A Phenomenology of Having

URI / Handle

The term having easily triggers associations of possession, particularly that of material possession, which can in turn connote vulgarity. This sequence of ideas is so natural that it could have been the inspiration for Gabriel Marcel's Being and Having, and Erich Fromm's To Have or To Be, two books that reprimand the attitude of having in various aspects of life.In this dissertation, however, I attempt to reveal the philosophical significance of having by articulating a phenomenological understanding of it. Metaphysically speaking, I argue, having is no less important than being. Crucial to my argument are two distinctions: one between having and possession, and another between having and being.The two distinctions are developed in two steps, the first being my critical evaluation of the being-having dichotomy set up by Gabriel Marcel in his Being and Having. Marcel misidentifies having with possession, and his negative attitude toward having results from that misidentification. While I disapprove Marcel's being-having dichotomy, I accept the two eidetic moments of having he discovers in his study of having (the tension between within and without, and the distinction between the self and the other) and employ them in my study of Husserl. Turning to Edmund Husserl's Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, I show that the two eidetic moments of having are operative in Husserl's methods of phenomenological epoch&eacute and transcendental reduction, and for this reason the two methods are the transcendental ego's means to achieve its self-evidence, that is, its self-having. The transcendental ego's self-having is then shown to be constitutive of being, and it also serves as both the archē; and the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. I conclude that Husserl's phenomenology can rightly be called a phenomenology of having because its subject matter, methodology, and terminology all can be understood in terms of having.I close the present dissertation by pointing out how a larger research project that aims at elucidating the topic of having in the history of philosophy (for example, in Plato and Aristotle's epistemology and metaphysics) can be carried out, and how this project could benefit greatly from Husserl's phenomenology.
Details
Title

A Phenomenology of Having

Contributors

Sokolowski, Robert S (Advisor); Yu, Yang (Author); McCarthy, John C (Other); Zaborowski, Holger (Other)

Degree Information

Degree awarded: Ph.D. Philosophy. The Catholic University of America

Extent

266 p.

URI / Handle

http://hdl.handle.net/1961/10146

Advisor

Sokolowski, Robert S

Other

McCarthy, John C; Zaborowski, Holger

Subject

Philosophy; Being and Having; Cartesian Meditations; Husserl; Marcel; Performance of the Phenomenological Epoché; Phenomenological epoché and Transcendental Reduction

Accessioned

2012-02-15T20:54:54Z

Available

2012-02-15T20:54:54Z

Created

2012-01-01T00:00:00Z

Issued

2012-02-15T20:54:54Z

Abstract

The term having easily triggers associations of possession, particularly that of material possession, which can in turn connote vulgarity. This sequence of ideas is so natural that it could have been the inspiration for Gabriel Marcel's Being and Having, and Erich Fromm's To Have or To Be, two books that reprimand the attitude of having in various aspects of life.In this dissertation, however, I attempt to reveal the philosophical significance of having by articulating a phenomenological understanding of it. Metaphysically speaking, I argue, having is no less important than being. Crucial to my argument are two distinctions: one between having and possession, and another between having and being.The two distinctions are developed in two steps, the first being my critical evaluation of the being-having dichotomy set up by Gabriel Marcel in his Being and Having. Marcel misidentifies having with possession, and his negative attitude toward having results from that misidentification. While I disapprove Marcel's being-having dichotomy, I accept the two eidetic moments of having he discovers in his study of having (the tension between within and without, and the distinction between the self and the other) and employ them in my study of Husserl. Turning to Edmund Husserl's Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, I show that the two eidetic moments of having are operative in Husserl's methods of phenomenological epoch&eacute and transcendental reduction, and for this reason the two methods are the transcendental ego's means to achieve its self-evidence, that is, its self-having. The transcendental ego's self-having is then shown to be constitutive of being, and it also serves as both the archē; and the telos of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. I conclude that Husserl's phenomenology can rightly be called a phenomenology of having because its subject matter, methodology, and terminology all can be understood in terms of having.I close the present dissertation by pointing out how a larger research project that aims at elucidating the topic of having in the history of philosophy (for example, in Plato and Aristotle's epistemology and metaphysics) can be carried out, and how this project could benefit greatly from Husserl's phenomenology.

Type

Text; Dissertation

Local

Yu_cua_0043A_10272

Publisher

The Catholic University of America

Publish Date

2012-02-15T20:54:54Z

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