153.

126 Although Thomas himself does not use the terms “natural implicit love of self” and “chosen explicit love of self,” the terms are useful in distinguishing the non-deliberated love of self in rational creatures from the deliberated love of self.
VI.

Kinds of Self-Love

Thomas does not use the term *dilectio sui* for any creatures other than rational ones. This fact highlights that, for Thomas, *dilectio sui* involves some capacity for self-reflection, an ability proper only to rational creatures. Thus, we see Thomas using the term *dilectio sui*, more often than the general term *amor sui*, when referring to self-love in rational creatures. How exactly does Thomas define self-love in human beings? Generally speaking, he argues that to love self is to will something good for oneself (diligat autem aliquid seipsum inquantum vult sibi bonum).\(^{127}\)

We can distinguish two kinds of self-love in human beings within Thomas’s thought.\(^ {128}\) First, there is a “human natural self-love” that follows from the will’s nature and is not deliberately chosen by the subject. This self-love is both natural to the will, as well as the source of all willed acts.\(^ {129}\) Second, there is rational self-love, which Thomas further divides into proper self-love (*amor sui ordinatus*) and improper self-love (*amor sui inordinatus*). This love is always chosen.

**A. Human Natural Self-Love (*dilectio naturalis*)**

In human natural self-love, the object of the natural inclination in the will is

\(^{127}\) *SCG* III, c. 153 (Leon. 14.447).

\(^{128}\) This threefold division is not that of Thomas’ himself, but it is based on Thomas’s texts on self-love. My thanks to Dr. Gregory T. Doolan for his helpful distinction between human self-love and the natural self-love of a human.

happiness, where the happiness is that of the subject himself or herself. Every human being naturally (spontaneously) wants to be happy.\textsuperscript{130} Thomas also calls the object of this natural inclination in the will, the good in general (\textit{bonum in communi}).\textsuperscript{131} The object of the will’s natural inclination is also called the perfect good (\textit{bonum perfectum});\textsuperscript{132} when possessed, this good is completely perfective of the subject.

As Gallagher argues, this natural inclination to beatitude is called self-love. Thomas clearly argues that the natural inclination of the will is natural self-love:

\begin{quote}
Both angel and man naturally love self (\textit{naturaliter seipsum diligit}). Now what is one with a thing is that thing itself: consequently, everything loves what is one with itself. So if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love.\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

Natural self-love flows from natural union with oneself; it is the ground of all willed acts.\textsuperscript{134} Since nature is inclined to the good in general, nature’s operation is “self-centred” in regard to

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{De ver.}, q. 22, a.7co (Leon. 22/3.630; 54–60): “hominis inditis est appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetat naturaliter se esse completum in bonitate. Sed in quo ista completio consistat, utrum in virtutibus vel scientiis vel delectationibus vel huissmodi aliis, non est ei determinatum a natura.”

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 10, a.1co (Leon. 6.83): “etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potestia in suum objectum: et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilitus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus: et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniuntvolenti secundum suam naturam.”

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q.1, a.5co (Leon. 6.13): “cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit, ut bonum perfectum et completivum suiprsum.”

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{ST} Ia, q.60, a.4co (Leon. 6.103): “angelus et homo naturaliter seipsum diligat. Illud autem quod est unum cum aliquo, est ipsummet: unde unumquodque diligit id quod est unum sibi. Et si quidem sit unum sibi unione naturali, diligat illud dilectione naturali.” Also \textit{ST} Ia, q.60, a.3, ad 2 (Leon.5.102): “sicut plus est esse unum quam uniri, ita amor magis est unus ad seipsum, quam ad diversa quae ei uniuntur. Sed ideo Dionysius usus fuit nomine \textit{unionis et concretionis}, ut ostenderet derivationem amoris a se in alia, sicut ab \textit{uno} derivatur \textit{unitio}.”

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{ST} Ia, q. 60, a.3co (Leon. 5.102): “Manifestum est autem quod in rebus cognitione carentibus, unumquodque naturaliter appetit consequi id quod est sibi nonum; sicut ignis locum sursum. Unde et angelus et
what is common, for everything is inclined to preserve its individuality and its species. Human natural self-love is more vehement than what is voluntary precisely because this natural self-love is rooted in a natural inclination of the will.

Thomas refers to this natural self-love in the will as *dilectio naturalis* because this natural love is grounded in a *rational* soul. Thomas is clear that natural self-love in human beings is an inclination in the will to happiness: the inclination to happiness is not voluntarily willed, but


135 _ST_ Ia, q. 60, a.5, ad. 3 (Leon. 5.105): “natura reflectitur in seipsam non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune: inclinatur enim unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum individuum, sed etiam suam speciem.” Kwasniewski notes that a creature is, by its very nature “ordered to the whole not merely as to something superior and in some sense constitutive if it, but as that to which, in its very universality, is most causative of and integral to its own proper perfection. It is in this context that the fundamental relationship of the *bonum privatum* and the *bonum commune* becomes evident: the *bonum commune* is not something over and above what is “good for me” personally; it is precisely what is best for and most perfect of me, simply speaking. That which is most commonly sharable is, in being shared, the most beneficial to all who partake of it.” Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love,” 94. See _ST_ Ia, q. 60, a.5, ad. 3 (Leon. 5.105): “Et multo magis habet naturalem inclinationem unumquodque in id quod est bonum universale simpliciter.”

136 _ST_ Ia, q. 60, a.3co (Leon. 5.102): “cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente . . . dupliciter aliquid amatur: uno modo, ut bonum subsistens; alio modo, ut bonum accidentale sive inhaerens. Illud quidem amatur ut bonum subsistens, quod sic amatur ut ei aliquid velit bonum. Ut bonum vero accidentale seu inhaerens amatur id quod desideratur alteri: sicut amatur scientia, non ut ipsa sit bona, sedut habeatur. Et hunc modum amoris quidam nominaverunt concupiscentiam: primum vero amicitiam. Manifestum est autem quod in rebus cognitione carentibus, unumquodque naturaliter appetit consequi id quod est sibi bonum; sicut ignis locum sursum. Unde et angelus et homo naturaliter appetunt suum bonum et suam perfectionem. Et hoc est amare seipsum. Unde naturaliter tam angelus quam homo diligit seipsum, inquantum aliquod bonum naturali appetitu sibi desiderat. Inquantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, intantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva.” Also, _ST_ Ia, q. 60, a.3, ad 1 (Leon. 5.102): “angelus aut homo non diligit se dilectione naturali et electiva secundum idem ; sed secundum diversa . . . .”
is the source of all willed acts.\textsuperscript{137} Several texts show that for Thomas, natural self-love is, in rational beings, prior to a chosen good:

\textit{De veritate, q.22, a.5:}

Nature and the will are ordered such that the will itself is a certain nature, because whatever is found in things is of the nature. There must be accordingly found in the will not only what belongs to the will but also what is proper to nature. Therefore, just as nature is the foundation of the will, similarly the object of natural appetite is the principle and foundation of the other appetible objects.\textsuperscript{138}

\textit{ST Ia, q.82, a.1co:}

what suits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else: because the nature of a thing is first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.\textsuperscript{139}

\textit{ST Ia, q.60, a.2co:}

in angels there is a natural dilection and an elective dilection. And in them natural dilection is the principle of elective dilection, because that which belongs to what is prior always has the character of a principle; hence, since nature is what is first in anything, it must be that in any given thing, what pertains to nature is a principle.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{ST IaIIae, q.1, a.5co (Leon. 6.13):} “sicut in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur.”

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{De ver., q.22, a.5co (Leon. 22/3.624:174–179; 190–193):} “Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt ut etiam ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit, quia omne quod in rebus inventur natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet inveniri non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. . . Et ideo sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum.” Also \textit{ST Ia, q.60, a.1 (Leon. 5.98).}

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{ST Ia, q.82, a.1co (Leon. 5.293):} “Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter aliqui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum: quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili.”

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{ST Ia, q.60, a.2co (Leon. 5.100):} “in angelis est quaedam dilectio naturalis, et quaedam electiva. Et naturalis dilectio in eis est principium electivae; quia semper id quod pertinet ad prius, habet rationem principii; unde, cum natura sit primum quod est in unoquoque. Oportet quod id quod ad naturam pertinet, sit principium in quolibet.” We note that properly speaking, rational love is so called because it follows a process of discursive reasoning; only human beings reason discursively. Knowledge in God, and the angels is intuitive so their love should be called intellectual rather than rational. But with this distinction in mind, we will use both terms to refer to human rational love. See McGinnis, \textit{Wisdom of Love}, 47.
Since the will necessarily inclines toward happiness, it was unnecessary for human beings to be commanded under divine law to love themselves.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, Thomas argues that natural self-love can never be disordered; to say otherwise would be “to derogate from the Author of nature.”\textsuperscript{142} Human natural self-love (\textit{dilectio naturalis}) does not require formation on the part of the will.\textsuperscript{143}

\textit{B. Rational Self-Love (dilectio electiva)}

Since the sensory powers are part of human nature, the movement of the passions and the sense-appetite will be included in the treatment of rational self-love. The focus of this section will be the difference between natural self-love as the individual’s natural inclination to happiness, and rational self-love as one’s conscious choice of wishing goods to self.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, ad 1 (Leon. 7.211).

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 100, a. 5, ad 1 (Leon. 7.211): “sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera, ita dilectio naturalis semper est recta: cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinatio naturae indita ab Auctore naturae. Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare Auctori naturae.”

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{In Ethic.}, II, lect 1 [1103a18–26; 248–249] Aristotle argues that moral virtue is caused by habit; it is not something we have by nature since nothing natural is changed by habit. He gives the example of a stone that naturally gravitates downward; it will never become accustomed to moving upward, not even if someone were to throw it upward thousands of times. Likewise, fire will never become accustomed to tend downward. In regard to virtue, while we have a natural capacity to acquire them, they only perfect us by use. For Thomas’s commentary on this passage, see \textit{In Ethic.}, II, i (Leon.47/1.373:90–115): “Cuius ratio est quia virtus moralis pertinet ad appetitum qui operatur secundum quod movetur a bono apprehenso et ideo simul cum hoc quod multotiens operatur, oportet quod multotiens moveatur a suo obiecto et ex hoc consequitur quandam inclinationem ad modum naturae . . . Sic igitur patet quod virtutes Morales neque sunt in nobis a natura neque sunt nobis contra naturam, sed inest nobis naturalis aptitudo ad suscipiendum eas, in quantum scilicet vis appetitiva in nobis nata est oboedire rationi; perficiuntur autem in nobis per assuetudinem, in quantum scilicet ex eo quod multotiens agimus secundum rationem imprimitur forma rationis in vi appetitiva, quae quidem impressio nihil aliud est quam virtus moralis.”

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{ST} Ia, q. 60, a.3co (Leon. 5.102): “Inquantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, intantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva.” Mansini notes that elective love for Thomas means the equivalent to what William of Auxerre calls “voluntary natural love.” Mansini explains that Thomas keeps the notion of
Rational love is a choice “for the good loved on account of the end.” Love in the will specifies the will’s natural love of self in an act of choice; it is another inclination of the will “of which the willer himself is the cause.” As one author summarises:

The first act of the will loving the end is necessarily specified by the first act of the intellect presenting the good in general. It is called volition and is not a free act. The first apprehension of the end specifies the act of volition that is a necessary act of love for the end. This is followed by a second act of the intellect that is a realisation of the end as attainable. This second apprehension differs from the first in that, the initial concept did not consider the end as attainable but as good only. Another act of the will follows immediately. This act is called intention. It is not identical to the first act, volition.

Thus, men and angels “love self with elective dilection insofar as from choice [each] wishes for something which will benefit himself.” In rational self-love, the will follows the individual’s “voluntary” in the Aristotelian sense. Thomas distinguishes between “God cognized ‘insofar as he is distinct from other things’ and God ‘according as he is the universal good.’” See Mansini, Duplex Amor, 176, n. 84.

145 ST Ia, q. 60, a.2 (Leon. 5.100): “dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva.” Gallagher calls dilectio “the rational amor which is found in the will” in contradistinction to the passion of love (amor). Dilection has natural and elective components. He states: “The natural dilectio is the will’s natural inclination to beatitude. Rational beings, like all beings, have a natural tendency or inclination to that which will fulfill them and this tendency is located in the will . . . The choices which arise on the basis of the will’s natural inclination can also be dilectio, and Thomas calls this dilectio electiva. Whether or not a person takes compliance in an object can result from a free choice: one chooses to take the object as one’s good to be pursued, or one chooses to pursue the good of one person and not another.” See Gallagher, “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” 56.

146 In III Sent., d.27, q.1, a.2 (Moos, 862): “Et inde est quod omnes aliae vires animae coguntur a suis objectis praeter voluntatem; quia omnes aliae habent appetitum naturalem tantum respectu sui objecti; voluntas autem habet praeter inclinationem naturalem aliam cujus est ipse volens causa.”

147 Renard, “The Function of Intellect and Will,” 88. We note that “intention” is an act of the will relating to the end. ST IaIIae, q. 12, a.1, ad 4 (Leon. 6.94): “intento est actus voluntatis respectu finis.”

148 ST Ia, q. 60, a.3co (Leon. 5.102): “Inquantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, intantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva.”
inclination towards a particular good, with that good being either good and appetible in itself or good and appetible in relation to something else.\textsuperscript{149}

In sum, by natural self-love, human beings seek happiness, whereas by rational self-love, we specify the way we seek happiness by choosing goods for ourselves. This love of choice is also the source of our love for others, since friendship is a spiritual good:

The love (dilectio) that is toward others arises in man from the love that he has for himself, for a man stands in relation to a friend as he does to himself. But someone loves (diligat) himself inasmuch as he wishes (vult) the good for himself, just as he loves another insofar as he wishes him good. So, by the fact that a man is interested in his own good he is led to develop an interest in the good of another. Hence because a person hopes for good from another, a way develops for man to love that other in himself, from whom he hopes to attain the good. Indeed, someone is loved in himself when the lover wishes his good, even if the lover may receive nothing from him.\textsuperscript{150}

Thomas follows Aristotle in arguing that the five properties found in friendship with others are found first in a virtuous man’s relations with himself.\textsuperscript{151} The good of a virtuous man is that he be

\textsuperscript{149} ST Ia, q. 60, a.2co (Leon. 5.101): “Unde non est imperfectione appetentis, quod aliquid appetat naturaliter ut finem, et aliquid per electionem, ut ordinatur in finem.”

\textsuperscript{150} SCG III, c.153 (Leon. 14.447): “Dilectio enim quae est ad alios, provenit in homine ex dilectione hominis ad seipsum, inquantum ad amicum aliquis se habet sicut ad se. Diligit autem aliquis seipsum inquantum vult sibi bonum: sicut alium diligat inquantum vult ei bonum. Oportet igitur quod homo, per hoc quod circa proprium bonum afficitur, perducatur ad hoc quod afficiatur circa bonum alterius. Per hoc igitur quod aliquis ab alio sperat bonum, fit homini via ut illum diligat a quo bonum sperat, secundum seipsum: diligitur enim aliquis secundum seipsum quando diligens bonum eius vult, etiam si nihil ei inde proveniat.” As Johann comments: “It is clear that, if a being is to find his own good in the proper and incommunicable subsistence of another, his own ipseity must first of all be a value to himself... . He must be conscious of himself, apprehend himself in his uniqueness and cherish himself, if he is to be present to and cherish the “self” in another,” Johann, \textit{The Meaning of Love}, 41. Other places where Thomas argues that love of self is the cause of love of others are \textit{In III Sent.}, d. 29, q. 1, a.3, ad 3; \textit{ST IIaIIae}, q. 17, a.8. This theme will be treated in chapter five of this work.

\textsuperscript{151} ST IIaIIae, q. 25, a. 4co (Leon. 8.200): “Unde sicut unitas est principium unionis, ita amor quo quis diligat seipsum, est forma et radix amicitiae: in hoc enim amicitiam habemus ad alios, quos ad eos nos habemus sicut ad nos ipsos; dicitur enim in \textit{IX Ethic.} quod \textit{amicabilitia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex his quae sunt ad seipsum.” For the five properties of friendship with others, see \textit{ST IIaIIae}, q. 25, a.7 (Leon. 8.203). Robert Johann adds: “To understand properly the communion of \textit{I} and \textit{thou} in love, we must realize that it is not simply a question of being
virtuous, “wishing himself to exist and to live according to what is permanent in him,” versus the person who wishes himself to exist and live chiefly in terms of his body, which is changeable.\textsuperscript{152} How rational self-love and friendship are related, however, will be discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this dissertation. For now, we will look at the two kinds of rational self-love presented by Thomas.

\textbf{C. Rational Self-Love: Two Kinds}

Thomas distinguishes two kinds of rational self-love: proper self-love (\textit{amor sui ordinatus}) and improper self-love (\textit{amor sui inordinatus}),\textsuperscript{153} where the difference between them is distinguished primarily in terms of what the person takes to be his self as well as what goods the person seeks for himself.\textsuperscript{154} In proper self-love, the individual takes his soul to be the most important part of himself and thus primarily wills spiritual goods for himself with a love of concupiscence; in improper self-love, he takes the sensitive and bodily side of his nature as primary, and accordingly wills mainly sensible and bodily goods for himself:

\begin{quotation}
\footnotesize
able to love another as myself but rather that only insofar as I love another do I really love myself. And this second truth has exactly the same foundation as the first—the metaphysics of participation; “I cannot really love myself without loving other selves.” Johann, The Meaning of Love, 50; 52. This “metaphysics of participation” is a point which will be explored in chapter six.

152 \textit{In Ethic.}, IX, iv (Leon. 47/2.326:132–138): “Unde virtuosus, qui totus vivit secundum intellectum et rationem, maxime vult se ipsum esse et vivere; vult enim se esse et vivere principaliter secundum id quod in eo permanet.”

153 I am following David Gallagher’s terminology here. Here, Thomas is using the general term for love (\textit{amor}) rather than the specific term for rational love (\textit{dilectio}).

\end{quotation}
'love of oneself' (dilectio sui ipsius) is understood with respect to those things that pertain to the soul; and therefore ‘love of one’s body’ (dilectio corporis) is distinguished from ‘love of oneself’ not as a part is distinguished from a whole, but as a part from [another] part.\textsuperscript{155}

The soul should be the proper object of one’s love of concupiscence since it is the soul that primarily participates in the life of eternal beatitude.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, the true self-lover wills for himself as his perfection the goods of the intellect and will, goods that include virtue and friendship.\textsuperscript{157} Thomas clearly identifies proper self-love and improper self-love in terms of willing immutable or mutable goods for oneself:

The proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that someone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for so to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin.\textsuperscript{158} 

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{In III Sent.}, d.28, q.1, a.7, ad 4 (Moos, 916): “dicendum quod ununquisque homo proprie dicitur esse id quod est nobilissimum in eo, ut dicit Philosophus in IX Ethic... Unde dilectio sui ipsius intelligitur quantum ad ea animam pertinent; et ideo dilectio corporis dividitur contra dilectionem sui ipsius, non sicut pars contra totum, sed sicut pars contra partem.”

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{In III Sent.}, d.28, q.1, a.7, ad 2 (Moos, 915): “dicendum quod hominem diligere seipsum secundum exteriorum naturam in his quae repugnant rationi, \textit{est vituperabile}; sed in his quibus natura exterior interiori concordat, est laudabile.” Not only can the body be mis-taken for the noblest part of oneself, but as far as spiritual goods are concerned, apparent moral goods can be mis-taken for true moral goods. Apparent goods are also desirable, but, Thomas adds, they are desirable only to those who do not have right judgment. See \textit{In IV Sent.}, d. 49, q.3, a.4, ad 2 (Parma, 1221): “... non solum appetitur bonum, sed etiam apparet bonum. Quia autem omnis delectatio ex hoc quod est delectatio, bona est; quantumcumque ex aliquo adjuncto efficiatur mala, habet unde apparere possit bona, et per consequens unde possit appeti; et sic appetibilis est non habenti rectum judicium; sed habenti rectum judicium delectationes quaedam appetibiles non sunt; sicut prudens et temperatus non appetit delectationes intemperati.” The Moos edition of Book IV ends at d. 22, so the Parma edition is being used here: \textit{Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, vol.7/2: Commentum in quartum librum Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi} (Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadorim 1858).

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{In III Sent.} d. 29, q. 1, a. 5 co. (Moos, 934).

\textsuperscript{158} ST IaIae, q.77, a. 4co (Leon. 7.66): “propria et per se causa peccati accipienda est ex parte conversionis ad commutabile bonum; ex qua quidem parte omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo inordinato appetitu aliquidus temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod inordinate
The “dis-order” of improper self-love lies in one’s adherence to the material or spiritual good loved:

Love denotes a suitability of the appetitive power to some good. Nothing, however, is hurt by being adapted to what is suitable to it, rather, it is possibly bettered and perfected. But if something is adapted to what is not suitable to it, then it is hurt and made worse by it. Consequently, love (amor) of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover, but love of a good which is not suitable to the lover (amanti) wounds and worsens him. Thus man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to Osee IX.10: *They became abominable, as those things which they loved.*

Being free, we can introduce disorder into ourselves through our actions. Sinful action is not simply a lack of order to the human good; it is also a rejection of that good for some other. The end is the object of the will, and so since the will always tends to the good, no end is itself evil; but it can be called evil regarding its effects. A person can only will one ultimate end at any one time and, by doing so, subjects all other ends to the end willed. Thus, the person who chooses theft as his end diverts his will from the proper final end as governed by reason. The diversion of the will is a result of choosing an improper end. In choosing the latter, the will amat seipsum: hoc enim est amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus amor sui est causa omnis peccati.”

159 *ST* IaIIae, q. 28, a.5co (Leon. 6.201): “*amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur: sed magis, si si possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni conveniens est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis: amor autem boni quod non est conveniens amanti, est laesus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde maxime homo perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei: laeditur autem et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud Osee ix: Facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt.*”


161 *ST* Ia, q. 48, a.1, ad 2 (Leon. 4.491): “*finis intemperati est, non quidem carere bono rationis, sed delectabile sensus absque ordine rationis.*”
necessarily excludes its inclination to the proper end.\textsuperscript{162} Human beings have free choice. Because there are many means that can be freely chosen, a susceptibility to defect is present.

In regard to oneself, valuing a part of oneself to the exclusion of one’s overall good is a dis-ordered choice of the part over the whole:

Those who love themselves (amantes) are to be blamed insofar as they love (amant) themselves as regards their sensible nature which they humour. This is not to love oneself truly according to one’s rational nature so as to desire (velit) for oneself those goods that pertain to the perfection of reason and in this way chiefly it is through charity that a man loves himself.\textsuperscript{163}

At this point, we may recall the biblical prudent man of the flesh who is called by the apostle Paul, a “clear-sighted sinner:”\textsuperscript{164} he is clear-sighted, because he establishes an end (pleasure of the flesh); he is a sinner, because he adheres his affections to goods for his sensual, lower nature (natura sensualis),\textsuperscript{165} rather than to those spiritual goods that are more suitable for his spiritual and higher self. Sin forces in a new order with a new species that is ordered to a new end.\textsuperscript{166}


\textsuperscript{163} \textit{ST} IIaIIae, q. 25, a.4, ad 3 (Leon. 8.200): “amantes seipsos vituperantur inquantum amant se secundum naturam sensibilem, cui obtemperant. Quod non est vere amare seipsum secundum naturam rationalem, ut sibi velit ea bona quae pertinent ad perfectionem rationis. Et hoc modo praecepue ad caritatem pertinet diligere seipsum.”

\textsuperscript{164} The character in question appears in \textit{Luke} 16:8—the steward who has been squandering his master’s possessions. When discovered by the master and called to give account, the steward devises a plan to take care of himself after his imminent dismissal by further squandering his masters goods in a crafty manner.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{In III Sent.}, d.9, q.1, a.5co (Moos, 934): “Sed sciendum quod, cum in hominie sit, duplex natura scilicet interior, videlicet rationis quae dicitur homo interior: et exterior, scilicet natura sensualis quae dicitur homo exterior; plus homo debet diligere se quantum ad naturam interiorem quam quantum ad naturam exteriorem. Et ideo ea quae sunt bona naturae interioris, plus debet optare quam ea sunt bona sibi secundum naturam exteriorem.” Also, \textit{ST} IIaIIae, q.25, a.7co (Leon. 8.203): “amare seipsum uno modo commune est omnibus; aliо modo proprium est bonorum; terto modo proprium est malorum. Quod enim aliquis amet id quod seipsum esse aestimat, hoc commune est omnibus. Homo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam substantiam et naturam. Et secundum hoc omnes aestimant bonum commune se esse id quod sunt, scilicet ex anima et corpore compositos. . . Et
The difference in the priority of goods one wills is based upon what part of oneself one most highly values. Self-knowledge is thus indispensable to proper self-love. An individual, knowing himself as subject, “has a living and experimental consciousness of himself as an ‘I.’” The kind of “I” that I know myself to be determines the kind of goods I will for myself. And in willing good to myself, “I give and devote myself explicitly to the full unfolding in being of this intimate value, this unique subjectivity to which I am present in myself, and which as in me is myself.”

But how does Thomas explain the connection between self-knowledge and self-love? How does self-knowledge allow me to properly love myself? We will now turn our attention to how Thomas answers these questions.

sic etiam omnes homines, boni et mali, diligunt seipsos, inquantum diligunt sui ipsorum conservationem. . . Principale enim in homine est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura sensitiva et corporalis; quorum primum Apostolus nominat interiorem hominem . . . Boni autem aestimant principale in seipsis rationalem naturam, sive interiorem hominem: unde secundum hoc aestimant se esse quod sunt. Mali autem aestimant principale in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporalem, scilicet exteriori hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt id quod seipsos esse reputant. Boni autem, vere cognoscentes seipsos, vere seipsos diligunt. . . mali amant seipsos secundum corruptionem exterioris hominis. Sic autem boni non amant seipsos.”

Also, ST IaIIae, q.77, a.4, ad 1(Leon. 7.66): “amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita scilicet quod elit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa peccati secundum Augustinum.”

166 Jensen, Good and Evil Actions, 297. For Thomas see De malo q. 2, a.4, ad 8.

167 Johann, The Meaning of Love, 42.
VII.

Self-Knowledge and Self-Love

Having outlined the different types of self-love, we come to the question of how self-love follows from self-knowledge according to Thomas. If human beings were wholly material we could not love ourselves since matter lacks the power of reflection. We have, however, an intellective soul, which can reflect upon itself and observe its own activities. Thus, we can judge our acts as good or defective. Reflection upon our acts is made possible by an act of explicit habitual self-awareness whereby the soul can attend to the movements within itself and reason about its acts. Given that reason can reflect back upon itself and order its own act, a person can take delight or displeasure in the nature of the acts which determine himself or herself.

As examined in chapter two, the intellect is able to reflect upon itself through an act of explicit self-awareness. In knowing myself through my acts—consciously choosing to act or not—I determine myself at the level of action: I “possess myself.” I am present to myself as the source of my own activity; I know myself as subject, possessing “a living and experimental consciousness” of myself as an ‘I.’

\[168 ST IaIIae, q. 17, a.6co (Leon. 6.122). See ch. 2, p. 8, fn 29.

\[169 Ch 2, p. 16.

\[170 Johann, Meaning of Love, 41.\]
We recall that it is proper to the intellective part of the human soul that it is reflected back upon itself (is “self-aware”): the intellect understands itself and reason can reason about its own act. Such self-awareness occurs in varying degrees in every voluntary action, for such action involves judgment about the object of the act. The mutual inclusiveness of intellect and will extends to their acts: the acts of will and of intellect are brought to bear on one another. The form of an object received in the intellect imparts an affective connaturality or proportion in the will, although the motion towards the object begins in the will.\textsuperscript{171} Since rational love is an act of the will, and thus intelligible, the intellect can perceive such an act when present. The object of love in the will (the good \textit{as known}) is the result of the lover’s free choice in judging and choosing that object as fitting. The person who genuinely desires his perfection “will value the operations of knowledge and love as perfective, as actuations of potentiality.”\textsuperscript{172}

Human beings have the capacity to self-reflect concerning moral matters precisely because the will can move the intellect to consider its acts.\textsuperscript{173} The will, while working together

\textsuperscript{171} As George Klubertanz notes, however, “in Thomas’s psychology there is no separation of any kind between intellect and will, but only a distinction based on their formal objects and their causal order.” George Klubertanz, “The Unity of Human Activity” in \textit{The Modern Schoolman} XXVII (1950), 89.

\textsuperscript{172} Johann, \textit{Meaning of Love}, 78. Moreover, “but more profoundly . . . because of the term towards which he is thereby explicitly oriented, Absolute Value, communicating Itself in its infinity and calling for a return of generous love, for communion. The man who desires the perfective must desire to give himself to Subsistent Perfection.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{173} See Ch.2, 23.
with the intellect as the principle of human action, operates in a different manner to the intellect, moving outward to unite itself to the object as it exists in itself.\(^{174}\)

When I apprehend and choose a good for myself in an act of rational self-love, that good is first intellectually grasped and then presented to the will which desires it as fitting; the will then moves itself by exercising an act of love. This interrelationship of reflexivity manifests the rich dynamism of being within the human subject. Although I can never fully know myself in this life, I can know myself to a degree through reflection on my acts by which I possess myself. As Johann describes:

[the human subject] is a subsistent plenitude revealed to itself in its own immanent activity; a generous abundance of being open to itself, not indeed as a pure datum of introspection, capable of being isolated and determined by a collection of attributes, but as affirmed and attained in the act by which it possesses itself. This profound source is, therefore, unequalled by the knowledge had of it. It is a wealth, a richness, an expansive power of action, present indeed, but never wholly rejoined, never exhausted, always experienced as capable of new manifestations, new revelations. And it is this original and subsistent value seized in the existential act of giving itself to itself, that I love when I love myself.\(^{175}\)

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\(^{174}\) “While the movement of both the intellect and will from one viewpoint are immanent, their natural tendencies are opposite. The movement of the intellect is inward. By its activity the intellect draws into itself the extramental object giving to it a new vital and intentional existence within the mind. The movement of the will, on the contrary, is outward towards the thing as existing ‘in rerum natura.’ For love is an ecstasy, a dynamic movement to union with the extra-mental beloved. The object of the will exists in it as a motive force. To love a thing is to be drawn outward to it in a manner more forceful than the intellect draws inward.” Johann, *Meaning of Love*, 54. See *ST* IaIIae, q.22, a 2 (Leon. 6.169): “Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt: unde Philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod *bonum et malum*, quae sunt objecta appetitivae potentiae, *sunt in ipsis rebus*. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum.”

\(^{175}\) Johann, *Meaning of Love*, 42.
Love as an act of the will can be “reflected back” upon the lover precisely because the reflexive soul can “reason about its own act,”¹⁷⁶ and consider the good chosen as well as why it was chosen. Moreover, the intellect can apprehend the good as good but not fitting and thus not move the will. In an act of rational self-love, the good must be judged as fitting for me; I must be “well-pleased” with the particular good and move myself towards it. I can reflect on the object of my desire and distinguish the object itself as well as my reason for desiring it (the ratio appetibilitatis).¹⁷⁷ I can distinguish the object (e.g., coffee) from the reason for its desirability (its pleasure or utility) and can therefore reflect both on why I choose certain goods, and on why I choose certain goods. Virtuous action is key to a person’s mastery over his or her acts. Before looking at this theme, however, we pause to examine briefly the structure of human action.

**First and Second Perfection in Human Agency**

Everything exists for the sake of its operation; “indeed, operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing” (Omnis enim res propter suam operationem esse videtur: operatio enim est

¹⁷⁶ *ST* Ia, q. 60, a.3, ad 3 (Leon. 6.102): “sicut amor est actio manens in agente, ita est motus manens in amante, non autem tendens in aliquid alium ex necessitate; sed potest reflecti super amantem, ut amet seipsum, sicut et cognitio reflectitur in cognoscentem, ut cognoscat seipsum.”

¹⁷⁷ Gallagher, “Desire For Beatitude,” 574.
ultima perfectio rei). A creature is in a state of potency to its way of acting; it has a particular capacity (quantum in se est) to be moved to its proper perfection.

A creature’s first act, or first perfection, is through its nature, and its second act, or second perfection, is through its operation. For example, the physical organ of the ear indicates potency; the healthy ear’s capacity to hear indicates first act, and its orientation to actually hearing indicates second act. In human beings, the capacity to learn (for example, the rules of grammar) illustrates potency; knowledge (of those rules) illustrates first act; and actually thinking (the grammatical rules) illustrates second act. First act disposes a creature to achieve its second act by way of operation.

In human action, the good designates a certain perfection, where perfection is twofold: (i) a first perfection, which is a form or habit, or (ii) a second perfection, which is an operation. Everything we use in acting can be referred to the first perfection, the use of which is operation or action. In a discussion on Divine Providence, Thomas states that a creature’s second

178 SCG III, c. 113 (Leon. 14.359).

179 SCG III, c. 16 (Leon. 14.38): “si perfectione propria careat, in ipsam movetur, quantum in se est: si vero eam habeat, in ipsa quiescit.”

180 Hütter notes: “Everything that achieves its secondary perfection by way of its operation ‘intends’ and ‘acts’ in the broadest sense, be it animate as fire is, animate as trees or birds are, or intelligent as humans or angels are. Thomas thus argues that in acting every agent intends an end, and that the ultimate end is that beyond which the agent seeks nothing else.” Reinhard Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven, 199. For Thomas see SCG III, c. 3.

181 De Malo, q. 1, a. 4, (Leon. 23.19–20:95–102): “Perfectio autem est duplex: scilicet prima, que est formae habitus, et secunda, que est operatio. Ad perfectionem autem primam, cuius usus est operatio, potest reduci omne illud quo utimur operando.”
perfection constitutes an addition to its first perfection. The act of being and the nature of a thing
(esse et natura rei) belong to a creature’s first perfection; operation (operatio) belongs to its
second perfection. He then adds that the perfection of the universe required the existence of
creatures “which return to God not only as regards likeness of nature, but also by their action.”
Such a return to God, he continues, can be made only by the act of the intellect and the will for
the reason that “God Himself has no other operation in His own regard than these.” Thus, he
argues, “the greatest perfection of the universe demanded the existence of some intellectual
creatures.”

The distinction, and interrelation, between first and second perfection is particularly
important in the case of human beings. As will be discussed in the next chapter, our first
perfection (nature) is alone not sufficient to secure our final end. Rather, it is by virtue of our
second perfection (operation) that we can reach our ultimate end, yet even our operation needs
divine aid (grace) for this to be achieved. For Thomas, because we possess reason and are free,
we are both ruled and rulers of ourselves, inasmuch as we can direct our own actions to a fitting
end. Thomas writes:

For some beings produced by God so exist that, possessing understanding, they bear his likeness and reflect
his image . . . If these beings submit to the divine rule in their own ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule

182 SCG II. c. 46 (Leon. 13.374): “Perfectio secunda in rebus addit supra primam. Sicut autem esse et natura
rei consideratur secundum primam perfectionem, ita operatio secundum perfectionem secundam. Oportuit igitur, ad
consummatam universi perfectionem, esse aliquas creaturas quae in Deum redirent non solum secundum naturae
similitudinem, sed etiam per operationem. Quae quidem non potest esse nisi per actum intellectus et voluntatis; quia
nec ipse Deus alter erga seipsum operationem habet. Oportuit igitur, ad perfectionem optimam universi, esse
aliquas creaturas intellectuales.”
they are admitted to the achievement of their ultimate end; but, if they otherwise proceed in their own ruling, they are rejected.\textsuperscript{183}

Our secondary perfection, operation, is by virtue of the intellect, which presents what it understands as good to the will. Our primary perfection – the gift of nature – remains ordered to our ultimate end but, as will be discussed, we can refuse a habitually perfected secondary perfection\textsuperscript{184} in the exercise of improper self-love.

\textbf{VIII.}

\textbf{Self-Possession and Virtue}

As discussed in chapter two, self-possession denotes a person’s mastery over his or her acts and is expressed at the level of self-awareness in the order of knowledge and at the level of self-determination in the order of will and action.\textsuperscript{185} At the level of self-awareness, a person can meaningfully say “I,” and in the order of action claim that “I” am responsible for this action. An individual who knows that he is self-possessed at these two levels knows himself as subject and


\textsuperscript{184} Hütter, \textit{Dust Bound for Heaven}, 236.

\textsuperscript{185} Ch 2, p. 18.
can thus love himself as subject. As a self-possessed subject, he is *obliged* to examine his own actions: “for every man is obliged to act according to reason.”

Thomas acknowledges that there is no reciprocal element in rational self-love, since there is only one term (myself), not two (myself and another):

Reciprocal love (*reamatio*) has a place in the friendship which is for another, but not in the friendship which is for oneself, whether in respect to the soul or to the body.

As we will see, our acts and decisions form in us a “second nature” and can become distinct objects of our consideration through reflection. Through reflection we are able to “stand outside ourselves” and examine our own acts as well as the decisions informing them. When I reflect on my acts, I am aware of being the subject of those acts, and delight or displeasure with myself as subject follows. Thomas describes this process within the virtuous person:

The virtuous man wishes most of all to live with himself, namely by returning to his heart and meditating with himself. He does this with pleasure: first regarding the memory of past events since the memory of good things that he has done is pleasurable to him; second, regarding hope for the future, for he anticipates doing well in the future and this is pleasant to him; third, regarding present knowledge, for his mind is filled with reflections, i.e., true and useful considerations.

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186 *De ver.*, q. 17, a. 5, ad 4 (Leon. 22/2.528:103–106): “unusquisque enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad scientiam quam a Deo habet sive sit naturalis sive acquisita sive infusa: omnis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere.” For context, the question is “Does Conscience in Indifferent Matters Bind More Than the Command of a Superior or Less,” where Thomas is discussing religious obedience. Ralph McInerny comments: “Only if we are habitually ordered to the good, to the ends of the particular moral virtues, are we free to see how in the here and now these ends can be achieved. If we act contrary to what, on the level of generality, we know we ought to do, our action can be explained by the disordered condition of our appetites. On the other hand, when we act well, in accord with principles, and succeed in applying those principles to the concrete, this is a positive benefit of a well-ordered appetite.” Ralph McInerny, *Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 101.

187 *ST* IIaIIae, q. 25, a. 5, ad 3 (Leon. 8.201): “reamatio habet locum in amicitia quae est ad alterum: non autem in amicitia quae est ad seipsum, vel secundum animam vel secundum corpus.”

My consciousness of myself as an acting subject grounds my relationship with others, as Johann
notes:

It is clear that if a being is to find his own good in the proper and incommunicable subsistence of another, his own ipseity must first of all be a value to himself. He must be conscious of himself, apprehend himself in his uniqueness and cherish himself, if he is to be present to and cherish the ‘self’ in another. A being that is absorbed, as it were, in a material nature, never really conscious of its own proper subsistence, unable to utter the simple electrifying ‘I am,’ is equally and strictly incapable of really loving itself . . . its existence is imprisoned in its nature and its operations are wholly necessitated.189

Thomas characterises proper love of oneself by the five things that are essential to friendship, where the “inward man” (the intellectual part of the soul)190 is the object of his *amor amicitiae*:

the good love (*diligunt*) themselves as to the inward man, because [1] they wish to preserve their own integrity, [2] they wish good things for him, namely, spiritual goods, [3] they do their best to obtain them, and [4] they take pleasure in returning to their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present, and in the memory of past good, and in the hope of future good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise, [5] they experience no dissention of the will because their whole soul tends to one thing.191

The first characteristic of proper self-love (love of one’s “inward man”) is love of one’s own existence as a person, and this is by natural self-love. The next four characteristics,

memoriam praeteritorum, quia memoria bonorum quae operatus est est sibi delectabilis; secundo quantum ad spem futurum habet enim spem bene operandi in futuro, quae est sibi delectabilis; tertio quantum ad cognitionem praesentium, abundat enim secundum mentem theorematibus, id est considerationibus veris et utilibus.”


190 See chapter one.

191 *ST* IIaIIae, q. 25, a 7co (Leon. 8.203): “boni diligunt seipsos quantum ad interiorem hominem: quia etiam volunt ipsam servari in sua integritate; et optant ei bona eius, quae sunt bona spiritualia; et etiam ad assequenda operam impendunt; et delectabiliter ad cor proprium redeunt, quia ibi inveniunt et bonas cogitationes in praesenti, et memoriam bonorum, praeteritorum, et spem futurum bonorum; ex quibus delectatio causatur; similiter etiam non patiuntur in seipsis voluntatis dissensionem, quia tota anima eorum tendit in unum.” Thus, “the presence of the other as really a ‘second self’ is necessarily that of a subject open to me in some sense as I am to myself—it must be a presence which permits exchange and dialogue.” Johann, *Meaning of Love*, 45.
however, concern rational love: *benevolence* (*benevolentia*), the goods one wishes to a friend; *beneficence* (*beneficentia*), the good one does for a friend; taking pleasure in the friend’s company, which is higher than pleasure and utility; and a union of intellect and will along with sharing joys and sorrows.\(^{192}\) Indeed, the virtuous man “keenly feels his own sorrows and joys since the same thing is painful or pleasant to his whole being (i.e. both the sensitive and the intellectual part) and not one thing to one part and another to another.”\(^{193}\) Such a person always acts according to reason and, not readily having regrets, is at peace with himself.\(^{194}\)

We turn now to explore how precisely the true self-lover, the virtuous subject, moves toward perfection in self-friendship.

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\(^{192}\) *ST* IIaIIae, q. 25, a.7 (Leon. 8:203): “Et hoc probat Philosophus, in IX *Ethic.*, per quinque quae sunt amicitiae propria. Unusquisque enim amicus primo quidem vult suum amicum esse et vivere; secundo, vult ei bona; tertio, operatur bona ad ipsum; quarto, convivit ei delectabiliter; quinto, concordat cum ipso, quasi in isdem delectatus et contristatus.” Concerning the effect of sharing sorrows with a friend, Thomas notes in *ST* IaIae, q. 38, a.3co (Leon. 6.258): “naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est consolativus. Cuius duplicem rationem . . . Quarum prima est quia, cum ad tristitiam per tineat aggravare, habet rationem cuiusdam oneris, a quo aliquis aggravatus alleviari conatur. Cum ergo aliquis videt de sua tristitia alios contristatos, fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod ilud onus alii cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum, et ideolevius fert tristitiae onus: sicut etiam in portandis oneribus corporalibus contingit.”

\(^{193}\) *In Ethic.*, IX, lect iv (Leon. 47/2.514: 153–168): “virtuosus habet concordiam as se ipsum secundum passiones. Et dicit quod ipse maxime condolet et condelectatur sibi ipsi, quia toti sibi, id est quantum ad partem sensitivam et intellectivam, est idem triste et delectabile et non alid alii . . .”

\(^{194}\) *In Ethic.*, IX, lect iv (Leon. 47/2.514: 165–167): “Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod praedicta conveniunt virtuoso respectu sui ipsius.”
IX.

Virtue and Self-Friendship

What we love shapes our moral life. In moral action, our intentions orient our acts, where the orientation “either conforms to or deviates from the telos of the act, the direction it ought to have.” The moral specification of a human act comes from ordering one’s exterior act to some end (intention) in a way that matches, or fails to match, the order that it ought to have (teleology). Thomas states:

In order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that a man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason, counsel, judge and command aright . . .

In recognising an object as good, one also recognises it in its relation to oneself. Our judgment of what is good, however, is modified by our character, which is in turn formed by the

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195 Jensen, Good and Evil Actions, 299. “The intention is not specified by the interior act as performed, but as conceived.”

196 “Since the good is found in order, and order is realised in actions, it follows that the order of our actions is of the utmost importance. Do our actions direct us to the good or do they direct us to some other end that excludes the human good?” Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey Through Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 299. Jensen argues against the “overstatement” that actions are specified by intentions: “although the species is taken from that which is intended . . . the overstatement is often tacitly accepted in efforts to discover the species of actions. As a result the focus shifts to the precise formality under which something is intended . . . Does the thief intend to take the chalice insofar as it is holy or insofar as it is valuable? . . . The strength of the agent’s imagination becomes a force by which she can redescribe her action in innocuous terms.” Ibid., 299–300.

197 ST IaIae, q. 58, a.4co. (Leon. 6.375): “moralis virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo ut sit debita intentio finis: et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem: et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinent ad prudentiam et ad virtutes sibi annexas.”
kinds of choices we make throughout life.\footnote{Thomas comments on a passage in Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} VI.9, 1137, that choice is a principle of action, where the principles of choice are the appetitive faculty and reason, “which by means of choice are principles of action;” \textit{In Ethic.}, VI.ii (Leon. 47/2.338: 204–213): “electio est principium actus et electionis principia sunt appetitus et ratio sive intellectus aut mens, quae mediente electione sunt principia actus, consequens est quod electio vel sit intellectus appetitivus, ita scilicet quod electio sit essentialiter actus intellectus secundum quod ordinat appetitum, vel sit appetitus intellectivus, ita scilicet quo electio sit essentialiter actus appetitus secundum quod dirigitur ab intellectu.” Also, \textit{In Ethic.} X, 9 (Leon. 47/2.581:150–158): “Ostensum est autem supra multotiens quod ila sunt vere pretiosae et delectabilia quae talia iudicantur a virtuoso, qui est regula humanorum actuum. Sicut autem unicularque videtur esse maxime eligibilis operatio quae convenit sibi secundum proprium habitum, ita etiam virtuoso est maxime eligibilis et pretiosa operatio quae est secundum virtutem.”} We are praised and reproached because of virtues and vices, which are not in us by nature.\footnote{\textit{In Ethic.}, II, iv (Leon. 47/1.92:201–204): “virtutes et malitiae secundum quas dicimur boni vel mali non sunt nobis a natura, ut supra probatum est; ergo virtutes et malitiae non sunt potentiae.”} Proper love (\textit{amor ordinatus}), love “ordered” to reason, or rational love, is the principle of our virtuous and of our sinful acts;\footnote{\textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 125, a.2co (Leon. 10. 44): “amor ordinatus includitur in qualibet virtute, quilibet enim virtuosus amat proprium bonum virtutis; amor autem inordinatus includitur in quilibet peccato, ex amore enim inordinato procedit inordinata cupiditas.” See Michael Sherwin, \textit{By Knowledge and Love}, 105.} our deeds reveal to us what we choose to love.

Virtue and vice are habits that modify the way we adapt ourselves to goods. Virtue is a habit that perfects us to perform good actions,\footnote{\textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 58, a.3co (Leon. 6.374): “virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem ad bene operandum.” Also, \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 59, a.4co (Leon. 6.383): “virtus moralis perfecti appetitivam partem animae ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum, Unde circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi: sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas . . .”} whereas vice is a habit that disposes us in a manner not befitting our rational nature.\footnote{\textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 71, a.1co (Leon. 6.4): “vitium enim uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod convenit suae naturae.” Additionally \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 71, a.2co (Leon.6.5): “Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse,” ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de \textit{Div. Nom.} Unde virtus humana, quae \textit{hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit}, intantum est secundum naturam hominis,} A habit in the soul is a “second nature;” it is not the
same as a natural form. This is because the form of a natural thing necessarily produces an operation befitting itself, whereas a habit in the soul does not necessarily produce its operation; a habit is used by a person when he wills to use it. Thus, a person can possess a habit but either fail to use it or “produce a contrary act.”

Although human beings do not necessarily perform virtuous acts, such acts are most fitting for human beings since they suit a rational nature:

The nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man.

Virtue, however, can become connatural to a person insofar as it becomes natural through habituation. That is, insofar as the appetite becomes the subject of a second nature:

moral virtue is so called from mos in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of mos, i.e., custom, is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an

inquantum convenit rationi: vitium autem intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem rationis.”

203 ST IaIae, q.71, a.4co (Leon. 6.7): “Sed habitus in anima non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo uitur eo cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti habitu, aut agere contrarium actum.”

204 ST IaIae, q.71, a.2co (Leon. 6.5): “Sed considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est homo; quod autem st secundum rationem, est secundum naturam hominis inquantum est homo.”

205 ST IaIae, q. 59, a.4co (Leon. 6.383): “virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi; sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas . . .”
action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all powers to their acts . . . Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.²⁰⁶

Thus, I can acquire new inclinations to things and come to find pleasure in things that I did not previously find pleasurable, as Thomas states:

What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement that gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.²⁰⁷

Virtues are in harmony with our rational nature since they complete or perfect that nature, and the harmony itself is pleasant. Indeed, for Thomas, “the works of virtue are connatural to reason.”²⁰⁸ Thus, if a person is habitually inclined to do good, good action can become connatural to him, such as the liberal person who takes pleasure in giving to others because he has acquired an habitual inclination to liberality.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ ST IaIIae, q. 58, a.1co (Leon. 6.372): “Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem: nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprii convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum . . . Et ideo non omnis virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi appetitiva.”

²⁰⁷ ST IaIIae, q. 32, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 6.225): “id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile, inquantum efficitur naturale: nam consuetudo est quasi altera natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate aliiuis operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.”

²⁰⁸ ST IaIIae, q.70, a.4, ad.1 (Leon. 6.464): “id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem;ideo opera virtutum fructus dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.”

²⁰⁹ ST IaIIae, q.32, a.6co (Leon. 6.228): “Aliud principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit aliius connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis.”
The acquisition of a second nature affects not only our actions, but also our judgment. Although by natural self-love human beings are rightly disposed to the universal principles of action, it is by proper self-love that we become rightly disposed to choosing appropriate goods for ourselves through the acquisition of virtuous, connatural habits. Once we have these habits, Thomas argues, it becomes connatural to us to judge rightly as to how actions should be ordered to the end. As far as performing those actions, virtue is required:

As to the universal principles of actions, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil, or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz., the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because such as a man is, such does the end seem to him.\footnote{ST IaIIae, q. 58, a.5co (Leon. 6.376): “Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrupitur in particulari per aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscientia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fit quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem: virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia quidem unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in III Ethic.”}  

Virtuous acts require seeking the goods of persons in the proper order. Virtue perfects one’s intellect and will: moral virtue perfects the appetites, and intellectual virtue perfects the
intellect.\textsuperscript{211} Yet the perfection of any one of the faculties of the soul is a perfection of the whole person, since all human action is ultimately grounded in the supposit. As an \textit{operative} habit belonging to a power of the soul, virtue perfects the power for its operation; in making the operation good, virtue makes the whole person good.\textsuperscript{212}

We pause to note that there are \textit{two} goods involved in relation to the human person: the good that our own natural human powers can attain, and the good that is above our human powers.\textsuperscript{213} Thus, when we call a virtuous person “perfect” it is in a restricted sense when compared to the perfection of God.\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{211} ST IaIIae, q. 58, a.3co (Leon. 6.374): “Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus: haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine . . . Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfecta alicuius istorum principiorum.” Also, \textit{De virt. in comm.} q.58, a. 2.

\textsuperscript{212} ST IaIIae, q. 56, a.1co (Leon. 6.355).

\textsuperscript{213} ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a.3co (Leon. 8.28): “Perfectio ergo rationalis creaturae non solum consistit in eo quod ei competit secundum suam naturam, sed etiam in eo quod ei attribuitur ex quadam supernaturali participatione divinae bonitatis.”

\textsuperscript{214} ST IIaIIae, q. 161, a.1, ad 4 (Leon. 10.293): “Perfectum dicitur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter. . . . Alio modo potest dici aliquid perfectum secundum quid: puta secundum suam naturam, vel secundum statum aut tempus. Et hoc modo homo virtuosus est perfectus.” Furthermore, the acquired virtues allow us to attain only a particular likeness of happiness. See ST IaIIae, q. 3, a.6 (Leon. 6.33): “Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem: beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non attingit, sed participat quandam particularum beatitudinis similitudinem.”
Likewise, the term “good” denotes two orders of perfection of the intellect and will: the natural order as measured by reason, and the supernatural order as measured by charity.215 These two perfections are distinct:

According to the Philosopher, ‘the virtue of a thing is that which makes both its subject good and its work good.’ Thus, wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to a good human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule, so we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, human acts have a twofold measure: one is proximate and of a human kind, viz., the reason; the other is supreme and excelling, viz., God: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God.216

Since the supernatural order of charity will be the subject of a later chapter,217 we will focus here on the natural perfection of the appetite through moral virtue, which allows a person to choose suitable goods for himself.218 Such perfection involves both intellect and will:

Just as a running horse, if it be blind, falls more heavily and more seriously the faster it runs, so moral virtue, although it is not right reason, as Socrates held, is not only according to right reason, in so far as it inclines man to that which is according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained, but also needs to be joined with right reason, as Aristotle declares.219

215 ST IaIIae, q. 65, a.2 (Leon. 6.423): “virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt: sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus.—Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalen, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt.”

216 ST IIaIIae, q.17, a.1co: “Secundum Philosophum in II Ethic, ‘virtus uniuscuiusque rei est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit.’ Oportet igitur, ubicumque inventur aliquis actus hominis bonus, quod respondeat alciui virtutis humanae. In omnibus autem regulatis et mensuratis bonum consideratur per hoc quod aliquid propriam regulam attingit sicut dicimus vestem esse bonam quae nec excedit nec deficit a debita mensura. Humanorum autem actum . . . duplex est mensura: una quidem proxima et homogenea, scilicet ratio; alia autem est suprema est exedens, scilicet Deus. Et ideo omnis actus humanus attingens ad rationem aut ad ipsum Deum est bonus.” Also, ST IIaIIae, q. 27, a.6, ad 3 (Leon. 8.229): “affectio illa cuius objectum subiacet iudicio rationis, est ratione mesuranda. Sed objectum divinae dilectionis, quod est Deus, excedit iudicium rationis.”

217 Chapter five of this work.

218 ST IaIIae, q. 58, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 6.372): “Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium virtutum quae sunt in vi appetitiva.”
In order to will the good for oneself or another, one must first know what goods are suitable. To the virtuous person, what is in fact good also appears good to him,\textsuperscript{220} for the kinds of goods he chooses are adapted to reason. Friendship with others is based on proper self-love and also ranks as a spiritual good willed by the true self-lover.\textsuperscript{221} As we will see in chapter five, friendship with others allows the lover to be “another self” to a friend and, in the process, to expand his or her own existence.

X.

Improper self-love.

Since natural love is founded on a natural unity with oneself, Thomas argues that, absolutely speaking, no one can hate himself:

\textsuperscript{219} ST IaIae, q. 58, a. 4, ad 3 (Leon. 6.373): “sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo, etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit in VI Ethic.”

\textsuperscript{220} In Ethic., III, 1 (Leon. 47/1.148.79–87): “Et hoc ideo quia unicumque habitui videntur bona et delectabilia ea quae sunt ei propria, id est quae ei conveniunt; habitui autem virtutis conveniunt ea quae sunt secundum veritatem bona, quia habitus virtutis moralis diffinitur ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam; et ideo ea quae sunt secundum rationem, quae sunt simpliciter bona, videntur ei bona”; ST IaIae, q. 58, a. 5 (Leon. 6.376): “Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem: virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in III Ethic.”

\textsuperscript{221} Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude,” 46. As Gallagher distinguishes: “I do not draw the other, so to speak, into my “world” as occurs in amor concupiscentiae, but rather I extend my “world” to include others.” Ibid. Johann remarks: “when I love another directly [with amor amicitiae], I break the little circle I form within myself where I would lodge the other simply as an idea. I discover a new existence; I am present to a new and transcendent revelation of that value I love in myself.” Johann, Meaning of Love, 52.
Love of self (*amare se ipsum*) is common to all, in one way; in another way, it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing in two ways: first, in respect of his substance and nature, and this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and a body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, insofar as they love their own preservation.  

The senses in which self-love is proper to the good and to the wicked are not relevant to our discussion here. Our focus is on the self-love “common to all.” All human beings, however, have a love of happiness in that “they love their own preservation.” By natural self-love one can desire only happiness; by rational self-love one can choose only good, not evil, unless the evil is perceived under the aspect of good.

Thomas’s discussions on improper self-love arise within the context of discussions on sin, which he defines as “an act lacking the right order which it ought to have.” Thus, varying degrees of sin manifest varying degrees of improper self-love. Following Augustine, Thomas

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222 *ST* IIaIae, q.25, a.7co (Leon. 8.203): “amare se ipsum uno modo commune est omnibus; alio modo proprium est bonorum; tertio modo proprium est malorum. Quod enim aliquid id quod se ipsum esse aestimat, hoc commune est omnibus. Homo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam substantiam et naturam. Et secundum hoc omnes aestimant bonum commune esse id quod sunt, scilicet ex anima et corpore compositos. Et sic etiam omnes homines, boni et mali, diligunt seipsos, inquantum diligunt sui ipsorum conservationem.” Also, *ST* IIaIae, q.25, a.7co (Leon. 8.203): “Homo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam substantiam et naturam. Et secundum hoc omnes aestimant bonum commune se esse id quod sunt, scilicet ex anima et corpore compositos. Et sic etiam omnes homines, boni et mali, diligunt seipsos, inquantum diligunt sui ipsorum conservationem.” Thomas’s reasoning is consistent also in regard to whether a person can be angry with himself. Thomas replies in the negative, arguing that since anger requires that we perceive the object of anger under the aspect of evil, we cannot be angry with ourselves, except in some respect. See also *ST* IaIae, q. 46, a.7co (Leon. 6.298) and *ST* IaIae, q. 29, a.4co (Leon. 6.206). Thomas argues that things cannot be *per se* be objects of hatred since being (*ens*) can only ever have the aspect of fittingness. Thus, a person experiences repugnance to the object insofar as he or she is comparing it to another object which seems suitable. *ST* IaIae, q. 29, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 6.203).

223 *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 5co (Leon. 22/3.739:89–91): “peccatum nihil aliud est quam actus aliquis deficiens a recto ordine, qui esse debeat.”
argues that improper self-love is the root of all sin, all disordered human acts. Those who love themselves improperly are blameworthy for primarily choosing goods that pertain to the perfection of their sensitive nature and not reason. Thomas argues:

Someone is said to love (amare) both the good he desires for himself, as well as himself for whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire, such as a man is said to love wine or money, admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil. For every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love (amorem sui). This is because man, through loving himself (amat seipsum), either desires good things, or avoids evil things.

A person cannot hate himself, he can hate something in himself, however, such as certain habits, dispositions, or actions insofar as they are some sort of defect. Thomas comments on Aristotle’s example of criminals who regard life as burdensome because they know they are offensive.

Yet Thomas argues that even in less extreme cases, if a person values his sensitive nature more

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224 *In II Sent.*, d.42, q.2, a.1co (Mandonnet, 1069): “radices diversimodo a sanctis assignatur. Quia passio, quae est radix peccati, vel est secundum inclinationem appetitus in id quod est ultimus finis bonorum commutabilium, et sic amor sui ponitur ab Augustino radix peccati: vel secundum inclinationem appetitus in ea quae propter hunc finem quaeruntur; et hoc dupliciter: vel secundum inclinationem appetitus in bonum tantum, propter quod malum fugitur; vel secundum comparationem appetitus ad utrumque. Si secundo modo, scilicet secundum inclinationem appetitus in bonum commutabile et malum oppositum, sic sunt radices peccatorum quae in Littera assignatur, scilicet cupiditas male inflammanns, et timor male humilians.” Also *ST* IaIae, q.73, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 7.26): “Sed amor sui disregat affectum hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona temporali, quae sunt varia et diversa, et ideo vitia et peccata, quae causantur ex amore sui, non sunt connexa.”

225 *ST* IaIae, q.25, a.4, ad 3 (Leon. 6.200): “amantes seipsum vituperantur inquantum amant se secundum naturam sensibilum, cui obtemperant. Quod non est vere amare seipsum secundum naturam rationalem, ut sibi velit ea bona quae pertinent ad perfectionem rationis. Et hoc modo praecipue ad caritatem pertinet diligere seipsum.”

226 *ST* IaIae, q. 77, a.4, ad 3 (Leon. 7.66): “aliaquis dicitur amare et illud bonum quod optat sibi, et se, cui bonum optat. Amor igitur secundum quod dicitur eius esse quod optatur, puta quod aliiquis dicitur amare vinum vel pecuniam, recipit pro causa timorem, qui pertinet ad fugam mali. Omne enim peccatum provenit vel ex inordinato appetitu aliqui boni, vel ex inordinata fuga aliqui mali. Sed utrumque horum reductur ad amorem sui. Propter hoc enim homo vel appetit bona vel fugit mala, quia amat seipsum.”

227 *In Ethic*. IX, iv (Leon. 47/2.516:275–278) : “homines enim pravi replentur paenitentia, quia videlicet, impetu malitiae vel passionis cessante quo mala faciunt, secundum rationem cognoscunt se mala egisse et dolent.”
highly than his spiritual one, he will tend to perceive any lack of material goods as a deficiency within himself. The ensuing endless hankering is based on a mis-taking of what is the highest part of oneself:

a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, not everyone thinks himself to be what he is. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the Apostle calls the *inward man*, and the latter, the outward man (2 Cor. iv.16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature or the outward man, to hold first place.\(^{228}\)

According primacy to one’s sensitive nature is due to a failure in self-knowledge:

Wherefore, since they [the wicked] know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly and therefore truly love themselves.\(^{228}\)

In another text, Thomas comments that certain people experience conflict within themselves because their choice of goods for themselves is not in harmony with the order of reason:

the wicked are divided in themselves insofar as they desire some pleasures agreeing with their sensitive part and at the same time that they wish others agreeing with their rational part. This is clearly the case with the incontinent who want harmful pleasures instead of those they reasonably judge good. Others, from fear and laziness, neglect to do what they know is good for themselves Thus they are doubly lacking in

\(^{228}\) *ST* IIaIIae, q.25, a.7co (Leon. 8.203): “Alio modo dicitur esse homo aliquid secundum principalitatem: sicut princeps civitatis dicitur esse civitas; unde quod principes faciunt, dicitur civitas facere. Sic autem non omnes aestimant se esse id quod sunt. Principale enim in homine est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura sensitiva et corporalis: quorum primum Apostolus nominat interiorum hominem, secundum exteriorum, ut patet II ad Cor. iv.”

\(^{229}\) *ST* IIaIIae, q.25, a.7co (Leon. 8.203): “Boni autem aestimant principale in seipsis rationalem naturam, sive interiorum hominem: unde secundum hoc aestimant se esse quod sunt. Mali autem aestimant principale in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporalem, scilicet exteriorum hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt id quod seipsos esse reputant.”
beneficence toward themselves: in one way, insofar as what they do is harmful; in the other, insofar as they shun what is beneficial to themselves.\textsuperscript{230}

Whereas the virtuous person chooses goods for himself that are “adapted” to reason, the non-virtuous person adheres to sensible goods for the sake of pleasure or utility; he loves himself in a qualified sense (secundum quid):

Now this division is according to what is primary and secondary. Now, that which is loved with the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) is loved simply and for itself (simpliciter et per se amatur); whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscientiae), is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence (habet esse) is a being simply (ens simpliciter), while that which exists in another is a qualified being (ens secundum quid), so because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another’s good, is good in a qualified sense (bonum secundum quid). Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply (amor simpliciter); while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another’s good, is love in a qualified sense (amor secundum quid).\textsuperscript{231}

The person who loves himself in a qualified way (secundum quid) treats himself merely “as a repository” of material goods.\textsuperscript{232} Thomas is clear that it is not the case that the goods themselves are defective; it is a person’s loving them wrongly that is disordered.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{230} In Ethic., IX, iv (Leon. 47/2.515: 217–227): “Dicet ergo primo quod mali differunt a se ipsis in quantum scilicet alia concupiscunt secundum partem sensitivam et alia volunt secundum rationem, sicut patet de incontinentibus, qui loco eorum quae secundum rationem indicant esse sibi bona appetunt delectabilia quae sunt eis nociva; alii autem propter timiditatem et pigritiam praetermittunt operari ea quae secundum rationem indicant sibi bona. Et sic dupliciter carent beneficiantia ad se ipsos, uno modo in quantum operantur sibi nociva, alio modo in quantum vitant sibi proficua.”

\textsuperscript{231} ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.4co (Leon. 6.190): “Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatut amor amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatut: quod autem amatut amore concupiscientiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatut, sed amatut alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio: ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem: quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatut aliiquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatut aliiquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.”

\textsuperscript{232} Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy of Love;” 76.

\textsuperscript{233} ST IIaIIae, q. 169, a.1co (Leon. 10.256–7).
In another passage, Thomas describes improper self-love in terms of a twofold disorder concerning *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentia*: 

Properly speaking, it is impossible for anyone to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: *for evil is outside the scope of the will*, as Dionysius says (Div., Nom. iv). Now to love (*amare*) someone is to will good to him . . . Consequently, anyone must, of necessity, love himself (*amet se ipsum*); and it is impossible for anyone to hate himself, properly speaking. But accidentally it happens that someone hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good that someone wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, someone accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love (*amant*) themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, *he that loveth iniquity hateth not only his own soul*, but also himself.234

Here, we see that for Thomas, self-love involves valuing oneself in such a way that one is concerned for one’s own good. We note that “one’s own good” does not denote some kind of preoccupation with one’s own *needs*, gratification, or pleasure, but rather, a mindfulness of those goods which will contribute to a meaningful life.

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234 *ST* IaIIae, q. 29, a.4co (Leon. 6.206): “impossibile, est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat se ipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni: nam malum est praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. de Div. Nom. Amare autem aliquem est velle ei bonum . . . Unde necesse est quod aliquis amet se ipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis odiet se ipsum, per se loquendo. Per accidens tamen contingit quod aliquis se ipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum: et secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso: unde civitas dicitur facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui aeminent se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aeminent se esse, sed odient id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligat iniquitatem, odit non solum animam suam, sed etiam se ipsum.”
In another text, Thomas comments that improper self-love in its extreme form, renders an individual so self-fragmented that he cannot love himself properly. He becomes unsuitable for friendship:

Evil men cannot live with themselves by turning to their heart, but they seek to associate with others by speaking and co-operating with them in external words and works. They act in this way because when thinking alone about themselves, they remember many serious evils they committed in the past and they are convinced they will do the same in the future, and this is painful to them. But when they are in the company of others, they forget their wrongdoings in the distraction of external activities. So, since they have nothing in themselves worth loving, they feel no love for themselves.\footnote{In Ethic., IX, iv (Leon. 47/2.515:238–250): \textquotedblleft Non enim possunt mali sibi ipsis convivere revertendo ad cor suum, sed quaerunt alios cum quibus commorentur collequendo et cooperando eis secundum exteriora verba et facta. Et hoc ideo quia, statim secum cogitando de se ipsis, recordantur multa et gravia mala quae in praetorio commiserunt et praesumunt se similia facturos in futurum, quod est eis dolorosum; sed, quando sunt cum alis hominibus, diffundendo se ad exteriora, obliviscuntur suorum malorum. Et sic, cum nihil in se ipsis habeant quod sit dignum amari, nihil amicabile patiuntur ad se ipsos.
}

Clearly the phrase, “they have nothing worth loving in themselves” refers to the works of virtue, to acts of self-possession. Thomas likens the person who habitually desires what is against reason to a non-rational creature:

By sinning man recedes from the order of reason and therefore falls from human dignity by which a man is naturally free and exists for his own sake, and he in some manner descends into the servitude of the beasts, who are ordered as useful for others.\footnote{ST IIaIIae, q. 64, a.2, ad 3 (Leon. 9.68): \textquotedblleft homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit et ideo decidit a dignitate humana, prout scilicet homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens, et incidunt quodammodo in servitutem bestiarum, ut scilicet de ipso ordinetur secundum quod est utile alii.
}

The wicked man loves himself insofar as he thinks himself good, which is only an apparent self-love \textit{(nec tamen ista est vera sui dilectio, sed apparens)}, though even apparent self-love is not possible in those who are very wicked.\footnote{Thomas states the following about such a life:

\begin{quote}In Ethic., IX, iv (Leon. 47/2.515:238–250): \textquotedblleft Non enim possunt mali sibi ipsis convivere revertendo ad cor suum, sed quaerunt alios cum quibus commorentur collequendo et cooperando eis secundum exteriora verba et facta. Et hoc ideo quia, statim secum cogitando de se ipsis, recordantur multa et gravia mala quae in praetorio commiserunt et praesumunt se similia facturos in futurum, quod est eis dolorosum; sed, quando sunt cum alis hominibus, diffundendo se ad exteriora, obliviscuntur suorum malorum. Et sic, cum nihil in se ipsis habeant quod sit dignum amari, nihil amicabile patiuntur ad se ipsos.\textquotedblright
\end{quote}

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If it is so extremely wretched to live without friendship for oneself (*amicitia ad se ipsum*), we ought to shun evil with increased ardor, and make every effort to become virtuous. For in this way, a person will have friendship for himself and be capable of becoming a friend to others.238

Improper self-love, however, includes not only loving the wrong goods for oneself too much, but also loving the right goods for oneself too little, a vice which Thomas calls “small-souledness” (*pusillanimus*):

Everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power . . . now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did no trade with it through faint-hearted fear, was punished by his master (Matth. xxv; Luke xix).239

Furthermore:

Pusillanimity in a certain way results from pride: namely, when a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent . . . For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others.240

237 *ST* IIaIIae, q. 25, a.7, ad 3 (Leon. 8.204): “mali, inquantum aestimant sic aliquid participant de non amore sui. Nec tamen ista est vera sui dilectio, sed apparens. Quae etiam non est possibilis in his qui valde sunt mali.”

238 *In Ethic.* IX, iv (Leon. 47/2.515–6:282–83): “concludit ex praemissis quod si valde miserum est sic se habere absque amicitia ad se ipsum, intense, id est vehementi studio, fugere debemus malitiam et conari ad hoc quod simus virtuos. Per hunc enim modum se habebit aliquis amicabiliter ad se ipsum et fiet etiam alis amicus. Et inde est quod servus qui acceptam pecuniam domini sui fodit in terram nec est operatus ex ea, propter quendam pusillanimitatis timorem, punitur a domino: ut habetur Matth. xxv et Luc. xix.”

239 *ST* IIaIIae, q. 133, a.1 (Leon. 10.86): “Inest autem unicumque rei naturalis inclinatio ad exequendam actionem commensuratam suae potentiae; ut patet in omnibus rebus naturalibus, tam animatis quam inanimatis.. Sicut autem per praesumptionem aliquis excedit proportionem suae potentiae, dum nititur ad maiora quam possit; ita etiam pusillanimus deficit a proportione suae potentiae, dum recusat in id tendere quod est suae potentiae commensuratum. Et ideo, sicut praesumptio est peccatum, ita est pusillanimus.”

240 *ST* IIaIIae, q. 133, a 1 ad 3 (Leon. 10.86–7): “Pusillanimitas aliquo modo ex superbia potest oriri: dum scilicet aliquis nimis proprio sensui innititur, quo reputat se insufficientem ad ea respectu quorum sufficientiam habet . . . Nihil enim prohibet quod se quantum ad aliqua deiciat. et quantum ad alia se in sublime extollat.”
Thomas calls pusillananimity, a graver sin than presumption since by it a person withdraws from good things. Precisely because it is an unnatural tendency away from the good, Thomas calls this vice “a very great evil.”²⁴¹ He states:

Just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one’s own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one’s ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy.²⁴²

Thomas’s account of sloth (acedia), a species of the passion of sorrow, also offers much insight into the human failure not even to desire to desire. Sloth is found when the will finds nothing it desires, and nothing worth seeking:

Sloth, according to Damascene, is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man’s mind, that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies a certain weariness of work . . . and . . . a ‘sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin good.’ Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality . . . Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds.²⁴³

²⁴¹ ST IIaIIae, q. 133, a. 2, ad 4 (Leon. 10.87): “pusillanimitas est gravius peccatum, secundum proprium speciem, quam presumptio: quia per ipsam recedit homo a bonis, quod est pessimum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.”

²⁴² ST IIaIIae, q. 133, a.2co (Leon. 10.87): “sicut magnanimus ex animi magnitudine tendit ad magna, ita pusillanimus ex animi parvitate se retrahit a magnis. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte suae causae: quae ex parte intellectus, est ignorantia propriae conditionis; ex parte autem appetitus, est timor deficiendi in his quae falso aestimat excedere suam facultatem. Tertio modo potest considerari quantum ad effectum, qui est retrahere se a magnis quibus est dignus.”

²⁴³ ST IIaIIae, q. 35, a.1co (Leon. 8.285): “acedia, secundum Damascenum, est quaedam tristitia aggravans, quae scilicet ita deprimit animum hominis ut nihil ei agere libeat; sicut ea quae sunt acida etiam frigidasunt. Et ideo acedia importat quoddam taedium operandi: ut patet per hoc quod dicitur in Glossa super lllid Psalm. Omnim escam abominata est anima eorum; et a quibusdam dicitur quod acedia est torpor mentis bona negligentis inchoare. Huismodi autem tristitia semper est mala: quandoque quidem etiam secundum seipsam; quandoque vero secundum effectum. Tristitia enim secundum se mala est quae est de eo quod est apprens malum et vere bonum: sic et contrario delectatio mala est quae est de eo quod est apprens bonum et vere malum. Cum igitur spirituale bonum sit vere bonum, tristitia quae est de spirituali bono est secundum se mala. Sed etiam tristitia quae
In sloth, “the will finds no particular good apprehended by the intellect worthy of its infinite desires.” The will, however, cannot help desiring, which makes the individual’s “fruitless straining” an unpleasant experience.\footnote{Lombardo, \textit{The Logic of Desire}, 264.} The passion of sorrow is particularly burdensome since the hurtful object, which is enclosed within oneself, is the focus of the soul’s intention (\textit{intentio animae}). When the hurtfulness is appeased by talking with a friend etc., the soul’s intention shifts to exterior things, thereby diminishing the interior pain.\footnote{\textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 38, a.2co (Leon. 6.258): “omne nocivum interius clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae circa ipsum: sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor minuitur.”}

In conclusion, we have seen that as rational animals, human beings are inclined toward their perfection through natural, sensitive, and rational appetite. We have also looked at how human love is connatural to goods suitable to a rational nature. Yet, since we have the freedom of choice, we are capable of choosing mutually incompatible goods. Unlike the love of brute animals, human love is a free act that follows deliberation. Rational self-love (\textit{dilectio sui}) has a twofold tendency: \textit{amor amicitiae}, love towards a good wished for \textit{myself}; and \textit{amor...
concupiscentiae, love towards a good willed for myself. As a free rational act, rational self-love can be ordered or disordered, where the difference is determined by our character and varying degrees of self-knowledge. Thus, deficiencies in character and self-knowledge, as well as sin, influence what goods we choose for ourselves and in what order.

As rational beings, we have the capacity to reflect on our acts, including our acts of self-love. The capacity of the intellect to be present to itself as the source of its own activity allows us to reason about our acts and decisions. We can thus reflect upon why we judge certain goods as suitable or unsuitable for us.

When someone who has proper self-love engages in such reflection, he is pleased because he sees that his acts conform to reason, at least for the most part. Such an individual can see that his acts are virtuous: he reflects upon a second nature that conforms to reason, and this knowledge is pleasurable. It is otherwise for the individual who loves himself or herself improperly. The disorder of one’s acts yields a pattern of imperfection that is unpleasant to examine, a pattern comprised of defective actions, habits, and dispositions. This self-knowledge can be not only unpleasant, but also painful, since the subject sees that improper self-love is the ground of his action, moving him away from completion/perfection. How such an individual can move out of this state, and how the self-lover can love himself properly, will be discussed in the next two chapters.

Our tendency as human beings to fall into improper self-love leads us to the question of whether we can naturally love God over self, a subject of scholarly debate. The debate highlights
the critical question of the extent to which one can even naturally will the good for oneself.\textsuperscript{246} In the next chapter, two meanings of nature involved in the debate will be taken into consideration, addressing nature viewed (1) as a principle of movement (natural vs. rational active powers) and (2) as what we can accomplish by our own efforts (nature vs. grace). I will also look at the role Thomas assigns to charity as the “medicine” that transforms and perfects self-love, allowing one to love God more than self and to love neighbor as oneself.

\textsuperscript{246} What is at stake here is the very meaning of “nature” in the senses of natural vs rational as well as natural vs. supernatural.
Chapter Four:
Natural Love of God and Natural Self-Love

This chapter will explore the relationship between human self-love and love of God, beginning with a presentation of scholarly debate concerning whether one can naturally love God over self.¹ This debate is relevant to my purposes precisely because it highlights the critical question of the extent to which one can will the good for oneself through one’s own efforts.

Whether Thomas defends a natural elective love of God has been the subject of much controversy among Thomistic scholars. Complicating the issue is that there are two sets of texts within the Thomistic corpus concerning nature and grace which seem mutually opposed, and which Thomas himself does not clearly reconcile.² What is fundamentally at stake is how he understands the relationship between nature and grace. There are many important aspects to this scholarly debate which will not be treated in this chapter, since to address them all would take us

¹ I am not engaging in the debate as to whether we can naturally love God over self as framed in terms of egoism and altruism. Rather, my interest is in what sense Thomas means we can “naturally” love God at all.

² For examples of Thomas’s arguments concerning man’s supernatural end, unattainable by natural powers alone, see: ST 1a, q. 75, a. 7, ad 1; ST 1aIIae, q. 110, a.2; ST 1aIIae, q. 62, a.1. For examples of Thomas’s arguments for man’s twofold end, see ST 1a, q. 23, a.1; ST 1aIIae, q. 5, a.5 and q. 62, a.1; De ver., q. 27, a.2; De virt. in comm., q.1, a.10. Denis Bradley, for example, argues that these series of texts “verbally contradict each other” and that Thomas does not himself “conciliate them.” Stephen Long and Lawrence Feingold, however, believe these texts can offer a coherent position when read in light of each other. See Denis J.M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Human Twofold Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 457; Stephen Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 13–15; Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Intepreters (Naples, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2010), 4ff.
too far afield from our narrower focus: the relationship between natural love of God and love of self.

In the first section of this chapter, I will look briefly at the most pertinent interpretations by some modern scholars as to whether Thomas defends a natural love of God. In the second section, I will look at the senses in which Thomas defines “nature,” and how these senses apply to our “natural” love of God. The third section will look at texts in which Thomas defends a natural as well as a supernatural love of God. In the fourth section, I will examine Thomas’s arguments for our natural love of God over self, and whether this love was different in the state of original justice and in the state of fallen nature. The fifth section will examine how Thomas argues that we can love another over ourselves. The sixth section will show the role that Thomas assigns to charity as the “medicine” that transforms and perfects self-love, and the final section will show how charity allows a person to actively love God more than self, and neighbour as oneself.

We pause here to emphasize that this work concerns Thomas’s philosophy. Nevertheless, we need to examine the question of the supernatural end of man and the controversy surrounding it, because of the repercussions it has for the interpretation of Aquinas’s philosophy regarding natural love. The question of the presence or absence of a natural beatitude (or natural end) is inextricably related to the question of a natural love for God. Thomas does discuss beatitude primarily in terms of intellectual knowledge, and in particular the knowledge of God. He does not discuss the love of God per se as the final end of man. Yet love follows upon knowledge so
there can only be a natural love of God (which Thomas clearly affirms) if some kind of natural knowledge of God. This raises the question of the extent to which the natural inclination in us toward knowledge and love of God (and the preferential love of God above self) is natural to man.

Furthermore, Thomas’s writings emphasize that even if there is an inclination toward natural love of God inscribed in the human person, this love is inhibited or hindered from its successful realization in the fallen state. Consequently, if there is a realization of natural love of God above all things in the concrete history of human beings, for Thomas, this occurs because of the healing effects of grace, which itself orients human beings toward a supernatural end and destiny. Grace does not destroy nature but heals and restores it, as well as elevates it.

Presuming all this, we need to consider the question of the final end of man in Thomas’s philosophical thought and explore how this is related to the natural love of God, especially considered in light of the fallen state of the human being. We also note here that Thomas tends to speak more in terms of perfect supernatural beatitude and imperfect, natural beatitude rather than the supernatural and natural ends of man.³

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³ Thomas does, however, expressly use the latter terminology in some places, such as ST IaIIae, q. 62, a. 3.
A Scholarly Debate: Nature vs. Grace and the Possibility of a Natural Love of God

We begin this section with an overview of some of the most recent scholarship concerning Thomas’s position on whether human beings have a natural love of God. The background to the debate is whether Thomas believes that human beings have either a natural (or connatural) end proportionate to our supernatural end, and thus whether we have two kinds of beatitude, natural and supernatural. On one side of the debate, scholars argue that for Thomas, man has only one ultimate end, which is supernatural; thus any notion of a distinct “connatural” end creates an unnecessary divide between nature and grace. On the other side of the debate, scholars argue that to deny man’s natural (connatural) end, and thus natural beatitude, threatens the gratuity of grace. Both views have important implications for whether we have a natural love of God. For the sake of clarity, throughout the following discussion I will refer to natural human love (vs. supernatural) as “natural elective love.”

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4 This debate, however, extends back to Thomas’s contemporaries. See M-R Gagnebet, “L’Amour Naturel de Dieu chez Saint Thomas et ses contemporains,” *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948): 397–412 for an overview of medieval positions on this topic.

5 The term *connaturalis* is used by Thomas to denote “proportionate to nature.” See *ST* IaIIae, q. 26 a.1co (Leon. 6.188): “In appetitu autem naturali, principium huìusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis: sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis;” *ST* IaIIae, q.32 a.3, ad 3 (Leon. 6.226): “amor est quaedam unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum;” *In De div. nom.*, IX, 2 (Marietti, 336): “connaturalitas autem ad concordiam naturalis appetitus.”
In 1946, Henri de Lubac’s work, *Surnaturel,* became the source of much controversy among Thomistic scholars, primarily because de Lubac questions the doctrine of “pure nature” (*natura pura*). This Scholastic doctrine taught that God could have created man with a purely natural end rather than a supernatural end and, thus, that God could have ordered man to a purely natural beatitude. In his later work, *Le Mystère du Surnaturel,* de Lubac writes:

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7 The implications of the theological question: “Could we have been created in a state of pure nature” (i.e., not in sin, but without grace) are beyond the scope of this work. For our purposes, the question itself is answered quite simply by Thomas – yes, it was possible that God could create man with purely natural powers and to exist without grace, but this state never actually existed. As Reinhard Hütter notes, Thomas never actually uses the term *natura pura* but rather “the more precise and restrictive notion *constitutus in solis naturalibus.*” See Hütter, *Dust Bound For Heaven*, 149. For Thomas on this topic see *De ver.,* q. 14, a. 10, ad 2; *Quod. I,* q. 4, a.3. Joseph Di Noia rightly cautions that the question as to whether human beings have a natural end, “loses its innocence, so to speak, when it takes on a hypothetical tone. What if God had not ordained human beings to a supernatural end? What kind of natural end might they have expected to enjoy in such circumstances? . . . Such speculation tempts the theologian to conjure up a ‘state of pure nature,’ the natural order as a separable, inherently perfectible set of states and capacities, integral and intact in itself, structured independently of the supernatural order, and directed to the attainment of a natural end called ‘natural beatitude.’ In such a view, the supernatural order . . . constitutes an addition to rather than a transformation of the natural order. The classical formula, *gratia perfection naturam,* would in this perspective imply that grace presupposes the perfection of nature rather than, as Aquinas has understood it, that grace perfects and transforms nature.” Joseph Di Noia, “Nature, Grace, and Experience: Karl Rahner’s Theology of Human Transformation” in *Philosophy and Theology* 7 (1992): 120–121.

My finality which is expressed by this desire, is inscribed in my being as it has been put into this universe by God. And, by God’s will, I do not have today any other real end, that is, no end really assigned to my nature or offered for my free acceptance, under any guise, but that of ‘seeing God.’

De Lubac denies that Thomas argues for a proportionate natural end in man. Rather, he sees Thomas de Vio, “Cajetan,” as being the “innovator” of a dualistic reading of Thomas’s position on the relationship between nature and grace. Curiously, though, de Lubac ignores the texts in which Thomas speaks of man’s proportionate end. On de Lubac’s reading, Thomas argues that man has a supernatural end only; whether we are conscious of it or not, we have a “natural desire” inscribed within us to attain this end. De Lubac thus denies that man can have a genuine natural elective love of God. According to de Lubac, when Thomas refers to our love for God as

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9 “Ma finalité, dont ce désir est l’expression, est inscrite en mon être même, tel qu’il est posé par Dieu dans cet univers. Et, de par la volonté de Dieu, je n’ai pas aujourd’hui d’autre fin réelle, c’est-à-dire réellement assignée à ma nature et offerte sous quelques espèces que ce soit, à mon adhésion libre, que de ‘voir Dieu.’” De Lubac, Le Mystère du Surnaturel, 81.


12 “Lorsqu’un saint Thomas, notamment, s’occupe des problèmes concernant notre fin dernière, il le fait toujours à la fois en analysant l’esprit créé dans son essence et en se maintenant à l’intérieur de notre univers, de cet univers don’t la finalité est—il ne cesse de le dire—surnaturelle.” De Lubac, Le Mystère du Surnaturel, 85. Also, “Dès que j’existe, en effet, toute indétermination est levée, et quoiqu’il en ait pu être en une existence autrement réalisée, aucune autre finalité ne semble désormais pour moi possible que celle qui se trouve maintenant, en fait, inscrite au fond de ma nature; il existe une seule fin don’t, par le fait même, je porte en moi, conscient ou non, le ‘désir naturel.’” Ibid., 82.

13 “Tout, dans le Don que Dieu veut faire de Lui-même, s’explique—si c’est là une explication—par l’Amour. Tout, et par conséquent déjà le ‘désir’ qui en résulte dans notre nature, de quelque manière qu’on entende
“natural,” he is merely denoting a necessary, determined tendency; that is, the term “natural” is being used in contradistinction to “gratuitous.” Consequently, de Lubac rejects the view that Thomas defends a distinction between a natural (vs. rational) love of God and a natural elective love of God; rather, if we are to truly love God, that love must be free and explicit, not determined (“natural”).

In response to de Lubac, M-R. Gagnebet\textsuperscript{14} defends the possibility of a natural elective love of God according to Thomas.\textsuperscript{15} Gagnebet cites ST Ia, q. 60, a.5, where Thomas asks whether charity is necessary \textit{in addition to} our natural love of God, thus contrasting a natural elective love to a supernatural love.\textsuperscript{16} Gagnebet argues that de Lubac conflates two uses of ce désir. C’est là ce qui fait que l’épithète de désir naturel est bien peu satisfaisante, qui qu’on ne puisse guère l’éviter si l’on veut distinguer un tel désir de tout ce qui est artificiel ou superficiel, sans risquer une confusion avec ce qui est déjà proprement et positivement surnaturel.” De Lubac, \textit{Le Mystère du Surnaturel}, 281.

\textsuperscript{14} See M-R. Gagnebet, “L’Amour Naturel de Dieu Chez Saint Thomas et Ses Contemporains.”


\textsuperscript{16} “L’Aquinate adopte la réponse du Chancelier Philippe: la créature spirituelle peut aimer Dieu d’un amour de préférence. Mais son originalité consiste dans l’extension à toutes les créatures même sensibles et inanimées d’un semblable amour, entendu en un sens tout analogique.” Gagnebet, “L’Amour Naturel de Dieu,” 414. Gagnebet gives a good historical overview of the positions of Thomas’s contemporaries who discuss the possibility of an explicit act of the will by which one loves God over self by strictly natural powers. He outlines the positions of Thomas’s predecessors, such as William of Auxerre, Phillip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and St. Bonaventure, concerning the distinction between voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut ratio. Ibid., 398–412. Gagnebet also notes: “Nous pouvons donc conclure, d’une façon assurée: dans notre distinction entre amour naturel et amour surnaturel, naturel s’oppose, sans contester possible, à surnaturel au sens actuel de ce mot. La distinction des deux amours, naturel et gratuit, n’est pas sortie de la “forge” de certains thomistes, mais, en usage déjà avant saint Thomas, elle a été par lui ciselée sous toutes ses faces. Les thomistes n’ont eu qu’à la recevoir de la main de leur maître.” Ibid., 445.
“nature” (natural vs. rational and natural vs. supernatural), and thus fails to distinguish between a natural elective love of God and charity, a distinction Thomas bases on the difference between God known naturally as the object of our intellect and will, and God known supernaturally, as the object of supernatural happiness.

In his work, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, Denis Bradley, goes beyond de Lubac in arguing that, for Thomas, we have an innate natural desire for supernatural beatitude. Bradley proposes that our natural desire to see God “is implicitly contained in the necessary desire for the perfect good or happiness that structures the will.” This natural, non-deliberated desire for supernatural beatitude cannot compromise man’s supernatural final end; thus it cannot

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17 See Gagnebet, “L’Amour Naturel de Dieu,” 425–432, where Gagnebet notes the twofold nature of love in human beings, *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor amicitiae*, each of which involve some knowledge of the object. Also, “le P. de Lubac se trompe-t-il lorsqu’il nous présente comme une manière de parler absolument commune l’opposition entre un amour naturel, mouvement instinctif de la *voluntas ut ratio*, et un amour gratuit qui serait un acte délibéré de la *voluntas ut natura*, nécessairement surnaturel, sans laisser place pour un amour délibéré proportionné à nos facultés natives.” Ibid., 398.


20 Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, 446. Bradley further notes that Thomists who emphasize the explicit or elicited desire to see God “obfuscate and ignore the emphasis that Aquinas places on the naturalness of the desire to see God that is *implicitly* contained in the desire for happiness” and “in interpreting Aquinas, then, it is just as necessary to offset as to affirm the twofold end of man.” Ibid., 448; 514. Stephen Long rejects Bradley’s inclusion of God within universal being or goodness since “between the good in general and *ipse bonum subsistens per se* there is an infinite divide.” Stephen A. Long, “On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man,” *The Thomist* 64 (2000), 224. See Cullen, “The Natural Desire for God,” 711.
be argued that we have a “natural/connatural” end. Rather, Bradley argues that the natural desire to see God “is implicitly contained in the desire for happiness.”

Arguing against both de Lubac and Bradley, Stephen Long in his work, *Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace*, states that according to Thomas, human beings do have an end that is proportionate to our nature and distinct from our supernatural end. Moreover, for grace to be grace, the integrity of nature must be upheld. Human nature has an “obediential potency” to receive from God a form that is “radically disproportionate to its unassisted nature and natural potencies.” In short, Long defends the position that for Thomas,

21 Bradley, *Aquinas on the Human Twofold Good*, 431. Bradley argues that the desire for beatitude “is a natural desire; it cannot be forever unfulfilled” and that Thomas “as a theologian, views man’s natural desire to know God (which can be established by philosophical argument) from the standpoint of man’s actual supernatural end (which can only be known by faith).” Ibid., 467. Furthermore, Bradley criticises the notion of a Thomistic philosophical ethics: “Traditional Thomists, however, usually insist that philosophical ethics can be adequately structured around the ultimate natural end of man, which, they claim, is the natural knowledge of God. There are, to be sure, many well-known texts of Aquinas that baldly state that ultimate human beatitude, and the virtues that allow us to attain it, is twofold, the perfect and the imperfect, the supernaturally infused and the humanly acquired. But in Aquinas’s own doctrine, the assertion that men can achieve imperfect or civil beatitude is subject to profound restrictions and transformations of meaning that are largely ignored by Thomist philosophical ethics.” Ibid., 488.

22 Bradley, *Aquinas on the Human Twofold Good*, 448; 459.

23 “for St Thomas there *is* a proximate and natural end, defining of the species, which is *distinct from and inferior to* the final end of supernatural beatitude.” Long, *Natura Pura*, 23.

24 “lacking natural finality distinct from supernatural beatitude, nature does indeed become merely a placeholder for grace . . . Speech about *anticipating* grace is utterly vain in a context within which the order of nature is not distinguished from the order of grace.” Long, *Natura Pura*, 23.

25 Long, *Natura Pura*, 27. He further notes: “a unilateral stress upon certain aspects of St. Thomas’s teaching about the natural desire for God led de Lubac to deny the existence of a proportionate natural end as opposed to the supernatural *finis ultimus.*” Ibid., 12.
the natural desire for God follows upon the natural order of the intellect to being. Unlike de Lubac and Bradley, he argues that according to Thomas, human nature is naturally ordered to God, “but is not of itself ordered toward supernatural beatitude.”

Lawrence Feingold’s *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters* is one of the most lengthy and detailed modern scholarly contributions to the debate on this topic, and directly challenges de Lubac’s position. Feingold argues that according to Thomas, the end of man is twofold, corresponding to two types of happiness which fulfill man, imperfectly and perfectly. Feingold thus defends a corresponding twofold love of God as the source of all natural perfections and as the object of a supernatural beatitude.

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26 Long, *Natura Pura*, 20. This desire, he argues, “is elicited by the acquired knowledge that God is, rather than being equivalent to the *voluntas ut natura*—because what the will naturally desires as its befitting object is the good in general and not specifically the essence of God (howsoever much it be true that God is the subsisting universal good).” Ibid.

27 Ibid., 45.


29 “St. Thomas habitually distinguishes these two orders [natural and supernatural] on the basis of two different types of *end* for man. These two ends correspond to two types of happiness or beatitude which fulfill man in two distinct ways: imperfectly and perfectly.” Feingold, *Natural Desire to See God*, 1. He further adds: “it is not idle or useless for theology to speak about a connatural end for man, for this notion of an end that corresponds to our nature as such, is absolutely necessary to distinguish the natural and the supernatural orders, and to show the gratuitousness of our supernatural end.” Feingold cites several texts in which Thomas presents this distinction (ibid., f/n 6), essentially arguing that “the difference between the connatural and supernatural end lies in the way God is contemplated: by our natural powers in the case of our connatural end, and by the light of glory in the beatific vision in the case of our supernatural end.” Ibid., 2.

30 Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God*, 421. As Christopher Cullen notes, the works of Long and Feingold, “are intended as a scholarly caution that the distinction between nature and grace has been jeopardized in such a way that nature is subsumed into the supernatural order and loses its ontological density. . . merely marking one moment of grace from another.” Cullen, “The Natural Desire for God,” 730. As will be discussed, I am not
Feingold emphasizes that since “appetite” is an analogical notion for Thomas, the term “natural desire” can be interpreted in two fundamentally different ways: 1) as a natural, innate appetite, prior to any knowledge; or 2), as an elicited act of the will, which is “drawn out” by some natural knowledge of the good. Consequently, human beings can desire an object in two different ways: as the object of the innate appetite, or as an object known to be a good, that is, as an elicited and conscious desire. Feingold further distinguishes two “movements” of the will based on rational knowledge of the good: natural movements (“natural willing” or elicited willing without deliberation) and deliberated willing (free willing that follows deliberation).

31 “Just as being is an analogical rather than a univocal reality, manifesting itself differently in every grade of the hierarchy of being, the same is true of the appetite specific to every nature.” Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God, 11–12. Jean-Hervé Nicolas also argues that, according to Thomas, God is both the natural and the supernatural end of man. Based on this twofold end, Nicolas argues for a distinction between natural appetite (appétit naturel) and elicited appetite (appétit elícite), where elicited love is the higher form of the natural appetite [“L’amour elícite est la forme supérieure de l’appétit naturel”; and “l’amour élicité qui dérive de la forme du connu présente intentionnellement au connaisant, dépend plus immédiatement encore d’un jugement de bonté”]. Nicolas, “Amour de soi, Amour de Dieu, Amour des Autres,” Revue Thomiste 56 (1956): 17–18. Nicolas further argues that there are two appetitive movements, two loves, which appear according to two different orders of knowledge: the grasp of an object in its particularity under its sensible aspect, and the grasp of this same object, or of another, under the universal notion of being. Ibid., 19. Thomas Osborne notes that Thomas uses the term “natural love” in three different ways: 1) in opposition to rational or sensitive loves; 2) to denote the natural desire for beatitude as opposed to deliberate choice; 3) as opposed to grace. See Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 107.

32 Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God, 14. Feingold admits that Thomas himself does not use the terms “innate appetite” and “elicited desire” but rather, that these were terms used at the time of Suarez. Yet, these terms, argues Feingold, “correspond to a real and meaningful opposition of two mutually exclusive categories which St. Thomas himself clearly distinguishes without using a fixed terminology.” Ibid., 15–16.

33 Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God, 17. Feingold notes several terms that are used by Thomas to denote natural movements of the will: “natural will,” “non-deliberated will,” voluntas ut natura, the will according...
Like Gagnebet, Feingold stresses that the terms “innate” and “natural desire/appetite” should not be conflated, for although innate inclinations can be referred to as natural appetite, elicited natural desires cannot be called innate since knowledge is involved.\footnote{Feingold, \textit{The Natural Desire to See God}, 19. Thus, he criticises de Lubac for viewing natural desire as the “innate inclination of a being for its actual final end, or as the ‘expression’ of the finality of a thing.” Subsequently, for de Lubac “a proportionate or connatural finality is not ‘imprinted on our nature’ as we possess it.” Ibid., 299; 301. Feingold gives examples of objects that are naturally willed: the good in general, happiness, and things which are necessarily joined to happiness, such as being, life and friendship. Ibid., 20.}

Feingold challenges de Lubac’s view that our natural desire for God is inscribed in us as an “ontological destiny,” and, furthermore, questions whether this “ontological destiny” is itself a “supernatural finality imprinted on our nature, prior to grace.”\footnote{Feingold, \textit{The Natural Desire to See God}, 317 and 329. Also, “if this new form which determines us to a supernatural end is above our nature . . . then this supernatural finality cannot be said to be ‘imprinted on our nature itself.’ . . . It is ultimately contradictory to suppose that our nature or being itself—without the addition of a supernatural principle—could be intrinsically determined by a supernatural finality . . .” and “a nature with a divine end can only be the divine nature.” Ibid., 321; 322. Rather, Feingold argues, the natural appetite of our will is determined only to our natural proportionate end. Ibid., 326. Also, “if we had an innate appetite for the vision [of God], then infused hope and charity would not be necessary to order our will to that end . . . but only to attain or merit it, contrary to the constant teaching of St. Thomas.” Ibid., 411.} Moreover, he notes that de Lubac’s defense of a supernatural end inscribed in our nature seems to imply that this end is \textit{due} us by nature, if we are to maintain that nature does nothing in vain.\footnote{Feingold states the main problem he finds with de Lubac’s thesis: “The great difficulty with the notion of an innate, absolute desire to see God lies in showing how grace and the beatific vision would not be due to a nature endowed with such a desire.” Feingold, xxxii. Feingold, \textit{The Natural Desire to See God}, 320. Feingold raises the objection in several other places: “to be ‘in vain’ has no place except in those things which are for the sake of something else, which they do not attain . . . However, the natural desire to see God is not conceived by Thomas as a natural inclination that serves to order us naturally to the vision of God. Instead, he teaches that we are ordered to the vision first through grace and the theological virtues, and that we do not have a sufficient natural inclination for the vision of God. Therefore, it follows that the axiom cannot be applied with the same demonstrative rigour to the}
this that “a natural desire or inclination would be in vain to the extent that it is ordered by God—and naturally orders the creature—to an end which could not be obtained.” As we will see, Feingold’s point seems to lose its urgency when we look at how Thomas understands “nature,” which is a more dynamic notion than both Feingold and Long allow.

In concluding this section, it is clear that Thomas’s use of “nature” lies at the heart of the debate. On the one hand, de Lubac and Bradley argue that according to Thomas, human nature in itself is ordained to supernatural happiness; on the other hand, scholars such as Gagnebet, Long, and Feingold argue that Thomas makes a distinction between man’s connatural and supernatural end, a distinction which they see must be safeguarded in order to preserve both the integrity of nature and the gratuity of grace.

We will now move on to examine the senses in which Thomas uses the term “nature” and what these usages imply for his theory concerning our natural love of God.

natural desire to see God as to other natural desires which sufficiently order the creature to their proportionate end;” “ordination to a supernatural beatitude is not due to the creature because a connatural beatitude is possible, and this alone is due him.” Ibid., 370; 310. For Thomas’s axiom that something is “in vain” if it does not achieve the end to which it is ordered, see ST Ia, q. 25, a.2, ad 2 (Leon,4.292): “Quia frustra est quod ordinatur ad finem, quem non attingit.” I think Feingold’s notion of nature here is rather static, and in fact, de Lubac does refutes this objection in Surnaturel (487–8), and again in his later work, Le Mystère du Surnaturel: “Qu’on ne parle donc point à ce sujet d’un debitum naturae quelconque. Qu’on ne pose rien qui ressemble à un exigence. Le cas du désir de Dieu est un cas à part.” Ibid., 120.

37 Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God, 370.
II

Nature As a Principle of Movement

A. Natural vs. Rational Active Powers

In this section I will look at two senses in which Thomas uses the term “nature” and “natural”: 1) natural vs rational active powers and 2) natural vs. supernatural, and how these senses apply to natural human love. Thomas acknowledges that the term “nature” can be used in many senses. 38 Following Aristotle, Thomas argues that nature is an inner principle (principium intrinsecum) of motion within a creature, 39 and is always the principle of everything else, including the rational appetite. 40

38 In ST IaIIae, q. 10, a. 1, Thomas, following Boethius and Aristotle, presents several meanings of nature: 1) nature as an intrinsic principle, either matter or the material form of a thing (natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis); 2) nature as ‘standing for’ substance (esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam); 3) nature as the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, i.e., ‘a natural principle’ (quod per se inest, sicut in principium), such as principles of intellectual knowledge as naturally known, and the principle of voluntary movements, ‘the good in general’ (bonum in communi), as naturally willed—‘all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.’ See ibid., (Leon.6.83): “sicut Boetius dicit in libro de Duabus Naturis, et Philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Allo modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insint, reductur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo nesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste appetit in intellectu: nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter vo litum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit.”

Every living creature has self-motion.\textsuperscript{41} As a self-mover, a creature \textit{naturally} has two principles within it that are related as act (mover) and potency (moved); an active (formal) principle and a passive (material) principle,\textsuperscript{42} where what is first is always preserved in what comes afterwards.\textsuperscript{43}

Moreover, nature is a principle of movement in that in which it is “primarily” and \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{44} That is, although nature is a principle of motion in composite things, it is not so “primarily.”\textsuperscript{45} Thomas clarifies Aristotle’s definition by way of an example: an animal is moved

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\item \textit{ST} Ia, q. 41, a.2 (Leon. 4.422): “voluntas et natura secundum hoc differunt in causando, quia natura determinata ad unum; sed voluntas non est determinata ad unum. Cuius ratio est, quia effectus assimilatur formae agentis per quam agit . . . voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium naturae est.” Also, \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 10, a.1, ad 1.
\item \textit{ST} Ia, q. 18, a.3 (Leon. 4.227): “vivere dicatur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab alis mota; quanto perfectius competit hoc alci, tanto perfectius in eo inventur vita.” Also In VII Met., lect 8 (Marietti, 353): “sola viventia inveniuntur movere seipsa. Et hoc ideo quia inveniuntur habere diversas partes, quarum una potest esse movens et alia mota; quod oportet esse in omni movente seipsum.”
\item In II Phys., lect 1 (Leon. 2.56): “in rebus naturalibus eo modo est principium motus, quo eis motus convenit. Quibus ergo convenit movere, est in eis principium activum motus; quibus autem competit moveri, est in eis principium passivum, quod est materia. Quod quidem principium, inquantum habet potentiam naturalem ad talem formam et motum, facit esse motum naturalem.” See Aertsen, \textit{Nature and Creature}, 285.
\item \textit{ST} Ia, q. 60, a.1 (Leon. 5.98): “semper prius salvatur in posteriori.” See Aertsen, \textit{Nature and Creature}, 296. Due to an intrinsic principle in the lower thing, it “naturally” follows the higher. See In VIII Physics, lect 8 (Leon. 2.392): “alter est in potentia ad scientiam ille qui addiscit et non dunt habet habitum scientiae, et ille qui iam habet habitum scientiae sed non considerat utemns habitu . . . Ergo de prima potentia reducitur in actum cui coniungitur secunda potentia, per aliquod agens, scilicet per docentem. Sed quando sic se habet quod habet habitum scientiae, non oportet quod reducitur in secunduma actum per aliquod agens, sed statim per seipsum operatur considerando, nisi sit aliquid prohibitus, puta occupatio vel infirmaturs aut voluntas.” See Aertsen, \textit{Nature and Creature}, 286.
\item In II Phys., lect 1 (Leon. 2.56): “natura nihil aliud est quam \textit{principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens}.”
\item In II Phys., lect 1 (Leon. 2.57): “Addit autem \textit{primum}, quia natura, etsi sit principium motus compositorum, non tamen primo.”
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downwards not because of the nature of animal *qua* animal, but because of the nature of heaviness.\(^{46}\) The heaviness is natural but it does not belong to the animal “primarily.” That is, the motion by which the animal moves itself is natural when it is compared to the whole animal, yet what belongs “primarily” to the animal are sensation and self-movement; these are “natural” because their intrinsic principle is the soul, the form of the animal.\(^{47}\) To apply a similar example to human beings, we could say that a person falling to the ground in a faint falls not *qua* human being, but *qua* body, for what belongs “primarily” to human beings is the rational soul, with its faculties of intellect and will.\(^{48}\) The operations of knowing and loving are natural to us because we are rational. Yet as Gregory Doolan notes, when predicated of a human being, *rational* does


\(^{47}\) *In VIII Phys.*, lect 7 (Leon. 2.387): “Et primo dicit de iis quae moventur a seipsis (sicunt sunt animalia, quae movent seipsa), quod moventur secundum naturam. Quod probat per hoc quod movetur a principio intrinseco: illa autem dicimus a natura moveri, quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Unde manifestum est quod motus animalis, quo movet seipsum, si comparetur ad totum animal, est naturalis; quia est ab anima, quae est natura et forma animalis.” As Aertsen notes, Thomas elaborates on the meaning of “primarily” (*primo*) in *In Post. an.*, lect 9, 78ff; lect 11, 97 concerning how nature is defined, where “‘primarily’ restricts the predication of *per se*” since what is predicated ‘primarily’ is predicated *per se*, but not vice versa. This is because “that which belongs to something in virtue of a part does not belong to it primarily.” In *In V Phys.*, lect 1 (Leon. 2.228): “tertio modo dicitur aliquid moveri, quod neque secundum accidentis movetur, neque secundum partem, ex eo quod ipsum movetur primo et per se; ut per hoc quod dicit *primo*, excludatur motus secundum partem; per id quod dicit *secundum se*, excludatur motus per accidentes.” See Aertsen, *Nature and Creature*, 295.

\(^{48}\) *ST* IIIa, q. 60, a.4, ad 1 (Leon. 12.7): “Unumquodque praeceptum denominator et definitur secundum illud quod convenit ei primo et per se.” We recall that the soul knows itself through its acts as their principle [*ST* Ia, q. 87, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 5:356): “mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actuum”]. “[I]n man, the genus *animal* is taken from man’s sensitive nature, whereas the difference *rational* is taken from man’s intellective nature,” Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas on *Substance* as a Metaphysical Genus,” in *The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations*, Edited by Gregory T. Doolan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 102.
not denote only the soul of a particular human being, since the soul is a part; rather, *rational* signifies the whole person. The rational love of human beings, therefore, is the love of the whole person for its object, even though it proceeds from the will. The addition of “primarily” in the definition of nature is important because it indicates that nature cannot stand apart from the subject of which it is the principle of motion. This point is consistent with the real distinction Thomas identifies between supposit and nature in material beings: nature is not the same as “subject.” A person, supposit (subject), is distinct and subsists in itself, whereas essence (nature), includes only the essential principles.

As rational beings, we naturally move ourselves to an end because we have dominion over our actions through free-will. Thomas argues that whatever naturally inclines to an end must have received this inclination from another which is directing it to that end. He reasons that since natural things incline to their end via natural appetite, there must be a divine intellect above all natural things which orders them to their end: “for this reason, every work of nature is said to

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49 Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas on *Substance* as a Metaphysical Genus,” 103.

50 *Quod.* 2, q. 2, a.2 (Marietti, 25): “Nam in significacione naturae includitur solum id quod est de ratione speciei; suppositum autem non solum habet haec quae ad rationem speciei pertinent, sed etiam alia quae et accidunt; et ideo suppositum signatur per totum, natura autem, sive quidditas, ut pars formalis.” John F. Wippel notes concerning this text: “[For Thomas] if a thing is such that something else can “happen” to it which is not included in the definition (ratio) of its nature, that thing (res) and its ‘what it is’ (quid quod est), or that subject and its nature differ. This follows because the meaning or definition of nature includes only that which belongs to it specific essence. But an individual subject includes not only this but other things which ‘happen’ to that essence. For this reason the subject (supposit) is signified as a whole, and its nature or quiddity as a formal part.” Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 244. As will be seen in the next section, other things which “happen” to human beings, i.e., accidents, include the superadded form of grace.

51 *ST* IaIIae, q.1, a.2 (Leon. 6.9): “rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem: quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est *facultas voluntatis et rationis.*"
be a work of intelligence.” 52 Since everything tends to its end via the divine intellect, no natural desire can be “in vain.” 53 Indeed, Thomas calls nature “the divine art, impressed upon things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end.” 54 As we will explore in a later chapter, the natural order is, for Thomas, “a work of providence.” 55 Thus the concern of both Feingold and Long as to what is “due” to nature loses its force. By nature, we are ordered to return to God as our source, a point which will be examined later in more detail when we discuss Thomas’s metaphysics of participation.

Thus, “nature” as a principle of movement in a human being qua subject, includes knowing and loving, for intellect and will are faculties that naturally (essentially) belong to us; 56

52 De ver., q. 3, a.1 (Leon. 22/1.100:204–209): “operatio naturae quae est ad determinatum finem praesupponit intellectum praestituentem finem naturae et ordinatam ad finem naturam, ratione cuius omne opus naturae dicitur esse opus intelligentiae.” Gregory T. Doolan argues that Thomas frequently uses the argument from natural teleology in reasoning towards the existence of exemplar ideas, “ideas that are actually practical, not ones that are either virtually practical or speculative.” See Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 61.

53 In II De caelo lect. 16 (Leon. 3.182): “Natura autem nihil facit irrationabiliter neque frustra, quia tota naturae operatio est ordinata ab aliquo intellectu propter finem operante.”

54 In II Phys., lect 14 (Leon. 2.96): “natura nihil est aliquid quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum.”

55 In II Phys., lect 12 (Leon. 2.90): “si natura operetur propter finem, necesse est quod ab aliquo intelligenti ordinetur; quod est providentiæ opus.”

56 De pot., q. 6, a. 3 (Marietti, 166): “per primum motum suum, scilicet localem, corporalis natura a spirituali movetur. Secundum hoc ergo corporalis creatura oedit imperio spiritualis secundum naturalem ordinem ad motum localem, non autem ad aliquius formae receptionem.” Knowing and loving are operations involving movement from potency to act. Also ST Ia, q. 18, a.1 (Leon. 4.225): “illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent.” See Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 296. We recall that Thomas uses the term “nature” to denote the essence of a thing, where “nature” includes all that belongs to the definition of a species, not the individuating characteristics of the thing. See ST Ia, q. 3, a.3 (Leon. 4:39–40): “Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae dunt in definitione speciei: sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt.
the acts of knowing and loving are motions in the sense that they involve a movement from
potency to act in receiving intentional forms, which cause the movement. The intellect
“naturally” knows first principles, and from these can reason to conclusions; likewise, the will
“naturally” desires its final end of happiness, and this natural appetite within the will is the
principle of all deliberate acts.

Furthermore, our rational active powers of intellect and will are the principles of the
operation (second act/perfection) which we desire as end. Thomas argues that just as matter
(passive principle) is for the sake of form (active principle), so the form (first act) is for the sake
of the operation (second act). Everything is perfected by its own operation; thus, in this sense,
operation can be called the “natural” end of the creature (operatio est finis rei createae).

in definitione hominis: his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo.”

57 ST IaIIae, q.10, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 6.83): “voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam:
quaeam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae
est domina sui actus, prater modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua
natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participatur a posteriori. Est enim
prius in unaquaque re ipsam esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem. Et inde est quod
voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.”

58 ST Ia, q. 18, a.3 (Leon. 4.228): “Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen aliqua sunt ei
praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia, circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non
potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio
moveatur.” Also ST IaIIae, q. 17, a 9, ad 2 (Leon. 6.125): “in his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent,
primum inventur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia derivantur: ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter
notorum, cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati, derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad
finem.”

59 ST Ia, 105, a.5 (Leon. 5.475): “ex virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi . . . cum
omnis res sit suam operationem. . . . sicut igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus primus, est
propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et sic operatio est finis rei createae.”Sic igitur intelligendum est
Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriae habeant operationem.”
Yet Thomas also argues that human beings are ultimately ordered to a supernatural final end. The finis ultimus is the divine goodness. Since the final end is the divine goodness, everything can be said to “naturally” desire God. Indeed, Thomas argues that the cause of a thing’s very desirability is its participation in the highest Good. As we will see in the next section, since God is the universal good, every creature naturally loves God more than it loves itself. The divine essence is not completely unattainable by our intellect, in the sense that it is knowable as “being” and “true,” yet it is unknowable in the sense that our intellect and will cannot naturally attain it. Thomas is clear that in terms of acquisition: 1) we do have a connatural end that can be reached naturally through our operation (second act), which is the natural perfection of our intellect and will (imperfect happiness), and 2) we do have a supernatural end that can be attained through grace only. In terms of completion, however, we

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60 ST Ia, q.44, a.4 (Leon. 4.461): “omne agens agit propter finem: alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequerentur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis agentis et patientis, inquantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter: unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod patiens intentit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta: et his convenit quod etiam in agendo intendat aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem allicuius finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est simulitude perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.”

61 In De div. nom., c. 10, lect 1, 857 (Marietti, 321): “nihil enim est desiderabile, nisi inquantum habet aliquam participationem Summi Boni.”

62 Quod. I, q. 4, a. 3 (Marietti, 8): “Deus est bonum commune totius universi et omnium partium eius.” Also In De div nom., c. 4, lect 1 (Marietti, 89): “Divina enim Bonitas convertit omnia ad seipsam”; ST Iallae, q.110, a. 2, ad 2 (Leon. 7.313): “Quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis : sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem.”

63 SCG III, q. 54 (Leon. 15.173–175).
have one beatitude only. Thomas uses the term “nature” in both these senses in the following
text, In Boeth. De Trin., q. 6, a.4, ad 5:

We are endowed with principles by which we can prepare for perfect knowledge of separate substances but
not with principles by which to reach it. For even though naturally (naturaliter) man is inclined to his
ultimate end, he cannot reach it naturally (naturaliter) but only by grace.

Yet, the question still remains: In what way can human beings as rational, “naturally”
love God through our operation, given the reality of Original Sin which affects the capacity of
the will to choose aright? This leads us to a further question: In what sense can human beings
“naturally” (vs. supernaturally) love God over self? As we will see, for Thomas, it is only by the
higher (super) nature that we are brought into proportion to our supernatural end. It seems true
to say that for Thomas, to be truly human is only possible by God’s grace, since “being human is
being unto God.” Such a position does not threaten the integrity of nature, since our
naturally incline towards the vision of God, but we cannot naturally attain this end, since our

64 Aerts, Nature and Creature, 367.

65 In Boeth. De Trin., lect. II, q. 6, a. 4, ad 5 (Marietti, 389): “nobis sunt indita principia, quibus possimus
nos praeparare ad illam cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatim, non autem quibus ad eam possimus
pertingere. Quamvis enim homo nauraliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter illum consecui,
sed solum per gratiam.”

66 De ver., q.27, a.2 (Leon. 22/3.794:121–133): “Homo autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est
ad quandam finem, cuius habet naturalis appetitum; et secundum naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem
illius finis; qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum, qualis est homini possibilis secundum facultatem naturae. . .
Sed est aliquid finis ad quem homo a Deo praeparatur, naturae humanae proportionem excedens, scilicet vita aeterna
quae consistit in visione Dei per essentiam, quae excedit proportionem cuiuslibet naturae creatae soli Deo
connaturalis existentis.”

rational active powers have no proportion to it: 68 we need the operation of a higher nature. 69 If we are to be ordered actively to our supernatural end, a form (grace) must be “superadded” to our nature. 70 Only grace can dispose us to actively unite ourselves with God. Thus, it is to this second sense of “nature” (nature vs. grace) that we now turn.

B. Nature vs. Grace

Thomas defines grace as the accidental perfection that “raises the soul to a certain supernatural existence (esse supernaturale).” 71 Grace is a supernatural form added to our substantial form. Grace is unique to man; it is a perfection and habit that enables man’s

68 Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 370. For Thomas see De ver., q. 27, a. 2 (Leon. 22/3.794: 135–144): “Unde oportet quod homini detur aliquid non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur eius appetitus in finem ilium, sed etiam per quod ipsa natura hominis elevetur ad quandam dignitatem, secundum quam talis finis sit ei competens; et ad hoc datur gratia. Ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas; ad exequendum autem opera quibus praedictus finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes.” See also De virt. in comm. q.1, a.10, and ST IaIIae, q. 62, a.1.

69 See Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 370; 385. ST IaIIae, q. 2, a.3 (Leon. 8.28): “In omnibus naturis ordinatis invenitur quod ad perfectionem naturae inferiores duo concurrunt: unum quidem quod est secundum proprium motum; aliud autem quod est secundum motum superioris naturae.” Aertsen notes: “In the perfecting of a nature there go together its own activity and the influence of a higher nature, which fulfills the passive potencies. Yet this thesis cannot satisfy. For man is distinguished from the other creatures precisely by his being ordered to an end that exceeds his natural faculties.”

70 De virt. in comm. q.1, a.10 (Marietti, 735): “per fidem intellectus illuminetur de aliquibus supernatualibus cognoscendis, quae se habent in isto ordine sicut principia naturaliter cognita in ordine connaturalium operationum.”

71 De ver., 27, 3 (Leon. 22/3.797: 214–216): “Gratia enim, ut dictum est, est quaedam perfectio elevans animam ad quoddam esse supernaturale.” As Di Noia notes, for Thomas, our participation in grace is transcendent as well as gratuitous: it surpasses our natural created capacities, and is unmerited. See “Nature, Grace, and Experience,” 117. Since grace is an accidental perfection, it can be lost. See ST IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2 (Leon. 7.313): “quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis: sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae.”
operations to “operate well and do the good, connaturally, easily and enjoyably.” Grace, which indicates a form and perfection present in man, is God’s gift to us so that we may attain our ultimate end.\footnote{SCG III, 150 (Leon. 4.442): “Est autem hic modus proprius hominum, quod ad perfectionem suarum operationum oportet eis inesse, super naturales potentias, quasdam perfectiones et habitus, quibus quasi connaturaler et faciliter et delectabiler bonum et bene operentur. Igitur auxilium gratiae, quod homo a Deo consequitur ad perveniendum in ultimum finem, aliquam formam et perfectionem homini inesse designat.”} Grace perfects nature (\textit{gratia perficit naturam});\footnote{See \textit{ST} Ia, q. 62, a.5 (Leon. 5.115): “gratia perficit naturam secundum modum naturae: sicut et omnis perfectio recipitur in perfectibili secundum modum eius.” Also \textit{De malo}, q. 2, a.11co.} it does not destroy or transmute nature, but elevates it.\footnote{As Reinhard Hütter aptly notes: “grace is the created effect of the gratuitous divine act—always coming on the way of being—that directs human beings to their supernatural end, that is, to God as their overarching specific end.” \textit{Dust Bound For Heaven}, 272. The intricacies of Thomas’s theory of grace cannot be discussed in detail here. We simply note here that it is specifically by operative grace that man is ordered to God as his supernatural end. “[O]perative grace is nothing other than the divine \textit{initium} of the second gratuity by which God brings about the returning to God of the \textit{actus essendi}, as it comes to subsist as human being, a returning that comes about by way of a gratuitous elevation of the human faculties of intellect and will.” Ibid., 273.} 

Thomas outlines the twofold perfection of a nature in \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 2, a.3:

In all things we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature: one is in respect of that nature’s proper movement; the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. . . [T]he created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God . . . but the rational nature, inasmuch as it knows the universal notion of good and being (\textit{ens}), is immediately ordered to the universal principle of being (\textit{esse}). The perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also to that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of divine goodness.\footnote{\textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 2, a.3 (Leon. 8.28): “in omnibus naturis ordinatis inventur quod ad perfectionem naturae inferioris duo concurrunt: unum quidem quod est secundum proprium motum; aliud autem quod est secundum motum superioris naturae . . . Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet immediatam ordinem ad Deum. . . natura autem rationalis, inquantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis rationem, habet immediatam ordinem ad universale essendi principium. Perfecto ergo rationalis creaturae non solum consistit in eo quod ei competit secundum suam naturam sed etiam in eo quod ei attribuitur ex quadam supernatrali participatione divinae bonitatis.”}
In this text, Thomas argues that man’s perfection/completion in respect of his nature (essence) is further ordered to perfection through a supernatural participation of God’s goodness.\textsuperscript{76}

As rational creatures, our love is only correctly (rectus) directed by an explicit appetitive tendency to God, whether actual or habitual;\textsuperscript{77} yet for this to occur, grace (gratia) is required.\textsuperscript{78} We need grace in order to actively know and love God as our ultimate end, since “no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act deserving of eternal life, unless there is added the supernatural gift which is called grace.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{76} The theme of participation will be the topic of the last chapter.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{De ver.}, q. 22, a. 2 (Leon. 22/3.617:68–71): “Appetitus creaturae rationalis non est rectus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei, actu vel habitu.” Also ibid., ad 5 (Leon. 103-107): “sola creatura rationalis est capax Dei, quia ipsa sola potest ipsum cognoscere et amare explicite; sed aliae etiam creaturae participant divinam similitudinem, et sic ipsum Deum appetunt.”

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 62, a.1 (Leon. 6.401): “Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connoturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur \textit{theologicae}: tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum.” \textit{De virt. in comm.}, q.1, a.10 (Marietti, 735): “Et quia unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per operationem aliquam; et ea quae sunt ad finem, opportet esse alqualiter fini proportionata; necessarium est esse aliquas hominis perfectiones quibus ordinetur ad finem supernaturalem, quae excedant facultatem principiorum naturalium hominis. Hoc autem esse non possit, nisi supra principia naturalia aliqua supernaturalia operationum principia homini infundatur a Deo.” See Aertsen, \textit{Nature and Creature}, 363.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q.114, a.2 (Leon. 7.346): “nulla natura creata est sufficiens principium actus meritori vitae aeternae, nisi superaddatur aliquod supernaturale donum , quod gratia dicitur.” Also \textit{ST} Ia, q. 62, a.2 (Leon. 5.111): “Unde nulla creatura rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a supernaturali agent. Et hoc dicimus auxilium gratiae”
III

Natural and Supernatural Love of God

Thomas clearly argues that we can have a natural love (dilectio naturalis) and a supernatural love (caritas) of God.80 We read in the following texts:

ST Ia, q. 60, a.5, ad 4:
God, in so far as he is the universal good upon which every natural good depends, is loved with natural love (diliguitur naturali dilectione) by everyone. Insofar as he is the good which naturally beatifies all persons with supernatural happiness, he is loved (diliguitur) with the love of charity (dilectione caritatis).81

ST IaIae, q.62, a.1, ad 3:
Reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as he is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature (secundum tamen proportionem naturae). But reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to him in so far as he is the object of supernatural happiness.82

ST IaIae, q. 109, a.3, ad 1:
Charity loves (diligit) God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves (diligit) God above all things inasmuch as he is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves him, as he is the object of happiness, and inasmuch as man has a certain spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to the natural love (dilectionem naturalem) of God a certain alacrity and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.83

80 See Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God, 418, n.78.

81 (Leon. 5.105): “Deus, secundum quod est universale bonum, a quo dependet omne bonum naturale, diliguitur naturali dilectione ab uno quoque. Inquantum vero est bonum beatificans naturaliter ex omnes supernaturali beatitudine, sic diliguitur dilectione caritatis.”

82 (Leon. 6.401): “ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur, prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non ordinantur sufficienter.”

83 (Leon. 7.295): “caritas diligit Deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim diliget Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni: caritas autem secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod homo habet quandam societatem spirituali cum Deo. Addit etiam caritas super dilectionem naturalem Dei promptitudinem quandam et delectationem: sicut et quilibet habitus virtutis addit supra actum bonum qui fit ex sola naturali ratione hominis virtutis habitum non habentis.”
Quodlibet 1, q. 4, a. 3, ad 1:
To love (diligere) God insofar as he is the principle of all being, pertains to natural love (naturalem dilectionem); but to love God insofar as he is the object of beatitude belongs to gratuitous love (gratuitae dilectionis) in which merit consists.\(^8^4\)

De caritate, q. 1, a. 2, ad 16:
Love (amor) of the highest good, insofar as it is the principle of natural being (esse naturalis), is in us by nature. However, insofar as it is the object of that beatitude which surpasses the entire capacity of created nature, it is not in us by nature, but is above nature.\(^8^5\)

We note in these texts that Thomas uses the term *dilectio naturalis* when referring to the natural love human beings have for God,\(^8^6\) denoting *amor naturalis* within the will. Contrary to what de Lubac argues, this natural love of God is not an innate, necessary activity since some knowledge in general is involved. Although Thomas does not use the terms “innate natural appetite” and “natural elicited desire,” terms used by various scholars,\(^8^7\) the notions do seem to be present in Thomas’s distinction between natural love of God (*dilectio naturalis*), which is natural love following from knowledge of God as the principle of all being, and natural love of God (*amor naturalis*) which is common to all creatures.

\(^8^4\) Quod, 1, q. 4, a.3, ad 1 (Marietti, 9): “diligere Deum prout est principium totius esse, ad naturalem dilectionem pertinet; sed diligere Deum prout est obiectum beatitudinis, est gratuitae dilectionis, in qua meritum consistit.”

\(^8^5\) De caritate, q. 1, a.2, ad 16 (Marietti, 760): “amor summi boni, prout est principium esse naturalis, inest nobis a natura; sed prout est obiectum illius beatitudinis quae totam capacitatem naturae creatae exedit, non inest nobis a natura, sed est supra naturam.”

\(^8^6\) As Aertsen notes: “there is a natural love (*amor*) to God as the Origin and End of things. Union with God as He is in Himself exceeds, however, the natural inclination of the will. Through the gift of charity, the will is assimilated to this end, ordered to God as object of beatitude, and a spiritual union is established.” Aertsen, *Nature and Creature*, 372.

\(^8^7\) See Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God* and Stephen Long, *Natura Pura*. 
Based on a twofold order of the good, the good of nature and the good of grace, Thomas distinguishes the basis for natural love (*amor naturalis*) which is common to all creatures, and the basis for supernatural love (*caritas*), friendship with God, which is based on the good of grace:

The good we receive from God is twofold: the good of nature (*bonum naturae*), and the good of grace (*bonum gratiae*). The communication of natural goods bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love (*amor naturalis*), in virtue of which not only man, in his integral nature, in which he loves God above all things and more than himself (*diliget Deum et plus quam seipsum*), but also every single creature, each in its own way, that is, either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love (*naturali amore*), as stones do, for instance, and other things that lack knowledge. For any part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part is towards a common action for the good of the whole (*utilitati totius*). . . this is realized much more in regard to the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace. Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God (*diligere deum*), who is the common good of all, more than himself since happiness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to participate that happiness.  

Yet, we may ask, even if we have a natural capacity to love God, via *dilectio naturalis*, to what extent can we naturally love him *over ourselves* in an active sense (via *dilectio electiva*)? That is, given that human nature is wounded by original sin, to what extent can man really love God with a love of choice (*dilectio electiva*)? Furthermore, was our natural capacity to love God different

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88 *ST* IIaIIae, q.26, a.3 (Leon. 8.211): “a Deo duplex bonum accipere possimus: scilicet bonum naturae, et bonum gratiae. Super communicatione autem bonorum naturalium nobis a Deo facta fundatur amor naturalis, quo non solum homo in suae integritate naturae super omnia diliget Deum et plus quam seipsum, sed etiam quaelibet creatura suo modo, idest vel intellectuali vel rationali vel animali, vel saltera naturali amore, sicut lapides et alia quae cognitione carent: quia unaquaque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium. Quod manifestatur ex opere: quaelibet enim pars habet inclinationem principalem ad actionem communem utilitati totius. . . amicitia caritatis, quae fundatur super communicatione donorum gratiae. Et ideo ex caritate magis debet homo diligere Deum, qui est bonum commune omnium, quam seipsum: quia beatitudo est in Deo sicut in communi et fontali omnium principio qui beatitudinem participare possunt.”
in the state of original justice?\textsuperscript{89} It is at this point that we need to look at Thomas’s distinction between natural love as it is possible for integral human nature and natural love as it is possible for fallen human nature. Before doing this, however, we will take a brief look at how Thomas argues that we can love God over oneself according to the principle that the part naturally loves the whole more than itself.

IV.

**How One Loves God More Than Oneself Naturally**

In several texts, Thomas argues that the part loves the good of the whole of which it is a part more than its own partial good. In ST IaIlae, q. 109, a. 3, Thomas addresses the question of how, even in the state of corrupt nature, man can love God naturally above all else. Following Aristotle, he argues that every thing naturally desires and loves those things to which it is naturally suited. This is because every thing acts according as it is naturally fit (*secundum quod aptum natum est esse*). Since the good of the part is for the sake of the good of the whole, every thing loves its own proper good for the sake of the common good of the universe, which is

\textsuperscript{89} For an in-depth analysis of the different “states” of human beings mentioned by Thomas, see Jean-Pierre Torrell’s excellent article, “Nature et Grâce chez Thomas d’Aquin,” *Revue Thomiste* (2001): 167–201. For example, Torrell notes that the terms “state of innocence” (*l’état d’innocence*) and state of “original justice” (*justice originelle*) are often used synonymously but without taking into account the distinct nuances between them. I don’t find it convincing that there is any difference between these two states. Thus, although the term “state of innocence” is more frequently used by Thomas (373 times) than “state of original justice” (206 times), I prefer to use the term “state of original justice” in this chapter. See Torrell, ibid., 175.
Thus all creatures, rational and irrational, love God above themselves according to their own proper mode of knowledge and love. Human beings, however, fall short of loving their own proper good on account of the good of the whole because our nature is wounded by sin: we tend to prefer our own private good (bonum privatum).\footnote{ST Ia, q. 60, a. 5 (Leon. 5.104): “autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius est magis inclinatur in id cuius est, quam in seipsum.”}

In \textit{ST} Ia, q. 60, a. 5, Thomas again argues that each thing “is more principally and more inclined to that to which it belongs than to its own self.”\footnote{ST IaIae, q. 109, a.3 (Leon. 7.295): “in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis.” What Thomas means by “naturally” here will be discussed later.} In this passage, he gives the example of the hand that naturally sacrifices itself for the sake of the head.\footnote{ST IaIae, q. 109, a. 3 (Leon. 7.205): “Cuius ratio est quia unicusque naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse: sic enim agit unumquodque, prout aptum natum est, ut dicitur in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius. Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaereres particularis amat bonum suum prorsum propterbonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus.”} Since reason copies nature, the same inclination is found in human beings and pertains to the social virtues: the virtuous citizen naturally exposes himself to danger for the sake of the whole community.\footnote{Ibid: “Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit, ad conservationem totius: sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis.”} As Osborne points out, the significant point of this passage is that, if human beings follow their natural

\footnote{ST IaIae, q. 60, a. 5 (Leon. 5.104): “Et quia ratio imitatatur naturam, huiusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis: est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius republicae conservatione; et si homo esset naturalis pars huius civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis.” See also ST IIaIae, q. 26, a.3.}
inclination, they will, like natural non-rational things, prefer the good of the whole to their own private good.95

In the next part of this text, using the part/whole argument, Thomas argues that “where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than oneself.” Since each part naturally loves the whole more than itself, each individual loves the good of the species more than its own private good. God is not only the good of one species, however; he is the universal good. Thus, Thomas concludes that everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.96 Yet, because human beings have free will, we can choose our individual good over that of God, a disorder due to original sin.

Jacques Maritain offers a helpful summary of Thomas’s thought on natural love. Maritain identifies two kinds of natural love as outlined by Thomas in his treatise on the angels. The first

95 Osborne, Love of God and Love of Self, 80.

96 ST Ia, q. 60, a.5, ad 1 (Leon. 5.104): “Sed in illis quorum unum est tota ratio existendi et bonitatis alii, magis diliguit naturaliter tale alterum quam ipsum; sicut dictum est quod unaquaeque pars diliguit in corpore naturaliter to tum plus quam se. Et quodlibet singulare naturaliter diliguit plus bonum suae speciei, quam bonum suum singulare. Deus autem non solum est bonum unius speciei, sed est ipsum universale bonum simpliciter. Unde uni quodque suo modo naturaliter diliguit Deum plus quam se ipsum.” Pierre Rousselot rightly notes, however, that “part” includes the more precise notion of “participant,” and “whole” includes the notion of “participated,” interpreting Thomas’s part/whole argument in light of his metaphysics of participation: “Ce que S. Thomas dit des parties, il le pense plus encore des participations.” See Rousselot, “Problème de l’Amour,” 13. Thomas’s theory of the different kinds of participation will be addressed in detail in the final chapter of this dissertation. For now, we note Rudi te Velde’s summary of the pertinent kind of participation here concerning how an effect participates in its cause, especially when the effect is not equal to the power of that cause: “This kind of causal participation is illustrated with the Dionysian image of the sunlight, which is less brightly present in the air than in the sun itself. The illuminated air participates, one can say, in the light of the sun, receives in diminished fashion the light that is full and undiminished in the sun itself.” Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden/New York/Koln: E.J.Brink, 1995), 14. See also Leo Elders: “creatures, however, do not participate in God in the sense of possessing a part of divine being . . . Things participate in God to the extent that God communicates himself in a different manner to each of them and attunes the being he gives, to each particular subject.” The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective (Leiden/New York/Koln: E.J.Brink, 1993), 228.
type of natural love is that by which every created thing “loves the supreme Whole more than itself with a radical élan consubstantial with its essence. . . . It naturally exists in every creature, with or without senses or reason, and is not free.” Furthermore, this love “continues to exist in the sinner and in the demon.”97 The second kind of natural love identified by Maritain in this passage is that love “through which every creature capable of knowledge loves the supreme Whole more than itself, instinctively or by a spontaneous élan and not because it knows Him, due solely to the fact that it loves necessarily, and with an elicited love, whatever is its good of nature.”98 As Reinhard Hütter comments:

Hence, since there is no innate knowledge of God, the human being’s natural desire for the vision of God, if it is an intellective desire (which, according to Thomas, it is), must be called forth via the senses by the first gift, creation, as it points, by way of its causal order, not ineluctably, but consistently, to its primal origin, the Giver of the gift. It must, therefore, be an elicited desire, intending a transnatural and ultimately infinitely disproportionate end that, however, because of the nature of the intellect, remains integral to the connatural human end as proportionate to human nature—short of the gift of sanctifying grace.99

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98 Maritain, J., The Sin of the Angel: An Essay on a Re-Interpretation of Some Thomistic Positions, trans. by William L. Rossner, S.J. (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1959), 22. Maritain goes on to identify two more loves: an elicited-love-of-nature, which is a spontaneous, pre-elective movement of the rational appetite at the moment that “the intellect knows the existence of the Principle of all good, the Self-subsuming Good which is the common good of all,” a movement which can be prevented by free will; and “there exists in every intelligent creature a natural inclination . . . to love the supreme Whole more than himself with an elicited love of free option. The intelligent creature is inclined by his nature to this love which is essentially free in its very mode of emanation.” Ibid., 23–26. See Hütter, Dust Bound For Heaven, 158.

99 Hütter, Dust Bound For Heaven, 158–9. As Maritain notes, the third and fourth loves rely on the exercise of free will. The third kind is an “elicited love-of-nature which, before any option or election, arises at once in every intellectual creature as a spontaneous, immediate movement of the rational appetite at the instant and by the mere fact that the intellect knows the existence of the Principle of all good, the Self, subsuming Good which is the common good of all.” The fourth kind is “a natural inclination . . . to love the supreme Whole more than himself with an elicited love of free option. The intelligent creature is inclined by his nature to this love which is essentially free in its very mode of emanation.” Maritain, Sin of the Angel, 23; 26.
Yet given that Thomas argues that all created things love God over self naturally, we need to examine the distinction he makes between natural love of God in the state of original justice and the state of fallen nature. The state of original justice was lost because of the Fall,\(^{100}\) and due to this loss, human nature is wounded. Yet our current state of corrupt nature is not one of “pure nature.” Hütter summarises well the importance of this theological distinction:

> because of the first sin, human nature is now continuously marked by the deficiency of a disordered disposition (*peccatum naturae*), which antecedes the free exercise of the will (ST I-II, qq. 82-83). Hence, Thomas consistently differentiates between the concrete historical condition of human nature *sub conditione peccati* which belongs to the extant order of providence as it coincides with the economy of salvation on the one hand, and on the other hand a *hypothetical state* of pure nature . . . What is presupposed by such a nuanced and theologically indispensable differentiation is the relative integrity of the principle (or the order) of nature is the necessary condition for the possibility of differentiating properly between the realities of creation, creation *sub conditione peccati*, and redemption. Failing to do so would inevitably lead to deficient theological positions, such as doctrines denying sin’s impact on human nature, or doctrines defending the essential corruption (allegedly due to original sin) or the essential transmutation (presumably due to deification) of human nature.\(^{101}\)

We now turn to examine these two states in more detail.

### V.


Thomas’s speaks of natural love of God over self within the context of man’s different “states.” First, however, we note the distinction he makes between man’s *nature* and the *state* of his nature:

\(^{100}\) Additionally, sanctifying grace was “withdrawn in consequence of it.” Hütter, *Dust Bound For Heaven*, 149.

\(^{101}\) Hütter, *Dust Bound For Heaven*, 150.
Man’s nature is the same before and after sin, but the state of his nature is not the same. Because after sin, the soul, even in its higher part, needs to receive something from corporeal things in order that it may be perfected whereas man had no need of this in that state.\footnote{ST IIIa, q. 61, a.2, ad 2 (Leon. 12.15): “eadem est natura hominis ante peccatum et post peccatum, non tamen est idem naturae status. Nam post peccatum anima, etiam quantum ad superiorem partem, indiget accipere aliquid a corporalibus rebus ad sui perfectionem: quod in ilio statu hominii necesse non erat.”}

The theological character of this distinction has philosophical implications, and thus requires some discussion. The reason we are interested in Thomas’s distinction between the state of original justice and the state of fallen nature is that we want to ascertain his answer to the question: To what degree can human beings will the good “naturally”?\footnote{Di Noia gives a good summary of these states: “In the economy of salvation, the only true ‘states’ of nature are the state of integrity and original justice and the state of fallen nature restored. Thus, the ‘states’ of nature reflect the actualities of the divine engagement with created persons and hence a supernatural order.” Thus, discussion concerning the “state of pure nature,” a merely hypothetical state, will not be addressed here. “Nature, Grace, Experience,” 118.}

The “state of original justice” does not simply denote the state man was in before the Fall; this state also includes certain preternatural graces.\footnote{[T]he state of original righteousness—which in the extant order of providence is from the first instance of the creation of the human being identical with the state of integral nature—includes also the gratuitous gift of sanctifying grace, the principal of the divine life infused in the human soul”; “Original justice, being gratuitously given to what has been created and hence to be distinguished from human nature per se, is a quasi disposition for the help of sanctifying grace. Hence, sanctifying grace acts upon a human nature readily fit for such an operation, the one being neither intrinsic nor extrinsic to the other, but of a perfect and perfectly gratuitous fittingness (convenientia). Original sin, however, destroys this quasi disposition, the help of original justice, as the result of which sanctifying grace—that is, ‘the help, whereby the human mind is ordained to see and enjoy God’—is withdrawn as the fitting punishment.” Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven, 112; 146.}

Thus, although sin vitiates secondary perfection (the good achieved by the rational creature), it cannot affect the first perfection, that...
is, “the distinct subsistent terminus of the act of being, which is the substantial form of the rational creature.”

This point concerning the effect of sin on human nature will be discussed later.

In *ST IaIlae*, q. 85, a.1, Thomas outlines three goods of human nature: 1) its primary perfection, such as the powers of the soul (intellect, will, senses); 2) its natural inclination to virtue, the inclination proper to reason; and 3) the good that pertains to man’s state of integral nature. The third point is of particular interest to us because it relates to man’s state of integral nature or the state of original justice. The gift of original justice is a good of nature because of

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106 Hütter, *Dust Bound For Heaven*, 111.

107 Torrell notes that the expression “integral nature” occurs 49 times in Thomas’s writings, 23 occurrences of which are used in a neutral context and signify wholeness, the “compleudo” of our given nature. 26 occurrences are used in a qualified theological sense. The most evident regards the two states of nature: integral and corrupt. Torrell argues that it is erroneous to equate “integral nature” with “state of innocence” or “original justice.” Rather, the term *natura corrupta* “is probably the preferred expression of Thomas to signify the result of sin.” See Torrell, “Nature et Grâce chez Thomas d’Aquin,” in *Revue Thomiste* (2000), 182–3; 184. Hütter offers a more precise explanation than Torrell as to Thomas’s subtle distinction between the state of integral nature and the state of original justice. Hütter notes: “Thomas’s careful way of indicating that this ‘integral nature’ may be called, ‘potest dici,’ a good of nature, signals a subtle analogical shift in the meaning of ‘nature,’ a shift from ‘nature’ identifying the essence or the quiddity of the species, that is, what belongs *de iure* to human nature, to ‘nature’ signifying now the inclusion of a perfection that human nature de facto received when first created.” Hütter, *Dust Bound For Heaven*, 112. It is worth clarifying here that the terms “state of integral nature” and “state of original justice” are not interchangeable. In his book entitled *Grace*, Fr Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange presents a clear distinction between these states. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St. Thomas, IaIlae*, q. 109-14, trans. by The Dominican Nuns (St. Louis: Herder Books, 1952). The state of original justice, the more inclusive notion, denotes human nature “in the beginning,” created in a *state of grace*, acquiring a state of rectitude in this life. The state of original justice thus includes both the grace and nature of the original state. “The state of integral nature,” however, denotes the state of nature alone—the state of nature *qua* nature in the state of original justice. Integral nature thus focuses only on the nature aspect of the grace-nature composite. In this “integral” state, human beings are not yet subject to death, have not sinned yet and the lower powers are subject to reason and reason is subject to God. Paradoxically, this state of integral nature is only possible because of the presence of grace and the praenatural gifts of original justice: our nature was more natural with the aid of grace in the state of original justice. I am indebted to Fr. Thomas Joseph White, O.P., for this formulation of the distinction. Thomas speaks of the state of original justice in *ST Ia*, q. 95, as outlined by Garrigou-Lagrange, as consisting in: “1) the perfect
“its properties to be rightly ordered, and hence for a rational creature to be rightly ordered internally (reason ruling the sense appetites), and in regard to the source of all being, reason being perfected by God and subject to God in all things.”

Thomas makes a further distinction between human nature as wounded by original sin and human nature as wounded by actual sin. Thomas calls original sin a habit, in the sense of a disposition, like sickness, and in this sense original sin has become a “second nature.” Original sin denotes the privation of original justice as well as “the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul.” Actual sin, however, is “an inordinateness of an act.” The inordinate disposition of nature is a type of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not.

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subjection of reason to God by grace and charity; 2) the perfect subjection of the sense appetites to reason; 3) the perfect subjection of the body to the soul.” Garrigou-Lagrange further notes that Thomas does not speak of a state of “restored nature as such but rather of the state of grace after justification or of the healing grace – stating that this is perhaps because nature is not perfectly restored in this life. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 24–27. For Thomas, see *ST* IIIa, q. 49, a.5 ad 1 and q. 69, a.3.

108 Hütter, *Dust Bound For Heaven*, 111. Furthermore, “Because this good of human nature orders human beings rightly to what infinitely transcends the created nature as such and is a good that is not proportionate to the powers of human nature, it is a good that is uniquely distinct from the first and the second good of nature, and therefore was later called ‘preternatural’ in contradistinction from ‘supernatural,’ the principle of the divine life itself.” Ibid., 112.

109 *ST* IaIae, q. 82, a.1 (Leon. 7.94): “Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad alicuium, et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam: ut patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale est habitus.”

110 Ibid., ad 1 (Leon. 7.94): “peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae.” See also *ST* IaIae, q. 82, a.3co (Leon. 7.97). Moreover, Thomas explains that in the order of original justice, man’s will is subject to God, where will functions to move all the other parts of the soul to the end. Thus, the will being turned away from God leads all the other powers of the soul to become inordinate. For this reason, original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance. Ibid., a.4.

111 Ibid., ad 2 (Leon. 7.94): “actuale peccatum est inordinatio quaedam actus: originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturae, est quaedam inordinata dispositio ipsius naturae, quae habet rationem culpae inquantum
As mentioned, the first good of human nature is not destroyed by sin; the second good of human nature is not destroyed by sin but it is diminished; but the third good of human nature was destroyed by original sin. In ST IaIIae, q. 85, a.1, ad 4, Thomas speaks of how our inclination to virtue is not destroyed by sin, but is affected negatively by it:

An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but acts on it formally, in the same way as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. Thus there is nothing to prevent sin from diminishing the good of nature: but only insofar as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, in that it is an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that such inordinateness is caused by the fact that, in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus, the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will . . . And this is the cause of inordinateness, not as though some accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on another, and puts it into disorder.112

The “state of fallen nature” denotes man’s condition after committing Original Sin, which introduced into human nature “the deficiency of a disordered disposition (peccatum naturae).”113

We can still carry out particular good in this state, although Thomas maintains that virtue ordered to a particular, true good (vs. apparent good) is imperfect virtue without charity: “no properly true virtue is possible without charity.”114

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112 ST IaIIae, q. 85, a.1, ad 4 (Leon. 7.111): “accidens non agit effective in subiectum; agit tamen formaliter in ipsum, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod albedo facit album. Et sic nihil prohibit quod peccatum diminuat bonum naturae: eo tamen modo quo est ipsa diminutio boni naturae, inquantum pertinet ad inordinationem actus. Sed quantum ad inordinationem agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum: sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensivum, et appetitus sensitivus inclinat rationem et voluntatem. . . Et ex hoc caussatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium subiectum; sed secundum quod objectum agit in potentiam, et una potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.”

113 Hütter, Dust Bound For Heaven, 149.

114 See ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a.7 (Leon. 8.171): “Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine caritate esse non potest.
For Thomas, man in the state of original justice referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to his end, loving God naturally more than himself and above all things.\textsuperscript{115} In the state of corrupt nature, however, man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is healed by God’s grace, follows its own private good on account of the corruption of nature through sin.\textsuperscript{116} Thomas writes:

In speaking of man it is one thing to speak of him according to the state of nature as it was instituted (\textit{statum nature condite}) and another thing to speak of him according to the state of fallen nature (\textit{statum nature corrupte}) because according to the state of nature as it was instituted (\textit{statum nature condite}), man had nothing impelling him to evil, although the goodness of his nature was not sufficient for the attainment of glory; therefore, he needed the help of grace to merit, but not to avoid sins because by reason of what he had received in accordance with his nature he could still be steadfast. However, in the state of fallen nature, he has an incitement to evil, and thus needs the help of grace not to fall.\textsuperscript{117}

In this passage, Thomas argues that in the state of original justice (\textit{statum nature condite}), man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments in order to love God above all things naturally, although he still needed God’s help to move him to it. In the state of corrupt nature (\textit{statum nature corrupte}), however, man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature. Both states require the help of God, but in different ways:

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\textsuperscript{115} See \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 109, a.3 (Leon. 7.295): “Unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum.”

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 109, a.3 (Leon. 7.295): “Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus.”

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{De malo}, q. 3, a.1, ad 9 (Leon. 23.68:244–57): “aliter loquendum est de homine secundum statum nature condite et aliter secundum statum nature corrupte: quia secundum statum nature condite homo nichil habebat impellens ad malum, licet bonum nature non sufficeret ad glorie consequitionem; et ideo indigebat auxilio gratie ad merendum, non autem indigebat ad peccata uitandum, quia per hoc quod naturaliter accepserat poterat stare. Set in statu nature corrupte habet impellens ad malum, et ideo indiget auxilio gratie ne cadat. Et secundum hunc statum Augustinus diuine gratie deputat quecumque mala non fecit. Set hie status ex precedentii culpa prouenit.”
Man’s nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. In both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever... Yet in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his nature (naturalia) could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, such as the good of infused virtue. Yet in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature (naturalia), so that he is unable to fulfil it by his nature (naturalia). Yet because human nature is not totally corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its nature (naturae), do some particular good, such as build dwellings, plant vineyards, and other such things; yet it cannot do all the good connatural (connaturale) to it, so as to be deficient in nothing; just as a sick man can himself make some movements, but cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of someone healthy, unless he be cured by the help of medicine. 118

In the state of original justice, man did not have the infirm nature and “multiplicity of impediments” which he has in the state of fallen nature. 119 Thus, although we were created to do good, in the state of corrupt nature we cannot do all the good that is proportionate even to our nature. We need grace to heal our nature in order to carry out the good natural to it. 120

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118 ST IaIIae, q.109, a.2co (Leon. 7.291): “natura hominis dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo, in sui integritate, sicut fuit in primo parente ante peccatum; alio modo, secundum quod est corrupta in nobis post peccatum primi parentis. Secundum autem utrumque statum, natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel volendum quodcumque bonum, sicut primo movente... Sed in statu naturae integrae, quantum ad sufficientiam operativa virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae: autem non autem bonura superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu naturae corruptae etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia. Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturae privetur; potest quidem etiam in statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae naturae aliquod bonum particular agere, sicut aedificare domos, plantare vineas, et alia huiusmodi; non tamen totum bonum sibi connaturale, ita quod in nullo defectat. Sicut homo infirmus potest per seipsum aliquem motum habere; non tamen perfecte potest moveri motu hominis sani, nisi sanetur auxilio medicinae.” Also De virt. in comm., q. 4, a. 1, ad 9.

119 De ver., q. 27, a.5, ad 3 (Leon. 27/3.811: 262–70): “Unde magis tunc poterat stare homo per se ipsum quam nunc possit etiam habentes gratiam, non quidem propter defectum gratiae, sed propter infirmitatem naturae, quamvis etiam tunc indiguerint divina providentia eos dirigente et adiuvante: et ideo habens gratiam necesse habet petere divinum auxilium, quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet.”

120 ST IaIIae, q.109, a.2co (Leon. 7.291): “Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo in statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale. Sed in statu naturae corruptae, quantum ad duo: scilicet ut sanetur; et ulterior ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium. Ulterior autem in utroque statu indiget homo auxilio divino ut ab ipso moveatur ad bene
Nevertheless, Thomas maintains that even in this fallen state, prescinding from grace, we can still naturally love God above ourselves (diligit Deum et plus quam seipsum) albeit with an imperfect love (dilectio naturalis), yet a love which can never be perverse.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, it is not by natural love that man can choose to turn away from God but rather by the sort of love that Thomas terms “love of friendship” (amor amicitiae), which is a kind of rational chosen love (dilectio electiva);:

natural love (dilectio naturalis) is a certain inclination put in nature by God; nothing [from God] is perverse; therefore it is impossible that some natural inclination or love (dilectio) be perverse; however a perverse love (dilectio) is that someone might love (diligat) himself more than God by a love of friendship (dilectione amicitiae). Therefore, such love (dilectio) cannot be natural.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{121} ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.3 (Leon. 8.211): “Super communicatione autem bonorum naturalium nobis a Deo facta fundatur amor naturalis, quo non solum homo in suae integritate naturae super omnia diligit Deum et plus quam seipsum, sed etiam quaelibet creatura suo modo . . . quia unaqueque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium. Quod manifestatur ex opere: quaelibet enim pars habet inclinationem principalem ad actionem communem utilitati totius.”

\textsuperscript{122} Quod. I, q. 8 (Marietti, 9): “Dilectio enim naturalis est quaedam naturalis inclinatio indita naturae a Deo. Nihil autem naturale est peversum. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua naturalis inclination vel dilectio sit perversa: perversa autem dilectio est ut aliquis dilectione amicitiae diligit plus se quam Deum. Non potest ergo talis dilectio esse naturalis.” Also: ST Ia, q. 60, a.5 (Leon. 5.104): “angelus et homo plus et principalius diligit Deum quam seipsum—Alioquin, si naturaliter plus seipsum diligeret quam Deum, sequeretur quod naturalis dilectio esset peversa; et quod non periceretur per caritatem, sed destrueretur”; ST IaIIae, q.109, a.7, ad 3 (Leon. 7.302): “in quando natura est integra, per seipsum potest reparari ad id quod est sibi conveniens et proportionatum: sed ad id quod superexcedit suam proportionem, reparari non potest sine exteriori auxilio, Sic igitur humana natura deflu ens per actum peccati, quia non manet integra, sed corrupta . . . non potest per seipsum reparari neque etiam ad bonum sibi connaturale; et multo minus ad bonum supernaturalis iustitiae.”
Thus, even in the state of original justice, where man could love God naturally, he still could not love him so as to attain perfect beatitude. Thomas argues that while we could do many good things in this state, we could not do meritorious works or persevere in an ordered love of God. Although we have the capacity, via our natural operation, to acquire natural virtue, we cannot persevere in such virtuous action without grace. Due to improper self-love, we turn away from God.

Yet we note here that sin does not affect the first good of nature (bonum naturae), whereby a thing is completed in itself. Rather, sin affects the second good of nature (medium bonum naturae), by which we are naturally ordered to do good (naturalis inclination ad virtutem). We still naturally love God without peversion, even after the Fall: at this level we are “magnetized” by nature toward God. But at the conscious level of dilectio electiva, we can choose to turn away from God and love other apparent goods through improper self-love.

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123 ST IaIae, 109, a.3 ad 1 (Leon. 7.295): “caritas dedit Deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim dedit Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni: caritas autem secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod homo habet quandam societatem spiritualis cum Deo.” The question is whether man can love God above all things from nature alone, without grace. Also, ST Ia, q 60, a.5, ad 4 (Leon. 5.105): “Deus, secundum quod est universale bonum, a quo dependet omne bonum naturale, deditur naturali dilectione ab unoquoque. Inquantum vero est bonum beatificans naturaliter omnes supernaturale beatitudine, sic deditur dilectione caritatis.”

124 ST IaIae, q. 85, a.1; 2 (Leon. 7.110): “Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollit nec diminuitur per peccatum.” Also ibid., ad 2 (Leon. 7.110): “ipsa natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae acritionis: sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur ad terminum.”

125 ST IaIae, q. 85, a.1; 2 (Leon. 7.110): “Sed medium bonum naturae, scilicet ipsa naturalis inclination ad virtutem, diminuitur per peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclination ad similes actus.”

126 Norris Clarke, Person and Being, 36.
How exactly, does Thomas see that we “naturally” prefer to love God over our own individual good? Pierre Rousselot argues that the opposition of one’s own good to that of God is due to sin,127 or we could say, improper self-love. Only rational chosen love (dilectio electiva) can choose against the natural love (dilectio naturalis) of God.128 Rousselot uses Thomas’s “part/whole” distinction to argue that man is related as a “part” to God who is the “whole,” and as a part he naturally tends to the whole more than self.129

The lover always has an underlying natural appetite for his own good (bien propre). This love for one’s own good is not a voluntary self-love, but an inclination which underlies all acts of the will.130 Avtial Wohlman rightly notes that the term “disinterested love” is a misnomer, since


129 Pierre Rousselot, Pour l’Histoire du Problème de l’Amour au Moyen Age, 13–14. Etienne Gilson criticizes Rousselot for what he takes to be a position close to pantheism: “the relation of dependence in which man stands to God is no longer that of a part to its whole. God is not a whole of which man is a part.” Gilson instead argues that the way of analogy and similitude is more reliable: man, bearing a greater likeness to God than lower creatures, in striving to perfect self, is perfecting the image of God, and is thus, in reality, loving God more than self. Curiously, though, Gilson does not interpret Rousselot’s part-whole interpretation in an analogous way. See Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 285; 286. As Gregory Stevens notes, “when St. Thomas states explicitly that the ‘inferior’ is compared to the ‘superior’ as part to whole, he is evidently interpreting this principle in an analogical manner.” Gregory Stevens, O.S.B., “The Disinterested Love of God According to St. Thomas and some of his Modern Interpreters” in The Thomist 16 (1953), 316. As will be seen in the final chapter, Thomas does regard the universe as a relative whole of which man is a real part, thus man is ordered to the good of that whole.

every love is a love of one’s own good. The will has a natural inclination to the final end as one’s own good, thus the act of the will must be directed towards that good.

Thomas Osborne, drawing upon much of the work of Pierre Rousselot, also argues that for Thomas, man has a natural love of God. Yet for Osborne, Thomas’s main argument for the natural love of God hinges on our natural inclination for the common good of the universe, which is God. “The will of a rational agent is directed in a pre-elective way to the good for its own sake, and most of all to God. The good agent acts in accord with this inclination.” It is by *dilectio electiva* that man fails to naturally (vs supernaturally) love God. Man needs charity so that by *dilectio electiva* he can love God aright.

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133 Osborne, *Love of Self and Love of God*, 86. “The difference between natural love and charity is not that charity is elective whereas natural love is not, but rather that God is the source of goods in different ways.” Ibid. He notes that most of the scholarly literature has focussed on the political common good, yet the “‘common good’ is by definition a good that is not private but instead capable of being shared. A private good can be common according to predication. Ibid., 89. God is the whole and the common good of the universe (90), thus Osborne argues that, according to Thomas, the basis of our natural love of God is the relationship to God as to a whole. Ibid., 92. Also “God is the whole of the universe ante partes, since he contains the universe in himself as a builder contains the house in himself. When God creates through his efficient causality, he gives his creatures a likeness to himself. Although a creature desires its own perfection, this perfection is found more fully in God. . . .Considering the part/whole relationship in the context of the natural love of God will help to explain how it is possible for the agent to prefer God to his own good, given that his own good is more perfectly contained in God than in himself.” Ibid., 94.

VI

Charity as “Medicine:” Perfection of Rational Self-Love (Dilectio Sui)

One may ask why a discussion of the distinctly theological notion of grace (charity) appears within a philosophical account of human self-love. In brief, Thomas argues that God is our final ultimate end. Yet God is eternal and we are finite. Clearly, there is an “ontological gap,” so to speak, in the relation between creature and Creator, a gap which requires some kind of bridge if finite creatures are to attain that for which they strive: ultimate union with God. For human beings this union is attained intellectually (the Beatific vision), a point which further highlights the chasm between God and man in the order of perfection. Although we cannot prove that human beings need to attain grace, the need for grace follows logically if we are to admit the necessity for divine help in attaining our final end. Charity provides a fitting bridge “over” this gap between man and God.

So how does charity perfect self-love (dilectio suí)? According to Aquinas, charity orders the will toward the vision of the divine essence.¹³⁵ That is, charity perfects the will in regard to supernatural good,¹³⁶ enabling human beings to participate in divine love.¹³⁷ Charity is “a certain

¹³⁵ ST IaIIae, q. 4, a.4 (Leon. 8.41): “nullus potest ad beatitudinem pervenire, nisi habet rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitantur autem, quia, . . . beatitudo ultima consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam.”

¹³⁶ De virt. in comm., q. 1, a.10 (Marietti, 735): “Per spelam autem et caritatem acquirit voluntas quamdum inclinationem in illud bonum supernaturale ad quod voluntas humana per naturalem inclinationem non sufficietur ordinatur.”
friendship (*amicitia*) of man for God.”

Charity is imperfect in this life, however, since there is an imperfect communication, or “conversation,” between us and God with respect to our intellect, and charity is love based on this communication. Nevertheless, as Michael Sherwin notes, charity’s act is not measured by human intellection since charity is moved efficiently by God.

The proper act of charity is to love God as the object of *amor amicitiae*, that is, by love of choice (*dilectio electiva*) for God himself. We may wonder, however, how the second element of rational love, *amor concupiscentiae*, applies to our love of God, since he lacks no good that we

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137 *ST* I,11ae, q. 110, a.4 (Leon. 7.315): “[homo participat] seundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum, per virtutem caritatis.” Also, *De caritate*, q un, a. 2, ad 15 (Marietti, 760): “caritas non est virtus hominis in quantum est homo, sed in quantum per participationem gratiae fit Deus et filius Dei.” The theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused principles that elevate our natural principles of intellect and will. Faith elevates the light by which the intellect knows truth, while charity and hope elevate the will’s inclination toward the good as its end. See *ST* I,11ae, q. 62, a.1 (Leon. 6.401): “oportet quod superaddantur hominii divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur *theologicae*: tum quia habent Deum prop objecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum.” Also, *ST* I,11ae, q. 62, a.3 (Leon. 6.403): “virtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem.”

138 *ST* I,11ae, q. 23, a.1 (Leon. 8.163): “Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatio nuper aliamam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem communicatione dicitur 1 ad Cor. 1: *Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii eius*. Amor autem super hac communicatio fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum.” Yet not every person enters into actual friendship with God. Yet, even when a person is given the possibility of this friendship, the friendship nevertheless remains a *gift*.

139 *ST* I,11ae, q. 23, a.1, ad 1 (Leon. 8.163): “Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem. Et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum Deo et angelis. In praesenti quidem statu imperfecte: unde dicitur *Phillip. III: Nostra conversatio in caelis est*. Sed ista conversatio perficietur in patria, quando *servi eius servient Deo et videbunt faciem eius*, ut dicitur Apoc. Ult. Et ideo hic est caritas imperfecta, sed perficietur in patria.”

140 Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love*, 147.
could wish to him. Yet Thomas is consistent in upholding the twofold character of rational love: even in the case of love of God, through charity, we love God with *amor concupiscentiae* when we affirm his goodness and wish others to do the same.\textsuperscript{141} That is, *because* we love God, we want others to love him and affirm his goodness as well. We recall that *amor concupiscentiae* is that aspect of rational love which is the love of goods for the sake of a person. Properly speaking, we love God when we love Him for his own sake, not for the good he does for us: this is the principal object of charity.\textsuperscript{142} If the good he does for me is the sole reason I love Him, then what happens to my love of God when I perceive those goods being taken away from me through suffering? I would be loving God as a good for me. We also bear in mind that charity is founded principally on the goodness of God, not on the virtue of human beings.\textsuperscript{143} The proper act of charity is joy (*gaudium*),\textsuperscript{144} which is an effect of love. In this life, however, we have an imperfect

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\textsuperscript{141} *ST* IIaIIae, q. 26, a.13 (Leon. 8.222): “donum caritatis unicumque confertur a Deo, ut primo quidem mentem suam in Deum ordinet, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui ipsius; secundario vero ordinem aliorum in Deum velit, vel etiam operetur secundum suum modum.” Also *ST* IIaIIae, q. 31, a.1 ad 1 (Leon 8.245): “Et ideo nostrum non est Deo benefacere, sed eum honorare, nos ei subiiciendo: eius autem est ex sua dilectione nobis benefacere.”

\textsuperscript{142} *ST* IIaIIae, q. 23, a.5 ad 2 (Leon. 8.169): “caritate diligitur Deus propter seipsum. Unde una sola ratio diligendi principaliter attenditur a caritate, scilicet divina bonitas, quae est eius substantia . . . Aliae autem rationes ad dilegendum inducentes, vel debitum dilectionis facientes, sunt secundarie et consequentes ex prima.”

\textsuperscript{143} *ST* IIaIIae, q. 23, a.3, ad 1.

\textsuperscript{144} *ST* IIaIIae, q. 28, a.4, ad 1 (Leon. 8.235): “amor Dei ponitur specialis virtus, quae est caritas, ad quam reducitur gaudium . . . sicut proprius actus eius.”
affective union with God, so the joy of charity is partial, and can only be complete in the next life.\footnote{ST IIaIIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 8.234): “Unde tunc est gaudium plenum quando iam nihil desiderandum restat. Quandiu autem in hoc mundo sumus, non quiescit in nobis desiderii motus . . . Sed quando iam ad beatitudinem perfectam perventum fuerit, nihil desiderandum restabit: quia ibi erit plena Dei fruitor.”}

Furthermore, in this life we require the theological virtue of hope (\textit{spes}) in order to believe that this kind of communion with God is possible; we need “to hope for this good as something attainable by us through God’s assistance if we are to form a friendship with him.”\footnote{ST IaIIae, q. 40, a.7 (Leon. 6.271): “Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum speratum, spes ex amore causatur: non enim est spes nisi de bono desiderato et amato.—In quantum vero spes respicit illum per quem fit aliquod nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum: et sic incipimus ipsum amare.”} The Holy Spirit in charity moves us to an ordered love of God.\footnote{SCG IV, q. 21 (Leon. 15.81): “Unde, cum caritas, qua Deum diligimus, sit in nobis per Spiritum Sanctum, oportet quod ipse etiam Spiritus Sanctus in nobis sit, quandiu caritas in nobis est.” Also, \textit{SCG IV}, q. 22 (Leon.15.84): “Spiritus Sanctus per amorem voluntatem inclinet in verum bonum, in quod naturaliter ordinatur, tollit et servitutem qua, servus passionis et peccati effectus, contra ordinem voluntatis agit; et servitutem qua, contra motum suae voluntatis, secundum legem agit, quasi legis servus, non amicus.”}

Thomas in no way maintains, however, that having received grace, human beings are “automatically” perfected: on the contrary, since grace elevates (not destroys) nature, human beings still need to perform good works to attain to perfection. “No pure creature can fittingly gain happiness without the movement of an operation.”\footnote{ST IaIIae, q.5, a.7 (Leon. 6.53): “Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur absque motu operationis, [per quam tendit in ipsam].”} It is through our own operation of

\begin{align*}
\text{145} & \quad \text{ST IIaIIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 8.234): “Unde tunc est gaudium plenum quando iam nihil desiderandum restat. Quandiu autem in hoc mundo sumus, non quiescit in nobis desiderii motus . . . Sed quando iam ad beatitudinem perfectam perventum fuerit, nihil desiderandum restabit: quia ibi erit plena Dei fruitor.”} \\
\text{146} & \quad \text{ST IaIIae, q. 40, a.7 (Leon. 6.271): “Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum speratum, spes ex amore causatur: non enim est spes nisi de bono desiderato et amato.—In quantum vero spes respicit illum per quem fit aliquod nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum: et sic incipimus ipsum amare.”} \\
\text{147} & \quad \text{SCG IV, q. 21 (Leon. 15.81): “Unde, cum caritas, qua Deum diligimus, sit in nobis per Spiritum Sanctum, oportet quod ipse etiam Spiritus Sanctus in nobis sit, quandiu caritas in nobis est.” Also, \textit{SCG IV}, q. 22 (Leon.15.84): “Spiritus Sanctus per amorem voluntatem inclinet in verum bonum, in quod naturaliter ordinatur, tollit et servitutem qua, servus passionis et peccati effectus, contra ordinem voluntatis agit; et servitutem qua, contra motum suae voluntatis, secundum legem agit, quasi legis servus, non amicus.”} \\
\text{148} & \quad \text{ST IaIIae, q.5, a.7 (Leon. 6.53): “Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur absque motu operationis, [per quam tendit in ipsam].”} 
\end{align*}
knowing and loving that we tend toward the divine likeness. The will is ordered only when we love God with *amor amicitiae* and will all other things in a manner befitting that love. That is, friendship with God requires that we will all other goods with a rational chosen love (*dilectio electiva*) in a way that is in harmony with our natural love (*dilectio naturalis*) of God. The ground of charity requires that a person consciously refer his or her own goodness and lovability, to its source in the whole, God:

That good in which each person most wishes to be preserved is that which is most pleasing to him, since this most conforms to an appetite informed by love. This, however, is one’s own good (*suum bonum*). Thus, just as the good of something is, or is thought to be, a greater good for the lover himself, he wishes even more that the good be preserved in the loved object. The good of the lover himself, however, is found more where it exists more perfectly. And thus, since any part is imperfect in itself, having its perfection within its whole, it tends by a natural love (*naturali amore*) more toward the conservation of its whole than toward its own preservation.150

Yet, until I see that God is the source of my own good and is himself good for *me*, I will not love him appropriately. I must have some degree of affective union with God based on knowledge of him as good for me. Thomas argues that since good is the will’s object, man’s perfect good is

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149 *SCG* III, q. 18 (Leon. 14.42): “sicut dicitur finis id quod aliquid sua actione vel motu acquirere intendit . . . Deus igitur sic est finis rerum sicut aliquid ad unaquaque re suo modo obtinendum.”

150 *In III Sent.*, dist. 29, a. 3 (Moos, 929): “Bonum autem illud unusquisque maxime vult salvari quod est sibi magis placens; quia hoc est appetitui informato per amorem magis conforme; hoc autem est suum bonum. Unde secundum quod bonum alicujus rei est vel aestimatur magis bonum ipsius amantis, hoc amans magis salvari vult in ipsa re amata. Bonum autem ipsius amantis magis inventur ubi perfectius est. Et ideo quia pars quaelibet imperfecta est in seipsa, perfectionem autem habet in suo toto, ideo etiam naturali amore pars plus tendit ad conservationem sui totius quam sui ipsius.”
that which satisfies his will entirely. At the level of *dilectio electiva*, self-love gives rise to the love of God when one actively chooses to direct one’s love to God. For even if someone comes to know that his good is to be found in God more than in himself, he must still actively choose to love God.

### VII

**Charity as “Medicine” Concerning Love of Neighbour As Oneself**

How does Thomas reconcile self-love and loving another *as oneself* in view of the gospel command: “love your neighbour as yourself”? Thomas defines charity as “the friendship of man for God” (*caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum*), a friendship that is imperfect in this life, but will be perfected in the next. He describes “charity as a good that we desire for all whom we love out of charity.” In *ST IIaIIae*, q. 23, a.1, ad 2, Thomas argues that it is out of love for our friends that we love friends of friends, “even if they hurt or hate us.” It is in this sense that the friendship of charity extends to our enemies, since it is out of our friendship with

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151 *ST IaIIae*, q. 5, a.8 (Leon. 6.54): “Cum autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter eius voluntati satisfacit.”

152 *ST IIaIIae*, q. 23, a. 1co (Leon. 8.163); ibid, ad 1.

153 *ST IIaIIae*, q. 25, a. 2 (Leon. 8.198–99): “caritas est illud bonum quod optamus omnibus quis ex caritate diligimus.” Also, see Wohlman, “Amour du Bien Propre,” 233–4: “L’homme trouve son bonheur dans le moment même où il aime Dieu pour lui-même. Un tel amour implique un choix conscient. C’est pourquoi, si l’on tient à user de la même expression, ce que nous avons essayé d’éviter en nous fondant sur saint Thomas, il importe de distinguer deux amours de soi. L’un, l’amour de soi comme fin ultime, est contraire à l’amour de Dieu et à la tendance fondamentale de la voluntas ut natura. L’autre, l’amour de soi en tant que créature, incluse dans la fin de l’aimé, trouve à la fois son origine et son terme dans l’amour de Dieu pour lui-même.”
God in charity that we can direct our love to them.\textsuperscript{154} We can will charity as a good for even those we dislike, for the sake of their Creator.\textsuperscript{155} Because charity extends to sinners, out of charity, we can love them for God’s sake.\textsuperscript{156}

In another text, ST IIaIIae, q. 26, a.5, Thomas asks whether out of charity we ought to love ourselves more than our neighbour. Thomas bases his response on the priority of unity over union. That is, a person’s own participation in the goodness of God holds priority over fellowship with another person in that goodness:

\begin{quote}
God is loved (\textit{diligitur}) as the principle of good, upon which the love (\textit{dilectio}) of charity is founded; while man, out of charity loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the good previously mentioned, and loves his neighbor by reason of his association in that good. Association is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Thus, just as unity is stronger than union, the fact that man himself participates in the divine good, is a stronger reason for loving than that another should be an associate with him in that participation. Thus, man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor. And a sign of this is that man ought not submit to any evil of sin, which runs contrary to his participation in happiness, not even in order to free his neighbor from sin.\textsuperscript{157}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{154} ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a.1, ad 2 (Leon. 8.164): “amicitia se extendit ad aliquem dupliciter. Uno modo, respectu sui ipsius: et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae: sicut, si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione eius diligimt omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualsiquumque ei attinentes. Et tanta potest esse dilectio amici quod propter amicum amatur hi qui ad ipsum pertinent etiam si nos offendant vel odiant. Et hoc modo amicitia caritatis se extendit etiam ad inimicos, quos diligimus ex caritate in ordine ad Deum, ad quem principaliter habetur amicitia caritatis.” Also, ST IIaIIae, q. 25, a. 2 (Leon. 8.198–99): “caritas non est simplex amor, sed habet rationem amicitiae . . . Per amicitiam autem amatur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipse amicus ad quem amicitiam habemus et cui bona volumus. Alio modo, sicut bonum quod amico volumus. Et hoc modo caritas per caritatem amatur, et non primo.”

\textsuperscript{155} ST IIaIIae, q. 25, a.6 (Leon. 8.202): “Debemus enim in peccatoribus odire quod peccatores sunt, et diligere quod homines sunt beatitudinis capaces. Et hoc est eos vere ex caritate diligere propter Deum.”

\textsuperscript{156} ST IIaIIae, q.23, a.1, ad 3 (Leon. 8.164): “amicitia honesti non habetur nisi ad virtuosum sicut ad principalem personam: sed eius intuitus diliguntur ad eum attinentes etiam si non sint virtuosi. Et hoc modo caritas, quae maxime est amicitia honesti, se extendit ad peccatores, quos ex caritate diligimus propter Deum.”

\textsuperscript{157} ST IIaIIae, q. 26, a.4 (Leon. 8.213): “Deus diligitut ut principium boni super quo fundatur dilectio caritatis; homo autem seipsum diliget ex caritate secundum rationem qua est particeps praedicti boni; proximus
Also:

We love (diligimus) someone for himself when we love him on account of his proper good, that is, because he is noble in himself, or because he is pleasing, or useful to us. But we love someone for the sake of another when we love him because he is related to someone else whom we love. If we love someone on his own account, we love his whole family, his relatives, his friends, inasmuch as they are related to him; but in all of these, there is only one formal notion of love (ratio formalis dilectionis), that is, the good of the one whom we love for his own sake; and, in a certain way, we love him in all these others.\(^\text{158}\)

Thomas consistently maintains that proper self-love is prior to love of another person. He argues that in the case where one should bear bodily injury for the sake of a friend, the reason is that such a virtuous act perfects one’s own mind.\(^\text{159}\) In the case of one’s spiritual welfare, we ought to love our neighbour more than our own body.\(^\text{160}\) Far from using others for some kind of “self-aggrandizement,” Thomas argues that we can only love and seek the good of another when that

\[\text{autem diligitur secundum rationem societatis in isto bono. Consociatio autem est ratio dilectionis secundum quandam unionem in ordine ad Deum. Unde sicut unitas potior est quam unio, ita quod homo ipse participet bonum divinum est potior ratio diligendi quam quod alius societur sibi in hac participatione. Et ideo homo ex caritate debet magis seipsum diligere quam proximum.— Et huius signum est quod homo non debet subire aliquod malum peccati, quod contrariatur participationi beatitudinis, ut proximum liberet a peccato.” See also In III Sent., d. 29, a.5.}\]

\(^{158}\) \textit{De caritate}, q. un., 4 (Marietti, 763–64): “Ratone autem sui ipsius aliquem diligimus, quando cum ratione boni proprii diligimus, utpotque quia est in se honestus, vel nobis delectabilis, aut utilis. Ratione autem alterius diligimus aliquem quando diligimus ipsum attinet alii quem diligimus. Ex hox enim ipso quod diligimus aliquem secundum se, diligimus omnes et familiares et consanguineos et amicos ipsius, in quantum ei attinet; sed tamen in omnibus illis est uno ratio formalis dilectionis, scilicet bonum illius, quem ratione sui diligimus, et ipsum quodammodo in omnibus aliis diligimus.”

\(^{159}\) \textit{ST} II\(\text{a}\)I\(\text{a}\), q. 26, a. 4, ad 2 (Leon. 8.213): “detrimenta corporalia debet homo sustinere propter amicum: et in hoc ipso seipsum magis diliget secundum spiritualem mentem, quia hoc pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, quae est bonum mentis. Sed in spiritualibus non debet homo pati detrimentum peccando ut proximum liberet a peccato.”

\(^{160}\) \textit{ST} II\(\text{a}\)I\(\text{a}\), q. 26, a.5 (Leon. 8.214): “Et ideo proximum, quantum ad salutem animae, magis debemus diligere quam proprie corpus.”
person’s good becomes our own.\footnote{In De div. nom., ch. 4, lect. 9, n. 401 (Marietti, 134): “Ex hoc igitur aliquid dicitur amari, quod appetitus amantis se habet ad illud sicut ad suum bonum”; ibid., n. 406 (Marietti, 134): “Et quia unumquodque amamus inquantum est bonum nostrum.” See also In III Sent., dist. 29, a.3 (Moos, 928–29).}

Paradoxically, the good of the other can only become our own good, when we love the other person, particularly with a love of friendship.\footnote{David Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others,” Acta Philosophica 8 (1999), 30.} Charity enables this to occur because it is grounded on friendship with God.

Thomas also emphasizes the priority of self-love when he discusses the virtue of hope.\footnote{See David Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others,” 30–31.} In response to the question whether we can hope for eternal happiness for another, Thomas states that one really only hopes for goods for oneself. He likens hope to motion, where motion always tends to its proportionate terminus; in this case, the terminus of hope is one’s own good (\textit{proprium bonum}).\footnote{ST IIaIIae, q. 17, a.3co (Leon. 8.126): “Motus autem semper est ad proprium terminum proportionatum mobili: et ideo spes directe respicit proprium bonum, non autem id quod ad alium pertinet. Sed prae supposita unione amoris ad alterum, iam aliquid potest desiderare et sperare aliquid alteri sicut sibi.”} Yet the good of another can become my good through a union of love with that person; such a union allows me to hope for something for them as if for myself.\footnote{ST IIaIIae, q. 17, a.3co (Leon. 8.126): “amor directe potest respicere alium, quem sibi aliquis unit per amorem, habens eum sicut seipsum.”} Since I naturally love my own good, Thomas argues that I will naturally love the good of anyone whom I take to be one with me.\footnote{ST Ia, q. 60, a.4, ad 3 (Leon. 5.103): “dilectio naturalis dicitur esse ipsius finis, non tamquam cui aliquis velit bonum; sed tamquam bonum quod quis vult sibi, et per consequens alii, inquantum est unum sibi.”}

In this sense, one can also hope for eternal life for another.

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\footnote{161}
person if we are united in love to that person. Yet again, since we love our own good with a love of concupiscence, we can only love the good of another with a love of concupiscence when we have taken the other person as united with ourselves.

We conclude this chapter having examined the relationship between love of self and love of God according to Thomas. We have seen that a correct understanding of what Thomas means by “nature” is key to a correct interpretation of his position concerning man’s natural love for God. As a creature having received existence from his Creator, man participates in the divine Goodness and desires this goodness naturally as his ultimate end (finis). As a rational creature, man tends toward God naturally via his rational active powers of intellect and will; yet he cannot naturally attain God as his end without the aid of grace, a form “super-added” to his nature. The philosopher’s role is to distinguish this difference and to clarify the extent to which human beings, as free, can perfect themselves. It is only through grace that God can become a “connatural” end for human beings; it is specifically through the theological virtue of charity that we can love God in an active and fully deliberate sense. Yet our natural love of God (dilectio naturalis), a love based on some knowledge of God as the source of our natural goods, is never perverse; rather, it is by sin, or improper self-love (amor sui inordinatus), that we direct ourselves against our natural love of God, thereby turn ourselves away from him. Yet sin never affects our natural love of God; rather it affects our powers, especially the will, by which we

\footnote{ST IIaIIae, q. 17, a.3co (Leon. 8.126): “Et secundum hoc aliquis potest sperare alteri vitam aeternam, inquantum ei unitis per amorem.”}
have the capacity, with grace, to love him as our end. Faith allows us to know God as the highest good for self, hope allows us to believe that the friendship of God with us is even possible, and charity allows us to love him as our highest good. It is only until I see that God is a good for me, that I can love others out of charity for his sake, that they may see him as a good for themselves.

The theme of friendship is of great importance for Thomas. Yet self-love is the ground even of our friendship with others. The next chapter will address the ways in which friendship with oneself is the basis for friendship with others, which in turn is perfective of oneself. The chapter will also look at how Thomas, following Pseudo-Dionysius, argues that friendship unifies and binds self to others, and how, through extasis, self extends out to others. This movement outward occurs in wishing another’s good (benevolentia) and in acting to achieve that good for the sake of the other (beneficentia), but ultimately returns to oneself. I will also develop David Gallagher’s point that the “union of wills” in friendship can be a form of self-gift and self-perfection.
Chapter Five:

Friendship as Self-Perfective

In the first section of this chapter, we will explore in what sense Thomas uses the term “friendship” (amicitia) in relation to oneself, as well as how this relation grounds one’s friendship with others. I will consider how Thomas, following Pseudo-Dionysius, argues that friendship unifies and binds self to others and, through extasis, self extends itself out to others via amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae. Particular emphasis will be placed on amor amicitiae as a movement that remains in the other. The second section will look at friendship as a form of self-knowledge. The next section will examine the works of friendship—beneficence, benevolence, and concord. The fourth section will address the unitive character of friendship, and the fifth section will develop David Gallagher’s point that the “union of wills” in friendship can be a form of self-gift and self-perfection.¹

I.

Can One Be a Friend to Oneself?

In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas gives an interesting response to the question of whether a person has friendship (amicitia) for himself. He argues that “it does not really make any difference whether the word ‘friendship’ (amicitia) is applied to oneself, because the reality of friendship (res amicitiae) abundantly belongs to a man in regard to

¹ In what follows, I will not translate the Latin terms amor amicitiae, amor concupiscentiae and amicitia in order to avoid confusion, particularly between love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and friendship (amicitia).
himself.” In another chapter of the same book, he states: “all the attributes of friendship, which are considered in reference to others, are derived from the amicability that a person bears toward himself (ex amicibilibus quae patitur homo ad se ipsum).” He gives a similar response in the Summa theologiae, arguing that “when someone loves another with a love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wishes good to himself,” apprehending his friend as “another self” (alter ipse).

It may be tempting to conclude from these statements that, given his emphasis on self-love’s priority over love of others, Thomas believes that all love of others is self-referential: but this is precisely what we should not conclude. Thomas does not hold a “means-end” view to the primacy of self-love. That is, he does not argue that we love ourselves first and then others afterwards. Rather, a correct interpretation of the relation between self-love and love of others lies in grasping the operation of amor concupiscentiae and amor amicitiae within the act of friendship.

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2 In IX Ethic., 4 (Leon. 47.514–15:186–91): “[utrum scilicet sit amicitia hominis ad se ipsum], unde, cum aliquis vult commendare amicitiam suam ad al terum, consuevit dicere: “Ego diligo eum sicut me ipsum.” Unde non refert quantum ad rei veritatem utrum nomen amicitiae dicatur respectu sui ipsius, ex quo ipsa res amicitiae superabundanter competit homini ad se ipsum.” Also: (ibid., 512:13–18): “Dicit ergo prima quod amicabilia, id est amicitiae opera, quibus aliquis ad amicos utitur et secundum quae determinantur amicitiae videntur processisse ex his quae sunt homini ad se ipsum; sic enim videtur esse unus homo alteri amicus, si eadem agit ad amicum quae aget ad se ipsum.”

3 Ibid., 8 (Leon. 47.528:47–52): “Et dicit quod reliqua omnia quibus determinatur et diffinitur quis sit amicus, maxime existunt homini ad se ipsum; unde supra dictum est quod omnia amicabilia quae considerantur in comparatione ad alios proveniunt ex amicabilibus quae patitur homo ad se ipsum.”

4 ST IaIIae, q.28, a.1 (Leon. 6.197): “cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum: unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse.”

This last point cannot be overemphasized. A “means-end” view would imply that one loves oneself with *amor amicitiae* yet loves everything else, including other persons, with *amor concupiscientiae*,\(^6\) which is not what Thomas means. Rather, as discussed in chapter three, rational love always comprises these two distinct elements—love of a person (myself or another) with *amor amicitiae*, and love of goods for that person (myself or another) with *amor concupiscientiae*. *Amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscientiae* are inseparable though distinct elements within an act of rational love.\(^7\) The object of *amor amicitiae* is the person, the supposit, whereas the object of *amor concupiscientiae* is a good (material or spiritual) for the person.\(^8\)

We return to the question: In what sense does Thomas think a person can be a *friend* to himself? First, it is important to note that in regard to self, Thomas is using the term *amicitia*

\(^6\) That is, as Gallagher notes, if one were to argue that one loves self with the love of friendship and loves all other goods with the love of concupiscence, then this means one would be loving others only with a love of concupiscence, which is not Thomas’s teaching. See Gallagher, “Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others,” 28.

\(^7\) See *ST* IaIIae, q. 26, a.4. ad 1 (Leon. 6.190–91): “Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscientiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscientiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.” Peter Kwasniewski nicely summarises the distinction between *amor concupiscientiae* and *amor amicitiae* as follows: “In the case of a lover who loves a good with *amor concupiscientiae*, his affection is drawn to it ‘by means of an act of will’—a phrase reminding us that *amor concupiscientiae* and *amor amicitiae* are not contrasted as instinct and free choice, sensuality and rationality, but each is a properly human love, an inclination towards a good apprehended by the intellect—but *per intentionem, affectus recurrir in seipsum*: the lover intentionally turns, or intends to turn, this good back to himself, for his own benefit; he views it and loves it under the aspect of ‘good for me.’” Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” 78.

\(^8\) Concerning this point, Gallagher writes: “This metaphysical precision is crucial. It means that in this mode of love [*amor amicitiae*], it is not some characteristic or quality of the person but rather what the person is *per se*, i.e., that which constitutes the person as person, that is loved. In this love the lover takes complaisance in the very subsistence of the person loved—the simple fact that the person is—and all the qualities and characteristics of the person are loved precisely as the qualities of *this person* and because they are perfections of this person. When a person is loved with a love of concupiscence for the sake of some particular quality he possesses, it is the quality that is loved *per se*, while the person is loved *per accidens*, merely as that which bears the loved quality. In *amor amicitiae*, in contrast, it is the good which is the existing supposit itself that is directly willed.” Gallagher, “Person and Ethics,” 60. Also, “what is crucial in Thomas’s mind is whether the other is regarded as pertaining to me in a distinctively personal way.” Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” 86.
analogously. Properly speaking, a person cannot have friendship (*amicitia*) for himself, since friendship denotes a relationship between two or more people mutually related as lover and beloved.\(^9\) Rather, as Kwasniewski notes, *amicitia* provides “the best framework, the natural and normal situation, in which to investigate the nature of love.”\(^10\) One does, however, naturally have love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) for oneself. Furthermore, the reflexive nature of the intellect enables a person to reflect upon his or her own acts, the ground of one’s psychological perception of oneself, and thus enables one to habitually choose the best goods for oneself in an ordered manner. *Amor amicitiae* toward oneself is an analogue (yet not the primary one as we shall see) for our friendship with others: the love we have for others is an extension of the *amor amicitiae* we have toward ourselves. Only for God is self-love absolutely prior to love of others, for, as creatures, our self-love is a deficient likeness to God. Thus, our self-love is primary to love of others only in a qualified sense.\(^11\)

A person naturally loves himself with *amor sui naturalis* and wishes happiness for himself. At the level of rational self-love, however, which is the level of choice, the kind of goods that one wishes for oneself and how one loves those goods, indicate whether one in fact

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\(^9\) Kwasniewski aptly makes an further note that “there would be something bizarre, not to say schizophrenic, about loving oneself as though loving another and going out to that other.” Ibid., 223.

\(^10\) Ibid., 130.

\(^11\) See *ST* Ia, q. 45, a.1 ad 2 (Leon. 4.464): “mutationes accipiunt speciem et dignitatem non a termino ad quos, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis est nobilior et prior.” Johann states: “precisely because the creature is only a deficient similitude of God, the creature’s love of self, as opposed to love for another, can never be radically primary. Its love for itself is already love for another; and it is only because it already loves God more than itself that it loves itself.” Johann, *The Meaning of Love*, 94, n. 4. For Thomas, see *In III Sent.*, 29, a.3, ad 3 (Moos, 930): “amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum, non sicut ex causa finali, sed sicut ex eo quod est prius in via generationis. Quia sicut quilibet sibi prius est notus quam alter, etiam quam Deus; *ita* etiam dilectio quam quisque habet ad seipsum, est prior ea dilectione quam habet ad alterum, *in via generationis*. ”
loves the highest part of oneself. Furthermore, a person can elevate or can debase his reason, depending on what kind of goods are the object of his amor concupiscientiae. Friendship is one of the highest goods to be desired for oneself, since loving another for his own sake is self-expansive, for “there is more to my good as a person than the private goods or inhering perfections I possess.”

Yet I can only love the good of my friend when my friend’s good becomes my own good which in turn can only occur when I love my friend: in loving my friend, he becomes “another self” to me. Only then am I able to will my friend’s good as my own with amor concupiscientiae. Since by natural self-love I love my own good with amor concupiscientiae, I can will the good of my friend (my “other self”) with the same love, because I take my friend to be one with myself. As Maritain notes:

12 This point touches on the theme of extasis, which will be looked at in more detail later. We note here that Thomas speaks of extasis as twofold in the apprehensive power: 1) a “casting down” of one’s mind and 2) an elevation of one’s mind. The first kind of extasis arises due to a “defect of the power [of the intellect], and Thomas calls these people “madmen” or “[people] caught in other seizures of the mind.” As Kwasniewski notes, “although passion can overwhelm and blind reason, this stripping away of wits is a perversion of or impediment to nature, whereas the afflatus of the poet and the lover is a higher perfection than nature can attain on its own, and is thus said to be ‘above nature’ rather than beneath it.” Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 590.

13 Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” 225; and, “when a person loves another as he loves himself, he actually comes to be outside himself by loving and promoting the other’s good as he does his own.” Ibid., 226.

14 In De div. nom., IV, 9 (Marietti, 134): “Ratio amoris accipiatur ex eo quod est commune objectum appetitus. Hoc autem est bonum. Ex hoc igitur aliquid dicitur amari, quod appetitus amantis se habet ad illud sicut ad suum bonum. Ipsa igitur habitudo vel coaptatio appetitus ad aliquid velut ad suum bonum amor vocatur. Omne autem quod ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad suum bonum, habet quodammodo illud sibi praesens et unitum secundum quamdam similitudinem, saltem proportionis, sicut forma quodammodo est in materia inquantum habet aptitudinem et ordinem ad ipsam.” Also In III Sent., d. 29, a.3c0.


16 ST Ia, q. 60, a.4, ad 3 (Leon. 5.103): “dilectio naturalis dicitur esse ipsius finis, non tanquam cui aliquis velit bonum; sed tanquam bonum quod quis vult sibi, et per consequens alii, inquantum est unum sibi.” Using the
Subjectivity, this essentially dynamic, living and open centre, both receives and gives. It receives through the intellect, by superexisting in knowledge. It gives through the will, by superexisting in love: that is, by having within itself other beings as inner attractions directed towards them and giving oneself to them, and by spiritually existing in the manner of a gift.  

Both *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscientiae* arise from an apprehension of the union of the beloved object with the lover. When we love a thing by *amor concupiscientiae*, we grasp it as “belonging to our well-being” (*pertinens ad suum bene esse*), but when we love a person with *amor amicitiae*, we will good to him as we would to ourselves, since we take him to be “another self.” Thomas writes:

> Now love is twofold, namely, love of concupiscence and love of friendship, where each arises from a certain apprehension of the oneness of the beloved with the lover. When someone loves something by desiring it, he apprehends it as belonging to his well-being. Similarly, when someone loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: he apprehends him as his other self (*alterum se*), in so far as he wills good to him as if to himself. Thus, a friend is said to be “another self” (*alter ipse*); and Augustine says “Well did one say of his friend: half of my soul.”

*Amor amicitiae* is the closest union to substantial union, in that the lover stands to the object of his love as to himself, whereas *amor concupiscientiae*, whereby I love other things, is the union of likeness by which I love something belonging to myself. Yet, as Johann notes: “If the other

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18 *ST IaIlae*, q. 28, a.1 (Leon. 5.197): “Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscientiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquum quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquam amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum: unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse *alter ipse*: et Augustinus dicit, in *IV Confess.*: *Bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae.*”

19 On union’s threefold relation to love, see *ST IaIlae*, q. 28, a.1, ad 2 (Leon. 5.197): “unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. [1] Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad
has to be one with myself for me to love him as myself, he will have to be so in his very otherness.”

In the union of **amor amicitiae**, the same goods are willed by my friend and myself, an effect of what Thomas calls “mutual indwelling” (**mutuae inhaesionis**), an “abiding of one in the other.” Thomas writes:

The effect of mutual indwelling can be understood both in regard to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved dwells in the apprehension of the lover, according to Phil. 1:7, ‘For that I have you in [my] heart.’ The lover, however, is said to be in the beloved according to apprehension in that the lover, not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul . . . As to the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship; not from any extrinsic cause . . . but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover’s heart.

In **amor amicitiae**, the good of my friend does not become my good by returning to me, which it would were I to love my friend with **amor concupiscientiae**. We will consider this point in more detail later. For now we note that **amor amicitiae** is properly personal love, where the lover wills

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amorem quo quis amat seipsum: quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. [2] Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscientiae, ut ad aliquid sui. [3] Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata.”

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20 Johann, *The Meaning of Love*, 36. Also, Gallagher: “The good of the beloved is the good of the lover by being the good of the beloved” in “Self-Love as the Basis for Loving Others,” 31.

21 Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” 136. For a good treatment of **mutua inhaesio**, see ibid., 135–165. As Kwasniewski notes, Thomas comments on adhesion or “clinging” to God and to divine things as our greatest good (**SCG** III, 130), and adhesion to worldly goods as self-destructive (**In Rom.**, 12, lect. 1, 965; **ST** IIaIIae, q. 122, a.2). This is also the language of St. Augustine. Ibid., 139.

22 **ST** IaIIae, q. 28, a.2. (Leon. 6.198): “effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud Philipp.1, eo quod habeam vos in corde. - Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem, inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nitiur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur. . . . Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandum complacentiam in eius affectum: ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praeSENTIAM; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscientiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa . . . sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam.”
good things for the sake of the beloved, a person, having already affirmed of the beloved that
“It’s good that you exist.”

II.

Friendship and Self-Knowledge

According to Thomas, human beings love life—perceiving and understanding—by a
natural self-love. Furthermore, we naturally love the conscious realization of these capacities
through our acts. A virtuous person loves himself “on the part of the activity” inasmuch as he
lives according to reason, and “on the part of the end” inasmuch as he seeks for himself what is
the absolute good; he enjoys watching himself as a virtuous agent in action. Just as he takes
pleasure in the awareness of his own existence and life, so too he delights in the awareness of
his friend’s acts of perceiving and understanding, the acts of his “other self.” And since it is


24 In *IX Ethic.*, 9 (Leon. 47.532:83–93): “assignat duas differentias, quarum una est ex parte actionis:
virtuosus enim amat se ipsum in quantum vivit secundum rationem, sed ille qui vituperatur vivit secundum
passionem (sequitur enim passiones irrationabilis animae, ut supra dictum est); alia vero differentia est ex parte finis:
nam virtuosus amat se ipsum in quantum sibi appetit id quod est simpliciter bonum, ille autem qui vituperatur amat
se ipsum in quantum appetit sibi id quod apparat bonum utile, cum tamen sit nocivum.”

25 Ibid., 11 (Leon. 47.540:124–143): “virtuoso est eligibile et delectabile suum esse et vivere propter hoc
quod sentit suum esse et vivere esse bonum, talis autem sensus est delectabilis secundum se ipsum, quo scilicet
aliquis sentit bonum sibi inesse. Sicut ergo aliquis delectatur in suo esse et vivere sentiendo ipsum, ita ad hoc quod
delectetur in amico oportet quod simul sentiat ipsum esse, quod quidem continget convivendo sibi secundum
communicationem sermonum et considerationum mentis; hoc enim modo homines dicitur proprie sibi convivere,
secundum scilicet vitam quae est homini propria, non aut em secundum hoc quod simul pascantur, sicut contingit in
pecoribus.”

26 On this theme, see Mansini’s excellent article, “Aristotle on Needing Friends,” *American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly* 72 (1998): 408–9. Mansini argues that this apparent “detour” through self-consciousness is
in fact key to a proper understanding of friendship. He uses some helpful examples from literature to demonstrate
his point.
easier to observe one’s friend in action than it is to observe oneself in action, a friend’s actions can serve to deepen one’s self-knowledge. 27 Maritain notes:

To the degree that we truly love [the beloved] . . . we acquire an obscure knowledge of the being we love, similar to that which we possess of ourselves; we know that being in his very subjectivity (at least in a certain measure) by this experience of union. Then he himself is, in a certain degree, cured of his solitude; he can, though still disquieted, rest for a moment in the nest of the knowledge that we possess of him as subject. 28

As “another self”—and yet precisely because of his “otherness” to myself—a friend can enlarge my own being, so to speak. That is, the otherness of my friend to myself, and at the same time the affective unity between us, is precisely what draws me to my friend.

The phenomenon of “mutual self-awareness,” a term used by Guy Mansini, 29 describes the shared awareness enjoyed by friends based on their knowledge and love of one another. 30 In a shared pleasurable activity with a friend, for example, there can be nuances which only the two friends can understand and appreciate. This knowledge proper to their relationship serves to heighten the friends’ enjoyment of the object of their amor concupiscentiae, or rather the enjoyment of one another’s company “through” the object. I can be aware, for example, of my enjoyment of a significant memory in a particular place with my friend and, at the same time, be aware of my friend’s awareness and enjoyment of that shared memory as well, and vice versa. 31


28 Maritain, Existence and Existent, 84.

29 Ibid., 413.

30 Daniel Schwartz notes: “The virtuous life is a sort of dialogue or conversation in which the friends act virtuously towards each other, thus mutually feeding the motivation of each to act in this way. Through our friends we expand our capacity to perform virtuous deeds, because friends are united to ourselves in such a way that their actions are, in some ways, also ours.” Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 4.

31 An example from literature, given by Mansini, shows up Thomas’s point as to the pleasure friends derive from mutual self-awareness. The following is part of an example Mansini provides from a book by James Agee
Although referring to this phenomenon in Aristotle’s thought, Mansini’s comment is equally applicable to Thomas:

The savouring of the other’s exercise of perception, the awareness of his exercise of wit, intelligence, \textit{nous}, an exercise I share with him, is the point. Aristotle’s deeper argument appeals to the pure desirability and goodness of the other as other, and as other self—both indissolubly.\footnote{Mansini, “Aristotle on Needing Friends,” 413. He adds: “the friend is another \textit{self}: where the self is one’s perceiving and understandings, the other self is constituted by these same acts.” Ibid., 413–414.}

The mutual shared perception that I and my friend are of “one mind,” is mutually delightful.\footnote{See Maher’s description of what he calls “contemplative friendship”: “The shared perception of their activity is the awareness that each is thinking the same thing. In perceiving my friend’s activity as his activity, it becomes at the same time my activity (and is perceived as my activity) without being or becoming less his activity.” Maher, “Contemplative Friendship in \textit{Nicomachean Ethics},” 780.}

Thus, Thomas agrees with Aristotle that the happy person needs friends in order to live virtuously (\textit{sed propter bonam operationem}), that is, “that he may do good to them, delight in seeing them do good, and that he may be helped by them in his good work.”\footnote{\textit{ST} IaIIae, q. 4, a.8 (Leon. 6:45): “felix indiget amicus, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectionatem, quia habet in seipso delectionem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciatur, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam ab eis in beneficiendo adiuventur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio.”}

Since our friends our like ourselves, we can observe ourselves by observing them. Thomas writes:

\begin{quote}
We can only take pleasure in what we know, but we can observe our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, because every man is a bad judge of himself due to the private affection he has for himself. Clearly, then, good men take pleasure in the actions of those who are both good and friends, for in them are found naturally delightful qualities, namely, goodness and love. Thus, the happy man will need these friends who are virtuous inasmuch as he seeks to consider the good actions of the good
\end{quote}

called \textit{A Death in the Family}: “he knew that each of them knew of the other’s well-being, and of the reasons for it, and knew how each depended on the other . . . and that the best of this well-being lay in this mutual knowledge, which was neither concealed nor revealed.” See James Agee, \textit{A Death in the Family} (New York: Avon Books, 1959), 22–23; see Mansini, “Aristotle on Needing Friends,” 413. Additionally, Daniel Maher comments, “all friendships include a reflective awareness of the activity engaging friends and, to that extent, all forms of friendship are contemplative.” Daniel P. Maher, “Contemplative Friendship in \textit{Nicomachean Ethics},” \textit{Review of Metaphysics} 65 (2012): 779.
man who is his friend. Since a man’s friend is another self [alter ipse], the friend’s actions will be in a certain sense his own.\footnote{In IX Ethic., 10 (Leon. 47.536: 118–132): “Non autem possimus delectari nisi in eo quod cognoscimus, magis autem possimus speculare proximos quam nos ipsos et actiones illorum quam nostras, quia uniussuusque indicium in propriis magis deficit propter privatum affectum quem habet ad se ipsum; sic igitur patet quod bonus hominibus delectabiles sunt actiones eorum qui sunt et boni et amici, in quibus inveniuntur ambo quae sunt secundum naturam delectabilia, scilicet bonum et amatum. Sic igitur beatus indigebit talibus amicitias, scilicet virtuosis, in quantum quae et considerare bonas actiones et sibi appropriatas, quales quidem sunt actiones viri boni qui est amicus: quia enim amicus hominis est quasi alter ipse, actiones amici sunt sibi quasi propriae.”}

The relation of friendship is constituted by two or more people who love each other with rational love, which involves both amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae. We recall what Thomas says about the relation of friendship in ST IlIIae, q. 25, a.7:

A friend first wills that his friend be and live; second, he wills good for him; third, he does good things for him; fourth, he lives with him joyfully; fifth, he agrees with him, as rejoicing and sorrowing in the same things.\footnote{ST IlIIae, q. 25, a.7 (Leon. 8.203): “enim amicus primo quidem vult suum amicum esse et vivere; secundo, vult ei bona; terto, operatur bona ad ipsum; quarto, convivit ei delectabiliter; quinto, concordat cum ipso, quasi in iisdem delectatus et contraistatus.” As Schwartz notes, benevolence and beneficence, two acts of friendship, do not require selflessness, but “a correct appreciation of what is really valuable.” Ibid., 13. For Thomas, greed (cupiditas) directly opposes these works of friendship precisely because in greed one chooses the wrong kinds of goods for oneself and others: love of external, temporal goods, rather than goods of the mind. Ibid., 12. See ST IlIIae, q. 19, a.3co and ST IlIIae, q.129, a.2co.}

Friends want the other to exist and to live for the other’s sake;\footnote{In IX Ethic., 4 (Leon. 47.513:37–40): “amicus vult suum amicum esse et vivere gratia ipsius amici et non propter se ipsum, ut scilicet quaerat ex eo solum proprium commodum.”} they mutually wish well to each other and are mutually aware of this act of benevolence;\footnote{In VIII Ethic., (Leon. 47.446: 100–102): “Et dicit quod adhuc apponendum est ad complendam rationem amicitiae quod sit benivolentia mutua non latens.”} they do good things for one another;\footnote{Ibid., (Leon. 47.513:24–26): “Dicit autem ‘volenterm et operantem,’ quia unum sine altero non sufficit ad amicitiam.”}
they spend time together; and they are like-minded in rejoicing and grieving at similar things. In order to appreciate this inseparable blend of affection and action within the relation of friendship, we turn to the works of friendship, or the willing of those means (goods) for the end (the beloved) which sets this relation apart from simple goodwill.

III.

The Works of Friendship: Beneficence, Benevolence, and Concord

The phenomenon of mutual self-awareness within friendship can be further appreciated when we look at the three works of friendship: beneficence, benevolence, and concord, which Thomas outlines in his Commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. These three works are habitual acts essential to the relation of friendship. Outside of friendship, these works are simply good actions, the performance of which do not necessarily indicate anything more than goodwill between two or more people.

*Beneficence*. A person is said to be beneficent (*beneficentia*) when he or she *acts* to secure the goods of another. Unlike friendship (of utility, pleasure, or the virtuous), the element of reciprocity in such a relationship is not essential. This is because benefactors, says Thomas, “feel love and real affection for those who receive their benefactions” regardless of the

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41 See Daniel Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship*, 6–21 on these three acts of friendship. See chapter two of the same work for an in-depth treatment of concord.
usefulness of the recipients.\(^{42}\) The movement outward of a benefactor ultimately returns to himself; he feels towards his beneficiaries as an artist feels toward his creations since “a person who is well-treated by another is in a way his product.”\(^{43}\) That is, like craftsmen and poets, benefactors love their productions. The reason Thomas offers is noteworthy: because benefactors love their own existence and “the producer actually producing is in some way the work produced.”\(^{44}\) We could say that the benefactor loves himself “through the recipient,” though clearly not in the same way as a friend, since the elements of affective unity, mutual self-awareness, and reciprocity are not necessary to this relation. In friendship, however, the element of knowledge is critical to the act of beneficence, since a friend must have a solid grasp of what is truly beneficial for the other; that is, he must know his friend well enough to know what goods would be truly beneficial to him. Outside of friendship, benefaction is simply an honourable, enduring good, where the benefactor delights in the recipient “as in a present good.”\(^{45}\) The kind of love here is *amor concupiscientiae*.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{42}\) *In IX Ethic.*, 7 (Leon. 47.524:49–53): “benefactores amant, secundum appetitum sensitivum, et diligunt, secundum electionem, eos qui ab eis bona recipiunt, etiam si in nullo sint eis utiles in prae senti nec expectent aliquam utilitatem in futuro.”

\(^{43}\) Ibid., (Leon. 47.524–5: 55–59; 67–69): “Et dicit quod idem accidit de benefactoribus ad beneficiatos quod accidit in artificibus respectu suorum operum; omnis enim artifex diligent opus magis quam diligatur ab eo, etiam si esset possibile quod opus illud fieret animatum. . . . ideo magis diligunt beneficiatos opus suum, scilicet beneficiatos, quam e converso.”

\(^{44}\) Ibid., (Leon. 47.525:79–84): “faciens autem in actu est quodam modo ipsum opus facientis, actus enim moventis et agentis est in mota et patiente; ideo itaque diligunt opus suum et artifices et poetae et beneficiatos, quia diligunt suum esse. Hoc auterri est naturale, scilicet quod unumquodque suum esse amet.”

\(^{45}\) Ibid., (Leon. 47.525:119–120): “delectatur in eo cui benefecit sicut in prae senti suo bono.”

\(^{46}\) Thus, we note with David Gallagher the critical role played by the intention of the love directed to the beloved: “If the other is taken as good insofar as he will serve to bring about a perfection in the lover as an individual distinct from the person loved, then the intention of the lover returns to himself and the love is one of concupiscence. If the intention does not so return, if the other is taken as good in himself and only thus seen as the
Benevolence. The second work of friendship is benevolence (benevolentia), “wishing good to someone,” an act which, by natural self-love, we first exercise toward ourselves.47 If there is a similitude or likeness between oneself and another person, where “the lover judges the beloved as somewhat united to him,” then we can extend benevolence toward that person.48 Thomas states:

Benevolence properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish good to another . . . the love, which is in the intellective appetite, differs from benevolence, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover regards the beloved as somewhat one with him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, benevolence is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him.49

Within friendship, an act of benevolence does not seek to benefit from the good of the other: one simply intends that the friend’s good “may be and increase.”50 Following Aristotle, Thomas

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47 ST IIaIIae, q 28, a 1 (Leon. 4.197): “Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.”


49 ST IIaIIae, q. 27, a.2 (Leon. 8.225): “benevolentia proprae dicitur actus voluntatis quo alteri bonum volumus. . . Sed amor qui est in appetitu intellectivo etiam differt a benevolentia. Importat enim quandam unionem secundum affectus amantis ad amatum: inquantum scilicet amans aestimat amatum quodammodo ut unum sibi, vel ad se pertinens, et sic movetur in ipsum.” As McGinnis notes, “to wish life to a friend implies wishing those things necessary for life, that is, things not merely necessary for the ‘esse’ but also his ‘bene esse’; or, we may say in summary, a friend wishes all that is implicit in the terms ‘beatitudo imperfecta’ and ‘perfecta’ to a friend.” See McGinnis, Wisdom of Love, 51.

notes that “benevolence is not friendship in its habitual character.” This is because goodwill can be exercised toward strangers and need not even be known to the recipient, characteristics which cannot be said of friendship. Moreover, unlike friendship, which requires time and familiarity, benevolence can arise suddenly; it is a simple movement of the will. Further still, the possible absence of affective unity between benevolent people is another reason why they cannot be called friends, a point that highlights the important role of the passions and desire within friendship. A person can want goods for someone, but may not necessarily do anything to help the other attain those goods or else not feel any distress at their unfavourable situation.

51 In IX Ethic., 5 (Leon. 47.518:16–18): “Benevolentia non est amicitia, quae significatur per modum habitus.”

52 Ibid., (Leon.47.518:26–32): “primum est quod benivolentia potest fieri ad homines ignotos, quorum scilicet experientiam aliquis non acceptit cum eis familiariter conversando, sed hoc non potest esse in amicitia. Secundum medium est quod benevolentia potest esse latens eum ad quem benivolentiam habemus, quod de amicitia dici non potest.” Thomas notes that for true friendship, the friends must mutually love one another, for this mutual love makes the friendship “true and firm.” See Lect. super Ioann., c. XIII, lect. 7 (Marietti, 344–45): “De ratione enim amicitiae est quod non sit latens, alias enim non esset amicitia, sed benevolentia quaedam. Et ideo oportet ad veram amicitiam et firmam, quod amici se mutua diligent.”

53 Ibid., (Leon. 47.518:49–52): “benevolentia importat simplicem motum voluntatis, potest repente fieri.”

54 Ibid., (Leon. 47.518: 35–42): “benevolentia non sit amatio, duplici ratione.Quarum prima est quod benevolentia non habet distensionem animi neque appetitum, id est passionem in appetitu sensitivo, quae animum suo impetu distendit quasi cum quadam violentia ad aliquid movens, quod quidem accidit in passione amationis, non autem in benevolentia, quae consistit in simplici motu voluntatis.”

55 Ibid., (Leon. 47.518:76–79):“ad benivolos pertinet hoc solum quod velint bona illis quibus sunt benivoli ita tamen quod nihil pro eis facerent neque pro eorum malis turbarentur.” Just as a person can experience sorrow at the loss of his own external goods, so it is natural to experience sorrow at the loss of a friend’s external goods. We note here that Thomas does not exclude the experience of sadness that a virtuous person may feel when external goods are lost. As Schwartz points out, Thomas disagrees with the view of the Stoics who argue that external goods are not goods for man, and thus should not be a cause of sadness for the wise man when they are lost. Rather, Thomas, following the Peripatetic view, argues that although external goods are accidental goods and thus not the highest goods for man, they are nevertheless ordered to man’s highest (substantial) good—that of his soul, and thus a “moderate sadness” when these goods are lost is permissible. If reason, however, is dragged down by sadness, this indicates excess. See Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship, 61, n. 58. For Thomas see In Librum Beati Job Expositio, c. 1, lect. 4 (Neapoli, 8): “rationabiliiter ostenditur quod propter amissionem rerum, et exteriorium bonorum, non debet homo tristitia absorberi: quia exteriora bona non sunt ei connaturalia, sed accidentaliter adveniunt: quod ex hoc patet, quod homo sine eis in hoc mundo venit, et sine eis recedit: unde accidentalibus bonis sublatis, si substantiale maneant, non debet homo tristitia obrui, et si cum tristitia tangat.” This can be equally applied to the case of friends.
Thomas concludes that benevolence alone “is a kind of lazy friendship because it is not joined with friendly activity.” He adds, however, that if a person were to continue in a relationship of benevolence long enough, he may become so habituated in willing good that friendship could arise.

Concord. The third work of friendship is concord, “making the same choices.” Following Aristotle, Thomas notes that concord is not homodoxia, having the same opinion; rather, concord is the union of wills between people, where the ground of the union is a common good envisaged and desired by each person. In a qualified sense, the primary analogue of concord with others is the concord that the virtuous person experiences within himself: that is, the enjoyment of his own company, the pleasure he finds in recalling past achievements and in looking forward to future accomplishments. Such a person is at peace with his own feelings, a state that is the result of habitually good choices made over time. As Schwartz points out, these

56 Ibid., (Leon. 47.518:80–82): “benivolentia est quaedam amicitia otiosa, quia scilicet non habet operationem amicabilem adiunctam.”

57 Ibid., (Leon. 47.518:82–86): “sed, quando diu durat homo in benivolentia et consuescit bene velle alicui, firmatur animus eius ad volendum bonum ita quod voluntas non erit otiosa, sed efficax, et sic fit amicitia.”

58 Ibid., 6 (Leon. 47.521:13–16): “ad amicos pertinet quod eadem eligant, in quo consistit ratio concordiae. Et ex hoc patet quod concordia non est homodoxia, per quod significatur unitas opinionis.” Schwartz notes that concord is the same as Aristotle’s homonoia. See Aquinas on Friendship, 8.

59 As will be discussed later, concord as the union of wills can exist between people who are not friends, since the common good lies outside the individuals (eg: agreement that patient confidentiality is indispensable to sound medical practice, or that the best people should rule the country). Within friendship, however, the union of wills is somewhat different in that a common, or shared, good is actually brought into being with the action of each friend going “out of himself/herself” for the sake of the other, transcending the bounds of his or her own good. That is, the friends mutually will the good of the other for the sake of the other: the union of wills becomes a shared good between them. In other words, this shared good is dependent on the ontological relation of friendship between them in which amor amicitiae is exercised. This latter point will be discussed in another section.
choices are intrinsically related to rational love (dilectio), the love proper to friendship.  
Friends enjoy mutual shared awareness because of concord—that act of friendship that enables them to share a life together. Individuals who live according to choices based on improper self-love, however, do not experience concord within themselves, and thus cannot form lasting friendships with others. While this condition does not exclude their need to be with other people, they simply love those others for the distraction they provide to facing their own unpleasantness.

People unknown to one another, who hold the same opinion yet have no concord among themselves, are not friends. Friends, however, can hold different opinions, since “judgment in speculative problems is not derived from compulsory preference.” Concord requires that each person agree “on the same numerical thing,” such as the agreement between both lower and upper classes that the best men should rule. Admittedly, this definition of concord describes virtuous people who act in such a way that they are at peace with themselves and with one another. Their minds remain “fixed in good” concerning choices or works.

Outside of virtuous friendship, the movement toward another ultimately returns to oneself: affective union with the other, and taking the other as “another self” do not necessarily

60 Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship, 8.

61 “These [choices] are precisely the choices which concord unifies.” Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship, 10. Also, “concord, as an act of friendship, does not eliminate the need to conduct practical deliberation in choosing the way towards realizing friendship.” Ibid. On pride as an obstacle to concord, see chapter four of the same work.

62 In IX Ethic., 6 (Leon. 47.521:12–18): “ad amicos pertinet quod eadem eligant, in quo consistit ratio concordiae. Et ex hoc patet quod concordia non est homodoxia, per quod significatur unitas opinionis; potest enim contingere quod sint eiusdem opinionis etiam illi qui se invicem non cognoscunt, inter quos tamen non est concordia sicut nec amicitia.”

63 Ibid., (Leon. 47.521: 68–71): “concordia quod consentiant in eodem secundum numerum, sicut cum in aliqua civitate tam plebs quam virtuosi in hoc concordent quod optimi principentur.”

64 Ibid., (Leon. 47.522: 98–100): “voluntates talium hominum manent fixae in bono et non transfiuunt ex uno in aliud.”
follow. That is, while these good works toward another may be good in themselves, they do not constitute friendship because the love directed toward the person is *amor concupiscentiae* rather than *amor amicitiae*. We note that it is the intention toward the *person*, and not the work alone, that determines the nature of the relationship: simple goodwill, or a friendship of pleasure, utility or virtue.⁶⁵

For Thomas, likeness, a cause of love, is grounded by shared common good. The likeness between virtuous friends is on account of their “communication in the good,”⁶⁶ where the likeness increases as they communicate over time, and often through formative experiences. Just as there are different communications, so there are different friendships.⁶⁷ As Mansini notes, the element of choice is crucial to the *communicatio* in the good between friends:

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⁶⁵ “Note that by ‘friendship’ Aquinas always means one’s friendship towards the friend, that is, a relational property inhering in oneself, rather than a relationship conceived as something, as it were, ‘hovering’ between the two friends.” Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship*, 8.

⁶⁶ *Lect. super Ioann.*, c. XIII, lect. 7 (Marietti, 344): “Recte vero, quia cum omnis amicitia fundetur super aliquam communicacionem (similitudinem enim est causa amoris), illa est recta amicitia quae est propter similitudinem, seu communicacionem in bono.” See Mansini, “*Similitudo, Communicatio*,” 8. What precisely Thomas means by *communicatio* here has been discussed by several scholars, especially Joseph Bobik. After examining six different interpretations of the meaning of *communicatio*, Bobik argues that Thomas uses the term *communicatio* in three ways: 1) as a “social relational context which is the foundation out of which friendship arises (or, at least, can arise)”; 2) as denoting friendship’s activities; 3) “as designating the activity of offering a gift which provides a foundation (where there was none), out of which friendship can arise.” Bobik notes that the second sense of *communicatio*, the active sense, is what Aristotle means in *In Ethic.*, IX. 12 (1171b32) when he says that “friendship is a koinônia.” This encompasses such activities as conversing together (which is the best kind of activity), “drinking together, gambling together, doing athletic exercises together, studying philosophy together” (*In Ethic.*, IX. 121172a3–7). See Bobik, “Aquinas on *Communicatio*, the Foundation of Friendship and *Caritas*,” *The Modern Schoolman* LXIV (1986): 1–15.

⁶⁷ *In III Sent.*, d. 29, a.6 (Moos, 936–7): “proximos diligimus, inquantum in eis bonum nostrum per similitudinem invenitur, loquendo de amore benevolentiae. Haec autem similitudo attenditur secundum quod cum eis communicationes, diversas amicitias Philosophus distinguat.” See Mansini, “*Similitudo, Communicatio*,” 7; 8. Also, “Cum enim amicorum sit cor unum et anima una, non videtur amicus extra cor suum ponere quod amico revelat” in *Lect. super Ioann.*, c. XV, lect. 3 (Marietti, 381).
given that it is convenient for us to be friends, and granted that we are like one another, we must nonetheless choose to enter into amicable relations with one another.\(^6\)

That is, *communicatio* and likeness alone are not sufficient for the higher kinds of virtuous friendship: there must also be a mutual choice to be friends. That choice is further specified by the kind of friendship decided upon (as determined by the character of each friend).\(^6\)

We pause here to say something of friendship with God (charity) where the communication is on the side of God. According to Thomas, God wants his own goodness, which he loves most of all, to also be desired by us as his friends by loving what he has revealed to us about himself.\(^7\) We note, however, that the relation of friendship between two people is a real relation, dependent on the similitude and communication between the friends. This is not the case for man’s friendship with God, where the relationship exists formally and really in man only, “since real non-subsistent relation is something which pertains to the created order only.”\(^7\)

\(^{6}\) Mansini, “*Similitudo, Communicatio*,” 8. See *In Ethic.*, VIII, lect. 5 (Leon. 47.458:106–113): “Amatio simplex potest etiam ad inanimata esse, sicut dicimus amare vinum vel aurum, sed redamare, quod pertinent ad rationem amicitiae, ut supra dictum est, est cum electione; non enim est nisi rationabilium ad invicem. Quod autem fit ex electione non fit ex passione, sed magis ab habitu. Ergo amicitia est habitus.”

\(^{6}\) Mansini, “*Similitudo, Communicatio*,” 8; *In Ethic.*, VIII.3 (Leon. 47.450:106–113): “et quia secundum differentiam oblectorum diversificantur actus, consequens est quod amationes secundum haec tria different specie, ut scilicet alia sit species amotionis qua amatur aliquid propter bonum et alia qua amatur aliquid propter delectabile et alia qua propter utile; et quia amicitiae actus est amatio, consequens est quod etiam sint tres species amicitiae aequales numero amabilibus, quarum una est amicitia propter honestum, quod est bonum simpliciter, alia propter delectabile et tertia propter utile.”

\(^{7}\) Commenting on John 15:15 “I no longer call you servants but friends,” Thomas states: “Verum enim amicitiae signum est quod amicus amico suo cordis secreta revelet. Cum enim amicorum sit cor unum et anima una, non videtur amicus extra cor suum ponere quod amico revelat; Prov. xxx, 9: *Causam tuam tracta cum amico tuo. Deus autem faciendo nos particeps suae sapientiae, sua secreta nobis revelat; Sap. vii, 27: Per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, amicos Dei et Prophetas constituit.*” Lect. *super Ioann.*, c. XV, lect. 3 (Marietti, 381).

We can say that we are *like* God but we cannot say that God is like us. Nevertheless, this does not preclude us from saying that we can be friends with God in an analogous/literal sense.\(^\text{72}\)

As Mansini notes, desire for the divine goodness is not different from the desire for God himself.\(^\text{73}\) As discussed in the previous chapter, although we naturally love God above ourselves, only charity can effect friendship between us and God.\(^\text{74}\) God makes us like himself, yet this likeness “precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor.”\(^\text{75}\) The importance of choice within friendship with God still applies, but the choice comes first from God.\(^\text{76}\) In his

\[^{72}\text{“Friendship, as well as anything else which is predicated of God and man, is predicated only analogously.” Yet, as Bond notes later in his article, “an analogous predication, however, is a true predication, although it applies in different ways to the different analogates, and it requires, therefore, a true basis of similarity between the analogates.” Ibid., 57; 59. As discussed in the previous chapter, man is made like to God by sanctifying grace through the gifts of faith, hope, and charity. Insofar as *communio* is a requirement in human friendship, when applied to man’s friendship with God, God’s communication of his beatitude to us is the foundation of our friendship with him. See *ST* IIaIIae, q. 23, a.1 (Leon. 8.163): “Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. . . Amor autem super hac communicacione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum.”\]

\[^{73}\text{Mansini, “Similitudo, Communio,” 11. “Here, the ground and the end and the friend of the friendship are the same.” Ibid., 14.}\]

\[^{74}\text{This point leads us into Theology, and thus lies outside our philosophical scope, but we mention it here for its relevance to our topic.}\]

\[^{75}\text{Ibid., 12. For Thomas, see *ST* IIaIIae, q. 26, a.2, ad 2 (Leon. 8.211): “similitudo quam habemus ad Deum est prior et causa similitudinis quam habemus ad proximum: ex hoc enim quod participamus a Deo id quod ab ipso etiam proximus habet, similes proximo efficium.” As Daniel Schwartz notes “the idea of friendship with God undoubtedly places considerable strain on the conception of friendship that Aquinas inherited from Aristotle. According to Aristotle friendship requires equality of power and status as well as shared activities, choices, and feelings. Yet, arguably, we cannot share time and activities with God…” Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship*, 1.}\]

\[^{76}\text{See Denys Turner, “While it is true, then, that the grace whether of justification or of sanctification, cannot do its work without the free consent of the human will, that free consent is itself the work of grace. . . On one side that friendship between God and creatures can only be pure gift . . . On the other side, it can be friendship that is offered only if the free choice comes with the offer . . . ‘Infallibly’ but not ‘coercively’ God effects the work of our salvation through the offer of the shared life of friends: that is all that grace is, utterly irresistible, utterly free, a friendship infallibly brought about by means of human choice enabled to share in the divine life itself.” Denys Turner, *Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2013), 151–3.}\]
Commentary on the Gospel of John 15:16, “You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,”

Thomas elaborates on this aspect of choice on the side of God:

Here he lays down the cause of friendship. It is usual with men, however, for each one to attribute to himself the cause of friendship, as Sirach 37:1 says: “Every friend says: ‘I too have joined in friendship.’” And thus many attribute the cause of divine friendship to themselves, attributing the principle of good works to themselves and not to God. And the Lord excludes this, saying “you have not chosen me,” as if he should say: Let whoever has been called to this dignity of friendship not attribute the cause of friendship to himself, but to me who chooses him for this.77

As discussed in the previous chapter, what man and God have in common is God’s beatitude, which he offers to human beings as a gift in charity; this beatitude is the only ground upon which our friendship with God can even arise. Thus, concerning our friendship with God in charity, the principle of likeness is “suspended,”78 since we naturally love God more than ourselves as a part (the creature) naturally loves the whole (the universal good) more than itself.

IV.

How Friendship Unites Lover to Beloved

We have so far looked at the works involved in loving a friend as “another self.” We now turn to Thomas’s account of how precisely self extends out to others in a way that the movement of love does not return to the lover. We find such an account in his treatment of extasis. Although much can be said on Thomas’s theory of extasis, the following discussion will

77 Lect. super Ioann., c. XV, lect. 4 (Marietti, 381): “Hic ponit amicitiae causam. Consuetum est autem apud homines ut unusquisque sibi attribuat causam amicitiae: Eccli.xxxvii, 1: Omnis amicus dicit: Et ego amicitiam copulavi. Et sic multi attribuunt sibi divinae amicitiae causam, dum sibi principium bonorum operum attribuunt et non Deo. Et Dominus hoc exclusens dicit Non vos me elegistis; quasi dicat: Quisquis ad hanc dignitatem amicitiae vocatus est, non sibi causam amicitiae attribuat, sed mihi eum ad hoc eligenti.” See Mansini, “Similitudo, Communicatio,” 13. Mansini adds, “the end of friendship is God, the divine goodness; and the choice that establishes the friendship is first of all God’s and so, God.” Ibid. Also ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a.3, ad 1 (Leon. 8.168): “amicitia virtuosa magis est aliquod consequens ad virtutes quam sit virtus. Nec est simile de caritate, quae non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super bonitate divina.”

be limited to how *extasis* can be, metaphorically speaking, a movement out of oneself to another for the sake of the other.\(^79\)

Thomas argues that there are two kinds of *extases*, or ways in which one may suffer “being placed outside of oneself;” apprehensive *extasis* and appetitive *extasis*. In regard to apprehensive extasis, Thomas states:

Someone, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to himself, is said to be placed outside himself. Either [this is because] he is raised to a higher knowledge; for example, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, insomuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of reason and sense, when he is raised up to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason, or he is cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness.\(^80\)

In this passage, Thomas outlines two causes of apprehensive extasis: one is an “upward” movement whereby a person moves out of himself by being raised above the type of knowledge proper to him;\(^81\) the other is a “downward” movement resulting from a debasement of reason. Thomas states that this movement is due to some kind of “defect of the power,”\(^82\) though he is

\(^79\) Thomas defines *extasis* in ST IaIIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 6.199) as follows: “To suffer extasis means to be placed outside oneself” [*extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur*].” For an excellent, in-depth treatment of Thomas’s theory of *extasis* see Peter Kwasniewski’s dissertation on this topic. Kwasniewski notes that “a total, unconditional *extasis* only occurs in the relation of creature and Creator, which is one of complete and total dependency, whereas various other relationships among creatures lead to partial or conditional *extases* which are nonetheless real, for they are founded upon *amor amicitiae*.” “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” 91.

\(^80\) *ST* IaIIae, q.28, a.3 (Leon.6.199–200): “Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur extra se ponit, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam: vel quia ad superiorum sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendinga aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiamcadit, dicitur extasim passus.”

\(^81\) As Kwasniewski notes, “it is unclear, perhaps intentionally, whether such supernatural knowledge is only to be attained through divinely inspired raptus. . . or whether in fact all love, including human friendship at its most sublime, draws the mind and the senses above the lot that falls to them in the ordinary course of nature.” “St Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 587–588.

\(^82\) See In *Cor.* II, c xii, lect. 1 (Marietti, 541), where Thomas mentions the two causes cognitive extasis: “uno modo per defectum virtutis, undecumque talis defectus contingat, sicut accidit in phreneticis et aliis mente captis, et haec quidem abstractio a sensibus non est elevatio hominis, sed potius depressio, quia virtus eorum debilitatur. Alio vero modo per virtutem divinam, et tunc proprie dicitur elevatio, quia cum agens assimilet sibi patientis, abstractio quae fit virtute divina et est supra hominem . . .”
unclear as to the nature of this defect. The first kind of extasis is positive in that the person’s experience of being “outside himself” is due to the elevation of his apprehension of objects that are outside his natural experience. The second kind of extasis is a negative going out of oneself, a movement akin to “going out of one’s mind” due to passion or madness. This movement arises “whenever intense love is directed toward a bad object or towards a good object with evil intentions;”83 that is, when one vehemently seeks, though sensitive love, to cling to the wrong kind of goods or the right kind of goods in the wrong way.

In regard to appetitive extasis, Thomas states:

Someone suffers ecstasy when his appetite moves towards something else so that it goes out from itself, so to speak.84 Apprehensive and appetitive extasis have different causes. In the apprehensive power, extasis is caused “dispositively,” that is, insofar as love “makes the lover dwell on the beloved” and draws the mind away from other things. In the appetitive power, extasis is caused directly, and in two ways: 1) simply, by amor amicitiae; 2) in a qualified sense by amor concupiscentiae.85 Thomas explains this distinction of movement within the appetite as follows:

Now, in love of concupiscence, [the lover] is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But because he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, but this movement terminates within him. But in the love of friendship, someone’s affection goes out from himself simply; because he wants his friend’s good, and does it, caring and providing for him, for his sake.86

83 Kwasniewski, “St Thomas, Extasis, and Union With the Beloved,” 590.

84 ST IaIIae, q.28, a.3 (Leon. 6.199): “Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.”

85 Ibid., (Leon. 5.200): “Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, . . . intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim facit amor directe: simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid.”
Love causes *extasis* in the appetitive power in a twofold manner, based on the twofold structure of rational love: 1) *amor amicitiae* leads to a movement out of self for the sake of another, where “one’s own good is placed in the good of another person,” whereas 2) the movement of *amor concupiscentiae*, which looks like an extasis, is in fact a movement that returns to the will of the lover.\(^87\)

Only God is the total good of the lover and the one to whom the lover should order himself wholly. In regard to all other things, the lover can move outside himself toward them “only to the extent that he does not intend them for himself alone.”\(^88\) Kwasniewski states:

> In preserving the bond of friendship with an equal or in taking care of the lover he is truly inclined to its good, but in neither case does he hand over or yield up his self, for it does not belong to the other as definitive source and goal.\(^89\)

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\(^86\) [ST IaIIae, q. 28, a.3 (Leon. 5.200):] “Nam in amore concupiscentiae, quodammodo furturamans extra seipsum: inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quærerit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed tali affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alius simpliciter exit extra se: quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.” See Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 591.

\(^87\) Thomas presents these two distinct aspects of love in [ST IaIIae, q. 26, a.4 (Leon. 6.190):] “sicut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est velle allicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult aliciu, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amat amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amat: quod autem amat amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amat, sed amat alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.” See Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 591.

\(^88\) [In De div. nom., IV, lect. 10 (Marietti, 143):] “Sic ergo aliquis debet Deum amare, quod nihil sui sibi relinquat, quin in Deum ordinetur. Cum autem aequalia vel inferiorea amat, sufficit quod sit extra se exiens in illa ita dumtaxat quod non sibi soli intendet, sed alii; nec oportet quod totaliter se in illa ordinet.”

\(^89\) Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” 100.
How does Thomas account for the difference between these two kinds of extasies? In commenting on *The Divine Names* of Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas emphasizes that the direction of the intention (*intentio*) toward the object in *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae* is different:

In both modes of love, the affection of the lover is drawn by some sort of inclination to the beloved, yet in different ways. In the second mode of love (*amor concupiscentiae*), the affection of the lover is drawn to the beloved by an act of the will, but through the intention, the affection returns to itself; for when I want justice or wine, my affection inclines toward one of them, but still comes back to itself, because it is drawn to those things so that, through them, it might be in a good way. Thus, this kind of love does not place the lover outside himself with respect to the end of the intention. But when something is loved by the first mode of love (*amor amicitiae*), the affection tends toward the loved thing in such a way that it does not come back to itself, since it loves the good for the loved thing and not for the reason that from it something might come to it. Therefore, such a love produces extasis because it places the lover outside his very self.

The extasis of *amor amicitiae* goes beyond the good desired by self and extends out to the other person as other. This extasis is a genuine going out of oneself—placing what one takes as one’s good in another. This movement out of oneself, however, is not some kind of self-destruction because the “separation” from oneself is not ontological, but logical, i.e., conceptual. The beloved and the good of the beloved are the reference points of the extasis of *amor amicitiae*, not oneself, even though, properly speaking, one never “leaves oneself behind.”

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90 Or, as Kwasniewski reformulates the question, “What good is that object to me?” Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 594.

91 *In De div. nom.*, IV, lect. 10 (Marietti, 142): “In utroque igitur modo amoris, affectus amantis per quandam inclinationem trahitur ad rem amatam, sed diversimode: nam in secundo modo amoris, affectus amantus trahitur ad rem amatam per actum voluntatis, sed per intentionem, affectus recurrit in seipsum; dum enim appeti iustitiam vel vinum, affectus quidem meus inlinatur in alterum horum, sed tamen recurrat in seipsum, quia sic fertur in praedicta ut per ea bonum sit ei; unde talis amor non ponit amantem extra se, quantum ad finem in tentionis. Sed cum aliquid amatur primo modo amoris, sic affectus fertur in rem amatam, quod non recurrat in seipsum, quia ipsi rei amatae vult bonum, non ex ea ratione quia ei exinde aliquid accidat. Sic igitur talis amor extasim facit, quia ponit amantem extra seipsum.”

92 Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 604.

93 As Kwasniewski points out, to do so would describe physical death, not love. Ibid. Also, “Love of things as instruments generates a quasi-ecstatic love that journeys outward to return inward, bearing gifts for the subject. Love of persons for their own sake generates a truly ecstatic love in which the self is borne as a gift to another
This genuine *extasis* leads us to return to a point made in chapter one, where St. Paul speaks of true selflessness, where one’s own private good is directed to others:

A man is said to live according to that in which he chiefly puts his affection and in which he is mainly delighted. Hence men who take their greatest pleasure in study or in hunting say that this is their life. However, each man has his kind of private affection by which he seeks that which is his own. Therefore, when someone lives seeking only what is his own, he lives only for himself; but when he seeks the good of others, he is said to live for them.94

Ultimately, only God can be the Other to whom a person may ordain his good, as well as himself, entirely.95 The lover, says Thomas, “wears the mask” of the beloved, where the beloved becomes a certain guiding principle for all that the lover does. We could say that the beloved’s inclination “in-forms” the inclination of the lover, drawing the lover to be at the service of the beloved’s desires.96

This “living by and within the life of the beloved” is a theme taken up again by Thomas in his discussion of mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*). The idea stated above that the will of the beloved becomes something of a principle of the lover’s acts appears in ST IaIIae, q. 28, a.2:

> In true love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as to himself, and the will of his friend as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or

subject by sharing a common life aspiring to common goods.” Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Thomas Aquinas,” i. We further note, that we cannot love ourselves ecstatically: “as the very word suggests, *extasis* implies otherness, duality, a subject stood out from and something stood in towards.” Ibid., 80.

94 *In Gal.*, c.2, lect. vi (Marietti, 588): “homo quantum ad illud dicitur vivere, in quo principaliter firmat suum affectum, et in quo maxime delectatur. Unde et homines qui in studio seu in venationibus maxime delectantur, dicunt hoc eorum vitam esse. Quilibet autem homo habet quendam privatum affectum, quo quaerit quod suum est; dum ergo aliquis vivit quaerens tantum quod suum est, soli sibi vivit, cum vero quaerit bona aliorum, dicitur etiam illis vivere.” See Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 597.

95 *In De div. nom.*, c. iv., lect. 10 (Marietti, 143): “Deus amator et sic exponenda est haec littera quod amor divinus facit extasim, idest ponit amantem extra se, idest ordinat ipsum in Deum ita quod non permissit ipsos amatores esse sui ipsorum, sed rerum divinarum quae amantur, quia nihil sui sibi relinquunt quin in Deum ordinent.”

96 *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a.1 (Moos, 856): “Cum enim amans amatum assumperit quasi idem sibi, oportet ut quasi personam amati amans great in omnibus quae ad amatum spectant; et sic quodammodo amans amato inservit, inquantum amati terminis regulatur.”
suffered the evil in his friend. Thus, it is proper to friends to wish the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same, as the Philosopher says in Ethic. ix, and Rhet. ii. Thus, insofar as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were made one with him. Insofar, however, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend’s sake as for his own, regarding his friend as identified with himself, the beloved is in the lover. In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love, insofar as there is mutual love between the lovers, and both desire and do good things for one another. 97

It is important to note that Thomas is not arguing that the beloved’s will is some kind of passive tool, available for manipulation by the lover. The lover does not wish to possess the beloved’s will but rather, the beloved’s likeness; as Schwartz notes, “the lover wants to participate in the form of the loved one as much as his particular mode of being is open to it.” 98 In this way, the love between the friends genuinely affects the choices they make.

In the case of mutual indwelling, the lover and beloved share one another’s good as a common good. 99 Yet, even when the lover goes out toward the beloved, or when he possesses the beloved, the lover is never separated from his own good; rather, he constantly seeks to enlarge

97 ST IAIIae, q. 28, a.2 (Leon. 6.199): “In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntateria amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere, secundum Philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redemptionis: inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur.”

98 Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship, 28. In the case of friendship with God in charity, Schwartz rightly notes that Aquinas does not use the expression “unity” of wills but more correctly “conformity” of our will to the divine will. Ibid., 29. For Thomas, see De ver., q. 23, a.7co.

99 Kwasniewski states: “In order for the mutual indwelling of friendship to take place, the lover and the beloved each must pass out of himself and come to dwell in the other, in this way ‘sharing’ each other’s good, willing it in common. . . such dwelling and communing is made possible when the affections of the heart become harmoniously proportioned to another person”; and “The lover goes out of himself to dwell in the beloved, but by so doing, the beloved comes to dwell in him; and the dialectical process of giving and receiving can never be completed, inasmuch as no love is perfected on earth.” Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 600; 601.
We note here that the unity caused by extasis of amor amicitiae does not obliterate the ontological “otherness” of lover and beloved. As Gallagher expresses it, an “ontological unity” is not effected by this kind of love but rather a union of affections by which one person “affectively takes the other to be part of himself and the goods of the other as his own goods.” That is, the unity caused by the love between lover and beloved is not an ontological unity: it is an affective unity where the lover sees the beloved as another self, and consequently acts in a way that takes the other as if he or she were one with oneself.

V.

Union of Wills in Friendship as a Form of Self-Gift and Self-Perfection

For Thomas, self-perfection is “the ecstatic gift of self to God and neighbour.” This mutual self-gift of lover and beloved is effected through a union of wills, a union that also implies a certain “bending” of each will to the other, since there is both likeness and unlikeness between lover and beloved. On the one hand, the affection of the lover tends to the beloved as if the beloved were one with him, as if there were one will; the lover wills good to the beloved as he would to himself. On the other hand, because lover and beloved are not really identical, the will of each undergoes a kind of modification. As Johann notes:

100 As Kwasniewski notes, Thomas always adds a qualifier to exiens extra se ipsum (ST IaIIae, q. 28, a.3) since a person cannot in reality “leave himself behind.” Furthermore, the demand of extatic amor amicitiae to always will the good of the beloved has a “wounding” effect in that the lover suffers “a steady purging of self-will [ST IaIIae, q. 28, a.5].” See Kwasniewski, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved,” 604; 602.


if a being is to find his own good in the proper and incommunicable subsistence of another, his own ipseity must first of all be a value to himself. He must be conscious of himself, apprehend himself in his uniqueness and cherish himself, if he is to present to and cherish the ‘self’ in another.103

When the lover takes the beloved as a “second self,” the lover “must somehow be present to that unique principle of action which he is in himself.”104 The affective unity of love moves the lover to help the beloved achieve whatever would contribute to the beloved’s perfection. This movement is distinct from simple well-wishing, since, as alter ipse, the beloved becomes a part of the lover and reciprocates his love. Thus, amor amicitiae “implies the reciprocity of two selves, an I and a thou.”105 Moreover, lover and beloved alike must each exercise proper self-love in order to achieve self-mastery if each is to authentically “find his own good in the self of the other.”106

Yet, ultimately, God is the ground of everything that one loves in oneself, as Thomas argues:

The good of the lover, however, is found more [completely] where it is more perfect . . . Since, therefore, our good is perfect in God, as in the first, universal and perfect cause of all goods, so it is that the good in Him is naturally of greater value to us than the good in ourselves.107

Thomas’s metaphysics of participation is the key to understanding how self-love is the basis of our love for others, since amor sui itself participates in being (esse commune). Thus, mutual self-

104 Ibid., 42.
105 Ibid., 47.
106 Ibid., 48.
107 In III Sent., d. 29, a.3 (Moos, 929): “Bonum autem ipsius amantis magis inventur ubi perfectius est . . . Quia ergo bonum nostrum in Deo perfectum est, sicut in causa universali prima et perfecta bonorum, ideo bonum in ipso esse magis naturaliter complacet quam in nobis ipsis.”
gift means that the other is able to reveal himself to me at the deeper level of mutual self-awareness.\textsuperscript{108}

The next chapter will address in detail how self-love comes to its fruition as a principle of perfection as presented within Thomas’s metaphysics of participation. As Johann notes:

For the search of creatures for that by which they are rendered actual and perfect, a principle of goodness inherent in themselves, is really a search for an analogue of the divine goodness. In seeking a good for themselves, they do therefore, in a sense seek God. And the good in every case remains a principle of actuation, \textit{bonum alterius}.\textsuperscript{109}

We could say that a desire for perfection is built into \textit{amor amicitiae}.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, a person’s desire to give himself completely to God is a desire to give his will to God—i.e., to give not simply the goods he has, but the very vehicle by which he desires and acquires those goods for himself. Thomas follows the apostle Paul in arguing that charity is the highest form of union of wills between friends, since charity causes a person to go out of himself for the good of the other:

\begin{quote}
[Someone] is made to be outside himself when he does not care about things that are his own, but about goods that pertain to others; and this is the work of charity: ‘Charity does not insist on its own way’ (1 Cor. 13:5). Concerning this ecstasy, Dionysius says in the \textit{Divine Names}: ‘Ecstasy is produced by divine love not permitting one to be a lover of self but of the beloved,’ namely, of the things loved.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} “To reveal \textit{itself} to me, therefore, to unveil that unique and original abundance which is itself, the being must be a \textit{someone}. It must be a someone, moreover, who is lovingly turned in my direction. For ‘self-giving’ indicates not merely a possibility, but also an act. The someone must offer himself to me, somehow give me access to that share of excellence which is himself. It may be only implicit.” Johann, \textit{The Meaning of Love}, 55.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 60.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 74.

\textsuperscript{111} See \textit{In Cor.}, c. 12, lect. 1 (Marietti, 541): “Efficitur vero extra se ipsum, quando non curat quae sua sunt, sed quae perveniunt ad bona aliorum, et hoc, facit charitas. 1 Cor. c.xiii, 4: \textit{Charitas non quaeit quae sua sunt. Et de hac extasi dicit Dionysius, iv cap. de \textit{Divinis Nominibus}: Est autem extasim faciens divinus amor non sinens amatorem sui ipsius esse, sed amatorum, scilicet rerum amatorum.”
We conclude this chapter with Mansini’s point that friendship “is more truly predicated of friendship with God than of natural friendship.” God desires for us his own goodness—himself—which is our highest good. Thomas moves beyond Aristotle’s analogue of the perfect friendship as that between virtuous people. For Thomas, the friendship of charity is the paradigm of all friendships because charity is participation in the highest good.


113 Marko Fuchs argues that for Thomas, we do not really charitably love our neighbour in any meaningful way for his or her own sake, but rather only on account of our love of God: “what we love in our neighbours when we love them out of charity is, broadly speaking, God;” and “When we love someone with charitable dílectio proximi, we do so not because of her or himself (ratione sui ipsius), but because of God (ratione Dei), while in any Aristotelian friendship we love our friend ratione sui ipsius.” Marko Fuchs, “Philia and Caritas: Some aspects of Aquinas’s reception of Aristotle’s theory of friendship,” in Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 215–16. I do not see how it follows, according to Fuchs, that loving one’s neighbour in charity “no matter how close he is to us” is not to love him for himself but because of God. Fuchs seems to misunderstand Thomas’s notion of charity, for while not all love is charity, charity is love (the highest kind). In charity, I will the highest kinds of goods to my neighbour for my neighbour’s sake and this is properly personal love. Charity does not change the direction of love’s relation; rather it elevates it.
Chapter Six:

Self-Love as Participation in the Divine Act of Self-Love

This chapter will explore the theme of self-love as a participation in the likeness of God’s act of self-love. Thomas’s theory of participation provides an account of how God loves himself by his very essence whereas human beings love themselves per participationem. God is simple; power, act and object are all the same in him,\(^1\) thus his self-love is pure act. Human beings, however, are self-lovers per participationem. Our self-love entails composition: power, act, and object are distinct in us; we have different powers for different acts\(^2\) and our acts are specified by their objects.\(^3\) What we choose to love shapes our moral life, where virtues and vices modify how we adapt ourselves to goods. God, however, is the sole object of his self-love. He is his very act of knowing and loving,\(^4\) and understands himself through himself.\(^5\) As we will see, human acts flowing from proper self-love means that we are agents of good—for ourselves and for

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\(^1\) In ST Ia, q. 3, Thomas addresses the simplicity of God in eight articles. As part of his discussion, he negates the four compositions—form/matter, essence/individual, esse/essence, and substance/accidents—as applicable to God.


\(^3\) Ibid., 166: “Actus autem ex objectis speciem habet.”

\(^4\) Since God is pure act, his intellect and its object are the same. ST Ia, q. 14, a. 2 (Leon. 4.168): “Deus nihil potentialitas habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis . . . Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit.”

\(^5\) ST Ia, q. 14, a. 2 (Leon. 4.168): “Deus nihil potentialitas habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis: ita scilicet, ut neque careat specie intelligibili, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia; neque species intelligibilis sit alius a substantia intellectus divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actus intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus divinis. Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit.” His will is moved by itself only ST Ia, q. 19, a. 1, ad 3 (Leon. 4.231): “Unde, cum voluntas Deo sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus.”

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others—in imitation of the First Agent, God. We turn now to examine the meaning of participation and how it accounts for the perfective nature of human self-love.

II.

The Meaning of Participation

The theory of participation is not original to Thomas. Plato first proposed this theory in order to account for the problem of the One and the Many. The theory of participation proposes that where there is a multiplicity of many members that have a common attribute, there must be one perfect source that possesses this attribute perfectly, and from which each of the imperfect recipients derives its own partial perfection. Plato, however, did not clearly explain the nature of this participation, especially the distinction between real and logical participation. Rather, it was Thomas who developed the notion of participation as the partial reception of an attribute in the recipient, an attribute which exists perfectly in the source of that perfection.6

To begin with a general overview of his theory of participation, Thomas holds that everything that participates in something receives it from that from which it participates, and in this respect that from which it participates is its cause.7 Within the structure of participation there

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6 Norris Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 90. As Clarke notes further, “The Plotinian intuition of participation in terms of infinity and limitation was reduced to rigid technical formulation by Proclus, the Scholastic of Neoplatonism. He laid down with new explicitness the necessity of composition or distinction between the participating subject and the participated perfection as an essential condition of every participation.” Ibid., 91.

7 De sub. Sep. c. 3 (Leon. 40.46:11–15).
is (i) the source of the perfection, where the source has the perfection in unlimited fashion, and (ii) a subject that participates that perfection in partial fashion, having received it from that higher source in a relation of real dependence.

The source of the perfection, which has a perfection in an unlimited way, possesses the perfection *per essentiam* (by its essence). The source is not composed; it is perfectly simple, and unique. Thomas excludes the possibility of two sources having the same perfection *per essentiam* for then they would be indistinguishable. But because the source is perfectly simple (not composed), the perfection is unlimited.

The participating subject, however, does not have its perfection *per essentiam* but *per participationem*; it receives its perfection from another. Thus, it is limited—composed of the received perfection and the subject receiving/limiting it. The distinguishing component principles are either real or logical, depending on whether the participation itself is in the real or logical order. We note that every participating subject must be composed and limited in distinction to its unparticipated, simple, and unlimited source.

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8 *SCG* II, c. 52 (Leon. 3.387): “Impossibile est quod sit duplex esse omnino infinitum: esse enim quod omnino est infinitum, omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendet; et sic, si duobus talis adesset infinitas, non inveniretur quo unum ab altero differret.”

9 *SCG* II, c. 52 (Leon. 3.388): “Quod autem competit alicui secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis: sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum igitur esse competit omnibus aliis a primo agente per participationem quandam. Quod autem competit alicui per participationem, non est substantia eius.”

III.

A Closer Look at Participation

In his Exposition on Boethius’ *De Hebdomadibus*, Thomas tells us that “when something receives in a particular way that which belongs to another in a universal way, it is said to ‘participate’ in that.” Boethius states that “what is” (*quod est*) can participate something. Here, Thomas develops the meaning of participation, stating that “to participate” (*participare*) is to “take a part” (*partem capere*). When something receives in a particular way what another has in a universal way, it is said to participate in what that other has. He goes on further to say that “when something receives in a particular fashion that which belongs to another in a universal fashion, the former is said to participate in the latter.” That is, when a quality or perfection is had by a subject in a partial fashion, the subject is said to participate in that perfection. Thomas then outlines three main kinds of participation.

Thomas presents the first and second modes of participation by way of example: (1) man in animal and (2) Socrates in man. Although he does not elaborate, we can gather from these examples that (1) a species can be said to participate in its genus and (2) an individual can

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11 *In De hebld.*, 2 (Leon. 50.271:71–73): “Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud.”

12 Ibid., (Leon. 50.271: 68–71): “Secundam differentiam ponit ibi: *Quod est participare* etc. Quae quidem differentia sumitur secundum rationem participationis. Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud.”

13 Ibid., (Leon.50.271:71–73): “Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud.”
participate in its species. Neither participant exhausts the intelligible content of its respective perfection. In the examples given, the specific notion man shares in the generic notion of animal, and the notion of the individual Socrates shares in the notion of the species of man: neither the notion man, nor the notion Socrates exhaust the universality of their respective perfection. That is, man and Socrates do not possess the intelligible structure of that in which they participate according to its full universality.

In another text, however, Thomas argues that “a genus is not predicated of a species by participation, but by essence. Man is an animal essentially, not only participating in something of an animal.”

Here, he argues that nothing precludes what is predicated of a thing through participation also to be predicated of it essentially. This conclusion seems to contradict his claim that things are either by their essence or by participation. Indeed, Thomas seems to hold an untenable position: that something can be predicated of another both by participation and essentially. Yet, when we explore further, we see that there is no contradiction if the predication is made differently.

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14 In VII Met., lect. 3, n. 1328 (Marietti, 329): “Genus autem non praedicatur de speciebus per participationem, sed per essentiam. Homo enim est animal essentialiter, non solum aliquid animalis participans, Homo enim est quod verum est animal.”


16 See Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 197.
Cornelio Fabro notes that because of their ontological contents, genera and species are predicated essentially of their respective subjects.\textsuperscript{17} The subjects, however, possess the \textit{ratio} of these perfections partially; thus, genera and species are also predicated of these subjects by participation. Some scholars call this a logical participation,\textsuperscript{18} since a less extended intelligibility is sharing in one that is more extended.\textsuperscript{19}

In addressing the second mode of participation Thomas gives the examples of a subject participating in an accident and matter participating in form. Again, the subject receives in a particular way what another has in a universal way; the receiving principle (whether a subject or matter) participates the received form. This kind of participation is real; the receiving subject \textit{really} participates in the form received, resulting in a compositon between the receiver and the received perfection.\textsuperscript{20}

Thomas addresses a third kind of participation, also by way of example—that of an effect in its cause, especially when the effect is not equal to the power of its cause. The effect acts as the recipient of the cause; it “particularises” the cause. As a determinate recipient of the cause,


\textsuperscript{18} Cornelio Fabro, \textit{La nozione metafisica}, 27–28, 145–46, 149–50; Geiger, \textit{La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d’Aquin}, 48–49; te velde, Participation and Substantiality, 76–82. See Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 97. We note that Thomas himself does not refer to this kind of participation as such.

\textsuperscript{19} See Doolan, \textit{Aquinas on the Divine Ideas}, 198.

\textsuperscript{20} Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Thought}, 98.
the effect participates the power of the cause; it receives from its cause only that which is necessary for its own production. In this way, a cause is participated in by its effect.

Thomas gives the example of air, which participates in the sun’s light but does not receive that light with the same intensity of brightness as in the sun.\(^{21}\) He presents this as real participation. We see that for Thomas, all things are composed of the interdependant, real principles of essence and \textit{esse} – that is, a real metaphysical composition.

Two scholars in particular, Cornelio Fabro and Louis Geiger, have made a significant contribution to our understanding of Thomas’s theory of participation, although they differ in their interpretation of it.\(^{22}\) John F. Wippel has made a further valuable contribution in striving to find a middle ground between the two.\(^{23}\)

We recall that for Thomas, “to participate” means to “take a part.” Looking at Thomas’s writings, Fabro isolates two basic ways in which beings “participate.” He first looks at what he calls predicamental-univocal participation. According to this mode, all the participants share the same formality that they have through their essential content. What is participated in does not

\(^{21}\) \textit{In De heb.}, c. 2 (Leon. 50.271:80–85).


exist in itself, but only in the participants, which really exist in themselves.\footnote{“tutti i partecipanti hanni in se la stessa formalita secondo tutto il suo contenuto essenziale, ed il partecipato non esiste in se ma solo nei partecipanti.” Fabro, \textit{La nozione metafisica di partecipazione}, 305.} Since the participant and the participated belong to the finite substance in Aristotle’s \textit{Categories} (predicaments), Fabro calls this predicamental participation. This mode corresponds with the first two modes already outlined in the \textit{De Hebdomadibus}: one mode that is logical, the other that is real.

The second mode Fabro outlines he calls transcendental-analogical participation, which corresponds to the third mode in the \textit{De Hebdomadibus}. In this mode, the participants take part in a given perfection according to a deficiency of likeness (“similitudine degradata”).\footnote{Ibid.} The participated perfection exists externally to the participant, as a property of a superior being or “as a pure and subsistent formality in full possession of itself.” Fabro argues that this analogical mode is the strongest meaning of participation.\footnote{“La partecipazione analogica . . . e quella dal Creatore che, essendo l’essere per essenza, in sè riassume . . . tutte le altre perfezioni, formalmente si sono perfezioni pure, virtualmente se miste.” Ibid., 306.} Here the creature participates in the likeness of the Creator because it participates in \textit{esse} (the act of being) by \textit{having esse} from the one who is \textit{ipsum esse} (\textit{Deus dicitur ens hoc modo quod est ipsum suum esse; creatura vero non est ipsum suum esse, sed dicitur ens, quasi esse participans}).\footnote{\textit{In II Sent.}, d.16, q.1, a.1, ad 3 (Mandonnet, 398), cited by Fabro, \textit{La Nozione Metafisica}, 306.}
Fabro regards creatures’ being *per participationem* in an interrelated manner: (i) according to the transcendental order inasmuch as it is composed of essence and *esse*; and (ii) according to the predicamental order inasmuch as it is a composite of matter and form or substance and accidents.\(^{28}\)

Louis Geiger also identifies two modes of participation within Thomas’s writings, but in a different way from Fabro. Geiger calls these modes: (i) “participation by composition” and (ii) “participation by similitude.”\(^{29}\) The first kind of participation is composition of a receiver and that which it receives. This participation is “the reception and consequently the possession of an element playing the role of form by a subject playing the role of matter.”\(^{30}\)

The second way of participation (by similitude, or formal hierarchy) concerns states of greater and lesser perfection, and is grounded on this unequal perfection. So two things can imitate the same referent for their perfection but each to its own extent. These two ways of participation are distinguished according to the way in which they explain the limitation of the received perfection. Thus, if composition accounts for the limitation, then participation by composition is the system of participation; if the limitation of the received perfection is prior by


\(^{30}\) Ibid: “la participation est la réception et consequemment la possession d’un element, jouant le rôle de former, par un subject jouant le rôle de matière.”
nature to composition then the system involved is participation by similitude or formal hierarchy. According to Geiger, Thomas regards both ways of participation as interrelated and adopts both, but views participation by similitude as primary.\(^{31}\)

Geiger does address Thomas’s commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus* but only looks at the second and third kinds of participation (the *real* modes). Geiger argues that the participation of matter in form and of subject in accident involves composition, yet he notes that there must be a prior limitation to account for the subject of the composition. He looks at the third mode of participation – of an effect in its cause – and argues that if an effect is produced by its cause, its limitation must precede its composition: it has to exist and be limited before it receives.\(^ {32}\)

Geiger examines how creatures are composed of two principles, essence and *esse*, where essence is the limiting principle of *esse*. Lest we fall into a series of infinite limiting compositions, he argues, the limitation of *esse* is not due just to essence, but to a prior participation—that of a formal hierarchy, where participants share in a greater or lesser likeness to the First Perfection. Geiger states: “the essence that participates in existence is itself a participation of the First Perfection, of which it conveys only a limited and fragmentary aspect.”\(^ {33}\)

\(^ {31}\) Ibid., 29–30.

\(^ {32}\) Ibid., 48–52.

Thus far, we have seen two various interpretations of Thomas: Fabro gives primacy to participation by composition, whereas Geiger gives primacy to participation by similitude. Despite their different emphases, John Wippel regards both as legitimate interpretations of Thomas’s theory of participation and offers insight into how they are both compatible points of view. Wippel, however, chooses to focus on the participation of creatures in esse. For Wippel, the participation of a being in esse pertains to the third kind of participation—that of an effect in its cause, especially when the effect is not equal in power to that cause.

This brief survey of Thomas’s theory of participation highlights the point that the receiver stands as potency to the received principle, which stands as act, and that there is real

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34 Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 204. Referring to the first mode of participation (logical) mentioned by Thomas in his Commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus*, Wippel argues that participation in esse cannot be reduced to logical participation for four main reasons: (i) participation in esse is real; (ii) there is a real distinction between the participating subject and that in which the subject participates; (iii) esse is not predicated essentially of the participant (i.e., esse is not part of a creature’s essence); (iv) logical participation accommodates univocal predication, whereas participation in esse does not. According to Wippel, participation in esse cannot be reduced to the second mode of participation either. This is because in order for a substance to participate in its accidents the subject must already exist, just as for matter to participate in form, a matter-form composite must first exist. In other words, participation in esse is prior to that of a subject in accidents or of matter in its form. Additionally, this second mode of participation also allows for univocal predication; esse, however, can only be predicated analogically of whatever participates in it. In both cases, Wippel argues that a third thing (tertium quid) results, whereas no third thing results in the participation of essence in esse. Ibid., 103–106.

35 Wippel also clarifies that Thomas is not always using esse in the same way when he speaks about beings participating in esse. Ibid., 109; 120–21. For a clear presentation on Thomas’s view on this third kind of participation, see Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas on *Esse Subsistens* and the Third Mode of Participation,” Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group I. *American Catholic Philosophical Association Conference*. October 10, 2014. Washington D.C.

36 *ST* Ia, q. 75, a. 5, ad 1 (Leon. 5.202).
composition between a participant and a participated perfection—matter in form, and a subject in
its accidents. Self-love, as a principle of perfection, is necessarily composed in creatures.

Creatures are good, yet goodness does not belong to them essentially but only by
participation. Consequently, perfections that belong to creatures (such as goodness, wisdom)
are transcendental ones that flow from the act of being. Thus, while self-love in us is an accident,
it does not fall under logical participation, because self-love is real. We will address this last
point now in light of how a creature, as an effect participating in its cause (real participation),
achieves perfection through active being.

Creatures, as effects, are agents as well as beings. Thomas argues axiomatically that
every effect is in some way like its cause; effects desire to participate in the similitude of the
agent where the agent has the character of the good ( ipsum agens est appetibile et habet rationem
boni: hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur, ut eius similitudo participetur). Creatures achieve
perfection through their operation as the (efficient) cause of another thing.

37 Quod. II, q. 2, art. 1 (Leon. 25/2.214:38–41): “Deus dicitur bonus essencialiter, quia est ipsa bonitas,
creature autem dicuntur bone per participationem, quia habent bonitatem.” See Cornelio Fabro, Participation et
causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquin. (Publications Universitaires: Louvain, 1961). Also, Cornelio Fabro, La nozione
metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Turin: 1950), 318.

38 Ibid. “Unde ipsum agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni: hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur, ut
eius similitudo participetur.”

39 SCG III, c. 19 (Leon. 14.47): “res ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem non solum secundum esse
substantiale, sed etiam secundum ea quae ei accident pertinentia ad perfectionem; et etiam secundum propriam
operationem, quae etiam pertinet ad perfectionem rei.”

operationem.”
Given that an effect proceeds from its cause and that a cause cannot give what it does not have, there must be relational similitude between effect and cause.\(^{41}\) In *ST* Ia, q. 4, a. 2, Thomas argues that a perfection found in an effect is also found in its efficient cause, either according to the same intelligible content (as in an univocal agent) or like that of an equivocal agent, like the sun.\(^{42}\) In the latter case, there is a similitude of those things that is effected through its power; in this way, an effect is said to preexist in the cause, but in a more perfect way.\(^{43}\)

Moreover, in *ST* Ia, q. 5, a. 4, Thomas discusses the nature of the four causes. In noting that the good has the character of an end, he states that “the definition of the good presupposes the definition of the efficient cause and formal cause.”\(^{44}\) He then delineates the order of the causes according to how they produce an effect. What is first in the order of causality, he argues,

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\(^{41}\) See Norris Clarke, *Explorations in Metaphysics*, 52. Clarke adds further on: “All that a being has to do is to become conscious, to become aware of itself as a receiving set, as the recipient of self-revealing action from the surrounding world, and it is now able to interpret the messages, the *information*, contained within this incoming action, as messages from these surrounding beings, as the self-revelation of these beings to it through the mediated action of their structured action upon it. A human being is precisely such a self-conscious receiving set.” Ibid., 54.

\(^{42}\) *ST* Ia, q. 4, a.2 (Leon. 4.51): “Primo quidem, per hoc quod quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa effectiva: vel secundum eandem rationem si sit agens univocum, ut homo generat hominem; vel eminenti modo, si sit, agens aequovocum, sicut in sole est similitudo eorum quae generantur per virtutem solis.”

\(^{43}\) Ibid: “Manifestum est enim quod effectus praexistit virtute in causa agente: praexistere autem in virtute causae agentis, non est praexistere imperfectiori modo, sed perfectiori.”

\(^{44}\) *ST* I, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 4.61). “Cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamens ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem causae formalis.”
is last in the effect. The order is as follows: (i) the good and the end which moves the efficient cause; (ii) the efficient cause acts, moving towards a form; (iii) the form itself appears. The order is reversed from the standpoint of the effect: (i) the form through which it is a being; (ii) the active power is considered, insofar as it is perfect in being (esse); (iii) the nature of the good is achieved, through which perfection in being (ente) is established. We note that it is especially through efficient causality that creatures operate in order to achieve their goodness. Furthermore, as Thomas states, “the perfection and form of the effect is a certain similitude of the agent, since every agent produces something like itself;” and again, “each and every thing is perfect when it is able to make another like itself.” Creatures, as effects, desire to participate the agent’s similitude where the agent has the character of the good. Thomas argues that all agents tend toward the final end of the first agent, in a fashion similar to individuals in an army


46 ST I, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 4.61): “In causando autem, primum invenitur bonum et finis, qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad formam; tertio adventit forma.”

47 Ibid: “Unde e converso esse oportet in causato: quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo consideratur in ea virtut effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in esse. Tertio consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.”

48 ST I, q. 6, a. 1 (Leon. 4.66): “Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis: cum omne agens agat sibi simile.”

49 ST I, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 4.61): “Quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi simile facere, ut dicit Philosophus in s in IV Meteor.”
who act for the victory—the ultimate end of the leader.\textsuperscript{50} God is the first mover and first efficient cause of all creatures, thus the actions and movements of creatures “are ordered to participating a similitude of divine goodness.”\textsuperscript{51} God is ultimately the final cause of creatures’ movements and operations.\textsuperscript{52} The latter point will be addressed in the final section of this chapter.

Self-love is an operation through which human beings act to achieve their perfection. Actions can be of two types for Thomas: “immanent action” (action which remains within the agent), or “transient action” (action which flows from the agent to an external effect) as a cause to its effect.\textsuperscript{53} Self-love is an immanent action because it is an action that remains within the agent: first act (esse) flows into action via second act (operation).


\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Comp.} I, c. 103. (Leon. 42.119:29–37). “Ostensum est autem supra quod primum mouens et agens est Deus, finis autem eius non est aliud quam sua bonitas, ut etiam supra ostensum est; necesse est igitur quod omnes actiones et motus quarumcumque creaturarum sint propter diuinam bonitatem, non quidem causandam neque augendam sed suo modo acquirendam, participando siquidem aliquam similitudinem eius.”

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Comp.} I, c. 103 (Leon. 42.119). “Quod non solum diuina bonitas est causa rerum sed etiam omnis motus et operationis.”

\textsuperscript{53} As Gregory T. Doolan notes, Thomas does not use these terms “immanent action” and “transitive action.” These are scholastic terms that were used and developed later. Thomas, however, does make a distinction between these kinds of actions, and “generally employs descriptors using variants of the words inmanens and transiens.” Doolan, “Aquinas on Creation: Transitive or Immanent Action?” Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Conference, 2011, Villanova University: PA.
The distinction between these two kinds of action is interesting because Thomas notes that immanent action not only remains within the agent, but is perfective of the agent. Thomas gives the examples of seeing, understanding, and willing as immanent actions—actions that remain within and perfect the agent; additionally, each is a “perfect act” (actus perfecti), complete in itself.

Furthermore, immanent and transitive actions elicit two kinds of procession: the procession of an interior reality (immanent action) and the procession of an exterior reality (transitive action). In ST Ia, q. 27, a.1, Thomas distinguishes between action that goes out of the

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54 Thomas refers to Book IX of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* in making this distinction. Gregory Doolan notes: “Aquinas first discusses these two sorts of actions in ch. 6 of book IX. Unfortunately, the relevant discussion was missing from Thomas’s text. Instead, he bases his distinction of Aristotle’s presented in c.8 of that book.” See Doolan, “Aquinas on Creation: Transitive or Immanent Action?” Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference, 2011. Villanova University: Villanova, PA.

55 Ibid. See also *SCG* II, c. 1 (Leon. 13.271): “Est autem duplex rei operatio, ut Philosophus tradit, in IX *Metaphysicae*: una quidem quae in ipso operante manet et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut sentire, intelligere et velle; alia vero quae in exteriorem rem transit, quae est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et aedificare.”

56 *ST* Ia, q. 27, a.4 (Leon. 4.313): “Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis: et intantum potest habere rationem generationis, quia omne generans generat sibi simile. Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis et moveitis in aiaquid.” This text appears in the context of Thomas’s arguments for procession of love in God. Given that our focus is strictly on Thomas’s philosophical account of human self-love as an immanent action, we will not address the topic of divine self-love as immanent and/or transitive action. For an excellent discussion on the area, see: Gilles Emery, O.P., *Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007); “Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in Saint Thomas Aquinas.” The Thomist 64 (2000): 521–63. We note in the text just cited, that Thomas also distinguishes the different modes by which the intellect and the will are in act: the intellect is actualised by the object known which, according to its own likeness, is in the intellect; the will, however, is actualised not by the likeness of the object, but because the will itself inclines towards the willed object. Thomas calls the procession of the intellect, which is by way of likeness, “generation,” whereas the procession which arises through the will is by way of impulse and moves toward an object. Just as the word expressed or known is in the knower, so in the procession of love, the object loved is in the lover.
subject to something external (eg: building) and action that remains within the subject (eg: knowing and loving) in terms of procession. In the first case, there is a procession of an external reality, and in the second case, the procession of an interior reality:

Since all procession is according to some action, just as there is an outward procession of an act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to some act remaining within the agent. This applies most clearly to the intellect, whose action of intellection is clearly in the knower. Whenever we understand, from the understanding itself there proceeds something within us, which is a concept of the object understood, a concept coming from our intellect and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the voice: and it is called the word of the heart, signified by the word of the voice.\(^57\)

**Thomas notes:**

Just as when a thing is understood by someone, there results in the one who understands a concept of the object understood, which we call word, so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands. So when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover... [On] the part of the will, with the exception of the words *dilection* and *love*, which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved produced in the lover by the fact that he loves—to the principle of that impression, or *vice versa*. Thus, because of the ineptness of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words *love* and *dilection*, just as if we were to call the Word *intelligence conceived*, or *wisdom begotten*.\(^58\)

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\(^57\) *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1co (León. 4.305): “Sed, cum omnis processio sit secundum aliquam actionem, sicut secundum actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam, est aliqua processio ad extra; ita secundum actionem quae manet in ipso agente, attenditur processio quaedam ad intra. Et hoc maxime patet in intellectu, cuius actio, scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente. Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat: et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo vocis.” See also *SCG* II, c.1; *De pot.*, q. 9, a.9; q.10, a.1.

\(^58\) *ST* Ia, q. 37, a.1co (León. 4.387–388): “Et tamen similiter utramque processionem considerari oportet. Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante... Ex parte autem voluntatis, praeter diligere et amare, quae important habitudinem amantis ad rem amatum, non sunt aliqua vocabula imposita quae importent habitudinem ipsius impressionis vel affectionis rei amatae, quae provenit in amante ex hoc quod amat, ad suum principium, aut e
In this text, we see that love arises within the lover’s will where the beloved is “impressed in” the lover, so to speak, inclining the lover’s will toward itself. Self-love as an (immanent) action by which one wills good for oneself, presupposes participation of an effect in its cause since “every agent produces something like itself.”

But an effect participating in its cause also shows how that effect participates in the likeness of that cause because likeness (similitudo) follows from agreement and communication of form (similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel communicationem in forma). Every participated likeness leads back to its principle.

Every creature operates “according to what it is.” Thus, creatures represent God according to their own being and consequently attain divine similitude in different ways. In *De substantiis separatis* c. 3, Thomas states that:

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61 ST Ia, q. 4, a. 3 (Leon. 4.53).


Every thing that participates something receives that which it participates from that by which it participates, and with respect to this, that by which it participates is its cause; as air has participated light from the sun, which is the cause of its illumination.\(^{64}\)

In this analogy, the sun shines by its own nature, but the air is made luminous only because it participates the light of the sun. In another text, Thomas gives the even clearer example of the moon, which illuminates (operation) only inasmuch as it participates the light of the sun.\(^{65}\) Thus, God alone is *ens per essentiam suam* since his essence is his *esse*. A creature, however, is *ens* by participation (*participative*) since it is composed; its essence is not its *esse*.\(^{66}\)

IV.

**Human Self-Love As a Participation in a Likeness of God’s Act of Self-Love**

Thomas argues that God, in loving Himself, loves his creatures; he wills their good and infuses goodness into them:

(Leon. 42.119:29–37): “Secundo uero per suam operationem unaqueque creatura suum esse perfectum alteri communicare conatur secundum suum modum, et per hoc tendit in similitudinem divinae causalitatis.”

\(^{64}\) *De sub. sep.* c. 3 (Leon. 40.46:11–15): “Omne autem participans aliquid accipit id quod participat ab eo a quo participat, et quantum ad hoc id a quo participat est causa ipsius: sicut aer habet lumen participatum a sole, quae est causa illuminationis ipsius.”

\(^{65}\) *Comp.* I, c. 124 (Leon. 42.127:25–31): “nam quod participat ab aliquo agente similitudinem forme ipsius et actionis, perfectius est eo quod participat similitudinem forme et non actionis, sicut luna perfectius recipit lumen a sole, que non solum fit lucida sed etiam illuminat, quam corpora opaca que illuminantur tantum et non illuminant.”

\(^{66}\) *ST* Ia, q. 104, a.1co (Leon. 5.464): “Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse.”
God wills good to every existing thing. Thus, since to love something is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is clear that God loves everything that exists. This is not, however, as we love. Because our will is not the cause of its goodness but, conversely, its goodness, whether real or imaginary, elicits our love by which we will that it should preserve the good that it has, and receive the good it does not have; it is to this end that we operate. But the love of God infuses and creates goodness in things.67

The perfection of an image consists in imitation of its exemplar through likeness, or similitude (perfectio autem imaginis est ut repraesentet suum exemplar per similitudinem ad ipsum), and this imitation occurs through the creature’s operation. A thing is perfect when it fulfills the purpose for which it was created. For Thomas, the perfection of all creatures is to achieve a divine similitude (res omnes propter divinam similitudinem consequendam sicut propter ultimum finem).68 As Norris Clarke aptly notes, “not only does every being tend, by the inner dynamism of its act of existence, to overflow into action, but this action is both a self-manifestation and a self-communication, a self-sharing of the being’s own inner ontological perfection with others.”69 The self-communication of creatures leads back to the self-communication of God, who loves himself per essentiam.

In Comp. Theol. I, c. 103, Thomas presents two ways in which things can be said to achieve a divine similitude: 1) in the conservation of their own being; 2) in the communication of

67 ST Ia, q. 20, a.2 (Leon. 4.254): “Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alciui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab objecto, amor noster, quo bonum alciui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius: sed e converso bonitas eius, vel vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet: et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.”


69 Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics, 48. See ST I, q. 6, a. 1 (Leon. 4.66). “Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis: cum omne agens agat sibi simile.”
their being to another. The first way denotes the tendency of creatures to conserve themselves in perfect being. The second way denotes a creature’s tendency toward “similitude to divine causality,” through efficient causality.

The natural tendency of being in act is to pour forth into action and to communicate itself insofar as it is possible. Actuality is communicable by nature, since “every agent, insofar as it exists in act and possesses some perfection, produces something similar to itself.” Thomas adds further:

It belongs therefore to the nature of the will to communicate to others as far as possible the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, insofar as they are perfect, communicate their goodness to others, much more does it pertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own goodness to others as far as possible.

In certain texts on creation, Thomas argues that effects are perfected by the creative action of God because of the likeness of the effects to that action. In the order of efficient causality, as the First efficient cause, God is in all things by his essence. He is not in any way

70 Comp. theol. I, c. 103. (Leon. 42,119:42–47): “Quia igitur omnibus creaturis commune est ut diuinam bonitatem repraesentent in quantum sunt, omnibus etiam commune est ut per operationes suas consequantur diuinam similitudinem in conservatione sui esse et communicione sui esse ad alterum.”


72 Ibid., 51–55. “Secundo uero per suam operationem unaqueque creatura suum esse perfectum alteri communicare conatur secundum suum modum, et per hoc tendit in similitudinem diuine causalitatis.”

73 ST Ia, q. 19, a. 2 (Leon. 4. 233): “omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi simile.”

74 Ibid: “Et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quamdam similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales, inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicat, multo magis pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est.”
perfected by the action of creation, but, rather, his effect (the creature) derives its perfection from the divine perfection. In the order of exemplar causality, the effect is perfected by God’s creative action in its likeness to that action. Given that God’s proper effect is being (esse), which is innermost in all things, he is innermost in all things by preserving them in being.\(^{75}\) In this sense, God is in all things by his essence. He does not enter into composition with creatures, but rather, the divine essence passes into the effect (creature) as a procession of the similitude of that essence flowing into the order of exemplar causality.\(^{76}\)

Through our operation of knowing and loving, we tend toward the divine likeness. The act of rational self-love requires that the good willed must be judged as fitting for the lover. I must be “well-pleased” with the good and move myself towards attaining it. I can reflect on my act and on myself as the subject that stands behind the act. Ultimately, I am conscious of myself as an actor. As Johann notes:

> For a subject that is really a self, there would seem then to be a twofold dynamism, a double finality. As a nature it tends to its full realization and desires what will contribute to that fulfillment; as ipseity, an “I”, its

\(^{75}\) ST\(\text{Ia, q. 8, a. 1 co.}: \) “Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime.” See Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas on Creation: Transitive or Immanent Action?” Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Conference, 2011, Villanova University: PA.

\(^{76}\) Ibid.
dynamic orientation is towards a “Thou”, towards Absolute Subjectivity, the transcendent ource of all personality, the total existential Plenitude of whom its own finite self is but a participation.\(^{77}\)

“From the fact that God takes pleasure in Himself, He directs other things to Himself.”\(^{78}\)

In willing and loving himself, God wills and loves other things.\(^{79}\) His self-love is productive: *amor igitur quo suam bonitatem amat, est causa creationis rerum.*\(^{80}\) Out of love for himself, for his own goodness, God brings creatures into existence and wills to communicate his goodness by way of likeness.\(^{81}\) Thomas outlines in the following text, that although God loves all creatures, he loves rational creatures in a particular way because they are more like to himself:

For one [way] is common *[dilectio generalis]*, whereby He loves all things that are, and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second [way] is a special love *[dilectio specialis]*, whereby He draws the

\(^{77}\) Johann, *The Meaning of Love*, 61. On a theological note, Thomas argues that we can enjoy God by the gift of grace whereby “the soul is conformed to God” [*ST* Ia. q. 43, a.5, ad 2 (Leon. 4.450): “animam per gratiam conformaturn Dei”], making us “participants of the Divine nature” [*ST* Ia. q. 62, a.1 (Leon. 6.401): “Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem.”] Hütter aptly notes that: “Different from this *donum ultimum*, the gift of union with God by the indwelling of the Trinity by sanctifying grace, is the very precondition for it, a first and fundamental gift, which we might want to call the *donum primum*, creation as the gift of a real relation to God that arises from a procession of creatures caused and upheld by the triune God’s exemplar, efficient, formal, and final causality, a real relation that, therefore, subsists in its own relative, but proper integrity”]. See Hütter, *Dust Bound for Heaven*, 162.

\(^{78}\) *De ver.*, q.22, a.1, ad 11 (Leon. 22/3.616:357–359): “Deus se ipso fruitur alia in se dirigit.”

\(^{79}\) *SCG* I, 75, 641 (Leon. 13.216): “Deus, volendo suam essentiam, vult etiam rerum multitudinem.”

\(^{80}\) *SCG* IV, 20 (Leon. 15.79).

\(^{81}\) *SCG* II, 46 (Leon.13.374) : “Ad productionem creaturarum nihil aliud movet Deum nisi sua bonitas, quam rebus aliis communicare voluit secundum modum assimilations ad ipsum.” See O’Rourke, *Metaphysics of Aquinas*, 228. O’Rourke notes that God does not need to create, defending both Aquinas and Dionysius from any interpretation of determinism. Rather, “God has intellect and will which are identical with God’s Being. Thus what God does according to his being, he does also according to his will and intellect.” Ibid., 252. For Aquinas see *In De div. nom.*, IV, lect 1 (Marietti, 88): “divinum esse est eius intelligere et velle et ideo quod per suum esse facit, facit per intellectum et voluntatem.”
rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.\textsuperscript{82}

God is the origin of all things and the end for the sake of which he creates all things.\textsuperscript{83} We return to God by self-love,\textsuperscript{84} coming forth from God in love and returning to him by self-love.\textsuperscript{85} As Johann notes:

Only by answering the gift of Self with the gift of himself can he [man] ever fully and consciously be what he is. Only by animating the torrential multiplicity of his desires with the fire of a single love—a love whose term is ultimately more himself than he is himself—can he realise fully and consciously in his own life that interiority and adhesion to Being in which he participates, and that communion with Being to which he is called. Only by digging deep into the value of self will he break through to paradise.\textsuperscript{86}

The return of human beings to God is the theme of exitus-reditus: “a certain circulation” whereby all things “are returned as to an end to that from which they proceed as from their

\textsuperscript{82} ST IaIIae, q. 110, a.1 (Leon. 7.311): “Una quidem communis, secundum quam \textit{diliget omnia quae sunt}, ut dicitur \textit{Sap. XI}; secundum quam esse naturale rebus creatis largitur. Alia autem est dilectio specialis, secundum quam trahit creaturam rationalem supra conditionem naturae, ad participationem divini boni. Et secundum hanc dilectionem dicitur aliquem diligere simpliciter: quia secundum hanc dilectionem vult Deus simpliciter creaturarum bonum aeternum, quod est ipse.” Also, \textit{In De div. nom.}, III (Marietti, 75): “quidquid Deus facis creaturis, sive esse sive vivere et quocumque aliud totum ex bonitate divina procedit et totum ad bonitatem pertinet creaturae.”

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{In De div. nom.}, IV, viii, 390 (Marietti, 139): “Non autem movet res propter aliquem finem extraneum, sed gratia sui ipsius, quantum ad suam intentionem, \textit{et propter ipsum} attingendum a rebus.”

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{De ver.}, q. 20, a. 4: Cum Deus sit principium omnium rerum et finis; duplex habitudo ipsius ad creaturas inventur: una secundum quam omnia a Deo procedunt in esse; alia secundum quam ad aum ordinatur ut in finem.” Thus, “there is thus within creation a circular movement which leads it forth from the original fullness of the source and returns it to God as its final fulfillment. There are within creatures two tendencies of being: being from God and being towards God.” O’Rourke, \textit{Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas}, 234.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{In De div. nom.} IV, iii, 315 (Marietti, 103): “ostendit ex qua causa contingat quod omnia, ordinetur in Deum sicut in finem”; also ibid., 316; (Marietti, 103–4): “Causam autem huius ordinis assignat dicens, quod divina \textit{Bonitas omnia convertit ad seipsam}: hoc enim ipsum quod res ordinantur in Deum, ab Ipso habent.”

\textsuperscript{86} Johann, \textit{The Meaning of Love}, 71.
origin.” Thomas calls God’s love “an eternal circle” (quidam circulus aeternus) through which God causes all creatures, and instills in them a love for himself, that is, natural self-love, in order that they return to him:

This love, firstly, is in that good which is God and has emanated from this good into existing things, participated in by beings it turns towards its own source which is the good . . . love is an eternal circle insofar as it has the good as its object, it comes from the good as its source, it is preserved in the good and consequently tends towards the good, moving around the good in an unerring cycle, on account of its uniformity.

We desire to be united to God because he is our final end. God is ipsum esse subsistens: he is pure actuality, the cause of all and the fullness of goodness whom we naturally desire as our final good: Et unaquaeque creatura intendent consequi suam perfectionem, quae est

87 In I Sent., 14, 2, 2 (Mandonnet, 325): “in exitu creaturarum a primo principio attenditur quaedam circulatio vel regiratio, eo quod omnia revertuntur sicut in finem in id a quo sicut principio prodierunt.” O’Rourke notes: “The use of exitus: reditus is not explicit in the Summa Theologiae but its meaning is nevertheless present as a latent and organic principle of order. Apart from the question of its architectonic role in the Summa, there is no doubt that it profoundly orders Aquinas’ vision of creation. Even his use of the Dionysian doctrine, Bonum diffusivum sui, which he recasts as a principle of finality, confirms how profoundly the principles of emanation and return are unified.” O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 238–9. O’Rourke summarises well the Neoplatonic influence on Thomas’s theory of love: “Aquinas accepts from Neoplatonism the principle that every effect is converted to the cause from which it proceeds; the reason is that each thing desires its good, and the good of an effect derives from its cause. It seeks its cause therefore, as its own good. Because all things are derived from God, they turn to him through desire.” Ibid., 235. See In div. nom., I, iii, 94 (Marietti, 29): “omnis effectus convertitur ad causam a qua procedit, ut Platonici dicunt. Cuius ratio est quia unaquaeque res convertitur ad suum bonum, appetendo illud; bonum autem effectus est ex sua causa, unde omnis effectus convertitur ad suam causam, appetendo ipsum. Et ideo postquam dixerat quod a Deitate deducuntur omnia, subiungit quod omnia convertuntur ad Ipsam per desiderium; et hoc est quod dicit: et omnia Ipsam desiderant.”

88 In De div. nom., IV, xi, 450 (Marietti, 148): “iste amor, primo, est in ipso bono quod est Deus et ex isto bono emanavit in existentia et, iterum, in existentibus participatus convertit se ad suum principium quod est bonum. . . amor est sicut quidam circulus aeternus, inquantum est propter bonum sicut objectum; et ex bono, sicut ex causa; et in bono preservans; et ad bonum consequendum tendens et sic circuit bonum quadam convoluntione non errante, propter uniformitatem.”

89 In De div. nom., I, iii, 100 (Marietti, 31): “Est etiam et causa conversiva ad ipsum, quia hoc quod res convertuntur in Deum, desiderando Ipsum sicut finem, est eis a Deo.”
similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Our natural self-love draws us toward union with the whole, since as part we naturally love the whole and seek the good of the whole. As rational creatures, we are like God inasmuch as we derive not only our being and our goodness from him, but also insofar as we act like him. We have being and are good—and love our existence and goodness—in imitation of the exemplar that is First Being and the First Good, but God remains unparticipated regarding his own substance (essence): he does not communicate his divine esse to creatures. Rather, everything is called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplar, effective, and final principle of all goodness.

Moreover, as Maritain notes beautifully:

Loving the divine Subject more than myself, it is for Him that I love myself, it is to do as he wishes that I wish above all to accomplish my destiny . . . I am known to other men. They know me as object, not subject. They are unaware of my subjectivity as such; unaware not merely of its inexhaustible depth, but also of that presence of the whole in each of its operations, that existential complexity of inner circumstances, data of nature, free choice, attractions, weaknesses, virtues perhaps, loves and pains; that atmosphere of immanent vitality which alone lends meaning to each of my acts . . . I am known to God. He knows all of me, me as subject. I am present to Him in my subjectivity itself; He has no need to objectise me in order to know me. Then, and in this unique instance, man is known not as object but as subject in all the depth and all the recesses of subjectivity. Only God knows me in this wise; to Him alone am I uncovered.

90 ST Ia, q. 44, a. 4 (Leon. 4.461).

91 In De div. nom., IV, ix, 406 (Marietti, 135): “totum est bonum partis: non enim est pars perfecta nisi in toto, unde naturaliter pars amat totum et exponitur pars sponte prop salute totius.”

92 In De div. nom., II, iv (Marietti, 57): “Deus ita participatur a creaturis per similitudinem, quod tamen remanet imparticipatus super omnia per proprietatem suae substantiae.”

93 ST Ia, q. 6, a.4 (Leon. 4.70): “[U]numquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo, et finali totius bonitatis.”

94 Maritain, Existence and Existent, 76–77.
As human beings, we have freedom; we choose to seek certain means and ends, to act or
to not act. We can choose the kinds of goods we love, and how we love them. Human self-love,
states Johann, “is the answer to a call from a Being who infinitely surpasses his own narrow
limits . . . and he attains it, not by appropriating something for himself, but by answering the gift
of Self with the gift of himself.”95 As Aertsen notes, “only man is capable, in his acts of
understanding and willing, to close the way of the creature.”96 As creatures, we are entirely
dependant on God for our existence: our relation to Him is real.

Thomas’s theory of participation shows that self-love is a principle of perfection because
it is grounded in the likeness of God’s act of self-love. Since as rational creatures, we are capable
of self-awareness and self-reflection, we can refer ourselves to God by our acts of knowledge
and love in a considered response to God as our Creator.97 To be a person, as Norris Clarke
expresses it so well, “is to be a dynamic act of existence on the move towards self-conscious,
free sharing and receiving, becoming a lover totally centred on Infinite Being and Goodness

95 Johann, The Meaning of Love, 63. Yet, as we recall from chapter four, Thomas argues that it is only by
grace that our nature can be elevated to participate the divine life. Grace enables our intellect to share in the divine
knowledge through faith, and our will to share in divine love through friendship with God, which is charity. See ST
IaIae, q. 110, a.4 (Leon. 7.315): “per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem
fidei; et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum , per virtutem caritatis.” See Aertsen, Nature and
Creature, 389. Thomas outlines five effects of grace: 1) to heal the soul (ut anima sanetur); 2) to will good (ut
bonum velit); 3) to carry into effect the good proposed (ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur); 4) to persevere in
good (ut in bono perseveret); 5) to reach glory (ut ad gloriam perveniat). See ST IaIae, q. 111, a.3co (Leon. 7.320).

96 Ibid., 384.

itself. Thomas’s theory shows up the truth that to be perfect we must be and act, through self-love, like God who is perfect.

Conclusion

As shown in these chapters, Thomas’s theory of proper self-love as a principle of perfection is essential to his philosophical account of how man becomes more perfect by loving self. We have seen that his theory of self-love is central to other areas of his philosophical thought, such as natural love of God, friendship, and human happiness.

In the first chapter, we looked at the influence of Aristotle, Paul, Augustine, and Pseudo-Dionysius in the development of Thomas’s theory of self-love. We noted that Thomas often utilizes Aristotle’s definition of love, where love’s twofold object is the good that is willed and a person (oneself or another) for whom that good is willed. Thomas consistently articulates two kinds of love: *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscientiae*. He goes beyond Aristotle’s account of friendship in arguing from a theological standpoint that the highest kind of friendship is charity, embedding his philosophical account of human self-love into the order of charity. Thomas also incorporates Paul’s notion of self-love as an orientation to or away from God. Turning one’s mind away from God and turning to the life of “fleshliness” constitutes improper self-love, whereas turning the mind, and consequently one’s true self, to God constitutes proper self-love.

We then looked at Augustine’s influence on Thomas’s view that ordered self-love is linked to love of God, as well as Thomas’s departure from Augustine in holding that natural self-love can never be perverse. Moreover, we noted that for Augustine there is no virtue without charity, whereas for Thomas, there can be a form of virtue without charity, which he calls imperfect virtue. We saw that a clear understanding of this point requires an understanding of the
extent to which we can naturally will the good for ourselves, a point which was addressed in
chapter four of this work.

We also noted the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius’s account of divine self-love on
Thomas’s metaphysics of participation, an account which owes much to the Proclean doctrine of
reversion. Thomas takes up the Dionysian/Proclean motif that the being of all creatures consists
in their “reversion” to God as the ultimate Good—and that for Thomas this reversion is natural
self-love. We also saw that Thomas incorporates Pseudo-Dionysius’s Neoplatonic notions of
emanation and diffusion into his philosophical account of how creatures naturally desire to be
like their cause.

Given that the topic is self-love, it was necessary that we then discuss in chapter two
whether Thomas has a notion of self and self-knowledge. It was seen that these notions are
implicit in his metaphysical account of personhood, which is also his account of subjectivity. We
considered that for Thomas, human “selfhood” is grounded in the soul, a subsisting, substantial
form—where “I” denotes the reflexive intellective, immaterial soul. It was emphasized that while
it is more appropriate to say that the person knows, the “knower” strictly speaking, is the
intellectual reflexive human soul for Thomas. We also considered how the intellect is aware of
itself (through knowing another object) and that self-knowledge involves knowing that I am and
knowing what I am. Following from this, we examined the two kinds of self-awareness, actual
and habitual in light of the scholarship on this aspect of Thomas’s thought. Actual self-awareness
is the perception that one has a soul and exists; habitual self-awareness is a “disposition” that
involves actual self-awareness as well as an act of explicit self-awareness. For Thomas, because
we know ourselves through our acts, we “determine” ourselves, we have mastery over our acts.
Although Thomas did not use the terms “self-awareness” and “self-possession,” we denoted his notion of self-mastery at the level of intellect and will using the terms “self-awareness” and “self-possession” respectively.

We then looked at Thomas’s account of subjectivity, considering how the soul acts through itself in the reflexive relationship between the intellect and will. As reflexive powers of the soul, the intellect and will can mutually include one another as objects since both are grounded in the same substance of the soul. We also considered the ways in which the will may not be moved by the intellect, and how the will can move the intellect to consider its acts.

Having briefly addressed the notions of “self” and “self-knowledge” in Thomas’s thought, we then looked at the nature of self-love, noting Thomas’s distinction between proper self-love (amor sui ordinatus) and improper self-love (amor sui inordinatus), as well as his basic distinctions between “love,” “desire” and “appetite.” After discussing natural, sensitive and rational appetite, we looked at the corresponding love in each of the appetites—natural love, sensitive love, and rational love, considering in particular Thomas’s distinction between natural love in the will (dilectio naturalis) and rational love (dilectio electiva).

We noted that for Thomas, the difference between amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae—the two “prongs” of dilectio—depends upon the direction of love’s tendency to the object. For Thomas, the way the lover takes the object determines the difference between amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae. This has important implications for self-love, where the way in which one takes “self,” the kinds of goods willed for oneself, and the way in which those goods are loved for oneself, determines whether the self-love is perfective in nature.
We distinguished human natural self-love (*dilectio naturalis*) from human rational self-love, where there are two kinds of rational self-love: proper self-love (*amor sui ordinatus*) and improper self-love (*amor sui inordinatus*). In the former, a person takes his or her soul to be the most important part; in the latter a person takes the sensitive and bodily side as primary.

The question of how self-love follows from self-knowledge was then addressed. It was seen that an act of explicit self-awareness allows a person to reflect upon his or her own acts, as the source of his or her own choices and actions. After the intellect has grasped a good *as fitting for oneself*, the will can move itself to exercise an act of love. The “standing outside of oneself,” the awareness that one is the subject of one’s acts, leads to reflection upon those acts and subsequently of being present to oneself. In this way, we can “get behind” why we perform an act by looking at why we did it – at the intention which oriented the act.

While natural self-love rightly disposes us to universal principles of action, such as to not do evil, only ordered rational love enables us to choose appropriate goods for ourselves in the proper order through virtuous habits. Improper self-love, however, lacks proper order in that goods are chosen which pertain to one’s sensitive nature and not to reason. By improper self-love, one loves self in a qualified way (*secundum quid*), whether loving the wrong goods for oneself excessively or loving the right goods for oneself too little.

Given the tendency of human beings to fall into improper self-love, we looked in the fourth chapter at the question of whether one can naturally love God over self. This involved a consideration of the extent to which one can even naturally will the good for oneself. We noted that a discussion of the theological notion of grace was relevant to a philosophical account of human self-love, in that it provides a fitting bridge to account for the “ontological gap” in the
relation between human beings and God. Specifically, Thomas uses the notion of charity to account for how the human will can be healed and elevated in order to attain union with God. We saw that there is debate as to whether Thomas believes that we have a natural end proportionate to our supernatural end and thus two kind of beatitude – natural and supernatural. This led us to explore several scholarly opinions, most notably those of de Lubac and Feingold and a consideration of what Thomas means by “nature.”

We focussed in this chapter primarily on two senses of nature according to Thomas: natural vs rational active powers, and nature vs grace. Regarding nature in light of the natural vs rational distinction, we note that rational love is the love of the whole person for its object, even though that love proceeds from the will, which naturally (essentially) belongs to us. Nature as a principle of movement in a human being qua subject includes knowing and loving which are a cause of movement in us. We saw that for Thomas, in terms of acquisition, we have a connatural end that can be reached naturally through our own operation, and a supernatural end that can be attained through grace only. In terms of completion, we have only one beatitude. In addressing the question of how we naturally love God over self, we concluded that, while we naturally incline towards the vision of God, only grace disposes us to actively unite ourselves with God.

Regarding nature in contradistinction to grace, we saw that the perfection of human beings is further ordered to perfection through a supernatural participation of God’s goodness. The question arose concerning our capacity to love God with a love of choice, given human nature is wounded by original sin. We thus examined Thomas’s position on how we love God more than ourselves naturally, looking specifically at his arguments for how the part loves the good of the whole more than itself. We fall short of loving our proper good on account of the
good of the whole because of our wounded nature; because we have free will, with this wound in our nature we tend to choose our own private good over God.

In light of Thomas’s argument that all creatures love God over self naturally, we examined in detail the distinction he makes between natural love of God in the state of original justice and the state of fallen nature, which involved also looking at his distinction between original sin and actual sin. Original sin introduced disorder into human nature, although we can still do good in the state of fallen nature. We cannot do all the good that is proportionate to our nature without grace. We saw that sin does not affect the first good of nature, by which a thing is completed in itself, but it does affect the second good of nature by which we are naturally ordered to do good. Thus, Thomas’s argument that charity is required for the perfection of rational self-love (dilectio sui) follows logically, given that his philosophical thought finishes in Theology.

In chapter five, we looked at self-love as the basis of friendship with others and how friendship is perfective of oneself in its extension out to others. We saw that for Thomas, it is not the case that we love ourselves first and then love others, but rather, the matter concerns the nature of love itself: the object of our amor amicitiae—properly “personal” love—is love of a person (oneself or another) and the object of our amor concupiscentiae is a good for the person. We saw that the amor amicitiae we have for ourselves is the prime analogate for the friendship we have for others. In loving a friend, that friend becomes “another self” allowing one to will goods to a friend as one would for oneself. We saw that friendship is itself one of the highest goods to be desired for oneself.
We then looked at the role of friendship and self-knowledge in relation to the perfection of self-love, particularly the phenomenon of “mutual self-awareness.” We examined beneficence, benevolence, and concord as works of friendship as well as the importance of the mutual choice to be friends. In regard to friendship with God, the relationship really only exists in us, and the choice to be friends first comes from the side of God. We are friends with God in an analogous sense. The question of how self is able to extend out to others led us to examine Thomas’s account of extasis which included looking at his distinction between a positive and a negative kind of extasis. We noted in particular how amor amicitiae implies reciprocity between an “I” and a “thou.”

In the last chapter, we examined how Thomas accounts for human self-love as a participation in the likeness of the act of divine self-love. In looking at his theory of participation, with a particular focus on interpretations by the scholars Cornelio Fabro and Louis Geiger, we saw that participation of an effect in its cause by similitude was the way in which human self-lovers participate in a likeness of God’s act of self-love. We then examined how humans achieve perfection not only at the level of being (esse), but also at the level of action (agere). We noted that self-love is an immanent action (an action remaining within the lover) and one through which we operate in communicating good to others. Lastly, we saw that God’s eternal, unchangeable act of self-love pours out for his creatures ecstatically and how, through self-love which perfects us insofar as we are agents, we return to God.

Indeed, through proper self-love, human beings move toward attaining union with God “in that ultimate rest which is at once an unending dynamism of knowing and loving.”

1 Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love, 240.
eternal and unchanging act of self-love is the origin and end of our self-love. In a mysterious way, God, the maker of all things:

through his good and beautiful love by which he loves all things according to the abundance of his goodness, by which he loves things, ‘is made to be outside himself’ insofar as he provides for all things that exist through his goodness and love. And somehow, he is drawn forth and somehow taken down from his excellence according to which he exists above all things and is set apart from all things, so that he may be ‘in all things’ through the effects of his goodness according to a certain ecstasy which nevertheless so makes him to be in all lower things that his supersubstantial power does not depart from him.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) *In div. nom.* IV lect 10 (Marietti, 437): “ipse qui est omnium causa per suum pulchrum et bonum amorem quo omnia amat, secundum abundantiam suae bonitatis qua amat res, *fit extra seipsum*, inquantum providet omnibus existentibus per suam bonitatem et amorem vel dilectionem et quodammodo *tractitur et deponitur* quodammodo a sua excellentia, secundum quod supra *omnia* existit et *ab omnibus segregatur*, ad hoc quod sit in *omnibus*, per effectus suae bonitatis, secundum quandam extasim, quae tamen sic ipsum facit in omnibus inferioribus esse, ut supersubstantialis eius virtus non egrediatur ab ipso.” (Italics in text).
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