Aristotle on Nature and the Moral Life
Aristotle`s teleological view of nature has become increasingly difficult to understand and to accept the further we move from him in time. The goal of this dissertation is to offer a way of looking at Aristotle`s teleology that will make it more accessible to the contemporary reader while remaining true to Aristotle`s vision of nature. I compare his account of nature to his theory of moral action.Since Aristotle`s natural teleology is directly related to his definition of nature as an inborn principle of change or rest, the dissertation begins by examining Aristotle`s understanding of nature, focusing on the convergence of formal, final, and efficient causes in natural objects. For Aristotle, natural objects possess their own principles of change and rest and are therefore directed from within their own being. This means that natural processes are not simply the result of objects external to them acting in accordance with natural laws.The dissertation then distinguishes Aristotle`s account of natural causality from that of modern mechanism and further distinguishes it from the account he gives of the causality at work in artifacts, both of which lack the convergence of causes that Aristotle sees in natural objects. I argue that the concept of energeia, actuality, lies at the heart of Aristotle`s account of natural objects and is necessary for understanding the convergence of causes he finds there. The dissertation contrasts Aristotle`s teleology with the contemporary functionalist account, again focusing on the role of energeia.The most common analogy for understanding nature in Aristotle has been making, i.e., craftsmanship or the design and production of artifacts. The dissertation concludes by arguing that Aristotle describes the moral life in a way that in some respects parallels the teleology found in nature. In particular, the orientation of the moral life toward human flourishing highlights the concept of energeia, and to that extent provides a better model for natural objects than artifacts do. After considering the benefits and drawbacks of both the moral life and artifact models, we propose the moral life as a supplementary model for natural teleology.
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