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Donum Habituale: Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in St. Thomas Aquinas

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Donum Habituale: Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in St. Thomas Aquinas

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Three contemporary problems contextualize my research. First, there is a dispute among Thomists over how often the gifts of the Holy Spirit are operative. Second, contemporary Thomists see Aquinas's *Summa* as an integral whole rather than disparate treatises, but this vision has yet to be implemented fully in the exegesis of Aquinas concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit or grace. Indeed, it seems that these two topics must be read together since they are both part of what Albert Patfoort calls Aquinas's loci of pneumatology. Third, secondary literature pays relatively little attention to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in Aquinas's thought, though Aquinas himself considers them central. In light of these contexts, I argue (1) that in order to understand fully Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit or grace one must read them in light of each other and (2) that by doing this one realizes that the spiritual life is fundamentally pneumatological. The gifts are always operative in the supernatural life.

In the first chapter, I survey a selection of settled positions and ongoing debates surrounding grace and the gifts in Thomism after *Aeterni Patris*. I find that much of the secondary literature could benefit from a more unified conception of Aquinas's corpus in which the two topics are brought into dialogue with each other. In the second chapter, I interpret Aquinas's thought on the gifts in light of his thought on grace. In the third chapter, I elucidate Aquinas's thought on grace in light of his thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In the final

chapter, I return to the ongoing debates and settled positions in light of the mutual reading attempted in chapters two and three. I argue that the mutual contact of chapters two and three makes a substantial contribution. In other words, in order to rightly interpret St. Thomas on either grace or the gifts of the Holy Spirit one must have information from the other and in so doing one can see that the spiritual life according to St. Thomas is fundamentally pneumatological.

This dissertation by John M. Meinert fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in moral theology/ethics approved by William C. Mattison III, Ph.D., as Director and by John Grabowski, Ph.D., and Fr. Thomas Joseph White, O.P., S.T.D. as Readers.

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To Katie, my wife

“If you love me you will keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Counselor, to be with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him; you know him, for he dwells with you, and will be in you. I will not leave you desolate; I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world will see me no more, but you will see me; because I live, you will live also. In that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you.”

—John 14:16-20

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Introduction

According to the Thomistic tradition, the life of grace is profoundly Christological and Pneumatological. The immanent processions of the Son and Spirit are not only causes of creation but, and this in an even more exemplary way, causes of the life of grace.¹ The spiritual life has a certain character and form because of who God is *in se*.² It is thus no mistake that Aquinas claims the grace received by the believer is the very grace of Christ and that New Law dwells interiorly in believers through the Holy Spirit.³ The manifold gifts of grace bring the the recipient into a direct relation with the Trinitarian mystery.⁴ For all these reasons, Aquinas calls grace a “participation in the divine nature.”⁵

In outlining the particular effects this graced participation has on the believer, Aquinas integrates the grace of Christ and the Holy Spirit, the written law, the Church, the sacraments, habitual grace, the theological virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the infused cardinal virtues into a unified and Catholic conception of the good life. Since Aquinas’s death, Thomists

¹Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 4–12, *S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M.* (Rome: *Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide*, 1888). This work will hereafter be abbreviated *ST*. All translations, unless noted, are my own. *ST* II-II q. 23, a. 2; *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 1. For a good exposition of this principle, see Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 349ff.

² Romanus Cessario, “The Trinitarian Imprint on the Moral Life,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, eds. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 487–492.

³ *ST* III q. 8, a. 5; *ST* I-II q. 106, a. 1, co.

⁴ Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology*, 373.

⁵ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.: “...*participatio divinae naturae*...”

have probed the depths of Aquinas's conception of of grace and the particular mechanisms by which it is lived. I will make no pretense at covering all or even a substantial portion of this vast body of literature. The topic of my research is much more circumscribed, the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

As the written record of revelation, Scripture is the primary source of a doctrine concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit. As with many authentically Christian doctrines, the gifts are not explicit in Scripture, but can only be found “in the latent implications of the New Testament message as a whole, and in the experience of the Christian life...”⁶ In short, to ultimately vindicate a doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit requires a previous justification of ecclesial hermeneutics. Hence, O'Connor argues that the gifts are not simply based on Isaiah 11, the manifestations of the Spirit in Paul, the activity of the apostles post Pentecost in *Acts*, and the Seven Spirits of the Apocalypse, but more surely on the central role of the Holy Spirit as the paraclete.

Origen, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and previous scholastics (among many others) codified and systematized the latent implications of the New Testament regarding the gifts of the Holy Spirit.⁷ Aquinas took up these traditional scriptural, patristic, and scholastic sources and molded their teachings into a systematic doctrine of the gifts. It is this doctrine of the gifts that Ulrich Horst calls the heart of Thomistic Moral Theology.⁸

⁶ Edward O'Connor C.S.C., “Appendix 1: The Scriptural Basis for the Doctrine of the Gifts,” in *Summa Theologiae Vol. 24* by St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 87.

⁷ O'Connor, 88-109.

⁸ Ulrich Horst, O.P., *Die Gaben Des Heiligen Geistes Nach Thomas Von Aquin* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 1.

After Aquinas, Thomists aimed to probe and understand Aquinas's teaching on the gifts more deeply. Although there are other members of the Thomistic school who reflect on the gifts in Aquinas, John of St. Thomas is by far the most influential. In his *de Donis*, John of St. Thomas outlined what would become the canonical reading of Aquinas on the gifts.⁹ Based on John of St. Thomas, most Thomists, even up to the middle of the 20th century and beyond, thought of the gifts as habitual dispositions to receive the intermittent inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This inspiration was necessary to counter the continuing imperfections of the infused virtues and the supernatural life lived under the direction of reason. The simplest way to explain this is an analogy: the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the sails of a ship; the wind is the Holy Spirit's *instinctus*; reason's power elevated by the infused virtues is represented by the oars. The gifts are always present, but only occasionally receive the wind. When the wind is received, the journey is faster, easier, and much more sure, yet one can move under the power of the oars.

In the middle of the 20th century, this common consensus was challenged by the likes of Servais Pinckaers.¹⁰ He, in contrast to the standard reading based on John of St. Thomas, thought of the gifts as the primary and immanent source of all Christian activity. They, as Pinckaers conceives them, are not just occasional helps in an otherwise reason directed supernatural life. The Holy Spirit's *instinctus* and the gifts which receive it are the ultimate causes behind all spiritual actions. Connaturality is the primary mode under which the supernatural life is lived, not discursive reason. In terms of the analogy given above, the oars can only be operative when

⁹ For the original Latin see *Joannes a S. Thomae, In I-II*, disp. 13, aa. 1-9. For the english translation see John of St. Thomas, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost*, trans. by Dominic Hughes (St. Louis: Sheed & Ward, 1950).

¹⁰ Servais Pinckaers, *The Sources of Christian Ethics* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 26 & 358; Servais Pinckaers, "L'instinct et l'Esprit au cœur de l'éthique chrétienne," in *Novitas et Veritas Vitae* (Fribourg, 1991).

the sail is operative. The oars are only operative because the sail is operative. This intra-Thomistic debate is the first context against which my research should be seen.

Two other movements within recent Thomism are also important for locating my research. The first is based on the broad consensus of Thomists that the *Summa* is an integral whole and should be read as such. Recent scholars also extend this vision, first outlined by Boyle, to include Aquinas's Biblical commentaries.¹¹ In short, Aquinas should not be interpreted piecemeal. The second context is the relative lack of research on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in Aquinas. I address each of these in more detail below.

In his article entitled "Aquinas's Exemplar Ethics," Brian Shanley claims, based on Leonard Boyle, that "The *Secunda Pars* makes sense only in the light of the *Prima Pars* and as pointing to the *Tertia Pars*."¹² The *Summa* is an integral whole. In other words, the different treatises which make up the *Summa Theologiae* are not only loosely related to one another but

¹¹ I will use the following editions of Aquinas's biblical commentaries: Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Hebrews*, ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcon, E., trans. Larcher, F., vol. 41, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, Wyoming: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans*, ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcon, E., trans. Larcher, F., vol. 37, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Corinthians*, ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcon, E., trans. Larcher, F., Mortensen, B., and Keating, D., vol. 38, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians*, ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcon, E., trans. Larcher, F. and Lamb, M., vol. 39, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon*, ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcon, E., trans. Larcher, F., vol. 40, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, MD: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, ed. The Aquinas Institute, trans. Larcher, F., vol. 35–36, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2013). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew*, ed. The Aquinas Institute, trans. Holmes, Jeremy and Mortensen, B., vol. 33–34 (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2013). All translations are my own, unless noted.

¹² Brian Shanley, "Aquinas's Exemplar Ethics," *The Thomist* 72 (2008): 345–69, 347.

integrally united. This fact, now much more widely accepted than it once was, requires (at least in general) that one interpret each treatise of St. Thomas within the overall structure and as situated in a particular place, as dependent on what has previously been written and particularized by what follows. This has not always been the common method of interpreting St. Thomas. The most precise interpreters of Aquinas, the commentators, rarely crossed between Aquinas's treatises.¹³ In other words, the most precise interpretations we have of Aquinas do not treat the *Summa* as an integral whole. Furthermore, the commentators rarely focus on Aquinas's Biblical commentaries. Put simply, the common consensus of current Thomists on how to read Aquinas's corpus has yet to be applied in a rigorous and precise fashion, because those who interpreted Aquinas in a rigorous and precise fashion did not hold this vision of his corpus.

The last context for this dissertation is the relative lack of scholarly attention given to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in Aquinas. Servais Pinckaers, the great renewer of Thomistic Moral Theology, once wrote that "...in his study of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas reaches the apex of his theological reflection and of his effort to account for the best of Christian experience, in light of Scripture and tradition."¹⁴ Nevertheless, the Thomistic renewal inspired by Pinckaers has hardly taken his message to heart. The gifts of the Holy Spirit still remain, for the most part, an obscure and insular topic within the secondary literature.¹⁵ Hence, Ulrich Horst writes that

¹³ Fr. Joseph d'Amecourt, email message to author, August 19, 2013.

¹⁴ Servais Pinckaers, "Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit: Aquinas's Doctrine of *Instinctus*," *The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology*, ed. by John Berkman & Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 388.

¹⁵ I have chosen to limit the secondary literature in two ways. First, I have limited the secondary literature to those authors writing after *Aeterni Patris*. I have done this for two reasons. The thought of St. Thomas received renewed attention in the 20th century after *Aeterni Patris* and the insights of the previous Thomistic commentators are often

“the object of our study, the teaching of St. Thomas on the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, has not found much attention among younger researchers.”¹⁶ Nevertheless, Horst goes on to note, the gifts are central to Aquinas’s theology, not a devout appendix. They are the apex of action theory and the heart of moral theology.¹⁷ In other words, to rightly interpret Aquinas on many issues one must attend to the gifts.

These three contexts furnish the topic of this dissertation. I aim to remedy partially the complaint of Horst (context three) by interpreting Aquinas’s thought on the gifts in light of his broader theological synthesis (context two), especially his thought on grace. Thereby I aim to join the continuing conversation of Thomists attempting to interpret Aquinas’s thought on the gifts (context one). My desire to focus especially on the intersection between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace is not haphazard. According to Patfoort, there are three great loci of pneumatology in Aquinas’s writings: the gifts of the Holy Spirit, grace, and the New Law.¹⁸ In order to understand any of these topics it must be interpreted in light of the other topics. The

summarized and recapitulated in the early 20th century Thomists. Second, I have limited the scope of secondary literature by choosing representative authors of differing approaches to interpreting St. Thomas: commentators, historians, and spiritual writers. This approach leaves off no interesting or novel interpretations of Aquinas’s thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit or his thought on grace. In addition, the preeminent pre *Aeterni Patris* work on the gifts is John of St. Thomas’s. His conclusions are standard in Thomism and are recapitulated by Garrigou-Lagrange. Likewise, on the side of grace, Thomistic thinkers did not produce very much substantial scholarship post Vatican II (apart from Lonergan and Wawrykow).

¹⁶ Horst, *Die Gaben*, 1: “Der Gegenstand unserer Untersuchung, die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die sieben Gaben des Hl. Geistes, hat in der jüngeren Forschung keine sonderliche beachtung gefunden.”

¹⁷ Horst, *Die Gaben*, 1.

¹⁸ Albert Patfoort, *Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Les Clefs d’une théologie* (France: FAC-éditions, 1983), 87.

topics are mutually dependent and interactive such that isolated and exclusive attention to one can result in distorted interpretation.¹⁹

Vis-à-vis these contexts and this topic, my dissertation aims to prove the following thesis: in order to understand fully Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit or grace one must read them in light of each other and that by doing this one realizes, that according to Aquinas, the Holy Spirit is intimately involved in the ordinary activity and spiritual life of the believer. In other words, in order to rightly interpret St. Thomas on either grace or the gifts of the Holy Spirit one must have information from the other and by doing this one can see that the spiritual life is fundamentally pneumatological. Put differently, Aquinas's moral theology is thoroughly Biblical; I do not think Aquinas would object to me calling the whole *Secunda Pars* a commentary on Paul's vision of the moral life as a life lived in the Spirit.

My method in proving this thesis aims to read Aquinas's mature corpus as an integral whole.²⁰ In other words, I will take it as a given that proper exegesis of any topic in Aquinas

¹⁹ Although Aquinas's texts on the New Law will factor into my argument, I have not included it in the title for two related reasons. First, the New Law is the context and overture for the other two topics. It benefits much less from a mutual reading and has much less precision to offer. Second, I will be dealing with the New Law in reality, but not as often in name. The New Law for Aquinas is the interior dwelling of the Holy Spirit by grace. This is the very topic of both the treatise on grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

²⁰ On both the topics under consideration the thought of Aquinas develops. Since this dissertation concerns the mature Aquinas, one must be clear when these developments occurred and focus on material only after them. Yet with both these topics it is difficult to locate an exact date for the development. As such, I will give a *terminus a quo* for the certainly mature Aquinas. Works after this date will receive full attention while works before will not be treated.

Dating Aquinas's mature thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit is a highly disputed by historians. There seem to be three positions in this regard. First is the position of Garrigou-Lagrange, Lottin, and Labourdette. They contend that Aquinas's thought on the gifts does not develop at all, save maybe in emphasis. In other words, there is not only continuity between Aquinas's thought in the *Summa* and the *Scriptum* but the same doctrine. The second position is represented by the editor of the New Blackfriars edition of the *Summa*, Edward O'Connor. According to O'Connor, 119: "It would be going too far, however, to identify the theory of the commentary with that of the *Summa* as Garrigou-Lagrange seems to do. The latter work introduces a precision that represents an immense progress over the former, and perhaps even a rectification of it." Rather, the *Summa* should be seen as an

often requires information from other parts of his thought. Indeed, I find that conceptual, verbal, contextual, and systematic overlap between Aquinas's treatises often yields surprising and novel interpretations of his thought.

I am also convinced that it is methodologically bad scholarship to read Aquinas in isolation from those who have been doing so for hundreds of years, the commentators. Doing so is like joining an ongoing conversation and ignoring all but one of the participants. Furthermore, doing scholarship on Aquinas without reference to the commentators suffers from ahistoricity (a critique often leveled at the commentators themselves). In trying to interpret and carry on the teaching of Aquinas, the commentators certainly erred in places and *might* have suffered from an ahistorical view of the object of study (Aquinas's teachings). On the other hand, though recent authors do not suffer from historicity of object (they fully recognize that Aquinas developed, lived in a certain time, and a certain place), they often suffer from an ahistorical view of their own scholarship. To do research on Aquinas is to join *ipso facto* the historical group and/or

interpretation, most specifically with reference to *instinctus*, of the same doctrine contained in the *Scriptum*. According to O'Connor, the *Summa* does represent Aquinas's mature thought, a position in continuity with his earlier positions. The final position is represented by de Blic, Pinckaers, and Stroud. They contend that Aquinas develops significantly in the *Summa*. According to this position, Aquinas's thought in the *Summa* is a break from his past thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Which of these the correct interpretation of St. Thomas? Such a question is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is not primarily historical/developmental. Hence, I will take the safe position vis-à-vis the three arguments. Since, all three agree that the *Summa* represents Thomas's mature thought, I will only treat those works on the gifts either concurrent or posterior to the *Prima Secundae*. This is roughly 1268 and beyond. The developments between I-II and II-II, which are well documented by O'Connor, are limited to the gifts as operative on their respective matter and their particular relation to certain virtues. Aquinas's overall theory of the gifts, in general, changes little between the I-II and II-II. Hence, I regard both as representing his mature thought, while simultaneously recognizing he developed on certain points. I will note these where they are relevant.

Happily, Aquinas's development on grace after his contact with the anti-pelagian writings of Augustine also coincides roughly with the same date. Following Lonergan one can say that Aquinas's development on grace occurs in the *Prima Pars* (1267-68). Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 124ff. In the *De Malo*, Aquinas's thought on the will develops also (1266-67). For the dating of these works see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*. Trans. by Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 327f.

conversation of Thomists. This fact must be recognized in the scholarship itself. I attempt to do this in my research. I argue my theses (which largely confirm the revisionist reading of the gifts inspired by Pinckaers) in dialogue with commentatorial Thomism as well as more contemporary authors promoting alternative visions of grace in Aquinas (e.g. Lonergan, Bouillard, and Wawrykow).

In recognizing the conversational aspect of Thomism, I aim in chapter I to summarize post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinker's positions on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace, both debates and settled positions. The selection of debates and settled positions is not arbitrary. I select and summarize those debates and settled positions for which a mutual reading of grace and the gifts can make some contribution. In other words, the following topics (each represented by a section) are those areas in which a more universal reading of the gifts and grace in Aquinas can advance the secondary literature or challenge it. Chapters II and III undertake that more universal reading.

I begin chapter I, section I by summarizing the debate between Bouillard and Deman, et al. over the existence of actual grace. Bouillard famously contends that the commentators' notion of actual grace does not exist in Aquinas. Deman et al. challenge him on this point. I follow this section with a summary of the Thomistic consensus on the division of actual grace into operative/cooperative, prevenient/subsequent, efficacious/sufficient, healing/elevating, and exiting/helping in section II. This section includes one sub section (IIa) on the correlation of actual grace to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Following these sections, section III outlines the common consensus of post *Aeterni Patris* Thomism on the division of habitual grace by subject and effect. Section IIIa, outlines the common consensus on the natural priority (formal order) of

the supernatural habits and habitual grace. Next, I summarize the Thomistic consensus on the necessity of grace in section IV (which is largely a commentary on *ST* I-II q. 109). I highlight two major debates on how often actual grace is necessary and the causes of perseverance. After that, section V summarizes the Thomistic consensus over the *ratio* and causes of merit. Section VI recaps three standard arguments given by Thomistic thinkers to distinguish the gifts of the Holy Spirit from the supernatural virtues. Section VII summarizes a debate between Thomistic thinkers concerning how often the gifts of the Holy Spirit are active. The standard reading claims that the gifts are only intermittent helps in the supernatural life whereas more recent scholars have claimed that the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action. Finally, section VIII summarizes the Thomistic consensus on the connectivity of the gifts in charity, the endurance of the gifts in heaven, and the relative excellence of the gifts and the supernatural virtues.

Chapters II and III aim to treat these same issues in Aquinas without explicit reference to the secondary literature outlined in chapter I. Chapter II treats the gifts of the Holy Spirit by reading them in light of Aquinas's mature thought on grace. I find in chapter II that information, context clues, and systematic overlap between Aquinas's thought on the gifts and grace has major implications for how one understands his thought on the gifts. Chapter III does the opposite. It treats Aquinas's thought on grace in light of his thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The same conclusion is reached. Reading Aquinas's mature thought on grace in light of his mature thought on the gifts makes a difference for how one understands his thought on grace.

Chapter II claims that in order to understand Aquinas's thought on the gifts one must read it in light of his thought on grace. Hence, each section aims to bring information from Aquinas's conception of grace to solve exegetical and systematic issues in Aquinas's thought on the gifts.

Chapter II, section I, claims that Aquinas's argumentation for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues in ST I-II q. 68, a. 1 is only meant to cover the distinction of the gifts from the acquired virtues. One must go to his thought on grace to find material necessary to construct and argument for the distinction between the gifts and the supernatural virtues. Section II of chapter II aims to summarize briefly Aquinas's thought and use of the term *instinctus* (section IIa) and then argue that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is identical in subject with motive *auxilium* post-justification (section IIb). In other words, in order to properly understand the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit one must notice its identity with common *auxilium* post-justification in Aquinas's treatise on grace (ST I-II q. 109, a. 9) and use data found therein. Section III asks the question how often the gifts are necessary. Based on the conclusion of Section IIb, I argue that since the gifts provide the disposition to be moved by common *auxilium*, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary as often as motive *auxilium* is necessary post-justification. I claim, following the commentators, that operative common *auxilium* is necessary at the beginning of every autonomous series of supernatural actions. Cooperative *auxilium* is necessary in each action following from the operative. Hence, the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action. Section IV's topic is the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits. I claim that information from the treatise on grace is essential in understanding the gifts as habits. In section IVb I claim that the gifts' effects include healing and elevating (terms and effects found in the treatise on grace). In section IVc, I claim that the gifts can be divided into operative and cooperative (also terms found in the treatise on grace). Both these divisions are essential for understanding the gifts. Section V treats the lesser implications of using Aquinas's thought on grace to help understand the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Section Va argues that habitual grace is the ultimate reason why all the supernatural habits

are connected. Section Vb argues that the gifts' proportion to common *auxilium* is the real reason behind their endurance in heaven. Section Vc argues that proximity to the immanent principle of habitual grace is the standard by which Aquinas judges the relative excellence of the virtues and the gifts.

Chapter III does the converse of chapter II. It aims to bring data from Aquinas's thought on the gifts to help solve exegetical and systematic issues in his thought on grace. Chapter III section I does so for Aquinas's thought on motive grace post-justification. Section Ia outlines Aquinas's broader thought on motion as a background. Section Ib argues that Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit proves that Aquinas does have a conception of supernatural motion post-justification. This supernatural motion is really different from natural motion and the inclinations of supernatural habits. Section II argues that data from Aquinas's thought on the gifts is integral for understanding the supernatural causes of perseverance in Aquinas. The *instinctus* of the gifts is the motive cause of the will's act of persevering. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are not only the disposition to this motion but the gift of fortitude habitually inclines the subject to complete supernatural actions thereby aiding the infused virtue of perseverance. Section III treats the division of actual and habitual grace. Section IIIa, which concerns the division of actual grace, claims that for actual grace, the *instinctus* which activates the gifts of the Holy Spirit particularizes Aquinas's general account of motion in the supernatural life (i.e., particularizes the category of common *auxilium*), helps one to posit the distinction between common actual grace and the actual grace of superabundance, and shows intimate links with the sacraments. Section IIIb, which concerns the division of habitual grace, argues that the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not provide further divisions but rather make clearer the proper order between

habitual grace and the supernatural habits (theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues). Finally, section IV argues that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are essential for understanding Aquinas's thought on merit. The two main principles of merit pertain to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. First, the very principle of all condign merit is the motion of the Holy Spirit, the divine *instinctus*. Second, the gifts inasmuch as they provide the disposition to be moved by God are involved in all meritorious action. Finally, I will argue that this does not displace charity as the primary vehicle of merit since the principles of meritorious activity are not themselves meritorious activity.

Chapter IV outlines the possible impact of my mutual reading of the gifts and grace on the settled positions and debates of chapter I. In section I, I argue that chapter III section Ia-b has some limited import for the debate between Bouillard and Deman, et al. concerning the existence of actual grace post justification. My argument in chapter III section Ib challenges Bouillard's conception that there is no such thing as actual grace post-justification. One cannot make sense of Aquinas's thought on the gifts if Bouillard's conception is true.

In section II, I argue that chapter III section Ib confirms that there is a common actual grace or common *auxilium* in the supernatural life as well as a type of superabundant *auxilium* beyond the normal which is necessary for the counsels. On the other hand, chapter III section IIIa challenges Ramirez concerning the grace of the sacraments and argues that in order to make sense of Aquinas sacramental grace must include actual grace and not only habitual. In Section IIa, I argue that my positive work in chapter II section IIb extends the conception of Pinckaers, et al. concerning the operation of the gifts. On the other hand, I argue that my conception in chapter II section IIb challenges the traditional position that correlates the gifts with a preeminent actual

grace. I argue, and this is where my argument extends the conception of Pinckaers, that the gifts correlate to common *auxilium*. In other words, they are not simply reserved for the counsels or difficult situations. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are the structural connection to the guidance of the Holy Spirit in each and every action.

In section III, I argue the following theses: Chapter II section IVa confirms that Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez are right to take habitual grace in both a narrow and a wide sense. In arguing this I also extend this commitment to include the claim that habitual grace in the wide sense is also healing and elevating, since the powers of the soul also need to be healed and elevated. In addition, chapter III section IIIb, supplements the commentators by specifying more clearly the relation between the supernatural habits and habitual grace. They are operative effects. Next, chapter II section IVa challenges Lonergan's thesis that Aquinas means habitual grace exclusively in the wide sense. Finally, chapter II section IVa challenges Ramirez in claiming that the supernatural habits are healing and elevating in the wide sense and that the supernatural habits are unrelated to the healing and elevating functions of habitual grace.

In section IV, I argue that my positive exegesis of Aquinas has the following implications. First, if my argument in chapter II section IIb was correct that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the further grace necessary for one already justified and that the gifts provide the disposition to this grace then the gifts are relevant in a myriad of ways for the traditional Thomistic understanding of the necessity of grace. For the most part these extend the traditional conception on the necessity of grace. Second, chapter II section III is irrelevant for the dispute between the commentators and Wawrykow over how often operative actual graces are necessary

in the supernatural life. Third, my argument in chapter III, section III both extends and challenges the conception of Ramirez and Garrigou-Lagrange on the cause of final perseverance.

Section V of chapter IV concerns merit. In this section I argue based on chapter III section IV that Wawrykow's use of the gifts as a paradigm for merit in Aquinas is justified. Likewise, I argue that chapter III section IV extends the traditional Thomistic understanding of merit, but does not challenge it.

In section VI of this chapter, the distinction between the gifts and the supernatural virtues, I argue that chapter II section I both challenges and supplements Thomistic thinkers. It challenges them because (and in this I am following Ramirez) it contends that none of the three ways traditional to Thomism for arguing the distinction between the gifts and the virtues work. It supplements them by claiming that my argument from chapter II section I does not suffer from the same inadequacies and thereby provides a more sure foundation for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues.

Chapter IV section VII concerns the operational necessity of the gifts. My argument in chapter II, section III, extends and supplements or challenges depending on which side of that debate one falls. If one falls on the traditional side of Thomism, then my argument challenges. I have contended that the gifts are necessary to receive common *auxilium* post-justification, whereas Thomistic thinkers have generally not held this thesis. My argument both confirms and extends the conception of Pinckaers that the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action. My argument extends Pinckaers's conception because it provides a more substantial conception of how this works and why it is the case.

Finally, I claim in the last section concerning the connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence of the gifts and the virtues, that my argument in chapter II section Va-c largely confirms the conception of Labourdette and Ramirez on the connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence of the gifts and the virtues.

This dissertation aims not only to contribute to the secondary Thomistic literature in particular ways, but also extend to the two contexts from which it arises. This dissertation makes a dual contribution to the context of reading Aquinas's thought as an integral whole. First, it makes some small step toward outlining a methodology for interpreting Aquinas's corpus as an integral whole. Certainly much more needs to be done, but a small step has been taken. Second, this dissertation also provides an example of what scholarship inspired by this vision could look like. Likewise, this dissertation also partially remedies the complaint of Horst about the secondary literature and the gifts. It aims to stimulate new research and conversation concerning both Aquinas's conception of the gifts in themselves and in their relation to other topics in Aquinas. At the very least, I can hope (in the words of MacIntyre) that "even if some large parts of my interpretation could not withstand criticism, the demonstration of this would itself strengthen the tradition which I am attempting to sustain and extend."²¹

²¹ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 3rd edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 260.

Chapter I – Grace and the Gifts *Post Aeterni Patris*

The broad purpose of this dissertation is to apply Shanley and Boyle's thesis on the unity of the *Summa* to Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace. Just as the different treatises of the *Summa* are integrally related, the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace (both the topics and the treatises) are specifically so. By reading the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace together and in light of each other a fuller understanding of Aquinas's thought on both can be achieved. In order to accomplish this purpose, it is necessary first to review the secondary literature on each of these topics. Hence, the goal of this chapter is to outline a sample of the settled positions and contested issues surrounding both grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in Thomistic thinkers.¹ The following issues will be of primary importance:² the existence and division of actual grace, the division and distinctions of habitual grace, the necessity of grace, merit, the distinction of the gifts and the virtues, the operational necessity of the gifts, the endurance of the gifts, the connectivity of the gifts, and the relative excellence of the gifts and virtues. After summarizing the broad consensus and debates in each of these areas, I suggest that the gifts of the Holy Spirit or grace, respectively, can make at least a modest contribution to advancing our understanding of St. Thomas on the other.

¹ In order to avoid a convoluted debate, by 'Thomistic thinkers', 'Thomism, and 'Thomists' I simply mean those authors who begin their reflections with St. Thomas whether or not they ultimately belong to any one of the explicit schools or adulterate the thought of St. Thomas so much that it is barely recognizable. In other words, even though I do have an opinion on the subject, I will not presuppose any argument about which Thomistic school should be considered normative or how the term Thomist should be limited.

² I have chosen these issues for two reasons. First, they are roughly the issues with which Aquinas is concerned in the *Summa* on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace respectively. Second, these are the issues on which I think at least some, albeit modest, progress can be made by reading treatises together.

I. The Existence of Actual Grace

In 1944, Henri Bouillard published his doctoral dissertation *Conversion et Grace chez S. Thomas d'Aquin*.³ Therein (and in response to critics)⁴ he contends that the concept of actual grace (a supernatural motion, i.e., non habitual-grace) as developed by later Thomistic thinkers⁵ does not exist in Aquinas's writings.⁶ Bouillard's argument against the existence of actual grace in Aquinas provoked an intense reaction within French Thomism,⁷ not only as naturalizing the beatific vision,⁸ but also as an adequate exegesis of Aquinas. Louis-Bertrand Gillon,⁹ Thomas Deman,¹⁰ and Guerard Lauriers¹¹ all followed the publication of *Conversion and Grace* with scathing critiques. The purpose of this section is to summarize the two sides of the debate over

³ Henri Bouillard, *Conversion et Grace chez S. Thomas d'Aquin: étude Historique* (Paris: Aubier, 1944).

⁴ Henri Bouillard, "Precisions," *Revue Thomiste* 47 (1947): 177-183.

⁵ Joannes a Sancto Thoma, O.P., *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. monks of Solesmes, vol. 5 (Paris: Desclée et sociorum, 1934), d. 22, a. 1: "[actual grace is] The effect of God by which he concurs with us, by helping us to operate (not by imprinting something permanent and through the mode of habit, but through the transitive mode, i.e., lasting only a short time with the operation and so explained through the mode of motion), either through a transitive quality/concursus or by *auxilium*."

⁶ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 12: "In the *Summa*, that which we call actual grace is simply the natural divine motion." Cf. also p. 176 & 195.

⁷ Yet it also received positive reviews. For example, Charles Boyer, "Recensiones: Theologica Henri Bouillard, *Conversion et grace chez saint Thomas d'Aquin*," *Gregorianum* 27 (1946): 157-160.

⁸ Louis Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," *Revue Thomiste* 46 (1946): 603-613 (see 603); Ibid., "Post-Scriptum." *Revue Thomiste* 47 (1947): 183-189.

⁹ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 603.

¹⁰ Thomas Deman, "Review of *Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas d'Aquin. Étude Historique* by Henri Bouillard," *Revue thomiste* 47 (1947): 46-58.

¹¹ Guerard des Lauriers, M.-L. "La Théologie de s. Thomas et la grâce actuelle," *L'Annee Theologique* 6 (1945): 276-332.

the existence of actual grace. It first summarizes Bouillard's position and then follow it with the position of Gillon, Deman, and Lauriers. Finally, it suggest that Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit could be of some help in resolving the debate.

As said above, according to Bouillard, actual grace is a later scholastic invention. The commentators invented it to account for the remote preparation for habitual grace and to elevate the human to the supernatural end prior to the infusion of habitual grace.¹² In other words, some Thomistic thinkers invented actual grace to claim supernatural actions prior to the infusion of habitual grace. Yet according to Bouillard, "actions cannot be supernatural unless they proceed from the infused habit of grace."¹³ One does not need to posit a new category called 'actual grace' to make sense of Aquinas's thought on the preparation for grace. There are only two types of motion in Aquinas: God's general concursus (roughly speaking, God's general activation of secondary causes)¹⁴ and the motion produced by a habit. According to Bouillard, these fully explain both Aquinas's position and the preparation for grace.

¹² For a summary of Bouillard's conclusions see Thomas Guarino, "Henri Bouillard and the truth status of dogmatic statements," *Science et Esprit* 39 (1987): 331-343.

¹³ Gerald A. McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1992), 206; Bouillard, *Conversion*, 183-184.

¹⁴ Gregory Doolan, "The Causality of the Divine Ideas in Relation to Natural Agents in Thomas Aquinas," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (2004): 393-409; Thomas Flint, "Two Accounts of Providence," In *Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism*, ed. by Thomas Morris (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 147-81; Alfred Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1994): 131-156; Alfred Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough," *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991): 553-85; Alfred Freddoso, "Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature," *Divine and Human Action*, 74-118; Philip Quinn, "Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes and Occasionalism," *Divine and Human Action*, 50-73; Brian Shanley, "Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71, no. 2 (1997): 197-224; Brian Shanley, "God's Causality and Human Freedom in Aquinas," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 72, no. 1 (1998): 99-122; Brian Shanley, "God's Causality and Human Freedom in Aquinas: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 72, no. 3 (1998): 447-57.

The three roles which traditional Thomistic thinkers hold for actual grace (conversion, preparation for habitual grace, and reduction to action post infusion of habitual grace), Bouillard contends, are actually fulfilled by God's general motion or habitual grace itself. The first role was the elevation of the human person to think and will eternal life prior to justification, prior to the infusion of habitual grace.¹⁵ This element of actual grace is not necessary in Aquinas, since humans do not need to be elevated to the end of seeing God face to face. They are already naturally ordered to see God face to face. When Aquinas speaks of a graced motion, he does not mean actual grace but rather God's general concurrence with the individual human.¹⁶ God's general concurrence accounts for all changes from potency to activity and is diversified by the recipient.¹⁷ In other words, the motion of the first mover and the motion of the Holy Spirit (actual grace, according to strict Thomistic thinkers) are employed indifferently by St. Thomas.¹⁸ This is the true sense of Aquinas's imperfect conversion: the unjustified human's activity under God's general concurrence.¹⁹

¹⁵ Jacobus M. Ramirez, *Opera Omnia Tomus IX: De Gratia Dei in I-II Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae Expositio* (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 1992), 743.

¹⁶ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 74: "The necessary grace to prepare for justification does not elevate the human act to the supernatural order but is only to give birth to that act."

¹⁷ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 179-180.

¹⁸ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 164 & 202: "St. Thomas does not know the distinction between actual grace and natural concurrence."

¹⁹ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 173.

The second role traditional commentators hold for actual grace in Aquinas is a preparation for habitual grace.²⁰ Yet according to Bouillard, Aquinas is only concerned with the ultimate disposition for the form of grace (namely, the act of free will)²¹ immersed as Aquinas is in Aristotle's physics.²² Bouillard proffers that Aquinas is not concerned with remote preparation,²³ which is the exact role that traditional Thomistic thinkers give actual grace—a transient elevating motion. Not only is Aquinas unaware of a remote preparation, but metaphysically there is no need for it at all. According to Aristotelian physics the real preparation needed is the proximate preparation, which Bouillard contends can be supplied by the very graced habit infused into the soul.²⁴ Certainly there is need of motion prior to the infusion of habit, but this is fulfilled by natural divine concurrence,²⁵ which moves all things according to their forms.

The last role traditional Thomism gives to actual grace is exciting the supernaturally meritorious act after justification.²⁶ According to Bouillard, this role is also unnecessary since habitual grace (coupled with God's general concurrence) is a principle of motion. The immanent

²⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 743.

²¹ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 149.

²² Bouillard, *Conversion*, 194.

²³ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 182.

²⁴ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 195.

²⁵ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 152 & 201ff.

²⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 743: "Second there is actual grace subsequent to justification so that the just may proceed to execute meritorious actions."

source of motion is habitual grace which is activated indifferently by God's general concursus, which which is called grace when it is ordained to grace.²⁷ In short, the motions Aquinas identifies as happening in the supernatural life are all motions produced by habitual grace.²⁸ Based on these contentions, Bouillard concludes that St. Thomas knows no distinction between actual grace and general concursus.²⁹ In short, actual grace is a fiction of the later Thomistic imagination read anachronistically back into Aquinas.

Deman, Lauriers, and Gillon, in response, contend that Bouillard is guilty of very bad exegesis. Not only does Aquinas envision a remote preparation for grace,³⁰ but also continues to hold that actual grace is necessary in the supernatural life after the infusion of habitual grace.³¹ It is this motion which is supernatural intrinsically (i.e., ordered to the supernatural end) and not simply extrinsically (in some way related to the supernatural end).³² According to these authors, Aquinas claims that those with habitual grace need another grace, and this grace cannot be habitual. Such a conception would give rise to infinite regress with each habitual grace in need of another. Likewise, these authors claim that Aquinas posited a motion to prepare for habitual grace. Their key difference from Bouillard is that they take these motions to be specifically

²⁷ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 202; Bouillard, *Precisions*, 182.

²⁸ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 176.

²⁹ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 202. McCool, 206: "Motion received from God, however, simply serves to stir agents into action."

³⁰ Deman, 49.

³¹ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 612.

³² Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 611.

different from God's general concursus and to be gratuitously given. Hence, they conclude that it is actual grace that remotely prepares the subject for justification, the infusion of habitual grace; it elevates the believer to the supernatural order prior to the infusion of habitual grace, causes the detestation of sin, and whets the appetite for justice.³³ Certainly habitual grace is necessary for connaturality in the supernatural life, but not absolutely speaking.³⁴ Likewise it is this grace as motion, actual grace, which moves the will to consent as the proximate preparation for the habitual infusion.³⁵ Certainly if there were no time in between conversion and justification, then actual grace would not be needed as a remote preparation (though it would still be necessary as a proximate preparation). Yet this is hardly ever the case: which adult is not converted before being baptized or desiring baptism?³⁶ Furthermore, it is also actual grace which excites the will of the believer post-justification to the meritorious act, not God's general concursus.³⁷ According to the conception of these authors, motion is not differentiated by the secondary cause.³⁸ Supernatural motion must be intrinsically so, and cannot become so on the basis of the secondary cause.

The purpose of this section is not to solve the debate, rather, I must point out that neither side averts to the gifts as a possible avenue for a solution. Granted, the gifts only have import for

³³ Deman, 49; John Capreolus, *IV Sent.*, dist. 14, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1, edited by Henrici, 321.

³⁴ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 610.

³⁵ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 611; *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, ad 2.

³⁶ Deman, 49-50.

³⁷ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 611.

³⁸ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 607-608.

the debate about actual grace post-justification. In this regard, Gillon makes short mention of the gifts by claiming that Bouillard is guilty of ignoring them.³⁹ He claims that the import of Bouillard's position is that the gifts are not distinct from the infused virtues. Likewise, without actual grace the gifts would not operate. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is a form of supernatural motion. Yet even these accusations would need to be justified. Bouillard could contend that the motion producing the meritorious act under the gifts is God's general concurrence and the immanent habit, as he understood the other motions of grace. He could also contend that the distinction of motions is not the only basis on which one could hold the distinction of the gifts from the infused virtues. Without a specific and more elaborate discussion of the gifts, it is not clear how this issue plays to the strength of either side.

II. The Division of Actual Grace

According to most Thomists, actual grace is a supernatural motion, "a created reality, which is neither the mover, nor the power, nor the operation of the power, but the motion of the mover..."⁴⁰ Among the many post *Aeterni Patris* scholars who dabbled in the division of actual

³⁹ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 612.

⁴⁰ M.C. Wheeler, "Actual Grace According to Saint Thomas," in *The Thomist* XVI (1953): 334-360.

grace,⁴¹ six are especially important and representative: Michel Labourdette,⁴² Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,⁴³ Jacobus Ramirez,⁴⁴ Bernard Lonergan,⁴⁵ M.C. Wheeler,⁴⁶ and Joseph Wawrykow.⁴⁷ The purpose of this section is to outline the settled and distinct (but not disputed)⁴⁸ positions on the division of actual grace in Aquinas.⁴⁹ In order to accomplish this goal, I first treat the fundamental divisions which yield actual grace. Then I outline the common consensus on the divisions of actual grace itself in the following order: operative/cooperative, prevenient/subsequent, efficacious/sufficient, healing/elevating, and exiting/helping. Finally, I

⁴¹ Others should at least be mentioned, even if they will not receive substantial attention. For example, Norbertus del Prado wrote a massive three volume work *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (1907) which includes a systematic division of actual grace in St. Thomas. Nevertheless, since his writing is only very slightly different from Garrigou-Lagrange's it will not be included. For Del Prado see Fr. N. Del Prado, O.P., *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio: Pars Prima in qua explanatur sex quaestiones de gratia dei ex d. Thomae summa theologia* (Fribourg: Ex Typis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1907).

⁴² Michel Labourdette, *Cours de Théologie Morale Tome 1: Morale Fondamentale* (France: Parole et Silence, 2010); Ibid., *Cours de Théologie Morale Tome 2: Morale Spéciale* (France: Parole et Silence, 2012).

⁴³ Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 109-114*, trans. by the Dominican Nuns of Corpus Christi Monastery (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co, 1952).

⁴⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*.

⁴⁵ Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*.

⁴⁶ Wheeler, "Actual Grace."

⁴⁷ Joseph Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action: Merit in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

⁴⁸ By distinct I mean the authors have different methods and often come to different, although usually complementary, conclusions. I will note where these differences amount to a disagreement in the footnotes. There are no formal disputes between these authors of which I am aware.

⁴⁹ According to Ramirez, only some of these divisions are explicit in Aquinas's treatise on grace (operative/cooperative and prevenient/subsequent). Others are found elsewhere in Aquinas's corpus. Finally, some of them are only implicit in Aquinas and are brought out by later controversies. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 674 & 727: "or however from St. Thomas himself speaking as the opportunity occurs within his total scientific system of theology."

note how Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit could either challenge or bring precision to this picture.

According to the authors listed above,⁵⁰ actual grace is a species (or quasi-species)⁵¹ of *gratia gratum faciens*.⁵² *Gratia gratum faciens* causes the sanctification of the subject and is thus often called sanctifying grace. *Gratia gratum faciens* is distinct from *gratia gratis data* (the charisms).⁵³ *Gratia gratis data* are those motions which are not for the personal sanctification of the subject, but ordered to the sanctification of another. It is *gratia gratum faciens* which is immediately divided into habitual and actual grace.⁵⁴ “The grace which makes one pleasing to

⁵⁰ Wawrykow, Wheeler, and Lonergan do not treat the divisions of grace prior to actual and habitual.

⁵¹ Ramirez understands actual grace as one of the quasi-species of *gratia gratum faciens vel sanctificans*. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 687: “*Gratia gratum faciens* or sanctifying is immediately and adequately divided into actual and habitual grace just as into distinct species.” It seems Garrigou-Lagrange means the same thing when he claims that actual grace is a part of *gratia gratum faciens* only in the broad sense. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 153: “Broadly, it [sanctifying grace] includes that which is ordained to the justification of its subject, whether antecedently as stimulating grace which disposes us for justification, or concomitantly, or consequently, as, for example, supernatural helps, the infused virtues, the gifts, the increase of grace, and glory, which is the consummation of grace.”

⁵² According to Garrigou-Lagrange, *gratia gratum faciens* is in turn a species of interior grace. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 150.

⁵³ For divisions of the charisms see Labourdette, *Cours*, 815-819.

⁵⁴ This is also true for the Dominican J.H. Nicolas. See J.H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs de la Grace* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969), 178. *Gratia gratum faciens* is in turn a species of created grace. See Labourdette, *Cours*, 807: “La grâce, c’est d’abord l’amour de dieu, donc Dieu lui-même : grâce créée. Dieu prend en grâce. Comme, pour Dieu, aimer, c’est donner, cela ne peut aller sans poser une réalité dans la créature.... Ces dons forment ce que nous appelons la grâce créée.” Labourdette immediately divides created grace into *gratia gratum faciens* and *gratia gratis data*, but Garrigou-Lagrange divides created grace into interior/exterior, then interior into *gratia gratum faciens* and *gratia gratis data*. Ramirez, on the other hand, claims that the interior/exterior division of is only properly said of actual grace. According to Ramirez, exterior actual graces are those which move the intellect and will by the mode of object (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 756). Ultimately, exterior graces still move the human through the intellect and the will, yet are called exterior because they originate beyond the intellect and will (extra intellectum et voluntatem). See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 757. Interior actual graces are those which moved the intellect and the will directly by the mode of agent (efficient) causality.

God or sanctifying grace is immediately and adequately divided into actual grace and habitual grace just as into distinct species.”⁵⁵ According to Ramirez, these distinctions are by Aquinas in the *Summa*, but is not explicit therein.⁵⁶

The primary purpose of actual grace as a species of *gratia gratum faciens* is to elicit a supernaturally salvific act, be it the first one (the grace of conversion) or any subsequent meritorious action.⁵⁷ It is metaphysically required because Aquinas “demands that grace does not lack that which is necessary for any movement.”⁵⁸ In other words, actual grace is the principle which activates a supernatural capacity.⁵⁹ As the principle of activation, actual grace is neither identified with the faculty itself nor the action it produces.⁶⁰ “It is wholly of the order of movement, of intention.”⁶¹ It never provides a specific or qualitative determination, unless it is elevating the subject who does not have a habitual form yet.⁶² In short, actual grace is a transitory activation of a (normally) supernatural form.

⁵⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 687: “*Gratia gratum faciens vel santificans immediate et adaequate dividitur in gratiam actualement et gratiam habitualement veluti in species distinctas.*”

⁵⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 685.

⁵⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 689: “Therefore this supposed fundamental division, the Sacred Doctor considers the divisions from Augustine given by the master of the sentences, and which which is fitting of actual and habitual grace under diverse respects.” See also 694: “actual grace is given *per se* and firstly to elicit the supernatural salvific act.”

⁵⁸ Michel Labourdette, *Cours*, 792: “*cela demande que ne manque pas à la grâce ce que est nécessaire a tout mouvement: la motion divine.*”

⁵⁹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 793 : “*L’opération surnaturelle est l’actuation d’une capacité elle-même surnaturelle.*”

⁶⁰ Labourdette, *Cours*, 793.

⁶¹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 793: “*elle est toute entière de l’ordre du mouvement, de l’intentio.*”

⁶² Labourdette, *Cours*, 793.

The first division of actual grace is operative/cooperative.⁶³ This distinction was first made by Augustine to signify God's activity causing conversion (operative) and human activity post conversion (cooperative). It has since become iconic in western theology and especially in Thomistic thinkers. According to post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers, the operative/cooperative division does not divide actual grace specifically but rather is a division by effect.⁶⁴ In other words, operative and cooperative actual grace are formally one grace (*est specificce unus*)⁶⁵ but are divided by effects on the will.⁶⁶ In other words, as Ramirez argues, an operative actual grace gives rise to more than one act of the soul (some operatively and others cooperatively) and in this sense (quasi-materially), operative and cooperative grace differ

⁶³ This division is more properly of actual than habitual grace. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 693; Labourdette, *Cours*, 811.

⁶⁴ Labourdette, *Cours*, 812; Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 131: "Thus, one and the same grace is both operative and cooperative; it is operative when God alone acts; it is cooperative when both God and the will combine to produce an effect." See also 130: "Such a definition [ST I-II q. 111, a. 2] implies that one and the same grace produces some effects by itself and others in conjunction with free will;" Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 173-175; Wheeler, "Actual Grace," 343.

⁶⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 698 & 700. Here Garrigou-Lagrange diverges from Ramirez, Wawrykow, Lonergan, Labourdette, and Wheeler. Garrigou-Lagrange claims that an action elicited by cooperative actual grace is not a result of the action elicited by operative actual grace. Indeed, according to Garrigou-Lagrange, operative grace and cooperative grace differ numerically since motion is differentiated by the term to which it is ordered, i.e. an act of the will. But the act is twofold, interior wherein the will does not move itself, exterior wherein it does. Therefore there are two distinct actual graces. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 175. Hence, the operative/cooperative distinction of actual grace is a division not only by effect, but also numerically. Garrigou-Lagrange claims that operative and cooperative actual graces are diversely given, and so they must be numerically distinct. Nevertheless, he does envision them not being numerically distinct in some cases, i.e. the gift of counsel "since it is simultaneous with an act of prudence". In this case the operative actual grace contains the cooperative eminently, that is virtually (put differently, the operative grace has the surplus of power to move toward the cooperative act).

⁶⁶ Ramirez *de Gratia*, 698: "Actual grace is denominated operative and cooperative from the work of free will which is made to act by grace or cooperates with grace." See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 177: "St. Thomas declares that operative grace, specifically so called, pertains only to the act of, the will by which it is moved toward something freely, but does not move itself by discursive deliberation."

essentially.⁶⁷ Operative actual grace (a supernatural efficient cause)⁶⁸ is a supernatural motion which operates on the will prior to its own activity “producing the act of human salvation.”⁶⁹

Cooperative actual grace, in the strict sense, comes only after conversion or justification.⁷⁰

Cooperative actual grace is when the soul having habitual grace is able to cooperate and will the means to salvation. Prior to justification, the operative actual graces given by God to convert are prevented from being cooperative in the strict sense by the will’s indisposition. They do give rise to activity, but that activity should not, properly speaking, be called an effect of cooperative actual grace.

Where Ramirez speaks of the quasi-material or psychological division of actual grace into operative and cooperative,⁷¹ other authors use Aquinas’s language of interior and exterior

⁶⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 700. Ramirez uses the terms psychologically and physically to also distinguish these senses. The psychological refers to the acts of the human soul, the physical refers to the way interior actual grace moves, efficiently.

⁶⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 695. Physical premotion is a later Thomistic term coined in debate with the Molinists who held that God moves the believer by a moral motion, not a physical motion. The differences between these types of motions can be seen vis-à-vis the four causes. A moral motion merely draws man, that is moves by way of final cause. A physical premotion moves by way of efficient cause. For an accessible account of this difference see Romanus Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 30-32.

⁶⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 694.

⁷⁰ Aquinas, unlike Gillon, identifies conversion and justification.

⁷¹ Ramirez, in distinction, offers interior and exterior as another division of actual grace. It is not clear whether, like the other authors, he aligns operative actual grace with the interior act and cooperative actual grace with the exterior act. According to Ramirez, actual grace is said to be interior when it elicits the interior act, *velle*, and thinking so that it may arrive at operation. (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 700: Ramirez states flatly here that the interior act is *velle*, although in another place he says actual grace confirms both the *cogitatum et velle*). It is called exterior when it supplies the strength of completion to the executive power.

act.⁷² Interior acts of the will are those which are elicited from the will;⁷³ exterior acts are those which are commanded. “The second presupposes the first and depends on it.”⁷⁴ Operative actual grace is a motion in the subject which elicits a vital act of the will (an interior act).⁷⁵ What does it mean to be operative in relation to an interior act of the will? Put simply, operative means that

⁷² Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 169: “In the first interior act, the will is situated as moved only, whereas God is the mover; whereas in the exterior act, ordered by the will, the will is both moved and moves.” Despite the centrality here of the interior/exterior division for the operative/cooperative division, Garrigou-Lagrange does not specify exactly what the interior act is. He seems to have in mind *velle* or *intentio*.

⁷³ According to Labourdette, this first interior act in a series is in turn divided into the perfect and the imperfect. The interior act is imperfect in the illumination of the intellect and impulsion of the will when it moves according to “the mode of deliberation” (*Cours*, 812). From this the intellect and will carry themselves to a fully human act according to the mode of deliberation for which actual grace is cooperative. The perfect, first act, in distinction, is both fully conscious and free but not in the deliberate mode. There is consent but no deliberation (*Cours*, 812: “*non délibère (sinon virtuellement), mais dans lequel je suis pleinement consentant*”). From this act the soul is still able to carry itself to further good acts. God is also able, by an operative actual grace (either perfect or imperfect) to move the soul to any one of the acts of the supernatural virtues. God can also move the soul by an eminent actual grace (the instinctus of the Holy Spirit), which exceeds the regulation of all human virtue. (*Cours*, 812: “*dépasse la régulation de toute vertu humaine: c’est le cas des inspirations reçues par les Dons Du Saint-Esprit*.”) Labourdette does not specify how this type of motion is different from the perfect listed above). This is how God moves by the gifts. In this type of motion God moves the believer to an act which is “free and therefore meritorious, but infallibly good”. (*Cours*, 812: “*nous provoquant a un acte qui est libre et donc méritoire, mais infailliblement bon, sans être le moins du monde nécessite en lui-même. Celle qui cause le second est dite subséquente par rapport au premier.*”). Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 177 responds to those authors who think that interior and exterior (and therefore operative and cooperative grace) has anything to do with deliberation.

⁷⁴ Labourdette, *Cours*, 812.

⁷⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 169: “The major is clear with regard to an inanimate thing that is moved as the cart is moved by the horse, but if the thing moved is a living thing and the operation is a vital act, it is elicited, indeed, from it.”

free will is driven,⁷⁶ but does not drive/act of itself (*non se agit*).⁷⁷ This is actual grace purely and simply speaking.⁷⁸ It is also called the beginning of⁷⁹ and immediate positive disposition for habitual grace.⁸⁰

Actual grace is called cooperative in relation to an exterior act of the will, since an exterior act depends on actual grace, but not uniquely; it also depends on habitual grace and the interior act which preceded it and excites it. Actual grace is cooperative when it operates with free will to produce another salvific human act.⁸¹ Cooperative grace “is conferred for good works in which our will is not only moved, but moves itself, that is, when, already actually willing the final supernatural end, it converts itself to willing the means conducive to the end.”⁸² In other

⁷⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange lists other effects of operative grace. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 176: “1. The enlightenment of the intellect and the objective pulsation of the heart: this is a moral movement prior to any consent; thereupon the acts are indeliberate, and with respect to this stage operative grace is nothing but a grace which urges. 2. The application of the free will to the holy affection or action, that it may be converted to God; this application is the complement in the secondary cause to the power to operate. 3. The very act of willing, applied to the action, namely, the very act of believing, hoping, and loving: in these acts the will does not remain passive, but elicits the acts freely. However, the will does not properly move itself to such an act as a result of a preceding act, since this act is first in the order of grace and relates to the final end.”

⁷⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 697: “Because in the first place, *velle* acts since it is caused or moved by an operative actual grace, but does not act of itself.”

⁷⁸ According to Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170, God moves us operatively in four ways (the last two of which are supernatural). First, God moves us by an operative motion to desire the good in general. Second, God can move someone by a special inspiration in the natural realm. “For example, poetic, philosophic, or strategic.” Third, God moves us by an operative actual grace “to become converted to ...[the] final supernatural end.” Finally, God moves by a special inspiration of the Holy Spirit (to which we are habitually disposed). The first two, strictly speaking, are operative motions, but not operative grace. The final two are operative grace, but only the third is identified as operative actual grace.

⁷⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 697.

⁸⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 700.

⁸¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 697.

⁸² Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 172.

words, operative actual grace is the motion of God which causes humans to make their first act of human salvation, the first thinking and willing of salvation.⁸³ Cooperative grace is thus said with respect to all acts which follow the first, the execution of the salvific understanding and willing. This is akin to the concurrence of God on the natural level, which is operative in regard to the first understanding and willing of the end and cooperative for all actions which pursue that end. More strictly speaking, as stated earlier, after the infusion of habitual grace God's graced motion (actual grace) can become cooperative. Prior to the infusion of habitual grace, the will's indisposition prevents this. Actual operative grace prior to justification does give rise to activity, but it is not rightly called cooperative.

Although the primary act operative actual grace elicits is the first willing of salvation, it is not only for this purpose, it stands at the beginning of any new autonomous series of salvific actions in the supernatural life.⁸⁴ Actual grace is operative in relation to the first interior act of a series,⁸⁵ since nothing on the soul's part could precede it. This interior act depends wholly on operative actual grace.⁸⁶ "Hence it is not to be wondered at that, in this act wherein the will cannot move itself by virtue of a previous efficacious act of the same order, it should be referred

⁸³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 695: "The first thought and first will of salvation."

⁸⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 696.

⁸⁵ There is another disagreement here among the authors. Wawrykow claims that every supernatural interior act is the effect of operative grace. See Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 176. Garrigou-Lagrange (with whom Ramirez agrees) claims that only the first in a series is the effect of operative grace. Hence, an act could be interior and not an effect of operative grace. Rather it would be the effect of cooperative grace. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 172: "This act is said to be external, although it may be only internal, since it is commanded by the will in virtue of a previous efficacious act of the same order." Although Lagrange does not say here what he is taking the interior or exterior act to be, it seems most likely he is identifying them with the elicited/commanded distinction.

⁸⁶ Labourdette, *Cours*, 812: "*C'est moi que agis, bien entendu, mais je ne suis pas porte à cet acte, j'y suis porté par l'influence de la seule grâce.*"

to as moved only, and the operation attributed to God.”⁸⁷ This obtains in three ways: the mode of contrariety (that is the human begins to will the good when he previously willed evil), the mode of division within the same line of salvation (increases by exciting new acts in proportion to grace), or by the mode of simple interruption (“whenever [someone] is moved without counsel and a previous motive to the good.”⁸⁸)

Lonergan, although he agrees with the above analysis, goes into more depth. Before putting forth his own opinion, he rejects previous exegetical failures.⁸⁹ In his positive exegesis, he offers five possible positions on the relation between operative and cooperative grace and the interior/exterior act.⁹⁰ In the end, he commits to the third possibility, that is “the internal act of

⁸⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170.

⁸⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 697. Ramirez here cites Cajetan for both the mode of division and the mode of simple interruption: “By the name of the first act (in this place) is not understood only that which the will has in the beginning of all its acts, but whenever it is moved to the good without counsel and a previous [act].”

⁸⁹ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 133ff. He begins with the first of Cajetan’s interpretations which prescind from the question by claiming that St. Thomas did not speak of acts of the will but only the *forma meriti*. He rejects this outright, since St. Thomas speaks of an interior act of the will. He follows this opinion with that of Banez, who makes operative actual grace the physical premotion applying to act and cooperating actual grace the act itself. He refutes this saying that it posits an operative and cooperative actual grace for both the interior and exterior act of the will. Such is clearly not the intention of Aquinas. He follows Banez with the opinion of Franciscus Zigon who claims that *mota et non moves, solus autem Deus movens* really means *voluntas mota et se movens sed non movens membra corporis*. This does not fit the text either. The next author on the chopping block is Cajetan (again). In his interpretation, Cajetan claims that the interior act is the act produced by the Eudemian first mover. Lonergan does not deny this, but only that this act would be free (which Cajetan claims). Next Lonergan reviews the opinion of John of St. Thomas who claims that the interior act was the will of the end by an indeliberate and free act. Again, Lonergan only objects to the claim that this is a free act. Finally, he treats the opinions of Fr. del Prado, who agrees with John of St. Thomas and argues for the freedom of the interior act, namely we consent while being justified. Lonergan contends that this is under cooperative grace and not operative grace.

⁹⁰ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 137: “The difficulty of the passage would seem to be this: it gives a *duplex actus*, one internal to the will and one external; but the theory of the will gives a *triplex actus*: willing of the end, choice of the means, and bodily execution. If we denote the pair by A and B and the trio by X, Y, and Z, respectively, then the possible interpretations may be listed as follows: (1) A is X, and B is Y; (2) A is X, and B is Z; (3) A is X and B includes both Y and Z; (4) A includes both X and Y, and B is Z; (5) A is Y, and B is Z.”

the will is with respect to the end; the external act is not merely the bodily execution but also the act of the will commanding this execution.”⁹¹ Hence, he agrees with many of his deceased interlocutors that the interior act “seems demonstrably to be the will of the end effected by the Eudemian first mover.”⁹² In this act God moves operatively and there is no self-movement on the part of the soul. In the exterior act, the actual grace by which God operatively moved the soul to the end cooperates with the will in choice of the means and bodily execution. More particularly, the exterior cooperative acts are the “internal acts of faith, servile fear, and hope.”⁹³

The next typical division of actual grace in Thomistic thinkers⁹⁴ is into prevenient and subsequent.⁹⁵ As Lonergan reads him, Aquinas entirely decouples the prevenient/subsequent distinction from the operative/cooperative distinction. The former is simply sequential whereas

⁹¹ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 140.

⁹² Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 139.

⁹³ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 142.

⁹⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 708; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 178.

⁹⁵ The following is roughly Ramirez’s distinction between the topic of article 2 (operative/cooperative) and article 3 (prevenient/subsequent): there is a twofold relation of operative and cooperative to their effect, i.e., an act of free will: (1) Actual grace vis-à-vis free will which yields the distinctions of operative and cooperative actual grace. If actual grace comes prior, then it is operative. If it comes posterior, it is cooperative. (2) Actual grace prior to other actual graces which yields the distinction of prevenient/subsequent. If actual grace is taken as the first actual grace prior to justification then other graces are said to be cooperative with it (For actual grace as a preparation for justification and habitual grace see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 372-378.) On the other hand, if actual grace is taken after justification then it is cooperative with habitual. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 694: “It is evidently able to be understood that one grace (posterior) cooperates with another grace (the prior).” The first, that is actual grace vis-à-vis free will is the concern of *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2 and the latter, i.e., the prior and posterior, is the concern of a. 3.

the latter denotes “diversity of causal function.”⁹⁶ Graces are prevenient and subsequent, that is follow successively, because we live “in time and our activity is discursive.”⁹⁷

Ramirez, claims that the division of actual grace into prevenient and subsequent can be taken in two ways. The first way is taken from the comparison with the terminus of actual grace, which is an act of free will. In this sense prevenient denotes that which is antecedent to all acts of free will and subsequent is an actual grace which follows a certain motion of free will.⁹⁸

Second, the prevenient/subsequent division can be taken of a series of graces, either actual or habitual. In this sense, prevenient is that which is prior in the series, subsequent that which follows.⁹⁹ In the second sense, Labourdette, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Lonergan use the five possible effects from *ST* I-II q. 113: to heal the soul, to will the good, to accomplish efficaciously, to persevere in the good, and to achieve glory.¹⁰⁰ Graces are distinguished as prevenient and subsequent along according to these effects.¹⁰¹ Prevenient grace (in reference to

⁹⁶ Ibid., 129. He locates a development of doctrine in Aquinas on this point after the *Scriptum*. “In his *Commentary on the Sentences* St. Thomas held to this identification [prevenient with operative/subsequent with cooperative], except in the case of the beatific vision, which was a *gratia subsequens* but not a *gratia operans*. On the other hand, the *De Veritate* and the *Summa theologiae* reveal a marked tendency to differentiate the two pairs of terms.”

⁹⁷ Labourdette, *Cours*, 813: “dans le temps et que notre activité est discursive.”

⁹⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 709: “antecedit...succedit.”

⁹⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 709. It can also be taken specifically of actual graces themselves. In this sense the actual grace which is dispositive toward justification is prevenient, whereas those that come after are subsequent. A remote disposition for justification under actual grace, either positive or negative, is prevenient for the ultimate and proximate disposition, which is subsequent. The actual graces which excite the acts of the infused virtues is prevenient in relation to that which conserves the acceptance of habitual grace. In the final sense the actual grace of perseverance is subsequent to all other graces, which are related to it as prevenient.

¹⁰⁰ Labourdette, *Cours*, 814; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 178.

¹⁰¹ Garrigou-Lagrange differs here again from the other authors and on the same basis as the operative/cooperative disagreement. Since Garrigou-Lagrange claims that an actual grace “ceases with the very act toward which it moves

actual grace) is any prior causal motion related to either the action toward which it moves or indirectly toward the next effect which follows from the first. Prevenient actual grace is the grace which has produced the prior effect on the list. “The grace which is the principle of the first effect...is prevenient in relation to the second....The cause of the second is said to be subsequent by relation to the first.”¹⁰² Actual grace has a hand in producing each of these and is therefore distinguished, normally,¹⁰³ by its relation to them. “The first effect is properly termed ‘prevenient’ with respect to the second effect, and as causing the second it is called ‘subsequent’ in relation to the first.”¹⁰⁴

The third division of actual grace common in Thomistic thinkers is efficacious and sufficient.¹⁰⁵ According to Ramirez, some have claimed that St. Thomas recognized this

immediately and of which it is the beginning...”, he claims that prevenient and subsequent actual grace cannot be numerically one grace. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 178.

¹⁰² Labourdette, *Cours*, 814: “*La grâce que est au principe du premier effet (guérison) est dite prévenante par rapport au second (vouloir le bien).*”

¹⁰³ I infer this by implication. Labourdette says that if one is talking about habitual grace then these divisions are not one of nature, that is the graces are the same numerically. The implication is that if one is talking about actual grace, the graces differ numerically; the divisions into prevenient and subsequent are thus stronger in the case of actual grace. Cf. Labourdette, 814: “*elle n’est pas d’une autre nature et, si nous parlons de la grâce sanctifiante, habituelle, c’est la même, numériquement.*” What Labourdette seems to be presupposing here, but not articulating, is the old theory of actual grace as a transitory motion. A transitory motion ceases when the act toward which it is ordered comes into being. *Fieri* no longer exists once *esse* obtains.

¹⁰⁴ Labourdette, *Cours*, 179: “Thus grace is called prevenient with respect to some following act, although it is also prevenient with respect to the act toward which it moves immediately, according as it is previous to it with the priority of causality.”

¹⁰⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 196: “This doctrine of really sufficient grace distinct from efficacious grace is expressed in several texts from St. Thomas.” He gives *ST* III q. 79, a. 7, a. 2; III *SS* d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2, ad 5; *DV* q. 29, a. 7, ad 4; *Super 1st Tim.*, 2:6; *ST* I-II q. 106, a. 2, ad 2; *Super Eph.*, 3.2; *ST* I-II q. 109, aa. 1, 9, & 10; *ST* I-II q. 137, a. 4; *ST* I-II q. 113, a. 7 & 10.

distinction but did not apply it to actual grace.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, Ramirez claims this is not the case. St. Thomas did recognize this distinction as a distinction of actual grace.¹⁰⁷ However, he admits that Aquinas does not formulate the distinction as theologians later would.¹⁰⁸

Sufficient vs. efficacious grace is a distinction among efficient causes.¹⁰⁹ A sufficient cause is adequate, but does not apply to operation. An efficacious cause is adequate and applies, *de facto*, to operation with the effect following.¹¹⁰ All humans receive sufficient actual grace;¹¹¹ all the just receive sufficient grace for final perseverance.¹¹² Sufficient grace in general

¹⁰⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 759: “This was unknown by St. Thomas and yet applied to the supernatural order of grace, not however properly to actual grace itself.” Yet Ramirez claims, *de Gratia*, 762: “*S. Thomas magis accredit ad opsam gratiam actualem, cui aequivalenter, et fere propriis terminis applicat distinctionem sufficientis et efficacis.*” “St. Thomas more believes that the terms sufficient and efficacious apply generally in their proper terms to actual grace itself, to which it is equivalent.”

¹⁰⁷ He cites the following texts in evidence: *In Ad Rom.*, c. 8, l. 6; *ST I-II* q. 106, a. 2, ad 2; *In II Cor* c. 12, l. 3; *In Ad Eph.*, c. 3, l. 2; As evidence of the distinction elsewhere in St. Thomas (especially in relation to the passion of Christ, he cites *De Veritate* q. 27, a. 7, ad 4 & 8; *In Ad Rom.*, c. 5, l. 5; *In Matt.*, 326a; *III Sent.*, d. 19, a. 2; *I Tim.*, c. 2, l. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 762: “Nevertheless, this distinction, inasmuch as it applies to his actual formulation, is not of St. Thomas, nor his time, but appears later.”

¹⁰⁹ The ultimate basis for this distinction according to Garrigou-Lagrange is God’s antecedent and consequent will. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 197: “Hence, the division into these two wills is the supreme basis of the distinction between sufficient grace which proceeds from the antecedent will and grace which is efficacious of itself proceeding from the consequent will.” The distinction between efficacious and sufficient actual grace is thus intrinsic and not dependent on the recipient in any way. God either gives efficacious or sufficient grace. He does not give a grace which subsequently becomes sufficient or efficacious depending on the act of the recipient’s will. Grace is either intrinsically efficacious by both moral movement and predetermining physical promotion or else it is (merely) sufficient grace.

¹¹⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 759: “this distinction is among efficient causes which are merely sufficient or adequate, but do not apply to act and efficient causes which are adequate and apply *de facto* to operation with the effect following.”

¹¹¹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 208: “Sufficient grace is that which confers upon man the power of doing good, beyond which he requires another grace, namely efficacious, that he may do good.”

¹¹² Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 180.

corresponds to God's antecedent will that all be saved.¹¹³ Yet not all humans are made just or persevere. Those who are made just or persevere receive efficacious grace toward those purposes;¹¹⁴ those who do not only received sufficient grace.¹¹⁵ This is because efficacious grace and sufficient grace are divided in relation to the effect of consent. Sufficient grace is merely sufficient to produce consent, but it does not follow and hence the rejection is culpable. Nevertheless, sufficient grace really gives the ability. "But they are called merely sufficient with respect to salutary acts which, on account of man's culpable resistance, are not performed. Indeed, as has been said, grace which is termed sufficient with respect to a perfect act, for example, contrition, is infallibly efficacious with respect to an imperfect act, such as attrition." Efficacious grace causes the act of consent efficiently.¹¹⁶ Efficacious grace

makes us act....It is therefore not merely a question of efficacious grace with the efficacy of power in first act, in the sense of conferring real and intrinsic powers of the supernatural order (this is true even of interior sufficient grace); but the term is applied to efficacious grace with efficacy of operation in the second act, since it produces the operation itself effectively with us.¹¹⁷

These two graces, efficacious and sufficient, are thus different essentially and not accidentally, that is based on the consent of the free will¹¹⁸ (the position of the Molinists for

¹¹³ It is also important for the claim that God never commands the impossible. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 434.

¹¹⁴ In addition those graces which are efficacious for the first steps of salvation are merely sufficient for those that follow. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 779: "For that which is efficacious relative to the imperfect act, for example the good understanding and desire of salvation, is merely sufficient relative to the perfect act: placing faith, hope, and love in God above all things."

¹¹⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 777.

¹¹⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 778: "...which it causes efficiently."

¹¹⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 239.

¹¹⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 779; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 254.

whom the human will is the ultimate factor in distinguishing efficacious from sufficient grace).¹¹⁹ Both efficacious and sufficient grace are really different from the will and from the acts of salvation they elicit.¹²⁰ They are that by which (*qua*), not that which is (*quod est*).¹²¹ Both sufficient and efficacious are elevating but only efficacious applies the will to elicit a vital act.¹²² Hence they give an instrumental power, which simultaneously gives a new power and moves that power to act.¹²³ Garrigou-Lagrange further divides sufficient actual grace into

¹¹⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 778.

¹²⁰ Labourdette distinguishes between efficacious and sufficient actual grace in a slightly-different manner than Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez. In doing so, again, he utilizes the five acts outlined above. Actual operative grace in relation to the act of healing is only sufficient in relation to the following effect (to will the good). See Labourdette, *Cours*, 814: “*Comme opérant la guérison, la grâce prévenante dont nous parlions n’est encoure que suffisante pour l’effet suivant: vouloir le bien.*” Actual grace is efficaciously given (*efficacement donne*), but the refusal of the will could sterilize the first effect. It is in relation to the second effect, which presupposes the first, that the grace is termed sufficient; Labourdette, *Cours*, 814: “...by relation to the second effect, it was sufficient.”

¹²¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 781: “but it is living just as that by which, because it is the principle of the vital act, just as *ens* is of *essentia*, not that which is, but that by which it is.”

¹²² Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 782. Efficacious grace produces all acts by deliberation, save the first act of salvation which is without deliberation according to the supernatural order, but not without deliberation simply speaking.

¹²³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 781: “Simultaneously elevates and applies the power to acting.”

proximate/remote,¹²⁴ conferred help/offered sufficient help, and immediate/mediate.¹²⁵ Ramirez does something similar for both sufficient and efficacious grace.¹²⁶

The next division, healing/elevating, is most properly said of habitual grace, but can also be said of actual grace less properly. This is so because actual grace is not always healing or elevating.¹²⁷ Whether it is healing or elevating changes given a host of factors, most especially prior/posterior to justification and the existential state of the human to whom it is given. The possibilities for healing and elevating grace are as following: Actual grace as purely healing,¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 213. Sufficient actual grace is divided into proximately sufficient and remotely sufficient. Only the final division is of actual sufficient grace and concerns me here. Garrigou-Lagrange explains this division thus: Proximate help is that by which a person can immediately perform a good work, such as the infused habits with respect to their acts, and with still greater reason indeliberate devout thoughts and aspirations inspired by God and inclining toward consent to the good. Remote sufficient help is that by which a person is not yet capable of the act, but can do something easier, for instance, pray, which, if he does it well, will enable him to act to overcome temptation for example.

¹²⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 213-214. Merely offered sufficient help is contrasted with conferred help by the fact of an obstacle. Merely offered grace is stopped by an obstacle which does not exist for that sufficient actual grace conferred. Immediate actual sufficient grace is conferred on the individual whereas mediate is through others (e.g. parents).

¹²⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 783-784. Sufficient grace can be divided in relation to the act of justification. Prior to justification all are given remote sufficient grace toward the first act of thinking and desiring salvation. There is also proximately sufficient grace which is sufficient for the remote dispositions to justification, but merely sufficient toward the ultimate. After justification, there is also remote and proximate sufficient grace. All are given remote and proximately sufficient grace for the second conversion to God through the increase of grace. To perseverance all receive the proximately sufficient grace. Efficacious grace is divided between ordinary and extraordinary in relation to the act of justification. Efficacious grace is ordinary toward the first conversion, usually. It is extraordinary when the first conversion is produced instantaneously and miraculously. Toward the second conversion normal and ordinary efficacious grace is given to move and excite man through readings, admonition or some other media. It is miraculous and extraordinary when it causes one to live a fervent life. Finally, efficacious grace is normal in relation to final perseverance when it is according to human psychology; it is extraordinary when one receives the singular grace of impeccability (as with our Lady).

¹²⁷ Labourdette, *Cours*, 807. Grace, in itself, is always elevating. In relation to humans who live “*dans un état historique de nature déchue*,” it becomes healing as well.

¹²⁸ Ramirez also calls this grace supernatural *quoad modum*. In this sense actual grace is identical with God’s general concurrence. It is purely natural according to its essence and substance. Cf. Ramirez, 736. “This grace is purely healing and is not sanctifying.”

when it is the motion needed for lapsed man to do an ethical good, as purely elevating,¹²⁹ when it is given to produce an act of salvation, and mixed, when an ethically good act (through pure healing actual grace) is positively ordained to the supernatural end from volition and intention (through pure elevating actual grace).¹³⁰ Based on these possibilities, Ramirez claims that actual grace is thus distinguished into purely elevating and elevating/healing on account of the conditions of humanity.¹³¹ He does not claim that this is the *ipsissimum verbum* of Aquinas, but that it is in the spirit of St. Thomas's words.¹³² Actual grace is called elevating because it is responsible for the thinking and efficacious willing of salvation.¹³³ This is implied since elevating grace is simply the raising of the mind to God as a supernatural end.

For the angels and Adam in the state of innocence, actual grace was purely elevating and not healing. They simply had to be moved to refer their good actions toward God as a supernatural end.¹³⁴ On the other hand, fallen humanity cannot be elevated without simultaneously being healed, *per accidens*. In other words, by moving the mind to think and will salvation, God also indirectly moves humans to good actions made proportionate to that end by

¹²⁹ Ramirez also calls this grace supernatural *quoad substantiam*.

¹³⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 736.

¹³¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 737.

¹³² Ramirez cites *ST I* 62, a. 2, ad 2.

¹³³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 697.

¹³⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 737: "an honest act or an act ordained to the *bonum honestum*."

the intention. These actions heal the wounds of sin and thus, indirectly, so does actual grace.

Hence the same actual grace, when given post fall, is both elevating and healing.¹³⁵

The fourth division of actual grace is exciting and helping (*excitantem et adiuvantem*). This distinction is more properly said of actual grace than habitual. The fundamental distinction Ramirez uses to understand this division is, first, relative to the pure salvific will and operation and, second, relative to the meritorious good which is inchoate and perfect.¹³⁶ He also utilizes the act of being justified as a heuristic division. In other words, actual grace is called exciting and helping in different ways before and after baptism.

To properly grasp the first distinction one must understand the three moments in the disposition to justification: (1) the inchoate initial movement, (2) the continuation, and (3) the consummation of preparation (i.e., the perfect act of contrition and charity—the perfect preparation for charity).¹³⁷ Actual grace moving the soul to the first inchoate moment in justification is called exciting,¹³⁸ which produces illumination in the mind and inspirations in the will (externally for the inchoate). The initial inspiration of the mind is purely external and imperfect. The inspiration of the will is exciting the pious desire for salvation. Ramirez claims this inspiration of the will is what St. Thomas means by the instinct or instigation of the Holy

¹³⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 738.

¹³⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 744.

¹³⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 744.

¹³⁸ Relative to this function, actual grace is also able to be called *vocans aut pulsans*.

Spirit.¹³⁹ Toward the continuation, which implies the movement of free will through faith, hope, and inchoate love as well as the detestation of sin, actual grace is called helping. These actions inspired by actual grace may also be taken more specifically. Actual grace is called exciting in the first thinking and desiring of salvation. In this sense helping actual grace and elevating actual grace is that power through which grace excites.¹⁴⁰ After the initial act of desiring salvation actual grace is called helping toward the act of faith, hope, and attrition. In this sense it is helping grace in applying the subject to exercise salvific actions.¹⁴¹

After baptism, Ramirez claims that actual grace is called exciting and helping in a new way:¹⁴² no longer is exciting grace that which awakens the soul from the slumber of sin, but rather spurs the soul on from hesitancy toward fervent acts.¹⁴³ Helping grace is the actual grace given so that the soul might complete the good action and persevere in the good begun.¹⁴⁴

In distinction to Ramirez, Garrigou-Lagrange, claims that the division between exciting and helping actual grace is implicit in Aquinas since it means the same thing as operative grace.

¹³⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 746. The texts of St. Thomas he cites are *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 6, co. & ad 4; *DV* q. 27, a. 5; *In Jer.*, XXXI, l. 3; *Super Io.*, VI, l. 4.

¹⁴⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 747: "Therefore those powers are elevated through exciting grace, so that they might be able to think and desire salvifically."

¹⁴¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 747: "Truly, it is applied to those salvific acts exercised through helping grace."

¹⁴² Ramirez cites St. Thomas's *commentary on II Timothy* in this regard. See *Super II Tim.*, I, l. 3: "*Gratia Dei est sicut ignis qui, quando obtegatur cinere, non lucet; sic gratia obtegatur in homine per torporem vel humanum timorem. Unde et Timotheus, effectus pusillanimitatis, torpuit circa praedicationem, et ideo dicit: ut resuscites gratiam sopitam.*"

¹⁴³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 747: "so that those sleeping with the sleep inducing sloth may fervently act."

¹⁴⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 747: "helping however is said to be that by which we are sustained so that we may complete acts and so that we may persevere in the good act started."

Later authors claimed that exciting grace “rouses one from the sleep of sin by moral movement, that is, by enlightenment and attraction...”¹⁴⁵ According to Garrigou-Lagrange, this is identical with what Aquinas means by operative grace in *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2. Helping grace on the other hand is “grace assisting one to will the good, by the application of the will to its exercise...”¹⁴⁶ According to Garrigou-Lagrange, this is also implicit in q. 111, a. 2 inasmuch as “operative grace is not only stimulating but assisting.”¹⁴⁷

Such is the common Thomistic synthesis of the post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers. The divisions are scholastic, precise, and the product of centuries of Thomistic reflection. Nevertheless, this picture of Aquinas’s divisions of actual grace hardly bridges the gap between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace. In short, none of the authors above use the particular data gathered about how God moves us by the gifts to either posit new divisions in actual grace or even fill out more particularly how the different types of actual grace interact with the recipient.¹⁴⁸

Yet this would seem to be necessary for a proper division of actual grace. When Aquinas is speaking about actual grace in the treatise, he is speaking (at least in part) about the motions to which the gifts correspond. This seems likely given the fact that the gifts are given to make the

¹⁴⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 180.

¹⁴⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 180.

¹⁴⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 180.

¹⁴⁸ By new divisions I mean the possibility of species of actual grace taken in general or of operative and cooperative actual grace.

believer proportionate “to the motion of God.”¹⁴⁹ Aquinas mentions God’s motion many times in *ST I-II* q. 109, 110, and 111. Hence, it is at least likely (unless the topic of these questions and the motion to which the gifts are proportionate are diverse types of actual grace) that the way God moves us in the gifts would yield a better understanding of Aquinas’s thought on grace.

IIa. Gifts and Actual Grace

To be fair, there is a position which makes some headway on using the gifts of the Holy Spirit to divide actual grace. The only explicit and worked out position of post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers is that of thinkers such as Garrigou-Lagrange, Ramirez, and Labourdette.¹⁵⁰ This position may be seen when Ambroise Gardiel notes: “the gifts are not to be confused with the inspirations of the Holy Spirit; they are powers in the soul making it receptive to the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit...”¹⁵¹ He continues and gives voice to a nearly unanimous position in Thomism.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 3: “*ad motionem ipsius [Dei]*.”

¹⁵⁰ Walter Farrell, O.P., and Dominic Hughes, O.P., *Swift Victory: Essays on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 17: “The gifts of the Holy Spirit differ intrinsically from the virtues; even from faith, which sets the boundary of their activity, and charity, which is the bond of their presence and perfection. They are dependent upon a different kind of grace moving them to act. In the practice of the virtues, the intellect and will, when moved by God’s efficacious grace, move themselves to act by counsel, deliberation, and decision. In the gifts the activity is much more passive, more ‘not I, but the grace of God with me’ (I Cor. 15,10). The Holy Spirit operates in the soul in such a way that the soul has no need to move itself laboriously by deliberation and choice. The choice and command are already full-fashioned by the Holy Spirit, and the soul’s activity is that of acceptance and assent.”

¹⁵¹ Ambroise Gardiel, *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life* (St. Louis : Herder, 1923), 7.

¹⁵² I say nearly unanimous because there are those authors whose position requires them to deny the received interpretation. In other words, the position of Pinckaers, Stroud, and Knobel require that they correlate the gifts of the Spirit with common actual grace, although none of them have fully articulated this implication or justified their thesis with reference to the general operations and divisions of actual grace. Indeed, their position has multiple implications for the conception of actual grace. The closest any author comes to the justification is Lonergan, *Grace*

There are two ways in which the Holy Spirit leads us. He, the breadth of love of Father and Son, acts upon us with inspirations which take a double course. Sometimes he simply leaves us to act by ourselves—to make acts of faith, hope or charity, acts of prudence, justice, fortitude or temperance; we ourselves set these acts in motion; it is under the impulse of divine love, yet we ourselves hold the mastery, rule the conduct of our lives....The Holy Spirit is not absent, he is the first cause himself applying our supernatural energies to the acts we make, but we retain the direction. This is the basis of the Christian life: the supernatural, but personal government of ourselves by the Christian virtues....This second intervention is assured us by what are called the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost....The Holy Spirit, by inspirations corresponding to his gifts presses us on to action, and in his hands we become no more than instruments. We lose the first place in the direction of our conduct; filled with divine assistance we have only to give our consent to his work; the task becomes easier, difficulties are eliminated....We may compare them to the respective progress made by a rowing boat and a sailing boat....To act by the active virtues of faith, hope and charity, and by the infused moral virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance with all their ramifications, requires an effort. This remains the basic way of life, for the wind of the Holy Spirit is not always blowing. Nevertheless, this additional means, this wind of the Holy Spirit, is guaranteed us by the very fact that with sanctifying grace we do possess the gifts, which were infused in us at baptism.¹⁵³

and Freedom, 47 & 65. Kelly also asserts this, but does not work it out fully. See Bernard J. Kelly, *The Seven Gifts* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942), 22-24; Steven Long, "The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Their Indispensability for the Christian Moral Life: Grace as *Motus*," in *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2013): 357-73; Angela McKay, *The Infused and Acquired Moral Virtues in Aquinas's Philosophy* (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2004); James Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Developments in His Thought and Rival Interpretations* (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 2012); Servais Pinckaers, *The Pinckaers Reader*, trans. Mary Thomas Noble in the Pinckaers Reader, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2005); Servais Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics*, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995); Servais Pinckaers, O.P., *La vie selon L'Esprit* (Paris: Éditions Le Cerf, 1997), chapter 11.

¹⁵³ Gardiel, *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life*, 5-7.

Gardiel's "double course" corresponds roughly to two types of actual grace outlined by Garrigou-Lagrange.¹⁵⁴ In dependence on Del Prado,¹⁵⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange claims that St. Thomas's conception of supernatural motion entails three types of actual grace.¹⁵⁶ First, "grace moves the sinner's free will to be converted to his supernatural end."¹⁵⁷ This motion is analogous to the first motion in the natural order by which humans will happiness. "The second mode of motion in this order is that by which God moves a just man to act well supernaturally by using the infused virtues as he ought."¹⁵⁸ Finally, the last mode of actual grace is that to which the gifts correspond. "Lastly, the third mode of the divine motion in the order of grace is that by which God especially moves the free will of a spiritual man, who is disposed to the divine inspiration by the gifts of the Holy Ghost."¹⁵⁹ This motion is not just given for the exercise of the act (as in cooperative actual grace) but even for its specification. It is the "eminent mode of operating

¹⁵⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170; 1. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, *Christian Perfection and Contemplation* (Rockford, Ill.: TAN Books, 2010), 285ff; Ambroise Gardiel, "Dons du Saint Esprit," *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique* (Paris: Letouzey, 1939) vol 4, cols 1728-1781. See especially col. 1738-1739.

¹⁵⁵ Norbert Del Prado, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio: Pars Prima in qua Explanatur Sex Quaestiones de Gratia Dei Ex D. Thomae Summa Theologica* (Fribourg, Switzerland: Ex Typis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1907).

¹⁵⁶ These three types are specifically distinct according to Garrigou-Lagrange, since they come before, with, or above human deliberation. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 294.

¹⁵⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 290.

¹⁵⁸ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 291.

¹⁵⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 292.

grace.”¹⁶⁰ Here the will does not move itself but freely consents to this motion, “as a faithful pupil or obedient inferior.”¹⁶¹

It is with this type of efficacious actual grace that Garrigou-Lagrange coordinates the gifts of the Holy Spirit. “Here the will does not move itself but freely consents to the motion.”¹⁶² In terms of the prior divisions of actual grace according to Garrigou-Lagrange, the motion to which the gifts of the Holy Spirit make the believer proportionate is an interior intrinsically efficacious actual grace which moves humans above the human mode.

Other authors, even if they do not agree in detail,¹⁶³ agree that there are (at least) two types of actual grace: one which moves the human subject according to his native deliberative power and another which moves him beyond it.¹⁶⁴ The latter type of motion is that to which the gifts correspond.

¹⁶⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 292.

¹⁶¹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 292. He further notes that this is operating, but not really justifying grace (since the subject is already justified).

¹⁶² Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 36.

¹⁶³ Jacobus M. Ramirez, O.P., *De Donis Spiritus Sancti Deque Vita Mystica: In II P. Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae Expositio* (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia, 1974), 95: “That St. Thomas reduces the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the heroic virtues can be contested in many ways.”

¹⁶⁴ Luis M. Martinez, *The Sanctifier*, trans. by Sr. M. Aquinas, O.S.U. (Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1957), 37; Farrell and Hughes, 17: “They are dependent upon a different kind of grace moving them to act.” Froget, 213; Gardiel, *Dons*, col. 1738: “They find their reason for being in the double manner in which the first cause may intervene in its domain namely: first in putting into movement the secondary causes to which it gives in a habitual manner part of its active power. Second, in intervening directly by personal initiatives in the ordinary functioning normally assured by the secondary causes. The first manner is called a simple concours or premotion of the secondary cause by the first. The second manner is instrumentality properly speaking. The first manner is related to the infused moral virtues and the second to the gifts.” Labourdette, *Cours*, 375; Edward Leen, *The Holy Ghost and His Work in Souls* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), 323-324; Hugh Francis Blunt, *Life with the Holy Ghost: Thoughts on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943), 47; J. A. O’Driscoll, *The Holy Spirit and the Art of Living* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1959), 14-16; Joseph de Guibert S.J., *The Theology of the Spiritual Life*, translated by Paul Barrett (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953), 123.

Can a renewed contact between St. Thomas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace enlarge or challenge this picture of the gifts corresponding to a special type of actual grace?¹⁶⁵ The answer to this question both does and does not rest on the following question: are the gifts required for every supernatural action (which I will treat later as a separate debate)? If this question is answered positively, then the correlation of the gifts with a type of actual grace needs to be worked out again. However, for those who do answer this question positively, there is little to no position on the division of actual grace or any correlation with a type of actual grace. Yet, their position implies much about that division and could be refuted by the possible absurdities it implies therein. If one answers this question negatively (as much of traditional Thomistic thinkers do), then there is still work to be done on the correlation. For example, even though Garrigou-Lagrange does associate a type of supernatural motion with the gifts, this supernatural motion is not integrated with the more general division of actual grace: the two never fully meet each other in his work. In his thought on the gifts, he posits new divisions of actual grace (beyond the human mode, pre-deliberative, etc.). How do these divisions of a type of graced motion relate to his other divisions? Should one posit additional species of actual grace? Are all operative actual graces beyond the human mode, or only that to which the gifts correspond? The purpose of this section is not to answer these questions. Nevertheless, it is

¹⁶⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange's position on the division of actual grace rests on two principle bases. First, the real distinction between operative and cooperative actual grace. Second, his position rests on the claim that the gifts operate beyond the human mode, i.e., beyond deliberation. The first position has a strong argument in support of it, given St. Thomas's conception of motion being the principle of *fieri*, which ceases when *esse* is attained. Yet it runs into difficulties with St. Thomas's explicit statements in *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2. The second claim was the subject of much controversy in the 20th century. It is certainly the case that St. Thomas conceived of the gifts of the Holy Spirit operating beyond the human mode in the *Scriptum*. His position on this issue in the *Summa* is not quite so clear.

important to note that no matter one's position on the necessity of the gifts, there is still work to be done correlating the gifts with the systematic divisions of grace in Aquinas.

III. The Division of Habitual Grace

The second species (or quasi-species) of *gratia gratum faciens* is habitual grace. The purpose of this section is to outline the settled position of a few post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers on the division of habitual grace. The method will be similar to that followed above for actual grace. I outline what I take to be the common consensus between the different authors and note divergences (and disagreements) in the footnotes. This section will consist of five parts. In the first part, I outline the common commitment that habitual grace is really distinct from the infused gifts and virtues.¹⁶⁶ Second, I survey the settled position on the division of habitual grace by subject. Third, I sketch the settled position on the division of habitual grace by effects. Fourth, I note the implications of the above division for the (possible) healing and elevating status of the supernatural habits.¹⁶⁷ Finally, I give a few reasons that the gifts of the Holy Spirit can aid in the division of habitual grace by effect (though not by subject).

¹⁶⁶ According to Ramirez the sole difficulty lies with the distinction between habitual grace and charity. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 614.

¹⁶⁷ The question governing this section is whether the supernatural habits are healing and elevating. The question could also be put exegetically. Is St. Thomas always speaking precisely when he uses the term habitual grace such that only the form infused into the soul is healing and elevating or is he sometimes using the term habitual grace more loosely (i.e., as including the supernatural habits), such as when he says that habitual grace is healing and elevating?

The common consensus among Thomists is that habitual grace is really distinct from the supernatural habits.¹⁶⁸ Ramirez, when discussing the division of habitual grace, immediately averts to an old Thomistic distinction: operative vs. entitative habit: “Truly, just as to act follows to be, so the principle of acting presupposes the principle of being.”¹⁶⁹ An entitative habit¹⁷⁰ is in this case an entitative supernatural quality infused into the essence of the soul which gives a participation in the very nature of God.¹⁷¹ An operative habit, on the other hand, only accidentally qualifies¹⁷² a power of the soul (has a power for its subject) and does not reside in the essence (like habitual grace does).¹⁷³ In speaking of the supernatural life, the theological virtues, infused cardinal virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit are operative habits.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, all operative habits presuppose an entitative habit which is their root and source. “Operative

¹⁶⁸ Labourdette, *Cours*, 804. Garrigou-Lagrange rests the bulk of his argument for this division on the strict parallelism between the natural and supernatural orders. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 144: “Based on the definition of virtue and on a parallelism between the natural and supernatural orders, virtue is really distinct from the proportionate nature which it presupposes; as the acquired virtues from the nature of the soul. But the supernatural virtues presuppose nature elevated by sanctifying grace. Therefore the supernatural virtues, even charity, are really distinct from sanctifying grace.”

¹⁶⁹ Ramirez, *Gratia*, 612. As far as I am aware, the distinction between entitative and operative habits is not explicit in Aquinas. He does posit habits in both the essence of the soul (habitual grace in *ST* I-II q. 110) and in its powers (supernatural virtues – see *ST* I-II q. 51, a. 4). Hence, the later Thomistic division seeks to make Aquinas’s explicit positions clearer by new terms.

¹⁷⁰ Ramirez, *Gratia*, 611: “a principle of being”.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 611.

¹⁷² According to all Thomists, grace falls fundamentally into the accident of quality. See *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2; Ramirez, *Gratia*, 589-609.

¹⁷³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 612.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 613-614.

supernatural or infused habits necessarily presuppose an entitatively supernatural infused form.”¹⁷⁵

The key to understanding this Thomistic claim rests on the two diverse subjects of habitual grace and the supernatural habits. Put differently, the claim is that since the essence of the soul and the powers of the soul are diverse, so too are habitual grace and the supernatural habits.¹⁷⁶ Each has a different proper and immediate subject. Habitual grace resides in the essence of the soul as an entitative habit¹⁷⁷ whereas the supernatural habits have the powers of the soul for their subject as operative habits.¹⁷⁸ Ramirez draws the conclusion of his above analysis: “The infused virtues are operative supernatural habits and the entitative supernatural form which they presuppose is habitual grace. Therefore, the infused virtues differ really and essentially from habitual grace.”¹⁷⁹

The one outlier to this common position is Lonergan. Lonergan seems to claim that the term habitual grace properly includes the supernatural habits. In other words, at times Lonergan

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 611. See also 612: “Infused virtue does not immediately dispose the nature of the soul just as it is in itself, since infused virtues are ordained essentially to the supernatural.”

¹⁷⁶ *ST I* q. 77, a. 1, co.; *ST I* q. 77, a. 6, co.: “Thus it is clear that all powers of the soul, whether their subject is the soul alone or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul just as from a principle, because (as was already said) an accident is caused by a subject according to its act, and is receptive to the subject inasmuch as it is in potency.” For more on the relation between accidents and their subject see 1. John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 266ff.

¹⁷⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 626. See *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 4 for St. Thomas’s clear treatment of this subject.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 612.

¹⁷⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 610.

seems to suggest that habitual grace is not distinct from the supernatural habits.¹⁸⁰ More specifically, in multiple places he seems to imply habitual grace is properly speaking a collective term. However, Lonergan never says this explicitly; the closest he comes is the claim that sanctifying grace is a multiplicity in Aquinas's mature writings.¹⁸¹

The first passage which seems to suggest that Lonergan includes the virtues and the gifts in the category of habitual grace is a simple parallel, that is taking the two as synonymous. "Just as the generation of fire results in immediate burning, so the infusion of the virtues results in immediate acts of virtue. For habitual grace is like any other form: it gives not only *esse* but also *operari*."¹⁸² The parallelism here between habitual grace and the infusion of the virtues seems clear. In other words, by the term habitual grace, Lonergan seems to mean the infused virtues collectively.¹⁸³ If he held the classic distinction between habitual grace and the virtues, this

¹⁸⁰ In Lonergan's defense, Aquinas does not use the term habitual grace in *ST* I-II q. 110, but rather generically speaks of grace as distinct from the virtues. Hence, Lonergan could say that the term habitual grace includes the virtues, but that in 110, a. 4, Aquinas is using the term grace to speak of the form infused into the essence of the soul and not habitual grace, as the commentators claim.

¹⁸¹ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 37: "A real distinction had to be introduced between operative and cooperative, prevenient and subsequent grace. To introduce such a distinction the category of grace in its strict sense, *gratia gratum faciens*, had to be enlarged." Indeed, he seems to imply that this is habitual grace by saying earlier on the page: "The answer they gave was that this distinction [operative and cooperative/prevenient and subsequent] did not imply a multiplicity of graces but only a multiplicity of effects from one and the same sanctifying grace. Now in the *De Veritate*, in the very article under consideration, this objection is repeated in a variety of ways to receive uniformly a new answer...plainly, this objection was decisive against the earlier view, for one cannot pray for something that is only notionally distinct from what one already has received."

¹⁸² Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 62. Lonergan makes a similar comment on page 48: "Because every habit is a perfection, the actuation and determination of an indeterminate potency, it will have its immediate effects in the field of formal causality and its ulterior consequences in the field of efficient causality. The accident 'heat' is the ground both of the fire's being hot and of its heating other objects; in like manner grace or any other form is a principle of both *esse* and *operari*." What is noteworthy here is Lonergan's specificity. He is speaking of grace and not habitual grace.

¹⁸³ It is also likely, though not stated, that Lonergan is including the habit infused into the essence of the soul from which the virtues flow.

sentence would not have been formulated as such (or only irresponsibly so). Rather, he would have said that the infusion of habitual grace results in immediate acts of virtue not the infusion of the virtues.

The second possibility for seeing habitual grace as a collective term flows from Lonergan's vision of habitual grace as a pre-motion (according to Lonergan, this is a temporally prior motion which "brings mover and moved in the right relation, mutual disposition, spacial proximity for motion naturally to ensue").¹⁸⁴ In making the argument he comments: "Once this is understood, one readily grasps why the infusion of habitual grace is a premotion. It is a change from one spontaneity to another....When such a change is produced in adult consciousness, it naturally gives rise to acts of free will, acts of faith and of repentance, which both acknowledge this change of attitude and result from it."¹⁸⁵ The most important part of this quote is that the infusion of habitual grace naturally gives rise to acts of faith and repentance, which are distinct from each other. Now Lonergan's view of habit is that it is "(as it were) a certain form tending in the way of a nature to one thing."¹⁸⁶ Faith and repentance are formally distinct and hence must fall under the activity of two different principles (virtues). Hence, when Lonergan says that habitual grace is a premotion, he must have more than simply the form infused into the essence of the soul, since that (as formally one on the standard reading) could only tend to many things under one formality and not many formalities.

¹⁸⁴ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 91.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

On the other hand, Lonergan does at times use the term ‘habitual grace’ in the classical sense thereby implying that it is distinct from the supernatural habits. One example will suffice: in commenting on habitual grace’s infusion as liberating human freedom, Lonergan says, “Finally, just as a vicious habit is not needed to set up slavery to sin, for a mere disposition suffices, so also the infusion of habitual grace is not the sole means God has for the liberation of liberty, for not only by imprinting a permanent form but also by a simple motion does God change the will of man.”¹⁸⁷ It seems clear here that Lonergan is taking habitual grace as the permanent form infused into the soul by God.

What should one make of the data in Lonergan? It seems that Lonergan is ambiguous on the issue. Indeed, it seems at times that Lonergan would deny (at least in vocabulary) the classical Thomistic distinction between habitual grace on the one hand, the virtues, and the gifts on the other.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, at other points Lonergan uses the term habitual grace in the classic Thomistic sense.

Recognizing Lonergan as a possible outlier on this point, it seems clear that the consensus of post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers is that habitual grace is really distinct from the supernatural habits. Given that, I can proceed to the second part: the division of habitual grace. According to most Thomistic thinkers, habitual grace can be divided by subject and by effect.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 58.

¹⁸⁸ It is interesting to note that in *ST I-II* q. 110, aa. 3-4, St. Thomas never uses the term habitual grace as divided from the virtues. In addition, it seems clear that in the corpus of a. 1, the term habitual grace is referring universally to all the infused habits (or else it would not be plural). Lonergan’s use of vocabulary mirrors St. Thomas’s usage in this respect.

The division of habitual grace by subject is not a strict division. In other words, this division does not posit different kinds of habitual grace. The warning of Garrigou-Lagrange is apropos. There are not, strictly speaking, “several kinds of sanctifying grace, essentially differing among themselves...”¹⁸⁹ These different ‘species’ should rather be thought of as a division by subject. The subjects of habitual grace are Christ (personal grace, and capital grace)¹⁹⁰ and the believers (grace commonly speaking – i.e., habitual grace and the supernatural habits taken collectively).¹⁹¹ It is less important for my research to understand the division of habitual grace by subject. Rather, what is more important is the division of habitual grace by effect.

The habitual grace of believers (and also the personal grace of Christ) is divided diversely by effects into operative/cooperative, prevenient/subsequent, and exciting/helping. Habitual grace is called operative in relation to those effects which “the divine alone immediately

¹⁸⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 139-140. All of the same distinctions of the types of habitual grace found in Ramirez are found in Lagrange. Nevertheless, he denies any essential difference among them: “...for grace is a formal participation in the divine nature which is absolutely simple, nor can anything higher be conceived in which it would participate.... not even in the most holy soul of Christ is habitual grace of a higher species than in any just man, although it is much more intense and extensive.” This would not place Garrigou-Lagrange at odds with Ramirez, since Garrigou-Lagrange’s divisions of habitual grace are by effect.

¹⁹⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 753-754. Christ has grace in two senses. First, he has the grace of union, which is a grace (has no preceding merits) but not a habitual grace. Second, he has habitual grace in his human nature. The habitual grace of Christ is divided accidentally by its effects. Thus, one has the personal grace of Christ which justifies his soul formally and the same grace serving as the capital grace of all believers.

¹⁹¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 754-756. The habitual grace of believers is divided (again accidentally by order to diverse effects) by habitual grace commonly and simply speaking (the grace of virtues and gifts) and sacramental grace. The grace of the virtues and the gifts is called healing in the following way: “And so from healing grace in a secondary way emanates the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.” By this effect grace restores the principles of supernatural life lost by sin. In another sense by original sin and by personal sin one debilitates nature and incurs many wounds. “and grace as medicinal and habitual is contrary to the infirmity and wounds of nature, is said to be sacramental grace.” Sacramental habitual grace is again divided into primary and secondary. The sacraments of the dead are primary inasmuch as they cause, per se, sanctifying grace. Secondarily are the sacraments of the living since they simply augment already existing sanctifying grace. “As above, the grace of virtue and gifts emanates per se from habitual grace and for this reason is known as elevating grace; while sacramental grace is from it in a certain way per accidens, and so it is only healing grace.”

causes.”¹⁹² It covers all those effects of habitual grace which do not involve the free will in their production. God alone causes the renewal of our nature; God alone elevates our nature to a supernatural end. In other words, the healing and elevating effects of habitual grace are operative effects.¹⁹³ These two terms are really an explanation of what the ‘sanctifying’ part of sanctifying grace means. Sanctifying grace is simply a synonym for habitual grace inasmuch as it causes the healing and elevating of fallen nature. Cooperative habitual grace, on the other hand, is habitual grace acting through and with the infused habits to cause the meritorious act.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, habitual grace is the ultimate cause and root of all meritorious action.

The second division of habitual grace, prevenient/subsequent, is only improperly said of habitual grace. One and the same grace cannot be taken as prevenient or subsequent to itself. Nevertheless, speaking improperly one may say that habitual grace is prevenient and subsequent because of sin, in growth, and in relation to its heavenly destiny.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 701.

¹⁹³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733-735. The mediate and effective effect is exercised through the virtues and is only in those having the use of reason. The immediate and formal effect is again divided. The *per se* immediate and formal effect is deification or elevating. The immediate and formal effect taken accidentally and contingently is the healing of fallen nature. In this sense habitual grace purges the wounds of original sin and reinstitutes health through the elevation to the principle of supernatural life.

¹⁹⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 702.

¹⁹⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 710. Ramirez notes the difficulty with calling habitual grace prevenient and subsequent is that habitual grace is specifically and numerically one in all believers. He does note, though, that in three senses one can take habitual grace as prevenient and subsequent. In the case of mortal sin and repentance, the prior habit could be said to be prevenient with respect to the subsequent habit of virtue. Thus also the grace of innocence in baptism is prevenient with respect to the grace of penance. Second, grace essentially increased, although not different in species and number, can be said to be prevenient and subsequent. The prior habitual grace in intensity is prevenient for the increase, which is subsequent. They differ as a child differs from an adult. Third, according to diverse statuses habitual grace can be prevenient and subsequent. Habitual grace in this life is prevenient with respect to the grace of the fatherland, which is subsequent.

Finally, and again by diverse effects, habitual grace can be called exciting and helping, although this is simply another name for the operative/cooperative effects.¹⁹⁶ Exciting habitual grace is an operative effect of habitual grace. By the infusion of habitual grace the sleeping sinner is awakened and pushed. Helping is a cooperative effect. In other words, habitual grace helps free will to produce a meritorious action.

As seen above, healing and elevating are operative effects of habitual grace. How do these operative effects relate to the other operative effects of habitual grace – namely the supernatural habits? According to Ramirez, the theological virtues, infused cardinal virtues, and gifts are in the powers and thus not properly sanctifying.¹⁹⁷ Likewise, the effects of elevating and healing are immediate effects of habitual grace, not mediate effects. The mediate effects of habitual grace are exercised through the virtues, preeminently merit. The effects of elevating and healing are immediate effects, and thus do not concern the virtues.¹⁹⁸

Garrigou-Lagrange is less certain about the impossibility of the supernatural virtues and gifts being healing and elevating. Commenting on *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 1, he poses a question with important implications for this section: “whether ‘sanctifying grace’ can be taken in a twofold

¹⁹⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 751-752. The division of habitual grace into exciting and elevating is a subdivision of grace as healing (more so than elevating). It presupposes free will, weak and lapsed. Hence, formally habitual grace is called formally exciting inasmuch as it gives, again formally, a share in the divine nature. Inasmuch as it is principle of supernatural actions through the supernatural virtues, it is said to be helping: “because the work of free will under grace, with grace, and from grace elicits [a free act].”

¹⁹⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 612: “And this form is first habitual grace which is properly called sanctifying grace.”

¹⁹⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733. Taken improperly one might, it seems on Ramirez’s conception, take the virtues and gifts as healing, sanctifying, and elevating. The virtues do not seem to be effects of habitual grace according to Ramirez. Rather, the virtues and gifts flow, *emanat*, from habitual grace. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 754: “And so from healing grace *per se* follow the infused virtues and the gifts in a secondary way.” This is why habitual grace taken as commonly and simply speaking is called the grace of virtues and gifts by St. Thomas and Ramirez.

sense?”¹⁹⁹ He answers in the affirmative and then outlines the dual senses of the term sanctifying grace. Strictly, it refers to habitual grace, distinct from the infused virtues, by which we are justified or formally rendered pleasing to God. Broadly, it includes that which is ordained to the justification of its subject, whether antecedently as stimulating grace which disposes us for justification, or concomitantly, or consequently, as for example, supernatural helps, the infused virtues, the gifts, the increase of grace, and glory, which is the consummation of grace.²⁰⁰ This seems to imply that for Garrigou-Lagrange, the supernatural habits are elevating and healing. Nevertheless, he does not explicitly say this.²⁰¹ He does claim that sometimes Aquinas uses the term habitual grace in a broad sense to include the infused virtues.²⁰² However, he does not say whether the operative effects of healing and elevating are predicated of habitual grace in the broad sense or the strict sense.²⁰³

On the other hand, the fact that Garrigou-Lagrange says that the wide and strict sense are of sanctifying grace would seem to push him into admitting that healing and elevating can also be taken in a wide sense, since these are simply effects of sanctifying grace inasmuch as it relates to a sinful subject or a merely natural subject. In other words, since Garrigou-Lagrange admits

¹⁹⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 153.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Nor have I been able to find an answer in any of the following works: Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection and Contemplation*; Ibid., *The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Volumes 1 & 2*, trans. by Sr. Timothea Doyle, O.P. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947); Ibid., *The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus Christ: Volumes 1 & 2*, trans. by Sr. Jeanne Maria, O.P. (St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1947).

²⁰² For this sense he specifically cites Aquinas *ST* III q. 62, a. 1: “*gratiam virtutum et donorum*.”

²⁰³ Since Garrigou-Lagrange specifically outlines the division in terms of sanctifying grace, it is clear that in a wide sense he takes Aquinas to include the infused virtues as sanctifying.

habitual grace can be taken in a wide sense, he at least seems open to admitting that in the wide sense habitual grace is healing/elevating (thereby including the infused habits as healing/elevating).

The same ambiguity seen above in Lonergan's thought about the division between habitual grace and the supernatural habits is also visible in Lonergan's thought on healing grace. He never explicitly states whether the supernatural habits are properly included in 'sanctifying grace' or not. In other words, it is not clear if, according to Lonergan, the supernatural habits should be properly called healing and elevating in the full sense, improperly, or not at all. One can see this ambiguity in a section entitled "Habitual Grace as *Gratia Sanans*," in which Lonergan outlines the psychological constraint to sin based on habit:

Still, even in this life a relative fixity in evil results from sin. This is a necessary consequence of three truths: (A) explicit deliberation is not needed for an act to be free; (B) explicit deliberation is necessary for the sinner to avoid further sin; (C) it is impossible for a man to deliberate explicitly before every act...²⁰⁴

After explaining the three truths in depth, he concludes: "Thus the Lombard's *non posse non peccare* is reestablished...Habitual grace, henceforth, is not only *elevans* but also *sanans*."²⁰⁵

In explicating this, Lonergan seems to imply both that the virtues are healing and that they are not. On the one hand, he identifies habitual grace as that which frees the soul from the bondage to sin²⁰⁶ while elsewhere writing that the infusion of divine charity is the only

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 51.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 51.

²⁰⁶ E.g. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 58: "...the function of the habit as a *gratia sanans* becomes quite plain. On the one hand, the sinner is confined by the law of psychological continuity to a perpetual repetition of past sins. On the other hand the infusion of grace constitutes a permanent change in the inclination or spontaneous orientation of the will..."

permanent liberation.²⁰⁷ This suggests that the virtues, at least charity, are healing. On the other hand, he uses habit/form in the singular multiple times with reference to healing grace and also calls healing grace habitual grace. If the virtues were included, then it would be habits and forms in the plural, not the singular.

Put simply, Lonergan is ambiguous on the issue of the distinction between habitual grace and the virtues and therefore ambiguous on the proper principles of healing and elevating. Indeed, this shows in the fact that he does not have a clear referent for the term healing grace.²⁰⁸ The intriguing part of Lonergan's writing is the possibility that St. Thomas uses the term habitual grace exclusively in the wide sense. This would seem to imply a larger role for the virtues to elevate and heal the subject from sin. Nevertheless, since he is ambiguous on the issue, my interpretation can only be offered as conjecture (of Lonergan, at least).

Can the gifts of the Holy Spirit fill out or challenge this picture on the division of habitual grace? It seems certain that they cannot, at least if the division is taken by subject. The gifts of the Holy Spirit in no way produce a different subject of habitual grace. Can they fill out or challenge in the division of habitual grace by effect? It would seem so. Intimately tied up with the question of whether the virtues and gifts are healing/elevating is their status vis-à-vis habitual grace. Thomists agree that the virtues and gifts flow from habitual grace. This would seem to make them immediate and operative effects of habitual grace. Does that challenge Ramirez's

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 54: "Nothing could summarize more effectively the kernel of St. Thomas's account of moral impotence: self love, *cupiditas*, makes sin connatural; it makes the avoidance of sin an impossible strain; it constitutes a servitude from which the only permanent liberation is the infusion of divine charity."

²⁰⁸ That being said, one must admit this direct question is not Lonergan's main purpose. Nevertheless, as a direct exegesis of St. Thomas's thought on grace, *Grace and Freedom* suffers from lack of attention to it.

claim that the gifts and virtues are unrelated to the healing and elevating effects of habitual grace? Such a question is better answered in the coming chapters. What is important to note now is that the division of habitual grace by effect in these authors is incomplete and that the gifts would seem to be able to make a modest contribution.

IIIa. Natural Priority among the Immanent Principles of the Supernatural Life

The purpose of this section is to outline the settled position of most post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers on the precise placement of the gifts within the operative effects of habitual grace on the powers of the soul.²⁰⁹ This purpose was partially completed earlier in the section on the division of habitual grace. Therein I found that it is common to Thomistic thinkers to see the gifts as flowing from the habitual grace infused by God into the essence of the soul. Likewise, I found that the gifts (at least according to explicit identification) do not concern the healing, elevating, or sanctifying of the subject. What remains to be seen in the secondary literature is

²⁰⁹ Barthélemy Froget, *The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Souls of the Just According to the Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Forgotten Books, 2012). See also Barthélemy Froget, *De L'Habitation du Saint-Esprit dans Les Ames Justes d'après la Doctrine de Saint-Thomas d'Aquin, Douzième Edition* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1900); de Guibert, *Theology of the Spiritual Life*; Joseph de Guibert, *Les Doublets de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1926); Gardiel, "Dons du Saint Esprit"; Gardiel, *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life*; Ambroise Gardiel, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, trans. by Anselm Townsend (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1937); Thomas O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 58 (1997): 254-285; Thomas O'Meara, *Thomas Aquinas Theologian* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997); Thomas Keating, *Fruits and Gifts of the Spirit* (New York: Lantern, 2000); Ramirez, *De Donis*; Leen, *The Holy Ghost and His Work in Souls*; Farrell and Hughes, *Swift Victory*; O'Driscoll, *The Holy Spirit and the Art of Living*; Bernard J. Kelly, *The Seven Gifts: Thoughts on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost*; Blunt, *Life with the Holy Ghost*; Michel Labourdette, "St. Thomas et la théologie thomiste," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* vol 3, cols 1610-1635; Labourdette, *Cours*, 367-383; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Three Ages of the Interior Life*, 66-82 & 223-240; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection and Contemplation*, 271-336; Leonce De Grandmaison, *Send Forth Thy Spirit*, trans. by M. Angeline Bouchard (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1962); Martinez, *The Sanctifier*. Horst, *Die Gaben*; Charles Bouchard, O.P., "Recovering the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in Moral Theology," *Theological Studies* 63 (2002): 539-558. Henry Formby, *The Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost as Exemplified in the Life and Person of the Blessed Virgin for the Guidance and Instruction of Her Children* (New York: Catholic Publication House, 1874); Henry Manning, *The Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost* (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1896).

two-fold: First, do any post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers more particularly identify the relation between the gifts, theological virtues, infused cardinal virtues, and habitual grace in the strict sense? Is there a particular order in which these virtues flow from habitual grace?

The purpose of this section is to answer these questions by summarizing a selection of authors on the division of habitual grace by effect. I first summarize the work of post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers in ascending order, that is beginning with those who do not get beyond the simple affirmation that the virtues flow from habitual grace to those who have a position on this issue worked out. Finally, I note how the gifts of the Holy Spirit could possibly challenge the settled positions and supplement those who have no position.

In *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co. Aquinas claims that grace is itself a participation in the divine nature, something beyond (and the source of) the infused virtues.²¹⁰ This text, among others, leads Dominican Thomas O'Meara to pose the question: "What is the relationship of virtues to grace?"²¹¹ In answering the question, he begins by noting (as all Thomists do) that "If grace is a kind of nature, then it will always be alien to Aquinas to conceive of habits or religious actions apart from their 'principle and root.'"²¹² From this root (habitual grace) flows the theological virtues and the "central moral virtues [infused cardinal virtues] and their sub-virtues"²¹³.

²¹⁰ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.

²¹¹ O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," 264.

²¹² O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," 266.

²¹³ O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," 266

Likewise, he notes that on a “third level” of activity the gifts flow from grace.²¹⁴ The entire moral life reaches its apex in the gifts of the Spirit.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, even though the entire purpose of his article is to emphasize the rootedness of the virtues in a supernatural anthropology of grace,²¹⁶ he never gets beyond the simple assertion of Aquinas that the virtues flow from grace and the implication that the gifts flow from habitual grace last.

Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez (like O’Meara) likewise do not get past the simple affirmation that the virtues flow from grace. Indeed, the likely place one would find any position on the order of derivation of the virtues from grace would be in a commentary on I-II q. 110, a. 3-4. Therein, Garrigou-Lagrange, does note that the infused virtues flow from sanctifying grace physically, “as properties of the soul.”²¹⁷ Nevertheless, he offers no specification beyond that. He does refer one to the Salmanticenses (a particular Thomistic school of discolored Carmelite theologians at Salamanca),²¹⁸ but this seems to be for the proof of a physical derivation from grace and not for any kind of order between the supernatural virtues derivation. Corroborating this reading is the fact that the Salmanticenses do not identify an order of derivation, but simply

²¹⁴ O’Meara, “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” 269: “They [the gifts] too flow from the life principle that, as we saw, is the Trinity’s presence in people.”

²¹⁵ O’Meara, “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” 275-276.

²¹⁶ This theme, as O’Meara notes, was never obscured in Dominican theology. For the general decline of thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit outside of Thomism see Bouchard, “Recovering the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in Moral Theology.”

²¹⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 139.

²¹⁸ Romanus Cessario, *A Short History of Thomism* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 76.

state that the virtues are produced in the same instant (*et eodem instanti producuntur*) with faith hope and love (at least in the passage to which Garrigou-Lagrange refers).²¹⁹

The same lack of attention to the priority among grace and the supernatural virtues is present in Ramirez.²²⁰ He treats the standard list of questions common among the commentators; the derivative priority of the infused virtues is not among them. In short, he does not specify beyond the common claim that the infused virtues flow from grace;²²¹ He has no clear position on the interrelation between the supernatural habits or their order of derivation from habitual grace.

Labourdette is somewhat of an exception among the commentators. He does note a priority in activity among the infused virtues, which is not necessarily the same order as their derivation from habitual grace. According to Labourdette, the priority in activity is as follows (at least when the gifts are operative):²²² theological virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit, infused cardinal virtues. The theological virtues *sont absolument premières*. The gifts are in the service of the

²¹⁹ Salmantecenes, *Cursus Theologicus: Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Complectens, Editio Nova, Correcta* (Paris: Societate Generalie Librariae Catholicae, 1878), *disp. IV, dub. 6*. Granted what I am seeking here is a natural and formal, not temporal, priority among the supernatural virtues. Nevertheless, the Salmanticenes never identify an order of natural priority among the supernatural virtues (as far as I am aware), but only deny any temporal priority.

²²⁰ Ramirez, in both *de Gratia* and *de Donis* treats the standard questions of the commentatorial tradition. Thus in his commentary on I-II q. 110, aa. 3-4, Ramirez treats the distinction of grace from all the infused virtues (especially charity!), the subject of grace as the *essentia animae*, and how grace is to be conceived as *ens divinum* and a participation in the divine nature. Likewise in his *de Donis*, he does not mention the issue in the only likely place I-II q. 68, aa. 1-3 & 8.

²²¹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 135: "But the gifts of the Holy Spirit, just as the infused virtues, have one common root or origin of being, that is habitual grace, from which they flow just as the powers from the essence [of the soul]."

²²² Labourdette (and the others addressed in this section) is a proponent of the traditional understanding of the intermittent operation of the gifts. Hence, the following priority among the gifts, theological virtues, and infused cardinal virtues is only a priority when the gifts are active.

theological virtues and push them to activity as their subordinate.²²³ On the other hand, the gifts are higher than the moral virtues and “put them into act”.²²⁴ Labourdette does hint that this priority (at least between the gifts and theological virtues) in activity is also a priority according to derivation from *gratia sicut radix*.²²⁵ Nevertheless, he does not elaborate fully on the order of derivation from habitual grace; priority in activity, while intimately related, is not priority according to being (or principle).

Other scholarship has even less on this issue than Labourdette. Although Gardiel does note the primacy of charity for the gifts,²²⁶ he does not specify beyond the simple statement that the gifts are infused.²²⁷ In addition, Farrell does note that the gifts are “derived from sanctifying grace in the soul,”²²⁸ but does not note any order of derivation among the virtues.²²⁹ He simply says they are “infused at once, either at Baptism or at the restoration of the state of grace through

²²³ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375: “They do not command the theological virtues, they are put into act as derivations of the theological virtues, Saint Thomas says. That is to say that the inspiration of the Spirit, received thanks to a gift, puts into act the theological virtues as subordinating the gifts and emitting thanks to them and with them an act that does not remain in the human mode characteristic of our manner of knowing.”

²²⁴ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375: “Superior to the moral virtues, the gifts put them into act and elevate them to a mode which is theirs, and without them, inaccessible.”

²²⁵ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375. He hints at this when he says that the gifts serve the theological virtues because they are derivations from them. Labourdette, *Cours*, 375: “They are put in act as derivations of the theological virtues....”

²²⁶ Gardiel, *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life*, 8: “The gifts are not of greater importance than charity; they will not enter into the soul where charity is not first, for charity retains its primacy.”

²²⁷ Gardiel, *The Holy Spirit in the Christian Life*, 7; Gardiel, *The Holy Ghost in the Lives of the Dominican Saints*, 29.

²²⁸ Hughes & Farrell, *Swift Victory*, 12.

²²⁹ He does note that the gifts’ activity is delimited by faith; charity is the bond of the gifts presence and perfection. See Hughes & Farrell, *Swift Victory*, 17.

Penance....”²³⁰ The situation is similar with Lonergan, who only mentions the gifts twice in *Grace and Freedom*,²³¹ and never mentions the order of derivation from habitual grace.²³² Joseph de Guibert, as well, does not locate a natural priority among the infused virtues.²³³ Finally, other literature of a more popular genre certainly does not take up this question.²³⁴

The one exception to this general trend is the work of Froget, who has a full theory (although without citations from Aquinas) on the derivational order of the infused habits from habitual grace. The order of derivation for Froget is: theological, infused moral, and then gifts. He notes that God’s infusion of habitual grace is a “root-grace”.²³⁵ Faith, hope, and charity “are the immediate and primary effects of sanctifying grace.”²³⁶ The infused cardinal virtues are in turn “derived” from the theological virtues.²³⁷ Finally, “The Sevenfold Gifts of the Holy Ghost,

²³⁰ Hughes & Farrell, *Swift Victory*, 24.

²³¹ Lonergan, *Grace*, 47, 65, and 366.

²³² Lonergan, *Grace*, 61: “When such a change is produced in adult consciousness [infusion of habitual grace as a promotion] it naturally gives rise to acts of free will, acts of faith and of repentance, that both acknowledge this change of attitude and result from it.... Just as the generation of fire results in immediate burning, so the infusion of the virtues results in immediate acts of virtue.”

²³³ Guibert, *The Theology of the Spiritual Life*, 48-52 & 122-144.

²³⁴ O’Driscoll, 16-17; Blunt, 29: “And when God constitutes the soul in this state of justice [with habitual grace], he also infuses with it the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, and also the moral or the cardinal, supernatural virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, and finally the gifts of the Holy Ghost”; Leen, 292: “...he must needs have infused into him, first, grace, which imparts a higher nature, and then , principles of action, in harmony with that superior nature and the end towards which it gravitates. These principles of action are none other than the theological virtues...so, too, must the regenerated soul receive from the divine influence, other virtues, namely, the infused, which perfect it in view of those actions by which it is to force its way onward to the goal of eternal life”; Kelly, 10 & 19; Grandmaison, 65-71; Martinez, 121: “We have our instruments also. They are the virtues that come with grace.”

²³⁵ Froget, *The Indwelling*, 190.

²³⁶ Froget, *The Indwelling*, 191.

²³⁷ Froget, *The Indwelling*, 192.

as well as His Twelve Fruits—about which we shall soon treat in detail—follow on after the infused theological and moral virtues.”²³⁸ It is through these three sets of virtues that sanctifying grace has its effects. As such habitual grace is only a remote or indirect principle of life and operation.²³⁹

Even though the secondary Thomistic literature, for the most part does not note the natural priority among the infused virtues, St. Thomas certainly has a position in this regard, or at least implies one.²⁴⁰ Clearly also for St. Thomas the derivational order of the supernatural principles in the order of being is also intimately related to their order in activity.²⁴¹ Hence, it seems, that in the most fundamental understanding of the supernatural organism, traditional Thomistic thinkers such as Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez (as well as wider Thomists such as Lonergan) still have lacunae to fill in order to understand fully the division of habitual grace by effect. Granted this dissertation and the import of the gifts for this topic can make only a modest contribution, yet it is important to note that this question of the proper derivation of the supernatural principles from habitual grace and its implications for the order of activity only arises in the meeting of different treatises, specifically the combination of I-II q. 110, a. 3-4, *ST I* q. 77, aa. 4-7; I-II q. 68, a. 8, and II-II q. 19, a. 9.²⁴²

²³⁸ Froget, *The Indwelling*, 192.

²³⁹ Froget, *The Indwelling*, 193.

²⁴⁰ For St. Thomas see *ST I-II* q. 19, a. 9, ad 3. Froget is the one outlier on this point. He has a theory on the order of the supernatural virtues, but it is unsupported by texts of Aquinas.

²⁴¹ *ST I* q. 77, a. 4, co.

²⁴² See also *ST I-II* q. 65, a. 3, co. Man is not supernaturally perfected in an erratic way. No, he is perfected in a certain order. Most fundamentally, he is perfected by the very infusion of grace into his essence by which he becomes a participant in the Divine Nature (*ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3, co.). This participation in turn flows forth into the powers producing the theological virtues, the first fruits of grace (*ST I-II* q. 110, a. 4, ad 1). Nevertheless, neither

IV. The Necessity of Grace

As with the division of actual and habitual grace, among post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers who reflect on this topic, there is broad consensus on the necessity of grace.²⁴³ The preeminent place for Thomists to comment on the necessity of grace is *ST* I-II q. 109.²⁴⁴ As with

can man have the theological virtues without the gifts (*ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, co., In *Super Rom.*, VIII, 2, lect. 1, nn 602-3 and 5). This is so because the theological virtues naturally result in the gifts and both together with the movement of the Holy Spirit form the infused virtues. (The gifts are regulated by charity [*ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co], quickened by charity [*ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 3], are informed by charity [*ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, co. & *ST* II-II q. 45, a. 2, co.], and effected by charity [*ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4]). The infused cardinal virtues, of which the gifts are the principle, come last. In *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 3, St. Thomas says that the moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts in the order of generation because they properly dispose man to be ordered directly by God. Nevertheless, this seems to be a natural preparation and not the infused virtues for the objector says, “that which is first natural seems to be more excellent.” Properly speaking the theological virtues are the source of the gifts and both of them are the source of the infused virtues. See *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4: “...*dona enim spiritus sancti sunt principia virtutum intellectualium et moralium, ut supra dictum est. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt principia donorum, ut supra habitum est.*” Emphasis added.

²⁴³ For Ramirez any identifiable need for grace is a reason grace is necessary. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 117: “The necessity of grace and the need of grace are correlative.” Most ink is spent refuting a Molinist conception on the necessity of grace, not arguing ad intra.

²⁴⁴ Ramirez, *Gratia*, 58-59. He presents the following outline of q. 109:

The Necessity of Grace - Against the Pelagians

1. In general (as an introduction)
 - a. On the part of the intellect (a.1)
 - b. On the part of the will (a.2)
2. Specifically
 - a. Against the pure Pelagians
 - i. The means
 1. The first precept, i.e. love of God above all (a.3)
 2. The other precepts, i.e. the commandments (a.4)
 - ii. The end, i.e. merit of eternal life (a. 5)
 - b. Against the Semi-Pelagians
 - i. Before having grace
 1. Positive preparation through the good act (a. 6)
 2. Negative through the shunning of evil acts
 - a. Detesting past sins (a. 7)
 - b. Avoiding future sins (a. 8)
 - ii. After having interior grace, to conserve it without a new grace
 1. For a certain time (a. 9)
 2. All the way to death (a. 10)

See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 41. He presents his division, following Cajetan:

The necessity of grace

- a. For fallen man

the two previous sections, this section attempt to outline the broad consensus among Thomists and note differences in the footnotes when they are not relevant for the overall project. Nevertheless, there are also important differences on the necessity of grace post justification. I outline these differences specifically, for it is in relation to these debates that the gifts have import. In order to accomplish these goals, this section has three parts. In the first part it summarizes the need for actual grace or grace as motion and the need for habitual grace.²⁴⁵ I simply list those actions for which grace is necessary. This not only shows the broad consensus of post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers but provides a context on those disputed issues important for this dissertation. Second, this section notes a particularly important disagreement on the necessity of actual grace post justification for both activity and perseverance. Finally, it suggests why the gifts of the Holy Spirit would seem to be helpful for an understanding of Aquinas on the necessity of grace.

Generally speaking the need for actual grace is as follows: first one needs actual grace in the broad sense (i.e., God's application of the creature to act)²⁴⁶ for any action in the natural

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- i. For doing good (aa. 1-6)
 - ii. For avoiding evil (a. 7 & 8)
 - b. For the just – acting and persevering (a. 9 and 10)

²⁴⁵ Ramirez identifies this necessity as that arising from a final cause. Ramirez, *Gratia*, 48: “*sed necessitate sumpta ex parte causae finalis, quasi medii ad finem totius humanae vitae.*” On the other hand, identifying the specific need for either habitual or actual grace is harder in Ramirez's case. He (like St. Thomas) intends to speak in this article about “abstracting from grace as habitual or actual” since that is clearer. This is also true for Labourdette. Labourdette does not distinguish types of grace within these four articles, but simply says that one needs elevating or healing grace (or both). He does constantly avert to the necessity of natural concurrence to pass into any natural act. See, for example, Labourdette, *Cours*, 780: “Finally, as often as [he acts] man has need of the activation of divine motion so that he may pass to operation (Saint Thomas repeats this each time so that nobody forgets).”

²⁴⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 46. Garrigou-Lagrange is quick to point out that even this natural concurrence is not mere simultaneous cooperation. It too is a determining physical pre-motion. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 55: “The Molinists understand it as a natural, general, indifferent concurrence which the will, through its own volition,

sphere.²⁴⁷ Human nature, in its integral state,²⁴⁸ needs it to know any truth,²⁴⁹ do any good action,²⁵⁰ love God above all things (naturally, not supernaturally),²⁵¹ fulfill any precepts of the

directs toward the good. But the Thomists reply that in that case God, by moving one as far as the exercise of the will is concerned, would be no more the author of a good work than of a bad one.... Therefore they insist upon a prevenient, determining, and effective concurrence enabling a man to do good rather than evil.”

²⁴⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 119: “Just as, therefore, interior supernatural grace was physically and intrinsically necessary for the created intellect to understand and grasp supernatural mysteries, strictly speaking, so also interior supernatural grace is physically and intrinsically necessary for the created will to desire salvifically the supernatural good or complete supernatural works.”

²⁴⁸ Ramirez, like most scholastics, distinguishes between integral nature, pure nature, and fallen nature. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 108.

²⁴⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 41. Integral nature has the power to do any good action proportionate with human nature. Yet it still needs the concurrence of God activating. Human nature, fallen or integral, is even able to assent to and enlarge upon supernatural truth (i.e., granting revelation). Yet it cannot assent to it properly through a supernatural motive, which requires an interior actual grace. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 47-50.

²⁵⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 54: “In the state of integral nature, man did not require special added grace, except for performing supernatural works, not, that is, for morally good works commensurate with nature. For nature was then in a perfect state and needed only general concurrence, which is, of course, to be understood in the sense of a concurrence which is prior and efficacious in itself, not in the sense accepted by Molina.” Man in the state of integral nature is able both physically and morally to love God in himself (effectively and simply) without grace. In a state of pure nature, with both physical and moral power, can love God above all things (affectively and in a certain way effectively, but not in every way effectively) without grace. Fallen man, without grace, cannot love God above all either effectively or affectively above all things, but only ineffectively. To love affectively or effectively, fallen man requires healing grace. See Ramirez, *Gratia*, 214.

²⁵¹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 57: “In the state of integral nature, man did not require an added gift of grace to love God, the author of nature, above all things efficaciously; he required only the help of God moving him to it, or natural concurrence.” Again, this is because of humanity’s metaphysical position as created (and thus secondary), a mix of act and potency. Integral human nature can do this because it is natural for humans to love God above all things. Yet it is only with a natural love. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 59: “Man in any state requires the help of special grace to love God, the author of grace, with an infused supernatural love.”

natural law,²⁵² and fulfill any of the supernatural precepts indirectly and *per accidens*.²⁵³ This is simply because of the metaphysical dependence of a secondary cause on the first cause.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 67: “His [St. Thomas’s] first conclusion is that the state of corrupt nature, man cannot, without healing grace, fulfill all the precepts of the natural law with respect to the substance of the works, while on the contrary he would be able to do this without grace in the state of integral nature (supposing, however, natural concurrence).”

²⁵³ Ramirez, *Gratia*, 281. Yet even lapsed man can indirectly and *per accidens* observe certain works of the supernatural law. See Ramirez, 288f. For the reasons fallen man is unable to avoid sin and do the whole good see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 438. The three reasons Ramirez gives for this are: 1. To avoid all temptations and sins is harder than to will and do the whole natural good. Since grace is required for the latter, *a fortiori* it must be required for the former. 2. To do this would merit eternal life, which by definition requires grace. 3. The disproportion between the power of fallen man and the power of temptation. Yet fallen man’s power is not greater. For the imperfect avoidance of sin see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 459f. In all cases an interior grace is physically and absolutely necessary (not simply morally necessary). For the meritorious resistance of temptation and sin, habitual grace is necessary. For the salvific, but not meritorious, resisting actual grace is sufficient.

²⁵⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 53: “To accomplish any good whatever, man, in any state, requires the general concurrence of God, whether in the state of incorrupt or of corrupt nature....The reason for this is that every creature, since it neither exists nor acts of itself, is in potency regarding action, and needs to be moved from without that it may act...”

Fallen nature, needs actual grace (in the proper sense as supernatural)²⁵⁵ as healing²⁵⁶ to know the whole body of natural truth,²⁵⁷ love God above all things explicitly,²⁵⁸ fulfill all the precepts of the natural law (in substance, both integral and fallen need grace, to fulfill the natural law according to its proper mode),²⁵⁹ and do good natural actions (beyond planting vineyards and building houses).²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 153. See the third conclusion. See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 534. Ramirez later claims that this concurrence is necessary for every supernatural act. See Ramirez, *Gratia*, 535: “if we speak of the necessity of actual grace (divine interior motion) that [the believer] may pass from the possibility of salvifically or meritoriously acting through the infused habits to the act of operating, this necessity is absolute (or physical), just as the necessity of a divine premotion for all secondary causes that they may operate.”

²⁵⁶ Labourdette, *Cours*, 776-777. In this regard Labourdette locates two particular areas. First, for knowledge of things divine (wisdom) grace is needed. This is true for all things properly revealed, but also (in practice) necessary for the praeambles of faith, which can only be attained with difficulty, by a few, after a long time, and with an admixture of error. Second, for moral knowledge (*connaissance morale*), that is prudence. Since man’s true end is supernatural and proper prudence presupposes the true end (as well as the rectification of the appetites), it cannot be had without grace. This would include both habitual grace and actual grace for Garrigou-Lagrange. It is simply healing and not also elevating because the works under question here are not supernatural. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 147. Whichever type of grace heals and elevates, it is one grace. See Ramirez, *Gratia*, 149: “and so de facto the same grace is healing and elevating...” For the claim that these functions of healing and elevating are performed by actual grace see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 150.

²⁵⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 44: “Fallen man, without grace, with natural concurrence alone, is capable of knowing certain natural truths, namely, the first speculative and practical principles of reason and the conclusions which can be easily drawn from them.” In short, for any bit of natural truth which might be healing or salvific, one needs natural truth. See page 46: “Fallen man, without a special added grace, cannot, at least with any moral power, know either collectively or even separately all natural truths, speculative or speculative-practical, or, for still greater reason, practical-practical; since for these last, as for prudence, rectitude of appetite is required.”

²⁵⁸ Labourdette distinguishes between the natural love of the will toward the end and the explicit and free love toward the end, God. To refuse the latter is sin and the result of original sin. Labourdette, *Cours*, 779. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 58: “In the state of fallen nature, in order to love God, the author of nature, above all things efficaciously, man requires the help of grace restoring nature.” See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 162: “the internal grace of God is physically necessary for all created acts of the will to elicit the salvific love of God above all things.” For a division of types of love see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 170.

1. Love of concupiscence
2. Love of friendship
 - a. Imperfect, conditional, and ineffective – i.e. velleity
 - b. Perfect, absolute, and effective
 - i. Actual and affective alone – simply an act of the will
 - ii. Habitual and effective – many acts
 1. Simply – reject all sin and observe all laws for a long time
 2. Qualified – observe certain mandates and reject certain sins

²⁵⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 54: “In the state of fallen nature man requires supernatural grace not only to perform a supernatural work, but to observe the whole natural law (as will be made more evident later in article 5).” Garrigou-Lagrange thus relates the conclusions of article two with article four such that they say the same thing, only article four is more specific. It would seem that his reference to article five is a mistake since article four concerns the commandments (which he reads as the natural law) whereas five has to do with meriting eternal life. See also footnote 193. Labourdette, *Cours*, 777-778. He does not specify what actions are possible to fallen humans beyond St. Thomas’s examples, but does claim that the whole good proportionate to human nature is impossible because of original sin. Hence, one needs healing grace, which enables acts toward the proper ends in convergence with a whole moral culture. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 482-502. 1. Integral nature – humans in this state can avoid all temptations and sins against the natural law for their whole life. 2. Pure nature – humans in this state can avoid every sin taken singularly and resist all temptations (even grave) without grace (but with difficulty) for the entire duration of life. 3. Lapsed nature – humans in this state have the physical power to avoid singularly every mortal sin against the natural law. Nevertheless, they do not have the moral power to avoid all collectively for a long time, unless healed through habitual grace. He cannot resist grave temptations or resist every single mortal sin. 4. Lapsed with original sin alone – not able to be without mortal sin for a long time. 5. Faithful forgiven of original sin – can avoid mortal sin if retaining sanctifying grace, but not each venial sin. If the believer loses sanctifying grace through one mortal sin, but has the acquired virtues as well as faith and hope, he can avoid new mortal sins with a certain facility. If he acquires a vice though, he sins regularly and with facility.

²⁶⁰ These are the paradigmatic examples given by Aquinas. As far as I can tell, Garrigou-Lagrange makes no attempt to specify the principle which produces both of them commonly so that one could extend knowledge of what exactly fallen man is capable of apart from grace. This seems to be a wise move since that path seems to require knowledge beyond what St. Thomas teaches. It is negatively clear that humans cannot thus do any supernatural good or the whole natural good. Yet to judge this or that to be beyond fallen man’s power seems a difficult task. As examples of what is possible Ramirez follows Aquinas and gives making houses, planting vineyards, chopping wood, and others of this genus. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 110 & 129. That is to say that not every action of the sinner is a sin. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 124.

Human nature in any of its existential states needs actual grace taken specifically to know salvifically supernatural truth,²⁶¹ fulfill the commandments according to the proper mode,²⁶² desire or do the supernatural good,²⁶³ merit eternal life,²⁶⁴ prepare for habitual grace²⁶⁵ (cause the first good wish of the supernatural order,²⁶⁶ for which there is no preparation),²⁶⁷ rise from sin (imperfectly),²⁶⁸ perform any supernatural action,²⁶⁹ avoid sin,²⁷⁰ and persevere to death.²⁷¹

The needs for habitual grace can be summarized simply. Both fallen and integral nature need habitual grace (since it is healing) to do all good natural actions, know the whole body of

²⁶¹ Ramirez, *Gratia*, 67. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 73-74: Human nature in all its states needs the *lumen fidei* for a salvific understanding, the gifts of understanding and wisdom for an easy/greater understanding (fallen man), and the gifts (in any state) for an affective and quasi-experiential understanding. For a perfect understanding, the *lumen gloriae* is necessary. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 79 for the *lumen gloriae*.

²⁶² This is because one needs charity (not only to heal fallen nature) but also to fulfill the works of the law according to their proper mode of acting. Actual grace would thus play a two-fold role. It would first prepare for habitual grace; it would also elicit acts of charity (either from those habitually disposed to them or in preparing for the habit of grace). See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 73: "According to ordinary providence, habitual grace is required, by which alone man is solidly well disposed toward his final end. And this firm disposition toward his final end is itself required that man may keep the whole natural law enduringly and perseveringly. Nevertheless, by an extraordinary providence, God can fortify a man's will in regard to the observance of all the natural precepts by means of continuous actual graces; but if a man does what lies within his power by the help of actual grace, God will not withhold habitual grace from him."

²⁶³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 111. See also 117: "The active potential of an inferior order is not able to act in that which is proper to an essentially higher order, unless it is intrinsically elevated and helped through the principle of the higher order. But the work of salvation is intrinsically supernatural." With regard to the natural good, Ramirez makes a distinction between the good taken as natural and psychological or honest and ethical (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 110). Man in the state of integral nature could do both types of good easily without the help of grace (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 120. Yet the acts merely honest are not salvific, but differ in kind. See also 146.) In the state of pure nature, man can do both types of good without the help of grace, but only with a struggle. Hence he needs grace strengthening (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 122).

²⁶⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 75: "Acts leading to an end must be proportionate to the end. But eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature." This article is simply speaking in general about grace and does not single out the particular roles of either habitual or actual grace. For their role in meriting eternal life see Garrigou-Lagrange's commentary on *ST I-II* q. 114.

²⁶⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 77: “Fallen man can in no way dispose himself either for habitual or for actual grace by his natural powers alone.” See also 78: “Since every agent acts on account of a proportionate end, the order of agents corresponds to the order of ends, and the disposition toward a supernatural end cannot be produced except by God, the supernatural agent...therefore man cannot prepare himself for grace except by the supernatural help of God, moving him.” Natural concurrence cannot suffice, 80: “Nor does natural help suffice to produce a disposition which is supernatural in form, since the order of agents should correspond to the order of ends. And God as the author of nature, cannot move one to a supernatural end.” No disposition is required, however, for actual grace (that motion which produces the disposition for habitual grace (see Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 81). It is under these principles that Garrigou-Lagrange interprets the medieval axiom that God does not deny grace to him who does what he can (i.e., who does what he can with the help of actual grace, God does not deny habitual grace). See also Labourdette, *Cours*, 781-782. Until this article, Labourdette claims, St. Thomas had only distinguished between a habitual gift of grace (both healing for nature’s normal capacity and elevating in relation to the supernatural objects) and general concurrence. In this article, he claims, we find that the action of elevating requires also actual grace, a type of motion. “1. It is not the common motion which actualizes the capacities already existing which are wholly natural. 2. But a motion which is at the same time elevating. The transitory elevation, for example the supernatural light preparing for faith, moving to penitence and supernatural love prepares for conversion.” See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 363: “The necessity of grace is not properly speaking healing, but elevating, which is the same as saying that this necessity of supernatural interior *auxilium* is physical and not simply moral.” Yet this grace is also healing, and not simply elevating, in fallen man.

For a division of disposition see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 324-325:

1. Physical
 - a. Positive – quasi-inchoate habit or perfect proportion to the form
 - i. Perfect – ultimate disposition which is simultaneous with the form to which it disposes
 - ii. Imperfect – remote, mediate, inadequate – prior in time
 - b. Negative – removal of obstacles
2. Moral
 - a. Perfect – merit
 - b. Imperfect – supplication

²⁶⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 369: “But the will in its first wish of the natural order is immediately moved solely by God (the author of nature). God promotes it physically that it may will, that is speaking of the motion of the will *quoad exercitum*. Therefore and similarly in its first wish of the supernatural order, which pertains to the disposition to grace, because it is the first inchoate life of salvation, depends solely on God the author of grace to apply it to act. And there the will is moved, but does not actively move as was shown in the article; neither does the supernatural will contain in a virtual series the natural will.” Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 372-375. This preparation could not be identical with habitual grace or the infused virtues since it is prior to both. Further it is not a habit, either entitative or operative. Likewise, if habitual grace prepared for habitual grace, one would have an infinite regress. Moreover, it must be an efficacious grace since preparation takes the consent of free will (in adults) and this can only happen under efficacious grace.

²⁶⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 376. This preparation would have to be either from man’s nature or actual grace. The latter gives rise to an infinite regress. The former is impossible since no positive disposition for grace can be in nature. Ramirez also claims that sufficient actual grace, which is given to all, can be seen as a “certain positive, but inadequate [preparation] for actual efficacious grace.” See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 378.

²⁶⁸ Actual grace first moves the sinner toward attrition (and thus disposes for contrition). See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 92: “Nevertheless, there can be an imperfect resurrection without habitual grace, by actual grace which is present in attrition when the sinner aspires after reconciliation.” See also Labourdette, *Cours*, 782. See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 406. Since it is the same cause which both positively prepares for a new form and removes the contrary form, this role is fulfilled by actual grace. “Therefore from the same efficient cause the positive disposition to the form of justice is produced and the negative disposition to the form of injustice or impiety is destroyed.” The actual

grace produces both the positive disposition and the negative disposition is the same in reality, but different in concept. Actual grace as elevating positively prepares; actual grace as healing causes imperfect resurgence from sin. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 386. The negative disposition for grace is either perfect in the “removal of the dispositions of vice and the relinquishing of sins” or imperfect and inchoate in the “simple ceasing from the act of sin”. See Ramirez, *Gratia*, 415-417 for a chart on the difference between the preparation for grace and the resurgence from sin. In contrast to this claim, Ramirez argues that lapsed man can make a partial and imperfect natural (i.e., non salvific) resurgence from sin without actual grace. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 413ff. See also his special section in debate with the Jesuits on this point. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 503-507. Therein he claims that fallen man can only avoid certain light sins and simple temptations, which is a very partial, remote, and imperfect negative disposition for grace. This person will still be positively *indispositio* though, since he exists with greater or lesser other sins. Plus, Ramirez claims, this very remote disposition does not even merit the name disposition. Ramirez also claims that under the motion of actual grace one could avoid those sins against faith and hope. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 480ff. Although Ramirez does note that normally this requires these virtues to be enlivened by charity.

²⁶⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 73: “As we shall see below, over and above habitual grace, actual grace is required for the just man to perform any supernatural good work, and even to persevere for long in the observance of the whole natural law, in spite of the rebellion of the sense appetites against reason, and the temptations of the world and the devil.”

²⁷⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 93-97. Man in the state of integral nature can, for a certain length of time, avoid sin and overcome slight temptations (yet only with the help of natural concurrence, which is grace broadly speaking). Fallen man cannot avoid all mortal sin or overcome temptations without habitual grace healing and actual grace moving him (at least to avoid sins of omission). It is possible by a preeminent actual grace of union, which is not continuous, except for the Virgin Mary. See also Garrigou-Lagrange’s commentary on article nine, which also concerns the avoidance of sin, but in a human subject having habitual grace. In this article, Garrigou-Lagrange claims that actual grace is necessary over and above habitual grace. This is so for the activation of the habitual gift but also to direct and protect him. See also Labourdette, *Cours*, 782-783. Fall man needs habitual grace as both healing and sanctifying to avoid mortal sins, but even with cannot avoid all venial sins because his sensitive appetites are not completely healed and escape reason’s direction. According to Ramirez, habitual grace is sufficient to avoid each and every sin taken singularly. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 454ff. “Therefore it must be said that grace is sufficient to avoid every sin taken singularly.”

²⁷¹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 103ff. Final perseverance is ultimately “a special actual grace...distinct from habitual grace and even from the preceding actual graces, such, that is, as precede the moment of death.” This is so because of the metaphysical dependence: “no one is preserved in good works until death unless specially preserved by God” and a threefold difficulty: “1. To shun evil, 2. To fulfill every commandment continually and enduringly, and 3. To have death coincide with grace, or to die at the opportune time.”

natural truth, love God above all things,²⁷² and fulfill all the precepts of the natural law.²⁷³ In addition, humans in any state need habitual grace to merit eternal life,²⁷⁴ rise from sin (perfectly),²⁷⁵ observe the supernatural law in substance and mode,²⁷⁶ and avoid sin (usually).²⁷⁷

²⁷² Labourdette, *Cours*, 778-779. One needs elevating grace, which is simultaneously healing, to place God above all things according to a natural love. Hence, “it remains that to love God more than oneself is wholly good and an act of human nature; this is even in a sense the most ‘natural’.”

²⁷³ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 779-780. Fallen man needs healing grace to accomplish even the substance of the works, i.e., to do them (abstracting from the proper mode). See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 256-278: Man in the state of integral nature is able, without grace, to keep perfectly all the precepts of the natural law according to substance and mode through the whole of life. Man in the “state” of pure nature is able to observe the whole natural law through his own powers, that is without grace, according to both their substance and proper mode. Yet man in this state is not able to do so perfectly and unfailingly as in a state of integral nature. Man in the state of fallen nature, without healing grace, is unable to observe the precepts of the natural law in every way with the proper mode of connaturality. Likewise, man in this state is unable to keep all the precepts in substance for a long time. Those precepts of the divine law which are natural (preambles) and specially difficult, fallen man cannot keep for a long time according to substance (without grace). Yet fallen man can, without the help of grace, keep the easy precepts of the natural law for a long time.

²⁷⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 376; Labourdette, *Cours*, 780-781. He argues this based on the radical disproportion between human nature and the beatific vision as well as the fact that grace is the beginning of eternal life in grace. Humans need elevating grace (a habitual gift) to raise them to eternal life. “*Ce sera un don habituel, comme un surcroît de nature qui nous mettra de plain-pied avec la vie éternelle.*” Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 304. See also 311: “The work of meriting eternal life ought to be in the same order and proportionate to eternal life. But work from what is solely natural precedes without the elevating grace of God, and so eternal life is not in the same order or proportionate.”

²⁷⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange takes rising from sin to be a return to those things lost by sin: the stain, punishment, and the decrease of the natural inclination to virtue. These can only be perfectly returned by habitual grace. See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 270-276. Lapsed humans are not able to keep the natural law according to the proper mode of connaturality or even according to substance (not even for a short time). The habitual sinner of the faithful (i.e., retains uninformed faith and hope) cannot keep the precepts of the natural law (let alone the divine) in substance (for any significant stretch of time) or in proper mode. The sinner of the faithful who is not habituated is able to keep the precepts of the natural law for a long time according to the proper mode and even per accidens the precepts of the supernatural law, but not for a long time. Finally, the lapsed with both original sin and personal sin, but not habituated to acquired virtue or vice, is able to negatively observe the precepts of the natural law, but frequently and quickly misses certain other precepts. The fallen man with original and personal sin, but also having the acquired virtues is able to observe the natural law according to substance, but not for a long time without new sin. Finally, the lapsed human with original and personal sin and full of vice is not able to keep the precepts for even a short time, but frequently sins against certain or all the precepts. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 396 & 401: Perfect resurgence from sin imports three concepts: 1. The restoration of the supernatural gifts lost through sin and the healing of the wounds of nature. 2. Perfect removal of the stain of sin. 3. Perfect remission of eternal punishment due to sin.

²⁷⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 277. See also 303: “For the true implementation of the supernatural law according to the pure substance of the work elevating grace is absolutely and physically necessary for every creature in all states; for the implementation according to the mode of merit, sanctifying grace is in every way required.” More particularly,

For the purposes of this dissertation, the most important need for actual grace, taken in the proper sense as grace, on the above list is to perform any supernatural action and persevere to death (the topics of *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 & 10).²⁷⁸ “Grace is also necessary for the man already revived by grace.”²⁷⁹ In this respect there is an important difference amongst post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers. Joseph Wawrykow stands on one side, and the scholastic authors Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez stand on the other.

The first distinctive position of Wawrykow on the necessity of grace concerns the role of operative *auxilium* (actual grace/grace as motion) in every supernatural act (i.e., the need for actual grace post justification). In this regard, Wawrykow claims that “anytime the will conceives and wills an end which is appropriate to maintaining the spiritual dignity of the justified soul, and thereby perseveres in the state of grace, this willing of the end is moved by God.”²⁸⁰ He goes on to clarify that “God operates every willing of the end...before each of our meritorious acts (of choosing of the means and executing) stands the initiative of God moving

Ramirez claims that to avoid sins against the precepts of the supernatural law or the infused virtues one needs the infused virtues themselves (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 477-478).

²⁷⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 93: “Fallen man being in the state of mortal sin, cannot, without the addition of healing, habitual grace, continually avoid all mortal sin against the natural law and overcome all temptations.” I say usually because Garrigou-Lagrange does think it possible that one could avoid all sin simply under the influence of continual actual graces.

²⁷⁸ The motion of article nine is not only necessary for activation but also protection from temptation and fortification against concupisence. Labourdette, *Cours*, 783: “This follows for a particular reason because of the state of human nature. Healed as to the spirit, it remains corrupt in its flesh and has a certain ignorance in the intellect. Also man always needs the help of God who knows and can do all things.”

²⁷⁹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 783; See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 511: “And the question is about the conservation of habitual grace, not purely actual grace, which is of itself in the mode of motion, while habitual grace is said to be something permanent and stable by which the impious is justified.”

²⁸⁰ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 176.

the will to an end whose attainment will be meritorious.”²⁸¹ In short, as Angela Knobel notes, “Wawrykow, commenting on the operative nature of grace, makes a convincing argument to the effect that operative grace is present in every meritorious action.”²⁸²

This is importantly distinct from the old scholastic position on the presence of an operative actual grace in the meritorious action. Certainly, the traditional interpretation of Aquinas on this point would not deny that an operative actual grace is present in each action. Yet, it would not claim that a separate operative actual grace moves to each end immediately. On the old thesis, an operative actual grace is only necessary when a new end is willed which could not be the result of a previous deliberation in the same order.²⁸³ A new operative actual grace is not needed, there is already one exercising its operative causality.

Wawrykow’s second distinctive position (in this following Lonergan)²⁸⁴ comes in understanding the grace of perseverance.²⁸⁵ According to Wawrykow, the continual need for

²⁸¹ Wawrykow, *God’s Grace*, 176. See also Wawrykow, *Thomas Aquinas*, 66: “Thus, when a person wills an end, and this is really conducive to reaching the end that is God, this is due to operative *auxilium*. When the person deliberates about means to the end, opts for a particular strategy, and then performs the act, that is to be ascribed to cooperative *auxilium*.”

²⁸² McKay, *The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’s Moral Philosophy*, 45.

²⁸³ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170-172. According to Garrigou-Lagrange there is an actual grace involved in every action, but not an operative actual grace. Those only occur when the will “cannot move itself from potency to act by virtue of a previous efficacious act of the same order....” In short, an operative actual grace is only necessary when a new end is willed which could not be the result of deliberation in that same order. Certainly, in those acts to which man moves himself under the inspiration of operative grace (i.e., the meritorious use of the infused virtues), God gives a separate cooperative grace (remember, Garrigou-Lagrange denies the numerical identity of operative and cooperative actual grace). “This [cooperative actual grace] is conferred for good works in which our will is not only moved, but moves itself, that is, when, already actually willing the final supernatural end, it converts itself to willing the means conducive to that end.” Yet this is not an operative actual grace, it is cooperative.

²⁸⁴ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 366-367.

²⁸⁵ Labourdette, *Cours*, 783-784. Although Labourdette does not identify the particular mechanics of perseverance, he does say that it is a special grace which is not included in the gift of habitual grace and does not demand it. It is

grace even after justification trades on the imperfection of the habitual gift. “Thomas asserts the provisional and incomplete healing accomplished by habitual grace in I-II 109, 9c.... Thomas affirms the need for God’s future involvement in the mode of *auxilium gratiae*, to help the justified person to will and do the good.”²⁸⁶ This need is not only for a reduction to action, but also to guide good actions. In other words, according to Wawrykow, God moves humans not only in general to act but to act well. “Thus, in the *Summa*, *auxilium* refers not only to God causing human action but indeed to God causing *correct* human action.”²⁸⁷ All this was explained above in the necessity of an operative actual grace for each action. What is further distinct is that Wawrykow claims that the need for an operative actual grace in every supernatural action is also the same need for perseverance. In other words, the need for continual involvement of actual grace in the life of the justified believer is identical to the need for grace to cause perseverance.²⁸⁸ In this way he allies *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 very closely with a. 10 by claiming that the grace necessary in 9 is the same as in 10.

“*être en état de grâce au moment de la mort.*” Certainly habitual grace is sufficient to enable this to happen, but because of human sin, it does not.

²⁸⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 171, fnt., 51.

²⁸⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 172.

²⁸⁸ Wawrykow, *God’s Grace*, fnt., 54. Wawrykow seems to identify the need for *auxilium* after justification with the need for the grace of perseverance. “As to habitual grace, he says that once this is received there is no need of a new infusion of habitual grace. But when we look at the other mode of the aid of grace, God’s motion of application, then we have to assert the need for the further gift of such grace, ‘*ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum.*’ Later in this chapter, I shall return to this operative grace of perseverance....” He returns to this grace on pages 227ff and 249-251. On 227 he states: “As with many of the issues treated in q. 114, Thomas had discussed this question earlier in the treatise on grace. In the earlier discussion [here he references the above quoted passage], Thomas has observed that ‘perseverance’ means the ability to refrain from actions that could cause the loss of grace (mortal sin) and the actual doing of the good compatible with the graced life.” If there were any doubt left that this grace is the grace of perseverance, he follows: “It is in this context that Thomas had affirmed the necessity of an additional grace that would enable the individual to overcome the temptations of sin and to remain in the state in which he had been placed by God. For Aquinas, this grace of perseverance is an operative *auxilium*, by which God reduces the

This is also importantly different from, at least, Ramirez's reading of perseverance in Aquinas. According to Ramirez, for easy acts sustained for a small time, God's general supernatural concurrence suffices (common actual grace); for difficult acts and perfect acts a special efficacious actual grace is required.²⁸⁹ Finally, certain graces, beyond the habitual gift are necessary that the believer may persevere²⁹⁰ in justice and holiness all the way to the end.²⁹¹

individual to acts in keeping with his status as the child of God. Through this grace, the individual resists the temptation to sin and freely does the good." For further confirmation of the identification see pages 249-251.

²⁸⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 534: "for this explanation of general *auxilium* is twofold, natural and supernatural. For it is clear that for all natural works universal *auxilium* is given, so for every supernatural work done, *auxilium* is given." This special supernatural actual grace necessary for the difficult acts and because of the wounds of original sin, operates as a moral motion alone, i.e., it draws man, but does not move him as an efficient agent would. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 537: "For us, therefore, the divine supernatural *auxilium* in the order of grace is moral alone, not physical, because grace and the infused virtues are of themselves physically potential to the operation of the whole supernatural good and the avoiding of every temptation and difficulty. Yet, per accidens, because of the record of imperfect and weak reason, a new and special *auxilium* is required that our whole potency may be led into act. And for this reason we need the divine mercy to protect and defend us against the fragility and the insidiousness of the devil."

²⁹⁰ Which grace is necessary depends on what one means by perseverance. See Ramirez, *Gratia*, 547:

Perseverance

- a. Improperly speaking
- b. Properly speaking
 - i. Potential – power of persevering (needs habitual grace and sufficient actual grace, i.e. all believers are able to persevere, if they will)
 - ii. Actual
 - 1. Imperfect and temporal
 - 2. Perfect
 - a. Purely passive (a special gift of God from special actual grace – for those without the use of reason)
 - b. In a certain way active
 - i. Briefly
 - ii. Long lasting (from a special gift of actual efficacious grace – consists of the conservation in grace and its correspondence with death – neither of which are in the power of free will)

²⁹¹ Ramirez, *Gratia*, 550-566. I will add those graces necessary for each type of perseverance to the outline in footnote 241. For active perseverance there are four parts: Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 564: "1. Impeding temptations that one might not be tempted. 2. Preparing one to resist temptations. 3. Repelling and conquering the external temptations which appear by the help of grace. 4. Strengthening and holding the will of the just so that he might not fall back." For passive perseverance there are also four parts: Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 566: "1. Solely from the operative grace of Christ the redeemer. 2. Impeding the possibility of sin, not by conferring the use of reason. 3. Giving death

Can the gifts of the Holy Spirit aid this Thomistic take on the necessity of grace? I think so. This is so both in general and in particular. In general, none of the above authors, including Wawrykow, make use of Aquinas's conception of the gifts for interpreting him on the necessity of grace. This seems to be a fatal move since Aquinas specifically says the gifts are necessary for salvation.²⁹² The very title of *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2 is "Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?" Aquinas replies in the affirmative. Hence, if the gifts are both a result of habitual grace (which is certainly healing and sanctifying) and are necessary for salvation, one would expect q. 109 to deal with them (at least in a general fashion). In short, part of the material for q. 109 is the gifts, yet nobody mentions them! In addition, all the interpreters affirm the necessity of *auxilium* as motion to act and avoid sin, yet nobody mentions the gifts of the Spirit in this regard, even though St. Thomas claims that they make one proportionate to the divine motion.²⁹³ In short, *apriori* it seems likely that the gifts can make at least a modest contribution to understanding St. Thomas's thought on the necessity of grace.

More particularly, the gifts could fill out the picture Wawrykow presents on the relation between the continual involvement of actual grace and perseverance. Indeed, if St. Thomas is talking about the motion corresponding to the gifts in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 (a position I will argue

before sin has the possibility of resurging." For the perseverance of unfallen humans and the angels see Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 566-567.

²⁹² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co. Ramirez does comment on this article in his *de Donis* but does not incorporate the data found therein for a greater understanding of the necessity and mode of grace.

²⁹³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.: "It is necessary, therefore, that there be higher perfections in man according to which he would be disposed to that which God moves. And these perfections are called gifts, not only because they are given by God, but because according to them man is disposed that he may be caused easily as a moved thing by the divine inspiration." This reason would also hold for Ramirez and Garrigou-Lagrange, but I mentioned it here because of the emphasis Labourdette places on the form/motion schema.

in chapter II), then one must either reject Wawrykow's identification of the further grace necessary beyond the habitual gift with the grace of perseverance or identify the grace of perseverance with the *instinctus* to which the gifts correspond.²⁹⁴ Furthermore, (depending on one's conception of how the gifts work) the gifts could provide either corroboration for the presence of a separate operative actual grace in each supernatural action²⁹⁵ or an argument against it.²⁹⁶

V. Merit

St. Thomas ends his famous treatise on grace with a question on merit, the ultimate effect of cooperative grace. Although there were no major controversies after *Aeterni Patris* concerning St. Thomas's thought on merit,²⁹⁷ it received ample attention from commentators and others. The purpose of this section is to summarize the settled positions of most Thomistic thinkers' interpretation of St. Thomas based on the following authors: Ramirez,²⁹⁸ Garrigou-Lagrange,²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴ This is, in fact, exactly what Lonergan does. See Lonergan, *Grace*, 366: "But this active guidance of the Holy Spirit may be considered relatively; as such, it tends to the elimination of folly, ignorance, obtuseness, and hardness of heart, precludes relapse into sin, and if intended to continue throughout life, constitutes the grace of perseverance."

²⁹⁵ Indeed, this is the way Knobel uses Wawrykow. McKay, *The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas's Moral Philosophy*, 45.

²⁹⁶ If one conceives of the gifts operating beyond the human mode then one cannot have an operative actual grace in every supernatural act. The human mode can move itself from the willing of the end to the choice of the means by a cooperative actual grace. No new operative actual grace would be necessary.

²⁹⁷ For other controversies and a summary of the relevant literature on merit see Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, chapter I, section I.

²⁹⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 947-1052.

²⁹⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 363-398.

J.H. Nicolas,³⁰⁰ Labourdette,³⁰¹ Wawrykow.³⁰² In order to do this, I first summarize what these Thomists take merit to be. Then, I follow their division between condign and congruous merit. Next, I go into the ‘mechanics’ of the meritorious action including both God’s and the individual’s involvement. Finally, I note that the settled positions of these Thomistic thinkers does not take into account the gifts when interpreting Aquinas’s thought on merit.

According to these Thomists, merit is an analogous term.³⁰³ It is both discovered and applied first in the realm of human justice.³⁰⁴ From there, It applies analogously to the divine human relationship (and there with greatest dignity).³⁰⁵ With respect to both spheres, merit is “a good work to which a recompense is attached and constituting a right to a reward.”³⁰⁶ Merit is the ‘positive’ debt which attaches to a good action.³⁰⁷ Nevertheless, in what sense ‘due’ is understood shifts when one is talking about the human-human relationship and the divine-human relationship.

³⁰⁰ J.-H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs*, 520-551.

³⁰¹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 840-851.

³⁰² Wawrykow, *God’s Grace*, 147-259.

³⁰³ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 369; Labourdette, *Cours*, 844.

³⁰⁴ Labourdette, *Cours*, 843-844.

³⁰⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 369.

³⁰⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 363. Merit can also be defined abstractly as a right to a reward.

³⁰⁷ Labourdette, *Cours*, 842: “However, employed on its own, the word merit is taken positively, as a title to a recompense. Opposed to this sense is demerit, which applies to blame and punishment.”

Trading on the different senses in which something can be due, these authors distinguish different types of merit. The first sense is condign merit. Condign merit works according to strict justice.³⁰⁸ In other words, the reward is equal payment for the work and is not more than the person strictly deserves.³⁰⁹ The reward must be equal to the goodness of the action. According to Garrigou-Lagrange, condign merit comes in two forms.³¹⁰ (1) The first is the strictest sense of justice and is based on a mathematical equality. One might say that this merit is based on commutative justice.³¹¹ Such are the acts of Christ,³¹² which are of infinite value because he is a divine person.³¹³ (2) The second type of condign merit works according to justice, that is, the work has a proportion to the reward in justice and creates a kind of debt for it, but the work is not strictly equivalent to the reward.³¹⁴ This is merit according to distributive justice, but could approach commutative (in a sense).³¹⁵

The other type of merit is congruous merit, which works on the basis of friendship, not justice.³¹⁶ This type of merit also comes in two types. (3) The first is according to friendship

³⁰⁸ Labourdette, *Cours*, 848.

³⁰⁹ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 193.

³¹⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 367.

³¹¹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 844.

³¹² J.-H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs*, 541.

³¹³ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 244ff.

³¹⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1001.

³¹⁵ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 206; J.-H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs*, 549.

³¹⁶ Labourdette, *Cours*, 848.

only. It has a kind of friendly debt, inasmuch as friendship creates a bond where one wants to do the other's will.³¹⁷ (4) The second is less based on friendship and more on mercy.³¹⁸ In other words, in the second sense of congruous merit, there is no debt in any sense of the word.

The principles involved in the meritorious action differ with what sense of merit listed above is under question. I will begin with the second type of congruous merit, which is performed by one who does not have sanctifying (habitual) grace.³¹⁹ For this type of merit, one of two things is required: a prayer or a non-repugnance for the infusion of habitual grace (created by good actions done apart from grace).³²⁰ In other words, by these actions one begs the mercy of God, but since the person performing the works is not a friend of God (this presupposes sanctifying grace and charity) it has no sense of debt. However, God can, out of his abundant mercy, answer such a plea.

For congruous merit in the first sense and condign merit in the second sense the following principles are required for the work itself: God's ordination,³²¹ habitual grace,³²² actual

³¹⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 369: "[It is based on] any friendly right."

³¹⁸ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 369: "It is therefore not based on any friendly right but only on the bounty or mercy...."

³¹⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 370.

³²⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 369.

³²¹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 845-846; Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 181ff; Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 963-964. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 381-383.

³²² Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 669: "Grace is the root of merit alone, but not its immediate cause. Charity is the immediate cause of merit."

grace,³²³ and a free act commanded or elicited by the virtue of charity.³²⁴ What separates condign merit of the second type from congruous merit of the first? An act is condignly meritorious of an object if the principles of that action are directly ordered to that object.³²⁵ If the principles of the meritorious act are not directly ordered toward the reward, then it can only be congruously meritorious of that object. This commitment of most Thomistic thinkers will become clearer when I summarize the objects of merit.

Based on the types of merit and the principles necessary for the meritorious act, one can summarize the different merits humans can have before God. According to condign merit of the second type (only Jesus merits in the first type strictly speaking),³²⁶ humans may merit eternal life³²⁷ and the growth of grace and charity.³²⁸ The principles involved are directly ordered toward the salvation of the believer, directly ordered to God as object. Hence, any activity based on them condignly merits eternal life or the growth of grace. According to congruous merit (of the first type), humans may merit the first grace for another person,³²⁹ spiritual goods ordained to

³²³ Labourdette, *Cours*, 847: “In the supernatural order, the principle of merit properly speaking is sanctifying grace, elevating nature, and preordained by God to attain glory, eternal life, by the free activity of the life of grace. The principle of supernatural merit is therefore grace. But this is habitual grace as cooperative, because it requires in addition our free acts, acts with a certain actual grace, but freely exercised.”

³²⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, ; J.-H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs*, 550.

³²⁵ Pressuposing the conditions Ramirez outlines. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 984.

³²⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 367.

³²⁷ Labourdette, *Cours*, 850.

³²⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1034.

³²⁹ Only Christ condignly merits the first grace for anyone. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1026. See also Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1027: “Nevertheless, the Blessed Virgin alone is able to congruously merit the first grace for all humans universally.”

salvation,³³⁰ and temporal goods ordained to salvation.³³¹ The principles of the meritorious act are not directly ordered toward these. They are not strictly proportionate and hence can only congruously merit them, that is based on friendship with God. Finally, in no sense can the human merit the inability to sin,³³² the return of grace after a fall,³³³ the first grace for oneself,³³⁴ or eternal life for another.³³⁵

Can the gifts of the Holy Spirit challenge or fill out this picture? I think so and will identify three possible contributions. First, Aquinas says that all condign merit is based on the motion of the Holy Spirit.³³⁶ Could this be related to the *instinctus* of the gifts? None of the above authors mention the gifts or attend to the motion of the Holy Spirit.³³⁷ Possibly the gifts or Aquinas's thought on *instinctus* can illuminate this requirement for the meritorious action. Second, Aquinas claims the gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose one to be moved by God.³³⁸ If this is

³³⁰ Labourdette, *Cours*, 851.

³³¹ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 229-230.

³³² Labourdette, *Cours*, 850.

³³³ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 389.

³³⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1016 & 1018.

³³⁵ Labourdette, *Cours*, 850.

³³⁶ *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.: "If however we speak of the act of merit inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, then merit is condign to eternal life. For the value of merit is then applied according to the power of the Holy Spirit who moves us to eternal life." See also *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 3, ad 3: "The grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present life, even if it is not equal to glory in act is nevertheless equal in power, just as also the seed of the tree in which is the power of the whole tree. And similarly through the grace of the Holy Spirit, who dwells in man, is the sufficient cause of eternal life. Whence it is said to be the pledge of the inheritance of glory."

³³⁷ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, identifies the motion of the Holy Spirit with Aquinas's *auxilium*. J.-H. Nicolas emphasizes that it is when the Spirit acts through us that acts are meritorious. See J.-H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs*, 550-551.

³³⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

the case, then the gifts, as habits, would seem to be preeminently related to merit (which is based on God's motion). Third, Wawrykow claims that the gifts of the Holy Spirit form part of Aquinas's main characterization of meritorious activity.³³⁹ Reading Aquinas's text, this is far from clear and Wawrykow does not justify his claim. In all three areas, the gifts could make a modest contribution for understanding Aquinas's thought on merit.

VI. The Distinction Between the Gifts and the Virtues

Debates over the distinction between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtues has a long history. Painting with broad strokes, Thomist thinkers (following St. Thomas) have always held a true distinction between the gifts and the virtues.³⁴⁰ In other words, the gifts and the virtues are truly distinct, not only in *ratio*, but in *res*. On the opposite side of the debate stands Scotus and his followers, who hold that the gifts and the virtues are not diverse in subject, but only in name. Indeed, according to Scotus, the gifts are simply the virtues expressed in different terms.³⁴¹ The purpose of this section is not to adjudicate the debate. Ramirez does that well.³⁴² Rather, the purpose of this section is to gain a clear picture of typical Thomistic arguments for distinguishing the gifts from the virtues and whether Aquinas's thought on grace could make a contribution to

³³⁹ Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts," 49-50.

³⁴⁰ E.g. Labourdette, "*Théologie des Dons dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas*," 1616-1618.

³⁴¹ Duns Scotus, *On the Will and Morality*, selected and trans. by Alan Wolter, ed. by William Frank (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 249-250.

³⁴² Ramirez, *de Donis*, chapter III.

those arguments. In this regard, I first follow Ramirez³⁴³ in summarizing the three main arguments commonly given by Thomistic thinkers as an interpretation of St. Thomas.³⁴⁴

Following that, I point out the possible contribution that Aquinas's thought on grace could make to the arguments of Aquinas and the Thomists.

The first argument common to Thomistic thinkers' interpretation of St. Thomas is drawn from *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1. Ramirez formulates it as follows: "Habits formally disposing human powers to be moved well and promptly by specifically different moving principles are among themselves specifically different."³⁴⁵ The virtues (including the theological, acquired, and infused cardinal), all dispose the human subject to be well moved by reason. The gifts dispose the subject to be moved by divine reason. Hence, since their moving principles are distinct,³⁴⁶ so too are the gifts and all the virtues.

The second argument is based on Aquinas's contention that the gifts aid the virtues.³⁴⁷

Ramirez formulates it as follows:

Habits removing the imperfect and essential impropotion of the virtues to seek perfectly and rightly the ultimate supernatural end are specifically different from the virtues. But the Gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits removing the imperfect or

³⁴³ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 88ff.

³⁴⁴ Of course Ramirez is not the only author in the 20th century treating this topic, but he is by far the most thorough. For other authors see Labourdette, "*Théologie des Dons dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas*," 1616-1618; Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages*, 73; Guibert, *The Theology of the Spiritual Life*, 122f; Gardiel, "*Dons du Saint Esprit*," 1738-1740.

³⁴⁵ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 102.

³⁴⁶ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 103: "But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are formally habits disposing the powers of the soul to be well and promptly moved by the divine reason or by the divine instinct; the virtues are formally habits which dispose the powers of the soul to be moved well and promptly by human reason."

³⁴⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, s.c.

essential improportion of the virtues to seek the ultimate supernatural end rightly and perfectly. Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits specifically distinct from the virtues.³⁴⁸

Any virtue conceived of by St. Thomas is essentially imperfect in relation to the ultimate end. In outlining these imperfections, I begin with the most imperfect and proceed to the least. Hence, the imperfections of those later apply to the former, but not vice versa. For example, the infused cardinal virtues also share charity's only imperfection, but charity does not share theirs.

The virtues with the most imperfect relation (or rather no relation) to the supernatural end are the acquired virtues. "The supernatural end...is supernatural in substance while those virtues are in every way natural, both in substance and mode."³⁴⁹ The infused moral virtues are "*per se* and primarily ordered to creatures, [and thus] are essentially and *per se* deficient in the order to the creator."³⁵⁰

Even though they are infused, the infused cardinal virtues have for their proper object what is created. Hence, they cannot be properly competent for perfectly leading the believer to heavenly bliss. That is not their forte, so to speak. The theological virtues also have an improportion to the supernatural end. Faith and hope are essentially imperfect on account of their distance from their proper object, God. Charity, likewise, has an essential imperfection, since it

³⁴⁸ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 104: "*Habitus tollentes imperfectionem seu improportionem essentialem virtutum ad finem ultimum supernaturalem rite et perfecte assequendum, specificè differunt a virtutibus. Atqui dona Spiritus Sancti sunt habitus tollentes imperfectionem seu improportionem essentialem virtutum ad finem ultimum supernaturalem rite et perfecte assequendum. Ergo dona Spiritus Sancti sunt habitus specificè distincti a virtutibus.*"

³⁴⁹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 105: "Nevertheless, they are essentially imperfect or improportionate to the ultimate supernatural end, because it is supernatural according to substance, while they are in every way natural both according to substance and according to mode."

³⁵⁰ Ramirez, *de Donis*, "For habits which are essentially, in the first place, and *per se* ordained to creatures, are essentially, *per se*, and firstly, deficient in the order to their creator."

is in the subject by participation.³⁵¹ The gifts, on the other hand, are essentially and perfectly proportioned to the supernatural end so that they perfectly and rightly seek it.³⁵² Thus, the gifts and infused virtues are distinct.

Thomistic thinkers give the third argument most frequently. Not only does Ramirez give it,³⁵³ but also Garrigou-Lagrange,³⁵⁴ Labourdette,³⁵⁵ and others.³⁵⁶ It rests on the difference in formal object between the gifts and the virtues, something which is implicit in St. Thomas.³⁵⁷ As Garrigou-Lagrange puts it, “We have here two regulating motions, two different rules, which constitute different formal motives. It is a fundamental principle that habits are specified by their object and their formal motive....A virtue and the corresponding gift...have the same material, but they differ in the rule which serves as a measure for their acts, and also by their mode of acting.”³⁵⁸ The rule of infused moral virtue is infused prudence, which operates from deliberation and disposes to cooperative common actual graces.³⁵⁹ The rule of the theological virtues as

³⁵¹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 105-106.

³⁵² Ramirez, *de Donis*, 106: “On the contrary, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are essentially and proportionately perfect so that they rightly and perfectly seek the ultimate supernatural end.”

³⁵³ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 106. Those habits are specifically distinct which have formal objects essentially distinct. The gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtues have essentially distinct formal objects. Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtues are essentially and specifically distinct.”

³⁵⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 276f.

³⁵⁵ Labourdette, *Cours*, 369-370.

³⁵⁶ E.g. Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life*, 163: “Because they depend upon a separate kind of divine initiative, the gifts of the Holy Spirit differ intrinsically from the virtues.”

³⁵⁷ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 4, co.

³⁵⁸ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 276.

³⁵⁹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 362.

exercised is infused prudence and according to specification in the order to their object is faith.³⁶⁰

The rule of the gifts, on the other hand, is the supernatural providence of God himself and is effected by God's *instinctus*. The reasoning is this: because their rules are distinct, so too are the virtues and the gifts.

What can St. Thomas's thought on grace add to these arguments for the distinction between the gifts and virtues? This depends on whether one thinks these arguments sound or not. If, with Ramirez, one thinks these arguments are not sound,³⁶¹ then St. Thomas's thought on habitual grace could provide a stronger argument (one that does not share those weaknesses Ramirez identifies in the traditional argumentation) for the distinction between the gifts, the theological virtues, and the infused cardinal virtues. However, if one thinks the arguments are sound, then St. Thomas's thought on grace could provide an additional argument for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues.

VII. The Necessity of the Gifts for Every Meritorious Action

"By the theological and moral virtues man is not so perfected in his order to the ultimate end, so that he does not always need to be moved by a certain superior instinct of the Holy Spirit, for the reason given above."³⁶² This quote from St. Thomas stands at the heart of a recurrent 19th and 20th century disagreement concerning the operational necessity of the gifts of the Holy

³⁶⁰ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 107.

³⁶¹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 108-117.

³⁶² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, ad 2: "*Ad secundum dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam dicta.*" See also *ST II-II* q. 54, a. 4, ad 2.

Spirit.³⁶³ On one side stands the majority of the Thomistic tradition following Cajetan and John of St. Thomas; on the other side stand Pinckaers and few others.³⁶⁴ The traditional position claims that the gifts are necessary for salvation, but not for every act in the supernatural order. The gifts are only intermittently activated by the Holy Spirit to help the believer in particularly difficult situations or to goad the believer to higher, more perfect, acts. Garrigou-Lagrange is a 20th century proponent of this thesis. “What we do not admit is that the gifts must enter into play every time the soul receives an actual grace; because an actual grace is required for even the most imperfect exercise of the Christian virtues....”³⁶⁵ In short, the gifts are in all believers, and

³⁶³ The first iteration of this debate took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries between Froget and Perriot. For a summary of this iteration of the debate see A. Gardiel, *Dons du Saint-Esprit*, DTC IV (Paris 1920), 1779-1781: «Une controverse a eu lieu, il y a quelques années, entre deux théologiens que leurs travaux antérieurs désignent comme des spécialistes dans la question des dons du Saint-Esprit, Mgr Perriot qui a publié sur les dons un article remarquable dans l'ami du clerge, 23 juin 1892, p. 389, et le P. B. Froget, auteur de L'habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les ames Justes, dans la Revue thomiste, mai 1896-mai 1898, tous deux disciples de saint Thomas. Le sujet a son importance, car il s'agit de savoir si le Saint-Esprit intervient par ses dons dans chacun de nos actes surnaturels. Le P. Froget soutient qu'il n'intervient pas ainsi dans chacun de nos actes surnaturels, que nombre de ces actes sont 'l'oeuvre propre des vertus morales infuses agissant sous 'l'inspiration des seules vertus théologales, c'est-à-dire sous l'inspiration commune et a forme humaine du Saint-Esprit, et non des inspirations des dons qui sont speciales et a forme divine. Op. cit., p. 378 sq. Mgr Perriot ne nie pas ces deux sortes d'inspirations, mais, conformément a ce qu'il avait tenu en 1892, il trouve que la distinction n'a pas son application dans le débat. C'est sans distinction que saint Thomas affirme la necessite de l'inspiration du Saint-Esprit la ou ne suffit pas l'initiative rationnelle. Sum. theol., Ia IIae, q. LXVIII, a. 2. Et donc, tout acte des vertus infuses suppose l'inspiration a forme divine des dons, et reciproquement aucune inspiration a forme divine n'exclut totalement la forme humaine, délibérée, des actes surnaturels. L'ami du clergé, 1^{er} septembre 1898, p. 722 sq. ; 23 décembre 1898, p. 1163 sq. Le P. Froget a répondu dans la Revue thomiste, novembre 1899, p. 530 sq., et, dans sa 2^e edition revue et augmentee de L'habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les ames justes, in-12, Paris, 1900, p. 378, il a introduit des complements relatifs a cette controverse. Mgr Perriot a replique dans L'Ami, le 11 janview 1900, en 23 colonnes. Le P. Froget n'a pas repondu et, de fait, il n'aurait pu que reproduire ce qu'il avait déjà dit.”

³⁶⁴ Angela McKay, *The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas's Moral Philosophy*; Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*; Eric Luijten, *Sacramental Forgiveness as a Gift of God: Thomas Aquinas on the Sacrament of Penance* (Louvain: Peeters, 2003), 71-75; Jan H Walgrave, “Instinctus Spiritus Sancti Een Proeve tot Thomas-Interpretatie,” in *Selected Writings Thematische Geschriften: Thomas Aquinas, J.H. Newman, Theologia Fundamental*, ed. G. De Schrijver and J. Kelly (Leuven, University Press, 1982), 126-40; Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. by L. K. Shook (NY: Random House, 1956), 348; Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*; Kelly, *The Seven Gifts*, 24: “There seems to be no reason for hesitation in asserting in this connection that every single act which is specifically an act of a child of God proceeds from the gifts. The gifts are not for occasional use.”

³⁶⁵ Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 325.

habitually so, but only occasionally operative. The *semper* in the above quote from St. Thomas should be read as *toujours*.³⁶⁶ The common metaphor for this position compares the gifts to sails on a ship. By the oars one can move laboriously but effectively toward the destination. The sails are a higher and more efficient way of reaching the goal. Yet the wind is only occasionally active. It is an intermittent help toward reaching the destination.

The other camp defines itself vis-à-vis the traditional reading of Aquinas and is represented most notably by Servais Pinckaers. These scholars take the *semper* as literal; the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for and operative in every supernatural action. In other words, the gifts are not simply occasionally operative but perpetually so. The wind does not simply always blow, but must always be blowing. The sails (gifts) must always receive the wind or the oars will not operate. The Holy Spirit stands at the heart of all supernatural activity. In addition to Pinckaers, Knobel argues this position in her recent dissertation.³⁶⁷

Finally, this view [the traditional one] of the gifts not only fails to find direct support in the text of Aquinas, but actually contradicts the text in a crucial regard. For Aquinas introduces the gifts because man's reason is inadequate to direct his activity at the supernatural level. Thus, Aquinas says that man, in order to perform actions at the supernatural level, is in continual need of divine assistance, and that he needs the motion of the Holy Spirit as the moon needs the sun in order to give off light, and as the medical student needs the assistance of the physician to heal.³⁶⁸

The purpose of this section is to summarize the debate and so see where Aquinas's thought on grace could bring further precision. In this regard, I outline the disagreement between

³⁶⁶ Gardiel, "*Dons du Saint-Esprit*," col. 1780.

³⁶⁷ McKay, *The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas's Moral Philosophy*, 42ff.

³⁶⁸ McKay, *The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas's Moral Philosophy*, 48.

the two sides following a schematic proposed in a recent dissertation by James Stroud (an explicit advocate of the non-traditional thesis): “1) the distinction and definition of two modes of human action; 2) the rule/measure for the infused virtues; 3) why the infused virtues are insufficient and need prompting of gifts; 4) how often the gifts are needed; in other words, are the gifts operative in every act of infused virtue or are the gifts operative sporadically?”³⁶⁹ I then follow the outline with a few suggestions for where Aquinas’s thought on grace could give clarity or closure to the debate.

The first area of disagreement concerns the distinction and definition of the two modes of human action. The traditional opinion follows John Capreolus, Cajetan, and John of St. Thomas on this point.³⁷⁰ The gifts of the Holy Spirit work beyond the human mode,³⁷¹ that is the human person operating with the acquired virtues or the infused cardinal and theological virtues; the gifts produce specifically different actions.³⁷² In other words, the gifts work beyond the normal operations of the human intellect, beyond deliberative and discursive reason.³⁷³ The more recent

³⁶⁹ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas’s Exposition*, 71.

³⁷⁰ Thomas de Vio Cajetan, *Commentarius in Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae*, vol. 6 in *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* (Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1891), 448.

³⁷¹ Romanus Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life*, 165-166.

³⁷² Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas’s Exposition*, 74; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 276; Labourdette, *Cours*, 369.

³⁷³ Gardiel, *Dons*, col. 1780; Gardiel, *The Gifts of the Holy Spirit in Christian Life*, 8-9; Gardiel, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, 8; Ramirez, *de Donis*, 122: “Response: I distinguish the major: the gifts are not ordained to more perfect acts in the genus or material object of the work. I concede that the gifts are ordered to higher acts inasmuch as this concerns the formal ratio of the work. I contradistinguish the minor: the more perfect acts are of the counsels, not the precepts, more perfect in the genus of work. Inasmuch as one would claim the greater in the mode or ratio of the work, I deny.” Farrell, 18: “Because in the gifts the soul does not move itself to act on the basis of some premise or previous decision, it is moved exclusively by a divine instinct,” Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 293. For Ramirez this means that the gifts do not corespond to cooperative grace. See Ramirez, *de Donis*, 362.

account denies this and claims that even if Aquinas did conceive of the gifts as operating beyond the human mode in his early years, Aquinas's doctrine develops on this point.³⁷⁴ In his mature work in the *Summa*, Aquinas holds that the gifts and infused virtues operate in the same mode. St. Thomas abandoned the "ascetic gradation"³⁷⁵ in his mature work. The human mode, as conceived in the *Summa*, is human action under the influence of the acquired virtues, not necessarily the involvement (or lack) of discursive thought. The gifts and the infused virtues all work beyond the human mode.

The second area of disagreement concerns the measure/rule for the infused virtues. As Aquinas says, "the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure."³⁷⁶ According to the traditional Thomistic opinion, the rule/measure for the infused virtues is human reason (operating, certainly, under the influence of infused prudence). In other words, the gifts

³⁷⁴ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 78, fn. 17: "In the 1920s and 1930s, there was an exchange between Joseph de Guibert and Garrigou-Lagrance. de Guibert argued that the *Summa Theologiae* presents a change in Aquinas's position in which the language of "super-human" disappears, where previously Aquinas had used language denoting a super-human mode in relation to the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his *Scriptum super Sententiis*. Thus de Guibert argued that language usage represents a substantive change in Aquinas's understanding of the gifts and their relation to the virtues. See Joseph de Guibert, S.J., "Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d'agir 'ultrahumain' d'après saint Thomas," *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique* 3 (1922): 394-411; Joseph de Guibert, S.J., *Les Doublets de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: 1926), 111-112. Garrigou-Lagrance countered that there is not only continuity between the two texts but also the same theory of the gifts in both texts, and the differences in terminology are due to different points of view. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrance, O.P., "Le mode supra-humain des dons du Saint Esprit," *Vie spirituelle* 8 (1932): 124-136. According to O'Connor, Lottin, and Labourdette also support Garrigou-Lagrance's thesis concerning the continuity between the *Scriptum super sententiis* and the *Summa Theologiae*. See Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C., "Appendix 4: The Evolution of St. Thomas's Thought on the Gifts," 110-130 in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* vol. 24 (Blackfriars). O'Connor accepts Garrigou-Lagrance's position with some changes. "It would be going too far, however, to identify the theory of the commentary with that of the *Summa* as Garrigou-Lagrance seems to do. The latter work introduces a precision that represents an immense progress over the former, and perhaps even a rectification of it"(119)."

³⁷⁵ De Guibert, *Les Doublets*, 125: "On voit dans quel sens s'est développée la formule abandonnée par saint thomas, dans un sens de gradation ascétique, fort différent de celui avec lequel elle est en faveur aujourd'hui."

³⁷⁶ ST I-II q. 64, a. 4, co: "medium virtutis accipitur per conformitatem ad suam regulam vel mensuram."

have nothing to do with the measure of infused virtue, but rather work with a measure beyond that of human reason (even enlightened by faith). The measure for the gifts, on the other hand, is the “Holy Spirit himself.”³⁷⁷ The opposite opinion, on the other hand, argues that the gifts and the infused virtues share one measure/rule: the divine law.³⁷⁸

The third area of debate concerns the insufficiency of the infused virtues (or why the gifts are necessary at all). Both positions claim that the gifts are necessary to aid the infused virtues. They disagree on why exactly that aid is necessary. The traditional account claims a two-fold insufficiency of the infused virtues: imperfect possession of the infused virtues and imperfections in the virtues themselves.³⁷⁹ In relation to the latter deficiency, the gifts find their reason for being.³⁸⁰ In other words, the gifts are operative only when the infused virtues are insufficient in themselves; this insufficiency is merely occasional and not structural (i.e., the imperfect possession of the virtues is not why the gifts are necessary). The account of Pinckaers et al. only claims that the gifts are necessary for the first reason given by the traditional account; the gifts are only necessary because of the imperfect possession of the infused virtues by the redeemed human. Now this imperfection is perpetual and not contextual (unlike the second) and thus the gifts are always necessary for the operation of the infused virtues.

³⁷⁷ Hughes & Farrell, 22. This is only a notionally distinct position from calling the measure of the acts of the gifts the eternal law.

³⁷⁸ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 201.

³⁷⁹ Gardiel, *Dons du Saint-Esprit*, col. 1735-1736; Gardiel, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, 14-15; Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 82-83.

³⁸⁰ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 84-85.

The last area of disagreement concerns the operational modality of the gifts and is merely the conclusion of the above disagreements. Are the gifts necessary/operative in every supernatural act or not? If one claims, as the traditional account does, that the human mode is discursive, the gifts operate beyond the human mode, the gifts and the virtues do not share a measure/rule, and the gifts are only necessary because of the occasional imperfection of the infused virtues, then it makes sense to affirm that the gifts are only occasionally operative. Most of the time humans are under their own direction with the aid of infused prudence. The gifts operate beyond the human mode and inspire particular acts necessary to avoid a failure in virtue.³⁸¹

The account typified by Pinckaers, however, claims that the gifts are operative in every supernatural action.³⁸² This position too makes sense given their above claims: the “human mode” is action under acquired virtue,³⁸³ the gifts and virtues share a rule/measure, and the necessity of the gifts is on account of the perpetual imperfection of the human subject’s participation in the infused virtues. In short, every act of an infused virtue is accompanied by an act of a gift.

³⁸¹ Gardiel, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, 17: “These two principles harmonize because the divine reason is the cause of our reason. Nevertheless, each acts in its own way, hence in the presence of the divine operation, our reason suspends activity. It is replaced by a higher principle than itself.”

³⁸² Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas’s Exposition*, 111: “...if God gives the human person grace with both the infused virtues and gifts, then these habits must work together in the moral life. Similarly, the acts of the gifts are brought about by divine *auxilium* or actual grace in a twofold manner: either operative actual grace or cooperative actual grace.”

³⁸³ Although the use of the gifts in every meritorious action is the logical conclusion, Aquinas’s abandonment of the language of ‘beyond the human mode’ does not mean that the gifts are operative in every supernatural act by itself (at least not necessarily).

The important thing to note (for my project) is the exclusive concern with q. 68 of the *Prima Secundae*; in other words, neither side incorporates much data from beyond Aquinas's explicit thought on the gifts. This is especially true regarding Aquinas's thought on grace. Neither side averts to Aquinas's teaching on grace to solve the debate in any structural or meaningful way;³⁸⁴ neither side tests their conclusions by reading Aquinas's thought on grace in light of them. Neither side, and this is especially true of the account exemplified by Pinckaers, works out the implications of its thesis for interpreting Aquinas's thought on grace. Nevertheless, this debate concerns the systematic divisions on grace intimately. Put differently, the debate about the perpetual or intermittent operation of the gifts is also a dispute about the following points: (1) How the gifts relate to supernatural motion. Do they correspond to common actual grace or a special actual grace? (2) How the different fruits of habitual grace relate? Do the theological virtues give rise to the gifts? If so, how do the gifts aid the theological virtues? (3) Is there a separate supernatural motion for each supernatural act?³⁸⁵ These questions can only be adequately answered by reference to Thomas's explicit thought on grace. Hence, it would seem that Aquinas's doctrine on grace could make at least a modest contributions to this debate.

³⁸⁴ Put differently, both sides make passing reference to the concepts found in the treatise on grace. Yet, neither side (and this is especially true of Pinckaers et al.) realizes the intimate connection between their thesis on the gifts and certain disputed interpretations of the treatise on grace.

³⁸⁵ Put differently, one might ask whether there is a separate operative actual grace for each supernatural act? Is the operative actual grace which activates the gifts the same as the one which activates the infused cardinal virtues and the theological virtues? Generally speaking, the answer of traditional Thomistic thinkers was negative to both, although there are exceptions. See Walter Farrell O.P. and Dominic Hughes, O.P., *Swift Victory*, 12 & 16; Froget, *The Indwelling*, 190. Farrell and Froget are exceptions to this because they hold that there is a stimulus of operative grace in each supernatural act, but also hold to the traditional doctrine of the gifts. The opposing answer is positive to both. There is a separate operative actual grace for each supernatural act and this operative actual grace is the motion corresponding to the gifts. I will argue somewhere in between. Is there a separate operative actual grace for each action? No. Is the operative actual grace which activates the gifts and supernatural virtues the same? Yes.

VIII. The Connectivity, Endurance, and Excellence of the Gifts

The connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence are the most sparsely covered topics in the secondary literature of the post *Aeterni Patris* period. Of all the Thomistic thinkers under consideration here only Ramirez³⁸⁶ and Labourdette³⁸⁷ give these topics enough attention to merit inclusion.³⁸⁸ In their analysis and reading of St. Thomas, they largely agree. Hence, the purpose of this section is to summarize their agreement (the settled position) on the connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence of the gifts (in that order) and note the possible contributions Aquinas's thought on grace could make to this settled position.

According to Ramirez and Labourdette, the gifts are connected by the virtue of charity in both existence and activity. In the order of existence, the gifts derive from the theological virtues, and especially charity, although ultimately the gifts derive from habitual grace. As Ramirez says, "All the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected in habitual grace as in a root; in charity, however, just as in a form."³⁸⁹ The gifts are connected in habitual grace since it gives rise to the gifts and whatever things have a common root and origin are connected in that root.³⁹⁰ Although Ramirez does not explain this argument in any more depth, he seems to mean the following: connectivity

³⁸⁶ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 135-147.

³⁸⁷ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*."

³⁸⁸ Other authors only mention the topics in passing. For an example see J.-M. Nicolas, "*Les Dons du Saint-Esprit*," in *Revue Thomiste* 92 (1992): 141-152.

³⁸⁹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 135: "All the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected in habitual grace as in a root, but in charity just as in a form."

³⁹⁰ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 135.

in the order of being arises based on a common principle. If two things arise from a principle they have a relation to it. Based on their relation to their principle they are related to each other.³⁹¹ The common principle brings some kind of unity, that is connectivity. Hence, the gifts are connected in the order of being.

In order to make sense of the gifts' dependence on charity in the order of activity, Labourdette utilizes the distinction between passivity in the objective or final order and passivity in the efficient order. Charity is the first and most fundamental passivity in both orders.³⁹² Charity receives the proper object, God, of the supernatural life in the objective and final order. Charity is also passive in the efficient order, it must receive its motion from God. The gifts, according to Labourdette, are a second passivity in the supernatural life. As a second passivity, they must be dependent on the first (since the order of finality, of which charity is clearly first, cannot be divided from the order of efficiency).³⁹³ The gifts are thus dependent on charity in both the final and efficient order, resulting in a two-fold connectivity in the order of activity. Charity provides the gifts with their ultimate end in God and therefore connects the gifts just as a form.³⁹⁴ In the efficient order the gifts are connected in charity since every act of a gift is necessarily commanded by an infused act of charity.³⁹⁵

³⁹¹ One can see the basis here is Aquinas's metaphysics of analogy.

³⁹² Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1630.

³⁹³ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1630: "For every human act, this passivity [efficient] is never separated from the first [final]..."

³⁹⁴ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 135: "Therefore also the gifts are connected in charity through the mode of the end or terminus, just as in a form."

³⁹⁵ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1630: "Each gift is not put into act by the divine inspiration without at the same time, an infused act of charity being excited by an operative grace."

This conception does not bias St. Thomas's commitment that the gifts are enacted by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Each act of a gift has two sources: the inspiration of God and a commanding act of charity.³⁹⁶ Why does a commanding act of charity always accompany an act of a gift? Ramirez claims it is because it is by charity that the Holy Spirit principally dwells in humans. Since the gifts make the believer obedient to the Spirit, it makes sense that they would thus make him obedient to the commands of charity.³⁹⁷ Labourdette, on the other hand, claims that all acts of the gifts must have an act of charity accompanying them since all the gifts work in the connatural mode. It is only by charity that the connatural mode is delivered.³⁹⁸ Hence, the gifts must have an act of charity commanding them. Their reasons are complementary.³⁹⁹ Either way, the gifts are connected in the efficient order of activity as well.

Labourdette and Ramirez are also complementary on the endurance of the gifts. Indeed, both claim that the gifts will continue to exist in heaven. Ramirez claims this on the basis of four

³⁹⁶ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1631.

³⁹⁷ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 136.

³⁹⁸ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1631: "This is beyond the explicit letter of St. Thomas; but it seems to us that it remains logical according to his principles and his formulas."

³⁹⁹ That is if one assumes that Ramirez does not mean that the *instinctus* of the gifts is the act of charity. If he held this (which his position seems open to), then he and Labourdette would be at odds. If one held that charity is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit then the acts of the gifts would only have one source, the act of charity commanding them.

arguments⁴⁰⁰ and Labourdette based on the clear commitment of St. Thomas.⁴⁰¹ Nevertheless, both distinguish (as St. Thomas does) between the gifts in their essence and in their matter. As Labourdette notes, in heaven the gifts will have will not have the same matter they have on earth,⁴⁰² just as the infused cardinal virtues will not.⁴⁰³ Nevertheless, that does not mean the gifts will cease to exist. They still exist in heaven according to their essence (proportioning the believer to God's inspiration). Indeed, in heaven the gifts will be most perfect.⁴⁰⁴

In outlining the relative excellence of the gifts and virtues, Ramirez and Labourdette diverge slightly in their conclusions. According to Labourdette, the gifts are greater than all the moral virtues (infused or acquired), but less excellent than the theological virtues.⁴⁰⁵ Labourdette simply follows St. Thomas's analysis in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8 by which St. Thomas comes to the same conclusion. Ramirez on the other hand posits some additional distinctions to help interpret St. Thomas's thought.

⁴⁰⁰ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 136-138. (1) Ramirez's first argument rests on the authority of Leo XIII's *Divinum Illud Munus*. (2) Since the gifts remain in Christ and he is *comprehensor*, then they must remain in heaven for the believer also. (3) *A fortiori* since the gift of fear (which is the most imperfect gift) still exists in heaven with charity, then the others must also. (4) The gifts dispose man to follow the motion of the Holy Spirit well. In heaven the believer will be maximally disposed to follow the motion of the Holy Spirit. Thus the gifts will be most perfect in heaven when they have no contrary and the believer is to the maximum extent docile to the Holy Spirit.

⁴⁰¹ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1631.

⁴⁰² Reading Aquinas carefully on this point is paramount. See *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: "*Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad materiam circa quam operantur, et sic in praesenti habent operationem circa aliquam materiam circa quam non habebunt operationem in statu gloriae.*" Aquinas does not say they will have no matter, but only that their matter in this life will not endure in the next.

⁴⁰³ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1631.

⁴⁰⁴ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 138: "Therefore it is evident that the gifts will be more perfect, firm, and pure, in the state of heaven, than on earth."

⁴⁰⁵ Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1626.

According to Ramirez, a virtue can be greater than another in two ways: in substance or in the mode of its operation.⁴⁰⁶ The gifts of the Holy Spirit are more perfect in both ways than the acquired intellectual and moral virtues. According to their substance, those virtues which are infused are greater inasmuch as they have God for their efficient cause, are ordered *per se* to the supernatural end, and have a form or measure commensurate with the supernatural end. The acquired virtues, on the other hand, are caused by humans, are not ordered necessarily to the supernatural end, and are regulated by human reason. The gifts are infused, so they are greater. The gifts also exceed the acquired virtues in their mode of operation. The gifts operate in a mode beyond the human, beyond the ratiocinative and according to connaturality.⁴⁰⁷ Hence, the gifts are greater. The gifts are also greater than the infused cardinal virtues in both these ways. The gifts are greater in substance because they are given to help the infused virtues, and that which is given against another's defects is greater. Likewise, in mode, the gifts are greater, since they operate under the special direction and regulation of the Holy Spirit whereas the infused cardinal virtues operate under the impulse of reason.⁴⁰⁸

When Ramirez treats the relative excellence of the gifts and the theological virtues, his account diverges from Labourdette's. According to Ramirez, the gifts are greater than faith and hope in mode but not in substance. Faith and hope are superior in substance since they are prior

⁴⁰⁶ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 146. In other words, a virtue can be greater in what it is or the way it acts.

⁴⁰⁷ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 147: "They operate beyond the human mode in a quasi-divine way."

⁴⁰⁸ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 149: "Whereas even the infused moral virtues operate under the direction and impulse proper to reason, which is defective and limited."

and more universal.⁴⁰⁹ Indeed, they are the roots and principles of the gifts. Whatever is naturally prior is greater. Faith and hope are naturally prior to charity, and charity to the gifts, thus faith and hope are naturally prior to the gifts. On the other hand, the gifts are greater than faith and hope in mode of operation. The gifts do not imply a distance with their proper objects and therefore act in a higher way. Faith and hope essentially imply distance with God.⁴¹⁰ Finally, charity is greater than the gifts in substance and mode. In substance for the same reasons as faith and hope: charity is naturally prior and more universal; charity is the root and form of the gifts; charity has greater presence and contact with the first principle of virtue, God. Charity is greater than the gifts in mode of operation because it too operates on the basis of a connatural experience of God. In short, charity gives its operative mode to the gifts and is therefore more excellent than them.⁴¹¹

In conclusion, one can say that the settled positions of most post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic thinkers (represented by Ramirez and Labourdette) are as follows: the gifts are connected in charity both on the level of being and activity, the gifts endure and are more perfect in heaven (according to their essence), and the gifts are more excellent than the infused and acquired

⁴⁰⁹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 149. By prior Ramirez means closer to their common principle, God. Faith and hope have God for their formal object whereas the gifts have other things for their formal objects. Faith and hope are more universal because their objects extend to all things. Faith believes all things and hope suffices for all things hopeful. The gifts extend only to their seven zones.

⁴¹⁰ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 150: “But faith and hope essentially postulate a distance with their proper object, because faith is essentially of things not seen and hope of things essentially not had.”

⁴¹¹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 150-151.

virtues in all ways; more excellent than faith and hope in mode; and in no way more excellent than charity.

Could these conclusions and arguments be supplemented or challenged by Aquinas's thought on grace? I will identify three areas of possible import. First, if charity is relevant for the connectivity of the gifts since it is the root of them, then could habitual grace be relevant for connectivity (as Ramirez intimates), since it is the root of both charity and the gifts?⁴¹² Second, Aquinas affirms that the believer cannot act out of the theological virtues without being moved by the gifts.⁴¹³ Does this change or challenge Ramirez's analysis of relative excellence of the virtues and the gifts? Third, Aquinas says that the gifts endure in heaven because they proportion the believer to the motion of the Holy Spirit.⁴¹⁴ Does Aquinas give any more information about this motion in the treatise on grace? If so, then it would be relevant for the endurance of the gifts.

IX. Conclusion

As stated in the introduction, the broad purpose of this dissertation is to seek further precision in Aquinas's thought by reading the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace in light of each other. In order to partially meet the goal, this chapter has two primary goals. First, this chapter summarizes a sampling of post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic literature on grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit respectively. Second, it aims to identify, but not argue, areas in which each topic could be of assistance for understanding the other. Thus, it finds that in the areas of the existence

⁴¹² *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.

⁴¹³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

⁴¹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.

and division of actual grace, the necessity of grace, the division and distinctions of habitual grace, and merit Aquinas's thought on the gifts could make at least a modest contribution for understanding. On the side of the gifts, it shows that for understanding the necessity of the gifts in every meritorious action, the precise placement of the gifts in the systematic categories of grace, the endurance of the gifts, the connectivity of the gifts, and the relative excellence of the gifts and virtues, Aquinas's thought on grace provides important data for navigating debates and understanding Aquinas. The next chapters, two and three, attempt a reading of Aquinas's thought on the gifts and grace in light of each other. Chapter II's subject is the gifts of the Holy Spirit. It aims to bring information from Aquinas's thought on grace to the issues outlined in this chapter concerning the gifts: the distinction between the gifts and the virtues, the *instinctus* of the gifts, the operational necessity of the gifts, the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits, the connectivity of the gifts, the endurance of the gifts, and the comparative excellence of the gifts and the virtues. Chapter III aims to do the opposite: bring conceptions from Aquinas's thought on the gifts to bear on understanding his thought on grace. Chapter III treats the existence of actual grace, the *instinctus* of the spirit and actual grace, the necessity of grace for perseverance, the division of actual grace, the division of habitual grace, and merit. In the final chapter I return to the secondary literature and conclusions outlined above and claim that an integral reading of Aquinas on the issues of grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit confirms, extends, or challenges the state of current scholarship.

Chapter II – Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

According to St. Thomas, God's causality over the whole supernatural life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit as a gift.¹ The Spirit proceeds as love and therefore as the *primum donum*.² This procession of love, this first gift, is poured out in grace. "For the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and of the Son, to be given to us is our being brought to participate in the Love who is the Holy Spirit, and by this participation we are made lovers of God."³ The Spirit does this by imprinting the very law of God on the heart.⁴ "Yet the New Law is not only called spiritual but 'the Law of the Spirit' (Rom 8:2), because it is not only given by the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit imprints it on the heart in which he dwells."⁵ The love of God poured out perfects all habits and acts of the soul.⁶

Even though the whole supernatural life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit as gift, the term gift is also used in a special sense for the gifts of the Holy Spirit.⁷ "These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration...."⁸ This chapter concerns the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the special sense. Can the systematic divisions of grace help us understand these gifts

¹ *ST I* q. 39, a. 7; *ST I* q. 43, a. 2, ad 1.

² *ST I* q. 38, a. 2, co.

³ *Super Rom.*, V, l. 1, n. 392.

⁴ *ST I-II* q. 106, a. 1.

⁵ *Super Rom.*, VII, l. 3, n. 557; *Super I Cor.*, XII, l. 2, n. 725.

⁶ *Super Rom.*, V, l. 1, n. 382.

⁷ *Super I Cor.*, XII, l. 1, n. 721.

⁸ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.

more fully? Two short arguments will suffice to show that grace is relevant for a proper understanding of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and open the possibility of the topic.

The first is based on Aquinas's understanding of *instinctus* as a *motio*. Aquinas identifies them throughout *ST* I-II q. 68 and also in his mature biblical commentaries. I will give two examples. First, in response to qq. 2 & 8 of *ST* I-II q. 68, Aquinas claims that the gifts render the powers of the soul proportionate to the motion of God and to the instinct of God respectively. In short, Thomas seems to consider the instinct of God and the motion of God identical in some sense. Indeed, he often switches freely between them in the same breath.⁹

Furthermore, this *motio/instinctus* moves believers to God as the object of supernatural beatitude.¹⁰ Hence, since humans can only be moved to God as the object of supernatural beatitude by grace, this motion must be a graced *motus animae*.¹¹ If this is true, then clearly Aquinas's thought on grace is relevant for the gifts. The gifts make the believer proportionate to a type of graced motion. Any clarity or information about this type of motion is thus information about the gifts and their operation.

⁹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co: "The very motion of reason does not suffice unless the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit is given to it." And: "Because nobody is able to come to the inheritance of that land of the blessed, unless he is moved and led by the Holy Spirit." Cf. also *Super Gal.*, I, 15, lect. 4, n. 42: "a certain interior instinct by means of which God touches man's heart through grace so that he will turn to him. He thus calls us from the bad road to the good, and this through grace, not through our merits." In *Super Rom.*, VIII, 30, lect. 6, n. 707: "This interior vocation is nothing other than a certain instinct of mind by which man's heart is moved by God to adhere to the faith or to virtue.... This interior call is necessary, because our heart could not turn itself to God, if God himself had not attracted us." See also *Super Rom.*, IX, l. 3, n. 781: "But it seems to me that still more must be understood here, namely, that men are moved to good and to evil by God through an interior instinct." On the Divine instinct see Jean Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 2: Spiritual Master* (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 206-211 & Pinckaers, *The Pinckaers Reader*, 385-395.

¹⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2.

¹¹ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, co.

The second argument is based on St. Thomas's claim that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits flowing from habitual grace.¹² Now, the cause of something is relevant for understanding it. Hence, grace is relevant for understanding the gifts. In addition, Aquinas discusses many distinctions when treating grace explicitly, operative/cooperative, prevenient/subsequent, etc. These divisions could possibly apply to the gifts and give a lot more information about their being and operation.

What both these arguments prove is stated in the introduction. Aquinas often talks about the same reality in different words and through different concepts. One must attend to diverse texts then to get the full picture of Aquinas on any issue. The purpose of this section is to do just that: to use Aquinas's thought on grace to further understand and explain the gifts of the Holy Spirit. It treats the following topics: grace and the distinction between the gifts and the virtues, the operational necessity of the gifts, the gifts as habits, the connectivity of the gifts, the endurance of the gifts, and the excellence of the gifts. In each of them Aquinas's thought on grace contributes to a fuller understanding of the gifts.

I. Grace and the Distinction between the Gifts and the Virtues

The distinction between the gifts and the virtues was a live debate in St. Thomas's day.¹³ His opinion in this regard is clear: the gifts and the virtues are truly distinct. Can Aquinas's thought on grace bring precision or further corroboration to this distinction? The thesis of this

¹² *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9; *ST* I-II q. 110, aa. 3-4.

¹³ Posterior to Aquinas, Scotus held that the gifts were not distinct from the virtues. The Council of Trent was careful not to condemn this view. See Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, trans. David Smith (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2006), 134. There are also more modern interpreters who claim that Aquinas only held the distinction between gift and virtue because of the formulations of his day. For this position see Odon Lottin, *Morale fondamentale* (Tournai: Desclée, 1954), 414-434.

section is that St. Thomas's thought on grace points one to a definitive and essential argument for the distinction between the gifts and the supernatural virtues, one which is necessary given that Aquinas's explicit argumentation in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues is only a proof for the gifts distinction from the acquired virtues. In order to argue this thesis, I begin by analyzing Aquinas's argumentation. Then, I show how Aquinas's thought on grace possibly points to an argument for the division between the gifts and the other infused virtues, both theological and cardinal.

In *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, St. Thomas, after giving three contrary opinions in the body of his answer, argues for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues in the following way:

And for this reason to distinguish the gifts from the virtues, we ought to follow the way of speaking in Scripture, which gives this reality less by the name of gifts and more under the name of spirit, for so it is said in Isaiah 11: "the spirit of wisdom and understanding rests upon him, and so on." From these words it is manifest that the seven gifts are listed there because they are in us by divine inspiration. Now inspiration signifies a certain motion coming from outside. For it ought to be considered that in man is a twofold principle of motion, one which is interior (reason) and the other which is exterior (God), as was said above. The philosopher agrees in *de Bona Fortuna*.¹⁴

He continues his argument by claiming that the *mobile* and the *movens* need to be proportionate to one another. In other words, the mobile has to have some relation or disposition to be moved by the mover. The *movens* is God and the *mobile* is the human subject. The human virtues

¹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co: *Et ideo ad distinguendum dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine spirituum, sic enim dicitur Isaiae XI, requiescet super eum spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, et cetera. Ex quibus verbis manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi, secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens, unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna.*"

perfect the subject inasmuch as he is moved by unaided reason.¹⁵ The gifts of the Holy Spirit, on the other hand, make the human subject proportionate to the very motion of God.¹⁶ Since God and human reason are distinct, so too are the capacities (the virtues and the gifts) which dispose the subject to each principle of motion.

The argument as given seems immediately problematic on Aquinas's own terms. Why? God moves the human subject by unaided reason as well;¹⁷ God moves all things in accord with their nature. In other words, the human subject is already naturally proportionate to God's motion (in some sense). The gifts would thus seem to be unnecessary at best and, at worst, not distinct from the virtues. Why another set of principles to dispose the human subject to God, if he is already so proportioned/disposed?¹⁸

The key to understanding why Aquinas's argumentation works is attending to the fact that he is specifying a habit and the type of specification he has in mind. As Aquinas says, the

¹⁵ St. Thomas says here that the human virtues perfect the subject in proportion to his interior and exterior actions, *per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius agit*. Interior actions are those elicited from the will and exterior actions are those commanded by the will, including the acts of the intellect. See *ST I-II* qq. 6 & 8 prol.

¹⁶ Obviously, God moves the human subject in more ways than one (each of which would require a different proportion/disposition). E.g. see *ST I-II* q. 9 & q. 109. Aquinas must have in mind here a special proportion and a special motion, apart from God's general natural concurrence (see *ST I* q. 105, a. 5).

¹⁷ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: "God moves the will of man just as a universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man is not able to will anything. But man through his reason determines himself to will this or that which is a true or an apparent good. But nevertheless, sometimes God moves someone to some determinate good specifically, just as in those whom he moves by grace, as will be said below."

¹⁸ One would expect Aquinas to argue for the distinction of types of habits based on their objects or active principles (to claim based on nature would beg the question). See *ST I-II* q. 54, a. 2, co.: "Habits are distinguished specifically in three ways. In the first way it is according to the active principle of such a disposition. The second way is according to their nature. The third is according to a specific difference in object..." Specification by active principle is not an option, since God produces both the virtues and the gifts (although in different ways). Why not a specific difference in object? It would seem a possibility since (presumably) the gifts do not share a formal object (although they do share the material objects) with the virtues (*ST I-II* q. 68, a. 4, co.). Yet Aquinas does not go this direction. He claims that the virtues and gifts are distinct because the motions to which they correspond are distinct.

two proportions are distinct (gifts and virtues) because the two movers are distinct.¹⁹ The type of specification Aquinas has in mind is specification²⁰ by *terminus a quo*.²¹ In other words, Aquinas is distinguishing the gifts from the virtues on account of their active principles, their respective agents (reason and God). The key about the specification of motion by *terminus a quo* is that it, at least in the case of rational agents, is not complete without simultaneous specification by *terminus ad quem*.²² This is the case because motion involving a rational agent cannot be specified by agent specification, *terminus a quo*, since rational agents are not determined to one specific effect, as are univocal subrational causes. In other words, when one is trying to specify a motion emanating from a rational agent (as Aquinas is from God and the human person), specification by the agent alone is insufficient. One needs also know to what end the motion is directed. Put simply, since rational agents are underdetermined in relation to action it is the end

¹⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 276.

²⁰ *ST I-II* q. 54, a. 2, co.: “A habit is a certain form and a habit. Therefore the distinction of habits according to species is according to a common way by which the species of a form is distinguished or according to the proper way of distinguishing habits. Forms, accordingly, are distinguished by relation to distinct active principles since all agents make something like themselves according to species. Habits however import an order to something else. However, all things which are said according to an order with another are distinguished according to the distinguishing of those things to which they are ordered. However a habit is a certain disposition to two orders, to nature, and to a following operation.”

²¹ There are two fundamental ways to specify motion in Aquinas’s thought. See Joseph Pilsner, *The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 30ff.

²² See Pilsner, *The Specification*, 54: “Aquinas explains here a crucial difference in the specification of natural motions and human actions: the former can be specified by active principles while the latter cannot. An active principle in a natural motion such as heating is fixed to a single end, and thus it always produces an act of just the kind (or species) to which it is determined. Human agents, however, are different: nothing in a human action mirrors exactly the kind of active principle found in a natural motion....In the end, Thomas concludes that, since no principle in human action is determinative in the way an active principle is in a natural motion, the specification of human action must depend solely on its final cause, that is, its end.” I am assuming that the specification of the diverse types sources of motion in this article, God and reason, are not determined either. Hence, I claim that one must specify them by end, *terminus ad quem*, and not agent.

that has primacy in specifying motions. The two types of specification, agent and end, are complementary, such that one can use either in specification, but the other is automatically assumed.²³ Hence, since Aquinas is specifying by *terminus a quo* he need also assume a disparate *terminus ad quem* between the two movers, the two motions.²⁴ Put more strongly, it is necessary that Aquinas assume a specifically distinct end for the two types of motion for his argument to work. Specification by mover alone will not work if the same rational mover is in question (or even two distinct rational movers).

Nor would making the claim based on proximate mover solve the problem. In other words, one might be tempted to say that it is the proximate mover that is of principal concern in specifying habits by agent. The proximate mover of reason for the infused virtues and God for the gifts are distinct and thus the dispositions to these movers are distinct. This clarification does not help because both agents are still rational agents. The proposition still holds, one must have disparate ends to specify any action by a rational mover. How would the specification by proximate mover solve this problem if God via the gifts and reason enlightened by faith are moving toward the same supernatural end?

Given that the *terminus ad quos* of the virtues and gifts must be distinct, Aquinas must have in mind the natural and supernatural ends.²⁵ This also implies that Aquinas is attempting to

²³ Pilsner, *The Specification*, 39: “Although it might seem inappropriate to have two determinates for the same motion at the same time, Thomas is convinced that both principles are complementary, so that the same motion can easily be specified by one as by the other.”

²⁴ This is especially the case since motions are more named from their *terminus ad quem*. See *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 1, co.: “Motion is moreso named from its *terminus ad quem* than from the *terminus a quo*.”

²⁵ *ST II-II* q. 8, a. 1, ad 1-2.

distinguish the gifts from the acquired intellectual and moral virtues in article one, not the infused virtues. The argumentation would not work for the infused virtues for the reasons given above. The acquired virtues are the virtues by which humans live *secundum regulam rationis*. The acquired virtues provide the disposition to be moved by human reason.

In addition, objection three provides a verbal confirmation that *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 is concerned with the distinction between the acquired virtues and gifts.²⁶ There he says that it is by the acquired virtues, as distinct from the infused, that we live according to the rule of reason.²⁷ In the corpus, he says that the virtues are distinct from the gifts because the virtues make the human subject amenable to be moved by reason.²⁸ The occurrence of the term *secundum regulam rationem* in the third objection (explicitly concerning the acquired virtues) and the occurrence of reason in the corpus, give a strong indication that Aquinas is thinking about acquired virtue in the corpus as that by which we live according to unaided reason. Furthermore, Aquinas says clearly in the corpus that his argument is for the distinction between the gifts and the human virtues. In the treatise on habits, Aquinas often equates the human virtues with the acquired virtues and separates them from the theological virtues.²⁹

²⁶ See also *ST* I-II q. 69, a. 1, co.

²⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 3: “The definition of virtue given is according to the common mode of virtue. Whence if we wish to restrict the definition to virtues as distinct from the gifts, we would say that “that by which we live rightly” should be understood as the rectitude of life which is according to the rule of reason (*secundum regulam rationis*). Similarly however the gifts, inasmuch as they are distinct from infused virtue, are able to be called that which is given by God in the rank of his very motion; because they make man follow well his instinct.”

²⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.: “It is manifest that the human virtues perfect man inasmuch as it is natural for man to be moved by reason in those things exterior and interior.”

²⁹ *ST* I-II q. 58, a. 3, ad 3: “To the third it is said that faith, hope, and love are above the human virtues, for they are the virtues of man inasmuch as he is made a participator in divine grace.” *ST* I-II q. 61, a. 1, ad 2: “To the second it

If I am correct in the above analysis that both Aquinas's argumentation and the relation linking of the rule of reason to the acquired virtues, then Aquinas's reasoning seems to work.³⁰ The gifts and acquired virtues are distinct because they have disparate moving principles and terms.

On the same token, this immediately presents a problem. What of the theological virtues? What of the infused cardinal virtues? Are the gifts distinct from the theological virtues and infused cardinal? If the above argument is correct, then is it simply Thomistic bias which would still hold to the distinction? I do not think so. Clearly Aquinas thinks the gifts are distinct from the infused theological and cardinal virtues, as he says in the response to the second objection: "Similarly the gifts, *inasmuch as they are distinguished from infused virtue*, are able to be called those which are given by God in relation to his very motion; those which indeed make man follow his [God's] instinct well."³¹

Based on this quotation it seems like Aquinas is attempting to distinguish the gifts from the infused virtues by a similar reasoning as the acquired virtues. The gifts relate the subject to God's *instinctus* and the infused virtues relate to some other mover (what mover Aquinas does not say). Yet, as I argued above, this argument does not seem to work.³² The fundamental unity

is said that the theological virtues are above man, as was said above. Whence they are not properly called human virtues, but superhuman, or divine."

³⁰ If the above analysis is incorrect, then my argument for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues can provide corroborating evidence for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues.

³¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 3. Emphasis is mine.

³² In this I am following Ramirez. See Ramirez, *de Donis*, 116-117: "First indeed, because all the infused or supernatural virtues are had only from the divine instinct, inspiration, or infusion of the Holy Spirit."

of specification by *terminus a quo* requires that both the principle and the term be distinct. Yet the *terminus ad quem* of the infused virtues and the gifts are not distinct.³³ In addition, although Aquinas does say that the gifts are distinct from the infused virtues by their relation to God's motion, he does not say that the infused virtues are related to any other mover. How are the gifts and the infused virtues to be distinguished then?

It is my contention that Aquinas's thought on grace can fill this lacuna and provide a strong argument for his clear position that the gifts and the supernatural virtues are distinct (as well as make sense of his response to the first objection).³⁴ Yet, this is only by attending to data outside *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1; there are intimations of the necessary argumentation in the rest of q. 68, but the full picture requires data from Aquinas's thought on grace.³⁵ More specifically, one must begin with *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3. In this article, Thomas claims that habitual grace is an accidental form infused into the essence of the believer³⁶ which in turn flows into the powers.³⁷

³³ This is the case if *terminus ad quem* means either object or end. The gifts and infused virtues share material objects and an end supplied by charity. Could *terminus ad quem* be the formal object? It seems possible, but Aquinas does not go this direction. Nor does the argument based on formal object work. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 117.

³⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 117: "Therefore, the explanation of St. Thomas, according to the original way proposed is not according to the thing. It shows that the way of the teacher is not sufficient to prove a real and essential distinction between the gifts and virtues."

³⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8.

³⁶ *ST* I-II q. 112, a. 4, ad 3.

³⁷ *ST* I-II q. 112, a. 1, co.; *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.: "So the very light of grace, which is a participation in the divine nature, is something other than the infused virtues which are derived from that light and ordained to that light." See also the commentary of Del Prado, for an additional argument. Del Prado, *de Gratia*, 168-169: "On the part of God all things are one: cognition, love, and nature, since the perfection of the divine goodness is found in simplicity; since God is truly in the highest way and in every way simple, he alone is goodness through his essence. Thus none of the perfections of being are able to be lacking in him, since he is *esse subsistens*. In the same way he is infinite in his goodness and perfection. Yet on our part, just as the powers of the intellect and will are really distinguished from

All the supernatural principles perfecting activity flow from the new participation in the divine nature in an orderly fashion.³⁸

Detailing the order in which the infused virtues flow from their graced root will be the (partial) concern of chapter three, but for now it is important to note that each type of virtue is the principle of another type of virtue. In other words, the virtues do not all immediately flow from grace.³⁹ “For the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the principles of the intellectual and moral virtues, as was said above. But the theological virtues are the principles of the gifts, as was shown above.”⁴⁰ Indeed, the theological virtues flow first from grace,⁴¹ then the gifts as the

the nature of the soul, so it is necessary to say that the ways through which the intellect and will participate in the nature of God are different from the way the soul participates by nature.”

³⁸ I say this not only because Aquinas has a particular position on the orderly flowing of the virtues from their graced root, but also as an application of a more general principle. The supernatural order is not less orderly than the natural. Both flow from divine wisdom. See *ST* II-II q. 26, a. 6, co.: “for the appetites of charity, which are the inclination of grace, are not less ordered than the natural appetites, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations come from the divine wisdom.”

³⁹ *ST* I q. 77, a. 4, co.: “However since order proceeds from one to many, it is necessary that among the powers of the soul there be order.” What is important here is not Aquinas’s affirmation that the powers of the soul flow from it in a certain order, but rather the general principle he cites. See also *ST* I q. 77, a. 6, ad 1-3: “The emanation of a proper accident from a subject is not through another transmutation but through a certain natural resulting, just as *aliquid* naturally results from *unum*, just as from light results color.” Finally, see *ST* I q. 77, a. 7, co.: “The agent and the end are more perfect, however taking the principle inasmuch as it is receptive, it is less perfect. Consequently it follows that those powers which are prior according to perfection and nature are the principles of the others through the mode of the end and active principle.”

⁴⁰ *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4: “For the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the principles of the intellectual and moral virtues, just as was said above. But the theological virtues are principles of the gifts, as was held above.”

⁴¹ For the theological virtues conceived as supernatural dispositions or inclinations see *ST* I-II q. 62, a. 3, co.: “The theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end.” St. Thomas conceives the theological virtues this way because “grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine Wisdom.” See *ST* II-II q. 31, a. 3, co. For an attempt to use this principle to systematically outline the ethical life of man see Rziha, *Human Participation in the Eternal Law*, 283.

effects of the theological virtues,⁴² and finally the intellectual and moral virtues from the gifts.⁴³

What does this have to do with the distinction between the gifts and the other supernatural virtues?

My argument for the distinction between the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit based on the immanent and formal order of the supernatural habits and has two parts. The first part argues that the gifts of the Holy Spirit (or a comparable principle proportioning the believer to God as efficient cause) must be included the those principles caused by habitual grace. The second part contends that the gifts of the Holy Spirit should be included in the unfolding causality of habitual grace after the theological virtues and before the infused cardinal virtues.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit must be included in the emanation from habitual grace. The theological virtues do not provide the disposition to be efficiently moved by God supernaturally.⁴⁴ They proportion the believer to God as final cause, but not as efficient cause. This is why Aquinas can say in his response to the third objection of q. 68, a. 1, that the gifts are distinguished from the infused virtues by their relation to God's motion. In this article, Aquinas has efficient motion in mind, not final. Hence, the theological virtues require another principle to

⁴² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 4, ad 3: "The soul of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it is in some way united to him, just as an instrument is not moved by the artisan unless through contact or through a certain union. However the first union [with God] is through faith, hope, and love. Whence those virtues are presupposed to the gifts, just as the roots of certain gifts. Thus all the gifts pertain to those three virtues, just as certain derivations of them."

⁴³ *ST I-II* q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

⁴⁴ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co. Alternatively, one might say that though they do provide a type of disposition to be moved by God in an efficient and supernatural way, since they are imperfectly possessed by the subject they require another habit (the gifts) to act out of this disposition.

move them to act.⁴⁵ Likewise, this principle must be an interior principle if the exterior motion is to avoid violence. In addition, given that these principles are ordered to the perfection of habitual grace, they should flow from habitual grace. In other words, it seems necessary to include a principle proportioning/disposing the believer to God as an efficient cause which flows from habitual grace. Aquinas conceives these necessary principles as the gifts.

Furthermore, the gifts must come posterior to the theological virtues and prior to the infused cardinal virtues. The final cause is the first of all causes. The theological virtues flow from habitual grace as supernatural inclinations.⁴⁶ Hence, the theological virtues as the proportion to God as final cause are first. Yet the theological cannot give rise to activity toward that end unless they are moved by God's efficient motion. After the final cause the efficient cause comes second. Thus, it would seem that the disposition to the efficient cause, the gifts, would come second as well. The infused cardinal virtues are thus left in the third spot. Hence, the order in which the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace is theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues. Indeed, this is the exact order Aquinas identifies in *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

Given this order one can use Aquinas's thought on grace to argue for the real distinction between the gifts and all the other supernatural virtues. A principle and its effect must be distinct, since a thing cannot be the principle of itself.⁴⁷ This is so because a principle is, simply put, a

⁴⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

⁴⁶ *ST* I-II q. 62, a. 3, co.

⁴⁷ *ST* I q. 33, a. 1. For one of Aquinas's best expositions of this principle, which he held throughout his whole life, see *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4. For more on the fourth chapter of *de Ente* see John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 404ff.

very broad term denoting anything from which another comes.⁴⁸ A principle and that which proceeds from it are distinct in all cases, even when they do not admit a diversity of substance, a difference of perfection, or variance of power.⁴⁹ In other words, even when the principle and that which proceeds have to be identified in the strongest sense (identity of nature), they are still distinct (by subsistent relations) inasmuch as one is a principle of the other (the Father and the Son). If the real diversity of principle and that which proceeds is true even in the Trinitarian case, then it is certainly true in the case of finite principles.

Now according to Aquinas, habitual grace is the fundamental principle of all supernatural characteristics. From habitual grace first flows the theological virtues, which are the principles of the gifts; the gifts are, in turn, the principles of the infused cardinal virtues.⁵⁰ Hence, the theological virtues, infused cardinal virtues, the gifts, and grace are distinct since a principle and that which proceeds are distinct in all cases. This argument applies to all of the gifts, theological virtues, and infused cardinal virtues. It does not assume a debatable interpretation involving the modes of human action. It does not assume imperfection in any set of the virtues which is not simultaneously shared by the gifts. In short, it avoids all the problems Ramirez identifies with

⁴⁸ *ST I* q. 33, a. 1, co.: “The name principle signifies nothing other than that from which something else proceeds.”

⁴⁹ *ST I* q. 33, a. 1, co. This is so in the case of the Trinity. Nevertheless, among the virtues, Aquinas admits a difference of excellence, and a diversity of substance. See *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 8, co. Hence, the virtues are much more so causes of each other in a stronger sense. Yet all causes are principles, so the word still holds.

⁵⁰ In this St. Thomas is following the way powers of the soul flow from one another (i.e. how one accident can be the cause of another). See *ST I* q. 77, a. 7, co.

Aquinas's argumentation and the typical argumentation of the Thomistic Commentators (more on this in chapter IV).⁵¹

If the above analyses and arguments are correct, then it is only by attending to data outside of *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, that a true argument can be formulated for the distinction between the gifts and the supernatural virtues. In this regard, Aquinas's thought on grace can aid in the formulation of a universal and essential proof that the gifts are distinct from the virtues.

Aquinas's argument based on movers and motions proves the distinction between the gifts and the acquired virtues. The argument based on the order of the supernatural life proves the distinction of the gifts from the theological virtues and the infused cardinal virtues.

II. Grace and the Instinctus of the Gifts

In Aquinas's thought on the gifts, he claims that they make the believer proportionate to the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti*. This, at least, is very clear. What is less clear is what Aquinas means by *instinctus* or *instinctus Spiritus Sancti*. According to Edward O'Connor, Aquinas chose the concept *instinctus* "in order not to specify in any way whatsoever the nature of the Holy Spirit's action."⁵² In other words, Aquinas adopted the term *instinctus* to say nothing more than the Holy Spirit is involved. God moves us. I do not think this is true, or rather, if it is true it does not have to be the end of the discussion. Aquinas writes about the same thing under different names. This is also true for the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the very reality about which Aquinas is speaking when he uses the term *auxilium* (as motion

⁵¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 102-117.

⁵² O'Connor, 132.

post-justification) in his thought on grace.⁵³ This gives the interpreter a lot more data about the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti*. In order to make this argument (which at this point should seem a wild assertion), this section will first outline Aquinas's uses of the term *instinctus* in order to gain broader traction for why Aquinas uses this term when he is speaking of the gifts. In this purpose I aim to complement the historical studies for why Aquinas uses the term *instinctus* with fitting systematic reasons.⁵⁴ Next, this section argues that the *instinctus* of the gifts is identical to the *auxilium* as motion spoken of in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, the necessary *auxilium* to do good and avoid sin post-justification. Finally, and based on the previous section, I outline the implications of this identification for understanding the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti*, in particular that it is operative and cooperative.

IIa. Aquinas's uses of the term *Instinctus*

As with many concepts in Aquinas, *instinctus* is used analogously.⁵⁵ At base, as O'Connor notes, *instinctus* simply means an *impetus ad opus*.⁵⁶ It is simply that which elicits a

⁵³ *ST* I-II q. 113, a. 1, co.: "...justice means a certain rectitude of order in the the interior disposition of man, insofar as what is supreme in man is subordinate (*subditus*) to God and the inferior powers of the soul are subordinate to the supreme power (reason)."

⁵⁴ For the historical reasons behind this term see O'Connor, 132-134; Farrell, *The Gifts*, 33ff & 164ff; Thomas Deman, "Le "Liber de Bona Fortuna" dans la Theologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *In des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 17 (1928): 38-58.

⁵⁵ Reinhard Hütter, "Attending to the Wisdom of God – From Effect to Cause, from Creation to God: A Relecture of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas," in Thomas Joseph White, ed., *The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or Wisdom of God?* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011): 209-245, 214: "There is simply no instance in Thomas's work where analogy is not tacitly presupposed or being treated without being named or simply being silently at work in the exercise of *sacra doctrina* itself."

⁵⁶ O'Connor, 135f.

vital act from a being. Thomas nowhere analyzes its meaning further.⁵⁷ As such, the term is impossibly general and could indicate almost any cause, direct or indirect.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, further specificity of Aquinas's thought is possible. He uses the term in certain contexts with a more definite meaning. This definite meaning reveals more clearly what Aquinas means when he uses the term *instinctus* for his thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In order to outline this, I first give an outline of the major applications in Aquinas's mature corpus of the term *instinctus*. After that I argue that Aquinas utilizes the term *instinctus* in relation to the gifts of the Holy Spirit because of an affinity between the way the Holy Spirit moves a believer and the other 'impulses' which Aquinas calls *instinctus*.

The following division outlines the major contexts and applications of *instinctus*. I will treat each in turn and then use the gathered data to revisit *instinctus* as it operates in the gifts.

- i. Natural
 - 1. Animal
 - 2. Human
 - a. Volitional
 - b. Intellectual
 - c. Sub-rational
- ii. Supernatural
 - 1. Instinct of faith
 - 2. Instinct of the Holy Spirit/motion of God

⁵⁷ Robert Greene, "The Instinct of Nature: Natural Law, Synderesis, and the Moral Sense," *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1997): 173-198. See page 182, fnt. 24: "*Instinctus* is 'an extremely important word in St. Thomas's vocabulary, though he nowhere analyses its meaning... [it] articulates in his thinking the significance of the pre-conceptual (by no means merely biological) element in human nature.'"

⁵⁸ Greene, "The Instinct of Nature," 132.

The primary and most fundamental context in which Aquinas utilizes the concept *instinctus* is in reference to animals.⁵⁹ Aquinas posits the existence of an instinct in animals to account for animal actions which seek the unpleasant sense object, avoid the pleasant, and do not seek the pleasant.⁶⁰ In other words, given the responses of their passions and interior senses alone, why would this happen?⁶¹ There must be *impetus ad opus* (instinct) which is not simply the concupisibile appetites, irascible appetites, or senses (exterior or interior). In this case Aquinas claims that this impetus is a type of particular judgment,⁶² the product of the estimative power.⁶³ The estimative power provides the impetus to action in animals. It explains why animals make judgments which are contrary to their sense data, but actually beneficial to the organism.

In general, animal *instinctus* is species specific, universal throughout that species, and prior/apart from learning.⁶⁴ “Activities which have these three characteristics are called

⁵⁹ Greene, “The Instinct of Nature,” 137.

⁶⁰ George Klubertanz, S. J., *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), 134.

⁶¹ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 134: “Now, as we have seen in general, and we will see in greater detail later on, appetite is moved to act only by knowledge. But the knowledge of things that is given by the external senses cannot account for these cases, as we have seen. Consequently, imagination cannot account for them either, since it can do no more than reproduce sense experience or its elements combined or separated. The only other sensory power of knowledge which we have discussed so far, the unifying sense, is likewise unable to perform the necessary task, since it deals directly, not with sensible objects, but with sensations themselves.”

⁶² O’Connor, 137: “By it [instinct] they judge what is good or bad for them.”

⁶³ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 138: “This power is called the estimative power (because by it the animal estimates an object or situation as good or harmful)”; See also Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp, *Sinne, Gegenstände und Sensibilia: zur Wahrnehmungslehre des Thomas von Aquin* (Leiden: Brill, 1999); Ibid., “Vis Aestimativa and Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences,” *The Thomist* 76 (2012): 611-40; Leo White, “Instinct and Custom,” *The Thomist* 66 (2002): 577-605.

⁶⁴ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 135.

instinctive.”⁶⁵ In particular, *instinctus* as it functions in animals includes three major elements: the individual object being sensed, an imagined conjunction with something that is good or bad for the perceiver, and the imagined self-movement through which the perceiver acts with the object and achieves or avoids the union.⁶⁶ In other words, animals perceive in a holistic way, that is they see themselves, their action, and the object in a relation of contrariety or fittingness.⁶⁷ Put more precisely, the estimative power’s proper object is “the sensible object as good or harmful (*conveniens et nocivum*)”⁶⁸. In short, “the estimative power must be a power that is innately determined to recognize some object-subject groupings as in harmony (as containing the relation of good), and certain others as in conflict (as containing the relation of evil).”⁶⁹ What supplies this drive, this impulsion, toward one judgment and not another? Considered as agents it is the estimative sense directly and remotely, God.⁷⁰ God is responsible for the instincts, the drives, of animals by creating them and moving them to act according to their natures to their natural end, being a flourishing instance of that particular type of animal.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 135.

⁶⁶ White, “Instinct and Custom,” 586.

⁶⁷ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 137.

⁶⁸ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 138.

⁶⁹ Klubertanz, *The Philosophy*, 138.

⁷⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia*, ed. Pession, P. (Marietti, 1965), q. 3, a. 7, co. Considering the power by which the animal acts God is the more immediate cause.

⁷¹ *ST I-II* q. 105, a. 3.

In addition, animals' instincts operate in the absence of freedom.⁷² Animal actions are intentional (seek an end), but not free. Put differently, animals do not know the end *qua* end but rather move through each situation and judge based on the fittingness or contrariety of the circumstances vis-à-vis their nature.⁷³ They seek ends which are instinctual too them, and their judgment of the particular means is also instinctual. When a new situation is met based on the previous judgment of the estimative sense, the *instinctus*, the judgment is made contextually here as well based on the new situation and its new relation to the subject. In sum, animal *instinctus* is the impetus of the estimative power driving animals to judge the particulars as good or evil, fitting or contrary to its nature.

Humans, being rational animals, also have a type of *instinctus* akin to animals.⁷⁴ Yet unlike the animal *instinctus*, it is “(a) specific only in being a vague and indeterminate sort of thing: (b) it is very complex and variable, and (c) it is essentially tied in with experience and rational control.”⁷⁵ Although human instinctive activity (like animals) is considered prior to learning, this is nugatory. The generality and vagueness of this *instinctus* is filled in by both personal reason/experience, but also (and more commonly) communal reason and experience (which we begin to learn almost immediately upon birth, even before our power of reason is

⁷² For a good account of animal instinct see Herbert McCabe, *On Aquinas*, ed. by Brian Davies (New York: Burns & Oates, 2008). *ST* II-II q. 95, a. 7, co.: “The cause of brute animals’ acts is instinct by which they are moved in the way of nature, for they do not have lordship over their acts.” See also Greene, 182.

⁷³ Rebecca Konyndyk Deyoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, *Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context* (South Bend: Notre Dame Press, 2009), 115ff. *ST* I q. 83, a. 1, co.; q. 22, a. 2, ad 4; q. 103, a. 1, ad 3; *ST* I-II q. 1, a. 2, co.; Klubertanz, 139.

⁷⁴ Klubertanz, 143.

⁷⁵ Klubertanz, 143.

active).⁷⁶ In short, human instincts are subordinate to practical reason. Hence, one cannot sufficiently separate the instinct of the sensitive power and the instinct of reason.⁷⁷ This is why Aquinas renames the estimative power in humans as the cogitative power or particular reason.⁷⁸ Indeed, Aquinas only gives one example of the sensitive instinct's operation in humans, suckling at the breast.⁷⁹

Aquinas also uses the term *instinctus* to refer to higher impulses in humans.⁸⁰ These roughly correspond to the principle by which a faculty is initially activated. "What first moves the will and the intellect is something above the will and the intellect, namely God."⁸¹ God first

⁷⁶ White, 599-600: "Experience, an act of the cogitative power, is the discovery of what is suitable or unsuitable that takes place after comparing various individuals that one has perceived in the past." See also Mark Barker, "Experience and Experimentation: the Meaning of *Experimentum* in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 76 (2012): 37-71.

⁷⁷ *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4 & q. 81, a. 3; Thomas Flynn, "The Cogitative Power," *The Thomist* 16.4 (1953): 542-563. See 556; White, 580.

⁷⁸ Mark Barker, "Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions: Nature and Classification," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 52.2 (June 2012): 199-226; For the role of the cogitative power in practical reasoning see White, 581, fn. 12: "Aquinas assigns a cardinal role to the *vis cogitativa* in each of the phases of practical reasoning. This role is apparent even before deliberation, for prior to that one must first apprehend that a concrete end is suitable under the present circumstances (see n. 1). In the same spirit, he assigns a key role to the *vis cogitativa* in *eubulia*, the virtue that perfects the inquiry into the suitability of each means. Aquinas ties *eubulia*, the virtue that perfects counsel, to the discursive nature of the cogitative power in VI Eth., c. 9 (47.2:368). The *vis cogitativa* is indispensable to counsel or deliberation, says Aquinas, because of that power's ability to compare the particular variables (VI Eth., c. 1 [47.2:334]). Likewise, the cogitative power is central to synesis, the virtue that perfects the choice of one means over the others: VI Eth., c. 9 (47.2:368). Practical reasoning comes to completion with command, which is perfected by *prudentia*. The cogitative sense plays a central role in this virtue as well; in fact, he states that it is the secondary subject of prudence, while universal reason is the primary (*ST* II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 3 [8:351])."

⁷⁹ *II Sent.*, d. 20, q. 20, a. 2, ad 5.

⁸⁰ Greene, 183 : "There are a very few occasions, however, where Thomas does take the use of *instinctus naturae* to refer to human behavior, sometimes in the context of speaking about the natural law."

⁸¹ Thomas, Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, vol. 23, *S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M.* (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1982), q. 6, co.: "*id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum, sit aliquid supra voluntatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus.*"

moves the intellect (which is responsible for specification)⁸² by knowledge of first principles (held by the habit of *synderesis*).⁸³ Their knowledge does not arise from learning or discursive activity, but from the instinct of reason, from the natural instinct.⁸⁴ This is the sense of *instinctus* Aquinas means when he says that the instinct of reason gives rise to the natural law.⁸⁵ The intention of Aquinas in claiming that the instinct of reason is the source of natural law and the activity of the intellect is that that which impels man to reason (and that by which he holds the primary precepts of the natural law) are prior to learning.⁸⁶ One does not learn to seek good and avoid evil in the most basic sense. It flows from the nature of reason itself. Since reason is moved (impelled, i.e. *instinctus*) to hold the first principles of practical reason naturally and act on the basis of them it is called an instinct. In sum, the instinct of reason impels and moves humans to their natural end based on *synderesis* and the primary precepts of natural law.

Aquinas also posits a natural *instinctus* in the will of humans. “It is necessary to hold that in the first movement of the will, the will proceeds from the *instinctus* of some exterior mover.”⁸⁷ In Aquinas’s early works, he terminates the mutual causality of the intellect in the will in the

⁸² Michael Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), ch. 3.

⁸³ Sherwin, 98.

⁸⁴ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: “*instinctus rationis*,” See also Thomas Aquinas, *Questiones Disputatae De Veritate*, ed. Marc, P., Pera, C., and Caramello, P., vol. 22.1–3, *S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M.* (Rome: *Commissio Leonina*, 1882), q. 24, a. 10, co.

⁸⁵ *ST I-II* q. 100, a. 1, ad 2: “The ceremonial and judicial precepts are determinative of the decalogue by the power of instintion and not by the power of natural instinct, just as the power of the moral are superadded.” Greene, 183.

⁸⁶ *ST I* q. 60, a. 2, co.

⁸⁷ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 4, co.

intellect. Nevertheless, in his later works he terminates it in a motion from outside, an impulse to its first act, an *instinctus*. This *instinctus* moves the will to the good in general. In other words, it begins our volitional life by moving the will to its proper object, the good. It does not move to any goods in particular, like grace, but leaves the will indeterminate with reference to all particular goods.⁸⁸ Without this motion to the good in general, which is necessarily loved by the will,⁸⁹ the will would not will anything at all.⁹⁰ Yet on the basis of this motion to the good in general, the will can move itself to the willing of the means to this end.⁹¹

On the supernatural level, Aquinas also posits a supernatural instinct, a supernatural impulse, to begin the life of faith⁹² called the *instinctus fidei* in the secondary literature.⁹³ This also comes from a development in Aquinas's doctrine, just like the *instinctus* to begin the volitional life. In his earlier works, Aquinas held that a previous judgment of the intellect was

⁸⁸ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: "God moves the will of man just as a universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man is not able to will anything. But man through his reason determines himself to will this or that which is a true or an apparent good. But nevertheless, sometimes God moves someone to some determinate good specifically, just as in those whom he moves by grace, as will be said below."

⁸⁹ *ST I-II* q. 82, a. 2, co. & ad 2: "The mover now causes motion from necessity in the moved when the power of the mover exceeds the moved so that the moved's whole potency is subject to the mover. Since, however, the possibility of the will is with respect to the universal and perfect good, its potency is not entirely subject to any particular good. And for this reason it is not moved of necessity by another."

⁹⁰ One can see here a parallel to Aquinas's thought on operative and cooperative grace. God operatively moves to the end and on the basis of that motion the will cooperatively moves itself to the means. It seems here there is also an operative motion on the natural level where the mind is *motus et non movens*.

⁹¹ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6, co.

⁹² *ST II-II* q. 2, a. 9.

⁹³ Max Seckler, *Instinkt und Glaubenswille nach Thomas von Aquin* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1961); Edward Schillebeeckx, "L'instinct de la foi selon S Thomas d'Aquin." *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 48.3 (1964): 377-408.

sufficient to move one to have faith.⁹⁴ Certainly the data was not sufficient to move the intellect absolutely, but the judgment of the intellect sufficed to move one to faith.⁹⁵ In his later life Aquinas changed his opinion, especially after the discovery of Augustine's later works (*de Praedestinatione Sanctorum et de Dono Perseverentiae*).⁹⁶ These works, as well as his contact with the *Liber de Bona Fortuna*,⁹⁷ moved Aquinas to posit a principle moving the will to cause the intellect's assent in faith. The judgment of the intellect is insufficient as well as the outer data (preaching, miracles, etc.). God must give an *instinctus* to the will to move the intellect to faith.⁹⁸

The second supernatural application of *instinctus* is tied to the gifts. This context is Aquinas's final application of the concept of *instinctus*; *instinctus* here is that to which the gifts make the believer proportionate.⁹⁹ The gifts dispose the believer to be moved by the *instinctus* of God.¹⁰⁰ Aquinas places the *instinctus* at the very heart and summit of the moral life.¹⁰¹ In short, the gifts dispose the believer to be moved by the "divine *instinctus*."¹⁰² This sense of *instinctus*

⁹⁴ III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; Sherwin, 136ff.

⁹⁵ III *Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2.

⁹⁶ Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce*, 92-134; Seckler, 90-132.

⁹⁷ Thomas Deman, "Le 'Liber de Bona Fortuna'"; C. Fabro, "Le 'Liber de bona fortuna' de l' 'Ethique a Eudeme' d'Aristote et la dialectique de la divine Providence chez saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 88.4 (1988): 556-572; Horst, *Die Gaben*, 71-79; O'Connor, "Appendix 6: St. Thomas' use of the 'De Bona Fortuna'," 142-147.

⁹⁸ Sherwin, 139-146.

⁹⁹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

¹⁰⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹⁰¹ Servais Pinckaers, O.P., "L'instinct et l'Esprit au cœur de l'éthique chrétienne." In *Novitas et veritas vitae* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1991), 213-23.

¹⁰² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.: "*instinctum divinum*"

Aquinas often calls *motio*.¹⁰³ Why then use the concept of *instinctus* at all? What does this application have in common with the others?

I think the key lies in Aquinas's *Commentary on the Romans*. The text bears quoting in full:

But since those who are led do not act from themselves the spiritual man is not only instructed by the Holy Spirit on what he ought to do but his heart also is moved by the Holy Spirit, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the saying "whosoever are led by the Spirit of God." For those are said to be led, who are moved by a certain higher instinct. Thus we say about animals that they do not act, but are acted upon, because they are move by nature to their actions and not their own motion. Similarly, a spiritual man is not inclined, principally speaking, to a certain act from the motion proper to his will, but from the instinct of the Holy Spirit, according to Is 59:19: "He will come like a rushing stream, which the wind of the Lord drives." And Luke 4:1: "Christ was driven by the Spirit into the desert." However this does not exclude the fact that the spiritual man acts through will and free decision, because the very motion of the will and free decision is caused in him by the Holy Spirit, according to Phil 2:13: "God is at work in you both to will and to work."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ For example, see *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co: "The very motion of reason does not suffice unless it is given also the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit" and "because nobody is able to come to the inheritance of that blessed land unless he is moved and led by the Holy Spirit." the Cf. also in *Super Gal.*, I, 15, lect. 4, n. 42: "a certain interior instinct by means of which God touches man's heart through grace so that he will turn to him. He thus calls us from the bad road to the good, and this through grace, not through our merits." In *Super Rom.*, VIII, 30, lect. 6, n. 707: "This interior vocation is nothing other than a certain instinct of mind by which man's heart is moved by God to adhere to the faith or to virtue.... This interior call is necessary, because our heart could not turn itself to God, if God himself had not attracted us." On the Divine instinct see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master*, 206-211 & Pinckaers, *The Pinckaers Reader*, 385-395.

¹⁰⁴ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635: "*Sed quia ille qui ducitur, ex seipso non operatur, homo autem spiritualis non tantum instruitur a spiritu sancto quid agere debeat, sed etiam cor eius a spiritu sancto movetur, ideo plus intelligendum est in hoc, quod dicitur quicumque spiritu Dei aguntur. Illa enim agi dicuntur, quae quodam superiori instinctu moventur. Unde de brutis dicimus quod non agunt sed aguntur, quia a natura moventur et non ex proprio motu ad suas actiones agendas. Similiter autem homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter sed ex instinctu spiritus sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum, secundum illud Is. LIX, 19: cum venerit quasi fluvius violentus quem spiritus Dei cogit; et Lc. IV, 1, quod Christus agebatur a spiritu in deserto. Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spirituales per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum voluntatis et liberi arbitrii spiritus sanctus in eis causat, secundum illud Phil. II, 13: Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere.*"

Aquinas here likens the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit to the *instinctus* as it operates in sub-rational animals. This is key for understanding why Aquinas uses the concept *instinctus* in his doctrine of the gifts. This is so for three reasons.

First, *instinctus* (in the case of animals and the gifts) comes from another agent (be it imbedded in nature or not). Animals' judgments come from their nature, not from their own self-motion. Similarly those led by the gifts receive a motion from without and are not moved primarily by their own self-motion. They are primarily moved by God (who causes their self-motion).¹⁰⁵ The fact of movement from another makes the parallel fitting, both animals and those moved by the gifts receive a motion which does not primarily originate from within.

Second, *instinctus* is not only fitting because it denotes motion primarily originating from without, but also because it denotes a type of judgment concerning particulars.¹⁰⁶ In short, the holistic way animal instincts judge is key for understanding how the instinct of the gifts operates and why Aquinas utilizes this term. *Instinctus* as it operates in sub-rational animals not only denotes a motion apart from self-motion (which the other senses of *instinctus* also carry) but also a type of judgment of fittingness between the object and the subject. Transposed onto the gifts, each gift makes the human connatural¹⁰⁷ with God's *instinctus*,¹⁰⁸ God's way of understanding,

¹⁰⁵ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635.

¹⁰⁶ White, 596ff; *ST II-II*, q. 47, a. 3, ad 3; *ST II-II*, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3; VI Eth., c. 7; Gilles Emery, "The Holy Spirit in Aquinas's Commentary on Romans" in *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas*, eds. Dauphinais & Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012).

¹⁰⁷ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 1 nn. 613-616 & l. 3, n. 635.

¹⁰⁸ Aquinas often calls the impulse for the gifts the divine instinct (*instinctus divinus*). See *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1 & 2.

knowing, judging, etc. that particular truth or deed.¹⁰⁹ Justification is fulfilled not only by being in Christ, but also by following the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.¹¹⁰ Those who do this have “a right sense in spiritual matters.”¹¹¹

Third, Aquinas utilizes the concept of *instinctus* to emphasize that we are united to God as to one unknown.¹¹² As such, the pursuit of this end (God himself) begins to appear much more akin to the way animals pursue their connatural good. Animals, because they lack the power of reason, pursue goods/ends as unknown.¹¹³ Believers also pursue God as one unknown. Certainly, as Aquinas says above, this does not bias human freedom. Humans still pursue God as an end, understand the concept of an end, understand the relation of means to that end, and direct themselves there (in a way subordinate to God’s motion).¹¹⁴ They are still free. It is knowledge of the end *qua* end and self-direction that make one free, not knowledge of the essence of the

¹⁰⁹ *Super Rom.*, IV, l. 2, n. 329.

¹¹⁰ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 1, n. 613.

¹¹¹ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 1, n. 616.

¹¹² Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum*, ed. Mandonnet, P. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929-1947), IV SS d. 4, q. 49, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 3; See also Gregory Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay between Positive and Negative Theology* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 56ff.

¹¹³ *DV* q. 15, a. 1, co.: “Brute [animals] are not said to have any reason, however they partake in a certain prudence, but this is in them according to a certain natural estimation.”

¹¹⁴ *ST I* q. 83, a. 1, co.; *ST I-II* q. 11, a. 2, co.: “But the cognition of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. The perfect is not only understanding that which is an end and good, but the universal concept of an end and good. And such cognition is only in a rational nature. Imperfect, however, is understanding a particular end and good, and such understanding can be in brute animals. The appetitive powers are not commanding freely but are moved according to a natural instinct to those things which are apprehended. Thus fruition is fitting to the rational nature in its fullness, but to brute animals according to its imperfection, and to other creatures in no way.”

end.¹¹⁵ Believers pursue God knowingly and freely, but they do not know what God is.¹¹⁶ Put more precisely, the believer pursues God under the formality of end but does not know the essence of that end. The believer freely pursues the unknown God whom he loves.

For these three reasons, Aquinas uses the term *instinctus* to name that activating cause of the gifts. It is an impetus from without, as with all *instinctus*. It concerns the judgment of particulars, as with *instinctus* as it operates in animals and the sub-rational elements of human nature. It moves toward the unknown, as *instinctus* does in animals. Nevertheless, these convergences do not explain what the *instinctus* of the gifts is or how it fits into Aquinas's larger theological picture. Are there any other places in Aquinas's mature corpus which would give further information about the being and operation of the *instinctus* of the gifts? It is the contention of the next section that there is, and it is Aquinas's thought on grace that provides them.

IIb. The *Instinctus Spiritus Sancti* and Grace as *Motus*

The last section attempted to answer why it is fitting that Aquinas uses the concept *instinctus* in his doctrine of the gifts. This section aims to garner further data about this *instinctus* of the gifts by arguing that the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti* is identical with *auxilium* (taken as motion post-justification or post-conversion).¹¹⁷ In order to make this argument, I distinguish the

¹¹⁵ *ST I* q. 83, a. 1-3.

¹¹⁶ *ST I* q. 12, a. 4, co. See also Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, ch. XIII.

¹¹⁷ Justification is the infusion of habitual grace, which is instantaneous. See *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 7. The reason the gifts are not necessary for all supernatural motion producing the disposition to habitual grace, conversion, and justification is not cooperative in the strict sense. The gifts are required that we cooperate with God's motion, that it be connatural. See *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6, co.; *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 7, co.; *ST I-II* q. 112, a. 2, ad 1 & ad 3. The potency to

two senses of *instinctus* tied to the gifts and argue that the primary sense of *instinctus* is a supernatural motion. Then I distinguish different senses of *auxilium* and the precise sense in which I claim *auxilium* is identical with the *instinctus* of the gifts. After that, I argue based on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* and mature biblical commentaries that the *instinctus* of the gifts is identical with *auxilium* taken as post-justification graced motion. If this argument is successful, then Aquinas's thought on *auxilium* as motion can be applied to the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti*.

In Aquinas's thought on the gifts, *instinctus* denotes that to which the gifts make the believer proportionate, that for which they dispose.¹¹⁸ The *instinctus* of the gifts cannot be the gift itself or any activity which follows from the gift. The gift cannot make the believer proportionate to itself. Such an account would be wholly circular and subject to infinite regress. The *instinctus* of the gifts must be something apart from the gifts, something which impels them (and thus the theological virtues also)¹¹⁹ to action,¹²⁰ akin to the way reason puts the human virtues into action.¹²¹ Sorting out the relative priorities between the *instinctus*, gifts, and

habitual grace or any preparation by actual grace for habitual grace is not what Aquinas means by conversion. When Aquinas uses the terms imperfect and perfect conversion he is talking about justification, since both include acts of charity and merit. See *ST I-II* q. 117, a. 10 co. The preparation for habitual grace is God producing the good will (*ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6, co.; *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, co.). The preparation of the human subject by God culminates in the *instinctus fidei* but moreso in an efficacious act of the love of God above all things as object of supernatural happiness.

¹¹⁸ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 3: "Similarly however, the gifts, as they are distinguished from infused virtue, are said to be those things which are given by God in relation to his very motion since they make man follow his instinct well." See also *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co. & ad 3; a. 3, co.: "The gifts are certain perfections of man by which he is disposed to follow well the instinct of the Holy Spirit;" *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 5, ad 1.

¹¹⁹ As will be recalled, the theological virtues cannot be used without the motion from the gifts. That is Aquinas's argument in *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹²⁰ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.

¹²¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 3, co.: "In this way, the gifts of the Holy Spirit relate man to the Holy Spirit as the moral virtues relate the appetitive faculty to reason. However, the moral virtues are certain habits by which the appetitive powers

theological virtues will be the (partial) topic for the next chapter. What is important to note now is that Aquinas immediately identifies that to which the gifts make the believer proportionate as the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit/the motion of the Holy Spirit,¹²² the *instinctus* of God himself.¹²³

Yet none of this answers the question. What is the *instinctus* of the gifts? To what do the gifts make the believer proportionate? For what do the gifts dispose? Put another way, how does God's impulse/*instinctus* appear in the concrete? The answer is two-fold: the command of charity and that which moves the believer on the supernatural level, that is *auxilium* as motion (actual grace).¹²⁴ Aquinas moves between the identification of *instinctus* with the act of charity and the motion of the Holy Spirit freely, since both are necessary for each act of the gifts. In other words, the *instinctus* of the gifts is not either the command of charity or a supernatural motion, but necessarily involves both. On the other hand, *instinctus* in the sense of supernatural motion has priority and it is in this sense that I will claim that the *instinctus* of the gifts is identical with *auxilium* post-justification. In order to make this clear, I first give a couple of examples where Aquinas identifies the *instinctus* of the gifts with charity. I then show why these senses of *instinctus* necessarily imply the supernatural sense of *instinctus* as activating motion. I finally conclude from this that *instinctus* in the sense of a supernatural motion is primary and argue that it is identical with *auxilium* post-justification.

are disposed to promptly obey reason. Whence also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are certain habits by which man is perfected to promptly obey the Holy Spirit.

¹²² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

¹²³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 3.

¹²⁴ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 4, co.

Aquinas identifies charity as the *instinctus* of the gifts in a few places throughout his mature corpus.¹²⁵ The first occurs in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5. In this article, Aquinas draws a well-known analogy between the moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. "...just as the appetitive powers are disposed through the moral virtues to the rule of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed through the gifts in comparison to the Holy Spirit."¹²⁶ Aquinas immediately follows this by claiming that the Spirit dwells in us by charity.¹²⁷ In short, that to which the gifts make one proportionate is the command of charity. Charity holds an analogous place to prudence in relation to the moral virtues. Prudence both connects the moral virtues and applies the rule of reason. Charity both connects the gifts and applies their rule, the divine law. That which connects and applies the rule of the gifts is clearly their driving force, the *instinctus*. Charity is the very means by which the Holy Spirit dwells in the human person and is the heart of the New Law.¹²⁸

This interpretation (the virtue of charity as the impelling force, the *instinctus*, of the gifts) can be strengthened by other quotations in Aquinas. While commenting on Hebrews 9:14 ("How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, purify your conscience from dead works to serve the living God."), Aquinas claims that the shedding of Christ's blood was done through the "instinct and motion" of the

¹²⁵ See also *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 4, co.

¹²⁶ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, co.: "*Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem.*"

¹²⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, co.: "However, the Holy Spirit dwells in us through charity..."

¹²⁸ *ST* I-II q. 106, a. 1, co.

Holy Spirit. After mentioning the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas clarifies, “that is, love [*charitate*] of God and neighbor.”¹²⁹ In short, Aquinas seems to identify the moving force behind the gifts (*instinctus*) of the Holy Spirit with the command of charity.

Nevertheless, the identification of charity with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit might seem odd for two reasons. First, the very reason given for the gifts was the inability of the subject to use the theological virtues without the motion to which the gifts are disposed.¹³⁰ How can the gifts making the believer proportionate to the inclination of charity resolve the problem with charity itself? Second, the gifts are conceived as habits to respect human freedom.¹³¹ In other words, if the instinct of the gifts is the impulse of charity, then why conceive of the gifts as habits? The motion of charity is interior to the believer and so already respects the believer’s freedom.

These two difficulties show that Aquinas must also (as he does) identify the *instinctus* of the gifts with the motion of God which does not originate from a faculty or habit in the believer.¹³² “But in the order to the ultimate supernatural end, to which reason moves (because it

¹²⁹ *Super Heb.*, IX, l. 3, n. 444: “*Deinde cum dicit quanto magis, etc., ponit consequens; quasi dicat: si sanguis et cinis hoc possunt, quid poterit sanguis Christi? Certe multo plus. Et ponit apostolus tria, quae ostendunt efficaciam sanguinis Christi. Primo quis est ille cuius est sanguis ille, qui scilicet est Christus. Ex quo patet quod eius sanguis mundat. Matth. I, 21: ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum. Secundo causam quare Christus sanguinem suum fudit, quia hoc fuit spiritus sanctus, cuius motu et instinctu, scilicet charitate Dei, et proximi, hoc fecit.*” Emphasis added.

¹³⁰ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹³¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 3, ad 3.

¹³² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 2: “Vice, inasmuch as it is contrary to reason is contrary to virtue, however inasmuch it is contrary to the divine instinct, it is contrary to the gifts. For the same things are contrary to God and to reason, which is a light received from God.” Here Aquinas identifies the divine instinct with God himself. Obviously this cannot be the charity immanent within the believer.

is in a certain way and imperfectly formed by the theological virtues) does not suffice unless it be given the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit."¹³³ Clearly here the motion of the Holy Spirit cannot be a result of charity, since it is a supplement to charity. It is this motion to which the believer with the theological virtues must be made proportionate.¹³⁴ It is this motion which could possibly be conceived as violating human freedom.¹³⁵ It is this motion that enables the believer to act with the theological virtues and supplements them.¹³⁶ It is this motion which is necessary to reach eternal life.¹³⁷

The sense of *instinctus* as motion becomes clearer if one steps outside of the *Summa* and into Aquinas's biblical commentaries. For example, while commenting on the eighth chapter of Romans, Aquinas claims that "the spiritual person in a certain sense is not primarily inclined to act from the motion of his own will, but from the instinct of the Holy Spirit."¹³⁸ Now the spiritual person's will is most certainly informed by charity. Yet the motion does not come from his own

¹³³ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "*Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliquantulum et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio spiritus sancti.*"

¹³⁴ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, ad 2: "Through the theological and moral virtues man is not so perfected in relation to his ultimate end, that he would not always need to be moved by the superior instinct of the Holy Spirit, for the reason said above."

¹³⁵ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 3, obj. 2 & ad 2.

¹³⁶ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co. *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, ad 3: "All things are not understood by the reason of man, nor all possible things, whether reason is taken in its natural perfection or with the theological virtues. Thus, it is not able to repel foolishness and all the other things mentioned in the objection. But God who knows and is able to do all things, by his motion guards us from all foolishness, ignorance, sluggishness, and heard heartedness, and the other things. And for this reason, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow well the instinct of God, are said to be given against these defects."

¹³⁷ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "Because nobody can come to the inheritance of that blessed land unless he is moved and led by the Holy Spirit."

¹³⁸ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 781.

will, but from the *instinctus* of God. Clearly then the *instinctus* is a motion apart from charity's impulse. In conclusion, *instinctus* also means a supernatural motion to which the gifts establish a proportion, disposition, or receptivity. It is this sense of *instinctus* which is of primary importance here and which I will argue is identical with one of Aquinas's senses of *auxilium*.

In addition to specifying that *instinctus* is a supernatural motion, I must also specify in what sense I claim *auxilium* to be identical to the *instinctus* of the gifts. Aquinas uses *auxilium* in, at least, three senses. The first is the widest sense of the term. In this sense Aquinas means anything God gives to the human, even things considered natural: motions, habits, goods, etc.¹³⁹ In the narrower sense, Aquinas means any supernatural help God gives to the believer, be it habit or motion.¹⁴⁰ In the narrowest sense, Aquinas means a supernatural motion given to the believer.¹⁴¹ The narrowest sense of *auxilium* also comes in three different types: the graces preparing for conversion/justification,¹⁴² all the operative and cooperative motions God gives the believer to both activate him and protect him from temptation (common *auxilium*),¹⁴³ and the

¹³⁹ E.g. *ST I* q. 113, a. 4, ad 3: "Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even the anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason so neither are they deprived of that exterior help given by God (the guardianship of the angels) to the whole human race"; *ST I* q. 117, a. 1, co.; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 1, co. In this last article Aquinas speaks of God's natural motion as grace in the wide sense. See *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 3, co. for another use of *auxilium* in the widest sense.

¹⁴⁰ *ST I* q. 62, a. 2, co.; *ST I* q. 114, a. 1, ad 2; *ST I* q. 114, a. 3, ad 3; *ST I-II* q. 5, a. 5, ad 2; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 7, co.: "And for this reason the help of grace is required that man may rise from sin both inasmuch as this help is a habitual gift and the interior motion of God."

¹⁴¹ *ST I* q. 83, a. 1, ad 4; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 5, ad 3; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6, co. & ad 4; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9.

¹⁴² *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 5, co.; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6, co.; *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 1, ad 3; *Super I Cor.* I, l. 1, n. 7. *Super Heb.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 406; *Super Heb.*, XII, l. 3, n. 688; *Super Rom.*, I, l. 4, n. 68; *Super Rom.*, III, l. 3, n. 302; *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 6, n. 707.

¹⁴³ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.

grace of perseverance (an operative supernatural *auxilium*).¹⁴⁴ It is in the last two senses (with a qualification on the latter) of the narrowest sense of *auxilium* that I will claim are identical to the *instinctus* of the gifts.

Now that the subject of my argument is a bit clearer, I will attempt to argue that the *instinctus* of the gifts is identical with common *auxilium*. The argument concerning the grace of perseverance is reserved for the next chapter. Simply put, the motion to which the gifts correspond is the same motion about which Aquinas speaks in *ST* I-II 109, a. 9.¹⁴⁵ This is the most crucial (and disputable) part of this argument. *Instinctus* is not the only referent for the term *auxilium*, but it is the referent when *auxilium* means a supernatural motion post-justification.¹⁴⁶ Aquinas does call the motion to which the gifts correspond *auxilium* in one place,¹⁴⁷ but nowhere else suggests this identity. The argument for this identity is tortuous and complicated exegetically but very important. Before I delve into it, a short summery will help. Roughly, the

¹⁴⁴ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.

¹⁴⁵ In this article Aquinas argues that this motion is necessary to put the supernatural organism into act (called common actual grace by the scholastics) and protect it from temptation. See *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

¹⁴⁶ Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, vol. 13–15, *S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M.* (Rome: *Commissio Leonina*, 1882–), III c. 148, n. 1: “Now, it might seem to someone that by divine help some external compulsion to good action is exercised on man, because it has been said: “No man can come to Me, except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him” (John 6:44); and because of the statement in Romans (8:14): “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God”; and in 2 Corinthians (5:14): “the charity of Christ presses us.” Indeed, to be drawn, to be led, and to be pressed seem to imply coercion. Why does Aquinas then seemingly never use the term *auxilium* to refer to the motion which the gifts make connatural? Generally speaking, *auxilium* is a general term whereas *instinctus* is particular. Under *auxilia* fall many different ways God helps the creature to his supernatural end. To speak thus would be very imprecise. Nevertheless, Aquinas does at times suggest that the *instinctus* of the gifts is a supernatural motive *auxilia*. See for example *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, s.c.: “On the contrary, the gifts are given to help the virtues against defects (*adiutorium virtutum contra defectus*), as is shown in the authority cited. So it seems that that the virtues are not able to achieve perfection. Thus, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues;” *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 5, n. 694: “Then he shows the efficacy of the help (*efficaciam auxilii*) by which the Holy Spirit helps us...”

¹⁴⁷ *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 1.

argument attempts to prove that the *instinctus* of God (a supernatural motion) is the same supernatural motion which Aquinas means when he speaks of supernatural *auxilium* as motion post-justification in the treatise on grace.¹⁴⁸ In order to prove this, I first argue that the motion to which the gifts correspond is a supernatural motion. Next, I bring a couple of arguments to prove the identity between the *instinctus* of the gifts and the supernatural motion called *auxilium* (the principle partially responsible for good activity on the supernatural level). The first argument is based on Aquinas's use of Romans 8:14, John 6:44, and John 15:5. The second is based on the conceptual and verbal similarities between *ST* I-II q. 68 and I-II q. 109, a. 9.

Let me start with the first claim: the *instinctus* of God is a supernatural motion.¹⁴⁹ This is clear from what was said above and what Aquinas says on the subject. As I argue above Aquinas means two things by *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. First, he means the command of charity; second, he means a motion coming from without and activating the believer and moving him to action.

¹⁴⁸ *Auxilium* as motion is called common actual grace by the tradition in distinction to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit which is occasional. Common actual grace is necessary for each supernatural act.

¹⁴⁹ See Garrigou-Lagrange for the relevant distinctions in the term supernatural. The claim here is that the *instinctus* of the gifts is supernaturally substantially and not merely modally. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 7. He presents the following information in chart form.

The absolute supernatural exceeding the powers and requirements of any created nature:

- a. With respect to the substance or to the formal cause
 - i. Uncreated, substantial of itself – God and the uncreated person of the Word subsisting in the human nature of Christ
 - ii. Created (accidental) – habitual and actual grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit (supernatural by virtue of their formal object)
- b. With respect to the manner or to the extrinsic causes, that is, in the manner both of its extrinsic disposition and of its production
 - i. In regard to the end – natural act ordered by charity to the supernatural end
 - ii. In regard to the efficient cause – the miraculous substantially, the miraculous subjectively, the miraculous modally

Clearly *instinctus* as an impulse to action which does not follow from an immanent habit is a supernatural motion; I will argue further for this conclusion in the next chapter,¹⁵⁰ but for now the following argument should suffice: the *instinctus* of the gifts corresponds to the gifts (which are clearly supernatural)¹⁵¹ and moves believers to eternal beatitude (a supernatural object).¹⁵² Reorganizing these two statements (and making them more precise), one could make the following argument from Aquinas's principles: motion is differentiated by its end, its terminus.¹⁵³ The motion of the gifts moves the believer toward eternal beatitude.¹⁵⁴ Hence, the motion of the gifts is supernatural; it is a motion toward a supernatural term.

The first argument for the identification of *instinctus* with common *auxilium* is based on Romans 8:14 ("All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God."). Aquinas cites this verse in numerous places and a clear majority of these citations refer to the gifts.¹⁵⁵ When Aquinas

¹⁵⁰ See chapter III, section I.

¹⁵¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3; *ST* I-II q. 63, a. 1, co.; *ST* I-II q. 63, a. 4, ad 1; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 1; *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 5, co.: "*dona spiritus sancti perficiunt animam secundum quod est bene mobilis a spiritu sancto.*"

¹⁵² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: "The reason of which is because the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the mind of man for following the motion of the Holy Spirit. Thus they will especially be in heaven because God will be all and all...and there man will be totally subordinate to God." *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹⁵³ Jeffery Brower, "Matter, Form, and Change," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, eds. Eleonore Stump and Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 85-103; Pilsner, *The Specification of Human Acts in Aquinas*, 52ff.

¹⁵⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

¹⁵⁵ Roughly speaking eight refer explicitly to the gifts, one to charity, three are other uses of the verse, four are used in objections, and six uses are unclear from the context (yet three of them can be linked to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit via the connection in Romans 1:9. There we see that Aquinas has in mind the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit as that which informs the saints and the scriptural authors. Hence, it seems likely that wherever he invokes the principle that the Holy Spirit moves both the saints and the scriptural authors, he has in mind the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and thus also the gifts).

explains the verse directly, he explains it using the gifts of the Holy Spirit.¹⁵⁶ Only one citation seems to refer this verse to charity.¹⁵⁷ In short, there is a strong probability that whenever Aquinas is invoking this verse, he is thinking of the motion/*instinctus* to which the gifts correspond. If this is the case, then one can use Aquinas's citation of this verse to garner further characteristics about the *instinctus* of the Spirit. Nevertheless, since this is only probable, I will limit my argumentative data to when Aquinas explicitly ties the *instinctus* of the gifts to this verse and use the others as corroboration. Based on these citations, I find that the *instinctus* of the gifts fulfills the same roles in the supernatural life as common *auxilium*: activation of the believer as a secondary cause (toward good action, not simply indifferently) and protection from temptation.

Limiting oneself to Aquinas's mature works and his explicit use of Romans 8:14 to indicate the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, one can say with assurance that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, the motion to which the gifts proportion the believer, moves the saints to both act (at all) and act well.¹⁵⁸ Put differently, it is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit which fulfills both the

¹⁵⁶ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635.

¹⁵⁷ SCG IV c. 22, n. 4: "However, similarly it is proper to friendship to consent to those things which one's friend wills. However the will of God is revealed through his precepts. Therefore, in the love by which we love God, we satisfy his commands according to John 14:15: "if you love me, keep my commandments." Thus, since through the Spirit of God we are made lovers of God, it is through him in a certain way we are led to act so that we keep the precepts of God. This is according to the apostle in Romans 8:14: "those led by the Spirit of God are sons of God."

¹⁵⁸ *Contra Ret.* C. 9; *Super Io.*, VII, l. 5; *Super Io.*, XIV, l. 4; *Super Io.*, XIV, l. 6; *Super Io.*, XVIII, l. 4; *Super Io.*, XX, l. 2; *Super Rom.*, I, l. 5; *Super Rom.*, IV, l. 1; *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3; *Super Rom.*, IX, l. 3; *Super Heb.*, XI, l. 7, n. 631. In the last citation Aquinas says that it is by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit that prophets are moved to know, speak, or act. This either with or without their knowledge. Clearly then the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is not above deliberation in a simplistic sense.

need for activation of a secondary cause and causes the human believer to act well.¹⁵⁹ One explicit verse proves this.

The Spirit is a most excellent gift because he is the Spirit of truth. He is called the Spirit to show the subtlety or fineness of his nature, for the word “spirit” is used to indicate something which is undiscoverable and invisible. And so what is invisible is usually referred to as a spirit. The Holy Spirit also is undiscoverable and invisible: “The Spirit blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes” (3:8). He is also called the Spirit to indicate his power, because he moves us to act and work well. For the word “spirit” indicates a certain impulse, and that is why the word *spiritus* can also mean the wind: “For all who are impelled by the Spirit of God are sons of God” (Rom 8:14); “Let your good spirit lead me on a level path” (Ps 142:10).¹⁶⁰

Given the context of this quote and certain verbal and conceptual similarities with Aquinas’s thought on the gifts, it is most probable that Aquinas here has in mind the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit which “*movet nos ad bene agendum et operandum*.”¹⁶¹

The context of this quote makes it clear that Aquinas has in mind the gifts. Before Aquinas claims that it is the Spirit who, by his power, moves us to act well, he clearly indicates that he is thinking about the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit (and its corresponding habitual dispositions). In other words, just previous to the above quotation Aquinas singles out the gifts of the Holy Spirit for discussion. Aquinas’s purpose is to show how the Spirit is with believers

¹⁵⁹ *Super Rom.*, I, l. 5, n. 80.

¹⁶⁰ *Super Io.* XIV, l. 4, n. 1916: “*Donum autem est excellentissimum, quia spiritus veritatis. Spiritum quidem dixit, ut ostendat naturae subtilitatem. Spiritus enim dicitur aliquid occultum et invisibile, unde quod invisibile est, spiritus dici consuevit. Sic et spiritus sanctus occultus est et invisibilis: supra III, 8: spiritus ubi vult spirat, et vocem eius audis, sed nescis unde veniat aut quo vadat. Item ut ostendat eius virtutem, quia movet nos ad bene agendum et operandum. Spiritus enim impulsione[m] quamdam insinuat, unde et ventum spiritum appellamus; Rom. VIII, 14: qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; Ps. CXLII, 10: spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam.*”

¹⁶¹ *Super Io.*, XIV, l. 4, n. 1916; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 2 & 9.

forever. Toward this end, Aquinas distinguishes two types of gifts: the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the charisms. It is by the first that the Holy Spirit remains forever with believers; those gifts are necessary for salvation. The second type of gift is given to the faithful so they can manifest the Spirit for the common good. The second type of gift is perpetually in Christ, but the first is in all believers.¹⁶² Aquinas immediately follows this distinction with his comments about the Spirit as the most excellent gift who moves us to act and work well. Based on Aquinas's above distinction between the charisms and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the context for this final claim is clearly the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Some verbal and conceptual similarities also confirm this reading of the above passage. Certainly they are not irrefutable or incontestable. They simply add to the probability of the argument above. Three of these conceptual and verbal similarities are most important. First, Aquinas uses the term *spiritus* to name this activating motion. In *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 he directly

¹⁶² *Super Io.*, XIV, l. 4, n. 1915-1916: "Above it was said to John the Baptist: 'He on whom you see the Spirit descend and remain, this is he who baptizes with the Holy Spirit.' From this it seems proper to Christ that the Spirit always remain with him. Yet this is not true, if he remains with the disciples forever. According to Chrysostom it is said that the Holy Spirit remains in us through his gifts. However certain of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation and these are common to all the saints, and always remain in them, as charity which never leaves, as I Cor. 13:8 says. It will continue in the future. Certain of the Spirit's gifts are not necessary for salvation but are given to the faithful to manifest the Spirit (1 Cor. 13:7: 'to each is given a useful manifestation of the Spirit'). Therefore, speaking of the first gifts, the Holy Spirit remains with the disciples and saints forever; but inasmuch as one speaks of the second, it is proper to Christ that the Spirit remain with him always because in him the fullness of power resides so that he would be able to perform miracles, prophesy, and other such things. But it is not so for the others, because as Gregory says, the spirit of prophecy is not subject to the prophet. However the gifts is most excellent because it is the Spirit of truth. It is said to be a spirit to show the subtlety of its nature. For spirit is said to be something hidden and invisible. So what is invisible is usually said to be a spirit. So also the Holy Spirit is hidden and invisible. Jn 3:8: 'The Spirit blows where he wills, and you hear the sound of it, but do not know from whence it came or where it is going.' Furthermore, he says spirit to show his power, because he moves us to act and operate well. For spirit insinuates a certain impulse. Thus we call wind a spirit. Romans 8:14: 'Those who are led by the Spirit of God, those are sons of God. Ps. 142:10: "Let your good spirit lead me into the right land.'

ties the term *spiritus* to the gifts.¹⁶³ Second, he claims that the word *spiritus* indicates a certain impulse.¹⁶⁴ Now impulse is simply another word for *instinctus*, which is simply an impulse to action.¹⁶⁵ Third, Aquinas quotes the exact same two scriptural verses here to confirm the need for this impulse to act well and to prove that the *instinctus* of the gifts is necessary in order to attain heaven and utilize the theological virtues.¹⁶⁶ Clearly then Aquinas has in mind here the *instinctus*/motion to which the gifts correspond. Hence, the *instinctus* (and thus the gifts) are that which causes the believer to act well.

One might raise an objection at this point. Granted Aquinas is here claiming that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary that the believer work and act well, but not that he act at all. For that the theological virtues and common actual grace suffice. I will grant that this is a possible reading of Aquinas (at this point), but it becomes far less probable given another citation from the *Commentary on John*. "...it is the same Holy Spirit who inspired the prophets and other sacred authors and who moves the saints to act. As we read: 'moved by the Holy Spirit holy men of God spoke' (2 Pet 1:21); and 'For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God' (Rom

¹⁶³ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.: "And for this reason we must distinguish the gifts from the virtues. In this we must follow the way of speaking in Scripture which gives us this more under the name of spirit and less of gift."

¹⁶⁴ *Super Heb.*, VI, l. 1, n. 278.

¹⁶⁵ *Super I ad Cor.*, II, l. 2, n. 106.

¹⁶⁶ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "But in the order to the ultimate supernatural end, to which reason moves us as in a certain way imperfectly formed by the theological virtues, the very motion of reason does not suffice, unless it also receive the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit according to Romans 8: 'Who are led by the Spirit of God, those are sons of God and if sons, then heirs' and Psalm 142:10: 'Let your good Spirit lead me into the good land.' Because indeed nobody is able to come to the inheritance of that blessed land unless he be moved and led by the Holy Spirit. And for this reason to achieve that end, it is necessary that man have the gift of the Holy Spirit."

8:14).”¹⁶⁷ As we saw above, Aquinas usually has in mind the *instinctus* corresponding to the gifts when he invokes this Romans 8:14. Hence, it is by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit that saints are “moved to act.”¹⁶⁸ The omission of the pronoun *bene* does not permit one to partition off the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit to higher acts. It is needed both to act (at all) and to act well. These are the two needs for common *auxilium*.

The second argument, in my opinion, is by far the stronger and is based on the textual and conceptual similarities between *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co. and q. 68, aa. 1-3. By looking at these articles closely in conjunction, I think I can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that St. Thomas holds that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is necessary for the believer to act supernaturally (at all) and to act well. In short, the *instinctus* of the gifts is identical with *auxilium* in subject. It is the grace necessary post-justification. In order to prove this, I will first follow St. Thomas’s argument in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 and then note the conceptual, verbal, and systematic similarities with his thought on the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.

St. Thomas’s whole response in article nine is predicated on one distinction: the habitual gift vs. the help of grace, in the common sense (*auxilium gratiae*).¹⁶⁹ Both are necessary. The

¹⁶⁷ *Super Io.*, XVIII, l. 4, n. 1916: “*Dicendum, secundum Augustinum, quod dicta et praecepta sacrae Scripturae ex factis sanctorum interpretari possunt et intelliguntur, cum idem spiritus sanctus qui inspiravit prophetis et aliis sacrae Scripturae auctoribus, moverit sanctos ad opus. Nam, sicut II Petr. I, 21 dicitur, spiritu sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines; ita Rom. VIII, 14, dicitur: qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi sunt filii Dei.*”

¹⁶⁸ *Super Io.*, XVIII, l. 4, n. 1916: “*moverit sanctos ad opus.*”

¹⁶⁹ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, co: “The grace of God helps the will of man in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as the soul of man is moved by God to know, will, or do something. This gratuitous effect in man is not a quality but a certain motion of the soul, for act of the mover in the moved is motion, as is said in Book III of the *Physics*. In another way man is helped by the gratuitous will of God inasmuch as it gives man a habitual gift infused in the soul.”

habitual gift¹⁷⁰ raises and heals nature so that it can work meritoriously.¹⁷¹ The help of grace is necessary even after receiving habitual grace for two reasons:

Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e., in order to be moved by God to act righteously (*moveatur ad recte agendum*), and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion (*motionis divinae*). Secondly, for this special reason—the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned by the flesh, whereby it serves the law of sin. In the intellect too, there remains the darkness of ignorance (*ignorantia*) whereby, as is written (Rom 8:26): ‘we know not what we should pray for as we ought’; since on account of the various turns of circumstances (*varios enim rerum eventus*), and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good....Hence, we must be guided and guarded (*dirigamur et protegatur*) by God, who knows and can do all things.¹⁷²

In his responses to the objections Aquinas adds that this help of grace preserves the believer in the good and will still be necessary in heaven.¹⁷³ Beyond the habitual gift the Holy Spirit moves and protects believers.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ ST I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.

¹⁷¹ ST I-II q. 111, a. 2; ST I-II q. 114.

¹⁷² ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, co: “*Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad primum auxilii modum, homo in gratia existens non indiget alio auxilio gratiae quasi aliquo alio habitu infuso. Indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum. Et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, ratione generali, propter hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum prodire nisi virtute motionis divinae. Secundo, ratione speciali, propter conditionem status humanae naturae. Quae quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quam servit legi peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom. VII. Remanet etiam quaedam ignorantiae obscuritas in intellectu, secundum quam, ut etiam dicitur Rom. VIII, quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus. Propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia etiam nosipsos non perfecte cognoscimus, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat; secundum illud Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Et ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegatur, qui omnia novit et omnia potest. Et propter hoc etiam renatis in filios Dei per gratiam, convenit dicere, et ne nos inducas in tentationem, et, fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra, et cetera quae in oratione dominica continentur ad hoc pertinentia.*”

¹⁷³ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, ad 1.

¹⁷⁴ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, ad 2: “*movet et protegit.*”

Looking back at *ST* I-II q. 68, it is clear that the *auxilium gratiae* spoken of in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, that to which the gifts proportion/dispose the believer. Both are a supernatural motion; both move toward the same ends: secondary cause activation and protection from temptation. The verbal and conceptual overlap is too strong to deny. I will highlight four such instances.

The first is the fact that both are needed to act rightly in general.¹⁷⁵ Second (and more particularly), both are necessary that the secondary cause operates at all. In *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, Aquinas claims that nothing can be put forth into act without the divine motion. The *auxilium gratiae* is that activating divine motion.¹⁷⁶ In *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, Aquinas claims the same role for the *instinctus* corresponding to the gifts. “That which has a nature, form, or virtue imperfectly is not able to operate by itself unless it is moved by another.”¹⁷⁷ In order for reason to move the believer to the supernatural end,¹⁷⁸ it must receive the *instinctus* and *motio* of the Holy Spirit.¹⁷⁹

Second, Aquinas claims that the *auxilium gratiae* is necessary because of the condition of human nature. Fallen human nature is subject to ignorance, does not know how to pray as it

¹⁷⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.; *Super Io.*, XIV, l. 4, n. 1916: “*movet nos ad bene agendum et operandum;*” *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.: “*a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum.*”

¹⁷⁶ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 2; *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, co; *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.

¹⁷⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹⁷⁸ *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 5, co.

¹⁷⁹ In this light, Aquinas’s disputed reply to the second objection in article 2 of question 68 becomes clearer. *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, ad 2: “Through the theological and moral virtues man is not so perfected in relation to the ultimate end that he does not always need to be moved by a certain superior instinct of the Holy Spirit, for the reason given.”

ought,¹⁸⁰ does not know the various circumstances, and does not know what is best. Aquinas gives the same reasons for the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.¹⁸¹ It too is necessary for fallen human ignorance and guards from ignorance, dullness of mind, folly, and hardness of heart.¹⁸² It is by the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti* that we are instructed on how to pray.¹⁸³ Aquinas even calls this help in prayer the *auxilii Spiritus Sancti*.¹⁸⁴ It is by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit (and thus also the gifts) that the individual is moved to what is particularly good for him.¹⁸⁵

Third, in both cases one needs to be guided and guarded (*dirigamur et protegatur*) by God who knows and can do all things.¹⁸⁶ It is by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit that the believer is guided and guarded.¹⁸⁷ It is necessary that God move us because “he knows and can do all things.”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁰ Aquinas explains this verse with the gifts. See *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 4, n. 688.

¹⁸¹ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 2, n. 628.

¹⁸² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, ad 3: “But God, whose reason and power encompass all is able by his motion to guard us from all foolishness, ignorance, sluggishness, and hardness of heart. For this reason the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow well his instinct, are said to be given against these defects.”

¹⁸³ *Super Rom* VIII, l. 5, n. 688-694.

¹⁸⁴ *Super Rom.* VIII, l. 5, n. 688.

¹⁸⁵ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.: “We are not able to fully know what we need.” *Super Rom* VIII, l. 5, n. 690-691: “The answer is that we can know in a general way what it is suitable to pray for, but we cannot know this in particular.”

¹⁸⁶ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.

¹⁸⁷ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, ad 3: “But God, whose reason and power encompass all is able by his motion to guard us from all foolishness, ignorance, sluggishness, and hardness of heart.”

¹⁸⁸ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.: “*qui omnia novit et omnia potest;*” *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, ad 3: “*Sed Deus cuius scientiae et potestati omni subsunt...*”

Fourth, both the *instinctus* of the gifts and the *auxilium gratiae* will be needed in the state of glory. In q. 109 Aquinas says “For this reason if after grace has been received man still needs divine help, then it is not able to be concluded that grace is given for nothing, or that it is imperfect. Because even in the state of glory, when grace will be in every way perfect, man still needs divine help (*divino auxilio*).”¹⁸⁹ Likewise, according to Aquinas the gifts, according to their essence, will be most perfect in heaven since they perfect the mind so that it may follow the motion of the Holy Spirit.¹⁹⁰

Clearly the *instinctus/motio* of the Holy Spirit is the further *auxilium gratiae* needed for the believer with habitual grace, called common *auxilium*. For further confirmation, the two-fold way Aquinas speaks of the gifts in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5 line up perfectly with the two-fold need for the *auxilium* of motion in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9. In the gifts’ essence, they render the mind proportionate to the motion of the Holy Spirit. Their *materia circa quam* are things of this world.

¹⁸⁹ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, ad 3: “*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod donum habitualis gratiae non ad hoc datur nobis ut per ipsum non indigeamus ulterius divino auxilio, indiget enim quaelibet creatura ut a Deo conservetur in bono quod ab ipso accepit. Et ideo si post acceptam gratiam homo adhuc indiget divino auxilio, non potest concludi quod gratia sit in vacuum data, vel quod sit imperfecta. Quia etiam in statu gloriae, quando gratia erit omnino perfecta, homo divino auxilio indigebit. Hic autem aliquantulum gratia imperfecta est, inquantum hominem non totaliter sanat, ut dictum est.*”

¹⁹⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: “The gifts are able to be spoken of in two ways. In one way according to their essence, in this way they will be most perfect in heaven, just as is clear through the teaching of Ambrose. The reason for this is because the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the human mind for following the motion of the Holy Spirit, and this motion is especially in heaven, where God is all in all, as is said in I Cor. 15, and there man will be totally subordinate to God. In another way the gifts are able to be considered by the material they concern, and so presently they have an operation around certain matter which they will not have in the state of glory. And according to the second sense, they will not remain in heaven, just as was said about the cardinal virtues.”

It is by the first that the activating motion of God can be received. It is by the second that the condition of human nature is fortified.¹⁹¹

If the above arguments are successful, then it is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit that Aquinas has in mind when he speaks of *auxilium* as motion post-justification. It is the *instinctus* of the gifts that is necessary to both act (at all) and to act well as well as counter the effects of fallen human nature (ignorance, etc.). This identification of the *instinctus Spiritus Sancti* with *auxilium* as motion tells one that all the data from Aquinas's thought on *auxilium* as motion can be applied to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is operative and cooperative.¹⁹² It falls within the matrix of prevenient and subsequent graces.¹⁹³ It accounts for both the activation of the justified secondary cause to act and to act well; it protects the believer from the continuing inclination to sin.¹⁹⁴ To explain such connections is beyond the purpose of this section and each will be taken up later in this chapter or the next. What is important to note now is that it is only by the meeting of different treatises that one can garner further data about the *instinctus* of the gifts.

¹⁹¹ Only one possible objection, in my mind, can appear to such a strong overlap: the claim that the two needs given in *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9 are fulfilled by different supernatural motions, as Ramirez does. According to this position, the need for activation is fulfilled by common actual grace whereas the need to supplement the imperfection of this life is fulfilled by a moral and not physical motion (Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 537). The two are not the same supernatural motion (and neither are the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit). I think two things make this reading implausible at best. First, Aquinas consistently uses the singular in article nine. In addition, elsewhere Aquinas links the *instinctus* of the gifts to the activation of the secondary cause as well as protection from temptation. In other words, he gives it the role of common actual grace and does not seem to limit it to simply activation. Furthermore, how does God protect from temptation? Clearly one way is external actual grace, i.e. providence. Nevertheless, the more important way is by moving us to acts of the virtues, i.e. activating.

¹⁹² *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2; *ST II-II* q. 52, a. 2, ad 1.

¹⁹³ *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 3.

¹⁹⁴ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.

III. Grace and the Operational Necessity of the Gifts

According to Aquinas, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation. “And for this reason it is necessary for humans to have the gift of the Holy Spirit to reach that [supernatural] end”¹⁹⁵ In order to aid the understanding of St. Thomas’s thought on the necessity of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, this section aims to bring the data of grace to bear on the issue, especially the above argued identification between the *instinctus* of the gifts and common *auxilium* as motion. The thesis of this section is that St. Thomas’s thought on common *auxilium* supplements arguments that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are both indispensably necessary for attaining the supernatural end and have perpetual necessity in beginning each new series of actions in the supernatural life. More precisely, what is necessary is the gift/*instinctus* combination.¹⁹⁶ The gifts are necessary inasmuch as they proportion/dispose the believer to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit;¹⁹⁷ the *instinctus* (as motion)¹⁹⁸ of the Holy Spirit is necessary inasmuch as it moves the believer toward good acts and protects the believer from folly and the

¹⁹⁵ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: “*Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti.*”

¹⁹⁶ *ST I-II* q. *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co. & ad 3.

¹⁹⁷ *ST II-II* q. 19, a. 9, co.

¹⁹⁸ Which designee of *instinctus* is the subject of the debate? Is it gift/charity or gift/motion (granting that most participants in the debate are not this precise)? It seems most likely *instinctus* taken as motion for two reasons. First, clearly the impulse and activity of charity is necessary to reach the supernatural end. There could be no dispute here. Second, in *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, Aquinas is clearly talking about the instinct of the Holy Spirit as motion. He specifically contrasts the motion of the Holy Spirit with the motion of reason. See *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: “But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting and motion of the Holy Ghost.”

like.¹⁹⁹ More specifically, the *instinctus*/gifts combination when the gifts are taken in their operative effects which I will argue is indispensably and perpetually necessary to reach the supernatural end.

In proving this thesis, I first outline St. Thomas's mature argument for the necessity of the gifts in the supernatural life (including a clarification of necessity, as St. Thomas says, "Necessity is said in many ways"²⁰⁰). Next, I review some of the articles from Aquinas's thought on grace relevant to this issue. Finally, I bring the elements together to prove the thesis that the gifts are indispensably and perpetually necessary.

St. Thomas gives his most thorough and comprehensive argument for the necessity of the gifts in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2. He begins by reiterating the conclusions of article one: the gifts dispose their subject to follow the divine instinct well. He follows with his thesis: "Whence, it is necessary for those things in which the instinct of reason does not suffice, there is need of the instinct of the Holy Spirit, and as a consequence, the need for a gift."²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 5, n. 693: "The Holy Spirit leads and excites our hearts, and objects of desire are not able to be so unless useful to us." *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.: "moved and led by the Holy Spirit." *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, ad 3: "All things are not understood by the reason of man, nor all possible things, whether reason is taken in its natural perfection or with the theological virtues. Thus, it is not able to repel foolishness and all the other things mentioned in the objection. But God who knows and is able to do all things, by his motion guards us from all foolishness, ignorance, sluggishness, and heard heartedness, and the other things. And for this reason, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow well the instinct of God, are said to be given against these defects."

²⁰⁰ *ST* I q. 82, a. 1, co.: "*Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter.*"

²⁰¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.: "*Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus rationis, sed est necessarius spiritus sancti instinctus, per consequens est necessarium donum.*"

All of Aquinas's argumentation in this article trades on the distinction between the two ways God perfects humans: naturally and supernaturally.²⁰² Man's natural perfection, although it is less perfect, is possessed more perfectly. In other words, it belongs to human nature itself to be rational. Indeed, the rational soul is the very form of the human person.²⁰³ Aquinas follows this with another principle: "That which has a nature, form, or virtue perfectly, can of itself (*per se*) operate according to it."²⁰⁴ Certainly this does not exclude the operation of God, whose primary causality is presupposed for any working,²⁰⁵ but rather that no other finite cause of activity is necessary.²⁰⁶ Aquinas specifically separates the necessity of the gifts and the *instinctus* from God's general working in all natures and wills.²⁰⁷ Certainly the judgment of reason can direct humans themselves toward their connatural end.²⁰⁸ Yet, since humans are not perfect possessors

²⁰² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "The reason of man is perfected in two ways by God. The first is a natural perfection according to the natural light of reason. In another way it is by the theological virtues in supernatural perfection, as was said above."

²⁰³ *ST I* q. 76, a. 1, co.: "It is necessary to say that the intellect, which is the principle of all intellectual operations, is the form of the human body."

²⁰⁴ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "*Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam vel formam aliquam aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam operari.*"

²⁰⁵ *DPD* q. 3, a. 7, co.: "It must be conceded that God works in the works of both nature and will."

²⁰⁶ What Aquinas seems to have in mind here is the exclusion of another necessary finite principle of movement, either intrinsic or extrinsic. Whatever has a form, nature, or virtue perfectly does not need another finite cause of its activity. In other words, it does not have to be given the power as an instrument.

²⁰⁷ This is the force of Aquinas's seemingly superfluous comment inserted in the middle of the article. *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "It is manifest, however, that whatever has perfectly a nature, form, or power is able to work according to it, **not however excluding the operation of God who works interiorly in all natures and wills.**" Emphasis added.

²⁰⁸ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co. The Latin Aquinas uses here is *iudicium rationis*. This seems to refer technically to his view of judgment as it enters into the human act. See *ST I-II* q. 15, a. 3, co.

of the theological virtues (or habitual grace), the motion of reason does not suffice in reference to the supernatural end. In other words, there must be another finite moving cause.

The result of this analysis is the necessity of the gifts for attaining the supernatural end. Their necessity is also something beyond the necessity of God's natural motion. These finite moving causes are the gifts; they operate through the "instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit."²⁰⁹ It is not that reason does not move humans toward the supernatural end when informed by the theological virtues, but rather that it moves as "imperfectly formed by the theological virtues."²¹⁰ Hence, it falls under the general principle outlined above. It needs another moving cause for all of its activity; it cannot cause per se, but rather must be an instrument. Of what is it an instrument? The motion or instinct of the Holy Spirit is identified here, but that motion presupposes a gift as providing the disposition to be so moved or else it could not be received (a. 1). Hence, the gifts are necessary for the movement to the supernatural end by the theological virtues.²¹¹ Such is Aquinas's argument for the necessity of the gifts.

Key to this argument is the term necessity. In order to gain clarity on what Aquinas could mean by the necessity of the gifts, *ST I q. 82, a. 1* is a good place to start. In this context Aquinas

²⁰⁹ *ST I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.*: "*instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti.*"

²¹⁰ *ST I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.*: "*imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas.*"

²¹¹ *ST I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.*: "In those things which fall under human reason in the order to the connatural human end, man is able to operate through the judgment of reason. If however man is helped in these things by God's particular instinct, this will be out of his superabundant goodness. Whence the philosopher says not all who have the acquired moral virtues have the heroic or divine virtues. But in the order to the ultimate supernatural end, to which reason moves us as in a certain way imperfectly formed by the theological virtues, the very motion of reason does not suffice, unless it also receive the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit according to Romans 8: "who are led by the Spirit of God, those are sons of God and if sons, then heirs" and Psalm 142:10: "Let your good Spirit lead me into the good land." Because indeed nobody is able to come to the inheritance of that blessed land unless he be moved and led by the Holy Spirit. And for this reason to achieve that end, it is necessary that man have the gift of the Holy Spirit."

divides necessity into absolute and conditional. Absolute necessity, or intrinsic necessity, can belong to a thing from either its formal or material principles (material and formal necessity). Conditional necessity (*ex suppositione or ex conditione*), also called extrinsic necessity, belongs to the other two types of causality, final and efficient. Necessity stemming from the efficient cause, or agent, is the necessity of constraint. Necessity stemming from the final cause is divided into indispensable and fitting (or useful). Things indispensable for the end must be utilized to attain the end.²¹² Things merely fitting for the end make the attainment of the end easier, but they are not absolutely necessary.²¹³

Given that Aquinas has in mind relative necessity for the gifts (the necessity belonging to a final cause), there are still two further questions. That Aquinas has in mind relative necessity is clear at the end of *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co. As Aquinas says, “and for this reason for the attainment of that end [the land of the blessed], it is necessary for man to have the gifts of the Holy Spirit.”²¹⁴ The whole argument concerns the movement toward an end, and this falls under

²¹² *ST* III q. 1, a. 2, co.: “Something is said to be necessary for an end in two ways. In one way it is necessary because the end is not able to be without it, just as food is necessary for the conservation of human life. In another way, something is necessary as better or more fittingly reaching an end, just as a horse is necessary to journey.”

²¹³ *ST* I q. 82, a. 1, co.: “Something is necessary because it is not able not to be. This is true for a thing either by an intrinsic principle. This could be according to the material, just as we say that it is necessary that all composites of contraries corrupt or the formal, just as we say that it necessary that a triangle have three angles equal to two right angles. These types of necessity are natural and absolute. In another way something something is not able not to be from something extrinsic, the end or the agent. According to the end something is necessary when an end is not able to be achieved without it, or it achieves the end well, just as food is necessary for life and a horse for a journey. And this is the necessity of the end which sometimes is said to be the useful. However, from the agent is it the result when someone is forced by some agent so that he is not able to do the opposite. And this is called the necessity of force.”

²¹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

relative necessity. It is within relative necessity that the two real questions surface.²¹⁵ The first concerns the indispensable/fitting distinction. Are the gifts indispensibly necessary or merely fittingly necessary? The second sense of necessity corresponds to the question of how often the agency or exercise of the gifts is necessary for the end. Is it for every supernatural act or only occasionally? The two questions of necessity could be put thus: Are the gifts merely a fitting help to eternal life or are they indispensable? If they are indispensable, is it an occasional necessity or a perpetual one?²¹⁶

In answer to the first question of necessity, it is clear that Aquinas has in mind indispensable necessity and not fitting necessity. To recall, both fall under the necessity caused by seeking a goal. Indispensible necessity is necessary for reaching that goal, but fitting necessity merely makes it easier. The gifts of the Holy Spirit must be active (at least sometimes) to reach the supernatural end; they are indispensable for that end. Two examples will suffice to prove this point.

²¹⁵ The following outline makes the division of necessity clearer:

1. Absolute
 - a. Formal
 - b. Material
2. Relative
 - a. Efficient
 - b. Final
 - i. Indispensible
 1. Occasional
 2. Perpetual
 - ii. Fitting

²¹⁶ At first blush it might seem that anything which has an indispensable necessity in relation to an end would, by definition, always be operative in relation to that end. A rocket is necessary to make it to the moon, and one cannot really be said to be going to the moon at that moment without the rocket. Nevertheless, there are other examples. Food is obligatory for bodily preservation, yet one could be pursuing bodily preservation without eating.

The first example comes from *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2. Here Aquinas claims that the motion of reason is not sufficient (*non sufficit*) to reach the supernatural end of man. It only becomes so by the addition of the motion of the Holy Spirit (*nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti*).²¹⁷ If the gifts are necessary and the motion of reason (even perfected by the theological virtues) is insufficient, then it is clear Aquinas does not have in mind merely fitting necessity.²¹⁸ With fitting necessity, the motion of reason would be sufficient albeit inconvenient.²¹⁹ Yet it is not even inconveniently sufficient. Aquinas is quite clear that without the motion of the Holy Spirit “none can reach the inheritance of that blessed land”²²⁰.

The second example comes from Aquinas’s *Commentary on Romans*. While commenting on Romans 1:9 wherein Paul calls God as his witness,²²¹ Aquinas outlines a principle for scriptural interpretation based on the motion of the Holy Spirit. “For it is the same Spirit who inspired the Scriptures: ‘men inspired by the Holy Spirit spoke of God’ (2 Peter 1:21) and who leads the saints to act: ‘all who are led by the Spirit are sons of God’ (Rm 8:14).”²²² Beyond the

²¹⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²¹⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, ad 3.

²¹⁹ In addition, Aquinas usually uses some form of *convenientia* to signify fittingness. He nowhere, as far as I am aware, uses that word in conjunction with the gifts.

²²⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.: “*quia scilicet in haereditatem illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi moveatur et deducatur a Spiritu Sancto.*”

²²¹ Romans 1:9: “For God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of his Son, that without ceasing I mention you always in my prayers.”

²²² *Super Rom.*, I, l. 5, n. 80: “*Idem enim Spiritus quo Sacrae scripturae sunt editae, secundum illud II Petr. I, 21: Spiritu Sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei, sanctos viros ad operandum inducit; infra VII, 14: qui Spiritu Dei aguntur hi sunt filii Dei.*”

very interesting implications this has for scriptural interpretation,²²³ it also implies that the motion corresponding to the gifts is indispensably necessary for the supernatural end. How does the quotation imply this? The key comes in Aquinas's citation of Romans 8:14. Aquinas interprets Romans 8:14 to mean that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit (that to which the gifts correspond)²²⁴ moves humans to their supernatural end by causing the act of free will.²²⁵ Put differently, wherever Aquinas cites Romans 8:14 (at least in his mature thought),²²⁶ it is very likely he has in mind the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Returning to the initial quotation on Romans 1:9, one can easily make an argument for the indispensable necessity of the gifts. Inasmuch as it is indispensably necessary to act to reach the supernatural end, and that act is caused by the Holy Spirit's *instinctus* ("who leads holy men to act"), the *instinctus* must be indispensably necessary to reach the supernatural end. Further, inasmuch as the gifts are that which proportion/dispose the believer to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, the gifts must also be indispensably necessary.²²⁷

²²³ For other citations of this principle see *De Perfectione* c. 18 and *Super Io.*, XVIII, l. 4; *Super Io.*, VII, l. 5: "Whence he spoke, because by the instinct and fervor of the Holy Spirit that the apostle was moved: 'the charity of Christ urges us' and Rm 8:14: 'those led by the Spirit of God, those are sons of God'."

²²⁴ It is possible, but very unlikely, that Aquinas means the *instinctus fidei*. It is very unlikely because Aquinas never calls that *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, the language of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit almost always recalls the gifts.

²²⁵ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 8, n. 635: "Thus we say about animals that they do not act, but are acted upon, because they are move by nature to their actions and not their own motion. Similarly, however, a spiritual man is not inclined, principally speaking, to a certain act from the motion proper to his will, but from the instinct of the Holy Spirit, according to Is 59:19: 'He will come like a rushing stream, which the wind of the Lord drives.' And Luke 4:1: 'Christ was driven by the Spirit into the desert.'"

²²⁶ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 8, n. 635: "However this does not exclude the fact that the spiritual man acts through will and free decision, because the very motion of the will and free decision is caused in him by the Holy Spirit, according to Phil 2:13: 'God is at work in you both to will and to work.'"

²²⁷ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.; *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 4, ad 3.

These two arguments will suffice for now, since implicitly I will continue to argue for the gifts' indispensable necessity. This is so because the stronger type of necessity implies the weaker. If the gifts are either intermittently necessary or perpetually necessary they are certainly indispensably necessary. The second type of necessity implies the first. Hence, my position vis-à-vis the second will also be an implicit argument for the gifts' indispensable necessity.

To recall, the second question concerns the intermittent relative necessity or the perpetual relative necessity. Both options would hold that the gifts are indispensably necessary to reach heaven. Yet that does not tell us how often they are necessary. Are they necessary for each supernatural act (perpetual) or merely occasionally (intermittent)? I argue that Aquinas holds that the gifts are perpetually necessary, that is necessary for each supernatural act.

The most basic and straightforward argument which can be brought in favor of the perpetual necessity of the gifts is based on *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2. In this article, Aquinas claims that the motion of the gifts is necessary for the operation of the theological virtues. That which has a form or virtue imperfectly cannot operate of itself. It must be moved by another. That 'other' was identified by Aquinas as the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, and thus the gifts. Hence, the gifts are necessary for each operation of the theological virtues. The believer always possesses the theological virtues imperfectly and so if they are to operate, always need the motion of God and the disposition provided by the gifts.²²⁸ Now the theological virtues, since they establish our first

²²⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2.

and fundamental union with God,²²⁹ are certainly necessary for each supernatural action (especially charity).²³⁰ If the theological virtues are necessary for each supernatural action, and

²²⁹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, ad 3: “The soul of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it is in some way united to him, just as an instrument is not moved by the artist unless through contact, either through something or some union. However, the first union of man to God is through faith, hope, and love. Whence, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, just as certain roots of the gifts. Thus, all the gifts pertain to these three virtues, just as certain derivations of the aforesaid virtues.” There is another puzzle here (actually many). They are as follows from most general to most particular: the relation of the gifts to the theological virtues, the relation of charity to the gifts, and the relation of each gift to each theological virtue.

In general, Aquinas says that the theological virtues are necessary so that God can move us by the gifts, yet in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 and 2 he claims that the gifts are necessary to use the theological virtues. In short, the gifts are necessary for the theological virtues and the theological virtues are necessary for the gifts. One must solve this dilemma by distinguishing the relative orders of priority. I shall do this more fully in the next chapter. For now it is important to note that this problem can be solved on multiple levels from most general to most particular. In the next chapter I offer a solution to the general problem without going into the particular.

One might say to this that the theological virtues do form the primal union to God (and are therefore necessary for the operation of the gifts) but still do not have the capability of acting out that union. For that they must give rise to the proportion to God as mover and not merely object. This is done by the gifts. Hence, the theological virtues are necessary for the gifts because one must be united to something in order to have proportion to it, yet one must be proportioned to act out that primal unity. In the order of activity then the theological virtues are prior according to final causality and the gifts according to efficient causality. In the order of being the theological virtues give rise to the gifts whereas in the order of activity the gifts as dispositions give rise to the acts of the theological virtues, which in turn give rise to the gifts as acts. Put differently, one might say that the theological virtues establish unity with God as object/*terminus ad quem*. Yet they do not establish unity with God as efficient cause or *terminus a quo*. For this type of unity/proportion, the gifts are necessary.

One might pose the problem more particularly: What about charity in relation to the gifts? Aquinas has a similar kind of chicken/egg problem here. Charity is the principle, director, and commander of the gifts. Yet the gifts’ proportion to God as mover are necessary to have any acts of charity. Can the more particular problem be solved in a way similar to the general? Possibly. It would go as follows: charity causes the proportion to God’s instinct. Charity is not the proportion to God’s instinct. Charity has God as its object, but is not sufficiently proportioned to God as director and leader of the moral life. Put another way, charity certainly is active in its proportion to God as object, but cannot be enacted without the gifts establishing another proportion to God as mover. In the order of being, the gifts are posterior to charity. Nevertheless, in the practical order of activity, the gifts (in their disposition) are prior to charity in proportion. It is only by the proportion established by the gifts that charity can be enacted at all. Yet given that proportion and the initial activation by the *instinctus* of God, charity commands the acts of the gifts *ad finem*, i.e. in relation to their proper matter.

Another solution to this puzzle on the particular level (and possibly the general) is to separate the *instinctus*/gift link in the order of activity. In other words, the gifts do establish a proportion to God’s motion, but are not always the recipients of it. God can move us by the other virtues directly and not always mediately through the gifts, presupposing that the gifts have established the proportion to God’s motion. Charity may put the gifts into act, since it is their principle of being, and yet the gifts establish the proportion between charity and the instinct of God conceived as the motion moving the subject to eternal life. The gifts establish proportion, but that does not mean they are active, in the proper sense, prior to charity. Charity causes the gifts to come into being, but the gifts in turn perfect charity by establishing a proportion between the will and God’s very motion. Hence it would be the *instinctus* of God which would activate the theological virtues, which would in turn command the acts of the gifts. I do not think this solution works given that if God moves us outside of our disposition to be moved, it would seem to be a violent motion. Aquinas holds that God never moves humans violently, i.e. contrary to their nature. What

the gifts are necessary for each operation of the theological virtues, then the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action also. They are perpetually necessary.

The second argument is where the treatise on grace makes its contribution to this debate, especially based on the argument of section Ib. There I argue that the *instinctus* of the gifts is identical with common *auxilium*. I can now pose the question governing this section with differently. If the common *auxilium gratiae* is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, and if the necessity of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is coterminus with the necessity of the gifts as habits, then as often as the common *auxilium gratiae* is necessary, that is how often the gifts are necessary.²³¹ How often, then, is *auxilium* conceived of as motion post-justification necessary in the supernatural life?

There are two possible answers to this question. One carries the bulk of the Thomistic tradition, and the other is put forward by Wawrykow.²³² According to the traditional opinion, an

captures the essence of this solution but without the drawback, I think, is the distinction between the gifts as providing disposition and the gifts in act. The gifts' disposition is prior to the theological virtues and charity, whereas the gifts in act are always commanded by charity.

Possibly the best solution to these puzzles would be more particular: to separate the gifts into their respective faculties and then assess priority or posteriority to the virtues. One could articulate this solution in two ways. First, one could say that each gift has priority for the respective virtues in that faculty so that they can be moved to act by God. This would be a similar solution with the disposition/act distinction above, yet for each power. The problem with this solution is that Aquinas abandons his position that fear of the Lord is located in the concupiscible appetites in the *Secunda Secundae*. Put differently, one could separate the gifts and show at least the priority of some gifts for the virtues of hope and charity. Understanding, knowledge, and wisdom would thus have priority over hope and love in the order of specification (although not in exercise). The only problem with this solution is that Aquinas seems to place the necessity of the gifts in the order of exercise (motion) and not specification. In short, I think the general solution is the right one.

²³⁰ I am not speaking about those actions which are merely modally supernatural, i.e., come before the infusion of habitual grace. For proof that the theological virtues are necessary/operative in each supernatural action see Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love*, chapter 5.

²³¹ *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, co.

²³² Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 175-176.

operative *auxilium/motio* stands at the beginning of any new autonomous series of salvific actions (*nova series autonoma actuum salutarium*).²³³ This obtains in three ways: the mode of contrariety (the believer begins to will the good when it previously willed evil), the mode of division within the same line of salvation (increases by exciting to new acts), or by the mode of simple interruption (“Whenever [someone] is moved without counsel and a previous motive to the good.”²³⁴). On the other side stands Wawrykow, who claims that “any time the will conceives and wills an end which is appropriate to maintaining the spiritual dignity of the justified soul, and thereby perseveres in the state of grace, this willing of the end is moved by God [operatively].”²³⁵

Although an interesting debate, and important in its own right, it is not necessary to solve it for the purposes of this section. Why? Either answer given makes the gifts perpetually necessary for each supernatural action. They either stand at the beginning with the motion of God and are therefore virtual in all subsequent actions which flow from the operative grace that moves them, or they are operative at the willing of each end. Clearly in either case common *auxilium* as motion is perpetually necessary in the supernatural life, that is for each supernatural action.²³⁶ Plus, the difference between the positions is actually much smaller than it may seem.

²³³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 696; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170; Del Prado, *Gratia*, 206 & 235.

²³⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 697. Ramirez here cites Cajetan for both the mode of division and the mode of simple interruption: “*Nomine primi actus (hoc in loco) non intelligitur solus ille quem voluntas in principio operationum suarum omnium habet, sed quicumque primus absque consilio et praevio motive ad bonum.*”

²³⁵ Wawrykow, *God’s Grace*, 176.

²³⁶ This is confirmed in Aquinas’s *Commentary on Romans*. One chapter after he explains that Romans 8:14 refers to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, he claims that “the will of man is moved by God to good. Whence it was said above that ‘those led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. And for this reason the interior operation of man is not

First, Warykow's position is ambiguous. He does not mention the different types of ends in Aquinas (proximate/remote, final, ultimate, etc.). Aquinas's vision of the moral life is teleological, each good achieved is also a means to a further good.²³⁷ In other words, all things pursued are in some sense ends.²³⁸ Is an operative grace necessary then for each numerical action, only some ends, only remote ends, only final ends, or what? Wawrykow does not say. In addition, because of Aquinas's teleological view of human action and his ambiguity about what end means, it is unclear how Wawrykow's seeming position can accommodate Aquinas's view of the will's self motion.²³⁹ According to Aquinas once God moves the human to the end, the

attributed to man principally, but to God." See *Super Rom.*, IX, l. 3, n. 777-778: "the will of man is moved by God to the good as was said above (8:14: "those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God"). And for this reason the interior operation is not attributed principally to man, but to God as it says in Phil 2:13: "God works in us to will and work to will the good." But if it is not of the willer to will or the runner to run, but God moving man to this, it seems that man is not the lord of his own actions, which pertains to free decision. And for this reason it must be said that God moves all, but in diverse ways inasmuch as he moves each one according to the mode of its nature. And so man is moved by God to will and run through the mode of free will. Therefore to will and to run is of the man, just as of a free agent, not however of man as a principle agent of movement. This is said of God."

²³⁷ For some of the complexities of Aquinas's view of 'end' see *ST I-II* q. 12, a. 2; Pilsner, *Specification*, chapter 9; Daniel McInerney, *The Difficult Good* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Eberhard Schockenhoff, "The Theological Virtue of Charity (II-II qq. 23-46)," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, trans. by Grant Kaplan and Frederick G. Lawrence, ed. by Stephen Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002). Daniel Westburg, *Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Thomas Osborne, "Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on Individual Acts and the Ultimate End," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, 351-374. Kent Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman, and Andreas Speer, ed. *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*. Leiden: Brill, 2011; "The Threefold Referral of Acts to the Ultimate End in Thomas Aquinas and His Commentators," *Angelicum* 85 (2008): 715-736.

²³⁸ Daniel McInerney, "Deliberation about Final Ends: Thomistic Considerations," in *Recovering Nature: Essays in Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph McInerney* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999): 105-125; Daniel McInerney, "Hierarchy and Direction for Choice," Unpublished Essay available at <http://www3.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/ti03/eMcIner.htm>.

²³⁹ Wawrykow seems to imply that an operative actual grace must move to the end of each numerical action. This coupled with the ambiguity about what an end is could imply that God moves us to each act, since everything we choose is in some sense an end. See Wawrykow, *Grace*, 176. See also Joseph Wawrykow, *The Westminster Handbook to Aquinas* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 66: "Thus, when a person wills an end, and this is really conducive to reaching the end that is God, this is due to operative *auxilium*." For Aquinas's view on the will's self motion see *ST I* q. 83, a. 1, ad 5; *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 3, co.: "It pertains to the will to move the other powers

human can move himself based on that motion to the means. Yet, in Aquinas's ethics those means are also ends in some sense, and especially in the case of those things necessary, do uphold the supernatural life. Hence, for those means too, it seems like Wawrykow would have to claim another operative grace, and so on. Where is the will's self motion?

based on the concept of an end, which is the object of the will. But just as was said above, the end in things appetible is like the principle in things intelligible. However it is manifest that the intellect, which knows the principle, reduces itself from potency to act inasmuch as from the principle it knows the conclusion, and so moves itself there. And similarly by its willing of the end moves itself to will those things which are toward the end." See *DPD* q. 3, a. 7 (Translation from Fathers of the English Dominican Province): "for the four different ways Aquinas claims that God causes each action. *DPD* q. 3, a. 7, co.: "It must be observed that one thing may be the cause of another's action in several ways. First, by giving it the power to act: thus it is said that the generator moves heavy and light bodies, inasmuch as it gives them the power from which that movement results. In this way God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being. For secondly, the preserver of a power is said to cause the action; thus a remedy that preserves the sight is said to make a man see. But since nothing moves or acts of itself unless it be an unmoved mover; thirdly, a thing is said to cause another's action by moving it to act: whereby we do not mean that it causes or preserves the active power, but that it applies the power to action, even as a man causes the knife's cutting by the very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting by moving it to cut. And since the lower nature in acting does not act except through being moved, because these lower bodies are both subject to and cause alteration: whereas the heavenly body causes alteration without being subject to it, and yet it does not cause movement unless it be itself moved, so that we must eventually trace its movement to God, it follows of necessity that God causes the action of every natural thing by moving and applying its power to action. Furthermore we find that the order of effects follows the order of causes, and this must needs be so on account of the likeness of the effect to its cause. Nor can the second cause by its own power have any influence on the effect of the first cause, although it is the instrument of the first cause in regard to that effect: because an instrument is in a manner the cause of the principal cause's effect, not by its own form or power, but in so far as it participates somewhat in the power of the principal cause through being moved thereby: thus the axe is the cause of the craftsman's handiwork not by its own form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who moves it so that it participates in his power. Hence, fourthly, one thing causes the action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument: and in this way again we must say that God causes every action of natural things. For the higher the cause the greater its scope and efficacy: and the more efficacious the cause, the more deeply does it penetrate into its effect, and the more remote the potentiality from which it brings that effect into act. Now in every natural thing we find that it is a being, a natural thing, and of this or that nature. The first is common to all beings, the second to all natural things, the third to all the members of a species, while a fourth, if we take accidents, into account, is proper to this or that individual. Accordingly this or that individual thing cannot by its action produce another individual of the same species except as the instrument of that cause which includes in its scope the whole species and, besides, the whole being of the inferior creature. Wherefore no action in these lower bodies attains to the production of a species except through the power of the heavenly body, nor does anything produce being except by the power of God. For being is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone to produce by his own power: and for this reason (*de Causis*, prop. ix) an intelligence does not give being, except the divine power be therein. Therefore God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power operating."

Nor does the argument of Denis Janz answer these questions.²⁴⁰ According to Janz, and others, Aquinas holds that a special grace is necessary for all good natural actions.²⁴¹ *A Fortiori*, it is necessary for each supernatural action, Wawrykow could claim. On the other hand, Janz's position suffers from the same ambiguity that Wawrykow's does. He never clarifies whether God's *auxilium* in natural actions (let alone supernatural) is operative or cooperative. Would Ramirez (as the representative here of commentatorial Thomism) deny that a cooperative actual grace is necessary for each moral act (actual grace at least in the wide sense of natural motion). I do not think so. Nor does it follow that if God must give an operative grace for each supernatural action, that it must be a separate operative actual grace. One operative actual grace, since it moves toward the end, can give rise to manifold good actions under cooperative actual grace.

For these reasons, it seems best to simply affirm (based on the classical view of actual grace) that the gifts are necessary every time actual grace is necessary.²⁴² This may not require a separate operative actual grace for each numerical supernatural act or supernaturally willed end. Yet, *auxilium* (and thus the gifts also) are necessary for each act in another way, that is so that the acts of the other virtues can exist (since God must move us to them by his *auxilium/instinctus*).²⁴³ The gifts stand at the height and primary place in the supernatural life

²⁴⁰ Denis Janz, *Luther and Medieval Thomism: A Study in Theological Anthropology* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010), 45f.

²⁴¹ For these other positions see Pesch and Auer.

²⁴² Obviously this does not hold for the initial operative actual grace (a preparatory grace) because the believer does not yet have habitual grace (and thus lacks the gifts). Yet, the gifts are necessary for this grace in another sense, that our activity on the basis of it becomes connatural.

²⁴³ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.

because it is by them that God moves us to every supernatural action.²⁴⁴ They are at the beginning of each new autonomous series of actions by their proportion to operative and cooperative actual grace actual grace post justification. We may move ourselves on the basis of God's motion, but God always has the initiative, and thus so do the gifts.

In addition to these two formal arguments, there are fitting confirmations that the gifts are necessary perpetually in the supernatural life (i.e., for each supernatural action in the way outlined above). First, this vision of the supernatural organism maintains cooperation between the supernatural principles. Habitual grace, the gifts, the theological virtues, and the infused cardinal virtues work in concert. The supernatural organism as Aquinas conceives it is a continual cooperative venture between God's action, our habitual dispositions, and our free will. Not only do the gifts and virtues flow in an ordered fashion from their root in grace,²⁴⁵ but they also have an ordered and cooperative activity.²⁴⁶ Second, this conception of the necessity of the gifts can make sense of the gifts' existence in Christ. Christ did not have the virtues of faith or hope. Likewise, Christ's virtue of charity is most perfect. What are the difficult acts for which it was insufficient? Why does Christ have the gifts of understanding and knowledge? These are very difficult questions for those who hold the occasional operation of the gifts. Yet, these difficulties disappear if one conceives of the gifts not just as supplements to the virtues

²⁴⁴ *Super Rom.*, IV, l. 1, n. 329; *Super Rom.*, I, l. 5, n. 80; *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9.

²⁴⁵ The supernatural life is not less orderly than the natural life. See *ST I-II* q. 26, a. 6, co. This is a general principle of Aquinas's.

²⁴⁶ The gifts exist to aid both the theological virtues and gifts. *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, 2, and 5.

remedying the defects of this life, but also as making Christ's human nature proportionate to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.

In conclusion, it is telling that when Aquinas writes of the gifts' necessity it is at the end of his treatment of the intrinsic principles of good human action.²⁴⁷ In other words, the gifts form the crucial link between the intrinsic principles of good action and the extrinsic principle of good action, grace.²⁴⁸ Clearly then the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, God's *auxilium*, is indispensably and perpetually necessary in the supernatural life.²⁴⁹ Such is the fruit of properly understanding Aquinas's thought on necessity, *instinctus*, and the gifts. Yet even more so, it is the fruit of Aquinas's thought on grace and *auxilium*.

IV. Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit as Habits

Aquinas conceives of the gifts as habits.²⁵⁰ It is by the gifts that believers become habitually and structurally dependent on God's *instinctus*, God's supernatural motion. It is by the gifts that "the Holy Spirit always dwells in the saints."²⁵¹ Why call the gifts habits? Can grace help understand the habitual nature of the gifts to a greater degree? The purpose of this section is three-fold vis-à-vis those questions. First, it outlines why Aquinas uses the concept of habit to understand the indwelling of the Spirit by the gifts. In completing this first objective I also argue

²⁴⁷ ST I-II q. 49, prol.

²⁴⁸ ST I-II q. 109, prol.

²⁴⁹ ST II-II q. 45, a. 5, co.

²⁵⁰ For Aquinas's thought on habits see ST I-II 49ff.

²⁵¹ ST I-II q. 68, a. 3, co.: "*Unde quantum ad ea, Spiritus Sanctus semper manet in sanctis.*"

why the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits are necessary every time the *instinctus*/common *auxilium* moves the believer. Second, it argues that the gifts indirectly heal the wounds of original sin and elevate the subject to the supernatural level. Third, it argues that the gifts are operative and cooperative, operative in proportioning/disposing the believer to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and cooperative in any action produced by the gifts and free will (as commanded by charity).

The first reason Aquinas conceives of the gifts as habits is based on an analogy he draws between the gifts and the moral virtues.²⁵² In *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 3, he bases the whole of his argument for the habitual nature (the qualitative nature) of the gifts on an analogy between them and the moral virtues.²⁵³ The moral virtues perfect the appetitive power inasmuch as it is moved by reason and partakes of the perfection of reason.²⁵⁴ The gifts are analogous to the moral virtues whereas the Holy Spirit is compared to our reason. Since the moral virtues are habits so too are the gifts. In other words, Aquinas conceives of the gifts as habits to ensure the continual dependence of the graced subject on the motion of the Holy Spirit.²⁵⁵ That is the gifts *raison*

²⁵² *ST* I-II q. 49, a. 2, ad 3. Calling the gifts habits is much stronger than calling them dispositions, for dispositions are effortlessly destroyed whereas habits pertain to perfection and cannot be easily lost.

²⁵³ *ST* I-II q. 49, a. 2 & 3. Metaphysically speaking, habits are the first species of quality.

²⁵⁴ *ST* I-II q. 51, a. 2, co.: “Just as the habits of moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers inasmuch as they are moved by reason, also the habits of knowledge are caused in the intellect inasmuch as it is moved by first principles.”

²⁵⁵ Obviously, just as it is not necessary that each act of acquired moral virtue be the result of reason commanding, so too neither does each act of the gifts (or the other virtues on the basis of them) require a separate operative supernatural motion.

d'être.²⁵⁶ To put it differently, by the gifts graced man is placed directly under the order of the divine law,²⁵⁷ the ultimate measure of human action.²⁵⁸

It is not only to ensure the continual dependence of man on the direction of God that the gifts are conceived as habits, but also to respect man's freedom. The key to understanding this is the term 'proportion' in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co. According to Aquinas,

proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, triple and equal are species of proportion. In another sense, every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as an effect to its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God."²⁵⁹

For the gifts proportion to the *instinctus* of God, the second sense of proportion is paramount.

Aquinas claims that the gifts give the believer some kind of relation to God's movement.

Nevertheless, it is also something beyond a general and vague relation. As Aquinas says in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, it is also a *dispositio*. In other words, Aquinas understands the gifts as providing the perfection of the mobile in relation to the mover, the aptitude to be moved in a certain way. As

²⁵⁶ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 3, co.: "The gifts are certain perfections of man inasmuch as he is disposed by them to follow well the instinct of the Holy Spirit."

²⁵⁷ *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 3, co. & ad 3: "The eternal law exceeds natural reason. And for this reason the knowledge of human acts inasmuch as they are regulated by eternal law exceeds natural reason. Thus it requires the supernatural light of the gift of the Holy Spirit."; *ST* II-II q. 45, a. 2, co.; *ST* II-II q. 45, a. 3, co.

²⁵⁸ *ST* I-II q. 72, a. 6, co.: "Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak." Cf. also *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 3, co.; *ST* I-II q. 19, a. 10, co.

²⁵⁹ *ST* I q. 12, a. 1, ad 4: "*Ad quantum dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum.*"

John Farrell notes, “To put it in Thomas’ terms: the perfection of the mobile qua mobile, (and in no other respect), depends on its dispositio to be moved by this particular mover.”²⁶⁰

One example will suffice to bring out two elements in Farrell’s quote: a disposition is toward a one particular mover and not another;²⁶¹ a disposition is according to one way of being moved and not another.²⁶² A train has the disposition to be moved by its engine along a track. When it is moved by its engine, it is moved well for it is disposed to be so moved. It is disposed to be moved by the engine as one among many particular movers. The disposition is not toward any other mover (e.g. the wind). Likewise, it has the disposition to be moved in a certain way. The train is disposed to be moved along the track. Motion pushing the train off the track would be violent because there is no disposition in the train to be moved in that way. If a very powerful wind pushes the train off the track, it was certainly moved, but it had no disposition to be moved that way. It was in no way connatural to it. In other words, disposition in general is not only the potency toward a particular mover (the engine), but the potency to be moved well, that is according to the nature of the mobile (on the track). This example helps explain Aquinas’s common claim that the gifts dispose man to be moved *well* by the *instinctus/motio* of God,²⁶³ to be moved according to his nature as man.²⁶⁴ “God moves everything according to its mode.”²⁶⁵

²⁶⁰ John Farrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas’s Treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa Theologiae*, unpublished dissertation (Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh, 1984), 37.

²⁶¹ Farrell, *St. Thomas Aquinas’s Treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit*, 37.

²⁶² *ST II-II* q. 19, a. 9, co.

²⁶³ *ST II-II* q. 8, a. 5, co.: “The gifts of the Holy Spirit, as was said above [*ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co. & ad 3] perfect the soul to be moved well (*bene mobilis*) by the Holy Spirit.”

²⁶⁴ *Super Matt.*, X, l. 2, n. 849: “When [man is moved] with reason, then he is said to be moved by the Holy Spirit.”

The gifts dispose the believer to be moved by God (as a particular mover) according to the mode of human nature.²⁶⁶

Put in the converse, without the dispositions which are provided by the gifts, the common *auxilium* of God, the very involvement of God in the particulars of every day life by his operative and cooperative motions would not be connatural or cooperative. Without the gifts, the believer has no disposition to be moved supernaturally by God. Hence, the motion could never be cooperative, but only operative like the actual graces of preparation. The gifts are the disposition to be moved by God as a particular mover. As Aquinas says, “For a thing to be moved well by a certain mover, the first thing requires is that it be subject to that mover and not resistant because resistance of the moved impedes motion.”²⁶⁷ Likewise, the gifts are dispositions to be moved by God according to human nature, that is as a rational and free agent.²⁶⁸ This is why Aquinas claims that the *instinctus* of the gifts causes the very act of reason;²⁶⁹ the *instinctus* of the gifts moves man according to his nature.²⁷⁰ The gifts do not operate above human nature. There is no operational occasionalism in Aquinas.

²⁶⁵ ST II-II q. 52, a. 1, co.: “*Deus autem movet unumquodque secundum modum eius quod movetur...*”

²⁶⁶ ST II-II q. 52, a. 1, ad 3: “The sons of God are enacted (*aguntur*) by the Holy Spirit according to their mode, that is saving free decision which is the faculty of will and reason.”

²⁶⁷ ST II-II q. 19, a. 9, co.: “*ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit bene mobile ab aliquo movente, primo requiritur ut sit ei subiectum, non repugnans, quia ex repugnantia mobilis ad movens impeditur motus.*”

²⁶⁸ ST I-II q. 9, a. 4, ad 1.

²⁶⁹ ST II-II q. 45, a. 5, ad 3; ST II-II q. 52, a. 1, co.; ST II-II q. 52, a. 2, ad 3: “The moved-mover moves through being moved. Thus the human mind, since it is led by the Holy Spirit is able to lead itself and others.”

²⁷⁰ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635.

The virtues provide the disposition to be moved by the internal principle of reason; the gifts provide the disposition to be moved by the external principle, God. This disposition to be moved by God is not just in special higher acts, but to be moved at all. Likewise, in Aquinas's mature thought one cannot partition off God's causality to some occasional acts, as if he causes only some acts by his motion and not others. All supernatural acts are caused equally by God and reason.²⁷¹ Hence, inasmuch as reason must be moved by God, inasmuch as the theological virtues must be moved by God, inasmuch as every action in the supernatural life depends intimately on the first cause, they all require the gifts for their activity. In short, to pursue the supernatural end as a rational and free agent, one must have the gifts providing the disposition to be moved by God supernaturally.

It is only because of the gifts and the disposition they provide that man can be moved on a supernatural level with any freedom at all.²⁷² The gifts are habits because man is a moved mover, an acting instrument.²⁷³ In order to be free action must come from within.²⁷⁴ This is true not only inasmuch as God internally moves our faculties to will or do, but that our faculties have a native propensity or inclination to be moved by God (as a particular mover) in that certain way.²⁷⁵ Toward this end, Aquinas conceives of the gifts as habits whereby the believer is

²⁷¹ SCG III c. 70.

²⁷² ST I-II q. 6, a. 2, co.

²⁷³ ST I-II q. 68, a. 3, ad 2.

²⁷⁴ ST I q. 83, a. 1, ad 3.

²⁷⁵ *Super Rom.*, IX, l. 3, n. 773: "And so the very use (*usus*) of grace is from God. Yet this does not mean that the habit of grace is superfluous, just as natural forms are not superfluous, even God operates in all, because it is said that "God orders all things sweetly" (Wis 8:1). That is, through their forms all things are inclined as if spontaneously to that to which they are ordered by God."

proportionated/disposed to the *instinctus* of the Spirit.²⁷⁶ The gifts give believers the native inclinations (following them as forms) to be moved supernaturally by God.

This argument corroborates the conclusion of the last section, that the gifts are indispensably and perpetually necessary in the supernatural life. One is not moved by God (after justification) sweetly and connaturally without the presence of the gifts,²⁷⁷ as Aquinas says God moves things.²⁷⁸ In motion there is a mover, a moved, and a term of movement. In order for the mover to move the moved well (i.e., in accord with its nature), the moved must have a proportion/disposition to the mover. In humans, Aquinas claims this disposition is given by the gifts. The gifts make the subject proportionate to the motion of the Holy Spirit and are thus necessary in the strongest sense if the Holy Spirit (the mover) is going to move the human person (the moved). The two exceptions to this are the graces preparing for conversion and the *instinctus fidei*. One does not need the gifts to receive these graces. However, is it because of a lack of the gifts that these graces are not connatural or cooperative. In short, the gifts are absolutely indispensable for seeking the supernatural goal cooperatively because the motion of the Holy Spirit is indispensable. Indeed, this is the very reason why the gifts are absolutely and indispensably necessary to reach the supernatural end as a rational and free agent (as argued in

²⁷⁶ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635: “So too, it is not in the first instances through his own will but through an instinct of the Holy Spirit that the spiritual man is impelled to do something...this does not exclude, however, that spiritual persons act through their will and free choice, for it is the Holy Spirit who causes in them the very movement of their will and of their free choice.”

²⁷⁷ The exceptions to this are all the graces which come prior to justification (baptism or the desire for baptism). The disposition for this motion is inherent in nature.

²⁷⁸ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 2, co.

the above section). The gifts proportion the believer to the very motion of God, common *auxilium*.

In this way the gifts are importantly different from normal habits,²⁷⁹ for which the proximate mover is the activity of an immanent power.²⁸⁰ Indeed, the gifts introduce passivity into the very heart of the spiritual life.²⁸¹ It is a life whereby the believer does not lead, but is led. This is why Aquinas can say that the gift of counsel directs in all acts of virtue.²⁸² The gifts make God's directing of the believer's life connatural, just as the acquired virtues make the movement of reason connatural for the passions.

Identifying the gifts as habits also allows Aquinas's thought on grace to make a contribution to our understanding of the gifts. Aquinas does not just give the characteristics of habits in the treatise on habits, but also in speaking about grace. From Aquinas's thought on

²⁷⁹ Aquinas says that habits have a two-fold relation. One is to the nature (subject) which they perfect and the other is to the acts toward which they tend. See *ST I-II* q. 49, a. 4, co. Yet they also have a relation to the active principle which causes them. In this case the relation is to the Holy Spirit himself as mover. Cf. *ST I-II* q. 54, a. 2, co.

²⁸⁰ Both the intellect and the will are moved this way by God on a natural level. cf. *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 4. The intellect moves itself from knowledge of principles to knowledge of conclusions and the will moves itself from willing the end to willing the means. The intellect moves the will by means of formal causality and the will moves the intellect by efficient causality. Of course, this is not to prejudice the motion of God, which occurs through the intellect and will because he made them (*ST I* q. 90, a. 2) and because he draws them by way of final causality (*ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6). Nevertheless, man decides which particular good, true or apparent, he will seek (*ST I-II* a. 9, a. 6, ad 3).

²⁸¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 3. The infused virtues are to make the human subject amiable to the direction of reason elevated by grace. Yet, as stated above, grace elevated reason is insufficient on the supernatural level and can only be a proper director through continual guidance and motion from the Holy Spirit. Hence, the infused virtues and the gifts are related to the same source of motion but the virtues are only indirectly related thereto, i.e. through their proportion to reason. This is intelligible, since the gifts and the virtues produce the same acts. Hence, they must share the same rule. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and reason are not contrary to one another, but exist as primary and secondary causes of supernatural action. See *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 4, n. 635. God by his *instinctus* causes the motion of reason.

²⁸² *ST II-II* q. 52, a. 4, ad 1.

grace I can gather two further traits of the gifts which help one to better understand their being and operation. It is to those two topics which I now turn.

IVb. Are the Gifts Healing and Elevating?

In order to answer the primary question governing this section, I must first ask what Aquinas means by habitual grace. It is habitual grace which is healing²⁸³ and elevating²⁸⁴ according to Aquinas. The real question is whether this term ‘habitual grace’ applies to grace taken as root, or to all the supernatural virtues (including their graced root). If it applies to grace taken as root, then another argument will have to be made concerning the gifts’ elevating and healing status. If it applies indifferently to all the infused virtues (and their graced root), then clearly the gifts are healing and elevating. The section argues the former: Aquinas uses the term ‘habitual grace’ for the habit infused into the essence of the soul. Hence, when Aquinas says habitual grace is healing and elevating he is primarily speaking about the entitative habit infused into the essence of the soul. Nevertheless, one should not too strictly separate habitual grace from the superantural habits, which necessarily flower from it. On this basis, I argue that even though Aquinas never explicitly states that the supernatural habits are healing and elevating, they

²⁸³ It is clear that Aquinas conceives of healing grace as habitual grace in relation to fallen nature. In other words, healing is simply an operative effect of habitual grace. See *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 3, co.; q. 109, a. 4, co.; q. 109, a. 8, co.: “In the state of corrupt nature, man needs habitual grace healing his nature so that he can in every way abstain from sin”; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co. & ad 1; q. 111, a. 2, co.: “If we take grace for the habitual gift, so even then the effect of grace is twofold, just as every other form, which first gives being and then operation.... So therefore habitual grace inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, makes it pleasing to God, is said to be operative grace, but inasmuch as it is the principle of merit (which also proceeds from free decision) is said to be cooperative.” *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 3, co.

²⁸⁴ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.: “In order to live rightly man needs a twofold help of grace. In one way he needs grace inasmuch as it is a habitual gift through which corrupt human nature is healed and being healed it is elevated to do works meritorious of eternal life, which exceeds the proportion of nature. In another way man needs the help of grace so that he is moved by God to act.”

do heal and elevate their human subject. Likewise, I argue the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit (taken as motion) is healing and elevating as a member of *gratia gratum faciens*.

It is manifest that habitual grace does not include the divine *auxilium* in the most narrow sense. Aquinas clearly distinguishes between them. For example, in responding to the objections of *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, Aquinas is forced to make a distinction between habitual grace and the divine motion. “The gift of habitual grace is not given to us that we may no longer need another divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from him.”²⁸⁵ Clearly habitual grace does not include the divine motion. The divine motion is not habitual.²⁸⁶ This does not mean that *auxilium* is not a part of *gratia gratum faciens*. It is.²⁸⁷ Graced *auxilium* both prepares for habitual grace and moves the subject of it to good works post-justification.²⁸⁸ Since motion is reduced to the genus of the form to which it moves, and habitual grace is clearly healing and elevating, so too is *auxilium*. It is clear thus, inasmuch as the *instinctus* of God is common divine *auxilium*, the *instinctus* of the gifts is imperfectly healing and elevating. It sustains the elevating functions of dispositional actual graces.²⁸⁹ It is healing in moving us to use the habitual gift of grace,²⁹⁰ that is act on the basis of our fundamental gift in habitual grace.²⁹¹

²⁸⁵ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, ad 1: “*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod donum habitualis gratiae non ad hoc datur nobis ut per ipsum non indigeamus ulterius divino auxilio, indiget enim quaelibet creatura ut a Deo conservetur in bono quod ab ipso accepit.*”

²⁸⁶ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, co.

²⁸⁷ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 1 & 2. This is clear from Aquinas’s division, for clearly *auxilium* is not a charism.

²⁸⁸ *ST* I-II q. 112, a. 2, co.; *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 6, co.: “It is clear that man is not able to prepare himself to receive the light of grace, unless through the gratuitous help of God interiorly moving.” *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 & 10.

²⁸⁹ Obviously for the *auxilium* which preceeds justification, the subject does not yet have the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, the gifts make this motion connatural, a structural part of the supernatural life, and render the believer continually dependent on God’s motion to act well. See *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 and *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, co.: “And so the

None of this answers the question about the gifts though. The real question, as stated above, is whether Aquinas means habitual grace in a strict sense or inclusively. If Aquinas means the term collectively (i.e. in a quasi-generic fashion), then the character traits of habitual grace can be predicated of all members. The virtues and gifts would then be healing and elevating. If Aquinas means it strictly, then the virtues and gifts would not seem to be healing or elevating.

Aquinas uses the term habitual grace nineteen times in his treatise on grace.²⁹² Can any of these citations reveal if Aquinas uses this term in the wide or narrow sense? Out of the many instances, Aquinas only sheds light on this question in *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3-4. Nowhere else is Aquinas in a context where he must distinguish between the different elements of *gratia gratum faciens*. Here Aquinas clearly distinguishes between grace taken as root and the supernatural habits which flow from it. Surprisingly what Aquinas distinguishes from the supernatural virtues is *gratia* simply taken.²⁹³ This would make it seem that habitual grace is being used in a wide sense elsewhere; when he specifically distinguishes habitual grace from the supernatural habits he does not use the term. However, other parts of these articles reveal that habitual grace does not include the infused habits but is simply the form infused into the essence of the soul.

motion by which God moves is connatural and easy to the creature as it is said in Wisdom 8: “he disposes all things sweetly.” Much more thus does he, in those who he moves to follow (*consequendum*) the eternal supernatural good, infuse certain supernatural forms or qualities, according to which the believer is sweetly and promptly moved by him to seek the eternal good. And so the grace of God is a certain quality.”

²⁹⁰ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

²⁹¹ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2.

²⁹² *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 1, ad 1; a. 6, co. & ad 3; a. 7, co.; a. 8, co.; a. 9, co. & ad 1-3; a. 10, co.; q. 110, a. 2, co.; q. 111, a. 2, co.; q. 112, a. 2, co.

²⁹³ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3.

Two examples serve to prove that the narrow use of the term is Aquinas's primary sense. The first occurs in Aquinas's response to the third objection of article three. In his response, Aquinas claims that grace, the same grace distinguished from the supernatural habits, is a certain habit (*habitus*) which is presupposed to the infused virtues.²⁹⁴ Second, in the corpus of article one, Aquinas says that the habitual gift (*habituale donum*), is infused by God into the soul. Now the supernatural virtues are located in the powers, whereas habitual grace is located in the essence of the soul.²⁹⁵ Hence, it seems most likely that Aquinas takes the term habitual grace to mean exclusively grace infused into the essence of the soul.²⁹⁶ Thus, when Aquinas says habitual grace is healing/elevating, he is speaking of habitual grace in the strict sense. He does not mean habitual grace in the wide sense is healing and elevating.

Nevertheless, that habitual grace is healing and elevating is not the whole story. Recall that by healing grace Aquinas denotes an effect of habitual grace, its relation to nature inasmuch as it is fallen.²⁹⁷ Aquinas does not limit the healing effects of habitual grace to the essence of the soul. That would be an odd position, principally because the effects of original sin are not simply 'located' in the essence of the soul (the loss of the integrity of nature).²⁹⁸ Certainly original sin is primarily seated in the essence of the soul itself (as a privation) and not in its powers.

²⁹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, ad 3: "Grace is reduced to the first species of quality. Nevertheless, it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain habit which is presupposed to the infused virtues, just as their principle and root."

²⁹⁵ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 4, co.: "Just as grace remains prior to virtue because it has its subject prior to the powers of the soul, i.e. the essence of the soul."

²⁹⁶ *ST* III q. 2, a. 10, ad 2: "habitual grace is only in the soul." Cf. also *ST* III q. 7, a. 1.

²⁹⁷ *ST* I-II q. 109, aa. 4 & 8.

²⁹⁸ *ST* I-II q. 83, a. 2, co.: "The essence of the soul is the first subject of original sin."

Nevertheless, the powers too suffer from the effects of original sin and need healing.²⁹⁹ They too need to be elevated to the supernatural order. Now since habitual grace does not reside in the powers, it cannot heal them or elevate them directly.³⁰⁰ Yet Aquinas holds that the powers are healed and elevated.³⁰¹ How can habitual grace cause this? It must perform this function through the supernatural virtues which flow from it.³⁰² Hence, in a secondary sense, the supernatural virtues and gifts are healing and elevating. They are the means through which habitual grace heals the inclination of the powers of the soul.³⁰³ They are the means through which man walks according to the new nature of habitual grace.³⁰⁴

Now I may return to the original question governing this section. Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit healing and elevating? I may safely say “yes”, in a secondary sense. They are healing; they return nature to its proper activity.³⁰⁵ The correct relation of the human person to God as principle of good activity is damaged by sin.³⁰⁶ It is right for rational nature to be

²⁹⁹ *ST* I-II q. 83, a. 3, co.; *ST* I-II q. 85, a. 1, co.

³⁰⁰ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 4, co.

³⁰¹ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

³⁰² *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.

³⁰³ *ST* I-II q. 85, a. 1, co.

³⁰⁴ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.: “So the infused virtues perfect man for walking fittingly according to the light of grace.”

³⁰⁵ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 4, co.: “We are able to speak of man “in two ways: integral nature or corrupt nature. According to the state of integral nature, even without habitual grace, man would be able to avoid both mortal and venial sin because to sin is something which causes man to fall back from nature – and in a state of integral nature man could do this. Yet he would not be able to do this without the help of God conserving him in the good, which if withdrawn would cause man to fall back into nothingness. In the state of corrupt nature, man needs habitual grace healing his nature, so that he man in every way abstain from sin.”

³⁰⁶ God moves all things according to their nature (applies them to their activity). See *ST* I-II q. 93 & 105, a. 5. Nevertheless, when nature is wounded by sin, God can no longer effectively move it because of the defect in the

efficiently moved by God not simply in the general sense, but to right action in the particular.³⁰⁷

We have, after sin, lost the inclination to reason and will correctly in the practical order.³⁰⁸ In other words, we are not fully and properly related to God as first efficient cause of our action.³⁰⁹

The improportion caused by sin between the subject and God as the efficient cause of right action in the particular is restored by the gifts.³¹⁰

The gifts also, by the same proportioning to God's motion, elevate nature beyond its natural operation thereby perfecting it.³¹¹ According to nature, we cannot know the contingent.³¹²

secondary cause in relation to his motion. This defect in relation to his motion is healed by the gifts. See *ST I-II* q. 68, aa. 1 & 2.

³⁰⁷ *ST I-II* q. 19, a. 10, co.: "But nevertheless in both these ways the human will is conformed to the divine will in a certain way. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to the divine will in the common reason for willing, it is conformed to it in the ultimate end. While, however, inasmuch as it is not conformed to it in the thing willed, it is conformed to it according to the reason of the efficient cause because the thing has the proper inclination following from nature, or the particular apprehension of this thing, from God just as from an effective cause. Hence, it is customary to say that that the will, in this respect, conforms to the divine will because it wills what God wants. There is another way of conformity, which is on account of the formal cause, just as man wills something from charity, just as God wills. And moreover, this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in the order to the ultimate end, which is the proper object of charity."

³⁰⁸ See also *ST I-II* q. 85, a. 3, co.: "And these are the four wounds from the sin of those others, inasmuch as through sin also reason is blunted, especially in relation to action. The will is hardened to the good. We have greater difficulties in acting well. Concupiscence blazes up."

³⁰⁹ Charity heals our relation to God as final cause and object. The infused cardinal virtues heal us in relation to those things *ad finem*. The gifts in turn heal us inasmuch as God moves us. See *ST I-II* q. 65, a. 2, ad 2: "In order that the act of a lower power may be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher power but also in the lower. For even if the principal agent has the right way, it would not follow that action would be perfect if the instrument is not well disposed. Whence it is necessary for right human action that man needs both those virtues which are related to the end and those virtues related to things referred to the end. For the virtue which regards the end is the principle and mover with respect to those things toward the end."

³¹⁰ *ST I-II* q. 68, aa. 1 & 2.

³¹¹ *ST II-II* q. 9, a. 1, co.: "Grace is more perfect than nature. Hence, it does not fail in those things in which man can be perfected by nature."

³¹² *ST II-II* q. 47, a. 9, ad 2; q. 49, a. 1, co.; q. 49, a. 2, ad 1; q. 49, a. 6, co.; q. 49, a. 8, co.; q. 51, a. 1, ad 2: "It is able to be said that human virtue is perfect according to the human mode, which is not able to be certain of the truth of the things it simply regards, and this is especially in activity, which is concerned with the contingent." q. 52, a. 1,

It is too variable. Yet, humans are by nature (and virtue)³¹³ ordered to know the truth in the practical order.³¹⁴ It is by the gifts that we achieve what our intellect can naturally obtain, but in a higher and fuller way. By the gifts we are moved to a right estimate of the contingent by connaturality,³¹⁵ which includes a certainty beyond what could be achieved by our natural lights alone.³¹⁶ This elevation does not destroy nature, but perfects it.³¹⁷ It enables nature to reach its proper object in a higher and fuller way.

In both these ways (again, in a secondary sense), the gifts are the tools through which habitual grace heals our relation to God as first mover and thus toward right activity in the contingencies of this life.³¹⁸ The operative effect of the gifts is to proportion the believer to God's motion. Thereby the gifts both help to heal the wounds of original sin and elevate nature

ad 1: "Prudence or *eubolia*, whether acquired or infused, leads man in counsel according to those things with reason is able to comprehend. Thus man who has prudence or *eubolia* can well take counsel for himself or others. But because human reason is not able to comprehend the singular and contingent things which can happen, 'the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain' (Wis. 9:14). And for this reason man needs to be led by God in counsel, who comprehends all things. This is through the gift of counsel whereby man is directed by God as if counseled by him, just as in human affairs when counsel is not sufficient unto itself the counsel the counsel of the wise is required."

³¹³ *ST* II-II q. 47, a. 1, co.: "Actions are about those things which are singular. For this reason it is necessary that prudence know both the universal principles of reason and those singular things about which actions are."

³¹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 94, a. 2, co.; *ST* I q. 79, a. 11, co.: "It happens in things apprehended by the intellect that they are ordained to action or not. According to this difference the speculative and practical intellect differ. For the speculative intellect in its apprehension of truth is not ordered to action, but simply to a consideration of the truth. The practical apprehends the truth to order it to action."

³¹⁵ *Super Rom.*, XII, l. 1, n. 966.

³¹⁶ *ST* II-II q. 45 & 52.

³¹⁷ *ST* I q. 1, a. 8, co. "...*enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat.*"

³¹⁸ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 1, n. 617. It is no mistake that Aquinas makes all the intellectual gifts in some sense (directly or indirectly) ordered to the practical and contingent, i.e. to action. See *ST* II-II qq. 8, 9, 45, and 52.

beyond its natural operation. Such truths about the gifts only come to light when they are read in conjunction with Aquinas's thought on grace.

IVa. Are the Gifts Operative and Cooperative?

As seen above, identifying the gifts as supernatural habits enables the treatise on grace to make a contribution to understanding properly the gifts. This same contribution to understanding the gifts occurs in another way as well: the gifts are both operative and cooperative. I will first look more precisely at this division in St. Thomas and then outline how it applies to the gifts.

In *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, Aquinas gives his definitive treatment of operative and cooperative grace. Aquinas says that grace can be taken as operative/cooperative in two ways. The first way is the divine *auxilium* by which God moves us to will and to act well.³¹⁹ The second way is the habitual gift (*donum habituale*) within us. Aquinas continues by noting that in both these ways grace can fittingly be divided into operative and cooperative. Operative grace is when the human subject is completely passive. He is not a moved mover, but is simply moved.³²⁰ Cooperative grace, on the other hand, involves both the motion of God and of the subject of grace. The justified human is both moved and moves.³²¹

The distinction applies to both *auxilium/motio* and the habitual gift. God moves us operatively to the interior act of the will (especially when it changes from willing evil to

³¹⁹ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: “*bene volendum et agendum.*”

³²⁰ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: “For the act of a certain effect is not attributed to the moved, but to the mover. In that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved and does not move, however God only moves, the operation is attributed to God. According to this grace is called operative.”

³²¹ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: “In that effect wherein our mind is moved and also moves, the operation is not solely attributed to God, but also to the soul. In this grace is called cooperative.”

good).³²² God cooperatively moves us to the commanded act of the will by strengthening us interiorly and giving the exterior faculty of operation.³²³ These two effects do not divide the motion; operative and cooperative grace are one numerical motion. As Aquinas says: “Operative and cooperative are the very same grace, but are distinguished according to diverse effects, as is clear from what was said.”³²⁴ God operatively moves us to the willing of the end³²⁵ and based on that motion cooperates with the commanded act of the will in seeking that end.³²⁶ The habitual gift, on the other hand, is called operative inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul. God works on the subject without the subject being active. The habitual gift is taken as cooperative when the same principle which justifies us becomes a co-principle of meritorious action, which springs both from the habitual gift and from free will.

As noted above, the gifts include two principles. There is a habitual gift which permanently qualifies the subject and the *instinctus* to which it is proportioned/disposed. Can these be better understood on the basis of Thomas’s distinction between operative and

³²² ST I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: “especially when the will, which had previously willed evil, begins to will the good.”

³²³ ST I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: “interiorly confirming the will so that it may pass into act, and exteriorly providing the means/opportunity to act.”

³²⁴ ST I-II q. 111, a. 2, ad 4: “*operans et cooperans est eadem gratia, sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus.*”

³²⁵ Granted that the interior acts of the will are manifold (velleity, intention, choice, consent, use, and enjoyment). Why limit operative grace to intention then (the effective willing of the end)? Lonergan proves that one should. See Lonergan, 137-141. Also, Aquinas makes reference to a clear case in which a new end is intended (conversion).

³²⁶ ST I-II q. 111, a. 2, ad 3: “And for this reason, now placed under the end, it follows that grace cooperates with us.”

cooperative grace? I think so.³²⁷ Each can be divided by its effects into operative and cooperative.

The *instinctus* to which the gifts proportion the believer has both operative and cooperative effects. This motion moves us both to act and to act well supernaturally. It moves us operatively to any supernatural end which cannot be an integral part of a previous series of supernatural acts. In this the subject is not free. On the basis of this motion toward the end in a new autonomous series of actions, the believer can then move herself to will the means to this end. Toward this end the *instinctus* is called operative. Toward any commanded act in the direction of that end (whether it is the intellect or the will), the same grace which moved operatively is called cooperative.³²⁸ In this way the whole series is attributed to God.³²⁹

The gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits can also be divided into operative and cooperative. Although each habit is numerically singular, they are distinguished by their two effects: being and operation. Operatively the gifts make the subject proportionate/disposed to the movement of the Holy Spirit (to supplement the insufficiency of the theological and infused cardinal

³²⁷ In order to apply these categories to the gifts, I must first deal with an objection for their application to the gifts taken as habits (clearly it would apply to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit). In this article Aquinas seems to be talking simply about the grace infused into the soul of man. It is this form that qualifies as operative and cooperative. Is it an abuse of Aquinas's thought to extend the operative/cooperative distinction to any habitual form? I do not think so. In this article Aquinas does apply the operative/cooperative distinction to grace, but only because he holds it to apply to every form. Now inasmuch as the gifts are forms (separable qualities are formal and active vis-à-vis their subject), the distinction would apply to them as well. See *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: "...just as with every other form, of which the first is to be and the second is operation."

³²⁸ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, ad 3.

³²⁹ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, ad 2.

virtues).³³⁰ This is simply another way of saying that the gifts provide the disposition for God to move us well. This includes both activation and supplementation. The gifts serve as an immanent principle of supernatural action, the very motion/instinct of the Holy Spirit serving as the external principle.³³¹ Cooperatively the gifts are commanded by charity upon their relative matter.

As I noted at the end of the last section, it is telling that Aquinas locates his question on the gifts at the end of the intrinsic principles of good action in the *Summa*. The gifts as habits form the crucial link between the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of good human action, between free will and God's supernatural motion. They dispose the believer to God's common *auxilium* thereby healing the individuals relation to God as an efficient cause by their operative effect and walking in proportion with habitual grace as their cooperative. All of this only becomes clear when Aquinas's thought on the gifts is read in light of his broader thought on grace.

³³⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co. *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co. *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 3. This is because both the theological and infused cardinal virtues must be moved as instruments to be operative. See *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co. The infused virtues are proportionate to the movement of reason's direction, whereas "the gifts, as distinct from the infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to his motion." Yet the motion of reason does not suffice on the supernatural level, cf. *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co: "But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Spirit." In other words, it is by the instinct of the Holy Spirit that reason operates on a supernatural level. God moves us by the gifts causing the very acts of the intellect and will. On the basis of God's activity via the gifts we act with those virtues proportioned to reason. In Aquinas's mature thought, there is no dichotomy between the action of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and reason. Both are operative, reason only because of the *instinctus* and the *instinctus* only through reason.

³³¹ *ST* I-II q. 109, prol; q. 109, a. 9, ad 1.

V. Further Implications of Grace for the Gifts

As seen above, Aquinas's thought on grace has major implications for understanding the gifts' distinction from the virtues, recognizing the necessity of the gifts, and conceiving of the gifts as habits. These are the major places of import in Aquinas's thought on grace. Nevertheless, Aquinas's thought on grace also makes some smaller contributions for understanding the gifts. Aquinas's thought on grace shows a deeper connectivity of the gifts (and the supernatural virtues) in habitual grace; Aquinas's thought on grace proves the endurance of the gifts in heaven; Aquinas's thought on grace explains the very principle Aquinas is using in assessing the relative excellence of the virtues and the gifts. It is to these minor topics I now turn.

Va. Grace and the connectivity of the gifts

Aquinas famously holds the thesis that the moral virtues are connected through prudence.³³² Less well known though, is his contention that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are also connected through charity in a similar way.³³³ In looking at Aquinas's doctrine on the connectivity of the gifts, I contend that his doctrine on grace has substantial import for understanding the connectivity of the whole supernatural organism. In order to make this clear, I first outline in summary fashion Aquinas's doctrine on the connectivity of the moral virtues. I then transpose it onto the gifts. Next, I solve a lingering difficulty with Aquinas's conception of the gifts' interaction with charity (the proximate source of their connection). Finally, I argue that habitual grace provides the fundamental reason for connectivity.

³³² *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 1.

³³³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5.

In order to understand the connectivity of the gifts, one must first understand Aquinas's doctrine on the connectivity of the moral virtues. This is so because Aquinas understands the connectivity of the gifts in relation to the connectivity of the virtues. "Just as the powers of the appetite are disposed to the rule of reason by the moral virtues so all the powers of the soul are disposed in relation to the movement of the Holy Spirit by the gifts."³³⁴ Hence, I will begin with a very short summary of Aquinas's thought on the connectivity of the moral virtues.

Before outlining Aquinas's arguments for the connectivity of the virtues, it is helpful to first note what Aquinas means when he claims the virtues are connected. Put simply, to claim that the virtues are connected is to claim that the operation of each moral virtue requires that of the other moral virtues.³³⁵ In other words, if one is lacking a certain virtue, then one's other inclinations toward certain activities cannot be considered virtues.³³⁶ Virtue, by definition, perfects both the possessor and his activity.³³⁷ Activity cannot be perfect unless all the virtues are possessed since they are principles of each other. Indeed, this is the most fundamental reason for connectivity. One virtue being the principle of the other is the real key to Aquinas's doctrine of connectivity.³³⁸ This will become clearer when I outline Aquinas's reasons for holding the connectivity thesis.

³³⁴ ST I-II q. 68, a. 5, co.: "*Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem.*"

³³⁵ ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, s.c.

³³⁶ ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, ad 1.

³³⁷ ST I-II q. 55, a. 3, s.c.; ST I-II q. 55, a. 1, co.

³³⁸ ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, ad 4.

Aquinas holds to the connectivity of the moral virtues (considered as complete or perfect)³³⁹ whether these virtues are taken as general or particular.³⁴⁰ If the virtues are taken according to their general ratio,³⁴¹ Aquinas claims it is clear that one cannot be virtuous without the others. “As was said above, certain authors distinguish the virtues as general conditions, so that discretion pertains to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to prudence, and firmness of soul to fortitude, as exercised in all activities. And according to this the reason for connection is apparent, for firmness is not praised as virtuous without moderation or rectitude without discretion and so on.”³⁴² On the other hand, Aquinas reasons, if the virtues are not considered general conditions, if the virtues are divided with respect to their matter, then the virtues still require each other for their activity. The virtues will still be principles of each other. Prudence judges the very mean of the other virtues,³⁴³ chooses the virtuous means, and executes³⁴⁴ toward the ends of moral virtue. Nobody can be imprudently just or imprudently brave. Such would not be just or brave. Prudence commands the acts of the other virtues and so is their principle in the executional order. Yet, conversely, prudence cannot be without the moral virtues which rightly

³³⁹ ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, co.: “And in this way of taking the moral virtues, they are not connected, for we find men who by natural temperament or some custom are propted to acts of liberality, which nevertheless are not prompted to do deeds of chastity.”

³⁴⁰ ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, co.

³⁴¹ ST I-II q. 63, a. 1.

³⁴² ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, co.: “*Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem ratio est de aliis.*”

³⁴³ ST II-II q. 47, a. 7, co.

³⁴⁴ ST I-II q. 65, a. 1, co.

dispose man toward the end.³⁴⁵ Prudence presupposes the end toward which it reasons,³⁴⁶ the “human good”.³⁴⁷ Without the other virtues prudence would be a blind guide aiming at false goods. The other virtues are the principles of prudence in the intentional order.

A similar dynamic of connectivity, mutual requirement, and causality can be observed between charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, with a few key differences. The first difference is that for the supernatural virtues connectivity is first in the order of being and then in the order of activity. For the acquired virtues the doctrine of connectivity arises first in the order of activity. Both the intentional order and the executorial order fall within the order of activity. The gifts and charity are certainly connected in these ways, but only because of their prior connection in the order of being. Hence, I will start with the connectivity in the order of being and then

³⁴⁵ *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 1, ad 4: “Those things to which the moral virtues incline relate to prudence just as principles.” *ST* I-II q. 77, a. 1, co.: “In another way on the part of the object of the will, which is the good apprehended by reason. Because judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded by vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as is clear in those insane. However, it is manifest that the sensitive appetite and the judgment of the estimative follow the apprehension of the imagination just as the judgment of taste follows from the disposition of the tongue. Thus, we see that men existing in some kind of passion do not easily turn their imagination away. Thus, as a consequence the judgment of reason usually follows the passions of the sensitive appetite. And as a consequence the motion of the will does too, since it follows the judgment of reason.” For Aquinas’s use of the Aristotelian principle that such as a man is so the end seems to him, see: *ST* I q. 83, a. 1, ad 5; *ST* I-II q. 9, a. 2, co.; *ST* I-II q. 58, a. 5, co.; *ST* II-II q. 24, a. 11, co.

³⁴⁶ *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 1, co.: “Others however distinguish these virtues according to their matter. And in this way the reason for connectivity is given by Aristotle in the sixth book of the *Ethics*. As it was said above, no moral virtue is able to be without prudence, since it is proper to moral virtue to make the right choice, since it is an elective habit. Nevertheless, for right choice, the inclination to the right end does not suffice (the direct outcome of moral virtue) but also prudence which chooses those things toward the end, which is to counsel, judge, and command those things toward the end. Similarly, however, prudence is not able to be had without the moral virtues since prudence is right reason about things to be done. This proceeds from the end of those things done as from a principle. For the end one must have the moral virtues. Thus, just as speculative science is not able to be without understanding of the principles, so neither prudence without the moral virtues. From this it is manifest that the moral virtues are connected.”

³⁴⁷ *ST* II-II q. 47, a. 6, co.: “*quod finis virtutum moralium est bonum humanum.*”

proceed to outline the connectivity in the order of activity (including the intentional and executorial orders).

The connectivity in the order of being is one-sided. In other words the gifts are connected in the theological virtues but the theological virtues are not connected in the gifts. In the order of being the theological virtues are prior as principles of the gifts;³⁴⁸ they cause the primal union with God and give rise to the gifts.³⁴⁹ In this order (the formal order) there does not seem to be a mutual requirement for existence. The theological virtues are the causes of the gifts, but the gifts are in no way the cause of the theological virtues.

In the order of activity, there is a much closer mutual connectivity between charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The gifts are prior in the executorial order and posterior in the intentional order. More precisely, one should say that the gifts operative effect is prior to the cooperative effect of charity whereas the cooperative effect of charity is prior to the cooperative effect of the gifts. In the order of activity the gifts (only inasmuch as they provide the powers of the soul the disposition to be moved, the operative effect) are prior since God's motion/*instinctus/auxilium* is the very well spring of all supernatural activity.³⁵⁰ The gifts are thus prior in the order of execution (in some sense) and use the other virtues as instruments.³⁵¹

³⁴⁸ *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

³⁴⁹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3: "The soul of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it is in some way united to him, just as an instrument is not moved by the artisan unless through contact or through a certain union. However the first union [with God] is through faith, hope, and love. Whence those virtues are presupposed to the gifts, just as the roots of certain gifts. Thus all the gifts pertain to those three virtues, just as certain derivations of them." *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3; *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

³⁵⁰ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

³⁵¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.: "But in those things which imperfectly have a certain nature, form, or virtue, are not able to operate by themselves, unless they are moved by another." To operate based on the motion

Nevertheless, charity also has as priority in the order of activity akin to prudence, that is by directing the cooperative acts of the gifts. Charity is prior in the order of final causality. It orders the acts of the gifts to God as their final cause and end, given the previous movement caused by the *instinctus*/gift combination.³⁵² Charity commands and regulates the acts of the gifts, directs them *ad finem*. Hence, it is prior in the intentional order.

Notice that the parallel with prudence and the moral virtues is not one-to-one.³⁵³ In the case of the moral virtues and prudence, the moral virtues have the priority in the intentional order and prudence in the executorial order. For charity and the gifts, charity has priority in the intentional order and the executorial order (when the gifts are taken according to their cooperative effect).³⁵⁴ The gifts are connected in the order of activity by charity because they require charity to command their activity. Nevertheless, the gifts are also required for charity's act. The gifts in their operative effect have priority in the executorial order in their providing the

of another is the very essence of an instrument. Cf. *ST* I q. 36, a. 3, ad 2 & *SCG* II c. 21: "But it is only in order to cause something by way of motion that an instrument is ever employed; for to be a moved mover is the very essence of an instrument." Charity, by providing the final cause of all action, commands all the acts of virtue.

³⁵² *ST* I-II q. 23, a. 8.

³⁵³ For related material on the priority between charity and the gifts see chapter III, section IIIb. An alternate account to the one I have outlined here which draws a much closer connection between the place of the gifts and the place of the moral virtues would be as follows: the gifts are necessary for charity because it is by them that God moves us to the subordinate ends of the supernatural life. They thus stand in the same place as the moral virtues. They place the subject in right relation to the subordinate ends of the supernatural life, although charity rightly relates the subject to the ultimate end, eternal beatitude. Hence, charity gives rise to the acts of the gifts in the order of execution. In this order, charity enlivens and uses the gifts to seek the ends to which it was moved by God in the intentional order. The gifts are necessary for right motion and estimation of the ends which charity seeks and also for the means charity chooses in this life.

³⁵⁴ *ST* I-II q. 26, aa. 1-2; *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 2, co.: "For the right reasoning of prudence being rightly related to the ultimate end, which is by charity, is more required than those things toward other ends, which are through moral virtues, just as in speculative matters one most needs the first indemonstrable principle, which is the principle of non-contradiction." See also *De Caritate* q. 3, co.

disposition to be moved by God, since (as explained above) it is by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and the disposition of the gifts that charity proceeds to act. Yet, given the disposition provided by the gifts, charity (by serving as the form of the virtues) commands and regulates the acts of the gifts.³⁵⁵ Put differently, since the gifts provide the disposition to be moved relative to God as first principle of activity, they have efficient priority whereas charity has the priority of final causality.³⁵⁶ Actually, it is more complicated than that. I will more fully explain this mutual dependence in the next chapter's section on the division of habitual grace. What is important to note now is that the gifts are connected because they are commanded and regulated by charity, just as the moral virtues are connected because they are commanded and regulated by prudence. Yet in both cases the activity of the gifts or the moral virtues is required for their commander.

Beyond the connectivity of the gifts with charity, there are a myriad of connections between the supernatural habits: faith and hope for charity,³⁵⁷ charity for the infused moral virtues and gifts,³⁵⁸ infused prudence for the infused moral virtues and vice-versa,³⁵⁹ the gifts for the infused moral virtues,³⁶⁰ the gifts for the theological virtues,³⁶¹ etc. Even if it were the purpose of this project to outline all of these connections (which it is not), the picture would be

³⁵⁵ *De Caritate* q. 3, co.

³⁵⁶ *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 2, ad 2.

³⁵⁷ *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 5.

³⁵⁸ *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 2.

³⁵⁹ *ST* I-II q. 65, a. 1.

³⁶⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8; *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

³⁶¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2.

inadequate unless one recognizes the fundamental reason all the supernatural virtues are connected in such ways. That reason comes from the Aquinas's thought on grace and his contention that habitual grace is infused into the essence of the soul and gives rise to the supernatural virtues as a root system gives rise to a flower.³⁶²

This is where Aquinas's thought on grace makes a fundamental contribution to the doctrine of connectivity. Remember that connectivity can belong to different orders. The obvious candidates are the order of intention and execution. Nevertheless, what is often missed is the connection in the order of being, the formal order, (i.e., habitual grace gives rise to the theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues). This order is not immediately about second act, but primarily about the fundamental existence of the supernatural principles. In this sense, the theological virtues, gifts, and infused moral virtues are all connected since they arise from habitual grace and are tools of it as the fundamental principle of merit.³⁶³ Strictly speaking,

³⁶² The infusion of grace into the very essence of the soul (ST I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.) flows forth into the powers producing the theological virtues, the first fruits of grace (ST I-II q. 110, a. 4, ad 1). Nevertheless, neither can man have the theological virtues without the gifts (ST I-II q. 68, a. 5, co.; *Super Rom.*, VIII, 2, lect. 1, nn 602-3 and 605). This is so because the theological virtues naturally result in the gifts and both together with the movement of the Holy Spirit form the infused virtues. (The gifts are regulated by charity (ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, co), quickened by charity (ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 3), informed by charity (ST I-II q. 68, a. 5, co. & ST II-II q. 45, a. 2, co.), and effected by charity (ST II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4).). The infused cardinal virtues, of which the gifts are the principle, come last. In ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 3, St. Thomas says that the moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts in the order of generation because they properly dispose man to be ordered directly by God. Nevertheless, this seems to be the activity of the acquired virtues and not the infused virtues for the objector says, "That which is first natural seems to be more excellent." Properly speaking the theological virtues are the source of the gifts and both of them are the source of the infused virtues. See ST II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4: "...*dona enim spiritus sancti sunt principia virtutum intellectualium et moralium, ut supra dictum est. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt principia donorum, ut supra habitum est.*"

³⁶³ ST I-II q. 109, a. 5; ST I-II q. 109, a. 6, co.: "And so the preparation of the will is not able to be without habitual grace given, which is the principle of meritorious works, as was said."

although Aquinas does not always do so,³⁶⁴ the theological virtues, gifts, and infused moral virtues are not infused in their separate species, each given distinctly from the others and having no internal order. God does not give the believer the supernatural principles at different times or even all at the same time in a separate way. There are not separate lines of causality from God causing each of the supernatural habits; there is one line of causality. God causes habitual grace, and the supernatural habits arise from habitual grace in an orderly fashion.

The supernatural virtues are connected in the order of being since all fundamentally arise from the same source (directly or indirectly), habitual grace. They share a common principle. Hence, all the supernatural habits are ultimately connected in habitual grace. Likewise, the connection in habitual grace is the ultimate source for all the above connections. Would the gifts be connected with charity in the order of activity if it were not charity which caused the gifts to exist in the first place? I do not think so. In other words, the fact that charity is the principle of the gifts in the order of being implies also its principality in the order of activity. Furthermore, as stated earlier being a principle of another is the essence of connectivity. Given Aquinas's thought on grace, it is clear that each previous set of virtues gives rise to the subsequent (theological – gifts – infused cardinal).³⁶⁵ Being a principle of a subsequent virtue belongs to the essence of connectivity.³⁶⁶ Such is the contribution of Aquinas's thought on grace to the connectivity of the

³⁶⁴ He often says that the gifts, the theological virtues, or the infused cardinal virtues are infused. By this he does not mean that each species of virtue is separately infused into the soul, but rather that they result from a principle which is infused, habitual grace.

³⁶⁵ *ST I* q. 77, a. 4, co.

³⁶⁶ *ST I-II* q. 65, a. 4, s.c.

virtues and gifts. It provides the deeper reason the supernatural virtues are connected in the order of activity. They are connected in the formal order, the order of being.

Vb. Grace and the Endurance of the Gifts

Aquinas's thought on grace forms the linchpin in his doctrine of the gifts' endurance. The question of endurance has to do specifically with the existence of a particular virtue in heavenly beatitude.³⁶⁷ Will the infused cardinal virtues exist in heaven?³⁶⁸ Will the intellectual virtues?³⁶⁹ Will faith and hope?³⁷⁰ Will charity?³⁷¹ Aquinas asks all these questions. In each case it is something about the virtue itself which yields his final position. With the gifts it is similar. The gifts' intrinsic connection to common *auxilium* forms the key to Aquinas's answer.

³⁶⁷ *ST* I-II q. 67.

³⁶⁸ Aquinas holds that anything essentially tied to this world will not endure in the next. The formal element of the infused cardinal virtues will remain, but the quasi-material element will not remain. For Aquinas's thought on the formal and material elements of these virtues see *ST* I-II q. 67, a. 1, co.: "For evidence of this, it should be known that in these virtues something is formal and something quasi-material. The material indeed is a certain inclination on the part of the appetitive to the passions and operations according to a certain mode. But because this way is determined by reason, for this reason what is formal in these virtues is the very order of reason."

³⁶⁹ The case with the intellectual virtues is similar to the moral virtues. See *ST* I-II q. 67, a. 2, co.: "Thus inasmuch as the phantasms are the quasi-material of the intellectual virtues, the intellectual virtues are destroyed with the destruction of the body. But inasmuch as the intelligible species, which is in the possible intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. However the species in the intellectual virtues are the formal element. Thus, the intellectual virtues remain after this life inasmuch as this is formal in them, not however in their material element, just as was said about the moral."

³⁷⁰ *ST* I-II q. 67, aa. 3-5. Faith and hope, in distinction from the intellectual and moral virtues, have imperfection in their very essence (*pertinet ad speciem ipsius*). Hence, they will not endure in heaven.

³⁷¹ *ST* I-II q. 67, a. 6, co.: "Just as was said above, when the imperfection of a certain thing is not of the very species of the thing, nothing prevents the same thing numerically which is previously imperfect to afterward become perfect, just as man is perfected through growth and whiteness through intensity. Charity however is love, the ratio of which is not something imperfect. Hence, it is able to relate to something possessed or not, seen or not. Thus, charity is not done away with in the perfection of glory, but remains the same numerically."

The endurance of the gifts is the topic of *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6. In arguing his conclusion (that the gifts do exist in heaven), Aquinas distinguishes between the gifts in their essence (*ad essentiam*) and the matter which they concern (*materia circa quam*). This procedure mirrors his approach toward the other supernatural virtues' endurance. Those with imperfection in their very essence will pass away (faith and hope) whereas those whose object is finite/material will remain in their essence (intellectual and moral virtues) but will not have an opportunity to exercise their acts.³⁷²

Aquinas poses a similar solution to the problem of the gifts' endurance. The essence of the gifts is the proportion/relation they establish to God's motion/the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. "The ratio of the gifts of the Holy Spirit is that they perfect the human mind to follow the motion of the Holy Spirit."³⁷³ On the other hand, their *materia circa quam* concerns the things of this life, things *ad finem*.³⁷⁴ According to their essence, they will be most perfect in heaven where humans will be "entirely subject to God."³⁷⁵ On the other hand, concerning their *materia circa quam*, since those objects will not exist in the next life, the gifts will have no operations concerning them.³⁷⁶ Put differently, the gifts will retain their operative effects (proportioning the believer to God's motion) but will not fully have their current cooperative effects, since part of

³⁷² See the previous footnotes.

³⁷³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: "*cuius ratio est quia dona spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem Spiritus Sancti.*"

³⁷⁴ In general, Aquinas says that the gifts extend to all those things to which the intellectual and moral virtues extend. See *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, co.).

³⁷⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: "*et quando homo erit totaliter subditus Deo.*"

³⁷⁶ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: "And so in the present life they have an operation concerning certain matters which they will not have in the state of glory."

what occasions the cooperative activity of some of the gifts is intrinsically bound to this world and things *ad finem*. In beatitude one is no longer seeking the supernatural end.

Aquinas's thought on the common *auxilium* of God makes the key contribution in this argument. Certainly Aquinas does not mention *auxilium* by name (except implicitly, "the motion of the Holy Spirit"). Nevertheless, it is the continual dependence of the creature on God for its activity that produces the necessity of the gifts even in heaven. It is no mistake that the two-fold need for *auxilium* outlined in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, correspond exactly to the essential (continual dependence for activity) and material aspects of the gifts (supplement the acts of the virtues in the fallen and uncertain context of this world).³⁷⁷ The gifts proportion all the powers of the human soul to the motion of God.³⁷⁸ It is God's supernatural motion moving the believer to act which is necessary both on earth and in heaven.³⁷⁹ Hence, since the *auxilium/instinctus/motio* of God is necessary both here and in heaven for the supernatural activation of the creature, the gifts (as the very proportioning to that supernatural motion) will continue to exist in heaven. It is not an imperfection to be moved by God and submitted to him. Indeed, that is the very perfection of the creature and is delivered by the gifts in their essence. This submission and receptivity to God's motion is the *raison d'être* of the divine law.³⁸⁰ It is fully achieved in heaven.

³⁷⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.

³⁷⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, co.: "So all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts to the the Holy Spirit's motion." *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 7, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.

³⁷⁹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.; *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

³⁸⁰ SCG III c. 118, n. 3: "Further, the divine law ordains humans so that they will be entirely subject to God [*subditus Deo*]."; *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 12, co.

As one can see the doctrine of grace makes the crucial contribution to the endurance of the gifts. Aquinas's doctrine of act and potency, his commitment that there is a supernatural common *auxilium*,³⁸¹ and the believer's needs to be disposed to God's motion, render the gifts necessary both here and in heaven.

Vc. Grace and the Comparative Excellence of the Virtues and the Gifts

The final topic to which grace modestly contributes is the relative excellence of the virtues and the gifts. Aquinas takes up this topic principally in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8. In this article, as can plainly be seen, there are no explicit references to the doctrine of grace. Can Aquinas's doctrine of grace make a contribution to his understanding of the gifts' excellence? I argue that the doctrine of grace can make a contribution, especially in relation to two anomalies in a. 8. These anomalies are that he does not mention the infused cardinal virtues and seems to contradict himself on the relative excellence between the theological virtues and the gifts. When one sees that it is by proximity to their principal and root, habitual grace, that Aquinas judges the relative excellence of the gifts and virtues, then these anomalies disappear. In order to argue this, I first outline Aquinas's argumentation, then highlight the difficulties found within, and finally prove that Aquinas's thought on habitual grace helps solve these difficulties.

Aquinas's argument in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8 uses two principles to decide the relative excellence of the supernatural habits. The first is an analogy. The theological virtues : gifts :: intellectual virtues : moral virtues. This principle yields Aquinas's conclusion that the

³⁸¹ Interestingly, this seems to imply that Aquinas does not hold that God concurs with natural and supernatural secondary causes in the same way. God concurs with supernatural creatures by a specifically different motion than by natural.

theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts. The theological virtues are that by which “the human mind is united to God.”³⁸² The gifts on the other hand dispose all the powers of the soul to follow the divine motion.³⁸³ Since the theological virtues stand in the place of the intellectual virtues, which are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so too are the theological virtues more excellent than the gifts. The theological virtues are the principle of the gifts, form them,³⁸⁴ and regulate them.³⁸⁵

The second principle Aquinas utilizes yields the relative excellence of the gifts over the intellectual and moral virtues. “It is manifest that the higher the mover the greater the disposition of the mobile.”³⁸⁶ Since the gifts perfect all the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit and the intellectual virtues and moral virtues perfect either reason itself or the other powers in relation to reason, the gifts are more perfect.

There are two manifest problems with these principles and Aquinas’s conclusions. The first is an omission. Aquinas fails to mention the infused cardinal virtues. When he speaks of intellectual and moral virtues in the article, it seems he has in mind acquired virtues (as in article

³⁸² ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.: “*Virtutes quidem theologiae sunt quibus mens humana Deo coniungitur.*” And “*per quos homo unitur Spiritui sancto moventi.*” It might seem here that Aquinas is attributing to the theological virtues the role of the gifts. That is not the case. The theological virtues unite the subject to God (who is the mover of the soul), but do not make all the powers of the soul proportionate to that motion. Hence, in one sense the gifts presuppose the virtues. In order to be moved by something, one must be united to it. Nevertheless, mere unity with a mover does not make one proportionate to that motion. The gifts render the soul already united with God by the theological virtues a fitting instrument of his motion.

³⁸³ ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.: “The gifts of the Holy Spirit, however, are those by which all the powers of the soul are placed under the divine motion.”

³⁸⁴ ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 3: “*secundum quod caritate informantur.*”

³⁸⁵ ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.: “*et regulant ea.*”

³⁸⁶ ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.: “*Manifestum est autem quod ad altiore motorem oportet maiori perfectione mobile esse dispositum.*”

one). The intellectual virtues have no infused counterpart; clearly they are the acquired virtues. Aquinas groups the moral virtues with the intellectual because he also has the acquired cardinal virtues in mind. This is confirmed by an objection and Aquinas's response.³⁸⁷ Hence the problem, Aquinas does not mention the infused cardinal virtues. How does their excellence relate to the gifts and theological virtues?

The second problem is that Aquinas's argument for the relative excellence of the gifts over the intellectual and moral virtues should also make the gifts more excellent than the theological virtues. As will be recalled from q. 68, a. 1, the theological virtues also perfect reason just as the intellectual virtues are said to in q. 68, a. 8.³⁸⁸ Because the virtues perfect reason in article 8, the gifts are greater. Why then are the gifts not greater than the theological virtues? Aquinas does not answer this question and seems to contradict himself on the issue.

It is my contention that Aquinas's thought on grace can help solve these two difficulties. As will be recalled from above, habitual grace is a form infused into the essence of the soul. It is akin to a new nature; it is that by which we participate in the divine nature. It flows out into the

³⁸⁷ See *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 8, arg. 2: "Further that which is prior naturally is more excellent. But the virtues are prior to the gifts, as Gregory says in Book II of the *Morals*: 'the gift of the Holy Spirit forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, in the mind it works on...and afterwards gives it a temper in the seven virtues (that is gifts) so that against foolishness, he gives wisdom. Against dullness, he gives understanding. Against rashness, he gives counsel. Against fear, he gives fortitude. Against, ignorance, he gives knowledge. Against hardness, he gives piety. Against pride, he gives fear.' Therefore, the virtues are greater than the gifts." *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 8, ad 2: "Something is prior to another in two ways. In one way, in the order of perfection or dignity, just as love of God is prior to love of neighbor. In this way the gifts are prior to the intellectual and moral virtues, however posterior to the theological. In another way, something is prior in the order of generation or disposition, just as love of neighbor precedes love of God, inasmuch as it concerns act. And so the moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, because through them man is well disposed concerning reason. On the basis of that he is well disposed to be rightly ordered to God."

³⁸⁸ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.: "The reason of man is perfected doubly by God...the other way is through a certain supernatural perfection, that is the theological virtues."

soul and first produces the theological virtues. The theological virtues in turn are the principles of the gifts. The gifts are the principles of the moral virtues.³⁸⁹ This conception of the order of being between the supernatural habits helps to solve the two anomalies in Aquinas's article.

This conception of the flowering of grace in the soul clearly solves the difficulty in relation to the infused cardinal virtues. Are the infused cardinal virtues more or less excellent than the gifts? Less. The gifts are the source of the infused cardinal virtues and thus regulate them in a way similar to the theological virtues in relation to the gifts. Being a source of the gifts and regulating them clearly implies for Aquinas that the theological virtues are more excellent. It would thus also seem to imply that the gifts are greater than and the infused cardinal virtues.

This conception of grace also helps solve the relative excellence of the gifts and the theological virtues. Clearly the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts in the way Aquinas states. The theological virtues are the principles of the gifts and regulate them. They are closer to the principle of habitual grace. Things closer to a principle are more excellent than those further.³⁹⁰ The theological virtues are closer because they unite us to God as object and end. They unite the soul to God as a final cause. The final cause is the first of all causes, thus that which united us to God as the final cause is the first flowering of grace.

As for the other problem concerning the mutual excellence of the theological virtues and the gifts, it seems to me that one can distinguish differing lines of causality (and thus excellence) to extricate Aquinas from the problem. As Aquinas states in *ST* I-II q. 68, aa. 1-2, the gifts make

³⁸⁹ The supernatural analogates to the acquired intellectual virtues are the gifts of understanding, knowledge, wisdom and counsel. See *ST* II-II q. 8, 9, 45, and 52.

³⁹⁰ *ST* I q. 77, a. 4, 1. Thomas Aquinas, *Questiones Disputatae de Virtutibus*, ed. Odetto, E. (Marietti, 1965), q. 4, a. 3, co.

all the powers of the soul proportionate to God inasmuch as he moves us as an efficient cause.

He confirms this in his *Commentary on Romans*.³⁹¹ As is implied above and will be argued more fully in chapter III, the *instinctus* of the gifts (and thus also the gifts' operative effect) is absolutely prior and the principle of the cooperative effects of all the virtues and gifts. This implies that in some sense the gifts are more excellent than the theological virtues.

In the order of excellence (the order concerning Aquinas in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8) the theological virtues are first, the gifts second, and finally the moral virtues are third when one considers the order from habitual grace as a principle.³⁹² The theological virtues unite us to God. The gifts proportion us to God's motion so that we may act so as to reach him. The moral virtues are the tools of both. Since each is a principle of the next, they have gradually diminishing extents of causality, gradually diminishing excellence. Yet this is not the only possible order, as implied above. In the efficient order the gifts are more excellent than the theological virtues (or at least equal),³⁹³ for they are the principle which proportion believers to God's motion and are thus the first tools by which God supernaturally moves in the order of activity. It is by recognizing another principle in the supernatural life, God and not simply the immanent habit of habitual grace, that a new order of priority arises. Inasmuch as one considers the formal order from habitual grace, the order of excellence is as Aquinas outlined in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8. Nevertheless, inasmuch as one considers God and the efficient order, there is a new order of

³⁹¹ *Super Rom.*, IV, l. 1, n. 329.

³⁹² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 2. When Aquinas mentions the order of generation here, he does not mean the same thing I mean by the order of generation. He is here speaking about the acquired virtues and I the infused.

³⁹³ I say equal because strictly speaking the gifts do not relate to a higher mover, but rather to the same mover in a different way. The theological virtues relate to God inasmuch as he moves by way of final causality. The gifts, in their disposition, relate to God as efficient mover.

priority where the gifts come prior and thus have more universal causality and excellence.

Hence, Aquinas does not contradict himself.

It is only by recognizing the order of the virtues from grace that the two anomalies in the article disappear. This perspective clearly gives a place for the infused cardinal virtues. This perspective also makes sense of Aquinas's implication that the gifts are more excellent than the theological virtues since they relate to a higher mover, to a different principle. None of this appears without Aquinas's thought on grace.

VI. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to argue that Aquinas's thought on grace can make substantial contributions for understanding his thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Key to this contribution is Aquinas's thought on habitual grace, grace as *motus*, and the order of the supernatural life. Using these tools, grace helps prove the distinction between the gifts and the virtues, the indispensable and perpetual necessity of the gifts, the operative/cooperative and healing/elevating effects of the gifts, the endurance of the gifts, and their relative excellence vis-à-vis the theological and infused moral virtues. In the next chapter, the reverse will prove true. Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit proves central for understanding Aquinas's thought on grace.

Chapter III – The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Grace

As the last chapter showed, Aquinas's thought on grace has implications for how one understands his thought on the gifts. Can the same movement work in reverse? Can Aquinas's thought on the gifts illuminate his thought on grace? One prominent scholar claims it does. Joseph Wawrykow asserts that the gifts "add to what we can find in the treatise on grace, in at least two important respects."¹ The gifts both extend the portrayal of habitual and actual grace as well as form a main component of meritorious action.² While Wawrykow is right about these two ways the gifts add to Aquinas's thought on grace, the contribution of Aquinas's understanding of the gifts goes well beyond these two.

In this chapter, I argue that using Aquinas's conception of the gifts to help understand Aquinas's thought on grace brings to light the following conclusions: (1) actual grace (*auxilium* as motion) does exist in Aquinas; (2) the gift of perseverance is nothing other than the continued motion of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit; (3a) the gifts of the Holy Spirit help prove another division in actual grace as well as showing an intimate connection to the sacraments; (3b) the gifts of the Holy Spirit and every other supernatural habit flow in an orderly fashion from habitual grace; (4) the *instinctus* of the gifts (and thus the habits providing the disposition to be moved) are the first extrinsic and immanent principles of merit in the supernatural life.

¹ Joseph P. Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit according to Thomas Aquinas," in *Kirchenbild und Spiritualität*, ed. Thomas Prügl and Marianne Schlosser, (Paderborn: Schöningh Paderborn, 2007), 43–62, 49.

² Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts," 49–50.

I. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Existence of Actual Grace

Actual grace is not a term Aquinas uses.³ It is a term coined by certain Thomistic thinkers. According to Ramirez, actual grace is “that by which man is moved by God to know or will or do something supernatural...”⁴ In short, according to many Thomists, actual grace is a supernatural motion,⁵ something beyond God’s natural concurrence with secondary causes.

Does actual grace exist in Aquinas? The argument of this section will be that it does, and the gifts as dispositions for the divine *instinctus* help prove it. Aquinas certainly does not use the term actual grace, but the concept is in Aquinas under a broader category (*auxilium*). In making this argument, I first outline what motion is for Aquinas and what would make it supernatural. I then outline the different types of natural motion as an analogue for (possible) supernatural motion. Finally I use Aquinas’s doctrine of the gifts as habits providing dispositions to God’s *instinctus/motio* to prove there is a supernatural motion according to Aquinas.

Ia. Natural Motion and Its Types in Aquinas

In order to make clear the central question (Does actual grace exist in Aquinas?), it is necessary to outline Aquinas’s thought on motion and take stock of its different possible natural realizations. One cannot ask whether actual grace exists as a supernatural motion unless one knows what a motion is. In order to pose clearly the central question of this section it is thus

³ At least not for *auxilium* as motion. Aquinas only uses the term actual grace in one place throughout his mature corpus. For this use see *Super Io.*, IX, l. 1: “through the removal of actual grace, [one is] led to sin mortally.”

⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 602: “Either through the mode of disposition or preparation to justification, or through the mode of use or operation of merit after the reception of justification.”

⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 602: “...helping or actual grace, which is put by reduction into the predicament of quality.”

necessary to make clear what motion is in Aquinas. In order to do this, I first outline the three senses of motion in Aquinas, the four ways God moves secondary causes, and finally relate the two lists. In doing so, it becomes clearer what sense of motion is under question here. Finally, I summarize the three types of natural motion in Aquinas, since if supernatural motion exists it will imitate natural motion.⁶

Aquinas takes much of his thought on motion from Aristotle.⁷ This often means that Aquinas's commentaries (especially the *Physics*) are the best place to find Aquinas's thought on motion.⁸ Therein, Aquinas locates motion midway between potency and act. It is neither identical with potency, nor with act. It is the act of potency inasmuch as it is in potency. As Aquinas says: "Motion is neither the potency of a thing existing in potency, nor the act of a thing in act, but it is the act of a thing in potency; where the word "act" designates its relation to a prior potency, and the words "of a thing in potency" designates its relation to a further act."⁹ In this sense, motion is simply another word for change.

Aquinas holds that the term 'motion' can be taken in three senses: the proper sense, the wider sense, and the widest sense. For all senses, motion's species depends on the category in

⁶ As Aquinas says in *ST* II-II q. 31, a. 3, co.: "Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which was instituted by divine wisdom."

⁷ Simon Oliver, "Motion According to Aquinas and Newton," in *Modem Theology* 17:2 (April 2001): 163-199.

⁸ See the following authors for arguments that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle can be used to discover his own thought. John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," In *Uses and Abuses of the Classics: Western Interpretations of Greek Philosophy*, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia & Jiyuan Yu (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Pub, 2004): 137-164. Christopher Kaczor, "Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on the *Ethics*: Merely an Interpretation of Aristotle?" in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2004): 353-378.

⁹ *Phys.*, I. 2, c. 1: "Unde neque est potentia existentis in potentia, neque est actus existentis in actu, sed est actus existentis in potentia: ut per id quod dicitur actus, designetur ordo eius ad anteriorem potentiam, et per id quod dicitur in potentia existentis, designetur ordo eius ad ulteriorem actum."

which the change occurs (or rather the category in which the form the motion aims to produce is). Put differently, Aquinas names motions by their terms; motion is always teleological for Aquinas.¹⁰ The different senses of motion depend thus on the different categories of being. The proper sense of motion comes in three species according to the categories of quality, quantity, and location. The motions which aim to produce a change in these categories are called (respectively): alteration (quality), increase/decrease (quantity), and locomotion (location). In a broader sense change can occur in the category of substance. This yields the species of generation and corruption. Finally, in the broadest sense, change can be taken in a metaphysical way as any transition from potency to act.¹¹ The metaphysical sense applies to both of the first senses of motion, although the reverse is not true. In other words, all motion in the first or second sense is also a transition from potency to act, but not all transitions from potency to act are categorical (fall into the categories of being).

In the passage of potency to act, motion (in all its species), Aquinas uses the concepts of form and matter to designate that which shifts and that which undergoes the change.¹² In the proper sense of motion, it is the substance (composed of prime matter and substantial form) which plays the role of “matter.” The accidental category undergoing the change plays the role of “form.” In other words, the substance is passive vis-à-vis the change occurring through an

¹⁰ *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 1, co.: “...motion is moreso named from the term to which than the term from which.”

¹¹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (Textum Leoninum, 1961 editum), *SCG* III c. 70. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle* (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Press, 1999), III, l. 2, nn. 285–86. Cf. also Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 445–46.

¹² Jeffery Brower, “Matter, Form, and Individuation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 85–103.

accident.¹³ The substance is being qualified, quantified, or located differently. Taking change in the broad sense, in the category of substance, it is prime matter which undergoes the shift of receiving a new substantial form. The substantial form plays the active role and prime matter the passive (and limiting) role.¹⁴ Finally, in transcendental motion, there is a shift from potency to act which might occur in one of the aforesaid categories, or it may be beyond them. Any transition from potency to act is transcendental motion.

These three categories of motion apply diversely to the ways God moves creatures. Based on *DPD* q. 3, a. 7, one can say that God moves all secondary causes in four ways: “(1) by giving the thing its power to act, (2) by preserving its power to act, (3) by moving (or applying) its power to act, and (4) by employing the thing instrumentally.”¹⁵ The first and second way, though only logically diverse from each other,¹⁶ are not motion/change in even the transcendental sense.¹⁷ Certainly, God causes the actions of all secondary creatures by creating and sustaining them. In other words, by giving creatures their principles of activity, God (in some sense) causes all the acts which they perform with those principles. Nevertheless, this is not motion in any of the senses given above. This is God’s activity of creation; creation is not a change or motion.¹⁸ In

¹³ Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 266ff.

¹⁴ Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 295ff.

¹⁵ Gregory Doolan, “The Causality of Divine Ideas.”

¹⁶ E.g. *I Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; *DPD* q. 5, a. 1, ad 2.

¹⁷ *ST I* q. 45, a. 2, ad 2.

¹⁸ *ST I* q. 44, a. 2, ad 2: “Creation is not a change, save according to the way of understanding alone.”

other words, by creation and conservation,¹⁹ God does cause all the acts of all creatures, but God's creation is not a motion or change. Hence, in these two categories God does not move the creature, properly speaking, but rather creates the creature.²⁰ However, improperly speaking, one may say God moves the creature by creating the principles of motion and sustaining them in being.

The third and fourth ways God moves creatures are transcendental motion. The difference between the third category and the fourth roughly corresponds to the difference between God producing an effect through the secondary cause to which the secondary causes' form is proportionate and God using the secondary cause as an instrument and producing an effect beyond the power of the secondary cause, yet still by the power of the secondary cause.²¹ Yet in both these categories, it is by a transcendental motion that God applies all secondary creatures to act. Indeed, this must be by transcendental motion, for that is the only possible candidate.

¹⁹ Between the first and second way God causes the acts of all secondary creatures, there is only a logical distinction. See *SCG* III c. 65.

²⁰ One might say, imprecisely (as Aquinas is doing here), that God moves the creature indirectly in these categories.

²¹ Actually, strictly speaking both the third and fourth modes are involved in every action since *esse* is an effect beyond the potency of the creature to produce simply speaking. See F.X., Meehan, *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1940), 299: "One formality of the effect is that which is attributable to the second cause by reason of a proper virtue permanently conferred and possessed by it. The other formality, however, is not due to the secondary cause by reason of its own virtue but rather by virtue of an influx transitorily shared by it and communicated to it by a superior cause to whom it is subject, viz., God. By reason of the first formality, the effect is of such and such a determined character and nature. By reason of the second, however, it has being, existence. Because of the first formality the secondary cause is called a principal cause in its own order....Because of the second formality, it is called an instrumental cause....Now to elicit its own proper action...it simply needs to be moved by God and applied to act. In order, however that it may act instrumentally, it is necessary, moreover, that it share in something of the superior agent's virtue, if it is to attain the effect proper to the latter." See also John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of *Esse*," In *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II*, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007): 172-193.

The third and fourth ways God moves creatures certainly cannot be substantial change or motion. God does not cause the actions of all things by substantially changing them. These ways God moves the creature cannot be accidental motion either (motion in the proper sense). When God moves a creature to act, it does not change the creature's place or quantity. What about quality? It is tempting to say that when God activates the creature's secondary act, it must be in the category of quality. One might say that God imparts a transitory quality to activate the subject to a secondary act. Yet this cannot be the case either. Aquinas specifically says that God's activating motion is not in the category of quality.²² Motion is the activity of the mover in the moved.²³ Hence, when Aquinas says that God moves all things in accord with their forms,²⁴ that is activates them on the secondary level, it is by a transcendental motion, a motion not in one of the categories but rather beyond them.²⁵

²² *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 2, co.: "In one way, inasmuch as the soul of man is moved by God to knowing, willing, or doing something. And this way is the very effect of grace is not a quality in man, but a certain motion of the soul, for the act of the mover in the moved is motion, as is said in book three of the *Physics*."

²³ *III Phys.*, nn. 305-306: "Secondly he explains this. And in regard to this he does three things. First he shows that there is a certain act of the mover, just as there is in the mobile. For whatever is said according to potency and act has some act competent to it. But just as that which is moved is called 'mobile' in potency inasmuch as it is able to be moved, and is called 'moved' according to act inasmuch as it is actually being moved, so on the part of the mover, a mover is described 'potential mover' inasmuch as it is able to move, and 'moves' in the act inasmuch as it actually acts. Therefore some act is competent to both, i.e., to mover and to mobile. Secondly [212] he shows that the act of the mover and of the mobile is the same act. For something is called 'mover' inasmuch as it acts and 'moved' inasmuch as it is being acted upon. But what the mover causes by acting and what the moved receives is being acted upon are one and the same thing. And this is what he means when he says that the mover actualizes the mobile, i.e., causes the act of the mobile. Wherefore, they must both, namely, mover and moved, have the same act; for what is from the mover as agent cause is the same as what is in the moved as patient and receiver."

²⁴ *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 3, co.

²⁵ This conclusion corroborates the conclusions of Brian Shanley. In other words, reading Aquinas correctly about the third and fourth modes by which God moves the creature leads to the affirmation that God moves all creatures to their acts and causes them to be, but since it is by a transcendental motion, one cannot specify the "mechanics" of this motion beyond the simple affirmation. As Shanley says in "God's Causality and Human Freedom," 120-121: "Once again it is clear that Aquinas's major argument for the compatibility of divine causation and genuine contingency is the transcendent nature of the former. Only a cause that transcends and indeed creates contingency

In order to specify the account further, one must look at the different ways God moves humans to act by this efficient transcendental motion on the natural level. In other words, the third and fourth categories can be subdivided. Recall, as was stated earlier, that motion is teleological for Aquinas. Specifying the ways God moves us naturally by a transcendental efficient motion then requires specifying the natural ends of the human person. In this respect, it seems clear that there are three different types of motion on the natural level.

Primarily God moves the will toward the end of happiness.²⁶

It is said that God moves the will of man just as a universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion, man is not able to will anything. But man through reason determines himself to will this or that, which is a true good or an apparent good. But nevertheless sometimes God specifically moves someone to will something determinate, which is good, just as those whom he moves by grace, as will be said below.²⁷

and necessity as modes of created being can work through them without violating or rivaling them. It is precisely in order to safeguard this transcendence that the mechanism of *praemotio physica* must be rejected. Once a created medium between God and the act of the will is posited, it is hard to see how its causation could fail to escape the necessity-contingency dichotomy. If the *praemotio physica* is necessary, then there is no human freedom; if it is contingent, then it is hard to see how it efficaciously and infallibly induces a particular determinate movement of the will. With this dichotomy in mind, it is better simply to affirm divine transcendence and to deny the applicability of any created model of causation; such models tend inevitably to an overly physical conception of causation that cannot do justice to the action of Spirit upon spirit. Behind the failures of both Banez and Molina (and their respective adherents) to articulate a satisfactory account of the causal relationship between God and human action, is a diminished sense of the transcendence of the Creator. It is not enough to read the traditional Banezianism-Molinism struggle simply as divergent attempts to fill the gaps in Aquinas's account in the altered climate of the Post-Reformation problematic; for what counts as a gap to be filled in depends upon still deeper assumptions. It is rather that Banez and Molina are separated from Aquinas by a fundamental change in background understanding. They are much more confident that mundane causal categories can be used to explain the relationship between God and human freedom and they seem consequently to assure that there is an inherent antagonism between God and the human will which must be resolved in favor of one of the contending parties; both of these assumptions are foreign to Aquinas because both compromise divine transcendence."

²⁶ Happiness as an end of this motion concerns both the *ratio ultimi finis* alone. In other words, it does not include (necessarily) that thing in which it is realized, i.e., God (the *finis cuius*) or that which attains God (the *finis quo*). According to Aquinas, all creatures tend to God as their ultimate fulfillment, but are not necessarily (operatively) directed to him.

²⁷ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: "*Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen*

In this motion, humans are not free.²⁸ The human will naturally tends to the good in general.²⁹

The human will must will happiness and whatever is necessary for that end,³⁰ although all other things do not move the will necessarily.³¹ In other words, God moves the human to will its natural end necessarily, that is operatively.³²

The second type of motion on the natural level is a cooperative motion toward the means to this natural end (happiness). On the basis of the first operative motion in the natural life,

interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.”

²⁸ Jean Laporte, “The Motion of Operative and Cooperative Grace: Retrievals and Explorations,” *The Lonergan Workshop* 13 (1997): 79-94. See 90: “But what it consents to or dissents from is a work of grace which has already begun to transform the human heart. We are moved before we move ourselves. But even when we move ourselves, we do so under grace which cooperates with and inwardly confirms our will towards its act Ia-IIae 111 2 c).” See also Daniel McInerney, “Deliberation about Final Ends: Thomistic Considerations.”

²⁹ *ST* I-II q. 10, a. 1, co.: “However this is the good in common, to which the will naturally tends just as a certain power to its object. Nevertheless, the ultimate end itself which is related in this way to all appetible things just as the first principles of demonstration to the intelligible, and is in every way fitting to the will according to its nature. For with our will we do not desire alone those things which pertain to the power of the will; but nevertheless those things which pertain to each power and to the whole man. Whence naturally man wills not alone the object of the will, but also all those things which are fitting to other powers, just as the understanding of truth, which is fitting to the intellect; and to be and to live and other things, which are fitting for natural sustenance. The will comprehends everything which falls under its object, just as certain particular goods.”

³⁰ *ST* I-II q. 10, a. 2, co.: “Whence if an object of the will which is universally good according to every consideration is proposed, then from necessity the will tends to it, if it wills anything at all, for it will not be able to will the opposite. If however a certain object of the will is proposed which is not good according to every consideration, the will is not born from necessity to it.” *ST* I-II q. 10, a. 2, ad 3: “To the third it is said that the ultimate end moves the will of necessity because it is the perfect good. And similarly those things which are ordained to that end without which the end cannot be had, just as to be and to live and other such things. Yet those things without which the end can be had do not move the will of necessity, just as he who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.

³¹ *ST* I-II q. 10, a. 1, ad 3: “Under the good in common however many particular goods are contained, to which the will is not determined.”

³² *ST* I-II q. 10, a. 4, co.: “Because therefore the will as an active principle is not determined to one, but is related indifferently to many, so God moves it contingently and not necessarily because it is not determined to one of necessity, unless it is in those things to which it is naturally moved.”

Aquinas holds that the will can move itself to will the means.³³ In this sense cooperative natural motion is the same motion which previously moved operatively toward the end, only now the will is active also. In other words, the first and second senses of natural motion are only distinct by effect.³⁴ The operative motion toward the end becomes cooperative after inspiring that act, and the will determines itself to will this or that real or apparent good under its influence as cooperative.³⁵

The final motion on the natural level is a special motion toward particular acts/goods toward the end. By this motion God moves the natural man to specific acts/goods directly, and not only indirectly based on the first motion of the will toward happiness. In other words, by this third type of motion God initiates a new series of acts toward the end by operatively moving the human subject to some particular good/act *ad finem*. St. Thomas mentions this motion in ST I-II q. 68, a. 2.

Accordingly, in those things subject to human reason (i.e., those directed to man's connatural end), man is able to work through the judgment of reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special *instinctus* of God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one who had the acquired moral virtues, also had the heroic or divine virtues.³⁶

³³ ST I-II q. 9, a. 3, co. & ad 1: "To the first it should be said that the will is not at the same time both mover and moved, nor in act and potency. But inasmuch as the will actively wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are toward the end."

³⁴ ST I-II q. 111, a. 2.

³⁵ ST I-II q. 9, a. 6, ad 3.

³⁶ ST I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.: "*Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini; homo potest operari, per iudicium rationis. Si tamen etiam in hoc homo adiuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis bonitatis, unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat virtutes morales acquisitas, habebat virtutes heroicas vel divinas.*"

Since man has the nature of rationality perfectly, he can normally work according to it (presupposing the first two motions outlined above). Nevertheless, out of God's superabundant goodness, he sometimes moves people to higher acts of natural/human virtue. This type of motion is usually toward those things particularly fitting or conducive to natural happiness.

At this point it might be helpful to ask what makes the above motions natural? What would make a motion supernatural for Aquinas? Implicit above is the claim that motion is natural because the form/act it aims to introduce is proportionate to human nature. Now whatever is proportionate to human nature is called natural.³⁷ Thus, the above three motions are natural motions. The supernatural is beyond human nature's substance or activity.³⁸ Motion would qualify as supernatural if the form/state it aims to introduce is supernatural, beyond human nature's substance or activity. It all depends on the act/form the motion aims to introduce. Hence, if there is any motion which aims to produce a supernatural state or form, it would be supernatural.³⁹

Having clarified the concept of motion in Aquinas, I can now proceed to the main question governing this section. Does a transcendental supernatural motion exist for Aquinas in the third and fourth ways God moves creatures? Put differently, does God apply creatures to act

³⁷ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 7, ad 3.

³⁸ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 2, co.

³⁹ For an example of something supernatural because it is ordained to a state beyond human nature see *ST I-II* q. 63, a. 3, co.: "Every intellectual or moral virtue which is acquired by our acts proceeds from certain natural principles preexisting in us as was said above. In place of those natural principles, God confers the theological virtues by which we are ordained to the supernatural end, as was said above. Whence it is necessary that to these theological virtues their correspond other divine habits caused in us which are related to the theological virtues just as the moral and intellectual virtues are related to the natural principles of virtue."

and use them as instruments in a way beyond the natural? If so, is this supernatural motion in anyway similar to the three types of natural motions?

Ib. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Actual Grace

Is there supernatural motion in Aquinas's thought? Putting this question into Aquinas's own terms, one might pose it in the following way based on the work of Joseph Wawrykow. He argues, the term *auxilium* can have a broader or a narrower significance in the supernatural order. In its broad sense, Aquinas means anything by which God aids the creature toward its supernatural vocation. In this sense it even includes habitual grace. In the narrower sense, Aquinas means something at least conceptually distinct from habitual grace, God's application of the creature to act (supernatural motion).⁴⁰ Is there a supernatural *auxilium* really distinct (as opposed to merely conceptually) from habitual grace?

I will argue that there is an *auxilium* as motion really distinct from habitual grace in Aquinas, a motion beyond the three natural types above; it is a supernatural transcendental motion in the third and fourth ways God moves human creatures. Put differently, *auxilium* (taken as motion, a supernatural motion) must be more than conceptually distinct from habitual grace.

⁴⁰ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 171 fnt. 52: "Auxilium can have both a narrower and a broader significance. In its specialized sense, Thomas means by the term something at least conceptually distinct from habitual grace: this is God applying or moving the rational creature perfected by habitual grace and the theological virtues to its act, or even God's first moving of the sinful soul back to God; in the discussion of I-II 111, etc., below in the text, the different meanings of this 'application' will be clarified. For *auxilium* in this sense, see such texts as I-II 109, 1c, where he calls it *divinum auxilium*, I-II 109, 2c (*divinum auxilium*), I-II 109, 3c (*auxilium Dei moventis*, *auxilium Dei*), I-II 109, 4c (*auxilium Dei moventis*), I-II 109, 5 ad 3 (*auxilium gratiae*), and I-II 109, 6c (*auxilium gratuitum Dei interius animam moventis*). On the other hand, Thomas also uses *auxilium* to refer to both this meaning of the term and habitual grace—see, e.g., I-II 109, 6c, where he says that we need the *auxilium divinum* understood both as habitual grace, which is involved in meritorious acts, and as God's moving people to God; I-II 109, 7c, where he uses *auxilium* to refer to the *habituale donum* and the *interior Dei motio*; and I-II 109, 9c, where again *auxilium* covers both *habituale donum* and the interior moving by God of the soul."

The argument that God's supernatural application of the creature to act is really distinct from habitual grace is the same which proves the existence of supernatural motion in Aquinas. This section aims to make that argument based on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In short, I argue that the supernatural dispositions to God's motion, the gifts, require the existence of supernatural motion in Aquinas, something actually distinct from the gifts taken as habits. Granting that the gifts are not the only basis on which one could make this argument, although they are the most fitting basis,⁴¹ I then provide corroborating arguments based solely in Aquinas's thought on grace. Finally, and in conclusion to this section, I argue for a particular division of supernatural motion on analogy with natural motion in Aquinas.

As Aquinas repeatedly affirms, the gifts proportion the believer to God's motion, to follow God's promptings well.⁴² This motion (these promptings) is neither natural motion (any of the three types) nor simply identical with the habit of the gifts itself. In other words, that to which the gifts proportion the believer (called diversely *instinctus*, *motio*, *inspiratio*, *divinus instinctus*, and if my argument from the last chapter is correct, common *auxilium*), is supernatural motion.

The motion toward which the gifts proportion the believer cannot be the natural motion outlined above. God's natural motion does not move creatures toward God as a special end.⁴³ Aquinas says that by natural motion God moves humans toward happiness in general. One might

⁴¹ They are the most fitting basis of argument since the gifts' operative effects are to proportion the believer to God's motion. Hence, another way to put the governing question of this section is whether God's motion as it concerns the gifts is natural or supernatural. I will argue it is supernatural.

⁴² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 3: "That which is given by God in relation to his very motion."

⁴³ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6, ad 3.

say that natural motion moves the human toward the formal notion of happiness, but not the material.⁴⁴ Clearly then the motion to which the gifts correspond cannot be the first type of natural motion. Given that the motion to which the gifts proportion the believer cannot be the first type of natural motion, *ipso facto* it cannot be the second, since operative and cooperative motions are only diverse by effects. Finally, the motion which corresponds to the gifts cannot be the third type of motion either. Aquinas clearly holds the gifts to be diverse from the so-called divine virtues of Aristotle.⁴⁵

Likewise, the motion for which the gifts dispose cannot be simply the virtue of charity or only logically different from the gifts. I proved in the previous chapter that Aquinas, usually, means something separate from charity by the *instinctus/motio* of the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, even if charity is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, the driving force of the gifts (which it clearly is in some sense), this would only push the question one step back further and would totally ignore those cases in which *instinctus* means something other than charity (i.e., when *instinctus* means motion). For those cases in which the *instinctus/motio* of the Holy Spirit is not charity, the habitual gift and the *motio* must be really diverse, since the *instinctus/motio* of the Holy Spirit is a principle of activation for the gifts.⁴⁶ Why does this require the real diversity of the gifts from its driving force, its activating principle? What is only logically diverse cannot be a principle of activation for something in potency, since what is logically diverse is identical in subject. The

⁴⁴ *ST I-II* q. 1, a. 7, co.

⁴⁵ The heroic or divine virtues are proportionate to humans natural end. Thus they are clearly distinct from the gifts which are related to the supernatural end. See *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 1; *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.

⁴⁶ The very definition of *instinctus* in Aquinas is an impulse to action. See O'Connor, "Appendix 5: Instinctus and Inspiratio."

principle of activation must really be diverse just as act and potency are diverse.⁴⁷ If this principle cannot be the gifts themselves and cannot be charity, it seems clear that there must be a principle of secondary act not identical with the gifts or any immanent habit. The gifts as habits must be activated by another cause. Aquinas says this cause is *motio*. Clearly then there is a motion really distinct from the gifts. Furthermore, this is clearly a supernatural motion according to Aquinas. It aims to activate, sustain, and introduce a form beyond the intrinsic principles of human nature. Likewise, it moves toward the supernatural end. Clearly then in Aquinas there is supernatural motion.

ST I-II q. 109, a. 6, co. corroborates this conclusion. Aquinas holds that God moves creatures teleologically toward supernatural states. Manifest instances of this are the *instinctus fidei*,⁴⁸ and the graces preparatory for justification.⁴⁹ Aquinas describes these motions in ST I-II q. 109, a. 6 and ST I-II q. 112, a. 2.⁵⁰ Therein he states that the preparation of the will for the good is two-fold. The first is by a habitual gift, which is the principle of merit. The second is by the *auxilium Dei*. The *auxilium Dei* cannot be another habit and must be actually diverse from the habitual gift because it prepares for habitual grace and diverse from the act it produces because it is the principle of the act.⁵¹ Likewise, *auxilium* in the narrow sense must be a

⁴⁷ ST I q. 2, a. 2; SCG I c. 13; *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4.

⁴⁸ This grace given to the will moves the intellect to assent to the articles of the creed explicitly and to whatever else the church teaches implicitly. See ST II-II q. 2, aa. 5, 7, and 9, ad 3; ST II-II q. 6, a. 1, co.

⁴⁹ ST I-II q. 114, a. 5, co.; ST I-II q. 109, a. 6, co.; ST I-II q. 113, a. 1, ad 3; *Super I Cor.*, I, l. 1, n. 7. *Super Heb.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 406; *Super Heb.*, XII, l. 3, n. 688; *Super Rom.*, I, l. 4, n. 68; *Super Rom.*, III, l. 3, n. 302; *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 6, n. 707.

⁵⁰ ST I-II q. 112, a. 3, co.

⁵¹ ST I-II q. 112, a. 2, co.

supernatural motion; it moves to supernatural happiness, not natural happiness. It is clearly called grace by Aquinas.⁵² Furthermore, Aquinas continues that this motion is not only so that the creature may act, *tout court*, but directs the creature to a definite end. It is true that in some sense all creatures are directed to God. Nevertheless, this motion (which prepares the will for habitual grace) directs creatures to God as a special end.

Clearly *auxilium* as it is found in ST I-II 109, a. 6 and ST I-II q. 112, a. 2 is a supernatural motion. First, it moves the creature toward eternal happiness, a supernatural end, and prepares for a supernatural habit, (habitual grace). Hence, it is a supernatural motion. Second, Aquinas clearly thinks that all creatures have God for their final end. God moves all creatures to himself as a final end. The perfection of every effect is to imitate its cause (“God converts all things to himself.”⁵³).⁵⁴ However, Aquinas clearly distinguishes the motion beginning the sequence to eternal life and preparing for habitual grace from the general way God moves all creatures: “but he converts just men to himself as to a special end.”⁵⁵ In other words, there has to be a difference in the motion by which God moves all things to himself and the motion by which he moves humans to himself as a special end. The clear candidate for this difference is natural and supernatural.

⁵² ST I-II q. 112, a. 2, co.: “...grace is spoken of in two ways...”

⁵³ ST I-II q. 109, a. 6, co.: “*Unde et Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., dicit quod Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum.*”

⁵⁴ Since all causes cause the effect to be in some way like themselves (*omni agens agit sibi simile*), the form of the effect exists (at least for equivocal causes) in a higher, fuller, and less limited way in the cause than in the effect. Hence, the perfection of the effect (to be the fullness of its form) is to bend back to its cause in imitation.

⁵⁵ ST I-II q. 109, a. 6, co.: “*Unde et Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., dicit quod Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum. Sed homines iustos convertit ad seipsum sicut ad specialem finem, quem intendunt, et cui cupiunt adhaerere sicut bono proprio; secundum illud Psalmi LXXII, mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est.*”

Nor can the way God converts/moves creatures to himself simply be his infusion of habitual grace. It has to be a supernatural motion really distinct from habitual grace. This is so for three reasons. First, Aquinas clearly divides the cause disposing for habitual grace from the infusion of habitual grace, since the former is necessary to prepare for the latter.⁵⁶ Second, Aquinas calls God's activity activating the creature toward supernatural happiness motion. Now motion cannot simply be logically diverse from the infusion or preservation of a form. Why? Because the infusion or preservation of a form, con-creation,⁵⁷ falls into the first two senses in which God moves creatures: giving them their principles of action and sustaining them in being. On the other hand, if it is truly a motion then it cannot be in the first two ways God moves creatures. God's activity in those categories is not a motion. Yet, the giving of habitual grace falls into the first two ways. Aquinas's third and fourth ways God moves creatures have to be beyond God's creation (or con-creation) and conservation. In addition, motion cannot be an abiding part of the creature, since then it would collapse back into the first two types of causality. Hence, God must move creatures by an additional principle beyond his substantial creation (or con-creation) and conservation of the creature.

This further motion toward eternal life and habitual grace cannot be general concurrence. In addition to the problems with the concept of general concurrence (as it is generally taken, not as I mean it outlined above as natural motion), the principal of which is that it is not teleological,

⁵⁶ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6, co.; *ST I-II* q. 112, a. 2, co.: "Taking grace in the first sense [as a habitual gift] it is necessary that there is a certain preparation because no form is able to be unless the matter is disposed."

⁵⁷ *DPD* q. 3, a. 1, ad 12: "For since becoming terminates in being, it belongs properly to the thing to which *per se* is, that is the subsistent thing. Whence neither matter, nor form, nor accidents are properly said to be created, but con-created."

this concept never occurs in Aquinas. According to Aquinas, God does not simply activate the creature in some generic sense. He does not gift an indeterminate ball of energy. He moves definitively and determinately toward an end. If there is a supernatural end different from the natural in any way, then there must be supernatural motion.

If further confirmation of the existence of supernatural motion in Aquinas is needed, one could find it in ST I-II q. 109, aa. 9-10 & ST I-II q. 110, a. 2. In these articles, Aquinas really, not conceptually, divides *auxilium* from habitual grace in manifold ways. *Auxilium* activates the creature and so cannot be habitual.⁵⁸ If it were, then an infinite regress would result since those with a habit are still in potency to act. Furthermore, this motion clearly moves toward definite supernatural acts or the avoidance of pitfalls to the supernatural life.⁵⁹ It promotes and guards supernatural states. Hence it is supernatural. The continuance of this supernatural motion is exactly what Aquinas means by perseverance. If God continues to move the believer, the believer will persevere. If God does not, the believer will fall. Perseverance is by definition toward attaining God, a supernatural object. Finally, in ST I-II q. 110, a. 2, Aquinas divides supernatural *auxilium* into two kinds of helps. The first is a quality (more particularly, a habit). The second, is that whereby God moves the believer to know, do, or act. It is not a quality, but a

⁵⁸ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.: “Therefore inasmuch as to the first way of help, man existing in grace does not need another help of grace as another infused habit. Nevertheless, he needs the help of grace according to the other way, that is he needs to be moved by God to right action. And this for two reasons. First, for a general reason, on account of that which was said above, no created thing is able to produce any act unless it is by the power of divine motion.”

⁵⁹ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.: “Second for a special reason, on account of the condition of human nature. Indeed, although by grace the human mind is healed, nevertheless there remains in it corruption and infection from the flesh through which it serves the law of sin as was said in Romans VII.” and ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, ad 2: “to the second it is said that the operation of the Holy Spirit by which we are moved and protected is not limited to causing the habitual gift in us, but beyond that effect moves and protects us with the Father and the Son.”

motion of the soul. This effect is gratuitous according to Aquinas, a supernatural motion.⁶⁰ In short, Aquinas clearly holds that there is a supernatural motion actually distinct from habitual grace and the supernatural habits.

In addition to the above textual proofs from the gifts and the treatise on grace, the necessity of supernatural motion can be argued as well. As was said above, if there are forms which are intrinsically supernatural, then the motion which moves toward them must be also. Now there certainly are supernatural forms (including perfect beatitude, which is only natural to God)⁶¹ and supernatural states in Aquinas.⁶² Hence, there must be supernatural motion according to Aquinas. The natural motions cannot account for the introduction of these forms.

Given that arguments based on the gifts (and other arguments) prove that supernatural motion exists, one can also divide it in a way similar to natural motion,⁶³ that is teleologically: toward the end, toward those things *ad finem*, and toward those things *ad finem* in a new line of causality. The key, again, to understanding Aquinas's account of the ways God moves humans is teleology.

The first type of supernatural motion is an operative motive *auxilium*. It moves humans to a new end which could not be the result of a previous autonomous series of actions.⁶⁴ The

⁶⁰ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 2, co.: "As was said however above that the will of man is helped by the gratuity of God in two ways. The first inasmuch as the soul of man is moved by God to know or will or do something. And this way the gratuitous effect is not a quality but a certain motion of the soul, for the act of the mover in the moved is motion, as is said in Book III of the *Physics*."

⁶¹ *ST I*, q. 24 a. 2 ad 1.

⁶² Clearly Aquinas holds this position. See *ST I-II* q. 62, a. 1, for example.

⁶³ *Super Heb.*, X, l. 2, n. 513.

⁶⁴ Notice here that although the first grace is operative, it is not the only instance of operative *auxilium*.

clearest instance of this, as St. Thomas says, is the grace beginning conversion and the preparation for justification.⁶⁵ One does not reason or will God as a supernatural end as a means to a further end! This paradigmatic instance of operative actual grace works analogously to the operative natural motion toward happiness. It operatively moves the human subject to God as object and begins the journey toward heaven.⁶⁶ In this motion humans are not free in the sense of deliberation, but have a kind of posterior freedom to consent to the motion already moving them to love God above all.⁶⁷ Put differently, operative actual grace causes freedom and is not the effect of it.

The second type of supernatural motive *auxilium* is toward those supernatural things *ad finem*. Cooperative supernatural *auxilium* is the same in subject with operative supernatural *auxilium*.⁶⁸ Operative is divided from cooperative by effect. Or rather, to operate and cooperate are two effects of one supernatural motion. Operative supernatural *auxilium* moves necessarily to the end. Cooperative supernatural *auxilium* is the same determinate motion in relation to the means, not the end. It is called cooperative because it effects the cooperation of free will and together with free will pursues the end toward which it moved operatively. As Aquinas puts it,

⁶⁵ *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, co.; *Super Rom.*, XIV, l. 2, n. 1131; *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6, co.: "...but just men he converts to himself just as to a special end, which they intend, and to which they desire to adhere just as to their own good. According to Psalm 72: 'to cling to God is good for me.'"

⁶⁶ Its first effect, as Aquinas says, is faith. See *Super Rom.*, III, l. 3, n. 302.

⁶⁷ *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, ad 2.

⁶⁸ *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, ad 4: "Operative grace and cooperative grace are one and the same grace, but are distinguished according to diverse effects."

cooperative supernatural *auxilium* strengthens the will interiorly (for those acts commanded based on the operative *auxilium*) and provides the exterior faculty of operating.⁶⁹

Does Aquinas hold that there is a supernatural motion beyond the two outlined above analogous to the third type of natural motion, namely a special motion toward things *ad finem*? This is a difficult question since Aquinas does not specifically mention a third type of motion. Nevertheless, it seems he does hold there is a third type of supernatural motion. This type of motion would be operative in moving toward a particular end (which would simply be a special way of seeking the general end or avoiding things contrary to that proximate end) and cooperative in seeking that end. Does Aquinas hold that God “out of his abundant goodness” moves operatively also to proximate ends in the supernatural life?⁷⁰

It seems that the counsels (those things beyond the commandments and not strictly necessary in the supernatural life)⁷¹ provide specific examples of acts inspired by a special motion *ad finem*, although the counsels would not exhaust the category which is potentially infinite.

“The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given.”⁷² The counsels

⁶⁹ *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, co.: “However there is in us a two-fold act. The first is interior to the will. And inasmuch as we consider this act, God is related to it as mover and it as moved, and this is especially when the will begins to will the good when it previously willed evil. And for this reason when God moves the human mind to this act, it is said to be operative grace. Another act is exterior; which, since it is commanded by the will (as was said above), follows so that the act is attributed to the will. And because even to this act God helps us, and confirms the will interiorly so that arrive to acting, and provides the exterior faculty of operating.”

⁷⁰ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, ad 1: “...and this out of his superabundant goodness.”

⁷¹ *ST I-II* q. 108, a. 4, co.

⁷² *ST I-II* q. 108, a. 4, co.

are simply more expeditious ways of seeking the same supernatural happiness.⁷³ They occupy a very similar place to the ‘divine virtues’ in relation to natural happiness. They are a higher and more fitting way of achieving the end. Likewise, God clearly moves individuals to this higher way.⁷⁴ This motion then is a motion toward things particularly fitting or expeditious *ad finem*. The full argument of the distinction of this motion from the above two comes later (Section IIIa). What is important to note now is that the key difference of this motion from the second type is similar to the difference of the the third type of natural motion from the second. The third type of supernatural motion initiates a new line of activity (still within the overall supernatural goal of God) which either could not or was not an effect of the cooperative motion. This type of motion moves the believer toward particular proximate ends. Thus, it seems that Aquinas does hold that there is an efficient motion which is toward those things fitting *ad finem*.

This third type of motion corresponds to the gifts in general, but not the acts of the gifts in particular.⁷⁵ Put differently, one could say that the gifts proportion the believer to God’s supernatural motion (all three types), although the cooperative actions of the gifts are not those of the counsels.⁷⁶ The gifts are presupposed as the dispositions for all efficient types of

⁷³ *ST I-II* q. 108, a. 4, co.: “Thus counsels are those things through which man may better and more advantageously obtain the aforesaid end.” See also *ST II-II* q. 189, a. 1, ad 3.

⁷⁴ *ST I* q. 19, a. 8.

⁷⁵ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 6, co.; *ST I-II* q. 61, a. 3, co.: “So therefore the aforesaid four virtues are able to be understood in two ways. In one way according to common formal principles...they are truly able to be taken another way as they are denominated as virtues from that which is paramount in each ones material.”

⁷⁶ It seems necessary to interpret Aquinas in this way for two reasons. First, he seems to link the gifts with the movement toward the counsels. See *ST II-II* q. 189, a. 10, ad 1: “The saying: ‘Try the spirits, if they be of God,’ applies to matters admitting of doubt whether they are of the Spirit of God; thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers himself to religion be led (*ducatur*) by the Spirit of God, or be moved by

supernatural motion post-justification.⁷⁷ Yet that does not mean that when God moves us as an agent supernaturally it is always to a distinctive act of a gift. More will be said about the distinction between the gifts' operative effect (the disposition given to the powers of the soul) and their activity on their proper matter. What is important to note now is that the special *auxilium* toward things *ad finem* corresponds to higher acts, the counsels, than those of the normal course of virtue in the supernatural life of which the gifts are a part. The counsels are something beyond the original line of activity based on the first actual grace and our supernaturally informed reasoning about the means.⁷⁸ In other words, it requires another operative supernatural *auxilium* moving to these acts. If one needs another efficient operative supernatural *auxilium*, then one needs the gifts' operative activity (proportioning the believer to God's supernatural motion), but the acts of the counsels are not acts of the gifts.

hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved (*moveatur*) by the divine Spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart has given birth is from the Spirit of God, for it is His spirit that leads man 'into the land of uprightness.'" The links in this response point in that direction. They include the term *spiritus* (ST I-II q. 68, a. 1), being led by the Spirit (*Super Rom* VIII, n. 635), being moved by the Spirit (ST I-II q. 68, aa. 1-2), and the same quote from Psalm 142 (ST I-II q. 68, a. 2). Second, the acts of the gifts in particular cannot be the counsels. The Spirit would thus move all, by default, to the religious life.

⁷⁷ ST I-II q. 109, a. 6; ST I-II q. 112, a. 2.

⁷⁸ It was also common in the Thomistic tradition to think of the gifts operating beyond human reason, beyond deliberation. There is some justification of this position in Aquinas's mature works. In ST I-II q. 68, a. 1, co. Aquinas says that those with the gifts do not need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner instinct. Yet even this does not exclude the use of human reason. In producing human action the work of the intellect and will are always complementary. According to Aquinas, the Holy Spirit by the gifts causes the acts of human reason. It is not that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is one more categorical cause in competition with the intellect and the will. Aquinas conceives of this type of motion as a non-competitive motion toward right activity. It causes the very acts of intellect and will, it does not substitute for them. See *Super Heb.*, XIII, l. 3, n. 769, *Super Heb.*, VIII, l. 2, n. 404, *Super Heb.*, XI, l. 7, n. 631, and *Super Matt*, X, l. 2, n. 849: "When someone is moved with reason, then it is said he is moved by the Holy Spirit."

Ic. Conclusion

Returning to the question governing this section, what does all this imply about the existence of actual grace? Following Ramirez's definition that actual grace is that by which God moves the believer to know, will, or do something supernatural, it is clear that this does exist in Aquinas. Aquinas calls this motion *auxilium*, but the difference with Ramirez (although not all of the Thomistic tradition) is merely semantic.⁷⁹ God moves the believer to know, will, and act in three ways by his motive *auxilium*: operatively toward the end, cooperatively toward those things toward the end, and particularly toward those things especially fitting for the end in a new line of activity.

Aquinas clearly holds that there is a supernatural motion, an efficient motion rightly called actual grace. Likewise, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are especially fitting for helping to argue this because they are the very disposition for that motion. In short, it is by attending to the gifts that one sees that any position which holds that what Aquinas calls *auxilium* as motion is only logically distinct from habitual grace (or the supernatural habits) is clearly wrong. Furthermore, this is not the only conclusion of this section. This section also proves another application of the well known Thomistic axiom: grace does not destroy, but perfects, nature. This is also true when speaking about the relation between natural and supernatural motion. On the

⁷⁹ J.-H. Nicolas, *Les Profondeurs*, 203 : "Cette motion est nommée couramment depuis le XVI^e siècle la grâce actuelle, et c'est à son propos que se sont affrontées les théologiens dans les disputes De Auxiliis. Nous avons vu qu'il était indispensable de la distinguer de cette autre sorte de motion, par laquelle le Saint-Esprit agit sur l'âme en lui montrant le bien à aimer et à vouloir, motion que nous avons nommée grâce objective, et que répond plus immédiatement à la notion traditionnelle de grâce actuelle. On a même contesté qu'avant le XVI^e siècle on ait conçu comme une grâce la motion efficiente du Saint-Esprit sur la volonté, que les scolastiques, et spécialement saint Thomas, auraient purement et simplement rattachée au « concours général. »

natural level God moves humans to the natural end, toward the means to that end, and directly toward those things fitting for the end. Motion on the supernatural level mirrors this natural motion and perfects it; supernatural motion achieves natural motion's purpose (happiness) in a higher way. God converts humans by the first grace (and subsequent preparatory graces), operatively moving them to the supernatural end.⁸⁰ Once justified, and on the basis of this grace, humans move themselves to real or apparent supernatural goods. God also occasionally moves them operatively toward some means particularly fitting.

II. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Necessity of Grace for Perseverance

The gifts make a definitive contribution to a proper understanding of the grace of perseverance in Aquinas. According to Aquinas, this grace ensures, positively, that the believer actually makes it to heaven and, negatively, that one not fall from the life of grace; this grace assures that one will persevere in the supernatural life all the way to the end. The gifts of the Holy Spirit contribute to the understanding of the gift of perseverance in two main ways: first, by the identification of the motion of perseverance with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit continuing until death and, second, by being the habitual disposition to the motion of perseverance and the habitual disposition to complete supernatural acts (especially via the gift of fortitude). In other words, the real foundation of any contribution the gifts can make to understanding Aquinas on

⁸⁰ The first grace could be either habitual or actual grace. It would be habitual in those God decides to convert instantaneously and for infants. The perfect preparation for grace is caused by habitual grace in these cases. See *ST I-II* q. 112, a. 1, co. It would be actual for those with the use of freedom whom God decides to convert and prepare slowly for habitual grace. For the former see *ST I-II* q. 112, a. 2, ad 2. For the latter see *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 6; *ST I-II* q. 112, a. 2, ad 1 & 3; *ST I-II* q. 117, a. 7, co. In both cases though there is a first actual grace. In the case of infants and those converted instantaneously, the first actual grace moves the will to make the first efficacious act of love of God. In the case of adult converts the first actual grace moves them to do the same, although they do not yet have habitual grace. In both cases it begins a new series of supernatural actions which culminates, hopefully, in the beatific vision.

the grace of perseverance is based on the contention that the gift of perseverance as *auxilium* is simply the involvement of the *instinctus* in the supernatural life continuing until death and that in order to persevere the gift of fortitude must be specifically active in its cooperative effect.

In order to argue these points, this section consists of three subsections. First, I summarize Aquinas's thought on perseverance. Second, I argue that Aquinas identifies the *auxilium* of perseverance with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit continued to the end of life. Third, I argue that the habitual gift of fortitude must also be involved necessarily in perseverance. Finally, I draw out some of the implications of this analysis: the *auxilium* of perseverance is operative and cooperative; perseverance involves human activity; the grace of perseverance is distinct from the first actual grace; the *auxilium* of perseverance is another operative actual grace in the supernatural life; the grace of perseverance does not violate human freedom.

Aquinas mentions the grace of perseverance in four major places in his mature works: ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, ST I-II q. 114, a. 10, ST II-II q. 137, & ST II-II q. 138.⁸¹ In ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, Aquinas clarifies three senses of the word perseverance.

Perseverance is said in three ways. First, it signifies a habit of the mind whereby a man stands firmly, so that he will not be moved from what is virtuous by the assault of sadness. And thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the Philosopher says in book seven of the *Ethics*. Secondly, perseverance can be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused

⁸¹ He mentions perseverance in passing in other places, but they do not add substantially new content to that in his explicit treatises. *SCG* III cc. 155 & 159; *ST* I q. 95, a. 3, ad 4; *ST* I-II q. 58, a. 3, ad 2; *ST* II-II q. 128; *ST* II-II q. 140, a. 2, ad 1; *Quodlibet* III q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; *Super Ps.* 43, n. 9; *Super Matt.*, X, l. 2; XI, l. 3; XV, l. 3; *Super Io.*, XIV, l. 6; XV, l. 1; XVI, l. 6; *Super II Cor.*, VI, l. 1; *Super Heb.*, XI, l. 4; XII, l. 1; *Super Rom.*, II l. 2; VIII, l. 6;

together with grace, even as continence and the other virtues are. Lastly, perseverance is said to be the continuation in the good to the end of life.⁸²

He continues and claims that it is the third sense of perseverance which is most aptly labeled the gift of perseverance. This sense of perseverance is neither infused with habitual grace nor is another habit given to the believer. If the gift of final perseverance were a habit or the result of habitual grace, an infinite regress would result, since the need for a further grace is precisely the need of those perfected by graced habits. What then causes perseverance in the third sense? For perseverance in the third sense (the sense of perseverance called the gift of perseverance), the believer “needs the divine help (*divino auxilio*) guiding and guarding (*dirigente et protegente*) him against the attacks of the passions.”⁸³

Aquinas further specifies the three types of perseverance in ST II-II q. 137. The first type of perseverance outlined above is habitual, comes both in acquired and infused forms, is contrary to sadness,⁸⁴ and inclines one to complete the virtuous action.⁸⁵ According to the second type of perseverance, which is also habitual, all who have habitual grace have the purpose of persevering

⁸² ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “*Respondeo dicendum quod perseverantia tripliciter dicitur. Quandoque enim significat habitum mentis per quem homo firmiter stat, ne removeatur ab eo quod est secundum virtutem, per tristitias irruentes, ut sic se habeat perseverantia ad tristitias sicut continentia ad concupiscentias et delectationes ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest dici perseverantia habitus quidam secundum quem habet homo propositum perseverandi in bono usque in finem. Alio modo dicitur perseverantia continuatio quaedam boni usque ad finem vitae.*”

⁸³ ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “*Et ad talem perseverantiam habendam homo in gratia constitutus non quidem indiget aliqua alia habituali gratia, sed divino auxilio ipsum dirigente et protegente contra tentationum impulsus, sicut ex praecedenti quaestione apparet.*”

⁸⁴ ST II-II q. 137, a. 2, co.: “But perseverance according to which it placed in virtue is to moderate certain passions, that is fear of fatigue and defects on account of longevity.”

⁸⁵ ST II-II q. 137, a. 1, ad 2: “...*per se* however it pertains to perseverance that someone persevere all the way to the end (*terminus*) of the virtuous action, just as a soldier perseveres all the way to the end of the battle, and the magnanimous to the consummation of the work.”

in the good until the end of life and not simply to the end of a particular action.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, “the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life.”⁸⁷ The significant difference between the second aspect of perseverance Aquinas listed above and the third is between habit and act. Why is it necessary to have a further grace beyond the habitual, especially when the habitual includes the “purpose of persevering to the end?”⁸⁸ The key move Aquinas makes involves the definition of virtue: “that which one uses when one wills.”⁸⁹ Hence, simply having the habit of perseverance does not guarantee its use all the way to the end, even if it inclines one to do so. One must actually will to use that habit; one must will to persevere.⁹⁰ This is where the grace of perseverance in the third sense makes its contribution. It moves the believer to use the habit of perseverance and the other virtues.⁹¹

Since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, and this is not destroyed by habitual grace as it is had in this life, it is not in the power of the free-will, even repaired by grace, to stand unchangeably in good, although free will has the power to choose this. It is often in our power to choose yet not to execute.⁹²

⁸⁶ *SCG* III, c. 155

⁸⁷ *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 1, ad 2: “...and for this reason with respect to those virtues which are principle [e.g., faith, hope, and love], the act of perseverance is not consummated until the end of life. And according to this, Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.”

⁸⁸ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “In another way perseverance is said to be a certain habit by which a man has the proposition (*propositum*) of persevering in the good to the end of life.”

⁸⁹ *ST* I-II q. 50, a. 5.

⁹⁰ *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 4, ad 1: “Therefore it must be said that the virtue of perseverance, inasmuch as it is taken in itself, inclines to perseverance. Because nevertheless a habit is that which someone uses when he wills, it is not necessary that the one who has the habit will use it immovably until death.”

⁹¹ *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 1, co.

⁹² *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 4, co.: “*Quia cum liberum arbitrium de se sit vertibile, et hoc ei non tollatur per habitualement gratiam praesentis vitae; non subest potestati liberi arbitrii, etiam per gratiam reparati, ut se immobiliter in bono statuatur, licet sit in potestate eius quod hoc eligat, plerumque enim cadit in potestate nostra electio, non autem executio.*” See also *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 10, co. For *electio* see *ST* I-II q. 13. For *usus* see *ST* I-II q. 16. See also *Super*

This further grace causing the believer to execute is not habitual grace or a habit. It is the *auxilio gratiae*.⁹³ It is a supernatural motion beyond the habitual gift.⁹⁴ It is necessary for two reasons. First, this motion is necessary so that the believer executes the choice to persevere, since even with habitual grace the subject is still in potency.⁹⁵ What is in potency must be reduced by something already having that perfection, already in act. The motion of God fulfills this role. Second, the believer needs this further *auxilium* because of the “impulse of temptation.”⁹⁶ If God ceased to move the believer, the believer would cease to act. If God did not protect the believer from temptation, the believer would fall.⁹⁷ In short, habitual grace alone is insufficient for reaching the supernatural end. The believer must have the further help of God guiding (leading) and guarding. In short, one needs the *auxilium* of perseverance both to reduce the subject to act and to guard against temptation.⁹⁸

Rom., IX, l. 3, n. 773: “And so the very use (*usus*) of grace is from God. Yet this does not mean that the habit of grace is superfluous, just as natural forms are not superfluous, even God operates in all, because it is said that ‘God orders all things sweetly’ (Wis 8:1). That is, through their forms all things are inclined as if spontaneously to that to which they are ordered by God.”

⁹³ *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 4, ad 3.

⁹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 10, co.: “...another way, on the part of the divine motion, which inclines man to the good all the way up to the end.”

⁹⁵ *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 10, co.: “I respond saying that, since man naturally has a free decision which is capable of both good and evil, it is able to obtain perseverance in the good in a twofold way from God.”

⁹⁶ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “*tentationum impulsus*.”

⁹⁷ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

⁹⁸ Aquinas seems to think that both of these roles can be fulfilled by the same motion. See *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co. Since virtuous action and virtues are contrary to vice and temptation, by moving the believer to virtuous acts, God does guard from temptation.

How is this gift of perseverance related to the gifts of the Holy Spirit? I argued in the last chapter that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, the very motion to which the gifts proportion the believer, is identical to the *auxilium* of ST I-II q. 109, a. 9. If that argument is correct, then clearly the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is also the agent of motion causing perseverance. In other words, to be given the gift of perseverance is to receive the motion/*instinctus* of the Holy Spirit activating and protecting the believer all the way up until death. Put differently, one might say that God enacts his providential predestination by the *instinctus* of the Spirit and his governance of the world (which is responsible for causing the particular time of death, inasmuch as it is good).

Why is this the case? Why should one think that the *instinctus* of the gifts is the cause of perseverance in the third sense? Aquinas clearly says that the gift of perseverance is simply the motion outlined in ST I-II q. 109, a. 9 continued to the end of life. If the motion of ST I-II q. 109, a. 9 is the *instinctus* of the gifts, then the *instinctus* of the gifts is also the motion which activates the habitual disposition to persevere to the end of life. As Aquinas clearly says: “Thirdly, perseverance is called a certain abiding in the good until the end of life. And for such perseverance, a human constituted in grace does not need another habitual grace, but divine help guiding and guarding him against the impulse of temptation, just as was shown in the preceding question.”⁹⁹ The motion of article nine is the motion causing perseverance. Not only does

⁹⁹ ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “*Alio modo dicitur perseverantia continuatio quaedam boni usque ad finem vitae. Et ad talem perseverantiam habendam homo in gratia constitutus non quidem indiget aliqua alia habituali gratia, sed divino auxilio ipsum dirigente et protegente contra tentationum impulsus, sicut ex praecedenti quaestione apparet.*” Aquinas also uses the same verbs for the action of the grace of perseverance and the motion in article nine. This makes it even more probable that the grace of perseverance is identical with the motion of article nine, simply continued to the end of life (or rather given whenever it is needed). The grace of perseverance is thus a separate operative actual grace from the first operative actual grace. On the other hand, it is not a separate actual grace from

Aquinas specifically say this, but the purposes of the motion in article nine and ten are also the same. The motion in article nine was for the purpose of reducing the subject from potency to act and guarding against temptation. These are the same purposes of the *auxilium* of perseverance. Hence, if my argument in the last chapter is correct that the motion of article nine, the motion which both activated the believer as a secondary cause and protected the believer from the dangers of this world, is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, then the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, if it continues to death, is the *auxilium* of perseverance.¹⁰⁰

This identification of the motion causing perseverance with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit also pulls the gifts as habits into the picture in two ways. First, one must have the gifts disposing the powers of the soul in order to receive God's supernatural motion. Motion requires an agent, a disposition in the moved, and a terminus.¹⁰¹ In the supernatural life, Aquinas conceives God as the primary agent and God as the object (via the theological virtues). The disposition in the moved is provided by the gifts.¹⁰² A disposition is required in the moved so that it may be moved well by the agent.¹⁰³ Hence, inasmuch as the grace of perseverance is

the other operative or cooperative actual graces in the supernatural life, but rather simply a continual gift of them where necessary until the end of life.

¹⁰⁰ The reason Aquinas uses a different term for this motion seems to be two-fold. First, the term 'gift of perseverance' is traditional in western Christianity. Second, it is logically distinct from the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit since it adds the notion of continuation until the end. This does not posit a real distinction between the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and the grace of perseverance. Yet since we name based on concepts, a new concept (even if identical in subject) merits a new name.

¹⁰¹ *ST I-II* q. 26, a. 7, co.

¹⁰² *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.

¹⁰³ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.: "It is manifest, however, that all things which are moved must be proportionate to their mover and this (the disposition by which the mobile is disposed to be well moved by its mover) is a perfection of the moved inasmuch as it is movable."

conceived as a motion post-justification, the gifts provide the disposition to receive it. The gifts are the dispositions to be moved by God as the primary agent of the supernatural life. Inasmuch as the *auxilium* of perseverance is a motion post-justification, it requires the disposition of the gifts.

Second, the identification of the *auxilium* of perseverance with the *instinctus* of the Spirit continued to the end of life implies not only that the gifts (as providing the disposition to be moved by God) are necessary for perseverance, but also the cooperative effect of the gifts of fortitude. In other words, one must have the habitual gift of fortitude to persevere. This may not seem to be the case given that Aquinas partitions off the *auxilium* of perseverance from habitual grace. As Aquinas stated earlier, the second sense of perseverance is “a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the end.”¹⁰⁴ This habit is not sufficient for perseverance, since humans are changeable,¹⁰⁵ and often will but do not accomplish.¹⁰⁶ The key to including habitual elements in the gift of perseverance is noticing that the second sense of perseverance is the infused virtue of perseverance as a subvirtue of the infused cardinal virtue of fortitude. Clearly the infused virtue of perseverance is necessary for perseverance. Yet, the gift of fortitude is necessary for the infused virtue of perseverance.

¹⁰⁴ *ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “Alio modo potest dici perseverantia habitus quidam secundum quem habet homo propositum perseverandi in bono usque in finem.”*

¹⁰⁵ *ST II-II q. 137, a. 4, ad 1: “It is said that man is able to fall into sin, but is not able to rise from sin without the help of grace. And for this reason man falls, from himself, into sin and perseveres in sin, unless he is liberated by God. It is not however from that good which he does that he is able to persevere in the good, because the power he has from himself is to sin. And for this reason he needs the help of grace.”*

¹⁰⁶ *ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.; ST II-II q. 137, a. 4, co.: “...for it is often in our power to elect, but not to execute.”*

In addition to the infused virtue of perseverance, the gift of fortitude is necessary for perseverance. What does the cooperative effect of the gift of fortitude add to the infused virtue of perseverance? At first it might seem like it adds nothing but a certain assurance that one will attain God.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, this is not the case. It not only adds assurance, but also completion of the work.¹⁰⁸ “Yet furthermore man's soul is moved by the Holy Spirit, in order that he may reach the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten....But the Holy Spirit works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils.”¹⁰⁹ The gift of fortitude aids the virtue of perseverance by giving the habitual ability to attain to the end of supernatural works and to avoid all dangers in the supernatural life.¹¹⁰ Yet the gift of fortitude can only do this because it provides the proportion

¹⁰⁷ ST II-II q. 137, a. 4, co.: “A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Spirit.” And ad 1: “Fortitude as a virtue perfects the soul to sustain any danger whatsoever, but it does not suffice to give the confidence of evading all dangers. This pertains to fortitude as a gift of the Holy Spirit.”

¹⁰⁸ ST II-II q. 139, a. 1, ad 3: “The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only in enduring dangers, but also in accomplishing any difficult work. For this reason the gift of fortitude is led by the gift of counsel because counsel seems to be chiefly concerned with the higher goods.” And co.: “Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Spirit, so that he may attain the end of each work begun and avoid whatever perils threaten. This indeed surpasses human nature, for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since he might be oppressed by them in death. But the Holy Spirit works this in man, while he leads him to eternal life, which is the end of all good works and the avoidance of every danger.”

¹⁰⁹ ST II-II q. 139, a. 1, co.: “*Sed ulterius a spiritu sancto movetur animus hominis ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cuiuslibet operis inchoati, et evadat quaecumque pericula imminencia. Quod quidem excedit naturam humanam, quandoque enim non subest potestati hominis ut consequatur finem sui operis, vel evadat mala seu pericula, cum quandoque opprimatur ab eis in mortem. Sed hoc operatur spiritus sanctus in homine, dum perducit eum ad vitam aeternam, quae est finis omnium bonorum operum et evasio omnium periculorum. Et huius rei infundit quandam fiduciam menti spiritus sanctus, contrarium timorem excludens. Et secundum hoc fortitudo donum spiritus sancti ponitur, dictum est enim supra quod dona respiciunt motionem animae a spiritu sancto.*”

¹¹⁰ ST II-II q. 139, a. 1, co.

necessary to God's very motion, motion necessary to begin, continue, or complete any act.¹¹¹

Now to accomplish the end of all works and avoid all dangers in the supernatural life clearly pertains to the gift of perseverance, as does the attainment of everlasting life—the end of all supernatural acts.¹¹² Hence, the gift of fortitude is necessary for perseverance in the following ways: (1) in its operative effect as proportioning/disposing the believer to the very motion of God, (2) in its cooperative effect (and based on the command of charity) by moving to acts of the infused cardinal virtue of fortitude, and (3) assuring their accomplishment as well as giving a certain confidence that God can bring the end of all supernatural works—heavenly bliss.¹¹³

Summarizing the above, it seems that the grace of perseverance preeminently pertains to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, but also to the gift of fortitude in both its operative and cooperative effects. Generally speaking, the motion of the Holy Spirit must continue to move the believer to good action, either operatively or cooperatively, depending, or the believer will not persevere. Specifically, in order to persevere, the Holy Spirit moves the believer by the gift of fortitude, which not only gives a certain confidence that the end of the supernatural life will be

¹¹¹ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 10, co.: “Whence is it clear that while the perseverance to glory, which is the term of the aforesaid motion, falls under merit, perseverance of this life does not fall under merit because it depends solely on the divine motion which is the principle of all merit.” Aquinas seems to be speaking here of the motion of perseverance in its operative sense. In this sense, perseverance depends solely on the motion of God. Nevertheless, if the believer is going to be the one persevering, i.e., completing acts and attaining their ends freely, one must posit some kind of habitual proportion to this motion which acts on the basis of the operative actual grace.

¹¹² *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 10, co.; *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 10, co.

¹¹³ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 1, co.; *ST II-II* q. 139, a. 1, co.: “*contrarium timorem excludens*”

attained by God's gift, but also gives the habitual disposition to complete supernatural actions and attain their ends. This is not just for acts of fortitude, but for all supernatural acts.¹¹⁴

This identification of the grace of perseverance with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit continued to the end of life and the gift of fortitude helps one further understand the grace of perseverance in (at least) three ways (the first of which has three parts).¹¹⁵ First, it particularizes the necessarily general treatment of the grace of perseverance. What does Aquinas mean particularly by perseverance? He means God continually activating the believer and protecting the believer by his *instinctus/auxilium* all the way until death.¹¹⁶ Given this, all the information about the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit can be applied to the gift of perseverance as a supernatural motion. This tells us a few things about the *auxilium* of perseverance: (1) It does not violate human freedom, but enables it by moving the believer to accomplish acts and reach the

¹¹⁴ ST II-II q. 137, a. 4, co.: "*Sed ulterius a spiritu sancto movetur animus hominis ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cuiuslibet operis inchoati, et evadat quaecumque pericula imminentia.*"

¹¹⁵ Does this identification make the grace of perseverance taken as motion due to the believer? If it did, this would be a fatal argument against it, for Aquinas wants to uphold the Augustinian conception that the gift of perseverance cannot be merited (ST I-II q. 114, a. 10). It might seem to make it due since the gifts are a habitual disposition to be moved by the Holy Spirit. In addition, if the *instinctus* of the believer is the supernatural motion which moves the believer to good action unto the end of supernatural life, then it would seem that the gift of perseverance is due to the believer as well. What can one say to this objection? The key distinction which must be made is to deny the link between having proportion to God's motion and being due God's motion. The gifts give the capacity to be moved by God's motion. The gifts do not give a claim on God's motion. Likewise, since the grace of perseverance includes the completed activity of not only each motion but a whole series of actions, only God can give this (See SCG III, c. 155). It can in no sense be due to the believer since proportion to God's motion is not proportion to a series of motions. Even if one were to answer the above objections and claim that the conception outlined above makes the gift of perseverance due to the believer, it could in no sense be due in a stronger sense than the way in which God's natural motion is due to human nature, which is to say in general, but not to each particular. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 56. I think this sense would still satisfy Aquinas's contention that the gift of perseverance is unmerited. The motion of the Holy Spirit is the cause of merit, and can in no way be the effect, save possibly in a wholly dispositive and fitting sense.

¹¹⁶ This necessarily includes actual external graces such as belong to the ordering activity of providence. This does not require the gifts since it only moves by a type of final causality and not efficient causality. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of a motion in the order of the good (final causality) requires a motion in the order of efficient causality, and therefore the gifts.

supernatural end.¹¹⁷ (2) It is both operative and cooperative.¹¹⁸ It both moves us to act operatively and cooperates with us in the production of the act. (3) It justifies the standard contention that the grace of perseverance is actually a combination of actual and habitual graces in adults.¹¹⁹ If one were to simply to interpret Aquinas's account in ST I-II q. 109, a. 10 and ST II-II q. 137, a. 4 at face value, one would probably come away with the idea that the grace of perseverance is simply actual grace. Indeed, Aquinas seems to partition off the grace of perseverance from any habitual aspect at all.¹²⁰ It is the identification of the grace of perseverance taken as an actual grace with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit that justifies the claim that the grace of perseverance, taken in a wide sense, is not simply an actual grace, but includes habitual counterparts as well.

Second, the identification of the grace of perseverance with the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit shows that the grace of perseverance is truly distinct from the first actual grace.¹²¹ This is so because the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not necessary for all the graces prior to justification to be received, but rather are necessary as a disposition to the motions which come posterior to the

¹¹⁷ *Super Io.*, VIII l. 4, n. 1199: "The truth of grace will free from the slavery to sin."; *Super Io.*, VIII l. 4, n. 1209: "Then there is true and spiritual freedom, which is the freedom of grace, that is the absence of sin. It is imperfect here because the flesh lusts against the spirit, so that we do not do that which we will. In glory, there is perfect and full freedom." ST II-II q. 137, a. 4; ST II-II q. 139, a. 1, co.

¹¹⁸ ST I-II q. 111, a. 2.

¹¹⁹ This contention is common in traditional Thomistic thinkers. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 106; Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 381.

¹²⁰ ST I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.

¹²¹ For more on the first actual grace, this *divinum auxilium*, see *Super Io.*, VI, l. 5 nn. 936-939 and ST I-II q. 114, a. 5, co.

infusion of habitual grace, which can be infused both prior to baptism or in baptism.¹²² The disposition for all *auxilium* preparing for habitual grace is negative prior to actual grace and positive under the good actions inspired by actual grace. The preparatory graces come naturally prior to any graced habitual disposition in the believer. What is naturally prior to habitual grace and all of its effects (including the gifts of the Holy Spirit) cannot come posterior (in either the natural sense of priority or the temporal sense) to habitual grace. Hence the preparatory graces (including the first operative actual grace, if it is preparatory) are distinct from any operative motions to which the gifts proportion the believer.

This is not to say that the first actual grace is unrelated to perseverance. In one place, when Aquinas argues why perseverance must be gratuitous, he claims that it is because something must cause the series of supernatural acts qua series of supernatural acts.¹²³ The best candidate for this role is the first actual grace, which (as argued earlier) continues throughout the supernatural life until God is reached (presuming no mortal sin, of course).¹²⁴ Nevertheless, beyond the first actual grace (and all other preparatory graces) another operative actual grace is

¹²² Aquinas implies that habitual grace could be infused prior to baptism in many places throughout his corpus. One example will suffice. According to Aquinas, the first free act of a human must be to place God as end of all activity (SCG III c. 10; DM q. 1, a. 3). God gives all sufficient grace to do this (*Super Io.*, VI, l. 5, n. 937). If the individual consents to this grace, he receives the remission of original sin (ST I-II q. 89, a. 6, co.). This implies that habitual grace is infused into one who does not place an obstacle (i.e., consents) to the first actual grace since original sin is only remitted by habitual grace (ST III q. 69, a. 3, ad 3; ST I-II q. 113, a. 2, co.). Yet they would not receive the conformity to Christ through the character (ST III q. 68, a. 1, ad 3). Obviously this applies only in the case of those with use of their freedom (older children and adults – infant baptism was the common practice by Aquinas’s day). The infusion of habitual grace prior to baptism is a baptism of desire (ST III q. 68, a. 2, co.) and is ordered toward true baptism. That habitual grace is infused in baptism is clear in Aquinas. See ST I-II q. 109, a. 9; ST III q. 69, aa. 4, 6, and 8.

¹²³ SCG III, c. 155.

¹²⁴ *Super Rom.*, VI, l. 4, n. 515.

needed to persevere for the reason given above. Neither the first actual grace nor any habitual gift moves the will to actually will to persevere. The first grace moves the will toward acts of love of God. It does not move the will to actively will perseverance in this love. The first actual grace (and other preparatory operative and cooperative graces) do prepare the soul for the infusion of habitual grace. Yet neither habitual grace, nor any of the habits which follow from it can do more than incline the will to persevere. Thus, there is certainly, if this needs further evidence, more than one possible operative grace in the supernatural life.¹²⁵ The *auxilium* of perseverance moves the will operatively to the act of perseverance and then cooperates with the will in all those actions which may follow.

Third, the identification of the grace of perseverance with the *instinctus* of the gifts continued to the end of life guards human activity in the realm of perseverance. Certainly perseverance is only possible because God moves the believer operatively to persevere by his *auxilium*. God must reduce the will from the potency of willing to persevere to actually willing to persevere. God must move the believer to good acts or the believer will not persevere. Nevertheless, this operative actual grace has real effects in the believer, that is the believer really wills to persevere and then (under the influence of the grace of perseverance as cooperative) carries out works of the supernatural life, those works necessary to persevere and merit eternal life.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ This explains Aquinas's *praesertim* in *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: "*Et quantum ad istum actum, voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens, et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat. Et ideo secundum quod Deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum, dicitur gratia operans.*"

¹²⁶ *Super Matt.*, X, l. 2, n. 849; *Super Heb.*, XIII, l. 3, n. 769.

Summarizing the above, one might say that the gifts of the Holy Spirit relate to the necessity of grace in two broad ways. First, they are necessary that one receive the supernatural motion of God, which both activates and guards from temptation. Such was the conclusion of the last chapter. Second, they are necessary that one may persevere in the supernatural life. God must move the will to actually will to persevere. Likewise, for this to be freely received and enacted, one needs both the gifts as dispositions to God's supernatural motion and the gifts of fortitude's cooperative effect to habitually incline the believer to complete all meritorious actions. These two broad points, and all their subpoints too, would not come to light (or not fully) without recognizing the contribution the gifts make for understanding Aquinas's thought on the necessity of grace.

III. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Division of Grace

As seen in chapter I, the division of grace seems almost a passtime in Thomism. The topic is picked up from time to time, made more precise, and passed on to the next generation. This chapter makes no pretense at presenting the whole of the divisions of grace in Aquinas. Such a topic would be a dissertation in itself. Rather, I claim that by using Aquinas's understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to help understand the divisions of grace one can come to a fuller understanding of those divisions. This is so in the following ways: for actual grace, the *instinctus* which activates the gifts of the Holy Spirit particularizes Aquinas's general account of motion in the supernatural life (particularizes the category of common *auxilium*), helps one to posit the distinction between common actual grace and the actual grace of supereminence, and shows intimate links between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the

sacraments. For habitual grace, the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not provide further divisions but rather make clearer the proper order between habitual grace and the supernatural habits (theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues).

IIIa. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Division of Motive *Auxilium*

Common *Auxilium* as motion is God's further help given to the believer who already has habitual grace.¹²⁷ As outlined in the last chapter, it serves a dual role. It activates the believer so that meritorious acts will follow. It protects the believer from temptation. I assume that this further help can be divided and will argue that the gifts contribute to the division in three primary ways. First, the gifts particularize Aquinas's account of supernatural motion post-justification. Put differently, the gifts particularize God's involvement in each activity post-justification. In this sense motion is God's governance of the justified believer, an effect of providence.¹²⁸ Second, since the gifts are dispositions to common *auxilium* as motion and this common motion does not concern the counsels, it seems one must posit a further division of actual grace in Aquinas: a distinction of common *auxilium* as motion from the graced motions of superabundance.¹²⁹ Finally, the gifts' disposition to common *auxilium* as motion links the effects of the sacraments to the immanent supernatural principles in the believer. In other words, the effects of the sacraments (at least some of them) are intimately linked with the *instinctus* of the gifts and the gifts' operative effect.

¹²⁷ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

¹²⁸ *ST* I q. 22, a. 1, ad 2.

¹²⁹ *ST* I q. 19, a. 12, co.: "...with respect to what is necessary for the good, there is a precept. With respect to what is superabundant for the good, a counsel."

The first contribution the gifts make to Aquinas's division of actual grace is to particularize Aquinas's account of supernatural motion. According to many in the Thomistic tradition, the ordinary motions given by God to convert humans and activate them toward good supernatural action are called common actual grace.¹³⁰ Put more technically in the argumentative language of this dissertation, common actual grace is all those operative and cooperative actual graces given so that believer may act well in those things necessary for the supernatural end.¹³¹ I call this common *auxilium*. These actual graces (pressuposing habitual grace)¹³² are (at least) sufficient to do all works necessary for eternal life and avoid all mortal sins. The gifts do not distinguish this as a category in Aquinas, but rather particularize the category and tell us more about it. After the infusion of habitual grace,¹³³ common actual grace is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.¹³⁴ The gifts of the Holy Spirit enable the subject to receive common actual grace

¹³⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages*, 91.

¹³¹ One may wonder here why I have separated common actual grace from the deliberative mode that the Thomistic tradition gave it. I have done so because I think Aquinas's conception of how God moves us is not by interacting with our causality in a sequential manner (before, after, above deliberation), but rather by causing deliberation itself. For more on this point, see *Super Matt.*, X, l. 2, n. 849: "*Quando cum ratione, tunc dicitur motus a Spiritu Sancto.*" *Super Heb.*, XIII, l. 3, n. 769; see also Brian Shanley, "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas."

¹³² See Garrigou-Lagrange for a caveat to this point.

¹³³ Baptism is the cause of habitual grace according to Aquinas (see *ST* III q. 69, aa. 4, 6, and 8). This is either by actual performance or by desire. The infusion of habitual grace does not change God's motion but rather the believer. Hence, after baptism God's motion is called *instinctus*, since the believer is connatural to it. Nevertheless, the first actual grace is also the *instinctus* of the Spirit. Put differently, the believer habitually wills that to which the first actual grace moved him. The first actual grace must remain until the end of life since it is a motion to God as supernatural end. Motions continue until the end toward which they move is reached.

¹³⁴ It is also possible, and probably also an implication of this dissertation, that the supernatural *auxilium* given to the unjustified is the same motion as the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, only without a habitual disposition in the subject. The justified subject is thus connatural to this motion in a way that the unjustified would not be. In other words, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are really what enable grace to be called cooperative. For a clear implication of this see *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 5, co.: "...The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the soul so that it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Spirit. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is called the gift of understanding insofar as man's understanding is moved well by the Holy Spirit, the consideration of which movement depends on a true

connaturally and cooperatively. Hence, when Aquinas speaks of the normal course of Christian life, he is speaking of activity incited by the *instinctus* of the Spirit. The Spirit is not partitioned off for the heights of the supernatural life.¹³⁵ He is the beginning and the end. All are called to radical holiness; all are led by the Spirit in the normal course of their lives,¹³⁶ who directs believers on the right path.¹³⁷

The second contribution of the gifts is related to the first. As stated above, Aquinas's thought on the gifts helps to posit the distinction between common *auxilium* and the graces of supereminence. Common *auxilium* as motion covers everything necessary for the supernatural life. As argued earlier common *auxilium* as motion is identical with the Holy Spirit's *instinctus* in reality, but not in name.¹³⁸ Now the gifts in their operative effect do proportion/dispose the

apprehension of the end. Whence unless the human intellect is moved by the Holy Spirit so that it has a right estimate of the end, it does not yet have the gift of understanding, however much it understands of the preambles of Faith by the light of the Holy Spirit."

¹³⁵ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 5, co.

¹³⁶ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635.

¹³⁷ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 6, n. 699.

¹³⁸ This category is diversely called *auxilium*, *instinctus*, and the grace of the sacraments by Aquinas. These are not absolutely different motions, but rather signify a different aspect of the different types of supernatural motions. *Auxilium* names supernatural motion from the perspective of human need. *Instinctus* names supernatural motion from the perspective of human proportion to it. The grace of the sacraments names motion inasmuch as it is ordered toward the end of the sacraments. All motions of the supernatural life are *auxilium*. All motions of the supernatural life post-baptism are *instinctus* and *auxilium*. All supernatural motions ordered to the purpose of the sacraments are *auxilium*, *instinctus*, and the grace of the sacraments. The grace of supereminence is not the grace of the sacraments. There is no habitual disposition in the ordinary principles of supernatural life ordered to preminent acts rather than just obedience to the commandments. Yet, the grace of supereminence is *instinctus* and *auxilium*.

believer to all supernatural motion,¹³⁹ but most specifically to the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, common *auxilium*. This is why the gifts are necessary to reach heaven.

The counsels, on the other hand, are beyond the necessary. Counsels are beyond that to which God moves all believers by the supernatural habits. Furthermore, God does draw people to these supereminent acts.¹⁴⁰ In other words, there is a supernatural motion which corresponds to the acts of the counsels, which is beyond the necessary common *auxilium*. This motion cannot be the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, which is necessary for activation and protection from temptation. God moves all believers this way. God does not move all to the counsels. Hence, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, common *auxilium*, must be distinguished from the grace of supereminence. The grace of supereminence is an operative/cooperative motion initiating a new line of causality toward those things more fitting to the supernatural end. Common *auxilium* is all the operative and cooperative motions God gives the believer to both activate and protect from temptation.

The previous contribution of Aquinas's thought on the gifts may lead one to wonder how the first actual grace relates to the gifts of the Holy Spirit according to Aquinas. Recalling one thing about Aquinas's account of motion and another about the first actual grace will help make the answer more apparent. First, the first grace is the first operative actual grace given to the will of a human to move him to actively love God as a supernatural end,¹⁴¹ to love God efficaciously,

¹³⁹ This is why Aquinas can say that the gift of counsel guides in all matters related to the supernatural end, necessary or not. See *ST* II-II q. 52, a. 4, ad 2.

¹⁴⁰ *ST* I q. 19, a. 8, co.

¹⁴¹ *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 5, co.

thereby moving one to the act of faith.¹⁴² It is analogous to the first motion toward happiness in general.¹⁴³ Second, according to Aquinas, motion ceases when the end toward which it moves is achieved.¹⁴⁴ Given both of these facts, it is clear that the first actual grace continues throughout the supernatural life (assuming one does not commit a mortal sin),¹⁴⁵ that is until God is achieved in the beatific vision.¹⁴⁶ Grace is the pledge of glory.¹⁴⁷

Are the gifts related to this grace at all, since they come posterior to justification and the first actual grace comes prior (usually)?¹⁴⁸ It would seem so. I see no reason why one should not affirm that the gifts of the Holy Spirit proportion the subject to this grace, since the first grace continues its influence after the infusion of habitual grace.¹⁴⁹ Inasmuch as the first actual grace continues to influence the life of the believer, the gifts make its influence connatural and allow

¹⁴² The act of faith is the first motion of the mind toward God. See *Super Rom.*, III, l. 3, n. 302; *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 4, co.

¹⁴³ *ST I-II* q. 9, a. 6, ad 3.

¹⁴⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 175. Commitment to this principle underlies Garrigou-Lagrange's contention that operative and cooperative actual graces are diverse separate motions. What Garrigou-Lagrange misses is that the grace of conversion moves one to glory, not simply to habitual grace. It moves and prepares for habitual grace only because it moves to glory. Grace is ordained to glory. *Super Heb.*, II, l. 3, n. 127.

¹⁴⁵ A mortal sin interrupts the motion of the first grace. If the person is to rise from sin, God must give a new operative actual grace, in a sense reconverting the sinner. See *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 7, co.: "Nobody can merit reparation after a future lapse by either condign or congruous merit. For condign merit is not able to be had because its very reason is that it depends on the free divine motion, whose motion is interrupted by sin. Whence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit. The motion of the preceding grace does not extend to them."

¹⁴⁶ *Super Heb.*, II, l. 3, n. 127; *Super Heb.*, X, l. 2, n. 513; *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 5, ad 3: "Every good work of man proceeds from the first grace as from a principle."

¹⁴⁷ *Super Heb.*, XIII, l. 3, n. 723.

¹⁴⁸ *ST III* q. 69, a. 4, ad 2.

¹⁴⁹ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 5, ad 3.

the believer to cooperate with it in the strict sense. The gifts make it possible that the will will continually receive the motion necessary to will God as supernatural end by the virtue of charity.¹⁵⁰ They enable faith to influence action through wisdom, understanding, and knowledge.¹⁵¹ In short, the gifts allow the continual influence of the first actual grace in the life of the believer.

Finally, reading the gifts of the Holy Spirit in conjunction with the divisions of actual grace helps one to understand the intimate links between the sacraments and the gifts. Sacramental grace, according to Aquinas, is something beyond habitual grace (infused in the rite of baptism or by the pure desire for it),¹⁵² the gifts, and the virtues.¹⁵³ What type of grace do the sacraments give then? Aquinas claims that the sacraments add “a certain divine help (*divinum auxilium*) for attaining the purposes of the sacraments.”¹⁵⁴ In other words, the sacraments give the necessary supernatural principles (the divine help) so that the sacraments can reach their intended purposes.¹⁵⁵ In order to see the connection between the ends of the sacraments and the gifts, one must first then be clear what the purposes of the sacraments are and the *auxilium* (in

¹⁵⁰ The infusion of habitual grace does not change God’s motion but rather the believer. Hence, after baptism God’s motion is called *instinctus*, since the believer is connatural to it. Nevertheless, the preparatory *auxilia* are also the *instinctus* of the Spirit, simply without the habitual disposition to it.

¹⁵¹ *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 8, ad 2: “Faith cannot universally precede understanding for it is not possible that man assent by believing what is proposed to be believed without understanding it in some way.” *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 6, co. & ad 2; *ST* II-II q. 9, a. 3, ad 3.

¹⁵² *ST* III q. 72, a. 7, ad 3.

¹⁵³ *ST* III q. 62, a. 2, co.

¹⁵⁴ *ST* III q. 62, a. 2, co.: “*quoddam divinum auxilium ad consequendum sacramenti finem.*”

¹⁵⁵ *Super Heb.*, VII, l. 1, n. 329.

the broad sense) God gives toward them. For Aquinas's mature thought this is only possible for the first four sacraments: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, and Penance.¹⁵⁶

The purposes of these four sacraments and the help given by God toward their ends are diverse in each case. In common, all four sacraments are ordered to the salvation of the individual.¹⁵⁷ In the case of Baptism, the direct purpose of the sacrament is the regeneration of the individual (negatively: the forgiveness of sins;¹⁵⁸ positively: incorporation into Christ).¹⁵⁹ This is accomplished by the first effect of the sacrament: an indelible mark on the soul and its direct effect, habitual grace.¹⁶⁰

The sacrament of Confirmation is directly ordered to bring spiritual adulthood¹⁶¹ in the baptized.¹⁶² It does this by imprinting a character,¹⁶³ ordered toward spiritual maturity,¹⁶⁴ ("the fullness of the Holy Spirit")¹⁶⁵ and external combat.¹⁶⁶ This character in turn effects the

¹⁵⁶ *ST* III q. 65, a. 2.

¹⁵⁷ *ST* III q. 84, a. 6, co.: "The sacraments are *per se* ordained to the salvation of man, just as baptism, which is spiritual generation, and confirmation, which is spiritual growth, and Eucharist, which is spiritual nutrition. Penance however is ordained to the salvation of man *per accidens*, that is supposing something, i.e., sin."

¹⁵⁸ *ST* III q. 69, aa. 1-3.

¹⁵⁹ *ST* III q. 69, a. 5, co. *ST* III q. 69, a. 10, co.; *ST* III q. 69, a. 8, co.

¹⁶⁰ *ST* III q. 69, a. 10, co.: "...and similarly when someone is baptized, he receives a character (a quasi form), and it follows the proper effect, which is the remittance of all sins."

¹⁶¹ *ST* III q. 72, a. 5, co.

¹⁶² *ST* III q. 72, a. 6, co.

¹⁶³ *ST* III q. 68, a. 6, co.: "and for this reason these three sacraments imprint a character: baptism, confirmation, and orders."

¹⁶⁴ *ST* III q. 72, a. 1, co.: "...est motus augmenti, quo aliquis perducitur ad perfectam aetatem."

¹⁶⁵ *ST* III q. 72, a. 4, ad 1: "Scilicet plenitudo spiritus sancti."

¹⁶⁶ *ST* III q. 72, a. 4, ad 2: "Et per hoc est effectus sacramenti, ut perducatur ad perfectionem."

augmentation of habitual grace in the life of the believer for the purpose of combating external foes.¹⁶⁷ In addition, the purpose of the characters imprinted by Baptism and Confirmation (which are a participation in the priesthood of Christ)¹⁶⁸ is external worship, namely participation in the Mass.¹⁶⁹

The final two sacraments are Eucharist and Penance. The Eucharist's purpose is the augmentation of the life of grace in the individual believer. Whereas confirmation is ordered to augmentation of habitual grace for the purpose of combat,¹⁷⁰ the Eucharist is ordered to the attaining of eternal life.¹⁷¹ This is accomplished by the augmentation of habitual grace, and especially charity (the virtue through which union with Christ is accomplished).¹⁷² Reception of the Eucharist even moves toward acts of charity.¹⁷³ The sacrament of penance is directly ordered to the forgiveness of sin. In other words, it restores grace by removing the impediments preventing the baptismal character from causing habitual grace.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁶ *ST* III q. 72, a. 9, co.; *ST* III q. 72, a. 4, co.: “*Sicut autem ex supra dictis patet, in hoc sacramento datur spiritus sanctus ad robur spiritualis pugnae.*”

¹⁶⁷ *ST* III q. 72, a. 7, ad 3.

¹⁶⁸ *ST* III q. 63, a. 3, co.; *ST* III q. 63, a. 6, ad 1.

¹⁶⁹ *ST* III q. 65, a. 5, ad 3.

¹⁷⁰ *ST* III q. 79, a. 1, ad 1: “...therefore, when this sacrament is really received, grace is augmented and the spiritual life perfected. Otherwise, than through the sacrament of confirmation in which grace is augmented and perfected to persist against the exterior attacks of the enemies of Christ.”

¹⁷¹ *ST* III q. 79, a. 2, co.

¹⁷² *ST* III q. 79, a. 8, co.: “The effect of this sacrament is not alone the attainment of habitual grace or charity, but even a certain active restoration of spiritual sweetness.” *ST* III q. 79, a. 5, co.

¹⁷³ *ST* III q. 79, a. 4, co.

¹⁷⁴ *ST* III qq. 86-87. *ST* III q. 89, a. 1, co.

The *divinum auxilium* God gives for the purposes of the sacraments are diverse in each case, but predominately relate to habitual grace: its introduction, increase, and restoration. By *divinum auxilium* in the case of Baptism, Aquinas means the infusion of habitual grace.¹⁷⁵ For confirmation, Aquinas means the augmentation of habitual grace for the purpose of external combat. In the Eucharist, the help received is the increase of habitual grace by unity with Christ. Finally, in penance, the forgiveness of sin is given by the reinfusion of habitual grace to the degree the believer is disposed.¹⁷⁶

Nevertheless, in order to interpret St. Thomas faithfully, one must read these *auxilia* in light of his doctrine of sacramental grace in ST III q. 62, a. 2. Therein, it will be recalled, St. Thomas argued that sacramental grace added something beyond grace commonly speaking: habitual grace, the virtues, the gifts, and their acts.¹⁷⁷ One can see here how Aquinas utilizes the ambiguity of *divinum auxilium*. In one sense *divinum auxilium* includes habitual grace. This is the sense on which Aquinas seems to exclusively focus in his questions about the effects of the sacraments individually. Hence, as identified above the help toward the end of the sacraments is often habitual grace itself, its strengthening, or its restoration. Nevertheless, *divinum auxilium* can also mean actual grace, or grace as motion. In order for Aquinas to remain consistent he must not only utilize *divinum auxilium* as habitual but also in the narrow sense as actual grace; sacramental grace must add something beyond habitual grace, the virtues, the gifts, and their

¹⁷⁵ *Super Heb.*, X, l. 2, n. 506.

¹⁷⁶ ST III q. 89, a. 2, co.

¹⁷⁷ Grace commonly speaking is a generic term for all grace. Hence, it includes implicitly, habitual grace, actual grace, the virtues, and the gifts. See ST III q. 62, a. 2.

acts. The sacraments not only give habitual grace, strengthen it, or restore it; they also confer the promise of God that he will sufficiently move believers to the ends/purposes of these sacraments.¹⁷⁸

One can see this sense of *divinum auxilium* appear in the effects of the Eucharist. Aquinas holds both that the reception of the Eucharist augments habitual grace, the increase of which is in some sense beyond habitual grace inasmuch as it is an additional gift,¹⁷⁹ and that “the reality of this sacrament is charity, not only as to its habit, but also as to its act, which is excited in this sacrament.”¹⁸⁰ Hence, the ultimate effect, the *res sacramenti*, is not simply the habit of charity but the act. Now above Aquinas identified sacramental grace as distinct from acts.¹⁸¹ Hence, there must be something given in the sacrament which is grace but is not a part of habitual grace, any of the supernatural habits, or an act of charity. The clear candidate is actual grace. In other words, reception of the Eucharist not only strengthens habitual grace but also includes God’s moving the believer to acts of charity by his *auxilium* as motion.

Something similar can be said for Baptism, Confirmation, and Penance. In Baptism the sacrament does not simply bestow habitual grace but also promises the actual grace necessary to

¹⁷⁸ This is the traditional interpretation of sacramental grace in Thomism. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 148-149. In this I am especially following Cajetan page see *Com. ST III*, vol. 8, p. 23.

¹⁷⁹ *ST III* q. 72, a. 7, ad 3: “Just as was said above, sacramental grace adds above grace commonly taken as sanctifying something which effects a special effect, to which the sacrament is ordained. If therefore grace is taken in the sacraments generally inasmuch as it is common, so through this sacrament is not conferred another grace than through baptism, but augments the grace given there. If however it is considered inasmuch as it adds something special, then it is not the same species.”

¹⁸⁰ *ST III* q. 79, a. 4, co.: “*Res autem huius sacramenti est caritas, non solum quantum ad habitum, sed etiam quantum ad actum, qui excitatur in hoc sacramento, per quod peccata venialia solvuntur. Unde manifestum est quod virtute huius sacramenti remittuntur peccata venialia.*”

¹⁸¹ *ST III* q. 62, a. 2, co.

reach the purposes of the sacrament. In Confirmation, habitual grace is not only strengthened but actual grace is promised to defend the faith. Finally, in Penance sins are not simply forgiven, restoring habitual grace, but God promises the sufficient actual grace to overcome those sins in the future. In short, in order that these sacraments cohere with Aquinas's definition of sacramental grace, they must also confer *auxilium* as motion:¹⁸² a promise of God's help as motion to attain the ends of the sacraments.

The fact that the sacraments confer actual grace connects the sacraments to the gifts in two very clear, but necessarily general, ways. First, the *instinctus* of the Spirit, the very help of God moving to the ends of the sacraments, is offered in all the sacraments. As argued in the last chapter, *instinctus* and common *auxilium* as motion are identical in subject. Hence, if the sacraments offer *auxilium* as motion, it is the very motion of the Holy Spirit, which is offered. Second, anytime this motion is received, it is by the gifts since the mobile must have a proportion to be moved by the mover. Hence, in all those sacraments which presuppose the existence of habitual grace (the sacraments of the living), the existence of the gifts in the subject are also presupposed, and preeminently so for without them one could not cooperatively receive the *auxilium* necessary for the purposes of the sacraments. For the sacraments of the dead the gifts are presupposed *ex post facto* for the *auxilium* offered to reach the ends of the sacraments by cooperative effects. In short, the gifts are necessary to attain the ends of the sacraments and

¹⁸² Most probably, given Jean-Pierre Torrell's reading of the structure of the *Summa*, Aquinas thinks of the sacraments as the normal means of God dispensing actual grace for all those things necessary in the supernatural life. In some cases this actual grace would be operative, but in most it would be cooperative since the ends toward which they move have already been willed by the believer: the motion is attributed to both grace and the motion of the will. See Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 29ff.

receive what they promise. In both these general ways the gifts are connected to the reception and ends of the sacraments.

These two general connections are also made more clear in a few particular examples. Others are possible,¹⁸³ but two will suffice. First, as shown above, the reception of the Eucharist strengthens not only habitual grace but also moves believers to acts of charity.¹⁸⁴ It does this by offering *auxilium* as motion for that purpose. The gifts provide the dispositions to receive this motion. In short, without the gifts this help toward the acts of charity could not be received without doing violence to the subject.¹⁸⁵ Second, in Aquinas's teaching on Baptism he teaches that the individual is united to Christ from whom he receives "sense and movement."¹⁸⁶ He continues by saying that this spiritual sense is knowledge of this truth. The spiritual movement received is from the *instinctus gratiae*.¹⁸⁷ It is telling that Aquinas uses the term *instinctus gratiae* to talk about the spiritual motion received from Christ in Baptism. This is the motion of the Spirit, the supernatural motion of the New Law.¹⁸⁸ It is the motion by which believers are

¹⁸³ For other possible particular connections see *ST* III q. 86, a. 4, ad 2; *ST* III q. 86, a. 3, ad 2; and *ST* I-II q. 87, a. 8, co. *ST* III q. 84, a. 1, ad 2. *ST* III q. 87, a. 2, ad 1: "the remission of venial sins is the effect of grace through the act it newly elicits, not however through a new habitual infusion into the soul." See also *ST* III q. 87, a. 4, ad 2: "Although the remission of venial sin does not require a new infusion of habitual grace, it does require some act of grace, which is not able to be in the one with mortal sin."

¹⁸⁴ For the paradigmatic acts of charity see *ST* II-II qq. 27-33.

¹⁸⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

¹⁸⁶ *ST* III q. 69, a. 5, co. "*sensum et motum suscipiunt.*"

¹⁸⁷ *ST* III q. 69, a. 5, co.: "Just as from the natural head the members derive sense and motion, so from the spiritual head (which is Christ) the members derive their spiritual sense, which consists in the understanding of truth and spiritual motion, which is through the instinct of grace."

¹⁸⁸ *ST* I-II q. 108, a. 1, co.

moved to do those things necessary for eternal life and are moved to do so freely.¹⁸⁹ Clearly this *instinctus gratiae* is the *instinctus* of the Spirit spoken of in the treatise on the gifts. I argued in the last chapter that the *instinctus* of the Spirit is the motion of the New Law;¹⁹⁰ it is this motion which moves us to those things necessary for eternal life and moves us to them freely.

Concluding this section on the gifts and the division of actual grace, one might say the following: Aquinas's account of *instinctus* also particularizes the general account of *auxilium* as motion. The gifts of the Holy Spirit and their corresponding *instinctus* help to specify the grace of supereminence. Finally, the gifts are the very presuppositions of the sacraments and the *instinctus* is the help offered. Such are the contributions of increased attention to the gifts in the practice of dividing actual grace.

IIIb. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Division of Habitual Grace

Strictly speaking habitual grace cannot be divided according to St. Thomas. Habitual grace can only be divided by the subject in which it inheres and by its effects. Do the gifts have any role to play in any of these divisions? It would seem so, since the gifts have a place in the unfolding causality of habitual grace, that is the division by effect. As will be recalled, the gifts of the Holy Spirit enter into the division of habitual grace by effect in the formal order, that is the

¹⁸⁹ *ST I-II* q. 108, a. 1, ad 2: "Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two ways. First, because it does not constrain us to do or avoid certain things, except those that are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, which come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the instinct of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect liberty."

¹⁹⁰ *ST I-II* q. 108, a. 1 & ad 1.

order of supernatural principles.¹⁹¹ This is true for both the believer¹⁹² and for Christ's individual grace.¹⁹³ In other words, there is an orderly flowing of the virtues and gifts from their root in habitual grace.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, there has to be an ordered sequence among the supernatural habits in Aquinas's thought for "many things come from one in an orderly sequence...."¹⁹⁵ Habitual grace is one, yet it gives rise to many supernatural habits. Thus, there must be an order.

In this orderly flowing from habitual grace, the gifts do have a role to play. Indeed, it is by including the gifts (and also including the other supernatural habits) that the proper order of the supernatural life becomes clear, both in the order of being (the formal order) and in the order of activity (the efficient order). The purpose of this section vis-à-vis the unfolding causality of habitual grace is three-fold. First, it outlines the general principles of the derivation of proper accidents, which serves as St. Thomas's model for the unfolding effects of habitual grace, which is likened to the reception of a new nature.¹⁹⁶ Second, it argues that the order between the supernatural principles according to Aquinas is theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues. Finally, it argues that in the efficient order, by providing the disposition to be moved by God in their operative effect, the gifts actually precede the theological virtues, although their cooperative acts are always commanded by charity.

¹⁹¹ *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 4, n. 659.

¹⁹² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1.

¹⁹³ *ST* III q. 7, a. 5.

¹⁹⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1039.

¹⁹⁵ *ST* I q. 77, a. 4, co.

¹⁹⁶ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co. Precisely speaking, habitual grace is not a new nature but is an accident. See *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, ad 2; *ST* I-II q. 112, a. 4, ad 3; Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 816.

Throughout the mature corpus of Aquinas the proper order of supernatural principles is clear. Of course, the unfolding of grace begins with the infusion of sanctifying grace into the essence of the soul.¹⁹⁷ This infusion “draws the creature beyond its natural condition to a participation in the divine goodness.”¹⁹⁸ As a supernatural form habitual grace is a participation in the divine nature.¹⁹⁹ Habitual grace is also the root of all other supernatural principles.²⁰⁰ It justifies the believer, heals his nature, and elevates him to the supernatural order. However, the supernatural principles, virtues and gifts, which flow from habitual grace perfect the believer in relation to action.²⁰¹ It is from this new form that the supernatural habits flow through natural succession.²⁰²

Aquinas claims that the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace on the model of the powers of the soul,²⁰³ as properties or proper accidents of habitual grace.²⁰⁴ In other words, habitual grace simply causes the supernatural habits to exist by its perfection of the powers of the soul; the theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues, as operative effects of habitual grace are thus found everywhere habitual grace is found. The many supernatural habits come

¹⁹⁷ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 2, co.

¹⁹⁸ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 1, co.: “*Alia autem est dilectio specialis, secundum quam trahit creaturam rationalem supra conditionem naturae, ad participationem divini boni.*”

¹⁹⁹ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3, co.

²⁰⁰ *ST III* q. 89, a. 1, co.: “From grace follow all the gratuitous virtues just as from the essence of the soul flow all the powers.” *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3.

²⁰¹ *ST III* q. 62, a. 2, co.: “*quandam perfectionem determinate ordinatam ad proprios actus potentiarum.*”

²⁰² *ST I* q. 77, a. 6 ad 3.

²⁰³ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3, ad 2; *ST I* q. 77.

²⁰⁴ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3.

from the simple root of habitual grace both because there is some kind of order between them, but also because of a variety in the recipients (the powers of the soul).²⁰⁵

In Aquinas's metaphysics of proper accidents, priority and posteriority in relation to a principle is paramount. Indeed, that is how something is considered prior or posterior, by its relation to a principle. The accident which is prior (i.e., closer to the substance or root)²⁰⁶ has three characteristics: it causes those which are posterior to be, it is more perfect, and it commands those which are posterior in activity.²⁰⁷ The prior causes the posterior to be, as Aquinas says, "In cases where many things come from one in a natural order just as the first is the cause of them all, so that which is closer to the first is in a way the cause of those which are more distant."²⁰⁸ In addition, those which are prior, that is closer to the principle, are not only principles of the others, but are also more perfect.²⁰⁹ In other words, their causality extends more universally. Finally, those which are prior command those which are posterior in the order of activity. In other words, not only does the existence of posterior accidents depend on those prior, but also their activity depends on the activity of those which are prior.²¹⁰ This order is reversed in the order of generation.

²⁰⁵ *ST I* q. 77, a. 6, ad 1.

²⁰⁶ *DQV* q. 4, a. 3, co.

²⁰⁷ The prior is not the subject, strictly speaking, of that which it causes. Rather, one accident inheres in the subject through the mediation of another.

²⁰⁸ *ST I* q. 77, a. 7, co.

²⁰⁹ *ST I* q. 77, a. 7, co.

²¹⁰ *ST I* q. 77, a. 4, co.

Habitual grace, the principle in question here and the ultimate source of the supernatural habits, is a formal principle.²¹¹ Hence, when speaking of the derivation of supernatural habits, one is in the formal order.²¹² The most fundamental accident is habitual grace and the other accidents (the supernatural principles) habitual grace causes inhere in the subject through the mediation of habitual grace and those habits which are prior to it (if any).²¹³ This is all in the formal order, or the order of perfection. The order of generation is not under question here. Furthermore, it is not clear to me that the order of generation would apply at all to the relation between the supernatural habits and habitual grace.²¹⁴

The theological virtues are the first supernatural principles to flow from habitual grace. This is clear not only because Aquinas explicitly says it,²¹⁵ but also because the theological virtues have the characteristics of that which is prior outlined above: greater excellence,²¹⁶ priority in command,²¹⁷ and causality in being.²¹⁸ Aquinas conceives these supernatural virtues to flow from habitual grace on analogy to natural inclinations. “The theological virtues direct man

²¹¹ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 2, ad 1; *Super Rom.*, I, l. 6, n. 99.

²¹² *DQV* q. 4, a. 3, co.

²¹³ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 815.

²¹⁴ In the order of generation what is prior occurs prior in time. Does it make sense to say that prior in time God infuses the infused cardinal virtues, then the gifts at a later time, and still at a later time the theological virtues? Furthermore, the infusion of habitual grace is not temporally prior to the supernatural habits. It is only naturally prior and thus cannot be temporally posterior. The natural order in *ST I-II* q. 113, a. 7-8, includes acts of the powers of the soul, which are presumably already perfected by the infused habits.

²¹⁵ *ST II-II* q. 19, a. 9, ad 3.

²¹⁶ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 8, co.

²¹⁷ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 8, co.

²¹⁸ *ST II-II* q. 19, a. 9, ad 3.

to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end.”²¹⁹ They therefore establish the fundamental union with God.²²⁰ “The first union of man is through faith, hope, and charity.”²²¹ Because of this they are not only presupposed to the gifts but are their roots in a similar way that habitual grace is the root of the theological virtues.²²² The gifts are derived from the theological virtues in general,²²³ and charity in particular.²²⁴ This dependence of the gifts in the order of being also translates into their dependence in the order of activity.²²⁵ Hence, Aquinas affirms that the theological virtues both form the gifts²²⁶ and regulate (command) them.²²⁷ This is a primary reason why Aquinas

²¹⁹ *ST* I-II q. 62, a. 3, co.: “*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem.*”

²²⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3.

²²¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3: “The first union of man [with God] is through faith, hope, and love. Hence those virtues are presupposed to the gifts just as roots of certain gifts.”

²²² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3.

²²³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, ad 3; *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 6, co.

²²⁴ *ST* II-II q. 139, a. 2, ad 2; *Super Heb.*, II, l. 1, n. 99; *ST* II-II q. 45, a. 6, ad 2; *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, co.; *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 11, co.

²²⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.: “So therefore the same comparison seems to be between the theological virtues and the gifts (which unite man to the movement of the Holy Spirit) as between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues, through which reason is perfected. Reason is the moving force behind moral virtue.”

²²⁶ *ST* II-II q. 23, a. 8; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 3: “*secundum quod caritate informantur.*”

²²⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.: “*et regulant ea.*” To regulate another virtue on Aquinas’s terms seems to mean that it commands the activity. This activity of commanding all the acts of the other virtues is based on charity’s being the form of the virtues. See *DQV* q. 2, a. 3, co.: “It is furthermore apparent from this how charity is the mover of all the virtues: it commands all their acts. For every higher virtue or power is said to move a lower by its command because the lower one’s acts are directed to the higher one’s end.... Therefore, since all the other virtues are directed to charity’s end, charity commands the acts of all the virtues and thus is called their mover. Moreover, because what conceives something in itself is called a mother, charity is called the mother of all virtues in that it produces the acts of all the virtues out of its own end and by the same line of argument charity is called the root of all the virtues.”

occasionally calls the command of charity the *instinctus* of the gifts. It commands the gifts' cooperative effects.

The gifts serve a similar role vis-à-vis the infused cardinal virtues.²²⁸ The gifts are the principles of the infused cardinal virtues, just as the theological virtues are the source of the gifts.²²⁹ "For the gifts are the principles of the intellectual and moral virtues."²³⁰ It makes sense why Aquinas would say this given his general metaphysics of proper accidents. The gifts are more proximate to habitual grace and are thus more perfect. Because of their greater excellence, the gifts both cause the infused cardinal virtues to be and command their activity.²³¹ They precede the moral and intellectual virtues as love of God precedes love of neighbor²³² and gives birth to love of neighbor.²³³ Hence, the gifts both give rise to the intellectual and moral virtues as well as regulate them in a similar way to the theological virtues and the gifts.

What is less clear in Aquinas is whether the priority in the order of being and activity enjoyed by the gifts applies to both the infused cardinal virtues and acquired intellectual and

²²⁸ *ST* II-II q. 9, a. 1, ad 3.

²²⁹ *ST* II-II q. 8, a. 4, co.: "Similarly, if these three [wisdom, understanding, knowledge] are taken as gifts in the present life, they presuppose faith as a principle."

²³⁰ *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 4: "*dona enim spiritus sancti sunt principia virtutum intellectualium et moralium, ut supra dictum est. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt principia donorum, ut supra habitum est.*"

²³¹ This makes sense for an additional reason as well: the infused cardinal virtues and the gifts share the same *materia circa quam*. Cf. *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 2; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, co.

²³² *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 2.

²³³ *ST* II-II q. 25, a. 1, co.

moral virtues.²³⁴ In the quote above Aquinas does not specify.²³⁵ Likewise, in ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, where Aquinas gives the relative priority and perfection of the theological virtues, gifts, and intellectual/moral virtues, he does not specify if it includes both infused and acquired. Nevertheless, it seems best to affirm that Aquinas holds the gifts to be the source of both the infused cardinal virtues and acquired intellectual and moral virtues, yet in different ways.

For the acquired virtues, the gifts would seem to be principles inasmuch as the acquired virtues cannot be obtained fully apart from grace.²³⁶ In other words, inasmuch as the acquired virtues are taken in their perfection, they cannot be had apart from healing grace (at least post fall).²³⁷ Considered apart from the perfection in by healing grace, the acquired cardinal virtues are preparatory (dispositive causality)²³⁸ for grace and thus precede the gifts.²³⁹ Nevertheless, in their fullness the acquired intellectual and moral virtues are the indirect effects of the gifts, since the gifts help heal nature and make reaching its natural end possible.²⁴⁰ In other words, the gifts play a particular role in healing fallen nature of its indisposition to be moved by God, even to naturally good actions. Now inasmuch as acquired virtue can only be had (presuming fallen

²³⁴ This question cannot be asked about the intellectual virtues, since the gifts take the place of any infused counterpart. There are no infused intellectual virtues; there are the gifts.

²³⁵ Although by grouping the intellectual and moral virtues together, it strongly suggests that Aquinas has in mind the acquired virtues.

²³⁶ See Brian Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 553-77.

²³⁷ ST I-II q. 109, a. 2, co.

²³⁸ For a very thorough treatment of the possibilities of dispositive causality for grace cf. Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 815ff.

²³⁹ Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 572ff; ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, ad 2: "Since man, through being well related to his own human reason, is disposed to be well related in the order to God."

²⁴⁰ ST I-II q. 109, aa. 2-3.

human nature) with grace healing nature, which must include the healing of nature's relation to God as an efficient cause, the gifts do cause the acquired virtues. Of course, the acquired intellectual and moral virtues are the direct effects of human nature, but without grace healing it (including the gifts healing the disposition to be moved by God), nature cannot achieve the fullness of acquired virtue.

Are the gifts also the principles of the infused cardinal virtues? This is a difficult question to answer given Aquinas's silence on the issue. Certainly he claims that the gifts are the principles of the intellectual and moral virtues, but the linking of those types of virtues strongly implies that he has in mind acquired virtue in ST I-II q. 68, a. 8. He nowhere, to my knowledge, says that the gifts are the source of the infused cardinal virtues specifically.²⁴¹

On the other hand, it seems best to hold that the gifts are the principles of the infused cardinal virtues for the following reason, assuming I was right that in ST I-II q. 68, a. 8 Aquinas has in mind the acquired intellectual and moral virtues. If ST I-II q. 68, a. 8 concerns the infused and acquired intellectual and cardinal virtues collectively, then no argument is necessary since the infused cardinal virtues would already be included as effects of the gifts.²⁴² In ST I-II q. 68, a. 8, the reason Aquinas holds the gifts to be the source of the acquired virtues also applies to the

²⁴¹ The intellectual virtues are replaced by the gifts on the supernatural level, so there is no need to ask the same question about them.

²⁴² This question is intimately tied up with how one distinguishes the gifts from the infused cardinal virtues. It seems best, in this regard, to distinguish them based on their relative proportions to God as mover, not as object of motion. The argument for their distinction would then be as follows: the moved is distinguished based on diverse proportions to the mover. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are essentially and perfectly proportioned to God as efficient mover. The infused cardinal virtues are proportioned to the act of infused prudence directly and God only indirectly. Hence, since their direct proportions are to diverse movers, the two are diverse.

infused cardinal virtues.²⁴³ The gifts are more excellent than the intellectual and moral virtues and precede them in the order of perfection; this is why the gifts are the source of the acquired virtues. Hence, it seems, that if a virtue is more excellent than another in the order of dignity, the order of being, the formal order, then it is the principle of that which is less perfect, just as Aquinas argues in his metaphysics of proper accidents. Just as the gifts are more excellent and precede the acquired intellectual and moral virtues,²⁴⁴ since they relate to a more exalted mover, so too do the gifts precede the infused cardinal virtues.²⁴⁵ Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are also the principles of the infused cardinal virtues.²⁴⁶

The third topic for this section is the relative causality of these supernatural habits in the order of activity. It might seem like there should no longer be a question here, since Aquinas specifically says that the virtue which is more perfect, closer to the principle under question, commands that which is less perfect and more posterior. Hence, the order of activity should clearly be: theological, gifts, and then infused cardinal. What is closer to the principle of habitual grace gives both existence and commands activity. Nevertheless, there is some difficulty with

²⁴³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.

²⁴⁴ This is so because they are closer to the theological virtues, although both the gifts and the infused cardinal virtues are effects of the theological virtues. Cf. *ST* I-II q. 66, a. 1, co.: "Since it is asked whether one virtue is able to be greater than another, one can understand this question in two ways. First inasmuch as virtues inhabit different species. And so it is manifest that one virtue is greater than another. For a cause is always greater than its effect, and so the effect is greater inasmuch as it is closer to the cause."

²⁴⁵ *ST* II-II q. 121, a. 1, ad 2.

²⁴⁶ Another possible reason to hold that the gifts are the principles of the infused cardinal virtues is as follows: The infused cardinal virtues have a different mean than the acquired virtues. The acquiring of a new mean cannot simply be explained by being directed to a new end, but rather differs on account of proper objects. The objects do not differ in their material aspect but rather in their formal aspect. What delivers this new formal aspect? Put differently, what principles are proportionate to the divine rule? Clearly these are the gifts. Hence, the gifts (as particular virtues) bridge the gap between the object of the theological virtues and action in this life, which must be under the divine rule.

this picture. This is so because although Aquinas says that the theological virtues have priority in being and in activity,²⁴⁷ the gifts must have some sort of priority to the theological virtues because they provide the disposition to common *auxilium*, as Aquinas clearly states.²⁴⁸ As I argue in the last chapter when discussing the habitual nature of the gifts, the gifts are necessary in every case to receive common *auxilium*. Furthermore, common *auxilium* is necessary for the acts of the theological virtues. Thus, it seems that the gifts are necessary for the acts of the theological virtues. However, given what I just argued, one might ask: In what sense can the gifts have priority if they are not closer to the principle of habitual grace?

In order to solve this priority puzzle one must attend to the distinction between the gifts as providing the disposition to be moved by God and the gifts as active upon their distinctive matter (operative and cooperative effects), the two principles in the supernatural life (God and man), and the different orders (efficient, final, and formal). Key to understanding the distinction between the disposition of the gifts and their activity is the claim that habitual grace is not the only principle in the supernatural life.²⁴⁹ In the formal order (the order of derivation from habitual grace),²⁵⁰ the theological virtues have absolute priority. There they give rise to the gifts and the infused cardinal virtues. The theological virtues also have priority in the order of activity

²⁴⁷ *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 3; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.

²⁴⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²⁴⁹ *ST* I-II q. 90, prol.

²⁵⁰ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 2, ad 1: "Grace considered as a quality is said to act on the soul as a formal cause and not as an efficient cause just as whiteness makes white and justice just."

by commanding,²⁵¹ which follows according to Aquinas's metaphysics of proper accidents.²⁵²

Now commanding, in Aquinas's mature theology, pertains to the final cause and efficient cause, namely when a higher virtue with a more universal object orders the activity of a lower virtue to its own object.²⁵³ In this sense clearly the theological virtues also have priority, for they concern God directly.

Nevertheless, in the efficient order one must make a distinction in priority. If one considers the efficient order of immanent principles (the participation and activity of the human subject in meritorious action) there too the theological virtues give rise to the acts of the gifts and the infused cardinal virtues.²⁵⁴ The order of agents corresponds to the order of ends.²⁵⁵ If the theological virtues concern the last end, then they are the first agent in the efficient order. Nevertheless, in the order of activity, the efficient order, there is never only one agent. There are both immanent and extrinsic agents. It is in relation to the extrinsic agent that the gifts have priority, not in relation to habitual grace.²⁵⁶ Inasmuch as God is conceived of as the primary agent of the supernatural life, the first efficient principle, the gifts are prior since they provide the very disposition to be moved by this principle.²⁵⁷ In this sense Aquinas claims that the gifts

²⁵¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.

²⁵² *ST* I q. 77, a. 4, co.

²⁵³ *ST* II-II q. 23, a. 8, co.

²⁵⁴ *ST* II-II q. 23, a. 8, ad 1.

²⁵⁵ *SCG* II c. 21, n. 2.

²⁵⁶ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²⁵⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

perfect man for “all the acts of the soul’s powers.”²⁵⁸ Put simply, the gifts and theological virtues have priorities in relation to different principles in the efficient order. The gifts perfect the human subject as a lower principle of movement in relation to a higher.²⁵⁹ Put differently, the operative effect of the gifts is prior to the cooperative effect of the theological virtues, but not the operative effect.

As outlined earlier, the gifts dispose for the *instinctus* of God by their operative effect. Hence, in their operative effect the gifts have priority in the efficient order considered in relation to God, but not in relation to habitual grace. The gifts have priority in the transcendent efficient order and not the immanent efficient order. On the other hand, in their cooperative effect the gifts are posterior to the theological virtues and commanded by them. This distinction between the operative and cooperative effects of the gifts is also the distinction between disposition and activity. In disposition the gifts come prior to the theological virtues in the efficient order when considering God’s involvement. God supernaturally moves humans according to their disposition to be moved, that is by an effect of the gifts. Nevertheless, the acts of the gifts are always commanded by charity and follow the theological virtues. In short, the disposition to be moved is necessary for the activity of the theological virtues. In this sense, the gifts are prior. Yet the acts

²⁵⁸ ST I-II q. 68, a. 7, co.: “*Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate donorum, eadem est ratio comparationis in ipsis et in virtutibus, quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est.*”

²⁵⁹ ST II-II q. 52, a. 2, co: “an inferior principle of movement is helped and perfected chiefly by being moved by a superior principle of movement, just a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is manifest, however, that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the divine reason as an inferior principle of movement to a superior. This is so since the eternal reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Thus prudence, which means rectitude of reason is most helped and perfected inasmuch as it is regulated and moved by the Holy Spirit.”

of the gifts are not necessary for the acts of the theological virtues. In this sense the gifts are posterior.

Put in a different and complementary way, one might say that the gifts dispose the powers of the soul to be moved by God.²⁶⁰ They do not dispose the other virtues or themselves to be moved by God. As habits, they must be habits of the powers of the soul as their subjects. Thus, God does not move the gifts (or any of the other virtues) directly. God does not move directly a quality, but a subject (the person who moves by powers of the soul). In other words, given the gifts' dispositions in the powers, God moves the powers by his *instinctus*. These powers are qualified by the theological virtues, the gifts, and the infused cardinal virtues in that order. Thus that order is observed when God moves the powers to act: theological, gifts, and infused cardinal. Where the gifts have priority is providing the powers of the soul with a disposition to be moved supernaturally by God. In nothing else do they have priority.

All of this only becomes clear by inserting the gifts into the supernatural apparatus and by the key distinctions involving the gifts, most especially the distinction between the gifts' operative and cooperative effects. In summary then, the gifts do have a role in the 'division' of habitual grace by effect. In the order of being and taken as particular virtues, the gifts are the effects of the theological virtues and the principles of the cardinal virtues (both infused and acquired). The theological virtues have priority in every sense save when one takes the gifts as providing the disposition to be moved by God and considers them in the order of efficient causality in relation to God. By making the precisions above, it allows one to avoid seeming

²⁶⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, aa. 4, 5, 7, 8, co.: "The gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose all the powers of the soul to be under the divine motion."

contradictions in Aquinas's thought and properly understand him on the relation of the three sets of supernatural principles in the order of being and of activity.

IV. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Merit

Joseph Wawrykow claims that the gifts of the Holy Spirit form part of Aquinas's characterization of meritorious activity.²⁶¹ Nevertheless, Wawrykow does not justify this claim and it is far from obvious, given Aquinas's explicit statements on the issue of merit.²⁶² For example, Aquinas never once mentions the gifts of the Holy Spirit in his explicit treatment of merit.²⁶³ However, Wawrykow is correct; the gifts are a central part of the meritorious act according to Aquinas. Nevertheless, this must be understood properly. They are the main characterization of merit as the principles of merit, but not the act of merit (at least not as providing the disposition to be moved by their operative effect). That role belongs to charity. In order to prove these points I will argue that the two main principles of merit pertain to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. First, the very principle of all condign merit is the motion of the Holy Spirit, the divine *instinctus*. Second, the gifts inasmuch as they provide the disposition to be moved by God are involved in all meritorious action. Finally, I argue that this does not displace charity as the primary vehicle of merit since the principles of meritorious activity are not themselves meritorious activity.

²⁶¹ Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts," 49-50.

²⁶² E.g. *Super I Cor.*, XII, l. 1, n. 715-718.

²⁶³ *ST I-II* q. 114.

In order to properly make this argument, I first make a short summary of Aquinas's thought on merit. According to Aquinas, merit is some kind of reward, a repayment for a debt.²⁶⁴ It comes in two kinds. The first is condign merit. Condign merit occurs when the debt is according to strict justice and between equals.²⁶⁵ The second is congruous merit, which is not a strict debt but rather a fitting repayment.²⁶⁶ Condign merit has the notion of strict equality, whereas congruous merit has the notion of an equality of proportion.²⁶⁷ When speaking of the possibility of meriting eternal life²⁶⁸ (conceived as the *terminus operis*),²⁶⁹ Aquinas holds that no human can merit anything from God without his previous ordination.²⁷⁰ In short, it is only on the basis of a gift (in the sense of justification) that humans merit.²⁷¹ Apart from grace, humans have

²⁶⁴ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 1, co.*: “*meritum et merces ad idem referuntur.*”

²⁶⁵ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 1, co.*

²⁶⁶ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.*: “...but there is there congruity on account of a certain equality of proportion. For it seems congruous that inasmuch as man operates according to his power, God recompense him according to the excellence of his power.”

²⁶⁷ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.*

²⁶⁸ Humans can also merit an increase of grace. See *ST I-II q. 114, a. 8, ad 3.*

²⁶⁹ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 5, co.*

²⁷⁰ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 1, co.*: “...unless the divine ordination is presupposed.”

²⁷¹ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 2, co.*: “No created nature is a sufficient principle of meritorious acts for eternal life, unless a certain supernatural gift is added, which is called grace.”

no proportion to eternal life.²⁷² Nevertheless, on the basis of this gift, they do truly merit eternal life.²⁷³

Humans merit eternal life by actions proportionate to that end.²⁷⁴ In each meritorious action there is a two-fold principle: the grace of the Holy Spirit and free will, each producing a different type of merit.²⁷⁵ The first principle involved in a meritorious action is a gratuitous principle – God’s actual grace²⁷⁶ or the habitual gift.²⁷⁷ Inasmuch as an action comes from God’s gift, Aquinas holds that an action merits eternal life condignly.²⁷⁸ God cannot owe a strict debt to

²⁷² *ST I-II q. 114, a. 2, co.*: “The acts of each thing are not divinely ordained to something exceeding the proportion of their power which is the principle of act. It is from the institution of divine providence that nothing will act beyond its power. However, eternal life is a certain good exceeding the proportion of created nature, because it exceeds its understanding and desire.”

²⁷³ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 7, ad 3.*

²⁷⁴ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 7.*

²⁷⁵ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.*: “The work of human merit is able to be considered in a twofold way, in one way inasmuch as it proceeds from free decision and the other inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit.”

²⁷⁶ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 6, co.*: “*Primo quidem, ex vi motionis divinae, et sic meretur aliquis ex condigno.*”

²⁷⁷ *ST I-II q. 114, aa. 2-3.* Aquinas makes mention both of the habitual gift and of the motion of the Holy Spirit as the sources of merit.

²⁷⁸ *ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.* There is a question here about condign merit. In one place (*ST I-II q. 114, a. 6, co.*) Aquinas says that condign merit does not reach beyond this motion: “*et ideo meritum condigni ultra hanc motionem non se extendit.*” This might lead someone to believe that the work itself does not merit eternal life condignly, but only the motion, as Aquinas seems to say in *ST I-II q. 114, a. 1, co.* Nevertheless, Aquinas holds elsewhere that wherever the motion reaches, there is condign merit (*ST I-II q. 114, a. 8, co.*: “*illud cadit sub merito condigni ad quod motio gratiae se extendit.*”) and also that the motion of grace extends not only to the term but to the whole progress in motion (*ad totum progressum in motu*). Likewise, he holds that by each act of charity, humans merit eternal life (*ST I-II q. 114, a. 7, ad 3*: “Whence it should be said that each act of charity merits, absolutely, eternal life.”). The confusion seems to come in asking whether virtuous acts themselves attain eternal life inchoately, i.e., merit it, or not. Based on the first couple of quotations, it would seem like the act itself has nothing to do with merit, but only the fact that God moves to that act. Nevertheless, as Aquinas says later, the works of charity (and the other virtues because of charity) really do attain eternal life, really do merit it. Each act inspired by charity does condignly merit eternal life. The act itself is caused by both free will and grace. Since grace extends to the whole act, supernatural acts do have condign merit. In other words, there is only one act which condignly merits eternal life because it is caused by grace. Inasmuch as it proceeds from free will it only congruously merits. Nevertheless, there are not two acts or two parts of one act, but one act.

any creature, but can to himself (so-to-speak).²⁷⁹ Inasmuch as the action comes from free will, on the basis of the previous gift of habitual grace and the actual grace which inspires it, there is only congruous merit.²⁸⁰

The gifts of the Holy Spirit enter into meritorious action in two ways based on Aquinas's ambiguous use of the phrase "the motion of the Holy Spirit."²⁸¹ This phrase can be taken in two ways according to Aquinas. In a wide sense the motion of the Holy Spirit includes the habits freely bestowed on the believer which incline to action.²⁸² In the narrow sense, the motion of the Holy Spirit is the necessary *auxilium* moving believers to act out of their, now native, inclinations.²⁸³ Put differently, God's causality extends not only to justification, but also the use of it.²⁸⁴

In the narrow sense, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit enters into every meritorious action. As argued in the previous chapter, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the *auxilium* which moves

²⁷⁹ ST I-II q. 114, a. 1, co.; *Super Rom.*, IV, l. 1, n. 329.

²⁸⁰ Aquinas does not mean here to partition off parts of acts which are meritorious and parts which are not. He is simply separating types of merit based on principles. Yet God as mover and free will do not produce two acts, but one act. Hence the act itself should be thought of as having condign merit for eternal life. This seems to be a necessary interpretation given Aquinas's abandoning of his earlier instrumental theory of cooperation between God and secondary causes. God and the secondary cause produce one act. See *SCG* III c. 70.

²⁸¹ ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.: "*Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam.*"

²⁸² ST I-II q. 114, a. 3 & 4.

²⁸³ ST I-II q. 114, aa. 6-8.

²⁸⁴ *Super Rom.*, IX, l. 3, n. 772-773.

the believer to act well in the supernatural life.²⁸⁵ God's motion is behind every single supernatural action in some way. In short, whenever Aquinas speaks of God's activity in the meritorious action as providing an inciting motion, Aquinas is implicitly speaking of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.²⁸⁶ The earlier section on perseverance also confirms this conclusion. Above, I argue that the motion of which Aquinas speaks in ST I-II q. 114, a. 9 concerning perseverance is also the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. If this argument is correct, then (again) the non-habitual motion behind meritorious actions, is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.²⁸⁷ Put simply, when Aquinas mentions an action as meritorious, he is speaking of action inasmuch as it is inspired by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit do not only enter into meritorious action as *instinctus* but also as a habitual proportion to that *instinctus*. In other words, it is not only the motion of the Holy Spirit which is the cause of condign merit but also the gifts taken as habits in their operative effect. As seen above, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit must move to every supernatural action in order for it to be meritorious condignly.²⁸⁸ The gifts of the Holy Spirit, as habits, enter into every meritorious action on account of their proportion to God's motion.²⁸⁹ The gifts, taken in their operative effect, enter into every supernatural action since they are the general conditions of

²⁸⁵ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.; *Super Heb.*, IV, l. 3, n. 238.

²⁸⁶ ST I-II q. 114, aa. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, & 10.

²⁸⁷ It is clear that sometimes Aquinas means motion improperly and includes the habitual gift. See (for example) ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.: "...and the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, through which man is made a sharer in the divine nature, an adopted son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by the law of adoption according to Romans VIII."

²⁸⁸ ST I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.

²⁸⁹ ST I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

every supernatural action, that is it is ultimately caused/insighted by God as first efficient cause. Hence, the gifts enter into every meritorious action as both the *instinctus* instigating the action and as the habitual disposition to that action.

As one can see above, the two ways the gifts enter into every meritorious action are also the very foundations of condign merit; without the gifts, there could be no condign merit. Condign merit is a supernatural action inasmuch as it proceeds from the motion of the Holy Spirit and the *instinctus* of the gifts is the motion of the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, without the gifts' disposition there could be no congruous merit either. A habitual proportion is necessary for free will to enter into supernatural action on the basis of God's motion.²⁹⁰ Merit must be an effect of cooperative grace. Thus, inasmuch as free will acts on the basis of God's motion and produces congruous merit,²⁹¹ the gifts' dispositions are necessary.

Given what has been said, it seems that Wawrykow is justified in saying that the gifts of the Holy Spirit form part of Aquinas's characterization of meritorious activity. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the supernatural motion in some way behind each supernatural act. The gifts of the Holy Spirit provide the very disposition to be moved by it. The gifts of the Holy Spirit in their cooperative effect, as active on their proper matter, can be one of the many supernatural habits, on the basis of habitual grace and charity, that give rise to meritorious action.

²⁹⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²⁹¹ The act itself, is condignly meritorious (presuming it is incited by the Holy Spirit). The one place where Aquinas seems to say that the act is not condignly meritorious makes the important caveat *inasmuch as it proceeds from free will*. *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.: "If one considers the substance of the work and according to which it proceeds from free will, it is not able to be condign on account of the great inequality." Free will and grace do not produce two actions, but only one action. Condign vs. congruous merit is a comparison to principles, but does not divide the act produced. The stronger sense of merit prevails over the weaker since both produce numerically one action.

At this point, an objection should arise from one versed in Aquinas's writings. What of Aquinas's explicit statements that habitual grace or charity are the real source of meritorious activity?²⁹² Indeed, Aquinas even says that the two-fold principle of merit (God's motion and free will) both pertain principally to charity.²⁹³ In other words, by giving such a prominent place to the gifts, have I thereby pushed aside the primacy of charity for merit? The short answer to this question is no. Aquinas conceives the roles of charity, habitual grace, and the gifts as complementary. In order to argue this, it is first necessary to step back and look at the two-fold proportion necessary for movement to eternal life.

As Aquinas says, no human has a proportion to eternal life by nature.²⁹⁴ This ontological gap is bridged initially by the first actual grace, but stably by habitual grace. Habitual grace gives the individual a participation in the divine nature, a kind of formal proportion to God. The theological gifts, which first flow from habitual grace are the most fundamental unity with God and proportion the believer to God as object of action,²⁹⁵ as the good sought, as final cause of action.²⁹⁶ The gifts proportion the powers of the soul to God as efficient cause of action.²⁹⁷ They

²⁹² *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 5 & 6, co.: "...and such a preparation of the will is not able to be without a habitual gift, which is the principle of all meritorious works, as was said." *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, co.

²⁹³ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, co.: "Just as it is able to be taken from what has been said, human acts have the ratio of merit from two sources. The first and principle is from the divine ordination according to which the act is said to be meritorious of that good to which it is ordained by the divine; the second is on the part of free decision inasmuch as man has before other creatures a power to act *per se*, as a voluntary agent. And according to both the principle of merit especially consists in charity."

²⁹⁴ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 5.

²⁹⁵ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 4, ad 3. *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, ad 1; *ST II-II* q. 26, a. 7.

²⁹⁶ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, co.: "The movement of the human mind to the fruition of the divine good is properly the act of charity through which the acts of all the other virtues are ordained to this end, since it commands the other

thus aid the virtues, for without the gifts there could be no activity of the theological virtues.²⁹⁸

The two principles are complementary just as the final and efficient causes are. As Aquinas says, every act has to be both proportionate to its object and agent.²⁹⁹ In the supernatural life, although this is certainly true in all cases, God is especially the primary agent. One must have the gifts' disposition to God as mover. Likewise, the motion activating charity through the mediation of the gifts' disposition is not competitive with the primacy of charity for merit. Indeed, without this motion of actual grace, one could never have acts of charity at all.³⁰⁰

In other words, charity and the gifts play complementary roles in producing the meritorious action. Aquinas gives primacy to charity and does not mention the gifts since merit is about attaining an object and end voluntarily.³⁰¹ Hence, even though the gifts are presuppositions to every meritorious act and enter into every one by providing the disposition to be moved by God, it is only by charity that merit occurs. Charity attains God as object, as *terminus operis*,³⁰² and commands all the other virtues thereto. Likewise, it is charity which does all this

virtues. And for this reason the merit of eternal life in the first place pertains to charity, and to the other virtues secondarily, i.e., when their acts are commanded by charity."

²⁹⁷ ST I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

²⁹⁸ ST I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²⁹⁹ ST II-II q. 26, a. 7, co.: "Every act must be proportionate to both object and agent. From its object it has the species, however from the power of the agent it has the mode of intensity, just as motion has species from its terminus, but the intensity of velocity from the disposition of the mobile and the power of the mover. So therefore love has its species from its object but its intensity from the agent itself."

³⁰⁰ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

³⁰¹ ST I-II q. 114, a. 4, co.

³⁰² ST I-II q. 114, a. 5, co.: "*quia merces est terminus operis.*" ST I-II q. 114, a. 8, co.: "*Terminus autem motus gratiae est vita aeterna.*"

voluntarily.³⁰³ Hence, the gifts, the motion of the Holy Spirit, and charity are complementary in producing the meritorious act, but the gifts' disposition (or the motion of God) themselves are not meritorious (since they relate to the principle, not the term).³⁰⁴ They produce the meritorious act, but they are not that act.

On the other hand, the gifts cooperative effects (i.e., as considered as active on their proper matter) are meritorious inasmuch as they are commanded by charity.³⁰⁵ For Aquinas all the other virtues become meritorious by charity's referral to the supernatural end. In other words, by serving its role as the form of the virtues,³⁰⁶ charity makes all the virtues and gifts properly meritorious.³⁰⁷ By themselves the cardinal virtues and gifts do not have God for their object, but rather the things of this world.³⁰⁸ Yet attaining God is the very notion of merit. Hence, they need

³⁰³ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, co.: "As we may gather from what has been stated above, human acts have the ratio of merit from two causes: first and principally from the divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Second on the part of free will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of *per se* action, i.e., voluntary agency. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. It must be remembered that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's movement to the enjoyment of the divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and to the other virtues secondarily, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, merit chiefly pertains to charity."

³⁰⁴ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 9, co.: "That falls under human merit which is the term of the act of free will directed by the motion of God, not however that which compares to the aforesaid motion as principle."

³⁰⁵ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, co.

³⁰⁶ *ST I-II* q. 23, a. 8, ad 3 and ad 2: "Charity is the foundation and root inasmuch as from it all the other virtues are sustained and nourished. It is not fundamental and root-like having the ratio of a material cause."

³⁰⁷ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, co.: "...and for this reason the merit of eternal life pertains to charity and to the other virtues secondarily inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity."

³⁰⁸ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 7; *ST I-II* q. 65.

charity to provide God as object,³⁰⁹ to order their activity to it as an end.³¹⁰ Yet given the activity of charity, the gifts' cooperative effects too attain God.³¹¹

In conclusion, it does seem that Wawrykow's contention about the gifts and merit is justified. As Aquinas says, "...They [human acts] can be considered according to their principle, insofar as they arise from the impulse of God according to the intention of predestination."³¹² Insofar as human acts arise from the impulse of God, they require the gifts as principles. This is so in two ways. First, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the very motion of God moving the believer to the meritorious act (and ultimately to perseverance). Second, the gifts' disposition is necessary to receive this motion, since the theological virtues (including charity) are possessed imperfectly. Yet given the motion of God and the proportion to God as mover by the gifts, charity is the main vehicle of merit. The gifts provide the principles of merit, but charity is and/or commands the meritorious act itself. The two supernatural principles are complementary. Finally, the gifts can enter into meritorious activity as commanded by charity on their particular matter.

³⁰⁹ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 4, ad 1: "Because charity, inasmuch as it has the ultimate end for its object, moves the other virtues to operation. For always a habit which pertains to the end commands those habits which pertain to those things concerning the means."

³¹⁰ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 7, ad 3: "Every act of charity merits absolutely eternal life. But by a following sin an impediment is put to the preceding merit so that the effect does not obtain, just as natural causes fail in their effects on account of a supervening impediment."

³¹¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 5.

³¹² *Super Rom.*, IV, l. 1, n. 329: "*Alio modo possunt considerari secundum suum principium, prout scilicet ex impulsu Dei aguntur secundum propositum Dei praedestinantis.*"

V. Conclusion

The gifts are essential for understanding Aquinas's thought on grace. Such is the thesis this chapter set out to prove. In doing so, I have argued the following particular theses: Aquinas's thought on the gifts, rightly understood, helps to prove that actual grace (*auxilium*) does indeed exist in Aquinas; perseverance is nothing other than the continued motion of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit; The gifts of the Holy Spirit and every other supernatural virtue flow in an orderly fashion from habitual grace; and the *instinctus* of the gifts (and thus the habits also) are the first principle of merit in the supernatural life. Put simply, if these arguments are successful, then the overall thesis has been proven. The gifts are essential for understanding Aquinas's thought on grace.

Chapter IV – A Return to the Secondary Literature

What implications does my positive work in chapters II and III have for the common post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic debates and settled positions outlined in chapter I? To answer this question is the purpose of this chapter. I will treat each section from chapter I in the following order: the existence of actual grace, the division of actual grace, the division of habitual grace, the necessity of grace, merit, the distinction between the gifts and the virtues, the operational necessity of the gifts, and the connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence of the gifts and virtues. In doing so, I will describe the relation of my position vis-à-vis the secondary literature with the following vocabulary. My arguments either confirm an already held position or one side of the debate (provide further support), particularize an already held position (specify an unnecessarily general account), extend an already held position (give something new and complementary with the old position), or challenge the old position or one side of the debate (disagree with it).

Given this common language, it is easier to describe the theses of this chapter and their importance for my overall project. The theses of this chapter are vital for the overall success of my main thesis. To recall, my main thesis is that in order to understand fully Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit or grace one must read them in light of each other and that by doing this one realizes, that according to Aquinas, the Holy Spirit is intimately involved in the ordinary activity and spiritual life of the believer. The success of my overall thesis depends on the success of the theses of this chapter, which outline the particular ways in which reading the gifts and grace together makes a difference. If the theses of this chapter are vindicated, then the

thesis of the overall project is vindicated. One must read Aquinas's thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace together in order to understand each fully.

In section I of this chapter, I argue that my analysis of Aquinas on motion as well as the correlation between the gifts and common *auxilium* has some limited import for the debate between Bouillard and Deman, *et alii*, concerning the existence of actual grace post justification. In short, if I am correct that the gifts prove the existence of actual grace post-justification, then Bouillard's claim that actual grace does not exist in Aquinas, inasmuch as it concerns post-justification actual grace, must be false.

In section II, I argue that my analysis of supernatural motion in Aquinas confirms that there is a common actual grace or common *auxilium* in the supernatural life as well as a type of superabundant grace beyond the normal which moves humans toward the counsels. Moreover, also concerning motion, I claim that if I am correct about the sacraments and *auxilium* Ramirez's conception of sacramental grace as entirely concerned with habitual grace cannot be correct. My argument challenges Ramirez on this point. In Section IIa, I argue that my further identification of the *instinctus* of the gifts with common *auxilium* extends the conception of Pinckaers, et al. concerning the operation of the gifts. The flip side of this extension implies that the same correlation challenges the traditional position that correlates the gifts with a preeminent actual grace. Both cannot be the case.

In section III, I argue the following theses: my analysis of healing and elevating grace in Aquinas confirms that Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez are right to take habitual grace in both a narrow and a wide sense. In arguing this I also extend this commitment to include the claim that habitual grace in the wide sense is also healing and elevating, since the powers of the soul also

need to be healed and elevated. In addition, my analysis of the division of habitual grace supplements the commentators by specifying more clearly the relation between the supernatural habits and habitual grace. They are operative effects. Next, my contention that habitual grace has both a wide and narrow sense in Aquinas challenges Lonergan's thesis that Aquinas means habitual grace exclusively in the wide sense. Finally, my claim that the supernatural habits are healing and elevating challenges Ramirez's claim that the supernatural habits are unrelated to the healing and elevating functions of habitual grace.

In section IV, I treat the necessity of grace. I argue the following theses. First, if the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the further grace necessary for one already justified and the gifts provide the disposition to this grace then the gifts are relevant in a myriad of ways for the traditional Thomistic understanding on the necessity of grace. For the most part these extend the traditional conception on the necessity of grace. Second, I argue that for the dispute between the commentators and Wawrykow over how often operative actual graces are necessary in the supernatural life, the gifts and the identification of *auxilium* with *instinctus* is irrelevant. Third, my argument in chapter three for the necessity of the gifts to persevere in the supernatural life both extends and challenges the conception of Ramirez and Garrigou-Lagrange on the causes of final perseverance. The extension can be stated generally and simply: anytime post-justification there is an activity inspired by God's *auxilium*, the gifts will be required in some way. I outline this more below. I also outline below in what way my conception of perseverance (and the gifts' involvement therein) challenges the conception of Garrigou-Lagrange on the timing of the grace of final perseverance.

Section V of this chapter concerns merit. In this section I argue based on chapter III section IV that Wawrykow's use of the gifts as a paradigm for merit in Aquinas is justified. The *instinctus* of the Spirit is the guiding impulse behind all meritorious activity. This requires the gifts' operative effects in order to be received voluntarily. This does not displace charity as the primary cause of merit, but rather complements Aquinas's picture of charity as the heart of all meritorious activity. Likewise, I argue that involving the gifts of the Holy Spirit in a conception of merit extends the traditional Thomistic understanding of merit, but does not challenge it.

In section VI of this chapter, the distinction between the gifts and the supernatural virtues, I argue that my analysis of both Aquinas's argumentation as well as my argument for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues both challenges and supplements the secondary literature. My argument challenges the Thomistic tradition because (and in this I am following Ramirez) it contends that none of the three standard ways for arguing the distinction between the gifts and the virtues work. It also challenges the standard reading of *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 inasmuch as it claims that Aquinas's argumentation is only meant to prove the distinction of the gifts from the acquired virtues. My argument supplements the secondary literature by claiming that my argument from the operative/formal order of habitual grace (an argument explicitly dependent on Aquinas's thought concerning grace) does not fail in the three ways the traditional arguments do.

Section VII of this chapter concerns the operational necessity of the gifts. My argument for the perpetual necessity of the gifts is based on the identity of *instinctus* and *auxilium* post-justification. Common *auxilium* is necessary perpetually post-justification, and thus, so too is *instinctus* and the habitual disposition to *instinctus*, the gifts. Whether this argument extends, supplements, or challenges the secondary literature depends on which side of that debate one

falls. If one falls on the traditional side of Thomism, then my argument challenges. I have contended that the gifts are necessary to receive all motive *auxilium* post-justification, whereas Thomistic thinkers have generally not held this thesis. If one agrees with Pinckaers, et al. that the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action, then my argument both confirms and extends. It confirms because it argues just this. The gifts are necessary for each supernatural action. It extends because it provides a more substantial conception of how and why.

Lastly, in the ultimate section which concerns the connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence of the gifts and the virtues, I argue that involving Aquinas's systematic divisions of grace confirms and extends the account of Labourdette and Ramirez in multiple ways. Aquinas's thought on grace both confirms and extends Ramirez's deeper reason for the connectivity of the gifts. Aquinas's thought on grace also extends the account of Ramirez and Labourdette on the endurance of the gifts by providing the deeper reason behind endurance. Finally, Aquinas's thought on the order of the supernatural life is definitive in making sense of his position on the relative excellence of the virtues. In this way my argument extends the account of Ramirez and Labourdette on the relative excellence of the virtues and gifts.

I. The Existence of Actual Grace

Bouillard's reading of Aquinas cannot make sense of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and in effect denies their distinction from the supernatural virtues. Such is Gillon's critique of Bouillard.¹ Bouillard, as far as I am aware, does not mention the gifts in his book or following

¹ Gillon, "Théologie de la grâce," 612.

defense.² So is Gillon right to critique Bouillard? Can Bouillard's reading of Aquinas make sense of the operation and being of the gifts? In relation to these questions, my analysis of Aquinas on supernatural motion and my argument for the identity between the *instinctus* of the gifts and *auxilium* have serious import.³ Put differently, my argument both extends and challenges Gillon's critique of Bouillard as well as challenges Bouillard's conception of post-justification graced motion. If I am correct in chapter III section I, that post-justification actual grace (*auxilium*) does exist in Aquinas, habits are not motions (nor can they produce motions without actual grace), and that which activates the gifts is not God's general concurrence but rather common *auxilium*, then Bouillard's conception of the gifts cannot be correct. In short, these conclusions challenge the conception of Bouillard and (mostly) confirm the critique of Gillon. On the other hand, the critique of Gillon is not wholly correct. It does not follow, as Gillon claims that if the gifts and the virtues correspond to the same motion they are themselves formally identical.

Given that Bouillard does not mention the gifts, it is necessary first to imagine how Bouillard would make sense of the gifts according to Aquinas. This is necessary if one is to test Bouillard's theory of actual grace vis-à-vis Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts. Bouillard's general thesis is that actual grace (as later Thomists conceive it) does not exist in Aquinas's own

² Bouillard, *Conversion*; Bouillard, *Precisions*.

³ My argument in chapter III section I for the existence of actual grace has less import for the overall debate between Bouillard and Gillon, Deman, and others as might appear at first. Their debate is primarily about preparation for the infusion of habitual grace. And while I do disagree with Bouillard about the remote preparation for grace being only modally supernatural and fulfilled by God's natural concurrence, I do not disagree based on Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts. The gifts, as I have argued, have nothing to do with the preparation for habitual grace; they are an operative effect of habitual grace. Hence, they have no application in the preparation for grace.

conception and writings.⁴ Put more precisely, Bouillard denies that there is motion in Aquinas which is not “general” and “natural.”⁵ Inasmuch as his thesis relates to my research, it concerns the post-justification need for grace. Traditionally Thomism has claimed that God’s further involvement in the life of the believer (after the infusion of habitual grace) is via actual grace.⁶ I claim the same thing.⁷ According to Bouillard, habitual grace (coupled with God’s general concurrence) is the continuing principle of motion in the supernatural life.⁸ The immanent source of motion is habitual grace as activated indifferently by God’s general concursus, which can be called grace when it is ordained to grace.⁹ In short, the motions Aquinas identifies as happening in the supernatural life are all motions produced by habitual grace.¹⁰ Bouillard concludes that St. Thomas knows no distinction between actual grace and general concursus.¹¹

Given this explicit doctrine, one can imagine how Bouillard would read Aquinas on the gifts. First and foremost, Bouillard would claim that as habits the gifts are themselves sources of

⁴ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 176 & 195.

⁵ Bouillard, *Precisions*, 182.

⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 743: “Second there is actual grace subsequent to justification so that the just may proceed to execute meritorious actions.”

⁷ See chapter III, section Ib.

⁸ Bouillard, *Conversion*, ch. III & 202; Bouillard, *Precisions*, 181.

⁹ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 202; Bouillard, *Precisions*, 182.

¹⁰ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 176.

¹¹ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 202. McCool, 206: “Motion received from God, however, simply serves to stir agents into action.”

motion.¹² Certainly they need to be activated, but that role is fulfilled by God's general concurrence. Indeed, this is exactly what Aquinas is contending in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, Bouillard could say. All the supernatural habits need to be moved by another since they are imperfectly possessed. This motion is the same motion by which God moves all things naturally.¹³ God moves all things according to their forms.

It is against this constructed doctrine of Bouillard that I think Gillon's critique has serious import (in part) and where my argument concerning *auxilium* and the gifts challenges Bouillard. I think there are two main problems with Bouillard's conception of the gifts. First, habits are not motions in the strict sense.¹⁴ There are four ways God causes the actions of all secondary causes. Only the second two can rightly be called ways God moves creatures. Habits fall into the first and second categories. Hence, they are not motions. Granted, Aquinas does not always speak precisely and sometimes does say that God moves humans by infusing habits.¹⁵ Nevertheless, precisely speaking a habit is not a motion. It is a quality, a type of form inclining to a specified object.¹⁶ A form is not a motion; an inclination is not a motion. Both could be causes of motion, but a habit is not a motion.

¹² Bouillard, *Conversion*, ch. III & 202: "St. Thomas knows no distinction between actual grace and natural concurs. ... The divine motion in itself is that which is called common by modern theology. It is, in itself, neither natural or supernatural but 'general' or 'universal'." Bouillard, *Precisions*, 181.

¹³ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 201-208 & 218.

¹⁴ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 135.

¹⁵ *DQV* q. 2, a. 1, co.

¹⁶ *ST* I-II q. 49, aa. 1-4.

Granted, Bouillard could say, but it is still true that the gifts cause continual motions of God in the supernatural life based on their inclinations to certain activities. In other words, he might admit that a habit is not strictly speaking a motion, but only the term (in one sense) and the cause (in another sense) of motion. Yet, he might still claim that it is an Aristotelian pre-motion (what Aquinas calls God's application of secondary causes).¹⁷ He could admit, as I have contended, that immanent habits can only produce motions if they are moved to do so; on their own habits only incline to action.¹⁸ Both a form and the ensuing inclination are in potency to act. What is in potency to act cannot reduce itself to act. It must be moved by another. Ultimately, this must be God.¹⁹ Bouillard could admit this by saying that the role of activation is fulfilled by general concurrence. It is general concurrence and the immanent habit that produce all the motions of the supernatural life.²⁰

However, the general activating motion of the supernatural life, whether one holds that the gifts are necessary to receive it, as I do, or not, as other Thomists do, cannot be general concurrence. Why? Motions are specified by the end to which they move, not that which they move. This is true of both natural motion and supernatural motion, but the concern here is supernatural motion post-justification, specifically the motion to which the gifts correspond.²¹

¹⁷ Lonergan is the famous claimant that the Aristotelian idea of pre-motion explains the Thomistic idea of application. See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 75ff.

¹⁸ *ST I-II* q. 49, a. 3, ad 1.

¹⁹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2.

²⁰ Bouillard, *Conversion*, 176.

²¹ *ST I-II* q. 109, a. 9, co.

According to Bouillard, God gives an indeterminate ball of energy; he indifferently activates the secondary cause. This is not the conception of Aquinas. Again, for Aquinas motions are specified by ends, not by that which they move. Hence, it is simply wrong for Bouillard to say that general concurrence (and here the ambiguity of this term is manifest) is supernatural when it is ordered to the supernatural by the immanent habit of habitual grace.²² As I argue in the last chapter, the end toward which the creature is moved by the gifts is clearly supernatural. Thus, the motion which causes this is also supernatural. This is why general concurrence (as Bouillard conceives it) cannot be the activating cause of the gifts. It is not a supernatural motion.

Put differently, Aquinas does not mean general concurrence by the *instinctus* of the gifts. This would be required for Bouillard's conception to be true. Granted based on O'Connor's contention one might say that Aquinas uses *instinctus* to avoid specifying the activating cause of the gifts.²³ One could make the argument that it is precisely on that basis that one should think the *instinctus* of the gifts to be general concurrence.

However, this conception has no textual basis in Aquinas. The texts of Aquinas discussing *instinctus* can be read one of two ways. First, the *instinctus* of the gifts is its own special supra-rational motion (the position of traditional Dominican Thomism and the early Aquinas). Second, the *instinctus* of the gifts is simply *auxilium* connaturally received (my position following Pinckaers). Either way Bouillard would be wrong that the activating cause of the gifts is general concurrence. In other words, Bouillard's general reading of Aquinas cannot

²² Bouillard, *Conversion*, 202; Bouillard, *Precisions*, 182.

²³ O'Connor, "Appendix 5: Instinctus and Inspiratio," 132.

make sense of Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts. There must be a graced motion not identical with God's natural activation of the creature which activates the gifts. There must be actual grace post-justification.

For the above reasons, my conception of the *instinctus* of the gifts being the common *auxilium* given post-justification challenges Bouillard's thesis inasmuch as it concerns the existence of a graced motion post-justification. Nevertheless, my argument also challenges the critique of Gillon. Gillon claims that if one reads Aquinas as having the same motion correspond to both the gifts and the supernatural virtues, one must deny their distinction. I do not think this is the case for two reasons. First, only the gifts dispose for an efficient motion in Aquinas.²⁴ It is not that there are two different motions, one corresponding to the gifts and one to the infused virtues. Aquinas nowhere says, in his mature corpus, that the theological or infused cardinal virtues provide dispositions to God as an efficient mover.²⁵ They need the gifts for this. Put differently, Gillon may be right that if the gifts and virtues disposed to the same motion, they would be formally identical.²⁶ My claim response to this could take one of two routes. The first would claim that the theological and infused cardinal virtues do not dispose the faculties of the soul to an efficient motion of God. Hence, they are not identical with the gifts, which have such a disposition as their *raison d'être*. Alternately, in order to avoid separating the final and efficient causes of the supernatural life too strictly by positing different dispositions according to each,

²⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 3.

²⁶ I say may because there are habits which dispose to the same mover and are not therefore identical. E.g., both justice and fortitude dispose to reason as a mover.

one might say that the theological virtues do dispose for an efficient motion of God. Nevertheless, since they are imperfectly possessed by the subject, they cannot receive this efficient motion without being moved by another immanent habit. Since the gifts as remedying the imperfection of the theological and infused cardinal virtues, the gifts are distinct from the infused virtues. Furthermore, there are reasons for the distinction of the supernatural virtues and the gifts which do not rest on disposing to any motion. The gifts are still distinct from both the theological and infused cardinal virtues based on their flowing from habitual grace (as cause/effect) and their order of operation (as command/commanded).²⁷

In conclusion, my research challenges both Gillon and Bouillard, but confirms Gillon more than Bouillard. In arguing that actual grace does exist in Aquinas (at least post-justification), my argument confirms the conception of traditional Thomism. God's further involvement in the life of the believer post justification is by a supernatural motion. Bouillard's position requires that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit be identical with general concurrence or an effect of the gifts themselves. Neither is a plausible reading of Aquinas. Hence, Bouillard's general thesis that actual grace does not exist post-justification is false (at least on Aquinas's terms). In short Gillon is right to challenge Bouillard on this point. Nevertheless, Gillon's critique needs to be made more precise, as I outline above.

II. The Division of Actual Grace

In chapter III section IIIa, I claim that attention to the gifts of the Holy Spirit can have modest implications for the division of actual grace. First, the gifts particularize Aquinas's

²⁷ See Chapter III, section IIIb.

account of supernatural motion post-justification. Second, Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts helps one to argue for a superabundant motion in the supernatural life.²⁸ Finally, the gifts are intimately linked with what Aquinas calls the grace of the sacraments. How do these implications relate to the divisions of actual grace given in chapter I (operative/cooperative, prevenient/subsequent, efficacious/sufficient, healing/elevating, and exiting/helping) and the secondary literature outlining them? My conclusions (if they are correct) relate to the secondary literature in four ways. First, they particularize the main motion in the supernatural life. It is precisely that motion which is being divided in the secondary literature. Second, my claim that the gifts are necessary to receive supernatural motion extends the traditional notion of operative and cooperative grace; this claim illustrates that the gifts are necessary for habitual or actual grace to be cooperative. Third, my account also particularizes and extends the common understanding of prevenient and subsequent grace. Fourth, my argument challenges Ramirez's interpretation of sacramental grace in Aquinas in favor of Cajetan's reading.²⁹

The identification of the *instinctus* of the gifts with common *auxilium* particularizes the common account of the division of actual grace. My position identifies one of the categories of motion being divided, although it adds nothing to the divisions themselves. At first this might seem totally nugatory, since it adds nothing to the task at hand (the division of actual grace). Nevertheless, the particularization of actual grace or *auxilium* post-justification does serve some intellectual function. It connects the precise divisions of actual grace to Aquinas's broader

²⁸ *ST I* q. 19, a. 12, co.: "...with respect to what is necessary for the good, there is a precept. With respect to what is superabundant for the good, a counsel."

²⁹ For a full discussion of the issues surrounding sacramental grace in Aquinas see Shea, W., "A Survey of the Theology of Sacramental Grace," in *PROCEEDINGS of the Eighth Annual Convention*, 1953.

theological perspective. It would be hard to overrate this service since it constantly reminds the theologian that when dividing actual grace, one is cataloging or particularizing (among other things) the involvement of the Holy Spirit in the supernatural life of the believer.³⁰ The divisions of actual grace are not insular and irrelevant Thomistic preoccupations. They are the realization of *fides quaerens intellectum*. By noting that it is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit that is the common motion being divided post-justification, this perspective is recalled and solidified. This seems to be the only contribution I can make to the divisions of efficacious/sufficient, exciting/helping, and healing/elevating actual grace. These divisions (especially the final one) make serious contributions for understanding the *instinctus* of the gifts, but not so much vice versa.

My account of the gifts not only connects the divisions of actual grace to Aquinas's broader theological perspective but also extends the traditional understandings of operative and cooperative actual grace. As outlined in chapter I, the traditional opinion is that actual grace becomes cooperative after justification. My reading of Aquinas confirms this, but also goes one step further. Actual grace becomes cooperative because of the gifts. Only the gifts provide the disposition to be efficiently moved by God supernaturally.³¹ This function is not fulfilled by any of the other supernatural habits or habitual grace in such a way that they do not require another cause of their activity and an immanent disposition to that cause. Further, a disposition to be moved by God is necessary for actual grace to be cooperative, for the believer to be moved

³⁰ Being more precise, one should say that as an effect of God *auxilium* is a common effect of the whole Trinity. It is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. See *ST I* q. 45, a. 6; *ST I* q. 43, a. 5; Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 338ff.

³¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.

freely.³² Without the disposition to be so moved by God, God's motion is ipso facto operative since we have no native inclination to receive such a motion.³³ The mind is moved, but does not move. With the gifts, the mind is moved and moves.

My account also particularizes and extends the division of prevenient and subsequent grace, especially taking prevenient/subsequent in the second way: as a series of effects. My account particularizes this in one way and extends it in another. My account particularizes the effects of grace: to heal the soul, to will the good, to accomplish efficaciously, to persevere in the good, and to achieve glory. The gifts are intimately related to these effects. The gifts (dependent on habitual grace and in concert with the other supernatural habits) heal the soul, are the very means by which God moves us to will the good, are the most characteristic features of perseverance, and the *instinctus* of the gifts even continues in glory. It extends this account of the series of prevenient and subsequent graces by noting that there is a prevenience and subsequence in the unfolding of habitual grace. There is a priority and posteriority in the unfolding of habitual grace itself. The theological virtues are prevenient with respect to the gifts, but subsequent with respect to habitual grace, and so on.

Finally, my account of the grace of the sacraments in Aquinas confirms a broadly Cajetanian reading against that of Ramirez.³⁴ Ramirez says that sacramental grace is only distinct

³² *DQV* q. 2, a. 1, co. In this article, Aquinas argues that for God to move the believer voluntarily toward the supernatural end, he must infuse the habit of charity. By charity God moves believers as a final cause. Nevertheless, believers also need a disposition to be moved by God as an efficient cause. These are the gifts. The action of charity, as Aquinas says, requires the gifts. See *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

³³ In other words, it is not freely received (although it does not violate freedom either) since human willing of final ends is presupposed for freedom, not a result of it. See also *DQV* q. 2, a. 1, co. External motion without an internal principle is either not voluntary or natural. Neither can be true of post-justification *auxilium*. The gifts serve as the internal disposition for God's efficient motion.

by effect and not by species from the grace of the virtues and the gifts.³⁵ In proof of this he reasons that habitual grace is healing in two senses. First, primarily and formally it heals the soul by restoring the principle of supernatural life lost through sin. Second, the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit emanate from it (Aquinas's "the grace of the virtues and the gifts"³⁶). The virtues are contrary to sin inasmuch as it is an ordination to act. The grace of the sacraments according to Ramirez is only distinct from habitual grace by effect. In other words, the grace of the sacraments is habitual grace and the supernatural habits inasmuch as they are opposed to something different than the privation of grace and the inclination to sin.³⁷ Sacramental grace is opposed to the debilitation of the natural good and the multiple wounds of sin.³⁸ Habitual grace and the grace of the sacraments thus differ immediately in term. Yet they are one and the same healing grace. The virtues and the gifts flow more immediately from habitual grace taken as elevating, but sacramental grace from grace as healing. Sacramental grace is also subdivided. In the primary sense it per se causes sanctifying grace itself in the sacraments of the dead. In the

³⁴ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 754-756. I say broadly Cajetanian because my account is compatible the theory of Cajetan or the development of his theory by Lugo and Gonet as well as the theory first championed by Ferland.

³⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 754: "Habitual grace as it is found in the just is distinguished into habitual grace commonly and simply speaking, which the sacred doctor calls the grace of the virtues and the gifts, and into sacramental grace. These are not distinguished by diverse species of habits but through order to diverse effects..."

³⁶ *ST* III q. 62, a. 2, ad 1: "*Gratia virtutum et donorum*."

³⁷ *ST* I-II q. 82, a. 3, co.; *ST* I-II q. 85, a. 1, co.

³⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 754: "...through the original sin and (especially) through the many personal sins which befall fallen nature, there occurs a mutilation of natural goods and multiple wounds. Against these there is needed the help of habitual grace and the continual multiplication of medicines to the contrary which are given through the sacraments. This habitual medicinal grace given against the mutilation and natural wounds is called sacramental grace."

sacraments of the living it augments the habit of grace.³⁹ In short and put much more simply, Ramirez argues that the category of sacramental grace is exhausted by the introduction, restoration, and augmentation of habitual grace inasmuch as it is contrary to the debilitation of the natural good and wounds of sin.

My argument that sacramental grace is both habitual and actual is challenging to Ramirez's conception on the very basis that it includes actual grace. To put it more precisely, I argue that sacramental grace in Aquinas is both habitual and actual. The key comes in Aquinas's comment that the sacraments give the grace necessary for achieving the purpose of the sacrament.⁴⁰ In almost all cases the purposes of the sacraments are not exhausted by habitual grace, but also require actual grace.⁴¹ For example, in baptism believers not only receive sanctifying grace but also life and movement from Christ.⁴² Spiritual movement requires a reduction to act in the form of a motion, that is actual grace. The reception of the Eucharist is another example. Aquinas affirms that it not only augments habitual grace but also moves the will to acts of charity.⁴³ Ramirez's theory cannot take into account multiple texts in Aquinas which suggest that sacramental grace has a motive element.

³⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 756.

⁴⁰ *ST* III q. 72, a. 7, ad 3; *Super Heb.*, VII, l. 1, n. 329; *ST* III q. 62, a. 2, co.: "The sacraments are ordained to certain special effects necessary for the Christian life..."

⁴¹ See Chapter III, section IIIa for my defense of this claim.

⁴² *ST* III q. 69, a. 5, co.

⁴³ *ST* III q. 79, a. 4, co.

Possibly in all these cases Ramirez could say that the habit itself or the augmentation of it constitute a movement. Thus, by infusing or augmenting habitual grace God does give the movement above and it is beyond the habit (inclination follows form). Yet this cannot be the case unless Aquinas is speaking equivocally when he says that God moves us in the sacraments to act. The causing of a habit is not a motion. It could be the term of motion or a premotion, but is not a motion. In addition, Aquinas clearly says that the grace of the sacraments adds something above and beyond the grace of the virtues and gifts.⁴⁴ Does he mean another healing effect, as Ramirez's account requires? If he does, he never says so. What Aquinas does say is that sacramental grace is a certain help for meeting the ends of the sacraments.⁴⁵ The clearest candidate for this is often actual grace. In this I agree with Cajetan, who argues that Aquinas that sacramental grace is actual grace and that Aquinas means the narrow sense of *auxilium* in *ST* III q. 62, a. 2, co.⁴⁶ Further, if my conception identifying the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit with the actual grace given in the sacraments is correct, then that provides another argument against Ramirez's position. If the *instinctus* (or the promise of motive *auxilium*) is given in the sacraments, then sacramental grace would have to include actual grace. Granted, that actual grace does not exhaust the category of the sacraments, habitual grace must also be included therein. Nevertheless, actual grace must also be included.

In conclusion, I think one must attend to Aquinas's thought on the gifts to properly divide actual grace. Does this attention make any difference for the standard divisions of actual

⁴⁴ *ST* I-II q. 62, a. 2; *ST* III q. 72, a. 7, ad 3.

⁴⁵ *ST* I-II q. 62, a. 2, co.

⁴⁶ *Com. ST* III, vol. 8, p. 23.

grace? No. The divisions of operative/cooperative, prevenient/subsequent, efficacious/sufficient, healing/elevating, and exiting/helping are the same whether they are taken of *instinctus/auxilium* as I have contended or common actual grace as is the standard contention. Nevertheless, without attention to the gifts two things are lost in the division of actual grace. First, the broader picture of the centrality of the Holy Spirit to the whole moral life is obscured and how the supernatural habits interact would be lost. In addition, one would not identify the real reason actual grace becomes cooperative. Finally, one would have less support for including actual grace in the category of sacramental grace.

IIa. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Actual Grace

My argument for the correlation of the gifts to common *auxilium* can contribute to the secondary literature on this topic for one principal reason. Both sides of the necessity of the gifts debate (which also represent the two possible positions on this issue) begin with Aquinas's thought on the gifts and argue from there to grace (or not, in the case of Pinckaers, et al.). What motion correlates with the gifts depends on how often one thinks the gifts are necessary. If the gifts are necessary for each act then they will correlate to a motion which is necessary for each act. If the gifts are necessary only intermittently, then the type of actual grace to which they correspond will only be intermittent. I seek to approach the question slightly differently and thereby shed new light on the debate.

In this regard, my argument that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the common *auxilium* given to believers post-justification is challenging to the traditional camp in two related, but distinct, ways. First, my position on the correlation of actual grace to the gifts challenges what

elements make up the twofold course itself. Second, my position also challenges to which of these two elements the gifts correspond/dispose. On the other hand, my argument is extending for Pinckaers et al. because it actually makes their claim for the perpetual operativity of the gifts intelligible in terms of grace. In other words, my correlation of the gifts with common *auxilium* fills a lacuna in their argument by providing (or at least attempting to provide) the speculative work necessary to really make that thesis intelligible to a wider Thomistic community. Nobody claiming that the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action goes further than to say that the gifts are activated by an operative actual grace. This is certainly something, but it is not everything since operative actual graces come in many kinds. Traditional Thomism could have said the same thing! My argument attempts to correlate the gifts with a category of actual grace and thereby specify more clearly how often the gifts are needed. This section first treats my challenge to the traditional correlation of the gifts with a superabundant actual grace and then treats my extension of the position of Pinckaers et al.

Although my account does not exactly agree with the traditional position of a two-fold course in the supernatural life, it does confirm that there is a common course of God's sanctifying motion in the supernatural life and a motion beyond the common.⁴⁷ I argue this on the basis of the gifts' correspondence to common *auxilium* and the distinction between the gifts' acts and those of the counsels. Common *auxilium* does not move us to acts of the counsels and so one must posit another superabundant motion by which God moves and strengthens believers to

⁴⁷ Gardiel, *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life*, 7; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170; *Ibid.*, *Christian Perfection* 285ff; Gardiel, *Dons*, col. 1738-1739; Chapter III, section Ia & Ib

undertake and further specify the commands.⁴⁸ In the bare fact that there is a two-fold course, my argument confirms the traditionally held opinion of a twofold course.

The real divergence between my position and that of Garrigou-Lagrange or Ramirez occurs in what one holds to be the common motion and what is the superabundant. The standard reading claims that the common motion is common actual grace and the superabundant motion is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. I claim that the common is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and the special is the grace of superabundance.

Put differently, my argument challenges the common understanding of the twofold course by positing a different two-fold course. Granted, the two motions largely fulfill the same roles. According to my reading of Aquinas, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the common help God gives in the supernatural life. The Spirit activates and protects from temptation by his *auxilium*. I have not concerned myself with the typical division between easy acts and difficult acts.⁴⁹ Rather, my division between the double course focuses on the purposes/ends of the supernatural life since ends specify motion. In other words, it seems to me that Aquinas's position on supernatural motion (like his philosophical position on natural motion) is teleological and not concerned with modes of activity.⁵⁰ Common *auxilium* is the motion which leads all believers to their supernatural home. The grace of superabundance, on the other hand, pushes believers to

⁴⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, ad 1.

⁴⁹ Although I did not focus on it, the division could be compatible with my account. It would simply involve positing another division in common *auxilium* akin to the sufficient/efficacious division. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 545ff.

⁵⁰ Wippel, *the Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 445-453.

undertake the counsels, those things which more safely implement the means toward this goal.⁵¹

The two motions are radically compatible and have the same purpose, but one accounts for the undertaking and conservation of higher acts.

The success of my reading of Aquinas rests, in part, on the lack of textual support for the traditional twofold course. The best textual support for the traditional identification of the twofold course as common actual grace and the *instinctus* of the gifts is found in a certain method of reading Aquinas on the gifts. This method argues that Aquinas's thought on the gifts undergoes no (significant) development between his immature *Scriptum* and his mature *Summa Theologiae*.⁵² Given that this is the case, then it is clear that the gifts and their correlative motion operate beyond the human mode, as they are claimed to do in the *Scriptum*. Thus, they cannot be the normal motion by which God moves believers. Experience testifies that most of the time our supernatural lives are lived under the power of discursive reason. The *instinctus* of the gifts must be the superabundant motion. In other words, when Aquinas writes about the gifts in his mature works these authors read his mature thought in light of his immature thought,⁵³ despite a lack of explicit evidence in Aquinas's mature corpus that he continues to hold to this division of motion between the rational and the super human.⁵⁴

⁵¹ *ST* I q. 19, a. 12, ad 4; *ST* II-II q. 184, a. 3; *ST* II-II q. 184, a. 1; Christopher Franks, *He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas's Economic Teachings* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 122ff.

⁵² For a proponent of this view see Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C., "Appendix 4: The Evolution of St. Thomas's Thought on the Gifts," 110-130; Garrigou-Lagrange, "Le mode supra-humain des dons du Saint Esprit." For the other side see Guibert, "Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d'agir 'ultrahumain' d'après saint Thomas;" and Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 172ff.

⁵³ *III Sent.* d. 34-35.

⁵⁴ Guibert, *Les Doublets*, chapter VI: "Troisième exemple: Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d'agir 'ultra humain'."

I think there are four problems with this approach. First, many scholars are now challenging the contention that Aquinas holds the gifts alone to operate beyond the human mode in his mature works.⁵⁵ Second, there are documented developments in Aquinas's thought on grace which have implications for his thought on the gifts.⁵⁶ These are not taken into account in the traditional position, as represented by Garrigou-Lagrangé. Third, the textual evidence of Aquinas's mature corpus pushes one to give the Holy Spirit a much more central place in the supernatural life. In other words, the textual evidence in Aquinas's mature corpus does not support the twofold course being common actual grace and the *instinctus* of the Spirit.⁵⁷ On the other hand, as I have tried to outline in the last two chapters, it seems to me that Aquinas's mature thought claims that the *instinctus* of the Spirit is the common motion. Finally, although it may be the case that Aquinas does not change his position between the *Scriptum* and the *ST*, one should not methodically preclude that possibility. Put simply, I think the standard reading of the twofold course of motion in the supernatural life is not a likely reading of Aquinas. I think a much more likely reading is that the *instinctus* and the grace of superabundance make up the twofold course.

The second way my position challenges the traditional understanding is related to, but distinct, from the first. I claim that the gifts of the Holy Spirit correlate to the common motion, not the superabundant one. The traditional opinion correlated the gifts with a special type of

⁵⁵ See Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 93ff.

⁵⁶ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 119f.

⁵⁷ In Aquinas's mature corpus he uses the term *instinctus* to refer to the activating motion of Aristotle's *De Bona Fortuna* not motion of God above human reason. See Thomas Deman, "Le 'Liber de Bona Fortuna,'" 55ff.

actual grace, not common actual grace. The gifts correlate to what Labourdette calls a preeminent actual grace, the higher motion in Gardiel's double course. My position, inasmuch as it argues that the activating cause of the gifts is not a special actual grace but common *auxilium* is directly contradictory to this conception. The central question then becomes whether Aquinas correlates the gifts with a superabundant motion, the higher way of the twofold course? What textual evidence can be brought for the traditional position apart from its reading of the gifts (which will be the topic of section VII)?

I think that two principle arguments based on Aquinas's mature corpus can be brought for correlating the gifts with the superabundant motion and not the common one. The first is based on Aquinas's language; the second is based on *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co. The first argument is quite simple. Aquinas calls the activating force of the gifts *instinctus* and the general activating principle of the supernatural life *auxilium*. Thus, there are two separate motions. One corresponds to the gifts and the other to the use of the theological virtues. *Auxilium* accounts for the metaphysical activation of the believer already justified. *Instinctus* activates the gifts. Hence, they seem to be separate motions.

The second argument is based on *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 and comes in two varieties. The first argues that *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 provides evidence (either positive or negative) that the gifts of the Holy Spirit correlate to a superabundant actual grace, not common actual grace. Both positions argue that the two-fold need identified in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co. for grace post justification (metaphysical activation and protection from temptation) are fulfilled by different motions. Both variations of this position claim that when Aquinas says that *auxilium* is necessary for both activation and protection from temptation, the singular *auxilium* should be taken as a collective

singular denoting a group (i.e., those which are still necessary). It does not mean that one motion activates and protects from temptation, they claim. The two varieties agree that the first need (activation) is fulfilled by common actual grace.

The second motion shows the difference in the two possible readings. The first possible reading claims that the second need for *auxilium* seems to correspond to the *raison d'être* for the gifts, which are also there to supplement the virtues and protect from temptation. The second motion is the *instinctus* of the gifts. In other words, according to the first reading there is evidence for both a twofold course and the gifts correlating to the superabundant and occasional motion in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9.

The second possible reading of *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 holds that protection from temptation (the second need for *auxilium* post-justification) is fulfilled by a moral and not a physical motion. The second reading of *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, has less textual evidence that the gifts correspond to the superabundant motion, but rather undercuts my evidence that *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 proves that the gifts correspond to common *auxilium*. To prove that the gifts correspond to the superabundant motion this position would have to go back to the name argument to prove that *instinctus* is a superabundant motion, since it is not mentioned in the treatise on grace as common or needed post-justification.

In order to justify my position that the gifts correlate to the common motion, I shall have to satisfactorily answer both of these arguments (and their varieties). To the first it is enough to point out that Aquinas (at least sometimes) speaks of the same reality with different words.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ For a short introduction to Aquinas's thought on the transcendentals of being see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 191ff.

This is because according to Aquinas's semiotics, words signify concepts which signify things.⁵⁹ Two concepts can signify the same thing from a different conceptual angle and so two names would be justified.⁶⁰ This exact thing happens in the case of the transcendentals.⁶¹ Hence, simply having different names is not sufficient to prove that the *instinctus* of the gifts and the *auxilium* of grace are two different motions. Furthermore, there are a lot of good reasons to hold that these motions are in fact the same reality (especially since they move toward the same ends and ends specify motions).

Nevertheless, that still leaves me with the problem of why Aquinas uses two different words for what amounts to be the same group of motions. It would seem that Aquinas has good historical and theological reasons for using two different words. The historical reasons are that *instinctus* was a functioning concept in both Augustine and Aristotle. In Augustine it denotes the Spirit's activity in the life of the believer, the ground of all good activity.⁶² In Aristotle, it signifies the activating force for the ethical life.⁶³ Aquinas attempts to combine these two in his

⁵⁹ John Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism* (New York: Bookman Associates Inc., 1952), 201ff.

⁶⁰ Gyula Klima, "Theory of Language," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 371-389.

⁶¹ *DV* q. 1, a. 1.

⁶² H.A. Gärtner, "Instinctus," in *AugLex* Vol. III, ed. R. Dodaro, C. Mayer, C. Müller et al. (Heidelberg: Schwabe & Co.), 636; "Gott kann 'occulto instinctu' den Willen der Menschen dazu bringen, sein eigenes Wollen zu erfüllen."

⁶³ Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, 1248a14ff. Aristotle's τίς ἡ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ("a certain principle of motion in the soul") was translated as *instinctus* in the *Liber de Bona Fortuna*. The *Liber de Bona Fortuna* was attributed to Aristotle and contained passages from the *Eudemian Ethics*. For more on this see Edward Schillebeeckx, *Revelation and Theology*, vol. 2 (St. Louis: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 36-37. See also Sherwin, *By Faith and by Love*, 140ff and Deman, "Le 'Liber de bona fortuna'."

theory of the gifts.⁶⁴ *Instinctus* combines these two traditions; it activates the believer (Aristotle) toward good activity (Augustine).⁶⁵ The term *auxilium*, on the other hand, is common parlance in the medieval schools denoting God's help in the supernatural life.⁶⁶ In this sense, *Auxilium* is certainly broader than *instinctus*, as I note above.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, *instinctus* is the *auxilium* necessary post-justification for activation toward good activity and protection from temptation.

The second of the two arguments (in both varieties) is the more plausible. It is possible that Aquinas means two different motions in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co., one to activate and the other to protect.⁶⁸ The first would be common actual grace and the other the *instinctus* of the Spirit or a moral motion. If this were true, it would certainly undercut a main piece of evidence I bring for the *instinctus* of the gifts being post-justification common *auxilium*.

Not surprisingly then, I think both arguments fail for three reasons. First, to protect one from temptation is a type of activation inasmuch as this requires an act of virtue to be activated.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ In this sense the statement by Sherwin should be expanded to include not only free action, but good free action under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. See Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love*, 142: "When we consider the discoveries of these scholars in light of our earlier analysis of Aquinas's mature psychology of action, we find that not only does *instinctus* provide a bridge between his 'anti-Semi-Pelagianism' and the *Ethics* of Aristotle, it also establishes a bridge between Aquinas's mature theology of faith and his mature psychology of action.

⁶⁵ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

⁶⁶ George W. Shea, "A Survey of the Theology of Sacramental Grace."; Janz, *Luther and Medieval Thomism*, 45.

⁶⁷ See Chapter II, pages 26f for the different senses of *auxilium*.

⁶⁸ This is the way Ramirez reads the article. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 536.

⁶⁹ Certainly it is the case that protection from temptation could be external providence. Nevertheless, protection from temptation means more than not simply being tempted. It means not falling into temptation. God must move to acts of virtue to prevent falling into temptation, since it is virtue which is contrary to sin. See *ST* II-II q. 83, a. 9, co.: "...when we say 'lead us not into temptation' we do not seek to remove all temptation but pray that temptation may not conquer us, which is to be led into temptation." Aquinas cites this verse from the Lord's prayer in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9. Inasmuch as this verse requires more than not being tempted (which seems to be all a moral motion could do),

In other words, it is impossible to distinguish the two motions by the terms of activation and protection from temptation. To protect from temptation is also an activation. This at least weakens the plausibility of both positions by attacking their major claim about *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 (i.e., that Aquinas is there talking about two motions). Second, to activate the believer was the very reason given for the gifts.⁷⁰ This would seem to more closely ally the *instinctus* of the Spirit with the first need, the one identified as common actual grace by both positions. Third, God protects from temptation by activating and sustaining the virtues and gifts since the acts of the virtues and gifts are contrary to sin.⁷¹ God cannot only protect us from temptation with the gifts (although the gifts are also contrary to sin) or a moral motion.⁷² This means that the first position must be wrong. Both the theological and infused cardinal virtues must fall under the second motion since they protect believers from temptation. In other words, it is impossible that the first need be fulfilled by common actual grace and activates the theological virtues in the human mode and the *instinctus* protects from temptation by a super human motion. For the above reasons also, it is an unlikely reading that the second need in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co. can be fulfilled by a moral motion.

In summary, my position arguing that the *instinctus* of the Spirit is the further *auxilium* necessary for believers' post-justification remains a plausible reading. The two other possible

the *auxilium* protecting from falling into temptation needs to be physical and not merely moral. This makes Ramirez's interpretation much less plausible. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 536f.

⁷⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

⁷¹ *ST* I-II q. 71, a. 1, co.

⁷² See footnote 69.

readings are not possible on Aquinas's terms. This at least casts doubt on the textual basis for the traditional position that the gifts of the Holy Spirit correspond to the superabundant motion in Aquinas whereas the theological virtues correspond to common actual grace. Aquinas nowhere says any such thing and the textual evidence for it in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co. is dubious at best.

In relation to the position of Pinckaers et al., my position both confirms and extends. Pinckaers and his disciples have no real and outlined answer for what type of grace the *instinctus* of the gifts is or how that type of grace relates to Aquinas's broader schema. Their one concern is to show that the gifts are necessary and operative in each meritorious action. In this regard my argument for the correlation between the gifts and common *auxilium* confirms their position, for common *auxilium* is so operative (even in the superabundant motions).⁷³ The gifts dispose to common *auxilium*. The gifts' operative effect is the habitual presupposition to any voluntary supernatural activity. In this way my argument confirms their position.

On the other hand, these scholars do not have a worked out position on the correlation between the gifts and actual grace. In this way my argument extends their work. It provides the correlation and works out the implications of claiming that the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action. This claim is not only based on the cooperative and connected activity of the supernatural virtues but also, it seems, the most plausible reading of *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9. The needs listed in this article are fulfilled by one type of graced motion, and that graced motion is

⁷³ The graces of superabundance operate within the normal working of common *auxilium* and are not toward another ultimate end.

the *instinctus* of the gifts.⁷⁴ By correlating the gifts with common *auxilium* and attempting to work out the implications of this, my work extends the work of Pinckaers et al.

In the above ways, my argument offers something concrete to the Thomistic conversation concerning grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. To those working predominantly with grace, it challenges the common conception of the gifts being coordinated with a superabundant actual grace and asks for more textual justification for this position. To those following Pinckaers in their thought on the gifts, my argument offers a more rigorous and explicit conception of how the gifts work and how this is connected to Aquinas's broader theological perspective.

III. The Division of Habitual Grace

The division of habitual grace has three principal questions: the distinction of the supernatural habits from habitual grace, the division of habitual grace by subject, and the division of habitual grace by effect. Aquinas's doctrine on the gifts makes no contribution whatsoever to the first two areas. One need not even mention the gifts to have a perfectly full picture of the distinction of the supernatural habits from habitual grace. In this regard the gifts are simply part of the collective supernatural habits being distinguished from habitual grace. In addition, the gifts in no way enter into the division of habitual grace by subject. How could the gifts posit a new supernatural subject? It is clear they cannot, for they are accidental qualifications presupposing a subject.

On the other hand, my analysis of Aquinas's division of habitual grace does have implications for the division of habitual grace by effect. It confirms that Garrigou-Lagrange and

⁷⁴ See Chapter II, section IIb.

Ramirez are right to take habitual grace in both a narrow and a wide sense. It also extends this commitment to include the claim that habitual grace in the wide sense is also healing and elevating, since the powers of the soul also need to be healed and elevated. In addition, it extends the traditional take on the relation between habitual grace and the supernatural virtues by specifying more clearly their relation. The supernatural habits are operative formal effects of habitual grace. It shows that if Lonergan means habitual grace exclusively in the wide sense and thus healing and elevating too, he has misread Aquinas. Finally, my argument that the supernatural habits are healing and elevating challenges Ramirez's claim that the supernatural habits are unrelated to the healing and elevating functions of habitual grace.

My analysis of the gifts as healing/elevating as well as operative/cooperative confirms and extends the traditional claim that habitual grace can be taken in two senses, a wide sense including habitual grace and all the supernatural habits and a narrow sense only including habitual grace. I argue that the narrow sense of habitual grace is Aquinas's primary and exclusive use of the term, although this does not preclude the legitimate development of the Thomistic tradition to take this term also in a wide sense. In fact, and this is where my argument extends the common conception, I argue that habitual grace should be taken in the wide sense when Aquinas predicates the effects of healing and elevating. Habitual grace taken in the strict sense is not the whole extent of God's healing and elevating. As Aquinas says, "[believers] are healing in the mind by grace, but their flesh remains corrupted and infected through which they serve the law of sin...."⁷⁵ The healing activity of grace is not exhausted by habitual grace in the narrow sense

⁷⁵ ST I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.: "*Quae quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quam servit legi peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom. VII.*"

since believers are healed in the mind also and not simply in the essence of the soul. The same goes for the elevating function of habitual grace. The powers of the soul are also in need of elevation, yet habitual grace (in the narrow sense) is not located in the powers of the soul. Habitual grace in the narrow sense causes the supernatural habits which both heal and elevate the powers of the soul to live and walk in accord with the new gift of a participation in the divine nature.⁷⁶

My analysis of the division of habitual grace extends the secondary literature by giving the precise relation between habitual grace and the supernatural habits. The supernatural habits are operative and per se effects of habitual grace, that is they are in the soul without the soul's cooperation or movement; they are operative effects.⁷⁷ In other words, they flow directly and necessarily from habitual grace, not on account of some other circumstance. The supernatural virtues are not like the effect of healing, which only follows if the human given habitual grace is fallen (not the case in Jesus, Our Lady, and pre-fall humanity). None of the secondary literature specifies thus, but is content to say that the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace. In this way my argument extends secondary literature.

⁷⁶ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3, co.

⁷⁷ They fall on the side of being inasmuch as they are habits, not operations. *ST I-II* q. 111, a. 2, co.: "If grace is taken as a habitual gift, again there is a twofold effect just as in every other form. The first is being and the second is operation.... Therefore, habitual grace inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul (makes it pleasing to God), is called operative grace. Inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious operation which spring also from free will, habitual grace is called cooperative."

In addition, the supernatural habits themselves are operative and cooperative in their effects.⁷⁸ As far as I know, none of the secondary literature notes this. The supernatural habits should be thought of as operative in being and cooperative in activity based on the will.⁷⁹ By noting this my argument extends the secondary literature. Furthermore, that the supernatural habits are operative and cooperative has drastic implications for understanding Aquinas's thought. It is not at all clear how one could take all of Aquinas's diverse statements on the different priorities of the supernatural habits seriously without noting that the supernatural habits (especially the gifts, in this case) are operative and cooperative.⁸⁰ In addition, by noting that the supernatural habits are operative and cooperative, it allows them to participate in the functions of healing and elevating, which must be operative effects.⁸¹

My argument also has implications for Lonergan's work. As will be recalled from chapter I section III, Lonergan is ambiguous on the issue of habitual grace. Does Aquinas mean it in the wide sense or the narrow? Lonergan never answers, but it seems in many places throughout his work that he claims Aquinas uses the term habitual grace in the wide sense exclusively.⁸² If I am right that this is Lonergan's position, then it would be a false interpretation of Aquinas.⁸³ More likely, Lonergan was not directly concerned with the issue of whether habitual grace should be

⁷⁸ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.: "...habitual grace has a twofold effect, **just as every other form...**" Emphasis added. Inasmuch as the gifts are habits and habits are forms, the gifts too must have a twofold effect.

⁷⁹ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.

⁸⁰ *ST* II-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 3; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

⁸¹ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.; *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 4, co.; *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

⁸² Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 54ff.

⁸³ See Chapter II, section IVb.

taken in the wide or narrow sense. Nevertheless, he probably should have been given that his work concerns freedom and the restoration of freedom is an effect of habitual grace and the supernatural habits, and especially the gifts since freedom requires God's movement.⁸⁴ The full implications of what this could mean for Lonergan's work are beyond the scope of this project, but it is important to note that attention to habitual grace's senses is not an interest extraneously to Lonergan's project (outlining Aquinas's position on grace and freedom).

Finally, my argument challenges Ramirez's contention that the supernatural habits are unrelated to the healing and elevating effects of habitual grace.⁸⁵ In order to make this clear, I will first outline Ramirez's argument and then show where Ramirez is incomplete by failing to take into account all the data in Aquinas.

Ramirez offers the following argument for the division of habitual grace into healing and elevating. He begins by noting that the division of habitual grace into healing and elevating is a division by effect and is not a division on the part of habitual grace itself.⁸⁶ He immediately divides the effects of habitual grace into two genera: the immediate or formal and the mediate or effective.⁸⁷ The mediate effects of habitual grace are those exercised through the mediation of the infused virtues in those having the use of reason. He follows this division by claiming that the healing and elevating effects of habitual grace cannot be mediate, cannot belong to the

⁸⁴ *ST I-II* q. 10, a. 4, co.; Shanley, "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas," 102ff.

⁸⁵ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 732ff.

⁸⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733: "This division, inasmuch as it concerns habitual grace, is not on the part of grace itself...[but] on the part of the effects of habitual grace."

⁸⁷ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733: "*immediatus seu formalis et effectus mediatu s seu effectivus.*"

efficient order. If they did belong to the efficient order, the mediate order, then the division of habitual grace into healing and elevating would not be universal, but only in those adults having the use of reason; it would exclude infants and those with perpetual mental handicaps.⁸⁸

Ramirez continues by elimination. If the effects of healing and elevating cannot belong to the mediate effects of habitual grace then they must belong to the formal order, to the immediate effects.⁸⁹ These effects are in all those who possess habitual grace. Habitual grace causes them *de facto* and not based on the conditions of the subject. Nevertheless, this is not the whole picture, for some of the formal effects of habitual grace are also based on the conditions of the subject. Taking into account this fact, Ramirez claims that the immediate or formal effects of habitual grace can be subdivided into those which are *per se* and those which are *per accidens* (based on a contingent condition).⁹⁰ The elevating function of habitual grace is a *per se* formal effect. It occurs no matter the state of human nature. The medicinal or healing effect of habitual grace though is contingent on the state of human nature.⁹¹ Not all who have habitual grace are fallen. In this case it is by its *per se* effect that the *per accidens* effect takes place. It is by

⁸⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733: "...excluding two categories of the baptized: children and those with permanent mental handicaps."

⁸⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733: "Therefore it is necessary to take [the division of grace into healing and elevating] on the part of the immediate or formal effects..."

⁹⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733: "...*per se*, which is to deify the soul by producing in it a sharing in the divine nature and elevate it intrinsically to the divine and supernatural order....Another effect is *per accidens* on account of the conditional and accidental status of the subject who receives habitual grace..."

⁹¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733: "[expelling] this sickness of sin, which is positively contrary to sonship of the divine. In this sense it causes spiritual and supernatural healing.... According to this effect [habitual grace] is called healing or medicinal not simply because it is healing by removing the contrary form, but because it is simultaneously healing and elevating."

elevating the fallen human to the supernatural order that the human is healed (if that human is fallen).

Clearly in one sense Ramirez is right, for habitual grace heals the essence of the soul and elevates it to the supernatural level without the supernatural habits. I call this the primary healing effect. Yet Ramirez totally misses the secondary healing effects of habitual grace. Put differently, he seems to imply that the virtues are unrelated to the healing and elevating functions of habitual grace. My argument is that, in the language of Ramirez, the supernatural virtues are part of elevating and healing effects of habitual grace. This conception differs from Ramirez on two points. First, I catalogue the virtues in the effects of habitual grace and relate them to its healing and elevating effects whereas Ramirez does not (at least not in this context).⁹² The mediate or efficient effects are exercised through the infused habits, but where do the infused habits themselves fall? Ramirez does not say. It seems to me that if one wants to follow St. Thomas's thought, one must locate the infused habits as immediate or formal effects of habitual grace.⁹³ Nevertheless, this same act of cataloging the supernatural habits as per se and formal effects of habitual grace begs the question of how these effects relate to habitual grace's other per se and formal effects: healing and elevating. In other words, the question does not even arise for Ramirez since he does not catalogue the supernatural habits as effects of habitual grace.

⁹² For Ramirez the effects of habitual grace are immediate/formal or mediate/efficient. The mediate effects are exercised through the infused habits. The immediate/formal effects are elevation (per se) and healing (per accidens). The fact that the infused virtues are used in the mediate effects implies that Ramirez would locate them in the immediate/formal category, but he does not say so. See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 733.

⁹³ To me, this is the effect of Aquinas's verbs such as *effluere* and *derivare* in *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3-4.

Second, Ramirez fails to note here that the infused habits can be divided into operative and cooperative also. Clearly healing and elevating cannot be an effect of the cooperative sense of the infused virtues, which would place it in the efficient order. Then God's healing and elevating of the human subject would be contingent on the will's cooperation.⁹⁴ This is clearly not St. Thomas's teaching or the teaching of the Church.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, why could not healing and elevating be an operative effect of the supernatural habits, just as they are an operative effect of habitual grace? Indeed, the supernatural habits are in all believers regardless of their use of reason. They are habitually possessed and so do make the subject just, faithful, loving, prudent (and so on with the other virtues) in habit, but not in act.⁹⁶ This is a strong indication they belong to the formal and not the efficient or mediate order. Likewise, as I argue in Chapter II, section IVb, I think this also implies that the supernatural habits, including the gifts are healing and elevating.

Based on these omissions by Ramirez (which amount to a false implication that the virtues are unrelated to the healing and elevating effects of habitual grace), I think my argument that the supernatural habits are healing and elevating is a more convincing interpretation of St. Thomas's thought. In the language of Ramirez, I would say that the supernatural habits themselves are formal and per se effects of habitual grace and that the operative effects of the

⁹⁴ That is the very definition of cooperative grace, that the will is operative also and not just grace. See *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2. In short, unless the infused habits are operative effects of habitual grace infants and those without the use of reason/freedom would not have them.

⁹⁵ Cornelius Ernst, "Appendix 2: Pelagius and Pelagianism," in *Summa Theologiae* vol. 30 by St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 236-237.

⁹⁶ *ST* I-II q. 49, a. 3, ad 1.

supernatural habits as forms is to elevate the powers to walk in accord with the new infused form (*per se*) and to heal the weakened inclination to virtue (*per accidens*).

However, this brings up another problem. How are the two formal effects of habitual grace related to each other, elevating/healing the essence of the soul and the supernatural habits? I've claimed, and I think rightly, that both the healing and elevating of the essence of the soul and the causing of the supernatural habits are formal effects of habitual grace, but have not related them to each other. The key to answering this question is noticing that habitual grace is infused into the soul and the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace and perfect the powers of the soul in relation to action.⁹⁷ The immediate healing and elevating effects of habitual grace are limited to the essence of the soul.⁹⁸ The supernatural habits, while also formal and *per se* effects of habitual grace, are in the powers of the soul. Put differently, Ramirez is wrong that all mediate effects of habitual grace are in the efficient order. Habitual grace immediately causes the elevation of the soul (and likely its healing too), which immediately causes the supernatural habits. The supernatural habits are part of the formal order, but are also mediate effects.

These supernatural habits in turn have their own immediate and *per se* effects. They each make the believer actually of that quality, faithful, loving, just, wise, etc. By doing this they elevate the powers of the soul to the supernatural order and heal the weakened inclination to

⁹⁷ *ST I-II* q. 49, a. 3, co.; *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3, co.

⁹⁸ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 4, co.

virtue in the powers.⁹⁹ In short, when Aquinas says that habitual grace is healing and elevating, one should take habitual grace in its wide sense, that is as including the supernatural habits.

In concluding this section, I should offer a caveat. The gifts are not absolutely essential to the insights above. In other words, one does not have to have information from Aquinas's thought on the gifts to properly understand the division of habitual grace by effect. Nevertheless, in my case it was through trying to understand the gifts more particularly in terms of grace that I came to ask these questions. They remain, what I think are, genuine insights and contributions to the secondary literature's discussion.

IIIa. The Natural Priority among the Supernatural Habits

As I argue above, the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace as one of habitual graces' operative and per se effects in the formal order. That is, they exist in all who are justified, even those without the use of free will.¹⁰⁰ In that section, I also argue that the order in which the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace is theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues. This argument extends the work of those authors who do not identify an order in which the supernatural habits flow from grace (Garrigou-Lagrange, Ramirez, and O'Meara).¹⁰¹ This argument challenges the account of Frojet who claims that the order between the infused cardinal

⁹⁹ In saying this I am not hypostasizing the powers of the soul, which are qualities. The powers of the soul are *ipso facto* elevated when the essence is elevated by habitual grace. On the other hand, they are not elevated by habitual grace directly but by the supernatural habits.

¹⁰⁰ *ST* I-II q. 84, aa. 7-8; *ST* I-II q. 113, a. 3, ad 1; *ST* II-II q. 15, a. 1, co.

¹⁰¹ O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," 264; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 139; Ramirez, *de Donis*, 135

virtues and gifts is reversed.¹⁰² Finally, this argument confirms, but slightly qualifies the account of Labourdette.¹⁰³

My argument complements the work of Garrigou-Lagrange, Ramirez, and O'Meara in two ways. The first is by filling a lacuna in their work. None of these authors outline the order in which the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace, even though clearly St. Thomas has a position on the matter.¹⁰⁴ All these authors clearly state that the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace, but none identify the precise order. By identifying the order my work extends theirs. The second way my work extends these authors is by laying the foundations of any proper action theory in the supernatural life. By action theory I do not mean the thought of Aquinas on intention, object, and circumstances, or even the traditional twelve steps of the human action.¹⁰⁵ By action theory I mean the interactions between the virtues themselves as co-principles of action. Obviously there is a relation between the different aspects of action theory for an action is numerically one; all three considerations are present (action theory, steps, and principles of action). Nevertheless, they can be separated and focused. My work helps by making clearer the action theory of the virtues as principles of action by following a very traditional Thomistic axiom: *agere sequitur esse*. In other words, the order of being and activity are related. Indeed,

¹⁰² Froget, *The Indwelling*, 191ff.

¹⁰³ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375

¹⁰⁴ *ST* I-II q. 19, a. 9, ad 3; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.

¹⁰⁵ The most recent controversies concerning the object of the human action have involved (among others) Lawrence Dewan, Stephen Long, Steven Jensen, Stephen Brock, and Martin Rhonheimer. For a succinct summary of the traditional Thomistic twelve steps of the human action see Vernon J. Bourke, *Ethics: A Textbook in Moral Philosophy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951).

this is one of the implications of the oft cited Thomistic axiom.¹⁰⁶ This is why my account supplements Garrigou-Lagrange, Ramirez, and O'Meara in a second sense. If one wants to properly outline the order of activity and the causal relations between the different types of supernatural habits, then one must properly outline their order in being. Once one has outlined their order in being, one has the proper tools for outlining their order in activity. As will be recalled, Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez very much do want to outline the relative activity of the supernatural habits.¹⁰⁷ To do so is simply to understand the workings of God and man in the supernatural life. Hence, they need to understand the order of being. Yet none of them do this.

Whereas my argument and account supplement the account of those authors above, my argument is in direct contradiction to Frojet's. As will be recalled from chapter I, Frojet claims that the order in which the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace is theological, infused cardinal, and the gifts. In this the gifts represent "exalted perfections" which God activates by a special inspiration, especially in difficult situations.¹⁰⁸ One can recognize the traditional theory of the gifts operative here. The gifts are only operative when the infused virtues and our elevated reason are insufficient. My analysis of the derivational order of supernatural habits directly contradicts this position by claiming that the order in which the supernatural habits flow from habitual grace is theological, gifts, and infused cardinal.

The intriguing question is whether the traditional theory of the gifts requires the derivational order of the gifts to be what Frojet outlines. While I have only the space for a

¹⁰⁶ SCG III c. 68, n. 20.

¹⁰⁷ E.g. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 378.

¹⁰⁸ Frojet, *The Indwelling*, 203. See also page 217.

provisional answer, it would seem that the answer is yes. Since the order of activity follows the order of being, it would seem that if one wants to think of the gifts as reserved for those actions for which the theological and infused cardinal virtues are insufficient, then the gifts would have to come third in the derivational order. If this is the case and I have rightly outlined the derivational order of the supernatural habits, then it is very likely that the traditional theory claiming only the occasional operation of the gifts is a false interpretation of Aquinas on other grounds as well.

On the other hand, Labourdette, who has the most complete action theory of the virtues, might have an answer to this objection. My account and his agree on the derivational order from habitual grace but differ in action theory. Where our accounts disagree is precisely where the traditional Thomistic position needs refinement.¹⁰⁹ In other words, Labourdette recognizes Aquinas's position on the derivation order of the supernatural habits from habitual grace correctly as theological, gifts, and infused cardinal.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, he continues to hold the traditional theory of the gifts as only intermittently operative. The real question is whether Labourdette's account is a good reading of Aquinas.

Labourdette's account requires that the order of activity mirrors the derivational order only when the supernatural organism is active under the special and higher inspiration of the Holy Spirit.¹¹¹ Normally the derivational order is not mirrored in the order of activity, which falls

¹⁰⁹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375.

¹¹⁰ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375.

¹¹¹ Labourdette, *Cours*, 812.

under common actual grace.¹¹² He offers no justification for this contention, nor can I think of one apart from the claim that the gifts are only occasionally active and supplement the virtues' imperfections vis-à-vis their objects. Recalling arguments given above and anticipating those below, I think it is clear that the traditional thesis on the occasional operation of the gifts cannot be upheld and to use it here as a premise would only beg the question. Hence, Labourdette's conception on the relation between the order of being and activity is suspect (since it rests on the occasional operation thesis) and, as a result, no defense on the order of being and activity from the traditional camp can be found.

In the above ways, my research complements and challenges the secondary literature on the derivation of the supernatural habits from habitual grace. Furthermore, the gifts are essential to my contentions. Without attention to Aquinas's doctrine on the gifts one could not have the full derivational order from habitual grace or the proper order of activity. A proper understanding of the gifts is essential for reading Aquinas rightly on these points.

IV. The Necessity of Grace

If my argument is correct that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the further grace necessary for one already justified and that the gifts provide the disposition to this grace then the gifts are relevant in a myriad of ways for the traditional Thomistic understanding of the necessity of grace. For the most part these extend the traditional conception on the necessity of grace. How my argument extends will be the first topic of this section. The second and third topics of this section deal more particularly with how often *auxilium* is active post-justification and the causes

¹¹² Labourdette, *Cours*, 812.

of final perseverance. In this regard, a proper understanding of the gifts is not relevant for the debate between Wawrykow and the commentators over how often motive *auxilium* is necessary to do good actions.¹¹³ Finally, my argument extends and challenges (though not in the same way) the conception of Garrigou-Lagrange on the cause of final perseverance.¹¹⁴

My argument for the place of the gifts in the systematic divisions of grace extends the Thomistic understanding of the necessity of grace in quite general ways. I argue that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the common *auxilium* given after justification and that the gifts of the Holy Spirit provide the dispositions to this motion by their operative effects. Hence, anytime post-justification there is an activity inspired by God's *auxilium*, the gifts will be required in some way. For example, the gifts are required to actively love God above all things.¹¹⁵ This is so because in order to actively (as opposed to habitually) love God above all things, one must be moved to it by God and be disposed to be so moved.¹¹⁶ Something similar could be said for knowing truth salvifically, willing or doing the good fully, observing the precepts of the law, meriting eternal life, and avoiding sin.¹¹⁷ Supernaturally the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and the gifts' operative effects are essential for all activity. The gifts also help the subject keep the

¹¹³ For more on the history of this debate see Janz, *Luther and Medieval Thomism*, 45.

¹¹⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 99f.

¹¹⁵ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 3, ad 1. The *auxilium* Aquinas mentions in the body of this article is *auxilium* in the widest sense, i.e., a natural activating motion. See Chapter II, section IIb for the three senses of *auxilium*.

¹¹⁶ Habits, although they are midway between potency and act, must be moved to act. See *ST* I-II q. 71, a. 3, co.; *ST* I-II q. 51, a. 3. See also Therese Scarpelli Cory, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 120f.

¹¹⁷ *ST* I-II q. 109, aa. 1-2, 4-5, and 8.

natural law by helping to heal the subject's wounds left by sin.¹¹⁸ These ways simply extend the traditional Thomistic understanding of the necessity of grace by adding the gifts into the mix.

At first it might seem that the gifts of the Holy Spirit could also contribute to the debate over how often an operative activating actual grace is necessary in the supernatural life. To recall, the disagreement is over whether an operative actual grace is present in the willing of every new end (Wawrykow) or only some (Ramirez, Garrigou-Lagrange, Labourdette).¹¹⁹ If the argument identifying *auxilium* with *instinctus* is correct, then is this not a debate over whether the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is necessary at the willing of each end or only for certain ends? Yes, it is. Nevertheless, that does not provide any new data to help solve the debate. Aquinas does speak of the *instinctus* of the Spirit as the activating cause of all the virtues, thereby aiding their imperfect possession by the subject.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, this does not tell us how often activation is necessary. Nor does Aquinas speak of how often the *instinctus* of the gifts is necessary. My argument for their perpetual necessity is also ambivalent on the issue. One could affirm either position and still hold the gifts to be perpetually necessary.

As I argue above, I think that there are good reasons to think of the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit as operative on the older model of actual grace (that of some commentators). Nevertheless, I did not decide this on the basis of any data from Aquinas's thought on the gifts. In short, whether one thinks that the activating cause of supernatural actions post-justification is the *instinctus* of the gifts or common actual grace (in the older conception), one will need to include

¹¹⁸ See chapter II, section IVb.

¹¹⁹ See Chapter I, section IV.

¹²⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

information from outside Aquinas's thought on grace and the gifts to decide how often it is necessary. In short, my research offers nothing new to this debate. On the other hand, my argument does particularize the traditional conception of the activating cause by identifying the more particular type of actual grace which is necessary to act on the supernatural level and avoid sin.

The final topic for this section concerns the necessity of grace for perseverance. According to my claim at the beginning of this section, the gifts of the Holy Spirit particularize, extend, and challenge the conception of Garrigou-Lagrange and Ramirez on the grace of final perseverance. My argument that the continuing motion of the Holy Spirit is by his *instinctus* particularizes the moving cause of perseverance. The most important cause of final perseverance is a special instinctus of the Holy Spirit. This extends the common understanding of perseverance in a few ways, most especially by including the gifts as necessary for perseverance. The gifts are necessary because they provide disposition to God's supernatural motion post-justification, of which the grace(s) of perseverance is one. In addition, my argument includes the gift of fortitude in its cooperative effects as essential for aiding the infused virtue of perseverance.¹²¹ Without the gift of fortitude, nobody could persevere, even though the gift is not technically a part of the gift of perseverance.¹²² While none of these additions contradict anything in the traditional take on the grace of perseverance, they are elements absent from it and

¹²¹ See Chapter III, section II.

¹²² Strictly speaking, no habitual aspect of grace can be included in the gift of final perseverance. This is why I claim extension of the traditional conception rather than contradiction. I do not intend to include habitual elements in the gift of final perseverance, but only show that they are necessary for the reception and efficacy of the gift of final perseverance.

complementary to it. Put differently, my analysis of the grace of perseverance not only particularizes the third sense of perseverance, but also the second by locating the gifts in relation to both.

On the other hand, my argument does not wholly accord with the common Thomistic understanding of perseverance. This will become clearer when I address a lingering issue from chapter III. The lingering issue is that I seem to simultaneously identify the gift of perseverance with an operative actual grace making the will actually will to persevere and at the same time with the continuation of the motion of the Holy Spirit. Yet how can the grace of perseverance be both the continuation of common *auxilium* and a special *auxilium*? By solving this lingering issue, the difference between my position and the common Thomistic understanding of perseverance will become clearer.

By “continuation of the motion of the Holy Spirit” in chapter III section II, I want to signify two things. First, the grace of perseverance is an unmerited gift beyond habitual grace and the previous motions of the Holy Spirit. This is so because God must be the cause of the series qua series of supernatural actions meriting eternal life.¹²³ God as the cause of the series qua series is principally what I mean by the continuation of the motion of the Holy Spirit, but also including cooperative actual graces.¹²⁴ God must continually move the believer to persevere (complete supernatural actions) or the believer will not persevere and will act out of contrary

¹²³ SCG III c. 155.

¹²⁴ See Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 550. Cooperative actual graces or the continuing motion of the Holy Spirit is truly, but only, sufficient to produce perseverance. In order to efficaciously persevere an operative actual grace is necessary likewise.

sinful inclinations and fall from grace.¹²⁵ That being said, let me be clear that it is necessary, as the Thomistic tradition clearly notes, to identify the grace of perseverance with an operative actual grace.¹²⁶ This is the second element which has to be included in the “continuation of the motion of the Holy Spirit.”¹²⁷ The grace of perseverance cannot simply be a continuation of cooperative actual graces, for then it would be within the power of free will to persevere without further help, since operative and cooperative actual graces are formally one grace.¹²⁸ No new grace would need to be given. Clearly this is not Aquinas’s position.

Hence, while one must acknowledge (as Aquinas seems to suggest in *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 10) that the grace of perseverance is simply God continually moving the believer and protecting the believer from falling,¹²⁹ one must also recognize that as an integral part of God’s causality of the series *qua* series, an operative *auxilium* making the will will to persevere is required.¹³⁰ God

¹²⁵ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9 & 10; *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 4, co.: “Perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God (*gratuito Dei auxilio*) sustaining man in good until the end of life....Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.”

¹²⁶ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 561: “But not from grace purely sufficient, because from this comes only the potency to persevere, but not the act of perseverance.... Therefore [final actual perseverance] should come from an actual efficacious grace.”

¹²⁷ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.

¹²⁸ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, ad 3.

¹²⁹ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 10, co.: “In a third way perseverance is a certain continuation in the good to the end of life. For perseverance in this sense the justified man does not need another habitual grace, but the divine help leading and protecting him against the impulse of temptation, just as appears in the preceding article.”

¹³⁰ *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 1, ad 1.

gives this operative *auxilium* to move us to persevere previous to death and arrange external circumstances by an external actual grace such that death coincided with this operative grace and its cooperative effects at a later time.¹³¹ Without this grace, the will would not will to persevere and so would not.¹³² In short, the gift of perseverance is the continuation of cooperative actual graces, an operative actual grace moving the will to will to persevere, and an external actual grace causing death to coincide with the operation of grace. Nevertheless, in order to fully understand the operations of these actual graces, one must include the habitual predispositions to these motions (as I argue in chapter III), the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

This understanding of perseverance does meet with some disagreement in the secondary literature on two points. First, my argument challenges the conception of Garrigou-Lagrange, who contends that the gift of (final)¹³³ perseverance, the operative *auxilium*, must be given at the moment of death “which confers the final act of the wayfarer connected with the attainment of the final end and therefore proceeds from a very special infusion by which God is the mover.”¹³⁴ What is unclear to me is why this actual grace is conceived of as motive, that is causing any act in the believer. Put differently, I disagree that the operative *auxilium* included in the “continuing motion of the Holy Spirit” must be given at the moment of death. Garrigou-Lagrange seems to

¹³¹ *ST* III c. 155, n. 10: “...that man still needs the help of divine providence externally governing him.”

¹³² *ST* II-II q. 137, a. 4, ad 1: “The virtue of perseverance considered in itself inclines to perseverance. Because a habit is that which we use when we will, it does not follow that one having the virtue will immovably use it all the way to death.”

¹³³ It is noteworthy that Aquinas never calls the gift of perseverance the gift of final perseverance. He is concerned with the cause of perseverance as such

¹³⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 104.

conflate interior and exterior actual grace by claiming that the grace of perseverance both guarantees the coincidence between grace and death, but also makes us act. Unless the grace of perseverance causes death, then it is unclear to me how the coincidence is guaranteed by a grace causing an action of the person.

I contend that an external actual grace (as an effect of providence) is necessary to arrange events such that the person dies at this particular time and not another. That is the aspect of the gift of perseverance which must coincide with death, but not the operative *auxilium* making the will will to persevere. We both agree that there must be an intrinsically efficacious operative actual grace given to the will, but I do not think it has to be given in the moment of death (that is that the precise moment in which the grace of perseverance is received is the temporal moment of death). Rather it is only necessary that it is given at such a time that its effect makes the will will to persevere until death, that is, before providence has foreordained to permit death.

In addition, my argument also challenges the conception of Billuart (as related by Garrigou-Lagrange) that

the just man requires the general help of God, as author of the supernatural, for any easy supernatural acts, and this general help, although, in a sense, due to nature raised to the supernatural, is yet not due to this individual rather than to another, since free will remains defectible and God is not always bound to proffer a remedy for this defectibility, even for the just. But the just man requires special help for more difficult acts and also for constant perseverance.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 99.

What I think should be denied as belonging to Aquinas's thought authentically is the distinction between the help necessary for easy vs. difficult acts.¹³⁶ There is equally a need for God's motion in both easy and difficult acts. God must reduce the subject from potency to act in both cases. God must protect from temptation in both cases. The reason all posit a distinct actual grace for perseverance is because the will must actually will to persevere, not only habitually will, not because (although this is the case also) perseverance for a long time is especially difficult.

As stated above, attending to Aquinas's thought on the gifts mostly extends the traditional conception on the necessity of grace. The *instinctus* of the gifts is the *auxilium* necessary post justification. The gifts as habits are necessary to receive this motion. Hence, the gifts help to fulfill all the needs of grace inasmuch as they require actual grace post-justification. On the other hand, properly understanding Aquinas on the gifts does not make a contribution to the disagreement between Wawrykow and other Thomistic thinkers. Finally, the gifts do make some contributions for properly understanding the grace of perseverance. In this they not only extend and particularize the traditional understanding, but also challenge it in places.

V. Merit

In chapter I, I identified three possible contributions of the gifts to the proper understanding of Aquinas's thought on merit in the form of questions. Is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit related to the motion of the Holy Spirit identified by Aquinas as the activating source

¹³⁶ Aquinas nowhere, as far as I am aware, mentions the distinction between easy and difficult acts within the context of grace. Nor was I able to find anything using the *Index Thomisticus*. The texts in which Aquinas mentions difficulty in act are principally two. First, questions on merit. See *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 3, ad 2. Aquinas explicitly says here that the difficulty of the act is removed by charity. Second, in *DQV* q. 4, a. 1, ad 15. Here Aquinas says that hope lessens difficulty in action and makes believers undertake difficult acts.

of all meritorious action? Does Aquinas's commitment that the gifts dispose the powers of the soul to be moved by God relate to merit? Is Wawrykow's contention that the gifts are Aquinas's preeminent description of meritorious activity justified? The purpose of this section is to answer these questions based on my reading of Aquinas on merit and the gifts. What is the answer? In short, Wawrykow is justified in his contention because the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and the habitual dispositions to it (the gifts) are necessary elements in every meritorious action. Put differently, the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the motion activating all meritorious activity. The gifts' operative effects are involved in all meritorious activity as the dispositions for the aforesaid motion.

In the most basic sense, these theses confirm the common Thomistic conception of meritorious activity. In other words, by ignoring the gifts, one would not come to a false interpretation of Aquinas on merit. On the other hand, one would come to an incomplete interpretation. By ignoring the gifts when interpreting Aquinas on merit, one would miss the following three points. In these three ways, my argument extends the common Thomistic understanding of merit. First, attending to the gifts of the Holy Spirit helps the secondary literature further specify exactly what Aquinas means by condign merit. Second, attention to the gifts of the Holy Spirit also help the secondary literature to specify exactly the mechanics of meritorious action. Finally, my analysis of the gifts in the meritorious action offers an argument for Wawrykow's claim that the gifts are central to Aquinas's conception of meritorious activity.

By condign merit, Aquinas means a good supernatural action inasmuch as it is inspired by the Holy Spirit. "If however we speak of the meritorious act inasmuch as it proceeds from the

grace of the Holy Spirit, it is condignly meritorious of eternal life.”¹³⁷ God, by moving us to supernatural works, is the proper cause of condignity.¹³⁸ When explicating this the secondary literature utilizes well the notions of actual and habitual grace. The reason supernatural acts can be condignly meritorious of eternal life is because “God as mover and God as term of movement are equal...”¹³⁹ Likewise, habitual grace is the seed of glory and already deifies believers.¹⁴⁰ Hence, supernatural works are themselves meritorious inasmuch as they proceed from God’s motion and habitual grace.

My argument further specifies and extends this picture of condign¹⁴¹ merit by identifying what Aquinas means by the “grace of the Holy Spirit” and the “divine motion.”¹⁴² Condign merit is not simply action generically moved to by God by cooperative actual grace.¹⁴³ It is action inasmuch as it is inspired by the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit. It is action to which God moves us by his common *auxilium*. It is action that presupposes the operative effect of the gifts. Indeed, for merit to be voluntary, one must have the gifts disposing the powers of the soul to be moved by

¹³⁷ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 3, co.: “*Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno.*”

¹³⁸ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1001.

¹³⁹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1001-1002: “...*quia aequalis est Deus movens et Deus terminans motum...*” See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 373: “But the works of the just, inasmuch as they proceed from sanctifying grace and the movement of the Holy Ghost, are proportionate in justice to the excellence of eternal life.”

¹⁴⁰ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 1002.

¹⁴¹ Ramirez, *de Gratia*, 999-1000. Ramirez divides glory into common and special (the glory of the martyrs, doctors, and virgins) as well as divides glory into the initial glory and the augment of essential glory. In *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 3, Aquinas is only speaking of the latter two (and the second, augmentation, only implicitly).

¹⁴² *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 3 & a. 6.

¹⁴³ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 363.

God. This is exactly what St. Thomas claims in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 3, ad 2. Therein the objector argues that habits are not befitting instruments but only principal agents. Hence, the gifts are not habits. Aquinas's response is apropos. "This conception presupposes an instrument which does not act, but is only acted upon. However, man is not such an instrument. When he is acted upon by the Holy Spirit, he also acts inasmuch as he is free. Hence, he needs a habit."¹⁴⁴ In other words, without the operative effect of the gifts as habits, there would not be cooperative activity; there would be no merit.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, it seems that meritorious action requires many of the gifts cooperative effects, their actions commanded by charity.¹⁴⁶ For a meritorious action one must utilize the gifts of understanding, knowledge, counsel, and especially fortitude (to complete the meritorious action).

My argument also helps to prove that the work itself is meritorious, a position unanimously held by the Thomists under question here. Quite a few texts of Aquinas seem to say that the supernatural work itself is not condignly meritorious.¹⁴⁷ When interpreting these texts, many Thomists do not recognize the use of Aquinas's instrumental theory is at work and supports the common opinion.¹⁴⁸ My argument aids the Thomistic school in proving that Aquinas holds the good work itself to be condignly meritorious of supernatural life.

¹⁴⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 3, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu."

¹⁴⁵ *ST* I-II q. 114, aa. 2-3.

¹⁴⁶ For example, the meritorious act of faith presupposes understanding. See *ST* II-II q. 9, a. 4.

¹⁴⁷ *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 3, co. & a. 6, co.

¹⁴⁸ E.g. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 373.

As I outline above, when God moves us by the *instinctus* and common *auxilium* it causes the act of free will. This means that although the work itself has two sources, free will and the common *auxilium* of God, the work itself is equally and totally a product of both.¹⁴⁹ God produces all meritorious actions by a cooperative *instinctus*.¹⁵⁰ Yet all meritorious works are equally caused by free will. The *instinctus*/gift combination (which I argue is at the heart of meritorious activity), Aquinas is especially invoking his theory of instrumentality. In other words, meritorious works have two sources, but there is one effect, one work. According to Aquinas's mature theory of instrumentality, part of the effect is not produced by the primary agent and part by the instrumental agent. The primary agent produces the effect by giving the instrument a participation in its own power and moving the instrumental agent according to its form. The whole effect is attributed to both. If this is the case, then supernatural actions must be meritorious, since God produces them. Yet it is equally true that meritorious acts are wholly a work of free will. Just as St. Thomas uses his concept of instrumentality to claim that every act of Christ merits eternal salvation for all humanity, so too Aquinas's concept of instrumentality allows him to say that all acts of the believer (inasmuch as they are good and ordered to God)¹⁵¹ are meritorious of eternal life.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ SCG III c. 70. On the development of Aquinas's instrument theory see Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P., "The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie Chauvet." *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006): 255–94.

¹⁵⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange also holds that it is possible to merit by an operative motion, but I'm not sure how this is the case since in operative motions the will does not move (ST I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.) and merit requires the motion of the will (ST I-II q. 114, a. 4, co.). See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 363.

¹⁵¹ Thomas Osborne, "The Threefold Referral of Acts to the Ultimate End in Thomas Aquinas and His Commentators," *Angelicum* 85 (2008): 715-736.

¹⁵² ST III q. 48, a. 6.

In the connection of instrumentality to meritorious activity the gifts are vital for proving that supernatural works are condignly meritorious. In other words, if I am correct that Aquinas is invoking his theory of instrumentality with the gifts and that the *instinctus*/gifts combination is at the heart of meritorious activity, then instrumentality can be connected to meritorious activity.¹⁵³ The work itself must be meritorious. Action inspired by God's *instinctus* inchoately achieves eternal life. It is by identifying the gifts as the heart of meritorious activity that one can connect merit to instrumentality. In other words, when Aquinas says that the works considered in themselves are not meritorious of eternal life, he means apart from grace.¹⁵⁴ Yet given the supernatural structure of grace and especially the gifts, works are not either caused by God or by free will.

The second contribution my argument makes to the secondary literature on merit is to enlarge the common conception of meritorious action. As it stands in the secondary literature, the mechanics of the meritorious action involve cooperative actual grace, habitual grace, and an act of charity itself or an act of charity commanding the act of another virtue.¹⁵⁵ My argument does not supplant any of this analysis. Rather it extends it by adding the gifts into the picture as an

¹⁵³ Aquinas even calls believers the organs, *organa*, of the Holy Spirit. See *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 4, ad 1: "*Potest tamen dici quod, quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt quaedam organa eius dum ab eo moventur.*" For more on Aquinas's use of the term *organon* see Gilles Emery, *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays* (Naples: Ave Maria Press, 2007), 198ff.

¹⁵⁴ *ST I-II* q. 114, a. 3, co.: "When we consider the substance of the work **inasmuch as it proceeds from free will**, the work is not able to be condignly meritorious on account of the great inequality." Emphasis added.

¹⁵⁵ *ST I-II* q. 114, aa. 1-3. Labourdette, *Cours*, 846-847.

integral part of the meritorious act.¹⁵⁶ The *instinctus* of the gifts is the motion of God causing meritorious action. The gifts' operative effects are presupposed for the cooperative *instinctus* to be received voluntarily by the virtue of charity. Charity, since it is imperfectly possessed by the subject, must have a moving cause. That moving cause is the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit, which requires the operative effect of the gifts to be received well.¹⁵⁷ On the basis of these two pieces, then charity can command a meritorious act of any of the virtues in their cooperative effects, be it the gifts, the other theological virtues, or the infused cardinal virtues.¹⁵⁸

Finally, Wawrykow is preeminently justified in using the gifts to further understand Aquinas's treatment of merit.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, this must be understood properly. Wawrykow does not offer an adequate justification of his contention. Put differently, Wawrykow does not outline why it is the case that the gifts are in integral part of meritorious activity and why it is that "by the gifts of the Holy Spirit one is made more ready for the Spirit-prompted acts that God seeks from those who aspire, by the grace of God, to full communion with God."¹⁶⁰ I attempt to do this. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is the motive force behind all meritorious activity. The gifts' operative effects are presupposed in any meritorious activity since meritorious activities are by nature voluntary. In other words, God must move the believer in accord with the believer's nature, freely. This requires the gifts' operative effect, since it is by

¹⁵⁶ See Chapter III, section IV.

¹⁵⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹⁵⁸ *ST* I-II q. 114, a. 3, co.

¹⁵⁹ Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts," 50.

¹⁶⁰ Wawrykow, "Christ and the Gifts," 50.

the gifts that the believer is disposed to be moved by God supernaturally as an instrument.¹⁶¹

Nevertheless, it does not seem to be the case that the gifts in their cooperative effect are integral to all meritorious activity. What reason could be given for calling these acts integral and not the acts of the other virtues? They would seem to be equally integral since all are commanded by charity.

In understanding merit, a proper understanding of Aquinas's thought on the gifts is important. This attention helps to specify what is meant by condign merit and the operative causes therein. This attention also helps prove that activity itself is condignly meritorious as opposed to simply congruously meritorious and extrinsically imputed condign. Finally, attention to the gifts also justifies both the centrality of the gifts for merit and qualifies their scope. In short, for interpreting Aquinas on merit, attention to the gifts is significant.

VI. The Distinction between the Gifts and the Virtues

I argue above that Aquinas's argument for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues succeeds in proving the distinction of the gifts from the acquired virtues. In response to this I offered, what I think to be, a complementary argument to prove the distinction of the gifts from the infused virtues based on Aquinas's thought on grace. It is the purpose of this section to ask whether this was really necessary given the post *Aeterni Patris* Thomistic tradition. Are there not arguments there to supplement St. Thomas's reasoning? Are there not arguments there already attempting to prove the distinction between the infused virtues and the gifts? Indeed, there are, as I note above. If those arguments are successful, then the argument I give based on

¹⁶¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 3, ad 2.

the outflowing of supernatural habits from habitual grace is merely confirmatory, another voice added to the Thomistic harmony all claiming that the virtues are really different from the gifts.

On the other hand, if those arguments are not successful then my argument becomes more pressing. It supplements not only St. Thomas' argumentation but also the Thomistic school's as well. In this section I will argue for the necessity of my argument. In other words, it is not simply the case that St. Thomas's argument seems to need supplementation, but also the three traditional arguments from the Thomistic tradition do not fill the lacuna. They fail to prove the distinction of all the gifts from all the virtues. In order to argue this I recall the three arguments from chapter I briefly. Then I analyze them following Ramirez and point out some essential weaknesses. Finally I will claim that the argumentation I provide based on the ordered outflowing of the supernatural habits from habitual grace does not suffer from these weaknesses at least.

The three standard arguments in the Thomistic tradition attempt to prove the distinction of the gifts from all the virtues (infused and acquired) in one fell swoop. These three arguments are based on *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, the improportion to the supernatural end, and the measure of the virtues and the gifts.¹⁶²

The first argument of the Thomistic tradition is the very reasoning of Aquinas in the article under question based on the distinction between moving principles. The key difference in the way many Thomists read article one and the way I do is that they think Aquinas's argumentation here proves the distinction of the gifts from all the virtues whereas I think it only

¹⁶² Ramirez, *de Donis*, 102-117.

proves the distinction between the gifts and the acquired virtues.¹⁶³ Ramirez formulates this argument as follows: “habits formally disposing human powers to be moved well and promptly by specifically different moving principles are among themselves specifically different.”¹⁶⁴ Since the virtues and the gifts dispose human powers to be moved by specifically different movers (God and reason respectively), they themselves must be distinct. This is simply the commentatorial traditions restatement of Aquinas’s argument in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1.¹⁶⁵

The problems with this argument comes in thinking it can distinguish between different types of supernatural virtues. Specification by mover is not possible in the case of rational agents and human actions. Rational movers simply cannot be treated like subrational determinate causes. They are not ordained to one effect necessarily. In other words, to specify by *terminus a quo* as a rational agent requires simultaneous specification by *terminus ad quem*, as Pilsner shows.¹⁶⁶ Yet the supernatural virtues and the gifts all share an end. Hence, this argument can only show the distinction between the gifts and the acquired virtues, not all virtues. Only the gifts and the acquired virtues can be distinguished by end.¹⁶⁷

The problem with this argument is not only the mistake above, but also the failure to recognize that St. Thomas’s intention in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, is not to prove the distinction of the

¹⁶³ E.g. Labourdette, *Cours*, 369-370.

¹⁶⁴ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 102: “*Habitus formaliter disponentes potentias hominis ut bene et prompte moveantur a principiis moventibus specificè differentibus, sunt specificè differentes inter se.*”

¹⁶⁵ For another formulation of this argument see Labourdette, *Cours*, 369-370.

¹⁶⁶ Pilsner, *The Specification*, 54.

¹⁶⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.

gifts from all the virtues, but only the acquired virtues. Again, Aquinas argues in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1 that the human virtues are distinct from the gifts.¹⁶⁸ The human virtues are the acquired virtues.¹⁶⁹ The supernatural life is not contrary to reason, but supra-rational. That does not mean that God moves humans there unnaturally, violently, or beyond human reason. Graced reason is still the internal and immanent principle of supernatural actions elevated by the supernatural habits and applying the rule of the Divine Law.¹⁷⁰

Someone wishing to defend this argument might cite *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 3: “Similarly the gifts, *inasmuch as they are distinguished from infused virtue*, are able to be called those which are given by God in relation to his motion; those which indeed make man follow his [God’s] instinct well.”¹⁷¹ Based on this quotation it seems like Aquinas is attempting to distinguish the gifts from the infused virtues by the same reasoning used in the case of the gifts and acquired virtues. The gifts relate the subject to God’s *instinctus* and the infused virtues relate to some other mover (what mover Aquinas does not say). The problem here is that both proximate movers (reason aided by the theological virtues – as is the traditional answer) and God

¹⁶⁸ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, co.: “*Manifestum est autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius agit.*”

¹⁶⁹ *ST* I-II q. 58, a. 3, ad 3: “To the third it is said that faith, hope, and love are above the human virtues, for they are the virtues of man inasmuch as he is made a participator in divine grace.” *ST* I-II q. 58, a. 3, ob. 3: “Further, faith, hope, and love are a definite group of virtues. However, they are not intellectual virtues, since there are only five: science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art (as was said above). Furthermore, they are not moral virtues either, because those concern the passions especially. Therefore, virtue is not sufficiently divided into intellectual and moral.” *ST* I-II q. 61, a. 1, ad 2: “To the second it is said that the theological virtues are above man, as was said above. Whence they are not properly called human virtues, but superhuman, or divine.”

¹⁷⁰ McKay, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues,” 33.

¹⁷¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 3: “*Similiter autem donum, prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene sequentem suos instinctus.*” Emphasis is mine.

are intellectual agents. Hence, one cannot specify by *terminus a quo*. One needs a disparate *terminus ad quem*. Why not then an argument by distinguishing *terminus ad quem*? In fact, this is exactly the basis on which the third common argument of the Thomistic school rests. That argument tries to prove that the supernatural virtues and the gifts do have disparate *termini ad quos* and are thus distinct virtues. Since that will be a later topic, I will simply note now that the argument from agent does not work.

Ramirez also identifies some problems with the first common argument in the Thomistic tradition. The moral virtues and charity are also connatural to God.¹⁷² It is not immediately clear why Ramirez takes this to be fatal to the argument. It requires some spelling out. The key to his argument is the claim that a disposition is connatural to its mover. In other words, the argument must assume that the infused virtues are not connatural to God's motion, but only to reason. This is pretty damning for the argument since most of those who argue this way claim that God also moves believers directly by the infused virtues (just in a different way from the gifts).¹⁷³ Hence, it seems that a proponent of the first type of argumentation must either give up the argument for the distinction between the gifts and the infused virtues based on dispositions to movers or claim that the infused virtues are not connatural to God's motion. The first seems to destroy the foundation of the distinction between the gifts and the virtues. The second makes God's motion by the infused virtues violent. The dilemma seems insoluble.

¹⁷² Ramirez, *de Donis*, 117: "*saltem in moralibus infusis et maxime in caritate, habetur illa experientia et tactus et unctio divinorum, per quandam connaturalitatem ad divina.*"

¹⁷³ Hence, the twofold course. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 54.

The second argument made by the Thomistic tradition (based on Aquinas's principles) is also unsuccessful. As outlined in chapter I, the second argument is as follows:

Habits removing the imperfect and essential improportion of the virtues to seek perfectly and rightly the ultimate supernatural end are specifically different from the virtues. But the Gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits removing the imperfect or essential improportion of the virtues to seek the ultimate supernatural end rightly and perfectly. Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are specifically distinct from the virtues.¹⁷⁴

The key for understanding this argument's failure is the claim that there are two types of imperfection or improportion in the supernatural life with reference to virtue. The first is an imperfection in the virtue itself vis-à-vis its object.¹⁷⁵ The virtue itself implies distance from its object. The second is an imperfection in the subject's possession of the virtue.¹⁷⁶ In the second case the virtue implies no distance from its object, but is imperfectly possessed by the subject. No matter which sense of improportion one takes, the argument does not distinguish all the infused virtues from the gifts.

If the argument means the first type of imperfection, Ramirez exposes a problem with the argument. Only some of the infused virtues have the essential imperfection toward seeking the supernatural end. Ramirez claims that the argument only seems to work for the acquired virtues, faith, and hope (since they all are essentially improportionate to God as object).¹⁷⁷ The argument

¹⁷⁴ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 104: "*Habitus tollentes imperfectionem seu improportionem essentialem virtutum ad finem ultimum supernaturalem rite et perfecte assequendum, specificè differunt a virtutibus. Atqui dona Spiritus Sancti sunt habitus tollentes imperfectionem seu improportionem essentialem virtutum ad finem ultimum supernaturalem rite et perfecte assequendum. Ergo dona Spiritus Sancti sunt habitus specificè distincti a virtutibus.*"

¹⁷⁵ *ST I-II* q. 66, a. 6, co.

¹⁷⁶ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 2, co.

¹⁷⁷ *ST I-II* q. 66, a. 6, co.

cannot work for charity or the infused moral virtues which only have the imperfection of the second type. There is nothing about the virtue itself which is lacking; their imperfection is *per accidens*.¹⁷⁸ Thus, the gifts cannot be distinguished from all the virtues on this basis. Not all the virtues have an essential improportion to the supernatural end.

If the argument means the imperfection of the subject, the argument still has its difficulties for a defender of the classical conception of the gifts. It would require them to abandon the intermittantly operative thesis, the very cornerstone of the classical conception of the gifts. According to the classical conception, the gifts are distinct from the infused virtues because they remove an essential imperfection for pursuing the supernatural end perfectly and rightly. They are distinct because they remove the second type of imperfection, not the first. Indeed, there is a very good reason that a defender of the classical conception of the gifts chooses the first type of imperfection. According to the classical conception, the gifts dispose to a different motion than the theological virtues. If the gifts do not dispose to a motion which activates the theological virtues, then it is not clear how the gifts remedy the imperfection of the subject. In short, on the classical conception of the gifts, the gifts cannot remedy the imperfection of the subject.¹⁷⁹ To do this the gifts would have to be operative every time the theological

¹⁷⁸ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 109. Ramirez goes on to argue that if we consider the infused moral virtues *per se* they do not have an imperfection with respect to their objects. This is even more the case with charity. Charity is greater than the gifts *quoad substantiam et quoad modum*.

¹⁷⁹ This is not true if one holds a perpetually operative thesis, as I do. Nor does this claim yield an infinite regress. At first it seems like it does, since the gifts are not perfectly possessed by the subject either. They need to be moved by another. Hence, it seems like another immanent habit is necessary and so on *ad infinitum*. The reason Aquinas's conception does not yield an infinite regress and this argument is mistaken, is that God terminates the causal series. The gifts are moved by another: God. Further, the gifts do not need a separate habit to be so moved either (as the infused virtues do), since they provide the disposition to be moved by God in their operative effect. They are the link between the supernatural primary causality of God and the secondary causality of creatures.

virtues are active. This is exactly what classical Thomism denies, so it can hardly be invoked here to defend the distinction of the gifts from the supernatural virtues. In addition, as Ramirez shows, this argument can hardly distinguish the gifts and virtues as they exist in Christ or the blessed.¹⁸⁰

The third and final argument is by far the most common and was mentioned earlier as a possible revision of the first argument. It is the argument of Garrigou-Lagrange,¹⁸¹ Labourdette,¹⁸² and others.¹⁸³ It rests on the difference in formal object between the gifts and the virtues, a specification by *terminus ad quem*.

We have here two regulating motions, two different rules, which constitute different formal motives. It is a fundamental principle that habits are specified by their object and their formal motive.... A virtue and the corresponding gift...have the same material, but they differ in the rule which serves as a measure for their acts, and also by their mode of acting.¹⁸⁴

The rule of infused moral virtues is infused prudence, which operates from deliberation and corresponds to common actual grace. The rule of the theological virtues as exercised is infused prudence and according to specification in the order to their object is faith.¹⁸⁵ The rule of the

¹⁸⁰ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 109.

¹⁸¹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 276f.

¹⁸² Labourdette, *Cours*, 369-370.

¹⁸³ E.g. Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life*, 163: "Because they depend upon a separate kind of divine initiative, the gifts of the Holy Spirit differ intrinsically from the virtues."

¹⁸⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection*, 276.

¹⁸⁵ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 107.

gifts, on the other hand, is “the supernatural providence of God himself” and is effected by God’s *instinctus*.¹⁸⁶

At first this argument seems the most promising of the three. It is explicitly based on the way St. Thomas distinguishes habits. In *ST* I-II q. 54, a. 2, St. Thomas identifies three ways in which a habit can be distinct from another habit.¹⁸⁷ The first is the general way forms are distinguished from each other, active principle. The second and third are specific to habits and based on the two-fold reference of habits to nature and action. Habits can thus be distinct based on the nature to which they refer or on the basis of specifically different objects. The first or general way habits are distinct is not viable for the virtues and gifts since the agents in question are rational. The proponents of the third argument all want to claim that God is the active principle behind both the infused virtues and the gifts.¹⁸⁸ Distinction by nature will not work for the infused virtues and the gifts, for they both perfect human nature. Hence, these authors go with the third option, distinction by formal object. Put differently, their argument is a variation on a *terminus ad quem* distinction. In this instance a specification by *terminus ad quem* is a

¹⁸⁶ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 107: “...regula vel mensura *donorum Spiritus Sancti* est *providentia* supernaturalis *ipsius Dei*.”

¹⁸⁷ *ST* I-II q. 54, a. 2, co.: “A habit is both a certain kind of form and a habit. Therefore, one can distinguish habits according to species either in the way common to all forms or in the proper way to habits. Forms are distinguished from one another according to diverse active principles since every agent makes something to be like its own species. Habits, however, imply an order to something. However, all things which are said in relation to something are distinguished according to the difference in that to which they are said. Now, a habit is a certain disposition to two orders: nature and to an operation following nature. Accordingly, habits are distinguished specifically in three ways. The first is by the active principles of such dispositions. Second, in respect to nature. Third, according to specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.”

¹⁸⁸ On the other hand, the argument from active principle could be revised to focus on proximate active principle. I will claim that my argument from chapter II, section I is a variation on the first way of distinction (more on this later). This revision will not work for the standard argument because the division of the proximate principles is exactly what is in question.

specification by formal object. The infused virtues and the gifts share an end¹⁸⁹ and material objects.¹⁹⁰

The problems with the argument based on formal objects are manifold. I will first list the flaws I find in this argument and then give the flaws Ramirez finds. My first problem with this argument is that it cannot make sense of Aquinas's mature avoidance of the term *supra modum humanum*. Many scholars have noted and argued that Aquinas abandoned his theory of the gifts operating above the human mode in his mature work.¹⁹¹ Most recently Stroud has made this argument.¹⁹² If these scholars are right, then the argument fails, since it presupposes a distinction of formal object (and thus mode) that Aquinas no longer holds. Even if those arguing that Aquinas abandoned the gifts operating *supra modum humanum* in his mature work are wrong, it is clear that Aquinas is not resting the difference between the gifts and the virtues upon the human mode vs. the super human mode in his mature work.¹⁹³ In addition, Aquinas identifies the infused virtues as moving the believer in a higher mode as well.¹⁹⁴ This at least presents

¹⁸⁹ *ST* II-II q. 23, a. 7, co.; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, co.

¹⁹⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 4, co.

¹⁹¹ Guibert has probably made this case with the most force. See Guibert, "Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d'agir 'ultra-humain' d'après saint Thomas;" Joseph de Guibert, *Les Doublets*.

¹⁹² Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 198-200.

¹⁹³ To this a defender of the standard reading could respond that the distinction is continuous with his mature work, although that would not fully solve the problem of Aquinas's explicit argumentation.

¹⁹⁴ *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 3, co.: "*Virtutes autem infusae disponunt hominem altiori modo, et ad altiorem finem, unde etiam oportet quod in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam.*"

difficulties (maybe not insoluble)¹⁹⁵ for someone holding that the gifts move in a still even higher mode than the infused virtues.

Furthermore, the argument is too imprecise. For the argument to be its strongest and not beg the question, it must actually identify a distinction in formal object. Distinction based on formal object is based on a different formal aspect of the object.¹⁹⁶ For example, the intellect and will are distinct powers because they are ordered to the same *res* under different formalities, truth and goodness respectively.¹⁹⁷ What is the different formal aspect of the objects for the gifts and infused virtues? Notice that it cannot be a different mode, for this is a consequence of the difference in formal object, not its cause.¹⁹⁸ The precise formality difference is never identified and so the argument is weakest where it needs to be strongest.

Finally, Aquinas seems to identify *instinctus* with common *auxilium*, called common actual grace in the Thomistic tradition.¹⁹⁹ If my argument for that identification is correct, then clearly there are not two types of motion coming from God (post-justification), one corresponding to the gifts and the other to the infused virtues. The very motion this argument requires to correspond to the infused virtues seems to be the motion corresponding to the gifts. In other words, if my argument identifying *instinctus* and *auxilium* is correct, then it undermines the

¹⁹⁵ In the authors under question here, I cannot find an explanation of this passage of Aquinas.

¹⁹⁶ *ST* I-II q. 54, a. 2, ad 1; *ST* I q. 77, a. 3, co.

¹⁹⁷ *ST* I q. 79, a. 8, co.; *ST* I q. 82, a. 2, ad 1.

¹⁹⁸ *ST* I-II q. 54, a. 1, ad 1.

¹⁹⁹ See especially Chapter II, section IIb.

very foundation of this argument since it requires *auxilium* (corresponding to the theological and infused cardinal virtues) and *instinctus* (corresponding to the gifts) to be distinct.

Ramirez critiques this argument in a more formal way. His fundamental critique is that the argument cannot universally prove the distinction between the gifts and the infused virtues. Again, what is common does not distinguish. This is so because the *supra modum humanum* also characterizes the heroic virtues.²⁰⁰ Hence, the argument does not distinguish the gifts from certain natural virtues. Furthermore, even if by ‘human mode’ Aquinas includes infused prudence informed by faith, the human mode is not common to all the supernatural virtues. “The command of infused prudence is not purely rational but from the help of the Holy Spirit, also the assent of faith is not from the light and direction of human reason, but from the motion of the grace of God.”²⁰¹ Put differently, the infused virtues do not all work in the human mode and it is debatable whether the gifts all work beyond the human mode.²⁰² The argumentative basis does not distinguish the gifts from the virtues for it simultaneously fails with reference to some acquired virtues and some infused virtues.

Given that the three most common arguments in the Thomistic tradition do not work, I think my argument from the operative effects of habitual grace can succeed where they fail. Recall that I argue the gifts (as principles proportioning the believer to God’s supernatural motion) must be included in the emanation of supernatural habits from habitual grace, posterior

²⁰⁰ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 1, ad 1; Ramirez, *de Donis*, 117. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), VII, I. 1145a20. Although Aristotle does here describe the godlike man (ὁ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος) as heroic (ἡρωικός) and divine (θεῖος), he does not say that this means that this man operates in a mode beyond the rational.

²⁰¹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 117.

²⁰² Ramirez, *de Donis*, 117.

to the theological and prior to the infused cardinal. Thus the theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues are distinct because each type of virtue is the principle of the next type. Principles and that which proceed from them are always distinct. Such is the pith of my argument. The real question is whether my argument can avoid the pitfalls associated with the three arguments identified above.

Clearly my argument does not fail in relation to the acquired virtues since it is a supplement to Aquinas's argumentation. Aquinas successfully proves the distinction of the gifts from the acquired virtues. Hence, no additional argument is needed.

I do not think that my argument fails in relation to the infused virtues either (theological or cardinal). The argument does not attempt to distinguish two types of motion coming from one rational agent (God) without two disparate ends. On the other hand, it is a type of proof based on *terminus a quo*, yet it has a crucial difference. It is not dealing with motion emanating from a rational agent and so does not have to assume disparate ends. The agents in question here are habitual grace and the supernatural habits themselves. Specification by agent, when the agent is not rational need not assume a disparity of ends. Hence, the *termini a quibus* are themselves different movers: God as the cause of habitual grace, habitual grace as the cause of the theological virtues, the theological virtues as the cause of the gifts, and the gifts as the cause of the infused cardinal virtues. The principles are distinct and thus so too are the habits as effects.

Likewise, my argument does not assume that certain types of supernatural habits are not proportionate to the divine. They are all proportionate to the divine, but in different ways. Furthermore, the gifts in this conception could share the imperfection of the supernatural virtues and yet still supplement the imperfection of the virtues. The gifts are not possessed perfectly by

the subject. They too must be moved by another. Does this yield infinite regress? No. The gifts are the very connection to the primordial supernatural mover. In their operative effect they dispose the subject to be moved by God as an efficient cause. This is why the gifts can supplement the supernatural virtues. None of the other supernatural virtues do this. Hence, the gifts can supplement their imperfection even while sharing that imperfection. This is because they do something the supernatural virtues do not, something unrelated to their being imperfectly possessed by the subject. The gifts are proportionate/dispose to God as efficient mover. In addition, this argument assumes no different mode in the gifts than that shared by the infused cardinal virtues. Certainly the gifts (in their cooperative effect) operate in the connatural mode based on the command of charity. Yet the infused cardinal virtues are also commanded by charity. The whole supernatural life operates by connaturality, which is the same as saying that the intellect and will are operating together, the intellect as formal cause and the will as efficient cause.²⁰³

Finally, one might ask are the gifts distinct from the other supernatural habits in only the general way forms are distinct or are they also distinct as habits?²⁰⁴ I think the right answer to this question is that the gifts and virtues are not only distinct in the way forms are generally distinguished, although this basis is sufficient to prove their distinction *qua* habits, but also in the way particular to habits.²⁰⁵ As will be recalled, Aquinas claims that habits are distinct *qua* habits

²⁰³ Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love*, 49ff.

²⁰⁴ *ST* I-II q. 54, a. 2, co.

²⁰⁵ Aquinas does say that *habits* can be distinguished in the general way forms are distinguished. See *ST* I-II q. 54, a. 2, co.: “*Potest ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum proprium modum distinctionis habituum.*”

by their twofold reference to nature and object of activity. I think that by their reference to nature the gifts can also be distinguished from the supernatural virtues. This is so because the order to nature is distinct in the case of the theological virtues, gifts, and infused cardinal virtues. The theological virtues proximately (i.e., in relation to habitual grace) perfect nature in relation to God as a final cause. The gifts more remotely perfect nature in relation to God as an efficient cause. The infused cardinal virtues perfect nature most remotely in relation to the things of this world.²⁰⁶

In conclusion, my argument for the distinction between the gifts and virtues seems to succeed where the traditional argumentation has failed, and this only by utilizing other principles and conceptions of Aquinas's thought. Aquinas's thought on grace thus does supplement both his own argumentation and the traditional Thomistic school's arguments for the distinction between the gifts and the virtues.

VII. The Operational Necessity of the Gifts

As seen in chapter I, the debate over the intermittent or perpetual necessity of the gifts trades on four issues: the two modes of human action, the measure for the infused virtues, the insufficiency of the infused virtues, and how often the gifts are needed. I argue that if my analysis of Aquinas concerning *instinctus*, *auxilium*, and the gifts' operative and cooperative effects is correct, then Pinckaers et al. are correct (when properly understood) that the gifts of the

²⁰⁶ In order to avoid begging the question, this argument must presuppose the twofold argument of Chapter II, section I. Put simply, it must have previously been argued that as a rational agents, humans need a habit in order to be moved by the Holy Spirit. The theological and infused cardinal virtues do not provide this disposition. Hence, there must be another set of habits included in the outflowing of habitual grace.

Holy Spirit are necessary for every supernatural action. Put differently, the life of a believer is lived in and by the Holy Spirit. In order to prove this thesis, I will briefly recall my argument and then go through the four areas one by one and assess the impact of my analysis based on data from Aquinas's thought on grace.

Above I argue that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are both indispensably necessary for attaining the supernatural end and have perpetual necessity in beginning each new series of actions in the supernatural life. They are indispensable for reaching the supernatural end, that is they are not just *conveniens* or a fitting help to reach it. They are perpetually necessary, that is necessary for each and every supernatural action, as providing the disposition to be moved by God's motion, which is perpetually necessary. I argued these twin theses based on the claim that the *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit is identical with common *auxilium*, the grace further necessary for one already justified.²⁰⁷ Inasmuch as the continuing operation of motive grace is indispensable and perpetually necessary for reaching the supernatural end, so too are the gifts as the very disposition to it.

If this argument is a correct interpretation of Aquinas, how does it impact the debate over the distinction and definition of the two modes of human action? A necessary corollary to the traditional thesis of the two modes of human action is that God moves us post-justification by two distinct motions: common actual grace for the human mode and the *instinctus* of the Spirit for the super-human mode. If it were shown that God does not move us by two different motions post justification (or rather not the two motions required for that thesis) or that the gifts correlate

²⁰⁷ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

with common actual grace, then the whole conception would be impaled. I argue both of these positions. God's involvement post-justification by his graced motion does not observe two distinct modes, even if it comes in (at least) two distinct motions. The *instinctus* of the Holy Spirit and common actual grace (the *auxilium* of *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9) are one and the same. This confirms the thesis of Pinckaers et al. when they claim that the human mode is the acquired virtues and the super-human mode is common to all the supernatural habits.²⁰⁸ In short, Aquinas's thought on grace proves helpful for solving this debate.

The second area of disagreement concerned the measure/rule for the infused virtues. As will be recalled, the traditional Thomistic thesis is that the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not share the same rule.²⁰⁹ The rule of the gifts is providence or the eternal law. The rule for the infused virtues is reason elevated by grace. The opposing side claims that the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused virtues share one rule, the divine law.²¹⁰ In this debate also my argument concerning the derivation of supernatural habits from habitual grace proves helpful.

Both sides assume that the proximate moving principle provides/applies the rule or measure for the commanded/moved virtue. In the traditional opinion, it is reason that directly commands all the supernatural virtues and the Holy Spirit who directly commands the gifts. Pinckaers (or others – as far as I know) do not formulate the debate in these terms but simply

²⁰⁸ *ST* I-II, q. 63, a. 2; Stroud, *Aquinas's Exposition*, 200f.

²⁰⁹ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 107; Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 170; Labourdette, "Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste," 1624.

²¹⁰ Stroud, *Aquinas's Exposition*, 203ff.

deny that there is more than one measure of the supernatural life. My argument on the order of the supernatural habits in the formal, final, and efficient order proves definitive here. If charity commands all the cooperative effects of the gifts, the infused cardinal virtues, and the other two theological virtues, then all these virtues must share one rule. They share a proximate mover. The clear candidate for that rule is the divine law. Hence, my argument inclines in the direction of Pinckaers. Furthermore, that the commanding power applies the rule reveals a fundamental tension in the traditional Thomistic thesis. According to the traditional thesis, the gifts of the Holy Spirit operate in the mode of connaturality, that is as operative under charity.²¹¹ Hence, charity must deliver the rule of the gifts. On the other hand, charity and the gifts operate under different rules according to that thesis. To have it both ways does not seem possible.

On the other hand, my argument does not simply confirm Stroud's thesis about the rule of the supernatural habits, it also fills out and illustrates that thesis in the concrete operation of the virtues. It is possible that someone reading Stroud's claim and wondering how all the supernatural habits could share one measure, if they are commanded by diverse proximate agents.²¹² Stroud argues the supernatural virtues and gifts share a measure but does not explain how this is possible. My argument about the operational order of the supernatural virtues and their causality vis-à-vis each other in the formal and efficient order thus provides something hitherto not provided and extends the secondary literature.

²¹¹ E.g. Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1630-31: "...each gift is not put into action by the divine inspiration without at the same time and as its principle both an operative grace and an infused act of charity. This is, not doubt, beyond the explicit letter of St. Thomas but it seems to us that it comes from the logic of his principles and formulas. How else should one understand the role that St. Thomas attributes, at least in the intellectual gifts, to the connaturality of love which presupposes an act of charity?"

²¹² Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 201ff.

The third area of disagreement is over why the gifts are needed in the first place. In this area, I think my argument for the perpetual necessity of the gifts challenges both sides. The traditional account claims a two-fold insufficiency of the infused virtues: imperfect possession of the infused virtues and imperfections in the virtues themselves.²¹³ In relation to the latter deficiency, the gifts find their reason for being.²¹⁴ According to Stroud, on the other hand, the gifts are only necessary for the first reason given by the traditional account; the gifts are only necessary because of the imperfect possession of the infused virtues by the redeemed human.

In distinction to both these positions, I argue that the gifts are needed for both reasons. Certainly, their overarching or primary need comes on account of the imperfect possession of the infused virtues. Indeed, this is Aquinas's clear argument in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co. Nevertheless, this necessity is not mutually exclusive with the necessity of the gifts vis-à-vis the imperfections in the virtues themselves. The key to recognizing how the gifts can serve both of these necessities is the distinction between the gifts operative effects and their cooperative effects. The operative effects of the gifts is to proportion/dispose the believer for the supernatural motion of God, common *auxilium*. In this they supplement all the infused virtues because of their imperfection in subject. As Aquinas says those virtues which have this imperfection need to be moved by another and that 'other' is God's very motion, his *instinctus*. Now the gifts in their operative effects provide a disposition for this *instinctus*, and are thus necessary each time it is received.

²¹³ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.; Gardiel, *Dons du Saint-Esprit*, col. 1735-1736; Gardiel, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, 14-15; Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 82-83.

²¹⁴ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 84-85.

On the other hand, the gifts' cooperative effects supplement the imperfections in the virtues themselves.²¹⁵ Thus does understanding deepen faith and fortitude complete fortitude.²¹⁶ Indeed, to make sense of Aquinas's mature thought, one must affirm the necessity of the gifts in both areas. The first imperfection is the target for necessity in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co. Yet he also identifies the imperfections in the virtues (or rather the wounds of original sin not remedied by the virtues) themselves as reason for the gifts in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, ad 3.²¹⁷ Neither position can account for both statements on Aquinas's part. One needs to affirm that the gifts in their operative effect aid all the virtues in disposing the powers of the soul to the motion of God. Yet, the gifts in their cooperative effect also aid the virtues in their remaining imperfection and the fallenness of the human condition.

The final area of disagreement concerns the operational necessity of the gifts. As stated above, this area is largely a conclusion of the above three disagreements. If one claims, as the traditional account does, that the human mode is discursive, the gifts operate beyond the human mode, the gifts and the virtues do not share a measure/rule, and the gifts are only necessary because of the occasional imperfection of the infused virtues, then it makes sense to affirm that the gifts are only occasionally operative. According to Pinckaers et al., however, the gifts are

²¹⁵ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 8, s.c.

²¹⁶ *ST* II-II q. 8; *ST* II-II q. 139.

²¹⁷ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, ad 3: "Human reason (whether taken in its natural perfection or as perfected by the theological virtues) knows neither all things nor all possible things. Thus, it is not able to avoid all foolishness, and the other things mentioned in the objection. But God, under whose knowledge and power all things fall, by his motion makes us safe from all folly, ignorance, and dullness of mind, and hardness of heart. And for this reason the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow his instinct well, are said to be given as remedies against these defects."

operative in every supernatural action.²¹⁸ This position too makes sense given their above claims: the “human mode” is action under acquired virtue,²¹⁹ the gifts and virtues share a rule/measure, and the necessity of the gifts is on account of the perpetual imperfection of the human subject’s participation in the infused virtues. In short, every act of an infused virtue is accompanied by an act of a gift.

In this area, my argument again falls somewhere in between the two interpretations of Aquinas, though closer to Pinckaers et al. Certainly, I argue that the gifts are necessary for each supernatural action. The gifts dispose to the motion of God which not only moves humans but moves them in accord with their nature, that is sweetly. Aquinas abandons the idea of a superhuman mode being exclusive to the gifts. The gifts are a part of everyday Christian life, wherein God moves humans according to their nature.²²⁰ In addition, I also found that the gifts and the infused virtues share a rule, the divine rule. Finally, I think it is clear that the gifts are necessary for both reasons of imperfection, as I argue above. The gifts’ operative effect is to dispose the powers of the soul to the supernatural motion of God. This aids the virtues’ imperfect possession by the subject. The gifts’ cooperative effects are under the command of charity and supplement the imperfections of the virtues themselves.

²¹⁸ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas’s Exposition*, 111: “...if God gives the human person grace with both the infused virtues and gifts, then these habits must work together in the moral life. Similarly, the acts of the gifts are brought about by divine *auxilium* or actual grace in a twofold manner: either operative actual grace or cooperative actual grace.”

²¹⁹ Although the use of the gifts in every meritorious action is the logical conclusion of all the positions taken by the revisionist camp collectively, Aquinas’s abandonment of the language of ‘beyond the human mode’ does not mean that the gifts are operative in every supernatural act by itself (at least not necessarily).

²²⁰ Servais Pinckaers, “Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit,” in *The Pinckaers’ Reader*, trans. by Steven Craig Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 394-395.

Based on these arguments, it is clear that I fall more squarely on Pinckaers' side than the standard Thomistic conception with respect to the necessity of the gifts. Without the supernatural motion of God, there can be no supernatural action, and without the disposition to that supernatural motion there can be no connatural or cooperative movement. In short, the gifts are necessary each time actual grace is necessary, each time an extrinsic moving cause is necessary.²²¹ On the other hand, this is also where my argument diverges from the revisionist account as well.

The only developed revisionist position is given by Wawrykow, who claims that there is a separate operative actual grace for each act of willing an end.²²² This does not seem to be the position of Aquinas. It cannot take into account his clear commitment to the will's self-motion based on the operative motions of God and its formulation of the ends under question, "...an end which is appropriate to maintaining the spiritual dignity of the justified soul..." is too ambiguous, as I claim above.²²³ In addition, I diverge from the implication of Pinckaers et al. in what aspect of the gifts is necessary for each supernatural action. I claim it is the operative effect and not the cooperative. Pinckaers et al., on the other hand, seem to claim that the gifts as operative on their respective matter are necessary for each supernatural action (what I call the cooperative effects of the gifts).²²⁴ Though this is a plausible position, proving that the gifts are

²²¹ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 2, co.

²²² Wawrykow, *The Westminster Handbook to Aquinas*, 66: "Thus, when a person wills an end, and this is really conducive to reaching the end that is God, this is due to operative *auxilium*."

²²³ Wawrykow, *God's Grace*, 176.

²²⁴ Stroud, *Thomas Aquinas's Exposition*, 208ff.

necessary in their operative effects is sufficient for my purposes.²²⁵ For these reasons, I think that the traditional account of the necessity of operative grace is superior and therefore the perpetual necessity of the operative effect of the gifts.²²⁶

Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit necessary for each meritorious action? In answering this question, as seen above, Aquinas's thought on *auxilium* is definitive. The gifts of the Holy Spirit provide the disposition to this very motion. In this light, the question becomes how often is *auxilium* post-justification necessary? The gifts will have the same necessity (at least in their operative effects). In this way, Aquinas's thought on grace proves key for answering the question. Yet in other ways, Aquinas's thought on grace proves advantageous for conceptualizing the issues listed above. Aquinas's mature commitment that God moves all things in accord with their forms, even by grace, helps one to reject the traditional claim that God

²²⁵ The difficult is principally with Aquinas's rethinking of the gifts in the *Secunda Secundae*. How can one of the cooperative effects of the gifts be involved in every action when there is not a gift in each power? Possibly one could conceive of the necessity stemming from the higher gifts. In other words, understanding, knowledge, counsel, piety, etc. are all necessary (in some way) for each action.

²²⁶ In response to my argument a proponent of the traditional position could level the following critique, which is the exact critique of Gillon against Bouillard (although my account and Bouillards differ substantially). Does my argument imply that the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the theological virtues are identical formally? Traditionally, the theological virtues and the gifts differ as dispositions to the cooperative and operative motions of God respectively. How can they correspond to one motion and remain distinct? The simple answer is that there is a distinction in the immanent order of operation based on the ordered flowing of the supernatural habits from habitual grace. It is true that an implication of this position is that the acts of the gifts become much more mundane, i.e., commanded by charity. This might make it seem like one could simply will to understand or get counsel, etc. That is clearly not the case for the gifts or implied by my position. The reason my position does not imply that one is in control of the cooperative acts of the gifts, even though they are commanded by charity, is that the strength, intensity, of the gifts is proportionate to the intensity of charity. Can one will to have more charity, no. One can dispositively act such that God gives more charity. By giving more charity God would increase the gifts. By moving the person to acts of charity, God moves to acts of the gifts as a consequence. God moves us by charity and charity moves the gifts. Put differently, the effects of God moving the believer by charity manifest cooperatively in greater understanding, knowledge, counsel, fortitude, fear of the Lord, etc.

moves humans ‘beyond reason’ in the gifts.²²⁷ The order of the supernatural life with the centrality of charity helps to prove that the gifts and the infused virtues share one rule.

In summary, Aquinas’s thought on grace provides definitive information in proving the theses of this section. In short, without information from the Treatise on Grace, one would at least have difficulty proving that the gifts correspond to common *auxilium*, that charity commands the cooperative effects of the gifts, that the gifts supplement the imperfections found in the virtues themselves, that the operative effects of the gifts supplement the imperfection possess of the virtues by the subject, and that although the supernatural motion of God is necessary for each supernatural action it is not always an operative supernatural motion which is necessary. Most of the supernatural life is spent under the cooperative *auxilium* of God. Put simply, Aquinas’s thought on grace is especially important for both deciding this debate and rightly conceptualizing the implications.

VIII. The Connectivity, Endurance, and Relative Excellence of the Gifts and Virtues

The contribution of Aquinas’s thought on grace to a proper understanding of these issues is modest. The arguments and explanations I offer in chapter II section V complement the accounts given by Ramirez and Labourdette. Aquinas’s thought on grace both confirms and extends Ramirez’s reason for the connectivity of the gifts. Aquinas’s thought on grace also extends the account of Ramirez and Labourdette on the endurance of the gifts by providing the reason behind endurance. Finally, Aquinas’s thought on the order of the supernatural life is

²²⁷ *DQV* q. 2, a. 1, co.

definitive in making sense of his position on the relative excellence of the virtues. In this way my argument extends the account of Ramirez and Labourdette on the relative excellence of the virtues and gifts. In order to make the above three extensions clear, I will first treat connectivity, then endurance, and finally relative excellence.

Previously, I found that connectivity depends largely on principle.²²⁸ Two virtues are connected when they are principles of each other (in different orders) or share a common principle.²²⁹ I likewise argue that the order of immanent principles in the supernatural life is habitual grace, the theological virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the infused cardinal virtues. In short, habitual grace is the fundamental immanent principle in the supernatural life and therefore the ultimate reason for the connectivity of supernatural virtue. It is the common principle of all the supernatural habits. This fundamental insight for the deeper reason of connectivity comes from Aquinas's thought on grace. Habitual grace is infused into the essence of the soul and is likened to a new nature, a participation in the divine nature.²³⁰ This 'new nature' gives rise to the supernatural virtues automatically and without participation from the will.

This exegesis of Aquinas largely complements and extends Ramirez's contention that the virtues are connected proximately in charity and remotely in habitual grace. It complements

²²⁸ The cardinal virtues are connected because prudence is the principle of the other three by commanding their acts and applying the rule of reason. Yet the other three cardinal virtues are principles of prudence, since the end is the principle of prudence, which concerns the means. In short, there is connectivity here because virtues are principles of each other.

²²⁹ *ST I-II* q. 65, a. 4, s.c.

²³⁰ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 2, ad 2.

Ramirez's contention by providing the governing principle behind the proximate connectivity of the supernatural habits in charity and remotely in habitual grace. All the supernatural habits are connected because charity is the principle of their activity. It provides the end, and thus commands all the other virtues.²³¹ All the supernatural habits are connected in habitual grace, on the other hand, because it is the formal principle of them all.²³² The supernatural habits thus find relation to each other based (ultimately) on their relation to habitual grace.

By the same conception and exegesis of Aquinas my work also complements Labourdette by placing the connectivity of the gifts and charity within Aquinas's larger theological picture of the supernatural life.²³³ The gifts too are proximately connected in charity and remotely in habitual grace.²³⁴ The gifts are also principles of the infused cardinal virtues and thus provide the proximate reason for connectivity there. The infused cardinal virtues are certainly connected in charity, but more immediately by the gifts, since those are the proximate principles of the infused cardinal virtues in the formal order. By outlining the ultimate reason for connectivity, the order of supernatural habits, and listing the additional connections in the supernatural life, my work extends that of Labourdette.²³⁵

²³¹ *ST* II-II q. 23, a. 8, co.

²³² *ST* I-II q. 110, a. 4, ad 1.

²³³ Servais Pinckaers, "The Return of the New Law to Moral Theology," in *The Pinckaers Reader*, trans. by Hugh Connolly (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 377ff.

²³⁴ *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 5, co.

²³⁵ Labourdette, *Cours*, 375f; Labourdette, "*Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste*," 1629ff.

My analysis of Aquinas on the endurance of the gifts both confirms and extends Ramirez's and Labourdette's analysis.²³⁶ It does this by recognizing the distinction between the operative and cooperative effects of the gifts and giving the metaphysical reason for the endurance of the gifts (secondary activation).²³⁷ In Ramirez's and Labourdette's analysis they simply restate the reasons Aquinas gives for the endurance of the gifts. This is certainly sufficient for understanding Aquinas on a basic level. Nevertheless, without noting the distinction I give above, one would not be able to make sense of Aquinas's cryptic distinction in *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6 between the gifts in their essence and their *materia circa quam*. Although Aquinas is certainly here invoking part of his action theory, he is also distinguishing between the gifts in their operative and cooperative effects. The gifts remain in their operative effects because God's motion is most realized in heaven where believers are entirely in submission to God.²³⁸ The cooperative effects of the gifts will be transformed since in this world are directed by charity to both active and contemplative purposes.²³⁹ In addition, my analysis highlights the ultimate cause of the gifts' endurance. They are the very habitual presupposition to God's supernatural *auxilium*, which fulfills two roles.²⁴⁰ It activates the believer toward good action and protects

²³⁶ Ramirez, *de Donis*, 136ff; Labourdette, "Saint Thomas et la Théologie Thomiste," 1631.

²³⁷ *ST* I-II q. 111, a. 2, co.; *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, ad 1.

²³⁸ SCG III c. 118, n. 3: "Further, the divine law ordains humans so that they will be entirely subject to God [*subditus Deo*]."; *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, co.: "We may speak of the gifts in two ways. In one way according to the essence of the gifts. In this way the gifts will be most perfect in heaven, as may be seen through the authority of Ambrose. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the human mind for following the motion of the Holy Spirit, which will especially be in heaven when God will be all in all (as is said in I Cor XV), and when man will be totally subject to God [*totaliter subditus Deo*]."

²³⁹ In heaven, the gifts will be limited to their application in the contemplative life. See *ST* I-II q. 68, a. 6, ad 3.

²⁴⁰ *ST* I-II q. 109, a. 9, co.

from temptation. Obviously the second role is not necessary in heaven. The reason the gifts endure in heaven is that they are the habitual dispositions to God's activating motion. Inasmuch as God moves the powers of the soul (which presupposes the operative effects of the gifts), the soul is in submission to God. In heaven souls will be maximally in submission.²⁴¹ Hence, the gifts are maximally necessary in heaven. Ramirez and Labourdette certainly recognize that the gifts will remain in heaven, but do not outline the reason. In this way my argument confirms and extends theirs.

Finally, my argument confirms and extends the account of Labourdette and challenges the account of Ramirez on the relative excellence of the supernatural habits. My argument confirms both Labourdette and Ramirez on the relative excellence of the virtues by species.²⁴² Labourdette and Ramirez argue that the order of substantial excellence is theological, gifts, and infused cardinal. I come to the same conclusion by a different route and so confirm their conclusion. They argue this based on the article under question and I do so based both on the article and on Aquinas's metaphysics of proper accidents.

My account extends the account of Labourdette and Ramirez because it provides an additional reason Aquinas holds to this order of excellence between the virtues in species. It is because he likens habitual grace to a new nature and to reason as it functions in the natural life.²⁴³ From habitual grace flow the supernatural habits. Likewise, the closer a habit is to its

²⁴¹ *ST I-II* q. 68, a. 6, co.

²⁴² *ST I-II* q. 66, a. 1, co.

²⁴³ *ST I-II* q. 110, a. 3, co.

principle, the greater it is. Aquinas's account of the relative excellence of the virtues in species is simply an application of his larger metaphysics of proper accidents. By outlining this larger perspective, my account extends that of Labourdette and Ramirez.

On the other hand, my account challenges that of Ramirez in two ways. First, my analysis of the gifts as dispositions to common *auxilium* requires me to deny that the gifts can be greater than any virtues in operational mode. In other words, in Aquinas's mature thought the virtues and gifts are to be compared based on substantial considerations. The gifts' cooperative effects are commanded by charity just as the infused cardinal virtues' and theological virtues' are. In other words, my account flattens Aquinas's mature thought on relative excellence to only substantial considerations and abandons those based on operational mode. Indeed, in Aquinas's mature corpus he only gives two possibilities for relative excellence.²⁴⁴ Both are substantial considerations. Nor does Aquinas mention operational mode in his mature account of the gifts' excellence. Hence, if I am right, then Ramirez's claim that the gifts are greater than faith and hope according to operational modality is false.²⁴⁵

The second way my account challenges Ramirez is concerning the relative excellence of the gifts and the infused cardinal virtues. I think Ramirez's argumentation proves too much. Ramirez argues that if one supernatural habit is given to remedy another, then the one given to remedy is greater. Hence, the gifts are greater than the infused cardinal virtues. The problem here is that if a virtue is given to remedy is greater, then the gifts would seem to be greater than the

²⁴⁴ *ST* I-II q. 66, a. 1, co.

²⁴⁵ I say specifically operational modality because the gifts are greater than faith and hope by endurance. The gifts endure into heaven whereas faith and hope do not.

theological virtues, which is false on Aquinas's terms. The gifts are given to remedy two defects. One is common to all the supernatural virtues. The other is specific to those which suffer vis-à-vis their objects. If Ramirez's principle is true universally, then the gifts are greater than all the theological virtues, for the theological virtues share a defect since they are not possessed perfectly by their subjects. I do not see how this can be the case given Aquinas's metaphysics of proper accidents.²⁴⁶ The theological virtues, since they are closer to the common principle, habitual grace, have to be substantially greater. They are the cause of the gifts, as Aquinas clearly says. Hence, it would seem that Ramirez's principle, and the basis on which he argues for the greater excellence of the gifts in relation to the infused cardinal virtues, must be abandoned or circumscribed to the second type of defect. If it is limited to the second type of defect though, it is not at all clear how the gifts are greater than the infused cardinal virtues, since the infused cardinal virtues do not have imperfection vis-à-vis their objects. A much surer foundation for Aquinas's claim that the gifts are more excellent than the infused cardinal virtues is the proximity to habitual grace.

Concerning the connectivity, endurance, and relative excellence of the gifts, Aquinas's thought on grace provides the reasons for the conclusions of the secondary literature. For the most part, one would come to the same conclusions without attention to Aquinas's thought on grace. Nevertheless, Aquinas's thought on grace answers the questions of why and thereby connects the secondary literature's conclusions to Aquinas's larger theological perspective.

²⁴⁶ A possible, defense of Ramirez's position could go as follows: If one distinguishes between the operative and cooperative effects of the gifts, then one can say that the operative effects the gifts are greater than the cooperative effects of the theological virtues. It is the operative effects of the gifts that supplement the cooperative effects of the virtues. On the other hand, the operative effects of the gifts are not given to supplement the operative effects of the theological virtues. Hence, the theological virtues are still absolutely speaking greater.

IX - Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempt to answer a fundamental question for any dissertation: what difference does my research make? After outlining all the different ways my arguments in chapters II and III confirm, extend, and challenge the secondary literature, it should be clear that if my arguments are right then this dissertation makes at least a modest contribution to understanding Aquinas's thought on both the gifts and grace by reading each in light of the other. As a further implication, it has a possible impact for the whole Catholic tradition in which the gifts are a structural element of the supernatural life, although outlining this impact more particularly is another dissertation in itself!

The real importance of this chapter's conclusions are vis-à-vis my overall thesis and in the Thomistic tradition. To recall, the first part of the thesis is to prove that in order to properly understand the gifts of the Holy Spirit or grace in Aquinas, the two topics must be read in light of each other. As a broad thesis its success rests on the success of this chapter proving its individual theses. In addition, it rests on these theses being unprovable otherwise than with contact between the treatises. I think that at least in a few places this is the case. On the other hand, even if none of the theses of this chapter require, in the most strict sense, the mutual contact between the treatises, the overall thesis of the dissertation is still confirmed in a weaker sense. One must read Aquinas's thought on the gifts and grace in tandem to understand fully the supernatural life, the context of the gifts, and the particularities of how habitual grace plays out in the spiritual life. At

the very least, many additional insights, otherwise unavailable or difficult to find, come from reading Aquinas's locations of pneumatology together.²⁴⁷

One of these implications of this mutual reading, and a confirmation of a weaker reading of the thesis, is that the Holy Spirit is not extraneous or occasional in the supernatural life.²⁴⁸ As with my first thesis, the success of this thesis rests on the success of my arguments in this chapter, especially those in sections II and VII. Possibly I am not successful in proving that Aquinas genuinely thought that all activity in the supernatural life has its ultimate source in the Holy Spirit via the gifts. However, at the very least this chapter and my argument in those sections gives both support and a fuller conception to Pinckaers' position that the gifts are not simply a pious appendix in Aquinas's work. Rather, the gifts are the heart and height of the moral life, a life lead under the impulse of the Holy Spirit.

I think my research also contributes to the other contexts which give rise to it as well. It attempts to read Aquinas's corpus as a whole in a substantial and structural way. It treats the different treatises of the *Summa*, and Aquinas's biblical commentaries, as integrally united to each other and gives an example of what scholarship informed by a unified vision of Aquinas's corpus could look like. Furthermore, my research attempts to do this while both remaining in dialogue with Aquinas's most precise interpreters, the commentators, and meeting the commentators' precision in interpretation. In addition, my research partially remedies the complaint of Horst that there are few studies devoted to the gifts of the Holy Spirit by Thomists.

²⁴⁷ Patfoort, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 87.

²⁴⁸ Pinckaers, "Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit," 391.

At the very least, I hope my research will stimulate a renewed conversation among Thomists concerning both the gifts and grace in Aquinas as well as further that very tradition.

Finally and in conclusion, I should note a few of reasons why Aquinas's conception of the gifts deserves wider readership in the Church.²⁴⁹ First, Aquinas outlines a truly ecclesial ethic which at the same time does not diminish individual experience and connatural judgment. In his thought on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas takes seriously human inclinations, freedom, and creativity. On the other hand, he embeds these firmly within the Church, following the long standing Catholic tradition of claiming true freedom is only found in God.

Second, Aquinas's thought on the gifts is truly Biblical. As St. Paul says, "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has gone, the new has come!"²⁵⁰ This new life is a life lived "in the Spirit."²⁵¹ Aquinas's thought on the gifts and the centrality of the Spirit is a testament to his grounding in Biblical thought. This no clearer than in Aquinas's commentary on Romans 8:12: "For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God."

But since those who are led do not act from themselves the spiritual man is not only instructed by the Holy Spirit on what he ought to do but his heart also is moved by the Holy Spirit, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the saying "whosoever are led by the Spirit of God." For those are said to be led, who are moved by a certain higher instinct. Thus we say about animals that they do not act, but are acted upon, because they are move by nature to their actions and not their own motion. Similarly, a spiritual man is not inclined, principally speaking, to a certain act from the motion proper to his will, but from the instinct of the Holy Spirit, according to Is 59:19: "He will come like a rushing stream, which the wind of the Lord drives." And Luke 4:1: "Christ was driven by the Spirit into the desert." However this does not exclude the fact that the spiritual man acts through

²⁴⁹ Pope Francis has recently offered a series of Wednesday Audiences on the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

²⁵⁰ 2 Corinthians 5:17

²⁵¹ Galatians 5:16

will and free decision, because the very motion of the will and free decision is caused in him by the Holy Spirit, according to Phil 2:13: “God is at work in you both to will and to work.”²⁵²

Finally, Aquinas’s thought is scholastic in the best sense of the term. In other words, he has confidence in the power of the mind under grace to penetrate (to a certain extent) the mysteries of God’s working in our lives. Aquinas’s thought on grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit is thus a true exercise in *fides quaerens intellectum*, which both respects the rigors of thought and the mystery of God’s workings.

The combination of these three traits: experiential, ecclesial, and scholastic is thought by many to be a contradiction. Possibly those who make this claim are right. It is certainly the case one of these three traits must take precedence over and govern the others. Nevertheless, the combination of these three traits in Aquinas’s doctrine of the gifts, at the very least, serves as a fitting exemplar of where Moral Theology should go in the future.

²⁵² *Super Rom.*, VIII, l. 3, n. 635: “*Sed quia ille qui ducitur, ex seipso non operatur, homo autem spiritualis non tantum instruitur a spiritu sancto quid agere debeat, sed etiam cor eius a spiritu sancto movetur, ideo plus intelligendum est in hoc, quod dicitur quicumque spiritu Dei aguntur. Illa enim agi dicuntur, quae quodam superiori instinctu moventur. Unde de brutis dicimus quod non agunt sed aguntur, quia a natura moventur et non ex proprio motu ad suas actiones agendas. Similiter autem homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter sed ex instinctu spiritus sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum, secundum illud Is. LIX, 19: cum venerit quasi fluvius violentus quem spiritus Dei cogit; et Lc. IV, 1, quod Christus agebatur a spiritu in deserto. Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spirituales per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum voluntatis et liberi arbitrii spiritus sanctus in eis causat, secundum illud Phil. II, 13: Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere.*”

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