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The Passivity and Activity of a Human Being as Revealed  
In the Passions of the Soul in Thomas Aquinas

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By

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The Passivity and Activity of a Human Being as Revealed  
In the Passions of the Soul in Thomas Aquinas

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Passion is peculiar in that it allows us to experience both passivity and activity. In a state of passion we sometimes feel helpless and other times feel in control of our action. This dissertation strives to resolve this apparent contradiction through Aquinas's doctrine of the passions. Although Aquinas's view of the passions has been discussed a great deal, the dual dimension of the passivity and activity of the passions has not been sufficiently explored. This dissertation examines this peculiar paradoxical character of the human passions.

According to Aquinas, the passivity of the passions is attributed to a passive power of the soul, i.e., the sensitive appetite. For him both sense and appetite, which constitute the seat of the passions, are passive. The passivity of the sensitive appetite is contrasted with the relative activity of the apprehensive and vegetative parts.

The passivity of the passions can also be explained by the passivity of the body. According to Aquinas, the soul and body are related to the passions as the formal and material constituents respectively. In this hylomorphic view of the passions, the body accounts for the passivity of the passions.

However, the passions take on an active character due to their participation in the life of reason in human beings. Among the passions the irascible passions are more active and closely associated with reason. Also, among the irascible passions, anger is

particularly close to reason in that it requires a rational act of comparing the injustice done to a person with the justice to be done.

The activity of human passions is even more evident in the case of “consequent passions,” i.e., those passions that result from rational judgment. Consequent passions arise either when the intensity of the will “overflows” into the sensitive appetite, or when a person “chooses” to have certain passions. Aquinas’s notion of the consequent passions can explain the paradox of the human passions, i.e., the more passive a person is, the more active he becomes.

The dissertation by Kyongsook Kim fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Tobias Hoffmann, Ph. D., as Director, and by Thérèse-Anne Druart, Ph. D., and Kevin White, Ph. D., as Readers.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<i>De an.</i>	<i>Quaestio disputata De anima</i>
<i>De ente</i>	<i>De ente et essentia</i>
<i>De malo</i>	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De malo</i>
<i>De ver.</i>	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De veritate</i>
<i>De pot.</i>	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De potentia</i>
<i>Quod.</i>	<i>Quaestiones disputatae De potentia</i>
<i>In De an.</i>	<i>Sententia libri De anima</i>
<i>In Eth.</i>	<i>Sententia libri Ethicorum</i>
<i>In Meta.</i>	<i>Sententia super Metaphysicam</i>
<i>In Phys.</i>	<i>Sententia super Physicam</i>
<i>Comp. theol.</i>	<i>Compendium theologiae</i>
<i>In Post. an.</i>	<i>Expositio Libri Posteriorum</i>
<i>In De sensu</i>	<i>Sententia libri De sensu et sensato</i>
<i>In Sent.</i>	<i>Scriptum super libros Sententiarum</i>
<i>In De Trin.</i>	<i>Super Boetium De Trinitate</i>
<i>SCG</i>	<i>Summa contra Gentiles</i>
<i>ST</i>	<i>Summa theologiae</i>

To my sister *Sukheui*

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table tennis coach and friend Donn Olsen. While I wrote about passion he lived it. I am blessed to have met him and witnessed the triumph of human passions, i.e., the wonderful fusion of passion and intellect.

## INTRODUCTION

Passion is puzzling in that it makes us experience the two opposite aspects of passivity and activity. Sometimes we feel helpless, as if we are at the mercy of our own passion. Yet other times we take advantage of our passion to pursue a goal, which gives us a sense of control over our action and destiny despite trying circumstances. The history of philosophy reflects the dichotomy of our experience with passion. The Stoics recognized only the passive dimension of the passions, saying that the passions deter one from following the correct rule of reason, which led them to have an extremely negative view of the passions, as Seneca does with the following words:

The question has been raised whether it is better to have moderate emotions, or none at all. Philosophers of our school reject the emotions; the Peripatetics keep them in check. I, however, do not understand how any half-way disease can be either wholesome or helpful.<sup>1</sup> (*Epistles* 116, 1)

On the other hand, some contemporary philosophers, such as Robert Solomon, seem to view the passions from the opposite extreme of the spectrum, recognizing only the active dimension of the passions, as is reflected in the following words of Solomon:

The Myth of the Passions, like all myths, is self-serving . . . . It is the myth of passivity.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, trans. Richard Mott Gummere, vol. 3 (London: William Heinemann, 1917), 333. Note that the term “emotions” here are used synonymously as the “passions.”

<sup>2</sup> Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), xv.

In place of the self-denying myth of the passions, I want to substitute a self-esteeming representation of emotions as *judgments*, with which we structure the world to our purposes, carve out a universe in our own terms, measure the facts of Reality, and ultimately “constitute” not only our world but ourselves. . . . The passions are not irrational; they are in their very essence “rational,” as Nietzsche wrote, “as if every passion did not contain its quantum of reason.”<sup>3</sup>

How can we resolve this apparent contradiction regarding passion? Aquinas reconciles these two dimensions in his doctrine of the passions, which is embedded in his uniquehylomorphism. Aquinas views a human being as a single substance composed of soul and body. An important corollary of this special union is that the soul and body do not merely co-exist but closely interact with each other. This means that the lower (sensitive) powers can be moved by higher (rational) powers, and vice versa. According to Aquinas, the passions originate in the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*), which is shared by other animals. Nevertheless, because human passions are movements of the whole rational animal,<sup>4</sup> and not simply of the passive sensitive appetite, they cannot be simply passive, as in the case of other animals, but must be *both* passive and active.

This dissertation strives to show in detail this peculiar status of the human passions as both passive and active and to weigh the philosophical coherence of Aquinas’s position. A great deal of literature has been written about Aquinas’s doctrine of the passions, but the interplay between passivity and activity suggested by this doctrine has not been sufficiently considered. Paul Wadell<sup>5</sup> and G. Simon Harak<sup>6</sup> have discussed

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., xviii-xix.

<sup>4</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 30, a.1 c.

<sup>5</sup> Paul, J. Wadell, *The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).

the positive role the passions can play in one's moral life and his relationship with God. However, while they rightly emphasized the active characteristic of the passions, they did not give an elaborate analysis of the passive origin of the passions and their transformative process in the context of the human soul. Recently Uffenheimer-Lippens clarified the richness in Aquinas's doctrine of the passions with concepts like "rationalized passions."<sup>7</sup> Also, Stephen Loughlin brought about Aquinas' understanding of the evaluative dimension of the human passions.<sup>8</sup> Although both scholars took a refreshed look at the much neglected issue of the human aspect of the passions, they did not directly address the duality of the passivity and activity of the human passions.

The validity and originality of this dissertation lies in its thorough and systematic examination of this dual dimension of the passivity and activity in the human passions and their resulting peculiar paradoxical character. Also, this dissertation pays special attention to the particular passion of anger. Contrary to the common association of anger with passivity in the form of impetuosity, I will use anger as a test case of my thesis that passions, especially the irascible passions, can take on a rational and active characteristic due to their participation in the life of reason.

This dissertation will consist of five chapters. The first chapter will place Aquinas's doctrine of the passions in its historical context. While presenting the general views of Aquinas's classical and medieval predecessors on the passions, I will pay

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<sup>6</sup> G. Simon Harak, *Virtuous Passions: the Formation of Christian Character* (New York: Paulist Press, 1993).

<sup>7</sup> Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passions and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56 (2003): 525-58.

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Loughlin, "A Response to Five Critiques of Aquinas's Doctrine of Passion" (Ph. D. diss., University of Toronto, 1998).

special attention to the aspects that are judged to be most relevant to my discussion of Aquinas's view of the passions, namely, the notions of passivity and activity in the passions, cognitivity in the passions, and the relevance of the passions to morality and happiness.

The second chapter will examine the passivity of the passions due to their origination in a passive power of the soul, i.e., the sensitive appetite. The starting point of this examination will be the fact that a human being is placed in a *passive* situation in regard to the external world in the sense that he must allow it to affect him in order to fulfill himself. This relation to reality is established in human beings and other animals primarily through their sensitive powers: the sensitive apprehension (*apprehensio sensitiva*) presents the sensible particular goods to the sensitive appetite, which then tends towards those goods. According to Aquinas, both sense and appetite, which constitute the seat of the passions, are passive. I will first contrast the passivity of the sensitive part to the activity of the vegetative and intellectual parts. Then I will contrast the passivity of the appetite with the activity of the apprehension.

The third chapter will discuss the passivity of the passions originating in the experience of the body, which constitutes “the material component of the total experience of the human passions.”<sup>9</sup> As a preliminary discussion I will present Aquinas's hylomorphism which views a human being as the composite of the soul and body. Then I will discuss Aquinas's application of his hylomorphism to the issue of the passions of the

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<sup>9</sup> George Klubertanz, *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), 209.

soul. According to him, the soul and body are related to the passions as the formal and material constituents respectively. The body can render a person passive in two aspects. First, a person's particular physiological composition can dispose him to react in a certain way to an external stimulus. Second, the physiological alteration accompanied by the passions can affect a person, often even after the incident of passion is long gone.

The last two chapters will focus on the active characteristic of the passions. The fourth chapter will bring out the activity of the passions by showing how the lower powers of the soul, e.g., the sensitive apprehension and the sensitive appetite, participate in higher powers of the soul. To achieve this goal, I will first discuss Aquinas's adaptation of Pseudo-Dionysius' principle that "the highest point of a lower being touches the lowest point of a higher being."<sup>10</sup> From this principle Aquinas derives the fact that both the higher part of the sensitive apprehension (for human beings, the cogitative power, and for other animals, the estimative power) and the higher part of the sensitive appetite (the irascible) "confine with" reason. As a result, even such sensitive powers exhibit a quasi-rational element, which is reminiscent of properly rational powers. I will pay special attention to the important faculty of the cogitative power (the particular reason), which has to take the place of the animal estimative power in human beings due to their reason and which works in close connection with the reason. Then I will discuss the high degree of activity and rationality of the irascible passions. The object of the irascible passions is good or evil considered under the aspect of arduousness (*ratio*

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<sup>10</sup> *De divinis nominibus*, ed. B. R. von Suchla, Corpus Dionysiacum, 1, Patristische Texte und Studien, 33 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1991), 197

*ardui*), for which reason Aquinas says that the irascible passions add something to the concupiscible passions, i.e., “contrariety in terms of approach and withdrawal with respect to the same object.”<sup>11</sup> I will argue that this added dimension of the irascible passions further distinguishes human passions from animal passions in that a human being in a state of passion is engaged in a relatively high level of cognition, i.e., judgment about a whole situation, not simply about a good in isolation.

Among the irascible passions, anger is closest to reason in that it requires an act of reason.<sup>12</sup> Anger is a desire for vengeance, and this requires a rational act of comparing the injustice done to a person with the justice to be done.<sup>13</sup> In this vein, Aquinas says that anger listens to reason, albeit not perfectly, and that anger follows the denunciation of reason.<sup>14</sup> The ‘human’ anger, which has its beginning in reason,<sup>15</sup> needs to be distinguished from the ‘animal’ anger which is in accordance with the natural instinct.<sup>16</sup>

The fifth chapter will further investigate the activity and rationality of the passions mainly by discussing the case of “consequent passions,” i.e., those passions that result from rational judgment. According to Aquinas, the passions can be consequent on the will in two ways.<sup>17</sup> In the first, the intensity of the will causes them by the overflow of a higher power, the will, upon a lower power, the sensitive appetite. The second is by choice, as when a person *wills* to have certain passions. This rational penetration enables

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<sup>11</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 25, a.1 c.

<sup>12</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4.

<sup>13</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 47, a. 2 c.

<sup>14</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 ad 3.

<sup>15</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 3 ad 1.

<sup>16</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 ad 2.

<sup>17</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 24, q. 3 ad 1; *De malo*, q. 3, a. 11.

the human passions to go beyond the passive movement of the animal passions, which merely seeks the good in a determined manner.<sup>18</sup> I will also discuss how consequent passions render a person more active by facilitating the physical movements themselves, through which the appetible thing is attained. Lastly, I will argue that Aquinas's notion of the consequent passions sheds light on the apparent paradox found in the human passions, i.e., the more passive a person is, the more active he becomes.

A philosophical project which thoroughly examines the nature of the passions is imperative when we think about what an important place they hold in our lives. Whether or not we affirm the goodness of the passions, we cannot deny the sheer force they have in our lives. In this sense, a correct understanding of the passions is crucial. From the fact that human beings are defined by their most noble part, i.e., reason, does not automatically follow that reason can gain complete control of them. Our numerous occasions of struggle clearly tell us otherwise.

After examining the passive origin of the passions and their interaction with other powers of soul, especially reason, this dissertation will show how crucial it is for us to embrace this important part of our self as a powerful "ally," rather than resigning ourselves to letting it be our own worst enemy.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 3.

<sup>19</sup> I was inspired by the book *Turning the Mind into an Ally* by a Zen master Sakyong Mipham ( New York: Riverhead Books, 2003)

# CHAPTER ONE: DISCUSSIONS ON THE EMOTIONS PRIOR TO THOMAS AQUINAS

## *Introduction*

This chapter will place Aquinas's doctrine of the passions in its historical context. Some familiarity with discussions of the emotions prior to Aquinas's time is important because Aquinas often quotes the views of his ancient and medieval predecessors in his treatment of the passions. He sometimes refutes their views and sometimes turns to them as authorities.

Below, I will present the views of Aquinas's predecessors mainly in chronological order. To achieve this objective, I will use Simo Knuuttila's *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*<sup>1</sup> as my main reference and will supplement it with the views of other contemporary scholars where necessary. Since it is beyond the scope of the present research to treat every aspect of the discussions conducted by Aquinas's predecessors, I will restrict my presentation to what is judged to be most relevant to my discussions in the forthcoming chapters. Accordingly, those philosophers who are thought to have played a critical role in the shaping of Aquinas's thoughts on the emotions will receive greater elaboration. With respect to the theme of this present work, particular attention will be paid to such aspects of the passions as their activity and passivity, their

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<sup>1</sup> Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

cognitivity, and their relevance to moral life and happiness. Please keep in mind that, in what follows, the term “emotion” is loosely interchangeable with the term “passion.”

I will start with Aristotle, who was one of the first among the ancient philosophers to treat the issue of the emotions in a coherent and systematic manner. Although Plato treated the emotions to a significant degree, as when he discusses the tripartite soul in the *Republic*, because his works were not directly or readily available to Aquinas, I will not present his position here. The Platonic tradition continued into the Middle Ages, but it was rather an “indirect tradition,” as Raymond Klibansky points out.<sup>2</sup> That is, even the meager Platonic literature available during the Middle Ages was mostly introduced through the writings of the later pagan philosophers (e.g., Cicero) and Christian philosophers (e.g., Boethius).<sup>3</sup> In addition, the only Plato’s work available during Aquinas’s times was Chalcidius’ translation of the *Timaeus*, which did not contain the second part in which Plato discusses the issue of the passions.<sup>4</sup>

After I discuss Aristotle, I will examine two groups, the Stoics and the Epicureans, which appeared after the period of Plato and Aristotle. They flourished around the same time, but they held views of the emotions that were dramatically different. Then there will be a brief discussion of the views of the middle Platonists, Galen, and Plotinus, which will be followed by an introduction to the view of Nemesius of Emesa whom Aquinas often quotes in his own treatment. Ironically, for the early

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<sup>2</sup> Raymond Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939), 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>4</sup> Paul Vincent Spade, “Medieval Philosophy,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (September 2004), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy/index.html> (accessed October 10, 2009).

Christians the emotions were important as something that needed to be controlled rather than as something to be affirmed during a life fully devoted to God. Augustine held a more moderate view than they. Also, he connected the emotions with the will. Mystics such as Pseudo-Dionysius influenced the effort by early Western monastics to “experience” God in desire for and love of Him, although these monastics thought this (spiritual) love comes with the conquest of the sensual love. In the late twelfth century, Avicenna’s view of the emotions, which was largely based on his interpretation of Aristotle, enlivened the discussions on the emotions among the medieval philosophers. Lastly, I will present the view of St. Albert the Great who was a direct influence on Aquinas as the latter’s teacher.

## ***1 Ancient Period***

### *1.1 Aristotle*

First of all, Aristotle had a view of life which was quite different from that of his teacher Plato. Plato held a high regard for life detached from the emotions and thought that “lovers of wisdom” (philosophers) must “turn away from the body towards the soul” (*Phaedo*, 64e).<sup>5</sup> For Aristotle, human life was largely based on the social and political nature of human beings, and there was goodness in it. Aristotle’s emphasis on the political nature of human beings is found at the beginning of his *Politics* (1253a2-31):

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<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Plato: Complete Works*, trans. G. M. A. Grube, 56.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the Tribeless, lawless, heartless one, whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts. Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. . . . But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors.<sup>6</sup>

Now community life involves interaction with other members of society, which naturally forms affective relationships among them. For Aristotle, once the centrality of the emotions in human life is acknowledged, the next question is how to habituate them in such a way that they can contribute to the virtuous life. This is an especially important task in educating the young members of the society.<sup>7</sup>

Here one needs to know Aristotle's thought behind the word "passion," since Aquinas frequently turns to Aristotle for this notion. Aristotle developed a systematic theory of passivity and activity,<sup>8</sup> which stemmed from his metaphysics and physics. Aristotle's notions of passivity and activity are tightly knit with those of potentiality and actuality as well as matter and form.<sup>9</sup> A thing is said to be passive when it is acted upon by another thing (an agent). Aristotle discusses this in *Metaphysics* (1046a18-28) with the following words:

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<sup>6</sup> The translation is from B. Jowett in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1987-1988.

<sup>7</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 25.

<sup>8</sup> Susan James, *Passion and Action* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 30.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

Obviously, then, in a sense the potentiality of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be capable either because it can be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potentialities are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain motive principle, and because even the matter is a motive principle, that the thing acted on is acted on, one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily is inflammable, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potentiality is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build.<sup>10</sup>

According to Aristotle, different powers of the soul can be viewed from the perspective of passivity and activity.<sup>11</sup> The (exterior) senses are considered passive because they need to be moved by an external thing in order to operate. In the same vein, the emotions as affective responses to external stimuli are considered passive. On the other hand, the intellect is regarded as active because it can “initiate” its action without being moved.<sup>12</sup> The presence of the reason in human beings is critical when it comes to the emotions. Since there is interaction among the different powers of the soul, emotions in human beings do not always have to take on a passive characteristic, as they do in other animals. This insight was an important discovery for Aquinas, who later developed this idea further (e.g., *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4).

Aristotle analyses the passions in Chapter eight of the *Categories* (8b25-11a3). Here he distinguishes the “passions” from “(passive or passible) qualities.” Whereas qualities such as madness and irritability are conditions which endure, the passions such

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<sup>10</sup> The translation is from W. D. Ross in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 1651-1652.

<sup>11</sup> For my treatment of this issue in Aquinas, see Chapter two, 145ff.

<sup>12</sup> Knuutila, *Emotions*, 45.

as anger are short-lived. The comparison between the “quality” of irritability and the “passion” of anger explains Aristotle’s position lucidly. While the former is a bodily disposition or temperament which is not easy to eliminate, the latter is an emotion which, once arisen, soon dissipates.<sup>13</sup>

Interestingly, Aristotle’s comprehensive treatment of the emotions is not found in his works on ethics (e.g., *Nichomachean Ethics*) or psychology (e.g., *On the Soul*).<sup>14</sup> Rather he discusses individual emotions at length in *Rhetoric*, although, as John M. Cooper points out, this treatment must be accepted as the philosopher’s “dialectic investigation” rather than his most scientific and final view on this matter.<sup>15</sup> *Rhetoric* was written with the practical purpose of teaching an orator how to persuade the audience by working on their emotions, and most of Aristotle’s later discussions on the emotions are traced back to this book.<sup>16</sup> In this book, in accordance with the Platonic tripartite soul, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of desire, rational desire (*logistikē orexis* or *boulēsis*) and non-rational desire (*alogos orexis*). The latter is sub-divided into anger (*thumos*) and appetite (*epithumia*).<sup>17</sup> Like Plato in *Philebus*, here Aristotle says that to have pleasure or pain is to have perception or awareness of them (*Rhetoric*, 1307a27-8). And he explains this perception (370a27-1370b3) with the following words:

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 27. For my discussion of this, see Chapter three, 145ff.

<sup>14</sup> John M. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 406.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 407.

<sup>16</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 27.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 28.

Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something the imagination of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected, since we perceive present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Now the things that are pleasant to remember are not only those that, when actually present, *were* pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good.<sup>18</sup>

As seen above, according to Aristotle, perception can be had in two ways. First, one can have pleasure or pain by perceiving a concurrent physical process. Second, although there is no concurrent actual physical process, one can still have pleasure or pain due to the impression of something pleasant or painful presented by the imagination.<sup>19</sup>

Aristotle's view of the emotions in *Rhetoric* may be summarized as a pleasant or unpleasant feeling aroused by the evaluation of a thing with the accompaniment of a physiological change. According to this description, one will come to have an emotional experience in the following way. First, when one senses a thing, one immediately judges it to be either good or bad for oneself. Next, depending on the conclusion of the judgment, a pleasant or unpleasant feeling arises in him. This feeling has two accompaniments. On the cognitive level, the person receives the "message" to take an action, and at the same time he goes through a physiological change, e.g., fast heart beat.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The translation is from W. Rhys Roberts in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2181.

<sup>19</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 29.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

Let me briefly discuss two things that seem to have had a great influence on later philosophers, including Aquinas: cognitivity in the emotions and physiological change. According to Aristotle, an emotion can be aroused not only by evaluation, belief, or judgment, but also by the act of the imagination.<sup>21</sup> This is why other animals can also experience emotions, since they, albeit lacking reason, have the power of imagination. On the other hand, the same fact has the important implication that other animals and human beings can have emotions in a different manner, since relatively complex emotions requiring belief or judgment are absent in other animals.<sup>22</sup> For this reason, scholars like Jonathan Lear distinguish “emotions” from “feelings.”<sup>23</sup> For Lear, whereas emotions involve belief, evaluation, or judgment; feelings can be caused by a sensible representation of the imagination only. An interesting aspect of the cognitivity or judgment in the emotions is that this judgment is always in reference to oneself. That is, one’s judgment of a thing to be good or bad is always *with respect to himself*.<sup>24</sup> For example, anger is an emotional reaction to one’s judgment that *he* has been slighted. Let us look at *Rhetoric* (1378a31-1378b5) for Aristotle’s discussion of the personal aspect of anger:

Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not man in general. It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>23</sup> Jonathan Lear, “Katharsis,” in *Essays in Aristotle’s Poetics*, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 329.

<sup>24</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 31.

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2195.

Another aspect of Aristotle's theory of emotion that has influenced later philosophers is the idea that a physiological change accompanies the emotions. According to Aristotle's hylomorphism, the body can be related to emotion in two ways. First, a person's particular bodily disposition or condition can be partly responsible for the occurrence of a certain emotion, as Aristotle explains with the following words (*On the Soul*, 403a16-25):

It seems that all the affections of soul involve a body—passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered accounts.<sup>26</sup>

Second, since emotion is a phenomenon caused by the corporeality of a being, whenever an emotion arises, there is a corresponding physiological change, as if this change were the emotion's physical symptom. Aristotle thought that this physiological change is derived from the altered activity of the heart, which he thought immediately "absorbs" the psychic activities.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The translation is from J. A. Smith in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 642-43.

<sup>27</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 33-34.

Aristotle addresses these two aspects via his hylomorphism: whereas the evaluation or judgment is a formal cause of emotion, the physiological change is the material cause of emotion (*On the Soul*, 403a24-b7). Accordingly, emotion can be defined differently depending on the point of view. For example, a dialectician can define anger in one way, and a physicist can define it in another (*On the Soul*, 403a29-b1). While for a dialectician anger is a desire for revenge, for a physicist anger is none other than the boiling of the blood around the heart.<sup>28</sup>

Another interesting fact about Aristotle's psychology is that, although he initially used the Platonic framework of the tripartite soul, he later concluded that the notion of "parts" cannot adequately account for the dynamic psychic activities. Hence, the notions of "faculties" or "powers" were introduced to explain the emotions which are the result of the dynamic interactions among the distinct powers in the soul. This manner of viewing the soul greatly influenced the thirteenth century thinkers including Aquinas.<sup>29</sup>

### 1.2 The Stoics

The Stoics had a very different notion of the emotions from Aristotle, one which derived from their distinct view of the world and the soul. According to them, the soul was entirely rational, but it was still a physical substance called "pneuma." *Pneuma* is a kind of corporeal spirit or breath.<sup>30</sup> The Stoics define emotion as a belief (*doxa*) or judgment (*krisis*) about good or evil in the present or future.<sup>31</sup> The Stoics classified the

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 47-48.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 53.

emotions into four kinds: pleasure (*hēdonē*), pain (*lupē*), appetite (*epithumia*), and fear (*phobos*).<sup>32</sup> This classification system had a lasting influence on later philosophers.<sup>33</sup>

According to the Stoics, the emotions must not be trusted, since the evaluation accompanying the emotions is based on a distorted view of the world.<sup>34</sup> Our false notions about ourselves expressed as self-centeredness and habits formed by such incorrect notions lead us to follow the suggestions of emotion rather than the dictate of the right reason. According to the Stoics, human beings are naturally prone to care for themselves.<sup>35</sup> However, they can also form a sense of kinship (*oikeiosis*) or solidarity with other rational beings.<sup>36</sup> A low form of life consists in staying in the selfish level never learning to reach out for others, which is the life of the majority of people. On the other hand, a mature life is attained as one is able to look at oneself “objectively.” Therefore, treating oneself and others indiscriminately was prerequisite for the Stoic way of virtuous life.<sup>37</sup>

According to the Stoics, human beings due to their rationality have a privileged position in the universe, which is also governed by (universal) reason (*logos*) which is essentially similar to the human reason. Reason connects human beings to the divine Reason, and this also held the implication that they are supposed to obey the rule of the latter.<sup>38</sup> Emotion tends to make people unduly focused on themselves, which leads them

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 232.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 55-56.

<sup>36</sup> Charlotte B. Becker, *Encyclopedia of Ethics: P-W*, vol. 3 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1653.

<sup>37</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 56.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 58.

to react wrongly. Therefore, according to Chrysippus, one of the founders of the Stoic philosophy, the emotions are irrational, unnatural, and excessive.<sup>39</sup> For this reason, we are better off without their presence.

An interesting theory of the later Stoics, which exerted a significant influence on later thinkers, was that of the “first movement” of the soul. Later Stoics thought that there is a movement prior to the emotions, which they termed the “first movement” (pre-passions or *propatheia*).<sup>40</sup> Seneca (4 B.C.-A.D. 65) discusses this issue in his book *On Anger*. According to him, this first movement, which was regarded as the agitation of the mind, is involuntary and presents an interpretation of the given situation. This interpretation is not yet emotion. Only when this interpretation is assented to is there emotion, which is called the “second movement” of the soul. Next, when one rejects the dictate of the reason and adheres to one’s emotional suggestions, this is called the “third movement.” According to Seneca, the first movements can be also called “natural affects” because they are found even in the virtuous and cannot be completely removed by reason.<sup>41</sup>

In general, the Stoic view of the emotions was similar to that of Plato in his early, ascetic, period; only they took it to a further extreme by advocating the state of *apatheia* or the complete detachment from emotions. While the Platonic virtuous person is in control of the emotions, the Stoic virtuous person is simply void of them. On the other hand, the Stoics’ view of the emotions differed greatly from that of Aristotle, who not

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 63. The Latin translation of pre-passion is “propassio.”

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 65.

only acknowledged the goodness of the emotions but also their significant role in moral life, as is revealed in his notion of moral virtues, many of which are about having the “right” emotions.<sup>42</sup> The Stoics placed a further emphasis on the aspect of cognitivity in the emotions than Plato and Aristotle did. They regarded the emotions as judgments. Yet they were false judgments, for which reason they need to be distrusted.<sup>43</sup> Cicero (c. 106-43 B.C.) expresses the “sickness” of the emotions in his *Tusculan Disputations*. Here he says that, like a sick body that needs to be cured, when the soul is disturbed by wrong beliefs, it needs to be cured through “therapy.” The Stoic therapy consisted in changing the beliefs of the “emotional patients,” since the emotions are based on false beliefs.<sup>44</sup>

### 1.3 The Epicureans

The school of Epicureanism was established around the same time as Stoicism. The Epicureans adopted the atomism of Democritus. According to them, the soul was material and was comprised of “soul atoms.” Accordingly, their position on the emotions was naturalistic.<sup>45</sup> They thought that human beings are no different from other animals in that they pursue pleasure and avoid pain by natural judgment, and this tendency largely accounted for their behavior.<sup>46</sup> The hedonism of the Epicureans consists in *ataraxia* (freedom from mental suffering) and the absence of bodily pain. Tranquility of life

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<sup>42</sup> See Books five and six of *Nicomachean Ethics* in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, trans. W. D. Ross.

<sup>43</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 72.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 73-74.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

granted by *ataraxia* held a supreme value for the Epicureans.<sup>47</sup> They thought that the fundamental cause of our mental suffering was our false beliefs regarding matters like pleasure, death, the soul, and the gods. Such distorted beliefs arouse irrational emotions like fear of death,<sup>48</sup> when death is only an “extinction,”<sup>49</sup> at which time we do not even exist.<sup>50</sup> Epicureans considered the emotions with the criterion of pleasure or displeasure. According to Epicurus (307-270 B.C.), what separates wise people from the rest of humanity is that the wise simply experience more pleasant feelings than others, since their soul is not disturbed.<sup>51</sup> When human beings can detach themselves from such unpleasant emotions as anger and anxiety, their lives approach that of gods, who enjoy the divine bliss.<sup>52</sup> They recommended that people with disturbing emotions treat their illnesses through therapy.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>49</sup> Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1959), 408.

<sup>50</sup> David Konstan, “Epicurus,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (February 18, 2009), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/> (accessed June 25, 2009).

<sup>51</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 83.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 84-85.

#### 1.4 The Middle Platonists, Galen, and Plotinus

Middle Platonism (c. 80 B.C.-c. A.D. 220)<sup>54</sup> was founded by Antiochus, who tried to focus on the similarities rather than on differences among Plato, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics.<sup>55</sup> The main emphasis of Middle Platonism was on the notion of moderation in emotion (*metriopatheia*) rather than on the complete detachment from it (*apatheia*). According to the Middle Platonists, the soul was divided into the two parts, the rational and the non-rational. The latter is sub-divided into the spirited and the appetitive.<sup>56</sup> Contrary to the Stoics, the Middle Platonists thought that emotions are void of such cognitive elements as beliefs and judgments.<sup>57</sup>

Galen (c. A.D. 130-c. A.D. 200) was a doctor who lived during the period of Middle Platonism.<sup>58</sup> He himself was influenced by Platonism, endorsing the Platonic tripartite soul over the unitary soul of the Stoics. He thought that the emotions arising from the appetitive part of the soul hinders the act of the reason and thus need to be checked. On the contrary, the emotions of the spirited part can be habituated to serve a higher purpose, a view similar to that of Plato and Aristotle. For him only strong emotions were passions, which explains why he thought that the passions are disturbances in general.<sup>59</sup> He regarded the passions as “sicknesses of the soul” which need to be cured. According to him, we cure the passions by exercising self-control over

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<sup>54</sup> The dates are from John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1.

<sup>55</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 87.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

the “symptoms” of the passions, which weakens the activity of the passions over time.<sup>60</sup> His account of the occurrence of the emotions reflects his distinct perspective as a medical person. He thought that emotions were movements in the liver and the heart affected by one’s evaluation of something or by a change in the body. He also thought that excessive passions can make one prone to certain emotions by changing the humors in his body.<sup>61</sup>

Plotinus (A.D. 204/5–269/270),<sup>62</sup> like the Middle Platonists, described the emotions as the “affections accompanied by the feelings of pleasure and pain.”<sup>63</sup> One of his fundamental principles was that the soul is impassible. However, this does not mean that the soul is not involved affectively at all; a part of it is related to emotion either by causing or perceiving it. According to him, a human being consists of the body, the individual soul, and the lower soul. Even the lower soul, which is in contact with the body, is impassible. However, because its effect, i.e., the “trace of soul,” is passible, one can have emotions. He thought that certain opinions and judgments can influence the lower soul, which in turn influences the effect of the soul. When this series of movements takes place we have emotional reactions.<sup>64</sup> Plotinus thought we can have two kinds of emotions. First, there are semi-voluntary emotions caused by judgments. Then there are non-voluntary emotions which arise spontaneously.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>62</sup> The dates are from Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1959), 463.

<sup>63</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 98.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 100.

### 1.5 Nemesius of Emesa

Nemesius of Emesa (late fourth century) was a bishop of Emesa in Syria. He is the author of the book, *De natura hominis*, which is a treatise on human nature. For a long time this book, especially the part on psychology (Chapters two and three), was attributed by medieval thinkers to Gregory of Nyssa. Probably the established fame of the Cappadocian Father contributed to the success of Nemesius' book.<sup>66</sup> *De natura hominis* shows the influence of such diverse intellectual sources as Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Galen's theory, and Christianity. It was translated into Latin in the eleventh century by Alfano of Salerno and later again by Burgundio of Pisa in 1165. Nemesius' work was appropriated by John Damascene in his *De fide orthodoxa*, which saw its Latin translation around 1153. Nemesius adopts Plato's view of the soul for the bedrock foundation of his theory of the emotions and supplements it with other philosophies.<sup>67</sup>

*De natura hominis* starts with Nemesius' anthropology. Here human beings are described as beings that straddle the boundary between the spiritual and the corporeal.

It is well known that man has some thing in common with the inanimate creatures, and shares life with the plant and animal creation, while partaking intelligence in common with all beings endowed with reason. . . . With irrational animals he [man] shares all these things, and, in addition, a range of voluntary movements, together with the faculties of appetite, anger, feeling and respiration. All these things man and the irrational animals have in common, if not everywhere on equal terms. Finally, by being rational, man shares with the incorporeal rational intelligences the prerogative of applying, to whatever he will, reason, understanding, and

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<sup>66</sup> Nemesius of Emesa, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, ed. W. Telfer, The Library of Christian Classics, 4 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), 203.

<sup>67</sup> Knuutila, *Emotions*, 103-4.

judgement. So he pursues virtues, and follows after godliness, in which the quest of every several virtue finds its goal.

It follows from these considerations that man's being is on the boundary between the intelligible order and the phenomenal [*medius est intellectualis et sensibilis substantiae*] order. As touching his body and its faculties, he is on a par with the irrational animate, and with the inanimate, creatures. As touching his rational faculties he claims kinship, as we said, with incorporeal beings. It would seem that the Creator linked up each several order of creation with the next, so as to make the whole universe one and akin.<sup>68</sup>

Then in the third chapter, the author discusses the union of the soul and body.<sup>69</sup>

However, his view of this union was closer to Plato than to Aristotle. Like Plato, he thought that the human soul as a separate substance is not affected by the body to which it is united.<sup>70</sup> When it comes to the analysis of the soul, however, Nemesius is similar to Aristotle. In Chapter sixteen, he divides the soul into two parts, [1] the rational and [2] the non-rational. The latter is further divided into [2-1] the part that can be penetrated by reason and [2-2] the part that cannot be. Nemesius calls the part that can be penetrated by reason ([2-1]) the passions (*passivum*). The passions are further divided into two kinds, [2-1-1] concupiscence (*desiderativum*) and [2-1-1] anger (*irascitivum*).<sup>71</sup>

Let us briefly discuss Nemesius' theory of the passions. He gives four different definitions of the passions: [a] a movement of concupiscence of the sensitive power as it

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<sup>68</sup> Nemesius of Emesa, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, 228-29. The translation is done by the editor. For my discussion of a human being as a "frontier being," see Chapter five, 220ff.

<sup>69</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 104.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>71</sup> *De natura hominis: Traduction de Burgundio de Pise*, ed. G. Verbeke and J. R. Moncho, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, suppl. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 92. When I directly quote Nemesius from Latin, I will use this edition. Also, note that chapter number was wrongly given here as Chapter fifteen; it should be Chapter sixteen.

imagines something to be good or evil, [b] an irrational movement of the soul as it perceives something as good or evil, [c] a movement in a thing by another thing, and [d] an act (*actus*) which goes against the nature.<sup>72</sup>

Like Aristotle and Galen, Nemesius thought that emotions can be described in different ways from different perspectives. His description of anger clearly reveals this thought. Like Aristotle, he analyzes anger from two distinct perspectives, i.e., the physiological and the psychological. In physiological terms, anger is the boiling of the blood around the heart. From a psychological point of view, anger is a desire for revenge for a wrong done unjustly.<sup>73</sup>

Another notable discussion found in *De natura hominis* is about fear. Nemesius thought that there are six symptoms of fear. One of them is “sluggishness” or “shrinking” (*ὄκνος* or *desidia*), which is fear of taking action.<sup>74</sup> This discussion is interesting in light of the way that Aquinas, in his treatise on the passions, later associates fear with the act of shrinking (*ST*, I-II, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1).<sup>75</sup>

## **2 Early Christian Period**

### *2.1 Clement, Origen, and Cappadocian Fathers*

Clement of Alexandria (c. A.D. 150–c. A.D. 215) and Origen (c. A.D. 185–c. A.D. 253), Christian teachers in Alexandria, tried to synthesize Christianity and Greek

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 93-94.

<sup>73</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 100.

<sup>74</sup> *De natura hominis: Traduction de Burgundio de Pise*, 103. See also Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 109.

<sup>75</sup> See my Chapter four, 205.

philosophy.<sup>76</sup> Clement's view of the emotions is particularly revealing of his synthesis of Middle Platonism (*metriopatheia*) and the Stoics (*apatheia*). He shared the Stoic tenet that perfect life is attained through complete detachment from worldly goods. Accordingly, he considered emotions immoderate, unnatural, and irrational.<sup>77</sup> For this reason, he thought that one has to exercise *metriopatheia*, i.e., moderation of emotions and lower parts of the soul, in the first place in order to be virtuous. Once the state of *metriopatheia* is acquired, one has to work his way to the perfect moral state of *apatheia*, which is witnessed in Christ's life.<sup>78</sup>

Clement's student Origen further developed his teacher's thought. In accordance with the Stoics, Origen thought that there are involuntary "first motions" (the equivalent of the Stoic pre-passions), which can develop into the proper emotions upon the assent of the higher controlling part of the soul. This assent implies that emotions are voluntary. Again, like the Stoics, Origen thought of these first motions as false beliefs.<sup>79</sup>

Origen's view of the emotions influenced the Cappadocian Fathers—Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus. They employed the Platonic and Stoic conceptual framework to support their Christian prayer life. They employed Plato's notion of the different "parts" of the soul. The higher part contains the image of God; the lower part is the emotional part, which is provided by God for the sensitive life of human beings. In the state of innocence, emotions in human beings were under complete

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<sup>76</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 111.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 118.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

subjection to the command of reason.<sup>80</sup> Christians should direct their lives toward restoring this internal order. Also, since we have to imitate God, Who is impassible, we have to strive for *apatheia*.<sup>81</sup>

The Cappadocian Fathers thought that the appetitive part can be rectified through extensive education and habituation. Following the suggestions of the appetitive part injudiciously would remove human beings further away from God.<sup>82</sup> Gregory of Nyssa, through his appropriation of Plato's allegory of the charioteer and the two horses, says that the spirited and the appetitive parts can be helpful in one's moral life.<sup>83</sup> Accordingly, in a virtuous person all the emotional movements are governed by reason. The Cappadocian Fathers also thought that through *apatheia*, i.e., detachment from self-regarding emotions, one can ascend to the level of the angels, which hints at the influence of Plotinus.<sup>84</sup>

## 2.2 Egyptian Fathers and Evagrius

The fathers of the Egyptian desert led an ascetic monastic life, inspired by St. Antony (c. A.D. 250-350) and Pachomius (d. A.D. 346).<sup>85</sup> St. Antony taught that when one has emotional attachment to mundane things, he should overcome it by thinking about eternal punishment and reward.<sup>86</sup> Evagrius (b. c. A.D. 345-399), a member of a

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 127.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 132-33.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 136-37.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 137-38.

religious community on the Mount of Olives, was influenced by Origen. He followed and developed Origen's thought of the mystical ascent of the soul, which involved the suppression of the passions.<sup>87</sup> For him a higher form of life, i.e., the contemplative life, consisted in *apatheia*. He made a close connection between the passions and the seven deadly sins, employing the Platonic tripartite soul.<sup>88</sup> However, more in accordance with the Stoics, he thought that, although one may be tempted by the involuntary first movements of the soul (pre-passions), one can reject them by dissenting.<sup>89</sup> Dissenting was done by eliminating the persistent immoderate thoughts which he called *logismoi*. For him, *apatheia* meant a complete absence of *logismoi*, including sentimental reminiscences.<sup>90</sup> Evagrius' thoughts were passed down to later monastics mainly through John Cassian (c. A.D. 365-c. A.D. 435) who entered a monastery in Bethlehem.<sup>91</sup> Cassian taught that the monks must free themselves from wicked thoughts, which he described as the "sicknesses" of the soul. He believed that ascetic discipline could weaken the emotional part of the soul.<sup>92</sup>

#### 2.4 Augustine

Augustine (A.D. 354-430) tried to show that the Stoic view of the emotions was in fact not so different from those of Plato and the Peripatetics. According to him, they all shared the thought that the first movement of the soul, i.e., the "impressions" taken from

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 148-49.

an external thing, disturbs even a virtuous person. Only the virtuous person does not approve such impressions.<sup>93</sup> Augustine in his later work *The City of God* shows his suspicion of the orthodox Stoic view of the emotions:

Yet if we felt no such emotions at all while subject to the infirmity of this life, we should then certainly not be living righteously. . . .<sup>94</sup>

At this point, let us consider what the Greeks call *apatheia* [ἀπαθεια], which might possibly be rendered in Latin by *impassibilitas*: a word which refers to a condition of the mind rather than the body. If, then, we are to understand this ‘impassibility’ to mean a life without those emotions which arise contrary to reason and which disturb the mind, it is clearly a good and desirable condition. It does not, however, belong to this present life. . . .<sup>95</sup>

And if it [the city of those who live not according to God, but according to man] has any citizens who seem to control and in some way temper those emotions, they are so proud and elated in their impiety that, for this very reason, their haughtiness increases even as their pain diminishes. Some of these, with a vanity as monstrous as it is rare, are so entranced by their own self-restraint that they are not stirred or excited or swayed or influenced by any emotions at all. But these rather suffer an entire loss of their humanity than achieve a true tranquility. For a thing is not right merely because it is harsh, nor is stolidity the same thing as health.<sup>96</sup>

This way, he thought that the Stoic position is not only unrealistic but also can influence people negatively by making them detach themselves from necessary and healthy emotions such as basic human feelings and communal sentiment. He thought that emotions can play a positive role by motivating moral agents.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 154.

<sup>94</sup> Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, trans. R. W. Dyson, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 599.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 600.

<sup>96</sup> Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, 602.

<sup>97</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 155-56.

Augustine's terms for emotions are worth mentioning. A negative term "perturbations" (*perturbationes*) and relatively neutral terms such as "affections" (*affectiones* or *affectus*) or "passions" (*passiones*) were used alternatively to refer to an affectative state.<sup>98</sup> Emotions are only found in beings with body, e.g., human beings; God and angels, who are impassible, do not have emotions. The human suffering from emotions is a consequence of the Fall, which Augustine expresses with the following words:

These philosophers therefore admit that the other two parts of the soul [the spirited and the appetitive] are vicious, even in a wise and temperate man. This is why the mind bridles them by suppression and restraint, and recalls them from that which they are unrighteously moved to do, while allowing them to do whatever is permitted by the law of wisdom. Anger, for example, is allowed for the purpose of just coercion, as is lust for the sake of begetting offspring. But in Paradise, before sin arose, these passions did not, I say, exist in their present vicious form. For they were not then moved to do anything contrary to a righteous will, from which it was necessary to force them to abstain by means of the guiding reins, as it were, of reason.

Now, however, when these passions are thus set in motion, they are regulated by those who live temperate, righteous and godly lives, sometimes easily, and sometimes with difficulty; but this is accomplished only by compulsion and struggle: it is not a healthy, natural process, but, thanks to guilt, a weary one.<sup>99</sup>

Augustine thought that animals have an "interior sense" in addition to the five senses. Through this interior sense animals seek pleasure and avoid pain.<sup>100</sup> However, human beings must be treated differently in this regard from other animals because they have rational powers in addition to sensitive powers. Simple emotions are found both in

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>99</sup> Augustine, *The City of God*, 618. A similar thought is reflected in Aquinas (*De ver.*, q. 25, a. 6).

<sup>100</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 157.

other animals and human beings. However, some emotions that require a complex cognitive process are found only in human beings.<sup>101</sup>

Augustine's notion of volition, or the will, in conjunction with the emotions is notable. For Augustine volition can be taken in two senses, in a narrow sense and in a broad sense. In a narrow sense, it refers to the act of the central controlling power in the higher part of the soul. In a broad sense, it refers to any act of the soul. In the latter sense, not only strictly willful actions but also any movements of desire or repulsion are acts of volition. All the activities of the volition in a broad sense can be either approved or rejected by the act of the volition in a narrow sense, which makes such activities "voluntary."<sup>102</sup>

Augustine thought that, although we have concupiscence due to our original sin,<sup>103</sup> if we reject it the moment it arises, we do not commit a sin.<sup>104</sup> Augustine's mention of "initial movement" in conjunction with the emotions shows that he was influenced by the Stoic notion of the first movement or "pre-passion." However, for him this initial movement was not a movement prior to the (proper) emotion, as the Stoics thought, but an early emotion. He also thought that due to the corrupt nature of human beings after the Fall, human beings are in need of the intervention of divine grace to overcome evil impulses and inclinations.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 158.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 171.

Augustine's view of the initial emotion and its rejection had a considerable influence on the early medieval philosophers. Another theory of Augustine which was influential to the later philosophers was the theory of "hesitant (*invitus*) actions." "Hesitant actions" were similar to Aristotle's so-called "mixed actions," which were exemplified in the jettisoning the goods from a sinking ship.<sup>106</sup> Perhaps the conception of this interesting notion is attributable to Augustine's own experience of struggle with desires and (hesitant) conversion to Christianity afterwards: he maintained his old way of life for quite some time before his actual conversion despite his willingness to live a new life. Augustine himself would describe this discrepancy between his action and will by saying that "his will to will" before the actual conversion was ineffective.<sup>107</sup>

### ***3 Medieval Period***

#### *3.1 Early Medieval Christian Monastic Views on the Emotions*

The ascent of the soul toward the union with God was a major theme in early Western monastic spirituality.<sup>108</sup> Since the soul's ascent was believed to be achieved by the "purification" of one's soul through an ascetic life, emotions were regarded as a potential disturbance to the soul. Gregory the Great thought that even those emotional

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 171-72.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 172.

movements which are quickly suppressed upon occurrence are still venial sins.<sup>109</sup>

According to him, the soul's ascent towards union with God came with the detachment from the worldly things.<sup>110</sup> What is interesting here is that, in a way, the role of (religious) emotion is crucial, since one desires to unite with God through love. Yet, ironically, this desire for union with God had to come by enfeebling the (sensitive) emotions. The notion of compunction (*compunctio*) shows such a delicate attitude well. Compunction referred to the uncomfortable feelings one has either when one fears the punishment of God or desires the union with Him. Gregory believed that one feels less fear and more (spiritual) love through a regular practice of penitence.<sup>111</sup>

Pseudo-Dionysius, who lived in late fifth century, was another major theologian who went a great length in his discussion of the ascent of the soul. His philosophy reveals an unmistakable mark of Neo-Platonism.<sup>112</sup> According to him, one enters the union with God in the ecstasy of love (*erōs*).<sup>113</sup> This important role of love led to a refreshed reflection on emotion, divine or human, especially love.<sup>114</sup> However, Dionysius thought that one has to be emotionally detached (*apatheia*) in order to be connected to God in (spiritual) love.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 173.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 174-75.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>114</sup> Kevin Corrigan and Michael Harrington, "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (September 4, 2004), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/> (accessed June 25, 2009).

<sup>115</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 176.

Dionysius' influence is evident in western theologians, including Aquinas, who wrote a commentary on Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus*. In the treatise of the passions in the *Summa theologiae* (I-II, qq. 22-48) Aquinas often resorts to Dionysius' authority. The most prominent place is when he discusses the issue of the participation of the sensitive appetite in the reason. Here he quotes Dionysius in Book seven of *De divinis nominibus* where the Neo-Platonist author discusses the chain of being. In this book Dionysius speaks about how all the beings form a hierarchy with the top of a lower being in touch with the bottom of a higher being.<sup>116</sup>

Nevertheless, as I said, we must draw this knowledge of Wisdom from all things; for wisdom it is (as saith the Scripture) that hath made all things and ever ordereth them all, and is the Cause of the indissoluble harmony and order of all things, perpetually fitting the end of one part unto the beginning of the second, and thus producing the one fair agreement and concord of the whole.<sup>117</sup>

Later, Aquinas appropriates this insight, particularly the conceptual framework that the highest point of a lower being is in touch with the lowest point of a higher being, to ground his view that the human emotions are different from the animal emotions

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<sup>116</sup> *De divinis nominibus*, ed. B. R. von Suchla, Corpus Dionysiacum, 1, Patristische Texte und Studien, 33 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1991), 197.

<sup>117</sup> *Dionysius the Areopagite: The Divine Names and Mystical Theology*, trans. C. E. Bolt (London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1987), 153. I use Bolt's translation because it is thought to convey the hierarchical connection between the lower and higher beings better than other English translation.

because the sensitive appetite in human beings is in touch with reason (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 c.).<sup>118</sup>

### 3.2 *The Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Philosophers*

#### 3.2.1 *Interpretations of “Pre-passio” and the Order of the Emotions*

According to Anselm of Laon (d. 1117), the involuntary “pre-passion” (*pro-passio*) is a weakness human beings have due to the original sin. Even though this is not controllable, it is still regarded as a venial sin in the sense that one has the obligation to repel it. As soon as one starts to deliberate whether he has to follow the suggestion of the first movement, he sins.<sup>119</sup> Peter Abelard (1079-1142) held a more moderate position on this issue than his teacher Anselm. However, he still thought that one commits a sin when one consents to the suggestion of the first movement.<sup>120</sup>

Peter Lombard (1095-1160) presented a similar position in his *Sententiae*, which was by far the greatest authority in the medieval universities later.<sup>121</sup> According to him, insofar as the sensitive part is considered, human beings are not so different from other animals. However, because human beings can resist impulses with the “intervention” of the higher part of the soul, they are distinguished from other animals. When the sensitive part of a person simply reacts to an external thing, it is considered a venial sin. However,

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<sup>118</sup> For my discussion of this issue, see Chapter four (151ff) of this dissertation. For a study on the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Neo-platonic theory of the graded continuity of beings on Aquinas, look at Chapter nine of *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* by Fran O’Rourke (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

<sup>119</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 179.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 180-01.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

when his reason is involved in consenting to the wrong suggestion, the person commits a mortal sin.<sup>122</sup>

Some scholars, e.g., Simon of Tournai, Alan of Lille, and Gilbert of Poitiers, further divided the first movement into the “primary first movement” and the “secondary first movement.” Most of these scholars did not regard the primary first movement as a sin because it suddenly arises and thus is not controllable. However, the secondary first movement was considered a sin because it arises on account of the fact that the primary first movement has not been duly suppressed.<sup>123</sup>

An interesting view regarding the primary movement was presented by William of Auxerre. He thought that, although the primary movement is found both in other animals and human beings, it is a sin in human beings while it is not in other animals. He drew this conclusion by reasoning the fact that human beings have a higher power (reason) which is capable of controlling some sinful primary movements. Accordingly, he thought that (while the primary first movement is common in other animals and human beings) the secondary first movement is only found in human beings due to the existence of the reason. For this reason the secondary first movement is termed human sensuality, and it is voluntary.<sup>124</sup>

The thought that the first movement (prepassion or *propassio*) is a venial sin is dominant among thirteenth-century scholars such as Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 182-83.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 186-87.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 189.

Aquinas.<sup>125</sup> It was commonly accepted that St. Paul's struggle with desire in Rom. 7: 17 ("I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate," RSV) was in fact "pre-passion." Interestingly, Christ was thought to have (sinless) pre-passions (*propassiones*) but not passions (*passiones*).<sup>126</sup> Later, Aquinas, making a similar statement, says that Christ's passion has a beginning in the sensitive appetite but it does not affect his reason (*ST*, III, q. 15, a. 4 c). Many scholars including Albert the Great explained that this is possible in Christ because his human rational will was always in accordance with the divine will. However, Christ also had the human natural appetite. This explains the difficult moment Christ went through when he not only willed to follow the Father's will and but also willed to avoid death (Matthew 26: 37). According to the above scholars, Christ willed to follow the Father's will with his rational will, whereas he willed to avoid death with his natural appetite. Aquinas further developed this distinction later and said that while the "natural appetite" pursues good and avoids evil without deliberation the "rational will" does so with deliberation.<sup>127</sup>

Hugh of St Victor's (1096-1141) work on emotion, *De substantia dilectionis*, is worth mentioning. In this work, Hugh distinguishes two kinds of love (*amor*): love of worldly things (*cupiditas*), and love of noble things (*caritas*). Then he introduces a series of emotions in order of their generation. First, we have love as we have affection (*affectio*) for something. As we pursue the object of our love, we feel desire (*desiderium*). Once we attain the object of our love, we have joy (*gaudium*), which puts us to rest

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>126</sup> See my Chapter two, 64.

<sup>127</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 193-94.

(*requiescens*).<sup>128</sup> Later Aquinas presents individual (concupiscible) passions in a similar order (*ST*, I-II, qq. 26-39).

### 3.2.2 Medical Perspective on the Emotions

An attempt to explain the emotions from a medical point of view was also made in the early twelfth century.<sup>129</sup> A medical encyclopedia, the *Pantegni*, which was a partial translation of an Arabic medical encyclopedia,<sup>130</sup> analyzed the emotions in terms of the vital spirit, humors, heat, etc. It discusses the physiological changes that accompany the emotions. For example, joy and anger cause the vital spirit and heat to pour out from the heart toward the extremities of the body, whereas fear and distress cause the heart to withdraw them. Excess or deficiency of humors and spirit can lead to a psychic disorder. Emotions themselves can also cause and aggravate the sickness.<sup>131</sup>

The psychic disorder may be cured by balancing the humors and spirits. For example, to cure a timid person, who is considered “cold” with his humors and vital spirits withdrawn in the heart, it was suggested that the patient be made to feel joy or anger, since these emotions were thought to reverse the activity of the heart. Interestingly, two forms of treatment were used to cure the emotional condition of depression: the physical and the psychological. A physical treatment would be the patient engaging in a soothing activity, e.g., taking a bath. On the other hand, a psychological treatment would be making the patient experience an intense emotion such as anger. This dual approach to

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<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>130</sup> The translation was done by Constantine of Africa in the eleventh century.

<sup>131</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 213-14.

the emotional disorder reveals the fact that these thinkers thought that the body and the soul were somehow connected to one another.<sup>132</sup>

### 3.2.3 Avicenna

Aristotle's *De anima* and Avicenna's *De anima* were translated into Latin in the middle of the twelfth century. Avicenna's psychology was introduced into medieval Europe through the sixth book of his encyclopedia *Kitāb al-shifā'*.<sup>133</sup> This sixth book was translated into Latin under the title of *Liber de anima* or *Sextus de naturalibus*.<sup>134</sup>

Avicenna's book generated a lot of philosophical discussions on the emotions in late twelfth century. Avicenna incorporated Aristotle and Neo-Platonism into his original thoughts. According to him, plants (the vegetative soul) have three main powers—nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Animals (the sensitive soul) have the powers of cognition and movement in addition to the three vegetative powers. Human beings have other distinctive faculties in addition to the vegetative and sensitive faculties: theoretical reason, practical reason, and choice. Unlike the vegetative and sensitive souls, the human soul is subsistent, self-conscious, and immortal.<sup>135</sup>

Avicenna divides the sensitive soul into [1] the motive part and [2] the perceptive part.<sup>136</sup> The former ([1]) is further divided into [1-1] the voluntary part which controls

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 214.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 218-19.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

impulsive movement<sup>137</sup> and [1-2] the part which controls the muscles and tissues to initiate or curb the start of the bodily movement.<sup>138</sup> The voluntary part [1-1] is essentially the appetite and is divided into the concupiscible (faculty of desire) and the irascible (faculty of anger). According to Avicenna, when the imagination perceives a good to be either necessary or useful, it stirs up the appetite. The irascible is concerned with overcoming the difficulty in avoiding harmful things.<sup>139</sup> Let us look at Avicenna's discussion of this issue:

Now the motive faculty, in so far as it provides the impulse, is the faculty of appetite. When a desirable or repugnant image is imprinted on the imagination of which we shall speak before long, it rouses this faculty to movement. It has two subdivisions: one is called the faculty of desire which provokes a movement (of the organs) that brings one near to things imagined to be necessary or useful in the search of pleasure. The second is called the faculty of anger, which impels the subject to a movement of the limbs in order to repulse things imagined to be harmful or destructive, and thus to overcome them.<sup>140</sup>

Avicenna thought that the objects of the concupiscible were the contrary of those of the irascible. However, he did not think that there are contrary emotions within the concupiscible or the irascible part themselves.<sup>141</sup> This is different from Aquinas in whose system contrary pairs are found in both the concupiscible and irascible parts (*ST*, I-II, q.

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<sup>137</sup> Peter Heath, *Allegory and philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 61.

<sup>138</sup> Avicenna, *Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitāb al-nājat, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo Edition*, F. Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 25-26.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 223.

23). Another notable aspect of Avicenna's theory of the emotions, which again differs from Aquinas, is that joy and pleasure were regarded as cognitions or perceptions of something pleasant. In fact, Avicenna defines sensitive pleasure as perception of a natural appetite being fulfilled.<sup>142</sup>

Next, let us look at Avicenna's treatment of the perceptive part ([2]), which is divided into [2-1] the exterior sense and [2-2] the interior sense. There are five exterior senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. The exterior senses consist in the reception of the sensible "forms" (*formae*) from external things. Then Avicenna presents five interior senses<sup>143</sup>: the common sense (*fantasia* or *sensus communis*), the faculty of representation (*imaginatio*), the faculty of sensitive/rational imagination (*imaginativa comparatione animae vitalis/cogitativa comparatione animae humanae*), the estimative faculty (*vis extimativa*), and memory (*vis memoralis et reminiscibilis*). First, the forms received by the exterior senses are delivered (*redduntur*) to the interior senses by the common sense. The faculty of representation retains that which has been received by the common sense. The faculty of sensitive imagination, which is replaced by rational imagination in human beings, combines and separates various images in the faculty of representation. Next, the estimative faculty receives the "intentions" (*intentiones*). "Intentions" refer to the judgments or estimation that trigger our desire or repulsion of a

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 220.

<sup>143</sup> Avicenna, part I, c. 5, pp. 87-90 in Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. S. van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (I-III, Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1972; IV-V, Louvain: Éditions Orientalistes; Leiden: Brill, 1968). George P. Klubertanz gives a good treatment of this issue in *The Discursive Power* (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952), 89-106. He also provides a reliable translation of the related part in Avicenna's texts.

thing.<sup>144</sup> When an animal sees a thing, through the estimative faculty it judges the thing to be “good,” “evil,” “agreeable,” “disagreeable,” etc.<sup>145</sup> Lastly, there is memory, which retains what the estimative faculty has received, i.e., the intentions.<sup>146</sup>

Here Avicenna makes a very important distinction between “forms” (*formae*) and “intentions” (*intentiones*). According to him, while some interior senses merely receive the forms of the sensible things others perceive their intentions.<sup>147</sup> That is, some interior senses perceive the aspects of a thing which are “over and above” what the sensible forms can yield.<sup>148</sup> For example, upon seeing a wolf, a sheep receives the “forms” of the wolf, i.e., shape, color, etc. Then based on these “forms” the interior senses perceive something that the exterior senses could not receive, i.e., judgment on the harmfulness or usefulness of the wolf. This view has a great influence on Aquinas later (e.g., *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c).<sup>149</sup> Below is a summary chart of Avicenna’s exterior and interior senses.

[1] the motive	[1-1] the voluntary part (essentially the appetite)	[1-1-1] faculty of desire
		[1-1-2] faculty of anger
	[1-2] the part in charge of muscle control	
[2] the perceptive	[2-1] the exterior sense: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch	
	[2-2] the interior sense: common sense, representation, sensitive/rational imagination, the estimative faculty, memory	

<sup>144</sup> Avicenna, *Avicenna’s Psychology*, 30-31.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>146</sup> Avicenna, part I, c. 5, pp. 89-90 in Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 85-87.

<sup>148</sup> Christian Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 480.

<sup>149</sup> See my Chapter four, 158.

According to Avicenna, the appetite and the estimative power are the two principles of the actions of animals. The evaluation of the estimative power can either move or not move the appetite. If the appetite is moved, again it can be either mild or intense. If the appetite is mild, it does not necessarily result in an action. If the appetite is intense, it causes an action in non-human animals. However, this is not necessarily true in human beings; because of the higher powers in them, they are not always subject to urges of the appetite.<sup>150</sup>

For Avicenna, emotions are primarily emotions of the “spirit” because emotional incidents bring about a change in the heart and spirit.<sup>151</sup> He thought that some emotions are only found in human beings. This is because he thought that there is interaction between the active intellect and the estimative power. Since other animals have only the estimative power, which produces judgments based on past experiences or instincts, emotional reactions are more or less determined in other animals. On the other hand, human emotions possess a higher degree of cognition, e.g., sense of time, as is witnessed in complex emotions, e.g., hope. Avicenna did not think that the estimative power is the sole cause of the emotions; they can be also caused by the particular physiological condition of a person.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 221.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 222.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 224.

### 3.2.4 John of la Rochelle

A main concern among the early thirteenth-century philosophers in their treatment of the emotions was how to classify the individual emotions according to the division of the concupiscible and the irascible.<sup>153</sup> John of la Rochelle's (John of Rupella, d. 1274)<sup>154</sup> theory of the emotions was influential in this regard. According to him, an animal is moved to an action as a response to an external stimulus in the following way: The two (interior) powers, i.e., the imaginative power and the estimative power, move the concupiscible and the irascible in the appetite. Whereas the imaginative power presents the appetite with the sensible forms (*formae*) of the external things, the estimative power presents the intentions (*intentiones*) of the things, which are the aspects of the usefulness or harmfulness of the things. Upon this presentation the appetite can be moved to a physical action. This way the concupiscible and the irascible are immediate or direct causes of an action, as opposed to the two interior powers, which are indirect causes. The command of the concupiscible and the irascible is carried out by the movement of the muscles and nerves in the body, which results in a physical change. What is notable about the psychology of John of la Rochelle is that he did not think that the process of reaction to an external stimulus was the same in other animals and human beings. Whereas this reaction is almost automatic in other animals, it is not in human beings due to the possible intervention of the reason.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>154</sup> *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy N. Noone (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 334.

<sup>155</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 231.

John of la Rochelle's classification of the emotions is noteworthy. Let us first look at his classification of the concupiscible. Since he thought that the concupiscible is basically concerned with liking (*placentia*) and disliking (*displacentia*), the emotions in the concupiscible were paired up in the following way: concupiscence-loathing; desire-avoidance; joy-pain; delight-sadness; love-hate; envy-pity. Aquinas later adopts this classification of the concupiscible.<sup>156</sup> The irascible emotions were paired up as follows: ambition-meagerness of spirit; hope-despair; arrogance/dominance-humility; contempt-respect; courage/boldness-penitence/impatience/fear. Two further emotions, anger and magnanimity,<sup>157</sup> did not have contraries.<sup>158</sup>

### 3.2.5 Albert the Great

The appearance of commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* in 1240s invigorated the discussions on the emotions by the thirteenth century philosophers. The influence of Albert the Great (1200-1280) was considerable not only on his student Aquinas but also on the philosophers after Aquinas to the extent that his thought ("Albertism") had its own following.<sup>159</sup> His theory of the emotions was based on such diverse sources as Nemesius of Emesa, John Damascene, Avicenna, and Aristotle.<sup>160</sup> He regarded emotions as the acts of the sensitive motive powers (the appetite), which are moved by the estimative power. The object of the concupiscible power is the pleasurable and the painful. On the other

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 233.

<sup>157</sup> John of la Rochelle considers magnanimity as an emotion.

<sup>158</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 234.

<sup>159</sup> Simon Tugwell, *Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 38.

<sup>160</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 236.

hand, the object of the irascible power is the difficult and the harmful, as Albert explains in the following<sup>161</sup>:

Strictly speaking, the concupiscible is the power of the sensitive soul. Its proper (*proprius*) object (*finis*) is that which is delectable to the sense. The concupiscible “initiates” (*imperat*) a movement to attain this good. This is how Avicenna defines the concupiscible.<sup>162</sup>

We must say that the irascible, as it is defined by Avicenna, is diversified according as it is contrary to the concupiscible, and this is the part of the appetite which repels the harmful thing which is in the way of the appetite. With respect to the first objection we must say that what is harmful can be considered in two ways, in an absolute sense and in a qualified sense. Absolutely speaking, what is harmful is that which attempts to injure by violent opposition and destroy the whole substance. This is what the irascible is concerned with in its principal sense. Now in a qualified sense, what is harmful is what is contrary to the delectable of one power.<sup>163</sup>

Albert defined the passions primarily in terms of qualities, which is different from the view of Aquinas later, who usually describes the passions as “movements” (*De ver.*, q. 26, a. 2 sc 1). Albert says in *De bono* that the passions are the “qualities” which are caused by the movements of the soul. Then in his commentary on the *Liber de sex principiis*, he gives the meaning of “action” and “passion.” Action is referred to the

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<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>162</sup> *De homine*, ed. Henryk Anzulewicz and Joachim R. Söder, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, 27-2.494: 15-18 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008): “Solutio: Dicendum, quod concupiscibilis proprie loquendo est vis sensibilis animae, cuius proprius finis est delectabile in sensu, et imperat motum ad consecutionem illius: et hoc attendit Avicenna in diffinitione sua.”

<sup>163</sup> *De homine*, ed. Henryk Anzulewicz and Joachim R. Söder, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, 27-2.497: 25-38 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008): “Solutio: Dicendum quod irascibilis prout diffinitur ab Avicenna, e diverso dividitur contra concupiscibilem, et est pars appetitus repellens nocivum insurgendo contra ipsum. (1) Ad primum autem dicendum quod nocivum est duobus modis, scilicet simpliciter et secundum quid. Simpliciter nocivum est id quod violenter oppugnando nititur laedere et destruere totam substantiam, et contra hoc principaliter est irascibilis. Secundum quid autem nocivum est, quod contrarium est delectabili unius virtutis.”

change or movement caused by an agent. Passion refers to the reception of this change or movement. A single movement can be seen distinctly from the perspective of action or of passion. When a movement is considered from the aspect of action, one has to say that a potentiality of an agent has been actualized, for which reason the movement is called a “perfect” act. However, when the same movement is considered from the aspect of passion, the subject is thought to be moved to an end by the act of an agent, for which reason the movement is called an “imperfect” act this time.<sup>164</sup> Let us look at how Albert treats this issue.<sup>165</sup> First, he presents an objection, which is followed by his response.

However, they say that Aristotle seems to state that action and passion are the same in number, just as the way from Thebes to Athens and the way from Athens to Thebes is the same in number. Therefore, since action is the comparison (*comparatio*) of the agent to the patient, whereas passion is the reverse [*econtra*] comparison of the patient to the agent, it seems that action is the same in number as passion. Accordingly, these two principles should not be spoken of two but one and the same in number yet diverse with respect to the end points (*termini*).<sup>166</sup>

To the [above] objection that action and passion are the same, we must answer that they are not the same unless they are in matter whereby action is in the subject to which it is designated and in which the action terminates. This is the same very matter which is the subject of the passion. However, because of the sameness of matter we cannot say that the same formal principle pertains to action and passion. That action and passion have the same formal principle is impossible. For opposite formal modes pertain to action and passion. Because the formal mode of action is

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<sup>164</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 238.

<sup>165</sup> Aquinas discusses this in *In III Phys.*, 1.5 under the title of “whether action and passion are the same motion.” For my discussion of Aquinas’s treatment of this issue, see Chapter two, 74.

<sup>166</sup> *De sex principiis*, ed. Ruth Meyer, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, 1-2.17: 15-22 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2006): “Dicunt etiam, quod Aristoteles dicere videtur, quod actio et passio idem sunt numero, sicut via quae est a Thebis ad Athenas eadem numero est ea quae est ab Athenis ad Thebas; sic cum actio sit comparatio agentis ad patiens, et passio sit econtra comparatio patientis ad agens, videtur actio idem numero esse passio; et sic ista duo principia non sunt dicenda duo, sed unum et idem numero : diversa tamen per terminos.”

like imprinting (*imprimentis*) and influencing (*influentis*), whereas the formal mode of passion is like being impressed (*impressi*) and being influenced (*influxi*). Because of these significant nuances (*voces*) [we must say that] there are distinct categories (*praedicamenta*) or principles (*principia*) [regarding action and passion].<sup>167</sup>

Also, individual passions can be considered differently from the notion of passion and action, according to Albert. For example, hope can belong to both the category of action and that of passion. In the sense that hope is caused by the judgment of the estimative power, it belongs to the category of passion. On the other hand, given the fact that hope causes change in the heart and spirit as well as an external action, it pertains to the category of action. This way, emotions can be both passions and actions. Albert's view of the relationship between the evaluation of the estimative power and the emotion is also notable. He thought that an emotion persists so long as the evaluation of the estimative power exists.<sup>168</sup>

In the above I have given a brief sketch of the discussions of Aquinas's ancient and medieval predecessors on the emotions. In the following chapters, I will discuss Aquinas's treatment of the passions. As a first step, in Chapter two, I will investigate the passivity of the passions as it originates in the passive sensitive powers of the soul.

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<sup>167</sup> *De sex principiis*, ed. Ruth Meyer, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, 1-2.18: 5-17 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2006): "Quod autem obiicitur, quod eadem sit actio et passio, dicendum quod non sunt eadem nisi in material, quae quidem in qua est actio sicut in subiecto, ad quod dirigitur et ad quod terminatur actio agentis, et ipsa eadem materia quae subiectum est passionis. Propter talem autem materiae identitatem non oportet quod idem formale principium sit actionis et passionis, in quantum unum est actio et alterum est passio. Hoc enim impossibile est; oppositi enim modi formales sunt actionis et passionis, quia modus et forma actionis est sicut imprimentis et influentis, modus autem passionis est sicut impressi vel influxi, propter quod etiam voces haec significantes diversa sunt praedicamenta vel principia."

<sup>168</sup> Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 239.

## CHAPTER TWO: THE PASSIVITY OF PASSION ORIGINATING IN A PASSIVE POWER OF THE SOUL

### *Introduction*

This chapter will investigate the passivity of the passions of the soul (*passio animae*) due to its origination in a sensitive power of the soul, namely, the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*). This is an important step in the scheme of the whole dissertation, for it will clear the ground for the discussions in the subsequent chapters, which will delve into more specific aspects of the passions, such as the differences between the animal and human passions.

The present chapter will proceed in the following order. First, as an introduction to the topic, I will connect the passivity of the passions to the overall passivity of human beings. Here an important point will be made: the passivity of human passions cannot be interpreted as simple passivity as if it contained no active aspects. Second, different senses of *passio* or *pati* in Aquinas's texts will be presented. My examination of a wealth of connotations of the word *passio* or *pati* will lead to the conclusion that "passion proper" is the psychical passion (*passio animalis*) or the passions of the soul (*passio animae*), the *principium* of which is the activities within the soul. Third, I will discuss the passivity of the sensitive and appetitive powers. The purpose of this discussion is to shed light on the high degree of passivity in the sensitive appetite. This discussion will be

divided into two parts. In the first part, I am going to bring out the passivity of the sensitive part of the soul as opposed to the vegetative and intellectual parts. In the second part of the discussion, I will focus on the high degree of passivity in the appetitive part of the soul as opposed to the apprehensive part. This examination will finally lead us to the conclusion of the chapter that [1] the sensitive appetite, which derives passivity from both sources of the sensitive part as well as the appetitive part, has a high degree of passivity, and [2] this passive origin of the sensitive appetite accounts for the passivity of the passions.

### *1 The Passivity of the Human Being*

Before passion is discussed in a strict sense, it is important to note that passion is closely related to the particular existential situation of human beings: we are passive to the world in the first place. In fact, few human activities illustrate this particular situation of human beings better than that of the passions. The fact that human beings lack self-sufficiency implies at least two things. First, we constantly come under the influence of the external world, and second, we must turn to this world as the ground of our perfection. This process through which we let the world affect us is not so different from the way a small child grows into an adult by interacting with his surroundings. The orientation of human beings toward the world, which is, after all, the work of the Creator, is captured well by Wadell with the following words:

We are made to receive something. This is the heart of Aquinas's anthropology. We are not closed-off, self-sufficient individuals, but creatures of such poignant need that we are fashioned to be open, shaped to embrace all the goods that bless us with fuller life. We are made to be receptive, and such abiding openness to the goodness of others and life is the most basic and natural fact about us.<sup>1</sup>

Here it is crucial to note that human beings' lack of self-sufficiency as well as our striving for perfection is revealed primarily through our sensitive part. This is because we are in direct contact with the external world through our senses. The fact that even the highest part in a human being, namely, the intellect, has to depend on the senses bestows a primordial role on the sensitive part of a human being, especially as an individual interacts with the external world. Aquinas says, in agreement with Aristotle, that the original state of the human mind is such that it is blank with no innate ideas, for which reason it is famously compared to a clean tablet or *tabula rasa*.<sup>2</sup> In other words, according to Aquinas, human beings are at first in potency for sensitive apprehension as well as intellectual apprehension. In the case of sensitive apprehension by receiving the sensible forms from the sensible objects, and in the case of intellectual apprehension by acquiring knowledge through "instruction" and "discovery," human beings move from

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<sup>1</sup> Wadell, *The Primacy of Love*, 84-85.

<sup>2</sup> *ST*, I, q. 79, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.259-60): "Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est *sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum*, ut Philosophus dicit in III *de anima*." With the exception of the four Books of *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* all the works by Aquinas will be cited from the Leonine Edition (Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia*, Iussu Leonis XIII edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum [Rome, 1882ff]) unless otherwise noted.

the state of potentially knowing to that of actually knowing.<sup>3</sup> This view of Aquinas is different from that of Plato who thinks that human beings are endowed with innate ideas but are hindered from actually knowing due to the soul's unfortunate union with the body.<sup>4</sup> However, for Aquinas, even our knowledge of the first principles is not entirely independent of our sense knowledge.<sup>5</sup> For example, the first principle, "A whole is greater than a part," will only be understood after one has secured the understanding of the terms in the proposition, i.e., a whole and a part, the knowledge of which is acquired from sense experience.<sup>6</sup> In sum, the human mind for its lack of innate ideas must turn to the sensible world for its "raw" material. Thus, we can say that the external world is the

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<sup>3</sup> *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.318): "Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum reducitur, ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilibus in sensum; ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi species omnes." In *De ver.*, 11. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.351:306-14), Aquinas distinguishes two ways of acquiring knowledge. One is "discovery" (*discipliana*), in which one's natural reason acquires knowledge without being aided by an external agent. The other one is "instruction" (*inventio*), in which one's natural reason acquires knowledge with the aid of an external agent, a teacher. "Sicut ergo aliquis dupliciter sanatur, uno modo per operationem naturae tantum, alio modo a natura cum adminiculo medicinae, ita etiam est duplex modus acquirendi scientiam: unus quando naturalis ratio per seipsam devenit in cognitionem ignotorum, et hic modus dicitur inventio; alius quando naturali rationi aliquis exterius adminiculatur, et hic modus dicitur disciplina."

<sup>4</sup> This is the major theme of Plato's *Meno*.

<sup>5</sup> In *SCG*, 11, 1, c, Aquinas says that something like "seeds of knowledge" do pre-exist in the human mind. However, even these "seeds," namely the first principles of knowledge can only be known through the forms abstracted from the sensible things, which again confirms the fact that we have to turn to the sensible world to acquire knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1.94): "Et hujus ratio est, quia ea quae per se nobis nota sunt, efficiuntur nota statim per sensum; sicut visis toto et parte, statim cognoscimus quod omne totum est majus sua parte sine aliqua inquisitione. Unde philosophus, *I Posterior*, text. 24: 'Principia cognoscimus dum terminos cognoscimus.' Sed visis sensibilibus, non devenimus in Deum nisi procedendo, secundum quod ista causata sunt et quod omne causatum est ab aliqua causa agente et quod primum agens non potest esse corpus, et ita in Deum non devenimus nisi arguendo; et nullum tale est per se notum. Et haec est ratio Avicennae." However, it needs to be noted here that Aquinas's denial of innate ideas does not lead to the denial of the first undemonstrable principles, as Gilson says in *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (trans. Edward Bullough, [New York: Dorset Press, 1980], 246).

point of origin in human knowledge and that the sensitive apprehension plays the role of the material cause (*materia causae*) for human intellectual apprehension.<sup>7</sup>

The fact that the human intellect must depend on the sensitive powers such as the senses and imagination is significant, because, even though the intellect is an immaterial power, it is always open to the possibility of being affected by the external world, albeit in an indirect manner via the sensitive powers. More importantly, here we witness the important fact that the human passivity is in fact what enables an individual human being to connect to the external world. That is, even though the fact that even the highest part of a human being must turn to the sensitive powers and eventually to the external sensible world renders human beings passive in a certain respect, still, this also means that human beings cannot be really isolated from the world.<sup>8</sup> Rather, they are in constant communication with the world.

However, here one can say that the sensitive appetite, which is designated as the seat of the passions by Aquinas, can bring a human being even closer to the external world than the sense apprehension, since the appetite is a power by which a human being actually tends to the good found in the world.<sup>9</sup> This extraordinary role of passion is well expressed by Wadell with the following words:

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<sup>7</sup> *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.324): “Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.”

<sup>8</sup> This seems to be especially true in Aquinas’s realism, which holds that in sense experience the subject is connected to the external world with “direct epistemic access” rather than isolated in his “private mental episodes,” as Paul McDonald, Jr. says in “Direct Realism and Aquinas’s Account of Sensory Cognition,” *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 344 and 353.

<sup>9</sup> Aquinas’s explanation of the relationship between the sensitive appetite and an external thing is a recurrent theme. It is found, for example, in *ST*, I, q. 80, a. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.282): “Et haec superior

A passion is a sign of deficiency, a confession of need. The word passion signifies the need for further development, it speaks of incompleteness yearning for growth; however, it also recognizes that wholeness is not something we can bestow on ourselves, but is something we acquire through the agency of another. To say that love is the key to our moral deliverance, and to identify it as a passion, is to know that our perfection comes by receiving a good we not only lack, but by nature are incapable of giving ourselves. As human beings we stand in absolute need: we come to wholeness only by suffering a good other than our own.<sup>10</sup>

Given the fact that passion plays the role of a bridge between individual human beings and the external world, we cannot interpret passion as simple passivity. In the sense that passion is our reaction to the world in which we live, it carries some kind of active dimension with it. A good word that captures this double dimension is receptivity. As everyone knows what difference it makes to have a receptive listener as opposed to a passive one, receptivity is quite different from simple passivity. In this sense, receptivity may be defined as “active passivity.” In fact, the Greek root for passion is “to receive” (*patin, παθειν*).<sup>11</sup> Thus, when considered in itself, passion may be a disturbance to the soul, as the ancient Stoics thought, but considered in the complete picture of a human life, it takes on a quite different meaning. That is, passion can be a vital medium in which human beings respond to the call of the world, and eventually to that of the Creator, and

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inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam.” See 96ff of this dissertation for my further discussion of this issue.

<sup>10</sup> Wadell, *The Primacy of Love*, 87.

<sup>11</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.747: 160-63): “Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicuius quocumque modo et hoc sequendo significationem vocabuli, nam passio dicitur a patin graeco, quod est recipere.”

as much as passion is personal, our response to the world and to the Creator will be intimate and even creative.<sup>12</sup>

This subtle difference and interplay between pure passivity and activity/receptivity is extremely important throughout this dissertation. Since we have seen the place of the passions in human life at large, we will now proceed to discuss them in a stricter manner. In the next section, I will examine the diverse senses Aquinas employs when he uses the word *passio* (passion) and *pati* (to be acted upon).

## ***2 Different Senses of Passion***

Passion or *passio* is derived from the verb, *pati*, which has the following meanings: suffer, undergo, experience, endure, permit, etc.<sup>13</sup> As we can see from these dictionary meanings, the original meaning of passion is passivity. Hence, passivity refers to a state of being acted upon rather than that of acting, and *patiens* or a patient is someone who is suffering or undergoing a change. The English word “patient” still retains the original meaning of passion, i.e., one who has been affected by something. The negative connotation of the word *patient* as a person in an abnormal state who needs to recover is consistently present in the word *passion* as it appears in Aquinas, who says

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<sup>12</sup> Apart from Wadell’s *Primacy of Love*, a good treatment of this dimension of passion is found in Harak’s *Virtuous Passions*. Read especially the Preface in which he talks about what it means for a human being to be touched.

<sup>13</sup> D. P. Simpson, *Cassell’s New Latin Dictionary* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968).

that a change for the worse is more properly attributed to passion than a change for the better.<sup>14</sup>

Aquinas gives an array of different senses of passion mainly in the following places: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1; *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 26, aa. 1-3; *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, l. 11; *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 79, a. 2 and q. 97, a. 2; I-II, q. 22, a. 1; and q. 41, a. 1.<sup>15</sup> His treatment of different senses of passion can be summarized as follows. *Passio* or *pati* can be taken in two ways: [1] in a general way (*communiter*) and [2] in a strict or proper way (*proprie*).<sup>16</sup> [1] In the first sense, anything receptive of something is said to be passive (*recipere est pati*).<sup>17</sup> In other words, whatever is in potency under any respect can be said to be passive in this sense, since it is capable of change.<sup>18</sup> Accordingly, Aquinas says that this kind of passion is closer to being perfected (*perfici*) than to being passive (*pati*), since perfection is none other than the reduction of potency to act.

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<sup>14</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.168): “Passio autem cum abiectioe non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem: unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laetitia.”

<sup>15</sup> Whenever more than one text by Aquinas is quoted in this dissertation, it will be put in a chronological order, unless it is otherwise indicated. The dates of Aquinas’s works have been taken from Jean-Pierre Torrell’s *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

<sup>16</sup> Aquinas mentions yet another kind of passion, namely, passion in a metaphorical sense (*transumptive*) in *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.756: 231-39). It refers to the state in which a thing is kept from what is suitable for it. Since Aquinas does not treat this kind of passion consistently enough to bestow it a separate kind of passion, it is not included in the present discussion.

<sup>17</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.168): “Respondeo dicendum quod *pati* dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis proprie est perfici, quam pati.”

<sup>18</sup> *SCG*, I, 89 (Leon. ed., Vol. 13.240: 9-12): “Adhuc. Omnis passio est alicuius potentia existentis. Deus autem est omnino liber a potentia: cum sit purus actus. Est igitur agens tantum, et nullo modo aliqua passio in ipso locum habet.”

In accordance with this view, Aquinas, in *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, l. 11, correlates the relationship between the recipient and what is received to that of a potentiality and its actuality. What is interesting about this broad sense of passivity is that there is not contrariety (*contrarietas*) but rather similarity (*similitudo*) between the receiver and the giver. This is ascribed to the metaphysical principle that an agent bestows its likeness (*similitudo*) to the patient.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, there is a sense of contrariety between an agent and a patient in a strict kind of passion, as we will see below.

Even though the soul is immaterial—it is not composed of matter and form<sup>20</sup>—it is still said to be passive in this general sense, since it can still be further perfected through its operation.<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, the two apprehensive powers in the soul, namely, sensitive apprehension (*sentire*) and the intellectual apprehension (*intelligere*) are passive in this sense.<sup>22</sup> Also, the passivity and activity of the powers of different kinds of soul can be discussed with this notion of passion, which will be treated in greater detail in the

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<sup>19</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 11 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.112: 109-28): “Alio modo passio communiter dicitur et minus proprie, secundum scilicet quod importat quamdam receptionem; et quia quod est receptivum alterius, comparatur ad ipsum *sicut potentia ad actum*, actus autem est perfectio potentiae; et ideo hoc modo dicitur passio non secundum quod fit quaedam corruptio patientis, sed *magis* secundum quod fit quaedam *salus*, id est perfectio, *eius quod est in potentia, ab eo quod est in actu*: quod enim est in potentia non perficitur nisi per id quod est in actu: quod autem in actu est, non est contrarium ei quod est in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi, set magis simile (nam potentia nihil aliud est quam quidam ordo ad actum, nisi autem esset aliqua similitudo inter potentiam et actum, non esset necessarium quod proprius actus fieret in propria potentia), passio igitur sic dicta, non est a contrario sicut passio primo modo dicta, set est a *simili*, eo modo quo *potentia se habet secundum similitudinem ad actum*.”

<sup>20</sup> *ST*, I, q. 75, a. 5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.202).

<sup>21</sup> This kind of operation is called “immanent operation” as opposed to a “transient operation.” For the treatment of the difference between these two operations, see pp. 89ff of this dissertation.

<sup>22</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26. a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.755: 146-56); *ST*, I, q. 79, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.259); q. 97, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.432); and I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.168). For the clarification of different kinds of apprehension in the soul, see the table on page 18 in this dissertation.

subsequent sections (p.82ff).<sup>23</sup> Another interesting use of this general sense of passion is found in describing the first man, Adam, in the state of innocence, which is found in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 97, a. 2 c. Here Aquinas says that Adam was passive in a general sense but not in a proper sense. This is because the first man was unable to incur any sin originating from inordinate passions, which would render him passive in a proper sense of the word. Nevertheless, he was still subject to change for he had potentiality in him.<sup>24</sup>

[2] Secondly, passion can be taken in a strict or proper sense. Passion, in its proper sense, is only found in a corporeal being.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, bodily alteration (*transmutatio corporalis*) is a defining element of “passion proper.” Aquinas calls this body-associated passion the passion of the body (*passio corporis*). A good place to find Aquinas’s detailed account of *passio corporis* is *De veritate*, q. 26, aa. 1-3. In *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 2 sc 1, in support of his view that passion in a strict sense is *passio corporis*, Aquinas says that passion is motion in the line of alteration (*passio motus quidam est secundum alterationem*).<sup>26</sup> It seems that when Aquinas chooses the word

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<sup>23</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.755: 146-56): “Dicitur enim passio tripliciter, ut prius dictum est: uno modo communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati; et sic passio non est in qualibet parte animae, nec tamen solum in appetitiva sensitiva. Hoc enim modo accipiendo passionem, dicit Commentator in libro De anima quod vires animae vegetabilis omnes sunt activae, vires autem sensibilis omnes passivae, vires autem rationalis partim activae propter intellectum agentem, et partim passivae propter intellectum possibilem.”

<sup>24</sup> *ST*, I, q. 97, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.432): “Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie. . . -Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur *pati quoddam*. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis: poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset.”

<sup>25</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.752: 70-77): “Responsio. Dicendum quod proprie accipiendo passionem impossibile est aliquod incorporeum pati, ut supra ostensum est; illud ergo quod per se patitur passione proprie accepta, corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens.”

<sup>26</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 2 sc 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.752: 55-59).

*alteratio* to explain passion here, he is drawing on the physical implications of the word.<sup>27</sup> We can find strong evidence for this view in at least three places in his other texts: his commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Aristotle's *On the Soul*, and *Physics*. In *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, he says that alteration is closely connected to passion, and in *Sententia super Physicam*, V, ll. 1-2, he gives the exact meaning of *alteratio*, which he confirms in *Sententia libri De anima*, II, l. 11.

Let us first look at the earlier of the two, his *Sentences* commentary, to see how he relates *alteratio* to *passio*. Here he says that *alteratio* is the kind of a movement which is most properly said of passion. This is because alteration necessarily involves the following three characteristics in the altered (*alteratum*), all of which are congruent with the proper notion of passion: [a] First, the altered needs to be a thing which subsists. Otherwise, there will be no subject (*subjectum*) to which the motion is referred to. [b] Second, it has a body. [c] Third, the movement has the nature of contrariety (*contrarietas*), i.e., the change takes place in the altered in such a manner that the quality

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<sup>27</sup> One cannot adequately understand Aquinas's notion of passion without taking its "physical" language into serious consideration, as Stephen Loughlin has correctly points out in "A Response to Five Critiques" (p. 34). Aquinas's dependence on the physical terminology and its implications is evident in his treatment of the passions of the soul. For example, he consistently defines the passions of the soul as the motion (*motus*) of the sensitive appetite, which consists in a replacement of a quality by its contrary. Also, the two central terms used to describe passion, namely, an agent and a patient, are primarily physical terms. That is, with respect to a physical movement, an agent (*agens*) refers to that which initiates motion, and a patient (*patiens*) is that which receives the motion. Aquinas often replaces the terms, "an agent" and "patient," with another set of physical terms, namely, "the mover" and "the moved" respectively, which reveals his intention to explain passion with some physical principles. For example, in *De ver.*, a. 26, q. 3 ad 4 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.757: 281-87), Aquinas says that the senses as passive powers are the moved whereas the external sensibles as agents are the mover: "Sensus autem comparatur ad sensibile sicut patiens ad agens, eo quod sensibile transmutat sensum; quod autem sensibile aliquando a sensu transmutetur, hoc est per accidens, in quantum ipsum organum sensus habet aliquam qualitatem per quam natum est immutare aliud corpus."

which has been removed and another quality which has been received in its place are contrary to each other.<sup>28</sup>

Let us now turn to the later work, his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* for the exact meaning of alteration. The reading of Book V, Lectures 1-4 yields us the fact that Aquinas employs physical terms and their implications to account for a proper kind of passion. First, in Lecture 2 he explains how Aristotle distinguishes three terms that are used to refer to change: mutation (*mutatio*), motion (*motus*), and alteration (*alteratio*). *Mutatio* has the broadest usage among the three and is divided into three species: (1) change from subject (*subjectum*) to non-subject (*non subjectum*), (2) change from non-subject to subject, and (3) change from subject to subject. The first two denote a substantial change, which is why they are called "corruption" (*corruptio*) and "generation" (*generatio*) respectively. On the other hand, the third change refers to the kind of change in which only a part of the subject undergoes change. Aristotle particularly calls this "subject to subject change" "motion" (*motus*). Here, as in his *Sentences* commentary, Aquinas, in agreement with Aristotle, says that only alteration is the kind of change that takes place between the two termini of contraries (*termini secundum contrarietatem*). The changes of generation and corruption happen between the

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<sup>28</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 (Moos ed., Vol. 3.483): (My numbering) "Respondeo dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod cum dicit Damascenus (lib. II, c. 22; G. 94, 941) quod '*passio est motus ab uno in aliud*,' non quilibet motus est passio, sed solum *alteratio*, proprie loquendo, ut dicit Philosophus in I *De generat.* (a. 4. 319b, 10sq.) quia in hoc solo motu aliquid a re abjicitur et aliquid imprimitur, quod est de ratione passionis. *Motus enim localis* est secundum id quod est extra rem, quod est locus; *motus autem augmenti* est secundum hoc quod ex eo quod jam est, scilicet nutrimento, producitur augmentatum in majorem quantitatem. *Ad hoc autem quod sit alteratio, requiritur ex parte alterati* [a] *quod sit res per se subsistens* aliter enim subjectum motus esse non posset; et [b] *quod sit corpus* quia solum tale movetur, ut in VI *Phys.* (ζ 4. 234b, 10; l. 5. n. 10), probatur; et ulterius [c] *quod habeat naturam contrarietati subjectam*, quia alteratio est motus inter contrarias qualitates."

two termini of contradictories (*termini secundum contradictionem*).<sup>29</sup> Now this is resonant with Aquinas in his treatment of *passio corporis* in *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 3 c where he says that a proper kind of passion is found when a quality is lost and a contrary quality (*unum contrarium*) is received in its place.<sup>30</sup>

After clarifying the meaning of motion in Lectures 2 and 3, in the same Book Aquinas divides motion into three kinds: (1) motion in quantity, (2) motion in quality, and (3) motion in location. Among these, motion in quality, which is called “alteration,” is particularly interesting to us. The quality (*qualitas*), with which alteration is concerned, refers to the category of quality in Aristotle’s ten categories (*praedicamenta*). However, four different meanings can come under this category of quality. Aristotle says that the kind of quality which he discusses here with regard to alteration is the sensible qualities, which is the third species of the category of quality and is also called passive qualities.<sup>31</sup> Hence, with this explication we can now define alteration as a motion with respect to sensible qualities. Here we see the link between *alteratio* and a proper kind of passion. Since a proper kind of passion must involve a bodily change, which is none other than a

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<sup>29</sup> *In V Phys.*, l. 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.238.11): “Omnis enim motus est mutatio ab una specie determinata in aliam speciem determinatam. Et similiter generatio et corruptio, quae condividuntur motui, habent determinatos terminos: sed est differentia intantum quod generatio et corruptio sunt in terminum oppositum *sic*, idest secundum contradictionem; sed motus est in terminum oppositum *non similiter*, sed secundum contrarietatem.”

<sup>30</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.755: 169-73): “Alio modo dicitur passio proprie, quae consistit in abiectione unius contrarii et alterius receptione per viam transmutationis; et hic modus passionis animae convenire non potest nisi ex corpore.”

<sup>31</sup> Aquinas explains what Aristotle means by “quality” with regard to alteration later *In VII Phys.*, ll. 4-5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.334-40). The four meanings that come under the category of quality are (1) habit and disposition; (2) natural power or lack of power; (3) passion or sensible qualities; and (4) quality with respect to quantity, i.e., form and figure. These four are derived from Aristotle’s classification in his *Categories* (8, 9a 28-10a 10), which is as follows: (1) states and conditions; (2) anything which they are called in virtue of natural capacity or incapacity; (3) affective qualities and affections, e.g., sweetness, bitterness, hotness, coldness, etc.; and (4) shape and external form of each thing.

change in sensible qualities, we can now say that the change which denotes a proper kind of passion is alteration.

The above idea is confirmed in *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, l. 11. Here Aquinas says, in accordance with Aristotle, that when someone undergoes a metaphysical change (i.e., when he becomes more perfect by transiting from the state of merely having knowledge about certain things to that of actually exercising the knowledge here and now), we cannot call this change an alteration in the proper sense of the word, as we would for a person (physically) building a house.

Let us now return to the discussion of *passio corporis*. *Passio corporis* can be considered further in two aspects.<sup>32</sup> [2-1] First, it can be considered from the perspective of whether the change brought about by passion is suitable for the subject. [2-2] Again, it can be considered in terms of the relation the soul has to the body. Each of them is subdivided into two kinds.

[2-1] Aquinas's treatment of passion from the former perspective is largely found in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 79, a. 2 and I-II, q. 22, a. 1. Now depending on the suitability of the alteration to the thing, we have two kinds of passion. [2-1-1] One is found when the subject of passion loses a quality which is suitable (*conveniens* or *connaturalis*) to him. Aquinas's example of this kind of passion is when someone falls sick as a result of losing what is suitable to him, namely, health. [2-1-2] The other kind of change is found when the subject of passion loses a quality that is not suitable (*non conveniens*) to him.

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<sup>32</sup> Notice the difference between the passion of the body (*passio corporis*) and bodily passion (*passio corporalis*). *Passio corporis* is a generic term referring to the passion in a strict sense, which pairs up with passion in a general sense. *Passio corporalis* is a sub-set of *passio corporis*, which pairs up with *passio animalis*.

Aquinas's example here is a person recovering health by losing the unsuitable or unnatural disposition, namely, illness.

Between these two, passion is more properly said of a change for the worse. This is because when someone is drawn to something that does not belong to him, he appears more *driven*, thus passive, than when he is drawn to something that is suitable for him.<sup>33</sup>

Aquinas includes a change for the worse as one of the characteristics which are associated with most proper kind of passion, which is treated in detail in two places: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 and *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 26, a. 8 c. In the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, which is the earlier of the two, he points out two situations which particularly bring out the proper notion of passion. The first situation is when the introduced quality is brought from *without* (*qualitas extranea*). And the other situation is when the removed quality is suitable (*connaturalis*) for the subject.<sup>34</sup> Then in *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 8 c, we see an expansion of his thought. He presents four characteristics that are attributed to *passion proper* here. [a] First, the kind of passion that follows from something harmful rather than beneficial is more properly said to be passion. In this sense, sadness (*tristitia*) is more properly passion than joy (*gaudium*). [b] Second, the kind of passion that is initiated

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<sup>33</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.168): “Alio modo dicitur pati proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectioe. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est conveniens rei: sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. -Alio modo, quando e converso contingit: sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur ad aliud trahi.”

<sup>34</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 (Moos ed., Vol. 3.484): “Sed ulterius ad rationem passionis *requiritur quod qualitas introducta sit extranea, et qualitas abiecta sit connaturalis*. Quod contingit ex hoc quod passio importat quamdam victoriam agentis super patiens.”

from outside rather than from an internal principle, namely, from the decision of the will, is more strictly said to be passion. In this sense, the (sensible) desire aroused by chocolate cake is more properly said of passion than the (rational) desire to help the poor, which is the result of the decision of the will. [c] Third, the kind of passion found in someone who is *wholly* transformed rather than partially is passion in a more proper sense. In this sense, the one whose rational capacity is disturbed by passion on a sensitive level—this seems to be the case of the possessed—carries more of the proper notion of passion than the one who only suffers in his low appetite. In particular, this latter kind of passion is called *propassion* (*propassio*), and Christ’s passion belongs here, since it only stays in the sensitive level and does not disturb the reason.<sup>35</sup> [d] Fourth, the kind of passion that brings about a vehement transformation rather than a mild one. In this sense, the one who is led into an intensive activity demonstrates a more proper kind of passion than the one who is merely interested in his work.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Aquinas’s presentation of the passion of Christ is found in *ST*, III, q. 15, a. 4 c (Leon ed., Vol. 11.189) as well. Here he points out the three ways passion existed in Christ different from other human beings. His passion is called “*propassion*,” and although it has a beginning in the sensitive appetite, it does not affect his reason: “*Sciendum tamen quod huiusmodi passiones aliter fuerunt in Christo quam in nobis, quantum ad tria. Primo quidem, quantum ad obiectum. Quia in nobis plerumque huiusmodi passiones feruntur ad illicita: quod in Christo non fuit. Secundo, quantum ad principium. Quia huiusmodi passiones frequenter in nobis praeveniunt iudicium rationis: sed in Christo omnes motus sensitivi appetitus oriebantur secundum dispositionem rationis. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod hos motus, certissimae dispensationis gratia, ita cum voluit Christus suscepit animo humano, sicut cum voluit factus est homo. Tertio, quantum ad effectum. Quia in nobis quandoque huiusmodi motus non sistunt in appetitu sensitivo, sed trahunt rationem. Quod in Christo non fuit: quia motus naturaliter humanae carni convenientes sic ex eius dispositione in appetitu sensitivo manebant quod ratio ex his nullo modo impediatur facere quae conveniebant.*”

<sup>36</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 8 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.775-77: 93-185): (My numbering) “*Ad dictorum autem evidentiam sciendum est quod huiusmodi affectiones animi quatuor differentiis distingui possunt, secundum quam distinctionem magis vel minus proprie passionis rationem habent. [a] Primo ex hoc quod aliquis afficitur passione animi per id quod est contrarium sive nocivum vel per id quod est conveniens et proficuum; et magis salvatur ratio passionis quando affectio sequitur ex nocivo quam si sequatur ex proficuo, propter hoc quod passio importat quamdam transmutationem patientis a sua naturali dispositione*

[2-2] Next we have a proper kind of passion which is attributed to the fact that the soul is united to the body. Aquinas discusses this kind of passion in *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 and *De veritate*, q. 26, aa. 1-3. Since his view is presented in a more organized fashion in his later work, *De veritate*, I will base my explanation upon this text. As has been said earlier, because passion is the movement of a corporeal power, i.e., the sensitive appetite, it is always accompanied by a bodily alteration (*mutatio corporalis*). Thus, the human soul, since it is immaterial, does not

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in contrariam dispositionem. Et inde est quod dolor et tristitia et timor, et aliae huiusmodi passiones quae sunt respectu mali habent rationem passionis magis quam gaudium et amor et alia huiusmodi quae sunt respectu boni; quamvis in his etiam ratio passionis salvetur, secundum quod cor per huiusmodi dilatatur vel accenditur vel qualitercumque disponitur aliter quam sit eius communis dispositio, unde ex huiusmodi affectionibus aliquem mori contingit. [b] Secundo per hoc quod passio totaliter est ab extrinseco vel est ab aliquo principio intrinseco; magisque salvatur ratio passionis quando est ab extrinseco quam quando est ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco quidem est quando passio subito concitatur ex occurso alicuius convenientis vel nocivi, ab intrinseco autem quando ex ipsa voluntate passiones istae causantur per modum qui dictus est; et tunc non sunt subitae cum sequantur iudicium rationis. [c] Tertio ex hoc quod aliquid vel totaliter transmutatur vel non totaliter: quod enim aliquo modo alteratur et non totaliter transmutatur, non ita proprie pati dicimus sicut quod totaliter in contrarium transmutatur; magis enim proprie dicimus hominem pati infirmitatem si totum corpus eius infirmetur, quam si morbus accidat in aliqua eius parte. Tunc autem totaliter homo per huiusmodi affectus transmutatur quando non solum sistunt in appetitu inferiori, sed trahunt ad se et superiorem; quando vero in solo appetitu inferiori sunt, tunc homo immutatur eis quasi secundum partem, unde sic dicuntur propassiones, primo autem modo passiones. [d] Quarto per hoc quod transmutatio est remissa vel intensa: remissae enim transmutationes minus proprie passiones vocantur; unde Damascenus dicit in III libro ‘Non omnes motus passivi passio vocantur, sed qui sunt vehementiores, et in sensum procedentes: qui enim sunt parvi et insensibiles, nondum passiones sunt.’ Sciendum est ergo quod in hominibus in statu viae, si sunt peccatores, sunt passiones respectu boni et respectu mali quandoque quidem non solum praevisae sed subitae et intensae et frequenter etiam perfectae; unde dicuntur ‘passionum sectatores’ in I Ethicorum. In iustis vero nunquam sunt perfectae, quia ratio in eis nunquam deducitur a passionibus; sunt tamen vehementes in imperfectis, sed in perfectis sunt debiles, inferioribus viribus per habitum virtutum moralium refrenatis; habent tamen passiones non solum praevisas sed subitas, et non solum respectu boni, sed respectu mali. In beatis vero et in homine in primo statu, et in Christo secundum statum infirmitatis huiusmodi passiones nunquam sunt subitae, eo quod propter perfectam oboedientiam in eis inferiorum virium ad superiores nullus motus exurgit in appetitu inferiori nisi secundum dictamen rationis; unde dicit Damascenus in III libro ‘non praecedebant in Domino voluntatem naturalia; volens enim esurivit, volens timuit,’ etc. Et similiter intelligendum est de beatis post resurrectionem et de hominibus in primo statu. Sed hoc interest quod in Christo non solum fuerunt passiones respectu boni, sed respectu mali; habebat enim corpus passibile, et ideo ex imaginatione nocivi naturaliter passio timoris et tristitiae et huiusmodi in eo poterant esse. Sed in primo statu et in beatis non potest esse apprehensio alicuius ut nocivi; et ideo in eis non est passio nisi respectu boni, sicut amor, gaudium, et huiusmodi, non autem tristitia vel timor aut ira vel aliquid tale. Sic ergo concedimus, veras passiones in Christo fuisse: unde dicit Augustinus, XIV De civitate Dei: Christus ‘hos motus certissime dispensationis gratia ita cum voluit suscepit animo humano, sicut cum voluit factus est homo.’”

have passion *per se*. However, because it enters a substantial union with the body, it can suffer, albeit indirectly (*per accidens*). Now according to the way it is related to the body, we have two kinds of passion. [2-2-1] The first kind of passion is found when the soul is related to the body as its form (*ut forma*). Soul and body are united as one being (*compositum* or *coniunctum*) in which the soul is the form of the body. As the form of the body the soul is the ultimate principle through which it gives life (*vivificans*) to the body.<sup>37</sup> Now the soul is affected by this kind of passion, because all the powers of a living thing, after all, are rooted (*radicantur*) in the essence of the soul.<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, Aquinas says that this kind of passion originates in the body and terminates in the soul, which is why it is given the name, bodily passion (*passio corporalis*).<sup>39</sup> Bodily passion arises as follows: When the body is hurt, the soul apprehends the pain with the sense of touch,<sup>40</sup> which is the primary sense in animals.<sup>41</sup> Because the soul is united to the body as

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<sup>37</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.752: 77-80) and *ST*, I, q. 97, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.433). This view of the soul as the first principle of life goes all the way back to Aristotle (*On the Soul* I, 1 [402a 5-9]). For a good source of this topic, see Kretzmann's "Philosophy of Mind" in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas* (ed. Norman Kretzmann and Elenore Stump. [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.], 128-59.) See especially the first section (pp. 128-31), "Soul as the First Principle of Life."

<sup>38</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.755-56: 179-204): "Passio igitur corporalis praedicta pertingit ad potentias secundum quod in essentia animae radicantur, eo quod anima secundum essentiam suam est forma corporis, et sic ad essentiam animae primo pertinet."

<sup>39</sup> According to Aquinas, this bodily passion was in Christ because He had a perfect human body, which meant His body was passible and mortal (*De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 1 [Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.756: 240-46]; *ST*, III, q. 15, a. 4 [Leon. ed., Vol. 11.189]). For an extensive treatment of this kind of passion, see Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2002).

<sup>40</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 9 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.757-58: 365-76): "Ad nonum dicendum, quod tristitia et dolor hoc modo differunt, quod tristitia est quaedam passio animalis, incipiens scilicet in apprehensione nocimenti et terminatur in operatione appetitus, et ulterius in transmutatione corporis; sed dolor est secundum passionem corporalem; unde Augustinus dicit, XIV De civitate Dei quod 'dolor usitatus in corporibus dicitur'; et ideo incipit a laesione corporis et terminatur in apprehensione sensus tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente, ut dictum est."

<sup>41</sup> *In II De an.*, 1.3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.80: 213-20): "*Sensuum autem* etc., ostendit quod inter alios sensus primo inest tactus animalibus. Quod probat ex hoc quod *sicut vegetativum potest separari a tactu et ab*

its form, the soul suffers when the body suffers, since the suffering of the body in turn weakens its union with the soul. We experience this kind of passion when we have difficulty in thinking clearly as a result of acute tooth pain. Bodily passion illustrates the fact that the soul is *really* united to the soul and is not entirely free from the influence of the overall disposition of the body.

[2-2-2] The second subset of *passio corporis* is found due to the fact that the soul is related to the body as its mover (*ut motor*). In this case, the soul is affected while operating its powers, which involves the body either directly or indirectly.<sup>42</sup> Thus, here the progression of the passion in question is the reverse of that of the bodily passion: it originates in the soul and terminates in the body. This kind of passion is triggered by the activities within the soul (*psyche*), i.e., apprehensive and appetitive activities, which is why it is called “psychical passion” (*passio animalis*).<sup>43</sup> The process of psychical passion is as follows. First, the soul—the sensitive apprehension, to be precise—apprehends a sensible thing either as good or evil. Then the sensitive appetite, which follows upon the sensitive apprehension, either pursues or shuns the object. Because the sensitive appetite is a power using a corporeal organ, this kind of passion is always accompanied by some kind of a physiological alteration. For example, the moment I recognize a dark object as a

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*omni sensu, sic tactus potest separari ab aliis sensibus: multa enim sunt animalia quae solum sensum tactus habent, sicut animalia imperfecta, omnia autem animalia habent sensum tactus.*”

<sup>42</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.752: 70-77): “Dicendum quod proprie accipiendo passionem impossibile est aliquod incorporeum pati, ut supra ostensum est, illud ergo quod per se patitur passione proprie accepta corpus est. Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens.”

<sup>43</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 9 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.780: 118-28): “Loquendo vero de passione animali, in illa sola parte animae potest esse tristitia quae est proprie passio animalis, ex cuius obiecto tristitia contingit, per cuius apprehensionem et appetitum tristitia contingit.” Here I have used Robert Schmidt’s translation of “animalis.” Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), 8.

bear while walking in a wooded area, there will be a drastic change in my physiological composition, such as the level of my adrenalin. Hence, the seat of the psychical passion must be a power which employs a corporeal organ, for the exercise of a corporeal organ results in a bodily alteration. Accordingly, the intellect cannot be the seat of the psychical passion, since it is not a corporeal power. Sensitive apprehension is also eliminated as the seat of psychical passion, because, even though it is a power on a corporeal level, it does not directly cause a bodily alteration. In fact, the sensitive apprehension can only move by means of the sensitive appetite.<sup>44</sup> Through this process of elimination Aquinas arrives at the sensitive appetite as the proper seat of psychical passion, because it not only employs a corporeal organ (since it is on a sense level) but also brings about a movement in the body (since it is an appetite which causes an external action).<sup>45</sup> In this way, Aquinas concludes that psychical passion is only found in the sensitive appetite of the soul and that it is the most proper kind of passion. The following table will help summarize my presentation of the diverse meanings of passion so far.

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<sup>44</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.756:204-220): “Passio vero animalis, cum per eam ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adiungitur, et cuius est corpus transmutare. Et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est alicuius organi corporalis actus; nec iterum est in apprehensiva sensitiva, quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva, quae est immediatum movens. Unde secundum modum operationis eius statim disponitur organum corporale, scilicet cor, unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur. Unde in ira fervet, et in timore quodammodo frigescit et constringitur.” See also *ST*, I, q. 20, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.153).

<sup>45</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.170): “Ad secundum dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exteriorem pervenimus ad consequendas res.”

## &lt;passion/passio&gt;

[1] passion in a broad sense	[2] passion in a strict sense/body-associated passion ( <i>passio corporis</i> )			
	[2-1] depending on the suitability of the change brought about by passion		[2-2] depending on the way the soul is united to the body	
	[2-1-1] passion accompanied with a suitable change	[2-1-2] passion accompanied with an unsuitable change	[2-2-1] <i>passio corporalis</i> : when the soul is united as a form	[2-2-2] <i>passio animalis/passio animae</i> : when the soul is united as a motor

As we can see in the table above, passion can be discussed in two ways, namely, in a broad sense and in a strict sense ([1] and [2]). And a strict sense of passion can be discussed in two different aspects ([2-1] and [2-2]), each of which is further divided into two kinds. Boxes [2-1-2] and [2-2-2] have been shaded to illustrate the fact that they are more properly said of passion than their counterparts, namely, [2-1-1] and [2-2-1]. The most proper kind of passion is found when [2-1-2] and [2-2-2] concur.

So far I have presented the rich connotations of the word “passion.” In the following section I will discuss the passive and active powers of the soul and show how they are related to the passions of the soul.

### *3 Passive Powers and Active Powers*

In this section, I am going to discuss what Aquinas means by passive powers as well as active powers. As the first step in my investigation, I will consider the metaphysical background of the word, *potentia*, which is the Latin word for power as well as potency. In *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, V, l. 14 and IX, l. 1, Aquinas, in agreement with Aristotle, says that being can be considered in two ways. [1] First, being can be considered as predicated by ten categories. These categories or *praedicamenta* consist of the most primary category of substance (*substantia*), which usually takes the place of the subject, and nine other categories, which predicate the subject analogously. [2] Next, being can be considered under the aspect of act (*actus*) and potency (*potentia*), since not every being is in act, but some beings are in act whereas some are not, which is *potentially* to be in act. Now this second consideration of being is more pertinent to our present discussion, for active and passive powers of the soul denominate being in such a way that they are in potency either to act (in the case of active powers) or to be acted upon (in the case of passive powers).

### 3.1 Diverse Senses of “*Potentia*”

Since *potentia* can mean different things, I will first discuss its diverse meanings in Aquinas.<sup>46</sup> Let us visit one of his earlier works, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1 c and ad 1, where he distinguishes two senses of *potentia*. [1] First, there is the primary sense of *potentia*, which refers to the power which enables the subject to resist the influence exerted on it by an external agent. This is the sense of *potentia* we employ when we normally talk about the power of a human being (*potestas hominis*). Using Aquinas’s example, a hard (*durus*) thing, such as an iron bar, is said to have *potentia*, since it is not easily cut by another thing, such as a knife. [2] Next, there is a transferred (*translatum*) sense of *potentia*, which refers to a thing’s capacity for receiving an action from an agent. This kind of *potentia* is specifically called *potentia passiva* or passive potency. What is interesting in these two senses of *potentia* is that they denote almost opposite conditions or dispositions of a thing. That is, while the *potentia* in the former case is the principle by which a thing can resist the impact of an external agent, the *potentia* in the latter case is the principle by which a thing receives the impact of an external thing. Hence, the same iron bar, which was considered to have *potentia* in the former case, would be considered to be without *potentia* in the latter case.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> In *In V Meta.*, l. 14 Aquinas actually introduces yet another kind of *potentia*, a metaphorical use of the word, as when we say the number 3 *can* be the number 9 through multiplication. Since this use of *potentia* is far removed from the original use of the word, it is excluded in the present discussion.

<sup>47</sup> Whereas the Latin term *potentia* can refer to its two fold meaning of being powerful and being in potency, its two possible English translations of “power” and “potency” fail to do so. To clarify this confusion, it might be helpful to render the primary and secondary senses of *potentia* as “ability” and “capacity,” respectively, as King suggests. Peter King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas’s Moral Theory* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 102.

Aquinas again brings out the notion of *potentia passiva* when he distinguishes it from *potentia activa* in his later works. First, in *De veritate*, q. 11, a. 1 c, he says that natural things can have two kinds of potency. [1] First, a natural thing can have an “active, completed potency” (*potentia activa completa*).<sup>48</sup> In this case, the thing has an intrinsic principle which can have sufficient power to bring it from potency to act. In this case, the external agent only plays the role of assisting the internal agent by providing it with the means to act.<sup>49</sup> This is why Aquinas says in his later work, *De potentia* (1. 1), that this kind of passive potency corresponds to an act taken as an operation (*operatio*), which Aquinas designates as a primary sense of an act. Aquinas’s example of an active potency is the case of healing. Let us say that I am sick and resorting to the doctor for help. In this case, it seems as though the doctor, an external agent, is healing me. However, strictly speaking, according to Aquinas, unless I am in a fatal condition, the doctor is merely assisting the principal agent, i.e., my natural body, in restoring my health. The doctor often prescribes some medicine, but it is none other than the *means* by which nature restores itself. [2] Next, a natural thing can have a passive potency (*potentia passiva*). In this case, the thing does not have an internal principle which has sufficient

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<sup>48</sup> The English translation I have used here is James V. McGlynn’s. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994).

<sup>49</sup> *De ver.*, q. 11, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.351: 280-303): “Sciendum tamen est, quod in rebus naturalibus aliquid praeexistit in potentia dupliciter: uno modo in potentia activa completa, quando scilicet principium intrinsecum sufficienter potest perducere in actum perfectum, sicut patet in sanatione: ex virtute enim naturali quae est in aegro aeger ad sanitatem perducitur: alio modo in potentia passiva, quando scilicet principium intrinsecum non sufficit ad educendum in actum, sicut patet quando ex aere fit ignis: hoc enim non poterat fieri per aliquam virtutem in aere existentem. Quando igitur praeexistit aliquid in potentia activa completa, tunc agens extrinsecum non agit nisi adiuvando agens intrinsecum et ministrando ei ea quibus possit in actum exire; sicut medicus in sanatione est minister naturae quae principaliter operatur, confortando naturam et apponendo medicinas quibus velut instrumentis natura utitur ad sanationem. Quando vero aliquid praeexistit in potentia passiva tantum, tunc agens extrinsecum est quod educit principaliter de potentia in actum; sicut ignis facit de aere, qui est potentia ignis, actu ignem.”

power to bring it from potency to act. Thus, the intervention of an external agent is essential in the transition from potency to act in this case. Again, this is why Aquinas says in the *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, 1, 1 that *potentia passiva* corresponds to act as a form (*forma*) or the principle of operation (*operatio*), which Aquinas designates as a transferred sense of act. Using Aquinas's example, a combustible thing, e.g., a piece of paper, cannot burn on its own. Lacking an internal principle of burning, it needs to be set on fire by an external agent, e.g., a lighter.

Aquinas's treatment of the diverse meanings of *potentia* is expanded in *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, V, l. 14. Here he presents four senses of *potentia* or *potestas*.<sup>50</sup> [1] First, *potentia* can refer to a principle of performing an act not merely in any way at all but *well* or as it is intended.<sup>51</sup> For example, we often take a person who can sing well as someone who is *able* to sing. Of course, this does not mean that he is the only human being who has the capacity for singing, but under this *ratio* of *potentia* he is one of those talented individuals who can sing well or in the way they want. [2] Second, *potentia* can refer to habits, dispositions, or forms which are the principle of not being able to be affected at all or not being easily changed for the worse by another thing.<sup>52</sup> This is the

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<sup>50</sup> I have rearranged the order of the appearance of the four senses of *potentia* for a better understanding.

<sup>51</sup> *In V Meta.*, l. 14: "Tertium modum ponit ibi amplius alia dicit, quod alia potestas dicitur, quae est principium faciendi aliquid non quocumque modo, sed bene, aut secundum *praeuoluntatem*, idest secundum quod homo disponit. Quando enim aliqui progrediuntur vel loquuntur, sed non bene, aut non secundum quod uolunt, dicuntur non posse loqui aut progredi. Et *similiter est in pati*. Dicitur enim aliquid posse pati illud quod bene potest pati. Sicut dicuntur aliqua ligna combustibilia, quia de facili comburuntur, et incombustibilia, quae non possunt de facili comburi."

<sup>52</sup> *In V Meta.*, l. 14: "Quartum modum ponit ibi amplius quicumque dicit, quod etiam potestates dicuntur omnes habitus sive formae vel dispositiones, quibus aliqua dicuntur vel redduntur omnino impassibilia, vel immobilia, aut non de facili mobilia in peius. Quod enim in peius mutantur, sicut quod frangantur, vel curuentur, vel conterantur, vel qualitercumque corrumpantur, non inest corporibus per aliquam potentiam, sed magis per impotentiam et defectum alicuius principii, quod corrumpenti resistere non potest. Nunquam

sense with which we call someone powerful when referring to his physical power. For example, a healthy person is said to have *potentia* in this sense, for his strength will keep him from being destroyed by a harmful external influence. As we can see, this sense of *potentia* has the same reference as the primary sense of *potentia* in *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, c and ad 1 (p. 72). [3] The third sense of *potentia* refers to a principle of “change in some other thing as other (*motus et mutationis in alio in quantum est aliud*).”<sup>53</sup> This is the principle by which something acts upon something else. This kind of *potentia* is specifically called *potentia activa* or active potency. Let us think about the case of building a house. Under this *ratio* of *potentia* the principle of building is not in the house being built but in the person building it, namely, the builder. [4] The fourth sense of *potentia* refers to a principle of “change by another thing as other (*motus vel mutationis ab altero in quantum est aliud*).” In contrast to *potentia activa* in the above, this *potentia* is called *potentia passiva* or passive potency. For example, when I break a piece of chalk, the principle of being broken down is not in me but in the chalk,

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enim corrumpitur aliquid nisi propter victoriam corrumpentis supra ipsum. Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate propriae virtutis. Illis vero, quae non possunt tales defectus pati, *aut vix aut paulatim*, id est tarde vel modicum patiuntur, accidit eis propter potentiam, et in eo quod habent *aliquo modo posse*, id est cum quadam perfectione, ut non superentur a contrariis. Et per hunc modum dicitur in praedicamentis, quod durum vel sanativum significat potentiam naturalem non patiendi a corrumpentibus. Molle autem et aegrotativum impotentiam.”

<sup>53</sup> The translation is from John P. Rowan’s. St. Thomas Aquinas *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John P. Rowan, vol. 1 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), 368. In *V Meta.*, l. 14: “Quorum primus est, quod potentia dicitur principium motus et mutationis in alio in quantum est aliud. Est enim quoddam principium motus vel mutationis in eo quod mutatur, ipsa scilicet materia: vel aliquod principium formale, ad quod consequitur motus, sicut ad formam gravis vel levis sequitur motus sursum aut deorsum. Sed huiusmodi principium non potest dici de potentia activa, ad quam pertinet motus ille. Omne enim quod movetur ab alio movetur. Neque aliquid movet seipsum nisi per partes, in quantum una pars eius movet aliam, ut probatur in octavo physicorum. Potentia igitur, secundum quod est principium motus in eo in quo est, non comprehenditur sub potentia activa, sed magis sub passiva. Gravitatis enim in terra non est principium ut moveatur, sed magis ut moveatur. Potentia igitur activa motus oportet quod sit in alio ab eo quod movetur, sicut aedificativa potestas non est in aedificato, sed magis in aedificante.”

in the particular material composition of the chalk, to be precise.<sup>54</sup> Again this *potentia* has the same reference as the secondary meaning of *potentia* in *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1 c and ad 1 (p. 72). In regard to *potentia passiva*, Aquinas gives two cases where a thing can be said to have *potentia passiva*. The first case is when any kind of change, whether it is good or bad, is brought about in the patient by an agent. The second case is when the change that is introduced is the one for the better. Aquinas's example for the latter case is a student who becomes more knowledgeable through the process of learning.<sup>55</sup>

### 3.2 Relationship between Passive and Active Powers

With this background knowledge of the diverse senses of *potentia*, I will now discuss the relationship between *potentia passiva* and *potentia activa*. First of all, it should be noted that passive powers cannot exist independently of their correlatives, namely, active powers. Aquinas, in agreement with Aristotle, consistently says that in nature there cannot be any passive powers to which no active powers correspond.<sup>56</sup> This

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<sup>54</sup> *In V Meta.*, l. 14: “Secundum modum ponit ibi, alia diverso dicit, quod quodam alio modo dicitur potestas principium motus vel mutationis ab altero in quantum est aliud. Et haec est potentia passiva, secundum quam patiens aliquid patitur. Sicut enim omne agens et movens, aliud a se movet, et in aliud a se agit; ita omne patiens, ab alio patitur: et omne motum, ab alio movetur. Illud enim principium, per quod alicui competit ut moveatur vel patiat ab alio, dicitur potentia passiva.”

<sup>55</sup> Compared to the diverse senses of *passio* earlier, both of these cases do not refer to the most proper kind of passion, which denominates a change for the worse.

<sup>56</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1 c (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2.781): “Si enim esset aliqua potentia passiva in materia cui non responderet aliqua potentia activa in rerum natura, illa potentia passiva esset superflua, ut Commentator dicit . . .” It needs to be noted that the passive powers here refer to natural passive powers. In *De pot.*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 18 and *ST*, III, q. 11, a. 1 c, Aquinas distinguishes two fold passive power in a creature: [1] a natural passive power (*potentia naturalis*) and [2] an obediencial passive power (*potentia obedientiae*). While the former is the principle by which a thing receives what is commensurate with its correlative natural active power, the latter is the principle by which a thing can receive more than its natural

is closely related to the fact that passive powers cannot raise themselves to the state of being in act; they need to be moved by another thing which is already in act, namely, an agent. One might oppose this statement, saying that a thing can move itself. Yet still in this case, one has to say that another part in the same whole is in act already. Aquinas illustrates this point with an analogy of healing.<sup>57</sup> When we recover from a leg injury, for example, it might seem as though the leg is healing of itself. However, according to Aquinas, the healing is possible because it is aided by another part of the body, namely, the heart, which is already in act, i.e., healthy. Thus, usually the collaboration of an intrinsic agent, i.e., the heart, and an extrinsic agent, i.e., a doctor, restores health.

Two major places where Aquinas gives a further treatment of the relationship between active and passive powers are *Sententia super Physicam* and *Sententia super Metaphysicam*. Let us first look at the earlier of the two, *Sententia super Physicam*. In

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power allows, which is possible due to the superiority of the agent, namely, God. Based on this distinction, Aquinas explains how it is possible for finite human beings to receive grace, which is beyond the natural, from God. *De pot.*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 18: “Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod quanto aliqua virtus activa est altior, tanto eadem rem potest perducere in altiorem effectum: unde natura potest ex terra facere aurum aliis elementis commixtis, quod ars facere non potest; et inde est quod res aliqua est in potentia ad diversa secundum habitudinem ad diversos agentes. Unde nihil prohibet quin natura creata sit in potentia ad aliqua fienda per divinam potentiam, quae inferior potentia facere non potest: et ista vocatur potentia obedientiae, secundum quod quaelibet creatura creatori obedit.” Also, in *ST*, III, q. 11, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 11.157): “Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva: una quidem per comparisonem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparisonem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari *potentia obedientiae* in creatura.”

<sup>57</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 11 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45-1.113: 206-24): “Et ad hoc dicendum est quod, semper cum aliquis est in potentia sciens, si fiat actu habens scienciam, oportet quod hoc sit ab eo quod est actu. Considerandum tamen est, quod aliquid aliquando reducitur de potentia in actum ab extrinseco principio tantum, sicut aer illuminatur ab eo quod est actu lucidum, quandoque autem et a principio intrinseco, et a principio intrinseco, sicut homo sanatur, et a natura, et a medico; utrobique autem sanatur a sanitate in actu: manifestum est enim quod in mente medici est ratio sanitatis secundum quam sanat; oportet etiam in eo qui sanatur secundum naturam esse aliquam partem sanam, scilicet cor, cuius uirtute aliae partes sanantur; et cum medicus sanat hoc modo sanat, sicut natura sanaret, scilicet calefaciendo aut infrigidando aut aliter transmutando, unde medicus nihil aliud facit quam quod auxiliatur naturae ad expellendum morbum, quo auxilio natura non egeret, si fortis esset.”

*Sententia super Physicam*, III, ll. 4-5, Aquinas says that passion and action are one and the same motion but different in nature or *ratio* (*non sit unus et idem secundum rationem, sed unus secundum rem*).<sup>58</sup> That is, passion and action are found in the same motion while bearing two different intelligibilities or *rationes*.<sup>59</sup> In fact, these intelligibilities are what the human mind imposes on a particular motion in order to understand the nature of the motion better. Thus, when the human mind approaches the motion from the perspective of an agent, we have action (*actio*); and when it does it from the perspective of a patient, we have passion (*passio*). While the former reveals the intelligibility of *from where* the action started (*secundum quod est ab eo*), the latter does that of *wherein* the action exists (*secundum quod est in ipso*).<sup>60</sup>

Let me further explain the above idea with one of Aristotle's own examples in his *Physics* (III, 3 [202b 6-8]), which Aquinas endorses. Let us think about the occasion of teaching and learning. If John learns French from his friend, Susan, her teaching and his learning take place in the same "motion." Yet according to Aristotle, this same motion can denote two intelligibilities. First, it denotes the intelligibility of "teaching" on the part

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<sup>58</sup>*In III Phys.*, 1.5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.113.10): "Et dicit quod nihil prohibet unum actum esse duorum, ita quod non sit unus et idem secundum rationem, sed unus secundum rem, ut dictum est supra quod eadem est distantia duorum ad unum et unius ad duo, et eius quod est in potentia ad agens et e converso." The translation referred to is that of Richard J. Blackwell and W. Edmund Thirlkel. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

<sup>59</sup>*In III Phys.*, 1.5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.113.7): "Est autem manifestum ex supra determinatis quod actio et passio non sunt duo motus, sed unus et idem motus: secundum enim quod est ab agente dicitur actio, secundum autem quod est in patiente dicitur passio."

<sup>60</sup>*In III Phys.*, 1.5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.113.10): "Deinde cum dicit: neque unum duobus etc., solvit aliud inconueniens, scilicet quod idem actus esset duorum. Et dicit quod nihil prohibet unum actum esse duorum, ita quod non sit unus et idem secundum rationem, sed unus secundum rem, ut dictum est supra quod eadem est distantia duorum ad unum et unius ad duo, et eius quod est in potentia ad agens et e converso. Sic enim idem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem: agentis quidem secundum quod est ab eo, patientis autem secundum quod est in ipso."

of Susan, who is already in act, since she has knowledge. On the other hand, it can denote the intelligibility of “learning” on the part of John, who is being acted upon by Susan by receiving knowledge from her.

This view, namely that passion and action reveal two different notions about one and the same movement, is traced to the idea that passion and action are two of the ten categories (*praedicamenta*) in Aristotle, namely, the categories of “being acted upon” and that of “acting” respectively. Fundamentally, Aristotle’s ten categories correspond to the ten ways of predicating being, which is analogical. Here Aquinas warns, with Aristotle, that categories must not be taken for genera (*genera rerum*). Since genera are predicated of things univocally, they divide things univocally. On the other hand, categories do not univocally divide things because they denote the diverse modes of being.<sup>61</sup> Hence, this means that even though we can predicate of one thing with two categories, e.g., passion and action, this does not necessarily mean that there are two things or realities (*res*) involved here.

A similar message is conveyed in Aquinas’s later work, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, IX, l. 1. Here Aquinas says that passive and active powers can be the same thing in one respect, and different in another respect. To understand this better, we need to understand the two occasions in which a thing can be said to have a potency for being acted upon, according to Aquinas. [1] First, we say a thing has a potency for being acted upon when it has *of itself* a potency by which it may be acted upon. [2] Second, we

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<sup>61</sup> *In III Phys.*, l. 5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.114.15): “Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta.”

say a thing has such a potency when it has a potency by which something else may be acted upon, i.e., when it has a potency to act upon something else. Now according to Aquinas, in the case of [2], passive and active potency are thought to have the same potency. On the other hand, when the concern of our consideration is the subject in which passive and active powers are found, then they are different. That is to say, passive powers are found in patients whereas active powers are found in agents.<sup>62</sup> For example, when fire heats the water, the passive power is in the water insofar as it has the capacity of receiving the heat, whereas the active is found in that which can impose the heat, namely, the fire.

### *3.3 Passive and Active Powers with respect to Objects*

For a deeper understanding of active and passive powers, one needs to consider passive and active powers with respect to their objects. A preliminary work for this discussion is to clarify the relationship between a power (*potentia*), an act (*actus*), and an object (*objectum*), whose concepts are tightly knit together. *Quaestio disputata De anima*, q. 13 c and *Sententia libri De anima*, II, l. 6 are two good places to see how Aquinas views the relationship among these three. First, the priority among the three needs to be

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<sup>62</sup> *In IX Meta.*, l. 1: “Deinde cum dicit palam igitur ex praedictis quamdam veritatem circa praedictas potentias manifestat; et dicit, quod potentia faciendi et patiendi est quodammodo una potentia, et quodammodo non. Una quidem est, si consideretur ordo unius ad aliam; una enim dicitur per respectum ad alteram. Potest enim dici aliquid habens potentiam patiendi, quia ipsum habet per se potentiam ut patiatur, vel eo quod habet potentiam ut aliud patiatur ab ipso. Et hoc secundo modo potentia activa est idem cum passiva: ex eo enim quod aliquid habet potentiam activam, habet potentiam ut patiatur aliud ab ipso. Si autem considerentur hae duae potentiae, activa scilicet et passiva, secundum subiectum, in quibus sunt, sic est alia potentia activa et alia passiva. Potentia enim passiva est in patiente, quia patiens patitur propter aliquod principium in ipso existens, et huiusmodi est materia.”

noted. In the order of thought (*secundum rationem*) an object precedes an act, which again precedes a power.<sup>63</sup> Now since what is prior in *ratio* can define what is posterior, we can say that the nature of a power is known by its act, the nature of which in turn is known by its object.<sup>64</sup>

Let us first consider the relationship between a power and an act. First, power, as we have seen earlier, is defined as a principle of either acting or being acted upon (*potentia est principium quoddam agendi vel patiendi*). Now in accordance with Aristotelian teleology, every power is ordered to an act. If this were not the case, passive powers would be superfluous (*superflua*), which is absurd.<sup>65</sup> Also, the fact that every power is ordered to an act implies that the concept of a power entails that of its correlative act. Next, let us consider the relationship between acts and their correlative objects. According to Aquinas, every act is either of an active or passive power.<sup>66</sup> Now

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<sup>63</sup> *De an.*, 13 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 24.1.115:163-70): “Responsio. Dicendum quod potentia, id quod est, dicitur ad actum. Vnde oportet quod per actum definiatur potentia, et secundum diuersitatem actuum potentie diuersificentur. Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habet: nam si sint actus passiuarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt actiua; si autem sunt actiuarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt ut fines.”

*In II De an.*, l. 6 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.93: 122-30): “. . . et hoc ideo quia secundum rationem deffinitiuam, actus et operationes sunt priores potentiis. Potencia enim, secundum hoc ipsum quod est, importat habitudinem quamdam ad actum: est enim principium quoddam agendi uel paciendi; unde oportet quod actus ponantur in deffinitionibus potenciarum. Et, si ita se habet circa ordinem actus et potentie, et actibus adhuc sunt priora opposita, id est obiecta.”

<sup>64</sup> *In IX Meta.*, l. 7, Aquinas confirms that idea that what is prior in *ratio* must be used in defining what is prior: “Id per quod oportet alterum definiri, est prius eo ratione; sicut animal prius homine, et subiectum accidente. Sed potentia non potest definiri nisi per actum. Nam prima ratio possibilis in hoc consistit, quod conuenit ipsum agere vel esse in actu; sicut aedificator dicitur qui potest aedificare, et speculator qui potest speculari, et visibile dicitur aliquid quod potest videri, et sic est in aliis. Ergo est necessarium, quod ratio actus praecedat rationem potentiae, et notitia actus notitiam potentiae.”

<sup>65</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1 c (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2.781): “Si enim esset aliqua potentia passiva in materia cui non responderet aliqua potentia activa in rerum natura, illa potentia passiva esset superflua . . .”

<sup>66</sup> *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.241): “Respondeo dicendum quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur: et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diuersificetur, ut diuersificetur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diuersificatur secundum diuersam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel

the way an object is related to a passive power is different from the way an object is related to an active power.

As a first step, the relationship between an active power and its object needs to be considered. An object is related to an active power as its end (*finis*) or term (*terminus*). This carries an important implication, namely that an object is related to an active power as that which undergoes a change. That is, an active power and its object are related to one another as an agent and a patient.

Among the powers of the soul,<sup>67</sup> Aquinas takes the vegetative powers and the agent intellect to be active. Let us first see in what way the vegetative powers can be said

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passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens: color enim in quantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis: sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti.” Also, in *De ver.*, q. 16, a. 1 ad 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.506: 381-92): “Cognoscitur autem earum distinctio per comparationem potentiae ad obiectum: si enim obiectum se habeat ad potentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa; si autem e converso se habeat ut agens et movens sic est potentia passiva. Et inde est quod omnes potentiae vegetabilis animae sunt activae quia alimentum transmutatur per animae potentiam tam in nutriendo quam in augendo et etiam quam in generando. Sed potentiae sensitivae omnes sunt passivae, quia per sensibilia obiecta moventur et fiunt in actu.”

<sup>67</sup> A table describing an overall picture of the powers of the human soul may be helpful here.

<The human soul>

<b>The intellectual part</b>	The apprehensive (intellectual apprehension)	
	The appetitive (intellectual appetite=the will)	
<b>The sensitive part</b>	The apprehensive (sensitive apprehension)	
	*The appetitive (sensitive appetite)	the concupiscible
		the irascible
<b>The vegetative part</b>	Generation, nutrition, and growth	

\*the seat of the passions

The powers of the soul can be classified into three kinds with respect to the varying degrees of universality of their objects. (*ST*, I, q. 78, a. 1 c) The sensitive part is sub-divided into an appetitive part (sensitive apprehension or *apprehensio sensitiva*) and an apprehensive part (sensitive appetite or *appetitus sensitivus*). The sensitive appetite is where the passions are seated, and this is again subdivided into two kinds: the concupiscible (*concupiscibilis*) and the irascible (*irascibilis*). The object of the concupiscible passions is good and evil in an absolute sense, whereas that of the irascible passions is good and evil considered under the aspect of difficulty (*ratio ardui*). Lastly, the intellectual part is divided into two parts:

to be active. The view that the powers of such low forms of life as plants are active may sound puzzling since activity is usually associated with animals.<sup>68</sup> The vegetative soul is divided into three powers: the generative, the augmentative, and the nutritive.<sup>69</sup> The generative power is what allows a plant to generate another plant. Next, the augmentative power is what is behind the growth of a plant into its perfect size. Lastly, the nutritive power is what sustains the existence and due quantity of a plant. Let us look at the relationship the vegetative powers have with their objects. First, the generative power is active because it creates another being. Here the newly generated being is the term or end of the generative power. Second, the augmentative power is active because it causes a plant to grow into a perfect size or quantity. Here a perfect size is the end of the augmentative power. Also, here what went through a change is the body of the plant, which is the object of the augmentative power. In the same way, with the nutritive power, the vegetative soul transforms the food through the process called assimilation for the sustenance of its life.<sup>70</sup> For this reason Aquinas says that a certain kind of passivity (*quoddam pati*) is found on the part of the food as it is assimilated.<sup>71</sup> This way, all the three powers of the vegetative soul are regarded as active by Aquinas.

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an apprehensive part (intellectual apprehension or *apprehensio intellectiva*) and an appetitive part (intellectual appetite or *appetitus intellectivus*). For a good source of the classification of diverse powers of the soul, see Eric D'Arcy's Introduction in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Vol. 19 (London/New York: Blackfriars, 1967), xxiv.

<sup>68</sup> *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5. 243). Here Aquinas says that there is an order among the powers. In accordance with the view that the more perfect a thing is by nature, the higher it is, the intellectual powers are higher than the sensitive powers, which are again higher than the vegetative powers.

<sup>69</sup> *ST* I, q. 78, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.252).

<sup>70</sup> Klubertanz, *The Philosophy of Human Nature*, 39.

<sup>71</sup> *ST*, I, q. 97, a. 3 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.433). "Ad secundum dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius quod alitur. Unde ex hoc

Next, let us see in what way the human intellect can be said to be active. Two good places to visit are *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 79, a. 3 c and q. 84, a. 7 where Aquinas discusses the active part of the human intellect.<sup>72</sup> Here Aquinas first reminds us that the proper object of the human intellect is the nature or quiddity of an individual thing. The nature of an individual thing is most completely known when it is known as it exists in an individual. Now an individual thing is apprehended only by sensitive powers which use a bodily organ for their operation, the senses and imagination, to be specific. Once the exterior senses are acted upon by the sensible things, the imagination, as one of the interior senses, produces a likeness of an individual thing (*similitudo rei particularis*), which is called phantasm (*phantasma*).<sup>73</sup> Now this phantasm is still on the level of the corporeal, even though it is void of individualizing matter, since it is produced by a power which employs a bodily organ. Hence, there needs to be a power which can transform the phantasm into the immaterial so that it can be commensurable to the immateriality of the intellect, which understands by means of universal forms. As a result, Aquinas, in agreement with Aristotle, designates a part of the intellect itself to do

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non potest concludi quod corpus hominis fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae.”

<sup>72</sup> *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 7 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.325). “Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.” In *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 2, Aquinas argues for the necessity of the existence of the agent intellect in the human soul by using the two extreme positions of Plato and ancient natural philosophers, such as Democritus, as foils and confirms the veracity of Aristotle’s view regarding this issue.

<sup>73</sup> *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 7 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.264). “Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ipsum phantasma est similitudo rei particularis . . .”

this work and names it agent intellect (*intellectus agens*).<sup>74</sup> The main work of this active intellect is abstracting the intelligible forms from the phantasms, and making them actually intelligible to the human intellect, the possible intellect, to be precise, as we will see below. Earlier (p. 82), we have said that the object of an active power is related to the power as an end. Now as much as the agent intellect produces an object, namely, intelligible forms, as the end of its operation, the agent intellect is active. Or conversely, we can say that the intelligible forms stand passive with regard to the agent intellect, since they are the end of the power.

Next, let us discuss the relationship between passive powers and their objects. An object is related to a passive power as the moving cause (*causa movens*), i.e., an agent, or principle (*principium*) of the power.<sup>75</sup> That is, a passive power is related to its object as a patient to an agent.<sup>76</sup> This peculiar relationship carries an important implication. Contrary to the case of an active power, this time it is the power that is being moved.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> *ST*, I, q. 79, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.264): “Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu: sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilibus, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu: sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.”

<sup>75</sup> *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.241). See p. 79.

<sup>76</sup> *De ver.*, q. 16, a. 1 ad 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.506: 381-92): “Cognoscitur autem earum distinctio per comparisonem potentiae ad obiectum: si enim obiectum se habeat ad potentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa; si autem e converso se habeat ut agens et movens sic est potentia passiva. Et inde est quod omnes potentiae vegetabilis animae sunt activae quia alimentum transmutatur per animae potentiam tam in nutriendo quam in augendo et etiam quam in generando. Sed potentiae sensitivae omnes sunt passivae, quia per sensibilia obiecta moventur et fiunt in actu.” Also, in *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 4 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.757: 281-87): “Ad quartum dicendum quod sensus non est virtus activa sed passiva. Non enim dicitur virtus activa quae habet aliquem actum qui est operatio, sic enim omnis potentia animae activa esset; sed dicitur potentia aliqua activa quae comparatur ad suum obiectum sicut agens ad patiens, passiva vero quae comparatur ad suum obiectum sicut patiens ad agens. Sensus autem comparatur ad sensibile sicut patiens ad agens, eo quod sensibile transmutat sensum; quod autem sensibile aliquando a sensu

Again, in accordance with Aquinas, we can think of two passive powers in the soul, namely, the senses and the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The senses are passive mainly because they need to be acted upon by an external sensible thing in order to be engaged in sensation. For example, the sense of sight is moved by the visible, which is the proper object of sight.<sup>78</sup> Since the passivity of the senses is crucial to the whole theme of this chapter, I will treat it in greater detail in the section immediately following.

The possible intellect is another passive power of the soul, according to Aquinas. Once the intelligible forms are abstracted from the phantasms by the agent intellect, as we have seen in the above, they are received in another part of the intellect, namely, the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*).<sup>79</sup> The passivity of the possible intellect consists in this receptive activity. And, as the possible intellect receives the intelligible forms, the human intellect moves from the state of not knowing to that of knowing, a process by which it becomes more perfect. And, as we have seen earlier (p. 72), this movement belongs to a broad sense of passivity.

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transmutetur, hoc est per accidens, in quantum ipsum organum sensus habet aliquam qualitatem per quam natum est immutare aliquod corpus.”

<sup>77</sup> This message appears in *De ver.*, q. 16, a. 1 ad 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.506: 381-86) and *ST I*, q. 78, a. 3 c. In *ST I*, q. 78, a. 3 c (Leon. Ed., Vol. 5. 253-54), Aquinas says: “Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum pertinet. Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur.”

<sup>78</sup> For a good source of a discussion on active and passive potency in Aquinas, see Kainz’s “*Active and Passive Potency*” in *Thomistic Angelology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1972). Here (pp. 30-45, especially) he first divides potency into two kinds: “substantial passive potency” and “accidental passive potency.” The latter is further divided into two kinds: physical passive potency and metaphysical passive potency. The passivity of the senses, as revealed when they receive the sensible forms from the sensible, belongs to the former. On the other hand, the passivity of the possible intellect, as revealed when it receives the intelligible forms is a case of metaphysical passive potency.

<sup>79</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.313: 200-04): “. . . secundum hoc ponitur in anima nostra intellectus possibilis cuius est recipere formas a rebus sensibilibus abstractas, factas intelligibiles in actu per lumen intellectus agentis . . .”

#### *4 The Passivity of the Sensitive Appetite*

In the following section, I am going to discuss the passivity of the senses and appetite, which constitute the seat of the passions of the soul. The purpose of this discussion is to make the case that the passivity of the passions of the soul is due to its origination in a passive power of the soul, namely, the sensitive appetite. I will divide the sensitive appetite into two parts of the sensitive and the appetitive, and discuss the passivity of each of them. In the first discussion, I will bring out the passivity of the sensitive part. In the second discussion, I will pay special attention to the passivity of the appetite (*appetitus*) as opposed to the activity of apprehension (*apprehensio*).

##### *4.1 The Passivity of the Sensitive*

Aquinas discusses the passivity of the sensitive powers in a number of places, the major places being *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 16, a. 1 and q. 26, a. 3; *Quaestio disputata De anima*, q. 13 c; *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, l. 10; *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 77, a. 3; and q. 78, a. 3. First, it should be noted that when Aquinas says that the senses are passive, it is most likely that he refers to the exterior senses rather than interior senses. In *De veritate*, q. 16, a. 1 ad 13, he says that “all the sensitive powers (*potentiae sensitivae omnes*)” are passive, but in *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, l. 10, where he discusses the passivity of the sensitive powers, he explicitly designates these senses as

exterior senses (*sensus exteriores*).<sup>80</sup> The view that the exterior senses are more passive than the interior senses is found in *Quaestio disputata De anima*, q. 13 where Aquinas says that the exterior or proper senses come first in the order of sensitive powers, implying that they are more passive than the interior senses because they are immediately acted upon by the external sensible. Interior senses are passive in the sense that they need to receive the sensible “data” from the exterior senses, but they are not directly acted upon by the external sensible objects, as Pasnau aptly points out.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, some of the interior powers, such as imagination (*phantasia*), produce something, namely, the phantasms, the act of which is congruent with the description of an active power, as we have seen earlier (p.82).

The passivity of the senses may be discussed in two aspects. [1] First, the senses are passive in the sense that they cannot be put in operation, i.e., sensation, without an external object.<sup>82</sup> That is, for the power of the senses to operate, they need to be acted

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<sup>80</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 10 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.107: 1-8): (My emphasis) “Postquam determinavit Philosophus de parte uegetativa, hic incipit determinare de parte sensitiva. Et diuiditur in partes duas: in prima determinat de eo quod apparet in hac parte, scilicet de sensibus exterioribus; in secunda determinat de eo quod latet in parte sensitiva, ibi: *Quod autem non sit sensus alter* etc.”

<sup>81</sup> Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75-89* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 267-68 .

<sup>82</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul II*, 5 (417a5-10). *In II De an.*, l. 10 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.108: 82-88): “. . . anima sensitiva non est actu sensibilia, sed potencia tantum, et propter hoc sensus non sentiunt sine exterioribus sensibilibus, sicut combustibile, quod est potencia tantum ignitum, non comburitur a seipso sine exteriori combustiua; si enim esset actu ignitum, combureret seipsum, et non indigeret exteriori igne ad hoc quod combureretur.” *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.118-19: 18-70), Aquinas distinguishes two ways the term sense object can be used: [1] in a derivative sense (*per accidens*), and [2] in a strict sense (*per se*). When we perceive Mr. Peacock to be white, Mr. Peacock is a sense object *per accidens*, whereas whiteness is a sense object *per se*. This means that whiteness, while being the sense object in an absolute sense, happened to belong to Mr. Peacock. Now this strict sense of sense object is further divided into two kinds. [2-1] First, we have sense objects which refer to the special objects proper to each exterior sense, e.g., flavor for the sense of taste. These sense objects are called “proper sensible objects (*sensibilia propria*).” [2-2] Next, we have sense objects that are common to more than one sense, i.e., movement, rest, number, shape and size. These sensible objects are called “common sensible objects (*sensibilia communia*).”

upon by something else, namely external sensible things (*exteriora sensibilia*). Because the operation of the senses is initiated by an external sensible thing, Aquinas calls the sensible thing the beginning (*principium*) of the operation.

For example, when I see a squirrel running across the street, it is not that I have been imagining the animal, and as a result came to have it in my vision. Nor is it because I have *willed* to see the animal. It is rather because the squirrel *struck* my sight, as a result of which I could not help seeing it. As such, there is an element of “helplessness” in sensation, as Kenny says.<sup>83</sup> Accordingly, verbs which carry a passive sense, e.g., “see” or “hear,” more aptly describe the passivity of the senses than “active” or “intentional” verbs, e.g., “look ” or “listen.”<sup>84</sup>

Now when the senses are acted upon by the external sensible things, a change takes place. It is important here to clarify the change undergone by the senses. In *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 3, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of change (*immutatio*) regarding sensation.<sup>85</sup> One is natural change (*immutatio naturalis*) and the other one is

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<sup>83</sup> Kenny explains this “helpless” aspect of sensation with the following words: “A sense is a power to *undergo*, not to initiate, change. Aquinas has in mind that the senses do not operate voluntarily: we cannot help seeing what is in plain view, or hearing the noise of the party next door, or tasting the nauseous medicine as it goes down, or smelling the rustic smells as we walk through the farmyard.” Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993), 34.

<sup>84</sup> The helplessness of sensation is thought to contribute to the helpless aspect of the passions of the soul, which is a movement on a sense level. However, the passions are not simply passive, which will be shown in the latter part of this dissertation. For the linguistic analysis of the verbs expressing emotion or passion, see Robert M. Gordon, “The Passivity of Emotions,” *The Philosophical Review* 95 (1986): 371-92.

<sup>85</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.254): “Est autem duplex immutatio: una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in *visu*. -In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte

spiritual change (*immutatio spiritualis*). [a] As the word “natural” suggests, in natural change a physical change is found either on the part of the source of the change (*immutans*) or on the part of the thing that undergoes the change (*immutatum*) or on both parts. In natural change, the form of the former is received into the immuted according to its natural existence, i.e., in such a manner as the latter undergoes a physical change. Aquinas’s example here is the change discovered between the conductor of the heat (*calor*) and that to which the heat has been transmitted (*calefactum*). For example, if I put a skillet on a hot stove, the stove (*calor*) will transmit the heat to the skillet (*calefactum*) and the skillet will become actually hot. This kind of change is “natural change.”

[b] However, natural change cannot be a sufficient cause for the operations of the senses. If this were the case, Aquinas goes on, all things including stones would engage in sensation whenever they are physically changed, which is absurd. In fact, every sensitive operation requires a non-physical kind of change, i.e., “spiritual change.” It is called spiritual because the form of the agent (a sensible thing) is received into the patient (the sense) in a non-material manner.<sup>86</sup> The form of a sensible thing is called a sensible

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autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, qui est obiectum *auditus*: nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum *olfactus*: oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. -Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio naturalis in *tactu* et *gustu*: nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut *auditus* nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior. Et post hoc *auditus*, et deinde *olfactus*, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti. Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII *Physic*. Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales: de quorum distinctione post dicetur. -Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut accidit in his duobus sensibus.”

<sup>86</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.254): “Est autem duplex immutatio: una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut

species or a sensible form (*forma sensibilis*). Here “spiritual” refers to the particular way the sense is engaged with its object, which has some degree of immateriality. Even though the sense is a corporeal power using a corporeal organ, the manner through which it has its proper object is immaterial. That is, it has the object intentionally, which is why it may be also termed “intentional change,” as Kenny suggests.<sup>87</sup>

Now this spiritual change is required for the operation of all the five senses (sight, touch, smell, hearing, and taste). However, natural change is not required for every sense. In fact, for the sense of sight, only spiritual change is needed. Borrowing Aquinas’s example, the act of my seeing a red rose does not turn my eyes red. Of course, my eyes can get tired if I gaze at the flower for a long time, but this change would be introduced by the corporeality of the vision itself, not by the rose. For this reason, sight is the most spiritual, most perfect, and most universal among the five senses. However, with other senses, natural change is required either on one or both parts of the object and the organ. With hearing and smell, which are ranked next to sight, natural change takes place on the part of the object only because, according to Aquinas, the objects of hearing and smell, namely, sound and odor respectively, need to be affected in a certain way so that they may be sensed by their respective organs. Next, with touch and taste, natural change takes place both on the parts of the object and the organ. For example, when I hold a cold drink on a warm day, not only does the hand get cooler and damp but the glass becomes

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calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata.”

<sup>87</sup> Kenny, 34.

warmer due to the physical contact. This physical contact makes the senses of touch and taste the most material, thus the most imperfect and the lowest among the senses.

[2] The other passive aspect of the senses is found in the fact that they undergo a change from the state of not sensing to that of sensing through the act of sensation. As has been said earlier in the discussion of different senses of *passio* (p. 57), this change belongs to a general kind of *passio*, which refers to any kind of change. This general notion of *passio* is found in feeling (sensing), understanding and willing. This kind of change or *passio* is closer to perfection.

Aquinas calls an operation with this kind of change in particular an “immanent operation.” An immanent operation can be compared with a transient operation. When the operation has its effect on something external to it, this is a transient operation. For example, when I write a letter, the effect of my writing takes place on a piece of paper, which is external to me. However, when the operation takes place within the operator by perfecting the operator, not in an external thing, this is an immanent operation. In this sense, feeling, understanding, and willing are immanent operations, since in these operations the operator simply becomes more perfect by passing from the state of potentiality to that of actuality.<sup>88</sup> We can also say that in an immanent operation the object resides in the operator,<sup>89</sup> which is to say that the operator is united to the object.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> *ST*, I, q. 54, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.45): “Duplex enim est actionis genus, ut dicitur IX *Metaphys.* Una scilicet actio est quae transit in aliquid exterius, inferens ei passionem, sicut urere et secare. Alia vero actio est quae non transit in rem exteriolem, sed manet in ipso agente, sicut sentire, intelligere et velle: per huiusmodi enim actionem non immutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur.”

<sup>89</sup> *ST*, I, q. 14, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 4. 168): “Respondeo dicendum quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, licet in operationibus quae transeunt in exteriolem effectum, obiectum operationis, quod significatur ut terminus, sit aliquid extra operantem; tamen in operationibus

This means that we are not put into operation until the specific power is acted upon by the object. For example, not until the sense organ is changed by a sensible object, do we start actually to sense. This is why Aquinas says that “the sensible in act is sense in act” (*sensibile in actu est sensus in actu*).<sup>91</sup> Since sensation is an immanent operation, and an immanent operation belongs to a broad sense of *passio*, we can conclude that the senses are passive powers.

Aquinas discusses this broad sense of passivity, namely, passivity taken as potency, with regard to the senses in *Sentencia libri De anima*, l. 12. First, he says that two transitions or movements (*mutationes* or *motus*) from potency to act are found in the sensitive powers of an animal. The first transition takes place when the animal is born with the sensitive powers. Now it should be noted here that the same status of a thing can be called both potential and actual, depending on what it is compared against. That is, the state of having sensitive powers itself can be called actual when it is compared with the state of pure potency (*pura potentia*), in which there is not even a capacity for sensing. On the other hand, the same status can be called potential when it is compared against the state of full actualization in which the senses are actually engaged in sensation here and now.<sup>92</sup>

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quae sunt in operante, obiectum quod significatur ut terminus operationis, est in ipso operante; et secundum quod est in eo, sic est operatio in actu.”

<sup>90</sup> *ST*, I, q. 56, a. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.62): “Sed in actione quae manet in agente, oportet ad hoc quod procedat actio, quod obiectum uniatur agenti, sicut oportet quod sensibile uniatur sensui, ad hoc quod sentiat actu. Et ita se habet obiectum unitum potentiae ad huiusmodi actionem, sicut forma quae est principium actionis in aliis agentibus: sicut enim calor est principium formale calefactionis in igne, ita species rei visae est principium formale visionis in oculo.”

<sup>91</sup> *ST*, I, q. 14, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 4.168).

<sup>92</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 12 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.114-15: 27-37): “Hoc est ergo quod dicit quod *prima mutatio sensitivi fit a generante* (nominat autem primam mutationem quae est de pura potentia in actum primum;

Now it should be noted that sometimes this second transition is called an *act*, and this might cause some misunderstanding. Associating the term, an act, with an active agent, one might think that calling sensation an act contradicts the view that the senses are passive powers. In fact, Aquinas was well aware of this potential misunderstanding, and clarifies Aristotle's position on this issue.<sup>93</sup> When sensation is called an act, the term act here is taken in a broad sense. That is, in that case, it refers to the act taken as a movement from potency to act. Now this movement is none other than motion (*motus*), which is defined as the “act of the potential as potential (*actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi*)” (Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 1 [201b 4-6]).<sup>94</sup> And insofar as this motion is situated somewhere between pure potentiality and full actualization, it is called actual.<sup>95</sup>

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hec autem mutatio fit a generante, nam per uirtutem que est in semine educitur anima sensitua de potencia in actum cum omnibus suis potenciis); cum autem animal iam generatum est, tunc hoc modo habet sensum sicut aliquis habet scienciam quando iam didicit; set quando iam sentit secundum actum, tunc se habet sicut ille qui iam actu considerat.”

<sup>93</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 10 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45-1.109: 103-17): “Videbatur enim repugnare quod sentire dicitur in actu ei quod dictum est, quod sentire est quoddam pati et moueri: esse enim in actu uidetur magis pertinere ad agere. Et ideo ad hoc exponendum dicit quod ita dicimus sentire in actu ac si dicamus, quod pati et moueri sint quoddam agere, id est quoddam esse in actu: nam motus est quidam actus, sed imperfectus, ut dictum est in III Phisicorum; est enim actus existentis in potentia, scilicet mobilis. Sicut igitur motus est actus, ita moueri et sentire est quoddam agere uel esse secundum actum. Per hoc autem quod dicit ‘Primum,’ significat quod quedam alia postmodum subdet ad ostendendum quomodo sensus fiat in actu.”

<sup>94</sup> *In III Phys.* 1. 2 (Leon ed., Vol. 2.105.3): “Unde convenientissime Philosophus definit motum, dicens quod motus est *entelechia*, idest *actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi*.”

<sup>95</sup> *In III Phys.* 1. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 2.105.3): “Considerandum est igitur quod aliquid est in actu tantum, aliquid vero in potentia tantum, aliquid vero medio modo se habens inter potentiam et actum. Quod igitur est in potentia tantum, nondum movetur: quod autem iam est in actu perfecto, non movetur, sed iam motum est: illud igitur movetur, quod medio modo se habet inter puram potentiam et actum, quod quidem partim est in potentia et partim in actu; ut patet in alteratione. . . . Sic igitur actus imperfectus habet rationem motus, et secundum quod comparatur ad ulteriorem actum ut potentia, et secundum quod comparatur ad aliquid imperfectius ut actus. Unde neque est potentia existentis in potentia, neque est actus existentis in actu, sed est actus existentis in potentia: ut per id quod dicitur actus, designetur ordo eius ad anteriorem potentiam, et per id quod dicitur *in potentia existentis*, designetur ordo eius ad ulteriorem actum.”

So far I have presented the passivity of the senses. Two things may need to be pointed out here. First, it is important to note that activity and passivity do not by themselves indicate the metaphysical dignity of a power of the soul. That is, if passivity and activity refer to the same subject, as in the case of the intellect which has both a passive part (possible intellect) and an active part (agent intellect), certainly the active part is higher than the passive part. However, if passivity and activity are not referred to the same thing, an active power is not necessarily higher than a passive power. In this respect, one can say that the activity of the vegetative soul is an inferior kind. Hence, Aquinas says that even though the vegetative soul is active, it is less noble than the sensitive soul, which is passive because it has to receive the forms of the external things in order to operate.<sup>96</sup> By the same token, the passive part of the human intellect, namely, the possible intellect, is more noble than both the sensitive and vegetative souls.<sup>97</sup>

Second, even though both the sensitive part and the intellectual part have a passive dimension in that they move from potentially apprehending to actually apprehending, which is a certain kind of passivity (p. 58), we must say that a higher degree of passivity is found in the sensitive part. The main ground for this is that the senses are passive with regard to something that is *external* to them, i.e., an external

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<sup>96</sup> *ST*, I, q. 79, a. 2, ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.260): “Ad tertium dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.”

<sup>97</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.757: 301-11): “Ad quintum dicendum quod quamvis activum simpliciter sit passivo nobilius et etiam respectu eiusdem, nihil tamen prohibet aliquod passivum activo nobilius esse, in quantum passivum nobiliori passione patitur quam sit actio qua activum agit, sicut passio a qua intellectus possibilis dicitur potentia passiva, et etiam sensus recipiendo aliquid immaterialiter est nobilior actione qua potentia vegetativa agit materialiter, id est mediantibus qualitatibus elementaribus.”

sensible thing. Aquinas discusses the impact of the dependence of the senses on the external sensible objects in detail in *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, l. 12. Here he discusses the difference between sensitive and intellectual apprehension.<sup>98</sup> The main difference between these two kinds of apprehension originates from the way they are engaged with their objects. Because sense objects exist outside the soul, the senses must turn *outside* themselves to look for their objects. On the other hand, the intellect, because it has its objects (i.e., intelligible objects) within itself, does not have to turn outside itself in order to engage itself in thinking. This explains why we can reflect on our thoughts whenever we want to. Now the fact that the senses have to go outside themselves each time they sense means that they have to depend on their external objects, and this fact is thought to render them more passive than the intellect.

In the following section I am going to discuss the passivity of the appetite.

#### 4.2 *The Passivity of the Appetite*

Appetite is the power by which a thing tends toward an apprehended good or avoids an apprehended evil. Aquinas's doctrine of appetition is inseparable from his

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<sup>98</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 12 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.115: 38-63): "Deinde cum dicit: Differt autem etc, quia posuerat similitudinem inter sentire in actu et considerare, uult ostendere differentiam inter ea: Cuius quidem differentiae causam assignare incipit ex differentia obiectorum, scilicet sensibilium, et intelligibilium, que sentiuntur et considerantur in actu: sensibilia enim quae sunt actiua operationis sensitivae, scilicet uisibile et audibile et alia huiusmodi, sunt extra animam. Cuius causa est quia sensus secundum actum, sunt singularium, que sunt extra animam, set scientia est uniuersalium, que quodam modo sunt in anima. Ex quo patet, quod ille qui iam habet scientiam non oportet quod quaerat extra sua obiecta, set habet ea in se, unde potest considerare ea cum uult, nisi forte per accidens impediatur; set sentire non potest aliquis cum uult; quia sensibilia non habet in se, set oportet quod assint ei extra. Et sicut est de operatione sensuum, ita est in scientiis sensibilium, quia etiam sensibilia sunt de numero singularium et eorum quae sunt extra animam, unde homo non potest considerare secundum scientiam, omnia sensibilia que uult, set illa tantum que sensu percipit. Set secundum certitudinem determinare *de hiis*, iterum erit *tempus*, scilicet in III ubi agetur de intellectu et de comparatione intellectus ad sensum."

teleology; the appetitive movement of each being reflects its end or *telos*. And although the way every creature tends to its end may seem like an isolated or random event on the surface, it is in fact carefully orchestrated with harmony by God.

Aquinas's general treatment of appetite is found in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 80.<sup>99</sup> Here he says that an inclination or an appetite follows upon a form (*quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio*). Now different forms are found in different kinds of beings. First of all, beings can be divided into two groups: [1] the ones devoid of cognition, e.g., rocks and plants, and [2] the ones endowed with cognition (apprehension), e.g., cats or human beings. [1] The non-cognitive beings have only the forms that determine them to what they are, namely, to their nature. These are natural forms and the special inclination that follows upon these forms is called a natural inclination (*naturalis inclinatio*) or natural appetite (*naturalis appetitus*). For example, the nature of water inclines the water to flow to a lower place unless it is obstructed to do so by external compulsion, as when we make a dam.

[2] Then there are beings with cognition. They have other inclinations on top of natural inclinations. This is because knowing is realized by receiving the forms of *other* things, which in turn are followed by new inclinations. Now there are two kinds of cognition, which means that there are two kinds of forms received in cognitive beings. [2-1] First, there is sensitive cognition (sensitive apprehension), which is knowledge acquired by the senses. Since sensitive cognition is the result of the use of the corporeal

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<sup>99</sup> A similar treatment is also found in *ST*, I, q. 59, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.260) where he discusses the will of the angels.

organs, only the forms of the particular are received in this process, as we have seen earlier (p. 84). Now the special inclination which follows upon sensitive cognition is called sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*), which is designated as the seat of the passions by Aquinas. Animals have this inclination on top of natural inclination. [2-1] Secondly, there is another kind of cognition which is acquired by the universal forms. Unlike sensitive cognition, which is limited to the realm of the particular, intellectual cognition (intellectual apprehension) transcends a sense level in that it can now have abstract or universal ideas about individual things. The special inclination which follows this cognition is the intellectual appetite (*appetitus intellectivus*), which is also called the will (*voluntas*).

Since human beings have both kinds of cognition along with their own nature, they have all the three inclinations in them. The presence of the sensitive and intellectual inclinations in human beings means that they can tend toward one and the same good from different perspectives. For example, I can enjoy a sensible good of food on different levels. I can desire food for its sensible pleasure of a good taste on one level. Yet on another level, I can desire it for its universal good, e.g., nutrition or comfort. Thus, unless the inclinations are in conflict with one another, as is illustrated in the case of incontinence, their presence can enrich human life.

Let us now discuss in what sense the appetites can be passive. The passivity of the appetite may be considered in two respects. [1] First, the appetite is passive in the sense that it is moved by an apprehended good or evil, which is its proper object. The appetite cannot be put into operation unless the apprehension first recognizes something as a good

or an evil and presents it to the appetite. For this reason, Aquinas, in *Sentencia libri De anima*, III, l. 15 and *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 80, a. 2 c, says that the object of the appetite, i.e., the appetible thing (*appetibile*), is an “unmoved mover” (*movens non motum*), whereas the appetite is “a moved mover” (*movens motum*).<sup>100</sup> The appetite is moved first when a good is presented to it by apprehension and then it tends toward the good. With regard to this peculiar relationship between apprehension and appetite, Aquinas says, in agreement with Aristotle, that “apprehension is the beginning (*principium*) of the appetite.”<sup>101</sup>

[2] Secondly, the appetite is passive in the sense that the soul is *drawn* to an external good through it. In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2, Aquinas puts forward the question of whether passion is in the appetitive part or in the apprehensive part. Aquinas’s answer to this question runs as follows. First, being passive or having passion implies that the soul is drawn to another thing, i.e., a good. Second, the soul seeks this good through the appetite, since appetition is the power which has an order to a thing *as it is*, as is summarized by the celebrated Aristotelian dictum, “good and evil are in the things themselves” (*bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis rebus*). Therefore, we have to say that passion is in the appetitive part of the soul.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>100</sup> This idea is traced to Aristotle in *On the Soul* III, 10 (433b 10-18); and *Metaphysics* XII, 7 (1072a 24-28). In *III De an.*, l. 15 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.247: 190-99): “*Mouens autem est duplex: unum quidem immobile et aliud quod est mouens motum; in motu igitur animalis, mouens quod non mouetur est bonum actuale, quod mouet appetitum prout est intellectus uel ymaginatum: set mouens motum est ipse appetitus, quia omne quod appetit in quantum appetit mouetur, et ipsum appetere est quidam actus uel motus, prout motus est actus perfecti, sicut supra dictum est de operatione sensus et intellectus . . .*”

<sup>101</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, 7 (1072a 26-29). In *XII Meta.*, l. 7: “*Huiusmodi enim appetitus principium est intelligentia, idest actus intellectus qui movetur quodammodo ab intelligibili.*”

<sup>102</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2 c. (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.169): “*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad*

On the contrary, almost the opposite is true with apprehension. Compared to appetite, apprehension can be said to be active in the sense that when the soul is engaged in the act of apprehension, this time the apprehended object is drawn to the knower.<sup>103</sup> This is true with both kinds of apprehension in the soul, namely, sensitive apprehension (*apprehensio sensitiva*) and intellectual apprehension (*apprehensio intellectiva*). In both cases, Aquinas says, the knower understands by receiving the form (*intentio*) of the thing it understands.<sup>104</sup> This peculiar relationship between apprehension and its object is summarized by another Aristotelian dictum, “truth and falsity are in the mind” (*verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt in mente*).<sup>105</sup>

Further contrast between appetite and apprehension in the way they are related to their objects is found in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 1 c. Here Aquinas says that the powers in the soul can unite to their object in two ways. [1] In the first way, an external thing has a natural aptitude to unite to the soul and to be present in its likeness in the soul. Apprehensive powers relate to their object in this way. [2] In the other way, the soul *itself* can tend toward an external thing. The appetitive powers and locomotive power relate to

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rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt: unde Philosophus dicit, in VI *Metaphys.*, quod *bonum et malum*, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, *sunt in ipsis rebus*. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod *verum et falsum*, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, *non sunt in rebus, sed in mente*. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.”

<sup>103</sup> *In II Eth.*, l. 5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.90: 47-61): “Et quamvis sentire et intelligere sit pati quoddam, non tamen dicuntur passiones animae secundum apprehensionem sensus vel intellectus, sed solum secundum appetitum. Quia operatio potentiae apprehensivae est secundum quod res apprehensa est in apprehendente per modum apprehendentis, et sic res apprehensa quodam modo trahitur ad apprehendentem; operatio autem potentiae appetitivae est secundum quod appetens inclinatur ad appetibile, et quia de ratione patientis est quod trahatur ad agentem et non e converso, inde est quod operationes potentiarum apprehensivarum non dicuntur proprie passiones, sed solum operationes potentiarum appetitivarum.”

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *ST*, I, q. 82, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.299).

their object in this manner. The former tends to its object as an end, and the latter, as the term of its movement. Now since tending to an object is more passive than having it in its own way, we can say that appetite is more passive than apprehension. Accordingly, Aquinas compares the operation of the apprehensive powers to “rest” (*quietum*) and the operation of the appetitive powers, to “movement” (*motum*).<sup>106</sup>

Another way of saying that apprehension has its object in its own way is that it understands its object in an *immaterial* way by having the form of its object in itself. In this manner, the knower forms a special union with the thing known, namely, an “intentional union,” and through this union the knower, in a way, *becomes* its object, namely, the thing known (*res apprehensa*). The idea that this peculiar union allows a human being to transcend himself while remaining as he is is well expressed by Klubertanz:

On the other hand, the form received in knowledge does not *of itself* and as a characteristic of knowledge have a physical mode of being.

When I know a piece of wood, I do, in truth, come to be that piece of wood, and yet I *come to be* it in a manner peculiar to a knower. I am not turned into wood; I do not take on, for instance, the qualities of the wood which I know. The piece of wood which I know cannot be predicated of me; I cannot say I *am* a piece of wood. There is a most intimate union between myself and the piece of wood; but, in spite of this union, I continue to exist in my own proper being and the piece of wood continues to exist in its own proper being. This union peculiar to the knower with the

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<sup>106</sup> *ST I*, q. 81, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5. 288): “Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII *de Trin.*, sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensibilis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus: nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti: operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.”

known is called “intentional” union. Consequently a form in the order of knowledge is immaterial in the sense that it does not itself have the same physical mode of being in the knower as it had in the agent which caused the knowledge: it is not the physical perfection of a matter of recipient.<sup>107</sup>

The intellect’s immaterial possession of a form is noteworthy since it reveals its active relation toward the external object even though it has to turn to the external thing at its initial stage of understanding. Furthermore, this activity of the intellect denotes nobility, since it is more noble to know a thing than to desire it when the object is lower than the knower.<sup>108</sup> On the contrary, if the object is higher than the knower, the opposite is true; it is more noble to love it. Now the forms of the things human beings can receive are limited to those of material things, and material things are lower than the human soul. Hence, we can say that it is more noble for the human soul to have a material thing in its own way, namely, in an immaterial way, than to be drawn to the thing itself.

One thing that needs to be noted here is that when the appetite tends to a good, it does so by causing a bodily movement, which reveals the dynamic nature of passion.<sup>109</sup> Aquinas shows this aspect of passion in his reply to the second objection in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2. The objection goes: since the appetite is an active power in the sense that it is the principle (*principium*) of external actions, it cannot be the seat of

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<sup>107</sup> Klubertanz, *The Philosophy of Human Nature*, 67-68.

<sup>108</sup> *ST*, I, q. 82, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.299): “Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio: e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas.”

<sup>109</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.756: 204-13): “Passio vero animalis, cum per eam ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adiungitur, et cuius est corpus transmutare; et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est alicuius organi corporalis actus; nec iterum est in apprehensiva sensitiva quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva quae est immediatum movens.”

the passions which are passive. This objector's view seems to be shared by many modern interpreters, e.g., Robert Solomon, who tend to regard passion as simply active.<sup>110</sup> This apparent contradiction is resolved if we remember the fact that one thing can be passive with regard to one thing but active with regard to another (*nihil enim prohibet respectu diversorum idem esse activum et passivum*).<sup>111</sup> Now the appetitive powers are passive with regard to the apprehensive powers but active with regard to the bodily members. Still, what is particularly interesting here is that the activity that the appetite has toward the bodily members in a way renders the appetite even more passive. As has been said earlier, an important aspect of passivity is being drawn (*trahitur*) or led (*ducitur*) to another thing, and one can be even more readily drawn to its object through the bodily movement which is made prompt by the appetite.<sup>112</sup>

Thus far, I have shown in what way appetition can be more passive than apprehension. Now of the sensitive appetite and the intellectual appetite (the will), the former is more passive than the latter. We can find two reasons for this in Aquinas's

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<sup>110</sup> This view is predominant in *The Passions* by Solomon.

<sup>111</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 4 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.756-57: 274-300): "Ad quartum dicendum quod sensus non est virtus activa sed passiva. Non enim dicitur virtus activa quae habet aliquem actum qui est operatio, sic enim omnis potentia animae activa esset; sed dicitur potentia aliqua activa quae comparatur ad suum obiectum sicut agens ad patiens, passiva vero quae comparatur ad suum obiectum sicut patiens ad agens. Sensus autem comparatur ad sensibile sicut patiens ad agens, eo quod sensibile transmutat sensum; quod autem sensibile aliquando a sensu transmutetur, hoc est per accidens, in quantum ipsum organum sensus habet aliquam qualitatem per quam natum est immutare aliud corpus. Unde infectio illa qua mulier menstruata speculum inficit, vel qua basiliscus hominem; sed visio perficitur per hoc quod species visibilis recipitur in visu, quod est quoddam pati, unde sensus potentia passiva est. Dato etiam quod sensus aliquid ageret active, non ex hoc sequeretur quod in sensu nulla passio esse possit; nihil enim prohibet respectu diversorum idem esse activum et passivum. Dato iterum quod sensus, qui nominat vim apprehensivam, nullius passionis esset capax, non propter hoc excluderetur quin in appetitiva sensibili passio esse posset."

<sup>112</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.170). See the quote on p. 68.

commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>113</sup> [1] The first reason is that when the intellectual appetite is in act, it is not accompanied by a physiological change, which signals the fact that one has been driven, thus passive, according to Aquinas. [2] The second reason is that when one is engaged in a willful action, he is more in an active state than in a passive one. In fact, the presence of the will implies that one can now determine things of his own accord, which is why Aquinas says that human beings are truly self-movers because they are masters of their own act (*domini suorum actuum*).<sup>114</sup>

### *Summary and reflection*

In this chapter I have traced the passivity of passion to a passive power of the soul, namely, the sensitive appetite. To do that, I have first suggested that the psychical activity of passion reflects the fundamental human condition, namely that human beings are passive and must allow the external world to affect themselves for their perfection. The lack of self-sufficiency in human beings is well expressed through passion, which is the soul's reaction to a sensible thing, which the soul recognizes as a good. After presenting

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<sup>113</sup> *In II Eth.*, l. 5 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.1.90:61-72): "Inter quas etiam operatio appetitus intellectivi non proprie dicitur passio, tum quia non est secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, quae requiritur ad rationem passionis proprie dictae, tum etiam quia secundum operationem appetitus intellectivi qui est voluntas, homo non agitur tamquam patiens, sed potius seipsum agit tamquam dominus sui actus existens. Relinquitur ergo quod passiones proprie dicantur operationes appetitus sensitivi, quae sunt secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, et quibus homo quodammodo ducitur." See also *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.171): "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis: quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi; ut etiam patet per definitiones Damasceni inductas."

<sup>114</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 1, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.6)

this general picture of human beings, I have clarified the diverse meanings of passion. Aquinas uses the word passion in two ways. In a broad sense, it refers to any kind of change, in which case passion can exist in every part of the soul. In a strict sense, however, passion is only found in the sensitive appetite whose movement originates in the soul and terminates in the body. This passion is called “psychical passion” or “passion of the soul.”

Next, I have investigated the origin of the passivity of the sensitive appetite. To do this, I have first discussed the first component of passion, namely, the sensitive part. The conclusion of this examination is that the sensitive part has a high degree of passivity. The senses are passive because they are not only passive in a metaphysical sense, namely that they become more perfect by moving from the state of potentially sensing to that of actually sensing, but also they are directly acted upon by something external to them.

Next, I have discussed the passivity of the other component of passion, namely, the appetite. From this discussion I have concluded that the appetite is more passive than apprehension on two grounds. First, the appetite is acted upon by a known good. Second, it tends to its object as it is. This was contrasted with the activity of apprehension which has its object in itself.

To sum up, I would like to make two points as the conclusion of my investigation in this chapter. Firstly, the sensitive appetite in a certain sense is the most passive part of the soul.<sup>115</sup> Secondly, the passivity of passion has its origin in the high degree of passivity of

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<sup>115</sup> Etienne Gilson supports the view that the sensitive appetite has a high degree of passivity. In fact, he says that the sensitive appetite is the most passive part of the soul: “We know, of course, that the human

the sensitive appetite. Now, to a large extent the passivity of the sensitive appetite is attributed to the fact that it is a corporeal power. In the following chapter, I will discuss how the material principle in the passion, i.e., the body, accounts for the passivity experienced by a person in a state of passion.

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mind has no innate ideas and that it must receive the whole content of its knowledge from without. . . . Because the desire of man does not reach things then except by way of ideas which he gets from them, it is doubly dependent and still more passive than the intellect. Yet, if rational desire is more passive than reason, sense desire is even more passive than rational; for the first is dependent only on the idea of what is a good for reason, while the second depends on what is a good for the soul as united to the body all of whose needs have their immediate echo in the soul. Desires of this kind thus presuppose not only objects and perception of objects, but, far more, the perception of objects known as good by the soul, though they are not the proper good of reason, and it is in this most passive part of the soul that the emotion is most at home.” Etienne Gilson, *Moral Values and the Moral Life*, trans. Leo Richard Ward (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1931), 94-96.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE PASSIVITY OF THE PASSIONS ORIGINATING IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BODY**

### *Introduction*

In the previous chapter I have argued that the passivity of the person in a state of passion is due to its origination in a corporeal power, i.e., the sensitive appetite. In this chapter, I will place the corporeality of the human beings in a broad context and discuss how it is related to the passivity of a person in a state of passion. This discussion will be conducted in the context of hylomorphism, which considers a human being as a single substance comprised of soul and body. Accordingly, this chapter will proceed in the following order. First, I will present Aquinas's hylomorphic view of a human being as a composite of soul and body. This is important in that it provides the metaphysical basis for my subsequent discussion of the material and formal aspects of the passions of the soul. As a part of the discussion, I will take a careful look at the nature of the human soul and more pertinently, the nature of the human body. This discussion of the nature of the human body is crucial for my subsequent discussion of the material aspect of the passions (i.e., physiological change), since physiological change is often regarded by Aquinas as the reason why a person in a state of passion is passive.

The second part of the chapter will give a specific treatment of Aquinas's hylomorphic view of the passions of the soul. As a starting point, I will explain in what

sense the passions are found only in beings with a body. Here the issue of the “passions” of immaterial beings such as angels and God will be clarified. Next, I will analyze the passions themselves from a hylomorphic point of view. According to Aquinas, the formal principle of the passions is the movement of the appetitive power. The material aspect of the passions basically concerns itself with the body, but it can be further considered under two different aspects: first, by being prior to the passions, and second, by being consequent to the passions. As an important part of the investigation of the material aspect of the passions, I will present the relationship between bodily disposition and the passions. Here I will closely look at how the former can influence the latter. After that I will present Aristotle’s discussion of “affections” and “affective qualities” in his *Categories* as the philosophical background for Aquinas’s view. Finally, I will discuss what insight this hylomorphic view of the passions can bring to the issue of the passions in general.

## ***1 Aquinas’s Hylomorphic View of a Human Being And the Nature of the Human Body***

### *1.1 A Human Being as a Union of Soul and Body*

The fact that human beings are a composite of soul and body plays a fundamental role in the treatment of the passions of the soul. After all, the passions are found only in beings with a body.<sup>1</sup> Aquinas, in accordance with Aristotle, views a human being as a

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<sup>1</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.168): “Passio autem cum abiectione non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem: unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet compositum patitur.”

composite of body and soul. But what does he exactly mean by this union and how did he reach this conclusion?

First of all, Aquinas turns to a special mental operation called “abstraction” (*abstractio*) to discuss the notion of a human being as a composite of soul and body. As Joseph Owens says, abstraction is a “process of considering things according to what they have in common while leaving out of consideration all that is not common to them.”<sup>2</sup> Now to understand abstraction better, one needs to distinguish it from another mental operation called “separation” (*separatio*).<sup>3</sup> Aquinas contradistinguishes these two methods of knowledge in *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3.<sup>4</sup> First, he says that there are two operations of the mind. [1] The first one is called simple apprehension (*intelligentia indivisibilium*) because it is the understanding of the indivisible things. By this operation the mind understands the quiddity (*quid est*) or essence of a thing albeit incompletely. [2] The second operation of the mind is called judgment, for through this operation the mind composes (*componit*) and divides (*dividit*) by forming affirmative and negative propositions (*enuntiationes*). Now to these two operations of the mind correspond two methods of knowledge.<sup>5</sup> [2-1] The first one is abstraction (*abstractio*), by

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<sup>2</sup> Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1963), 63.

<sup>3</sup> However, as Armand Maurer says, one should note that the explicit terminological distinction between abstraction and separation fades away in the later Aquinas, although he is still making such a distinction implicitly. See the Introduction, especially p. xi in St. Thomas Aquinas, *The a of the Sciences*, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986).

<sup>4</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, trans. Armand Maurer, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), 32-46.

<sup>5</sup> *In III De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3 c 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.50.148: 159-73): “Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diuersas operationes: quia secundum operationem qua componit et diuidit distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse, in operatione uero qua intelligit quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit quid est hoc, nichil intelligendo de alio, neque

which the mind (through simple apprehension) distinguishes one thing from another by knowing what one is *without* knowing anything about the other. [2-2] The second method is separation (*separatio*), by which the mind (through judgment) distinguishes one thing from another by understanding that one does not exist in the other. There is an important difference between abstraction and separation. Whereas the mind can abstract one thing from the other only when the two things are united as one in reality, it can separate only when the two things are not actually united in reality. In this sense, distinguishing “animal” from “stone” should be called an act of separation rather than that of abstraction, since they are not one in existence. Now when it comes to soul and body, they are united in one thing, as in a human being. Hence, we come to the distinction of soul and body through the speculative method of abstraction.<sup>6</sup>

To understand Aquinas’s statement that a human being is a composite of soul and body, we still need to know a special kind of abstraction called “abstraction with precision”<sup>7</sup> or “precise abstraction.”<sup>8</sup> In the *De ente et essentia* (1252-1256), Aquinas distinguishes “abstraction with precision” from “abstraction without precision.” Through this distinction Aquinas gives the exact meaning of the body when he says that a human being is a composite of soul and body.<sup>9</sup>

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quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum; unde ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, set prima tantum. Hec autem distinctio recte dicitur abstractio, set tunc tantum quando ea, quorum unum sine altero intelligitur, sunt simul secundum rem: non enim dicitur animal a lapide abstrahi, si animal absque intellectu lapidis intelligatur.”

<sup>6</sup> This translation is that of Armand Maurer.

<sup>7</sup> This term is borrowed from Joseph Owens, *Christian Metaphysics*, 63.

<sup>8</sup> This term is borrowed from Kevin White in his “Two Studies Related to St. Thomas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s *De Sensu et Sensato*, Together with an Edition of Peter of Auvergne’s *Quaestiones super Parva Naturalia*” (Ph. D. diss., University of Ottawa, 1986), 8.

<sup>9</sup> For a full exposition of this topic, see pp. 7-12 in White’s “Two Studies.”

According to Aquinas, the term “body” can be considered in two ways depending on the kind of abstraction used. [1] First, “body” can be considered as the genus of an animal (*genus animalis*) by “abstraction without precision.”<sup>10</sup> Let me first briefly explain what Aquinas means by “abstraction without precision.” “Praecisio” is the noun form of the verb “praecidere,” which has such meanings as “to cut off,” “cut short,” “mutilate” etc.<sup>11</sup> Aquinas usually uses it in a formula, “cum praecisione X,” which means that when something is considered, X is left out of consideration.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, “abstraction without precision” means that, although something is abstracted, it still “implicitly” and “indeterminately” includes the rest of that which it is abstracted from, as Owens says.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, in the above case, although “body” is abstracted, its notion still carries the notion of “animal.”<sup>14</sup> Now if we applied “abstraction without precision” to the case of a human being as a union of soul and body and abstract “body,” it would still implicitly include the notion of “soul.” According to Aquinas, this kind of abstraction does not yield

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<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of this chapter, I have rearranged the original order of the first and second points.

<sup>11</sup> *Cassell's New Latin Dictionary*.

<sup>12</sup> Owens, *Christian Metaphysics*, 63.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *De ente*, c. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.43.372: 135-63): “Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi ut significet rem quandam que habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quecumque forma sit illa, siue ex ea possit prouenire aliqua ulterior perfectio, siue non; et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nichil erit accipere quod non implicite in corpore contineatur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur ‘quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo’, intelligebatur: quecumque forma esset, siue animal siue lapideitas, siue quecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius. Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. Si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam que habet talem perfectionem ut possit sentire et moueri per principium in ipso existens, cum precisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quecumque alia perfectio ulterior superueniret haberet se ad animal per modum compartis, et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis: et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam ex cuius forma potest prouenire sensus et motus, quecumque sit illa forma: siue sit anima sensibilis tantum, siue sensibilis et rationalis simul.”

an adequate understanding of the view that a human being is a single substance comprised of soul and body.

[2] Second, body can be considered as an integral part of an animal (*pars integralis animalis*). This is a mental operation with which one can separate two constituents of a whole *as if* they were two *distinct* things.<sup>15</sup> Understood this way, we have the notion “body” with the exclusion (*cum praecisione*) of the notion of soul in a union of soul and body. For this reason this kind of abstraction is called “abstraction with precision.” In sum, by “abstraction with precision” we can consider the soul and the body as the integral parts of the whole human being, and the notion of either part excludes (*cum praecisione*) that of the other.<sup>16</sup> However, it is important to know that this consideration is still abstraction which can only be applied to things which constitute a single substance in reality, as I have said earlier. Kevin White explains how “abstraction with precision” enables one to distinguish two integral components of a whole without harming its unity.

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<sup>15</sup> White, “Two Studies,” 8.

<sup>16</sup> *De ente*, c. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.43.371: 105-34): (My italics) “Hoc autem quomodo contingat uideri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis, et secundum quod ponitur genus; non enim potest eo modo esse genus quo est pars integralis. Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantie dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipse enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem, ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat; sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet, et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, que est habere talem formam ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, que habet talem formam ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum, *cum praecisione*: ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur, sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit preter significationem corporis sic dicti. Et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis: quia sic anima erit preter id quod significatum est nomine corporis, et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur animal.” See also White, “Two Studies,” 9.

The human “body”—understood as a genus, rather than precisely—does not enter into this hylemorphic composition as a part, but rather is [author’s underlining] the composition itself. At this fundamental level, then, it is inexact to speak of a union of soul and body in man, since the soul itself is one of the parts of the body. If, however, one turns from an analysis of human nature into its real co-principles to a consideration of it as a whole, one can then, by precise abstraction, make a distinction between soul and body “as” integral parts, taking “body” to mean human nature to the exclusion of man’s rational power, and “soul” to mean the soul as the source of man’s rationality alone. The passage in which St. Thomas speaks of a union of soul and body in human nature seem to tacitly rely upon this precise sense of the term “body.”<sup>17</sup>

Now that we have seen the special method which enabled one to view a human being as a union of body and soul, let us see the relationship between these two parts more in detail. In accordance with Aristotle, Aquinas says that the union of soul and body is such that the former is related to the latter as form and matter. This way of viewing things is called hylomorphism. *Hylē* and *morphē* in Greek mean “matter” and “form” respectively. The core of this view is that the soul gives a form to the body, so that the body, which is only potentially alive without the soul, may be actually alive. In this sense, we can say that the soul is active, whereas the body is passive. This hylomorphic view of a human being is directly related to my subsequent discussion of Aquinas’s distinctive take on the hylomorphic view on the issue of the passions. In accordance with his unique hylomorphism, Aquinas considers the passions according to their formal and material aspects.

Let us first examine the *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259-1264), one of Aquinas’s earlier works, for his treatment of hylomorphism. Chapters 68 through 72 in Book II in

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<sup>17</sup> White, “Two Studies,” 11.

particular treat the union of an intellectual substance (soul) and body. In Chapter 68, the question of how an intellectual substance can be the form of the body is proposed. Here Aquinas defines the human soul as “an intellectual substance united to the body as its form” (*anima humana sit intellectualis substantia corpori unita ut forma.*).<sup>18</sup> Then he says that there are two general requirements for the soul to be the substantial form of another entity. [1] First, the form must be the principle (*principium*) of the substantial being of the thing whose form it is. The “principle” here, he clarifies, means not the productive (*factivum*) principle but the formal (*formale*) principle by which “a thing exists and is called a being.” [2] The second requirement is that the form and the matter should be united to constitute one being (*forma et materia convenient in uno esse*). This is a logical outcome of the first requirement, since if something is the formal principle by which another thing exists and is called being, they are united in one being. It is in this one being that the composite substance (*substantia composita*) subsists (*subsistit*). In other words, a composite is one in being but constituted of two principles of matter and form.<sup>19</sup>

In the next chapter (c. 69), Aquinas confirms this union, as he replies to the objection which argued that an intellectual soul cannot be united to the body as a form. In

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<sup>18</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 68 (Leon. ed., Vol. 13.440: 12-14).

<sup>19</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 68 (Leon. ed., Vol. 13.440: 15-32): (My numbering) “Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. [1] Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma: principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur *ens*. [2] Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia convenient in uno esse: quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui dat esse. Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse, ex materia et forma constans. Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est, esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae. Non est enim inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum et forma ipsa: cum compositum non sit nisi per formam, nec seorsum utrumque subsistat.”

reply to this objection, Aquinas once again says that the body and soul are not “two actually existing substances” but “one actually existing substance” (*una substantia actu existens*) constituted by the two principles. Because the two principles, Aquinas continues, together comprise one being, and the body is bestowed life by the soul as its form, the body of a human being is not the same actually when the soul is present and when it is absent.<sup>20</sup> This way Aquinas explicitly designates the soul as the life giver of the body.<sup>21</sup>

After introducing the hylomorphic composition of the human person, Aquinas now elaborates on how this union of an intellectual substance and matter is possible. First of all, it should be noted that the issue of the union of soul and body was quite controversial among the philosophers since ancient times. For example, although some of the ancient philosophers agreed with Aristotle and Aquinas that the human person is comprised of soul and body, they disagreed on the *manner* they are united. For instance, Plato thought that the soul is united to the body as a mover (*motor*). Adopting a modern example, Plato’s union of soul and body would be analogous to the “union” of the driver to his or her motor vehicle.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 69 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.447: 5-9): “Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens: corpus enim hominis non est idem actu praesente anima, et absente; sed anima facit ipsum actu esse.”

<sup>21</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 69 (Leon. ed., Vol. 13.447: 4-9): “In prima enim ratione falsum supponitur. Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens: corpus enim hominis non est idem actu praesente anima, et absente; sed anima facit ipsum actu esse.”

<sup>22</sup> Aquinas’s criticism of Plato in this regards appears in *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 7 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.231) as well: “Respondeo dicendum quod si anima, secundum Platonicos, corpori uniretur solum ut motor, conveniens esset dicere quod inter animam hominis, vel cuiuscumque animalis, et corpus aliqua alia corpora media intervenirent: convenit enim motori aliquid distans per media magis propinqua movere.”

On the contrary, Aquinas, in accordance with Aristotle, thinks that the union of the soul to the body is not just that of a mover to the moved. For him the union of soul and body is a much more *intimate* one. In addition, this union is good for both soul and body. Aquinas strengthens the validity of the union of soul and body, by pointing out the fact that the kind of body that is united to the soul is not just any body but a superior kind of body. For the authority on this argument, he turns to Pseudo-Dionysius who said that “the lowest in the higher genus touches the highest of the lower species” (*divina sapientia coniungit fines superiorum principiis inferiorum*).<sup>23</sup> What this principle implies is that something supreme (*aliquid supremum*) is found even in a lower genus, i.e., the genus of the bodies (*in genere corporum*). And what is supreme is the human body, which is harmoniously disposed (*corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum*), compared to other bodies. Since this harmoniously disposed body takes up the highest place in the genus of lower bodies,<sup>24</sup> it shares the border with the lowest of the higher genus (i.e., the genus of intellects), which is none other than the human soul. Owing to this peculiar characteristic of the human soul, namely that despite being an intellect, it is united to a body as its form, it is described as a “certain horizon and boundary of the corporeal and the incorporeal (*quasi quidam horizon et confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum*).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> *De divinis nominibus*, ed. B. R. von Suchla, Corpus Dionysiacum, 1, Patristische Texte und Studien, 33 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1991), 197.

<sup>24</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 70 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.450: 11-16): “Sic igitur et corpori humano, quod est inter omnia corpora inferiora nobilissimum, et aequalitate suae complexionis caelo, ab omni contrarietate absoluto, simillimum, secundum intentionem Aristotelis substantia intellectualis unitur non per aliqua phantasmata, sed ut forma ipsius.”

<sup>25</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 68 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.440-41:16-8): “Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest. Semper enim invenitur infimum supremi generis contingere supremum inferioris generis: sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt vitam plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt immobilia, et solum tactum habent, et terrae in modum plantarum adstringuntur; unde et beatus Dionysius dicit, in VII

After showing the superiority of the human body, Aquinas now further strengthens the validity of this union by pointing out the fact that for the matter (body) to be united to the form (soul), it does not always have to be “adequate” (*adaequet*) to the form. This is because, although the given body is inadequate to the soul, the soul can “subsume” the weakness of the matter. In fact, Aquinas adds, “the higher the form is, the more it surpasses the matter in its being” (*Immo, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto in suo esse superexcedit materiam*).<sup>26</sup>

*Sententia Libri de anima* (Book II, Lect. 1) is another prominent place where one can find Aquinas’s treatment of hylomorphism. In this passage Aquinas explains in what way a human being is a composite. Here again Aquinas says that matter is potential, whereas form is actual. In order to show what kind of substance (*substantia*) the soul is, Aquinas first distinguishes three kinds of substance.<sup>27</sup> [1] The first one is the substance

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cap. de Div. Nom., quod divina sapientia coniungit fines superiorum principiis inferiorum. Est igitur accipere aliquid supremum in genere corporum, scilicet corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad infimum superioris generis, scilicet ad animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in genere intellectualium substantiarum, ut ex modo intelligendi percipi potest. Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam *horizon* et *confinium* corporeorum et incorporeorum, in quantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma. Non autem minus est aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et materia corporali quam ex forma ignis et eius materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum.”

<sup>26</sup> SCG, II, c. 68 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.441: 9-18): “Quamvis autem sit unum esse formae et materiae, non tamen oportet quod materia semper adaequet esse formae. Immo, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto in suo esse superexcedit materiam. Quod patet inspicienti operationes formarum, ex quarum consideratione earum naturas cognoscimus: unumquodque enim operatur secundum quod est. Unde forma cuius operatio superexcedit conditionem materiae, et ipsa secundum dignitatem sui esse superexcedit materiam.”

<sup>27</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.69: 96-117): “Secunda diuisio est secundum quod substantia diuiditur in materiam et formam et compositum: materia quidem est que *secundum se non est hoc aliquid*, set in potencia tantum ut sit hoc aliquid; forma autem est, secundum quam iam est hoc aliquid in actu; substantia uero composita est, quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie, et hoc competit soli substantiae compositae in rebus materialibus; nam substantiae separate, quamuis non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sunt tamen hoc aliquid, cum sint subsistens in actu et complete in natura sua; anima autem rationalis, quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se subsistens, set quia non habet speciem completam set magis est pars speciei, non omnino competit ei quod sit hoc aliquid. Est ergo differentia

taken as the compound (*compositum*).<sup>28</sup> This refers to a particular material being. [2] The second is the substance taken as matter (*materia*). This refers to the body as the subject receiving life. [3] The last one is the substance taken as form (*forma*). After enumerating these three kinds of substance, Aquinas says that, since soul can be neither the actual living thing, nor the matter, it has to be a “substance in the manner of a form,” which determines a particular sort of a body.<sup>29</sup> According to him, matter is “that which is not as such a particular thing, but is in potency to become a particular thing” (*Materia quidem est, quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in potentia tantum ut sit hoc aliquid*). On the other hand, form is defined as “that by which a particular thing actually exists” (*Forma autem est, secundum quam iam est hoc aliquid in actu*). To sum up, the matter of a living body is related to the body’s life (i.e., soul) as a potency to act (*Materia autem corporis vivi est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad actum: et hoc est anima, actus, secundum quem corpus vivit*).

Here Aquinas notes that soul is not an accidental but a substantial form (*forma substantialis*) of the body. An accidental form (*forma accidentalis*) only brings in accidental qualities to the being. Since an accidental form by definition can only give a form to an already existing thing, it presupposes the existence of a subject. That is, an accidental form depends on the subject. On the other hand, a substantial form bestows a

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inter materiam et formam, quod materia est ens in potencia, forma autem est *endelichia*, id est actus, quo scilicet materia fit actu unde ipsum compositum est ens actu.”

<sup>28</sup> I have rearranged the order for a better understanding. The original order is matter, form, and compound.

<sup>29</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.70: 216-23): “Sic igitur, cum sit triplex substantia, scilicet compositum, materia, et forma, et anima non est ipsum compositum, quod est corpus habens uitam, neque est materia, quae est corpus subiectum uite, relinquitur, per locum a diuisione quod anima sit substantia sicut forma uel species talis corporis, scilicet corporis phisici habentis in potencia uitam.”

thing a *simple* being (*Forma autem substantialis facit [ens] esse actu simpliciter*).

However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, since there is no active power to which its correlative passive power does not correspond, a substantial form has to presuppose its correlative passive being, namely matter. In this sense, matter here can be said to be a subject “existing potentially only” (*existens in potentia tantum*), for which reason Aquinas calls it “first matter” (*materiae primae*).<sup>30</sup> And because form tells us about the nature or essence of a thing, there is only one substantial form for a thing, since a thing has only one nature.<sup>31</sup>

A similar argument is found in Aquinas’s later work, *Summa theologiae* (I, q. 76,

a. 8). Once again here Aquinas says that the soul is united to the body not merely as an

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<sup>30</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.71: 242-51): “Sciendum autem est quod hec est differentia inter formam accidentalem et substantialem, quod forma accidentalis non facit ens actu simpliciter, set ens actu tale uel tantum, utputa magnum uel album uel aliquid aliud huiusmodi, forma autem substantialis facit esse actu simpliciter; unde forma accidentalis aduenit subiecto iam existenti actu, forma autem substantialis non aduenit subiecto iam praeexistenti in actu, set existenti in potencia tantum, scilicet materie prime.” Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries translates “materia prima” as “bare matter.” St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1951; Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1994) 75.

<sup>31</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.71: 251-57): “Ex quo patet, quod impossibile est unius rei esse plures formas substantiales, quia prima faceret ens actu simpliciter et omnes aliae aduenirent subiecto iam existenti in actu; unde accidentaliter aduenirent subiecto iam existenti in actu, non enim facerent ens actu simpliciter, set secundum quid.” Aquinas’s explanation of accidental and substantial forms is continued in Lecture 2. Here with the distinction of accidental and substantial forms he wants to explain why there should be only one substantial form to a thing, although there can be multiple accidental forms. He says that it is basically because a substantial form by definition is a “form that is substance.” That is, a substantial form tells us about the *nature* of the thing of which it is the form. On the other hand, an accidental form, e.g., whiteness, does not yield the knowledge about the nature or essence of a thing. In other words, whiteness is only an accidental quality of that thing. Now since a thing can have only one nature, there can be only one substantial form in any one thing. For a human being, this is soul. *In II De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.74: 26-44): “Dicit ergo primo, quod dictum est in uniuersali quid sit anima, cum premissa deffinitio omni animae conueniat: dictum est enim quod anima est substantia que est forma a qua accipitur ratio rei. Est autem differentia inter formam que est substantia et formam que non est substantia: nam forma accidentalis, quae non est in genere substantiae, non pertinet ad essenciam siue ad quiditatem subiecti (non enim albedo est de essentia corporis albi), set forma substantialis est de essentia siue de quiditate subiecti. Sic igitur anima dicitur forma substantialis quia est de essentia siue de quiditate corporis animati. Et hoc est quod subdit: *Hoc autem, scilicet substantia que est secundum rationem est quod quid erat esse huic corpori*, id est corpori constituto in specie per talem formam; ipsa enim forma pertinet ad essenciam rei, que significatur per deffinitionem significantem de re quid est.”

accidental form (*forma corporis accidentalis*) but as a substantial form (*forma corporis substantialis*). However, here we have an important implication about something being a substantial form: the substantial form perfects not just the thing as a whole (*perfectio totius*) but each and every part of it (*cuiuslibet partis*). There is the kind of form which is the form of the whole yet does not give being (*esse*) to each part. Such a form gives the whole thing composition (*compositio*) and order (*ordo*). The form of a house belongs to this kind, and such a form is not a substantial form but an accidental form. However, soul is a substantial form, which means that it must be the form (*forma*) and act (*actus*), not just of the whole but of each and every part of it. Accordingly, when the soul is no longer present in a human being, we can only call it a human being equivocally (*nisi aequivoce*). That is, in accordance with Aquinas's painting analogy, just as the potato eaters in Van Gogh's painting, although they are called "human beings," are not "human beings" in the full sense of the word, a part of a human being, e.g., a hand, cannot be called a human being in the proper sense of the word.<sup>32</sup>

It is extremely important for Aquinas that soul is not just an accidental but a substantial form of the body, because, as he explicitly states in *Summa theologiae*, I, q.

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<sup>32</sup> *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.232): "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in aliis iam dictum est, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, posset dici quod non esset in qualibet parte corporis, sed in una tantum, per quam alias moveret. Sed quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus: et talis forma est accidentalis. Anima vero est forma substantialis, unde oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Et ideo, recedente anima, sicut non dicitur animal et homo nisi aequivoce, quemadmodum et animal pictum vel lapideum; ita est de manu et oculo, aut carne et osse, ut Philosophus dicit. Cuius signum est, quod nulla pars corporis habet proprium opus, anima recedente: cum tamen omne quod retinet speciem, retineat operationem speciei. Actus autem est in eo cuius est actus. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet eius parte."

76, a. 8, only then can the soul form an intimate union with the body and permeate in every part of the body. In this way, the soul is the ultimate source of explanation as to any activity of a being. That is, any act a human being does ought to be ascribed to the whole composite. And this in turn yields an important insight into the issue of the passions of the soul. On the surface, because the passions necessarily involve a corporeal power, they may seem essentially animalistic. However, this peculiar union of soul and body allows one to ascribe the passions of the soul not just to the body or to the soul, but to the whole composite, i.e., to the whole human being.

### *1.2 The Nature of the Human Body*

In the above, I have examined how the intellectual soul is united to the body. In this section, I will specifically discuss the nature of the human body.<sup>33</sup> This discussion is crucial in providing the foundation to my subsequent discussion of the material aspect of the passions, namely, physiological change, which is often regarded by Aquinas as a defect.

First of all, one has to acknowledge that a dual aspect is found in the nature of the human body. On the one hand, the human body is the most suitable body for the human soul. On the other hand, the human body carries inherent defects. I will first discuss the suitability of the human body for the soul. A good place where Aquinas discusses this aspect of the human body is *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 5 c. In Aquinas' view, the

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<sup>33</sup> I will use White's discussion of the specific character of the human body in his "Two Studies" (12-137) as a main reference to my discussion of the nature of the human body as well as a dual aspect of the human body.

human body is not the best body in an absolute sense. In fact, heavenly bodies are superior to it insofar as the body itself is considered. However, when it comes to the union of soul and body, the consideration of the matter itself is secondary to that of its suitability for the form, since matter, after all, exists for the sake of the form.<sup>34</sup> Given the fact that the human soul is the lowest intellectual substance, and thus needs to understand individual things through the senses, it is necessary for the soul to be united to the body that can assist in this operation, i.e., a body with good sensitive powers.<sup>35</sup> Now in accordance with the Pseudo-Dionysian principle, namely that “what belongs to an inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior” (*quod est inferioris praeexistit perfectius in superiori*), one has to say that the human body, as the best among the lower bodies, has the best sensitive powers. In this way, Aquinas explains the suitability of the human body with respect to the human soul.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> White, “Two Studies,” 85.

<sup>35</sup> *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.227-28): “Respondeo dicendum quod, cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia propter formam; ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis, et non e converso. Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra habitum est, secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam sensus, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. *de Div. Nom.* Natura autem nulli deest in necessariis: unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi. Actio autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento.” In his earlier work, his *Commentary on Sentences*, Aquinas’s view that matter exists for the form is expressed in a slightly different way: “the order of perfectibles must follow the order of perfections.” *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 c (Mandonnet ed., Vol.2.55): “Respondeo dicendum, quod oportuit talem formam, scilicet animam rationalem, corpori bene complexionato uniri: cujus rationem assignat Avicenna, *De intelligentiis*, cap x, part.2, et deinceps, dicens, quod oportet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionum.” White, “Two Studies,” 90.

<sup>36</sup> *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.228): “Oportuit igitur animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus. Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra tactum. Ad organum autem tactus requiritur quod sit medium inter contraria, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, et similia, quorum est tactus apprehensivus: sic enim est in potentia ad contraria, et potest ea sentire. Unde quanto organum tactus fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto perceptibilior erit tactus. Anima autem intellectiva habet completissime virtutem sensitivam: quia quod est inferioris praeexistit perfectius in superiori ut dicit Dionysius in libro de Div. Nom. Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis. Et propter

However, what renders the human body suitable for the soul carries defects on another level. Aquinas's treatment of the defects of the human body is found in a number of places, the major ones being *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 c; *Quaestio disputata De anima*, a. 8; *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 75, a. 6; and q. 76, a. 5; and III, q. 14, aa. 1-4; *Quaestiones disputatae De malo*, q. 5, a. 5. An examination of these passages brings us to the conclusion that Aquinas views the defects of the human body from two perspectives. The first one is a natural or biological perspective, through which the defects of the human body are ascribed to the particular physiological composition of the human body. The second one is a theological point of view, through which the defects of the human body are ascribed to the original sin of the first parent, Adam. Here I will restrict my discussion to the physiological perspective of the body. This discussion is pertinent to the material aspect of the passions, since the physiological change, a necessary concomitant of the passions of the soul, can be said to have its root in these general defects of the human body.

The human body has such defects as death, hunger, and thirst. According to Aquinas, the direct cause for these defects is that the human body is comprised of contraries (*ST*, III, q. 14, a. 2 c and a. 3 ad 2) such as hot and cold. For him, in accordance with Aristotle, contrariety (*contrarietas*) is the principle of dissolution or death. In

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hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est tactus. Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt melioris intellectus. Cuius signum est, quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus, ut dicitur in II de anima." Also, see *De malo*, 5, 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.141: 209-18): "Non enim unio animae ad corpus est propter corpus, set propter animam; non enim forma est propter materiam: set materia propter formam. Primus autem sensuum est tactus, qui quodammodo est fundamentum aliorum, organum autem tactus oportet esse medium inter contraria, ut probatur in II De anima. Vnde corpus congruens tali anime fuit corpus ex contrariis compositum; quod autem sequitur ex necessitate materie quod sit corruptibile."

*Summa theologiae*, I, q. 75, a. 6 c, Aquinas explicitly says that corruption (*corruptio*) is only found where there is contrariety (*contrarietas*).<sup>37</sup> That is, generations and corruptions are brought out of contraries and degenerated into contraries (*generationes enim et corruptiones ex contrariis et in contraria sunt.*).

Later in *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 14 a. 2 c, Aquinas confirms this view by saying that such defects as death are derived from the necessity of body. For this, he distinguishes two kinds of necessity. [1] First, we have a “necessity of constraint” (*necessitas coactionis*), which was imposed by an external agent. This external constraint, Aquinas continues, was imposed against our inner principles (*principium intrinsecum*), namely, the human nature and will. [2] Next, we have “natural necessity” (*necessitas naturalis*), which results from the natural principles. This natural necessity is pertinent to our discussion here. Since a thing is composed of matter and form, this necessity is derived either from the form or the matter of the thing. Using Aquinas’s own example of fire and a log, we can explain the formal and material necessities. The necessity of the fire heating the log is a formal one, since it is derived from the form of the fire. On the

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<sup>37</sup> *ST*, I, q. 75, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.203-4): “Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum principium, esse incorruptibilem. Dupliciter enim aliquid corrumpitur: uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur. Unde quod per se habet esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se: quae vero non subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum. Ostensum est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis corporibus: anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se corrumperetur. Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam: secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse.”

other hand, material necessity leads to the log's consumption, since the body composed of contraries necessarily degenerates. Through this distinction Aquinas concludes that such human defects as death are derived from natural necessity coming from the material aspect of the human nature, the contrariety in the body, to be precise.<sup>38</sup>

In the next Article (*ST*, III, q. 14, a. 3 ad 2), Aquinas presents two causes of the bodily defects of human beings. [1] The first one is a "remote reason" (*causa remota*), which is the result of the material principles of the human body (*ex parte principiorum materialium humani corporis*), namely the fact that the human body is made of contraries. [2] Also, such bodily defects are derived from "proximate cause" (*causa proxima*), namely our sin.<sup>39</sup> Through this passage Aquinas once again makes it clear that bodily defects are necessary results of our bodily condition, which will shed light on my subsequent discussion of the "material necessity" in the passions of the soul.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> *ST*, III, q. 14, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol.11.180-81): "Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est necessitas. Una quidem coactionis, quae fit ab agente extrinseco. Et haec quidem necessitas contrariatur et naturae et voluntati, quorum utrumque est principium intrinsecum. Alia autem est necessitas naturalis, quae consequitur principia naturalia: puta formam, sicut necessarium est ignem calefacere; vel materiam, sicut necessarium est corpus ex contrariis compositum dissolvi. Secundum igitur hanc necessitatem quae consequitur materiam, corpus Christi subiectum fuit necessitati mortis, et aliorum huiusmodi defectuum. Quia, sicut dictum est, *benepiacito divinae voluntatis Christi carni permittebatur agere et pati quae propria*: haec autem necessitas causatur ex principiis humanae carnis, ut dictum est. Si autem loquamur de necessitate coactionis secundum quod repugnat naturae corporali, sic iterum corpus Christi, secundum conditionem propriae naturae, necessitati subiicitur et clavi perforantis et flagelli percutientis. Secundum vero quod necessitas talis repugnat voluntati, manifestum est quod in Christo non fuit necessitas horum defectuum, nec per respectum ad voluntatem divinam; nec per respectum ad voluntatem humanam Christi absolute, prout sequitur rationem deliberativam; sed solum secundum naturalem motum voluntatis, prout scilicet naturaliter refugit mortem et corporis nocentia." White, "Two Studies," 107.

<sup>39</sup> Here we see Aquinas's effort to synthesize Aristotle's philosophy with Christian philosophy. Aquinas accepts Aristotle's view that bodily defects such as death are derived from the material principle of human nature. However, he goes beyond the pagan Philosopher. He says that even though it is "natural" for the human body to degenerate, this process can nevertheless be intervened by supernatural intervention, which Aquinas specifically terms as "original justice" (*originalis iustitia*).

<sup>40</sup> *ST*, III, q. 14, a. 3 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.11.182): (my numbering) "Ad secundum dicendum quod causa mortis et aliorum corporalium defectuum in humana natura est duplex. [1] Una quidem remota: quae accipitur ex parte principiorum materialium humani corporis, in quantum est ex contrariis compositum. Sed

### 1.3 A Dual Aspect of the Human Body

The two places where Aquinas specifically deals with the dual aspect of the human body is *Quaestio disputata De anima*, a. 8 and *Quaestiones disputatae De malo*, q. 5, a. 5. Since there is no significant difference between these two texts, I will base my presentation on his later work, *De malo*. The question proposed in *De malo*, q. 5, a. 5 is whether death and other such defects are natural (*naturales*) for human beings.<sup>41</sup>

Aquinas's answer to this is twofold: death can be *both* natural and unnatural. To explain how it is so, he first distinguishes two ways the word "natural" (*naturale*) can be used. [1] First, "natural" can be used to refer to "that which has nature" (*id quod habet naturam*), namely, natural things (*corpora naturalia*). [2] Second, "natural" can refer to "that which follows upon the nature of something" (*illud quod consequitur naturam secundum naturam existens*). Now because the "nature" of a thing can refer to both its form and its

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haec causa impediatur per originalem iustitiam. [2] Et ideo proxima causa mortis et aliorum defectuum est peccatum, per quod est subtracta originalis iustitia. Et propter hoc, quia Christus fuit sine peccato, dicitur non contraxisse huiusmodi defectus, sed voluntarie assumpsisse."

<sup>41</sup> *De malo*, q. 5, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.141: 157-94): "Responsio. Dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum in II Phisicorum, naturale dicitur dupliciter: uel id quod habet naturam, sicut dicimus corpora naturalia, uel illud quod consequitur naturam, secundum naturam existens, sicut dicimus quod ferri sursum est naturale igni. Et sic loquimur nunc de naturali, quod est secundum naturam. Vnde cum natura dicatur dupliciter, scilicet forma et materia, dupliciter dicitur aliquid naturale, uel secundum formam uel secundum materiam. Secundum formam quidem, sicut naturale est igni quod calefaciat, nam actio consequitur formam; secundum materiam autem, sicut aque est naturale quod ab igne calefieri possit. Cumque forma sit magis natura quam materia, naturalius est quod est naturale secundum formam quam quod est naturale secundum materiam. Set id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod congruit forme, et hoc est quod agens eligit in materia; alio modo non secundum quod congruit forme, immo forte repugnat etiam forme et fini, set est ex necessitate materie; et talis conditio non est electa uel intenta ab agente. Sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secundum, querit ferrum, quia est materia apta ad formam serre et ad finem eius propter suam duritiem. Inuenitur tamen in ferro aliqua conditio secundum quam ferrum non habet aptitudinem nec ad formam nec ad finem, sicut quod est frangibile, uel contrahens rubiginem, uel aliquid huiusmodi, que sunt impeditiua finis: unde non sunt electa ab agente, set magis ab agente repudiarentur si esset possibile. Vnde etiam Philosophus dicit in XIX De animalibus quod in accidentibus individui non est quaerenda causa finalis, set solum causa materialis: proueniunt enim ex dispositione materiae, non ex intentione agentis."

matter, [2] can be further distinguished into [2-1] “that which follows upon the nature as matter,” and [2-2] “that which follows upon the nature as form.” Aquinas’s example of [2-1] is that it is *natural* for fire to emit heat. An example of [2-2] is that it is *natural* for the water to be warmed by fire. According to Kevin White, since form and matter are united in a thing as agent and patient, one has to say that what is natural with respect to form is active in a thing, whereas what is natural with respect to matter is passive in a thing.<sup>42</sup>

Aquinas starts to discuss the issue of the defects of the body, as he makes a further distinction of what is natural with respect to matter. [2-1-1] In the first way, matter is said to be natural insofar as it is suitable for (*congruit*) the form, to which it is united. [2-1-2] In the other way, matter is said to be natural due to its necessity of matter (*ex necessitate materiae*), namely, bodily defects or weaknesses.<sup>43</sup> What is interesting here is that matter takes on a completely different meaning under these two considerations. Under the first consideration, matter is considered to be something that forms the best “partnership” with its form. On the contrary, under the second consideration, matter can be something even contrary to its form, thus hindering a thing from fulfilling its *telos*.<sup>44</sup>

Aquinas wants to resolve this apparent incongruence with the analogy of an artisan choosing a material for a saw. Since the artisan has in mind the *telos* of the saw (i.e., a saw is supposed to cut well), he chooses an enduring material such as iron. In this

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<sup>42</sup> White, “Two Studies,” 105.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 105-06.

case, the matter (iron) is considered natural with respect to its suitability (*aptitudo*) for its end ([2-1-1]). However, as the artisan uses the iron saw for a long period of time, it will gradually wear out and rust. For Aquinas these defects are “natural” for the saw insofar as the matter of the saw is concerned. [2-1-2]. After carefully distinguishing these two ways of considering the matter, Aquinas makes a poignant point: the defects of the iron saw does not have anything to do with either the intention or capacity of the agent. That is, if there had been material which is both durable and rust-resistant, the artisan would have chosen that material.<sup>45</sup>

In fact, Aquinas’s presentation of the diverse considerations of the matter of a thing was to clear the ground for his more intended discussion of the human body.<sup>46</sup> He

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>46</sup> *De malo*, q. 5, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.141-42: 194-270): “Sic igitur homini est aliquid naturale secundum suam formam, ut intelligere, uelle et alia huiusmodi; aliqua uero sunt ei naturalia secundum suam materiam, quod est corpus. Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam, alio modo secundum id quod consequitur in ipso secundum necessitatem materie tantum. Secundum aptitudinem quidem ad formam, necessarium est corpus humanum esse ex elementis compositum et medie complexionatum. Cum enim anima humana sit intellectiua in potentia, unitur corpori ut per sensus accipiat species intelligibiles, quibus fit intelligens actu. Non enim unio anime ad corpus est propter corpus, sed propter animam: non enim forma est propter materiam, set materia propter formam. Primus autem sensuum est tactus, qui quodammodo est fundamentum aliorum, organum autem tactus oportet esse medium inter contraria, ut probatur in II De anima. Vnde corpus congruens tali anime fuit corpus ex contrariis compositum; quod autem sequitur ex necessitate materie quod sit corruptibile. Set secundum hanc conditionem non habet aptitudinem ad formam, set magis repugnantiam ad formam. Et quidem omnis corruptio cuiuscumque rei naturalis non est secundum conuenientiam ad formam. Nam cum forma sit principium essendi, corruptio, que est uia ad non esse, opponitur ei; unde Philosophus dicit in II De celo et mundo quod corruptio senium, et omnis defectus sunt contra naturam particularem huius rei determinatae per formam, quamuis sint secundum naturam uniuersalem, cuius uirtute reducitur materia in actum cuiuslibet forme ad quam est in potentia, et uno generato necesse est aliud corrumpi. Set speciali modo corruptio proueniens ex necessitate materie est preter conuenientiam huius forme que est anima intellectiua. Nam alie forme sunt corruptibiles saltem per accidens, set anima intellectiua non est corruptibilis nec per se nec per accidens. Vnde si < in> natura inueniri potuisset aliquod corpus ex elementis compositum quod esset incorruptibile, proculdubio tale corpus esset conueniens anime secundum naturam. Sicut si posset inueniri ferrum infrangibile et rubiginem non contrahens, esset conuenientissima materia ad serram, et talem artifex quereretur; set quia talis inueniri non potest, accipit qualem potest, scilicet duram set frangibilem. Et similiter, quia natura non potest inuenire corpus ex elementis compositum quod secundum naturam materie sit incorruptibile, aptatur

parallels the discussion of the matter of a thing to that of the human body. First, he says that just as a thing can be called natural in two ways, a human being can be called “natural” in two ways: [1´] according to his form, and [2´] according to his matter. In the sense of the former ([1´]), it is natural for him to exercise his rational powers, i.e., intellect and will.<sup>47</sup> In the sense of the latter ([2´]), it is natural for him to be subject to his body or material conditions. Now as in the case of the iron saw, [2´] can be further considered in two ways. [2´-1] First, the human body can be considered as it is suitable for its form (i.e., soul) (*secundum aptitudinem ad formam*).<sup>48</sup> [2´-2] Second, the human body can be considered according to the necessity of the matter (*secundum necessitatem materiae*), namely, bodily defects. Now in order for the human body to be most suitable for the soul, it needs not only be composed of the elements but also constituted moderately or disposed in the middle of the contraries (*complexionatum medie*). And this kind of body is inevitably composed of contraries. Ironically, however, this contrariety itself implies certain defects, which follow from the necessity of the body. Hence, we can conclude that what is a strength in the human body in one respect becomes a weakness in another aspect.

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naturaliter anime incorruptibili corpus organicum licet corruptibile. Set quia Deus, qui est hominis institutor, hanc necessitatem materie sua omnipotentia potuit prohibere ne in actum prodiret, eius uirtute collatum est homini ante peccatum ut a morte preservaretur quousque tali beneficio se reddidit peccando indignum; sicut et faber prestaret ferro ex quo operatur, si posset, quod nunquam frangeretur. Sic ergo mors et corruptio naturalis est homini secundum necessitatem materie; set secundum rationem forme esset ei conueniens immortalitas. Ad quam tamen praestandam naturae principia non sufficiunt; set aptitudo quaedam naturalis ad eam conuenit homini secundum animam, complementum autem eius est ex supernaturali uirtute. Sicut Philosophus dicit in II Ethicorum quod habemus aptitudinem ad virtutes morales ex natura, set perficiuntur in nobis per consuetudinem. Et in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis, mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam.”

<sup>47</sup> One may say that this first consideration of “natural” sharply distinguished human beings from other animals.

<sup>48</sup> White, “Two Studies,” 107-8.

Returning to the question whether such defects as death are natural for human beings, we have to say that they are *both* natural and unnatural. They are natural insofar as the *material* nature of human beings is considered. On the other hand, they are unnatural insofar as their *formal* nature is considered. However, given the fact that form has more characteristics of nature than matter, one can say that those bodily defects are more unnatural than natural for a human being.<sup>49</sup>

*Summary of the first part*

In this part, first I have discussed Aquinas's hylomorphic view of a human being as a composite of soul and body. Then I have paid special attention to the nature of the human body. Both these discussions are related to my subsequent discussion of the passions of the soul. The hylomorphic view of human beings will lead us to see the human passions as acts of the whole composite, not just of the body or of the soul. The peculiar nature of the human body is also pertinent to my discussion of the material side to the passions of the soul, namely, the physiological change. In sum, the human body can be considered under two aspects. First, it is the most suitable body for the soul. However, this suitability entails its own defects such as death, hunger, and thirst. In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss how these general discussions are related to the specific issues of the passions of the soul.

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<sup>49</sup> The fact that immortality is still "natural" for human being while death is also natural for them is closely related to the issue of natural and supernatural ends of human beings. An excellent source of this discussion is found in Denis Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Good* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997).

## *2 The Experience of the Body in the Passions*

The purpose of this part is connecting my earlier discussion of hylomorphic view of human beings and the particular nature of the human body to the issues of the passions of the soul. As the starting point, I will first discuss how passion in the proper sense is only found in beings with body. Then I will discuss how we can treat the passions of the soul from the hylomorphic point of view.

### *2.1 Passions Are Found in Corporeal Beings Only*

As we have seen earlier, we can distinguish a broad sense and a strict sense of passion. It is important to know that the broad sense of passion (i.e., passion taken as potentiality) can apply to *any* finite being. Hence, even immaterial beings such as angels are subject to this kind of passion, according to Aquinas. On the other hand, a proper kind of passion is found only in corporeal beings, because only a corporeal being can undergo a physiological change in a true sense.<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, we can say that our body reveals the *ratio* of passion more than the soul.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 1 sc (Leon. ed., Vol.5.288): “Sed contra est quod sensualitas definitur esse *appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium*.” In *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 ad 1, Aquinas confirms this point. He says that a proper kind of passion can only be found in a being with body. *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.6.168): “Ad primum igitur dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abiectio et transmutatione, proprium est materiae: unde non invenitur nisi in compositis ex materia et forma.”

<sup>51</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol.6.168): “Passio autem cum abiectio non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem: unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laetitia.”

This physiological change, which is an inevitable concomitant of the passions, can be explained by the “weakness” of the body with respect to the external (sensible) objects. In *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 75, a. 3, ad 2, Aquinas compares the sensitive powers with the intellective powers in their relation to their respective objects (*sensibilia* and *intelligibilia*).<sup>52</sup> First he points out the similarity between the two powers: they are both in potency with respect to their respective objects. However, Aquinas continues, there is an important difference between the two. While the reception of the intelligible species by the intellect takes place without any corporeal change, the reception of the sensible species by the senses is accompanied by a bodily change (*sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione*). As a result, “high intensity” of the sensible objects can corrupt the senses (*excellencia sensibilibium corrumpit sensum*). This means that the senses, once they have undergone change, take some time to revert to the normal state. This also implies that in the process of this reversion the person in a state of passion can be under the influence of this physiological change in one way or another, and the more intense the passions are, the more powerful the influence will be. However, when it comes to the intellect, almost the opposite is true. According to Aquinas, the operation of the intellect is not only independent from matter but also it operates in such a way that once the intellect receives the highest of the intelligible objects (*maxima intelligibilium*)

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<sup>52</sup> *ST*, I, q. 75, a. 3 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.200): “Ad secundum dicendum quod sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut intellectivum ad intelligibilia, in quantum scilicet utrumque est in potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, in quantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione: unde excellencia sensibilibium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu non contingit: nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, magis potest postmodum intelligere minora. Si vero in intelligendo fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata preparantur.”

such as extremely complex mathematical problems, it can receive lower intelligible objects later with no difficulty.

One might interject here saying that we often attribute emotional terms to immaterial beings such as angels and God, as when God says at Jesus' baptism, "This is My beloved Son in Whom I am well pleased." (Matthew 3:17)<sup>53</sup> Aquinas was aware of this apparent conflict. Let us see how he resolves it in his earlier work, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (IV, d. 49, q. 3, a 1, qc. 2 c). The question proposed in this Article is whether delight is a passion (*utrum delectatio sit passio*). This question seems to have been raised because emotions such as delight can be applied to human beings as well as such immaterial beings as angels and God. Aquinas recognizes the legitimacy of this broad application of the term "delight" (*delectatio*), but at the same time introduces an important distinction. He says that delight can be found in different ways in different beings (e.g., brutes, humans, angels and God), depending on how each being is related to its own perfection (*perfectio*). [1] First, the kind of delight found in brutes is called "material passion" (*materialis passio*). This is because brutes pursue delight in a material way (*materiali motu*), i.e., through a bodily organ, since they have material perfection (*perfectio materialis*) only. Hence, delight is caused in them as their body is pleasantly stimulated. [2] Second, the kind of delight found in angels is "immaterial passion" (*immaterialis passio*). This is attributed to the fact that they do not have material perfection but only immaterial perfection, since they are totally removed from matter.

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<sup>53</sup> Parallel reading: Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22. For a good source of the discussion on the "passions" of God, see Norman Kretzmann, "Aquinas on God's Joy, Love, and Liberality," *The Modern Schoolman* LXXII (1995): 125-48.

Aquinas supports this view with Pseudo-Dionysius' words: "heavenly dispositions, i.e., angelic dispositions, are not receptive of what is passable delight (*passibilis delectationis*) to us human beings" [3] Next, in human beings, not only material passion but also immaterial passion is found. This is due to the peculiar composition of human beings, namely that human beings are a composite of the immaterial and the material. This dual dimension in the human nature leads one to consider the passions under two aspects. That is, with respect to an inferior part of a human being (i.e., the sensitive appetite), which human beings share with brutes, their passions are material passions. However, when it comes to a higher part of the soul (i.e., the will), which they share with angels, their passions are immaterial passions.<sup>54</sup> For example, we can derive delight from helping our neighbors. [4] Finally, in God the most simple and pure delight is found. Aquinas says that in all the other beings, perfection is different from what is perfected (*perfectio est aliud ab eo quod perficitur*), which is the same as to say that there can be more than one perfection in one being.<sup>55</sup> Hence, multiple delights supervene (*superveniunt*) to any finite

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<sup>54</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 2 c: "Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod delectatio invenitur diversimode in Deo, Angelis, hominibus, et brutis, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad suas perfectiones, ex quarum conjunctione delectatio consurgit. Bruta enim non possunt pertingere ad altiorem perfectionem quam sit perfectio materialis; unde eam consequuntur materiali motu, qui scilicet est per organum corporale; et sic delectatio in eis consurgens est materialis passio. In Angelis vero, cum sint omnino a materia separati, non est accipere aliquam materialem perfectionem, sed immaterialem tantum; unde et immaterialiter eam consequuntur; et delectatio in eis consequens immaterialis est. Unde dicit Dionysius in fine Caelest. Hierarch.: *caelestes dispositiones*, idest Angeli, *acceptrices non sunt omnino ejus quae secundum nos est passibilis delectationis*. Homines vero ex spirituali et materiali natura compositi sunt; et ideo quantum ad inferiorem partem, scilicet appetitum sensibilem, in quo cum brutis conveniunt, est delectatio materialis; in superiori vero appetitu, in quo cum Angelis conveniunt, habent delectationem immaterialem, ut cum gaudent de rebus spiritualibus, puta de contemplationibus, et aliis divinis donis; unde dicit Dionysius, ibidem, quod *in participatione angelicae delectationis saepe facti sunt et viri sancti per deificos divinarum illuminationum superadventus.*"

<sup>55</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 2 c: "In omnibus autem praedictis perfectio est aliud ab eo quod perficitur; unde possibile est plures perfectiones uni inesse; et ideo tam in brutis quam in hominibus et Angelis sunt multiplices delectationes eis supervenientes. Sed Deus non habet perfectionem quae non sit

beings, e.g., brutes, human beings and angels. However, in God perfection is not different from what is being perfected. Hence, His delight is pure (*unica*) and essential (*essentialis*) rather than extraneous. Aquinas confirms this idea with Aristotle who says in Book 7 of *Nicomachean Ethics* that “God always rejoices in one and simple (*una et simplex*) delight.”<sup>56</sup>

Let us examine how Aquinas discusses the “passion” of angels and God in his later work, particularly in the *Summa theologiae*. In *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4 and a. 3 c, he says that angels do not have the kind of passion which disturbs a higher power (i.e., the intellect), which is ascribed to the fact that they do not have a body.<sup>57</sup> Now passion proper is the act of the sensitive appetite, which, being a corporeal power, is ordered to particular and sensible goods (*bona particularia et sensibilia*) (*ST*, I, q. 63, a. 4 ad 1).<sup>58</sup> Accordingly, angels do not seek sensible goods; they only pursue universal goods because their intellectual appetite (the will) considers an object according to the common notion of good (*secundum communem rationem boni*) (*ST*, I, q. 63, a. 9 ad 1 and

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idem quod ipse, cum ipse sit actus purus; et ideo unica tantum est ejus delectatio, non superveniens, sed essentialis; unde dicit philosophus in 7 Ethic., quod Deus semper una et simplici gaudet delectatione.”

<sup>56</sup> *In VII Eth.*, l. 14 (Leon. ed., Vol.47.438: 266-76): “Et dicit quod si natura alicuius rei delectantis esset simplex et immutabilis, semper eadem actio esset sibi delectabilissima; puta, si homo esset solum intellectus, semper in contemplando delectaretur. Et inde est quod, quia Deus est simplex et immutabilis, semper gaudet una et simplici delectatione, quam scilicet habet in contemplatione suiipsius. Non enim est operatio quae delectationem causat solum in motu consistens, sed etiam in immobilitate, sicut patet de operatione intellectus.” Originally, this passage appears in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1154 b26-39.

<sup>57</sup> *ST*, I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.122): “Hoc autem modo in angelo peccatum esse non potuit: quia nec in angelis sunt passiones, quibus ratio aut intellectus ligetur, ut ex supra dictis patet; nec iterum primum peccatum habitus praecedere potuit ad peccatum inclinans.” See also *ST*, I, q. 63 a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.126): “Respondeo dicendum quod angelus, absque omni dubio, peccavit appetendo esse ut Deus. Sed hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, per aequiparantiam; alio modo, per similitudinem. Primo quidem modo, non potuit appetere esse ut Deus: quia scivit hoc esse impossibile, naturali cognitione; nec primum actum peccandi in ipso praecessit vel habitus vel passio ligans cognoscitivam ipsius virtutem, ut in particulari deficiens eligeret impossibile, sicut in nobis interdum accidit.”

<sup>58</sup> *ST*, I, q. 63 a. 4 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.129): “Natura autem sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquod bonum particulare, cui potest esse coniunctum malum.”

q. 82, a. 5 c).<sup>59</sup> However, angels are still subject to a broad sense of passion, since they have potency with respect to the intellectual part (*potentia secundum intellectivam partem*) (*ST*, I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 1).<sup>60</sup> This difference between corporeal beings and incorporeal beings leads Aquinas to make an important distinction regarding affections later in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 82, a. 5 ad 1. He says that there can be two senses of love (*amor*) and concupiscence (*concupiscentia*).<sup>61</sup> [1] The first one is the affections that arise with the commotion (*concitatio*) of the soul. These are called “passions” (*passiones*) and

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<sup>59</sup> *ST*, I, q. 63, a. 9 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.138): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur quantum ad homines, in quibus malum contingit ex hoc quod sequuntur bona sensibilia, quae sunt pluribus nota, deserto bono rationis, quod paucioribus notum est. In angelis autem non est nisi natura intellectualis. Unde non est similis ratio.” See also, *ST*, I, q. 82, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.5.306): “Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni: quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, in quantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnavivum eius quod infert nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.”

<sup>60</sup> *ST*, I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.121): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in angelis non est potentia ad esse naturale. Est tamen in eis potentia secundum intellectivam partem, ad hoc quod convertantur in hoc vel in illud. Et quantum ad hoc, potest in eis esse malum.” In *ST*, I, q. 54, a.1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.39), Aquinas discusses God as pure act. He argues for divine characteristic with the following steps. First, he says that no action of any created being can be its own substance. This is because action is the actuality of a power, whereas existence is the actuality of a substance (i.e., essence). Now if a thing has potentiality, it cannot be its own actuality, because actuality is opposed to potentiality. Only in God is His substance (essence) the same as His existence and His action. John Wippel gives a good explanation as to the nature of the potentiality of finite beings including angels and humans. First of all, being finite means having been created. A created thing can be finite or limited in two ways. First, a thing can be limited “from above,” i.e., when its act of being is limited by its essence. Second, a thing can be limited “from below,” i.e., when its form is limited by another receiving subject, namely matter. Now angels, since they have no body, are limited only “from above.” On the other hand, human beings, since they have body, are limited both “from above” and “from below.” God is the only being that is not limited in any way. John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 310.

<sup>61</sup> *ST*, I, q. 82, a. 5 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.306): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur: et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias: sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.”

are found only in the sensitive appetite. [2] The other kind of affections are “simple affections” (*simplex affectus*), which arise without any commotion of the soul. These are the act of the will, which is an intellectual power. In conclusion, we have to say that when God is said to have “passion,” it should be understood as an act of His will.

## 2.2 Hylomorphism in the Passions of the Soul

In this section, I will discuss the hylomorphism of the passions of the soul based on the general discussion of hylomorphism of a human being earlier. One can find two kinds of hylomorphism in Aquinas with respect to the passions. The first kind of hylomorphism concerns the relationship between the passions and higher powers of the soul. The second kind of hylomorphism concerns the hylomorphism within the passions themselves. Let us first examine the former.

In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 17, a. 4 c, Aquinas explicitly says that passion is matter (*materia*) with respect to a higher power which moves it.<sup>62</sup> In this Article, he first

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<sup>62</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 17, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol.6.120-21): “Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse secundum quid multa, et secundum quid unum. Quinimmo omnia multa sunt secundum aliquid unum, ut Dionysius dicit, ult. cap. *de Div. Nom.* Est tamen differentia attendenda in hoc, quod quaedam sunt simpliciter multa, et secundum quid unum: quaedam vero e converso. Unum autem hoc modo dicitur sicut et ens. Ens autem simpliciter est substantia: sed ens secundum quid est accidens, vel etiam ens rationis. Et ideo quaecumque sunt unum secundum substantiam, sunt unum simpliciter, et multa secundum quid. Sicut totum in genere substantiae, compositum ex suis partibus vel integralibus vel essentialibus, est unum simpliciter: nam totum est ens et substantia simpliciter, partes vero sunt entia et substantiae in toto. Quae vero sunt diversa secundum substantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid: sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus acervus; quae est unitas compositionis, aut ordinis. Similiter etiam multa individua, quae sunt unum genere vel specie, sunt simpliciter multa, et secundum quid unum: nam esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum secundum rationem. Sicut autem in genere rerum naturalium, aliquod totum componitur ex materia et forma, ut homo ex anima et corpore, qui est unum ens naturale, licet habeat multitudinem partium; ita etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, in quantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam, sic enim et actus moventis primi formaliter se habet ad actum

shows how a natural thing is comprised of matter and form. Then he says that human acts can be viewed in the same way. That is, human acts (*actus humani*) are constituted of form and matter. What plays the role of form here is a higher power, and what plays the role of matter is a lower power. And this also means that reason can *command* the sensitive appetite. According to Aquinas, “command” (*imperare*) is directing a lower power to do something “by a certain motion of intimation” (*intimativa motio*), and this is a proper characteristic of reason. Accordingly, reason is related to the sensitive appetite as form and matter.<sup>63</sup>

Now let us discuss hylomorphism within the passions of the soul themselves. Earlier we have seen Aquinas’s hylomorphic view of a human being. Let us see how this basic frame of thought is at play in Aquinas’s treatment of the passions of the soul. Aquinas distinguishes a formal principle and a material principle regarding the passions, and they are the two conceptual axes in explaining the activities of the passions. The formal principle refers to the appetitive power in the soul. The material principle refers to the bodily disposition, but this can be further considered on two levels. In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7 ad 2, Aquinas says that the “condition of the body” (*qualitas corporalis*) can be related to the act of the sensitive appetite (i.e., the passions) in two

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instrumenti. Unde patet quod imperium et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa.”

<sup>63</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 17, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol.6.119): “Respondeo dicendum quod imperare nihil aliud est quam ordinare aliquem ad aliquid agendum, cum quadam intimativa motione. Ordinare autem est proprius actus rationis. Unde impossibile est quod in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est ratio, sit aliquo modo imperium.”

ways.<sup>64</sup> [1] First, the bodily condition, by being prior to passion, can affect one's passion. Since in this case the bodily condition is due to its nature or to some prior movement that is still exerting its influence, it is not under the command of reason. [2] Second, the bodily condition can be a consequence of the act of the sensitive movement. In this case, the bodily disposition is the result of the "movement of the heart," which is moved in various ways according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite. And as much as the sensitive appetite can be commanded by reason, the bodily disposition can come under the control of reason.

[1] Let us first examine the case in which the body affects the passions by being prior to them. Let us first look at Aquinas's early work, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (II, d. 15, q. 2 a. 1) where he discusses how people can have different bodily dispositions. In this Article, he discusses the nature of the human body as a part of his treatment of the predominant elements in each thing.<sup>65</sup> In the Corpus, he first says that the predominance of an element (*elementum praedominari*) in some body can be understood in two ways.<sup>66</sup> [a] First, it can be considered with respect to the genus

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<sup>64</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.6.123): (My numbering) "Ad secundum dicendum quod qualitas corporalis dupliciter se habet ad actum appetitus sensitivi. [1] Uno modo, ut praecedens: prout aliquis est aliquid aliter dispositus secundum corpus, ad hanc vel illam passionem. [2] Alio modo, ut consequens, sicut cum ex ira aliquis incalescit. Qualitas igitur praecedens non subiacet imperio rationis, quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti motione, quae non statim quiescere potest. Sed qualitas consequens sequitur imperium rationis: quia sequitur motum localem cordis, quod diversimode movetur secundum diversos actus sensitivi appetitus."

<sup>65</sup> The question itself in this Article is "whether some animals have taken on matter from waters, and some from the earth" (*Utrum quaedam animalia sumpserint materiam ex aquis, quaedam ex terra*).

<sup>66</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 c (Mandonnet ed., Vol.2.378): (My numbering) "Respondeo dicendum, quod elementum praedominari in aliquo corpore potest intelligi dupliciter: [1] vel secundum suum genus, [2] vel quantum ad id quod est proprium illi corpori in genere illo. Cum enim alicui generi deputatur aliqua complexio, hoc non est secundum aliquem indivisibilem gradum, sed secundum latitudinem quamdam; ita quod est invenire aliquos terminos ultra quos non salvatur complexio illius generis. Sed inter illos terminos

(*secundum suum genus*). [b] Second, it can be considered insofar as what is proper to that body in its genus (*quantum ad id quod est proprium illi corpori in genere illo*). Then he says that when some bodily disposition (*complexio*) is assigned to some genus, it is not that the disposition is just one general disposition with no visible grades (*gradus*) in between, but rather that some kind of “spectrum” (*latitudo*) is found. That is, this particular disposition is situated between some “boundaries” (*termini*), beyond which the disposition of that given genus is no longer saved (*salvatur*). However, between those boundaries, a large diversity is found according as it approaches either end. Aquinas takes the example of the human body to support this view. According to him, the disposition proper for the human body is the most mild body (*complexio debita corpori humano est complexio temperatissima*). Nevertheless, multiple degrees or “streaks” of temperament (*multi gradus temperamenti*) are found in the same human body. That is, although human beings have taken on generically same body, i.e., the human body, they can still have different temperaments. Aquinas supports this view by saying that owing to

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est multa diversitas, secundum quod acceditur ad unum vel alterum: verbi gratia, complexio debita corpori humano est complexio temperatissima; et tamen sunt multi gradus temperamenti, secundum quos quidam dicuntur melancholici, quidam cholericus, et sic de aliis, secundum propinquitatem ad terminos complexionis humanae speciei vel in calore vel in frigore; ita tamen quod est aliquis gradus caloris vel frigoris, quem non transit humana complexio. Dico ergo, quod si loquimur de elemento praedominante in corpore animalis quantum ad complexionem consequentem ipsum genus, oportet quod elementa inferiora grossiora secundum quantitatem excedant elementa subtiliora, quae tamen excedunt secundum virtutem, scilicet secundum calidum et humidum, in quo vita consistit; quae sunt qualitates principales ignis et aeris. Cum enim corpora animalium debeant esse aliis temperatiora, ut magis a contrariis remota, et per aequalitatem complexionis naturae corpori caelesti assimilata, perfectionem magis similem sortiantur virtuti quae movet caelos: oportet inferiora elementa, quae sunt minus activa eo quod habent plus de materia et minus de forma, secundum quantitatem excedere, ut virtutis defectum suppleat quantitatis excessus. Sed tamen complexio in qua salvatur natura animalis, habet multas diversitates; et secundum quod accedit ad unum extremum vel ad alterum, dicitur in altero dominari hoc vel illud elementum.”

this diversity within the same kind of body, some people are melancholic (*melancholici*) and some others are choleric (*cholericici*).

This way, Aquinas implies that human beings differ in temperament from one another. This finding is significant in the issue of the passivity in the passions of the soul. It provides a “material” explanation as to the cause of certain “passionate” tendencies in certain people. For example, some people may be more prone to sadness than other people due to their particular bodily disposition. And as much as it is natural, it is the source of their passivity. Hence, we can say that the particular bodily disposition accounts, at least partially, for the passivity of the person in a state of passion.

Next, let us look at *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 63. The question proposed in this Chapter is whether the soul is a disposition (*Quod anima non sit complexio*).<sup>67</sup> Aquinas opens this chapter, critiquing the physician, Galen, who said that the soul is none other than disposition (*complexio*).<sup>68</sup> According to Aquinas, Galen identified the soul with disposition, since people seem to exhibit passions in as many different ways as their dispositions. For example, those with choleric disposition tend to be more easily irritated than those without such a disposition. In the same way, melancholic people seem to get sad even at small things.

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<sup>67</sup> There can be several translations for the Latin, *complexio*: “disposition,” “bodily constitution,” “bodily composition,” “temperament,” etc.

<sup>68</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 63 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.433: 1-10): “Praedictae autem opinioni Alexandri de intellectu possibili, propinqua est Galeni medici de anima. Dicit enim animam esse *complexionem*. Ad hoc autem dicendum motus est per hoc quod videmus ex diversis complexionibus causari in nobis diversas passiones quae attribuuntur animae: aliquam enim complexionem habentes, ut cholericam, de facili irascuntur; melancholici vero de facili tristantur.”

However, Aquinas continues, Galen failed to note the fact that the passions are attributed to disposition in one way, and to soul in another way.<sup>69</sup> First, passions are attributed to disposition in such a way that the latter disposes the person to (re)act in a certain way. It is notable here that Aquinas calls this disposition “what is material” (*id quod est materiale*) in the passions of the soul, insinuating that it is the material cause of the passions. Later in *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 65, he says more explicitly that bodily disposition is in a way a “cause” of the passions of soul by way of disposing a person to act in a certain way (*causa animae passionum per modum disponentis*).<sup>70</sup> Next, the passions are attributed to the soul as the latter is the principal cause (*principalis causa*) of the former. For example, when it comes to a particular passion of anger (*ira*), one’s desire for vengeance can be the principal or formal cause of the passion. Here Aquinas refers to the soul as the formal cause, but in his later works, he further specifies it as the appetitive movement or the will. Here in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, we witness the early development of Aquinas’s hylomorphism on the passions of the soul. This view becomes even more evident in his later works, particularly in the *Summa theologiae*. For example, in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 63, a. 4 ad 2, Aquinas says that some people are

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<sup>69</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 63 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.434: 1-4): “Deceptus autem fuisse videtur ex hoc quod non consideravit aliter passiones attribui complexioni, et aliter animae. Complexioni namque attribuuntur sicut disponenti, et quantum ad id quod est materiale in passionibus, sicut fervor sanguinis et huiusmodi: animae autem tanquam principali causae, ex parte eius quod est in passionibus formale, sicut in ira appetitus vindictae.”

<sup>70</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 65 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.435): “Sed contra hoc iam dictum est quod complexio corporis est aliquantulum causa animae passionum per modum disponentis. Anima etiam non compatitur corpori nisi per accidens: quia, cum sit forma corporis, movetur per accidens moto corpore. Separatur etiam anima a corpore, non sicut tangens a tacto, sed sicut forma a materia. Quamvis et aliquis tactus sit incorporei ad corpus, ut supra ostensum est.”

naturally prone to anger. Then he adds that this natural inclination (*naturalis inclinatio*) is on the part of the sensitive nature, not on the part of the intellectual nature.<sup>71</sup>

[2] Next, let us examine how the body can affect the passions by being consequent to the passions. Let us first look at Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's *On Memory* (1268-1269).<sup>72</sup> He discusses how physiological change can render the person passive in a state of passion. He says that once passion has been aroused in someone by a certain object, it is not easy for him or her to "move away in the opposite direction." This is because it takes time for the passion to quiet down, which is again due to the fact that the bodily change which accompanied a particular passion takes time to revert to the usual state. In accordance with this, Gilson says that the passivity of the sensitive appetite is ascribed to the fact that it is a corporeal organ:

The reason of this inferiority [the fact that animals are being acted upon by sensible particulars] is that the sensible appetite of the animal is bound up, like the sense itself, with a bodily organ; the likeness of this appetite to the dispositions of matter and to corporeal things results in a nature which is less capable of moving than of being moved.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> *ST*, I, q. 63, a. 4 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.5.129): "Ad secundum dicendum quod malitia aliquorum hominum potest dici naturalis, vel propter consuetudinem, quae est altera natura; vel propter naturalem inclinationem ex parte naturae sensitivae, ad aliquam inordinatam passionem, sicut quidam dicuntur naturaliter iracundi vel concupiscentes; non autem ex parte naturae intellectualis."

<sup>72</sup> *In II De sensu*, l. 8 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.2.132: 101-12): "Deinde cum dicit: *Vnde et ire et timores etc.*, manifestat quod dixerat per simile. Et ponit duo similia. Quorum primum est de passionibus anime, quibus organum corporale quodam modo commouetur. Et dicit quod quando ira uel timor uel concupiscencia uel si quid huiusmodi mouetur *contra* aliquod obiectum, etiam si homines uelint in contrarium mouere retrahendo se ab ira uel a timore, non sedatur passio, set ad huc contra idem mouetur. Quod contingit quia commotio corporalis organi non statim quietatur."

<sup>73</sup> Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. I. T. Eschmann (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 285.

Also, in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5 c, Aquinas discusses the formal and material elements of the passions, using love (*amor*) as an illustration this time. Here he says explicitly that the formal element is derived from the appetite, whereas the material element denotes bodily change.<sup>74</sup> Then in his replies to the objections, he says that these two elements account for the two kinds of effects.<sup>75</sup> [a] First, there are effects that come from the formal side of passion, namely, according as the appetitive power is related to its object. There are four proximate effects that belong to this case: melting (*liquefacio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and fervor (*fervor*). [b] Second, we have effects that are derived from the material side of passion, namely, the effects that are brought about due to the change in the bodily organ.<sup>76</sup>

In his later work, *De malo* (q. 12, a. 1 c), Aquinas gives a fuller explanation of this dual aspect of the passions, this time using anger (*ira*) as an example of the passions.

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<sup>74</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol.6.201): “Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis: sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.”

<sup>75</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol.6.201): “Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui possunt quatuor effectus proximi: scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est *liquefactio*, quae opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive *fruitio*. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passionis: scilicet tristitiam de absentia, quae significatur per *languorem* (unde et Tullius, in III *de Tusculanis* Quaest., maxime tristitiam *aegritudinem* nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione amati, quod significatur per *fervorem*. Et isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.”

<sup>76</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 44, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol.6.283): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis: quorum unum alteri proportionatur.” The same message is found in *ST*, I-II, q. 44, a. 1.

The question proposed in this Article is whether anger can be good or bad. Aquinas says that anger and other passions can be considered in two ways.<sup>77</sup> [a] First, we can discuss the formal element of the passions. This formal element is derived from the appetitive power of the soul and concerns what the passions are trying to attain. For example, the passion of anger can be formally defined as the “desire for vengeance” (*appetitus vindictae*). [b] Second, we can discuss the material element of the passions. This material element means a physiological change, which is often regarded as a bodily commotion (*commotio corporalis*). Under this material consideration, a particular passion of anger is defined as the “increase of the circulation of blood around the heart” (*accensio sanguinis circa cor*). Naturally, excessive physiological change fetters the judgment of reason.

Now if we consider anger by its formal element, it belongs not only to the sensitive appetite but also to the intellectual appetite (the will), as the formal principle concerns one’s *intention*. And the involvement of intention makes it valid for the passions to come under moral consideration.<sup>78</sup> (I specifically discuss this issue in Chapters four and five of this dissertation.) Aquinas argues that the passions can be subject to morality with the following steps. First, we can think of two kinds of goods: “what is unconditionally good” (*id quod est optimum simpliciter*), and “what is the best in a

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<sup>77</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.235: 145-58): “Responsio. Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem fuit olim controuersia apud philosophos; nam Stoyci dixerunt omnem iram esse uitiosam; Peripatetici autem dicebant, aliquam iram esse bonam. Vt ergo circa hoc quid sit uerius uideatur, considerandum est, quod in ira, sicut in qualibet alia passione, duo possumus considerare: unum quod est quasi formale, aliud quod est quasi materiale. Formale quidem in ira est id quod est ex parte anime appetitiue, quod scilicet ira sit appetitus uindictae, materiale autem id quod pertinet ad commotionem corporalem, scilicet quod ira sit accensio sanguinis circa cor.”

<sup>78</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.235: 159-64): “Ita igitur si consideretur ira secundum id quod est formale in ea, sic potest esse et in appetitu sensitio et in appetitu intellectio qui est uoluntas, secundum quam aliquis potest uelle sumere uindictam; et secundum hoc manifestum est quod ira potest esse et bona et mala.”

particular case” (*id quod est optimum huic*). Now what is unconditionally good is not always the best in a particular case.<sup>79</sup> For example, given the particularity of the dog, it is better for the animal to be ferocious than to be rational. Similarly, when it comes to human beings, it is better for them to have the whole composite as such (i.e., the rational nature, the sensitive nature, and the body itself) subject to virtue, rather than just one part. That is, it would be the best for human beings in carrying out righteous virtue not only to will it, but also to feel the anger as well as to let the body experience the anger.

This conclusion gives an important insight into physiological change with regard to the passions. Since it is both natural and best for human beings to have the body moved as an effect of the movement of the sensitive appetite, we have to say that, so long as the bodily change does not disturb the judgment of reason, which is essential for a moral good, this movement is even desirable. In other words, this bodily movement can be even an indication of inner virtues. Aquinas critiques the Stoics’ view of the passions, saying that their failure to distinguish between the unconditionally best and what is best in a particular case led them to have a rather simplistic or unduly stringent view of the passions.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.235: 189-205): “Contingit enim aliquid esse melius simpliciter quod non est huic melius, sicut filosofari est simpliciter melius quam ditari set indigenti necessariis ditari est melius, ut dicitur in III Topicorum, et furiosum esse est bonum cani secundum conditionem sue nature, quod tamen non est homini bonum. Sic ergo, quia natura hominis composita est ex anima et corpore et ex natura intellectiua et sensitua, ad bonum hominis pertinet quod secundum se totum uirtuti subdatur, scilicet et secundum partem intellectiuam et secundum partem sensitiuam et secundum corpus; et ideo ad uirtutem hominis requiritur ut appetitus debite vindicte non solum sit in parte rationali anime set etiam sit in parte sensitua et in ipso corpore, et ipsum corpus moueatur ad seruiendum uirtuti.”

<sup>80</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol.23.235: 189-205): “Sed si quis recte consideret, inueniet Stoicos in sua consideratione tripliciter defecisse. Primo quidem quantum ad hoc quod non distinguebant inter id quod est optimum simpliciter, et id quod est optimum huic. Contingit enim aliquid esse melius simpliciter, quod non est huic melius . . . .”

### 2.3 Passion as an Act of the Whole Composite

In the above, I have analyzed the passions with regard to their formal and material aspects. Based on that discussion, I will argue in this section that the passions are an act of the whole composite.<sup>81</sup> In *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 50, Aquinas says that any act a human being does should be attributed to the whole human being. He says that any action of a thing composed of matter and form belongs not only to the form, nor only to the matter, but to the composite. This is because the act of a composite belongs to that which exists (*eius enim est agere cuius est esse*), and to exist (*esse*) belongs to the composite on account of its form. Therefore, we have to say that the composite acts on account of its form.<sup>82</sup>

Then in *Sentencia libri De anima*, I, l. 2, Aquinas even more explicitly says that the passions are the act of the whole composite. In the previous Lecture, Aquinas mentioned the significance and complexity of the study of the soul, and here he shows the difficulty of the study of the soul, by pointing out the fact that some things seem to pertain not only to the soul but also to the body. In this regard, an important question is

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<sup>81</sup> For a good source of the discussion on the relationship between the human composite and emotion, see Judith Barad, “Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity,” *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 397-413. For example, on p. 402, she critiques the view of William James on emotion with that of Aquinas: “Yet in opposition to James, Aquinas maintains that bodily changes are the causes of emotion only in the sense that they are its material embodiment. He did not share James’s view that emotion is the mere perception of physiological changes. For Aquinas, the fact that we are composite beings precludes ascribing emotion either solely to our rational element or solely to our bodies. In a being made of matter and form, action comes from form and emotion from matter.”

<sup>82</sup> *SCG*, II, c. 50 (Leon. ed., Vol.13.384: 1-12): “Adhuc. Actio cuiuslibet ex materia et forma compositi non est tantum formae, nec tantum materiae, sed compositi: eius enim est agere cuius est esse; esse autem est compositi per formam; unde et compositum per formam agit. Si igitur substantia intelligens sit composita ex materia et forma, intelligere erit ipsius compositi. Actus autem terminatur ad aliquid simile agenti: unde et compositum generans non generat formam, sed compositum. Si igitur intelligere sit actio compositi, non intelligetur nec forma nec materia, sed tantum compositum.”

asked: Do the passions (*passiones*) and operations (*operationes*) of the soul pertain to the soul only (Plato's position), or to *both* the soul and body?<sup>83</sup> What is peculiar about the operations of the soul is that it appears as if some acts pertained only to the soul, and others both to the soul and body. Initially, Aristotle says that the power of the intellect (*intelligere*) seems to be a case of the former. However, a careful consideration reveals that this is not exactly correct, since the (human) intellect has to turn to the sensitive powers, e.g., imagination (*phantasia*), in order to understand. Hence, one must say that the intellect involves both the body and soul for its operation. However, Aquinas continues, one also has to admit the fact that the way intellect involves the soul and body is significantly different from the way other powers, especially the sensitive appetite, do. Therefore, he says that different powers involve the body and soul in different ways. In the case of the intellect, it is right to say that it is a "proper" act of the soul, because it can operate without using a bodily organ. When it turns to the imagination, it does so in such a way that the latter provides the "raw" material from which it can abstract intelligible species. Now when it comes to the passions, they can be truly said to be operations of the compound (*conjunctum*) of soul and body.<sup>84</sup>

Next, following the steps of Aristotle, Aquinas explains in what way the passions can be said to pertain to the composite. He says that anything for which the constitution of the body operates pertains both to the body and the soul. Now the constitution of the

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<sup>83</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon., ed., Vol.45.1.9: 11-15): "Dicit ergo primo, quod dubitatio est circa passiones anime et operationes, utrum scilicet essent anime proprie sine communicatione corporis, ut Platoni uidebatur, uel nulla sit propria anime, set omnes sint communes corporis et compositi."

<sup>84</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.10: 69-74): "Et ex hoc duo sequuntur. Vnum est quod intelligere est propria operatio anime et non indiget corpore nisi ut obiecto tantum, ut dictum est; uidere autem et alie operationes et passiones non sunt anime tantum, set coniuncti."

body operates for all the passions of the soul, e.g., anger. Therefore, all the passions of the soul seem to pertain to the body.<sup>85</sup> Then with three examples, Aquinas shows in what way the body or bodily disposition (*complexio*) partakes the activity of the passions of the soul.<sup>86</sup> [a] First, there is a case in which one is surrounded by apparent afflictions but is not emotionally affected. For example, someone's house is about to be hit by a hurricane, but he is not frightened. [b] Then there is another case in which the same person, once he has been already "fired up" by anger or a certain physical disposition (*complexio*), finds his body reacting to even a slightest stimulus, as if he was really angry. This kind of reaction is usually called "sensitive" or "hysteric." [c] Lastly, there is a case that is an extreme version of [b]. Some people seem to experience a certain emotion when there is no (apparent) cause to it. For example, someone can undergo an acute feeling of fear when there is nothing that is threatening him.

Now all three of these cases, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, illustrate the way in which the body plays a significant role in the activity of the passions. The first case reveals a situation where the person's body has been too "stiffened" or "hardened" to show an "appropriate" reaction to the present or imminent danger. On the contrary, in

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<sup>85</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.10: 82-93): "Consequenter cum dicit: *Uidentur autem et anime passiones* etc., manifestat illud quod supra supposuerat, scilicet quod quedam passiones anime sunt coniuncti et non anime tantum. Cuius ratio talis est: omne ad quod operatur complexio corporis non est anime tantum, set complexio corporis operatur ad omnes passiones anime, ut puta ad iram, mansuetudinem, timorem, confidenciam, misericordiam et huiusmodi; uidentur ergo anime passiones omnes esse cum corpore."

<sup>86</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.10: 112-26): (My numbering) "Primo sic: quia nos uidemus quod [1] *aliquando* superueniunt dure et manifeste passiones et homo non prouocatur neque timet; [2] set si *accendatur* ex furore seu ex complexione *corpus*, a ualde *paruis et debilibus* mouetur *et sic se habet sicut cum irascitur*. [3] Secundo probat dicens *adhuc* fit *magis manifestum* quod ad huiusmodi passiones operetur complexio corporis: uidemus enim quod, etiam si nullum imineat periculum, fiunt in aliquibus passiones similes hiis passionibus que sunt circa animam, ut puta melancholicis frequenter, si nullum periculum imineat, ex ipsa complexione inordinata fiunt timentes."

the second case, the person's bodily disposition has become so "soft" or "vulnerable" that he or she can be an easy prey to external afflictions. The third case would apply to the melancholic (*melancholicis*) who are emotionally paralyzed due to their physical condition. This investigation clearly shows how deeply rooted matter is in the issue of the passions. This is why Aquinas concludes that passions have "(some of their) causes in matter" (*sunt rationes in materia*) or they "have being in matter" (*habentes esse in materia*).<sup>87</sup> Therefore, Aquinas continues, the passions cannot be defined without mentioning their material conditions. For example, anger can be defined as the movement of the heart or of a similar body, or of a part or power (proceeding from the body).

For this reason Aquinas, in accordance with Aristotle, says that such "enmattered" things as the passions are the subject of natural science, since natural science is primarily concerned with the body or matter. However, one must know the "proper" way the body is studied in natural science. To explain the proper treatment of the body in natural science, Aquinas first shows the two imperfect ways the body can be defined and then presents the correct way to define it.<sup>88</sup> [1] First, we cannot adequately define the passions

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<sup>87</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.10: 126-36): "Ergo quia *sic se habet*, scilicet quod complexio operetur ad passiones huiusmodi, *manifestum est quod* huiusmodi *passiones sunt rationes in materia*, id est habentes esse in materia. Et propter hoc *termini tales*, id est deffinitiones harum passionum, non assignantur sine materia' sicut si deffiniatur ira, dicitur quod est *motus talis corporis* [sive cordis], *aut partis, aut potentiae*: et hoc dicit quantum ad substantiam seu causam materialem; *ab hoc*, quantum ad causam efficientem; *et gratia huius*, quantum ad causam finalem."

<sup>88</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.11: 161-80): (My numbering) "Consequenter cum dicit: *Differenter autem* etc., insistit circa deffinitiones. Quia enim ostendit, quod in deffinitionibus passionum anime [1] alique sunt in quibus ponitur materia et corpus, [2] alique uero in quibus non ponitur materia set forma tantum, ostendit quod huiusmodi deffinitiones sunt insufficientes. Et circa hoc inuestigat differenciam que inuenitur in istis deffinitionibus: aliquando enim datur aliqua deffinitio in qua nichil est ex parte corporis, sicut quod ira est appetitus uindictae; aliquando assignatur aliqua deffinitio in qua est aliquid ex parte corporis seu materie, sicut quod ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor; prima est dyalectica, secunda uero est phisica, cum ponatur ibi aliquid ex parte materie, et ideo pertinet ad naturalem. Hic enim, scilicet phisicus,

with a logical (*dialectica*) definition.<sup>89</sup> Logical definition is employed by a dialectician and refers to the “species or formal principle” (*species et ratio*) of the “enmattered” thing. Under this definition, anger, for instance, can be defined as “a desire of revenge.” [2]

Second, we have “physical” (*physica*) definition, which only points to the material or bodily factor of the given thing. This definition is usually employed by a natural scientist. Accordingly, in this definition, the same emotion of anger is defined as “a heating of blood round the heart,” which is quite different from the logical definition of anger in the above. According to Aquinas, both these definitions fall short of the definition of a thing that has its being in matter (*ratio in materia*). For example, logical definition is inadequate, since it leaves out of consideration the particular matter in which the form itself is found. [3] Therefore, the complete definition of a corporeal thing must reveal *both* its formal and material principles. Aquinas explains the difference among these three definitions using the analogy of a house.<sup>90</sup> That is, based on our discussion so far we can have three different definitions of a house, two of them imperfect and one perfect.

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*assignat materiam, cum dicit quod ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor; alius uero, scilicet dyalecticus, ponit speciem et rationem: hec enim, scilicet appetitus uindictae, est ratio ire.”*

<sup>89</sup> “Logical definition” is the translation of K. Foster and S. Humphries.

<sup>90</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.45.1.11: 190-208): (My numbering) “Et sic habemus tres deffinitiones, quia [1] una assignat ‘speciem et speciei rationem’ et est formalis tantum, sicut si deffiniatur domus quod sit *operimentum prohibens a uentis et ymbribus et caumatibus*; [2] alia autem assignat materiam, sicut si dicatur quod domus est operimentum quoddam ex lapidibus, lateribus et lignis; [3] alia uero assignat, id est in deffinitione ponit, utrumque, materiam scilicet et formam, dicens, quod domus est operimentum tale constans ex talibus, et propter talia, scilicet ut prohibeat uentos etc. Et ideo dicit quod *alia* deffinitio, scilicet tertia, ponit *in hiis* scilicet lignis lapidibus, que sunt ex parte materie, *speciem*, id est formam, *propter ista*, scilicet ut prohibeat uentos; et sic complectitur materiam cum dicit ‘in his’ et formam cum dicit speciem, et causam finalem cum dicit ‘propter ista,’ que tria requiruntur ad perfectam deffinitionem.”

formal/logical definition	“A house is a shelter from wind, rain, and heat.”
material definition	“A house is a shelter made of stones and bricks.”
“complete” definition	“A house is a shelter from wind, rain, and heat, built of stones and bricks, to keep out the wind, rain, and heat for a particular purpose.”

As we can see in the table above, in the formal definition of a house, only its formal aspect has been pointed out; its material aspect has been omitted. In the material definition, on the other hand, only material aspect has been accounted for. Now in the “complete” definition, *both* formal and material aspects have been considered. In fact, Aquinas adds that this perfect definition contains the three causes: (1) formal cause (the particular purpose of the house); (2) material cause (the particular material of the house); and (3) final cause (the particular end of the house). Therefore, the passions must be treated along with their formal and material aspects, which again fall into the domain of natural science in a “special” way, since natural science studies the inseparable dispositions of matter.<sup>91</sup>

#### 2.4 Aristotle’s Categories

In the background of Aquinas’s account of passions is Chapter eight of Aristotle’s *Categories*, in which he discusses the category of “quality.” Aristotle opens this chapter by giving a definition of the category of “quality”: “By “quality” I mean that in virtue of

<sup>91</sup> *In I De an.*, l. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol.1.12: 214-21): “[N]ichilominus tamen illa *que ex utrisque* est, scilicet ex materia et forma, est magis naturalis. Et due harum deffinitionum pertinent ad naturalem, set una est imperfecta, scilicet illa quae ponit materiam tantum, alia uero perfecta, scilicet illa quae est ex utrisque. *Non est enim aliquis qui consideret passiones materie non separabiles, nisi phisicus.*”

which people are said to be qualified somehow.”<sup>92</sup> Aristotle’s “quality” is divided into four subsets: (1) states and dispositions, (2) capacities, (3) affective qualities and affections, and (4) figure and the external form. Our interest here is his third subset, i.e., affective qualities and affections. Our discussion of this subset will shed light on our present issue, i.e., how the bodily element affects the person in a state of passion. First, Aristotle distinguishes between [1] affective qualities and [2] affections. Now the affective qualities can be further divided into two kinds. [2-1] First, there are those affective qualities which produce an “affection” in the senses (of animals). For example, an affective quality of sweetness in honey, by producing an “affection” in our sense of taste, allows us to taste the sweetness. [2-2] Then there are some affective qualities that do not produce an affection but are the *results* of affections. Colors, such as whiteness and blackness, are examples of this type of affective quality. For example, when someone is embarrassed or ashamed, he blushes. What draws our attention here is that Aristotle relates these “results of affections” to the bodily disposition. In fact, he attributes them to two sources, both of which concern bodily disposition: (a) the person’s natural constitution, and (b) the chronic illness or strong sunburn which more or less permanently alters the natural bodily composition of the person. About the first condition, Aristotle explicitly says that somebody can be “by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution.” In any case, according to Aristotle, either due to the nature or an irreparable environmental factor, e.g., chronic disease, one

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<sup>92</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 24.

can display certain affective qualities. And these qualities are more or less permanent, and because of this durability they bear more affinity to states than dispositions.

[2] Then, Aristotle discusses those conditions that are not permanent, namely, “affections.” According to him, affections are not permanent or enduring, as affective qualities are, because their causes can be easily removed. And because of this non-permanent character of affections, we do not necessarily call someone who is displaying anger, for example, an “angry person.” Here Aristotle makes an important distinction. A better explanation of the person’s anger in this case is that he had been “affected,” which is different from saying that he is an angry man by nature.

Then, finally, Aristotle says that the soul can also have “affective qualities” as well as “affections.” [1] First, he discusses affective qualities. In line with what he said about affective qualities in general, he says that what someone has from birth is rooted in “deep-seated affections” and is called quality because of its enduring character. And, he continues, because these are the results of the certain “elements” in the body, they are hard to remove. [2] Next, Aristotle discusses the “affections” of the soul. What distinguishes the “affections of the soul” from the “affective qualities of the soul” is that the former “evaporates” rather quickly. For example, when someone has been annoyed, he soon comes back to his usual emotional state. On the contrary, the person who has the affective quality of irritability, has an irritable disposition.

What is particularly interesting in Aristotle’s discussion of affective qualities and affection is that when a person is angry, we can explain it on two different grounds. [1] First, the person can be angry due to his natural predisposition to anger, which is again

traced to the “concomitance of certain elements” in his body. [2] Second, he can be angry because he has been simply affected by something, e.g., a friend has insulted him. It is not difficult to see that this idea of Aristotle has greatly influenced Aquinas in his treatment of the passions.

### *Summary and reflection*

In this chapter, I have discussed how Aquinas’s hylomorphic view of a human being is reflected in his treatment of the passions of the soul. In the first part I have first presented Aquinas’s view of a human being, namely that a human being is a composite of soul and body. In this discussion we have seen that soul and body are related to one another as form and matter and that they constitute a single substance. Considering the fact that the passions of the soul necessarily involve the body, I have paid special attention to the nature of the human body. This discussion yielded us two important facts about the human body. Firstly, the human body is not only the best body among the lower non-heavenly bodies but also the most suitable body for the soul. Secondly, however, its material nature implies its intrinsic defects or weaknesses such as death, hunger, and thirst, which Aquinas calls “the necessity of the body.”

In the second part of the chapter, I have discussed Aquinas’s hylomorphic view of the passions of the soul based on his hylomorphic view of a human being in general. First, I have argued that, according to Aquinas, properly speaking, the passions are found only in corporeal beings. In support of this, I have contrasted the human passions with

those of immaterial beings such as angels and God. When the passions are predicated of them, they refer to the movement of the intellectual appetite, not the sensitive appetite as in the case of human beings.

Next, I have discussed Aquinas's hylomorphic view of the passions of the soul themselves. His view of a human being as a composite of soul and body leads him to consider the passions of the soul to be comprised of formal and material principles. The formal principle concerns itself with the activity of the soul, the movement of the sensitive appetite, to be precise. On the other hand, the material principle concerns itself with the body. This material principle can be further considered under two aspects. First, the body is related to the soul by being prior to the passions. Second, the body is related to the soul by being consequent to the passions. In the former case, the body disposes the person to act in a certain way. In the latter case, the physiological change, which is the concomitant of the passions, renders the person passive, by subjecting him or her under its influence. This is fundamentally because the body, once it undergoes a change, needs some time to regain its usual state.

Finally, I have argued that this hylomorphic view of the passions reveals an important insight into the passions: the passions ought to be considered the activity of the whole composite, not just of the body, or of the soul. This conclusion paves the way for my subsequent discussions in Chapters four and five. In the next chapter, I will shift my focus from the passivity of the passions to their more active and rational dimension. Difference between the animal passions and the human passions will also be discussed.

## CHAPTER FOUR: AN ACTIVE AND RATIONAL DIMENSION TO THE PASSIONS

### *Introduction*

The main endeavor of this chapter will be to present the case that the human passions are not simply passive reactions to external stimuli but carry an active dimension through their participation in rationality. The starting point of my investigation will be the Pseudo-Dionysian principle that “the highest point of a lower nature touches (*atingit*) the lowest point of a higher nature.”<sup>1</sup> In the first section, I will use this principle to analyze the sensitive apprehension and sensitive appetite. This analysis will bring out a division of the sensitive apprehension into a higher and a lower part and a similar division of the sensitive appetite into two parts. Then in the second section, I will first discuss the higher part of the sensitive apprehension (the estimative power in other animals and the cogitative power in human beings) and the manner in which it touches reason. A central discussion in this section will be the comparison between the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*) and the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*). Through this comparison I will argue that the human passions are not purely passive or mechanical like the animal passions. I will support my argument by examining the close interaction that the cogitative power has with reason. Then, in the third section, I will discuss the higher

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<sup>1</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII (PG 3: 871). For an excellent commentary on this text, see George P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power*, 152-56.

part of the sensitive appetite, i.e., the irascible passions. By pointing to the distinction between the irascible passions and the relatively simple concupiscible passions, I will argue that the irascible passions are more complex and more closely related to reason. Then finally, in the fourth section, I will give a special treatment of one specific irascible passion, anger, as a supreme example revealing the rational dimension of the irascible passions. Once again, the rational and active character of anger will be presented mainly in contrast to the relatively simple and spontaneous character of the concupiscible passions, especially desire (*concupiscentia*). Lastly, I will discuss the material aspect of anger, which is mainly responsible for the “commotion” (*concitatio*) caused by anger in the soul.

### ***1 Two Divisions in the Sensitive Part***

According to Aquinas, there is a way in which the sensitive soul is not sensitive through and through. The best place to find Aquinas’s treatment of this issue is *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 c where he compares human passions with animal passions. My presentation below will be mainly based upon this early text by Aquinas, and other texts that I quote here should be viewed with this text in mind. According to Aquinas, there is a part of the sensitive nature that “confines” with the rational nature. Aquinas supports this view with Pseudo-Dionysius’ words that “the Divine Wisdom ordained that the highest point of a lower nature touch the lowest point

of a higher nature.”<sup>2</sup> It is important to note here that this arrangement by Divine Wisdom is reflected not only on a “macro” scale, i.e., between different creatures, but also on a “micro” scale, i.e., within a single creature. Aquinas analyzes the sensitive faculties of an animal (the sensitive apprehension and the sensitive appetite) with this Pseudo-Dionysian principle and comes up with two divisions in each of the two faculties: [1] the part that is in accordance with the sensitive nature in itself (*secundum se*), and [2] the part that participates in a higher nature.<sup>3</sup>

Let us first look at the division in the sensitive apprehension. According to Aquinas, imagination (*imaginatio*), which retains and preserves forms that are apprehended through the sense,<sup>4</sup> is a power that is in accordance with the sensitive nature in itself. That is, it is an intrinsically sensitive power, which does not confine with reason. On the other hand, apprehending those forms that do not fall under the sense (i.e., *intentiones*) belongs to the sensitive apprehension insofar as it touches (*attingit*) reason. Friendship and hatred are Aquinas’s two examples of such intentions. This part is called the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*).<sup>5</sup> With respect to this part, Aquinas further

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<sup>2</sup> *De divinis nominibus*, VII (PG 3: 871).

<sup>3</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 c (Moos ed., Vol. 3.816-17): “Quia autem, ut dicit Dionysius, 7 cap. *De divin. nomin.*, (n. 3; G. 3, 871; l. 4, p. 536), ‘*divina sapientia conjungit fines primorum principii secundorum*’, quia omnis natura inferior in sui supremo attingit ad infimum naturae superioris, secundum quod participat aliquid de natura superioris, quamvis deficienter; ideo tam in apprehensione quam in appetitu sensitivo invenitur aliquid in quo sensitivum rationem attingit.”

<sup>4</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.255): “Ad harum formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur *phantasia*, sive *imaginatio*, quae idem sunt: est enim *phantasia* sive *imaginatio* quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum.”

<sup>5</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 c (Moos ed., Vol. 3.817): “. . . ideo tam in apprehensione quam in appetitu sensitivo invenitur aliquid in quo sensitivum rationem attingit. *Quod enim animal imagnetur* formas apprehensas per sensum, hoc est de natura sensitivae apprehensionis secundum se; sed quod apprehendat illas intentiones quae non cadunt sub sensu, sicut amicitiam, odium, et hujusmodi, hoc est sensitivae partis secundum quod attingit rationem.”

differentiates human beings from other animals. The fact that sensitive apprehension is found even more perfectly in human beings due to its interaction with reason necessitates that the estimative power be replaced by an even superior power in human beings, namely, the cogitative power or the particular reason (*ratio particularis*).<sup>6</sup>

Next, let us look at the sensitive appetite, which follows upon its active counterpart, namely the sensitive apprehension. Once again we find two divisions in this part in accordance with the Pseudo-Dionysian principle. First, we have the part of the sensitive appetite by which the animal desires (*appetat*) those things which are suitable (*convenientia*) to the sense by giving immediate pleasure to it. This part belongs to the sensitive appetite in accordance with the sensitive nature itself and is called “the concupiscible power” (*vis concupiscibilis*). Then there is another kind of the sensitive appetite, by which an animal tends to some good which does not give immediate pleasure to the sense yet is still suitable for it *as a whole*. This part of the sensitive appetite exists insofar as it touches reason and is named “the irascible power” (*vis irascibilis*).<sup>7</sup> The

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<sup>6</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 c (Moos ed., Vol. 3.817): “Unde pars illa in hominibus, in quibus est perfectior propter conjunctionem ad animam rationalem, dicitur *ratio particularis*, quia confert de intentionibus particularibus; in aliis autem animalibus, quia non confert, sed ex instinctu naturali habet hujusmodi intentiones apprehendere, non dicitur ratio, sed *aestimatio*.”

<sup>7</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 c (Moos ed., Vol. 3.817): “*Similiter etiam ex parte appetitus*, quod animal appetat ea quae sunt convenientia sensui, delectationem facientia, secundum naturam sensitivam est, et pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem; sed quod tendat in aliquod bonum quod non facit delectationem in sensu, sed magis natum est facere tristitiam ratione suae difficultatis, sicut quod animal appetat pugnam cum alio animali, vel aggredi aliam quamcumque difficultatem, hoc est in appetitu sensitivo secundum quod natura sensitiva attingit intellectivam; et hoc pertinet ad irascibilem. Et ideo *sicut* aestimatio est alia vis quam imaginatio, ita irascibilis est alia vis quam concupiscibilis. Objectum enim *concupiscibilis* est bonum quod natum est facere delectationem in sensu: *irascibilis* autem bonum quod difficultatem habet. Et quia quod est difficile, non est appetibile in quantum hujusmodi, sed vel in ordine ad aliud delectabile, vel ratione bonitatis quae difficultati admiscetur—conferre autem unum ad aliud, et discernere intentionem difficultatis et bonitatis in uno et eodem, est rationis;—ideo proprie istud bonum appetere est rationalis appetitus: sed convenit sensitivae, secundum quod attingit per quamdam imperfectam participationem ad rationalem, non

chart below summarizes the division in the sensitive apprehension and sensitive appetite.

	<i>The part that exists in accordance with the sensitive nature in itself</i>	<i>The part that conforms with a higher nature</i>
<i>sensitive apprehension</i>	imagination	the estimative (other animals)
		the cogitative/the particular reason (human beings)
<i>sensitive appetite</i>	the concupiscible	the irascible

In the next part of this chapter, we will first take a close look at the division in the sensitive apprehension.

## ***2 The Higher Part of the Sensitive Apprehension***

In this section I will discuss the higher part of the sensitive apprehension. I will first investigate the estimative power, that is, the higher part of the sensitive apprehension in animals, and then the cogitative power, which is a power equivalent to the estimative power in human beings. The main purpose of this section is to show how the higher part of the sensitive apprehension in human beings participates in reason, which will help build the basis of my thesis, namely, that the human passions are not just passive but active.

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quidem conferendo vel discernendo, sed naturali instinctu movendo se in illud, sicut dictum est de aestimatione.”

### 2.1 Sensation *per se* and Sensation *per accidens*

To discuss the passions of other animals, we need pay special attention to the estimative power, since the sensitive appetite follows upon it. The estimative power is an interior sense. The most distinguishing characteristic of the interior senses (*sensus interiores*) is that, although they are sensitive powers, they lack the kind of external bodily organs that the exterior senses (*sensus exteriores*) possess. The meaning of the word, “interior” (*interior*), as Barad points out, implies this lack.<sup>8</sup> For a better understanding of the estimative power, a comparison of two kinds of sensations, namely *sensation per se* (direct sensation) and *sensation per accidens* (accidental sensation), is warranted. This discussion will also reveal how the interior senses differ from the exterior senses, especially in regard to their objects. Aquinas discusses this issue in several places (*In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 2 c; *In II De an.*, l. 13; *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 3 ad 2). Since Aquinas’s most detailed and mature treatment is found in his commentary of Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, I will mainly refer to this text in my argument. In accordance with Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of sensation: [1] *sensation per se* (direct sensation) and [2] *sensation per accidens* (accidental sensation). [1] *Sensation per se* refers to the kind of sensation in which an object is directly sensed by the exterior senses (i.e., sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch). *Sensation per se* can be further divided into two kinds, with each kind depending on the relation of the sense to its object. [1-1] In the first kind of *sensation per se*, the sense object is sensed by one sense only. This kind of sense

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<sup>8</sup> Judith A. Barad, *Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals* (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1995), 86.

object is called a “proper sensible” (*sensibile proprium*). For example, color is the proper object of sight while sound is the proper object of hearing. That is, the objects of the proper senses do not overlap, which is what is meant by the word “proper” (*proprius*). [1-2] The other kind of *sensation per se* refers to the sensation in which a sensible object is common to more than one sense. For example, a sensible quality of “shape” can be perceived both by sight and touch, as when both by seeing and touching a needle, I get the information about the shape of that particular needle. In contrast to a “proper sensible” this kind of sensible object is called a “common sensible” (*sensibile commune*).<sup>9</sup>

[2] Next, let us discuss *sensation per accidens*, which is particularly pertinent to our discussion of the estimative and cogitative powers. The object of *sensation per accidens* may be called an “accidental sensible,” a “sensible *per accidens*,” or an “accidental sense object” (*sensibile per accidens*). According to Aquinas, for an object to

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<sup>9</sup> According to Aquinas, there are five common sensibles in all: movement, rest, number, shape, and size. (*ST*, I, q. 78, a. 3 ad 2) *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.118-19: 15-54): “Dicere ergo quod ante quam determinetur de sensu quid sit, oportet primo dicere de sensibilibus secundum unumquemque sensum, quia obiecta sunt preuia potencie. Sensibilia uero tribus modis dicuntur; uno quidem modo per accidens et duobus modis per se, quorum uno dicuntur sensibilia illa que propria sint singulis sensibus, alio modo dicuntur sensibilia illa que communiter sentiuntur ab omnibus sensibus. Deinde cum dicit: *Dico autem proprium* etc., exponit membra diuisionis. Et primo exponit que sunt sensibilia propria et dicit quod sensibile proprium est quod ita sentitur uno sensu, quod non potest alio sensu sentiri, et circa quod non potest errare sensus, sicut uisus proprie est cognoscitiuus coloris, et auditus soni et gustus humoris, id est saporis; sed *tactus habet plures differentias* appropriatas sibi: cognoscit enim calidum et frigidum, humidum, et siccum, graue et leue et huiusmodi multa. *Vnusquisque* autem horum sensuum *iudicat* de propriis sensibilibus et *non decipitur* in eis, sicut uisus non decipitur quod sit talis color neque auditus decipitur de sono, *set* circa sensibilia per accidens uel communia decipiuntur sensus, sicut decipitur uisus si uelit iudicare homo per ipsum quid est *coloratum aut ubi* sit, et similiter decipitur quis si uelit iudicare per auditum *quid* est quod sonat. *Hec igitur* sunt *propria* sensibilia *uniuscuiusque* sensus. Secundo ibi: *Communia autem* etc., exponit secundum membrum diuisionis, dicens quod *communia* sensibilia sunt ista quinque: *motus, quies, numerus, figura* et *magnitudo*. *Hec enim nullius unius sensus sunt propria, set* sunt *communia omnibus*. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi omnia ista sint omnibus communia, set quedam horum, scilicet numerus, motus et quies, sunt communia omnibus sensibus, tactus uero et uisus percipiunt omnia quinque. Sic *igitur* manifestum est que sint *sensibilia per se*.”

be an accidental sensible, it must satisfy two conditions. First, the object must be *accidentally (per accidens)* related to the proper sensible. Second, it must be concurrently perceived by the one who is sensing, even though it is accidental to the proper sense. That is, during sensation *per accidens*, when I, as a sensing subject, sense an object with my proper sense(s), I incidentally perceive something *else*. For example, as my eyes see a green object, I incidentally but immediately perceive it as a sign of a Starbucks store.<sup>10</sup> This perception of “something else” is extremely important; it is a “telltale” sign of the complexity of the human cognition. According to Aquinas, the fact that we perceive something other than the proper sensible during sensation indicates another cognitive faculty in us that is in charge of this particular kind of cognition. He offers three candidates for this faculty: [1] another proper sense (*alius sensus*), [2] intellect, and [3] the estimative power/ the cogitative power.<sup>11</sup> When Aquinas proposes another proper sense, he seems to think of a sensory event in which two senses are in operation, e.g., my eyes see a yellow thing while my tongue detects its tart taste. In this sensory event, the sensible quality of tartness can be said to be an accidental sensible in a way. However, while it is accidental to the sense of sight, it is proper to another sense, namely, the sense of taste. For this reason, strictly speaking, it is not an accidental sensible.<sup>12</sup> This way

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<sup>10</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.120: 161-70): “Viso igitur quomodo dicantur per se sensibilia et communia et propria, restat uidentum qua ratione dicatur aliquid sensibile per accidens. Sciendum est igitur quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per accidens primo requiritur quod accadat ei quod per se est sensibile, sicut accidit albo esse hominem et accidit ei esse dulce, secundo requiritur quod sit apprehensum a senciente: si enim aliquid accideret sensibili quod lateret sencientem, non diceretur per accidens sentiri.”

<sup>11</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.120: 171-74): “Oportet igitur quod per se cognoscatur ab aliqua alia potencia cognoscitiua sentientis, et hec quidem uel est alius sensus, uel est intellectus, uel uis cogitatiua aut uis aestimatiua.”

<sup>12</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.120-21: 175-81): “Dico autem quod est alius sensus, sicut si dicamus quod dulce est uisibile per accidens in quantum dulce ‘accidit albo, quod apprehenditur uisu, et

Aquinas eliminates another sense faculty as a candidate for the special cognition he is looking for.

Now the second and third candidates are interesting because they will eventually point to the involvement of the intellect in sensation.<sup>13</sup> [2] Let us first talk about the second candidate, the intellect. According to Aquinas, when an accidental sensible is something that cannot be perceived by the senses at all, i.e., a universal concept, then its cognition must be attributed to the intellect, since a universal is grasped only by the intellect. Aquinas's example of an accidental sensible here is the concept of life. That is, *the moment* I see a white thing moving, I know that it is alive. In Aquinas's analysis, my cognition of the thing's being alive and my sensing of the color white are the results of two distinct sensations, *sensation per accidens* and *sensation per se* respectively.<sup>14</sup>

[3] Next, let us think about the third candidate, the estimative and cogitative powers. According to Aquinas, when an accidental sensible is an individual thing, i.e., a "material singular," then the estimative power (the cogitative power in human beings) is involved in sensation, since the estimative power as a sensitive power is directed to material singulars.<sup>15</sup>

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ipsum dulce per se cognoscitur ab alio sensu, scilicet a gustu. Set, ut proprie loquamur, hoc non est uniuersaliter sensibile per accidens, set per accidens uisibile, sensibile autem per se."

<sup>13</sup> Robert Pasnau gives a good treatment of this issue in his book, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*. See especially Chapter 6 which deals with sensation.

<sup>14</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.121: 182-90): "Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid uniuersale, apprehenditur intellectu. Non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re *sensata*, potest dici sensibile per accidens, set quod statim ad occursum rei sensate apprehenditur intellectu, sicut statim cum uideo aliquem loquentem, uel movere se ipsum, apprehendo per intellectum uitam eius, unde possum dicere quod uideo eum uiuere."

<sup>15</sup> *In II De an.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.1.121-22: 191-205): "Si uero apprehendatur in singulari, ut puta 'si', cum uideo coloratum, percipio hunc hominem uel hoc animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per uim cogitatuam, que dicitur etiam ratio particularis eo quod est collativa intentionum

Since the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power in human beings, the two powers need to be treated separately. [3-1] Let us first discuss the estimative power. According to Aquinas, the object of the estimative power is the aspect of the useful or the harmful in a sensible thing.<sup>16</sup> Notice here the shift from the mere sense qualities, which were the object of the exterior senses, to the aspects of the suitable and the harmful. Aquinas's distinction of the two objects is revealed in his use of different terms. In *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c, Aquinas uses the term, "(sensible) form" (*forma*) in conjunction with the proper senses and the common sense.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, he uses the term "intention" (*intentio*) to refer to the objects of such interior powers as imagination, memory, and the estimative power. Whereas "forms" are merely a set of

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indiuidualium sicut ratio uniuersalis est collatiua rationum uniuersalium. Nichilominus tamen hec uis est in parte sensitua, quia uis sensitua in sui supremo participat aliquid de ui intellectiua in homine, in quo sensus intellectui coniungitur; in animali uero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis indiuidualis per aestimatiuam naturalem, secundum quod ouis per auditum uel uisum cognoscit filium, uel aliquid huiusmodi." This does not mean that the intellect cannot apprehend material particulars, but rather it does so in a remote and indirect way. *ST*, I, q. 86, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.347): "Respondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia indiuidualis: intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia indiuiduali abstrahitur, est uniuersale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscituius nisi uniuersalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*. Sic igitur ipsum uniuersale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, *Socrates est homo*."

<sup>16</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2 a. 1 c (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2.602): "Vis autem apprehendens huiusmodi rationes convenientis et non convenientis, uidetur uirtus aestimatiua, per quam agnus fugit lupum et sequitur matrem; quae hoc modo se habet ad appetitum partis sensibilis, sicut se habet intellectus practicus ad appetitum uoluntatis; unde, proprie loquendo, sensualitas incipit ex confinio aestimatiuae et appetitiuae consequentis, ut hoc modo se habeat sensualitas ad partem sensitiuam, sicut se habet uoluntas et liberum arbitrium ad partem intellectiuam." Klubertanz provides reliable translation of and commentary on this text. See pp. 154-55 of *The Discursive Power*.

<sup>17</sup> Due to the fact that the common sense (*sensus communis*) regards the qualities that are present here and now, it is often regarded by some scholars as an exterior sense, although it lacks an external organ unlike the exterior senses. For example, the distinction between perceiving things that are present and things that are absent leads Barad to name the exterior senses and common sense "presentative senses" and, the three interior senses (i.e., imagination, memory, and the estimative power) "representative powers." Barad, *Aquinas on the Nature*, 86 and 112.

sensible qualities, “intentions” yield some coherent information to the sensing subject.<sup>18</sup> For example, when a lamb sees a steep cliff, it receives the information that the cliff is dangerous and it needs to stay off. For this reason, Klubertanz says that the Latin “*intentio*” needs to be understood, not just as a “sensible object,” but in such cognitive terms as a “cognition,” an “object known,” or a “cognition under the aspect of its having a direction toward an object.”<sup>19</sup> Understandably, the existence of the estimative power is crucial for an animal to lead a perfect animal life; an animal cannot survive on the information given by the exterior senses only.

[3-2] Now let us discuss the involvement of the cogitative power in sensation,

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<sup>18</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.256): (My underlining) “Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta: sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium: cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur *sensus proprius et communis*: de quorum distinctione post dicitur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur *vis aestimativa*. Ad conservandum autem eas, *vis memorativa*, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia *animalia*, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est: nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur *cogitativa*, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur *ratio particularis*, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam *reminiscentiam*, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones.” Both Klubertanz and Pasnau discuss this issue on pp. 200-1 (*The Discursive Power*) and pp. 268-69 (*Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*) respectively.

<sup>19</sup> Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power*, 232.

which is unique to human sensation. In the above, I have said that the estimative power excels the proper senses by grasping the aspect of the useful and the harmful in a sensible object. Now the cogitative power excels the estimative power by not only perceiving the aspect of the useful or harmful in a sensible thing but also cognizing the thing as a *one coherent individual*. That is, in this kind of sensation we cognize “this person” (*hic homo*) as “this person” (*hic homo*). It must be noted here that this coherent understanding of the cogitative power needs to be sharply distinguished from that of the common sense, which merely unifies proper and common sensibles, as Lisska aptly points out.<sup>20</sup> For example, the moment I see this particular colored thing, I know it is my friend Susan. What makes this sensation different from those perceived by the intellect alone ([2]) is that the accidental sensible here is not a universal but a material singular. The significance of the apprehension of a material singular here is great in that it points to the close collaboration between the intellect and the cogitative power, as Pasnau points out. I agree with him that we cannot really perceive this particular colored being as a particular person, say, Susan, unless we already have some universal knowledge of Susan (“Susan is a human being.”), knowledge which can only be provided by the intellect. That is, to identify a person as a certain person requires a prior recognition of the individual as a member of a certain kind, as Lisska says.<sup>21</sup> This close connection between the cogitative power and the intellect is plausible in human beings, since in them the two powers do not merely co-exist but are

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<sup>20</sup> Anthony Lisska, “A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 80 (2006): 9. Later (p. 10) Lisska also argues that the cogitative power can enable Aquinas to reject the so-called “bundle theory” of the British empiricists.

<sup>21</sup> Lisska, “A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas,” 7.


connected (*continuatur*) to each other.<sup>22</sup> This close interworking of the cogitative power and the intellect explains why the human perceptions and their resulting passions transcend the instinctive perception and passive responses found in other animals.<sup>23</sup> The chart below summarizes my discussion so far.

<i>sensation per se</i>	when the object is a proper sensible	
	when the object is a common sensible.	
<i>sensation per accidens</i>	when the accidental sensible is something individual	when the object is the aspect of the useful or harmful—the estimative power is involved
		when the object is a whole individual thing—the cogitative power and the intellect are involved.
	when the accidental sensible is a universal—the intellect is involved.	

<sup>22</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.309: 67-70): “Sed tamen mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, in quantum continuatur viribus sensitivis quae circa particularia versantur. . . .”

<sup>23</sup> William Mattison, “Virtuous Anger? From Questions of Vindicatio to the Habituation of Emotion,” *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics*, 24 (2004): 170.

The role of the cogitative power as a connector of the sensitive part and the intellectual part in a human being can be put in a diagram in the following way:



The above diagram indicates that the sensitive part and the intellectual part are connected to each other. The intersection of the two circles is the seat of the cogitative power, which is a sensitive power. The cogitative power is at the crossroad of the sensitive and the intellectual, being the “bridge” between the sensory grasp of the particular and the intellectual grasp of the universal, as A. Leo White says.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> A. Leo White, “Why the Cogitative Power?,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 72 (1998): 213.

## 2.2 The Estimative Power in Non-rational Animals

Now let us look at the estimative power more in detail. Let us first discuss the object of the estimative power: the aspect of the useful or the harmful in a sensible thing. Aquinas says that just as the rational appetite is moved when reason presents something good to it, the sensitive appetite is moved only when the sensitive apprehension presents to it something as “suitable” (*conveniens*).<sup>25</sup> Following Aquinas, we can regard sensible goods or evils under two aspects. First, we can regard the sensible goods or evils insofar as they give immediate pleasure or pain to the senses with their sensible qualities, e.g., sweet taste, smooth texture, soothing sound, etc. Second, we can regard the sensible goods or evils under the aspect of being useful or harmful (*rationes convenientis vel nocivi*) for our whole being.<sup>26</sup> An animal’s movement concerning the latter kind of good or evil is witnessed when it disregards immediate pleasure and goes through difficulty or pain for its overall well-being. For example, when a female dog sees a wolf attack her puppies, it attacks the wolf. If the dog were just to respond to the good or evil with respect to exterior senses only, that is, without the estimative power, it would not engage itself in such an arduous attempt. Loughlin emphasizes this distinctive characteristic of the estimative power with the following words:

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<sup>25</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad (Moos ed., Vol. 3. 531-32): “Ad secundum dicendum, quod *sicut* appetitus rationis non sequitur quamlibet apprehensionem rationis, sed quando aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, *ita* et appetitus sensibilis non surgit nisi quando apprehenditur ut conveniens. Hoc autem non fit per exteriorem sensum, qui apprehendit formas sensibiles; sed per aestimationem, quae apprehendit rationem convenientis et nocivi quam sensus exterior non apprehendit; et ideo in parte sensitiva non est nisi unus appetitus secundum genus; qui tamen dividitur, sicut in species, in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quarum utraque sub sensualitate computatur.”

<sup>26</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.256), cited above in footnote 412. For a commentary on this part, see Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power*, 158.

It is argued that the estimative and cogitative powers must be posited as one of the being's interior powers, as the needs of the sensitive being extend beyond those things which are pleasing or agreeable to its senses, which is to say that the various *natural* inclinations, appetites or movements of an animal being's particular powers, taken singularly or even collectively, do not constitute the inclination or appetite which regards *the benefit of the whole being*, for example, sight naturally desires the visible thing for the sake of seeing, but the animate being *desires* this visible thing *not* for the sake of seeing it, but rather as it is considered to be for the sake of its benefice in some way.<sup>27</sup>

According to Aquinas, the act of the estimative power is analogous to that of reason. Aquinas turns to the Pseudo-Dionysian principle to explain this analogous relationship. As has been said earlier, according to the Pseudo-Dionysian principle, the highest point of a lower nature confines with the lowest point of a higher nature. This means that while all the creatures form one great hierarchical structure in the universe they are somehow connected to one another. This connection between the lower and higher creatures is made by the "participation" (*participatio*) of the lower creature into the higher, or by the "overflow" (*redundantia*) of the higher being into the lower, as Pasnau says.<sup>28</sup> Now in this hierarchy other higher animals are one step below human

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<sup>27</sup> Loughlin, "A Response to Five Critiques," 108-9.

<sup>28</sup> *De ver.*, q. 15, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.480: 340-56): ". . . quod ideo dicit quia illud quod est superioris naturae non potest esse in inferiori natura perfecte, sed secundum quamdam tenuem participationem, sicut in natura sensitiva non est ratio sed aliqua rationis participatio in quantum bruta habent quamdam prudentiam naturalem, ut patet in principio Metaphysicae. Id autem quod sic participatur, non habetur ut possessio, id est sicut aliquid perfecte subiacens potentiae habentis illud; sicut dicitur in I Metaphysicae quod cognitio Dei est divina et non humana possessio. Unde ad id quod hoc modo habetur non deputatur aliqua potentia, sicut bruta non dicuntur habere rationem aliquam, quamvis aliquid prudentiae participant; sed hoc inest eis secundum quamdam aestimationem naturalem." Pasnau, *Thomas*

beings. Accordingly, the highest apprehensive faculty in other animals, i.e., the estimative power, bears some similarity to the apprehensive power proper to human beings, i.e., reason. This participation accounts for the quasi-rational acts exhibited in other animals.<sup>29</sup> As evidence of this similarity, the animal estimative power carries some kind of judgment as well as freedom, which idea Aquinas expresses with the following words:<sup>30</sup>

Brutes have a certain semblance [*similitudo*] of reason inasmuch as they share in a certain natural prudence, and in this respect a lower nature in some way attains to the property of a higher. This semblance consists in the well-regulated judgment which they have about certain things. But they have this judgment from a natural estimate, not from any deliberation, since they are ignorant of the basis of their judgment. On this account such a judgment does not extend to all things like that of reason, but only to certain determined objects. . . . In like fashion there is in them a certain semblance of free choice inasmuch as they can, according to their judgment, do or not do one and the same thing. As a result there is in them a sort of conditional freedom. For they can act if they judge that they should or not act if they do not so judge.<sup>31</sup>

As we can see in the above, judgment is found in the animal estimative power. In fact, the Latin “aestimatio” has such senses as “judgment” “value” “assessment” and

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*Aquinas on Human Nature*, 272. This notion of “overflow” is very significant in the next chapter as I discuss the permeation of reason into the passions.

<sup>29</sup> For this reason Barad calls the estimative power the “animal intelligence.” Barad, *Aquinas on the Nature*, 93.

<sup>30</sup> Loughlin, “A Response to Five Critiques,” 103.

<sup>31</sup> This is Robert Schmidt’s translation. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, trans. Robert W. Schmidt. Vol. 3 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), 146. De ver., q. 24, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.686: 104-21): “Bruta autem habent aliquam similitudinem rationis, in quantum participant quamdam prudentiam naturalem, secundum quod natura inferior attingit aequaliter ad id quod est naturae superioris; quae quidem similitudo est secundum quod habent iudicium ordinatum de aliquibus. . . . Et similiter est in eis quaedam similitudo liberi arbitrii, in quantum possunt agere vel non agere unum et idem, secundum suum iudicium, ut sic sit in eis quasi quaedam conditionata libertas; possunt enim agere, si iudicant esse agendum vel non agere, si non iudicant.”

“reckoning.”<sup>32</sup> Loughlin emphasizes the significance of this assessment of the estimative power with the following words:

This assessment [of the estimative power] is vital for emotion, for by it the sensible thing is brought under the *ratio* of the *conveniens* or *inconveniens* and thereby becomes the proper object of the sensitive appetite itself. Without this assessment, the sensitive appetite lacks its proper or formal object, and is thus not moved, which is to say that there is no experience of the emotions in such a situation; the simple presentation of an object from evaluation does not move the appetite.<sup>33</sup>

Also, in *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato*, l. 1 Aquinas says that animals have some kind of prudence (*prudencia*). Here he contrasts the limitation of the exterior senses to the openness of the estimative power in terms of their object. He says that the fact that “forward-moving” animals (i.e., higher animals) perceive what is necessary for their survival “from a distance”<sup>34</sup> allows them to have knowledge of an object that is not bound by the realm of “here and now,” which brings it closer to the intellectual knowledge of human beings.<sup>35</sup> This knowledge, Aquinas continues, allows other animals to pursue what is useful and avoid what is harmful to them. According to Aquinas, this kind of quasi-intellectual knowledge is found in those animals which have “prudence” for the sake of their “well-being.” After defining prudence as “a directive in what is to be

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<sup>32</sup> *Cassell's New Latin Dictionary*.

<sup>33</sup> Stephen Loughlin, “Similarities and Differences between Human and Animal Emotion in Aquinas’s Thought,” *Thomist* 65 (2001): 46.

<sup>34</sup> This is Kevin White’s translation. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentaries on Aristotle’s “On Sense and What Is Sensed” and “On Memory and Recollection*, trans. Kevin White and Edward M. Macierowski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 26.

<sup>35</sup> *In I De sensu*, c. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.2.13-14: 124-28: “[A]nimalia uero progressiva accipiunt notitiam eorum etiam quae a remotis; unde quedam magis accedunt ad cognitionem intellectiuam que non determinatur ad hic et nunc. . . .”

done,”<sup>36</sup> Aquinas distinguishes human prudence and animal prudence by referring to them as “universal prudence” (*prudentia universalis*) and “particular prudence” (*prudential particularis*) respectively. It seems that Aquinas uses the term, “universal,” because human prudence is rooted in reason which grasps universals. On the contrary, particular prudence is found in other higher animals with respect to *certain* acts only. Furthermore, the “prudent” acts of other animals are naturally determined, which is different from the acts of human prudence which are derived from rational deliberation and free choice. According to Aquinas, animal prudence is witnessed when ants hoard food for the winter.<sup>37</sup>

So far I have argued that the estimative power is not totally devoid of cognition; it carries such cognitive qualities as judgment or evaluation. However, there is a qualitative difference in the sensitive apprehension between other animals and human beings. This difference largely accounts for the difference human beings display in their reaction to the external stimuli compared to other animals. I will discuss this important difference in

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<sup>36</sup> This is Kevin White’s translation.

<sup>37</sup> *In I De sensu*, c. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45.2.13-14: 144-79): “Et ideo dicit quod illi *sensus qui per exteriora media fiunt*, ut dictum est in II De anima, scilicet *odoratus, auditus et visus, insunt* illis de numero animalium que proficiscuntur, id est motu progressiuo mouentur, *omnibus quidem* hiis propter unam causam communem, scilicet *causam salutis*, ut a remotis scilicet necessaria cognoscant, sicut per gustum et tactum praesentialiter; et hoc est quod subdit: *ut praesentientia*, id est a remotis sentientia *prosequantur* conueniens *alimentum*, et *fugiant mala et corruptiua* quecumque; sicut ouis fugit lupum ut corruptiuum, lupus autem sequitur ouem uisam uel auditam aut odoratam ut conueniens alimentum. Deinde cum dicit: *Et habentibus autem* etc., assignat aliam causam specialem quibusdam perfectioribus animalibus. Et primo proponit hanc causam; secundo circa has causas comparat sensus ad inuicem, ibi: *Horum autem ipsorum* etc. Circa primum considerandum est quod prudentia est directiua in agendis, et uniuersalis quidem prudentia est directiua respectu quorumcunque agendorum, unde non est in animalibus, nisi in solis hominibus, qui habent rationem uniuersalium cognoscitivam, et in aliis autem animalibus sunt quedam prudentiae particulares ad alios aliquos determinatos actus; sicut formica, que congregat in estate cibum de quo uiuat in hyeme. Praedicti autem sensus, maxime auditus et uisus, proficiunt animalibus, ad huiusmodi prudentias particulares et hominibus ad prudentiam uniuersalem ad hoc quod aliquid *bene fiat* (odoratus autem totaliter uidetur necessitati nutrimenti deservire, parum autem prudentiae. Unde in omnibus, in quibus est perfecta prudentia, est deficientissimus iste sensus, ut dicitur libro De anima). . . .”

the following section.

### 2.3 *The Limitations of the Estimative Power*

Although animals participate in the life of reason, there is a qualitative difference between their quasi-rational acts and the properly rational acts of human beings.

According to Aquinas, this is fundamentally because “the participant” cannot be the same as “the participated” in every aspect.<sup>38</sup> He says that participating in a part of another thing is distinct from having the shared thing as its “own” (*possessio*). For this reason, the prudence and judgment found in other animals need to be qualified as “natural” or “instinctive” prudence and judgment in contrast to those derived by rational deliberation in human beings. Then how can we characterize the natural judgment and prudence of other animals? In contrast to the human free judgment whose principle is internal to the agent (i.e., reason),<sup>39</sup> the animal judgment is not free because its principle is external to them (i.e., God).<sup>40</sup> According to Aquinas, this judgment is given to other animals in the

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<sup>38</sup> *De ver.*, q. 15, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.480: 340-56): “. . . quod ideo dicit quia illud quod est superioris naturae non potest esse in inferiori natura perfecte, sed secundum quamdam tenuem participationem, sicut in natura sensitiva non est ratio sed aliqua rationis participatio in quantum bruta habent quamdam prudentiam naturalem, ut patet in principio *Metaphysicae*. Id autem quod sic participatur, non habetur ut possessio, id est sicut aliquid perfecte subiacens potentiae habentis illud; sicut dicitur in I *Metaphysicae* quod cognitio Dei est divina et non humana possessio. Unde ad id quod hoc modo habetur non deputatur aliqua potentia, sicut bruta non dicuntur habere rationem aliquam, quamvis aliquid prudentiae participant; sed hoc inest eis secundum quamdam aestimationem naturalem.”

<sup>39</sup> *ST*, I, q. 59, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.95): “Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ab aliis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad finem. Quaedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia: ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc iudicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum, potest agere iudicio libero, in quantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest iudicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium.”

<sup>40</sup> Here I have interpreted “separate Intellect Who has created nature” as “God.” *ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.267): “Sed in hoc est differentia, quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione intellectus coniuncti,

form of natural instinct by Divine Reason so that they may react in a certain manner to certain matters.<sup>41</sup> It is important to note that, unlike plants, animals do have judgments, but because they lack rational faculties, they can neither know their judgment nor “work it out” for themselves. For this reason it would be less misleading to use an intransitive or static verb, as in “judgment *is* found in other animals,” rather than a transitive or possessive verb, as in “animals *have* judgment,” or “animals *judge*,” when it comes to explaining the relationship between other animals and their judgment.

The judgment of an animal may be characterized in three ways. [1] First, the animal judgment cannot reflect upon itself. In *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 2, Aquinas says that judgment is said to be “owned” by the one in whom the judgment is found only when it can judge about its own judgment.<sup>42</sup> Now only a being with reason can judge about its own judgment, because it pertains to reason to reflect on its own judgment. Accordingly, non-rational animals, for their lack of reason, can know neither the process nor the end of their judgment. [2] Second, unlike the human judgment which is virtually unlimited in its

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sed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam quodam instinctu naturali agunt.”

<sup>41</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.295): “Ad secundum dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est.”

<sup>42</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.685-86: 88-104): “Et ideo, si iudicium cognitivae non sit in potestate alicuius, sed sit aliunde determinatum, nec appetitus erit in potestate eius, et per consequens nec motus vel operatio absolute. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare; de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate possumus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat; unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium. Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine; unde in eo solum liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur.”

scope, the animal judgment is concerned with a limited number of things.<sup>43</sup> It is true that with certain matters, say, avoiding a dangerous trail in a forest, their judgment may be keener than that of human beings, but a fundamental weakness of their judgment is that it is directed to certain matters only.<sup>44</sup> [3] Third, animal judgment is pre-determined to a single course of action. Freedom by definition means being open to more than one judgment and course of action. Accordingly, animals cannot be said to have freedom of judgment and action.<sup>45</sup>

In *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 2 ad 2, Aquinas says that animals can be said to have freedom in the sense that they are “indifferent” to acting or not acting insofar as the action itself is considered.<sup>46</sup> However, when its relation to judgment is considered, they cannot be said to be free, since their judgment is naturally determined. Using Aquinas’s classic example of a wolf and a sheep, whenever a sheep is confronted with a wolf, it takes a single course of action under the dictate of its natural judgment: flight. In a normal situation it would be highly unnatural for the sheep to pursue the wolf. Also, *any*

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<sup>43</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.686: 110-15): “Sed hoc iudicium est eis ex naturali aestimatione non ex aliqua collatione, cum rationem sui iudicii ignorent; propter quod huiusmodi iudicium non se extendit ad omnia, sicut iudicium rationis, sed ad quaedam determinata.”

<sup>44</sup> Robert Miner makes the same point regarding the excellence of the animal estimative power with the following words: “In non-rational animals, the natural estimative power is remarkably accurate; its quasi-judgments about what is useful or dangerous are not typically erroneous.” Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 75-76.

<sup>45</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.686: 121-33): “Sed quia iudicium eorum est determinatum ad unum, per consequens et appetitus et actio ad unum determinatur; unde, secundum Augustinum XI Super Genesim ad litteram, ‘moventur visis’, et secundum Damascenum aguntur passionibus, quia scilicet naturaliter de tali viso et de tali passione sic iudicant; unde necesse habent ab ipsa visione alicuius rei vel a passione insurgente moveri ad fugiendum vel prosequendum, sicut ovis viso lupo necesse habet timere et fugere, et canis insurgente passione irae, necesse habet latrare, et prosequi ad nocendum.”

<sup>46</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.686: 145-51): “Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia motiva brutorum secundum se considerata non magis inclinatur ad unum oppositorum quam ad alterum, et sic dicitur quod possunt moveri et non moveri; sed iudicium quo applicatur potentia motiva ad alterum oppositorum est determinatum, et *sic* non sunt liberi arbitrii.”

sheep will react in the same way in such a situation.<sup>47</sup> This is because while the human act is elicited from the determination of an individual agent that of other animals is derived from the determination of their nature.<sup>48</sup> For this reason, Aquinas says that the actions of other animals as well as inanimate things bear affinity to those of art (*ars*).<sup>49</sup> In the same vein, appropriating John Damascene's axiom, Aquinas says that brute animals are said to be "acted upon rather than act" (*non agunt, sed magis aguntur*).<sup>50</sup> On the contrary, human beings are a true master of their own action, because they *can* act or not act. This is derived from the fact that they have free decision (*liberi arbitrium*) or free judgment (*liberi iudicium*), which allows them to be able to *choose* to follow or not follow the dictate of the apprehension."<sup>51</sup> In fact, in the *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 6, a. 3

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<sup>47</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.680-81: 267-79): "Ex iudicio rationis homines agunt et moventur, conferunt enim de agendis; sed ex iudicio naturali agunt et moventur omnia bruta. Quod quidem patet tum ex hoc quod omnia quae sunt eiusdem speciei similiter operantur, sicut omnes hirundines similiter faciunt nidum, tum ex hoc quod habent iudicium ad aliquod opus determinatum et non ad omnia, sicut apes non habent industriam ad faciendum aliquod aliud opus nisi favos mellis, et similiter est de aliis animalibus." Barad in her book, *Aquinas on the Nature*, seems to have a different view on this point. She poses the possibility of "individuality" among other higher animals such as chimpanzees, by denying the "species predictable" behaviors of the higher animals. She supports her view with Jane Goodall who testified that the chimpanzees in captivity showed a behavior different from that of the other chimpanzees. However, because this difference was still displayed on the basis of the group, not of the individual, it seems more correct to say that the chimpanzees in captivity merely reacted to their environment in a uniform manner. In other words, their behavior did not originate from "personal" deliberation and choice.

<sup>48</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.99): "Ad secundum dicendum quod brutum animal accipit unum prae alio, quia appetitus eius est naturaliter determinatus ad ipsum."

<sup>49</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.267): "[S]ed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quae etiam quodam instinctu naturali agunt. Unde in operibus brutorum animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus sicut et in operibus artis."

<sup>50</sup> This idea of John Damascene appears in Ch. 12, n. 12 in John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* (versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus), ed. E. M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 8 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1955), 137-38. *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.620: 74-78). "Animal enim ad aspectum delectabilis non potest non concupiscere illud, quia ipsa animalia non habent dominium suae inclinationis, unde 'non agunt, sed magis aguntur' secundum Damascenum."

<sup>51</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.681: 288-95): "Homo vero per virtutem rationis iudicans de agendis potest de suo arbitrio iudicare in quantum cognoscit rationem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et

sc, Aquinas gives a precise meaning of being a master of one's own action. He says that only when one is able to choose between "acting and not acting, or willing and not willing" (*est agere et non agere, velle et non velle*), he is said to be a master of his act.<sup>52</sup>

#### 2.4 The Cogitative Power in Human Beings

To further our discussion on the difference between animals and human beings in their reaction to external stimuli, let us take a close look at the cogitative power in human beings. Since Questions 77-83 of the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* is the place where Aquinas treats the powers of the human soul in the most organized manner, my argument below will be mainly based on this text. In *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4, Aquinas treats the important issue of the difference between other animals and human beings with respect to the interior powers. One of the differences regards the estimative power. He says that there is difference between other animals and human beings in the manner the "forms that are not received through the exterior senses" (i.e., intentions) are received. In other animals, such forms are perceived by natural instinct alone, for which reason the estimative power is equated to natural instinct, as we have seen earlier. However, in human beings, such forms are received by the act of the comparing or collecting ideas (*per quandam collationem*) of the cogitative power. Here the term "collatio" is significant. "Collatio" refers to the act of comparing forms, which

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habitudinem et ordinem unius ad alterum; et ideo non est solum causa sui ipsius in movendo sed in iudicando. Et ideo est liberi arbitrii, ac si diceretur liberi iudicii de agendo vel non agendo."

<sup>52</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 3 sc (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.58): "Sed contra, illud cuius domini sumus, dicitur esse voluntarium. Sed nos domini sumus eius quod est agere et non agere, velle et non velle. Ergo sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non velle."

distinguishes the cogitative power from the estimative power, for the latter does not compare intentions. Comparison implies that more than one thing is taken into consideration, and one of them can be chosen over others. It is important to note that other animals cannot compare this way.<sup>53</sup> For this reason, Aquinas says that other animals do not have an opinion (*opinio*) although they have images (*phantasia*).<sup>54</sup> The significance of the lack of comparisons made by other animals is that they are prevented from making their own decisions and, as a result, are determined to one course of action. Inversely, the presence of the comparative act in human beings points to the participation of the cogitative power in reason, the characteristic of which is discursive.<sup>55</sup> In *De veritate*, q. 15, a. 1, Aquinas characterizes the discursiveness of reason as “going from one thing to another, in order to reach knowledge of things unknown through those which are known.”<sup>56</sup> Then he adds that this discursiveness is “proper” for human beings.<sup>57</sup> In sum, the cogitative power is a sensitive power which is analogous to reason, in which respect it may be termed “sensitive reason.”

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<sup>53</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.256), cited above in footnote 412.

<sup>54</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 16 “Et haec est causa, quare animalia non habent opinionem, licet habeant phantasiam; quia non possunt uti syllogismo, per quem unum praeeligant alteri. Sed deliberatio rationis habet illam, scilicet opinionem, alias non faceret ex pluribus phantasmatis unum.”

<sup>55</sup> For this reason, Klubertanz calls the cogitative the “discursive power.”

<sup>56</sup> This is James McGlynn’s translation. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, trans. James V. McGlynn, Vol. 2 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), 272. For Aquinas, although the intellect and reason are not distinct powers, the intellect is called reason when it is engaged in an enquiry (*inquisitio*), which is conducted in a discursive manner. *In III De an.*, l. 14: “Unde accipere possumus, quod ratio et intellectus non sunt diversae partes animae, sed ipse intellectus dicitur ratio, in quantum per inquisitionem quamdam pervenit ad cognoscendum intelligibilem veritatem.”

<sup>57</sup> *De ver.*, q. 15, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.479: 276-83): “Quaedam vero sunt inferiores quae ad cognitionem veritatis perfectam pervenire non possunt nisi per quemdam motum quo ab uno in aliud discurrunt ut ex cognitis in incognitorum notitiam perveniant, quod est proprie animarum humanarum: et inde est quod ipsi angeli intellectuales substantiae dicuntur, animae vero rationales.” The angelic intellect is not discursive because it proceeds straight to the conclusion. In this sense, one can say that the intellect is superior to reason.

The cogitative power is also called particular reason (*ratio particularis*), and the analysis of this term also reveals its close connection to reason. The cogitative power is called “reason” because like reason it engages itself with *comparing* intentions. Yet it is “particular” reason because it compares *individual* intentions (*intentiones individuales*) as opposed to *universal* intentions (*intentiones universales*), which is the object of the “intellectual reason” (*ratio intellectiva*). This way Aquinas suggests that particular reason, albeit being a sensitive power, has something of reason by participating in it.<sup>58</sup>

Now let us discuss how the particular reason confines with the universal reason. Since the sensitive appetite is moved by particular reason, showing the relationship between universal reason and particular reason will clarify the relationship between (universal) reason and the sensitive appetite. As a corporeal power, sense can directly understand material singulars. (Due to its corporeality, it cannot understand what is abstracted from individual matter, i.e., universals.) On the other hand, the human intellect<sup>59</sup> can only understand material singulars indirectly.<sup>60</sup> This is ascribed to the particular manner in which the human intellect understands: it understands by means of

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<sup>58</sup> For an excellent treatment of the cogitative power, see Part II of Klubertanz’s *Discursive Power*. Here the author gives a detailed presentation of Aquinas’s treatment of the estimative and cogitative powers in the order that Aquinas wrote about them over his career.

<sup>59</sup> Here I am using reason and intellect interchangeably in accordance with Aquinas. (p. 172)

<sup>60</sup> *ST*, I, q. 86, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.347): “Respondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, *Socrates est homo*.”

the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms.<sup>61</sup>

Let us now investigate how the intellect, with its indirect way of understanding material singulars, is involved in practical matters. First, the intellect here should be the practical intellect rather than speculative intellect, since the intellect here is engaged in the application of its apprehension, not to ideas, but to practical matter, i.e., operations and actions.<sup>62</sup> Just as the intellect cannot directly apprehend material singulars, the (practical) reason cannot directly command (singular) act.<sup>63</sup> That means that for the intellect to command an act, it has to go through a sensitive power. Without it, the practical intellect can only consider the particular matter *universally*, which does not initiate any movement or action. Precisely speaking, this power needs to be able to form a particular proposition by comparing individual intentions. This power is none other than the cogitative power. Aquinas explains this relationship between reason and the

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<sup>61</sup> *ST*, I, q. 85, a. 1 c. (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.331): “Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt.” For the discussion of the difference between intelligible species and phantasms, see Elenore Stump in *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 256-59.

<sup>62</sup> *ST*, I, q. 79, a. 11 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.278): “Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem: practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in III *de Anima*, quod *speculativus differt a practico, fine*. Unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, idest operativus.”

<sup>63</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 14: “Deinde cum dicit amplius et probat, quod nec etiam intellectus practicus movet: dicens, quod nec etiam intellectu practico praecipiente, quod contingit cum intelligentia dicit aliquid fugiendum aut prosequendum, non propter hoc homo movetur, sed agit secundum concupiscentiam; sicut patet de incontinentibus, qui habent rationem rectam, sed non inhaerent rationi rectae; unde videtur quod intellectus non moveat. Probat autem idem ex medicis, qui habentes scientiam medicativam non sanantur, quia non faciunt ea in seipsis, quae praecipit ars eis. Ex quo videtur, quod agere secundum scientiam non sit scientiae practicae, sed alicuius alterius.”

cogitative power with a practical syllogism.<sup>64</sup> The process of decision making or engaging in action would typically take the following steps.

<b>major premise</b> (universal opinion)	<i>“All cheatings are bad.”</i>	(universal) practical intellect
<b>minor premise</b> (particular opinion)	<i>“Using a friend’s argument last night in my paper is cheating.”</i>	particular reason
<b>conclusion</b> (choice or an action)	<i>“I withdraw from using my friend’s argument.”</i>	

A preliminary fact needs to be pointed out regarding the above practical syllogism. What is implicitly understood in a practical syllogism is that a good is desirable and thus pursued.<sup>65</sup> In a practical syllogism, a major premise is a universal opinion, and this is supplied by the intellect, since it grasps universals. Next, a minor premise is a particular opinion, which is supplied by a sensitive power, namely the cogitative power. Lastly, the conclusion is either a choice or an action, since a practical syllogism is directed to that end.

Let us discuss the role of the cogitative power in this syllogism. Its major role is

<sup>64</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.309: 81-99): “Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires. et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam sensitivae partis componens et dividens intentiones individuales, quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis: universalem enim sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare, ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus, cuius maior sit universalis quae est sententia mentis, minor autem singularis, quae est apprehensio particularis rationis, conclusio vero electio singularis operis, ut patet per id quod habetur in III De anima.”

<sup>65</sup> This is traced back to Aristotle at the beginning of Book I of *Nicomachean Ethics* (1094a1-3). For a discussion of the practical syllogism of the incontinent, see Denis J. M. Bradley, “Aquinas on Weakness of the Will,” in *Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 82-114.

connecting the practical intellect to an action. The only way a universal opinion can reach a singular conclusion is by the intermediary of a singular proposition, which is the result of the specific application of a universal opinion.<sup>66</sup> This intermediary power should be a sensitive power in the first place, since a sensitive power is directly ordered toward singular matters, i.e., operations and actions. Yet not every sensitive power is suitable for this role. Forming a particular opinion involves “dividing and joining” particular intentions, which is the act of reason. Accordingly, the discursive power on a sensitive level, namely the cogitative power, is the best candidate for this role.

Using the above syllogism, let us think about Aquinas’s view of the relationship between (universal) reason and particular reason. Universal reason governs particular reason by providing a universal proposition, which is applied in a concrete situation by particular reason. Then particular reason moves the sensitive appetite, which in turn stirs up the passions. In sum, reason can reach the passions through particular reason. This view of Aquinas can yield an important insight to the issue of the human passions. The rather indirect government of the passions by reason contributes to the dynamic life of the human passions, which defies a simple dichotomous characterization of the rational and the irrational. Aquinas compares and contrasts the way the sensitive appetite obeys reason with that of the bodily members. Unlike the bodily members which are governed by reason acting as a “despotic power,” the sensitive appetite is governed by “political

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<sup>66</sup> *ST*, I, q. 86, a. 1 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.347): “Ad secundum dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII *Ethic*. Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*.”

and legal power.” Here the sensitive appetite is compared to a free citizen who, albeit being subject to the rule of the governor, has “something of their own” and, for that matter, can resist the rule of the governor. In an analogous way, the sensitive appetite can resist the command of the rational faculties.<sup>67</sup> According to Aquinas, a degree of “fundamental recalcitrance”<sup>68</sup> on the part of the sensitive appetite towards rational control is ascribed to the fact that the sensitive appetite is moved not only by the particular reason, which is governed by universal reason, but also by the imagination and sense, which can make one act impulsively before reason interferes. This also explains why the animal passions are simply passive; only through the imagination are they moved.<sup>69</sup> Understandably, those passions in human beings that are moved by imagination and sense are not much different from the animal passions.<sup>70</sup> Our experience testifies to this rebellious trait of the passions. By letting ourselves imagine or sense something that is not approved by reason, we rebel against reason. For example, by recalling the sweet cake in a TV commercial, we can grab a piece of cake against the command of the reason, which says that we have to lose weight.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> This goes back to Aristotle’s *Politics* (1.2.1254 b4).

<sup>68</sup> I have borrowed Mark P. Drost’s expression. Mark P. Drost, “Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Emotions,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 124 (1991): 459.

<sup>69</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 15: “Multi enim homines praetermissa scientia intellectus, sequuntur in suis motibus phantasiam, sicut illi, qui non secundum rationem agunt, sed impetu moventur ad aliquid agendum. Et in aliis animalibus manifestum est, quod nunquam intellectus est neque ratio quae movere possit, sed solum phantasia. In hominibus vero est phantasia et intellectus.”

<sup>70</sup> Claudia calls these passions “reason-independent passions” as opposed to “reason-dependent passions.” Claudia Eisen Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999): 177.

<sup>71</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 3 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.291). “Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I *Politicorum* [Aristotle, *Politics* (1.2.1254 b4)], *est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali*. Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur servis, qui non

So far I have discussed how the higher part of the sensitive apprehension (the estimative and cogitative powers) confines with reason. I have discussed this connection on two levels. First, in the case of non-rational animals, the participation of a lower power into a higher takes place beyond a single creature. That is, although non-rational animals do not possess reason in themselves, a higher part of their soul still participates in it, which is revealed in their quasi-rational acts, such as prudence. Aquinas attributes this “cross-species” participation to the Divine Wisdom. Secondly, the participation of a lower power into a higher can take place within a single creature. This is the case of human beings in whom the cogitative power participates in reason. Since the participation takes place in one and the same soul, understandably the interaction between the lower and higher powers in human beings will be more intimate and powerful.<sup>72</sup> More importantly, although the passions, as the movement of an animal power (the sensitive appetite), are common to other animals and human beings, once they

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habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent. Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu: quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu: quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant.”

<sup>72</sup> In fact, in regard to this interaction, Aquinas says that it pertains to the powers of the soul that higher powers overflow into the lower powers. We experience this “overflow” when we lessen our bodily pain with the pleasure we derive from a spiritual thing, e.g., from contemplation. *ST*, I-II, q. 38, a. 4 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.259): “Ad tertium dicendum quod in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu.”

are viewed in the “context of their respective beings,”<sup>73</sup> they are qualitatively different. In the forthcoming section, my investigation of Aquinas’s interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysian principle will continue. This time the two divisions in the sensitive appetite will be given special attention.

### *3 The Higher Part of the Sensitive Appetite*

In this section, I will investigate the higher part of the sensitive appetite, i.e., the irascible part, and argue that the close connection it has with reason points to its active and dynamic dimension as opposed to the relatively receptive and static dimension of the concupiscible part.<sup>74</sup>

#### *3.1 The Division of the Concupiscible and the Irascible*

First of all, according to Aquinas, the sensitive appetite is divided into two parts: the concupiscible and the irascible.<sup>75</sup> Let us briefly discuss the origin of their names. The English word, “concupiscible,” comes from the Latin “concupiscentia,” which means

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<sup>73</sup> I have borrowed Loughlin’s words in his “Similarities and Differences” (p. 64).

<sup>74</sup> Aquinas gives a major treatment to the subject of the passions in two places in the *Summa theologiae*. First, in *ST*, I, qq. 81-82, he discusses it along with the powers of the soul. Specifically, Question 80 deals with the appetitive powers in general, and Question 81 discusses sensuality (*sensualitas*). The other place is the *prima secundae pars* (qq. 22-48). It is generally agreed in the scholarship that the *Prima secundae pars* of the *Summa theologiae* is about Aquinas’s ethics. In this sense, it is not surprising that Aquinas gives a detailed treatment to the passions in this part, as, for Aquinas, the passions play an indispensable role in moral life. His general discussion of the passions in qq. 22-25 is followed by more specific treatments of the concupiscible passions (qq. 26-39) and the irascible passions (qq. 40-48).

<sup>75</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.289): “Respondeo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem.”

desire. The word, “irascible,” is derived from the Latin, “ira,” which means anger. According to Aquinas, the concupiscible part was named after desire because it is a passion that is the most keenly felt when we feel that something is lacking in us.<sup>76</sup> The irascible part was named after “ira” for two reasons. First, all the movements of the irascible passions terminate in anger, since anger is concerned with an evil that is already present. Second, the movement of anger seems more manifest (*manifestior*) than any other movements of the irascible passions.<sup>77</sup>

Let us first discuss why there need to be two such parts as the concupiscible and the irascible in the sensitive appetite. The two best sources where Aquinas treats this issue are *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 2 c and *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 81, a. 2 c, since both are located in the *Quaestio* which directly deals with sensuality (*sensualitas*) in general. Aquinas defines sensuality as “the appetite for the things that pertain to the body.”<sup>78</sup> In both places, he first points out the two tendencies, or inclinations (*inclinaciones*), found in a natural thing. [1] First, a natural thing has a tendency to seek what is suitable (*convenientia*) and repulse what is harmful (*nociva*) for itself. This is necessary for a natural thing to preserve its nature. Aquinas says that this preserving act is done in a

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<sup>76</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 25, a. 2 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.185): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit: voces enim *sunt signa intellectuum*, secundum Philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in *X de Trin.*, *amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia*. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.” Drost mentions this on p. 453 in his “Intentionality.”

<sup>77</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.292): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, vis irascibilis denominatur ab ira, non quia omnis motus huius potentiae sit ira: sed quia ad iram terminantur omnes motus huius potentiae; et inter alios eius motus, iste est manifestior.”

<sup>78</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 1 sc (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.288): “Sed contra est quod sensualitas definitur esse *appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium*.”

manner of “reception” (*receptio*). [2] Second, a natural thing has a tendency to fight against that which destroys and hinders its preservation. As opposed to the receptive manner of the preserving tendency, this act is carried out in a manner of “action” (*actio*), since the thing has to take action to fight what threatens its existence. Now reception and action are derived from two distinct principles, which Aquinas explains with the example of fire. The upward movement of the fire is attributed to the principle that the fire is light in its nature. On the other hand, the destructive action of the fire is derived from another principle that the fire contains heat in itself.<sup>79</sup>

In parallel to the division in a natural thing, two parts are found in the sensitive appetite in an animal. [1] The first one is the power by which the soul simply tends to what is suitable and avoids what is harmful. This is accomplished by the concupiscible power of the sensitive appetite, the object of which is what is delectable to the sense. Again, this act has the manner of reception (*receptio*), since the animal strives to possess the delightful object within itself. [2] The other is the power by which the soul fights against that which hinders the attainment of what is suitable and causes harm to it. This is accomplished by the irascible power, the object of which is an arduous good (*bonum*

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<sup>79</sup> *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.732: 89-116): “Respondeo. Dicendum quod appetitus sensualitatis has duas vires continet, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae sunt ad invicem diversae potentiae; quod quidem hoc modo videri potest. Appetitus enim sensitivus quamdam convenientiam habet cum appetitu naturali, in quantum uterque tendit in rem convenientem appetenti. Invenitur autem appetitus naturalis ad duo tendere, secundum duplicem operationem rei naturalis: una quarum est per quam res naturalis nititur acquirere id quod est conservativum suae naturae, sicut grave movetur deorsum, ut ibi conservetur; alia est per quam res naturalis sua contraria destruit per qualitatem activam; et hoc quidem necessarium est corruptibili quia nisi haberet virtutem qua suum contrarium vinceret, ab eo corrumpetur. Sic ergo appetitus naturalis ad duo tendit, scilicet ad consequendum id quod est congruum et amicum naturae, et ad habendum quamdam victoriam super illud quod est ei adversum; et primum est quasi per modum receptionis, secundum vero est per modum actionis; unde ad diversa principia reducuntur: recipere enim et agere non sunt ab eodem principio, ut ignis, qui per levitatem fertur sursum, per calorem contraria corrumpit.”

*arduum*). This act is carried out in the manner of action (*actio*), since through action an animal can defeat what poses a threat to its life. Since reception and action are derived from two distinct principles in an animal, they are regarded as two distinct powers. However, it must be remembered that these two powers are distinct within the same genus of the sensitive appetite, which is why Aquinas correlates the division of the concupiscible and irascible parts to that of the possible and active intellects in the intellect.<sup>80</sup>

What is significant to our present discussion is that the two tendencies in a natural thing as well as the two parts in the sensitive appetite are in line with the two-part distinction made by the Pseudo-Dionysian principle (“The highest point of a lower nature confines with the lowest point of a higher.”). According to the Pseudo-Dionysian principle, two divisions are found in the sensitive appetite. (See p. 158) [1] First, there is a part which belongs to the sensitive appetite *per se*. [2] Then there is a part which participates in a higher power, i.e., reason. Now the simple self-preserving tendency is something an animal has in accordance with the sensitive soul *per se*, and this pertains to

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<sup>80</sup> *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.732: 116-143): “Ita etiam in appetitu sensibili ista duo inveniuntur: nam animal per appetitivam potentiam appetit id quod est congruum et amicum sibi, et hoc per vim concupiscibilem cuius proprium obiectum est delectabile secundum sensum; appetit etiam habere dominium et victoriam super ea quae sunt sibi contraria, et hoc per vim irascibilem, unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est aliquid arduum. Et sic patet quod irascibilis est alia potentia a concupiscibili, nam aliam rationem appetibilitatis habet aliquid ex hoc quod est arduum cum quandoque illud quod est arduum, a delectatione separet, et rebus circumstantibus immisceat, sicut cum animal relicta voluptate cui vacabat, aggreditur pugnam, nec retrahitur propter dolores quos sustinet. Et iterum una earum, scilicet concupiscibilis, videtur ordinata ad recipiendum: haec enim appetit ut ei suum delectabile coniungatur; altera vero, scilicet irascibilis, est ordinata ad agendum, quia per actionem aliquam superat id quod est contrarium vel nocivum, ponens se in quadam altitudine victoriae super ipsum. Hoc autem communiter in potentiis animae invenitur, quod recipere et agere ad diversas potentias pertinent sicut patet de intellectu agente et possibili.”

the concupiscible part. On the other hand, the active fighting tendency which exists for self-preservation is what the animal has in accordance as it confines with the higher powers of the soul, i.e., the reason and will, and this pertains to the irascible part. The following chart summarizes these three kinds of distinction.

<i>The sensitive appetite</i>	
<i>The concupiscible</i>	<i>The irascible</i>
Derived from a receptive principle of self-preservation	Derived from an active principle of fighting for self-preservation
Tends to what is suitable and avoids what is harmful.	Fights against that which hinders the attainment of what is suitable and causes harm to it.
Belongs to the sensitive appetite <i>per se</i> .	Confines with a higher power, i.e., reason.

As we can see in the above graph, in comparison with the concupiscible part the irascible part is more active, multi-dimensional, and more closely related to reason.

Later in *Sentencia libri De anima*, III, l. 14, Aquinas discusses why there need to be two parts in the sensitive appetite in contrast to only one in the intellectual appetite. First of all, appetitive powers are distinguished by their objects, i.e., an apprehended good. Now the intellect and the sense apprehend a good in a different manner. Whereas the intellect understands a good under its universal nature (*secundum universalem rationem boni*), the sense perceives a good under a “determinate”<sup>81</sup> or particular aspect (*sub determinata ratione boni*). These particular aspects can be classified into two groups, according to which there can be two kinds of goods. First, there are goods that are simply good, i.e., they give immediate pleasure to the sense. Second, there are goods

<sup>81</sup> This is Pasnau’s translation in his *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*.

that are good insofar as they enable one to attain the simple goods. Accordingly, there can be two types of appetite that correspond to these two kinds of goods. The part of the sensitive appetite that pursues the simple good is named the concupiscible, whereas the part after the other kind of good is called the irascible.<sup>82</sup>

### *3.2 The Complex Nature of the Irascible Part*

An analysis of the object of the irascible part also brings out the active and complex nature of the irascible part. Let me present the difference in object between the concupiscible and irascible parts through a mundane example. Let us say that I am walking along a street and smell coffee from a nearby coffee shop. I immediately desire a cup of coffee but find that I do not have any money with me. Here, for the entire time, the object of my desire is the single sensible good of coffee. However, this good can be further distinguished according to the way it is viewed. First, there is the kind of good in an absolute sense, as when my desire for it was immediately aroused when I smelled the coffee aroma. Second, there is the kind of good revealed in the context of its difficult circumstances, as when I realize that I need to return home to get the money to get some coffee. The latter kind of good is notable. Since I find it troublesome to return home to

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<sup>82</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 14: “Sed quaeritur quare in appetitu sensitivo sunt duae potentiae appetitivae, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, in appetitu autem rationali est unus appetitus tantum, scilicet voluntas. Et dicendum est, quod potentiae distinguuntur rationes obiectorum. Obiectum autem appetitivae est bonum apprehensum. Alio autem modo apprehendit bonum intellectus et sensus. Nam intellectus apprehendit bonum secundum universalem rationem boni; sensus autem apprehendit sub determinata ratione boni. Et ideo appetitus qui sequitur apprehensionem intellectus, est unus tantum. Appetitus autem qui sequuntur apprehensionem sensus, distinguuntur secundum diversam rationem boni apprehensi. Nam aliquid apprehensum per sensum, habet rationem boni appetibilis, in quantum est delectabile secundum sensum; et ad hoc bonum ordinatur concupiscibilis. Aliquid autem habet rationem boni et appetibilis, in quantum perficitur delectabilibus, quasi habens facultatem ad libitum utendi eis; et ad hoc ordinatur irascibilis, quae est quasi propugnatrix concupiscibilis.”

get the money, the good which was previously viewed as a simple good now takes on a different aspect, namely, the difficulty of attaining it. According to Aquinas, the first kind of good is the object of the concupiscible, and the latter is the object of the irascible.

Whereas the object of the concupiscible is good and evil taken in an unqualified sense, that of the irascible is good or evil considered with the aspect of difficulty. Accordingly, one can say that the irascible passions have the added aspect of assessing difficulty, and this added aspect makes the subject “re-evaluate” the whole situation in which good or evil exists.<sup>83</sup> Drost’s insight into the notion of “aspect” is very helpful here.<sup>84</sup> He says that our response to an “aspect” of a sensible thing points to the cognition and intentionality on our part. In this sense, the irascible passions possess a higher level of cognition and intentionality, since they arise as a result of the consideration of the aspect of difficulty on top of the basic aspect of usefulness and harmfulness, which triggers the concupiscible

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<sup>83</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 23, a.1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.173): “Ad cognoscendum ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam patiat in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo aliquod huiusmodi malum, in quantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.”

<sup>84</sup> Based on his distinction between a “material object” and an “intentional object,” he defies the view that emotion lacks any cognitive or intentional dimension with the following words: “The notion of *aspect* that operates here is significant. An emotion always has an aspect as the object of its intentional focus. The aspect ordinarily arises from the perceptual experience that one has of an object in the environment. Consider these analogies: by pointing at a material object you refer to it, and you can also turn the object you point to into a target simply by aiming at it. Aiming always has a target, but nothing is intrinsically a target. . . . Nothing has changed in the material object when we take it to be a target or a picture, but by intentionally focusing on it we have conferred a new aspect on that object. The *aspect* that Aquinas speaks of in his theory of emotions arises from the sensory orexis responding to a cognition of an object. This intentional object of an emotion is ontologically dependent on a perceptual or a quasi-perceptual experience.” (Drost, “Intentionality,” 452.)

passions. Using Aquinas's own example, hope (*spes*), an irascible passion, has more complex dimension than desire (*desiderium*), a concupiscible passion. The object of hope has two elements in addition to what the object of desire has: possibility (*possibilitas*) and difficulty (*arduitas*).<sup>85</sup> That is, hope is a passion that is concerned with a future good which is difficult to obtain yet not impossible. This added dimension in the irascible part means that it has a two-fold contrariety in contrast to a single contrariety in the concupiscible part. This in turn points to the close connection the irascible part has to reason. Aquinas defines "contraries" as the two things that are farthest removed from one another.<sup>86</sup> Let us look at *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 23, a. 2 c for Aquinas's treatment of contrariety in the passions.<sup>87</sup> There, Aquinas says that passion is a kind of movement. Now two kinds of contrariety are found in a movement. [A] First, there is contrariety in terms of end (*terminus*). That is, a thing can be concerned with two contrary ends or terms, such as hot and cold. [B] Then, there is contrariety according to whether a thing either approaches or withdraws from the same term. Applied to the passions of the soul, we have two kinds of contrariety. [a] First, we have the contrariety of good and evil, since sensible good and evil are the object of the sensitive appetite. [b] Second, we have

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<sup>85</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 1 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.265). "Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super obiectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem: quae ad aliam potentiam facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quae respicit arduum, ut in Primo dictum est. Possibile autem et impossibile non omnino per accidens se habent ad obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Nam appetitus est principium motionis, nihil autem movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis."

<sup>86</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 45, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.287): "Respondeo dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in *X Metaphys.*"

<sup>87</sup> I chose this place because apart from being located in Aquinas's most complete treatment of the passions (*ST*, I-II, qq. 22-48), it deals specifically with the differences among the passions.

the contrariety of approach and withdrawal with respect to the same object whether it be good or evil.

Now there is a difference between the concupiscible and the irascible passions in regard to contrariety. While only the contrariety of object ([a] in the above) is found in the concupiscible, both kinds of contrariety ([a] and [b]) are found in the irascible. To see the source of this difference, we need to compare the object of the concupiscible with that of the irascible. When the appetite is moved by the sensible good or evil, the subject can regard the good or evil in two ways. First, the subject can regard the object in itself without considering the circumstances involved in attaining the object. The concupiscible regards its object in this manner. Now with this kind of simple good or evil, the subject can only have two reactions: either it seeks the good or avoids the evil. Since this is simple good or evil, it cannot resist good or pursue evil. Hence, only the contrariety of object, i.e., of good or evil, is found in the concupiscible.

Next, one can also regard the good or evil along with the particular circumstance involved attaining it. As he does that, his reaction is no longer just one-dimensional, as it was with the concupiscible passions. That is, it sometimes happens that the subject, based upon his evaluation of the particular circumstance, as when the difficulty involved exceeds his capacity, can give up the good. This would not happen were it not for such a circumstance. In the same vein, the subject can also decide to fight evil, which would not occur if he did not have to take the circumstances into consideration. Accordingly, a two fold contrariety is found in the irascible passions. First, there is the contrariety in terms of object, i.e., that of good or evil. Hope and fear are contrary passions in this sense because

the object of the former is good that of the latter is evil. Second, there is the contrariety of approach and withdrawal with respect to the same object. Daring and fear are contrary passions in this sense, for while the former approaches evil the latter recoils from evil.<sup>88</sup> The two fold contrariety of the irascible passions, as opposed to a single contrariety of the concupiscible ones, means that the former are more complex than the latter. And this complexity points to the fact that the irascible passions are more closely related to reason than the concupiscible passions, since the former involves a further consideration of the circumstances, which can prevent the subject from simply acting spontaneously toward the given good or evil. White explains the connection between the irascible passions and reason with the following words:

The concupiscible appetite seems to operate as continually as perception, the irascible only in special circumstances. Arousal of the latter signals interruption in the smooth concupiscible flow of love toward the delightful and of hatred away from the painful: suddenly simple desire and aversion are no longer enough to ensure this flow; an obstacle has appeared; the soul responds by tensing for struggle. . . . The irascible appetite is a higher perfection of animal nature than is the concupiscible insofar as, by taking on a present difficulty for the sake of a remote good, it approximates the foresight of reason. . . .<sup>89</sup>

The above discussion of the double-contrariety of the irascible passions seems to be an extension of Aquinas's similar discussion in *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 5, which was

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<sup>88</sup> The parallel readings are found in *ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 4 c and q. 45, a. 1 ad 2.

<sup>89</sup> Kevin White, "The Passions of the Soul (IaIIae, qq.22-48)," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 109.

written about ten years before the *Summa theologiae*.<sup>90</sup> In this text, Aquinas brings out the complexity of the irascible passions in the discussion of the four principal passions. The question discussed here is whether the four passions of hope, fear, joy, and sadness are the four principal passions (*principales animae passionnes*). From Aquinas's argument for the validity of those four passions as principal passions, we can infer the fact that the irascible passions are more complex than the concupiscible.

First, Aquinas clarifies the meaning of the word "principal" (*principalis*). For a passion to be a principal passion, it needs to satisfy two conditions: [1] it must arise *before* the other passions, and also [2] it is the departure point (*origo*) of the other passions. Now the passions which arise *immediately* from the object of the appetite (good and evil) are said to be prior. On the other hand, those which arise having other passions as intermediaries are said to be sort of secondary (*quasi secundaria*).

Now two things are required for a passion to arise immediately: [a] First, it must directly (*per se*) arise from good or evil; and [b] it must arise presupposing no other passions. The first condition means that, if a passion arises in pursuit of a good insofar as it is good, it is said to arise directly or *per se* from good. On the other hand, if a passion arises in such a way that it avoids the good, it is said to arise accidentally or *per accidens* from the good. Next, the second condition is based on the fact that the order of intention or appetite is the reverse of reality or execution. In other words, what is first in the order of intention is last in the order of reality. According to Aquinas, a passion which arises in

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<sup>90</sup> The dates of Aquinas's works in this dissertation have been taken from Jean-Pierre Torrell's *Saint Thomas Aquinas*.

the last stage in the order of reality when either good or evil is finally present is the most prior passion. Because a good is apprehended as giving joy in the first place, the movement of the passions towards the good is triggered. Likewise, because an evil is apprehended as giving sadness, the sequence of the passions avoiding the evil follows.

Now let us consider the concupiscible passions with these two criteria. All the concupiscible passions satisfy the first condition; they arise directly from good and evil, since their object is simple good and evil. However, only joy and sadness satisfy the second condition, since they arise first in the order of intention yet last in the order of reality. Next, let us consider the irascible passions with the two criteria. With respect to the first condition, some of the irascible passions are essential and some accidental or incidental. This is due to the fact that the irascible passions arise as a result of the overall “assessment” of the situation, and this can trigger passions that would be improbable to arise when good and evil were considered absolutely. Now with respect to the second condition, none of the irascible passions satisfy this condition. This is fundamentally ascribed to the fact that the irascible passions begin and end in the concupiscible passions, as we have seen earlier.

The above discussion yields the conclusion that the less a passion satisfies the two conditions of a principal passion, the less spontaneous it is, since it is more likely to engage itself in some cognitive process, as when hope arises as a result of overall “appraisal” of the whole context of good or evil. Such are the irascible passions, especially despair, daring, and anger. In fact, in his reply to the third objection of the same Article, Aquinas explains why anger is a particularly complex passion. First of all,

the object of anger is evil, i.e., a harm to another person, but the angry person “judges” that evil needs to be done for the sake of a good, i.e., restoring justice. Also, anger results from two prior passions, sadness and hope. It presupposes sadness because it can only arise once the evil is apprehended as giving him sadness. It presupposes hope, for if the revenge were thought to be beyond his capacity, anger would not arise. This complexity of the irascible passions sheds a new light on the issue of the passions. Most often passion is viewed as something spontaneous and even irrational. However, from the above discussion we learn that this is not always the case, at least not with the irascible passions.<sup>91</sup> The “thoughtful” assessment of the irascible passions can provide “space” that one needs to avoid an automatic passive reaction and engage in a relatively active response to the external stimuli.

In fact, the close association of the irascible passions with reason is revealed in Aquinas’s discussion of the issue of continence and incontinence. According to him, incontinence is derived from the opposition between reason and the sensitive appetite.<sup>92</sup> That is, an incontinent person has a correct rational judgment as to what ought to be done

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<sup>91</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 5 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.765: 191-204): “Ad tertium dicendum, quod ira oritur ex malo per accidens, in quantum scilicet iratus vindictam mali sibi illati bonum aestimat et in eam tendit; unde spes vindictae consequendae est causa irae. Unde cum aliquis laeditur ab eo cui non reputat posse vindictam inferre non irascitur, sed tristatur solum vel timet, ut Avicenna dicit, sicut si rusticus laeditur a rege. Et ideo ira non potest esse principalis passio; praesupponit enim non solum tristitiam, quae est in concupiscibili, sed etiam spem, quae est in irascibili. Denominatur autem irascibilis ab ira, quia est ultima passionum quae sunt in irascibili.”

<sup>92</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 15: “Sed haec ratio solvitur; quia in homine sunt contrarii appetitus, quorum unum continentes sequuntur, et alii repugnant. Dicit ergo, quod quia possunt fieri appetitus contrarii adinvicem, hoc contingit cum ratio concupiscentiae contrariatur. . . .”

yet due to his desire acts contrary to his judgment.<sup>93</sup> What is notable here is that, when Aquinas mentions passion in conjunction with the issue of continence and incontinence, he usually employs concupiscible passions, especially desire. In fact, Aquinas is closely following Aristotle here and explains why the Philosopher mentions the concupiscible passions rather than the irascible in conjunction with incontinence: while the irascible passions are mixed with rationality, the concupiscible passions are not. That is, the close connection of the irascible passions to reason prevents them from being completely opposed to reason, although they arise from the sensitive appetite. By the same token, the concupiscible passions are further removed from reason, which makes them more likely to rebel the command of reason.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, they serve as good examples in a discussion of incontinence.

An important remark needs to be made regarding the close connection of the irascible passions to reason. Since the involvement of reason is proportionate to the graveness of the sinfulness of an act, the sin in the irascible passions may be more grievous than the sin in the concupiscible passions.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> *In VII Eth.*, l. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.380: 35-40): “Si quidem igitur sit perversitas ex parte appetitus ut ratio practica remaneat recta, erit incontinentia, quae scilicet est quando aliquis rectam aestimationem habet de eo quod est faciendum vel vitandum, sed propter passionem appetitus in contrarium trahit.”

<sup>94</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 15: “Sed appetitus movet sine ratione, sicut patet ex his quae ex concupiscentia moventur. Concupiscentia enim est appetitus quidam. Exemplificat autem magis de concupiscentia quam de ira, quia ira habet aliquid rationis, non autem concupiscentia, ut probat philosophus in septimo Ethicorum.”

<sup>95</sup> *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 6 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.742: 106-16): “Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod motus rationis magis participatur in irascibili quam in concupiscibili, contingit quod peccata irascibilis sunt graviora, sed peccata concupiscibilis turpiora; ipsa enim discretio rationis culpam auget, sicut ignorantia culpam alleviat, recessus autem a ratione, in qua tota dignitas humana consistit, ad turpitudinem pertinet: unde ex hoc ipso patet quod concupiscibilis est magis corrupta, utpote longius a ratione discedens.”

So far, I have discussed the higher part of the sensitive appetite, namely, the irascible part. Earlier, I have argued that the human passions carry an active dimension due to their close connection to reason. In this section, I have argued that among the human passions the irascible passions are more closely connected to reason than the concupiscible passions.<sup>96</sup> The close connection to reason is significant in that it can prevent a situation where one becomes a prey of his own passions due to his “helpless” passive reaction to the external stimuli. The rational permeation in the human passions, which is even more pronounced in the irascible passions, can function as a “buffer” against such an automatic response, and allow the person to take a relatively active stance, or at times even a creative one, towards the external stimuli, many of which are out of his control. Now because among the irascible passions, anger is particularly revealing in this respect, it warrants a separate treatment. The close liaison between anger and reason will be the main subject of next section.

## *4 Anger*

### *4.1 Anger as an Act of Reason*

In this section, I will continue my argument for a higher degree of rationality and activity of the irascible passions, this time using anger as a prime example.<sup>97</sup> My

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<sup>96</sup> On this point White says that the irascible passions transcend the “level of the sluggish concupiscible appetite.” (“The Passions of the Soul,” 110)

<sup>97</sup> The significance of anger has been dealt with by several contemporary scholars. For example, Mattison says that due to its special relationship with reason, anger can be used to test Aquinas’s thought on the moral significance of the passions in general. See p. 180 of his “Christian Anger?” (William Mattison,

presentation will be mainly based on two texts: Questions 24-25 of the *De veritate* and the *Secunda secundae pars* of the *Summa theologiae*. Let us first look at *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4. First, anger is defined as a desire for vengeance (*appetitus vindictae*). What is important here is the fact that one can only desire vengeance on another person through some rational act of comparison (*collatio*). That is, anger arises in a person as he compares the due punishment for the wrongdoer against the injury inflicted on the angry person. Now according to Aquinas, this act of comparison bears affinity to that of inferring or syllogizing (*sylogizare*), which pertains to reason.<sup>98</sup> It is worth recalling that the same term, “collatio,” was used previously to describe the act of the particular reason, namely, that it compares and collects particular intentions (p. 180). In this sense, “collatio,” as the common denominator of anger and reason, reveals the former’s rationality due to its participation in the latter. In a way similar to particular reason, anger is engaged in a rational act of comparison. In other words, using Roberts’s expression, anger has “built-in rational considerations.”<sup>99</sup>

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“Christian Anger? A Contemporary Account of Virtuous Anger in the Thomistic Tradition” [Ph. D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2003]). Another notable observation about contemporary Thomistic scholarship is that the high degree of rationality of anger makes some scholars use another term which can encompass such “rational” passions as anger. For instance, Shawn D. Floyd argues that Aquinas’s passions are not equal to the modern day emotion, because the former does not include the aspect of cognition and rationality. On the other hand, he continues, modern day “emotion” as a broader concept encompasses such “rational” feeling as anger along with Aquinas’s “matter-based” passions. For this reason, he holds that Aquinas’s intellectual affections, i.e., the act of the intellectual appetite, can be also called “emotion.” Shawn D. Floyd, “Aquinas on Emotion: A Response to Some Recent Interpretations,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 15 (1998): 161-75.

<sup>98</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.294): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus vindictae. Haec autem collationem importat poenae infligendae ad nocumentum sibi illatum: unde, in VII *Ethic.*, dicit Philosophus quod *sylogizans quoniam oportet talem oppugnare, irascitur confestim*. Conferre autem et sylogizare est rationis. Et ideo ira est quodammodo cum ratione.”

<sup>99</sup> Robert C. Roberts, “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 9 (1992), 291.

It may seem contradictory that anger, which is rooted in a sensitive power, requires an act of reason. In fact, the same doubt was raised in the first objection of the same Article: “Since anger is a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by the sensitive apprehension, it does not require an act of reason.”<sup>100</sup> Aquinas answers this objection by distinguishing two ways the appetitive power follows an act of reason. [1] In the first way, the appetite follows reason by obeying the command of reason. This is the way the rational appetite (the will) follows reason. [2] In the second way, the appetite follows reason as it listens to the denunciation of reason (*ratio denuntians*). Here it needs to be noted that denouncing or pronouncing a judgment (*proferre iudicium*) is an important characteristic of reason.<sup>101</sup> Anger is said to follow reason in this second way.<sup>102</sup>

Yet another interesting issue is brought up in the second objection of the same Article: “Since non-rational animals also have irascible passions including anger, anger does not seem to need an act of reason.”<sup>103</sup> Aquinas deals with this objection by carefully distinguishing the different ways anger arises in human beings and other animals. In human beings, since they are endowed with reason, anger is triggered by reason which

<sup>100</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 arg. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.294): “Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit cum ratione. Ira enim, cum sit passio quaedam, est in appetitu sensitivo. Sed appetitus sensitivus non sequitur rationis apprehensionem, sed sensitivae partis. Ergo ira non est cum ratione.”

<sup>101</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 60, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 9.25): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen iudicii, quod secundum primam impositionem significat rectam determinationem iustorum, ampliatur est ad significandum rectam determinationem in quibuscumque rebus, tam in speculativis quam in practicis. In omnibus tamen ad rectum iudicium duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ipsa virtus proferens iudicium. Et sic iudicium est actus rationis, dicere enim vel definire aliquid rationis est.”

<sup>102</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.294): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis potest esse cum ratione dupliciter. Uno modo, cum ratione praecipiente: et sic voluntas est cum ratione; unde et dicitur appetitus rationalis. Alio modo, cum ratione denuntiante, et sic ira est cum ratione. Dicit enim Philosophus, in libro *de Problemat.*, quod *ira est cum ratione, non sicut praecipiente ratione, sed ut manifestante iniuriam*. Appetitus enim sensitivus immediate rationi non obedit, sed mediante voluntate.”

<sup>103</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 arg. 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.294): “Praeterea, animalia bruta carent ratione. Et tamen in eis invenitur ira. Ergo ira non est cum ratione.”

recognizes the injury done. However, this is not the case with other animals, which are devoid of reason. Anger does arise in them, but its movement is carried out by natural instinct (*instinctus naturalis*) moved by imagination.<sup>104</sup> Hence, the movement of the animal anger is rather mechanical compared to the human anger, a characteristic of the movement of other animal passions (see p. 186).

Aquinas brings out the rationality of anger by contrasting it with the relatively basic and spontaneous nature of desire in several places. Let us first look at *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 6 ad 3. Here he compares the movement of the concupiscible and the irascible under two aspects: [1] in terms of desiring, and [2] in terms of execution. [1] First, in terms of desiring, the concupiscible is more sudden (*subitus*) than the irascible. This is because when the good is apprehended, the concupiscible part of the sensitive appetite is immediately moved, since its object is simple good and evil. On the other hand, the irascible part is not immediately moved by its object, since it has to “deliberate” on the circumstances before it is moved, i.e., weighing the inflicted injury against the punishment to be done in the case of anger. That the irascible part is engaged in an act of comparison brings it closer to reason. According to Aquinas, this kind of comparison is conducted in a manner analogous to a syllogism, and this kind of discursive nature of

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<sup>104</sup> Note here that, when the passions are moved by imagination, they are removed from reason. In fact, the “rebellious” character of the passions is partly due to the fact that they are moved not only by the particular reason and reason but also by sense and imagination, as we have seen earlier (p. 177). *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.295): “Ad secundum dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est.”

syllogism is what properly pertains to reason, as we have seen earlier (p. 185).<sup>105</sup> Based on Aquinas's explanation here and in *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, I, l. 6 we can reconstruct a syllogism which an angry person adopts before engaging himself in action in the following way.<sup>106</sup>

<i>Major premise</i>	“Someone who acts wrongfully must suffer violence.”
<i>Minor premise</i>	“This one acts wrongfully to me.”
<i>Conclusion/action</i>	“I am angry; I will revenge myself on this one.”

[2] Next, insofar as execution is considered, the irascible part is more sudden than the concupiscible. Aquinas ascribes this to the material component of anger, namely the natural heat and quickness of the bile that prompts a person to anger. This material aspect of anger will be dealt with in detail later in this chapter (p. 214ff).

A similar discussion based on the diverse senses of “natural” is found in

Aquinas's later work, the *Summa theologiae* (I-II, q. 46, a. 5). The question proposed in

<sup>105</sup> *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 6 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.742: 117-38): “Ad tertium dicendum, quod motus irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter potest considerari, scilicet in appetendo et in exequendo: in appetendo quidem magis est subitus motus concupiscibilis quam irascibilis, quia irascibilis movetur quasi deliberando et conferendo vindictam intentam ad iniuriam receptam, quasi syllogizans, ut dicitur in VII Ethicorum; sed concupiscibilis, ad solam apprehensionem delectabilis, movetur ad fruitionem delectabilis, ut ibi dicitur. Sed in exequendo motus irascibilis est magis subitus quam concupiscibilis; quia irascibilis cum quadam fiducia et fortitudine agit, concupiscibilis vero cum quadam mollitie insidiosae tendit ad propositum adipiscendum. Unde dicit Philosophus in VII Ethicorum quod “iracundus non est insidiator, sed manifestus; concupiscentia vero insidiator”; et inducit versus Homeri qui dixit “Venerem esse dolosam, et eius corrigiam variam”, significans deceptionem qua Venus furatur intellectum etiam multum sapientis.”

<sup>106</sup> *In VII Eth.*, l. 6 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.1.404: 38-405: 50): “Quomodo autem hoc fiat, ostendit subdens: < *Ratio quidem enim* etc. > Manifestatur enim homini quod sit sibi facta iniuria vel contemptus quandoque quidem per rationem, sicut quando hoc verum est, quandoque autem per fantasiam, puta cum homini ita videtur licet non sit, homo autem iratus quasi syllogizat quod iniuriantem oportet impugnare et determinat modum indebitum et sic statim irascitur movens ad vindictam ante quam determinetur ei a ratione modus vindictae; sed con concupiscentia statim quod denuntiatur sibi delectabile per rationem vel per sensum, movet ad fruendum illud delectabile absque aliquo syllogismo rationis.”

this Article is that of whether anger is more “natural” (*naturale*) than desire (*concupiscentia*). Aquinas’s affirmative answer (“anger is something natural for a human being.”) proceeds in the following way. First, to decide on whether anger is more natural than desire for a human being, one has to compare the causes of the two passions. Now the cause of a passion may be viewed in two respects: [1] in respect to the object and [2] in respect to the subject. [1] In respect to the object, desire is more natural than anger, since the objects of desire, e.g., food, drink, and sex, are more natural than the object of anger, i.e., doing harm to another person. [2] However, in respect to the subject, i.e., the person who is angry, anger may be more natural than desire. Now the nature of the subject of a passion can be further considered in three ways: [2-1] from the perspective of the generic nature, i.e., a human being taken as an *animal*; [2-2] from the perspective of the specific nature, i.e., a human being taken as *rational*; [2-3] from the perspective of the particular temperament of a particular person. When it comes to [2-1], desire is more natural than anger, since it is owing to the generic nature that a human being preserves his individuality as well as his species. However, when it comes to [2-2] and [2-3], anger is more natural than desire. First, for a human being taken as a rational being, anger is more natural, since anger follows reason while desire does not. Next, for a human being taken as an individual with a particular temperament, anger is still more natural, since anger has a deeper root in a person’s natural disposition, i.e., his natural inclination to anger, than any other passions. This component of natural disposition in anger explains

why an angry person is volatile and quickly led to an action. Furthermore, one's natural disposition to anger is more easily passed down to the next generation than desire.<sup>107</sup>

Let us think about what insight the above discussion can yield in conjunction with anger and rationality. The distinction between different senses of "natural" is crucial in the above discussion because the validity of Aquinas's argument for the rationality of anger rests on the obliteration of the "dichotomy between reason and nature," as Mattison says.<sup>108</sup> It should be noted that anger is regarded as natural for human beings when human beings are referred to either as rational beings or individuals with a particular natural disposition. This carries the significant implication that for Aquinas anger is a passion that goes hand in hand with the notion of rationality and individuality, both of which fundamentally distinguish human beings from non-rational animals which act

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<sup>107</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.295): "Respondeo dicendum quod naturale dicitur illud quod causatur a natura, ut patet in II *Physic*. Unde utrum aliqua passio sit magis vel minus naturalis, considerari non potest nisi ex causa sua. Causa autem passionis, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Si ergo consideretur causa irae et concupiscentiae ex parte obiecti, sic concupiscentia, et maxime ciborum et venereorum, naturalior est quam ira: inquantum ista sunt magis naturalia quam vindicta. Si autem consideretur causa irae ex parte subiecti, sic quodammodo ira est naturalior, et quodammodo concupiscentia. Potest enim natura alicuius hominis considerari vel secundum naturam generis, vel secundum naturam speciei, vel secundum complexionem propriam individui. Si igitur consideretur natura generis, quae est natura huius hominis inquantum est animal; sic naturalior est concupiscentia quam ira: quia ex ipsa natura communi habet homo quandam inclinationem ad appetendum ea quae sunt conservativa vitae, vel secundum speciem vel secundum individuum. Si autem consideremus naturam hominis ex parte speciei, scilicet inquantum est rationalis; sic ira est magis naturalis homini quam concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam concupiscentia. Unde Philosophus dicit, in IV *Ethic.*, quod *humanius est punire*, quod pertinet ad iram, *quam mansuetum esse*: unumquodque enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva. Si vero consideretur natura huius individui secundum propriam complexionem, sic ira naturalior est quam concupiscentia: quia scilicet habitudinem naturalem ad irascendum, quae est ex complexione, magis de facili sequitur ira, quam concupiscentia vel aliqua alia passio. Est enim homo dispositus ad irascendum, secundum quod habet cholericam complexionem: cholera autem, inter alios humores, citius movetur; assimilatur enim igni. Et ideo magis est in promptu ut ille qui est dispositus secundum naturalem complexionem ad iram, irascatur; quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, quod concupiscat. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit, in VII *Ethic.*, quod ira magis traducitur a parentibus in filios, quam concupiscentia."

<sup>108</sup> Mattison, "Christian Anger?," 194.

rather collectively.<sup>109</sup> In other words, for Aquinas anger is the kind of passion which is more adequate for rational beings. Understanding this close connection between anger and rationality helps one better appreciate Aquinas's view that anger serving reason is "natural" for human beings but anger predominating (*praedominans*) over reason is not.<sup>110</sup>

Another characteristic that brings anger closer to reason is that it is directed to beings to whom justice or injustice can be applied, i.e., rational beings. Aquinas discusses this issue in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 46, a. 7. The first objection is interesting, which runs as follows: "Since some people are angry at irrational animals, who are devoid of moral obligation, anger is not only directed to human beings."<sup>111</sup> Aquinas deals with this objection by distinguishing different manners in which anger is aroused. [1] First, when anger is aroused only by the denunciation of imagination, as is the case with other animals, a person can be angry at irrational animals and even at inanimate things. Once again here we see that a passion triggered by the imagination is not so different from the animal passion (see p. 186). [2] However, when anger is aroused by the denunciation of reason (*ratio denuntians*), a person can only be angry at other human beings. The reason one cannot be angry at inanimate things and deceased people is that they do not feel anything, and this defeats the angry person's purpose: the angry person wants the

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<sup>109</sup> *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.680-81: 268-79). For the Latin text, see footnote 441. .

<sup>110</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.236: 255-57): "Ad secundum dicendum, quod ira praedominans rationi non est naturalis homini, set naturale est ei ut ira rationi deseruiat."

<sup>111</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 7 arg. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.297): "Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia. Non enim est iustitia hominis ad res irracionales. Sed tamen homo quandoque irascitur rebus irrationalibus: puta cum scriptor ex ira proiicit pennam, vel eques percutit equum. Ergo ira non solum est ad illos ad quos est iustitia."

wrongdoer to feel the pain and harm he is inflicting and, even better, to *know* that he is being punished for his wrongdoing.<sup>112</sup> This *ratio* on the part of an angry person implies that anger is far from being a simple passion. The angry person's demand for the wrongdoer to recognize his wrongdoing and its consequences points out something that is intrinsic to human life, i.e., human interaction, and in light of such interaction, Mattison insightfully calls anger a “relational passion.”<sup>113</sup>

#### 4.2 Anger and Individuality

Another aspect that heightens the rational dimension of anger is that anger is the result of an individual or “personal” assessment of the whole situation. Two good places to examine Aquinas's treatment of this issue are *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 29, a. 6 and I-II, q. 46, a. 7 ad 3. In both places Aquinas compares the generic nature of hatred with the individual character of anger. The question proposed in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 29, a. 6 is whether a thing can be hated universally. Aquinas gives an affirmative answer to this, and contrasts this universal or generic aspect of hatred with the particular or individual

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<sup>112</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 7 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.298): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira, quamvis sit cum ratione, potest tamen etiam esse in brutis animalibus, quae ratione carent, inquantum naturali instinctu per imaginationem moventur ad aliquid simile operibus rationis. Sic igitur, cum in homine sit et ratio et imaginatio, dupliciter in homine potest motus irae insurgere. Uno modo, ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem. Et sic insurgit aliquis motus irae etiam ad res irracionales et inanimatas, secundum similitudinem illius motus qui est in animalibus contra quodlibet nocivum. Alio modo, ex ratione nuntiante laesionem. Et sic, ut philosophus dicit II *Rhetoric.*, *nullo modo potest esse ira ad res insensibiles, neque ad mortuos*. Tum quia non dolent, quod maxime quaerunt irati in eis quibus irascuntur. Tum etiam quia non est ad eos vindicta: cum eorum non sit iniuriam facere.”

<sup>113</sup> Mattison, “Christian Anger?,” 200.

aspect of anger. In *Sed contra*, quoting Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1382 a4-6),<sup>114</sup> Aquinas says that while hatred is directed to both general and particular things, anger can only be directed to a particular thing.<sup>115</sup>

The source of this difference is given in the *Corpus* of the same article. First, the two fold meaning of the word, “universal” (*universale*), must be distinguished. [1] First, “universal” can refer to the aspect of universality (*intentioni universalitati*).<sup>116</sup> [2] Second, it can refer to the nature to which such a universal aspect is attributed. Now taken in the first way, the sensitive powers cannot be called “universal.” This is because, being corporeal powers, the sensitive powers cannot obtain the universal. Next, taken in the second way, the sensitive powers can be called “universal.” For example, sight can be said to have “universal” perception in the sense that it perceives not just a particular colored thing but *any* colored thing. This does not, of course, mean that the sight perceives an abstract form of color devoid of individual matter, which would be taking “universal” in the first sense. Now according to Aquinas, the way we can have universal hatred towards something is analogous to the way the sense of sight has a universal perception. A good example of “universal hatred” is that the sheep hates the wolf *universally*. That is, the sheep hates not a particular wolf but any wolf. In a way, this hatred is inscribed into the nature of the sheep. In contrast to this, anger is always

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<sup>114</sup> Here Aristotle states that “anger is always concerned with individuals—Callias or Socrates—whereas hatred is directed also against classes.” The translation is from W. Rhys Roberts in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*.

<sup>115</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 29, a. 6 sc (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.207): “*Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira semper fit inter singularia odium autem etiam ad genera: furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque.*”

<sup>116</sup> The translation, “aspect of universality,” is from *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920.

directed to something particular, which implies the fact that an individual assessment has been conducted on the part of the angry person based on a particular injury done to him. Aquinas ascribes this “personal” characteristic of anger to the fact that anger is a response to an unjust *action* caused by someone else. Now since an action is always singular, a reaction to it must be also directed to a singular thing or an individual.<sup>117</sup>

In accordance with Aquinas in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 46, a. 7 ad 3, one can provide another piece of the explanation of the difference between hatred and anger. Here the different origin of the two passions may be pointed out. First, hatred arises when a quality is in discord with a person’s disposition. This discord can be found on two levels, individually or collectively. In other words, one can either hate a particular person for a certain quality or the whole group for the same quality. On the other hand, anger can only arise from an individual’s assessment of another individual: “How could *Lisa* look down upon *me* the other day?” Since actions are always the product of individuals, it is natural

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<sup>117</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 29, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.207-08): “Respondeo dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui: uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur: alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo. Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale: quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva. Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori in quantum est hic color, sed in quantum est color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, potest respicere aliquid in universali: quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit quod *ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere*. Sed odium secundum quod est in parte intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.”

The view that a person’s acts along with choices is directed to singulars are also found in *ST*, I-II, q. 9, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.77): “Ad secundum dicendum quod actus et electiones hominum sunt circa singularia. Unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis, habet magnam virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo, ut ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter, circa singularia.”

that anger be directed to the individual agents of deeds.<sup>118</sup> According to Aquinas, the generic nature of hatred is revealed by the fact that we can harbor hatred even without any harm or injury done to us. That is, we can hate someone just because we think of him in a certain way.<sup>119</sup> On the other hand, anger needs a personal dimension, as Miner explains with the following words:

Many things can be desired or sorrowed for. But such things are not initially objects of anger. I can regret that a valued colleague has decided to take a position at another university. But something else has to happen if I am to become angry. My colleague's action must rise to the level of a personal slight. Without this "elevation," I will not be angry, although I may be sorrowful. Similarly, a colleague may say something that I know to be directed against me personally.<sup>120</sup>

This individual characteristic of anger is poignant, especially when we think about how essential the conception of individuality is with respect to rational acts such as the exercise of choice. In fact, the whole discipline of ethics would collapse without this personal domain. By contrast, the universality of some passions, with the implication that every member of the same species reacts in a uniform way to external stimuli, will

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<sup>118</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 7 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.298): "Ad tertium dicendum quod Philosophus, in II *Rhetoric.*, assignat unam differentiam inter odium et iram, quod *odium potest esse ad aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus: sed ira non est nisi ad aliquod singulare.* Cuius ratio est, quia odium causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut dissonans nostrae dispositioni: et hoc potest esse vel in universali, vel in particulari. Sed ira causatur ex hoc quod aliquis nos laesit per suum actum. Actus autem omnes sunt singularium. Et ideo ira semper est circa aliquod singulare. Cum autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum singulare." In *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 6 c, Aquinas also says that actions are concerned with singulars which are here and now. *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.61): "... cum enim actus in singularibus sint, singulare autem, in quantum huiusmodi, est hic et nunc. . . ."

<sup>119</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 47, a. 1 sc (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.300): "Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II *Rhetoric.*, quod *ira fit semper ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum: si enim putemus talem esse odimus.*"

<sup>120</sup> Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passion*, 272.

remove the subject of those passions from the act of reason as well as moral obligations. In sum, the individual assessment implied in anger offers a valuable insight that we can have *personal* affective reactions to the external stimuli. In fact, we know this fact from our own experience: the same remark that was well received by one person may greatly annoy another. Also, this personal dimension is an important aspect that distinguishes the human passions from the animal passions.

### 4.3 *The Dual-dimension of Anger*

In the above I have argued for the close association of anger with reason. I will discuss in this section how anger can be a hindrance to the right judgment of reason, as we often experience in life. In fact, this dual aspect of anger leads many people to doubt the rationality of anger. After presenting the two facets of anger, I will discuss the main “culprit” of the problem of anger: the bodily “commotion” (*commotio*) caused by its material aspect.

Anger is a peculiar passion in that it both complies with and hinders the act of reason. According to Aquinas, this is due to the fact that anger has two distinct aspects: formal (*formale*) and material (*materiale*). Aquinas was well-aware of this apparent contradiction of anger, as he presents it in the first objection in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 48, a. 3: “Since anger works along with reason (*cum ratione*), it is contradictory to say

that it impedes reason.”<sup>121</sup> Aquinas’s answer to this objection is formulated in his hylomorphism, which is found in the *Summa theologiae* and the *De malo*. In both places Aquinas says that anger needs to be considered from its two distinct aspects of the formal and the material. In its formal aspect, anger refers to the appetitive part of the soul, in which sense anger is defined as “desire for revenge” (*appetitus vindictae*). In its material aspect, anger refers to the bodily commotion it creates and is defined as “firing up of the blood around the heart” (*accensio sanguinis circa cor*).<sup>122</sup> This means that anger starts out with its formal aspect, as it is listening (*audiens*) to the denunciation of reason. Accordingly, in its formal aspect, anger is an act of reason. However, in its material aspect, anger can hinder the act of reason by bringing about a bodily disturbance or commotion with the “heat” it produces.<sup>123</sup> Since the exercise of reason is not immune to the physiological state, an excessive physiological disturbance can impede the right judgment of reason.<sup>124</sup> What is interesting is that these two aspects of anger reveals its two contrary objects. Under its formal aspect, anger pursues a good, as it seeks to remedy the injustice. On the other hand, under its material aspect, anger pursues an evil, as it

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<sup>121</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 3 arg. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.305): “Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non impediatur rationem. Illud enim quod est cum ratione, non videtur esse rationis impedimentum. Sed ira est cum ratione, ut dicitur in VII *Ethic*. Ergo ira non impedit rationem.”

<sup>122</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.235: 150-58): “Vt ergo circa hoc quid sit uerius uideatur, considerandum est quod in ira sicut in qualibet alia passione duo possumus considerare: unum quod est quasi formale, aliud quod est quasi materiale. Formale quidem in ira est id quod est ex parte animae appetitiue, quod scilicet ira sit appetitus uindictae, materiale autem id quod pertinet ad commotionem corporalem, scilicet quod ira sit accensio sanguinis circa cor.”

<sup>123</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 3 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.306): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae est materialis in ira. Et quantum ad hoc, impedit iudicium rationis.”

<sup>124</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.306): “Respondeo dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato; necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediunt, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.”

tends to inflict harm on another person.<sup>125</sup> With this duality of anger, one may wonder whether anger is good or evil. For Aquinas, anger is good rather than evil, since it is more correct to judge a movement by its formal principle than its material principle.<sup>126</sup>

Let us briefly discuss the physiological change in conjunction with the passions. According to Aquinas, the physiological alteration which accompanies the passions is proportionate to the movement of the appetite.<sup>127</sup> That is, the appetite reacts with greater force when it is presented with what is contrary to it. Now anger is caused by the perception of an injury, which is considered a contrary. Hence, the angry person strives to repel the contrary with greater force through an intense desire for revenge. This intensity results in vehemence (*vehementia*) and impetuosity (*impetuositas*) in an angry person. Now the movement of anger is an action of pursuit (*insecutio*) rather than that of withdrawal (*retractio*), which is in accordance with the act of heat. This way anger

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<sup>125</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.238: 61-67): “Ira autem importat quidem appetitum alicuius mali, id est nocuenti quod querit inferre proximo non tamen appetit illud sub ratione mali set sub rationi boni quod est iustum uindicativum: propter hoc enim iratus querit alium ledere ut uindicet iniuriam sibi factam.”

<sup>126</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.238: 67-73): “Motus autem appetitivi magis diiudicantur secundum illud quod est formale in obiecto quam secundum id quod est materiale in ipso; unde magis est dicendum quod ira sit prosecutio boni quam quod sit prosecutio mali, quia id quod querit est malum materialiter sed bonum formaliter.”

<sup>127</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.305): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, corporalis transmutatio quae est in passionibus animae, proportionatur motui appetitus. Manifestum est autem quod quilibet appetitus, etiam naturalis, fortius tendit in id quod est sibi contrarium, si fuerit praesens: unde videmus quod aqua calefacta magis congelatur, quasi frigido vehementius in calidum agente. Motus autem appetitivus irae causatur ex aliqua iniuria illata, sicut ex quodam contrario iniacente. Et ideo appetitus potissime tendit ad repellendum iniuriam per appetitum vindictae: et ex hoc sequitur magna vehementia et impetuositas in motu irae. Et quia motus irae non est per modum retractionis, cui proportionatur frigus; sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus irae causativus cuiusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est instrumentum passionum animae. Et exinde est quod, propter magnam perturbationem cordis quae est in ira, maxime apparent in iratis indicia quaedam in exterioribus membris. Ut enim Gregorius dicit, in *V Moral.*, *irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpit, corpus tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquatur, ignorat.*”

creates heat (*calor*), which in turn creates fervor (*fervor*) around the heart. When the heart is disturbed by the movement of anger in this manner, it leads the angry person to engage in intense and volatile actions. In fact, according to Aquinas, anger can alter the physiological composition more than any other passions.<sup>128</sup>

For a better understanding of the physiological aspect of anger, let us look at how an angry person's experience of physiological alteration differs from that of a fearful person.<sup>129</sup> [1] First, fear generates cold (*frigiditas*) in a fearful person. And this cold causes a "high to low movement" (*motus a superioribus ad inferiora*), as its presence keeps the heat and spirits from gathering around the heart. When the heat and spirits become scarce around the heart, a person becomes low in action. As a symptom of this downward movement, a fearful person typically becomes withdrawn and sometimes even speechless. [2] On the other hand, anger, i.e., the intense desire for revenge, generates heat and keen spirits in an angry person. The presence of these heat and keen spirits causes a "low to high movement" (*motus ab inferioribus ad superiora*), an upward movement towards the heart. It is in such a physiological state that an angry person becomes prompt and brave in his action. As a side note, in medieval physiology, the heart was thought to play a crucial role with respect to the passions. Aquinas himself describes

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<sup>128</sup> *ST*, I-II, 48, 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol.6.306): "Unde ira, inter ceteras passiones, manifestius impedit iudicium rationis; secundum illud Psalmi xxx: *Conturbatus est in ira oculus meus.*"

<sup>129</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.283): "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in libro *de Problematibus*, licet in timentibus retrahantur spiritus ab exterioribus ad interiora, non tamen est idem motus spirituum in iratis et timentibus. Nam in iratis, propter calorem et subtilitatem spirituum, quae proveniunt ex appetitu vindictae, interius fit spirituum motus ab inferioribus ad superiora: et ideo congregantur spiritus et calor circa cor. Ex quo sequitur quod irati redduntur prompti et audaces ad invadendum. Sed in timentibus, propter frigiditatem ingrossantem, spiritus moventur a superioribus ad inferiora: quae quidem frigiditas contingit ex imaginatione defectus virtutis. Et ideo non multiplicantur calor et spiritus circa cor, sed magis a corde refugiunt. Et propter hoc, timentes non prompte invadunt, sed magis refugiunt."

the heart as “the instrument of the soul’s passions”<sup>130</sup> as well as “the starting point of any motion.”<sup>131</sup>

Interestingly, although fervor (*fervor*), an effect of anger, is a cause of physiological disturbance, not every fervor is destructive. In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 48, a. 2 Aquinas differentiates the fervor caused by anger (*fervor irae*) from that which is caused by love (*fervor amoris*).<sup>132</sup> While a person with the fervor of love exudes something sweet and mild, the one with the fervor of anger exhales bitterness to destroy someone. This difference is again ascribed to the distinct object of each passion: while love seeks the good it desires, anger, by contrast, seeks the evil of harming another person.

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<sup>130</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.305): “Et quia motus irae non est per modum retractionis, cui proportionatur frigus; sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus irae causativus cuiusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est instrumentum passionum animae.”

<sup>131</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.755: 213-21): “Unde secundum modum operationis eius statim disponitur organum corporale, scilicet cor, unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur: unde in ira fervet, et in timore quodammodo frigescit et constringitur. Et sic in appetitiva sensitiva sola, animalis passio proprie invenitur.”

<sup>132</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 48, a. 2 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.305): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod *amor ipse non ita sentitur, nisi cum eum prodit indigentia*, ut Augustinus dicit, in *X de Trin.* Et ideo quando homo patitur detrimentum amatae excellentiae propter iniuriam illatam, magis sentitur amor; et ideo ferventius cor mutatur ad removendum impedimentum rei amatae; ut sic fervor ipse amoris per iram crescat, et magis sentiatur. Et tamen fervor qui consequitur calorem, alia ratione pertinet ad amorem, et ad iram. Nam fervor amoris est cum quadam dulcedine et lenitate: est enim in bonum amatum. Et ideo assimilatur calori aeris et sanguinis: propter quod, sanguinei sunt magis amativi; et dicitur quod *cogit amare iecur*, in quo fit quaedam generatio sanguinis. Fervor autem irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum: quia tendit ad punitionem contrarii. Unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae: et propter hoc Damascenus dicit quod *procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et fellea nominatur.*”

#### 4.4 Anger and Sinfulness

Now that we have looked at the dual aspect of anger, let us briefly discuss anger in conjunction with sinfulness. The two good places to examine Aquinas's treatment of this issue are the *Summa theologiae* (II-II, q. 158, a. 4) and the *De malo* (q. 12, a. 2). My argument below is based mainly on these two texts. Absolutely speaking, it is sinful to pursue an evil. However, the case of anger is peculiar; an angry person pursues an evil under the aspect of good, i.e., restoring justice. For this reason, anger needs to be treated differently from relatively simple passions such as hatred, which pursues evil for the sake of evil. Aquinas makes this point by comparing anger with envy (*invidia*) and hatred (*odium*) in *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 158, a. 4. The question proposed here is whether anger is the most grievous sin. First, the inordinateness which causes the sinfulness of a certain passion can be considered under two aspects: [1] under the aspect of its undue object, and [2] under the aspect of its undue manner of having a particular passion. [1] As to the former, the object of a certain passion can be further considered under two aspects: [1-1] under the aspect of good, and [1-2] under the aspect of evil.

[1-1] Let us compare the evil aspect of each object of the three passions, anger, envy, and hatred. Both hatred and envy have self-centeredness or self-indulgence. A hateful person simply (*absolute*) wants evil for another person, and an envious person wants evil for another person because he is driven by his own glory. On the other hand, an angry person, although he wants evil for another person, does this under the aspect of justice. Now two things make a sin graver. First, it is more sinful to desire evil as an evil, which is the case regarding hatred. That is, as opposed to hatred which simply intends

harm, anger intends “the removal of harm,” as Mattison says.<sup>133</sup> Second, it is more sinful to desire evil on account of external goods such as honor, which is the case with envy. Accordingly, it is concluded that the sin of hatred is graver than the sin of envy, and the sin of envy is graver than the sin of anger.

[1-2] Next, let us compare the three passions under the good aspect of their objects. Whereas the object of hatred and envy is either pleasure or a useful good, the object of anger is justice, which is a higher good. Therefore, for this reason also, anger is less grievous than hatred and envy.

[2] Next, when the three passions are compared under the aspect of their inordinate manner, anger may be said to be the most inordinate. This is because, according to Aquinas, anger has some sort of “excellence” (*excellencia*) due to the vehemence and promptness of its movement.<sup>134</sup> This is an interesting point. Often anger is thought to be wicked due to the intensity and promptness exhibited in the action of an

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<sup>133</sup> Mattison, “Christian Anger?,” 237.

<sup>134</sup> *ST*, II-II, q. 158, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 10.276): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, inordinatio irae secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum indebitum appetibile, et secundum indebitum modum irascendi. Quantum igitur ad appetibile quod iratus appetit, videtur esse ira minimum peccatorum. Appetit enim ira malum poenae alicuius sub ratione boni quod est vindicta. Et ideo ex parte mali quod appetit, convenit peccatum irae cum illis peccatis quae appetunt malum proximi, puta cum invidia et odio: sed odium appetit absolute malum alicuius, in quantum huiusmodi; invidus autem appetit malum alterius propter appetitum propriae gloriae; sed iratus appetit malum alterius sub ratione iustae vindictae. Ex quo patet quod odium est gravius quam invidia, et invidia quam ira: quia peius est appetere malum sub ratione mali quam sub ratione boni; et peius est appetere malum sub ratione boni exterioris, quod est honor vel gloria, quam sub ratione rectitudinis iustitiae. Sed ex parte boni sub cuius ratione appetit iratus malum, convenit ira cum peccato concupiscentiae, quod tendit in aliquod bonum. Et quantum ad hoc etiam, absolute loquendo, peccatum irae videtur esse minus quam concupiscentiae: quanto melius est bonum iustitiae, quod appetit iratus, quam bonum delectabile vel utile, quod appetit concupiscentia. Unde Philosophus dicit, in VII *Ethic.*, quod *incontinens concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae*. Sed quantum ad inordinationem quae est secundum modum irascendi, ira habet quandam excellentiam, propter vehementiam et velocitatem sui motus: secundum illud *Proverb.* XXVII: *Ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor, et impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis poterit?* Unde Gregorius dicit, in V *Moral.*, *Irae suae stimulus accensum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti: ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquitur, ignorat.*”

angry person. However, it must be noted that this apparent violent manner through which anger is expressed does not necessarily mean that anger is a graver sin. In fact, this violent manner is due to its close association with the bodily disposition of the angry person.

It is worth reflecting, following Aquinas, why anger may be less grievous than hatred and envy. The main reason is that, although anger may be expressed in a rather aggressive manner, it is fundamentally directed to good rather than evil, which accords with reason. On the other hand, a passion that is displeased with another person's good, e.g., envy, is contrary to reason.<sup>135</sup>

For Aquinas, passions can be subject to morality so long as they are subject to the governance of reason. Since anger has an even closer association with reason, anger is more readily said to be morally good or evil. This view is behind Aquinas's sharp distinction of "zealous anger" (*ira per zelum*) and "vicious anger" (*ira per vitium*).<sup>136</sup> "Zealous anger" is the virtuous anger which pursues the due punishment in accordance with the dictate of reason. The good pursued in this case is a true good. On the other hand, the good pursued by "vicious anger" *appears* good but is not really good.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> *ST*, II-II, q. 158, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 10.272): "Quae quidem consideratur secundum obiectum passionis. Sicut invidia secundum suam speciem importat quoddam malum: est enim tristitia de bono aliorum, quod secundum se rationi repugnat."

<sup>136</sup> The translation, "zealous anger" and "vicious anger," is from Jean Oesterle (Aquinas, *On Evil*, trans. Jean Oesterle [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995], 379).

<sup>137</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.238: 73-91): "Quamuis autem omnis prosequitio mali sit mala, non tamen omnis prosequitio boni est bona, set oportet considerare an illud bonum sit uerum et simpliciter bonum uel magis sit apparens et secundum quid bonum: nam prosequitio eius quod est uere et simpliciter bonum est bona, sicut amor et concupiscentia sapientie et gaudium de ipsa, set prosequitio eius quod est bonum apparens et secundum quid, malum autem simpliciter et secundum rei ueritatem, est mala; sicut patet in gula et luxuria, in quibus uituperatur concupiscentia apparentis et non ueri boni. Sic igitur dicendum est in proposito quod si ira sit appetitus uindictae secundum quod uere est iusta, tunc ira erit bona

Aquinas enumerates the three occasions when one can be engaged in “vicious anger”: [1] when the angry person seeks an excessive punishment for revenge; [2] when the angry person bases his vengeance on his own authority, which does not accord with the law; and [3] when the angry person seeks vengeance with improper intentions.<sup>138</sup>

In fact, the occurrence of undue anger is not uncommon, and Aquinas ascribes this fact to the angry person’s failure to follow through regarding the dictates of reason. An angry person does start with reason, as he *judges* that an injury needs to be done to another person for a punishment. However, he does not fully listen to the dictates of reason, which leads him to fail in executing the alleged act of justice in the order measured by reason. In this sense, an angry person is compared to a servant who fails to listen thoroughly to the order of his master and fumbles his order.<sup>139</sup>

#### 4.5 *The Human Aspect of Anger*

In the previous section, I have discussed the dual aspect of anger. Despite the commotion caused by its material aspect, anger is still a passion closer to reason than other passions, as we have seen in the above. This close association of anger with reason in a way means that anger can be more readily habituated, since it listens to reason (see p.

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et uirtuosa, et uocatur ira per zelum; si autem sit uindictae que est apparens iusta et non uere iusta, sic ira est peccatum, quam Gregorius in V Moralium, uocat iram per uitium.”

<sup>138</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.238: 92-99): “Est autem uindicta sic desiderata apparens iusta propter praecedentem iniuriam quam ratio dictat esse uindicandam; non tamen est uere et simpliciter iusta, quia non seruatur debitus ordo iustitiae; quia forte aliquis querit maiorem uindictam quam debeat; uel quia querit se uindicare sua auctoritate cum hoc ei non liceat, uel quia querit uindictam non debito fine.”

<sup>139</sup> *De malo*, q. 12, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.238: 99-106): “Et ideo Philosophus dicit in VII Ethicorum quod iratus incipit quidem audire rationem, prout scilicet iudicat iniuriam esse uindicandam, non tamen perfecte audit eam quia non attendit ut sequatur rectum ordinem uindictae secundum quod ratio dictat; unde comparat iram ministris festinantibus exequi mandatum antequam totum audiant, et propter hoc offendunt.”

215). In this section I will focus on this human aspect of anger. In fact, in accordance with Aristotle, Aquinas presents two virtues which are specifically concerned with anger: meekness (*mansuetudo*) and clemency (*clementia*). My discussion of these virtues in conjunction with anger is important in that it will further reveal the activity and rationality of the human anger in contrast to the passive animal anger.

The starting point of my argument is whether anger can be validly discussed in the moral domain. This question is in line with Mattison's important question of whether the passions which have been habituated can still be regarded as "genuine" passions.<sup>140</sup> According to Aquinas, the co-existence of the sensitive appetite and rational faculties in the single human soul yields an affirmative answer to the above question. In fact, for him, the reason's government of the passions is not only possible but even "natural."<sup>141</sup>

Then how can we discuss anger in the moral domain? Since the passions are the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is a faculty that is non-rational yet one that can participate in reason, they can be validly discussed in the moral domain insofar as they participate in reason.<sup>142</sup> In a way, it would not be doing full justice to the human passions

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<sup>140</sup> Mattison, "Christian Anger?," 279.

<sup>141</sup> *ST*, III, q. 15, a. 2 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 11.187): "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inferiores vires pertinentes ad sensibilem appetitum, naturaliter sunt obedibiles rationi: non autem vires corporales, vel humorum corporalium, vel etiam ipsius animae vegetabilis, ut patet in I *Ethic*."

<sup>142</sup> This is originally from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (I. 12, 1102 b13-14). In I *Eth.*, 1. 20 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.1: 69-74) "Dicit ergo primo quod praeter nutritivam partem animae, videtur esse quaedam alia pars animae, irrationalis quidem sicut et nutritiva, sed aequaliter participans rationem, in quo differt a nutritiva, quae omnino est experta humanae virtutis, ut dictum est." *ST*, I-II, q. 56, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.359): "Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo secundum se, in quantum sunt partes appetitus sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum virtutis. Alio modo possunt considerari in quantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae, sic enim est principium humani actus, in quantum participat rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes. Quod enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet."

to treat them in isolation by excluding their vital context, i.e., the presence of other faculties in the soul. Now when an act is derived from two faculties in such a way that one faculty is moved by the other, its virtue consists in the conformity of the lower faculty to the higher.<sup>143</sup> Accordingly, virtuous anger is defined as the anger which is in accordance with the judgment of reason.

Now let us discuss the specific virtues regarding anger. The best place to find Aquinas's discussion of this issue is the *Secunda secundae pars* of the *Summa theologiae*. My discussion below will mainly draw on this text. The problem of anger can be traced to two sources. First, evil can be found in the internal passion of anger. This is the case where the desire of vengeance itself arises suddenly with a lot of force. This impetuosity or violent urge (*impetum*) is a quintessential characteristic of anger,<sup>144</sup> its major problem being that it can hinder, and even occasionally forestall, the judgment of reason. Second, the evil of anger can be found in the external action anger takes, i.e., punishment. This is the case where an angry person seeks an unduly severe punishment. Now, according to Aquinas, there are two special virtues that correspond to the above two cases: meekness and clemency. Meekness is directly concerned with the passion of anger itself, whereas clemency is directed to the external act of punishment.<sup>145</sup> Given the

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<sup>143</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 56, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.359): "Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit bene disposita ad actum. . . . Et quia bona dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem."

<sup>144</sup> *ST*, II-II, q. 158, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 10.276): "Sed quantum ad inordinationem quae est secundum modum irascendi, ira habet quandam excellentiam, propter vehementiam et velocitatem sui motus. . . ."

<sup>145</sup> *ST*, II-II, q. 157, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 10.271): "Nam ira, quam mitigat mansuetudo, propter suum impetum maxime impedit animum hominis ne libere iudicet veritatem. Et propter hoc, mansuetudo maxime facit hominem esse compotem sui: unde dicitur *Eccli. x: Fili, in mansuetudine serva animam tuam.*"

fact that these two virtues tend toward moderating the intensity of either the passion or the action, it is not surprising that these two virtues come under the umbrella of the virtue of temperance (*temperantia*), which consists in repressing (*refrenatio*) the desire of the pleasures of touch.<sup>146</sup>

Since meekness is a virtue that is directly concerned with the passion of anger itself, let us look at it more closely. Since Aquinas's view of meekness heavily draws on Aristotle, his commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* is a good place to look for his treatment of meekness. In Lecture 13 of Book 4, Aquinas refers to meekness as a mean for anger.<sup>147</sup> Since the mean is the virtuous middle point between two vicious extremes, looking at each one of the two extremes (i.e., a lack of anger and an excess of anger) will lead us to the nature of meekness.

First, we have the vice of a lack of anger. What is interesting here is that because the evil of anger usually originates from an excess of anger, it almost seems counter-intuitive that a lack of anger is a vice. Aquinas acknowledges the fact that due to its rare occurrence, a lack of anger has earned no explicit name.<sup>148</sup> However, for Aquinas a lack

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Quamvis concupiscentiae delectationum tactus sint turpiores, et magis continue infestent, propter quod temperantia magis ponitur virtus principalis, ut ex dictis patet. Clementia vero, in hoc quod diminuit poenas, maxime videtur accedere ad caritatem, quae est potissima virtutum, per quam bona operamur ad proximos et eorum mala impedimus.”

<sup>146</sup> *ST*, II-II, q. 157, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 10.269): “Clementia autem et mansuetudo similiter in quadam refrenatione consistit, quia scilicet clementia est diminutiva poenarum, mansuetudo vero est mitigativa irae, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo tam clementia quam mansuetudo adiunguntur temperantiae sicut virtuti principali. Et secundum hoc ponuntur partes ipsius.”

<sup>147</sup> Aquinas first addresses the confused use of the word “meekness.” *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.242: 15-18): “. . . nomen autem mansuetudinis assumitur ad significandum medium, cum tamen ex vi nominis magis declinet ad defectum irae. . . .”

<sup>148</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.242: 15-22): “. . . nomen autem mansuetudinis assumitur ad significandum medium, cum tamen ex vi nominis magis declinet ad defectum irae (dicitur enim aliquis

of anger or apathy (*inirascibilitas*) is clearly a moral deficiency.<sup>149</sup> That is, angerless life is not the road to a virtuous life. He gives three reasons for this. [1] First, for a moral agent to feel virtuous anger, he needs to be prudent. Inversely, if he does not get angry in a situation he should, it is indicative of his lack of prudence and wisdom.<sup>150</sup> [2] The second reason runs deeper. A person who does not get angry at all fails to let his sensitive appetite assist him carrying out the judgment of his reason. Of course, as Aquinas points out, this does not mean that one cannot execute one's rational judgment without passion. Rather the passions, as is particularly true in anger, prompt one to take action.<sup>151</sup> A more fundamental problem of the "idle" sensitive appetite is that it violates the principle that "nature does nothing in vain" (*natura nihil faciat frustra*),<sup>152</sup> as Mattison argues.<sup>153</sup> For Aquinas who has inherited Aristotle's teleological view, the passions must exist for a purpose. And at least in his Christian philosophy, this means that the passions are in

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mansuetus ex eo quod non irascitur quasi manu assuetus ad similitudinem bestiarum quae iracundiam deponunt manibus hominum assuetae), ipse etiam defectus inordinatus irae est innominatus. . . ."

<sup>149</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.243: 50-53): "Deinde cum dicit: *Peccare autem* etc., ostendit quid pertineat ad mansuetum secundum nominis proprietatem. Et dicit quod secundum hoc videtur magis peccare in hoc quod accedit ad defectum. . . ."

<sup>150</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.243: 70-82): "Omne quod pertinet ad insipientiam est vituperabile, quia laus virtutis est in hoc quod operatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae. Sed ad insipientiam videtur pertinere quod aliquis non irascatur in rebus in quibus oportet irasci et eo modo et tempore quo oportet irasci et quibus personis irasci oportet; manifestum est enim quod ira causatur ex tristitia, tristitia autem est sensus nocuenti, si igitur aliquis non irascitur in quibus oportet irasci, consequens est quod non doleat de eis et ita quod non sentiat ea esse mala, quod pertinet ad insipientiam. Patet ergo quod defectus irae est vituperabilis."

<sup>151</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.243: 84-93): "Ira enim est appetitus vindictae. Qui ergo non irascitur in quibus debet irasci, sequitur quod non vindicet ea quae debet vindicare, quod est vituperabile. Non est autem haec ratio sic intelligenda quasi non possit aliqua vindicta fieri ex iudicio rationis sine ira, sed quia motus irae excitatus ex iudicio rationis facit promptiorem ad recte vindicandum. Nisi enim appetitus sensitivus adiuvaret ad exequendum iudicium rationis, frustra esset in natura humana."

<sup>152</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* (l. 8, 1256 b20-22).

<sup>153</sup> Mattison, "Christian Anger?," 161-62.

service of reason. [3] Third, a lack of anger can lead one to overlook injustice and be lenient with wrongdoings.<sup>154</sup>

Next, with respect to the vice of excessive anger, which is far more common than a lack of anger, Aquinas gives another three examples to illustrate how an excessively angry person can deviate from the virtuous mean. [1] First, there are “the quick-tempered” (*iracundi*) who become angry at the slightest matter. Their anger may be concerned with the right matter, but it blows the severity of the matter out of proportion.<sup>155</sup> [2] Second, there are “the bitter” (*amari*) who harbor anger for an extensive period of time. Again, their anger may be about the right matter, but the duration of their anger is excessive.<sup>156</sup> [3] Third, there are “the difficult” (*difficiles* or *graves*) who are angry when there is absolutely no reason to be.<sup>157</sup> That is, they are angry about the wrong matter, at the wrong people, and for the wrong amount of time.

Aquinas’s explanation of the two vicious extremes leads us by way of elimination to the nature of the virtuous middle. The virtuous person is the one who is angry about the right matter, at the right people, and for the right amount of time. The inclusion of the

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<sup>154</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.243: 95-101): “Et dicit quod ad servilem animum pertinet quod aliquis despiciat familiares suos et quod sustineat iniuriantes sibi, ita scilicet quod non repellat iniurias debito modo. Hoc autem consequitur ex defectu irae, quia per hoc redditur homo piger et remissus ad repellendum iniurias. Unde patet quod defectus irae est vituperabilis.”

<sup>155</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.244: 130-36): “Circa quarum primam dicit quod illi qui dicuntur iracundi, id est prompti ad iram, velociter irascuntur et etiam quibus personis non oportet et in quibus rebus non oportet et vehementius quam oportet; non tamen multo tempore durat eorum ira, sed velociter ab ea requiescunt, et hoc est optimum in eis.”

<sup>156</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.244: 151-53): “Et dicit quod amari secundum iram dicuntur quorum ira difficile solvitur; et diu irascuntur, quia retinent iram in corde.”

<sup>157</sup> *In IV Eth.*, l. 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.2.244: 171-76): “Tertiam speciem ponit ibi: *Difficiles autem* etc. Et dicit quod illos dicimus difficiles sive graves qui irascuntur in quibus non oportet et magis quam oportet et pluri tempore quam oportet et non commutantur ab ira sine hoc quod crucient, vel puniant eos quibus irascuntur.”

treatment of anger in conjunction with meekness is important in light of the theme of this chapter. The existence of virtuous anger is a real possibility in human life, and it removes the human anger even more radically from the animal anger which is simply passive and violent. For Aquinas, anger mitigated by meekness makes human beings even more human. That is, episodes of anger do not necessarily degrade human beings. Rather, well-placed anger brings out humanity in a positive light. For Aquinas, this kind of virtuous anger is “natural” and “proper” for human beings, given “natural” temperament of human beings, which consists in meekness (*mansuetudo*). This mild temperament of human beings makes a sharp contrast with the “violent” nature of non-rational animals. This is why Aquinas says that non-rational animals exhibit a singular reaction in anger. Because they lack such a virtue as meekness which tempers anger, they are quickly moved to an extreme state in anger.<sup>158</sup>

### *Summary and reflection*

In this chapter I have investigated the peculiar character of the human passions focusing on their rational and active character. As starting point of my investigation, I have distinguished the sensitive apprehension and the sensitive appetite into the two

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<sup>158</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 46, a. 5 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.295-96): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in homine considerari potest et naturalis complexio ex parte corporis, quae est temperata; et ipsa ratio. Ex parte igitur complexionis corporalis, naturaliter homo, secundum suam speciem, est non habens superexcellenciam neque irae neque alicuius alterius passionis, propter temperamentum suae complexionis. Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad timorem, et sic de aliis. Ex parte vero rationis, est naturale homini et irasci et mansuetum esse, secundum quod ratio quodammodo causat iram, inquantum nuntiat causam irae; et quodammodo sedat iram, inquantum iratus *non totaliter audit imperium rationis*, ut supra dictum est.”

divisions of the higher and lower parts respectively, according to the Pseudo-Dionysian principle (“The highest point of a lower nature confines with the lowest point of a higher nature”). This distinction was necessary in order to bring out the connection between the passions and the higher powers of the soul.

First, I have discussed the two divisions in the sensitive apprehension: the imagination and the estimative power. Whereas the former is a power which properly belongs to the sensitive power, the latter is a power which participates in the higher powers. I have argued that the overall assessment of good or evil that animals conduct by the estimative power points to the fact that there is some cognitive dimension to the passions, and that, therefore, the extreme view that the passions are a blind affective reaction to the external stimuli should be rejected. Now this cognitive dimension to the passions is more evident in human beings due to the presence of reason. Unlike the animal estimative power, which is none other than natural instinct, the human cogitative power participates in the life of reason, which bestows human beings some flexibility in their response to external stimuli.

Next, I have discussed the two divisions in the sensitive appetite: the concupiscible and the irascible. The main reason that the irascible passions are closer to reason is that their object is not a simple good or evil but a good considered in the whole context of attaining it, which requires a higher kind of cognition. For this reason, a class of passions arises that would not occur if good or evil were considered in an absolute sense, especially in human beings. This again testifies to the fact that humans’ affective reactions to the external stimuli are not pre-determined by their nature.

In the last section, I have given a more in-depth treatment of the rational dimension of the irascible passions by focusing on anger as its superb example. Anger is a peculiar passion in that it basically seeks a good, although it wants evil for another person. Anger, which is driven by a sense of justice, differentiates itself from other simple passions which pursue evil for the sake of evil. I have also pointed out the important fact that anger can hinder the judgment of reason. As the main cause of this hindrance I have discussed the effect of the material aspect of anger: the physiological “commotion” (*concitatio*) in the soul.

My investigation of this chapter yields the conclusion that, although the passions originate in the sensitive powers, they can go beyond the sensitive level, due to their participation in higher powers of the soul. This aspect is more manifest in the irascible passions, especially, in anger. In light of such a high degree of rationality in anger, it makes a good sense why some people decide to participate in the so-called “anger management” sessions which are mainly designed to help grow the virtue that tempers anger, i.e., *mansuetudo*. Were it not for the shared implicit understanding that anger is a passion that can be “talked to” or “reasoned with,” this kind of workshop would not make sense. Again, this is why we can ask an angry person for his reasons, while we cannot a hungry person for his reasons, as Roberts says.<sup>159</sup> In sum, the presence of the rational faculties in human beings plays a crucial role in elevating the animal passions to the

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<sup>159</sup> Roberts, “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions,” 292.

“rationalized” passions.<sup>160</sup> In the forthcoming chapter, I will discuss the specific way and manner through which this elevation takes place in human beings.

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<sup>160</sup> I have borrowed the expression, “rationalized passions,” from Uffenheimer-Lippens in “Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality.”

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE ACTIVITY AND PARADOX OF THE RATIONALIZED PASSIONS**

### *Introduction*

In the previous chapter, I discussed the activity of the human passions as opposed to the passivity of the animal passions. What makes for the active character of the passions is the presence of rational powers in a human being. However, the passions that have been treated in the last chapter were the passions that arise prior to fully conscious judgment of reason. Although those passions have some degree of activity and rationality, which distinguishes them from the animal passions, passions can be still more active when they are permeated by the reason and will.

I will press the issue of the activity and rationality of the human passions even further in this chapter. My presentation will proceed in three parts. In the first part, I will briefly present Aquinas's anthropology, which is important background for the dynamic nature of the passions. Here I will show that that the interplay among the powers of the soul reflects the peculiar status of a human being as a being on the boundary between the two worlds of the spiritual and the corporeal. In the second part, I will focus on those passions that arise as a result of the judgment of the reason and the movement of the will, passions which are a unique phenomenon about human beings. These passions are called "consequent passions." Then in the last part, I will pay special attention to the

paradoxical nature of the passions, mainly by discussing how the human passions reflect the dual dimension of passivity and activity.

### *1 Peculiar Status of Human Beings*

How can the passions, whose origin is a passive animal power (the sensitive appetite), play an active role in human life? This active role is mainly due to the fact that human beings have a spiritual dimension which interacts with a sensitive dimension. In order to understand the interplay between these two dimensions, one needs to know Aquinas's distinct view of human beings. This knowledge will provide us with a useful framework for understanding the dynamic nature of the passions of the soul. After all, as Uffenheimer-Lippens aptly says, the "passions are not only an expression of Thomas's hylomorphism. They reflect his anthropological conception of man."<sup>1</sup>

According to Aquinas, a human being is a being that straddles the boundary between the corporeal and the spiritual. Verbeke neatly renders such a being as a "frontier being."<sup>2</sup> Aquinas's distinct anthropology is witnessed in his earlier work, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* where he says, "Man is kind of 'horizon' [*horizon*] and 'common boundary' [*confinium*] of the spiritual and corporeal natures, as if he

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<sup>1</sup> Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passions and Passionate Rationality," 546.

<sup>2</sup> Gerard Verbeke, "Man as a 'Frontier,'" in *Aquinas and Problems of His Time*, ed. G. Verbeke and D. Verhelst (The Hague: Martins Nijhoff, 1976), 197.

participates in the corporeal and the spiritual as some kind of ‘medium’ [*medium*] between the two.”<sup>3</sup>

The analysis of a human being into a composite of soul and body can clarify the status of a human being as a “frontier being.” Whereas through their intellect<sup>4</sup> human beings are in touch with the spiritual, with their body they are in touch with the corporeal. Aquinas explains this boundary position of a human being with the Pseudo-Dionysian principle in the *Summa contra Gentiles*.<sup>5</sup> Here he first brings out the notion of connectedness in the chain of being. Then he discusses the peculiar place of human beings in the universe:

Thus are we able to contemplate the marvelous connection of things. For it is always found that the lowest in the higher genus touches the highest of the lower species. Some of the lowest members of the animal kingdom, for instance, enjoy a form of life scarcely superior to that of plants; oysters,

<sup>3</sup> *In III Sent.*, Prol. (Moos ed., Vol. 3.2): “Ista flumina in aliis creaturis inveniuntur distincta; sed in homine inveniuntur quodammodo aggregata homo enim est quasi horizon et confinium spiritualis et corporalis naturae, ut quasi medium inter utrasque, bonitates participet et corporales et spirituales. . . .” See pp. 197-98 of Verbeke’s “Man as a ‘Frontier’” for his excellent explanation.

<sup>4</sup> As James Robb says, when Aquinas discusses the status of a human being as a frontier being, he uses the intellectual soul interchangeably with “human soul,” “rational soul,” and “possible intellect.” Thomas Aquinas, *The Questions on the Soul*, trans. James H. Robb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984), 23.

<sup>5</sup> The translation is from James Anderson. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. James F. Anderson. Book Two: Creation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). *SCG*, II, 68 (Leon. ed., Vol. 13.440:16-441:8): “Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest. Semper enim invenitur infimum supremi generis contingere supremum inferioris generis: sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt vitam plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt immobilia, et solum tactum habent, et terrae in modum plantarum adstringuntur; unde et beatus Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. *de Div. Nom.*, quod *divina sapientia coniungit fines superiorum principis inferiorum*. Est igitur accipere aliquid supremum in genere corporum, scilicet corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad infimum superioris generis, scilicet ad animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in genere intellectualium substantiarum, ut ex modo intelligendi percipi potest. Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam *horizon et confinium* corporeorum et incorporeorum, in quantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma. Non autem minus est aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et materia corporali quam ex forma ignis et eius materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum.”

which are motionless, have only the sense of touch and are fixed to the earth like plants. That is why Blessed Dionysius says in his work *On the Divine Names* that “divine wisdom has united the ends of higher things with the beginnings of the lower.” We have, therefore, to consider the existence of something supreme in the genus of bodies, namely, the human body harmoniously tempered, which is in contact with the lowest of the higher genus, namely, the human soul, which holds the lowest rank in the genus of intellectual substances, as can be seen from its mode of understanding; so that the intellectual soul is said to be on the horizon and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal, in that it is an incorporeal substance and yet the form of a body.

What is particularly interesting about the human composite is that the human body is the highest in the genus of the bodies, whereas the human soul is the lowest in the genus of the intellectual substances. This fact not only explains why human beings are at the *confinium* of the corporeal and the incorporeal but also raises the question whether the place of human beings needs to be explained by “an ascent from below or by a descent from above,” as Brezik asks.<sup>6</sup> Regardless of the answer to this important question, one should also note the important implication this question holds, namely, that human beings can bring themselves closer to either world, as Verbeke insightfully tells us by his thoughtful analysis of the notion of being in the middle (*medietas*).<sup>7</sup> This inherent “instability” of a frontier being, as opposed to the “stability” of the brute animals and

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<sup>6</sup> Victor B. Brezik, “The Descent of Man According to Thomas Aquinas,” *Thomistic Papers I*, ed. Victor B. Brezik (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1984), 98.

<sup>7</sup> Verbeke extends his discussion of the boundary status of human beings to ethics with the following words: “Ethical behaviour is also closely linked to the frontier position of man. Thomas, under Aristotle’s influence, treats the ethical attitude as a ‘medietas’, a central position between two extremes. With respect to the ‘medium’ Thomas writes that in a certain sense (quodammodo) it is in potency towards the extremities between which it lies: the medium is able to move in the direction of either one of the extremes. When this happens it ceases to be a medium, except in so far as it has still the potency to return to the central position. Not only virtue is a medium, but also man himself according to Aquinas: he is always on the brink of good and evil, of ethical and unethical.” Verbeke, “Man as a ‘Frontier,’” 222.

angels, is the basic condition of human life and accounts for the dynamic interplay between sensitive and intellectual powers.

This distinct view of a human being must be kept in mind when one reads Aquinas's later *Summa theologiae*, where he explains why human beings have diverse powers in the singular soul. He attributes this diversity to the fact that human beings are at the *confinium* of spiritual and corporeal creatures. As a result, he continues, the powers of both realms meet together in the human soul.<sup>8</sup> Here it is important to add that these powers are brought together in the *unity* of the single human soul. That is, they do not merely exist together; they interact with each other. Verbeke emphasizes the importance of this unity with the following words:

According to Thomas man is not an unnatural duality: of course, the two levels of reality are not identified with one another; the spiritual remains spiritual and the corporeal remains corporeal. The term "frontier" in this context signifies not so much a separation but rather a bond: it does signify a "difference" but also a unification. If man were not there, reality would be divided into two completely different separate spheres, but thanks to this existence everything is unified: the corporeal is no longer divided from the spiritual and vice versa. A being which is situated on the boundary between two worlds and which is not fixed in a particular position is able to develop in either of two directions, towards the upper level or the lower one: the ethos of such a being is therefore ambivalent, it is on the brink of time and eternity.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.240): "Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum: videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum."

<sup>9</sup> Verbeke, "Man as a 'Frontier,'" 195-96.

Aquinas's hylomorphic view of a human being, which asserts an "intimate" union of the two worlds, needs to be sharply distinguished from the views which tend to deny or diminish this close union.<sup>10</sup> One can think of two such positions. One of them is the reductionist view. Since nobody can really deny the existence of the human body, the real anti-hylomorphic view here would be "material reductionism."<sup>11</sup> The material reductionists believe that human beings are reduced to matter or material elements. According to Aquinas, Empedocles and Galen hold this position in that their "harmony theory" and "mixture theory," respectively, eventually reduce a human being to elemental qualities.<sup>12</sup> The other view is the Platonic and Cartesian dualism. Unlike the above material reductionism, this position does view a human being as a unity of soul and body. However, its view of the union of soul and body greatly differs from that of Aquinas's hylomorphism, which, borrowing Gilson's words, insists that "[t]he soul, being an integral part of the human composition, is constituted in its full natural perfection only by its union with the body."<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, the "union" of soul and body purported by Platonic and Cartesian dualism is extremely weak. Accordingly, these dualists deny that a

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<sup>10</sup> See Chapter three of this dissertation in which I discuss Aquinas's hylomorphism as a main topic.

<sup>11</sup> This is Pasnau's term. Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 95.

<sup>12</sup> *Quaes. disp. de an.* q. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 24-1.7:208-8:222): "Duobus igitur existentibus de ratione eius quod est hoc aliquid; quidam utrumque anime humane abstulerunt, dicentes animam esse harmoniam, ut Empedocles, aut complexionem, ut Galienus, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Sic enim anima neque per se poterit subsistere, neque erit aliquid completum in aliqua specie uel genere substantie; set erit forma tantum similis aliis materialibus formis. Set hac positio stare non potest. Nec quantum ad animam uegetabilem, cuius operationes oportet habere aliquod principium supergrediens qualitates passiuas et actiuas, que in nutriendo et in augendo se habent instrumentaliter tantum, ut probatur in II De anima; complexio autem et harmonia qualitates elementares non transcendunt." The contemporary physicalists would also belong to this group. They famously assert the view that "everything supervenes on the physical." Daniel Stoljar, "Physicalism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/physicalism/> (accessed June 25, 2009).

<sup>13</sup> Gilson, *The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 216.

single substance composes a human being but rather propose that the two distinct substances of soul (mind) and body compose a human being.<sup>14</sup> Aquinas critiques Plato's dualism by saying that his theory renders the soul as a mere "attachment" to the body, as if it were a garment on a human body or a sailor on a ship.<sup>15</sup>

The problem of the above anti-hylomorphic positions with respect to the passions is that they fail to provide a sufficient account for complex human behaviors derived from the close interplay between the corporeal and incorporeal powers in a human being. This failure is a great and unfortunate one, since this dynamism, as the vast amount of classical literature has shown, is so core to human life, creating all kinds of drama. This dynamism is absent in brute animals and angels. Indeed, no movement of human beings captures this dynamics more vividly than the passions. Pasnau and Shields endorse Aquinas's critique of Plato's dualism, using the example of complex passions such as anger:

Let a neutral observer focus on such human experiences as fear, high anger, embarrassment, and even such pedestrian perceptual experiences as the tasting of something bitter, or hotly spiced, or sweet. Each of these experiences clearly has both a psychic and a corporeal component. When deeply angered, when enraged, a man trembles, turns red, and in extreme cases even has difficulty forming words with his mouth. He also *feels*

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<sup>14</sup> Armand A. Maurer, "Descartes and Aquinas on the Unity of a Human Being: Revisited," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993), 500.

<sup>15</sup> *Quaes. disp. de an. q. 1 c* (Leon. ed., Vol. 24-1.8:260-9:268): "Set ulterius posuit Plato, quod anima humana non solum per se subsisteret, set quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei. Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, diffiniens hominem non aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, set animam corpore utentem, ut sit comparatio anime ad corpus sicut naute ad nauem, uel sicut induti ad uestem." It should be noted, however, that the analogy of a captain and his ship is not found in any of Plato's works. One may theorize that this analogy was introduced by later philosophers as an aid to explain Plato's position and later falsely understood as Plato's. This kind of "distortion" is attributable to the "indirect tradition" of Plato during the Middle Ages, as I have noted earlier on p. 9.

slighted, regards himself as having been treated unjustly, or *understands* himself to have been cruelly deceived. For Aquinas, trembling and feeling slighted are equally, and ineliminably, features of human anger. Anger is common to soul and body. The subject of anger is plainly the human being; since anger is both psychic and corporeal, however, the human being must be both—it must be, as hylomorphism insists, a compound of soul and body. No soul could tremble, because no soul, even according to Plato, is a body. So, Aquinas infers, it is only by ignoring the manifest data of our lived lives that a Platonic dualist is able to pretend that a human being is really a soul and not an ensouled body.<sup>16</sup>

The interaction between the corporeal and incorporeal in the unity of a human being can account for the seemingly paradoxical nature of the human passions: although the passions have their origin in a passive animal power (the sensitive appetite), unlike in other animals, they can become rational and active due to their interaction with the rational powers in the soul. For this reason, Uffenheimer-Lippens aptly calls the sensitive appetite, i.e., the seat of the passions, the “crossroad between body and soul.”<sup>17</sup> Understandably, those passions that are “baptized” by reason are only found in human beings, whereas the “raw” passions, namely, those impulsive passions which arise prior to the intervention of reason, are common to brute animals and human beings. Sometimes we experience both kinds of passions one after the other. For example, I can get angry at a cashier who snaps at me but later, reflecting on the whole situation (“I did not do anything wrong to her; she must have been stressed out after a long day of dealing with so many customers.”), I may even feel compassion towards her.<sup>18</sup> Gondreau calls this

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<sup>16</sup> Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, *The Philosophy of Aquinas* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2004), 163-64.

<sup>17</sup> Uffenheimer-Lippens, “Rationalized Passions and Passionate Rationality,” 538.

<sup>18</sup> This example was inspired by Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility,” 179.

phenomenon of the integration of the passions in the life of reason “participated psychology” and emphasizes the significance of the interplay between the sensitive appetite and higher powers of the soul with the following words:

What Aquinas’s anthropology promotes, in other words, is what we could term a “participated psychology.” In his view an intimate synergy and interpenetrability exist between the emotions and reason and will, making the emotions not merely ‘animal-like’ acts but genuine *human* acts. After all, the sensitive appetite forms part of the larger whole which is the human being. We are rational even in our bodies, in our eyes, in our muscles, in that which is biochemical in us. . . .<sup>19</sup>

Bearing Aquinas’s overall anthropology in mind, let us look at the powers of the soul, which will help us explain the elevated status of the passions in human beings. First of all, the transformation of the passions is possible in human beings due to their co-existence with the higher powers of the soul. I will explain this rational penetration into the passions with Aquinas’s two key concepts: [1] the interaction among the powers of the soul, and [2] the hierarchy among the powers of the soul.

[1] Let us first discuss the interaction among the powers of the soul. I will mainly present Aquinas’s discussion in the *De veritate* since his presentation on this issue is more systematic in this text. Let us first look at *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 11. The question proposed in this article is whether the human mind can in this life see God through His essence. The third objection argues that it is possible, as it was possible in Christ who

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<sup>19</sup> Paul Gondreau, “The Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the Originality of Aquinas,” *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 425.

was also human.<sup>20</sup> Aquinas answers this question by comparing the interaction among the powers in Christ's soul with that of other human beings. In Christ, the human nature was under His control, an important implication of which is that in Him the higher powers did not have to be affected by the lower powers, unless He willed to. However, Aquinas continues, this is not the case of us mere human beings, "in whom there is some necessary diffusion from the higher powers to the lower and in whom the higher powers are drawn down by the strong passions of the lower powers."<sup>21</sup>

Later in *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 10 c, Aquinas presents a more detailed discussion of the interaction among the powers of the soul. The question proposed in this article is whether it is true that the passion of pain (*dolor*) which was in Christ's higher reason was impeded by the joy of fruition, and also the converse. Here Aquinas presents the interaction among the powers of the soul again, along with two other kinds of conjunctions in a human being: [a] a conjunction of the higher powers of the soul with the lower; [b] a conjunction of the soul and body in one existence of the whole composite; and [c] a conjunction of all the powers of the soul in one essence of the soul.

<sup>20</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 11 arg. 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.334:19-24): "Praeterea, Christus habuit intellectum eiusdem naturae sicut nos habemus; sed status viae non impediēbat intellectum eius quin Deum per essentiam videret; ergo et nos in statu viae Deum per essentiam videre possumus."

<sup>21</sup> This is James McGlynn's translation. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth*, trans. James V. McGlynn. Vol. 2 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), 63. *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 11 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-2.337:230-46): "Ad tertium dicendum quod in Christo hoc fuit singulare ut esset simul viator et comprehensor, quod ei competeat ex hoc quod erat Deus et homo; unde in eius potestate erant omnia quae ad humanam naturam spectabant, ut unaquaeque vis animae et corporis afficeretur secundum quod ipse disponebat. Unde nec dolor corporis contemplationem mentis impediēbat nec fruitio mentis dolorem corporis minuebat, et sic intellectus eius, luce gloriae illustratus Deum per essentiam videbat ut tamen ad inferiores partes gloria non derivaretur, et sic simul erat viator et comprehensor; quod de aliis dici non potest in quibus ex superioribus viribus de necessitate redundat aliquid in inferiores et a passionibus vehementibus inferiorum virium superiores trahuntur." A similar statement is found in *Quaes. disp. de an.* a. 4 arg. 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 24-1.31:7-12): "Potentie quae radicanur in una essentia anime, compatiuntur sibi inuicem. Vnde ex motu facto in potentia sensitiva relinquitur aliquid in ymaginatione; nam fantasia est motus a sensu factus secundum actum, sicut dicitur in III De anima."

The common thread behind these conjunctions is the fact that the seemingly distinct parts of the soul interact with each other and form a unity. Following the lead of Aquinas, let us look at the first two kinds of conjunctions. First, consider the conjunction of the soul and body. The interaction between the soul and body can take place in two ways. First, there is the “overflow” from the soul into the body. This happens when the apprehension of the soul is so strong that it alters the composition of the body. When the influence is really potent, it can even bring death to the body. For example, a person who is gripped by the miserable thought of his sin can lose health and even die. Next, there can be the “overflow” from the body into the soul. For example, one has difficulty concentrating on his study after his vigorous exercise.

Let us now look at the interaction between the higher and lower powers. Since an intellectual power is higher than a sensitive power,<sup>22</sup> one should really take this as a specification of the former kind of interaction, i.e., the interaction between the soul and body. Interestingly, Aquinas uses the relationship between the passions and reason to explain this interaction. Here again, the interaction takes place in two ways. First, there is the overflow from the higher power into the lower. For example, as a result of the strong conviction of the goodness of God, a passion of love may arise in a human being. Then there is an inverse overflow from the lower power into the higher. For example, one may

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<sup>22</sup> *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.243): “Respondeo dicendum quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse. . . . Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis: unde dirigunt eas, et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae.”

decide to not follow his healthy diet, driven by his strong desire to eat a greasy hamburger.<sup>23</sup>

[2] Let us now discuss the rational penetration of the passions from the perspective of the hierarchy among the powers of the soul. Aquinas did not hold an “egalitarian” view of the powers of the soul. For him it is crucial to recognize the “natural order” among the powers of the soul. In *Sentencia libri De anima*, III, l. 16, Aquinas makes it clear that the term “overflow” is used more properly when it refers to the movement from the higher to the lower than the other way round. He says that it is more “natural” (*naturalis*) for a higher power to move the lower, just as it is more natural for the higher sphere to move the lower.<sup>24</sup> In fact, he says, for a lower power to move the higher is against nature (*praeter ordinem naturalem*).<sup>25</sup> It is important to keep in mind

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<sup>23</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 10 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.784:162-91): “Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod secundum naturae ordinem, propter colligantiam virium animae in una essentia, et animae et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus invicem in se effluunt quod in aliquo eorum superabundat; et inde est quod ex apprehensione animae transmutatur corpus secundum calorem et frigus, et quandoque usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem, et usque ad mortem; contingit enim aliquem ex gaudio vel tristitia vel amore mortem incurrere. . . . et similiter est e converso, quod transmutatio corporis in animam redundat. Anima enim coniuncta corpori eius complexiones imitatur secundum amentiam vel docilitatem et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in libro Sex principiorum. Similiter etiam ex viribus superioribus fit redundantia in inferiores, ut cum ad motum voluntatis intensum sequitur passio in sensuali appetitu, et ex intensa contemplatione retrahuntur vel impediuntur vires animales a suis actibus; et e converso ex viribus inferioribus fit redundantia in superiores; ut cum ex vehementia passionum in sensuali appetitu existentium obtenebratur ratio, ut iudicet quasi simpliciter bonum id circa quod homo per passionem afficitur.”

<sup>24</sup> In the same vein, Aquinas says that anger serving the reason is “natural” in *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.236:255-57): “Ad secundum dicendum quod ira predominans rationi non est naturalis homini, set naturale est ei ut ira rationi deseruiat.”

<sup>25</sup> *In III De an.*, l. 16 (Leon. ed., Vol. 45-1.251:108-22): “Et iste est naturalis ordo ut superior appetitus moueat inferiorem, quia etiam in corporibus caelestibus naturaliter sphaera superior *principalior est et mouet* inferiorem, ita quod inferior *mouetur tribus* motibus localibus (sicut sphaera Saturni mouetur et motu diurno, qui est super polos mundi, et motu contrario, qui est super polos zodiaci, et preter hoc motu proprio); et similiter appetitus inferior, etsi aliquid de motu proprio retineat, mouetur tamen naturali ordine motu appetitus superioris, et motu rationis deliberantis. Si autem e conuerso accidit, quod appetitus superior transmouetur ab inferiori, est preter ordinem naturalem; unde et hoc facit peccatum in moribus, sicut peccata sunt monstra in natura.”

here that for Aquinas to be natural means to be in accordance with the right order of things.

Let us look at his treatment of the same issue in his later work, *Summa theologiae*. In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 77, a. 3 c, Aquinas says that it is natural for the rational power to move the lower powers, e.g., the sensitive powers. For this reason he says that the reason is the “ruling power of the soul.”<sup>26</sup> Then, later, in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 77, a. 4 c, he fully discusses the question whether there is an order among the powers of the soul. His affirmative conclusion is reached by the following argument. The diverse powers in a human being originate from the singular soul. When a number of things originate from one thing, there must be an order among them. This is true with the diverse powers of the soul: there is an order among the powers of the soul. Now a three-fold order is found among the powers of the soul: (1) the order in terms of time and generation; (2) the order with respect to the objects; and (3) the order of nature. The last one is most relevant to our present discussion. According to Aquinas, it pertains to the order of nature for a more perfect thing to lead a less perfect thing. This way we have a hierarchy of lives in the sequence of the intellectual, the sensitive and the vegetative. That is, the intellectual powers naturally “direct and command” (*dirigunt et imperant*) the sensitive powers, whereas the sensitive powers naturally direct and command the vegetative powers.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 7.65): “Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae.”

<sup>27</sup> *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.243): “Respondeo dicendum quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae

Let us now reflect on the issue of the interaction among the powers of the soul. One may say that the conjunction of diverse powers to one soul is a miniature manifestation of the Pseudo-Dionysian principle. (Chapter 4, p. 158.) The Pseudo-Dionysian principle yields the fact that all the creatures are connected to one another in such a way that the upper end of a lower being touches the lower end of a higher being.<sup>28</sup> An analogous connection between the higher and lower beings is found *within* the soul: the lower powers of the soul participate in the higher powers. Aquinas explains the basis of this participation with the term, “overflow” (*redundantia*).

The fact that the sensitive appetite interacts with other powers in human beings implies that the treatment of the sensitive appetite is not complete or adequate without considering its interaction with other powers in the soul. As Harak rightly cautions, Aquinas’s own distinction when he introduces the topic of the passions and morality should not mislead us here.<sup>29</sup> According to Aquinas, the passions can be considered under

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ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera: tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem obiectorum. Dependuntia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venit. Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis: unde dirigunt eas, et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in via generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae: unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum autem ordinem tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem, scilicet visus, auditus et olfactus. Nam visibile est prius naturaliter: quia est commune superioribus et inferioribus corporibus. Sonus autem audibilis fit in aere, qui est naturaliter prior commixtione elementorum, quam consequitur odor.” In a similar manner, Aquinas introduces two kinds of order among the powers of the soul in *Quaest. disp. de an.* a. 13 ad 10 (Leon. ed., Vol. 24-1.241:432-36): “Ad decimum dicendum quod ordo potentiarum anime est secundum ordinem obiectorum. Set utrobique potest attendi ordo uel secundum perfectionem, et sic intellectus est prior sensu; uel secundum generationis uiam, et sic. . . .” Here, the first kind corresponds to the “order of nature” in *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 4 c.

<sup>28</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII (PG 3: 871).

<sup>29</sup> Harak, *Virtuous Passions*, 90.

the following two aspects: in themselves and according as they participate in the reason and will. In the latter case, the passions are morally praised or blamed.<sup>30</sup> However, it is important to know that Aquinas is not suggesting with the former case that the passions can be adequately treated in themselves apart from their interaction with the higher powers of the soul. This is why it is true that, according to Aquinas, we are responsible for our passions more than we typically think, even often when the passions arise prior to our judgment of reason.<sup>31</sup>

The fact that the powers of the soul interact with each other enables the passions to go beyond their animal origin. That is, they can “imitate” rationality. Two things need to be pointed out in this regard. First, although human beings share the passions with other animals, because the human passions are conjoined with the reason, they have some kind of excellence (*excellencia*) in human beings.<sup>32</sup> This excellence corresponds to the replacement of the estimative power in a human being by a superior sensitive apprehensive power, namely, the cogitative power.<sup>33</sup> Second, the human passions, despite their animal origin, can be called “rational” because of their participation in rational

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<sup>30</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 24, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.179): “Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale.”

<sup>31</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.123): “Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis: quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset.”

<sup>32</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 74, a. 3 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 7.37): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur: sicut nos, prae aliis animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et reminiscentiam, ut in Primo dictum est. Et per hunc modum etiam appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi. Et quantum ad hoc, potest esse principium actus voluntarii; et per consequens subiectum peccati.”

<sup>33</sup> *ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.256), cited above in footnote 412.

powers.<sup>34</sup> In *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, I, l. 20, Aquinas says that the sensitive appetite, although it is not essentially rational (*rationale per essentiam*<sup>35</sup> or *rationale essentialiter*), it can be called rational by participation (*rationale per participationem*).<sup>36</sup> In fact, he says that the sensitive appetite can be *both* rational and irrational. He contrasts the dual dimension of rationality and irrationality of the sensitive appetite to the single dimension of rationality or irrationality found in the reason and the vegetative powers.

In this sense, it is more correct to call those passions that participate in reason and will “rationalized passions” rather than “rational passions.” According to Aquinas, rational desire and sensuous desire (*concupiscentia*) are distinct from one another.<sup>37</sup>

Whereas the object of the former is an intelligible good (*bonum rationis*), that of the latter

<sup>34</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 24, a. 1 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.179): “Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur rationales, secundum quod *participant aliquantulum rationem*, ut dicitur in *I Ethic.*”

<sup>35</sup> Aquinas often uses the expression “rationale per essentiam” in his *commentary on the Sentences*. For example, we have in *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4 qc. 2 s.c. 1 (Moos ed., Vol. 3.1060): “Sed contra, Philosophus in *I Eth.* (a13. 1103<sup>a</sup>, 20-22; l.20 k), distinguit virtutes morales et intellectuales; et morales distinguit secundum rationale per essentiam et per participationem. Sed rationale per participationem est in irascibili et concupiscibili. Ergo etc.”

<sup>36</sup> *In I Eth.*, l. 20 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.1.73:169-83): “Deinde cum dicit: *Si autem oportet et hoc etc.*, subdividit alium membrum divisionis primae, scilicet rationalem animae partem. Et dicit quod si oportet dicere illam partem animae quae participat ratione esse aliquantulum rationale, duplex erit rationale: unum quidem sicut principaliter et in seipso rationem habens, quod est essentialiter rationale; aliud autem est quod est natum obedire rationi sicut et patri, et hoc dicimus rationale per participationem. Et secundum hoc, unum membrum continetur et sub rationali et irrationali: est enim aliquid irrationale tantum, sicut pars animae nutritiva; quaedam vero est rationalis tantum, sicut ipse intellectus et ratio; quaedam vero est secundum se quidem irrationalis, participative autem rationalis.” See also *In I Eth.*, l. 10 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.1.36:107-10): “Sed rationale est duplex: unum quidem participative, in quantum scilicet persuadetur et regulatur a ratione; aliud vero est rationale essentialiter, quod scilicet habet ex seipso ratiocinari et intelligere; et . . .” Uffenheimer-Lippens discusses this in “Rationalized Passions and Passionate Rationality.” See p. 542.

<sup>37</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 30, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.209): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in *I Rhetoric.*, *concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis*. Est autem duplex delectatio, ut infra dicitur: una quae est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum. Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem est animae et corporis: quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus: ut ipsum nomen concupiscentiae sonat. Unde *concupiscentia*, proprie loquendo, est in appetitu sensitivo; et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea denominatur.”

is a sensible good (*bonum secundum sensum*). Accordingly, rational desire pertains to the soul only while sensuous desire pertains to the composite of soul and body. However, sometimes rational desire is called “concupiscence” either because it bears similarity (*similitudo*) to sensuous desire or because the intensity of the rational appetite overflows into the sensitive appetite.<sup>38</sup> Here it is important to note that, although the sensitive appetite is not essentially rational but only to the extent of its participation in reason, it can still remove itself from the sensitive appetite of other animals. That is, its movement is more excellent than the one in other animals, as I said above. Accordingly, Aquinas says that human beings are distinguished from other animals not only by that which is rational per se but also by that which is rational by participation.<sup>39</sup>

So far I have discussed the important background needed to understand Aquinas’s treatment of the human passions: his hylomorphic anthropology and the dynamic interplay among the powers of the soul. In the next part, I will discuss a specific product of this interplay, namely, consequent passions, which are uniquely human passions.

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<sup>38</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 30, a. 1 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6. 209): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quamdam: vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur: *Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum.*”

<sup>39</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 2 ad 4 (Moos ed., Vol. 3.1064): “Ad quartum dicendum quod homo distinguitur a brutis non solum in eo quod est rationale essentialiter, sed etiam in eo quod est *rationale per participationem.*”

## *2 Consequent Passions*

In the previous section, I have discussed the peculiar state of a human being as a “frontier being.” I have also pointed out that this fact is shown in the interaction between diverse powers of the soul. Through this interaction the passions can be more active, rational, and human. In this section, I will investigate the subject of the rational permeation in the passions more specifically. Aquinas deals with this issue in a number of places. Here I will mainly use two texts, *De veritate* and *Summa theologiae*, since Aquinas’s treatment of the issue is the most comprehensive in these two works.

First of all, “rationalized passions” can be characterized as those passions which have been made to conform to the judgment of the reason. According to Aquinas, these reason-abiding passions are what is “natural” in the moral order, just as a heavy weight falling down to the ground is natural in the natural (physical) order.<sup>40</sup> Now let us think about the significance of the rationalized passions. Let us look at *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 24, a. 3 c where Aquinas, in his critique of the Stoics’ limited view of the passions, presents the refreshing possibility that the (rationalized) passions contribute to one’s moral life. First of all, human beings are distinguished from other animals by rationality. This means that human good must be ultimately considered in its relation to the reason. An important corollary of this statement is that we become more properly human if we let

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<sup>40</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 34, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.235): “Sicut igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut cum grave quiescit sursum: ita et in moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei.”

“what is distinctive of human” (*quod est proprium homini*),<sup>41</sup> namely, the reason, extend to the non-rational parts which we share with other animals, e.g., the sensitive appetite. The “expansion” of reason is possible in human beings because the powers of the soul operate, not in isolation, but in conjunction with other powers, often synergistically, as we have seen above. Aquinas suggests two cases as examples of the extended application of the reason in human life. First, we can let the bodily members obey the reason. (We observe a lack of this in little children.) Second, we can let our affective state be permeated by the reason.<sup>42</sup>

In order to understand rationalized passions better, we need to know the distinction Aquinas makes between the antecedent passions and the consequent passions. Here Aquinas is distinguishing the passions with respect to whether they precede or follow the judgment of reason. The terms “antecedent” and “consequent” denote the sequence of the two psychological events, namely, when the passions arise in relation to the judgment of reason. What makes the sequence important is that this sequence determines whether the passions or the rational powers take the initiative in their interplay. Let us look at each kind of passion more carefully.

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<sup>41</sup> *In I Eth.*, l. 20 (Leon. ed., Vol. 47.71:31-34): “Humanum enim dicimus, quod est proprium homini; si ergo haec pars animae maxime est communis, consequens est quod non sit humana.”

<sup>42</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 24, a. 3 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.181): “Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae homini conveniunt, derivari potest.” Richard Mansfield gives a similar argument. Richard Mansfield, “Antecedent Passions and the Moral Quality of Human Acts,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71 (suppl. 1997): 225.

### 2.1 Antecedent Passions

Let us first discuss antecedent passions. When the passions arise prior to the judgment of the reason, they are called “antecedent passions.” What accounts for a possible deficiency in “antecedent” passions for Aquinas is that, because they precede the judgment of reason, they do not get a chance to be “tempered” by rational powers, which explains why antecedent passions are usually impulsive.<sup>43</sup>

Antecedent passions can influence the reason and will. Aquinas uses such terms as “move,” “draw,” or “pull” to describe the passion’s influence on the will.<sup>44</sup> Aquinas says that the passions can arouse the act of the will in two ways. [1] First, they can stir up the will directly (*per se*). Passion’s influence is direct here because the passion sets the will upon the same object as that of the passion. For example, a person by virtue of his desire to use a drug wills to pursue it. When a person’s will is directly influenced by a passion, he is often attracted to something which he would not really find appealing in his tranquil state of mind.<sup>45</sup> [2] Second, passion can arouse an act of the will indirectly (*per*

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<sup>43</sup> I am borrowing the expression “tempered” from Giuseppe Butera in his Ph. D. dissertation “Thomas Aquinas on Reason’s Control of the Passions in the Virtue of Temperance” (The Catholic University of America, 2001).

<sup>44</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 7.67): (My bold type) “Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi arbitrii, quod est *facultas voluntatis et rationis*. Passio autem est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi **trahit** vel **inclinat** rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est.”

<sup>45</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 9, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.77): “Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti: sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto. Et per hunc modum, ex parte obiecti, appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.” The idea of “tranquility of mind” is from *De malo*, q. 12, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.235:206-236:213): “Secundo non consideraverunt quod ira et alie huiusmodi passionem dupliciter se possunt habere ad iudicium rationis: uno modo antecedenter, et sic necesse est ut semper ira et omnis huiusmodi passio iudicium rationis impediatur, quia anima maxime iudicare veritatem in tranquillitate quadam mentis; unde Philosophus etiam dicit quod in quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens.” Of course, passion’s direct movement of the will is only half of

*accidens*). Here passion's influence on the will is indirect in the sense that it makes the person will to fight the passion and pursue the contrary of the passion's object.<sup>46</sup> In the above example, the same person being aware of his desire to use a drug, musters his willpower with great effort to counteract the urge.

One may ask here how a lower power, e.g., the sensitive appetite, can have an upper hand over a higher power, e.g., the will, when the higher power "naturally commands" the lower power. As I said earlier, the immaterial power's command of the material power is not absolute because the latter, being a corporeal power, has "something of its own." (Chapter 4, p. 186.) Furthermore, a person can be attracted to a good that is not endorsed by his reason in a "particular" situation, since reason and will, being immaterial powers, cannot directly concern themselves with a particular case in which a particular good is pursued. (Chapter 4, p. 183)

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the story when it comes to the interaction between the two powers, as my next section discusses. Regarding a passion directly moving the will Aquinas says in *De malo*, q. 6 c that the will can reject such a passion. Here he clearly states that, although the will can be moved by the passion in terms of object, it can still resist the passion. Contrasting a "natural disposition" (*dispositio naturalis*) to a disposition subject to the will, such as the ones brought about by a habit (*habitus*) and a passion (*passio*), Aquinas says that, although a person may initially find something good under a certain aspect, he can "remove" (*removere*) the disposition so that the good may no longer appear good to him. *De malo*, q. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 23.150:468-85): "Si igitur dispositio per quam alicui uidetur aliquid bonum et conueniens fuerit naturalis et non subiacens uoluntati, ex necessitate naturali uoluntas praeeligit illud, sicut omnes homines naturaliter desiderant esse, uiuere et intelligere. Si autem sit talis dispositio que non sit naturalis, sed subiacens uoluntati, puta cum aliquid disponitur per habitum uel passionem ad hoc quod sibi uideatur aliquid uel bonum uel malum in hoc particulari, non ex necessitate mouetur uoluntas: quia poterit hanc dispositionem remouere, ut sibi non uideatur aliquid sic, ut scilicet cum aliquis quietat in se iram, ut non iudicet de aliquo tamquam iratus. Facilius tamen remouetur passio quam habitus. Sic igitur quantum ad aliqua uoluntas ex necessitate mouetur ex parte obiecti, non autem quantum ad omnia; set ex parte exercitii actus non ex necessitate mouetur."

<sup>46</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.768:203-769:215): "Secundo prout passio aliqua excitat uoluntatem uel intendit eam; quod dupliciter accidere potest, uel per se uel per accidens; per se quidem quando passio excitat uoluntatem ad id quod est sibi consimile, sicut cum ex concupiscentia uoluntas inclinatur ad consentiendum concupiscibili, ex ira ad uolendum uindictam, per accidens uero, quando passio per quamdam occasionem excitat uoluntatem ad contrarium, sicut in casto homine, quando insurgit passio concupiscentiae, uoluntas cum maiori conatu resistit; circa difficilia enim magis conamur."

## 2.2 Consequent Passions

When the passions arise as a result of the judgment of reason, they are called “consequent passions.” They are also a result of an act of the will, since the will is moved by the apprehension of the reason. For this reason, when Aquinas discusses the will he often refers to both the reason and will.<sup>47</sup> Aquinas divides consequent passions into the following two kinds: those that are elicited by choice and those that result from the “overflow” of the higher powers. I will discuss each one carefully below.

### 2.2.1 Consequent Passions Elicited by Choice.

Let us first discuss consequent passions that are elicited by choice. Here the passions are willed as the object of the will.<sup>48</sup> That is, someone who is determined to take action wills to have a passion so that he can carry out his action more easily and promptly with the assistance of his passion.<sup>49</sup> For example, in order to do something about the widespread injustice in society, I can will to get angry at those who impose the evil.

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<sup>47</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 7.67): “Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi arbitrii, quod est *facultas voluntatis et rationis*.”

<sup>48</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.768:198-203): “Habet autem se passio ad voluntatem tripliciter: uno modo ut voluntatis obiectum, et sic passiones dicuntur esse meritoriae in quantum sunt volitae vel amatae; id enim quo per se meremur, secundum hoc non erit ipsa passio, sed passionis voluntas.”

<sup>49</sup> *ST*, q. 24, a. 3 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.181): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter se possunt habere ad iudicium rationis. Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt actus bonitatem, laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis aliquis faciat opus caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae. Alio modo se habent consequenter. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum redundantiae: quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem. Alio modo, per modum electionis: quando scilicet homo ex iudicio rationis eligit affici aliqua

Now let us think about the manner in which a passion is elicited by the reason. In *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 4, Aquinas says that the reason can govern the sensitive appetite by controlling its object. The sensitive appetite, being a passive appetitive power, can be moved only after the sensitive apprehension presents it with a thing either as suitable or unsuitable.<sup>50</sup> Here it is important to note that this sensible good is not a universal good (*bonum universale*) but a particular good (*bonum particulare*).<sup>51</sup> Particular goods, although they are not perfect goods, can be considered good in a certain aspect.<sup>52</sup> Now because the reason concerns itself with the universal aspect of a thing, it can “pick” a certain aspect and present it to the sensitive apprehension as a good, which in turn moves the sensitive appetite.<sup>53</sup>

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passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo. Et sic passio animae addit ad bonitatem actionis.”

<sup>50</sup> This sentence is derived from *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 4 ad 4 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.737:104-111): “Ad quartum dicendum quod appetitiva inferior non naturaliter tendit in rem aliam nisi postquam proponitur sibi sub ratione proprii obiecti, ut ex dictis patet. Unde cum in potestate rationis sit sub diversis rationibus unam et eandem rem proponere, utpote cibum aliquem ut delectabilem et ut mortiferum, potest in diversa ratio sensualitatem movere.”

<sup>51</sup> Aquinas uses the terms “universal good” and “particular good” in *ST*, I, q. 105, a. 4 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.474): “Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum: solus autem Deus est bonum universale.”

<sup>52</sup> *ST*, I, q. 65, a. 1 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.149): “Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporalis, secundum suam naturam, est bona: sed non est bonum universale, sed est quoddam bonum particulare et contractum, secundum quam particularitatem et contractionem sequitur in ea contrarietas, per quam unum contrariatur alteri, licet utrumque in se sit bonum.” See also, *ST*, I-II, q. 19, a. 10 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.151): “Contingit autem aliquid esse bonum secundum rationem particularem, quod non est bonum secundum rationem universalem, aut e converso, ut dictum est. Et ideo contingit quod aliqua voluntas est bona volens aliquid secundum rationem particularem consideratum, quod tamen Deus non vult secundum rationem universalem, et e converso.”

<sup>53</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.74): “Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus: utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.”

Now the reason does this with the intermediary of the imagination, as Aquinas says in *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 13. That is, the reason represents what it has apprehended, the universal, to the imagination in a particular manner. This way, i.e., by way of the imagination, the reason touches the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite in its turn stirs up the passions. Here it is important to remember the relationship between the imagination and the passions. Earlier we noted that the passions are moved by the imagination. For example, as a person apprehends the cruelty of a war and conjures all the atrocities of the war in his mind, he has in him a surge of courage to fight for peace.

### 2.2.2 Consequent Passions Which Result from the “Overflow.”

Let us now discuss the other kind of consequent passions, those passions that arise as a result of the “overflow” from the will. It is interesting that Aquinas uses a physical metaphor, “overflow” (*redundantia*), to explain the transference of the intensity of a higher power into a lower one. According to him, the diverse powers of the soul are like a multi-tier fountain. When the water fills up the upper tiers, it naturally trickles down to the lower tiers. An analogous phenomenon is found in the act of the appetite: when the higher appetite (the will) is intensely moved by the intellectual apprehension, the lower appetite (the sensitive appetite) is naturally moved along with the higher.<sup>54</sup> For this

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<sup>54</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 ad 13 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.758:442-759:456): “Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod ex aliquo apprehenso per intellectum potest sequi passio in appetitu inferiori dupliciter: uno modo in quantum id quod intelligitur universaliter per intellectum, formatur in imaginatione particulariter, et sic movetur inferior appetitus, sicut cum intellectus credentis accipit intelligibiliter futuras poenas et earum phantasmata format, imaginando ignem urentem et vermem rodentem et alia huiusmodi, ex quo sequitur

reason, Nister describe the will in this case as “infectious will.”<sup>55</sup> In fact, according to Aquinas, there cannot be an intense movement of the will without the accompanying movement of the lower appetite, which again reveals the organic nature of the powers of the soul.<sup>56</sup> The latter follows the former because the passions naturally follow the perfect act of the will.<sup>57</sup> Understandably, the passions that arise as a result of this overflow are “effects” (*effectus*) or “signs” (*indicia*) of the intensity of the will.<sup>58</sup>

We see according to Aquinas in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 30, a. 1 that those passions that have resulted from the overflow of the vehement will are something “in-between.” That is, they are not quite like the animal passions; they are semi-rational.<sup>59</sup> The question asked in this article is whether concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) is in the sensitive appetite only. First of all, concupiscence is defined by Aquinas as “craving for that which is pleasant.” Now pleasure can be found in two kinds of goods, intellectual goods and sensible goods. While the former are apprehended by the reason the latter are perceived by the sensitive apprehension. Were it not for the permeation of the reason in

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passio timoris in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo in quantum ex apprehensione intellectus movetur appetitus superior, ex quo, per quamdam redundantiam vel imperium, appetitus inferior commovetur.”

<sup>55</sup> Thomas Nisters, “Aquinas on Passions and Diminished Responsibility,” *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik* (1994), 252.

<sup>56</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 7.67): “Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores: non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitivo.”

<sup>57</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 7 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.774:175-80): “Ad secundum dicendum quod motus virtutis, qui consistit in perfecta voluntate, non potest esse sine passione, non quia voluntas ex passione dependeat, sed quia in voluntate perfecta in natura passibili ex necessitate passio sequitur.”

<sup>58</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 6 ad 16 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.771:385-91): “Ad sextum decimum dicendum quod passiones aliquae dicuntur esse a philosophis laudabiles in quantum sunt effectus et indicia bonae voluntatis; sicut patet de verecundia, quae indicat voluntatem hominis repugnare turpitudini peccati, et misericordia, quae est dilectionis signum.”

<sup>59</sup> Butera makes an interesting distinction between the two modifiers, “semi” and “quasi.” According to him, a “semi-virtuous” act has some of the characteristics of virtue, whereas a “quasi-virtuous” does not. Butera, “Thomas Aquinas on Reason’s Control of the Passions,” 355.

the sensitive appetite, spiritual goods would be apprehended only by the reason while sensible goods would be perceived only by the sensitive appetite. Aquinas says that this is true when the word “concupiscence” is taken in a strict sense. However, our experience tells us that we sometimes have a “craving” for higher things, e.g., desire for wisdom. Aquinas tells us that this kind of craving bears a precise similarity to our craving for a sensible good, e.g., a cup of coffee in the morning. According to him, this craving for higher things is possible due to the overflow (*redundantia*) of the vehement act of the will into the sensitive appetite. And, since the sensitive appetite is the principle of the bodily movement, in a situation like this, our body becomes more ready to assist the attainment of the spiritual goods.<sup>60</sup>

### 2.3 Reflection on the Antecedent And Consequent Passions

Let us now think about the difference between antecedent passions and consequent passions. Perhaps the most striking difference is that, while antecedent passions are impulsive, consequent passions take on a moderate nature. This difference results, because whereas antecedent passions arise before the permeation of rational

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<sup>60</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 30, a. 1 c and ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.209): “ Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I *Rhetoric.*, *concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis*. Est autem duplex delectatio, ut infra dicitur, una quae est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum. Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem est animae et corporis: quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen *concupiscentiae* sonat. Unde concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est in appetitu sensitivo; et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea denominatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam: vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit *redundantia* in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur: *Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum.*”

powers, consequent passions arise as a result of the judgment of reason, during which process they are moderated by the reason and will.

One reason antecedent passions are impulsive is attributable to the bodily condition which has been already set up, thus not subject to reason. Aquinas discusses the two fold relation of the bodily condition to the sensitive appetite in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7 ad 2.<sup>61</sup> [1] Let us first discuss the bodily condition which precedes the act of the sensitive appetite. One may call this “antecedent bodily condition.” Specifically, it can originate from two sources. [1-1] First, it can originate from the person’s natural bodily disposition. For example, a person can be naturally more prone to melancholy or anger. Since this is natural, it is not subject to reason. [1-2] Second, one can have a certain bodily condition due to the previous bodily condition. That is, a person may still physically suffer the aftermath of the physiological change from the previous breakout of a passion. For example, a person can still feel the heat after having been angry. This bodily condition is not completely subject to reason, either, since it takes time for the body to revert to the normal state once it has been worked up, as a pot that has been heated takes time to cool down. What is common to both these cases is that an already established bodily disposition makes the person prone to a certain passion.

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<sup>61</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.123): “Ad secundum dicendum quod qualitas corporalis dupliciter se habet ad actum appetitus sensitivi. Uno modo, ut praecedens: prout aliquis est aliquo modo dispositus secundum corpus, ad hanc vel illam passionem. Alio modo, ut consequens, sicut cum ex ira aliquis incalescit. Qualitas igitur praecedens non subiacet imperio rationis: quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti motione, quae non statim quiescere potest. Sed qualitas consequens sequitur imperium rationis, quia sequitur motum localem cordis, quod diversimode movetur secundum diversos actus sensitivi appetitus.”

[2] Secondly, a certain bodily condition can result from the act of the sensitive appetite. Let us call this “consequent bodily condition.” In fact, this is due to the fact that physiological change is a necessary accompaniment of the passions. Aquinas says that in this case the bodily disposition can follow the command of reason. Aquinas’s argument may be presented in the following way. [a] The “consequent bodily disposition” is derived from the movements of the heart. [b] The movements of the heart follow the movements of the sensitive appetite. [c] Lastly, the movements of the sensitive appetite follow the command of the reason to a certain extent.

One important thing needs to be pointed out here. The physiological change accompanying the passions is harmful considered in itself. However, the case of the consequent passions must be carefully distinguished from that of the antecedent passions in this regard. The bodily condition accompanying consequent passions is not only subject to the reason to a certain extent but can assist the reason by making the person promptly carry out his judgment of reason. We experience this dual aspect of the physiological change when we are excited about something. Imagine a contestant in a cooking competition which promises the winner a huge reward. He may be initially hindered by his excitement, with its symptoms of rapid heartbeat, increased adrenaline level, etc. Yet this bodily condition will also make him prompt with whatever action he needs to bring out the best of his cooking skill.

Now let us compare antecedent and consequent passions in regard to their subjectability to reason. It is true that antecedent passions are impulsive, which means that they can elude the controlling hand of the reason. Then are we simply helpless in

regard to our antecedent passions? Although Aquinas speaks a great deal about the irrationality or impetuosity of the antecedent passions as opposed to the rationality or compliance of the consequent passions, he is in fact fairly optimistic about what the reason can do about the antecedent passions. It is true that the reason cannot prevent the passions from arising.<sup>62</sup> However, Aquinas continues, the reason can still exert its influence on antecedent passions at least in two ways. First, it can foresee the arousal of the passions. For example, a person who needs to watch his sugar intake can know that he will surely have a strong desire for chocolate cake if he keeps watching a dessert show on the Food Network. Second, even after the passions have arisen, one can mitigate them by engaging himself in a rational consideration. Aquinas says that those who suffer from both “internal pain,” i.e., the passion of sadness (*tristitia interior*) and “external pain,” i.e., a physical injury (*dolor exterior*) can mitigate their sadness or pain by being engaged in an act of reason.<sup>63</sup> For this reason, one may not be responsible for the “springing-up” passions, but one is responsible for the “prolonged” passions, as Murphy aptly points out.<sup>64</sup> For this reason, according to Aquinas and contrary to popular belief, we are responsible for our passions most of the time because, although passions do not belong to the realm of reason per se, the reason can permeate them to a great extent. This is both good and bad news to us rational beings. Due to our reason we do not have to be driven

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<sup>62</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 10, a. 3 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.88): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi voluntas non possit facere quin motus concupiscentiae insurgat, de quo Apostolus dicit *Rom. VII, Quod odi malum, illud facio*, idest *concupisco*; tamen potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire.”

<sup>63</sup> Then he adds that this mitigation is possible because an intense act in a higher power overflows into the lower. *ST*, III, q. 46, a. 6 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 11.443): “Nam in aliis patientibus mitigatur tristitia interior, et etiam dolor exterior, ex aliqua consideratione rationis, per quandam derivationem seu redundantiam a superioribus viribus ad inferiores.”

<sup>64</sup> Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility,” 194.

so much by such powers of animal origin. However, this news also means that we are responsible for those acts that our reason can reach.

Now let us think about the significance of the consequent passions which consist in the permeation of the higher appetite in the lower appetite. The main difference between the two appetites is that, although both appetites can pursue the “goods outside the soul” (*res quae sunt extra animam singulares*), i.e., sensible goods (the will can also pursue immaterial goods such as knowledge of God), the will pursues these goods under the aspect of universality, but the lower appetite pursues them under the aspect of a certain particular good or evil.<sup>65</sup> Although everything that we are attracted to has an aspect of good,<sup>66</sup> we can pursue goods that bring us closer to happiness. These are the goods that we pursue with the welfare of our whole being in mind. This pursuit cannot be done without the involvement of the will because the will concerns itself with the universal aspect of a being. Aquinas says that those passions whose object is a good that is suitable for us will make us better and more perfect. In choosing the right object, the role of the will is crucial, since the will concerns itself with the overall well-being of the

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<sup>65</sup> *ST*, I, q. 80, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.284): “Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde Philosophus dicit in sua *Rhetorica*, quod odium potest esse de aliquo universali, puta cum *odio habemus omne latronum genus*. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia huiusmodi.” The same message is found in *ST*, I-II, q. 10, a. 3 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.88): “Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum.”

<sup>66</sup> *ST*, I, q. 59, a. 1 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.92): “Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum omnia procedant ex voluntate divina, omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode.”

whole person.<sup>67</sup> Gallagher expresses this important aspect of the will with the following words: “The universal aspect of the will’s object, especially the universal good [*bonum universale; bonum in commune*], also enables the will to be in the appetite of the whole person, what we might call a ‘personal appetite.’”<sup>68</sup> His words are also in line with Gondreau’s expression of the phenomenon of the rationalization of the passions: “What the sensitive appetite sets in motion reason and will finalize through a transformative synergistic process.”<sup>69</sup>

So far I have discussed the origin of the consequent passions and how they differ from the antecedent passions. The existence of these consequent passions affirms the fact that the human passions are not just passive but also active. In this part, I will investigate the source of this paradox

### *3 The Paradox of the Human Passions*

We have looked at how the human passions, although they originate in an animal power, can be brought closer to reason by their interaction with the reason and will. This interaction renders the human passions not just passive but also active. Recognizing this

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<sup>67</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.201): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amor significat coaptationem quendam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur: sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur.”

<sup>68</sup> David Gallagher, “The Will and Its Acts,” in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 72. He emphasizes the integrative role of the will again later on the same page: “All the goods that are objects of other powers (for example, truth, sensible pleasures, bodily motions) need to be integrated into the overall good of the person. The will carries out this integration by commanding the acts of the other powers.”

<sup>69</sup> Gondreau, “The Passions and the Moral Life,” 440.

dual dimension of passivity and activity in the passions is extremely important, since it implies that the passions can play a dynamic role in human life. I will investigate the source of this paradox in this part.

Paradox can be defined as a “statement or proposition that seems self-contradictory or absurd but in reality expresses a possible truth.”<sup>70</sup> Earlier, in Chapter two, I discussed the passive and active powers of the soul. One conclusion of that chapter was that the sensitive appetite is the most passive power of the soul. (See Chapter 2, p. 105.) Let us briefly recall the passivity of the sensitive appetite. First of all, the sensitive power is passive because it cannot control the presence of its object, i.e., a sensible good or evil. For example, a person on a weight-loss diet can stumble upon a sweet thing, even though he does not want to.<sup>71</sup> In this way a sensible good can put a person in a passive position.

Now the way in which the sensitive appetite is related to its object also has an aspect of passivity. In the appetitive movement, the appetite itself is drawn to its object (that which is desired), in contrast to the act of the apprehension, which assimilates its object (that which is known) within itself. Aquinas explains this contrast with the following words:

I answer that, as we have already stated (1) the word “passion” implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to

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<sup>70</sup> *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Fourth Edition.

<sup>71</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 3 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 5.291): “Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in potestate rationis.”

things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that “good and evil,” i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, “are in things themselves.” On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an “intention” of the thing, which “intention” it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that “the true and the false,” which pertain to knowledge, “are not in things, but in the mind.” Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.<sup>72</sup>

As seen above, the passions carry a passive characteristic in their initial movement. However, it should be noted that passivity does not necessarily dictate the rest of the movement of the passions. The major “turning point” for the passions comes as they participate in the life of reason, from which point they may be no longer passive. For this reason, Aquinas says that the passions “act” or “move” (*agere*) once they participate in reason.<sup>73</sup>

An interesting piece of evidence that rationalized passions are not just simply passive is that we sometimes even *choose* to be passive. This peculiar kind of passivity of the passions is discussed by Aquinas in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 6, a. 5 c and ad 2. The question proposed in this article is whether violence (*violencia*) causes involuntariness

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<sup>72</sup> The translation is from *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920. *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.169): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt: unde Philosophus dicit, in VI *Metaphys.*, quod *bonum et malum*, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, *sunt in ipsis rebus*. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod *verum et falsum*, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, *non sunt in rebus, sed in mente*. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.”

<sup>73</sup> *De ver.*, q. 25, a. 5 ad 4 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.739:131-34): “Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis sensualitatis secundum se consideratae non sit agere, est tamen eius prout participat aliquantulum rationem.”

(*involuntarium*). First, in the *corpus*, Aquinas tells us what the conventional meaning of “the involuntary” is. Then, in his reply to the second objection, he introduces a rather special kind of involuntary act which is in fact closer to a voluntary act.

Let us first look at his response. First of all, the violent is directly opposed both to the natural and to the voluntary as to the principle (*principium*) of action. Whereas a violent act takes place due to a cause external (*extrinsecum*) to the subject, both a natural act and a voluntary act take place for a reason internal (*intrinsecum*) to the subject.<sup>74</sup> However, in accordance with Aquinas in the previous article (I-II, q. 6, a. 4 ad 2), it should be noted that not every act caused by an external principle is violent; only those which are caused by external principle *and* are against the inclination of the subject are said to be moved violently.<sup>75</sup> For example, if my appetite is aroused by the aroma of the freshly baked good samples at a grocery store and I eat them, this does not qualify as a violent situation. However, if someone promoting the goods forces me to eat a piece of bread, violence was done to me. According to Aquinas, specifically, a natural act is due to the natural inclination of the subject while a voluntary act is due to the inclination of the will of the subject.<sup>76</sup> Now violence can be done both to the natural and the voluntary,

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<sup>74</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.60): “Respondeo dicendum quod violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam et naturali. Commune est enim voluntario et naturali quod utrumque sit a principio intrinseco: violentum autem est a principio extrinseco.”

<sup>75</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.60): “Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper est motus violentus, quando passivum immutatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra interiorem inclinationem passivi. Alioquin omnes alterationes et generationes simplicium corporum essent innaturales et violentae. Sunt autem naturales, propter naturalem aptitudinem interiorem materiae vel subiecti ad talem dispositionem. Et similiter quando voluntas movetur ab appetibili secundum propriam inclinationem, non est motus violentus, sed voluntarius.”

<sup>76</sup> This sentence is from *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 5 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.60): “Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut naturale dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita voluntarium dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem voluntatis.”

but it is referred to differently in each case. The violence done to the natural is called “unnatural” (*innaturale*) while the one done to the voluntary is called “involuntary” (*involutarium*).<sup>77</sup> Aquinas thus gives us the usual meaning of “the involuntary.”

Now in his reply to the second objection, Aquinas brings up an interesting case of “the voluntary” in which some thing appears involuntary but is actually voluntary. He makes this point by showing the fact that a (natural) thing can be called “natural” in two ways. [1] First, a thing can be called “natural” due to its active principle. For example, fire is called natural due to its active principle of burning things. [2] Second, a thing can be called “natural” due to its passive principle. Here Aquinas takes the example of heavenly bodies. The heavenly bodies are called “natural” in the sense that they “receive” the movement.

Now a similar distinction is found in the case of the voluntary. An act can be called “voluntary” under two aspects. Aquinas only offers one of the aspects. However, we can supply the other one based on his distinction regarding what is natural. [1'] First, an act can be called “voluntary” when the agent engages himself in an action. For example, when I talk to a friend, this would be a voluntary act on my part due to my active principle. [2'] However, there is another kind of voluntary act, which is rather peculiar. This act appears passive but is in fact voluntary. If, in the previous example above, I let my concerned friend talk to me so that she can relieve her anxiety, my act here would be still voluntary but it would be based on my passive principle, namely,

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<sup>77</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 5 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.60): “Et propter hoc, sicut in rebus quae cognitione carent, violentia aliquid facit contra naturam; ita in rebus cognoscentibus facit aliquid esse contra voluntatem. Quod autem est contra naturam, dicitur esse *innaturale*: et similiter quod est contra voluntatem, dicitur esse *involutarium*. Unde violentia involutarium causat.”

receptivity. What is interesting about this kind of voluntariness is that a person in this situation may appear passive. However, on a deeper level it is a completely different story: the (good) listener is active to the extent that he has chosen to be affected by the other person. For Aquinas this kind of act is voluntary rather than involuntary. Certainly there is an element of “violence” on the part of the listener in the sense that a quality was brought in from without, but this is far from being a simple case of violence. Aquinas’s explanation is very apt and interesting here. He says that the person in this situation is passive, since he does not initiate any “external” action, yet active, since he *does* something by willing to “undergo” (*pati*).<sup>78</sup> Then using a double-negative, he concludes that this kind of act cannot be called involuntary (*Unde non potest dici involuntarium*).<sup>79</sup>

This kind of passivity, namely, “voluntary passivity,” needs to be sharply distinguished from the simple passivity found in the initial movement of the passions. In fact, this kind of passivity shares many of the characteristics found in such states as receptivity, sensitivity, and even activity. What is astonishing about this kind of passivity is that one makes a conscious decision to be in a passive state in order to be touched more deeply by the external goods and the world at large. We experience this passivity when

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<sup>78</sup> As I said earlier in Chapter two (p. 56), the Latin *pati*, which is the infinitive form of the noun *passio* can be rendered into “suffer,” “undergo,” “experience,” “endure,” and “permit.”

<sup>79</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 6, a. 5 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.60): “Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut naturale dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita voluntarium dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Dicitur autem aliquid naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est a natura sicut a principio activo: sicut calefacere est naturale igni. Alio modo, secundum principium passivum, quia scilicet est in natura inclinatio ad recipiendum actionem a principio extrinseco: sicut motus caeli dicitur esse naturalis, propter aptitudinem naturalem caelestis corporis ad talem motum, licet movens sit voluntarium. Et similiter voluntarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo, secundum actionem, puta cum aliquis vult aliquid agere; alio modo, secundum passionem, scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Unde cum actio infertur ab aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non est simpliciter violentum: quia licet ille qui patitur non conferat agendo, confert tamen volendo pati. Unde non potest dici involuntarium.”

we are in love with someone or something: we deliberately let ourselves be vulnerable so that we may experience our passion more intensely. Wadell explains this paradox behind “willful” passivity beautifully. He shows how one can be more active and virtuous by rendering himself more passive to goods, the supreme of which is God.

The paradox in Aquinas’s understanding of the virtues is that through the activity of virtues born from charity, we grow not more independent or self-sufficient, but more reliant upon God. To grow in charity’s virtues is to grow in divine dependence, to allow ourselves increasingly to be acted upon by God. The paradox is this: the more active we are in charity’s love, the more active God can be toward us. The paradox is that the stronger we are in charity’s virtues, the more defenseless we grow before God. There is surely a twist to how Thomas understands the virtues, but it is a twist we can see only when we acknowledge the connection between the virtues and the love which forms them. The more charity grows in us, the harder God is to resist, because if we grow in such passionate love for God we cannot help but suffer God’s love more completely. To increase charity is to grow weaker in the ways we can resist God, stronger in the ways we can receive God.<sup>80</sup>

Aquinas also discusses the factors that can make the passions more intense. In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, a. 3 ad 2, he says that the intensity (*magnitudo*) of passion is determined by two factors, the agent and the patient. First, the more powerful the agent is, the more deeply the patient is moved. This explains why traumas, even those that happened in childhood, can scar a person for the rest of his life. The other factor is the

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<sup>80</sup> Wadell, *The Primacy of Love*, 90-91.

very condition of the recipient, i.e., his passibility (*passibilitas*). That is, the more vulnerable the patient is, the greater impression the agent will make on the patient.<sup>81</sup>

This receptive quality of the passions opens up yet another avenue to the issue of the passions: the personal voice expressed through the passions. Receptivity is about individuals: things are not received in the same way with the same degree of intensity by everyone. This explains why different individuals are passionate about different objects. Our experience confirms my point. A “trivial” thing which hardly has received any attention from one person can be taken by someone else seriously, personally and can become the ardent object of his passion.

Aquinas alludes to the view that such “receptivity” can be a defining characteristic of the human passions in *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5 ad 1.<sup>82</sup> Interestingly, the question discussed in this article is whether love is a passion that wounds the lover. Aquinas argues for the close liaison between receptivity and the passions through the particular passion of love. According to him, there are four effects of love: melting (*liquefactio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and fervor (*fervor*).<sup>83</sup> Among them “melting” is particularly interesting in that it implies the receptivity or vulnerability of the person in a state of love. Aquinas contrasts the

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<sup>81</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 3 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.171): “Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute agentis, sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis: quia quae sunt bene passibilia, multum patiuntur etiam a parvis activis. Licet ergo obiectum appetitus intellectivi sit magis activum quam obiectum appetitus sensitivi, tamen appetitus sensitivus est magis passivus.”

<sup>82</sup> I am indebted to Dr. Kevin White for this discussion. He first mentioned this topic in the fall of 2008. Harak also discusses the “liquefaction” (his translation of the Latin “liquefactio”) on pp. 84-85 of *Virtuous Passions*.

<sup>83</sup> The translation is from *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920.

receptive state of love to the imporous state of the cold heart. Love makes the lover be in a more suitable position to receive the beloved. Aquinas describes this state of love figuratively as “a softening of the heart,” (*mollificatio cordis*) which is contrasted to a “freezing or hardening of the heart” (*congelatio vel duritia cordis*) of repulsion to love.<sup>84</sup>

There is another aspect of the passions that reveals the activity of the passions: the causing of a prompt physical movement. Here the passions assist the reason by doing what they are naturally cut out for: making the bodily members most ready for the execution of the command of reason. In *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2, Aquinas explains in what manner the passions can be *both* passive and active. The passions are passive in the sense that they are “pulled out” to the thing as it is, as we have seen above. However, they are also “active” in the sense that they make the person more prompt in carrying out the judgment of his reason.<sup>85</sup>

This way the passions can greatly contribute to virtuous life, since a moral act is not complete without its smooth execution, for which fluid bodily operation is critical.

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<sup>84</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5 ad 1 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.201): “Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui possunt quatuor effectus proximi: scilicet *liquefactio*, fruitio, languor et fervor. Inter quae primum est liquefactio, quae opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quae sunt congelata, in seipsis constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret. Si ergo amatum fuerit praesens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive *fruitio*. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duae passionnes: scilicet tristitia de absentia, quae significatur per *languorem* (unde et Tullius, in III *de Tusculanis Quaest.*, maxime tristitiam *aegritudinem* nominat); et intensum desiderium de consecutione amati, quod significatur per *fervorem*. Et isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.”

<sup>85</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2 (Leon. ed., Vol. 6.170): “Ad secundum dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exteriorem pervenimus ad consequendas res.”

According to Aquinas, a virtuous deed requires not only choice (*electio*) but also “execution” (*executio*). While discernment (*discretio*) is required for choice, “alacrity” (*promptitudo*) is required for the execution of the choice.<sup>86</sup> Now execution refers to the actual carrying out of the decision made by the reason. The role of the sensitive appetite is crucial here. First of all, the sensitive appetite is the proximate cause of an action in the sense that it can cause the change in the body more directly and effectively.<sup>87</sup> This causation is fundamentally such because the apprehensive powers, whether they belong to the order of the sensitive or the intellectual, can move the body only indirectly. Even the sensitive apprehension can bring out the bodily change only with the intervention of the sensitive appetite. This way, the sensitive appetite can make a moral agent more prompt in carrying out his judgment of the reason by making the movement of his bodily members swifter. The significance of keen bodily reaction is felt strongly in its absence. We know from experience how sluggish it feels to be in a situation where we know what to do yet lack the appetite to do it. Then we are badly in need of a “kick” from our appetite to be prompt with what we want to do. This sluggishness is a typical characteristic of a life without the passions.

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<sup>86</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 7 ad 3 (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.774:181-85): “Ad tertium dicendum, quod in opere virtutis est necessaria et electio et executio; ad electionem autem requiritur discretio, ad executionem vero eius quod iam determinatum est, requiritur promptitudo.”

<sup>87</sup> *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 7 c (Leon. ed., Vol. 22-3.773:141-46): “Secundo per modum adiutorii, quia quando voluntas iudicio rationis aliquid eligit, promptius et facilius id agit, si cum hoc passio in inferiori parte excitetur, eo quod appetitiva inferior est propinqua ad corporis motum. . . .”

*Summary and reflection*

In this chapter I have further investigated the issue of the activity of the human passions. In order to understand the rich dynamics of the passions, one needs to be familiar with Aquinas's anthropology, which views a human being as a being that straddles the two worlds of the spiritual and the corporeal. Aquinas's distinct anthropology is reflected in his view of the powers of the soul. According to him, the powers of the soul do not merely co-exist but interact with each other. This interaction means that the passions can be rationalized by being made to conform to the rule of reason. This rationalization in turn can move the human passions in a quite different direction. Namely, they now can take on an active characteristic and assist the reason in carrying out its judgment. These rationalized passions present us with the paradox of the passions. That is, the human passions can possess the dual aspects of passivity and activity. Since we cannot completely prevent the passions from arising, we are inevitably passive in the initial movement of the passions. However, once the passions are permeated by the reason and will, we can become more active with their assistance. Without the presence of the rational powers in us, we would have the passions in a manner not so different from other animals.

## CONCLUSION

What motivated the writing of this dissertation was a puzzling characteristic of the passions: when we are in a state of passion we sometimes feel helpless but other times feel more empowered to do something. I wanted this dissertation to clarify this apparent contradiction of passivity and activity, and I have taken three steps to achieve this goal. First, I have provided the historical context for Aquinas's doctrine of the passions (Chapter one). Second, I have explained the passivity of the passions by focusing on their material, i.e., bodily, aspect (Chapters two and three). Third, I have placed the passions in their full context in the rational soul and showed how they become active through interaction with the higher powers, namely, reason and will (Chapters four and five).

First of all, the passivity of the passions can be attributed to the high degree of passivity of the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions. The sensitive appetite is considered passive primarily for two reasons. First, it is moved by the sensitive apprehension which is put into action by an external thing. Second, in its relation to its object, it is drawn to the thing itself rather than assimilating the object in itself, as is the case with the intellect's relation to its object.

The passivity of the passions can be also analyzed from the perspective of corporeality. Strictly speaking, the passions are found only in beings with a body. Accordingly, such immaterial beings as God and angels do not have the passions. Here Aquinas's hylomorphism yields a unique insight into the issue of passions. In accordance with Aristotle, Aquinas views a human being as a single substance of body and soul, in

which the two are related to one another as form and matter. It is very important here to understand that this union of the soul and body is an intimate one, a corollary of which is that they closely interact with each other. This way Aquinas's hylomorphism is carefully distinguished from such dualistic views as that of Plato, according to which, although a human being is a composite of soul and body, the two constituents have a rather extrinsic relationship.

Aquinas's application of hylomorphism is evident in his treatment of the passions. First of all, in his hylomorphic analysis passion itself is divided into its formal and material components. The former refers to the movement of the soul, and the latter to the bodily involvement in the movement of the passions. Here the body can render a person passive in two ways. First, one's particular physiological constitution can dispose him to react in a certain way to an external stimulus, as when we often attribute our irritability to a certain "pre-existing" physical condition we have. Second, a physiological alteration caused by the passions can render a person passive, as when we have the sensation of rising blood pressure and heat along with feeling anger. In sum, the corporeality of human beings is largely responsible for the passivity we experience in a state of passion.

However, passivity does not constitute the totality of the passions; they also have an active and rational dimension. To argue for the existence of this active aspect of the passions, Aquinas turns to Pseudo-Dionysius' principle, namely that "the highest point of a lower being confines with the lowest point of a higher being." Adopting this principle, Aquinas says that in both the sensitive apprehension and the sensitive appetite a higher part is found that confines with the higher powers of the soul.

When it comes to the sensitive apprehension, this higher part is the estimative power, which becomes the cogitative power in human beings. In accordance with the Dionysian principle, even the animal passions carry some kind of cognition, which judges an external thing to be either good or bad for its *whole* being. This cognitive element is even more heightened in the case of human beings due to the presence of the cogitative power, which works in close liaison with the (universal) reason on particular matters. For its intermediary role in applying the universal propositions to particular cases, the cogitative power is also called “particular reason.”

Next, the sensitive appetite is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible, and as the higher part of the two, the irascible confines with the reason. The object of the irascible reveals the relative complexity of the irascible passions. Whereas the object of the concupiscible is a simple good or evil, that of the irascible is the difficulty in attaining the good. That is, the irascible passions arise as one makes a further assessment on the particular circumstances of the attainment of the good.

Anger is particularly illustrative of the activity and complexity of the irascible passions. First of all, anger is triggered by a sense of injustice, which is a relatively high level of judgment. Also, anger carries a personal dimension, which is contrasted with the generic nature of some passions, e.g., hatred. The complexity of anger is also reflected in its dual object. Although anger apparently aims at an evil, i.e., harming another person, it pursues a good more fundamentally, i.e., the restoration of justice. All these considerations reveal that anger is a passion that is closely associated with reason. The fact that an angry person can be “talked out of” his anger supports my argument.

According to Aquinas, the presence of reason and its penetration into the inferior powers justifies the distinct status of the human passions as well as a demand for a special treatment of them as opposed to the animal-based crude passions. For him, “consequent passions,” i.e., those passions which arise as a result of the fully conscious activity of the reason and will are the passions that properly fit human life. In contrast to the “antecedent passions,” which arise spontaneously prior to the permeation of the rational faculties and thus can hinder one’s rational life, consequent passions, which result from the right judgment of reason, can contribute to one’s moral life by carrying out the command of reason with much needed promptness.

Once we recognize this dynamic nature of the passions, even the momentary “rebellion” of the passions may be viewed in a different light. Perhaps Aquinas is alluding to a paradoxical aspect of the passions when he compares the passions to “free citizens” (*liberi*) as opposed to the bodily members which he compares to “slaves” (*servi*).<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly, the sensitive powers ought to obey reason and will. However, the fact that the passions do not automatically obey reason may be interpreted as their refusal of “slavish” compliance to the authority of reason, a refusal, which, despite the initial commotion involved, may form the ground for personalized participation in the life of reason later.

In conclusion, it is extremely important to recognize the fact that the passions play more than an assisting role in moral life. It is true that our true happiness consists in the intellectual life, i.e., contemplation of the truth. However, as Aquinas says, we arrive at

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<sup>1</sup> *ST*, I, q. 81, a. 3 ad 2.

that stage of life through the appetite, which motivates us to lead such a noble life.<sup>2</sup> And more importantly, we usually come to desire a spiritual good after experiencing the goodness of a sensible good, which is pursued by the sensitive appetite. This is why we often express our spiritual pleasures in the terms similar to those we use for expressing the sensible pleasures, as when we say “finding out the truth is ‘sweet.’” Gondreau puts this fundamental role of the passions in moral life with the following words: “Our sensitive appetite, our animal-like inclination to lower goods, acts as a kind of germinating seed from which our desire to possess the first good sprouts out.”<sup>3</sup> Given that even our most intellectual quest starts with our basic sensitive desire, we have to try fully to incorporate the passions into our moral life rather than to render the sensitive appetite completely “idle” (*otiosus*).<sup>4</sup>

It goes without saying that human life is complex and thus needs to be treated with due depth and comprehensiveness. Accordingly, the passions, despite their deceptive familiarity to us, defy a simple treatment based on the dichotomy of the passive and the active. Only when the passions are considered in their dynamic relationship with

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<sup>2</sup> *ST*, II-II, q. 180, a. 7 ad 1: Ad secundum dicendum quod contentio vel certamen quod provenit ex contrarietate exterioris rei, impedit illius rei delectationem, non enim aliquis delectatur in re contra quam pugnat. Sed in re pro qua quis pugnat, cum eam homo adeptus fuerit, ceteris paribus, magis in ea delectatur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., quod *quanto fuit maius periculum in praelio, tanto maius est gaudium in triumpho*. Non est autem in contemplatione contentio et certamen ex contrarietate veritatis quam contemplamur, sed ex defectu nostri intellectus, et ex corruptibili corpore, quod nos ad inferiora retrahit, secundum illud Sap. IX, *corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem*. Et inde est quod quando homo pertingit ad contemplationem veritatis, ardentius eam amat, sed magis odit proprium defectum a gravitate corruptibilis corporis, ut dicat cum apostolo, *infelix ego homo. Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?* Unde et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., *cum Deus iam per desiderium et intellectum cognoscitur, omnem voluptatem carnis arefacit.*”

<sup>3</sup> Gondreau, “The Passions and the Moral Life,” 430.

<sup>4</sup> *ST*, I-II, q. 50, a. 5 c: “Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum.”

the reason, will one come to a full recognition of the passive and active dimensions of one's passions.

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